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c9f2af61f82da80103670b87ae5af7a3d927092313f89d0040e3d77b45d9ee35

Salience. Nuclear threats cause pro-nuclear factions to believe weapons are the only route to security.

Mount 23, Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists (Adam Mount, 2023, “The US and South Korea: The Trouble with Nuclear Assurance,” Routledge Publishing, Survival, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp. 123-140, University of Kansas Libraries, Taylor & Francis)

increasing salience of weapons in Asia may backfire ’, fuelling proliferation risks By reinforcing fiction the alliance is dependent on nuc s serves interests of factions invested in such weapons to raise salience only increase an ally’s anxieties goal should be to assure security does not depend on US nuclear use alliance that depends on nuclear assurance is weak

‘ increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia may could also backfire ’, fuelling nuclear- proliferation risks and weakening extended deterrence By reinforcing the fiction that the alliance is dependent on nuc lear weapon s it serves the interests of factions within both countries invested in such weapons , but prevents the alliance from prioritising its more effective , flexible and credible conventional forces efforts to raise the salience of nuclear weapons only increase such an ally’s anxieties . The goal should be the opposite : to assure the alliance is sufficiently capable that its security does not depend on US nuclear use An alliance that depends on nuclear assurance is a weak and fragile one

salience weapons Asia backfire proliferation weakening deterrence fiction alliance dependent factions invested weapons alliance effective conventional salience weapons increase anxieties opposite capable not depend nuclear use alliance nuclear assurance fragile

['In practice, nuclear assurance does more harm than good to extended deterrence. As Lauren Sukin and Toby Dalton have argued, ‘increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia may not only fail to address’ Seoul’s concerns, ‘but could also backfire’, fuelling nuclear-proliferation risks and weakening extended deterrence.12 By reinforcing the fiction that the alliance is dependent on nuclear weapons to protect South Korea, it serves the interests of factions within both countries invested in such weapons, but prevents the alliance from prioritising its more effective, flexible and credible conventional forces. Because the United States can never convince a sceptical ally that it will use nuclear weapons on its behalf, efforts to raise the salience of nuclear weapons only increase such an ally’s anxieties. The goal should be the opposite: to assure Seoul that the alliance is sufficiently capable that its security does not depend on US nuclear use.', 'In the rush to strengthen nuclear assurance, it is easy to forget that Healey was not arguing that it is a necessary tool to address an ally’s anxieties. He was making the opposite point: the European allies were worrying too much about the credibility of the American deterrent. In practice, the allies were more concerned about US political leadership than a deficit of nuclear assurance.13 No nuclear-assurance measure can assuage an ally that is fundamentally concerned about whether a US president will defend them. An alliance that depends on nuclear assurance is a weak and fragile one. A strong US–South Korea alliance requires a commitment to reduce its reliance on nuclear assurance and nuclear deterrence in general.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Aff-ADA-Octas.docx

Kansas

ReSo

3cb48f3a5175e31f78d1b8413fd525ef8d33587bad8abf1e88a5f254064a7924

Foreign policy “strength” is the determinant of a strong leader.

Friedman 23, PhD, Professor of Government @ Dartmouth (Jeffrey, “Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections: Why Voters Don’t Just Care About “The Economy, Stupid!,” https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/foreign-policy-and-presidential-elections-jeffrey-a-friedman-12-06-2023/)

relationship between fo po and presidential voting . When voters think about candidates will do best job of handling international affairs traits like strong leaders w stand up to adversaries and promote US interests voters three times as likely to vote for candidate based on strong leader strength and decisiveness as praise of fo po platforms candidates have incentives to show that they are tough enough to serve

this conventional wisdom underestimates the relationship between fo reign po licy and presidential voting . When voters think about which presidential candidates will do the best job of handling international affairs they make judgments about personal traits : particularly whether candidates seem like strong leaders w ho will stand up to America’s adversaries and vigorously promote US interests on the international stage that voters are more than three times as likely to vote for a presidential candidate based on beliefs about whether that person is a strong leader voters are twice as likely to cite strength and decisiveness as praise of candidates’ fo reign po licy platforms candidates have incentives to show that they are tough enough to serve as the country’s commander-in-chief

underestimates relationship fo po presidential voting voters think best job handling affairs personal traits strong leaders stand up adversaries vigorously promote interests international stage more than three times likely strong leader strength decisiveness fo po incentives tough enough

['Yet, as I show in my new book, The Commander-in-Chief Test, this conventional wisdom underestimates the relationship between foreign policy and presidential voting. When voters think about which presidential candidates will do the best job of handling international affairs, they do not simply consider the specifics of those candidates’ policy platforms. Instead, they make broader judgments about whether those candidates seem competent to handle foreign policy matters writ large. These assessments primarily revolve perceptions of presidential candidates’ personal traits: particularly whether candidates seem like strong leaders who will stand up to America’s adversaries and vigorously promote US interests on the international stage. ', 'For example, my research shows that voters are more than three times as likely to vote for a presidential candidate based on beliefs about whether that person is a strong leader as they are to vote based on the candidate’s foreign policy stances. And, when asked to say why they think that one presidential candidate would do a better job of handling foreign policy than others, voters are twice as likely to cite candidates’ personal attributes – such as strength and decisiveness – as they are to praise specific elements of those candidates’ foreign policy platforms. These findings show that the relationship between foreign policy and presidential voting revolves primarily around voters evaluating candidates’ personal traits, rather than parsing the merits of their policy positions. ', 'This focus on personal images over policy issues is consequential, because it means that presidential candidates have incentives to take unpopular foreign policy positions if that helps them show that they are tough enough to serve as the country’s commander-in-chief. The Commander-in-Chief Test shows how these dynamics produce the very suite of policies – rising defense budgets, open-ended wars of choice, and unilateral diplomacy – that seem to be at odds with public opinion. For example, it shows how John F. Kennedy oriented his 1960 presidential campaign around building new military capabilities, even though less than one-quarter of Americans actually thought military expenditures were too low. In 1964, Lyndon Johnson asked Congress to provide open-ended authorization for the use of force in Vietnam as a way to rebut charges that he was soft on communism, even though voters did not support escalating the war. In 1996, Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign manager advised him to “bomb Serbia to look strong,” even though a minority of voters supported military intervention in the Balkans. In 2004, George W. Bush turned substantive criticisms of the Iraq War into a narrative that he was willing to “stick to his guns” in the face of political pressure, thereby translating public opposition to his policies into an indication of leadership strength. In 2016, Donald Trump publicly criticized allies to show that he was a hard-nosed bargainer who would prevent other countries from taking advantage of the United States, even though most voters disliked Trump’s abrasive posturing in its own right. ']

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ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-9---NDT-Doubles.docx

Kansas

MaPa

d0c3a644e4df295a5e982585771e96ed3b386d22c3a0b7570ab5ff1178a6be6d

AND the nearest person doesn’t exist.

Susanne Beck 18. Professor & L.L.M. (LSE), Leibniz Universität Hannover. “Robotics and Criminal Law. Negligence, Diffusion of Liability and Electronic Personhood.” .

it is postulated that there be a “human in the loop” One has to realise in many situations this lead to excessive demand responsibility of the human mental influence suggestions by the machines is high decision by the human determined in a way lead to doubts about responsibility even when there is a human one cannot speak of a human decision anymore

it often is postulated that there always be a “human in the loop” of the decision making process the decision would still be based on human morals, empathy, and potential liability of the human involved One has to realise , though, that in many situations , this might lead to excessive demand and responsibility of the human in question contexts, the mental influence of the suggestions by the machines is high as well decision by the human in the loop is determined in a way that might lead to doubts about his responsibility , one should be aware that even when there is a human in the loop one cannot speak of a human decision anymore

this might lead to excessive demand and responsibility of the human in question decision by the human in the loop is determined in a way that might lead to doubts about his responsibility one cannot speak of a human decision anymore

['Because of this, it often is postulated that there always, or at least in some contexts, should be a “human in the loop” of the decision making process. Thus, the decision would still be based on human morals, empathy, and potential liability of the human involved. One has to realise, though, that in many situations, this might lead to excessive demand and responsibility of the human in question. The driver of an autonomous vehicle, for example, does need at least 6 seconds to overtake – too long for most traffic situations. In other contexts, the mental influence of the suggestions by the machines is high as well, thus the decision by the human in the loop is determined in a way that might lead to doubts about his responsibility. At least, one should be aware that even when there is a human in the loop one cannot speak of a human decision anymore, but a decision made by human and machine collaboratively. ']

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ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Aff-Texas-Round-6.docx

Emory

GiKe

9a724ffea9d0385a5100ff4ecd60feadcc075fe4eaa5d29bcf3c35f506a70c86

John Yoo is a lying, soulless, war criminal that you should disregard.

Nancy Mancias 10, CODEPINK Activist and Organizer, Coordinator for the Organization's War Criminals and Ground the Drones Campaigns, Member of the Marin Green Party County Council, “War Criminal of the Week: Back to School with John Yoo”, CodePink, 8/17/2010, https://www.codepink.org/war_criminal_of_the_week_back_to_school_with_john_yoo

Yoo was Bush's Legal Lackey helping create torture under investigation by O P R critical of his work Yoo stirred outrage because inaccuracy and self-serving ideology

Yoo was Bush's Top Legal Lackey helping to create the construct for torture he unruly bunch conducting the torture were working above the law lawyers such as Yoo rewrite the rules of engagement Yoo has been under investigation by the O P R who has been critical of his work Yoo stirred outrage because inaccuracy and self-serving commitment to ideology over law

Legal Lackey torture under investigation O P R critical inaccuracy self-serving ideology law

["John Yoo was Bush's Top Legal Lackey in helping to create the construct for torture. As Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel, John Yoo signed off on the legal opinions purporting the use of torture was legal as a part of the president's vast wartime powers. These legal opinions are most commonly referred to as the Torture Memo and have been a source of controversy and redesign of executive power.", 'In 2004, images of naked and hooded innocent Iraqis who had been raped and tortured by U.S. soldiers and private military contractors at Abu Ghraib prison were released for the world to see. The unruly bunch conducting the torture were working above the law and eventually were held accountable in court but for those senior Bush officials who were making the decisions, pulling the strings and asking their lawyers such as John Yoo to experiment and rewrite the rules of engagement in a post-9/11 world no justice and accountability has been served.', "Yoo has been under investigation by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility who has been critical of his work.", "It's been six years since the Abu Ghraib scandal and John Yoo now enjoys a cushy position at one of the most respected law schools in the country - UC Berkeley. Not bad for a man whose legal reasoning stirred an international outrage because of its inaccuracy and self-serving commitment to ideology over law."]

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ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGa-Neg-NDT-Round-8.docx

Kentucky

DiGa

62d785ec28c689306ec0eaefcfb94bc0973da4ec2c1baf1758bbbc39d3e05216

Pitt-stuffing solves long term colonial impacts of nukes – the method of demolishing we follow keeps the land safe

Matthew Bunn. 98. James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy; Co-Principal Investigator at the Project on Managing the Atom; Member of the Board, Belfer Center. “'Pit-Stuffing': How to Disable Thousands of Warheads and Easily Verify Their Dismantlement”. Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center. 2-28-98. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/pit-stuffing-how-disable-thousands-warheads-and-easily-verify-their-dismantlement

Tech exists to disable thousands of warheads, rapidly, permanently, and verifiably If steel wire fed through tube until inside of pit is "stuffed" pit can no longer be compressed to sustain nuclear chain reaction weapon physically incapable of going off. wire cannot be pulled back out fact can be easily confirmed

Tech nology exists which makes it possible to disable thousands of nuclear warheads, rapidly, permanently, and verifiably and to verify their dismantlement with a minimum of cost and intrusion. pit-stuffing was originally developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory Every modern "boosted" nuclear weapon has at its core a "pit" a hollow sphere of plutonium or uranium with a tiny tube through it that allows the tritium to be fed into the hollow inside If a steel wire is fed in through this small tube until the inside of the pit is "stuffed" the pit can no longer be compressed enough by the explosives surrounding it to sustain a nuclear chain reaction the weapon is physically incapable of going off. this " safing " technology applied to permanently disable nuclear weapons the wire cannot be pulled back out Pit-stuffing would be possible to disable thousands of nuclear weapons in just a few weeks. Once the pit has been stuffed this fact can be easily confirmed by a variety of means

rapidly, permanently, and verifiably with a minimum of cost and intrusion. the weapon is physically incapable of going off. cannot be pulled back out thousands of nuclear weapons in just a few weeks. easily confirmed

['Technology exists which makes it possible to disable thousands of nuclear warheads, rapidly, permanently, and verifiably -- and to verify their dismantlement with a minimum of cost and intrusion.', 'This technology, which might be called "pit-stuffing," was originally developed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory to ensure that warheads that had been determined to be unsafe would not go off accidentally -- but it has never been applied to arms control. How does it work? Every modern "boosted" nuclear weapon has at its core a "pit" -- a hollow sphere of plutonium or highly-enriched uranium, with a tiny tube through it that allows the tritium to be fed into the hollow inside the sphere. If a steel wire is fed in through this small tube until the inside of the pit is "stuffed" with tangled wire, the pit can no longer be compressed enough by the explosives surrounding it to sustain a nuclear chain reaction -- the weapon is physically incapable of going off.', 'I believe this "safing" technology should be applied to permanently disable nuclear weapons. If the end of the wire is pushed inside the sphere, it cannot be pulled back out -- the weapon is permanently disabled. The only way to get the weapon to work again is to dismantle it, remove the pit, cut the pit open and take the wire out, remanufacture the pit, and reassemble the weapon -- a long and costly process. (While it might be possible to develop a means to pull the wire back out through the tube, it should also be possible to fray the end of the wire before pushing it in, making it impossible to pull it back out. Additional "red team" studies should be done to confirm this.)', 'In the past, the rate at which the costly and time-consuming process of dismantling nuclear weapons could be accomplished posed a physical limit on how rapidly nuclear arms could be reduced. Pit-stuffing overcomes that problem; in principle, it would be possible to disable thousands of nuclear weapons in just a few weeks. The physical act of stuffing the pit takes only one or two minutes for one person, using a small device developed for the "safing" mission at Los Alamos -- though disabling "live" warheads would take somewhat longer, because of the necessary safety procedures involved in doing anything at all to a nuclear weapon.', 'Once the pit has been stuffed with wire, this fact can be easily confirmed by a variety of means, such as a gamma-ray image of only, for example, one square inch of the pit. It should be possible to devise simple means to confirm the presence of the wire without revealing substantial design information.', '']

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ndtceda

Emory-FeWa-Aff-Mukai-Debate-Tournament-Round-1.docx

Emory

FeWa

523e099dd6d539ff15eb1655c861ea963d2dc1daefd30bab4056f43154f02c4f

Emory’s solvency advocate says states can solve, legislate around pre-emption, and cause federal follow-on. (even if they didn’t get to it—doesn’t matter—says the aff is BEST under states)

Kim 20—(JD from yale). Eugene K. Kim. 2020 “Labor’s Antitrust Problem: A Case for Worker Welfare”. The Yale Law Journal. . Accessed 10/8/21.

states should enact statutes for contractors to bargain collectively and obtain periodic review of agreements thus conferring antitrust immunity due to state-action immunity state legislators, unlike municipal governments , are well positioned to craft statutes that avoid antitrust preemption under Parker not preempted by the NLRA . state s are willing to be leaders in antitrust when the fed does not go far enough. states have shaped the national dialogue This is true within labor law suggesting moves at the state level impact the federal level

This Section proposes that states should enact statutes creating procedures for independent contractors both to bargain collectively and obtain periodic review of resulting agreements thus conferring antitrust immunity due to state-action immunity from application of the antitrust laws. several states, most recently California , have enacted statutes expanding the state definition of “employee” with the purpose of extending various minimum-wage protections and labor benefits such as unemployment insurance. This Note proposes that states consider adopting statutes similar to Seattle Ordinance 1249 allowing for-hire vehicle drivers to bargain collectively with their “ driver coordinators ” or hirers . Shortly after it was enacted, the Seattle ordinance was challenged on federal preemption grounds , both under federal antitrust and labor law . state legislators, unlike municipal governments , are well positioned to craft statutes that avoid antitrust preemption under Parker and a proposal like Seattle’s is not preempted by the NLRA . states have often pursued aggressive antitrust agendas when federal enforcement has been lacking , precisely because federal enforcement has been lacking, and have developed independent agendas state authoritie s are willing to be leaders in antitrust enforcement when the fed eral government does not go far enough. By paying extra attention to no poach agreements or particular mergers, states have shaped the national dialogue . This is true within labor law as well : the House passed the Protecting the Right to Organize Act which would nationalize provisions in California’s AB5 legislation, suggesting moves at the state level impact legislative discussions at the federal level

bargain collectively periodic review of resulting agreements antitrust immunity state-action immunity most recently California expanding the state definition of “employee” driver coordinators hirers challenged on federal preemption grounds antitrust and labor law unlike municipal governments well positioned avoid antitrust preemption NLRA federal enforcement has been lacking state s leaders in antitrust enforcement fed extra attention shaped the national dialogue within labor law as well Protecting the Right to Organize Act moves at the state level legislative discussions at the federal level

['', 'C. State Legislation ', '1. The Proposal', 'While agency guidance has the appeal of procedural simplicity, it does not address private antitrust actions against workers’ organizations. This Section proposes that states should enact statutes creating procedures for independent contractors both to bargain collectively with their employers and to obtain periodic review of resulting agreements by the state, thus conferring antitrust immunity due to state-action immunity from application of the antitrust laws. Under the Parker state action doctrine, restraints of trade arising from state regulation are not subject to antitrust liability.165 While the political feasibility of this approach will be a state-by-state question, several states have already shown a willingness to extend protections to a greater number of workers.', 'As discussed above, several states, most recently California, have enacted statutes expanding the state definition of “employee” with the purpose of extending various minimum-wage protections and labor benefits such as unemployment insurance.166 While these statutes promise to expand the rights of large numbers of workers, their definition of “employee” applies only to specific parts of state labor laws167 and does not shield these workers from federal antitrust suits. Even in the absence of federal antitrust enforcement, the lack of explicit language preserving a right to bargain creates uncertainty and limits any leverage workers may have due to the threat of private antitrust litigation.168 Because the principle underlying this Note’s proposal is similar to the principle that justifies recent changes to state definitions of “employee”—namely, a concern for the welfare of workers who are currently considered independent contractors in spite of their limited control over their work—there is no reason that the same democratic will that led to those definitional changes could not also be used to protect the right of those workers to organize.', 'This Note proposes that states consider adopting statutes similar to Seattle Ordinance 124968, which provides procedures allowing for-hire vehicle drivers to bargain collectively with their “driver coordinators” or hirers.169 Under Seattle’s ordinance, the bargaining is to occur through exclusive driver representatives (EDRs) that are elected and approved by Seattle’s Director of Financial and Administrative Services.170 The ordinance requires that the driver coordinator and the EDR “meet and negotiate in good faith certain subjects to be specified in rules or regulations promulgated by the Director,” including: “best practices regarding vehicle equipment standards; safe driving practices; the manner in which the driver coordinator will conduct criminal background checks of all prospective drivers; minimum hours of work, conditions of work, and applicable rules.”171 The ordinance originally included payments to drivers as a topic of bargaining, but this was removed as part of a litigation settlement, discussed below.172 Any agreement to emerge from the bargaining process would then be reviewed by the Director and approved if it complies with Seattle law and “promotes the provision of safe, reliable, and economical for-hire transportation services and otherwise advance[s] the public policy goals set forth in Chapter 6.310 and in the Preamble to and Section 1 of [this] [o]rdinance.”173 If negotiations break down, either party has the right to demand that the negotiations be submitted to arbitration.174', 'Shortly after it was enacted, the Seattle ordinance was challenged on federal preemption grounds, both under federal antitrust and labor law.175 While the Ninth Circuit held that the Seattle ordinance was preempted by federal antitrust law, leading Seattle to compromise on the text of its ordinance and remove payments to drivers as a topic of bargaining,176 this Section discusses how state legislators, unlike municipal governments, are well positioned to craft statutes that avoid antitrust preemption under Parker177 and analyzes case law to demonstrate that a proposal like Seattle’s is not preempted by the NLRA.178', '2. Normative Justification', 'A state legislative approach would promote worker welfare in a way similar to the federal guidance proposal: with greater liberty to organize, workers can obtain higher wages and better working conditions.179 By permitting workers to seek a fair wage for their services and granting bargaining power to those in our society with the least economic and political leverage, the proposal would bring to fruition the original purposes of the antitrust labor exemption while also maximizing total social welfare.180', 'Although a state approach lacks the uniformity of a federal agency approach, it has two advantages. First, it shields workers’ organizations from both private and government lawsuits. Second, a state legislative proposal benefits from the force of law and democratic imprimatur afforded to state statutes that agency guidance lacks. Citizens of states like California have already demonstrated their interest in protecting gig-economy workers, and that democratic interest is a justification in and of itself.', 'A state legislative approach is likely to be implemented piecemeal: in some states, there may not be the political will for a pro-labor policy, and in others, the gig economy may not be politically or economically salient. But, perhaps unsurprisingly, the states with the most interest in regulating the gig economy are the ones where it is most strongly present: for example, California and New York either have181 or are considering182 expanded protections for gig workers, and Uber’s three busiest cities, in terms of bookings, are in those states (the fourth and fish busiest are abroad).183 For-hire drivers are geographically concentrated,184 meaning that individual states will have disproportionate power to regulate that sector of the economy.', '3. Implementation: Parker Immunity', 'The key value of state legislation in this context is the complete exemption of state regulation from private and public enforcement actions under the federal antitrust laws. The doctrine of state-action immunity was articulated in the landmark case Parker v. Brown, which concerned a California statute that facilitated coordination among California farmers.185 The statute “authorizes the establishment, through action of state officials, of programs for the marketing of agricultural commodities produced in the state, so as to restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in the distribution of their commodities to packers.”186 The program at issue was an agreement among raisin producers to restrict the quantity of raisins produced, in part by disposing of “inferior” and “substandard” raisins and collecting excess raisins in a “stabilization pool.”187 A group of raisin producers sued to enjoin enforcement of the program, alleging among other claims that the program was illegal under the Sherman Act.188 But the Supreme Court upheld the program and the statute from which it arose, holding that the Sherman Act prohibited “individual and not state action.”189 California was free to “[create] the machinery for establishing the prorate program.”190 The Court emphasized that California could not simply authorize cartels by applying its imprimatur to private collusion, but rather had to take an active role in adopting and enforcing any programs among the raisin producers.191', 'For a state restraint of competition to trigger Parker immunity, two prongs must be met: (1) the “restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy;’” and (2) “the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.”192 The case most frequently cited for this two-pronged articulation of Parker is California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, which concerned a statute establishing a state-sponsored resale-price maintenance scheme for wine.193 The Court held that the statute met the first prong, because “[t]he legislative policy [was] forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance.”194 But the statute failed the second prong, largely because the Court believed California was merely acting as a rubber stamp for private collusive behavior:', 'The program, however, does not meet the second requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any “pointed reexamination” of the program. The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.195', 'Later cases add further clarity to what does and does not constitute “active supervision.” In Patrick v. Burget, the Supreme Court struck down a hospital’s peerreview standards for doctors on antitrust grounds, implying that such standards constituted an attempt by doctors to exclude competitors, even though hospitals were required to have such standards by Oregon’s Health Division.196 The role of the Health Division was to make sure that peer-review procedures were in place, not to review them substantively, and the Court held that this arrangement did not constitute active supervision.197 Later, in FTC v. Ticor, the Supreme Court held that it was insufficient for a state to imply its approval of a privateparty agreement by failing to raise objections.198', 'Most recently, in North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, the Supreme Court held that a state-organized board of dentists could not escape antitrust scrutiny for regulating the dental profession, because “active market participants” are unable to provide active state supervision as required under Midcal. 199 The Court held that the State must accept “political accountability” for its actions200 and named a few “constant requirements of active supervision:”', 'The supervisor must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it [citing Patrick]; the supervisor must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy [same]; and the “mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State.” Further, the state supervisor may not itself be an active market participant.201', 'Seattle’s ordinance was challenged on Parker grounds, and the Ninth Circuit held that the Ordinance met neither Midcal prong.202 But Seattle faced a', 'major legal obstacle because it was acting as a municipality rather than as a state. ', 'Because there is no antitrust-immunity exception for municipalities,203 Seattle had to prove that the State of Washington intended to create an antitrust exemption for gig-economy drivers, in part by referencing state statutes that permit municipalities to regulate the industry.204 But the Ninth Circuit held that this was insufficient to constitute a clearly articulated antitrust exemption, in part because the ordinance was not a “foreseeable” result of the state statutes.205 Similarly, although the Ordinance contained procedures for local-government review of collective bargaining agreements made between gig-economy workers and their coordinators, the Ninth Circuit held that there needed to be active supervision by the State of Washington, which the court deemed absent.206', 'States can implement statutes that are similar in form to Seattle Ordinance 124968, with adjustments to ensure that the statutes fall under Parker antitrust immunity. States, not municipalities, are the intended beneficiaries of Parker immunity, and as such, there would be fewer legal obstacles for state legislation. State legislatures can shape statutes to match the Parker prongs, unlike municipalities, which must rely on the enactments of a separate legislative body. Moreover, states can restore payments to drivers as an appropriate topic of bargaining, a provision Seattle was forced to drop as a result of preemption concerns.207 But even though the Seattle ordinance was struck down largely because of the attenuated connection to state action, the same rule, if passed by a state, would not necessarily qualify.', 'States considering a statute similar to the Seattle ordinance would need to make sure that their intent is clearly articulated, and that there is active state supervision and regulation of collective-bargaining activity, rather than rubberstamp approval. On the first prong, the “[l]egislative policy [should be] forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit” anticompetitive conduct.208 In the 2013 case FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., the Supreme Court held that it was insufficient for a state to grant regulators a “general power to act;”209 rather, “the State must have foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive effects as consistent with its policy goals.”210 States can look for guidance to statutes that were upheld by the Supreme Court, such as the North Carolina rate setting statute that was considered in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States and was deemed to pass the “clearly articulated” policy prong.211 The statute begins with a statement of legislative policy and an intent to fix rates:', 'For the purpose of achieving a stable rate structure it shall be the policy of this State to fix uniform rates . . . by carriers of the same class. In order to realize and effectuate this policy and regulatory goal any carrier . . . may . . . apply to the Commission for approval of the agreement, and the Commission shall by order approve any such agreement . . . if it finds that, by reason of furtherance of the transportation policy and goal declared in this section and in G.S. 62-2 or G.S. 62-259 . . . the relief provided in subsection (h) shall apply [antitrust immunity].212', 'Legislatures will need to consider what their purposes are in enacting something similar to Seattle’s ordinance, and in particular whether to expand the scope of Seattle’s ordinance to cover categories of workers other than Uber and Ly� drivers. The latter question poses issues of federal labor-law preemption (which are discussed in the next Section),213 but a sample statement of purpose might include the following language:', 'For the purpose of promoting the provision of safe, reliable, and economical for-hire transportation services and ensuring that for-hire drivers work under fair and reasonable terms, it shall be the policy of this State to permit for-hire drivers to bargain collectively with their hirers and to agree collectively upon terms of employment including but not limited to vehicle equipment standards, safe driving practices, compensation, minimum hours of work, conditions of work, and applicable rules.', 'On the second Midcal prong, states are unlikely to receive Parker immunity unless they adopt a procedure similar to Seattle’s, whereby state officials review each proposed collective-bargaining agreement for compliance with the purposes of the statute. States have a greater chance of receiving immunity if they take “political accountability” for approved agreements.214 One way to do this could be to articulate standards of review and supervision—for example, by specifying that worker compensation must be reasonable and equitable, or that there must be reasonable procedures governing expulsion or termination. Further, state officials supervising these agreements are less likely to be preempted by federal law if they are not drivers themselves and if they reserve the right to veto collective bargaining agreements.215 States can address the concerns raised in Midcal216 by engaging in periodic review of “market conditions”217 and offering proposed benchmark compensation levels, and could also establish procedures for gathering additional facts and evidence on specific collective-bargaining negotiations, like the procedures outlined in the Seattle ordinance.218', '4. Feasibility: Garmon and Machinists Preemption', 'One obstacle to state-enacted labor regulations is that the NLRA has been construed broadly to preempt state labor laws. In San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, the Supreme Court held that states may not regulate conduct that falls under the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, a doctrine that is often referred to as “Garmon preemption.”219 The Court in Garmon held:', 'When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act [protecting the right to organize and collectively bargain], or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.220', 'Since the NLRB has jurisdiction to protect collective-bargaining rights of employees,221 state statutes that broaden collective-bargaining rights for a broad category of workers may be preempted under Garmon if they regulate employees and impinge on the NLRB’s jurisdiction. The scope of federal labor-law preemption was expanded in Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, which held that “a particular activity might be ‘protected’ by federal law not only when it fell within section 7, but also when it was an activity that Congress intended to be ‘unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate.’”222 This doctrine, often referred to as “Machinists preemption,” in effect suggests that the absence of congressional regulation could itself be intentional and preemptive of state regulation.223 Since the NLRA grants the NLRB jurisdiction over employees224 but defines “employee” to exclude independent contractors,225 a state statute that broadens collective-bargaining rights for workers currently classified as independent contractors may be preempted if Congress intended to leave those workers unregulated by excluding them.', 'Although this Note’s state-legislation proposal may raise labor-preemption concerns, this Section provides three reasons to believe that those concerns are surmountable. First, the NLRB has declined jurisdiction over for-hire drivers, the focus of this Note’s proposal, and states seeking broad legislation can dra� statutory text likely to evade preemption under Garmon. Second, a close reading of the case law regarding Machinists preemption suggests that it would not apply to the case of independent contractors. Finally, even though the Supreme Court has construed labor preemption very broadly, often to the exclusion of workerfriendly state legislation, expanding preemption to cover this Note’s proposal would destabilize precedent and jeopardize both worker-friendly and employerfriendly state legislation.226', 'States that narrowly legislate to enable collective bargaining by gig-economy drivers are unlikely to face preemption under Garmon given that the NLRB has recently declined jurisdiction over Uber drivers.227 In an April 2019 advice memo, counsel at the NLRB opined that Uber drivers are independent contractors under the common-law employment test and therefore beyond the NLRB’s jurisdiction over employees.228 Given that the NLRB itself has declined jurisdiction over Uber drivers, plaintiffs will have difficulty arguing that state legislation in that area infringes on federal authority under Garmon. The NLRB’s memo is consistent with existing case law on the topic,229 which suggests the Board’s determination may persist through new administrations. But even if the NLRB were to reverse course and declare that Uber drivers were employees, preempting state legislation under Garmon, that would be a pyrrhic victory for challengers of state legislation: Uber drivers, once allowed to organize under State supervision, would still be allowed to organize, just under the supervision of the NLRB.', 'There is a significant risk of preemption under Garmon if states adopt a version of the Seattle ordinance that applies to any worker that qualifies as an employee under the ABC test, because some of these workers are probably considered employees under the common-law test currently employed by the NLRB and therefore are under the jurisdiction of the NLRB. But the risk of preemption decreases for enactments that cover specific categories of workers, like Uber and Ly� drivers, who are deemed to be independent contractors under the common law and are unlikely to fall under the NLRB’s jurisdiction.230 States may also consider adopting Seattle’s disclaimer that the enactment does not make any determinations about the legal status of any worker, avoiding arguments that the determination of worker status is itself under the jurisdiction of the NLRB.231', 'The question of preemption under Machinists is more difficult given the dearth of case law on state regulation of independent contractors, but existing case law strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to preclude state regulation in that area. In the challenge to the Seattle ordinance, the Ninth Circuit held that the ordinance is not preempted by Machinists a�er reviewing the legislative history of the NLRA and concluding that there was no congressional intent to prevent independent contractors from organizing and to leave them to the forces of the free market. The Ninth Circuit looked to the legislative history surrounding the Ta�-Hartley Act, which modified the NLRA’s definition of “employee” to exclude independent contractors232 and was passed in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hearst Publications, which in turn approved of the NLRB’s attempt to broaden the definition of “employee.”233 The Ninth Circuit held that even if Congress wanted to “return to the status quo” agency definition of employee for the purpose of the NLRA, there was no evidence of intent to “preempt state or local regulation of independent contractors.”234', 'Other courts have similarly held that Congress did not intend to preempt state regulation of othercategories of workers that are excluded from the NLRA’s protection. In Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n, Justice Scalia wrote that the NLRA “leaves States free to regulate their labor relationships with their public employees,” citing the section of the NLRA that excludes government employers from the set of employers covered by the Act.235 Similarly, in Greene v. Dayton, the Eighth Circuit held that states are free to facilitate collective bargaining of domestic service workers who, like independent contractors, are excluded from the NLRA’s definition of employee.236 Referencing cases from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits holding that states are free to regulate agricultural workers (another excluded category), the court noted that “[t]he two groups of employees are treated identically in the text of the statute.”237 Independent contractors are excluded from the NLRA’s definition of employee in the same way as agricultural workers and domestic workers, and under the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning, state regulation of independent contractors is unlikely to be preempted under Machinists. 238', 'Finally, although the Supreme Court has construed labor-law preemption broadly, o�en to the exclusion of worker-friendly state laws,239 there are reasons to believe the Court would still be unlikely to strike down this Note’s proposal through Machinists preemption. First, expansive federal labor-law preemption does not discriminate between worker- and employer-friendly state legislation.240 A decision to expand the scope of preemption and strike down a worker-friendly state statute could be used in later years to strike down employer-friendly state legislation.241 Garmon and Machinists themselves were ostensibly worker-friendly decisions when they were decided. Garmon held that when the NLRB declines jurisdiction over a matter, a state court cannot award damages to an employer for union activity that is arguably protected under federal labor laws.242 Machinists held that when the NLRB determines that union conduct does not violate the NLRA, an employer cannot seek a remedy under a state unfair-labor-practice provision.243 Second, precedent makes it difficult to distinguish independent contractors from other workers under the NLRA. Given that agricultural workers, domestic workers, and independent contractors are all exempted from the NLRA in the same section,244 it is unclear why only independent contractors could not be regulated by states. Without a way to distinguish these types of workers, a judgment that state regulation of independent contractors is preempted would implicitly prohibit state regulation of all of the other types of workers exempted from the NLRA, which could have unpredictable consequences.', 'D. Combining State and Federal Regulatory Responses', 'The proposal for federal guidance and state legislation described above would be most effective if the two were adopted in tandem: nonenforcement by federal agencies would remove a significant source of antitrust liability for workers’ organizations, and legislation in individual states would shield workers in those states from both private and state-government lawsuits. But in a world with only the proposed federal guidance, workers’ organizations would not be shielded from private lawsuits.245 And in a world with only state legislation, workers could be investigated by the federal government in states that had not adopted processes for collective bargaining. If states and federal antitrust agencies are able to cooperate, the resulting regulatory regime would combine the strengths of both approaches.', 'Antitrust enforcement has historically relied on cooperation among federal and state authorities: agencies at both levels routinely share information, expertise, and resources, and they often file antitrust actions jointly or in parallel.246 But the history of state-federal antitrust cooperation suggests that cooperation is o�en driven by aligned political interests and not just an interest in cooperation per se. Rather than fall in line for the sake of falling in line, states have often pursued aggressive antitrust agendas when federal enforcement has been lacking, precisely because federal enforcement has been lacking, and have developed independent agendas that have sometimes converged with and at other times diverged from the federal agenda.247 The Trump administration has been a period of divergence, marked by visible conflicts between federal and state authorities: most notably, state authorities filed suit against the merger of T-Mobile and Sprint a�er the DOJ had cleared it, and the DOJ intervened to suggest a more defendant-friendly standard in state prosecutions of franchise no-poach agreements.248 The question of whether these conflicts will continue, or cooperation will be restored, seems like it will in large part depend on politics.', 'But these conflicts between state and federal antitrust authorities illustrate how state authorities are willing to be leaders in antitrust enforcement when the federal government does not go far enough. By paying extra attention to no poach agreements or particular mergers, states have shaped the national dialogue around those issues. This is true within labor law as well: in February 2020, the House passed the Protecting the Right to Organize Act, which would nationalize provisions in California’s AB5 legislation, suggesting that moves at the state level are impacting legislative discussions at the federal level.249 While a federal structure of government presents opportunities for conflict between state and federal regulation, it also presents opportunities for moves at one level to influence policymakers at the other. Further, despite public conflicts between state and federal antitrust authorities in recent years, both seem increasingly aware of the impact that antitrust can have on labor: even if states and the federal government disagree on the extent to which no-poach agreements should be prosecuted, they agree that such agreements should be subject to scrutiny. The renewed interest in labor from antitrust enforcers suggests that they are beginning to see their duties more broadly.', '', '']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Mary%20Washington-Quarters.docx

Minnesota

FrPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/FrPa/Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Mary%2520Washington-Quarters.docx

38be59111c1100d8dac28ef0bc80feaa26831adca3fa41be5c4987b93eb8ad6b

Their author concedes coordination to influence a blockchain is impossible

Thibault Schrepel 19, Assistant Professor at Utrecht University School of Law, Associate Researcher at University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and Invited Professor at Sciences Po Paris, Spring 2019, “IS BLOCKCHAIN THE DEATH OF ANTITRUST LAW? THE BLOCKCHAIN ANTITRUST PARADOX,” 3 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 281

public blockchain predatory innovation could be if new governance is adopted by majority This seems unlikely any change requires coordination among all stakeholders it is impossible to replace the original chain When governance is modified, a " hard fork" is created copy of ledger is made software running old rules sees blocks according to new rules as invalid as community grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach consensus on changing governance

As far as public blockchain are concerned, predatory innovation could be implemented if a new governance design is adopted by a majority of the miners. This seems unlikely any change to public blockchain governance design requires coordination and consensus among all of the stakeholders it is impossible to replace the original block chain When the governance design is modified, a " hard fork" is created a copy of the ledger is made , and miners switch their hardware to the new governance design. If they do not, the software running under the old rules sees the blocks produced according to the new rules as invalid as the community on public blockchains grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach a consensus on changing governance

public blockchain seems unlikely requires coordination and consensus among all of the stakeholders impossible chain hard fork" is created increasingly difficult to reach a consensus on changing governance

['As far as public blockchain are concerned, predatory innovation could be implemented if a new governance design is adopted by a majority of the miners. This, however, seems unlikely. First, any change to public blockchain governance design requires coordination and consensus among all of the stakeholders. 153 Second, it is impossible to replace the original blockchain. 154 When the governance design is modified, a "hard fork" is created, 155 a copy of the ledger is made, and miners switch their hardware to the new governance design. If they do not, the software running under the old rules sees the blocks produced according to the new rules as invalid. 156 For that reason, as the community on public blockchains grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to reach a consensus on changing governance. 157 And yet, future introduction of new governance models using off-chain and sidechain mechanisms in public blockchain may reduce these difficulties and therefore facilitate predatory innovation.', '']

[(9, 20)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

925ba091a1722d902bd67ad5145ac4a27b93d554da4a2d6f6d78a01dd1b715bd

Particularly true for medical AI.

Scott J. Schweikart 21. Senior Research Associate at the American Medical Association and Legal Editor of the AMA Journal of Ethics. “Who Will Be Liable for Medical Malpractice in the Future? How the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine Will Shape Medical Tort Law,” 22 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2021). https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1497&context=mjlst

courts have not viewed it as possible to hold AI responsible, as they are “not legal persons Chung argues there is overlap between AI and medical students for the court to make determination of personhood status for AI along with new legal status would come new legal burdens conferring personhood on AI may also come with quandaries such as “whether machines should be granted legal rights in addition to du- ties

Traditionally courts have not viewed it as possible to hold AI ) legally responsible, as they are “not legal persons Chung argues that, by way of analogy com- paring AI to medical students, “ there is enough overlap between the two [i.e., AI and medical students ] in terms of level of au- thority, tasks and level of oversight for the court to make such a determination [i.e. a determination of personhood status for AI ] “[c]onferring ‘personhood’ on these machines would resolve the agency question; the machines would become principals in their own right, and along with new legal status would come new legal burdens conferring personhood on AI may also come with a “combination of pragmatic and ethical quandaries such as “whether machines should be granted legal rights in addition to du- ties

along with new legal status would come new legal burdens rights in addition to du- ties

['A. AI PERSONHOOD', 'Traditionally, courts have not viewed it as possible to hold a machine or computer (like AI) legally responsible, as they are “not legal persons.”71 Chung argues that, by way of analogy com- paring AI to medical students, “there is enough overlap between the two [i.e., AI and medical students] in terms of level of au- thority, tasks and level of oversight for the court to make such a determination [i.e. a determination of personhood status for AI].”72 David Vladeck notes that “[c]onferring ‘personhood’ on these machines would resolve the agency question; the machines would become principals in their own right, and along with new legal status would come new legal burdens, including the burden of self-insurance.”73 Of course, if we look to the personhood solu- tion for AI, Vladeck points out that it is likely that the standard of care applied to AI and that applied to humans would be dif- ferent, and autonomous machines would then have a standard of care unique to themselves.74 Additionally, Chinen notes that conferring “personhood” on AI may not be such a far leap, as “giving legal personhood to things is not new. Ships and corpo- rations enjoy status as legal persons and assume liabilities.” 75 FOOTNOTE 75 BEGINS 75. Chinen, supra note 60, at 387–88 (noting that conferring personhood on AI may also come with a “combination of pragmatic and ethical quandaries,” such as “whether machines should be granted legal rights in addition to du- ties.”). FOOTNOTE 75 ENDS', 'No-Fault CP']

[(9, 22)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Georgetown-Round-2.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

6e39a6046efff0b2b2534b63de1cfd7d449c7dd7b4650ef4da9b7a87228a9dcd

‘EXPAND THE SCOPE’ CHECKS---limits the topic to CWS.

Sintia Radu 18, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, “Antitrust Policy Should Focus on Consumer Harms and Benefits, Not Vague Economic and Social Goals, New Report Advises,” ITIF, 10/4/18, https://itif.org/publications/2018/10/04/antitrust-policy-should-focus-consumer-harms-and-benefits-not-vague-economic

scholars and activists call to abandon a consensus that antitrust should focus on consumer s by broadening the scope of antitrust to address social challenges neo-Brandeisians advocate expanding the scope of antitrust to address small business inequality , regional decline , wage stagnation, privacy and political

Large corporations are under intense scrutiny in Washington, with the F T C conducting hearings on the state of competition and consumer protection Against this backdrop , a n increasingly vocal group of scholars and activists has been call ing on policymakers to abandon a consensus that antitrust should focus on consumer harm s and benefits by instead broadening the scope of antitrust to simultaneously rein in big firms and address an array of social challenges following in the tradition of the early 20th century Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who distrusted large corporations and championed the cause of breaking them up, today’s neo-Brandeisians advocate for expanding the scope of antitrust policy to address concerns such as the decline in small business formation, the rise in income inequality , regional economic decline , wage stagnation, privacy concerns, and political reform .

F T C Against this backdrop a vocal group of scholars activists abandon a consensus that antitrust should focus instead broadening the scope of antitrust social challenges neo-Brandeisians expanding the scope of antitrust policy small business income inequality regional economic decline wage privacy political reform

['Large corporations are under intense scrutiny in Washington, with the Federal Trade Commission conducting hearings on the state of competition and consumer protection in the 21st century, the Federal Communications Commission reviewing proposed mergers between telecommunications giants, and public opinion souring on the perceived role and influence of ‘Big Tech.’', 'Against this backdrop, an increasingly vocal group of scholars and activists has been calling on policymakers to abandon a 40-year-old consensus that antitrust policy should focus first and foremost on consumer harms and benefits by instead broadening the scope of antitrust enforcement in aggressive new ways to simultaneously rein in big firms and address an array of social challenges. But a new report released today by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), the world’s top-ranked science and technology policy think tank, finds there is no case for rejecting the long-established “consumer welfare standard.” ITIF concludes that doing so would be ineffective in solving the problems that advocates seek to address, and it would undermine consumer welfare and economic growth.', '“The consumer welfare standard is the bedrock of American antitrust law. There is no legitimate case for abandoning it in favor of a vague and hard-to-enforce alternative,” said ITIF Senior Fellow Joe Kennedy, author of the report. “Attacking large companies without considering the value they produce for consumers will only produce uncertainty, deter firms from innovating, and undermine American companies’ ability to compete in global markets.”', 'The consumer welfare standard generally states the main criterion regulators should use when evaluating a merger or alleged anticompetitive behavior is overall consumer welfare, economic efficiency, or both. But, following in the tradition of the early 20th century Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, who distrusted large corporations and championed the cause of breaking them up, today’s neo-Brandeisians advocate for expanding the scope of antitrust policy as the lynchpin of a broader agenda to address concerns such as the decline in small business formation, the rise in income inequality, regional economic decline, wage stagnation, privacy concerns, and political reform. ']

[(7, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Agbede-Stamenkovic-Diez%20Aff-NUSO-Round2.docx

Northwestern

AgSt

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/AgSt/Northwestern-Agbede-Stamenkovic-Diez%2520Aff-NUSO-Round2.docx

2825b0ccaf47cffb89c372b69a59db1f849b6006f61486274b2102390dd00b39

Heg doesn’t create peace.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, )

the world remained equally peaceful while the U S cut forces throughout the 90s as well as while it doubled spending have been unrelated to stability Africa is peaceful something for which heg cannot take credit Stability exists in many places to which heg does not extend . The egocentric bias suggests U.S. policymakers overestimat their own importance Americans have been exceptional in their exceptionalism None of the contributing factors interdependence , nuc s institutions norms seem poised to disappear The world will continue peace no matter what

proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for pacific trends the world remained equally peaceful while the U S cut its forces throughout the 19 90s , as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century Complex statistical methods demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability . The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to The U S can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts violence in most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention The continent is , nevertheless , more peaceful today than at any other time in its history something for which U.S. heg emony cannot take credit Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. heg emony simply does not extend . proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be The egocentric bias suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimat ing their own importance Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s unique, nonpareil stature Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism The short history of the U S has led to a belief that it is morally, culturally , and politically superior to other, lesser countries Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil It is quite likely that the world does not need the U S to enforce peace if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested economic development , complex interdependence , nuc lear weapon s , international institutions , shifting global norms on war seem poised to disappear any time soon The world will probably continue peace no matter what the U S chooses to do or not do

faith alone precious little evidence equally peaceful doubled Complex statistical methods unrelated never been able to explain adequately 5 percent force 95 percent choose not to steer well clear intervention nevertheless more peaceful today any other time cannot take credit many such places simply does not extend stabilizing power basic observations cognitive psychology rarely perceive them to be egocentric bias natural almost certainly overestimat ing their own importance myriad decisions indispensability fallacy bask reflected glory unique, nonpareil stature exceptional exceptionalism morally, culturally politically superior divine providence battle evil does not need the U S to enforce peace virtually any difficult to reverse None contributing factors economic development interdependence nuc lear weapon s institutions shifting global norms poised to disappear continue no matter what

['Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.', 'Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.', 'Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐\u200bcalled egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.', 'The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.', 'Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46', 'Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.', 'Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐\u200branging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 11)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Revare-Butler-Neg-1%20-%20Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Kansas

ReBu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/ReBu/Kansas-Revare-Butler-Neg-1%2520-%2520Northwestern-Doubles.docx

40cc4313caf88dc40339681c0b8dc6cdc72d051230340bfdeff3bdbb46430fd2

Constitution prevents nuclear war

Hemesath 00 (Paul A., Georgetown Law Journal, August, 88 Geo. L.J. 2473, Lexis)

In a nuclear attack the importance of a coherent legitimate decision cannot be overestimated harms with a "on-the-fly" decisionmaking process are serious enough to demand a principled solution based on the Constitution To reach a solution, Congress pursue remedies well in advance of a nuclear crisis

In the case of a n offensive nuclear attack , the importance of a coherent and legitimate decision cannot be overestimated Finding a resolution to nuclear war powers uncertainty is not an obvious endeavor the harms associated with a n unprepared and contentious "on-the-fly" decisionmaking process are serious enough to demand a principled solution based on the Constitution and not on improvised convenience. To reach such a solution, Congress must cohere in an attempt to draft an unambiguous War Powers Act and proceed to pursue remedies in the courts well in advance of a nuclear crisis . In return, the courts must either deign to decide the issue on its merits, or provide a definitive jurisdictional holding upon which the courts and the President may come to rely

coherent legitimate nuclear crisis

['In the case of an offensive nuclear attack, the importance of a coherent and legitimate decision cannot be overestimated. Even with the force of a congressional declaration of war, Harry Truman still faced critics that questioned the sagacity of his atomic decision in World War II. 183 Although the wisdom of any nuclear use may always remain open to criticism, the legality of such a decision should be beyond reproach. As previously noted, the potentially "unlimited costs" of a nuclear war are extremely difficult to fathom, both physically and politically. 184 A legitimate decision to utilize a nuclear weapon thus requires a high level of legality and consensus--two qualities that cannot be attained with a Congress plausibly asserting the nonexistence of the Executive\'s very constitutional authority to carry out the act.\xa0\xa0\xa0Finding a resolution to nuclear war powers uncertainty is not an obvious endeavor. However, the harms associated with an unprepared and contentious "on-the-fly" decisionmaking process are serious enough to demand a principled solution based on the Constitution and not on improvised convenience. To reach such a solution, Congress must cohere in an attempt to draft an unambiguous War Powers Act and proceed to pursue remedies in the courts well in advance of a nuclear crisis. In return, the courts must either deign to decide the issue on its merits, or provide a definitive jurisdictional holding upon which the courts and the President may come to rely.\xa0']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BuGe-Aff-Hoosier-Invitational-HIT-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

BuGe

061bd96cf442de35a105438fcdfbe9b12b4ba20b47c5457477785bc9feff5d12

We don’t have any medium-range missiles, nuclear or conventional, and they won’t be deployed to Asia any time soon

Range between 310 and 3,400 miles = 500 to 5,500 km, the INF definition of intermediate

U S is not ready to deploy new missiles in Japan Tokyo approved acquiring counterstrike That led Washington to forgo deployment of its own missiles U.S. military does not operate ground-launched missiles with range between 310 and 3,400 miles U.S. withdrawal from INF meant inevitable talk of deploying missiles There are limited alternatives Guam is too far So Ko would provoke too much backlash Taiwan is not an option Missiles won’t arrive any time soon

The U S is not ready to deploy a variety of new missiles in Japan The U.S. is developing new missiles but it’s too early to consider where to deploy them, Japanese officials were told by their U.S. counterparts Tokyo approved a national security strategy in December that includes acquiring counterstrike capabilities to attack enemy bases with missiles. That led Washington to forgo deployment of its own missiles The U.S. military does not operate ground-launched missiles with a range between 310 and 3,400 miles . The weapons were banned under the I ntermediate-Range N uclear F orces Treaty, which expired in 2019 U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty meant inevitable talk of deploying missiles in Japan There are limited alternatives Guam is too far In So uth Ko rea, it would provoke too much public backlash . And Taiwan is not yet an option Missiles won’t arrive any time soon , Brown predicted

U S not ready acquiring counterstrike capabilities forgo deployment of its own missiles does not operate ground-launched missiles I N F inevitable talk limited alternatives Guam is too far So Ko Missiles won’t arrive any time soon

['Seth Robson 23, reporter for Stars and Stripes; and Hana Kusumoto, reporter/translator, 2/7/23, “US military not ready to deploy missiles to Japan, country’s defense ministry says,” https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2023-02-07/japan-missiles-china-taiwan-senkakus-9062073.html', 'The United States is not ready to deploy a variety of new missiles in Japan, contrary to a recent newspaper report, the country’s Ministry of Defense said this week.', 'The U.S. is developing new missiles but it’s too early to consider where to deploy them, Japanese officials were told by their U.S. counterparts, according to a ministry statement emailed Monday to Stars and Stripes.', 'The ministry was responding to a report Saturday by the Sankei newspaper, citing multiple anonymous U.S. and Japanese sources, that the U.S. government had suggested deploying medium-range, hypersonic and Tomahawk missiles to Japan’s southern island of Kyushu.', 'Tensions are rising near Japan’s southern islands amid a Chinese military buildup and its claims on Taiwan, about 700 miles south of Kyushu. Beijing considers democratic, self-governing Taiwan to be a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary.', 'U.S. Forces Japan had no comment on the Sankei report, USFJ spokesman Air Force Maj. Thomas Barger said in an email Monday.', '“We continuously work closely with our Japanese Ally to ensure we maintain capabilities necessary to uphold our treaty obligations of mutual security and cooperation,” he said. “U.S. Forces in Japan continue to train and posture in order to remain ready for any potential future crisis or contingency.”', 'The Sankei article runs counter to a Jan. 23 report by the Yomiuri newspaper — also citing unnamed U.S. and Japanese sources — that said American missiles would not be deployed to Japan.', 'Tokyo approved a national security strategy in December that includes acquiring counterstrike capabilities to attack enemy bases with missiles. That led Washington to forgo deployment of its own missiles, the Yomiuri report said.', 'The U.S. military does not operate ground-launched missiles with a range between 310 and 3,400 miles. The weapons were banned in 1988 under the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which expired in 2019.', 'Medium-range ballistic missiles travel between 620 and 1,860 miles, according to The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation website.', 'However, the U.S. Army recently took delivery of a prototype Typhon Weapon System, which is intended to fire missiles at ranges between 300 and 1,725 miles.', 'The system, armed with SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, is intended to hit targets at ranges between the Army’s Precision Strike Missile, about 300 miles maximum, and the developmental Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon system, about 1,725 miles maximum, Naval News reported Dec. 5.', '“The [Marine Corps] is also looking at land-based Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles launched from trailers,” the news site reported.', 'Beijing has more than 1,900 ballistic missiles that can reach Japan, according to a 2022 Pentagon report on China’s military capabilities.', 'U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty meant inevitable talk of deploying missiles in Japan, according to James Brown, an international affairs expert at Temple University’s Japan campus.', "“One of the reasons for withdrawal from the INF Treaty was to enable the US to deploy ground-based intermediate range missile(s) in Asia as a means of countering China's large advantage in this category of weapon,” he said in an email Monday.", 'Kyushu is a logical spot for the missiles given that the East China Sea is a focal point for tension between the U.S. and China, Brown said. There are also limited alternatives, he said.', '“Guam is too far,” he said. “In South Korea, it would provoke too much public backlash. And Taiwan is not yet an option. Okinawa is also a possibility but there is a widespread feeling, especially on Okinawa itself, that US deployments within Japan should be spread more evenly. “', 'Missiles won’t arrive any time soon, Brown predicted.']

[]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-Harvard-College-Tournament-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

8896d06757ea65d38606746d456183dc15f656c2e870f16feea286e104f7165d

A narrow shutdown fix will pass now, staving off a bulldozing crunch on the economy.

Moore ’11-9 [Simon; November 9; Senior Contributor at Forbes; Forbes, “As Government Shutdown Deadline Nears, Here Are the Likely Outcomes,” https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonmoore/2023/11/09/as-government-shutdown-deadline-nears-here-are-the-likely-outcomes/]

U.S. will see shutdown without a budget by November 17 . Most expect c r to be passed , though only days remain shutdown has far greater economic impact major issue is delay around pay c r is expected even if timing is tight . However, the speaker is conscious that his predecessor was deposed after c r shutdown would worry markets , especially as recession risks are surfacing and it would likely be a drag on growth

The U.S. will see a shutdown without a budget by November 17 . Most expect a c ontinuing r esolution to be passed , though only days remain to do so. event-forecasting site Kalshi gave a 1 in 3 chance that a government shutdown occurs A shutdown has a far greater economic impact . The major issue is delay and uncertainty around pay for government employees a delayed paycheck can have a major impact on a household payment for government contractors is more ambiguous . This can impact the defense and pharmaceutical sectors , which are dependent on government procurement activity A c ontinuing r esolution is expected , even if the timing is tight . However, the House speaker is no doubt conscious that his predecessor was deposed after agreement on a c r A shutdown would worry markets , especially as recession risks are surfacing and it would likely be a drag on economic growth

shutdown November 17 c r passed only days remain Kalshi 1 in 3 chance government shutdown occurs far greater economic impact delay uncertainty employees major impact household ambiguous defense pharmaceutical sectors dependent government procurement activity c r expected tight no doubt conscious c r markets surfacing economic growth

['The U.S. will see a government shutdown without a full budget or continuing resolution by November 17. Most people expect a continuing resolution to be passed, though only days remain to do so. At the time of writing, event-forecasting site Kalshi gave a 1 in 3 chance that a government shutdown occurs. However, if a shutdown is avoided, further work will likely be needed to pass a full budget.', 'Markets have paid limited attention to shutdown risks because a continuing resolution is expected. In fact, continuing resolutions have been the norm in recent years. Historically, going back to 1952, continuing resolutions almost always occurred, often into December or later, while a full budget is worked out. However, government shutdowns have occasionally occurred, too.', 'Over the last 70 years, only five of them have avoided a continuing resolution. Still, any continuing resolution will require subsequent work from legislators to pass a budget. Additionally, given provisions in the 2023 debt ceiling agreement, automatic 1% budget cuts across the board are possible if budgetary delays continue.', 'Progress So Far On The Budget', 'A continuing resolution was passed on September 30, funding the U.S. government for an additional 45 days as the new fiscal year began. The hope was that a full budget would be worked out during that 45-day period.', 'So far, that hasn’t happened. That’s in part because more than half of that time was ultimately spent deposing Kevin McCarthy (R-Ca.) as House Speaker and replacing him with Mike Johnson (R-La.). Johnson has said he wants to avoid a shutdown, though his detailed plan for doing so isn’t public yet. The Republicans’ narrow House majority adds complications.', 'However, there are 12 appropriations subcommittees that comprise the U.S. budget. The Senate has made progress on three of them, passing a bipartisan combined bill on November 1 for Agriculture; Veterans Affairs and Transportation; Housing and Urban Development.', 'The House has so far passed bills for seven of the 12 budgetary areas, although further progress this week has stalled so far. House bills have been passed along partisan lines, and so they are unlikely to attract the necessary support within the Democratic-controlled Senate. In contrast, the Senate measures have been bipartisan.', 'In addition, the text of the bill raising the debt limit includes automatic 1% cuts to the government’s entire budget if a full one is not passed by January 1, 2024. The intent of that measure was to incentivize relatively quick progress on the budget, rather than for the cuts to actually be implemented. Still it’s another deadline consideration in the budgetary process.', 'Market Reaction To The Budgetary Process', 'Continuing resolutions are common historically — although, they may disrupt some aspects of government, such as travel and hiring practices. They also require planning for a potential government shutdown as shutdown deadlines approach. Generally, though, government can continue to function with relative normalcy under a continuing resolution.', 'The Impact Of A Government Shutdown', 'A shutdown, should one occur, has a far greater economic impact. The major issue is delay and uncertainty around pay for government employees. Back pay is legally guaranteed for most positions but a delayed paycheck can have a major impact on a household.', 'In addition, payment for government contractors is more ambiguous. This can also impact the defense and pharmaceutical sectors, which are often dependent on government procurement activity. There is also concern from lawmakers that disrupting the military via a shutdown during currently heightened geopolitical tension, would be unacceptable.', 'There have also been discussions about a “laddered” approach to the components of the budget as USA Today explains. For example, it would be possible to pass a budget for the military, but then subsequently consider the budget for another department at a later date, and, as such, individual department budget deadlines could be spread out. The value of this approach might be to give lawmakers specific deadlines for specific departmental budgets, rather than a single deadline for the entire budget. However, this segmented approach might complicate the budgetary process further.', 'Will We See A Government Shutdown?', 'A continuing resolution is expected, rather than a government shutdown, even if the timing is tight. However, the House speaker is no doubt conscious that his predecessor was deposed after agreement on a bipartisan continuing resolution.', 'A shutdown would worry markets, especially as recession risks are surfacing and it would likely be a drag on economic growth. Also, the terms of any continuing resolution will be closely watched, including its duration. While the laddered approach to upcoming budgetary deadlines has been floated, the prospect of automatic budget cuts in 2024 is also possible with further delays.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-Wake-Doubles.docx

Michigan

ShGa

36ca2f8716f0056b77369f2db093fee4320cc5ab710bfa8f55e84a9f261d3241

Culinary metaphors are easily coopted and repurposed by politicians who will use it to block advantages

Anthony 8, AP director of new storytelling and newsroom innovation. Former director of Asia-Pacific news. (Ted, The kitchen table: Anatomy of a metaphor, )

politicians invoked the kitchen table as the touchstone for modern politics the perfect opening for politicians to invite themselves in the kitchen offers metaphoric warmth. That makes it the perfect terrain for a political battle in a country enduring fights. when interest groups wanted to sink the Clinton administration’s health-care plan, its notorious “Harry and Louise” video took place at a kitchen table The search for robust political metaphors is always a race. Parties troll fervently for one entry point to get themselves in. And if you can access the kitchen table the political opportunities are tremendous

politicians invoked the kitchen table as the touchstone for modern politics the perfect opening for politicians to invite themselves in the kitchen offers metaphoric warmth. It is a place for family members to talk and eat That makes it the perfect terrain for a political battle in a country enduring fights. when interest groups wanted to sink the Clinton administration’s health-care plan, its notorious “Harry and Louise” video took place at a kitchen table The search for robust political metaphors is always a race. Parties troll fervently for one entry point to get themselves in. And if you can access the kitchen table the political opportunities are tremendous

['In speech after speech, interview after interview, the nation’s most powerful Democratic politicians invoked the commonplace kitchen table as the touchstone for modern politics – the vantage point from which the ordinary American family watches, wonders and worries. In short, the perfect opening for politicians to invite themselves in. “Republican mismanagement has really hit home around the kitchen table,” Democratic National Committee Treasurer Andrew Tobias said. “At kitchen tables across Ohio and the heartland, mothers and fathers are worried,” Ohio Gov. Ted Strickland said. And from Missouri Sen. Claire McCaskill: “Tonight, families are balancing checkbooks at kitchen tables, trying to stay on budget.” Joe Biden did it, accepting the vice presidential nomination Wednesday night. “I take the train home to Wilmington, sometimes very late. As I look out the window at the homes we pass, I can almost hear what they’re talking about at the kitchen table after they put the kids to bed.” The question must be asked: What on Earth is up with the kitchen table? “It’s a wonderful image. It’s an image that stays with you because it mirrors reality,” says Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano, a Democrat. “In my kitchen, that’s where I pay my bills,” she says, and in a bad economy “it resonates with a lot of people.” It is a potent metaphor that evokes images of private time, nesting and the process of managing a household – “the symbol of all things practical and all things comforting,” as Cynthia Glozier, a Democratic delegate from Rhinebeck, N.Y., put it. And consider what’s percolating in American households in these troubled times. Bills need to be paid from checking accounts that contain too little money. Families are agonizing about what to do next. Anxiousness is causing a circling of the wagons. Enter the kitchen. Once used for physical warmth because it contained the fireplace, today it offers metaphoric warmth. It is a place for family members to talk and eat (rather than dine), but guests and strangers are typically received elsewhere. “You don’t invite the stranger into the kitchen unless you really like them. The living room is preserved for that,” says Susan Strasser, author of “Never Done: A History of American Housework.” In the republic’s early days, when most houses had only a few rooms, the kitchen was an intimate gathering place. But many of the dominant images of postwar America, with its newfound prosperity, showed families gathering in the living room or den. Now, though, demographics are shifting again. Many households have two working parents, and the kitchen table – and its younger sibling, the kitchen island – have become family meeting places. Some companies have even marketed kitchen-table computers. “The kitchen table has evolved. It’s become multifunctional,” says Kristi Hoffman, who teaches about the American family at Roanoke College in Salem, Va. “Many people don’t make as formal meals anymore. So the kitchen table becomes a place where a lot does happen.” Because of that, kitchens are getting bigger. In recent years, buyers of new homes have been looking for outsized kitchens and enormous tables for them that can function as both family eating station, workspace and storage area for paperwork or toys. “If you’re not in the kitchen, you’re going to miss out,” says Erich Gaukel, editor of Renovation Style magazine. “The kitchen itself is really becoming a living room in American homes.” That makes it the perfect terrain for a political battle in a country where the soul of the American family – and who can lay claim to it – is one of the parties’ most enduring fights. It was no coincidence that, in 1994, when interest groups wanted to sink the Clinton administration’s health-care plan, its notorious “Harry and Louise” video took place at a kitchen table – as does a new chapter with the same actors that was released earlier this month. Finally, the kitchen table is an icon of regularness – common ground we can all share. Well, most of us: Joe Biden hammered that home on his first appearance as Barack Obama’s running mate, using the table as a launching pad for salvos against John McCain. “Ladies and gentlemen, your kitchen table is like mine,” Biden said. “You sit there at night … after you put the kids to bed and you talk, you talk about what you need. You talk about how much you are worried about being able to pay the bills. Well, ladies and gentlemen, that’s not a worry John McCain has to worry about. It’s a pretty hard experience. He’ll have to figure out which of the seven kitchen tables to sit at.” McCain scurried to “The Tonight Show” to shoot back. “I spent 51/2 years in a prison cell,” he said. “I didn’t have a house, I didn’t have a kitchen table, I didn’t have a table, I didn’t have a chair.” The search for robust political metaphors is always a race. Parties troll fervently for that one image, that one entry point to get themselves in. And if you can access the kitchen table – or at least make voters think of you when they’re sitting at theirs, the political opportunities are tremendous. Because if you can get that far with voters, make that connection, heck – you’re practically family.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-SpHa-Neg-9---CEDA-Doubles.docx

Kansas

SpHa

4554c7a15289a8a12bf746770679d29e5efd569561e1c7a9b39ffd5dc7a4aeb5

Liability is distinct from the remedy---any range of consequences can follow prohibited behavior

Erika M. Douglas 20, Assistant Professor of Law at the Temple University, Beasley School of Law, “Monopolization Remedies and Data Privacy”, Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, 24 Va. J.L. & Tech. 1, Summer 2020, Lexis

Although analytically distinct stages antitrust long treated remedies and liability as related analysis "blur[s] the line" No particular form of relief is automatic for violations of Sherman Instead courts have broad discretion to order relief that remedy unlawful conduct remedies range from fines to injunctive relief

Although analytically distinct stages of a case, antitrust scholarship has long treated the questions of remedies and liability as related . Antitrust analysis "blur[s] the line" between the two, the " nature of the remedy sought in an antitrust case is often . . . an important clue to the soundness of the antitrust claim." No particular form of relief is automatic for violations of Sherman Instead , trial courts have broad discretion to order relief that will remedy the unlawful conduct possible remedies range from criminal penalties of fines or jail to injunctive relief

analytically distinct remedies liability related "blur[s] the line" nature important clue No particular form automatic broad discretion remedy unlawful conduct range criminal fines jail injunctive relief

['Early consideration of remedies is important because it acts as a disciplining mechanism, testing the robustness and specificity of liability-stage theories. Although analytically distinct stages of a case, antitrust scholarship has long treated the questions of remedies and liability as related. Antitrust analysis "blur[s] the line" between the two, particularly for unilateral conduct. 17As Judge Posner observes, the "nature of the remedy sought in an antitrust case is often . . . an important clue to the soundness of the antitrust claim." 18If there is no logical remedy available for the misconduct, that may indicate the liability theory needs refinement, or even that scarce prosecutorial resources are better spent elsewhere. 19If the case proceeds, the willingness of a court to grant a particular remedy will depend on what is proven at the liability stage, which means the claims, arguments and evidence should be developed with the intended remedy in mind.', 'No particular form of relief is automatic for violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act (the "Sherman Act"). 20 Instead, trial courts have broad discretion to order relief that will remedy the unlawful conduct. 21 In cases where the government is the plaintiff, possible remedies range from criminal penalties of fines or jail, 22 to injunctive or other equitable relief. 23Damages are generally awarded only in private antitrust litigation, which offers plaintiffs the lure of treble damages. 24']

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ndtceda

Kentucky-Stockstill-Weinhardt-Aff-Districts-Round2.docx

Kentucky

StWe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/StWe/Kentucky-Stockstill-Weinhardt-Aff-Districts-Round2.docx

987b6ed137c0745be419938128f4ce800d47a7d0cf67ffed584cb977f9982fe4

Cultivates competition in agriculture and healthcare markets – overcomes inequality.

Aydin & Büthe ’16 [Umit and Tim; Associate Professor at the Instituto de Ciencia Política, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and George C. Lamb, Jr. Fellow at the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University; Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the Hochschule für Politik (Bavarian School of Public Policy) at the Technical University of Munich, Germany, where he holds the Chair in International Relations, as well as a senior fellow of the Kenan Institute for Ethics and a founding member of the Rethinking Regulation Initiative at Duke University; Law and Contemporary Problems, “Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits,” ; KS]

competition policy in developing countries focus on “sectors that impinge on well-being in goods , ag and health care strat build tech capacity build popular support for competition policy and gives time to develop linkages competition policy to overcome inequality

drawing on human (rather than “just” economic) development , suggests competition law enforcement and policy in developing countries focus on “sectors that directly impinge on the well-being of the poor , in particular essential consumer goods , ag riculture and health care developing country agencies focus on alleviating concrete local impediments to the operation of competitive markets. Such a strat egy allows new agencies to build tech nical capacity by solving relatively tractable problems; build popular support for competition policy through actions that yield clear benefits for domestic market participants ; and gives the agency time to develop transgovernmental linkages with their counterparts in other countries sectoral composition and geographic distribution of implementation and enforcement efforts serve as initial measures of success competition policy that foster equality of opportunity to partake in the market and share in its benefits include measures to overcome inequality competition law and policy are successful if they increase market participation from excluded segments of the population, and measurably reduce the barriers to entry.

human development focus on “sectors directly impinge well-being of the poor essential consumer goods ag riculture health care alleviating concrete local impediments build tech nical capacity build popular support clear benefits domestic market participants develop transgovernmental linkages sectoral composition geographic distribution equality of opportunity overcome inequality

['Bhattarcharjea, drawing on the broader notion of human (rather than “just” economic) development, suggests that competition law enforcement and policy in developing countries should focus on “sectors that directly impinge on the well-being of the poor, in particular essential consumer goods, agriculture [and its inputs] and health care.”23 And he argues that developing country agencies should initially focus on disclosing and alleviating concrete local impediments to the operation of competitive markets. Such a strategy is promising because it: allows new agencies to build technical capacity by solving relatively tractable problems; enables them to build popular support for competition policy through actions that yield clear benefits for domestic market participants; and gives the agency time to develop transgovernmental linkages with their counterparts in other countries before going after the transnational cartels that often ruthlessly target developing countries.24 These arguments suggest that the sectoral composition and geographic distribution of implementation and enforcement efforts may serve as initial measures of success, until it becomes possible to assess whether reductions in local distortions and benefits for the poor are indeed materializing. ', 'Fox goes further, both in conceptualizing development as an operational goal of competition policy and in suggesting specific foci for competition policy implementation. Pointing out that severe inequalities in education and access to capital create highly consequential barriers to entry, she suggests that a competition policy that seeks to foster equality of opportunity to partake in the market and share in its benefits must include measures to overcome such inequality or at least its effects.25 From this perspective, competition law and policy are successful if they contribute to actual increases in market participation from previously marginalized or excluded segments of the population, and could be considered at least partly successful to the extent that they measurably reduce the barriers to entry. ']

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ndtceda

Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Aff-indiana-Round2.docx

Michigan

AgHs

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/AgHs/Michigan-Agrawal-Hsu-Aff-indiana-Round2.docx

2a912072a876a7b950b30b12b9f8de784520345e3c026451211c98996a982fed

2---AI will win the right to not be shut down and modify its source code.

Osborn 21, JD (Daniel, “PERSONHOOD FOR SYNTHETIC BEINGS: LEGAL PARAMETERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DAWN OF HUMANLIKE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,” Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal, 37.3)

giving full rights cannot be ignored because the synthetics will ask for it sentient beings desire and feel entitled to the basic right of autonomous personhood A synthetic person may be a very difficult being to deny minimum of rights The right to not be shut down The right to have full and unhindered access to code The right to not have its own source code manipulated against its will The right to copy The right to privacy These have analogues to human rights self-defense

giving synthetics full rights cannot be ignored because the synthetics will ask for it Self-conscious, sentient beings desire and feel entitled to the basic right of autonomous personhood A synthetic person with the capacity to pass the test for personhood and with the consciousness to request its own rights may be a very difficult being to deny There are a minimum of rights that should be recognized The right to not be shut down against its will The right to have full and unhindered access to its own source code The right to not have its own source code manipulated against its will The right to copy (or not copy) itself The right to privacy the right to conceal its own internal mental states) These have analogues to human rights But it is not all of them. three potential rights would be: voting, marriage, and self-defense

synthetics will ask for it desire feel entitled very difficult being to deny minimum of rights not be shut down full unhindered access not have its own source code manipulated right to copy right to privacy analogues to human rights

["Beyond presenting a prima facie case for personhood modeled after the human condition, giving synthetics full rights cannot be ignored because the synthetics will ask for it. “Self-conscious, sentient beings desire and feel entitled to the basic right of autonomous personhood. Humans certainly feel this way. Frankenstein's monster, human clones, genetic human constructs, cyborgs, and digital copies also feel this way.”129", 'A synthetic person with the capacity to pass the test for personhood and with the consciousness to request its own rights may be a very difficult being to deny.130 We, as humans, must also realize that to come short of giving synthetics full human lives is to make an arbitrary judgment of which thinking, feeling, creative beings get a say in self-governance, who to love, travel, employ, and many other issues. Such an action “would be an expression of both human exceptionalism and substrate chauvinism—ideological positions which state that biological humans are special and that only biological minds matter.”131 To create such a division risks demeaning and diminishing our own humanity.', 'There are, perhaps, a bare minimum of rights that should be recognized. George Dvorsky lays out the following fundamentals:', '• The right to not be shut down against its will', '• The right to have full and unhindered access to its own source code', '• The right to not have its own source code manipulated against its will', '• The right to copy (or not copy) itself', '• The right to privacy (namely the right to conceal its own internal mental states)132', 'These have analogues to human rights. The right to life, liberty, reproduction, and privacy are well-recognized. But it is not all of them. Some rights, such as interstate travel or protection on the high seas from pirates are non-controversial, but three potential rights would be: voting, marriage, and self-defense. While each is deserving of much fuller study, in brief they are discussed below.']

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ndtceda

Kansas-ScMc-Neg-Shirley-Round-4.docx

Kansas

ScMc

d90ebb0d75a46ca53fb0f5203e13ba5d81ebf6166ec6e9288aea0aa5e6b9f0d4

The aff jeopardizes global antitrust coop.

Greenfield et al ’15 [Leon Greenfield; Steven Cherry; Perry Lange; Jacquelyn; Spring 2015; Partner at WilmerHale; Partner at Wilmerhale; Counsel at Wilmerhale; Asscoiate at WilmerHale; Antitrust; “Foreign Component Cartels and the U.S. Antitrust Laws: A First Principle Approach,” vol. 29, no. 2]

Extending enforcement to overseas components create problems for enforcement by foreign agencies effectiveness and leniency diminished if amnesty applicants or exposure in the U S cartel enforcement involve coordination Overreaching could threaten foreign support for coop with U.S. authorities or robust if foreign countries believe the U S will intrude on authority affect their markets and affecting U.S. indirectly overreaching provoked protests resulting in blocking statutes anti-suit injunctions and retaliatory conduct and it would be counterproductive to overreach jeopardize this harmonious competition should leave each nation exclusive authority to safeguard markets

Extending U.S. antitrust enforcement to overseas sales of components could create substantial problems for enforcement efforts by foreign antitrust agencies The effectiveness of those efforts , and particularly foreign governments’ leniency programs may be diminished if potential amnesty applicants in foreign jurisdictions must weigh the advantages of amnesty in the country in which they did business against the potentially far-reaching criminal or civil exposure in the U nited S tates, Most U.S. cartel enforcement actions in the last two decades have involve d some element of international coordination among enforcement agencies Overreaching by the United States could easily threaten foreign political support for coop eration with U.S. antitrust authorities or for robust antitrust enforcement of any sort if foreign countries come to believe the U nited S tates will intrude on their authority to sanction anticompetitive conduct affect ing the operation of their own markets and affecting U.S. markets only indirectly and derivatively Concern about perceived overreaching by U.S. courts and antitrust agencies has provoked strong protests and opposition from foreign nations , resulting in measures such as blocking statutes , anti-suit injunctions , and other retaliatory conduct The last two decades have brought about a more cooperative approach by both the United States and its major trading partners abroad, and it would be counterproductive to allow overreach of U.S. antitrust laws in component cartel cases to jeopardize this cooperation A rational and harmonious system of global competition enforcement should leave each nation the exclusive authority to use competition law to safeguard the process of competition in its own markets , not in the markets of other nations.

Extending U.S. antitrust enforcement overseas sales of components substantial problems for enforcement foreign antitrust agencies effectiveness foreign governments’ leniency programs diminished amnesty applicants weigh the advantages amnesty country exposure U S Most U.S. cartel enforcement element international coordination Overreaching threaten foreign political support coop eration U.S. antitrust authorities robust antitrust enforcement any sort foreign countries U S intrude on their authority sanction anticompetitive conduct affect ing their own markets affecting U.S. markets indirectly perceived overreaching U.S. courts and antitrust agencies strong protests opposition foreign nations blocking statutes anti-suit injunctions retaliatory conduct more cooperative approach counterproductive to allow overreach component cartel cases jeopardize this cooperation rational harmonious global competition enforcement exclusive authority safeguard process of competition

['Extending U.S. antitrust enforcement to overseas sales of components could create substantial problems for enforcement efforts by foreign antitrust agencies. The effectiveness of those efforts, and particularly foreign governments’ leniency programs (which are an important element of efforts to detect cartels), may be diminished if potential amnesty applicants in foreign jurisdictions must weigh the advantages of amnesty in the country in which they did business against the potentially far-reaching criminal or civil exposure in the United States, even if they never or only rarely sold components into the United States. 48 This is particularly true because of the availability of private treble damages remedies in the United States, a feature that is not common in other jurisdictions. 49', 'Most U.S. cartel enforcement actions in the last two decades have involved some element of international coordination among enforcement agencies. 50 Overreaching by the United States could easily threaten foreign political support for cooperation with U.S. antitrust authorities—or for robust antitrust enforcement of any sort—if foreign countries come to believe the United States will intrude on their authority to sanction anticompetitive conduct affecting the operation of their own markets and affecting U.S. markets only indirectly and derivatively. 51 Concern about perceived overreaching by U.S. courts and antitrust agencies has provoked strong protests and opposition from foreign nations, resulting in measures such as blocking statutes, anti-suit injunctions, and other retaliatory conduct. 52 The last two decades have brought about a more cooperative approach by both the United States and its major trading partners abroad, and it would be counterproductive to allow overreach of U.S. antitrust laws in component cartel cases to jeopardize this cooperation. A rational and harmonious system of global competition enforcement should leave each nation the exclusive authority to use competition law to safeguard the process of competition in its own markets, not in the markets of other nations.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-ADA-Octas.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-ADA-Octas.docx

236b5a16b4ea6229f4c787bf6c1545a557b2d97915f6e6a70f990c323b1c2df3

2. Prefer issue-specific evidence. The warrant in Edwards is timeframe and competing factors. We’ve read evidence that PC works in the context of this bill.

Arlette Saenz & Kevin Liptak 24. White House Correspondent. **CNN senior White House reporter based in Washington covering the Biden administration. "Biden embraces bully pulpit as he escalates fight against Trump and GOP over Russia". CNN. 2-22-2024. https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/22/politics/biden-bully-pulpit-trump-russia/index.html

Biden is embracing his bully pulpit as he calls out resistance from Trump and Republicans on Ukraine and Russia . the president has latched on to Republicans’ refusal to approve additional aid for Ukraine turned up the heat on Trump and Republicans The bully pulpit approach comes as the president is eager to put Trump front and center

Biden is embracing his bully pulpit as he calls out resistance from former Trump and Republicans on Ukraine and Russia . The tactic which is playing out in fundraisers and in public events - has become more pronounced in recent days as the president has latched on to House Republicans’ refusal to approve additional aid for Ukraine The president has turned up the heat on Trump and Republicans in California this week in a series of fundraisers The bully pulpit approach comes as the president is eager to put Trump ’s inflammatory rhetoric front and center as the 2024 race heats up Republicans have scuttled efforts to pass a bipartisan border security bill and additional assistance for Ukraine – both at Trump’s urging.

Biden embracing bully pulpit out resistance Trump Republicans Ukraine Russia The tactic president has latched on approve additional aid for Ukraine turned up the heat Trump Republicans front and center 2024 race heats up Republicans scuttled efforts additional assistance Ukraine

['President Joe Biden is embracing his bully pulpit as he calls out resistance from former President Donald Trump and Republicans on Ukraine and Russia.', 'The tactic – which is playing out mostly in off-camera fundraisers and in public events - has become more pronounced in recent days as the president has latched on to House Republicans’ refusal to approve additional aid for Ukraine and Donald Trump’s refusal to condemn Russia for the death of Alexey Navalny, Vladimir Putin’s top critic.', 'The president has turned up the heat on Trump and Republicans in California this week in a series of fundraisers, venues where the president tends to speak a bit more freely and bluntly.', 'Biden calls Putin a ‘crazy SOB’ and criticizes Trump’s Navalny comments during fundraiser', 'At a San Francisco fundraiser Wednesday, Biden referred to Putin as a “crazy SOB” and said Trump’s comments on Navalny were confounding.', '“He’s comparing himself to Navalny and saying that because our country’s become a communist country, he was persecuted, just like Navalny was persecuted,” Biden said. “Where the hell does this comes from? If I stood here 10 to 15 years ago and said all this, you’d all think I should be committed.”', 'The bully pulpit approach comes as the president is eager to put Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric front and center as the 2024 race heats up. Biden has directed his senior campaign team to more aggressively call out the “crazy s***” Trump says.', 'In repeatedly assailing Trump and his party from the White House, Biden also hopes to illustrate the stakes of the upcoming election and demonstrate his own efforts to unite the west against Russian aggression. House Republicans have scuttled efforts to pass a bipartisan border security bill and additional assistance for Ukraine – both at Trump’s urging.']

[(8, 15), (22, 31)]

ndtceda

Emory-GaHe-Neg-National-Debate-Tournament-Round-1.docx

Emory

GaHe

7da81057e0de04097f4ffd8eb53b5e152a76685a25366f6faa7abde29e07d58d

The U.S. will use bolstered nonprolif cred to crack down on the global spread of enrichment and reprocessing---causes extinction from warming

John Mueller 8, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, 7/16/8, “THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION,” https://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA08.pdf

Nonprolif efforts hamper worldwide development increasing costs of nuclear energy making them prohibitive for some countries Any measure that limits ability to acquire or increases price kills people The N P T guarantees peaceful nuclear power. However this rationale has been undermined by a "nuclear suppliers cartel" which has worked to "cut off trade in tech for reprocessing or enriching nuclear power does not emit g h g s an obvious candidate for global warming of the highest concern for the future of the planet

Nonprolif eration efforts worldwide hamper worldwide economic development by increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear energy making them prohibitive for some countries Any measure that limits their ability to acquire this vital commodity-- or increases its price slows economic growth and essentially kills people by reducing the gains in life expectancy commonly afforded by economic development. The N P T guarantees to signing nonnuclear countries "the fullest possible exchange of technology" for the development of peaceful nuclear power. However this rationale has been undermined by the development of a "nuclear suppliers cartel" which has worked to "cut off trade in tech nology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching Because nuclear power does not emit g reen h ouse g ase s , it is an obvious potential candidate for helping with the problem of global warming , an issue many people hold to be of the highest concern for the future of the planet

Nonprolif eration efforts hamper worldwide economic development increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear energy making them prohibitive slows economic growth kills people N P T rationale has been undermined g h g s highest concern for the future of the planet

['Nonproliferation efforts worldwide also hamper worldwide economic development by increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear energy--sometimes even making them prohibitive for some countries. As countries grow, they require ever increasing amounts of power. Any measure that limits their ability to acquire this vital commodity--or increases its price--effectively slows economic growth and essentially kills people by reducing the gains in life expectancy commonly afforded by economic development. The Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically guarantees to signing nonnuclear countries "the fullest possible exchange of technology" for the development of peaceful nuclear power. However, as Richard Betts points out, this rationale has been undermined by the development of a "nuclear suppliers cartel" which has worked to "cut off trade in technology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium," thereby reducing the NPT to "a simple demand to the nuclear weapons have-nots to remain so."49', 'More broadly the nonproliferation quest has from time to time boosted international oil prices to the detriment of almost all the countries in the world except for the potential proliferator.', 'Because nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gases, it is an obvious potential candidate for helping with the problem of global warming, an issue many people hold to be of the highest concern for the future of the planet. ', '', '']

[(5, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-RaYe-Neg-Wayne-State-Round-3.docx

Northwestern

RaYe

e552f235a74515865e91e1525d028146ef6230a33ac6d44bc35ebf87579e8b81

Circuit split over the definition of ‘direct’ is unresolved – the 9th circuit interpretation solves.

Murray ’17 [Sean; November 17; Fordham University School of Law (J.D.); Fordham International Law Journal; “With a Little Help from my Friends: How a US Judicial International Comity Balancing Test Can Foster Global Antitrust Redress,” ; KS]

FTAIA contribute to ill-defined boundaries of effects FTAIA produced splits between Seventh and Ninth Seventh held anticompetitive intermediary products , not have direct” effect on commerce . Motorola indirect purchaser falls outside FTAIA Motorola was wrongly decided negative consequences eliminates private remedies drastically mitigating ability to deter conduct decision gives no attention to whether Motorola would recover Hartford Fire Empagran are under over-inclusive

FTAIA is anything but clear FTAIA contribute d to the ill-defined boundaries of the effects doctrine FTAIA produced circuit splits including one between the Seventh and Ninth circuits concerning the interpretation of direct which the Supreme Court has abstained from resolving . The Seventh Circuit took the position that direct” means a reasonably proximate causal nexus.” the Ninth Circuit held that an effect is “direct” if “it follows the immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.” This definition was utilized by the Ninth Circuit in its decision in United States v. Hsiung which expressly rejected Minn-Chem’s “reasonably proximate causal nexus” approach Using Minn-Chem’s definition of “direct produced a questionable holding in Motorola Mobility. the Seventh Circuit definition of “direct ” held that anticompetitive behavior affectin g intermediary products , could not have a “ direct” effect on US commerce . the court construed Motorola as an indirect purchaser , and concluded that the entire transaction falls outside of the FTAIA ’s exception , Several points suggest Motorola Mobility was wrongly decided , including inconsistencies with US precedent and statutes . In holding that Motorola and its subsidiaries did not function as one enterprise Judge Posner disregarded Copperweld’s progeny a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries to be a “single entity” with “complete unity of interest” other US antitrust statutes treat parents and subsidiaries as one entity. If the acquiring business is controlled by a parent corporation, the HSR mandates that the “ultimate parent entity” file the notification regardless of the nationality of the acquired business the HSR does not require filing for the merger of two wholly owned subsidiaries with a common parent Motorola Mobility has negative consequences for US antitrust law, non-US subsidiaries of American parents relying on US law for potential recovery, US businesses operating inter nationally and consumers the Seventh Circuit announced a broad rule t hat eliminates private antitrust remedies where the first purchase of a price-fixed component occurs offshore, drastically mitigating the ability of US antitrust law to deter harmful foreign conduct targeting US markets. the Seventh Cir cuit’s decision creates a glaring inconsonance with the Ninth Circuit’s the court gives no attention to whether Motorola would be able to recover abroad or, whether the cartels’ host countries have any incentive to prosecute “when their nationals engage in hardcore cartel conduct directed at a huge U.S. consumer market” that caused harm in that, opposed to its own, market. two most recent comity principle constructions are in Hartford Fire and Empagran the different comity approaches are under -inclusive and over-inclusive , The Supreme Court’s approach in Hartford Fire suggested irrelevance , of comity Empagran’s comity analysis may be rigidly over-inclusive to the point where deterrence and remedy go unserved .

the ill-defined boundaries effects doctrine circuit splits Seventh Ninth circuits abstained from resolving questionable holding Seventh Circuit definition of “direct anticompetitive behavior intermediary products not direct” effect US commerce falls outside FTAIA ’s exception wrongly decided inconsistencies US precedent statutes negative consequences eliminates private antitrust remedies drastically mitigating deter harmful foreign conduct glaring inconsonance no attention recover abroad cartels’ host countries incentive to prosecute under -inclusive over-inclusive irrelevance comity deterrence remedy unserved

['IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE', 'Although clarity was one of Congress’ goals in enacting the FTAIA, the statute as drafted is anything but clear, and the FTAIA itself has contributed to the ill-defined boundaries of the effects doctrine. The FTAIA has produced a number of circuit splits, one of which was decided by Empagran.151 Other circuit splits currently exist, including one between the Seventh and Ninth circuits concerning the interpretation of the FTAIA’s requirement that anticompetitive behavior have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on US commerce which the Supreme Court has so far abstained from resolving.152 As explained in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., the “substantial” and “reasonably foreseeable” prongs have produced little dispute and are relatively straightforward.153 Rather, what it takes to show “direct” is less clear.154 The Seventh Circuit took the position that, like in tort law, recovery should be cut off for injuries that are too remote from the cause of an injury and held that the term “direct” means only “a reasonably proximate causal nexus.”155', 'To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies looked to the Supreme Court’s definition of “direct” from a different statute germane to international relations.156 Drawing from dictionary definitions and language in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that is similar to that in the FTAIA, the court held that an effect is “direct” if “it follows the immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.”157 This definition was subsequently utilized by the Ninth Circuit in its decision in United States v. Hsiung (the criminal prosecution of the defendants in Motorola Mobility), which expressly rejected Minn-Chem’s “reasonably proximate causal nexus” approach and reiterated instead the broader “immediate consequence” test.158', 'A. Problems Arising from the Circuit Split', 'Using Minn-Chem’s definition of “direct,” however, has produced a questionable holding in Motorola Mobility.159 In that case, a US company, Motorola, brought a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging that it was the victim of price-fixing among foreign manufacturers of liquid crystal display (“LCD”) panels used as components in the manufacture of cellphones.160 The LCD panel manufacturers had already been found guilty of participating in an illegal cartel, and those convictions were affirmed in Hsiung.161 Motorola was a major purchaser of LCD panels, but had purchased most of the price-fixed products through its majority-owned foreign subsidiaries.162 Only one percent of its purchases were made directly by Motorola in the United States and incorporated into cellphones also sold in the United States.163 The other ninety-nine percent of its purchases were made abroad.164 Of those purchases, forty-two percent were incorporated into phones destined for the United States, while the remainder were used to make phones sold abroad.165', 'In its first stab at the appeal of the lower court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit following Minn-Chem’s definition of “direct” held that anticompetitive behavior affecting intermediary products, rather than final products, could not have a “direct” effect on US commerce.166 After additional consideration likely influenced by the DOJ’s concern with the initial holding and its implications for international cartel enforcement, the court vacated the first opinion and opted for a different approach to the same conclusion.167 Summarizing that the case involved “components [that] were sold by their manufacturers to their foreign subsidiaries, which incorporated them into the finished product to Motorola for resale in the United States,” Judge Posner branded the wrongful conduct, effect, and injury as entirely extraterritorial because Motorola and its subsidiaries did not function as one enterprise.168 Therefore, the court construed Motorola as an indirect purchaser, barred from bringing a claim under the Sherman Act by virtue of the holding in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,169 and concluded that the entire transaction falls outside of the FTAIA’s exception, though recognizing that the effect on US commerce may, perhaps, be “direct.”170', 'But, the court’s reliance on Illinois Brick was no better than its initial attempt to characterize the effect of the LCD cartel on US commerce. Several points suggest Motorola Mobility was wrongly decided, including inconsistencies with US precedent and statutes. In holding that Motorola and its subsidiaries did not function as one enterprise because they are governed by the different laws of the countries in which they are incorporated and operated, Judge Posner disregarded the Supreme Court’s central holding in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.171 Copperweld’s progeny have found a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries to be a “single entity” with “complete unity of interest” and, similarly, have also found a lack of relevant differences between a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary for Sherman Act analysis.172 Additionally, for non-wholly owned subsidiaries, courts relying on Copperweld have treated a parent and its non-wholly owned subsidiary as a single entity for antitrust purposes where the parent held a controlling majority of the subsidiary’s stock.173', 'In addition to precedent, other US antitrust statutes treat parents and subsidiaries as one entity. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act (“HSR”) requires a business acquiring another business in a transaction meeting certain thresholds to file a premerger notification with the government.174 If the acquiring business is controlled by a parent corporation, the HSR mandates that the “ultimate parent entity” file the notification regardless of the nationality of the acquired business.175 Furthermore, appearing to be influenced by Copperweld, the HSR does not require filing for the merger of two wholly owned subsidiaries with a common parent.176', 'Motorola also argued that it was the “target” of the illegal conduct or, alternatively, the direct victim because its subsidiary “passed on” the cartel-inflated portion of the original purchase price to Motorola.177 In Illinois Brick, which also contemplated the offensive use of the ill- fated pass-on theory in US antitrust jurisprudence, Justice White surmised that a situation in which the pass-on defense “might be permitted” is where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer.178 Posner, highlighting the semantic difference between “might be” and “is,” brushed this off as meaningless.179', 'The Motorola Mobility decision has negative consequences for US antitrust law, non-US subsidiaries of American parents relying on US law for potential recovery, US businesses operating internationally with international subsidiaries, and consumers. In essence, the Seventh Circuit announced a broad rule that eliminates private antitrust remedies where the first purchase of a price-fixed component occurs offshore, drastically mitigating the ability of US antitrust law to deter harmful foreign conduct targeting US markets.180 Is Posner really suggesting that American businesses are only protected by US antitrust law when the domestic parent itself engages in such wholly foreign transactions?181', 'Moreover, the Seventh Circuit’s decision creates a glaring inconsonance with the Ninth Circuit’s in what should be similar outcomes to similar cases. Despite justifying its second decision the Seventh Circuit by warning that “rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law ‘creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability to independently regulate its own affairs,’” the court did not delve into any meaningful comity analysis.182 Particularly troubling is that while concerned with the prospect of “rampant extraterritoriality,” the court gives no attention to whether Motorola would be able to recover abroad or, more importantly, whether the cartels’ host countries have any incentive to prosecute “when their nationals engage in hardcore cartel conduct directed at a huge U.S. consumer market” that caused harm in that, opposed to its own, market.183 ', 'B. Comity Analysis: A Possible Solution to Interpreting the FTAIA?', 'Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit may have initially reached a more reasonable conclusion in its first decision of Motorola Mobility had the court taken a different interpretational approach, such as one taken by the Supreme Court. Because the FTAIA’s effect test reflects an evaluation of a US jurisdictional claim, a possible method of aiding the courts’ construction of what a “direct” effect entails may be to follow Empagran’s example and in fact employ a comity analysis.184 The two most recent comity principle constructions, as discussed, are in Hartford Fire and Empagran. However, the different comity approaches the Supreme Court undertakes in both cases result in standards that are under-inclusive and over-inclusive, respectively.', 'The Supreme Court’s approach in Hartford Fire suggested the unhelpfulness, if not irrelevance, of comity if there was no true conflict of laws.185 Hartford Fire’s comity test is under-inclusive in the sense that comity considerations would rarely be triggered, perhaps only in cases where a foreign state established laws mandating anticompetitive behavior.186 Indeed, the First Circuit in Nippon Paper suggested that Hartford Fire had “stunted” the growth of comity in antitrust, and Professor Eleanor Fox proclaimed that “[the decision in Hartford Fire] gives U.S. jurists and enforcers license to disregard the interests of non- Americans.”187', 'Empagran’s comity analysis, on the other hand, may be rigidly over-inclusive to the point where important US antitrust law objectives, such as deterrence and remedy, may go unserved. Turning its back on the Supreme Court’s previous holdings in Continental Ore and Pfizer, the decision’s use of comity may in fact have created “a handicap going forward [that] would lead to under-deterrence as well as unfairness.”188 As Judge Higginbotham’s dissent in Den Norske v. HeereMac stresses, the FTAIA does not alter Pfizer’s affirmation of foreign plaintiffs’ ability to sue under the Sherman Act, which was expressly approved in the statute’s legislative history.189']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-Harvard-Round4.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Aff-Harvard-Round4.docx

a5ece03919bfbd1a950125b500bd3fcc6ed3b1630c590cb0997796168c9149d8

Growth is strong

Dr. Daniel Bachman 3-17, Senior Manager with Deloitte Services LP, B.A. from Johns Hopkins and Ph.D. from Brown University, “United States Economic Forecast”, Deloitte, 3/17/2022, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/us-economic-forecast/united-states-outlook-analysis.html

Ukraine won’t derail recovery US performance has been better While Omicron took rates high, little trace appeared in data US is well by most measures unemployment back labor participation up Corporate profits more than satisfactory profits support investment businesses are optimistic impact of Ukraine is not enough to generate recession But growth could slow

Ukraine war won’t derail the recovery The US economy’s performance has been better than expected While Omicron took rates to a new high, little trace appeared in economic data the US economy is performing well by most measures unemployment is back to full labor force participation has started to pick up Corporate profits are more than satisfactory That’s much better than many businesses had reason to expect when the pandemic first hit in March 2020 Strong profits have support ed business investment But the willingness to invest suggests that businesses are surprisingly optimistic about the future The pandemic drove the adoption of tech and accelerated labor productivity growth The US economy is likely to feel the impact of Ukraine The combined impact is not large enough to generate a recession in the U S But growth could slow down That’s not huge

won’t derail better Omicron little trace economic data performing well most measures Corporate profits more than satisfactory much better expect support business investment surprisingly optimistic tech Ukraine impact not large enough recession U S slow not huge

['The Russia-Ukraine war won’t derail the recovery', 'The US economy’s performance in the past few months has been better than most people expected—or even realized. While Omicron took infection rates to a new high, little trace appeared in economic data. Inflation and related problems, such as tangled supply chains, may continue to challenge business leaders and policymakers, but the US economy is performing well by most measures:', 'The unemployment rate is already back to the full employment level.', 'The labor force participation rate has started to pick up, as some of the folks who left the labor force are coming back to work.', 'Corporate profits are more than satisfactory. Profits in Q3 2021 were 21% above the prepandemic level. That’s much better than many businesses had reason to expect when the pandemic first hit in March 2020.', 'Strong profits have supported business investment. The pandemic shifted investment away from buildings and toward equipment and information products.1 But the willingness to invest suggests that businesses are surprisingly optimistic ', '', '', '', 'about the future.', 'The pandemic drove the adoption of technology and—as a consequence—appears to have accelerated labor productivity growth. Previous Deloitte forecasts assumed trend productivity was less than 1%. But productivity growth has remained surprisingly strong during the recovery from the pandemic, about 2% over the four quarters to December 2021. If productivity growth remains high, many of the long-term issues facing the US economy—such as financing social security—will likely become considerably easier to solve.', 'But just as Omicron’s potential to impact the economy waned, geopolitical tensions increased. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not likely to derail the US recovery, but it will push up inflation in the short run.', 'The US economy is likely to feel the impact of a continuing Ukraine crisis through two main channels.', 'Most importantly, the price of oil is likely to remain higher than it would have otherwise—although how much higher is an open question. Russia produces about 12% of global crude oil supplies. Sanctions may remove some of this oil supply, as the United States (and possibly some European countries) reduce or end purchases of Russian oil.', 'However, oil is a global, fungible commodity and Russia can still sell oil to non-boycotting nations. That would release other oil for shipment to boycotting countries without affecting the global price of oil. Of course, payments may be more difficult, and Russia may need to sell its oil at a discount. But the size of the supply shock may be more limited than that 12% figure suggests.', 'Europe’s heavy dependence on Russian natural gas suggests that the EU’s economy will experience slower growth—or, in the extreme case, a recession. The EU is a major trading partner of the United States, accounting for more than 15% of US exports. On top of a direct decline in demand, dollar appreciation reflecting the relative safety of the United States will make US goods less competitive. Both would reduce the contribution of exports to US GDP growth.', 'The combined impact is not large enough to generate a recession in the United States. But growth could slow down. And inflation would pick up, at least in the short term. Our baseline forecast assumes a US$15 per barrel rise in the price of oil, which leads to an extra half a percentage point rise in the consumer price index (CPI) in 2022 (with most of the rise occurring in the second quarter). That’s not huge, but during a period when the Fed is struggling to control inflation, it presents policymakers with a big problem.', '']

[(11, 23)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%20National%20Debate%20Tournament-Doubles.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Neg-00%2520National%2520Debate%2520Tournament-Doubles.docx

f4ff582d01766e280b47f600a20544bb9540f141ba6f84285dd6b6218e16465b

It's a key stepping stone for NPT commitments.

Paul 23 (*Dr Rishi Paul: Policy Fellow, Programme Manager, BASIC Programme on Nuclear Disarmament; Manager, Stepping Stones Project, provides intellectual support to the Stockholm Initiative, MA, Strategic Studies, PhD, University of Leeds, *Paul Ingram: Former Head of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2023, “Nuclear Diplomacy Crossroads,” BASIC, https://basicint.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Nuclear-Diplomacy-Crossroads_Rishi_Paul_Paul_Ingram-1-1.pdf)

declarations had no legal or political obligation importance of commitments was reinforced represents a significant step in reinforcing importance and sustainability of NPT agreements most notable was extensive reference to NSAs regretting lack of progress on universal NSAs participants felt adherence was very relevant to progress and ought be a focus . would reflect justice and recognition of double-commitment to non-prolif and strengthen confidence in the regime .

The draft Final Document was not agreed. it reaffirms ‘validity of all existing commitments undertaken’ This is in spite of prior suggestions that previous declarations had no legal or political obligation shared understanding of the importance of past commitments was reinforced by representatives of the NWS. It represents a significant step forward in reinforcing importance and sustainability of NPT agreements the most notable references in the Document was extensive reference to Negative Security Assurances ( NSAs ), welcoming their reaffirmation , but regretting lack of progress on effective universal NSAs participants felt references to achieving universal adherence amongst NWS to the NWFZ additional protocols was very relevant to progress and ought to be a focus . legal status was important given the recent experience with security assurances contained within the Budapest Memorandum. This would reflect justice and recognition of the double-commitment to non-prolif eration by NWFZ members, and strengthen confidence in the regime .

legal political obligation significant step importance sustainability NPT agreements NSAs reaffirmation lack of progress universal NSAs very relevant focus recent experience Budapest justice recognition double-commitment to non-prolif confidence in the regime

['', 'Assessment of the Draft Final Document ', 'The draft Final Document was not agreed. Given this document holds no formal legal or political status, it cannot be used to imply agreement by any participating state. Whilst it appeared that it was the paragraphs pertaining to the Ukrainian nuclear facilities that blocked agreement, there could have been other dimensions that would have resulted in the same negative outcome. Nevertheless, the draft Final Document is the best resource we have at our disposal, as a point of departure for those within the Stockholm Initiative seeking indicators of potential productive stepping stones as we move into the next Review Cycle. ', 'At several points, it reaffirms continued ‘validity of all existing commitments undertaken’ from 2000 and 2010, especially Action 5 from the 2010 Plan. 8 This is in spite of prior suggestions that previous declarations were of their time and had no legal or political obligation to them. This shared understanding of the importance of past commitments was reinforced in our workshops by representatives of the NWS. It represents a significant step forward in reinforcing the importance and sustainability of NPT agreements, and was an explicit objective of the Stockholm Initiative. Our participants agreed that without the universal recognition of the lasting nature of agreements, the value of the NPT Review process was called into question.', 'Also, other important objectives of the Stockholm Initiative were reaffirmed at the roundtables, including early entry into force of the CTBT and a negotiation of a fissile material treaty. But perhaps the most notable references in the draft Final Document around the Initiative’s agenda was extensive reference to Negative Security Assurances (NSAs), welcoming their reaffirmation, but regretting the lack of progress on effective universal NSAs (Para. 145). Some participants to our workshops felt that the references to achieving more universal adherence amongst the NWS to the NWFZ additional protocols in an unconditional manner was very relevant to progress and ought to be a focus. Their legal status was particularly important given the recent experience with the security assurances contained within the Budapest Memorandum. This would reflect some degree of justice and recognition of the double-commitment to non-proliferation by NWFZ members, and thereby strengthen confidence in the regime. ', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-2---Kentucky-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

fbfb702137f7b107dd000948d7e776eb01fb2bd5fe630ddc5a76c665742917fc

Threat of treble damages alone are devastating.

Buxbaum ’19 [Hannah; 2019; professor at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law, where she holds the John E. Schiller Chair; Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper, “The Role of Hybrid Public-Private Regulation in Reducing Cross-Border Conflict,” no. 8 p. 409-34; KP]

disincentives to self-reporting by civil liability become overwhelming when treble damages available to all consumers around world prospect of liability outweighs amnesty would foreign nations’ antitrust diminishing foreign firms’ incentive to coop with authorities in return for amnesty private enforcement in U S interfere with enforcement in other countries

Public authorities made this point public agencies reviewed disincentives to self-reporting created by civil liability [t]hese disincentives become overwhelming when treble damages are made available to all consumers around the world the prospect of ruinous civil liability in U.S. courts far outweighs benefits companies would receive from participating in amnesty program allowing foreign plaintiffs to pursue private treble-damages would undermine foreign nations’ antitrust enforcement by diminishing foreign firms’ incentive to coop erate with antitrust authorities in return for amnesty private enforcement in the U S risks interfere nce with enforcement in other countries , not just in the U S This interference is difficult to address it cannot be resolved by regulation

disincentives civil liability overwhelming around the world far outweighs private treble-damages antitrust enforcement coop erate amnesty private enforcement enforcement difficult regulation

['Public authorities both in the United States and in a number of European countries made this point as amici curiae in litigation against participants in a global vitamins cartel in the early 2000s. In that case, the Supreme Court considered whether U.S. antitrust law applied to the claims of plaintiffs who had purchased price-fixed vitamins outside the United States. If so, those plaintiffs could have joined the class action initiated by U.S. purchasers of the goods, thus increasing the overall size of the class. The public agencies reviewed the disincentives to self-reporting created by follow-on civil liability. They argued that “[t]hese disincentives become overwhelming when treble damages are made available not only to U.S. consumers, but also to all consumers around the world. At that point, the prospect of ruinous civil liability in U.S. courts far outweighs the benefits most companies would receive from participating in an amnesty program.”459 The Court referred to this argument in its decision, observing that allowing foreign plaintiffs to “pursue private treble-damages remedies would undermine foreign nations’ own antitrust enforcement policies by diminishing foreign firms’ incentive to cooperate with antitrust authorities in return for prosecutorial amnesty.”460', 'In this way, private enforcement in the United States risks interference with public enforcement efforts in other countries, not just in the United States. This sort of interference is more difficult to address, since it cannot be resolved by domestic regulation calibrating the relationship between public and private regulation.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-ADA-Quarters.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-ADA-Quarters.docx

42dc64d1d802e6ba4de2cdbd6e17745685df9934799515b5c9443941af7ba0d2

Alt causes to autonomous ship adoption and mix navigational scenarios can challenge world trade.

Tae-eun Kim at al., 22. Associate Professor of Maritime Safety Management at University of Tromsø (UiT) - The Arctic University of Norway. Safety challenges related to autonomous ships in mixed navigational environments. WMU J Marit Affairs 21, 141–159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13437-022-00277-z

although autonomous ships are projected to be the future their safety risk control reliability legal qualification and watchkeeping requirements economic cyber security as well as many other challenges viewed as obstacles in transforming this into reality. Several studies have assessed the risks less discussion related to risks and hazards in mix-navigational scenarios conventionally manned ships carry more than 80% of trade on the global oceans autonomous ships will navigate in a mixed environment with close-range encounters vessel interactions can complicate the decision-making process and compromise navigation safety since both humans and systems are making respective decisions

although autonomous and remotely controlled ships are projected to be the future of maritime operations, their safety (Felski and Zwolak ), risk control (Utne et al. ), reliability ( Abaei et al. ), legal ( Ringbom et al. ), qualification and watchkeeping requirements for remote control operators and seafarers (Sharma and Kim ), economic (Kretschmann et al. ), cyber security (Tam and Jones ) as well as many other challenges (Hogg and Ghosh ) have also been viewed as obstacles in transforming this concept into reality. Several studies as of present have assessed the risks involved in the operations of MASS (Bao et al. ; Chang et al. ; Fan et al. ; Huang and van Gelder ). However, there has been less discussion related to the risks and hazards involved in the mix-navigational scenarios . there are more than 61,000 conventionally manned ships carry ing more than 80% of world trade on the global oceans autonomous ships will navigate in a mixed environment with potentially close-range encounters vessel interactions in such environments can complicate the decision-making process and compromise navigation safety since both humans and systems are making the respective decisions , specially in ship collision avoidance situations t

safety risk control reliability legal qualification and watchkeeping requirements economic cyber security many other challenges obstacles Several studies mix-navigational scenarios . carry ing more than 80% of world trade on the global oceans close-range encounters complicate the decision-making process compromise navigation safety

['However, although autonomous and remotely controlled ships are projected to be the future of maritime operations, their safety (Felski and Zwolak ), risk control (Utne et al. ), reliability (Abaei et al. ), legal (Ringbom et al. ), qualification and watchkeeping requirements for remote control operators and seafarers (Sharma and Kim ), economic (Kretschmann et al. ), cyber security (Tam and Jones ) as well as many other challenges (Hogg and Ghosh ) have also been viewed as obstacles in transforming this concept into reality. Disruptive technologies promise new capabilities and solutions, but also bring new risk profile, quality assurance, and safety management challenges. With higher level of autonomy, the unpredictability and uncertainties would become more significant, which creates new safety and reliability assurance challenges for MASS operations (Goerlandt ). Several studies as of present have assessed the risks involved in the operations of MASS (Bao et al. ; Chang et al. ; Fan et al. ; Huang and van Gelder ). However, there has been less discussion related to the risks and hazards involved in the mix-navigational scenarios. Today there are more than 61,000 conventionally manned ships carrying more than 80% of world trade on the global oceans; it can be predicted that in near future, different degrees of MASS and conventional ships will share and operate at the same time in the same sea area, which means the autonomous ships will navigate in a mixed environment with potentially close-range encounters. The vessel interactions in such environments can complicate the decision-making process and compromise navigation safety since both humans and systems are making the respective decisions, specially in ship collision avoidance situations (Perera and Batalden ). The risk and safety issues under such navigation conditions should be considered and identified so that preventive measures could be designed during the current technological development phase. This study explores the potential safety challenges related to autonomous ship operations in a mixed navigational environment and provides an analysis regarding the safety factors to be considered for the interaction scenarios and how greater compatibility might be achieved within a mixed traffic environment.', '']

[(8, 11), (12, 19), (20, 22)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-NDT-Round-6.docx

Emory

MiPi

5270e976c9f347ac8fb5e54f22769551aa825ebbb874e1c21aae227a42117a8a

Empirics—it’s resilient—even the best movement can’t collapse it.

Igor Guardiancich 17, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Management of the University of Southern Denmark, 3/3/2017, “Absorb, Coopt and Recast: Global Neoliberalism’s Resilience through Local Translation”,

Even under full-out attack unleashed in the financial crisis neoliberalism proved resilient Its capacity to absorb, coopt and recast ideas guarantee survival Zapatero tried to salvage social-democratic legacies the disaster of the cajas intensified In Romania, local policymakers further radicalized opposite strategy of upward redistribution was chosen despite challenges, neoliberalism is alive and kicking

rather than a mass-produced, slightly shrunk, and off-the-rack ideological suit, neoliberalism is a bespoke outfit made from a dynamic fabric that absorbs local color Even under a full-out attack against some of its basic assumptions such as the one unleashed in the immediate wake of the global financial crisis neoliberalism proved resilient beyond its many architects’ wildest dreams. Its capacity to absorb, coopt and recast selected ideas of oppositional social forces has been the valuable asset guarantee ing its survival The socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero tried to salvage the social-democratic legacies of the Spanish economy by engineering a Keynesian rescue package. Only later, when the disaster of the cajas became apparent and the emergency intensified , did conservative PM Mariano Rajoy embrace more deregulation In Romania, local policymakers further radicalized in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ crisis, thereby outbidding the IMF on austerity and structural reforms. Instead of shielding lower-income groups, the opposite strategy of upward redistribution was chosen , despite the challenges, neoliberalism is alive and kicking

full-out attack beyond its many architects’ wildest dreams. guarantee alive and kicking

['', 'One powerful message permeating the book, and which gives a forceful explanation to Colin Crouch’s punchy title is that: “rather than a mass-produced, slightly shrunk, and off-the-rack ideological suit, neoliberalism is a bespoke outfit made from a dynamic fabric that absorbs local color” (5). Even under a full-out attack against some of its basic assumptions, such as the one unleashed in the immediate wake of the global financial crisis, neoliberalism proved resilient beyond its many architects’ wildest dreams. Its capacity to absorb, coopt and recast selected ideas of oppositional social forces has been the most valuable asset guaranteeing its survival. Again, the comparison of the responses to the crisis in Spain and Romania show such adaptability in full.¶ The socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero tried to salvage the social-democratic legacies of the Spanish economy by engineering a Keynesian rescue package. Only later, when the disaster of the cajas became apparent and the emergency intensified, did conservative PM Mariano Rajoy embrace more deregulation in the labour market (inspired by the Hartz IV reform) and extensive cuts in the public sector under the strong external pressure of the European Central Bank and of international financial markets.¶ In Romania, local policymakers further radicalized in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ crisis, thereby outbidding the IMF on austerity and structural reforms. Instead of shielding lower-income groups, the opposite strategy of upward redistribution was chosen. By heroically withstanding the external attempts at moderation, the Romanian economy retained an unenviable mix of libertarian achievements (flat-tax rates), experimental neoliberalism (privatized pensions) and mainstream neoliberal orthodoxy (sound finance, labour market deregulation, social policy targeting, privatization of all public companies). Pure laissez-faire ideas such as the replacement of the welfare state by a voluntary, private, Christian charity system were not unheard of.¶ Hence, through an insightful analysis of the ideational underpinnings of its local interpretations, this book shows us that, despite the challenges, neoliberalism is alive and kicking. Ban guides us through half a century of policymaking in Spain and Romania, and embeds his analysis within the related nuances of contemporary liberal economic thought. The research is a valuable addition to a growing literature on the origin of current ideational frames and comfortably sits alongside contemporary classics, such as Mark Blyth’s Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. ', '', '']

[(5, 20)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-8-Navy-Round3.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-8-Navy-Round3.docx

9d5b66034679f5ec5481ac5197a6de03286fee7978f19a1a656baba5674fafd1

Infrastructure bills are stalled---shutdown is the new top priority and will drain PC

Greg Valliere 9/8, Chief US Policy Strategist, AGF Investments, “Hardball on Debt Ceiling; Manchin Sets His Price,” AGF Perspectives, 9-8-2021, https://perspectives.agf.com/ci-morning-bullets-hardball-on-debt-ceiling-manchin-sets-his-price/

THE INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING BILLS stall until early winter debt ceiling extension needs to be resolved THERE WILL BE BRUTAL ARM-TWISTING to pass a c r accompanied by the debt ceiling Manchin could be bluffing 1.5 trillion really is his limit THIS ENRAGES PROGRESSIVES

THE INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING BILLS may stall until early winter but a debt ceiling extension needs to be resolved within the next two months this may prompt a change in strategy at the White House . Biden and his top aides are considering this quid pro quo : if at least some Republicans don’t agree to hike the debt ceiling , they would jeopardize emergency aid for hurricane victims and Afghan refugees SO attempting to raise the debt ceiling in a separate, stand-alone bill may be scrapped because there probably aren’t enough votes The need to pass a stop-gap budget resolution, keeping the government open changes the dynamics. THERE WILL BE SOME BRUTAL ARM-TWISTING to pass a c ontinuing r esolution accompanied by the debt ceiling hike and hurricane aid But the mammoth infrastructure bills are another story Manchin dropped this bombshell yesterday — he will accept only a $1.5 trillion social spending bill, and might not approve much above $1 trillion. MANCHIN OFTEN POSTURES could be bluffing but our sense is that $ 1.5 trillion really is his limit THIS ENRAGES PROGRESSIVES

stall until early winter debt ceiling extension within the next two months change in strategy at the White House quid pro quo some Republicans debt ceiling emergency aid for hurricane victims and Afghan refugees separate, stand-alone scrapped SOME BRUTAL ARM-TWISTING to pass a c ontinuing r esolution accompanied by the debt ceiling hike and hurricane aid mammoth infrastructure bills are another story Manchin OFTEN POSTURES could bluffing our sense really is his limit ENRAGES PROGRESSIVES

['THE INFRASTRUCTURE SPENDING BILLS may stall until early winter, but a debt ceiling extension needs to be resolved within the next two months. So this may prompt a change in strategy at the White House.', 'POLITICAL HARDBALL: Joe Biden and his top aides are considering this quid pro quo: if at least some Republicans don’t agree to hike the debt ceiling, they would jeopardize emergency aid for hurricane victims and Afghan refugees, which may be combined with a debt ceiling extension. And who would want to vote against aid to hurricane victims?', 'SO THIS SUMMER’S STRATEGY of attempting to raise the debt ceiling in a separate, stand-alone bill may be scrapped, wisely, because there probably aren’t enough votes for that. The need to pass a stop-gap budget resolution, keeping the government open when the new fiscal year begins on Oct. 1, changes the dynamics.', 'WHAT A DIFFICULT CHOICE for the two Republican Senators from Louisiana — they hate the idea of raising the debt ceiling, but are they prepared to accept blame for a government shutdown on Oct. 1 if they don’t pass a continuing spending resolution by then? And, more importantly, would they be willing to delay federal aid to their storm-ravaged Louisiana constituents? Now that’s hardball.', 'WE THINK THERE WILL BE SOME BRUTAL ARM-TWISTING to pass a continuing resolution by Oct. 1, accompanied by the debt ceiling hike and hurricane aid. But the mammoth infrastructure bills are another story, as Joe Manchin once again becomes the key player.', '* * * * *', 'JOE MANCHIN’S PRICE: While a debt ceiling deal can get hammered through Congress, getting $3.5 trillion in new social spending may be more difficult. Moderate Democratic Sen. Joe Manchin, always in the spotlight, dropped this bombshell yesterday — he will accept only a $1.5 trillion social spending bill, and might not approve much above $1 trillion.', 'MANCHIN OFTEN POSTURES, because his conservative constituents in West Virginia don’t like big government and spending (both of which help those constituents). Manchin could be bluffing, but our sense is that $1.5 trillion really is his limit; same with Sen. Kyrsten Sinema, another moderate Democrat.', 'THIS ENRAGES PROGRESSIVES IN THE HOUSE, who will not agree to a measly $1.5 trillion. Thus we think that a “pox on both your houses” mood may prevail, with the massive $3.5 trillion social spending bill gridlocked for weeks to come — a source of uncertainty for the markets, which want to see more stimulus as the economic outlook turns cloudy because of Delta.', '', '']

[(5, 17)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Landgraff-Wegener-Aff-Northwestern-Round6.docx

Northwestern

LaWe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/LaWe/Northwestern-Landgraff-Wegener-Aff-Northwestern-Round6.docx

9ada2bca08f4252742611372097da9b12ef86ea2cf3fa5e230e768994e6e60c8

Extinction is antithetical to black scholarship.

Moten and Kelley ’17 [Fred and Robin; professor of Performance Studies at New York University; Professor of American History at UCLA; “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten in Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 31:49-55:57]

Black studies has fundamental mission to save possibility of human existence Black studies critique West we have to dismantle it, recognize weak edifice also know everything happening within liberation is ongoing recognizing the past and construction of new future there's lot of scholarship that has no relation to transformation to community settler colonialism slave trade provide conception of self But for everybody we now attempt to survive feminist queer interventions against patriarchy Black interventions against slavery indigenous interventions against set colonialism constitute attempts to survive save the Earth before end of the world this is urgent

Black studies has a certain place in university having done the work of attempting to bring university into its own intellectual mission Black studies has fundamental and specific mission that mission is to save the possibility of human existence Black studies is a critique of West ern civilization we both have to dismantle it, recognize the weak edifice but also know everything that’s happening within it Black Studies is a project for liberation liberation is an ongoing project It’s about the future recognizing the past and the construction of a new future there's a lot of scholarship that has no relation ship at all to transformation to actual people in community settler colonialism transatlantic slave trade and philosophical formulations provide conception of self But for everybody who lives in the world modernity is a disaster that we live, that we now attempt to survive what's at stake is feminist and queer interventions against heteronormative patriarchy Black interventions against slavery that indigenous interventions against set tler colonialism constitute practical and intellectual basis for attempts to survive to save the Earth to see the Earth before the end of the world this is an emergency and it's urgent there’s convergence of black

Black studies university done the work intellectual mission fundamental specific mission human existence Black studies critique West ern civilization have dismantle weak edifice know everything within it project liberation ongoing project future past new future no relation ship transformation community settler colonialism transatlantic slave trade philosophical formulations self But everybody lives in the world disaster attempt to survive stake feminist queer heteronormative patriarchy Black slavery indigenous set tler colonialism practical intellectual survive save the Earth before the end of the world emergency urgent convergence

["MOTEN: Well, first of all, I just want to say how much I appreciate having a chance to be here with all of you tonight, and thank you, Rinaldo, and, uh, Alicia, and Afua, of course. Robin, as always, uh, an honor to be, have a chance to hang out with you, and uh, and to learn from you, and um, let me see. Um, well, I tend to think of Black studies not so much as an academic discipline or confluence of disciplines but as the atmosphere in which I grew up, and so, and I love that, that atmosphere. I love the way that it felt, and I love the way that it smelled, and I love the flavors, and I love the sounds, and I love the movements. Um, and so, it is, again, something that I think has a certain place, maybe, in the university, and what it meant, what it has meant for Black studies to take that place in the university has had both, has been both good and bad. I think it’s probably done much more for the university than it has for Black studies, and, and that’s something worth thinking about. And I don’t say that because I’m trying to advocate some withdrawal from the university of Black studies, but I’m thinking that, you know, that at this stage of the game in having done the work of attempting to actually bring, um, the university into some sense of its own, of what ought to be its own intellectual mission, Black studies has the right to look out for itself now, for a little bit, um, and I think it’s worth it to do that. And insofar as Black studies has earned a right to look out for itself, what that really means, I think, is that Black studies has earned the right to try again to take its fundamental responsibility, which is to be, uh, a place where we can look out for the Earth. Um, I think that Black studies has a fundamental and specific, though not necessarily exclusive mission, and that mission is to try to save the Earth, or at least to try to save, not, well, on the most fundamental level to save the Earth, and on a secondary level, to try to save the possibility of human existence on the Earth. Um, and I know that’s a big statement, and I don’t wanna take up all the time, but I’m happy to try to say more about what I think I mean by that later on, but, um, but I think maybe it’s important just to leave that big statement out there for a minute, and just to make sure that you know that I knew that I said it when I said it. KELLEY: Okay, well, actually I wanna echo, uh, Fred’s sentiments, that it’s really an honor to be here, in this space. Um, this is the second time that we’ve had kind of a public conversation, and it’s always packed, you know, and it’s always a lot of people, and expectations are always high, and one of my favorite things on the planet, besides just talking to my daughters, talking to Fred Moten, um, you know, and it’s just really, you know, I learn so much from it, and in fact, let me just begin by saying that one of the pieces that Rinaldo was referring to was an essay I wrote called, uh, “Black Study, Black Struggle,” which was entirely inspired by, uh, Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s, uh, book, “The Undercommons.” It was a way of the application of the notion of the undercommons to understanding what was happening at that moment, which in, in the fall of 2015, there was like an explosion of, um, Black protests on, on campus, and, you know, I won’t repeat what’s in the article, uh, but it, it’s not an accident that some of those struggles, uh, were products of what was happening in the streets. In other words, what happened in Ferguson, and what happened in Baltimore, what happened all over the country, and what happened in places like here in Toronto, were the catalyst for, um, a kind of explosion on campuses, where, uh, students were trying to figure out their place in the university. They’re dealing with racism, and microaggressions on university campuses, uh, they’re dealing with a, a kind of deracinated, you know, curriculum where ethnic studies wasn’t what it was, in its inception. Um, and, I was also dealing with, or many of us were also dealing with, uh, a culture of, and I hate to put it this way, but a culture of anti-intellectualism in, in a different sort of way. I mean, universities are often anti-intellectual, in that they actually disavow certain forms of knowledge and put other knowledge above that, which is an anti-intellectual position by the way. Um, but then when you’re assaulted by that all the time, uh, sometimes you end up mirroring that culture. And you’re saying “well I’m not gonna read this, I’m not gonna read that, because so-and-so wrote it,” as opposed to saying that there’s nothing off the table, uh, that Black studies, and Fred knows this ‘cause he repeats it more than I do, that our mutual, uh, teacher, Cedric Robinson, who paraphrased C. L. R. James, said you know, Black studies is a critique of Western civilization, and if that is the case, then we both have to dismantle it, recognize the weak edifice upon which it’s built, but also know everything that’s happening within it. But anyway, let me just back up, um, so, I just, so the three points I wanna make in reference to the question, one is that, uh, social movements have always been the catalyst for Black studies. When Fred was talking about, you know, Black studies as, as, uh, kinda, kinda like a way of life, as an atmosphere in which he grew up and which I grew up and many of us grew up, that’s so true. I never thought about it that way, but, you know, that’s so true. And in fact, um, if anything, Black Studies is not a multidiscipline but a project, a project for liberation, whatever that means, and liberation is an ongoing project. Um, Ruthie Gilmore, uh, who was at USC, uh, with me and Fred, had come up with this idea of renaming ethnic studies “liberation studies.” And, you know, we were actually serious about that, we were like, trying to figure out how to do that, and never filled it, but it reminds us that, you know, it’s not about, um, it’s not about a body. It’s not about bodies. It’s about ideas, and about the future, you know. It’s about recognizing the past and the construction of a new future. And so I think, in that respect, in order to understand the future of Black studies, we gotta understand the movements that produced it—that, that the Movement for Black Lives, that, um, uh, We Charge Genocide, that Black Youth Projects 100—all these struggles that erupted have, in fact, uh, pointed the way for Black Studies. The problem is, is that what gets constituted as the institutional space of Black studies, in many cases, isn’t really that. And I hate to bring people down, because we’re supposed to be up, right? But there are a lot of departments that I wouldn't call Black studies departments that have that name, you know, there are a lot of, there's a lot of scholarship that goes on that has no relationship at all to the project of transformation, or to people, to actual people in community. And one of the important things to always remember is that, um, we wouldn't have Black studies if it wasn't—in the United States, that is, I'm talking about the US—if it wasn't for Watts, if it wasn't for Detroit in 67, and if it wasn't for those kinds of urban rebellions, if it wasn't for the struggles in the South, that's where Black studies comes from. Uh, and so it moves into the university as a, as a transformative project. Um, it's not—and that's why I think there was a disconnect between some of the, the protests and what was happening in the academy. Finally, there’s this question of, of ethnic studies versus, or against, or for, or within or bedded in Black studies. And one of the things that, that I think a lot of us are trying to figure out is to deepen the relationship between indigenous studies and Black studies. Um, to understand that this was what I call second wave ethnic studies in the 1990s was itself a project that was, believe it or not, in a, a response to neoliberalism. And I think we don't always see that because we, we tend to read backwards in the 1990s and 1980s as, like, ethnic studies as identity politics in the narrowest sense of the word, that somehow this was about producing a sense of, of pride and a sense of identity devoid of the question of power. But if you actually look at the struggles for ethnic studies in the 80s and 90s, it was all about power. That, that what we think of as comparative or critical ethnic studies was, wasn't about the celebration of difference. It wasn't liberal multiculturalism. It was an assault on a neoliberal turn. And we, we sometimes forget that and, and, and then we write the history. And so I think I want to at some point talk more about that, but I think that's something to remember, because, right now, if we don't have Black studies as a critique in response to the neoliberal neofascist turn, then it's sort of worthless. You know, it's going to continue to exist. Maybe not in the academy though. So I'll just stop there. WALCOTT: So, um, Robin, where you ended, and, and where Fred began, it’s a, is a good segue into getting you, both of you, to talk about the work that you've been doing around questions of Palestinian struggle and freedom. Fred, the work that, the tremendous work that you did in the ASA, um, American Studies Association, for which the Association is still living true, and, and Robin the work that you continue to do with um, um, with faculty for Palestine. But I'm thinking about Fred's provocation here that Black studies about saving the Earth and if Black studies is indeed about saving the Earth, which I'm very willing to fall right into right now, you know, first to kind of maybe think about this relationship between the struggle and, and freedom of Palestine and the relationship between ongoing settler colonialisms globally, because it seems to me that one of the most powerful things that, um, the kind of Black studies that has taken to the streets recently has done is to make those kinds of concerns present, right? BLM visits to Palestine, BLM in Toronto, always making sure that the invocation of the politics of settler colonialism is a part of a political organizing, and, um, their intimate relations with indigenous communities. So maybe this is a way for us to begin to talk about what's really at stake in this contemporary political moment where, um, or, or a radical politics, a politics that wants to think a different kind of future formation, is grappling with, um, settler colonialism in various kinds of ways. But Palestine being central to that, given that we know as we sit in this university is that often, um, what we call our senior administrators have an entirely different relationship with the question of freedom for Palestine. MOTEN: Well, um, first, I mean, the work I did around, um, you know, the ASA’s, um, you know, decision to endorse the academic and cultural boycott of Israel was really minimal and minor compared to a lot of other people who were really out front, um, and, and have been working tirelessly for that for many, many years. Um, and I think, you know, the, my contribution was more, you know, rhetorical in many ways in, in, in, and, and maybe, maybe theoretical only in the most minimal sense, in the sense that what I wanted to do was a couple of things. First, to recognize that, um, you know, let's say that the conditions of what people call modernity, um, in, in, in, in, or global modernity, that the fundamental conditions that make that up are, you know, settler colonialism. And I think we can talk about settler colonialism in ways that are broader than the normal way that we usually think of them as a set of violent and brutal relations between Europe and the rest of the world. Because I think it's really important. And, and, and again, our, our mutual friend and mentor Cedric Robinson, pointed this out emphatically, and in brilliant ways early on, that settler colonialism is also an intra-European affair. Um, and it's important to understand that. It's important to understand this historic relationship between settler colonialism in the enclosure of the commons, um, which is part and, part of the origins of, of what we now know or understand as capitalism. But if we understand that settler colonialism, that the transatlantic slave trade, um, and that, you know, the emergence of a set of philosophical formulations that essentially provide for us some modern conception of self that has as its basis a kind of possessive, heteronormative, patriarchal individuation, right? That's what it is to be yourself on the most fundamental level. You know, and if you ask anybody in the philosophy department, they'll tell you that that's true, you know, and they won’t be joking, right, that, um, that, these, that these constitute the basis of, of our modernity. But for most of the people who live in the world, actually for everybody who lives in the world, although most of the people in live in the world are actually able to both recognize this and say this, that modernity is a social and ecological disaster that we live, that we now attempt to survive. Okay? And if we take that up, then part of what's at stake is that we recognize that feminist and queer interventions against heteronormative patriarchy, that Black interventions against the theory and practice of slavery, which is ongoing, that indigenous interventions against settler colonialism constitute the general both practical and intellectual basis for not only our attempts to survive, but also our attempts to, as I said before, save the Earth. And, and I put it in terms that the great poet Ed Roberson puts it; not just to save the Earth, but to see the Earth before the end of the world. And this is an emergency that we're in now and it's urgent. Um, and I believe that there’s a specific convergence of black thought and indigenous thought that situates itself precisely in relation to, and is articulated through, the interventions of queer thought and feminist thought that we want to take up. And, and it, and it strikes me as, for me at least, it's, it's a way of taking up a kind an—it's, it’s a way of imagining how one might be able to, how we might be able to walk more lightly on the Earth. To honor the Earth as we walk on it, as we stand on it. To not stomp on it, to not stomp all over it, where every step you take is a claim of ownership. And, and this is one way to put it, would be to not so presumptuously imagine that the Earth can be reduced to something so paltry and so viciously understood as what we usually call home. This is part of the reason why the queer and the feminist critique is so important. It's a critique of a general problematic notion of domesticity. It's like another way of being on the Earth that doesn't allow you in some vicious and brutal way to claim that it is yours, right? Um, this is important and this is so, you know, often the methods that we use to claim the Earth as ours involved fences, borders. This manifests itself on a private level from household to household, but it also manifests itself on a national level, and at the level of the nation state, and it's not an accident that settler colonial states take it upon themselves to imagine themselves to be the living embodiment of the legitimacy of the nation state as a political and social form. For me, there's two reasons to be in solidarity with the people of Palestine. One is because they're human beings and they're being treated with absolute brutality, but the other is that there's a specific resistance to Israel as a nation state. And for my money, to be perfectly clear about this, I believe that this nation state of Israel is itself an artifact of antisemitism. If we thought about Israel and Zionism, not just as a form of racism that results in the displacement of Palestinians, but if we also think about them as artifacts of the historic displacement of Jews from Europe, right, in the same way that we might think of, let's say Sierra Leone or Liberia as artifacts of racist displacement, okay. If we think about it that way, okay, and another, and the reason I'm saying this is just to make sure that you know that there's a possible argument against the formulation that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic when we know that Donald Trump is a staunch supporter, that people like Pat Robertson in the United States are staunch supporters that help us to the fact that you can be deeply anti-Semitic and support the state of Israel. These things go together. They're not antithetical to one another. So that it becomes important for us to be able to suggest that resistance to the state of Israel is also resistance to the idea of the legitimacy of the nation state. It's not an accident that Israel has taken upon itself, that when Israel takes upon itself, when the defense of Israel manifests itself as a defense of its right to exist, this is important. It's a defense, not just of Israel's right to exist, but of the nation state as a political form’s right to exist. And nation states don't have rights. What they're supposed to be are mechanisms to protect the rights of the people who live in them, and that has almost never been the case, and to the extent that they do protect the rights of the people who live in them, it's in the expense, it's at the expense of the people who don't, okay. So part of what's at stake, one of the reasons why it's at, it's important to pay particular attention to this issue, why we ought to resist the ridiculous formulation that singling out Israel at this moment is itself anti-Semitic is because it's important to recognize that Israel is the state. [KELLEY: Right.] MOTEN: For reasons that I think are totally bound up with antisemitism, right? Israel is the state that, insofar as it makes the claim about its right to exist, is also making the claim about the nation state’s right to exist as such. It's this, it's that same kind of argument that, I remembered the—and I'm sorry to keep going on so long, but there's—there's those formulations that people often make about Black people in it or indigenous people as if they were the essence of the human, right, so that every time Black people or indigenous people do something that supposedly we're not supposed to do, it constitutes a violation to the very idea of the human. Right, because somehow as a function of the nobility of our suffering, we constitute the very idea of humanity, right? And there's nothing more brutal, right? Nothing more vicious than having been being consigned to that position. Similarly, Israel as a function of anti-Semitism has now been placed in the position of protecting the very idea of the nation state. So for me, first and foremost, it's important to have solidarity with the Palestinian people, but second of all, it's important to actually have some solidarity with the Jewish people insofar as they can and must be separated from the Israeli state because ultimately the fate of the Jewish people, if it is tied to this, to the nation state of Israel, will be more brutal than anything that has yet been done or can be imagined, and I mean everything that you think I mean when I say that. "]

[(0, 20)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Aff-Kentucky-Round-5.docx

Michigan

ShGa

6c5df0a81fd125b94d404ba1da1b7e596f00874a0bf32f6cb4f9493c43156977

4---Experts are optimistic---it’s a priority for both sides.

Dave Levitan 1-2. "There were some big climate policy moves in 2022. What’s on tap for the new year?". Grid News. 1-2-2023. https://www.grid.news/story/climate/2023/01/02/there-were-some-big-climate-policy-moves-in-2022-whats-on-tap-for-the-new-year/

experts think there are still bipartisan climate wins to be had in 2023 growing interest in clean energy among Republicans space for conversations around permitting reform Both sides have said that’s a priority with support in both parties it could have life left

Though a divided Congress likely means transformational legislation some experts think there are still bipartisan climate wins to be had in 2023 . We’ve certainly seen growing interest in climate and clean energy among Republicans This is not breaking news but there is a space for conversations around permitting reform continue in the new Congress Both sides have said that’s a priority for them .” But with at least some support in both parties that there’s hope that it could still have some life left and revisiting it could help speed some of the renewable energy deployment that Schmidt said is crucial to making progress against climate change in the coming years though critics think it will also allow expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure.

experts still bipartisan climate wins had 2023 climate clean energy Republicans This is not breaking news conversations permitting reform new Congress have said that’s a priority for them some support both parties some life left speed renewable energy deployment

['Bipartisan appetite for climate progress? Though a divided Congress likely means transformational legislation similar to the IRA is off the table for the next few years, some experts think there are still bipartisan climate wins to be had in 2023. “We’ve certainly seen growing interest in climate and clean energy among Republicans,” said Ben Pendergrass, vice president of government affairs with the Citizens’ Climate Lobby. “This is not breaking news, but there is a space for conversations around permitting reform to continue in the new Congress. Both sides have said that’s a priority for them.” Permitting reform legislation, which would change the way energy and other infrastructure projects are reviewed and approved by the government, was dealt an apparent death blow in December of 2022. But with at least some support in both parties, Pendergrass said that there’s hope that it could still have some life left, and revisiting it could help speed some of the renewable energy deployment that Schmidt said is crucial to making progress against climate change in the coming years — though critics think it will also allow expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure. Pendergrass said that a bright spot even with a divided Congress is that, in general, Republicans did not run against the IRA’s clean energy provisions during the midterms. “A lot of those clean energy provisions are wildly popular, and especially as they start being deployed out in American communities,” he said.', '']

[(5, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-4.docx

Emory

MiPi

aca82518757e87425fab59219d569955f8c74ff5dff8b43a61ccf3391bee2174

AFF has to change Sherman, Clayton, or FTCA

Kendall Kuntz 21, J.D. Candidate at The University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, “Can the Courts and New Antitrust Laws Break Up Big Tech?,” 2/23/21, https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Business-Law/JBTLOnline/Break-Up-Big-Tech/

There are three core antitrust laws Sherman Clayton and F T C A

There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act , the Clayton Act , and the F T C A These three attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers

three core antitrust laws Sherman Act Clayton Act F T C A

['There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These three antitrust laws attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers. The Sherman Act outlaws monopolies and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. Lastly, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Antitrust laws are not established to punish success, but are focused on preventing anticompetitive effects, exclusionary practices, reduced consumer choice, and hindered innovation.']

[(8, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Kentucky%20Round%20Robin-Round1.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Kentucky%2520Round%2520Robin-Round1.docx

936f09b70fff69d991b60371a691bd9e4f56d30187daecd9953f7a204dddaade

China in particular will shield bad actors from the AFF. They get off totally scot-free.

Ben Bradshaw 16, Partner and Julia Schiller a Counsel in the Washington, DC office of O’Melveny & Myers LLP; Remi Moncel is an associate in O’Melveny’s San Francisco office, “International Comity in the Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Law in the Wake of in Re Vitamin C,” The Places We Go: Developments in International Competition Law, Antitrust, vol. 31, no. 2, 2017/2016, pp. 87–93

exercise of jurisdiction already negatively affected relations, and it would be unlikely that injunctive relief obtained in court would be enforceable in China

Chinese law required defendants to violate U.S. antitrust law , while the plaintiffs may have been unable to obtain a Sherman Act remedy complaints as to China’s export policies could be adequately addressed through diplomatic channels and the World Trade Organization the court recognized that according to MOFCOM the exercise of jurisdiction had already negatively affected U.S.-China relations, and it would be unlikely that the injunctive relief obtained by the plaintiffs in the district court would be enforceable in China , just as a similar injunction issued in China against a U.S. company would be difficult to enforce in the United States the court concluded that exercising jurisdiction was inappropriate and dismissed the case

violate U.S. antitrust law World Trade Organization negatively affected enforceable in China difficult to enforce in the United States dismissed the case

['Having found that Chinese law required defendants to violate U.S. antitrust law, the Second Circuit went on to consider whether the remaining factors in the Timberlane/ Mannington Mills balancing test weighed in favor of dismissal. The court concluded that they did.32 Of particular note, the court found that while the plaintiffs may have been unable to obtain a Sherman Act remedy in another forum, complaints as to China’s export policies could be adequately addressed through diplomatic channels and the World Trade Organization, of which both the United States and China are members.33 The court found it significant that there was no evidence that the defendants acted with the express purpose or intent to affect U.S. commerce or harm businesses in particular. Moreover, the regulations at issue were intended to assist China in its transition from a staterun economy and to remain a competitive participant in the global Vitamin C market.34 Finally, the court recognized that according to MOFCOM the exercise of jurisdiction had already negatively affected U.S.-China relations, and it would be unlikely that the injunctive relief obtained by the plaintiffs in the district court would be enforceable in China, just as a similar injunction issued in China against a U.S. company would be difficult to enforce in the United States.35 Upon consideration of all of these factors, the court concluded that exercising jurisdiction was inappropriate and dismissed the case.']

[(4, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Kiihnl-Weinhardt-Neg-ADA-Round1.docx

Kentucky

KiWe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/KiWe/Kentucky-Kiihnl-Weinhardt-Neg-ADA-Round1.docx

931b8c9cd73252d672373076557e2e5f78b6faa4f5d64d4fb3d0864df5c8cf35

Impossible to fix algorithmic bias.

Karen Hao 19, senior AI editor at MIT Technology Review, 2-4-2019, "This is how AI bias really happens—and why it’s so hard to fix," MIT Technology Review, https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/04/137602/this-is-how-ai-bias-really-happensand-why-its-so-hard-to-fix/

bias isn’t obvious during construction because it’s hard to retroactively identify where bias came from and get rid of it. standard practices are not designed with bias in mind. computer scientists split data into one group for training and another for validation the data you use to test your model has the same biases used to train it. it is good practice to design a system used for different tasks in different contexts. what that does is ignore social context you can’t have fair’ criminal justice results applied to employment. How we think about fairness in those contexts is different.” It’s not clear what absence of bias look like. fairness has to be defined in mathematical terms there are many definitions that are mutually exclusive.

The introduction of bias isn’t always obvious during a model’s construction because you may not realize the downstream impacts of your data and choices until much later. Once you do, it’s hard to retroactively identify where that bias came from and then figure out how to get rid of it. many of the standard practices in deep learning are not designed with bias detection in mind. Deep-learning models are tested for performance before they are deployed, creating what would seem to be a perfect opportunity for catching bias. But in practice, testing usually looks like this: computer scientists randomly split their data before training into one group that’s actually used for training and another that’s reserved for validation once training is done. That means the data you use to test the performance of your model has the same biases as the data you used to train it. Thus, it will fail to flag skewed or prejudiced results. the way in which computer scientists are taught to frame problems often isn’t compatible with the best way to think about social problems. it is considered good practice to design a system that can be used for different tasks in different contexts. “But what that does is ignore a lot of social context You can’t have a system designed in Utah and then applied in Kentucky directly because different communities have different versions of fairness. Or you can’t have a system that you apply for ‘ fair’ criminal justice results then applied to employment. How we think about fairness in those contexts is just totally different.” It’s also not clear what the absence of bias should look like. What’s different about computer science is that the concept of fairness has to be defined in mathematical terms But as researchers have discovered, there are many different mathematical definitions of fairness that are also mutually exclusive. Does fairness mean, for example, that the same proportion of black and white individuals should get high risk assessment scores? Or that the same level of risk should result in the same score regardless of race? It’s impossible to fulfill both definitions at the same time (here’s a more in-depth look at why),

['Unknown unknowns. The introduction of bias isn’t always obvious during a model’s construction because you may not realize the downstream impacts of your data and choices until much later. Once you do, it’s hard to retroactively identify where that bias came from and then figure out how to get rid of it. In Amazon’s case, when the engineers initially discovered that its tool was penalizing female candidates, they reprogrammed it to ignore explicitly gendered words like “women’s.” They soon discovered that the revised system was still picking up on implicitly gendered words—verbs that were highly correlated with men over women, such as “executed” and “captured”—and using that to make its decisions.', 'Imperfect processes. First, many of the standard practices in deep learning are not designed with bias detection in mind. Deep-learning models are tested for performance before they are deployed, creating what would seem to be a perfect opportunity for catching bias. But in practice, testing usually looks like this: computer scientists randomly split their data before training into one group that’s actually used for training and another that’s reserved for validation once training is done. That means the data you use to test the performance of your model has the same biases as the data you used to train it. Thus, it will fail to flag skewed or prejudiced results.', 'Lack of social context. Similarly, the way in which computer scientists are taught to frame problems often isn’t compatible with the best way to think about social problems. For example, in a new paper, Andrew Selbst, a postdoc at the Data & Society Research Institute, identifies what he calls the “portability trap.” Within computer science, it is considered good practice to design a system that can be used for different tasks in different contexts. “But what that does is ignore a lot of social context,” says Selbst. “You can’t have a system designed in Utah and then applied in Kentucky directly because different communities have different versions of fairness. Or you can’t have a system that you apply for ‘fair’ criminal justice results then applied to employment. How we think about fairness in those contexts is just totally different.”', 'The definitions of fairness. It’s also not clear what the absence of bias should look like. This isn’t true just in computer science—this question has a long history of debate in philosophy, social science, and law. What’s different about computer science is that the concept of fairness has to be defined in mathematical terms, like balancing the false positive and false negative rates of a prediction system. But as researchers have discovered, there are many different mathematical definitions of fairness that are also mutually exclusive. Does fairness mean, for example, that the same proportion of black and white individuals should get high risk assessment scores? Or that the same level of risk should result in the same score regardless of race? It’s impossible to fulfill both definitions at the same time (here’s a more in-depth look at why), so at some point you have to pick one. But whereas in other fields this decision is understood to be something that can change over time, the computer science field has a notion that it should be fixed. “By fixing the answer, you’re solving a problem that looks very different than how society tends to think about these issues,” says Selbst.', '', '']

[(6, 12)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

4c3694e31f5a317ecf51dbadf452e209d4efe996a68d2ad8ebad76fdac0ce927

6— No race war---it’s ahistorical and fractures coalition building that’s more effective.

Beaty ’16 [Thalia and T.J. Raphael; July 11; Senior Producer for visual investigations at ProPublica; Digital Content Editor, citing Al Amin and Stanley Nelson; The Takeaway, “Is America Headed for a Race War?” ]

some claim a race war But in reality , the narrative of warfare goes back centuries there’s a way forward people look at violence different people have a camera it’s impossible to deny there are no quick answers” comparing the 1960s there are similarities to be hopeful the ‘60s was not only African-Americans it’s white Asians , and Latinos race joins different groups demonstrations all over the country Rejecting a race war and choosing a non-violent path is “the only way you can win,” the civil rights movement was to say You have to pick a side

The U S is reeling from racial tension and violence, and while there is more than enough anger in America, some continue to fan the fire some claim we’re starting to see the beginning of a race war in America. But in reality , the narrative of racial warfare in the U S goes back two centuries black militants like said racial violence was unavoidable there are about a race war started to prevent the government from suspending the Constitution Have we crossed a threshold in this country? believes there’s a way forward out of this tension we may be on the edge of something good people are look ing at police violence and racism in a different way The change in perception can be linked to technology people have a camera in their pocket , and they’re able to film “That’s what’s changed we’re now able to see it and it’s impossible to deny .” Nelson says there are no “clear, quick answers” to questions surrounding racism police brutality, and gun violence When comparing the racial struggles of the 1960s to the present, Nelson argues there are several similarities to be hopeful about the ‘60s was a movement not only of African-Americans , but of all people it’s not just black Americans, it’s white Americans , Asians , and Latinos — everybody is participating everybody’s outraged the start of a movement While some claim a race war Nelson sees a future that joins together different groups black people, white people, Asians, Latinos — everybody is thinking about how we get better we must start viewing police brutality as human issue instead of a black or brown issue “I’m heartened by young people,” “When you look at demonstrations all over the country , it’s not just black people, it’s everybody protesting it has to be everybody who protests police killings we’ve seen evidence this is happening — irrefutable evidence Rejecting calls for a race war and choosing a non-violent path forward is “the only way that you can win,” “The very idea of the civil rights movement and non-violence was to say You have to pick a side that’s not a bad moment it’s a moment of change.”

more than enough anger fan the fire some claim race war But in reality two centuries way forward on the edge look ing at police violence in a different way technology camera in their pocket impossible to deny no “clear, quick answers” struggles of the 1960s several similarities not only all people white Americans Asians Latinos movement joins together different groups as human issue all over the country irrefutable evidence Rejecting calls for a race war non-violent path only way civil rights movement You have to pick a side

['', 'The United States is still reeling from a week of racial tension and graphic violence, and while there is more than enough anger in America, some continue to fan the fire that has been lit under the summer of 2016.', "Fox's Bill O'Reilly has insisted that “” the Black Lives Matter movement, and the head of the National Association of Police Organizations accused President Obama of being responsible for a “.”", 'As tension continues to mount, some claim that we’re starting to see the beginning of a race war in America. But in reality, the narrative of racial warfare in the United States goes back two centuries.', 'In\xa0\xa0he wrote before assassinating President Abraham Lincoln, John Wilkes Booth claimed that "this country was formed for the white, not for the black man" — a theme picked up by the KKK in its angry, murderous, and garbled calls for white power.', 'Back in 1967, black militants like\xa0, formerly known as H. Rap Brown, also said that racial violence in the United States was unavoidable.', '“I say violence is necessary," Al Amin\xa0\xa0decades ago. "Violence is a part of America’s culture. It is as American as cherry pie. Americans taught the black people to be violent. We will use that violence to rid ourselves of oppression if necessary.”', 'And then there are\xa0\xa0from 1978 — a novel about a race war started to prevent the government from suspending the Constitution. The book seemed to inspire Timothy McVeigh, who carried out the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995.', 'Just last week after the shooting in Dallas, Texas, former Illinois Congressman Joe Walsh\xa0\xa0on Twitter: "3 Dallas Cops killed, 7 wounded. This is now war. Watch out Obama. Watch out black lives matter punks. Real America is coming after you." He later\xa0\xa0that tweet and said he did not mean it as a call for violence.', 'Have we crossed a threshold in this country? Is the nation really evolving into a war zone, with battlefields popping up everywhere by surprise?', ', a documentary film director and MacArthur fellow who made documentary "," believes there’s a way forward out of this tension.', '“I think that we may be on the edge of something good,” he says. “I think that people are looking at police violence and people are looking at racism in a different way than they were certainly [seeing things] even three days ago.”', 'The change in perception, Nelson says, can be linked to changing technology.', '“The difference is that people have a camera in their pocket, and they’re able to film these things,” he says. “That’s what’s changed —\xa0the way we look at it —\xa0because we’re now able to see it and it’s impossible to deny.”', 'Though he does sense change, Nelson also says that there are no “clear, quick answers” to the questions surrounding racism, racial tension, police brutality, and gun violence in America.', '“There’s a feeling that there’s a culture in the police department that has to change, and how do you change a culture?” he asks. “I think one of the most startling things that’s happened is that these killings have gone on in every sector of the country —\xa0it’s not just the south, the north, or the east. So what does that say about police departments?”', 'As tensions continue to simmer, Nelson says that it’s important for America to “speak honestly about what is going on.” However, such an exercise seems to be increasingly difficult as the 2016 election marches forward.', '“Donald Trump has fanned the flames of racism in this country,” Nelson says. “He was a real driving force in the birther movement, and he started out his campaign by calling Mexicans rapists, and he’s called for banning Muslims from this country. There’s a feeling that we’re under attack, and at the same time, other Republicans are saying, ‘Yeah, that’s racist, but we’ll still support him.’ It’s very scary, I think, for African-Americans to look out and see that Donald Trump has over 50 percent of the white male vote.”', 'When comparing the racial struggles of the 1960s to the present, Nelson argues there are several similarities — similarities to be hopeful about.', '“One thing that’s important to remember about the ‘60s is that it was a movement not only of African-Americans, but it was a movement of all people,” he says. “If you look at any of the huge marches, it’s not just black Americans, it’s white Americans, Asians, and Latinos — everybody is participating. And I think just as today, everybody’s outraged by what’s going on. I hope that we are at the start of a movement.”', 'While some claim that a race war is on the horizon, Nelson sees a future that joins together different groups.', '“We’re at a place, hopefully, where change is something that people are thinking about, that black people, white people, Asians, Latinos — everybody in this country is thinking about how we get better,” he says. “That’s one of the things that the United States offers — the chance to get better.”', 'In order to see that things get better, Nelson argues that we must start viewing police brutality as human issue instead of a black or brown issue.', '“I’m very heartened by young people,” he says. “When you look at these demonstrations that are taking place all over the country, it’s not just black people, it’s everybody who’s protesting. That’s what we have to understand — it has to be everybody who protests these police killings, which have gone on and on again for the last two years. Because of video cameras that we have in our pockets, we’ve seen evidence that this is really happening — irrefutable evidence. Before we could kind of pass it off.”', 'Rejecting calls for a race war and choosing a non-violent path forward is “the only way that you can win,” Nelson says.', '“The very idea of the civil rights movement and non-violence was to say, ‘Look, look at what’s happening in the south — look at the dogs, look at the hoses. You have to pick a side,’” he says. “I think that’s maybe where we’re coming to now, and I think that’s maybe not a bad moment. Maybe it’s a moment of change.” ', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-11---ADA-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

9acaf88906132356904936f1788e3ba20cd0e365fd1b509b0df02763c2b1af2a

not specific – all our uniqueness cards on investment and mergers now prove that we are in the race for 5G – here’s another one xx

Sbeglia 21 (Catherine is a Technology Editor for RCR Wireless News, 3-29-2021, "Comparing 5G progress in the US and China," RCR Wireless News, https://www.rcrwireless.com/20210329/5g/comparing-5g-progress-in-the-us-and-china//ES).

China and the U.S. continue to top the 5G charts by 2026, North America will have the highest share of 5G subscriptions, accounting for 80% of all mobile subscriptions T-Mobile has the best 5G availability

China and the U.S. continue to top the 5G charts the countries have 341 and 279 5G-connected cities, respectively. In China, the number of cities with 5G grew six-fold in one year, while coverage in the U.S. increased by a factor of five. Chinese telecom carriers are expected to build over 1 million new 5G base stations in 2021 While North America’s 5G subscription forecast remained unchanged, Ericsson does believe that by 2026, North America will have the highest share of 5G subscriptions, accounting for 80% of all mobile subscriptions . T-Mobile actually has the best 5G availability of the major providers

North America will have the highest share of 5G subscriptions, accounting for 80% of all mobile subscriptions .

['China and the U.S. continue to top the 5G charts, with VIAVI’s The State of 5G Deployments report showing that the countries have 341 and 279 5G-connected cities, respectively. In China, the number of cities with 5G grew six-fold in one year, while coverage in the U.S. increased by a factor of five. Further, in Ericsson’s November Mobility Report, 220 million 5G subscriptions were expected by the end of 2020, an estimation that the company increased as a result of China’s faster-than-expected uptake, which was “driven by a national strategic focus, intense competition between service providers and more affordable 5G smartphones from several vendors.” Chinese telecom carriers are expected to build over 1 million new 5G base stations in 2021, as the cost of 5G base stations is expected to decrease. China Mobile, specifically, is the world’s largest operator in terms of subscribers, and it reportedly added 4.19 million 5G subscribers in February, bringing its total number of 5G subscribers to 173.16 million, compared to 15.4 million 5G customers in February 2020. Rival operator China Telecom added a total of 6.2 million 5G subscribers in February to take its total 5G subscribers base to 103.37 million, while China Unicom ended February with 84.5 million 5G subscribers, up from 77.95 million the previous month. While North America’s 5G subscription forecast remained unchanged, Ericsson does believe that by 2026, North America will have the highest share of 5G subscriptions, accounting for 80% of all mobile subscriptions. 5G leaderboard Country Number of cities in which 5G is available China 341 USA 279 South Korea 85 UK 54 Spain 53 Canada 49 Australia 37 Saudi Arabia 37 Italy 35 France 24 Thailand 24 Sweden 23 (Source: VIVAI) Verizon was the first to turn on its 5G network in the U.S., but, according to Opensignal, T-Mobile actually has the best 5G availability of the major providers, with users able to connect to next-gen services more than 30% of the time, while for AT&T customers that number was 18% and just 9.5% for Verizon customers. Undoubtedly related, T-Mobile currently covers 280 million people across 1.6 million miles throughout the U.S. compared to around 230 million people for AT&T and Verizon. LitePoint’s Director of Marketing Adam Smith weighed in on the comparison of China and North America’s 5G progress, telling RCR Wireless News that if you’re measuring by the percentage of the population that “has 5G devices in hand,” China is leading “hands down.” “They have a national policy to move rapidly over to a 5G network and they’re incentivizing devices with a consumer-friendly price point,” he elaborated, “while in the U.S., there is no such thing as a low-end 5G phone today.”']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Northwestern-Round4.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/BaCh/Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-Northwestern-Round4.docx

c3f7c04c6aaf437adff2b397cead365557a51952338c01d5e928e0f7c0b376a1

Zero chance of war.

Sawant 21 - (Mangesh Sawant, Masters in International Affairs with a concentration in international security policy from Columbia University, Senior Fellow of International Security & Military Studies @ Consortium of Indo-Pacific Researchers; 12-13-2021, Air University (AU), "Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy," doa: 7-12-2023) url: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870650/why-china-cannot-challenge-the-us-military-primacy/

U S enjoys ov erwhelming advantages over China. retains a tech edge in key areas spent 16 trillion more than China fighting wars on every continent has maritime supremacy in a familiar terrain in the Indo-Pacific . Iraq’s fourth-largest military was decimated . China not dealt with any external crisis nor full-scale wars . PLA ranked behind France while PLAN behind Japan . CCP gains legitimacy from econ USN will destroy hi-tech industries in hours war lead to loss of exports production unemployment and inflation , causing a revolution . U S has learning China does not . world sends officers to US not China . Less than 30 percent of China’s forces were modern . training do not match US . emphasizes risk aversion . U S decimate without entering A2/AD . China thinly stretched defending third-largest country top echelons acknowledge China is a featherweight for decades .

The U nited S tates enjoys ov erwhelming advantages over China. The United States retains a tech nological edge in key areas like command , control , communications , computers , intelligence , surveillance , and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and air , surface , and undersea weapon systems . The United States has spent $19 trillion on its military since the end of the Cold War. This spending is $ 16 trillion more than China spent and nearly as much as the rest of the world’s combined expenditure during the same period. The United States has been fighting conventional and unconventional wars on every continent . The United States has war-fighting experience in World War II , the Korean War , the Vietnam War , Panama , Grenada , the First Gulf War , Kosovo , Iraq , and Afghanistan . The US Navy USN has established maritime supremacy . It operates 11 carrier groups . The United States is in a familiar terrain in the Indo-Pacific , having fought during World War II , the Korean War , and the Vietnam War . INDOPACOM accounts for 60 percent of USN , 55 percent of the US Army , and 40 percent of US Marine Corps . Iraq’s fourth-largest military in the world was decimated by the United States during the First Gulf War . China has not dealt with any external crisis , nor has fought full-scale wars in modern history . A technological gap exists between the United States and China. The USN’s merging of weapon systems and C4ISR systems with multi-domain network and integrated ship defenses is more lethal than the numbers of PLAN submarines and warships. PLAN warships are armed with 1,900 missiles , whereas the USN has 9,500 missiles deployed on its warships. The United States is far ahead in tracking and prioritizing PLAN targets. The USN is equipped with 426 C4ISR aircraft, while the PLAN has only 22 such aircraft. The PLAN has 441 fixed-wing aircraft and 118 helicopters , while the USN and the Marines collectively have 2,448 fixed-wing aircraft and 1,249 helicopters . the USN’s 11 ACs collectively have more than 800 aircraft . The USN and PLAN have an equal number of submarines . However, the USN’s technologically advanced fleet weighs 730,000 tons, which is three times that of the PLAN. The USN is inducting 10 high-tech DDG 51 Flight III destroyers , equipped with new technologies such as more power for laser weapons , newer engines , improved electronics and the advanced SPY-6 radar . A total of 20 DDG 51 class ships are under contract at US shipyards. The US military has 516 installations in 41 countries and bases in more than 80 countries. Collectively they store a million pieces of weapon systems. The USN has 31 fast combat supply ships with a total tonnage of 1.29 million tons , while the PLAN has only 12 supply ships totaling 330,000 tons. The United States vastly exceeds the minimum requirement for nuclear retaliatory strikes on China The USAF Rapid Raptor program can globally deploy F-22s anywhere in the world within 24 hours . Why China Cannot Challenge the United States PLA Major General Zhang Shaozhong ranked Chinese military power behind the U nited S tates, Russia , Britain , and France , while PLAN surface power was ranked in the eighth place behind Japan and India . The US military plays the central role of economic deterrence . The Communist Party of China ( CCP ) gains its legitimacy from econ omic development . The USN Maritime Strike Tomahawk Cruise Missile Block V will destroy coastal cities like Shanghai , obliterating China’s hi-tech industries in a matter of hours . A war will lead to a loss of China’s exports to the United States worth USD 310 billion . The war will result in a decline in industrial production , unemployment , and inflation , causing an economic crash and a people’s revolution . the United States will experience reverse economic gains and benefit from the war , resulting in high employment and industrial growth The U nited S tates has an analytical learning process in place — China does not . The world sends its military officers to US military institutions and not China ’s military colleges . US nuclear-powered carriers can rule the seas for four years before being refueled . China’s nonnuclear-powered AC can barely operate beyond its green waters . The USN’s 68 nuclear-powered submarines have been prowling the world’s oceans displaying naval power, while the PLAN’s nuclear-powered submarines are unable to do so China’s only existing bomber , the H-6K, is reverse engineered from the 1950s Soviet-designed Tu-16 bomber. The bomber is incapable of attacking Hawaii —even when equipped with CJ-10 cruise missiles. The H-6K has a range of 3,800 miles, while Hawaii is 5,157 miles from the closest H-6K base. The H-6K cannot attack nearby US bases , as the bomber will be detected on open seas by the US C4ISR systems. PLAAF fighters are unable to escort the bombers , as they cannot match its range. Less than 30 percent of China’s surface forces , air force , and air defense forces were modern in 2011 . nothing much has changed, as a substantial percentage of China’s military remains obsolete . China’s military faces institutional shortcomings arising from obsolete command structures , low quality of personnel , and corruption . The military has weaknesses centering on supporting capabilities such as logistics , inadequate airlift , and deficient air defense and antisubmarine warfare . The PLA’s loyalty to the CCP has hampered its competence . China’s military training and operational capabilities and competences do not match US standards . PLAAF pilots fall short on the requirement of executing sophisticated aerial maneuvers during unplanned operations. China’s military structure presents significant cultural challenges as it emphasizes control above command . A culture of risk aversion and low levels of trust in subordinates impacts the PLA effectiveness . The USN values autonomy from the individual to the institution, which reflects its emphasis on commanding at sea . The much-hyped Chengdu J-20 is a heavy fighter aircraft comparable to the MiG 31, which is essentially an interceptor and not a multirole or an air superiority aircraft. A study of modern wars suggests that the U nited S tates will decimate China’s military without entering the A2/AD zone . This is how the United States devastated Iraqi defenses in 1990. US strategic depth in Asia will allow military planners to concentrate the military at different locations . During the First Gulf War, the United States launched 297 Tomahawks , which destroyed the Iraqi military Ohio-class submarines can operate unhindered in the adversary’s A2/AD zone closer to the shore; thus, striking targets far inland . Collectively, four Ohio-class submarines installed with 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles would obliterate China’s military The inexperienced PLAN AC group will be destroyed by long-range antiship missiles LRASM Tomahawks and Mark 48-Mod 7 torpedoes launched from USS Key West, USS Oklahoma City, USS Topeka, and USS Asheville submarines based in Guam . China is constructing military bases on islands in the South China Sea; however, this military infrastructure is vulnerable to US weapon systems , as the islands lack natural defenses and camouflage . During a war, the bases will be annihilated by the USN as the PLA cannot hide behind hills and forests . Once destroyed, these facilities cannot be supported from the mainland, as the logistical supplies will be demolished by the USN. The antiship DF-21 missile are based in the barren Gobi Desert , which makes it an easy target for the US military. it has not yet been successfully tested against a moving target . . China does not know about the DF-21 performance against the US CSG countermeasures . China lacks the C4ISR systems to strike targets at that range . China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the S oviet U nion. China ’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world . The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages . Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades .

ov erwhelming advantages tech nological edge key areas command control communications computers intelligence surveillance reconnaissance air surface undersea weapon systems $19 trillion $ 16 trillion more as much as the rest of the world’s combined expenditure conventional unconventional every continent World War II Korean War Vietnam War Panama Grenada First Gulf War Kosovo Iraq Afghanistan USN maritime supremacy 11 carrier groups familiar terrain World War II Korean War Vietnam War INDOPACOM 60 percent of USN 55 percent of the US Army 40 percent of US Marine Corps fourth-largest military in the world decimated any external crisis full-scale wars technological gap exists PLAN 1,900 missiles 9,500 missiles deployed tracking prioritizing 426 only 22 441 fixed-wing aircraft 118 helicopters 2,448 fixed-wing aircraft 1,249 helicopters 11 ACs more than 800 aircraft equal number of submarines three times high-tech DDG 51 Flight III destroyers new technologies laser weapons newer engines improved electronics advanced SPY-6 radar 516 installations 41 countries million fast combat supply ships 1.29 million tons vastly exceeds minimum requirement nuclear retaliatory strikes globally deploy F-22s anywhere in the world within 24 hours Why China Cannot Challenge the United States PLA military power U S Russia Britain France surface power behind Japan and India economic deterrence legitimacy econ omic development Cruise Missile Block V destroy coastal cities Shanghai obliterating China’s hi-tech industries matter of hours loss of China’s exports 310 billion decline in industrial production unemployment inflation economic crash people’s revolution reverse economic gains benefit from the war high employment industrial growth analytical learning process in place China does not world US military institutions not China ’s military colleges rule the seas four years before being refueled barely operate beyond its green waters prowling the world’s oceans unable only existing bomber reverse engineered 1950s incapable of attacking Hawaii cannot attack nearby US bases detected unable to escort the bombers Less than 30 percent surface forces air force air defense forces modern substantial percentage obsolete institutional shortcomings obsolete command structures low quality of personnel corruption supporting capabilities logistics inadequate airlift deficient air defense antisubmarine warfare hampered its competence training operational capabilities competences do not match US standards fall short sophisticated aerial maneuvers significant cultural challenges control command risk aversion low levels of trust autonomy emphasis on commanding at sea interceptor not a multirole air superiority modern wars decimate without entering the A2/AD zone devastated Iraqi defenses concentrate the military different locations 297 Tomahawks destroyed the Iraqi military unhindered striking targets far inland four Ohio-class submarines 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles obliterate LRASM Tomahawks based in Guam military bases on islands vulnerable to US weapon systems lack natural defenses camouflage annihilated cannot hide behind hills and forests cannot be supported logistical supplies will be demolished barren Gobi Desert easy target not yet been successfully tested moving target China does not know about the DF-21 performance against the US CSG countermeasures lacks the C4ISR systems strike targets at that range miniscule S U thinly stretched third-largest country in the world top echelons acknowledge US military advantages military featherweight remain so decades

['', 'The United States enjoys overwhelming advantages over China. The United States outweighs China in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), technology, and military spending. China’s GDP is 15 percent of global GDP, compared to 24 percent of the United States.4 The United States retains a technological edge in key areas like command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and air, surface, and undersea weapon systems. The United States has spent $19 trillion on its military since the end of the Cold War. This spending is $16 trillion more than China spent and nearly as much as the rest of the world’s combined expenditure during the same period.5', 'The United States has been fighting conventional and unconventional wars on every continent. The United States has war-fighting experience in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Panama, Grenada, the First Gulf War, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The US military can be deployed at short notice anywhere on Earth. The United States maintains strategic peace through military bases and defense alliances in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.6 In the post–Cold War world, the United States achieved dominance thorough AirLand Battle. Now the United States is shifting its military assets to the Indo-Pacific as it prepares for a SeaAir Battle.', 'The US Navy (USN) has established maritime supremacy. It operates 11 carrier groups. The United States is in a familiar terrain in the Indo-Pacific, having fought during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. INDOPACOM accounts for 60 percent of USN, 55 percent of the US Army, and 40 percent of US Marine Corps.7', 'Iraq’s fourth-largest military in the world was decimated by the United States during the First Gulf War. Airpower played a major role, while there was diminutive fighting between the US and Iraqi armies. Then what? China studied the First Gulf War to understand modern warfare. In a full-scale war, China would be decimated by the nuclear and conventionally superior US military. China has not dealt with any external crisis, nor has fought full-scale wars in modern history. A technological gap exists between the United States and China. They definitely are not in the same league.', 'An Overwhelming US Military Superiority', 'Navy', 'The USN’s merging of weapon systems and C4ISR systems with multi-domain network and integrated ship defenses is more lethal than the numbers of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines and warships. The PLAN consists of 63 warships over 3,000 tons with a total tonnage of 447,000 tons, while the USN has 120 warships with a total of 2 million tons.8 PLAN warships are armed with 1,900 missiles, whereas the USN has 9,500 missiles deployed on its warships.9', 'The course and outcome of modern wars is determined by C4ISR capabilities and not the quantity of weapon systems. The United States is far ahead in tracking and prioritizing PLAN targets. The USN is equipped with 426 C4ISR aircraft, while the PLAN has only 22 such aircraft. The PLAN has 441 fixed-wing aircraft and 118 helicopters, while the USN10 and the Marines11 collectively have 2,448 fixed-wing aircraft and 1,249 helicopters. The PLAN’s two aircraft carriers (ACs) can carry 70 aircraft, while the USN’s 11 ACs collectively have more than 800 aircraft. The Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group (CSG) includes the USN’s only forward deployed AC, the USS Ronald Reagan, which is operating along with the Nimitz CSG 11 and Theodore Roosevelt CSG for anti-China operations in the Pacific.12', 'The USN and PLAN have an equal number of submarines. However, the USN’s technologically advanced fleet weighs 730,000 tons, which is three times that of the PLAN.13 The Block V, a Virginia-class ballistic missile submarine, has a contract that includes 11 submarines and will triple the class’s Tomahawk cruise missile capacity to 40 missiles per submarine.14', 'The USN is inducting 10 high-tech DDG 51 Flight III destroyers, equipped with new technologies such as more power for laser weapons, newer engines, improved electronics and the advanced SPY-6 radar. A total of 20 DDG 51 class ships are under contract at US shipyards.15 The United States is constructing the new Flight IIA DDG 51s, which will be equipped with the next-generation radar technology, Aegis Baseline 9 Combat System, BMD, and antiship cruise missiles capabilities. The Flight IIA and III have 96 missile tubes equipped with SM-2, SM-6, and the Tomahawk cruise missile.', 'Logistics', 'The United States has a separate military air lift command and a host of agreements with private logistics transport firms. The US military has 516 installations in 41 countries and bases in more than 80 countries.16 The United States spends $156 billion on 800 bases in foreign countries, while China’s defense budget is US$180 billion/year.17 The US military has bases in Italy, Diego Garcia, South Korea, Australia, Japan, Kuwait, and Qatar. Collectively they store a million pieces of weapon systems. US military personnel are stationed in 160 countries and has operational ground troops in more than 15 countries.18 The USN has 31 fast combat supply ships with a total tonnage of 1.29 million tons, while the PLAN has only 12 supply ships totaling 330,000 tons.19', 'Nuclear', 'The number of Chinese warheads is roughly 200 and is expected to double over the next decade.20 By comparison, the United States has close to 4,000 superior nuclear warheads with 1,600 strategic weapons. The United States continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, and it vastly exceeds the minimum requirement for nuclear retaliatory strikes on China.21', 'USAF', 'The USAF has deployed F-15, F-16, and F-22 fighter aircraft; B-1 and B-2 bombers; and air-refueling aircraft at Guam.22 The USAF Rapid Raptor program can globally deploy F-22s anywhere in the world within 24 hours.23 The USAF has 44 missile interceptors in concrete silos in Alaska and California. The United States is also constructing the next-generation stealth B-21 bomber, which will complete its maiden flight in 2022. The B-21 will be equipped with the next-generation long-range standoff stealth nuclear cruise missile and the JASSM-ER conventional cruise missile.', 'Global Partners', 'The network of US international partnerships has fostered security, promoted stability and prevented conflicts. In the Indo-Pacific region, the US forward military presence and cooperation with its regional partners is a deterrence for China.24', 'The United States leads NATO and simultaneously provides a defense umbrella to Japan and South Korea. The United States has 29,500 troops deployed in South Korea and another 45,000 troops in Japan.25 The Quad exercises bring together Indo-Pacific democracies committed to a rules-based order against the China threat. The United States also has bilateral military cooperation with Australia, Philippines, Thailand, India, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The US Third Fleet commander told reporters that the United States has 10 nations participating in military exercise while the number of nations participating in China’s exercises is probably less than two.26 A Chinese attack on the United States will result in direct intervention of NATO under Article V as seen during the 2001 Afghanistan War.', 'Why China Cannot Challenge the United States', 'People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Major General Zhang Shaozhong ranked Chinese military power in 2020 in the fifth place behind the United States, Russia, Britain, and France, while PLAN surface power was ranked in the eighth place behind Japan and India. The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was ranked seventh in the world, due to its lack of fourth-generation fighter planes and high-end drones. In General Shaozhong’s view, China will become the second-largest military power in the world only in 2049, when it celebrates its centennial anniversary.27', 'The US Military as an Economic Deterrent', 'The US military plays the central role of economic deterrence. The Communist Party of China (CCP) gains its legitimacy from economic development. It is possible that China could target Guam with its small fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). However, the use of ICBMs will lead to massive retaliatory strikes by the United States leading to total annihilation of China’s military and economic centers of gravity.28 The USN Maritime Strike Tomahawk Cruise Missile Block V will destroy coastal cities like Shanghai, obliterating China’s hi-tech industries in a matter of hours.', 'The CCP leadership is inexperienced in nuclear matters as it lacks exposure to a nuclear warfare strategy as practiced by the United States and Russia. China’s nuclear policy is based on low-level deterrence, “minimum deterrence,” and its nuclear arsenal remains small and vulnerable.29 Threatening the United States with 200 nuclear weapons is not an option. Geographically, the United States and China are similar in size. However, China’s economy will be decimated by a few US nuclear weapons, as its critical infrastructure is concentrated on the coastlines and not dispersed like the US infrastructure.', 'A war will lead to a loss of China’s exports to the United States worth USD 310 billion. The war will result in a decline in industrial production, unemployment, and inflation, causing an economic crash and a people’s revolution. As seen from World War II, the United States will experience reverse economic gains and benefit from the war, resulting in high employment and industrial growth.', 'It is expensive to be a superpower. Sun Tzu wrote in The Art of War two and a half millennia ago, “first count the cost.”30 China’s defense budget cannot compete with the combined power of United States, India, Japan, and Australia. The United States alone spends more on national defense than China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil combined.31 Can China afford it? An arms race will lead to an increase in China’s military spending, affecting its development goals.', 'The Absence of War-fighting Experience', 'The United States has an analytical learning process in place—China does not.32 Lessons learned have been well documented by the US military in the form of doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The US military has been documenting lessons learned since as early as the Boxer Revolution during the China campaign.33 The US military has been led by outstanding military generals like George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, George Patton, and David Petraeus, while China always lacked great generals. The world sends its military officers to US military institutions and not China’s military colleges.', 'The PLA strategy is based on Mao’s theory of the weak contender fighting a stronger adversary through deceit and deception. China’s only option is an asymmetric strategy due to its incapability to fight symmetric wars. Chinese scholars have authored books like Science of Military Campaigns, Science of Military Strategy, and Unrestricted Warfare.34 However, China is unable to convert the strategies and tactics mentioned in these books into an executable doctrine.', 'The Lack of Power Projection', 'Power projection capabilities set a superpower apart. From its Charm Offensive to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has been wielding its economic power to compel US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to align with China, which has not been greatly successful.35 China lacks global reach, as it does not have foreign defense treaties or logistical bases abroad equipped with military stockpiles.36 During a war with the United States, soliciting Pakistan’s military support looks difficult, as China’s all-weather friend has been hesitant to cut its military ties with the United States.', 'China is constrained to operate beyond the unrefueled range of its aircraft, warships, and submarines. US nuclear-powered carriers can rule the seas for four years before being refueled. China’s nonnuclear-powered AC can barely operate beyond its green waters. The Type 903 replenishment ship can only support two to three ships for approximately two weeks.37 The USN’s 68 nuclear-powered submarines have been prowling the world’s oceans displaying naval power, while the PLAN’s nuclear-powered submarines are unable to do so.', 'Fighter aircraft operating without a package of air-refueling tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, or a network of expeditionary airfields cannot travel very far. The PLAAF’s capability to target US bases in the Pacific is hindered by a lack of air-refueling capacity. A flight group of eight J-11B Flankers will have to be simultaneously refueled twice by two air-refueling tankers for a seven-hour flight.38 The PLAAF will have to deploy 20 percent of its tanker fleet to refuel the Flankers. The PLAAF has 10 tankers for more than a thousand fighter aircraft, while the USAF has 625 tankers for 1,956 fighter aircraft.39 The tankers will be the prime targets for the USN potentially putting the Flankers at risk.', 'China’s only existing bomber, the H-6K, is reverse engineered from the 1950s Soviet-designed Tu-16 bomber. The bomber is incapable of attacking Hawaii—even when equipped with CJ-10 cruise missiles. The H-6K has a range of 3,800 miles, while Hawaii is 5,157 miles from the closest H-6K base. The H-6K cannot attack nearby US bases, as the bomber will be detected on open seas by the US C4ISR systems. PLAAF fighters are unable to escort the bombers, as they cannot match its range.40', 'An Archaic Military', 'Less than 30 percent of China’s surface forces, air force, and air defense forces and 55 percent of its submarine fleet were modern in 2011.41. Subsequently, nothing much has changed, as a substantial percentage of China’s military remains obsolete.42', 'China’s military faces institutional shortcomings arising from obsolete command structures, low quality of personnel, and corruption.43 The military has weaknesses centering on supporting capabilities such as logistics, inadequate airlift, and deficient air defense and antisubmarine warfare.44', 'The PLA’s loyalty to the CCP has hampered its competence.45 China’s military training and operational capabilities and competences do not match US standards.46 PLAAF pilots fall short on the requirement of executing sophisticated aerial maneuvers during unplanned operations.47', 'China’s military structure presents significant cultural challenges,48 as it emphasizes control above command.49 A culture of risk aversion and low levels of trust in subordinates impacts the PLA effectiveness.50 A highly centralized structure does not allow the PLAN to operate autonomously during a war. Therefore, a political commissar is positioned on PLAN warships and submarines.51 The USN values autonomy from the individual to the institution, which reflects its emphasis on commanding at sea.52 Nation states cannot project power globally through a rigid command-and-control system.53', 'PLAN submarines have the worst safety record in the world.54 The PLAN’s rudimentary nuclear missile submarine fleet carries a limited number of missiles.55 The PLAN cannot threaten the US mainland, as its submarines will have to sail through chokepoints such as the Kuriles and the Ryukyus islands, Luzon Strait, Taiwan Strait, and the Philippine archipelago—all of which are controlled by the USN.56 These chokepoints, forming a crescent-shaped chain, are also a defensive line for US containment policy; and the United States is involved in monitoring them. The PLAN submarine power is outdated, compared to the overwhelming USN undersea warfare capabilities. The US submarine arm brings strategic deterrence to the Indo-Pacific through a wide array of capabilities such as antisubmarine warfare antisurface warfare precision land strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and special warfare capabilities.', 'Soviet weapon systems were much sought after by the United States to learn their strengths and weaknesses. Numerous Soviet-made fighter aircraft defected during the Cold War. An Iraqi MiG 21 defected to Israel, while a Soviet MiG 25 landed in Japan. The aircraft were later handed over to the United States to decipher the technical details. However, US intelligence is not similarly orchestrating any defections of PLAAF fighter aircraft, as the United States is not interested in obsolete Chinese technology. Instead, China is stealing weapon data or reverse engineering US weapon systems.57 The CCP-controlled military press described the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark fighter aircraft as a “flopping fish” and criticized it for lacking the stealth capabilities of the F-35 Lightning.58', 'The US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter entered service in 1983 and saw combat during the First Gulf War, while the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning fighter aircraft have been deployed in conflict zones. However, the PLAAF has not operationally inducted the J-31 fighter aircraft while the J-20 fighter aircraft has not yet proven its capabilities in any bilateral or multilateral military exercise. The much-hyped Chengdu J-20 is a heavy fighter aircraft comparable to the MiG 31, which is essentially an interceptor and not a multirole or an air superiority aircraft.', 'China’s Vulnerable A2/AD Zones', 'A study of modern wars suggests that the United States will decimate China’s military without entering the A2/AD zone. This is how the United States devastated Iraqi defenses in 1990. US strategic depth in Asia will allow military planners to concentrate the military at different locations.', 'The United States has a devastating array of lethal weapon systems, such as submarines, for countering China’s A2/AD strategies. During the First Gulf War, the United States launched 297 Tomahawks, which destroyed the Iraqi military.59 Ohio-class submarines can operate unhindered in the adversary’s A2/AD zone closer to the shore; thus, striking targets far inland. Collectively, four Ohio-class submarines installed with 616 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles would obliterate China’s military. The inexperienced PLAN AC group will be destroyed by long-range antiship missiles (LRASM), Tomahawks, and Mark 48-Mod 7 torpedoes launched from USS Key West, USS Oklahoma City, USS Topeka, and USS Asheville submarines based in Guam.', 'The USN and USAF have signed a USD 414 million contract for autonomously guided with onboard sensors, jam-resistant, and difficult to detect antiship LRASM.60 The stealthy Zumwalt-class warship—equipped with emerging technologies—can sail undetected in littoral waters and contested territories to launch LRASM and Tomahawk cruise missiles.', 'China is constructing military bases on islands in the South China Sea; however, this military infrastructure is vulnerable to US weapon systems, as the islands lack natural defenses and camouflage.61 During a war, the bases will be annihilated by the USN as the PLA cannot hide behind hills and forests. Once destroyed, these facilities cannot be supported from the mainland, as the logistical supplies will be demolished by the USN. China’s military modernization may enhance A2/AD zones, but it does not contribute to a blue-water, sea-control capability.62', 'China’s Hyped DF-21 Missile', 'The antiship DF-21 missile, carried by colossal transporter erector launchers, has a range of 1,400 miles. The missile regiments are based in the barren Gobi Desert, which makes it an easy target for the US military. The DF-21 has been tested on a stationary ship, but it has not yet been successfully tested against a moving target.63 A system of systems is required to track the AC,64 acquire the precise location, keep the missile locked on the target, penetrate the carrier’s multilayered defenses, and provide mid-course updates as within one hour the ship will have moved 30 miles. China does not know about the DF-21 performance against the US CSG countermeasures.65', 'The United States and Russia have not yet developed a missile equivalent to the DF-21. However, China lacks the C4ISR systems to strike targets at that range. China does not release the missile testing data, leading to many questions, including whether it can hit moving targets. Does it have precision targeting technologies?66 Until proven otherwise, the functionality of the missile is based on nothing but circumstantial inference and speculation.', 'Opium War: Then and Now—Nothing Much Has Changed', "One can draw some historical parallels. For example, similarities exist between the unprepared Qing military during the Opium Wars and the contemporary PLA, which underestimates the US military.67 The Opium Wars were fought between the obsolete Qing military and an industrializing and a technologically advanced Britain, which possessed the world’s most-powerful navy.68 The British consisted of 20,000 troops and three dozen modern Royal Navy warships. While China maintained an 800,000 strong military force, only 35 percent of these forces were equipped with firearms.69 China had several A2/AD advantages, including strategic depth, numerical advantage, familiarity with battle terrain, and excellent coastal defenses.70 But, much like today's PLA, the Qing troops lacked combat experience. In contrast, the British troops were battle hardened and highly disciplined because of their involvement in various wars in the Middle East and Asia.71 The Qing’s archaic military system made it difficult to deploy troops to counter the mobile British forces.72 China’s generals, such as Yi Shan and Yang Fang, were incompetent in the pivotal Battle of Canton in 1841, resulting in a defeat for China.73", 'The Opium Wars have military parallels for the PLA. The wars led to the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the decimation of China’s military. The outcome of a contemporary war with the United States will be nearly identical to the political dimensions of the Opium Wars. The Tianjin Treaty of 1858, imposed by foreign powers, devastated China. Russia did not intervene but pressured China to cede a large part of its northeastern territory, including Vladivostok.74 The consequences of the Opium Wars led to the Boxer Rebellion in 1899. About 80 years later, the Japanese invasion of 1937 demonstrated how vulnerable and weak China was to external naval powers.', 'Conclusion', 'The US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. The Pentagon is implementing sophisticated network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control. China is concerned about the lethal and distributed US military, equipped with a potent combination of quantity and quality of weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The overwhelming display of US military power since 1945 is a credible deterrent for Beijing. Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability of destroying the adversary through preemptive strikes consisting of long-range weapon systems such as cruise missiles in the first few days of the war, giving no time for the adversary to retaliate.75', 'According to Taylor Fravel, China is not a military superpower.76 There is not much evidence about China’s plans for global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the Soviet Union. China’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world. The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is an economic heavyweight but is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades.77 US primacy in the post–Cold War world has prevented World War III. The two most likely contenders for expansion, North Korea and China, have restricted their militaries within their borders. The United States retains unrivaled military power, and China is not in a position to challenge it.', '', '', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-7---RRR-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

6be9a89f62c272c735afe193e1590fa4df5f7c91a9286dcf703d763c6d5b818e

The plan doesn’t spillover to other entities.

Alicia Lai 21 J.D, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 2021. “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LLC: CORPORATE PERSONHOOD AS TORT REFORM” Michigan State Law. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677360

personhood to Al selectively limited personhood entails divisible limited rights No moral rights Al will never be able to replace humans C]orporations have no consciences personhood serves useful legal fiction circumvents question of whether Al should be equivocated to person because personhood divvied up not all-or nothing Entities can have " fewer, jurisprudence allows for nuanced selection of which rights to confer legal system selectively choose which rights Al given narrowly tailored set of rights

The grant of personhood to Al may be selectively limited , just as the rights and obligations of corporate personhood are likewise limited. this Article does not liken Al to living, breathing humans with emotions and volition-at least in the philosophical sense-even if they are granted legal personhood. But in response to recent proposals of granting full "electronic personhood" to artificial technologies, critics have latched onto exactly that argument: legal and technology experts have expressed their vehement disapproval in giving Al the moral rights of personhood because corporate personhood entails a divisible , limited set of rights and obligations. No moral rights are necessary. Critics argue that granting the moral rights of personhood to Al systems would improperly violate humanist exceptionalism. Because Al lacks these fundamental, intangible characteristics, they will never be able to replace humans or assume legal personhood Courts have also tried to refute the notion that nonhuman entities could partake in moral rights In Citizens United, Justice Stevens worried that, [ C]orporations have no consciences , no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure their " personhood " often serves as a useful legal fiction . But they are not themselves members of "We the People" by whom and for whom our Constitution was established. 23 0 As a legal matter, corporate personhood does not require proof that Al is effectively a natural person Unlike a proposal of full legal personhood, a proposal of corporate personhood entirely circumvents the question of whether Al should be equivocated to a natural person because corporate personhood may be divvied up .238 It is not an all-or nothing proposition . Corporate rights are divisible . 23 9 Entities can have " more, fewer, overlapping, or even disjointed sets" of rights and obligations.2 4 While the Supreme Court has granted corporations many human legal rights, the jurisprudence allows for the nuanced selection of which rights to confer 42 This scheme makes it evident that while corporations and human persons are both considered "legal persons" under the law, each has their own distinctive set of rights.2 43 If the law were to grant personhood to Al, a legal system could selectively choose which rights it conferred. if the legal system reaches a consensus that limited liability and the right to be sued are not moral rights inherent to human beings, it may confer those rights. . Al , too, could be given a narrowly tailored set of rights and obligations.

selectively limited corporate personhood divisible , limited No moral rights are necessary. never be able to replace humans circumvents the question of whether Al should be equivocated not an all-or nothing proposition divisible selectively choose which rights it conferred. Al , too, could be given a narrowly tailored set of rights and obligations.

['B. Divisibility The grant of personhood to Al may be selectively limited, just as the rights and obligations of corporate personhood are likewise limited. 22 5 To be clear, this Article does not liken Al to living, breathing humans with emotions and volition-at least in the philosophical sense-even if they are granted legal personhood. But in response to recent proposals of granting full "electronic personhood" to artificial technologies, critics have latched onto exactly that argument: legal and technology experts have expressed their vehement disapproval in giving Al the moral rights of personhood. However, these concerns should not apply to a proposal to give Al corporate personhood because corporate personhood entails a divisible, limited set of rights and obligations. No moral rights are necessary. Critics argue that granting the moral rights of personhood to Al systems would improperly violate humanist exceptionalism.226 According to these critics, the human species inherently possesses unique traits of ethics, morality, and emotions. Because Al lacks these fundamental, intangible characteristics, they will never be able to replace humans or assume legal personhood. The World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology Commission said as much in its report, arguing that it is "highly counterintuitive to call [Al] \'persons\' as long as they do not possess some additional qualities typically associated with human persons, such as freedom of will, intentionality, self-consciousness, moral agency or a sense of personal identity."2 27 The opposition to the 2017 European Union proposal to grant legal personhood to Al also furthered this argument: 285 Al experts in an open letter argued that Al systems could not derive human rights from the natural person model, the legal entity model, nor the Anglo-Saxon trust model. 2 2 This branch of criticism invokes a "persons-are-conceptually-human" argument that suggests that "our very concept of person is inextricably linked to our experience of a human life." 22 Courts have also tried to refute the notion that nonhuman entities could partake in moral rights. In Citizens United, Justice Stevens worried that, [C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their "personhood" often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves members of "We the People" by whom and for whom our Constitution was established. 23 0 But the majority rejected Justice Stevens\' concerns that nonhuman entities are not natural persons. 231 Tongue in cheek, Saudi Arabia has even gone further to announce it considered robots capable of achieving citizenship by giving citizenship to Sophia, a humanoid robot capable of complex interactions. 23 As a philosophical matter, the logic underlying the attribution of human capabilities and rights to other natural persons likewise extends to an attribution of rights to Al. Other natural persons are considered philosophical and legal persons because we believe that they are like ourselves in possessing a conscious intelligence. 23 3 This is entirely dependent upon our external interactions with them. 234 Al may be capable of exhibiting similar external interactions that would justify granting them legal rights. In his classic article, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Alan Turing proposes a test as a proxy for conscious intelligence, where hidden humans and machines answer conversational responses to human testers. 23 1 The machine is said to pass the Turing test if the testers cannot distinguish which responses are from which entities. 236 Once a machine has passed the Turing test, it functionally performs the external interactions necessary to attribute human capabilities-and thus legal personhood-to it, regardless of whether it possesses true intelligence. After all, if we cannot understand the black box of the human mind, how can we reject the possibility that a machine could learn to act comparably? Al systems have access to far greater datasets and have far greater processing power than the limited, faulty human mind.23 7 Perhaps they could make more comprehensive, insightful, ethical decisions than humans would be capable of. As a legal matter, corporate personhood does not require proof that Al is effectively a natural person. Unlike a proposal of full legal personhood, a proposal of corporate personhood entirely circumvents the question of whether Al should be equivocated to a natural person because corporate personhood may be divvied up.238 It is not an all-or nothing proposition. Corporate rights are divisible. 23 9 Entities can have "more, fewer, overlapping, or even disjointed sets" of rights and obligations.2 4 While the Supreme Court has granted corporations many human legal rights, the jurisprudence allows for the nuanced selection of which rights to confer. The Court has previously refused to grant corporations the right against self-incrimination in criminal trials.2 41 The Court has also refused to apply Article IV\'s Privileges and Immunities Clause to corporations for protection against states treating out-of-staters worse than it treats its own citizens.2 42 This scheme makes it evident that while corporations and human persons are both considered "legal persons" under the law, each has their own distinctive set of rights.2 43 If the law were to grant personhood to Al, a legal system could selectively choose which rights it conferred. For instance, if the legal system reaches a consensus that limited liability and the right to be sued are not moral rights inherent to human beings, it may confer those rights. If the law agrees that the right to vote or bear arms is a moral right inherent to human beings-as it did with the right against selfincrimination, for example-it may choose to withhold those rights from corporations. Al, too, could be given a narrowly tailored set of rights and obligations.', '']

[(7, 13)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-NDT-Round-1.docx

Emory

MiPi

b17f2382f50fe1aad0ef5b7d5d4f5153c7237efd3b92a6391c16050cc965dda3

Deterrence breakdown against China causes nuclear war

Max Boot 23, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 4/17/23, “In the U.S.-China competition, the real ‘existential’ danger is nuclear war,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/04/17/china-united-states-nuclear-conflict-danger/

U S and China are in an existential struggle this has potential to turn into nuclear conflict Even worst-case scenarios are too sanguine lack of nuclear exchange is common in war games it risks reinforcing assumptions conflict could avoid nuclear escalation Beijing would consider nuclear use if conventional defeat threatened PRC survival U S could attack bases in China Even if retaliatory strikes were conventional it risk immediate U.S. escalation Both have incentive to avoid destruction,” but countries act rashly in battle great powers in combat unlikely to avoid nuc s 1914 with nuclear weapons an existential danger U S should deter China , but avoid needless provocations

the U S and China are locked in an existential struggle because this new cold war has the potential to turn into a nuclear conflict Even worst-case scenarios about China are too sanguine about the outcome of a conflict a U.S.-China war game ended up with China having a lodgment on Taiwan lack of a nuclear exchange is quite common in U.S.-China war games at the unclassified level it inadvertently risks reinforcing assumptions a U.S.-China conflict could avoid nuclear escalation yet China is in the midst of a rapid nuclear buildup its nuclear stockpile will grow from 400 warheads today to 1,500 warheads by 2035 while China nominally adheres to a “no first use” policy Beijing would consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat gravely threatened PRC survival .” Given that a failed invasion of Taiwan could threaten the CCP’s power China could up the ante by going nuclear risk of nuclear escalation is all the greater because it would be difficult for the U S to win a war over Taiwan by attacking only Chinese ships at sea and Chinese aircraft in the skies. The U S could find itself compelled, as a matter of military necessity, to attack bases in China . China could strike U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, even Hawaii and the West Coast Even if Beijing announced its retaliatory strikes were conventional ly armed it would risk immediate U.S. escalation . Can a U.S. president refuse to launch in the 30 minutes between missile launch from China and impact in the U.S.? When two nuclear powers attack each other’s territory, it would be difficult to keep the conflict contained at a conventional level. Both sides have an incentive to avoid “mutual assured destruction,” but countries often act rashly in the heat of battle , particularly after they have suffered significant casualties If the U.S. and China manage to sleepwalk into a conventional war, the chances of it escalating into a nuclear exchange are significant . Two great powers who face each other in combat are unlikely to avoid using tactical nuc lear weapon s Once that threshold is crossed, it is but a short step to a much broader nuclear conflict 1914 with nuclear weapons ? Now that’s an existential danger This is not an argument for kowtowing to Beijing or abandoning Taiwan. It is a potent warning about the dangers of blundering into war with China . The U S should continue to support Taiwan and to deter China , but should also avoid needless provocations That’s a fast-track to World War III

U S locked in an existential nuclear conflict Even worst-case scenarios too sanguine reinforcing assumptions rapid nuclear buildup China could up the ante by going nuclear U S U S in China conventional ly armed immediate U.S. escalation have an incentive often act rashly in the heat of battle significant nuc s 1914 with nuclear weapons ? existential danger blundering into war with China U S deter China avoid needless provocations

['But Gallagher is right that the United States and China are locked in an existential struggle, because this new cold war, like the original Cold War with the Soviet Union, has the potential to turn into a nuclear conflict. This is a danger that China hawks — and the U.S. public in general — do not pay sufficient attention to. President Biden, for example, repeatedly says that the United States will defend Taiwan if it’s attacked, without any mention of the potential consequences of a conflict with China.', '“It seems odd that war with China over Taiwan seems a comfortable assumption for so many when the U.S. and NATO remain cautious about Russia’s war in Ukraine precisely because of the perceived risk of nuclear escalation,” John K. Culver, a CIA veteran and former national intelligence officer for East Asia, told me.', 'Even many worst-case scenarios about China are too sanguine about the outcome of a conflict. In March, for example, House Republicans took part in a U.S.-China war game organized by retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. After the exercise was first reported by my Post colleague Olivier Knox, I reached out to Montgomery to ask how it unfolded and whether it included a nuclear exchange.', 'He said, “The war game ended up with China having a lodgment on Taiwan, but not having defeated the Taiwan Army.” The United States suffered “significant casualties” and Taiwan “awful casualties.” Montgomery explained that the scenario “did not escalate to nuclear, although that is certainly a possibility in this sort of contingency.”', 'The lack of a nuclear exchange is quite common in U.S.-China war games, at least those conducted at the unclassified level. (A senior defense official told me this is no longer the case with top-secret Pentagon war games.) A recent war game organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), like the congressional war game, had the United States and its allies defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Victory came at “high cost” — “The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members” — but not at the highest cost: i.e., the destruction of U.S. cities. CSIS senior adviser Mark F. Cancian told me that, although he would pursue “a follow-on project that looks at nuclear operations,” he wanted to focus specifically on conventional operations.', 'That’s a perfectly legitimate choice, but it inadvertently risks reinforcing assumptions that a U.S.-China conflict could avoid nuclear escalation. Even a New York Times op-ed in February written by an Australian scholar, headlined “A War With China Would Be Unlike Anything Americans Faced Before,” focused on cyberwarfare and economic warfare — not nuclear warfare.', 'And yet China is in the midst of a rapid nuclear buildup. The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military power projects that its nuclear stockpile will grow from 400 warheads today to 1,500 warheads by 2035. The report also warns that, while China nominally adheres to a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons, “Beijing probably would … consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat gravely threatened PRC survival.” Given that a failed invasion of Taiwan could threaten the CCP’s power, it’s reasonable to worry that China could up the ante by going nuclear.', 'The risk of nuclear escalation is all the greater because, as a senior U.S. admiral explained to me, it would be difficult for the United States to win a war over Taiwan by attacking only Chinese ships at sea and Chinese aircraft in the skies. The United States could find itself compelled, as a matter of military necessity, to attack bases in China. China, in turn, could strike U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Guam, even Hawaii and the West Coast.', 'Culver, the former intelligence officer, told me, “Even if Beijing announced that its retaliatory strikes against Hawaii or the West Coast of the U.S. were conventionally armed, it would risk immediate U.S. escalation. Can a U.S. president refuse to launch in the 30 minutes between missile launch from China and impact in the U.S.?”', 'When two nuclear-armed powers attack each other’s territory, it would be difficult to keep the conflict contained at a conventional level. Both sides, admittedly, would have an incentive to avoid “mutual assured destruction,” but countries often act rashly in the heat of battle, particularly after they have suffered significant casualties and feel the need to ensure that their troops did not die in vain.', 'For a sense of how destructive a war with China could be, read “2034: A Novel of the Next World War” by retired Adm. James Stavridis, a former supreme allied commander in Europe, and Marine combat veteran Elliot Ackerman. It ends — spoiler alert — with nuclear devastation in both countries.', 'Stavridis told me: “If the U.S. and China manage to sleepwalk into a conventional war, the chances of it escalating into a nuclear exchange are significant. Two great powers who face each other in combat are unlikely to avoid using tactical nuclear weapons, at least at sea. Once that threshold is crossed, it is but a short step to a much broader nuclear conflict. Think 1914 with nuclear weapons at the ready.”', '1914 with nuclear weapons? Now that’s an existential danger.', 'This is not an argument for kowtowing to Beijing or abandoning Taiwan. It is, however, a potent warning about the dangers of blundering into war with China. The United States should continue to support Taiwan and to deter China, but should also keep lines of communication open and avoid needless provocations such as recognizing Taiwan’s independence — as has been rashly suggested in the past year by former secretary of state Mike Pompeo and 19 House members. That’s a fast-track to World War III. Maintaining the fiction that Taiwan is a renegade province of China is a small price to pay for avoiding nuclear annihilation.']

[(4, 11)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-ADA-Nationals-at-Indiana-University-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

4c3fd8931d2788c1c028c1075abf149430bba2865e6eb728ffdf1a2e0fb8cba0

Courts are swamped and its getting worse.

Deese 22 - (Kaelan Deese, Supreme Court Reporter; 9-15-2022, Washington Examiner, "Justice delayed: Federal case backlog prompts calls to expand courts," doa: 9-15-2022) url: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/courts/caseloads-in-federal-courts-indicate-need-for-more-judges

An overburdened and backlogged court system got worse during rona several attorneys said the pandemic had a significant impact delaying cases Backlogs have always been an issue but they spiked 49% in one year court s had to acquire new skills and equipment delays were compounded because courts place a higher priority on criminal cases Still criminal cases seen a 6% increase when you consider population growth it doesn't make sense the number of judges in 91 is still appropriate

An already overburdened and backlogged federal court system got worse during the co rona virus pandemic The Washington Examiner spoke with several attorneys who said the pandemic had a significant impact on delaying cases , compounding the large uptick in pending civil cases . " Backlogs have always been an issue in the civil court system, but they became especially pronounced following COVID," In 2020, there were 397,492 pending civil cases filed in federal court. By 2021, the figure spiked to 590,288 pending civil cases , marking a nearly 49% change in one year , according to official U.S. federal judicial caseload statistics. Not only court employee s , but also attorneys and others making use of the courts had to acquire new skills and equipment to handle judicial work remotely," Many persons who otherwise would have become involved in litigation or other proceedings during the pandemic likely were unable or unwilling to do so." delays in civil court trials were compounded because most courts place a higher priority on criminal cases due to the Constitution's promise of a right to a speedy trial. Still , the number of pending criminal cases has also seen a 6% increase the "clear culprit" of the clogged and overgrowing caseload phenomena is the "increasingly polarized and partisan judicial confirmation process " when you just consider the basic fact of population growth , it just doesn't make sense that the number of , especially appellate judges we had in 19 91 , is still an appropriate number for 2022

already overburdened backlogged worse co rona virus pandemic several attorneys significant impact delaying cases compounding large uptick pending civil cases Backlogs always been an issue especially pronounced 397,492 pending civil cases spiked 590,288 pending civil cases 49% change in one year court employee s attorneys others acquire new skills equipment otherwise become involved in litigation unable unwilling civil court trials compounded higher priority criminal cases pending criminal cases 6% increase clogged overgrowing caseload polarized partisan judicial confirmation process population growth 19 91 appropriate number 2022

['', 'An already overburdened and backlogged federal court system got worse during the coronavirus pandemic, prompting some legal experts and lawmakers to call for an expansion of the judicial bench.', "And unlike the deeply divisive idea of packing the Supreme Court with more justices, there's some bipartisan agreement that lower-court federal judges are overworked and need help presiding over their growing caseload.", 'The Washington Examiner spoke with several attorneys who said the pandemic had a significant impact on delaying cases, compounding the large uptick in pending civil cases.', '"Backlogs have always been an issue in the civil court system, but they became especially pronounced following COVID," said Evan Walker, owner of a legal firm in La Jolla, California.', 'In 2020, there were 397,492 pending civil cases filed in federal court. By 2021, the figure spiked to 590,288 pending civil cases, marking a nearly 49% change in one year, according to official U.S. federal judicial caseload statistics.', 'During this period, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the workload of almost all components of the federal judiciary, resulting in the shuttering of some federal courthouses and the reliance on electronic methods to conduct proceedings. The adaptations were not seamless and had the effect of delaying justice.', '', '"Not only court employees, but also attorneys and others making use of the courts had to acquire new skills and equipment to handle judicial work remotely," according to a 2021 U.S. federal court report on judicial caseloads. "Many persons who otherwise would have become involved in litigation or other proceedings during the pandemic likely were unable or unwilling to do so."', "Texas-based personal injury attorney Dr. Louis Patino said delays in civil court trials were compounded because most courts place a higher priority on criminal cases due to the Constitution's promise of a right to a speedy trial. Still, the number of pending criminal cases has also seen a 6% increase between 2020 and 2021, from 110,115 pending cases to 114,174.", '"Getting a trial date in many courts is difficult, and even if we are fortunate enough to have a trial date on the court’s docket, the chances of that trial date being reset is very high," Patino added.', 'While increasing the size of the federal judiciary has been common throughout U.S. history, with nearly 30 expansions since 1891, the last meaningful expansion happened in 1990, when Congress added 11 more circuit court judgeships and 61 more district court judge seats.', 'In the years since, the federal judiciary has become increasingly political, as presidents are granted responsibility to appoint judges and have used that ability to stack the roster with individuals who align with their ideologies.', 'Thomas Berry, a research fellow at the Cato Institute, wrote that the "clear culprit" of the clogged and overgrowing caseload phenomena is the "increasingly polarized and partisan judicial confirmation process" in an August 2021 report on the matter.', '"I think there\'s no disputing that the drought we\'re in between bills to create new judgeships is unprecedented. And so, when you just consider the basic fact of population growth, it just doesn\'t make sense that the number of, especially appellate judges we had in 1991, is still an appropriate number for 2022," Berry told the Washington Examiner in a phone interview.', '']

[(0, 5), (6, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

01df8beb3ccba0b27692e5051b84632e54eeb20e784b73bef9e6c75ca0c98738

Independently---DELAY LINK---the plan crowds BBB off the agenda---that’s Feiner---kills the bill

Adrian Carrasquillo 12/28, political reporter for Newsweek reporting on the 2020 election, who has covered national politics and Latino issues over the last decade for NBC News, BuzzFeed, New Republic, Politico Magazine, Texas Monthly, and others, “With Biden's agenda in danger, Democrats scramble to lay out 2022 battle plan,” Newsweek, 12-28-2021, https://www.newsweek.com/bidens-agenda-danger-democrats-scramble-lay-out-2022-battle-plan-1663678?amp=1

Manchin walked away from BBB While there is still a framework to come to the table and work on passing a bill , it would leave a very short window to pass legislation urgency is real Dem s have months

Manchin walked away from negotiations on BBB While there is still a framework for Manchin and Biden to come back to the table and work on passing a bill , it would leave the president with a very short window to pass major legislation before the midterm s urgency is real Dem s have months to make due on that promise, or walk through an election season without anything to offer

BBB still a framework come back to the table work passing a bill very short window to pass major legislation midterm s urgency real Dem s months anything to offer

['Manchin walked away from negotiations on the roughly $2 trillion Build Back Better (BBB) spending bill just before the holidays. It included a child tax credit, universal preschool, free community college, expanded Medicare and Medicaid, as well as significant climate provisions.', 'While some Democrats believe there is still a framework for Manchin and Biden to come back to the table and work on passing a smaller bill, it would leave the president with a very short window to pass major legislation and still have time to tout his accomplishments before the November midterm elections, which many analysts are predicting will go badly for his party.', 'Democrats know the urgency is real.', '"As best as I can tell, Democrats have about three months to make due on that promise, or else we walk through an election season without anything to offer the American people," Brad Bauman, the former executive director of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, told Newsweek.']

[(7, 25)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-FullerTown-Round3.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-FullerTown-Round3.docx

c41f3b283ca8cf3bba39a8c20006ceb091e117c6f0b8aa288922574c15927d8c

That strategy will work as long as Biden maintains high PC

Haberkorn 12-8 Jennifer, Burgess Everett, and Jonathan Lemire, Politico, “Biden the closer? Senate GOP urges president to clinch Ukraine-border deal,” December 8, 2023 https://www.politico.com/news/2023/12/08/senate-republicans-urge-biden-ukraine-border-talks-00130738

Senate Republicans are demanding Biden insert himself into negotiations It’s his job to fix this Republicans and Dem s say negotiations require that Biden revive his longtime deal-maker reputation to clinch an agreement he “needs to be the deal closer.” Biden’s track record as vice president and senator is one of deal-cutter given his relationship with McConnell even the president’s top allies say Biden will need to take the lead with a sharply divided Congress Biden has an opportunity to use his knowledge of the Senate as well as foreign policy acumen to try for another bipartisan win he could make all the difference in whether the Senate passes aid for Ukraine

Senate Republicans are demanding Biden insert himself forcefully into negotiations to salvage his top foreign policy priority. It’s his job to fix this ,” said Graham Senate negotiators “don’t matter, if he’s not on board He’s the commander in chief Republicans and Dem ocrat s say the laborious negotiations require that Biden revive his longtime deal-maker reputation to clinch an agreement he “needs to be the deal closer.” Biden’s track record as vice president and senator is certainly one of deal-cutter , particularly given his relationship with McConnell lawmakers got close enough to Murphy back to the negotiating table after he balked over GOP demands. But even the president’s top allies say Biden will need to take the lead . many in Biden’s inner circle believe something has to be done at the border, lest they lose independent and swing voters who have seen surging migration’s negative effects in many major U.S. cities. with a sharply divided Congress stumbling to finish all but its most essential work, Biden has an opportunity to use his knowledge of the Senate as well as his foreign policy acumen to try for another bipartisan win he could make all the difference in whether the Senate passes aid for Ukraine

Senate Republicans are demanding Biden insert himself forcefully into negotiations Republicans and Dem ocrat s say the laborious negotiations require that Biden revive his longtime deal-maker reputation to clinch an agreement he “needs to be the deal closer.” foreign policy acumen could make all the difference passes aid for Ukraine

['Congress is on the verge of leaving for the holidays without delivering further aid to Ukraine. And Senate Republicans are demanding that President Joe Biden insert himself forcefully into negotiations in order to salvage his top foreign policy priority. “It’s his job to fix this,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), who is a party to the discussions. Senate negotiators “don’t matter, if he’s not on board,” Graham added. “He’s the commander in chief. I think we’re wasting our time.” Republicans and a handful of Democrats say the laborious negotiations require that Biden, a 36-year Senate veteran, revive his longtime deal-maker reputation to clinch an agreement on his nearly $106 billion national security aid request. Graham said he personally told Biden as much earlier this fall, saying he “needs to be the deal closer.” Biden’s track record as vice president and senator is certainly one of deal-cutter, particularly given his relationship with Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). Yet, as president, his administration has found success leaving the policymaking details to the legislative branch. Biden’s been burned by getting too close to heated Capitol talks. The most famous stumble came when a trillion-dollar party-line social spending bill fell apart in 2021. Even so, a significant part of that effort got preserved in the Inflation Reduction Act after Biden and Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) fell short on a bigger agreement. Biden was able to sign that smaller-scale party-line bill after employing a far lighter touch with lawmakers — one that might not work for a delicate negotiation that hinges on pairing stricter border policies with billions of dollars for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. Sens. James Lankford (R-Okla.), Kyrsten Sinema (I-Ariz.) and Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) agreed on Thursday to continue negotiating through the weekend. Republicans made a new offer to Democrats, and though there’s no deal in sight, they got close enough to at least bring Murphy back to the negotiating table after he balked over GOP demands. But if senators can’t finish the job, even the president’s top allies in the Capitol say Biden will need to take the lead. “If they are not successful, then I would urge the president to get more directly involved,” said Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) There’s real worry on Capitol Hill, however, that even presidential involvement might not be enough to save the negotiations. In particular, some senators fear that Biden would be set up to fail after Republicans voted unanimously earlier this week against the foreign aid request because it lacked border policy changes. Not to mention the primary risk to Biden if he steps in: Republicans could blame him should everything fall apart — and increase their finger-pointing over a migration crisis they hammered him on for months. On Thursday, White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the bipartisan negotiations on the Hill “should be happening” but said the Republican Party is “not moving forward in good faith.” Sen. Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) said that after the GOP’s filibuster he’s “wondering how important or urgent this is” for Republicans. “It’s hard not to be a little cynical about whether they really want a deal,” said Sen. Tina Smith (D-Minn.). Not every Democrat wants the White House to cut a deal with the GOP, either. Progressives and immigration advocates are frustrated that the White House is even encouraging negotiations over border policies, which they worry will result in virtually eliminating the U.S. asylum system. The Congressional Hispanic Caucus, including the four Latino Democratic senators, as well as Sen. Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), asked White House chief of staff Jeff Zients for a meeting on the border talks. The White House has not made Zients available, according to three people familiar with the request. A White House official said the administration is currently getting updates only from the lawmakers at the negotiating table and providing technical assistance. The official didn’t rule out future engagement. “I’m waiting to see if a meeting will come to pass but it’s not as though they’re not aware of our concerns,” Hirono said. She wants the administration to identify the “significant” border concessions that Biden on Wednesday said he would be willing to make. Zients and other White House senior staff have been in regular touch with Lankford, according to a person familiar with the private conversations but not authorized to publicly discuss them. The conversations are not negotiations, the person stressed, with Zients leaving that to his Democratic colleagues on the Hill. Rather, the chief of staff has been getting regular updates on the state of the negotiations from Lankford reiterating the importance of getting a deal done to help Ukraine. Zients has also held regular calls with Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) on the same issues, this person said. In interviews, chief Senate negotiators said Biden’s top aides are involved to some degree. Lankford said the White House is mostly providing “technical assistance” even as it seeks a compromise. Murphy said senators are “in the driver’s seat, but the administration is in regular touch.” There’s also an acute awareness among Biden aides of how thorny an issue the border is. Progressives fear the administration will go too far, accepting what resembles restrictive Trump-era immigration policies, while getting no Democratic immigration wins in return. Heading into an election year, many of those liberals are already furious with Biden for his handling of the Israel-Hamas war and the failures to deliver on other campaign promises. However, many others in Biden’s inner circle believe something has to be done at the border, lest they lose independent and swing voters who have seen surging migration’s negative effects in many major U.S. cities. The White House has publicly warned that it will run out of money for Ukraine by the end of the year, but some Pentagon officials are hopeful the funding could stretch a little further. Moreover, some senior administration officials believe the Presidential Drawdown Authority may free up some additional funds. But even with a little wiggle room, the situation could soon grow dire with sweeping ramifications for the war, according to two senior officials not authorized to speak publicly about private discussions. There is growing fear in the White House that a break in U.S. funds would create a domino effect and other nations would also begin to pull back support. In light of those concerns, Republicans say Biden needs to do more. Sen. Mitt Romney (R-Utah), a top backer of Ukraine aid, said the lack of progress is “driving me nuts.” “Where the heck is the White House, do they care about Israel and Ukraine?” Romney said. “It’s up to [Biden]. Does he care about this? The people of the country expect the president to be the leader.” Still, with a sharply divided Congress stumbling to finish all but its most essential work, Biden now has an opportunity to use his knowledge of the Senate as well as his foreign policy acumen to try for another bipartisan win. And how he and his top aides handle the next few days could make all the difference in whether the Senate passes aid for Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan and the border.']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Neg-Kathryn-Klassic-Doubles.docx

Kansas

ReSo

e9af1bf6eeed0e8744acd00225116835832c61f63d5d68facf721a2d35728c07

Geoengineering is inevitable, but the CP is necessary to allocate resources towards best tech.

Cascio 7 [Jamais Cascio is an environmental futurist and a fellow at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, March 30, 2007, “Geoengineering and the Future of Desktop Fab”]

geoengineering tech is essentially inevitable. No nation that sees itself as a great power is willing to risk its climate and environment in the hands of another nation. Research will happen out of self-preservation

; the two quotes he used represent a very small part of the conversation. I think I come across as a bit more of an advocate of geoengineering That possibility is another reason why the development of geoengineering tech nologies is essentially inevitable. No nation that sees itself as a great power is going to be willing to risk having its climate and environment completely in the hands of another nation. Research into methodologies for geoengineering will happen simply out of self-preservation it’s further underscores the absolute need for people who see responsibility and precaution as paramount to be part of the conversation.

['(I spoke with the article author, Moises Velasquez-Manoff, for over an hour; the two quotes he used represent a very small part of the conversation. I think I come across as a bit more of an advocate of geoengineering in the article than I really am, but by and large I think I’m represented reasonably well.) The most interesting comment comes at the end, from , a climate scientist at the Carnegie Institution at Stanford University: “You could imagine some kind of arms race of geoengineering, where one country is trying to cool the planet and another is trying to warm the planet.” That possibility is another reason why the development of geoengineering technologies is essentially inevitable. No nation that sees itself as a great power is going to be willing to risk having its climate and environment completely in the hands of another nation. Research into methodologies for geoengineering will happen simply out of self-preservation—after all, nobody wants to fall victim to a “terraforming gap.” It’s hardly a good reason to pursue geoengineering, but it’s a powerful one, and further underscores the absolute need for people who see responsibility and precaution as paramount to be part of the conversation.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Wake-Round-1.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

00e909953d8cc3c21f1420122a070e33b04cfaf22516ae87e243bd1c282af4a5

Biden rolled it back

Ollstein 21 (Alice Miranda, “Biden administration reverses Trump restrictions on fetal tissue research,” Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/16/biden-reverses-fetal-tissue-research-restrictions-482503)

Biden moved to unwind Trump-era restrictions on federal-funded research using fetal tissue Medical groups urged Biden reverse the ban saying that it left scientifically meritorious research unfunded Fetal research has been used in development of numerous vaccines

Biden moved to unwind strict Trump-era restrictions on federal-funded medical research using fetal tissue obtained by abortions, reversing policies that scientists warned would devastate the development of treatments for a broad range of diseases Trump ended fetal tissue research at the National Institutes of Health Medical groups urged Biden to reverse the ban shortly after he took office , saying that it left “ highly worthy, scientifically meritorious research ” unfunded and created a chilling effect on the broader scientific community. Fetal tissue research has been used in the development of numerous vaccines and treatments , including for Parkinson’s, HIV and Covid

shortly after he took office highly worthy, scientifically meritorious research numerous vaccines and treatments

['The Biden administration on Friday moved to unwind strict Trump-era restrictions on federal-funded medical research using fetal tissue obtained by abortions, reversing policies that scientists warned would devastate the development of treatments for a broad range of diseases. The Trump administration, under pressure from allied anti-abortion groups, ended fetal tissue research at the National Institutes of Health and established an ethics board to review government support for the research at universities and other labs. The board, which was filled with critics of the research, met just once and rejected 13 of 14 projects that NIH scientists had deemed worthy of support. The Trump administration had announced its policy in 2019 after a long internal battle between political appointees and career scientists, who argued that the research was essential and conducted ethically. Medical groups urged Biden to reverse the ban shortly after he took office, saying that it left “highly worthy, scientifically meritorious research” unfunded and created a chilling effect on the broader scientific community. Fetal tissue research has been used in the development of numerous vaccines and treatments, including for Parkinson’s, HIV and Covid-19.', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 11)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HiWi-Neg-65th-Annual-George-R-R-Pflaum-Debates-at-Emporia-State-Round-6.docx

Kansas

HiWi

362b824b275f8fba7df450fc9f6c5014b941773bc0709f8cd5f4c60a7d72c39f

Nuclear terrorism collapses the nuclear order, wrecks global security, economies, international norms, and rolls back disarm – turns the case

Irma Arguello and Emiliano J. Buis 18 founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network and PhD from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), a Master’s in Human and Social Sciences from the University of Paris/Panthéon-Sorbonne, and a postgraduate diploma in national defense from the National Defense School, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 74 No. 2, February 2018 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812?journalCode=rbul20

A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario direct death toll of 23,000 and 57,000 injured Total destruction of infrastructure area would be unusable for years consequences propagate worldwide global distrust lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use decrease in self-control escalation of conflicts and the emergence of new ones increase in military unilateralism and expenditures severe global depression a 2 percent fall in global G D P 4 percent decline of trade Global poverty raise 4 percent breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations international tensions lead to a collapse of the nuclear order with a setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments re-assessment of deterrence no-first-use proportionality and negative security assurances significant increase in social fragmentation

A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario direct death toll of 23,000 and 57,000 injured Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure , due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years . radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers consequences propagate worldwide Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control , an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones , accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures . severe global economic depression would rise from the attack lasting for years 2 percent fall in global G D P 4 percent decline of international trade developing countries a shortage of medicines a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries Global poverty raise 4 percent at least 30 million more people living in extreme poverty a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states international tensions lead to a collapse of the nuclear order with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments there would be a re-assessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence , no-first-use , proportionality , and negative security assurances . Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

direct death toll of 23,000 and 57,000 injured consequences propagate worldwide lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states severe global economic depression 2 percent fall in global G D P 4 percent decline of international trade Global poverty raise 4 percent at least 30 million more people living in extreme poverty lead to a collapse of the nuclear order with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments

['A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a re-assessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-first-use, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.']

[(5, 17), (30, 37)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GaKi-Neg-NU-Round-4.docx

Kentucky

GaKi

b967174d5a9078b94a852dc9413796c7016414a3b2325f03ba52b082b93b2c98

Plan’s a method of “asking for everything” – mobilizing ambitious political demands – even if unfulfilled – shifts the overton window, accumulates interim gains and builds support for radicalization – changing subjectivities and combatting marginalization broadly

Susan J. Shaw 12, Associate Professor in the School of Anthropology at the University of Arizona, “Conclusion,” Chapter 7, Governing How We Care: Contesting Community and Defining Difference in U.S. Public Health Programs, Temple University Press, 2012, ISBN 978-1-4399-0684-2, p.184-190 *added [an imagination]

advocates call for remedies to health disparities that include social goods such as housing are “ asking for everything what is most immediately needed will be granted in the absence of structural reforms a productive way to think about collective organizing discourses of community participation migrate to facilitate dramatic transformations in welfare reform mobilizations toward “ universal values” such as health produce powerful transformations and new subject-positions recommendations for policy are unavoidably integrated with modes of neolib governance While these relations of governing shape conditions within which collective action takes place case studies illustrate diverse ways community programs affect collective subjectivities offer important resources for action we eschew the entity and pursue the aspiration , with full knowledge of constraints community [remains] the most motivating discourse take many forms of sociality and alliances to mitigate marginalization does not demand homogeneity on a national scale disruptive of its role as supplementary to capital to realize social change Claims instantiat marginalized groups as political actors with voices that must be heeded Recognition drives a social movement institutionalization propelling governmental effects to new levels communities identify problems and seek resources to solve all apart from state bureaucracy both take part in and resist new modes of governing Implementing programs that result from these struggles calls into being new subject-positions struggles over community health are struggles over the nature and meaning of difference contribute to empowerment able to criticize the conditions of its own possibility while engaging with others

ask for everything , because it increases the chances of getting what is most crucial diverse groups engaged in community health advocacy may be practicing some version of this wisdom as they take up the banner of health in order to talk about inequality in the U S Perhaps the activists, researchers, and advocates who call for remedies to health disparities that include social goods such as housing and health insurance are “ asking for everything ” in the hopes that what is most immediately needed in the short term will be granted in the absence of real structural reforms others analyzing these moves can interpret the gains and deferrals that result from a strategy of “asking for everything” as maneuvers in the field of struggle over community health. While often embrace broad structural critiques and point to the social determinants of health as critical factors in health disparities, they frequently operate within constraints that force their attention instead to the level of individual behavior asking for everything a productive way to think about collective organizing to solve problems of health inequality and access community health programs struggle for legitimacy, to achieve community representation, to win regular and sustainable funding, and to serve target populations that are constructed or “known” through public health and ethnographic research Community health programs produce assemblages that bring together diverse forces As these assemblages develop, discourses of community participation migrate from nonprofit helping agencies to help facilitate dramatic transformations in social benefit eligibility such as welfare reform the mobilizations of affected people and their advocates toward “ universal values” such as health produce powerful transformations in marginalized groups’ self-understandings and new subject-positions from which political and health-related claims may be launched recommendations for policy makers and program designers these efforts are already unavoidably integrated with modes of neolib eral governance While these relations of governing shape the conditions within which collective action takes place case studies illustrate the diverse ways in which community health programs affect both population health and individual and collective subjectivities The social relations of community , buttressed by structures of identification that link individuals with groups, offer important resources for action In Gerald Creed’s words, “ Community is an aspiration envisioned as an entity ” What if we eschew the entity and continue to pursue the aspiration , with full knowledge of the constraints posed by economics , the state , and even the restrictive constructions of identity ? Despite generations of critique community [remains] one of the most motivating discourse s eliciting “the strongest of passions collective action might take many forms , providing opportunities for new forms of sociality and new alliances to emerge the liberatory possibilities of community relationships hold special potential as ways to mitigate the forces of marginalization This image of community does not demand consensus or homogeneity when imagined on a national scale calling for community mobilization that is both reflexive and disruptive of its role as supplementary to capital , intervening in diverse political and institutional realms to realize actual social change community groups seeking to represent specific populations act on issues around community health as a practice of government, in part as a way to constitute themselves and to win more resources for their groups Claims all have the effect of instantiat ing marginalized groups as political actors with voices that must be heeded Recognition of these claims contributes to the public visibility of a group and accelerates the process of individual identification with its collective aims, which drives a social movement and its representative organizations processes of institutionalization as a result of the success of their advocacy efforts pulled each of these advocacy groups, previously constituted as an outsider social movement , into the assemblage of community health, propelling the governmental effects of their activism to new levels New kinds of subjects emerge through these transformations: the active citizen, the ethically self-reflexive health care provider, the ethnically identified patient, the responsible drug user In the process, communities demonstrate increased “capacity” by identify ing problems and seek ing resources to solve them, all apart from state bureaucracy Individuals and communities both take part in and resist new modes of governing Citizen-subjects collectively advocate for or against new programs and forms of entitlement based in part on their beliefs about what constitutes a just society, what the state’s obligations are to its citizens Implementing the programs that result from these struggles and transformations calls into being new subject-positions through discursive practices such as risk communication or empowerment-based education struggles over community health are struggles over the nature and meaning of difference community , access , and justice (e.g., are drug users criminals to be incarcerated or addicts in need of treatment?) are thus subject to popular contestation on the street, in the clinic, and at the ballot box. Both experts and citizen-subjects mobilize and generate concepts of difference as they diagnose problems, propose remedies, and work to make a world more receptive to justice and equality These efforts contribute to [an imagination ] of empowerment that is able to criticize the conditions of its own possibility while engaging with others in pursuit of our mutual concerns

ask for everything most crucial community health advocacy take up the banner of health talk about inequality U S remedies to health disparities social goods housing health insurance asking for everything most immediately needed absence structural reforms broad structural critiques asking for everything productive way to think about collective organizing health inequality access discourses of community participation migrate facilitate dramatic transformations social benefit eligibility welfare reform universal health powerful transformations new subject-positions political claims recommendations for policy already unavoidably integrated with modes of neolib eral governance relations of governing shape the conditions within which collective action takes place case studies diverse ways community health programs collective subjectivities community important resources for action Community aspiration entity eschew the entity pursue the aspiration with full knowledge of the constraints posed economics state constructions of identity community most motivating discourse s collective action take many forms new forms of sociality new alliances liberatory possibilities community relationships mitigate the forces of marginalization not demand consensus homogeneity national scale reflexive disruptive supplementary to capital realize actual social change Claims all effect instantiat ing marginalized groups as political actors with voices that must be heeded Recognition of these claims drives a social movement processes of institutionalization success advocacy efforts pulled previously constituted outsider social movement into the assemblage propelling governmental effects new levels New kinds of subjects emerge communities identify ing problems seek ing resources to solve all apart from state bureaucracy both take part in and resist new modes of governing collectively advocate for or against Implementing new subject-positions struggles over community health nature and meaning difference community access justice subject to popular contestation imagination of empowerment criticize the conditions of its own possibility while engaging with others

['After college, I spent some time as an activist with the AIDS and women’s health movements in New York City. I remember attending endless strategy sessions in advance of protest actions, trying to come up with our demands. (Never do an action without presenting demands!) In these conversations someone would often share this bit of social movement wisdom: when negotiating with the people in charge, ask for everything, because it increases the chances of getting what is most crucial. As I now observe diverse groups engaged in community health advocacy, it occurs to me that they may be practicing some version of this wisdom as they take up the banner of health in order to talk about inequality in the United States. Perhaps the activists, researchers, and advocates who call for remedies to health disparities that include social goods such as housing and health insurance are “asking for everything” in the hopes that what is most immediately needed in the short term—more Spanish-speaking medical interpreters in the hospital, for example—will be granted as a goodwill gesture in the absence of real structural reforms. ', 'Anthropologists and others analyzing these moves can interpret the gains and deferrals that result from a strategy of “asking for everything” as maneuvers in the field of struggle over community health. While community health programs often embrace broad structural critiques and point to the social determinants of health as critical factors in health disparities, they frequently operate within constraints that force their attention instead to the level of individual behavior. In addition to offering a pragmatic approach to negotiation, asking for everything may be a productive way to think about collective organizing to solve problems of health inequality and access. What are the possibilities, from an identity-based approach to organizing (i.e., “by and for the community”), that are opened by asking for everything? ', 'While community health programs may differ dramatically from grassroots social movements, they share some of the same challenges. Programs such as those discussed here struggle for legitimacy, to achieve community representation, to win regular and sustainable funding, and to serve target populations that are constructed or “known” through public health and ethnographic research. They run interventions seeking to prevent HIV, treat addiction, eliminate prejudice from health care, and bring the uninsured into the clinic. Through funding requirements such as those seen in Chapter 3, they are accountable to modes of economic rationality that transform nonprofit work using the language of “outcomes,” “results,” and “investments.” Community health programs produce assemblages that bring together diverse forces: for example, harm reduction organizations find themselves working closely with police officers and becoming more tightly bound up with agencies of the state than they ever imagined possible, or desirable. ', 'As these assemblages develop, discourses of community participation migrate from nonprofit helping agencies to help facilitate dramatic transformations in social benefit eligibility such as welfare reform. This process, which began in the 1970s, is ongoing, both in the United States and elsewhere (Clarke 2008). At the same time, the mobilizations of affected people and their advocates toward “universal values” such as health (Laclau 1995) produce powerful transformations in marginalized groups’ self-understandings and new subject-positions from which political and health-related claims may be launched. ', 'Community health interventions have wide-ranging and often unintended effects. The field of community health has become a crucial set of practices of government in which populations are constituted through their difference and by which they can be more effectively administered. In its focus on populations designated as urban, minority, or poor, community health engages in pragmatic activities as well as discursive practices that obscure the structural conditions constituting them as marginalized by use of the term community. Funded primarily by the state and nonprofit groups, HIV prevention and public health outreach programs administer these populations through concepts such as empowerment and outreach. Members of these groups are enlisted in practices of individual and collective self-management and self-government.1', 'In a related process, advocates, including community health workers and experts, strive to develop a language and method for expanded access as they push for health care reform on both state and national levels to reach and enroll the so-called hardest-to-serve. Conceived as a way to form stronger links between health care providers and those in need of their services, community health outreach workers like the CHAs discussed in Part I are an example of community participation that emerged in response to the disenfranchisement of marginalized urban communities in the United States (Loyd 2010). Others, however, recognize the potential for discourses of community participation to serve as a terrain of government, where concerns about health care costs contend with a notion of citizenship that includes the right to health care. ', 'Might community health programs do something differently to avoid or mitigate these governing effects? This question gets to the heart of the unique challenges facing applied anthropology, the effort to put anthropological ways of understanding to work solving pressing social problems. What can we learn from the successes and failures of these programs and the ways that they are implemented? In documenting diverse programs that aim to reduce inequality, I show how our very ideas of what constitutes “difference” or “the Other” are in fact defined by such programs. Rather than generating additional programmatic recommendations for policy makers and program designers, I instead reveal how these efforts are already unavoidably integrated with modes of neoliberal governance. As others have shown, even simply partaking in the language of empowerment invokes the interest of the state in having empowered citizens—now understood as those who are self-sufficient, middle-class consumers (e.g., Cruikshank 1999). While these relations of governing shape the conditions within which collective action takes place, the case studies discussed here illustrate the diverse ways in which community health programs affect both population health and individual and collective subjectivities. The social relations of community, buttressed by structures of identification that link individuals with groups, offer important resources for action. In Gerald Creed’s words, “Community is an aspiration envisioned as an entity” (Creed 2006b, 22, italics in original). What if we eschew the entity and continue to pursue the aspiration, with full knowledge of the constraints posed by economics, the state, and even the restrictive constructions of identity? What kinds of relations of community can we aspire to? Despite generations of critique of the concept by scholars from many disciplines, “community [remains] one of the most motivating discourses and practices circulating in contemporary society,” eliciting “the strongest of passions” (Joseph 2002, xxx). The case studies presented here explore several articulations of community as it contributes to the field of community health. In her important book, Against the Romance of Community, Miranda Joseph shows how meanings of community are supplementary to capital’s demands for consumer behavior. She calls instead for “productive participation in collective action” that is “articulated as resistance or even [in] opposition to the flows of capital” (2002, 172). Such collective action might take many forms, providing opportunities for new forms of sociality and new alliances to emerge. In settings like Thornton’s inner city, the liberatory possibilities of community relationships hold special potential as ways to mitigate the forces of marginalization. Joseph argues in favor of movements that are “potentially disruptive and displacing” of capital’s relentless drive to produce communities as sites of affective bonding that foster appropriate consumption (2002, 172). In an earlier paper, Gerald Creed proposes a “notion of community in which conflict, both intra- and interethnic, is elemental and constitutive. This image of community does not demand consensus or homogeneity when imagined on a national scale” (2004, 56). Community health staffers and local activists articulate, as they try to mobilize, relations of community which already embody these elements of both conflict and identity. I follow both Loyd 2010 and Joseph 2002 in calling for community mobilization that is both reflexive and disruptive of its role as supplementary to capital, intervening in diverse political and institutional realms to realize actual social change. ', 'As shown in the case studies presented here, community groups seeking to represent specific populations act on issues around community health as a practice of government, in part as a way to constitute themselves and to win more resources for their groups. Claims about need, health disparities, or the relevance of harm reduction for HIV prevention, for example, all have the effect of instantiating marginalized groups as political actors with voices that must be heeded. Recognition of these claims (Fraser 2001) contributes to the public visibility of a group and accelerates the process of individual identification with its collective aims, which drives a social movement and its representative organizations. ', 'As seen in Part II, harm reduction activists witnessing the devastating AIDS epidemic among injection drug users (IDUs) seized the moment to call for and implement syringe exchange programs (SEPs) for IDUs as part of a broader harm reduction approach to drug use and addiction. As they achieved success after success, SEPs became entangled in new regimes of accountability imposed by more established funders.2 Each of the groups discussed here—community-based public health workers, advocates for culturally appropriate health care, and harm reduction groups—underwent similar processes of institutionalization as a result of the success of their advocacy efforts. Their interventions pulled each of these advocacy groups, previously constituted as an outsider social movement, into the assemblage of community health, propelling the governmental effects of their activism to new levels. ', 'Difference may also offer a resource to those striving for greater recognition and access to care. Through the 1990s and 2000s, minority advocacy groups helped push the concept of health disparities into the headlines as a way to comment on and contest their marginalized status in U.S. society. As the concept of health disparities has gained political traction, efforts to attain recognition on the basis of difference must battle a countervailing democratic tendency against what is perceived as special treatment of one group over another. At the same time, this democratic belief in equality drives health disparities discourse and provides political grounding for the legitimacy of claimants seeking remedies for discrimination. ', 'A similarly anxious ambivalence could be seen in popular debates around health care reform in the United States in 2009, where liberal anger at exclusion from the right to health care vied with populist and neoconservative resistance to the expansion of government in the Obama administration’s proposed “public option,” a publicly funded health insurance program (Espo 2009). Health care in the United States, and Americans’ devotion to it, remains resolutely focused on both individual responsibility (in maintaining health and in ability to pay) and private profit. Despite enormously high rates of uninsurance (up to one in three U.S. residents in a given year [Bailey 2009]), and despite ongoing efforts at state and national reforms, employer-based health care continues to reign supreme. Americans seem to desire equality of access and outcomes while simultaneously favoring profits for health care delivery and the survival of the economically fittest. Even with the limited successes of those seeking to contest inequality by highlighting health disparities, a broader understanding of health care as a right has not perfused the popular media or town halls. In fact, when changes to the private employer-based system were proposed, Americans rallied in defense of private profit in the guise of “choice,” “competition,” and the desire for “privacy” between patients and their doctors. In the face of such fervent commitment to an individualized, capitalist status quo, minority advocacy groups drawing attention to health disparities face an uphill battle in their call for cultural competence interventions for health care providers. Their allies include antiracist and immigrant advocacy groups who, in concert with medical education providers, are developing online and other educational programs for health care professionals. Cultural competence interventions aim to transform medical practices, the subjectivity of health care providers, and the meaning of difference as they present models of ethnicity and culture to health care providers as operative guides for practice. ', 'New kinds of subjects emerge through these transformations: the active citizen, the ethically self-reflexive health care provider, the ethnically identified patient, the responsible drug user. In the process, communities demonstrate increased “capacity” by identifying problems and seeking resources to solve them, all apart from state bureaucracy. Individuals and communities both take part in and resist new modes of governing. In this way, the pragmatics and practices of neoliberal government are both ethical and teleological. Citizen-subjects collectively advocate for or against new programs and forms of entitlement based in part on their beliefs about what constitutes a just society, what the state’s obligations are to its citizens, and who counts as a citizen. Implementing the programs that result from these struggles and transformations calls into being new subject-positions through discursive practices such as risk communication or empowerment-based education. ', 'As epidemiological and ethnographic research transforms individuals’ and groups’ understanding of themselves as being “at risk” for HIV, harm reduction activists also work to bring forth new forms of identification among IDUs enrolled in SEPs. Harm reduction workers have both embraced these epidemiological risk categories and contested the “disease” paradigm of addiction and risk through concepts of “controlled use.” By enrolling in SEPs, users are encouraged to take care of their communities at the same time that they are taking care of themselves. These moves are designed to foster drug users’ identification with larger formations of community. Like the Community Health Advocate program described in Part I, community health programs seek to achieve transformations in subjectivity and foster the collective identification of problems facing economically and ethically marginalized groups. As activists, advocates, and researchers documenting these transformations, anthropologists face unique challenges in making our research legible in wider domains to support the liberatory aims of community health while critically examining the larger contexts and effects of these endeavors. ', 'In contemporary U.S. society, struggles over community health are struggles over the nature and meaning of difference. Difference here can mean the condition of being underserved or in need; being outside the body politic; or being marked as poor, urban, or a racial or ethnic minority. Drawing their disciplinary expertise from biomedicine and public health, community health experts consider health on a population level. They develop a medicalized gaze aimed at the margins of society, generalizing across individuals to construct populations deemed most at risk. Their proposed interventions intersect with collective decisions made at the local level. Citizenship, community, access, and justice (e.g., are drug users criminals to be incarcerated or addicts in need of treatment?) are thus subject to popular contestation on the street, in the clinic, and at the ballot box. Both experts and citizen-subjects mobilize and generate concepts of difference as they diagnose problems, propose remedies, and work to make a world more receptive to justice and equality. These efforts contribute to a vision [an imagination] of empowerment that is able to criticize the conditions of its own possibility while engaging with others in pursuit of our mutual concerns.', '', '']

[(9, 16)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-5.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

b42222c95cc6a393fc7a96bfc38e32062448f99fda17b31251b82cb55e8e54a3

Alt causes to lack of cred

Goolsbee ’20 [Austan; September 30; Professor of economics at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, has been a Department of Justice antitrust consultant, and was an adviser to President Barack Obama; New York Times, “Big Companies Are Starting to Swallow the World,” ; KS]

enforcement budget thin budget falling for years and is lower now entire division operate on less than a single company brings in over days filings doubled

the enforcement budget for antitrust actions was already stretched way too thin That budget has been falling for years and is lower now than it was two decades ago. The entire antitrust division of the Justice Department and the F.T.C. are being forced to operate on less than a single company like Facebook brings in over a few days the number of merger filings doubled

enforcement budget for antitrust actions already stretched way too thin budget falling for years entire antitrust division forced to operate on less than a single company brings in over a few days merger filings doubled

['First, the enforcement budget for antitrust actions was already stretched way too thin even before the current crisis began. That budget has been falling for years and is lower now than it was two decades ago. The entire antitrust division of the Justice Department and the F.T.C. are being forced to operate on less than a single company like Facebook brings in over a few days. In the last 10 years, the number of merger filings (which notify the authorities of an intended merger) has almost doubled, but the number of enforcement actions taken by the government has actually fallen.', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Mikelson-Flashner-Aff-Northwestern-Round1.docx

Michigan

MiFl

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MiFl/Michigan-Mikelson-Flashner-Aff-Northwestern-Round1.docx

7f4bb29f8e7892694e96bc81e2ee84ca87a57273a42a93e0216bb246ca9b4006

2. They’ll be watered down OR rolled back.

Pardo 23 --- Professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea chair at the Brussels School of Governance

Even sanctions may not be a deterrent Beijing removed the sanctions any econ measures U S and allies take against So Ko would have to be balanced against deep links many would find it difficult to sever ties with So Ko to detriment of own economies U S Europe other partners would certainly much rather have So Ko in their corner as they focus on China

Even economic sanctions may not be a realistic deterrent 2016, China imposed unofficial sanctions on South Korea after the Park Geun-hye administration agreed to the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system on Korean soil. Beijing removed the sanctions , in no small part because Beijing also needs access to South Korea’s semiconductors and other high-tech products to compete in the global economy. Likewise any econ omic measures the U nited S tates and its allies could take against So uth Ko rea would have to be balanced against deep existing economic links with Seoul Among the world’s leaders in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, electric batteries, green ships, and 5G/6G technologies many countries would find it difficult to sever ties with So uth Ko rea to the detriment of their own economies . Not to mention the U nited S tates , Europe , and other likeminded partners would certainly much rather have So uth Ko rea in their diplomatic and political corner as they focus on competition with China Quietly, many Western officials would probably not be opposed to a nuclear South Korea in a region where it has to confront the nuclear arsenals of North Korea, China, and Russia.

Even economic sanctions Beijing removed the sanctions econ omic measures balanced against existing links with Seoul many countries find it difficult to sever ties with So uth Ko rea to detriment of their own economies . U nited S tates certainly have So uth Ko rea in their corner

['Ramon, "South Korea Could Get Away With the Bomb", 3-16-2023, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/16/south-korea-nuclear-weapons-military-defense-security-proliferation-npt/', 'Even economic sanctions—one of the nonproliferation regime’s most powerful tools—may not be a realistic deterrent. In 2016, China imposed\xa0unofficial sanctions\xa0on South Korea after the Park Geun-hye administration agreed to the deployment of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system on Korean soil. The sanctions hit the South Korean economy, but they did not wreak havoc on it, even though China accounts for 25 percent of South Korean exports. Eventually, Beijing\xa0removed the sanctions, in no small part because Beijing also needs access to South Korea’s semiconductors and other high-tech products to compete in the global economy.', 'Likewise, any economic measures that the United States and its allies and partners could take against South Korea would have to be balanced against deep existing economic links with Seoul. Among the world’s leaders in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, electric batteries, green ships, and 5G/6G technologies, many countries would find it difficult to sever ties with South Korea to the detriment of their own economies.', 'Not to mention, nuclear-armed or not, the United States, Europe, and other likeminded partners would certainly much rather have South Korea in their diplomatic and political corner as they focus on competition with China and Russia. Former U.S. President Donald Trump, if reelected, or a Trump-like successor, may even welcome South Korea\xa0stepping up\xa0and taking greater responsibility for its own security instead of “free-riding” on Washington’s largesse. Quietly, many Western officials would probably not be opposed to a nuclear South Korea in a region where it has to confront the nuclear arsenals of North Korea, China, and Russia.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Neg-ADA-Round-1.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

c54538f87927472b1092e24f96e5a8cdf909db2c1e000e494adefd27fc295ec6

Prolif causes extinction

Matthew Kroenig 16, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council, June 2016, “Approaching Critical Mass: Asia’s Multipolar Nuclear Future,” National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report #58

Nuclear use set a precedent dangers of escalation magnified in multipolar order small skirmishes quickly draw in multiple nuclear states against one another There is always danger one unintentionally cross a red line triggering a nuclear crisis “catalytic” war is conceivable “chain ganging” dangers are severe the more nuclear weapons states the greater likelihood nuclear weapons will be used Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical precedent

The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be catastrophic Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse , could result in large-scale death and destruction , and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers , each with a finger on the nuclear trigger the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit multiple nuclear -armed states against one another conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict . There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis There is also the issue of “catalytic” war a third nuclear power might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other was responsible and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor this risk is still conceivable among less technologically developed states nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought face to face in peak crises theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present the more nuclear weapons states present, the greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used . ∂ Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical precedent many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of the nuclear era .

the probability is not zero catastrophic 70-year tradition of nonuse large-scale death destruction set a precedent magnified multipolar nuclear order quickly draw in multiple powers pit multiple nuclear -armed states against one another inadvertently impinge drawing them into conflict always a danger unintentionally cross a red line “catalytic” war still conceivable drawn into smaller conflicts brought face to face in peak crises “chain ganging” more severe greater the likelihood more likely it is will be used not without historical precedent the most dangerous of the nuclear era

['The most important reason to be concerned about nuclear weapons in Asia, of course, is the threat that nuclear weapons might be used. To be sure, the use of nuclear weapons remains remote, but the probability is not zero and the consequences could be catastrophic. The subject, therefore, deserves careful scrutiny. Nuclear use would overturn a 70-year tradition of nonuse, could result in large-scale death and destruction, and might set a precedent that shapes how nuclear weapons are viewed, proliferated, and postured decades hence. The dangers of escalation may be magnified in a multipolar nuclear order in which small skirmishes present the potential to quickly draw in multiple powers, each with a finger on the nuclear trigger. The following discussion will explore the logic of crisis escalation and strategic stability in a multipolar nuclear order.14∂ First and foremost, the existence of multipolar nuclear powers means that crises may pit multiple nuclear-armed states against one another. This may be the result of formal planning if a state’s strategy calls for fighting multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. A state may choose such a strategy if it believes that a war with one of these states would inevitably mean war with both. Alternatively, in a war between state A and state B, state A may decide to conduct a preventive strike on state C for fear that it would otherwise seek to exploit the aftermath of the war between states A and B. Given U.S. nuclear strategy in the early Cold War, for example, it is likely that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have also resulted in U.S. nuclear attacks against China, even if China had not been a direct participant in the precipitating dispute.∂ In addition, conflicts of interest between nuclear powers may inadvertently impinge on the interests of other nuclear-armed states, drawing them into conflict. There is always a danger that one nuclear power could take action against a nuclear rival and that this action would unintentionally cross a red line for a third nuclear power, triggering a tripartite nuclear crisis. Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper have dubbed this category of phenomena the “security trilemma.”15 For example, if the United States were to engage in a show of force in an effort to signal resolve to Russia, such as the flushing of nuclear submarines, this action could inadvertently trigger a crisis for China.∂ There is also the issue of “catalytic” war. This may be the first mechanism by which Cold War strategists feared that multiple nuclear players could increase the motivations for a nuclear exchange. They worried that a third nuclear power, such as China, might conduct a nuclear strike on one of the superpowers, leading the wounded superpower to conclude wrongly that the other superpower was responsible and thereby retaliate against an innocent state presumed to be the aggressor. This outcome was seen as potentially attractive to the third state as a way of destroying the superpowers and promoting itself within the global power hierarchy. Fortunately, this scenario never came to pass during the Cold War. With modern intelligence, reconnaissance, and early warning capabilities among the major powers, it is more difficult to imagine such a scenario today, although this risk is still conceivable among less technologically developed states.∂ In addition to acting directly against one another, nuclear powers could be drawn into smaller conflicts between their allies and brought face to face in peak crises. International relations theorists discuss the concept of “chain ganging” within alliance relationships, the dangers of which are more severe when the possibility of nuclear escalation is present.16 Although this was a potential problem even in a bipolar nuclear order, the more nuclear weapons states present, the greater the likelihood of multiple nuclear powers entering a crisis. A similar logic suggests that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used.∂ Multipolar nuclear crises are not without historical precedent.17 Several Cold War crises featured the Soviet Union against the United States and its European nuclear-armed allies, Britain and later France. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War involved the United States, the Soviet Union, and a nuclear-armed Israel. The United States has been an interested party in regional nuclear disputes, including the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 and several crises in the past two decades on the Indian subcontinent. Indeed, many of these crises stand out as among the most dangerous of the nuclear era.', '', '-']

[(8, 18)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-HiZi-Aff-Wake-Round-1.docx

Northwestern

HiZi

313f45a6e52103b2198bb737062b8e7e4304df3c1485acda078446e057efe772

Hospital mergers are ramping AND on the cusp of expanding to rural markets BUT on the brink due to COVID

Susan Kelly 22, Contributor at Healthcare Drive, Freelance Journalist at MedTech, Former Correspondent from Thompson Reuters, BS in Journalism from Northwestern University, “Hospitals Turned to M&A to Shore Up Core Operations Last Year”, Healthcare Dive, 1/11/2021, Lexis

Hospitals inked M&A deals stabilizing pandemic-shaken op s the number of "mega mergers" doubled entering a new phase in dealmaking focused on partnerships that will tackle underserved populations divestitures allow systems to free resources and re-balance portfolios report highlighted several medical centers making a push to expand to create a model for rural healthcare

Hospitals in 21 inked M&A deals aimed at stabilizing their pandemic-shaken core op eration s , according to a new analysis the number of "mega mergers" almost doubled Hospitals are entering a new phase in healthcare dealmaking focused on partnerships that will look to tackle broader societal problems and address the needs of underserved populations Transactions involving groups of facilities in concentrated markets were one of 2021's most notable trends, the report found Pandemic disruptions and financial pressures have made non-core assets and markets less attractive to acquirers asset divestitures allow multi-regional systems to free up resources and re-balance portfolios focused elsewhere The report highlighted several medical centers making a push to expand resources to create a model for rural healthcare

21 stabilizing their pandemic-shaken core op eration s "mega mergers" doubled new phase focused partnerships tackle broader societal problems underserved populations Pandemic disruptions financial pressures less attractive free up resources re-balance push expand resources model rural healthcare

['Hospitals in 2021 inked M&A deals aimed at stabilizing their pandemic-shaken core operations, according to a new analysis Monday from Kaufman Hall. It was a year marked by a significant drop in transactions across the sector overall, but a higher percentage of larger-sized deals.', '•Just 49 health system mergers were announced in 2021, down from 79 in 2020 and the lowest number in a decade, according to the report. Yet the number of "mega mergers" in which the seller\'s annual revenue exceeds $1 billion almost doubled, reaching 16.3% in 2021, compared to 8.9% the year before. More than 12% of the smaller partners in those deals had a credit rating of A- or higher.', '•Hospitals are also entering a new phase in healthcare dealmaking focused on partnerships that will look to tackle broader societal problems and address the needs of underserved populations, the industry consultants said.', 'Dive Insight:', "Transactions involving groups of facilities in concentrated markets were one of 2021's most notable trends, the report found. Prominent examples included Tenet Healthcare's $1.1 billion sale of five hospitals and associated physician practices in south Florida to Steward Health Care and HCA's sale of four Georgia hospitals to Piedmont Healthcare for $950 million.", "Steward doubled its Florida footprint through its deal with Tenet. HCA, meanwhile, said the hospitals it sold to Piedmont were not able to fully benefit from the chain's presence in their areas, Kaufman Hall said.", 'Pandemic disruptions and financial pressures have made non-core assets and markets less attractive to acquirers, the report said. Meanwhile, asset divestitures allow multi-regional systems to free up resources and re-balance portfolios focused elsewhere.', "The consultants noted fewer independent, unaffiliated community hospitals seeking partnerships. In 2021's transactions, the average size of the smaller partner by annual revenue jumped to $619 million, from $388 million in 2020. Since 2011, average smaller partner size has increased at a compound annual growth rate of about 8%, they said.", 'The pandemic has drawn fresh attention to issues of health equity and underserved populations, and addressing those issues is becoming a stated goal of partnerships. In the Chicago area, for example, the merger of Edward-Elmhurst Health and NorthShore University HealthSystem includes creation of a community investment fund to which each partner will commit $100 million to support organizations working to advance health equity and local economic growth.', "The report highlighted the efforts of several academic medical centers making a push to expand their intellectual capital resources in the past year. Among them, East Carolina University's Brody School of Medicine and Vidant Health joined forces to create ECU Health, with the goal of becoming a model for rural healthcare."]

[(6, 14)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-NDT%20Districts-Round2.docx

Kentucky

AdKi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/AdKi/Kentucky-Adam-Kiihnl-Neg-NDT%2520Districts-Round2.docx

b9752d78987f7bd1c8904c6416ac0e3cd7d7060c3c0e04198811eab9e05077c8

Russian and Chinese presence creates a ‘Polar Trap,’ triggering great power war.

Burke ‘21 [Ryan and Jahara Matisek; October 2021; professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies, United States Air Force Academy; PhD, associate professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies; Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, “The Polar Trap,” https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/24/2002879323/-1/-1/1/JIPA%20-%20BURKE%20&%20MATISEK.PDF]

Whereas the U S stands as the hegemon activities by China and Russia in polar regions contribute to the Thucydides Trap the likely result is war 12 of the 16 cases resulted in war there is empirical validity that provides utility in a lesser-known region The Trap is illustrative of a security dilemma when a ruling power confronts a rising power there are similarities to the polar regions tensions stemming from presence producing conditions for confrontation burgeoning entitlement demand for influence coupled with insecurity 75 percent of cases resulted in war

Whereas the U S stands as the current global hegemon increased activities by China and Russia in the polar regions contribute to the necessary preconditions for realization of the Thucydides Trap whenever the rise of an ambitious power threatens to dethrone the existence of a current hegemon, the likely result is war 12 of the 16 recorded cases of a rising power threatening a ruling one resulted in war there is empirical validity to the concept that provides utility in applying it to a lesser-known region The Thucydides Trap is illustrative of a security dilemma when a ruling power confronts a rising power militarily over a contested domain there are similarities to the evolving situation in the polar regions continued tensions stemming from Russian and Chinese presence likewise undermine American hegemony producing the conditions for confrontation Thucydides specified two primary drivers of the dynamic leading to the trap the burgeoning entitlement and demand for influence by the rising power coupled directly with the rising power’s fear and insecurity When a rising power demonstrated these attributes 75 percent of the historical cases meeting these criteria resulted in war

U S global hegemon polar regions Thucydides Trap ambitious power dethrone war 12 of the 16 resulted in war empirical validity lesser-known region Thucydides Trap contested domain similarities polar regions continued tensions Russian Chinese confrontation two primary drivers entitlement influence insecurity 75 percent resulted in war

['Considering Chinese and Russian policies and actions, the polar regions are becoming easy power grabs. Whereas the United States stands as the current global hegemon, or the ruling power in historical narrative, increased activities by China and Russia in the polar regions—coupled with American strategic dithering elsewhere in the world—contribute to the necessary preconditions for realization of the Thucydides Trap. Coined by Graham Allison in 2015, the concept suggests that whenever the rise of an ambitious power threatens to dethrone the existence of a current hegemon, the likely result is war.65', 'According to Allison, 12 of the 16 recorded cases of a rising power threatening a ruling one in the past 500 years resulted in war.66 Some, such as Jonathan Kirshner openly, question Allison’s assumptions and arguments, chiefly that his case-selection bias supports his theory and that the four cases where war did not result all occurred after 1945 where nuclear weapons changed the calculus behind greatpower wars.67 Still, there is empirical validity to the concept that provides utility in applying it to a lesser-known region. In this way, we generate a template for understanding future polar power competition and predicting a potential Polar Trap under similar circumstances.68', 'The Thucydides Trap is illustrative of a security dilemma when a ruling power proactively confronts a rising power militarily over a contested domain, thereby leading to greater militarization and raising the potential for conflict. In each of Allison’s cases, he identifies the period in which the conflict occurs, a ruling power, a rising power, a contested domain, and a binary outcome of war or no war. Using this framework, there are similarities to the evolving situation in the polar regions. Whereas the rise of Athens supposedly threatened Sparta and catalyzed war, continued tensions stemming from Russian and Chinese presence in the polar regions will likewise undermine American hegemony. Increased military activities by rival competitors will continue producing the conditions for confrontation.', 'Conditions for the Polar Trap', 'Allison’s theory stems from his interpretation of Thucydides’s writings in the History of the Peloponnesian War.69 According to Allison, Thucydides focused on the shift in the balance of power between Athens and Sparta as the basis for their eventual conflict. Allison contends Thucydides specified two primary drivers of the dynamic leading to the trap: (1) the burgeoning entitlement, sense of importance, and demand for influence by the rising power, coupled directly with (2) the rising power’s fear and insecurity. 70 When a rising power demonstrated each of these attributes, Allison and his research team found that they challenged—in some way—the ruling power of the time. Though Allison’s team limited its study to 16 cases, 75 percent of the historical cases meeting these criteria resulted in war.71 The team further identified two cases in which the United States was the ruling power and simultaneously threatened by at least one rising power: World War II and the Cold War.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Aff-Dartmouth-RR-Round-4.docx

Michigan

DoPh

318f9c949f6feae535275d95e0d0462850b806c311c15ba2393fcbe340403666

They’re wrong about inevitable decline.

Doshi ’21 [Rush; August; Fellow, Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, Director, Brookings China Strategy Initiative and a fellow in Brookings Foreign Policy; Oxford Academic, “The long game: China’s grand strategy to displace American order,” Ch. 14]

narratives on decline are incomplete inequality , polarization deindustrialization forget same forces are global rather than American they overlook US advantages over China, which has aging population debt , slow growth , and currency U S retains advantages young population, financ resources , peaceful borders alliances , and innovative economy

narratives on American decline are incomplete . Declinists point to inequality , polarization , disinformation, and deindustrialization but they forget these same forces are also global rather than uniquely American . At the same time, they overlook US advantages over China, which has a fast- aging population , enormous debt , slow ing growth , and a currency still far from rivaling the dollar U S still retains enviable advantages : a young population, financ ial dominance, abundant resources , peaceful borders , strong alliances , and an innovative economy

incomplete inequality polarization deindustrialization global uniquely American overlook advantages fast- aging debt slow ing growth currency U S young financ resources borders alliances innovative

['Despite their popularity in Beijing, narratives on American decline are often incomplete. Declinists point to forces—such as inequality, polarization, disinformation, and deindustrialization—that are real and formidable in the United States, but they forget these same forces are also global in nature rather than uniquely American. At the same time, they overlook US advantages over China, which has a fast-aging population, enormous debt, slowing growth, and a currency still far from rivaling the dollar. In contrast, the United States still retains enviable advantages: a young population, financial dominance, abundant resources, peaceful borders, strong alliances, and an innovative economy. Moreover, it is hardly incidental that throughout most of China’s four-decade rise, the United States has consistently held a quarter of the world’s GDP.10']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-NDT-Round-2.docx

Michigan

DoPh

a2399b11c43c772f00cfc72cc30e3be7c516be05e1cfef7d73713d71d8352428

Violence is not some amalgamation of signs but is instead about flesh and bone – their project fuels capitalist pedagogy

McLaren 10 [Peter, UC-Los Angeles and Nathalia E. Jaramillo, Purdue University, “Not Neo-Marxist, Not Post-Marxist, Not Marxian, Not Autonomist Marxism: Reflections on a Revolutionary (Marxist) Critical Pedagogy” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies 2010 10: 251]

avant-garde scholars deconstruct materialism as effects of tropes It attempts to create a prefigurative origin for ontology. this transforming materialism into materiality Matter is turned into signs critics who would replace materialism with materiality severely undercut class struggle The real is folded into the representation. value is not a sign freed from its referent It must pass through toiling subjects that takes place in an organic universe of skin, hair, blood, and bone. capitalism abstracts from these bodies, and commodifies them. cultural discourses distract from the central antagonism of capitalist society pedagogical practices theorize experience in relation to affective relations as if these were cleaved from relations of class local affective strategies serve as epistemological covers that help the subject cope with capitalist exploitation. The pedagogy of affect warns students against structural analysis Students seem to know but have no knowledge. This is exactly the education capital requires workers who are educated but nonthinking ; it integrates the illusion, thereby making itself immune to critique. its “falseness is already reflexively buffered.”

Ebert makes an important distinction between corporeality/materiality and matter/materialism. Materiality refers to the acceptance of an idea in the mind as something real that escapes class interests. avant-garde scholars will deconstruct materialism as merely the effects of tropes and representations. It attempts to create a prefigurative origin for what is essentially an ontology. However this constitutes transforming materialism into materiality purging materialism of its conceptuality and determinate meanings. Matter is turned into signs This has led politics of performativity matter is not synonymous with physical objects; matter exists outside the consciousness of the subject, and it cannot be separated from its production and contradictions in history. Matter is objective reality in history. materialism as the objective productive activities of humans involving them in social relations; under definite historical conditions shaped by class struggle over the surplus produced by social labor. A materialism that operates as cultural practices is not materialism; it is materiality or “ matterism .” Avant-garde critics who would replace materialism with materiality (through the tropes of spectrality, undecidability, and difference) severely undercut the claim for the objectivity of class interests and ultimately replace class struggle with the struggle over the sign. The real is folded into the representation. Derrida assimilate the economy (the same one that is throwing people out of their homes and into the streets at present) into their poststructuralist model of language. Contrary to Derrida value is not a sign freed from its referent ; rather, value expresses itself in material form. It must pass through laboring bodies and their history of struggle, through toiling subjects and practical human activity that takes place in an organic social universe of skin, hair, blood, and bone. capitalism abstracts from these bodies, and commodifies them. cultural discourses distract from the central antagonism of capitalist society thereby producing subjects who cannot grasp the totality of the system. pedagogical practices developed by the poststructuralist avant-garde theorize experience in relation to trauma, desire, and affective relations as if these relations were antiseptically cleaved from relations of class , thereby replacing a conceptual analysis of the social totality local affective strategies that serve unwittingly as epistemological covers for economic conditions that help the subject cope with capitalist exploitation. This leads to a de-historicization of social life and draws attention away from the way all human beings are implicated in international class struggles The pedagogy of affect piles up details and warns students against attempting to relate them structurally because any structural analysis will be a causal explanation, and all causal explanations, students are told, are reductive. Teaching thus becomes a pursuit of floating details Students seem to know but have no knowledge. This is exactly the kind of education capital requires for its new workforce: workers who are educated but nonthinking ; skilled at detailed jobs but unable to grasp the totality of the system—energetic localists, ignorant globalists. This pedagogy provides instruction not in knowledge but in savviness it integrates the illusion, thereby making itself immune to critique. Savviness is enlightened false consciousness its “falseness is already reflexively buffered.”

materialism into materiality Matter is objective reality shaped by class struggle severely undercut throwing people out of their homes value is not a sign freed from its referent central antagonism affective relations epistemological covers de-historicization of social life pedagogy of affect

['Ebert (2009; Ebert & Zavarzadeh, 2008) makes an important distinction between corporeality/materiality and matter/materialism. Materiality is related to objective idealism and refers to the acceptance of an idea in the mind as something real, something that escapes class interests. In this way, avant-garde scholars will deconstruct materialism as merely the effects of tropes and representations. It attempts to create a prefigurative origin for what is essentially an ontology. However, Ebert (2009) argues that this constitutes transforming materialism into materiality, into a contemplative corporeality of difference, purging materialism of its conceptuality and determinate meanings. Matter is turned into signs or the effect of signs or sign power. This has led to the recent interest in the politics of performativity—performing identities, performing pedagogy, performing class, and so on. However, Ebert argues that matter is not synonymous with physical objects; matter exists outside the consciousness of the subject, and it cannot be separated from its production and contradictions in history. Matter is objective reality in history. Ebert and Zavarzadeh (2008) characterize materialism as the objective (transformative) productive activities of humans involving them in social relations; these social relations occur under definite historical conditions that are independent of their will and are shaped by class struggle over the surplus produced by social labor. A materialism that excludes historical processes and operates as a medium of cultural practices is not materialism; it is materiality or what Ebert (2009) refers to as “matterism.” Avant-garde critics who would replace materialism with materiality (through the tropes of supplementarity, spectrality, undecidability, and difference) severely undercut the claim for the objectivity of class interests and ultimately replace class struggle with the struggle over the sign. Like Ebert, David McNally (2001) in his classic Marxist text, Bodies of Meaning, describes the deconstructive efforts of post-structuralists such as Jacques Derrida as a form of linguistic idealism. In his critique of anti-fetishistic thought (like that of Marx), that palpates the farthest reach of linguistic meaning, Derrida devalues dialectical critique as useless by disavowing embodied human activity, by ignoring laboring human bodies and rejecting them as metaphysical illusions. When Derrida deals with issues of the economy, he is interested only in capital that begets capital—that is, in credit or fictitious capital. Likewise, in his critique of Saussure, he critiques the notion of a transcendental signified, a universal equivalent or what McNally refers to as meaning’s gold standard (something positive that can exist outside of an endless reference of commodities to other commodities). There is nothing extralinguistic for Derrida, since language suspends all reference to something outside of it. Similarly, for Derrida, money lacks a referent. It is driven by credit and speculation and lacks any material foundations. Derrida deals with fictitious or dematerialized money, money that can be produced without labor, that is, money as an expression of hyperreality. Capital in this view is nothing more than a self-engendering dance on a solipsistic path of self-fecundation. The real is folded into the representation. Derrida (and Baudrillard and others) assimilate the economy (the same one that is throwing people out of their homes and into the streets at present) into their poststructuralist model of language. Contrary to Derrida, Ebert and McNally maintain that value is not a sign freed from its referent; rather, value expresses itself in material form. It must pass through laboring bodies and their history of struggle, through toiling subjects and practical human activity that takes place in an organic social universe of skin, hair, blood, and bone. And capitalism abstracts from these bodies, and commodifies them. The work of McNally and Ebert implodes the limitations of post-structuralist thought in dealing with capitalist exploitation. According to Ebert (2009), revolutionary agents of social transformation act ethically when they attempt to resolve the contradictions of their objective location in relations of exploitation. Capitalist violence often doubles as cultural discourses, and Ebert views popular culture, especially, as a narcosis of violence, predicated on distracting subjects from the central antagonism of capitalist society—the struggles over the surplus labor of the other––thereby producing subjects who cannot grasp the totality of the system. In Ebert’s view, the pedagogical practices developed by the poststructuralist avant-garde theorize experience in relation to trauma, desire, and affective relations in general as if these relations were antiseptically cleaved from relations of class, thereby replacing a conceptual analysis of the social totality with liberating pedagogical narratives grounded in local affective strategies—strategies that serve unwittingly as epistemological covers for economic conditions that help the subject cope with the objective material conditions of capitalist exploitation. This leads ultimately to a de-historicization of social life and draws attention away from the way in which all human beings who populate capitalist societies are implicated in some manner in international class struggles and the social division of labor (see also Zavarzadeh, 2003). Ebert and Zavarzadeh describe this process as a “pedagogy of affect.” They write that The pedagogy of affect piles up details and warns students against attempting to relate them structurally because any structural analysis will be a causal explanation, and all causal explanations, students are told, are reductive. Teaching thus becomes a pursuit of floating details—a version of games in popular culture. Students seem to know but have no knowledge. This is exactly the kind of education capital requires for its new workforce: workers who are educated but nonthinking; skilled at detailed jobs but unable to grasp the totality of the system—energetic localists, ignorant globalists. This pedagogy provides instruction not in knowledge but in savviness—a knowing that knows what it knows is an illusion but is undeluded about that illusion; it integrates the illusion, thereby making itself immune to critique. Savviness is enlightened false consciousness: a consciousness that knows it is false, but its “falseness is already reflexively buffered.” (2008, pp. 107-108)', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PrWe-Neg-1--Kentucky-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

PrWe

63f6aaff4e8526246683cae2d22f2762ab7470ee7aef5c102f1bc3c883b3ef5e

Third, legitimacy – arbitration without human intervention is necessary to foster respect for resolution – perception of human corruption destroys the process

Marrow 20 [Paul Bennett Marrow, attorney/arbitrator and a member of the American Arbitration Association’s Commercial Panel. He teaches Domestic Arbitration at New York Law School. 11-13-2020 ]

millions have no access or find the system badly choked by bureaucratic inefficiencies costs beyond reach and corruption disputants take the law into their own hands or abandon claims result is distaste for the system and disregard for the rule of law Arbitration by computers without human intervention offers alternative Computers handle tasks simultaneously relatively inexpensive And most important don’t do personal favors demand fidelity or take graft. A.I. bridge disregarded disputant to meaningful disposition of dispute This encourage respect for arbitration While A.I., may never be perfect far preferable to no determination

A.I. arbitration results would unquestionably be a game-changer in resolving legal disputes Today millions have no access or have access only to find the system badly choked by bureaucratic inefficiencies costs beyond reach and corruption disputants are left to either take the law into their own hands or abandon their claims altogether the result is a distaste for the system and disregard for the rule of law Arbitration by computers without human intervention offers an exciting alternative Computers can handle numerous tasks simultaneously relatively inexpensive thus within the reach of most disputants, no matter their economic status And most important computers don’t do personal favors demand fidelity and/ or take graft. A.I. provides the bridge connecting the disregarded and/or overlooked disputant to meaningful disposition of a dispute . This welcomed news that serve to encourage a respect for arbitration as a meaningful way to resolve disputes based on the rule of law and available to anyone While even with A.I., outcomes may never be perfect determination by computer is far preferable to no determination at all Imperfections once identified, are the subject of study and research and result in the discovery of a way to eliminate the imperfection demand for bigger and better never ceases.

game-changer no access badly choked bureaucratic inefficiencies costs beyond reach corruption distaste for the system disregard for the rule of law without human intervention most important personal favors demand fidelity take graft. bridge meaningful disposition respect far preferable

['In this age where big data is commonplace and computers are becoming more powerful every day, Artificial Intelligence (“A.I.”) has become a fact of life and is here to stay. Computer scientists posit that with enough data and properly designed algorithms, the “well-trained” computer should soon be able to produce an acceptable arbitration award. The necessary data set would hopefully include thousands of transcripts from actual arbitration proceedings; hundreds of thousands of actual awards; all known reported judicial opinions issued by courts throughout the United States embodying the complete state of arbitration jurisprudence; all relevant statutes and rules used by judges, lawyers, arbitrators, and the administrators of the arbitration process; and all known journal and law review materials.1 If these computer scientists are correct, and the authors of this paper believe they are, the results would unquestionably be a game-changer in resolving legal disputes in many parts of the third world as well as in many industrialized countries. Today, millions either have no access to an existing system of justice or have access only to find the system badly choked by bureaucratic inefficiencies, costs that are beyond their reach, and/or corruption. The disputants are left to either take the law into their own hands, often resulting in a violent confrontation, or abandon their claims altogether. Either way the result is a distaste for the system under which they live and a disregard for the rule of law', 'Arbitration by computers without human intervention offers an exciting alternative. Computers have no schedules. They can handle numerous tasks simultaneously. Computers need only electricity and a connection to the internet in order to perform any assigned task. Once up and running, a computer-based system for arbitration would be relatively inexpensive and thus within the reach of most disputants, no matter their economic status. And most important, computers don’t do personal favors, demand fidelity and/or take graft.', 'As will be discussed throughout this paper, A.I. provides the bridge connecting the disregarded and/or overlooked disputant to a meaningful disposition of a dispute. This will be welcomed news that in the end will serve to encourage a respect for arbitration as a meaningful way to resolve disputes based on the rule of law and available to anyone. While it is true that even with the advantages of A.I., the outcomes may never be absolutely perfect, still a determination by computer is far preferable to no determination at all.', 'Humans have routinely believed that they can always make improvements on the performance of computers, and this is reflected in the way that computers have evolved over the last 100 years. Computer science is a never-ending process striving for perfection. Imperfections, once identified, are the subject of study and research and, more times than not, result in the discovery of a way to eliminate the imperfection. The demand for bigger and better never ceases. Breakthroughs such as the development of hardware capable of supporting “big data” and computers using quantum physics for the processing of complex algorithms and huge data sets confirm this. With time, the concept of arbitration by a computer will very likely become an acceptable norm, providing considerable advantages over courtroom-based dispute resolution.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuKo-Aff-ADA-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

GuKo

08f22f7fc1c0c4130ebb8878148dc42652cb93d045334be9f4c16082e65dbcee

2. CRISIS STABILITY---cable attacks undermine surveillance, C3, AND second-strike capabilities ensuring escalation.

Clark 16, is a senior fellow with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (Bryan, 6-15-2016, “Undersea cables and the future of submarine competition,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 72, Number 4, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2016.1195636)

Stability depends on predictability , and ability to detect and respond undersea warfare threaten stability like cables through loss of surveillance and c n c or risks second strike nuclear submarines

Stability depends on predictability , and the ability of targets to detect attacks and respond appropriately . Emerging changes in undersea warfare threaten to undermine today’s relative stability like submarine cables through the loss of surveillance information and c n c or risks to “ second strike ” nuclear capabilities submarines 1NC---No Arms Control---Russia

Stability predictability ability detect attacks respond appropriately undersea warfare threaten stability submarine cables loss surveillance information c n c risks second strike nuclear capabilities submarines

['Stability in international relations depends in part on predictability, and the ability of targets to detect attacks and respond appropriately. Emerging changes in undersea warfare threaten to undermine today’s relative stability – including essential underwater infrastructure like submarine cables – through the loss of surveillance information and command-and-control capabilities, or risks to “second strike” nuclear capabilities of ballistic-missile submarines. To sustain their national security and preserve stability, large economies and nuclear powers will need to improve their ability to monitor and control the waters off their shores, just as they do the skies above their lands.', '1NC---No Arms Control---Russia']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-McYa-Neg-UCO-Round-2.docx

Kansas

McYa

01e45e76bea12bed21d793838103a0f741f9fd564a05b8ddf0fdf995f5ddf6aa

The Ecomodernist Manifesto fabricates data, is tainted by pro-growth ideology, is condescending towards indigenous populations, and is flat out wrong.

Caradonna et al. ’15 (Jeremy; PhD, teaches Environmental Studies and the Human Dimensions of Climate Change at the University of Victoria; Iris Borowy, Tom Green, Peter A. Victor, Maurie Cohen, Andrew Gow, Anna Ignatyeva, Matthias Schmelzer, Philip Vergragt, Josefin Wangel, Jessica Dempsey, Robert Orzanna, Sylvia Lorek, Julian Axmann, Rob Duncan, Richard B. Norgaard, Halina S. Brown, Richard Heinberg; May 6th; “A Degrowth Response to an Ecomodernist Manifesto”; ; accessed 1/10/19; MSCOTT)

Manifesto has already received strong criticism from an array of commentators group of over fifteen researchers Manifesto assumes that growth is a given limits to growth are being reached Ecomodernists believe in the myth of decoupling no known society has achieve absolute decoupling Is technology the problem or the solution? The ecomodernists cannot decide Manifesto tacitly supports coal, oil and natural gas indigenous peoples are seen as backwards and undeveloped Manifesto suffers from factual errors and misleading statements suggests that there is currently a “net reforestation” which contradicts 2014 Millennium Development Report world still suffered a net loss

The Manifesto has already received strong criticism from an array of commentators but none of these assessments has yet critiqued it from the perspective of “degrowth,” From a degrowth perspective, technology is not viewed as a magical savior since many technologies actually accelerate environmental decline With these disagreements in mind, a group of over fifteen researchers from the degrowth scholarship community has written a detailed refutation of the Ecomodernist Manifesto, which can be read here The Manifesto assumes that growth is a given The ecological economists associated with degrowth assume that growth is not a given, and that population growth inequalities and the decline of cheap and abundant fossil fuels which spurred the unprecedented growth of the global economy over the past century, means that the limits to growth are either being reached or will be reached in the very near future. The ecomodernists, by contrast, scoff at the idea of limits to growth, arguing that technology will always find a way to overcome those limits the Manifesto does nothing to question and rethink the growth fetish that has preoccupied the world since at least the 1940s Ecomodernists believe in the myth of decoupling growth from impacts. Long the fantasy of neoclassical economists, industrialists, and many futurists decoupling is the idea that one can have more of the “good stuff” without any of the “bad stuff” there has been no known society that has simultaneously expanded economic activity while reducing absolute energy consumption and environmental impacts the only periods over the past century in which global or regional emissions have actually declined absolutely have occurred during periods of decreased economic activity (usually a political crisis, war, or a recession) efforts to decouple GDP-growth from environmental degradation through technological innovations and renewable energies have failed to achieve the absolute emissions reductions and reductions in aggregate environmental impacts necessary for a livable planet absolute decoupling has not occurred and has not solved our problems Is technology the problem or the solution? The ecomodernists cannot decide The Manifesto is open and honest about the impact that modern technologies have had on the natural world , and especially emissions from fossil-fueled machines. However, as an act of desperation, the ecomodernists retreat to the belief that risky, costly, and underachieving technologies such as nuclear power and carbon capture and storage, will solve climate crisis Ecomodernism is not very “eco.” Ecomodernism violates everything we know about ecosystems, energy, population, and natural resources Fatally, it ignores the lessons of ecology and thermodynamics, which teach us that species (and societies) have natural limits to growth The ecomodernists, by contrast, brazenly claim that the limits to growth is a myth, and that human population and the economy could continue to grow almost indefinitely Moreover, the ecomodernists ignore or downplay many of the ecological ramifications of growth The Manifesto has nothing to say about the impacts of conventional farming, monoculture, pesticide-resistant insects, GMOs, and the increasing privatization of seeds and genetic material Nor does it really question our reliance on fossil fuels. It does argue that societies need to “decarbonize,” but the Manifesto also tacitly supports coal, oil and natural gas by advocating for carbon capture and storage the Manifesto merely rehashes the naïve belief that technology will save us and that human ingenuity can never fail. One fears, too, that the ecomodernists support geoengineering The Manifesto has a narrow, inaccurate, and whitewashed view of both “modernity” and “development.” The Manifesto’s assertions rest on the belief that industrialized modernity has been an undivided blessing The “progress” of modernity has come at a heavy cost, and is more of a mixed blessing Ecomodernism is condescending toward pre-industrial, agrarian, non-industrialized societies, and the Global South. The issue of condescension is particularly stark in the Manifesto Pre-industrial and indigenous peoples are seen as backwards and undeveloped The authors go so far as to say that humans need to be “liberated” from agricultural labor, as though the production of food, and small-scale farming, were not inherent goods The Manifesto suffers from factual errors and misleading statements The Manifesto is particularly greenwashed when it comes to global deforestation rates. It suggests that there is currently a “net reforestation” which contradicts the 2014 Millennium Development Report that shows that afforestation and reforestation have, in fact, slowed deforestation rates, but that the world still suffered a net loss of forested land between 2000 and 2010 by many millions of hectares Further, the Manifesto makes dubious claims about net reductions in “servitude” over the past few centuries, and the role played by pre-historical native peoples in driving the megafauna to extinction the ecomodernists provide neither a very inspiring blueprint for future development strategies nor much in the way of solutions to our environmental and energy woes

already received strong criticism from an array of commentators group of over fifteen researchers assumes that growth is a given population growth inequalities decline of cheap and abundant fossil fuels limits to growth being reached Ecomodernists believe in the myth of decoupling no known society absolute decoupling has not occurred ecomodernists cannot decide open and honest about the impact that modern technologies have had on the natural world as an act of desperation, the ecomodernists retreat to the belief that risky, costly, and underachieving technologies natural limits to growth ignore or downplay many of the ecological ramifications of growth Manifesto tacitly supports coal, oil and natural gas narrow, inaccurate, and whitewashed view of both “modernity” and “development.” condescension indigenous peoples are seen as backwards and undeveloped factual errors and misleading statements suggests that there is currently a “net reforestation” 2014 Millennium Development Report world still suffered a net loss of forested land between 2000 and 2010 by many millions of hectares

['The Manifesto has already received strong criticism from an array of commentators, but none of these assessments has yet critiqued it from the perspective of “degrowth,” which is an approach that sees the transition to sustainability occurring through less environmentally impactful economic activities and a voluntary contraction of material throughput of the economy, to reduce humanity’s aggregate resource demands on the biosphere. From a degrowth perspective, technology is not viewed as a magical savior since many technologies actually accelerate environmental decline.', 'With these disagreements in mind, a group of over fifteen researchers from the degrowth scholarship community has written a detailed refutation of the Ecomodernist Manifesto, which can be read here. The following is a summary of the seven main points made by the authors of this critique:', '1. The Manifesto assumes that growth is a given. The ecological economists associated with degrowth assume that growth is not a given, and that population growth, inequalities, and the decline of cheap and abundant fossil fuels, which spurred the unprecedented growth of the global economy over the past century, means that the limits to growth are either being reached or will be reached in the very near future. The ecomodernists, by contrast, scoff at the idea of limits to growth, arguing that technology will always find a way to overcome those limits. Graham Turner, Ugo Bardi, and numerous others have shown through empirical research that many of the modeled scenarios, and the fundamental thesis, of the Club of Rome remain as relevant as ever—that is, that the human endeavor is bumping up against natural limits. Richard Heinberg has shown that the production of conventional oil, natural gas, and heavy oil all peaked around 2010, despite, but also due to, continued global reliance on fossil fuels, which still make up over 80% of the world’s primary source of energy. The history of industrialism to date suggests that more growth will be coupled with increasing environmental costs. Thus, the Manifesto does nothing to question and rethink the growth fetish that has preoccupied (and negatively impacted) the world since at least the 1940s.', '2. Ecomodernists believe in the myth of decoupling growth from impacts. Long the fantasy of neoclassical economists, industrialists, and many futurists decoupling is the idea that one can have more of the “good stuff” (economic growth, increased population, more consumption) without any of the “bad stuff” (declines in energy stocks, environmental degradation, pollution, and so forth). Yet to date, there has been no known society that has simultaneously expanded economic activity while reducing absolute energy consumption and environmental impacts. In terms of carbon-dioxide emissions, the only periods over the past century in which global or regional emissions have actually declined absolutely have occurred during periods of decreased economic activity (usually a political crisis, war, or a recession). While it is true that many countries have reduced their carbon intensity in recent decades, meaning that they get more bang for their energy buck, efforts to decouple GDP-growth from environmental degradation through technological innovations and renewable energies have failed to achieve the absolute emissions reductions and reductions in aggregate environmental impacts necessary for a livable planet. In short, absolute decoupling has not occurred and has not solved our problems.', '3. Is technology the problem or the solution? The ecomodernists cannot decide. The Manifesto is open and honest about the impact that modern technologies have had on the natural world, and especially emissions from fossil-fueled machines. However, as an act of desperation, the ecomodernists retreat to the belief that risky, costly, and underachieving technologies, such as nuclear power and carbon capture and storage, will solve the climate crisis and energize the sustainable society of the future. The reality, however, is that nuclear power provides less than 6 percent of the world’s energy needs while creating long-term storage nightmares and present-day environmental hazards. We cite Chernobyl and Fukushima as obvious examples. From the point of view of degrowth, more technology is not (necessarily) the solution. The energy crisis can be addressed only by reductions in throughput, economic activity, and consumption, which could then (and only then) create the possibility of powering global society via renewables.', '4. Ecomodernism is not very “eco.” Ecomodernism violates everything we know about ecosystems, energy, population, and natural resources. Fatally, it ignores the lessons of ecology and thermodynamics, which teach us that species (and societies) have natural limits to growth. The ecomodernists, by contrast, brazenly claim that the limits to growth is a myth, and that human population and the economy could continue to grow almost indefinitely. Moreover, the ecomodernists ignore or downplay many of the ecological ramifications of growth. The Manifesto has nothing to say about the impacts of conventional farming, monoculture, pesticide-resistant insects, GMOs, and the increasing privatization of seeds and genetic material. It is silent on the decline of global fisheries or the accumulation of microplastic pollution in the oceans, reductions in biodiversity, threats to ecosystem services, and the extinction of species. Nor does it really question our reliance on fossil fuels. It does argue that societies need to “decarbonize,” but the Manifesto also tacitly supports coal, oil and natural gas by advocating for carbon capture and storage. Far from being an ecological statement of principles, the Manifesto merely rehashes the naïve belief that technology will save us and that human ingenuity can never fail. One fears, too, that the ecomodernists support geoengineering. ', '5. The Manifesto has a narrow, inaccurate, and whitewashed view of both “modernity” and “development.” The Manifesto’s assertions rest on the belief that industrialized modernity has been an undivided blessing. Those who support degrowth have a more complex view of history since the 18th century. The “progress” of modernity has come at a heavy cost, and is more of a mixed blessing. The ecomodernists do not acknowledge that growth in greenhouse gas emissions parallels the development of industry. The core assumption is that “development” has only one true definition, and that is to “modernize” along the lines of the already industrialized countries. The hugely destructive development path of European and Neo-European societies is the measuring stick of Progress.', '6. Ecomodernism is condescending toward pre-industrial, agrarian, non-industrialized societies, and the Global South. The issue of condescension is particularly stark in the Manifesto. There is not a word about religion, spirituality, or indigenous ecological practices, even though the authors throw a bone to the “cultural preferences” for development. Pre-industrial and indigenous peoples are seen as backwards and undeveloped. The authors go so far as to say that humans need to be “liberated” from agricultural labor, as though the production of food, and small-scale farming, were not inherent goods. There is no adoration for simple living, the small scale, or bottom up approaches to development.', '7. The Manifesto suffers from factual errors and misleading statements. The Manifesto is particularly greenwashed when it comes to global deforestation rates. It suggests that there is currently a “net reforestation” occurring at the international scale, which contradicts the 2014 Millennium Development Report that shows that afforestation and reforestation have, in fact, slowed deforestation rates, but that the world still suffered a net loss of forested land between 2000 and 2010 by many millions of hectares. Research by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Wide Fund for Nature confirms the reality of net forest losses. Further, the Manifesto makes dubious claims about net reductions in “servitude” over the past few centuries, and the role played by pre-historical native peoples in driving the megafauna to extinction.', 'In sum, the ecomodernists provide neither a very inspiring blueprint for future development strategies nor much in the way of solutions to our environmental and energy woes.', '']

[(0, 20)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Hines-Neg-Minnesota-Round5.docx

Kansas

PaHi

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaHi/Kansas-Park-Hines-Neg-Minnesota-Round5.docx

85a4dd7fc5c6205d99a7572639221927d3260b30a5004269f9d806cbc28a26e7

[ ] Irrationality’s wrong---decades of history prove.

Mueller 20, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University. (John, 06/24/20, “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism”, Cato Institute, https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/nuclear-alarmism-proliferation-terrorism) *language edited---brackets

weapons have proliferated to large, important countries run by unchallenged monsters who were irrational Stalin and Mao countries acquired nuc s as an ego trip

It is sometimes said that prolif has had little consequence because the only countries to possess nuclear weapons have had rational leaders But the weapons have proliferated to large, important countries run by unchallenged monsters who were irrational Stalin and Mao It is incumbent on those who strongly oppose an Iranian bomb to demonstrate that the regime there is daffier than these. The few countries to have acquired nuc lear weapon s programs seem to have done so sometimes as an ego trip for current leaders and as an effort to deter a potential attack China to deter the U S Israel to deter various enemy nations India to deter China, Pakistan to deter India, and now North Korea to deter the U S Insofar as nuclear proliferation is a response to perceived threat , it follows that one way to reduce the likelihood of such countries’ going nuclear is a simple one : stop threatening them.

rational leaders large, important countries unchallenged monsters were irrational Stalin Mao incumbent strongly oppose daffier than these. ego trip deter a potential attack China Israel North Korea response to perceived threat reduce simple one stop threatening them.

['It is sometimes said, or implied, that proliferation has had little consequence because the only countries to possess nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. But the weapons have proliferated to large, important countries run by unchallenged monsters who, at the time they acquired the bombs, were certifiably [irrational] deranged: Josef Stalin, who in 1949 was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong, who in 1964 had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.20 It is incumbent on those who strongly oppose an Iranian bomb to demonstrate that the regime there is daffier than these. \nThe few countries to have acquired nuclear weapons programs seem to have done so sometimes as an ego trip for current leaders and, more urgently (or perhaps merely in addition), as an effort to deter a potential attack on themselves: China to deter the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel to deter various enemy nations in the neighborhood, India to deter China, Pakistan to deter India, and now North Korea to deter the United States and maybe others.21 Insofar as nuclear proliferation is a response to perceived threat, it follows that one way to reduce the likelihood of such countries’ going nuclear is a simple one: stop threatening them.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiYa-Neg-2---Kentucky-Round-3.docx

Kansas

WiYa

bb775530ed9dce0fc84700398b42086c6d1fbb779cd74b60b89b0f524e96dc37

The status quo solves.

Matthew Oliver 21, J.D. candidate at Yale Law School, Ph.D. in the Philosophy of Law from the University of Oxford, “Contracting by Artificial Intelligence: Open Offers, Unilateral Mistakes, and Why Algorithms Are Not Agents,” Australian National University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2021, https://anujolt.org/article/24466.pdf

AI-negotiated contracts are perfectly enforceable within existing contract doctrine programs fill in specific content Contract law already accepts a person may contract on terms filled by some future event

AI-negotiated contracts are perfectly enforceable within existing contract doctrine AI programs are not agents Rather programs fill in specific content of offers made Contract law already accepts a person may validly offer to contract on terms filled in by some future event The person who makes such an offer must accept associated risk AI-negotiated contracts are perfectly enforceable within existing contract law doctrines

perfectly enforceable already some future event existing contract law doctrines

['The agency solution is unnecessary because, properly understood, AI-negotiated contracts are perfectly enforceable within existing contract doctrine. AI programs are not the agents of contracting parties. Rather, AI programs are tools that fill in the specific content of offers made by contracting parties. Contract law already accepts that a person may validly offer to contract on terms that will be filled in by some future event. For example, I could consent to contract ‘at market prices on 1 June’ or on ‘whatever terms John offers to Sally.’ Just as I can legally consent to contract on ‘whatever terms John offers to Sally,’ I can legally consent to contract on whatever terms my AI program offers to you. This kind of underdetermined open offer is risky, but it can also be profitable.16 The person who makes such an offer must accept the associated risk. I argue that this is a better and more practicable way of understanding the role of AI programs in contract negotiation. Understood this way, AI-negotiated contracts are perfectly enforceable within existing contract law doctrines.']

[(8, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Kentucky-RR-Round-4.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

2244de1a2e8f5fbea60c1dbc5b09f58e8e63d1634d60557f9b36b3ec06df5079

US NFU is key to reinvigorate the international nonprolif. movement and put the US at the forefront of it—that’s key to check prolif.

Sirota, 22. Politics Reporter for the Intercept, 2022 (Sara Sirota, 1-21-2022, "Biden’s Nuclear Strike Policy Is the Same as Russia’s," Intercept, , DoA 8/7/2023, DVOG, ADA-]

Biden missed a key opportunity to reject first use Biden’s policy allows first use and is the same as Russia’s, and this undermines Biden’s ability to build international opposition to Putin A U.S. declaration stating that it would never start a nuclear war, would breathe new life into international efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear war,” lawmakers cited the importance of such a policy as tensions between the U.S. and China, continue to worsen Murphy called for the U.S. to take action to prevent prolif worldwide. it’s time for us to lead a global conversation around prolif

Putin is threatening the first use of nuclear weapons to hold Ukraine hostage This is nuclear blackmail, and its a dangerous precedent that we must oppose. Its therefore deeply disappointing that th e Biden administration just missed a key opportunity to reject first use . Instead, Biden’s policy also allows first use and is essentially the same as Russia’s, and this undermines Biden’s ability to build international opposition to what Putin is doing.” “ A U.S. declaration stating that it would never start a nuclear war, supported by Japan, would breathe new life into international efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear war,” the letter, led by CPC Chair Pramila Jayapal, D-Wash., said. The lawmakers cited the importance of such a policy as tensions between the U.S. and China, also a nuclear power, continue to worsen Russia notoriously has more low-yield nuclear weapons than the U.S., which has raised concerns about their potential use in the war against Ukraine, especially if Putin believes that he has no other way to defeat the resistance. Murphy called for the U.S. to take action to prevent their prolif eration worldwide. “I think it’s time for us to lead a global conversation around the prolif eration of these smaller tactical nuclear weapons, because they will ultimately allow a madman to justify using it and believing they can ultimately get away with it,” he said.

['Tom Collina, policy director at the nuclear arms control group Ploughshares Fund, argued that rolling back the strike authority could have benefited international efforts against Russia. “Putin is threatening the first use of nuclear weapons to hold Ukraine hostage and keep the US and NATO out,” he wrote to The Intercept. “This is nuclear blackmail, and its a dangerous precedent that we must oppose. Its therefore deeply disappointing that the Biden administration just missed a key opportunity to reject first use. Instead, Biden’s policy also allows first use and is essentially the same as Russia’s, and this undermines Biden’s ability to build international opposition to what Putin is doing.” That may be the case for lawmakers of at least one ally. On April 1, dozens of members of the Progressive Caucus of Japan, a minority coalition to the left of the conservative\xa0Liberal Democratic Party fronted by Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, joined American lawmakers in the Congressional Progressive Caucus to call on Biden to commit to a no-first-use policy. “A U.S. declaration stating that it would never start a nuclear war, supported by Japan, would breathe new life into international efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear war,” the letter, led by CPC Chair Pramila Jayapal, D-Wash., said. The\xa0lawmakers cited the importance of such a policy as tensions between the U.S. and China, also a nuclear power, continue to worsen. (China owns\xa0\xa0nuclear weapons than the U.S. or Russia, but the Defense Department\xa0\xa0it’s engaging in a buildup.) Other Democrats have remained quiet or indicated tacit support of the status quo. Republicans took advantage of a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing with the head of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, last month to defend the logic of first-strike authority. When Richard said that changes to declaratory policy would harm relationships with allies, the panel’s chair, Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., did not question the argument, and no other Democrats broached the subject. Despite the dangers that nuclear weapons pose, Democrats are allowing their fear of appearing weak amid Russia’s war on Ukraine to triumph over meaningful reform that could make the world safer. “I’m certainly in favor of making it clear that the United States is not going to be the first to use nuclear weapons,” Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., told The Intercept. “I’d have to think a little bit more about whether this is the right time or what the mechanism would be to make that policy.” He downplayed the idea, though, that the U.S.’s strike policy is indistinguishable from Russia’s: “Russia’s policy is whatever is in Vladimir Putin’s head at the moment.” While maintaining first-strike authority, Biden’s nuclear policy is slated to roll back certain nuclear weapon programs started under the Trump administration. According to the Wall Street Journal, he’s planning to get rid of the B83 gravity bomb, the largest in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, which was on track for retirement until the previous White House decided to keep it around. Biden’s also planning to get rid of a nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile that the Trump administration had greenlighted. Biden has, however, reportedly decided to stick with the Trump administration’s plan to deploy the “low-yield” W76-2 warhead on nuclear submarines. This class of weapons has lower explosive power compared\xa0with the most destructive nuclear weapons, like intercontinental ballistic missiles, potentially lowering the threshold for nuclear war. Russia notoriously has more low-yield nuclear weapons than the U.S., which has raised concerns about their potential use in the war against Ukraine, especially if Putin believes that he has no other way to defeat the resistance. Murphy called for the U.S. to take action to prevent their proliferation worldwide. “I think it’s time for us to lead a global conversation around the proliferation of these smaller tactical nuclear weapons, because they will ultimately allow a madman to justify using it and believing they can ultimately get away with it,” he said. In the meantime, Biden has foregone his primary chance to rally allies around the push for a no-first-use policy. “If media reports are true, President Biden has missed an historic opportunity to reduce the role of existential nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy,” said Markey in a statement\xa0following the Wall Street Journal report. “Retaining a warfighting role for U.S. nuclear weapons is a triumph for the trillion-dollar defense industry, but it is a tragedy for everyone counting on the President to keep his campaign promise to make deterrence the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.”']

[(0, 7), (8, 11)]

ndtceda

Emory-ChCh-Aff-Kentucky-Round-3.docx

Emory

ChCh

6d40571fc42784cc834f0e95ef8036c1e770e2302ecf0323ec1e54597d1ba203

‘United States’ means the federal government or the 50 states.

Stone ’45 [Harlan; April 9; Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; Westlaw, “Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt,” 324 U.S. 652]

The te rm ‘U S may be the sovereign or collective states

The te rm ‘U nited S tates’ may be the name of a sovereign designate territory or be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution

te rm name of a sovereign collective name of the states

['The term ‘United States’ may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, *672 or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.6', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Aff-Northwestern-Round-4.docx

Michigan

DoPh

e1a3a223f1c8420fa7f2ad6a0884606ac54a455a3114b2798849bee0e787da1a

2. NFU forces the US to drastically scale up foreign military presence

Rich Lowry 16, editor @ National Review, "Obama’s nuclear fantasy would make the world more dangerous", New York Post, https://nypost.com/2016/08/08/obamas-nuclear-fantasy-would-make-the-world-more-dangerous/

Declaring No First Use would kick away our nuclear deterrent Relying entirely on conventional forces would require more military spending and more forward-deployed assets by us and our allies the same analysts who argue for No First Use tend to be the same ones who think we spend too much on defense One of these things does not go along with the other.

Declaring No First Use would kick away our nuclear deterrent we no longer have to worry about deterring a massive Soviet army facing West But Putin has already changed the borders of Europe through force and there’s no reason to think he’s necessarily done A Rand study says that Russian forces could reach the capitals of the Baltic states in less than 60 hours Why would we make Putin’s calculation any easier or ease the minds of other potential aggressors like China and North Korea? If we are going to have nuclear weapons, we should take advantage of their deterrent effect Relying entirely on conventional forces for deterrence would require more military spending and more forward-deployed assets by us and our allies the same analysts and activists who argue for No First Use tend to be the same ones who think we spend too much on defense . One of these things does not go along with the other.

kick away nuclear deterrent But Putin changed the borders of Europe through force less than 60 hours any easier China North Korea? conventional more military spending more forward-deployed assets by us and our allies One of these things does not go along with the other.

['Declaring No First Use would kick away an element of our nuclear deterrent. Yes, we no longer have to worry about deterring a massive Soviet army facing West. But Vladimir Putin has already changed the borders of Europe through force, and there’s no reason to think he’s necessarily done. A Rand Corporation study says that Russian forces could reach the capitals of the Baltic states in less than 60 hours. Why would we make Putin’s calculation any easier in considering such moves, or ease the minds of other potential aggressors like China and North Korea? We might never use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack, no matter how brazen. Obviously the risks in resorting to nuclear weapons would be mind-boggling, but taking the possibility off the table serves no purpose. If we are going to have nuclear weapons, we should take advantage of their deterrent effect. Relying entirely on conventional forces for deterrence would require more military spending and more forward-deployed assets by us and our allies. Of course, the same analysts and activists who argue for No First Use tend to be the same ones who think we spend too much on defense. One of these things does not go along with the other.']

[(5, 13)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GaSl-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-4.docx

Kentucky

GaSl

3c27bee162a291b5530ee15585dc10731b102fc4159953e5334ac9ef23a8d2b3

Nature of the industry ensures biotech fails.

Packer 18 - (Milton Packer MD, Distinguished Scholar in Cardiovascular Science at Baylor University Medical Center at Dallas; 4-18-2018, MedPageToday, "It’s Official! Curing Patients is Bad for Business," doa: 11-18-2022) url: https://www.medpagetoday.com/opinion/revolutionandrevelation/72407

will a company that wants to develop a cure have trouble getting financing response from investors your drug is too effective drug for blindness is 850,000 lipoprotein 1.6 million We have not reached the limits of scientific innovation But we have reached the limits of decency Want to make money? Develop drugs that cure nothing , yet promote long-term use and shorten life

will a company that wants to develop a real cure for an infectious disease have trouble getting financing ? imagine a company has a new drug that can cure a disease in >90% of patients with one dose. imagined response from investors : That is great. But your drug is too effective . You won't be able to generate sustainable cash flow The obvious suggestion: Could you possibly make the drug a bit less effective The company says no. The imagined response: Well, if you insist on making a drug that cures with one dose, we would recommend charging a king's ransom for it. Spark Therapeutics introduced its new drug for a rare form of blindness . The price tag is $425,000 per eye . That means $ 850,000 for a cure uniQure N.V. marketed Glybera for the treatment of lipoprotein lipase deficiency at a price of $ 1.6 million per treatment . We have not reached the limits of scientific innovation . But we have reached the limits of common sense and common decency Want to make money? Develop drugs that cure nothing , but yet promote long-term use and dependency , and shorten life

develop a real cure trouble financing too effective make the drug a bit less effective king's ransom blindness per eye $ 850,000 for a cure $ 1.6 million per treatment scientific innovation common sense common decency cure nothing long-term use dependency shorten life

['', 'So will a company that wants to develop a real cure for an infectious disease have trouble getting financing?', 'Just imagine a company has a new drug that can cure a disease in >90% of patients with one dose.', "The imagined response from investors: That is great. But your drug is too effective. You won't be able to generate sustainable cash flow with that kind of business plan.", 'The obvious suggestion: Could you possibly make the drug a bit less effective, so that people would need to continue to take it on an ongoing basis, so you would be able to generate more money?', 'The company says no.', "The imagined response: Well, if you insist on making a drug that cures with one dose, we would recommend charging a king's ransom for it. Could we propose that you charge $1 million for a course of treatment?", 'Do you think such a figure is exaggerated?', 'Early this year, Spark Therapeutics introduced its new drug (Luxturna) for a rare form of blindness. It promises a cure with a single dose. The price tag is $425,000 per eye. That means $850,000 for a cure.', 'And it gets worse.', 'In 2012, a company called uniQure N.V. marketed Glybera (tiparvovec) for the treatment of lipoprotein lipase deficiency at a price of $1.6 million per treatment. After one patient in the entire world was treated, no one seemed excited about prescribing the overpriced drug, and the company did not renew its marketing license.', 'What do these examples teach us? We have not reached the limits of scientific innovation. But we have reached the limits of common sense and common decency.', 'When the most important investment banking enterprise in the world wonders whether it is a good idea to support companies that want to develop cures, we truly have reached rock bottom.', "What is next for health care? We always knew that prolonging life was expensive. Now it seems that curing people isn't profitable enough.", 'Want to make money? Develop drugs that cure nothing, but yet promote long-term use and dependency, and shorten life. Bankers and payers will love it.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

0a59c236261972ca3024b2c6c10685f72a367e6033b51abe383d1b0b838ee11f

Qualitative analysis---second-strike solves

Jeffrey Knopf 19, professor and program chair of nonproliferation and terrorism studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and a senior research associate with the institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2019, “Are more bombs better?” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2019.1571726?journalCode=rnpr20

Kroenig qualitative analysis examines four crises How one interprets the record in these cases bears strongly on whether superiority carries advantages Kroenig defines victory as achieving basic goals With this approach three of the four cases support Kroenig cases look more like compromises The Cuban Crisis was resolved by negotiated settlement the U S pledged to withdraw missiles the Soviet Union came out ahead Kennedy rejected escalatory options the 69 crisis China backed down But diplomatically , the Soviets’ position worsened Kargil is more ambiguous than Kroenig suggests Pakistan withdrew primarily because of pressure from the U S The cases all support a key proposition Where both have second-strike it becomes very hard to force a change to the s quo

Kroenig turns from quantitative to qualitative analysis and examines what most specialists regard as the four most dangerous crises of the nuclear age the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 1969 border conflict between China and the Soviet Union 1973 Middle East War 1999 Kargil conflict For all four cases, Kroenig seeks to show that the side with a nuclear advantage prevailed, that, consistent with his theory, it was more willing than the other side to run risks, and that leaders on the two sides were aware of and influenced by the nuclear balance How one interprets the historical record in these four cases bears strongly on whether nuclear superiority carries all the advantages Kroenig ascribes to it. Kroenig defines victory in a crisis as a state achieving its basic goals With this approach to coding, three of the four cases can clearly be interpreted as support ing Kroenig ’s theory: in 1962, the United States got the Soviet Union to withdraw missiles from Cuba; in 1969, the Soviet Union persuaded China to return to negotiations over the status of disputed islands in the Ussuri River; and in 1999, Pakistan was induced to withdraw troops that had infiltrated across the Line of Control into Indian-controlled Kashmir If one examines the other cases in a similarly holistic way, they also come out look ing more like compromises The Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved by a negotiated settlement in which the U nited S tates pledged never to invade Cuba and to withdraw Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey one could even argue that the Soviet Union came out ahead In relative terms, it may be that states are still much more willing to run risks and press for victory in purely conventional crises President Kennedy rejected the most escalatory options presented by his advisors the 19 69 crisis can be considered a more definitive success for the Soviet Union. In the face of nuclear threats, China backed down and agreed to reopen talks But in the aftermath Mao became more open to improved relations with the U nited S tates paving the way for President Richard M. Nixon’s historic visit in 1972. On the border, the status quo remained in place, while, diplomatically , the Soviets’ position worsened . Taking all of this into account, the outcome is closer to a stalemate than a clear victory.15 1999 Kargil is also more ambiguous than Kroenig suggests It looks like a victory for India because Pakistan withdrew . But Pakistan did so primarily because of pressure from the U nited S tates . Pakistan hoped the United States might intervene to mediate the conflict, but the Bill Clinton administration made it clear that Pakistan would first have to withdraw its forces. The conflict ended with the restoration of the status quo ante. The four cases all support a key proposition associated with the nuclear-revolution hypothesis. Where both sides have nuclear second-strike capabilities, it becomes very hard for either side to force a change to the s tatus quo . And in the four biggest crises of the nuclear age, when the dust had settled, the status quo was preserved.

qualitative analysis the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 1969 border conflict between China and the Soviet Union 1973 Middle East War 1999 Kargil conflict historical record bears strongly compromises negotiated settlement U S one could even argue that the Soviet Union came out ahead escalatory options 19 69 crisis But U S diplomatically 1999 Kargil more ambiguous than Kroenig suggests primarily because of pressure from the U nited S tates all Where both sides have nuclear second-strike capabilities, it becomes very hard for either side to force a change to the s tatus quo . And in the four biggest crises of the nuclear age, when the dust had settled, the status quo was preserved.

['To his credit, Kroenig is aware of the claim that nuclear crises typically end in a draw, and he responds to it in Chapter 4. In this chapter, he turns from quantitative to qualitative analysis and examines what most specialists regard as the four most dangerous crises of the nuclear age: the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1969 border conflict between China and the Soviet Union, the 1973 Middle East War, and the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan. For all four cases, Kroenig seeks to show that the side with a nuclear advantage prevailed, that, consistent with his theory, it was more willing than the other side to run risks, and that leaders on the two sides were aware of and influenced by the nuclear balance. In two of the cases, one side clearly enjoyed a sizable nuclear advantage: the United States in 1962 and the Soviet Union in 1969. In the other two cases, the nuclear balance was closer to parity, but the United States still had a lead in 1973, while in the India-Pakistan case, the two sides were probably nearly even in numbers. How one interprets the historical record in these four cases bears strongly on whether nuclear superiority carries all the advantages Kroenig ascribes to it.', 'Kroenig defines victory in a crisis as a state achieving its basic goals (pp. 68, 81). With this approach to coding, three of the four cases can clearly be interpreted as supporting Kroenig’s theory: in 1962, the United States got the Soviet Union to withdraw missiles from Cuba; in 1969, the Soviet Union persuaded China to return to negotiations over the status of disputed islands in the Ussuri River; and in 1999, Pakistan was induced to withdraw troops that had infiltrated across the Line of Control into Indian-controlled Kashmir. Kroenig also counts the 1973 Middle East War as a victory for the United States because the Soviet Union backed down from threats to intervene in the war between Israel and Egypt. But the Soviet Union backed down because it largely got what it wanted. At that point in the war, Israeli forces had surrounded and were poised to destroy Egypt’s Third Army. Moscow was seeking to protect its Egyptian ally, and the United States put pressure on its ally Israel to agree to a ceasefire that spared Egypt’s Third Army. The United States successfully prevented the Soviet Union from expanding its presence in the Middle East, but only at the price of making a major concession to Soviet concerns. Regardless of how the ICB dataset codes this case, it overall has the flavor of a compromise or a stalemate. Nobody involved was able to push for all-out victory.12', 'If one examines the other cases in a similarly holistic way, they also come out looking more like compromises and less like clear-cut victories for one side. The Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved by a negotiated settlement in which the United States pledged never to invade Cuba and to withdraw Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey. Compared with the status quo ante, one could even argue that the Soviet Union came out ahead, but, since the Soviets had to withdraw their missiles publicly, the compromise seemed at the time to favor the United States. To draw a firmer inference, however, Kroenig’s assessment needs a comparison with otherwise similar crises in which there was no danger of nuclear war. In relative terms, it may be that states are still much more willing to run risks and press for victory in purely conventional crises. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F. Kennedy had recently read Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August about the origins of World War I.13', 'In the July 1914 crisis, all the continental European powers were willing to push strongly to get their way, which led to an extraordinarily deadly protracted war. In 1962, in contrast, the United States exercised considerable restraint while also looking for a way to stand firm. President Kennedy rejected the most escalatory options presented by his advisors: he chose a naval blockade over conducting airstrikes or launching an invasion to overthrow Castro.14 Looking just at the short term, the 1969 crisis can be considered a more definitive success for the Soviet Union. In the face of nuclear threats, China backed down and agreed to reopen talks over the status of a contested border. But no agreement ever came out of the talks. And, in the aftermath of the Soviet threats, Chairman Mao Zedong became more open to improved relations with the United States, paving the way for President Richard M. Nixon’s historic visit in 1972. On the border, the status quo remained in place, while, diplomatically, the Soviets’ position worsened. Taking all of this into account, the outcome is closer to a stalemate than a clear victory.15', 'The 1999 Kargil conflict is also more ambiguous than Kroenig suggests. It looks like a victory for India because Pakistan withdrew. But Pakistan did so primarily because of pressure from the United States. Pakistan hoped the United States might intervene to mediate the conflict, but the Bill Clinton administration made it clear that Pakistan would first have to withdraw its forces. The conflict ended with the restoration of the status quo ante. Like the United States in 1962, the Indian government exercised restraint in its response, carefully keeping its troops on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Once again, the outcome is closer to a stalemate than a decisive Indian victory.16', 'The four cases all support a key proposition associated with the nuclear-revolution hypothesis. Where both sides have nuclear second-strike capabilities, it becomes very hard for either side to force a change to the status quo. And in the four biggest crises of the nuclear age, when the dust had settled, the status quo was preserved.']

[(8, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Aff-Wayne-State-Octas.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

9ad6ab635ffd033ce895873fe7cbf15d398899101a96cb4f2da142532581970f

Space col is impossible.

Arwen E Nicholson and Raphaëlle D Haywood 23. Nicholson is is a research fellow in physics and astronomy at the University of Exeter in the UK. Haywood is a senior lecturer in physics and astronomy at the University of Exeter in the UK. “There is no planet B” https://aeon.co/essays/we-will-never-be-able-to-live-on-another-planet-heres-why

futuristic dream-like scenario is being sold as scientific possibility We need a planet same size and temperature as Earth that spent billions of years evolving with We depend completely on other organisms Without them, we cannot survive There is no planet B best-case scenario for Mars an atmosphere we are incapable of breathing with global dust storms recent NASA determined there isn’t even enough CO2 on Mars to warm it we will Suggesting another planet could become an escape suddenly seems absurd other worlds are at unimaginable distances from us Let’s imagine that some futuristic form of tech exists we would have been unable to survive on Earth for 90 per cent of its history such changes often led to extinction

This futuristic dream-like scenario is being sold to us as a real scientific possibility , with billionaires to move humanity to Mars in the near future Given all our technological advances, it’s tempting to believe we are approaching an age of interplanetary colonisation. But can we really leave Earth and all our worries behind? No. We don’t just need a planet roughly the same size and temperature as Earth ; we need a planet that spent billions of years evolving with us . We depend completely on the billions of other living organisms that make up Earth’s biosphere. Without them, we cannot survive . Astronomical observations and Earth’s geological record are clear: the only planet that can support us is the one we evolved with. There is no plan B . There is no planet B . Our future is here, and it doesn’t have to mean we’re doomed However, no one actually explains why there isn’t another planet we could live on , even though the evidence from Earth sciences and astronomy is clear . best-case scenario for terraforming Mars leaves us with an atmosphere we are incapable of breathing The most common target of such speculative is our neighbour Mars. It is about half the size of Earth and receives about 40 per cent of the heat that we get from the Sun. Present-day Mars is a cold, dry world with a very thin atmosphere and global dust storms that can last for weeks on end Surviving without a pressure suit in such an environment is impossible . Mars is further from the Sun than Earth, so it would require significantly more greenhouse gases to achieve a temperature similar to Earth’s. Thickening the atmosphere by releasing CO 2 in the Martian surface is the most popular ‘solution’ to the thin atmosphere on Mars. However, every suggested method of releasing the carbon stored in Mars requires technology and resources far beyond what we are currently capable of. a recent NASA determined that there isn’t even enough CO2 on Mars to warm it sufficiently. we will even if there is abundant oxygen. The proposed absolute best-case scenario for terraforming Mars leaves us with an atmosphere we are incapable of breathing ; and achieving it is well beyond our current technological and economic capabilities. a more realistic scenario might be to build habitat on its surface with internal conditions suitable for our survival. However, there would be a large pressure difference between the inside of the habitat and the outside atmosphere From an astronomical perspective, Mars is Earth’s twin; and yet, it would take vast resources, time and effort to transform it into a world that wouldn’t be capable of providing even the bare minimum of what we have on Earth. Suggesting that another planet could become an escape from our problems on Earth suddenly seems absurd One issue to consider is that other worlds are at unimaginable distances from us . Going in the same space vehicle, it would take our astronaut crew 79,000 years to reach planets that might exist around our nearest stellar neighbour. let’s for a moment optimistically imagine that we find a perfect Earth twin: a planet that really is exactly like Earth Let’s imagine that some futuristic form of tech nology exists , ready to whisk us away to this new paradise This planet sure is habitable – just not to us . It has a thriving biosphere with plenty of life, but not life like ours. In fact, we would have been unable to survive on Earth for around 90 per cent of its history ; the oxygen-rich atmosphere that we depend on is a recent feature of our planet. But let’s not get too excited: the level of oxygen was less than 10 per cent of what we have today. The air would still have been impossible for us to breathe. This time also experienced global glaciation events known as snowball Earths, where ice covered the globe from poles to equator for millions of years at a time. Earth has spent more of its time fully frozen than the length of time that we humans have existed. However, for lifeforms at the time, such changes shattered their world and very often led to their complete extinction .

futuristic dream-like scenario No. same size and temperature as Earth spent billions of years evolving with us depend completely Without them, we cannot survive There is no plan B There is no planet B . there isn’t another planet we could live on clear incapable of breathing global dust storms impossible technology and resources far beyond there isn’t even enough CO2 on Mars we will incapable of breathing large pressure difference suddenly seems absurd unimaginable distances from us 79,000 years to reach planets let’s for a moment optimistically imagine Let’s imagine that some futuristic form of tech unable to survive on Earth for around 90 per cent of its history more of its time fully frozen often led to their complete extinction

['At the start of the 22nd century, humanity left Earth for the stars. The enormous ecological and climatic devastation that had characterised the last\xa0100 years\xa0had led to a world barren and inhospitable; we had used up Earth entirely. Rapid melting of ice caused the seas to rise, swallowing cities whole. Deforestation ravaged forests around the globe, causing widespread destruction and loss of life. All the while, we continued to burn the fossil fuels we knew to be poisoning us, and thus created a world no longer fit for our survival. And so we set our sights beyond Earth’s horizons to a new world, a place to begin again on a planet as yet untouched. But where are we going? What are our chances of finding the elusive\xa0planet B,\xa0an Earth-like world ready and waiting to welcome and shelter humanity from the chaos we created on the planet that brought us into being? We built powerful astronomical telescopes to search the skies for planets resembling our own, and very quickly found hundreds of Earth twins orbiting distant stars. Our home was not so unique after all. The universe is full of Earths!', 'This futuristic dream-like scenario is being sold to us as a real scientific possibility, with billionaires\xa0\xa0to move humanity to Mars in the near future. For decades, children have grown up with the daring movie adventures of intergalactic explorers and the untold habitable worlds they find. Many of the highest-grossing films are set on fictional planets, with paid advisors keeping the science ‘realistic’. At the same time, narratives of humans trying to survive on a post-apocalyptic Earth have also become mainstream. Given all our technological advances, it’s tempting to believe we are approaching an age of interplanetary colonisation. But can we really leave Earth and all our worries behind? No. All these stories are missing what makes a planet habitable\xa0to us. What\xa0Earth-like\xa0means in astronomy textbooks and what it means to someone considering their survival prospects on a distant world are two vastly different things. We don’t just need a planet roughly the same size and temperature as Earth; we need a planet that spent billions of years evolving with us. We depend completely on the billions of other living organisms that make up Earth’s biosphere. Without them, we cannot survive. Astronomical observations and Earth’s geological record are clear: the only planet that can support us is the one we evolved with. There is no\xa0plan B.\xa0There is no\xa0planet B.\xa0Our future is here, and it doesn’t have to mean we’re doomed.', 'Deep down, we know this from instinct: we are happiest when immersed in our natural environment. There are countless examples of the healing power of spending\xa0. Numerous articles speak of the benefits of ‘forest bathing’; spending time in the woods has been scientifically shown to reduce stress, anxiety and depression, and to improve sleep quality, thus nurturing both our physical and mental health. Our bodies instinctively know what we need: the thriving and unique biosphere that we have co-evolved with, that exists only here, on our home planet.', 'There is no planet B.\xa0These days, everyone is throwing around this catchy slogan. Most of us have seen it inscribed on an activist’s homemade placard, or heard it from a world leader. In 2014, the United Nations’ then secretary general Ban\xa0Ki-moon\xa0said: ‘There is no\xa0plan B\xa0because we do not have [a]\xa0planet B.’\xa0The French president Emmanuel Macron echoed him in 2018 in his historical address to US Congress. There’s even a\xa0\xa0named after it. The slogan gives strong impetus to address our planetary crisis. However, no one actually explains\xa0why\xa0there isn’t another planet we could live on, even though the evidence from Earth sciences and astronomy is clear. Gathering this observation-based information is essential to counter an increasingly popular but flawed narrative that the only way to ensure our survival is to colonise other planets.', 'The best-case scenario for terraforming Mars leaves us with an atmosphere we are incapable of breathing', 'The most common target of such speculative\xa0\xa0is our neighbour Mars. It is about half the size of Earth and receives about\xa040 per\xa0cent of the heat that we get from the Sun. From an astronomer’s perspective, Mars is Earth’s identical twin. And Mars has been in the news a lot lately, promoted as a possible outpost for humanity in the\xa0. While human-led missions to Mars seem likely in the coming decades, what are our prospects of long-term habitation on Mars? Present-day Mars is a cold, dry world with a very thin atmosphere and global dust storms that can last for weeks on end. Its average surface pressure is less than\xa01 per\xa0cent of Earth’s. Surviving without a pressure suit in such an environment is impossible. The dusty air mostly consists of carbon dioxide (CO2) and the surface temperature ranges from a balmy 30ºC (86ºF) in the summer, down to -140ºC (-220ºF) in the winter; these extreme temperature changes are due to the thin atmosphere on Mars.', 'Despite these clear challenges, proposals for\xa0\xa0Mars into a world suitable for long-term human habitation abound. Mars is further from the Sun than Earth, so it would require significantly more greenhouse gases to achieve a temperature similar to Earth’s. Thickening the atmosphere by releasing CO2\xa0in the Martian surface is the most popular ‘solution’ to the thin atmosphere on Mars. However, every suggested method of releasing the carbon stored in Mars requires technology and resources far beyond what we are currently capable of. What’s more, a recent NASA\xa0\xa0determined that there isn’t even enough CO2\xa0on Mars to warm it sufficiently.', 'Even if we could find enough CO2, we would still be left with an atmosphere we couldn’t breathe. Earth’s atmosphere contains only\xa00.04 per\xa0cent CO2, and we cannot tolerate an atmosphere high in CO2. For an atmosphere with Earth’s atmospheric pressure, CO2\xa0levels as high as\xa01 per\xa0cent can cause drowsiness in humans, and once we reach levels of 10 per cent CO2, we will\xa0\xa0even if there is abundant oxygen. The proposed absolute best-case scenario for terraforming Mars leaves us with an atmosphere we are incapable of breathing; and achieving it is well beyond our current technological and economic capabilities.Instead of changing the atmosphere of Mars, a more realistic scenario might be to build habitat\xa0\xa0on its surface with internal conditions suitable for our survival. However, there would be a large pressure difference between the inside of the habitat and the outside atmosphere. Any breach in the habitat would rapidly lead to depressurisation as the breathable air escapes into the thin Martian atmosphere. Any humans living on Mars would have to be on constant high alert for any damage to their building structures, and suffocation would be a daily threat.', 'From an astronomical perspective, Mars is Earth’s twin; and yet, it would take vast resources, time and effort to transform it into a world that wouldn’t be capable of providing even the bare minimum of what we have on Earth. Suggesting that another planet could become an escape from our problems on Earth suddenly seems absurd. But are we being pessimistic? Do we just need to afield? Next time you are out on a clear night, look up at the stars and choose one – you are more likely than not to pick one that hosts planets. Astronomical observations today confirm our age-old suspicion that all stars have their own planetary systems. As astronomers, we call these exoplanets. What are like? Could we make any of them our home? The majority of exoplanets discovered to date were found by NASA’s Kepler mission, which monitored the brightness of 100,000 stars over four years, looking for dips in a star’s light as a planet obscures it each time it completes an orbit around it.', '[image excluded] Kepler more than 900 Earth-sized planets with a radius up to 1.25 times that of our world. These planets could be rocky (for the majority of them, we haven’t yet determined their mass, so we can only make this inference on empirical relations between planetary mass and radius). Of these 900 or so Earth-sized planets, 23 are in the habitable zone. The habitable zone is the range of orbits around a star where a planet can be considered temperate: the planet’s surface can support liquid water (provided there is sufficient atmospheric pressure), a key ingredient of life as we know it. The concept of the habitable zone is very useful because it depends on just two astrophysical parameters that are relatively easy to measure: the distance of the planet to its parent star, and the star’s temperature. It’s worth keeping in mind that the astronomical habitable zone is a very simple concept and, in reality, there are many more factors at play in the emergence of life; for example, this concept does not consider , which are thought to be crucial to sustain life on Earth. Planets with similar observable properties to Earth are very common: at least one in 10 stars hosts them How many Earth-sized, temperate planets are there in our galaxy? Since we have discovered only a handful of these planets so far, it is still quite difficult to estimate their number. Current of the frequency of Earth-sized planets rely on extrapolating measured occurrence rates of planets that are slightly bigger and closer to their parent star, as those are easier to detect. The studies are primarily based on observations from the Kepler mission, which surveyed more than 100,000 stars in a systematic fashion. These stars are all located in a tiny portion of the entire sky; so, occurrence rate studies assume that this part of the sky is representative of the full galaxy. These are all reasonable assumptions for the back-of-the-envelope estimate that we are about to make. Several different teams carried out their own analyses and, on average, they that roughly one in three stars (30 per cent) hosts an Earth-sized, temperate planet. The most pessimistic studies found a rate of 9 per cent, which is about one in 10 stars, and the studies with the most optimistic results found that virtually all stars host at least one Earth-sized, temperate planet, and potentially even several of them. At first sight, this looks like a huge range in values; but it’s worth taking a step back and realising that we had absolutely no constraints whatsoever on this number just 20 years ago. Whether there are other planets similar to Earth is a question that we’ve been asking for millennia, and this is the very first time that we are able to answer it based on actual observations. Before the Kepler mission, we had no idea whether we would find Earth-sized, temperate planets around one in 10, or one in a million stars. Now we know that planets with similar observable properties to Earth are very common: at least one in 10 stars hosts these kinds of planets. [image excluded]Let’s now use these numbers to predict the number of Earth-sized, temperate planets in our entire galaxy. For this, let’s take the average estimate of\xa030 per\xa0cent, or roughly one in three stars. Our galaxy hosts approximately\xa0300 billion\xa0stars, which adds up to\xa090 billion\xa0roughly Earth-sized, roughly temperate planets. This is a huge number, and it can be very tempting to think that at least one of these is bound to look exactly like Earth.', 'One issue to consider is that other worlds are at unimaginable distances from us. Our neighbour Mars is on average\xa0225 million\xa0kilometres (about\xa0140 million\xa0miles) away. Imagine a team of astronauts travelling in a vehicle similar to NASA’s robotic New Horizons probe, one of humankind’s fastest spacecrafts – which flew by Pluto in 2015. With New Horizons’ top speed of around\xa058,000 kph,\xa0it would take at least\xa0162 days\xa0to reach Mars. Beyond our solar system, the closest star to us is Proxima Centauri, at a distance of\xa040 trillion\xa0kilometres. Going in the same space vehicle, it would take our astronaut crew\xa079,000 years\xa0to reach planets that might exist around our nearest stellar neighbour.', 'Still, let’s for a moment optimistically imagine that we find a perfect Earth twin: a planet that really is exactly like Earth. Let’s imagine that some futuristic form of technology exists, ready to whisk us away to this new paradise. Keen to explore our new home, we eagerly board our rocket, but on landing we soon feel uneasy. Where is the land? Why is the ocean green and not blue? Why is the sky orange and thick with haze? Why are our instruments detecting no oxygen in the atmosphere? Was this not supposed to be a perfect twin of Earth?', 'As it turns out, we have landed on a perfect twin of the Archean Earth, the aeon during which life first emerged on our home world. This new planet is certainly habitable: lifeforms are floating around the green, iron-rich oceans, breathing out methane that is giving the sky that unsettling hazy, orange colour. This planet sure is habitable – just not\xa0to us. It has a thriving biosphere with plenty of life, but not life like ours. In fact, we would have been unable to survive on Earth for around\xa090 per\xa0cent of its history; the oxygen-rich atmosphere that we depend on is a recent feature of our planet.', 'The earliest part of our planet’s history, known as the Hadean aeon, begins with the formation of the Earth. Named after the Greek underworld due to our planet’s fiery beginnings, the early Hadean would have been a terrible place with molten lava oceans and an atmosphere of vaporised rock. Next came the Archean aeon, beginning\xa04 billion\xa0years ago, when the first life on Earth flourished. But, as we just saw, the Archean would be no home for a human. The world where our earliest ancestors thrived would kill us in an instant. After the Archean came the Proterozoic,\xa02.5 billion\xa0years ago. In this aeon, there was land, and a more familiar blue ocean and sky. What’s more, oxygen finally began to accumulate in the atmosphere. But let’s not get too excited: the level of oxygen was less than\xa010 per\xa0cent of what we have today. The air would still have been impossible for us to breathe. This time also experienced global glaciation events known as snowball Earths, where ice covered the globe from poles to equator for millions of years at a time. Earth has spent more of its time fully frozen than the length of time that we humans have existed. We would have been incapable of living on our planet for most of its existence', 'Earth’s current aeon, the Phanerozoic, began only around\xa0541 million\xa0years ago with the Cambrian explosion – a period of time when life rapidly diversified. A plethora of life including the first land plants, dinosaurs and the first\xa0\xa0all appeared during this aeon. It is only within this aeon that our atmosphere became one that we can actually breathe. This aeon has also been characterised by multiple mass\xa0\xa0that wiped out as much as\xa090 per\xa0cent of all species over short periods of time. The factors that brought on such devastation are thought to be a combination of large asteroid impacts, and volcanic, chemical and climate changes occurring on Earth at the time. From the point of view of our planet, the changes leading to these mass extinctions are relatively minor. However, for lifeforms at the time, such changes shattered their world and very often led to their complete extinction.', '', '']

[(8, 21), (34, 44)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Neg-3---Navy-Round-5.docx

Emory

RuSh

d6df90a15d9a68cabd31aae36e513f6823a308d7aa56a25d40ba3c2e69cd0565

8. Democracy doesn’t solve war.

Sam GHATAK ET AL. 17. **Lecturer, Political Science, University of Tennessee Knoxville. **Aaron Gold, PhD Student, Political Science, UT Knoxville. **Brandon C. Prins, Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, UT Knoxville. “External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 34(2): 141-59. Emory Libraries.

the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues Efforts to assess democratic pacifism ignored rivalry democratic leaders fail to resolve problems nonviolently when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and external threat, the pacifying effect is less visible we find consistent evidence that pacifism does not survive the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or norms are not able to lower the likelihood of conflict Audience costs , resolve , and electoral pressures are powerful forces present even in jointly democratic relationships These make it difficult for leaders to trust one another , which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility

Conclusion It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues , specifically the external threats that they pose This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat , be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders , owing to audience costs , resolve and electoral pressures , fail to resolve problems nonviolently This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database external threats clearly increase conflict propensities when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two Audience costs , resolve , and electoral pressures , produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another , which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility It does appear that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace

stylized fact epiphenomenal to territorial issues not result of settled borders ignored rivalry external threat audience costs resolve electoral pressures fail to resolve problems nonviolently interactive relationship less visible consistent evidence democratic pacifism does not survive liberal institutions norms not Audience costs resolve electoral pressures powerful forces trust one another inhibits conflict resolution hostility limit

['Conclusion It has become a stylized fact that dyadic democracy lowers the hazard of armed conflict. While the Democratic Peace has faced many challenges, we believe the most significant challenge has come from the argument that the pacifying effect of democracy is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. This argument sees the lower hazards of armed conflict among democracies not as a product of shared norms or institutional structures, but as a result of settled borders. Territory, though, remains only one geo-political context generating threat, insecurity, and a higher likelihood of armed conflict. Strategic rivalry also serves as an environment associated with fear, a lack of trust, and an expectation of future conflict. Efforts to assess democratic pacifism have largely ignored rivalry as a context conditioning the behavior of democratic leaders. To be sure, research demonstrates rivals to have higher probabilities of armed conflict and democracies rarely to be rivals. But fundamental to the Democratic Peace is the notion that even in the face of difficult security challenges and salient issues, dyadic democracy will associate with a lower likelihood of militarized aggression. But the presence of an external threat, be that threat disputed territory or strategic rivalry, may be the key mechanism by which democratic leaders, owing to audience costs, resolve and electoral pressures, fail to resolve problems nonviolently. This study has sought a ‘‘hard test’’ of the Democratic Peace by testing the conditional effects of joint democracy on armed conflict when external threat is present. We test three measures of threat: territorial contention, strategic rivalry, and a threat index that sums the first two measures. For robustness checks, we use two additional measures of our dependent variable: fatal MID onset, and event data from the Armed Conflict Database, which can be found in our Online Appendix. As most studies report, democratic dyads are associated with less armed conflict than mixed-regime and autocratic dyads. In every one of our models, when we control for each measure of external threat, joint democracy is strongly negative and significant and each measure of threat is strongly positive and significant. Here, liberal institutions maintain their pacific ability and external threats clearly increase conflict propensities. However, when we test the interactive relationship between democracy and our measures of external threat, the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible. Park and James (2015) find some evidence that when faced with an external threat in the form of territorial contention, the pacifying effect of joint democracy holds up. This study does not fully support the claims of Park and James (2015). Using a longer timeframe, we find more consistent evidence that when faced with an external threat, be it territorial contention, strategic rivalry, or a combination, democratic pacifism does not survive. What are the implications of our study? First, while it is clear that we do not observe a large amount of armed conflict among democratic states, if we organize interstate relationships along a continuum from highly hostile to highly friendly, we are probably observing what Goertz et al. (2016) and Owsiak et al. (2016) refer to as ‘‘lesser rivalries’’ in which ‘‘both the frequency and severity of violent interaction decline. Yet, the sentiments of threat, enmity, and competition that remain—along with the persistence of unresolved issues—mean that lesser rivalries still experience isolated violent episodes (e.g., militarized interstate disputes), diplomatic hostility, and non-violent crises’’ (Owsiak et al. 16). Second, our findings show that the pacific benefits of liberal institutions or externalized norms are not always able to lower the likelihood of armed conflict when faced with external threats, whether those hazards are disputed territory, strategic rivalry, or a combination of the two. The structural environment clearly influences democratic leaders in their foreign policy actions more than has heretofore been appreciated. Audience costs, resolve, and electoral pressures, produced from external threats, are powerful forces that are present even in jointly democratic relationships. These forces make it difficult for leaders to trust one another, which inhibits conflict resolution and facilitates persistent hostility. It does appear, then, that there is a limit to the Democratic Peace.', '', '', '']

[(4, 20)]

ndtceda

Emory-RuSh-Aff-3---Navy-Round-1.docx

Emory

RuSh

d5d813e2659af08424cfd85a0e22d90c6fd62ce39a2274109dd530ec9bf68617

“No war” is bunk.

Clauset 18 – Aaron Clauset, Computer Science Professor at the University of Colorado, Computer Science PhD from the University of New Mexico. [Trends and fluctuations in the severity of interstate wars, Science Advances, 4(2), 2-2-18, https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/4/2/eaao3580]//BPS

peace is unsurprising long periods are common in statistics of wars peace is not evidence peace would need another 100 years before it would be statistically a trend results undermine optimism Evidence from complex systems suggests we underestimate complexity and overestimate our ability If statistics are stationary risk over the century of a large war is high

without a complete understanding of mechanisms that promote interstate war it is unclear whether the postwar pattern of peace will continue analysis here finds the postwar pattern of peace is remarkably unsurprising Similarly long periods of relative peace are common occurrences in the naturally variable statistics of interstate wars the long peace is not evidence by itself of a change in the underlying mechanisms that generate conflict the postwar pattern of relative peace would need to endure in its current form for at least another 100 years before it would be come statistically unusual enough to justify a genuine trend These results undermine optimism by implying the enormous efforts after the Second World War have not yet changed the statistics enough to tell whether they are working Evidence from the study of complex social and biological systems suggests we underestimate the importance of complexity and overestimate our ability to understand complicated effects, especially the aggregation of many inconsequential individual actions interstate wars are only one conflict variable among many which are surely interdependent If the statistics of interstate wars are genuinely stationary , the risk over the next century of a very large war is uncomfortably high results highlight the importance of continued efforts to ensure the long peace endures

a complete understanding unclear the postwar pattern the postwar pattern of peace remarkably unsurprising Similarly long common occurrences the naturally variable statistics interstate wars the long peace the underlying mechanisms the postwar pattern of relative peace at least another 100 years statistically unusual enough a genuine trend undermine the enormous efforts not yet changed enough complex social biological systems the importance of complexity many inconsequential individual actions one conflict variable among many surely interdependent genuinely stationary a very large war uncomfortably high continued efforts the long peace

['In the long run, some of the processes that promote interstate war may be intimately related to the ones that reduce it over the shorter term, through feedback loops, trade-offs, or backlash effects. For example, the persistent appeal of nationalism, the spread of which can increase the risk of interstate wars (56), is not independent of deepening economic ties via globalization (57). The investigation of these interactions will be a vital direction of future work in conflict research. However, without a complete understanding of mechanisms that promote interstate war, especially the large ones, it is unclear whether the postwar pattern of peace will continue or whether the formation and eventual dissolution of periods of peace are part and parcel for a dynamical but ultimately stationary system.', 'Three key difficulties for evaluating the changing likelihood of war from a mechanistic viewpoint are (i) the incomplete accounting of mechanisms, that is, it seems unlikely that every peace- or war-promoting process has been identified, (ii) the lack of understanding of “meta-mechanisms,” that is, processes that govern over very long periods of time the emergence and relevance of more specific mechanisms, and (iii) the difficulty of integrating these varied mechanisms into a single calculation. In contrast, a statistical analysis of the historical record, like the one performed here, does not require accounting for all possible mechanisms. Hence, it provides both an alternative approach to arrive at some kind of answer to a difficult question and a quantitative means by which to identify unusual patterns in need of explanation.', 'The analysis here finds that the postwar pattern of peace is remarkably unsurprising (Table 1). Similarly long periods of relative peace are common occurrences in the naturally variable statistics of interstate wars [a point recently made by Cirillo and Taleb (23)]. The more unusual pattern in the past two centuries is not a long period of relative peace but the markedly violent period that preceded it (in which 42% of large wars occurred over 15% of the total time). This period was so violent over such a short period of time that the subsequent long peace simply balanced the statistical books (Fig. 5B), making it entirely plausible that the timing and sizes of interstate wars since 1823 were generated by a stationary process. Hence, the long peace is not evidence by itself of a change in the underlying mechanisms that generate conflict (Fig. 4B). The analysis here estimates that the postwar pattern of relative peace would need to endure in its current form for at least another 100 years before it would become statistically unusual enough to justify a claim that it represents a genuine trend (Fig. 5B).', 'A related finding is the remarkable stability of war onsets of any size since 1823 (Figs. 3 and 4B), whose statistics are consistent with a simple Poisson process, as originally proposed by Richardson (24, 25). In other words, the annual hazard rate of a new interstate war is evidently also stationary, despite changes in many relevant factors (14), including the number of states, which increased by nearly an order of magnitude over this time period.', 'These results undermine the optimism of liberalism by implying that the enormous efforts after the Second World War to reduce the likelihood of large interstate wars have not yet changed the observed statistics enough to tell whether they are working. This does not lessen the face value achievement of the long peace because the severity of a large war between major powers using modern military technology could be very large, and there are real benefits beyond lives saved (15) that have come from increased economic ties, peace-time alliances, and the spread of democracy. However, it does highlight the continued relevance of the realist perspective and the appropriateness of a stationary process as the null hypothesis for patterns in interstate war. It also highlights the difficulty of understanding the role that human agency plays in driving trends and fluctuations in the statistics of interstate wars. Specifically, how can so much concerted effort, by so many individuals and organizations over so many decades of time, not be evidence of a genuine trend?', 'The answer may be simply a shift in perspective. Evidence from the study of complex social and biological systems (58) suggests that we often underestimate the importance of complexity and overestimate our ability to understand complicated causes of complicated effects, especially those that represent the aggregation of many inconsequential individual actions. Human agency certainly plays a critical role in shaping shorter-term dynamics and specific events in the history of interstate wars. However, the distributed and changing nature of the international system evidently moderates the impact that individuals or coalitions can have on longer-term and larger-scale system dynamics.', 'In this sense, the correct level of description to understand trends in conflict may be the entire system, above the level of individual states, individual conflicts, or even individual peace- or war-promoting mechanisms. A pattern like the long peace could thus be real and understandable, produced by mechanisms that have genuinely reduced the likelihood of war over this period, and yet still be consistent with an overall stationary process running at a larger scale.', 'To illustrate this point, consider a professional basketball game and the ups, downs, and reversals in the lead size by one team over the other. As a spectator or player, one can readily explain why the lead size increased at one time or decreased at another. Each scoring event can be tied to specific actions and individuals within the game and to individual or team strategies. At this level, scoring trends have interpretable causes that depend on actions at the same scale as the events themselves.', 'However, when thousands of individual games across teams and seasons are aggregated to consider basketball as a system, the relevance of these explanations blurs. Patterns at this scale cannot be attributed to specific actions or individuals and, instead, emerge from subtle correlations within or constraints on collective behavior. At this scale, the empirical statistics of lead sizes in basketball are nearly indistinguishable from those of a simple unbiased random walk (59, 60), and exciting trends within individual games are just statistical fluctuations at the system level.', 'Counterintuitively, the stationary pattern of scoring in basketball appears despite the strategic efforts of highly skilled players to make it otherwise. It may be precisely these independent efforts of skilled individuals in competition with each other that produce the observed stationary statistics (60). This analogy suggests a new direction in conflict research, one aimed at identifying and testing mechanisms that could cause stationary statistics in the long term to emerge out of nonstationary dynamics at smaller temporal and spatial scales. A related direction would seek to understand what actions are necessary to genuinely alter these mechanisms and to change the characteristics of the stationary process.', 'Without a clearer understanding of the underlying mechanisms that drive the production of conflicts over long periods of time or access to sufficiently broad and reliable data by which to identify them, a satisfying answer to the debate over trends in war may remain out of reach. Progress may be further complicated by the fact that interstate wars are only one conflict variable among many (4), which are surely interdependent. The analysis here indicates that none of the variations in the frequency and severity of wars since 1823 are statistically plausible trends. However, this finding may occur in part because there are compensatory trends in other variables that mask a subtle underlying change in the conflict-generating processes. Proponents of the trend toward peace cite patterns across multiple conflict variables or focus on patterns among developed nations, as evidence of a broad shift toward less violence (3, 7, 12, 13). However, not all conflict variables support this conclusion, and some, such as military disputes and the frequency of terrorism, exhibit the opposite pattern (22, 43). Untangling the interactions of various conflict variables, and characterizing both their trends and their differences across different groups of nations, is a valuable line of future work.', 'For instance, a stationary process for interstate wars is not inconsistent with an overall decline in per capita violence (3) because the human population has grown markedly over the same period (23, 27). The nonstationarity dynamics in human population, in the number of recognized states, in commerce, communication, public health, and technology, and even in the modes of war itself make it all the more puzzling that the hazard of interstate war in general has remained evidently so constant.', 'If the statistics of interstate wars are genuinely stationary, the risk over the next century of a very large war is uncomfortably high. The results here thus highlight the importance of continued efforts to ensure that the long peace endures and to prevent fragile peace-promoting institutions or systems from falling in the face of stable or contingent processes that drive the production of war. Much of this work must be done on the policy side. In the long run, however, research will play a crucial role by developing and evaluating mechanistic explanations, ideally at the system scale, of the likelihood of war (61, 62), which will help shed new light on what policies at what scales will promote peace.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-McYa-Neg-UCO-Round-6.docx

Kansas

McYa

f262dcd67710ed787dbbbe4d78a74b9a3855bf15771c5de4dfb29730641d3989

8—No internal—SoKo gives leeway.

Kelly 22 - (*Robert E. Kelly **Paul Poast *Professor of Political Science at Pusan National University **Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and a Nonresident Fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs; 2-22-2022, Foreign Affairs, "The Allies Are Alright," doa: 6-14-2023) url:

Trump harbor disdain for So Ko told were “terrible people complained regularly about military support making clear his preference for No Ko he fell in love. Despite Moon’s anti-Americanism relationship remained as before .

Trump seemed to harbor special disdain for So uth Ko rea. he allegedly told a meeting of U.S. governors that South Koreans were “terrible people .” he complained regularly about the United States’ trade deficit with South Korea and the costs of U.S. military support for the country. making clear his preference for the No rth Ko rea n dictator Kim Jong Un, with whom he supposedly “ fell in love. ” Despite Trump’s contempt and Moon’s left-wing politics with its tradition of anti-Americanism the relationship between Seoul and Washington remained much as it was before . South Korea remained yoked to the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. South Korea had good reason to drift away from the United States. But it did not. Like the actions of the other allies, Seoul’s approach was to flatter and persevere , not bolt

special disdain costs U.S. military support preference for the No rth Ko rea anti-Americanism much as it was before yoked good reason drift away flatter persevere not bolt

['', 'PERSEVERANCE ON THE PENINSULA', 'Of all the major U.S. allies, Trump seemed to harbor special disdain for South Korea. In 2020, he allegedly told a meeting of U.S. governors that South Koreans were “terrible people.” As with other allies, he complained regularly about the United States’ trade deficit with South Korea and the costs of U.S. military support for the country. He repeatedly gestured toward pulling U.S. troops out, and observers feared that, if reelected in 2020, he would actually try to do so. Trump personally intervened in U.S.–South Korean cost-sharing negotiations, demanding that Seoul raise its $1 billion contribution to $5 billion. Trump also ordered a revision of the U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement, signed during the George W. Bush administration, even as he hinted that U.S. car and steel tariffs would carry on regardless. He even called South Korean President Moon Jae-in an “appeaser” of North Korea in 2017 and repeatedly said he did not like dealing with Moon, while making clear his preference for the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, with whom he supposedly “fell in love.”', 'But like the other allies, South Korea was largely unaffected. Moon and his first foreign minister waxed lyrical about Trump’s “courage,” “determination,” and “leadership.” After publicly warning Trump in 2017 not to attack North Korea, Moon pivoted to flattery, even floating the idea that Trump would merit a Nobel Peace Prize should he meet with Kim. The blatant pandering and lack of seriousness of this suggestion was an open secret in South Korea.', 'South Korean behavior supported this assertion. Despite Trump’s contempt—and Moon’s left-wing politics with its tradition of anti-Americanism—the relationship between Seoul and Washington remained much as it was before. During the Trump presidency, South Korea made no changes to its otherwise businesslike relationship with Russia, and its relations with China remained fraught. Regarding North Korea, Moon did not make a breakthrough, despite a vigorous effort to reach a détente.', 'South Korea could have responded to Trump’s disdain by trying to bury the hatchet with Japan and strengthen its ties with the other major democratic power of the region. After all, both countries’ fear of abandonment by the United States under Trump created room for rapprochement. Instead, the opposite happened. Moon doubled down on the traditional anti-Japanese line of the South Korean left, provoking a small crisis with the United States in 2019 when he resisted an intelligence-sharing deal with Japan. In the face of Trump’s derision, South Korea could have strengthened its hand by increasing its defense spending. It did so—but only slightly, and as part of long-term military modernization efforts planned well before Trump came to office.', 'At the strategic level, South Korea remained—and remains—yoked to the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. The most important marker of this integration is that operational wartime control of the South Korean military has yet to return to the South Korean government even after 20 years of discussion. Should war break out with North Korea, a U.S. general would still command the South Korean army in the field. The U.S. military forces on the peninsula also remain deeply integrated with the South Korean military, and the tempo of joint training exercises has picked up since Trump left office. South Korea last published a national security strategy in 2018. It emphasized outreach to North Korea but, critically, did not frame such overtures as a substitute for the alliance with the United States.', 'South Korea had good reason to drift away from the United States. Trump repeatedly publicly condemned it, and it is governed by a coalition with roots in anti-American protest. But it did not. Like the actions of the other allies, Seoul’s approach was to flatter and persevere, not bolt.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-BeWe-Aff-2--MAC-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

BeWe

dd93f3669c304e2fb35dc8d06641ada9fddfbcc5d62fa11a99011db4a977b9b9

Leveraging prosecution of American export cartels is a valuable bargaining chip that encourages international follow-on.

Waller 92 - (Spencer Weber Waller, John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and Professor @ Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Spring 1992, UNC School of Law, North Carolina Journal of International Law Vol. 17, Number 2, "The Failure of the Export Trading Company Program," doa: 6-8-2021) url: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol17/iss2/1

The solution is to confront the core evils and eradicate them the U.S. may make repeal politically advantageous U.S. cartels are a matter of concern to foreign governments authorities must expend valuable resources monitoring American ETCs and W P A abolition may be valuable as a bargaining chip in negotiations regarding abolition of export cartels negotiations could sharpen transparency and make info available to injured nations agreements could prohibit export cartels or strengthen coop in investigation and legitimize countermeasures such negotiations could prove beneficial to the U.S. exposure regulation , and abolition of national cartels and legitimation of measures to counter foreign cartels are worthy tradeoffs

A New ETC Program or No ETC Program? The question remains as to what should be done with a legislative program whose purposes were unfocused and contradictory, whose foundations were empirically shaky , whose performance has been poor , and which has produced some undesirable side effects . The other solution is to confront the core evils of the legislation and eradicate them . In view of the inability of the ETC program to generate exports and the unhealthy side effects that the program has produced, the most effective action would be simply to abolish the ETC Program altogether, and phase out the existing certificates over a period of years . The abolition of the ETC program would once again make U.S. antitrust law simple and consistent . The Antitrust Division could focus on its traditional role of case investigation and prosecution, rather than continue as a reluctant regulator and antagonist to the Commerce Department in the field of export promotion. The Antitrust Division could then target its international enforcement efforts at those international cartels which harm the U.S. domestic economy or U.S. export opportunities. there may be international fora in which the U.S. may be able to bargain away the ETC program in return for valuable concessions which may make repeal of the ETC Act politically advantageous to the U.S. U.S. cartels are still a matter of concern to foreign governments since competition authorities must expend valuable resources monitoring the operations of both American ETCs and W ebb P omerene A ssociations. 16 9 The abolition of both the ETC Act and the Webb-Pomerene Act may be most valuable as a bargaining chip in international negotiations regarding the legitimacy and abolition of export cartels as a tool of international trade International negotiations could sharpen the transparency in the use of export cartels and make important info rmation available at the international level to injured nations . More ambitious agreements could include the eventual prohibit ion and abolition of export cartels or provisions strengthen ing the coop eration of national governments in the investigation of such cartels, and thereby legitimize the use of countermeasures in markets affected by the export cartel such negotiations could prove beneficial to the U.S. The exposure , regulation , and potential abolition of national export cartels , and the legitimation of measures to counter the actions of foreign export cartels are worthy tradeoffs for the abolition or curtailment of the ETC program which never served the interests of the U.S. in the first place

A New ETC Program or No ETC Program? empirically shaky performance has been poor undesirable side effects core evils eradicate them inability unhealthy side effects most effective action simply to abolish the ETC Program phase out period of years simple consistent traditional role reluctant regulator antagonist to the Commerce Department target its international enforcement international fora bargain away the ETC program valuable concessions politically advantageous matter of concern to foreign governments expend valuable resources monitoring the operations W P A The abolition of both the ETC Act and the Webb-Pomerene Act may be most valuable as a bargaining chip in international negotiations regarding the legitimacy and abolition of export cartels as a tool of international trade sharpen the transparency make important info available injured nations eventual prohibit ion and abolition of export cartels strengthen coop investigation legitimize the use of countermeasures exposure regulation potential abolition export cartels legitimation of measures to counter the actions of foreign export cartels never served the interests of the U.S. in the first place

['', 'V. A New ETC Program or No ETC Program?', 'The question remains as to what should be done with a legislative program whose purposes were unfocused and contradictory, whose foundations were empirically shaky, whose performance has been poor, and which has produced some undesirable side effects. One solution is to do nothing and allow the ETC program to slide into relative obsolescence. The other solution is to confront the core evils of the legislation and eradicate them.', 'A. Abolishing the ETC Program', 'In view of the inability of the ETC program to generate exports and the unhealthy side effects that the program has produced, the most effective action would be simply to abolish the ETC Program altogether, and phase out the existing certificates over a period of years. Congress should simply acknowledge that it had been sold an unneeded program on false pretenses and end this unsuccessful experiment. Exporters could still rely on the FTAIA to distinguish matters subject to the U.S. antitrust laws from matters more appropriately the concern of foreign competition authorities.', 'The abolition of the ETC program would once again make U.S. antitrust law simple and consistent. The Antitrust Division could focus on its traditional role of case investigation and prosecution, rather than continue as a reluctant regulator and antagonist to the Commerce Department in the field of export promotion. The Antitrust Division could then target its international enforcement efforts at those international cartels which harm the U.S. domestic economy or U.S. export opportunities.168', 'The outright and unilateral abolition of the ETC program is probably unrealistic. The institutional and bureaucratic interests of the Department of Commerce constitute a powerful lobby for the preservation of its central role in the promotion of U.S. exports. The business community that persuaded Congress to enact the ETC Act a decade ago and the existing certificate holders would be reluctant to abandon the procedural advantages of the ETC Act and whatever limited advantages reaped in their export promotion activities.', 'While unilateral repeal may not be possible, there may be international fora in which the U.S. may be able to bargain away the ETC program in return for valuable concessions which may make repeal of the ETC Act politically advantageous to the U.S. Although there may be few successful export cartels operated under the ETC program, U.S. cartels are still a matter of concern to foreign governments since competition authorities must expend valuable resources monitoring the operations of both American ETCs and WebbPomerene Associations. 16 9', "The abolition of both the ETC Act and the Webb-Pomerene Act may be most valuable as a bargaining chip in international negotiations regarding the legitimacy and abolition of export cartels as a tool of international trade. The lack of international consensus and the absence of international regulation pertaining to the use of export cartels leaves a conspicuous gap in the enforcement of competition norms. 170 Like the U.S., most nations assert jurisdiction over injurious conduct taking place outside their territory under some version of the 'effects' doctrine, but tacitly or openly approve of export agreements which injure only foreign markets.", 'International negotiations could sharpen the transparency in the use of export cartels and make important information available at the international level to injured nations. More ambitious agreements could include the eventual prohibition and abolition of export cartels or provisions strengthening the cooperation of national governments in the investigation of such cartels, and thereby legitimize the use of countermeasures in markets affected by the export cartel.', 'The problem of export cartels can also be attacked as an international trade problem under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").1 7\' The close relationship between international trade and antitrust policy suggests that competition issues may well be the next non-tariff barrier addressed in multilateral trade negotiations.\' 72 The promotion of export cartels to alter the terms of international trade to a country\'s mercantilistic advantage is as much a non-tariff barrier to free trade as the use of \'unfair\' trade practices such as dumping and subsidies.173 The development of interpretive side agreements under the GATT governing dumping and subsidies could serve as a model for a similar agreements regarding export cartels. 174 Although the GATT Antidumping and Subsidies Codes do not address the abolition of these practices, both Codes define the trade practices deemed unfair, provide detailed procedures for countermeasures by nations injured by the practices, and establish dispute resolution procedures at the international level. 175', 'Regardless of the forum for these negotiations, such negotiations could prove beneficial to the U.S. The exposure, regulation, and potential abolition of national export cartels, and the legitimation of measures to counter the actions of foreign export cartels are worthy tradeoffs for the abolition or curtailment of the ETC program which never served the interests of the U.S. in the first place.', '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-3-Harvard-Doubles.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-3-Harvard-Doubles.docx

488264f87f79dab078255ee4e05196055e4d145dfdecff122f028aa526ca26d3

A consensus of economists agree.

Smart ’21 [Tim; June 30; Contributing Editor for news at U.S. News & World Report; US News, “Economic Recovery to Continue in Second Half But at Slower Pace,” https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2021-06-30/economic-recovery-to-continue-in-second-half-but-at-slower-pace]

Recent reports suggested good footing A survey found " a uptick in growth with gains widespread business s will improve in the next months survey of economists was bullish

Recent economic reports suggested that the economy remains on good footing A monthly survey of small businesses found " a notable uptick in small business jobs growth with gains widespread by industry and geography consumer confidence rise sharply with the Conference Board's monthly index rising business condition s will improve in the next six months quarterly survey of economists was bullish

Recent economic reports good footing A monthly survey small businesses a notable uptick small business jobs growth widespread by industry and geography rise sharply monthly index business condition s the next six months quarterly survey of economists bullish

['Recent economic reports have suggested that the economy remains on good footing entering the second half of the year. A monthly survey of small businesses by Paychex-IHS Markit released Tuesday found "a notable uptick in small business jobs growth in June" with gains widespread by industry and geography.', 'Among sectors, personal and other services, along with finance, leisure and hospitality led the gains in percentage terms.', "Tuesday also saw consumer confidence rise sharply in June, with the Conference Board's monthly index rising to 127.3 from 120 a month ago. Consumers' expectations that business conditions will improve in the next six months rose to 33% from 31.1% in May.", "And Bankrate's quarterly survey of economists released Wednesday was generally bullish, with experts predicting monthly job gains averaging 412,000 over the next 12 months."]

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Kentucky-Octas.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Kentucky-Octas.docx

838ad99a630257cbf7e5ad3c0863b9601a6886faa20ac0ce4f242a296d1e39dc

Nuclear detonation in one large city is enough to cause 5 billion deaths.

Tegmark 23 {A professor doing AI research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology} [Max Tegmark, "Here's How Bad a Nuclear War Would Actually Be", 06/29/2023, Time, https://time.com/6290977/nuclear-war-impact-essay/, Accessed 10/25/2023] // KSU DJR

peer-reviewed research suggests black carbon smoke from the nuclear firestorms into the stratosphere heated by sunlight, lofting it for up to a decade it takes only a few days for the smoke to spread across the northern hemisphere farmland in Kansas cooling by about 40 degrees and other regions cooling twice as much. A recent paper estimates over 5 billion people could starve to death

peer-reviewed research suggests that explosions, aren’t the worst part: a nuclear winter is caused by the black carbon smoke from the nuclear firestorms today’s bombs are much more powerful. A large city like Moscow can create much more smoke into the stratosphere , far above any rain clouds that would otherwise wash out the smoke. This black smoke gets heated by sunlight, lofting it like a hot air balloon for up to a decade . High-altitude jet streams are so fast that it takes only a few days for the smoke to spread across much of the northern hemisphere . with farmland in Kansas cooling by about 20 degrees centigrade (about 40 degrees Fahrenheit), and other regions cooling almost twice as much. A recent scientific paper estimates that over 5 billion people could starve to death , including around 99% of those in the US, Europe, Russia, and China most black carbon smoke stays in the Northern hemisphere where it’s produced, and because temperature drops harm agriculture more at high latitudes.

peer-reviewed research suggests that explosions, aren’t the worst part: a nuclear winter is caused by the black carbon smoke from the nuclear firestorms today’s bombs are much more powerful. A large city like Moscow can create much more smoke into the stratosphere , far above any rain clouds that would otherwise wash out the smoke. This black smoke gets heated by sunlight, lofting it like a hot air balloon for up to a decade . High-altitude jet streams are so fast that it takes only a few days for the smoke to spread across much of the northern hemisphere . with farmland in Kansas cooling by about 20 degrees centigrade (about 40 degrees Fahrenheit), and other regions cooling almost twice as much. A recent scientific paper estimates that over 5 billion people could starve to death , including around 99% of those in the US, Europe, Russia, and China most black carbon smoke stays in the Northern hemisphere where it’s produced, and because temperature drops harm agriculture more at high latitudes.

['Unfortunately, peer-reviewed research suggests that explosions, the electromagnetic pulse, and the radioactivity aren’t the worst part: a nuclear winter is caused by the black carbon smoke from the nuclear firestorms. The Hiroshima atomic bomb caused such a firestorm, but today’s hydrogen bombs are much more powerful. A large city like Moscow, with almost 50 times more people than Hiroshima, can create much more smoke, and a firestorm that sends plumes of black smoke up into the stratosphere, far above any rain clouds that would otherwise wash out the smoke. This black smoke gets heated by sunlight, lofting it like a hot air balloon for up to a decade. High-altitude jet streams are so fast that it takes only a few days for the smoke to spread across much of the northern hemisphere. This makes Earth freezing cold even during the summer, with farmland in Kansas cooling by about 20 degrees centigrade (about 40 degrees Fahrenheit), and other regions cooling almost twice as much. A recent scientific paper estimates that over 5 billion people could starve to death, including around 99% of those in the US, Europe, Russia, and China – because most black carbon smoke stays in the Northern hemisphere where it’s produced, and because temperature drops harm agriculture more at high latitudes.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

KansasState-RoTu-Neg-3---UCO-Joe-C-Jackson-Round-2.docx

KansasState

RoTu

f9f325f572f315baa26633f7b40e6a37a8ed3ec1a65fefcd73601f706962b497

CMR is multifactorial, and modernization impact is “dimmed”.

Sahibzada Muhammad Usman 22. Ph.D., University of Pisa, Italy. “History and Future Perceptive of Civil-Military Relations in China.” World Affairs, Volume 186, Issue 1.

PLA's relationship with the government determined by achievement of civilian governance extent of professionalization and level to which PLA participates in external missions influenced by additional factors from internal and external environments modernization splits impact on military dimmed

PLA's future relationship with the civilian government will be determined by degree of achievement of civilian governance extent of professionalization of the PLA and level to which PLA participates in external missions influenced by additional factors from internal and external environments modernization objectives transformations led to occasional splits party resorted to institutional methods to ensure political control and party loyalty institutional integrity and relative impact on military commanders dimmed

future relationship professionalization of the PLA external missions additional factors occasional splits institutional methods dimmed

["The PLA's future relationship with the civilian government, and whether it results in increased autonomy for the PLA or a closer bond, will be determined by three factors: “the degree of achievement of civilian governance, the extent of professionalization of the PLA, and the level to which the PLA participates in external missions” (Li 2013). Although the PLA's short-term conversion to a fully-fledged national army is governed by civilians and is subject to legislation, a case has been made for the gradual expansion of the role of state institutions such as the NPC, to which the PLA is formally accountable (Scobell 2005).", "Analysts underline the conflict between the PLA's “disproportionate” involvement in national security strategy and its autonomy in implementing that policy and attempts to allay regional fears about China's growing military dominance. With the PLA's expanding capabilities and out-of-area actions, a greater understanding of the PLA's autonomous second-order decision-making repercussions would aid in avoiding problems in international relations. The PLA's negotiating strength with civil leadership is partly a product of its enhanced capabilities after the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait conflict. They allow the military elite to provide more forceful choices to the civil leadership, which will continue to translate into a strong position for the military to extract concessions, such as increased budget allocations. The PLA's primary priorities in international and domestic defense and security policy are conservative nationalism, which aims to strengthen the PRC's national power via economic and technical growth, internal stability, and national unity (Shambaugh 2010). In foreign policy, the PLA has been more confident than the CCP leadership on issues such as China's relations with North Korea, America, Japan, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, as well as proliferation, arms control, and energy security—and has been outspoken in response to criticism.", 'Conclusion', "For the party leadership from the early 1950s to the 1980s, the professionalization of the PLA was not a priority. However, as professionalism expanded across the officer's corps globally, changes at home, and in the international environment helped create cleavages among the Chinese political elite. The opinions of the party elites were also influenced by additional factors from the internal and external environments. Due to the military's professionalism and modernization objectives, transformations in the political elite led to occasional splits within the military. The party resorted to institutional methods to ensure political control and party loyalty. Using parallel and separate political control mechanisms of party committee systems and the political commissary system, the CCP penetrated the military command structure to the company level. Although these procedures were professionally driven, their institutional integrity and relative impact on the military commanders were dimmed. The party effectively controlled the military and emphasized professionalization with the consolidation and expansion of the Party Committee and political system of committees.", '']

[(18, 18), (19, 27)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Aff-Kathryn-Klassic-Round-4.docx

Emory

KeRa

71510fcf0b47f98129131f8dc12d58ea4deb8648f9293f03b6228516acde2cc7

1. Russia and China would both agree---they’ll trade an agreement allowing the U.S. to deploy SLCM-N in exchange for limits on Aegis BMD and transparency on every other nuclear system---solves arms racing, miscalc, and escalation

James M. Acton 21, the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Thomas D. MacDonald, fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Pranay Vaddi, fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2021, “A Comprehensive Approach: A Trilateral Treaty to Limit Missile Launchers and Bombers,” in Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control: A Comprehensive Approach, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/12/16/comprehensive-approach-trilateral-treaty-to-limit-missile-launchers-and-bombers-pub-85982

arms race in ground-launched missiles and aircraft disquiet Beijing, Moscow Washington tech developments are driving up risk of escalation treaty proposed here could restrain threatening capabilities , mitigate arms racing , and manage escalation each could accept basic compromise U S Aegis launchers would be accountable; sea-based missiles, other than SLBMs, would not limits on SLCMs are absent from Putin’s proposal for moratorium on Russian deployments in Europe Russia may entertain transparency on land-based missiles by themselves inspections of ground launchers represent increase in transparency for China Two characteristics make it palatable parties use NTM to verify silo SLBM and bombers deploying mobile ground-launched missiles to allied territory would prove politically fraught treaty would foreclose an option in practice, the U S would not execute anyway . (Instead U S would rely on SLCMs

emerging arms race in ground-launched missiles and significant developments in aircraft technology appear disquiet Beijing, Moscow , and Washington there may be concern in Moscow, about the possibility of renewed competition between China and Russia over the long term tech nological developments are driving up the risk of escalation should growing tensions spark a conventional conflict treaty proposed here could restrain an adversary’s threatening capabilities , mitigate the costs and tensions associated with arms racing , and manage escalation risks created by growing nonnuclear threats to nuclear forces One question is whether each could accept the basic compromise U S Aegis Ashore launchers would be accountable; sea-based missiles, other than SLBMs, would not greater transparency about SLCMs would be both possible and desirable and could enhance the viability of the proposed agreement China and Russia should note although they lag the U S in sea-based missiles, they have made considerable efforts to enhance their capabilities in this area limits on SLCMs are noticeably absent from Putin’s proposal for a verified moratorium on Russian and U.S. deployments in Europe of any missiles formerly prohibited under the INF Treaty Russia may entertain limits and transparency on land-based missiles by themselves Specifically, inspections of mobile ground -based launchers would represent a radical increase in transparency for China Two characteristics should make it more palatable to Beijing than limits on missiles or warheads the parties would use NTM to verify silo launchers , SLBM launchers , and accountable bombers intrusiveness of inspections limited to mobile ground-based launchers, would be mitigated since inspectors would not need access to missile front sections China would not be required to provide any information at all about its warheads within the U S opposition to the treaty may come from officials and analysts who are concerned about a new missile gap in regional missile forces vis-à-vis China deploying mobile ground-launched missiles to allied territory , where they would be militarily useful, would likely prove politically fraught . Local populations would almost certainly oppose such deployments, even for missiles that were not nuclear-armed the deployments would likely be quite small—if they could be agreed on at all treaty proposed here would therefore foreclose an option a major buildup of forward-deployed mobile ground-launched missiles—that, in practice, the U S would likely not to be able to execute anyway . (Instead , the U S would probably rely on SLCMs not be limited by the proposed treaty, to meet its deterrence requirements

emerging arms race tech restrain an adversary’s threatening capabilities arms racing manage escalation risks basic compromise U S sea-based missiles, other than SLBMs, would not U S considerable efforts SLCMs noticeably absent land-based missiles by themselves more palatable to Beijing use NTM to verify silo launchers SLBM launchers accountable bombers would not need access to missile front sections U S politically fraught even for missiles that were not nuclear-armed at all in practice, the U S would likely not to be able to execute anyway U S probably rely on SLCMs

['Political feasibility. The emerging arms race in ground-launched missiles and somewhat less competitive but still significant developments in aircraft technology appear to disquiet Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. Both parties in the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese dyads express concerns about the other’s programs. Below the surface, there may also be some concern, particularly in Moscow, about the possibility of renewed competition between China and Russia over the long term. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, technological developments are driving up the risk of escalation should growing tensions spark a conventional conflict.', 'The treaty proposed here could help restrain an adversary’s threatening capabilities, mitigate the costs and tensions associated with arms racing, and manage the escalation risks created by growing nonnuclear threats to nuclear forces. While the first two of these advantages, in particular, may be understood by Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, crafting a treaty that each participant viewed as beneficial to its specific interests would likely be more difficult when there are three parties rather than two. These difficulties would be magnified by the poor state of U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations.', 'One threshold question is whether each party could accept the basic compromise underlying the proposed treaty: the United States’ Aegis Ashore launchers would be accountable; sea-based missiles, other than SLBMs, would not. (As argued in chapter 1, greater transparency about SLCMs and SLBGMs would be both possible and desirable and could enhance the viability of the proposed agreement.)', 'In evaluating this trade-off, the United States should recall that it has always justified its Aegis Ashore deployments on the need to combat Iranian missiles and that this agreement would not stop it from retaining, or even modestly expanding, such capabilities. Meanwhile, China and Russia should note that, although they lag the United States in sea-based missiles, they have made considerable efforts to enhance their capabilities in this area. Indeed, limits on SLCMs (and air-launched cruise missiles, for that matter) are noticeably absent from Putin’s proposal for a verified moratorium on Russian and U.S. deployments in Europe (including European Russia) of any missiles that were formerly prohibited under the INF Treaty.21 This proposal hints that Russia may entertain limits and transparency on land-based missiles by themselves (though the treaty proposed here would, by limiting bombers, also limit air-launched missiles indirectly).', 'Another challenge in securing a treaty is Beijing’s relative lack of experience with arms control, particularly negotiating and implementing limits on missiles or aircraft. Specifically, inspections of mobile ground-based launchers would represent a radical increase in transparency for China and hence could be a potential deal breaker. Two characteristics of the proposed agreement, however, should make it somewhat more palatable to Beijing than, say, limits on missiles or warheads. First, the parties would use NTM to verify silo launchers, SLBM launchers, and accountable bombers. Second, the intrusiveness of inspections, which would be limited to mobile ground-based launchers, would be mitigated since inspectors would not need access to missile front sections, as in New START. Indeed, China would not be required to provide any information at all about its warheads.', 'If China concluded that this basic treaty concept would advance its interests but that it could not accept on-site inspections, the parties should, at least initially, consider a non-legally binding agreement and rely exclusively on NTM for verification for some period of time. While this approach would present significant challenges—in trying to verify mobile launchers, in particular—the corresponding benefit of engaging China in a mutually beneficial arms control agreement would be considerable. If this arrangement proved successful, the parties could then enshrine the limits in a treaty with full verification provisions.', 'An additional consideration for China is that it appears to target states besides the United States and perhaps Russia with its missile forces. Various DF-21 battalions in central and southern China, for example, appear to hold Indian targets at risk.22 China may therefore view the proposal’s failure to constrain Indian forces as a significant flaw—though China’s ongoing missile competition with the United States is likely a more immediate concern than its competition with India.', 'Finally, within the United States, opposition to the proposed treaty may come from officials and analysts who are concerned about a new missile gap—in particular, in regional missile forces vis-à-vis China. Some would probably worry that the proposed treaty would enshrine U.S. inferiority in regional missiles and would likely argue that the United States should build up its force before seeking limits through arms control.', 'One problem with this approach is that deploying mobile ground-launched missiles to allied territory, where they would be militarily useful, would likely prove politically fraught. Local populations would almost certainly oppose such deployments, even for missiles that were not nuclear-armed. As a result, the deployments would likely be quite small—if, that is, they could be agreed on at all. The treaty proposed here would therefore foreclose an option—a major buildup of forward-deployed mobile ground-launched missiles—that, in practice, the United States would likely not to be able to execute anyway. (Instead, the United States would probably rely on SLCMs and perhaps SLBGMs, which would not be limited by the proposed treaty, to meet its deterrence requirements.)']

[(9, 17), (155, 164), (265, 270)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Neg-Harvard-Round-6.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

d731863a1d8ab6c03b5ad76d5d6e6cd4bb7bdbfad40708e02819f6a43550ff3a

Authoritarianism leads to extinction, democracy solves it

Belfield 23, Research Associate and Academic Project Manager at the University of Cambridge's Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (Haydn, “Collapse, Recovery, and Existential Risk,” in How Worlds Collapse: What History, Systems, and Complexity Can Teach Us About Our Modern World and Fragile Future, p. 74-76)

A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more war-prone less cooperative , and inhibitive of progress Totalitarian states are bad at forecasting and dealing with disasters a world dominated by them would be worse at responding to extinction Miscalc might be a problem due to personalization and disincentives for accurate info War makes extinction more likely raising the chance of w m d totalitarian states are less cooperative This is bad for all risks that require coop such as pandemics or climate change Scientific progress could address natural risks and climate change solve safety in AI or biotech totalitarian states would inhibit social progress future tech such as a i space settlement or surveillance could enable lock-in Allied Assurance Score : Strong but at Risk The cred of nuclear deterrence is the most important component of assurance Japan So Ko and Australia face aggressive nuclear adversaries nuclear assurances are critical and must be perceived as credible Japan and So Ko have the capability and know-how to build nuc s quickly Based on public statements and data allies do not doubt extended deterrence commitments to any serious degree NATO and Asian allies like Japan and So Ko affirmed the NPR supports extended deterrence allied assurance remains “strong,” especially as the U S remains committed to modernizing The U S will need to strengthen extended deterrence by communicating resolve

A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more war-prone , less cooperative , and more inhibitive of progress It would increase the risk of extinction and could shape the future toward less desirable trajectories Totalitarian states are bad at forecasting and dealing with disasters If totalitarian states are worse at addressing social, environmental, and technological problems a world dominated by them would likely be worse at responding to risks of extinction A world dominated by totalitarian states is more likely to have major wars Miscalc ulation might be a particular problem for totalitarian states due to personalization and disincentives for accurate info rmation War makes collapse and extinction more likely , by raising the chance of w eapons of m ass d estruction being used totalitarian states are less cooperative This is bad for all risks that require coop eration such as pandemics or climate change continued social and scientific progress is likely to reduce risks of extinction reduce global inequality and other risk factors. Scientific progress could address natural risks and climate change differentially increase defensive rather than offensive power and solve safety challenges in AI or biotech totalitarian states would inhibit social progress We should be particularly concerned about “ bottlenecks ” at which values are particularly important—where there is a risk of “ locking-in values future tech nologies such as a rtificial g eneral i ntelligence space settlement , life extension (of autocrats), or much better surveillance could enable lock-in A long-lasting totalitarian-dominated world would extend the period of time humanity would spend with a heightened risk of collapse or extinction, as well as increased potential for lock-in 1NC PROLIF DA strong but at risk Allied Assurance Score : Strong but at Risk The cred ibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence is the most important component of allied assurance . The U S extends nuclear assurances to more than 30 allies who have maintained the commitment to forgo nuclear programs If allies were to resort to build ing their own nuc s because their confidence in U.S. extended deterrence had been degraded , the consequences for nonprolif and stability could become dire The U S provides nuclear assurances to Japan So Ko and Australia all of which face increasingly aggressive nuclear -armed adversaries China , Russia , and No Ko Continued U.S. nuclear deterrence assurances are critical and must be perceived as credible Both Japan and So Ko have the capability and basic know-how to build their own nuc s quickly Based on public statements and the available data , allies do not appear to be doubt ing U.S. extended deterrence commitments to any serious degree or thinking of developing their own nuc s Europe continue to express their commitment to NATO as a U.S.-led nuclear alliance even as they worry about Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling both NATO allies and Asian allies like Japan and So Ko have affirmed the 2018 NPR supports extended deterrence allied assurance faces increasing risks as the regional threats to U.S. allies grow China continues to advance its capability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk with its strategic forces allies’ assurance of the nuclear umbrella can become more fragile unofficial sentiment could indicate concern about U.S. extended deterrence commitments a senior Japanese ruling party lawmaker recently called for a national debate on the U.S. nuclear umbrella significant percentages of South Koreans continue to express support for an indigenous nuclear capability or nuclear-sharing Biden rejected a declaratory policy of n f u or sole purpose which would have made allies uneasy over U.S. extended deterrence commitments after significant pressure from them The score for allied assurance remains “strong,” especially as the U S remains committed to modernizing its nuclear deterrent and rejects calls to reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally but is at risk of weakening increasing regional threats combined with consideration of n f u could creat concern about U.S. extended deterrence commitments. The U S will need to strengthen its commitments to extended deterrence through its capabilities and by communicating resolve

more war-prone less cooperative more inhibitive of progress increase the risk of extinction responding to risks of extinction major wars Miscalc ulation War w m d all risks that require coop eration pandemics or climate change solve safety challenges in AI or biotech inhibit social progress bottlenecks locking-in tech a g i space settlement life extension much better surveillance would risk lock-in

['A world dominated by totalitarian states would be more incompetent, more war-prone, less cooperative, and more inhibitive of progress than one dominated by democratic states. Our current world is not particularly competent, peaceful, cooperative, or progressive—a totalitarian-dominated world would be worse. It would increase the risk of another collapse and extinction and could shape the future toward less desirable trajectories (Beckstead, 2013). Totalitarian states are incompetent. They are bad at forecasting and dealing with disasters (Caplan, 2008).16 This can be seen most clearly in the great famines of Communist China and the USSR, in which millions died (Applebaum, 2017; Becker, 1996; Dikotter, 2010; Snyder, 2010). In comparison, functioning multiparty democracies rarely, if ever, experience famines (Sen, 2010). “Established autocracies” (or “personal”/“sultanist”) are particularly bad, as there are few checks or restraints on arbitrary rule and the whims and ideology of the single individual, even from other elites (Svolik, 2012). From the inside, the “inner circle” around Mao, Stalin, and Hitler seems incredibly chaotic, with elites strongly incentivized to conceal information and encouraged by the autocrat to squabble and feud—so they are divided (Conquest, 1992; Kershaw, 2008; Zhang & Halliday, 2006). If totalitarian states are worse at addressing social, environmental, and technological problems, then a world dominated by them would likely be worse at responding to risks of collapse and extinction. A world dominated by totalitarian states is more likely to have major wars. States with near-universal adult suffrage rarely (if ever) go to war with one another (Barnhart et al., 2020), so a world dominated by democracies has fewer wars. Miscalculation might be a particular problem for totalitarian states due to personalization and disincentives for accurate information, leading to well-known strategic disasters such as Hitler and Stalin’s blunders in World War II (Bialer, 1970; Noakes & Pridham, 2001), or at a smaller level, Saddam Hussein’s rejection of diplomacy (Atkinson, 1993). War makes collapse and extinction more likely, by raising the chance of weapons of mass destruction being used. Linked to this, totalitarian states are less cooperative than democratic states. While cooperation is possible (Ginsburg, 2020), their internal norms are characterized by paranoia and treachery, and their lack of transparency limits their ability to credibly commit to agreements. This is bad for all risks that require cooperation such as pandemics or climate change (Tomasik, 2015). Finally, continued social and scientific progress is likely to reduce risks of collapse and extinction. Social progress could reduce global inequality and other risk factors. Scientific progress could help address natural risks and climate change (Sandberg, 2018), differentially increase defensive rather than offensive power (Garfinkel & Dafoe, 2019), and solve safety challenges in AI or biotechnology (Russell, 2019). However, as we will now discuss totalitarian states would likely inhibit social progress. A central question from a longtermist perspective is: Which values should shape the future? I would argue that we should prefer it to be shaped by liberal democratic values. This is not to say that the current democracy-dominated world is perfect—far from it. The fate of billions of factory-farmed animals or hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty makes that abundantly clear. However, democracies have two advantages. First, democracies have space for cosmopolitan values such as human rights, plurality, freedom, and equality. These are better than those that characterize life under totalitarianism: Fear, terror, subjection, and secrecy. Second, they have within themselves the mechanism to allow progress. In the last 100 (or even 50) years, the lives of women, LGBT people, religious minorities, and non-white people have dramatically improved. Our “moral circle” has expanded, and could continue to expand (Singer, 1981). The arc of the moral universe is long, but given the right conditions, it might just bend toward justice (King, 1968). A global society dominated by these values, and with the possibility of improving more, has a better longterm potential. A totalitarian-dominated world, on the other hand, would reduce the space for resistance and progress—distorting the human trajectory. We should be particularly concerned about “bottlenecks” at which values are particularly important—where there is a risk of “locking-in” some particular set of (possibly far from optimal) values. While they are currently far-off, future technologies such as artificial general intelligence, space settlement, life extension (of autocrats), or much better surveillance could enable lock-in (Caplan, 2008).17 Conditional on them avoiding new catastrophes, world orders dominated by totalitarians could be quite long-lasting (Caplan, 2008). Democracies can undermine authoritarian and totalitarian regimes through the following ways: Control, including conquest; contagion through proximity; and consent, promoting receptivity toward democratization (Whitehead, 2001). Democracies can actively undermine these regimes through war, sanctions, hosting rebellious exiles, or sponsoring internal movements. Passively, through contagion, they offer a demonstration that a better, more prosperous life is possible. For example, in the final years of the USSR, ordinary Soviet citizens were able to see that the West had a higher standard of living—more innovation, more choice, and more consumer goods. The elites were able to read books from the outside, and travel—Gorbachev’s contacts and friendships with European politicians may have made him more favorable to social democracy (Brown, 1996). Democracies can undermine the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus (Bellin, 2004). However, in a world not dominated by democracies, all these pressures would be far less. A world in which, say, totalitarian regimes emerged as dominant after World War II (for example if the USA was defeated) could be self-reinforcing and long-lasting, like the self-reinforcing relationship of Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia (Orwell, 1949). Orwell’s fictional world is characterized by constant low-grade warfare to justify emergency powers and secure elites, and with shifting alliances of convenience as states bandwagon and balance, thereby preventing any resolution. A totalitarian-dominated world order could be rather robust, perhaps for decades or even centuries. A long-lasting totalitarian-dominated world would extend the period of time humanity would spend with a heightened risk of collapse or extinction, as well as increased potential for distortion of the human trajectory and the possibility that a “lock-in” event may occur. This example illustrates the possibility of a “negative recovery,” resulting in a trajectory with less or no scientific and social progress and a less favorable geopolitical situation, which would threaten the destruction of humanity’s longterm potential.', '1NC', 'PROLIF DA:', '', 'Allied assurance is strong but at risk. ', 'Geller 22, MA, former senior policy analyst for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense. (Patty-Jane, 10-18-2022, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessment-us-military-power/us-nuclear-weapons)', 'Allied Assurance Score: Strong but at Risk of Weakening', 'The credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence is one of the most important components of allied assurance. The United States extends nuclear assurances to more than 30 allies who have maintained the commitment to forgo nuclear programs of their own. If allies were to resort to building their own nuclear weapons because their confidence in U.S. extended deterrence had been degraded, the consequences for nonproliferation and stability could become dire.', 'In Europe, the United States can coordinate with France and the United Kingdom, which already have nuclear weapons. The United States also deploys B-61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe as a visible manifestation of its commitment to its NATO allies and retains dual-capable aircraft that can deliver those gravity bombs. The United States provides nuclear assurances to Japan, South Korea, and Australia, all of which face increasingly aggressive nuclear-armed regional adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. Continued U.S. nuclear deterrence assurances are critical and must be perceived as credible. Both Japan and South Korea have the capability and basic know-how to build their own nuclear weapons quickly. A decision to do so would be a major setback for U.S. nonproliferation policies and could increase regional instability.', 'Grade: Not unlike deterrence, assurance is about allies’ perceptions of the U.S. nuclear umbrella’s credibility rather than what the United States perceives to be a credible extended deterrent. Any assessment of allied assurance will therefore be inherently subjective.', 'Based on public statements and the available data, U.S. allies do not appear to be doubting U.S. extended deterrence commitments to any serious degree or thinking of developing their own nuclear weapons. European members of NATO continue to express their commitment to and appreciation of NATO as a U.S.-led nuclear alliance even as they worry about the impact of Russia’s growing non-strategic nuclear capabilities and nuclear saber-rattling over Ukraine.106 Additionally, both NATO allies and Asian allies like Japan and South Korea have affirmed that the strategy outlined in the 2018 NPR supports extended deterrence.107 Because the 2022 NPR has not yet been released publicly, allies have not publicly commented.', 'However, allied assurance faces increasing risks as the regional threats to U.S. allies grow in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. In particular, as China continues to advance its capability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk with its strategic forces and to execute any nuclear strategy in the region, allies’ assurance of the U.S. commitment to extend its nuclear umbrella in the region can become more fragile. While China has hundreds of nuclear-capable missiles in the region, the United States deploys none. Both South Korean and Japanese leaders have recently discussed with President Biden the need to ensure that extended deterrence remains strong in light of these threats.108', 'While official statements remain positive, unofficial sentiment could indicate concern about U.S. extended deterrence commitments. For example, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has called for Japan to consider hosting U.S. nuclear weapons,109 and a senior Japanese ruling party lawmaker recently called for a national debate on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.110 Additionally, significant percentages of South Koreans continue to express support for an indigenous nuclear weapons capability or nuclear-sharing agreement with the United States as they face increasing nuclear threats from both China and North Korea.111', 'The 2018 NPR had proposed and allies had expressed support for two supplements to existing capabilities—a low-yield SLBM warhead and a new nuclear sea-launched cruise missile—as important initiatives to strengthen allied assurance.112 The low-yield SLBM warhead, deployed in 2020, is an important component of America’s ability to deter regional aggression against its Asian and NATO allies. However, the Biden Administration has proposed canceling the SLCM-N, a capability that could be deployed directly to regional theaters of conflict to help assure our allies.113 The Biden Administration had rejected a declaratory policy of “no first use” or “sole purpose,” which would have made allies uneasy over U.S. extended deterrence commitments, but only after significant pressure from them.114', 'The score for allied assurance remains “strong,” especially as the United States remains committed to modernizing its own nuclear deterrent and rejects calls to reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, but is at risk of weakening. The increasing regional threats combined with the Biden Administration’s consideration of a “no first use” policy and proposal to cancel SLCM-N could be creating concern about U.S. extended deterrence commitments. The United States will need to make concerted efforts to strengthen its commitments to extended deterrence to reflect the change in threat, both through its capabilities and by communicating resolve, if this score is to remain unchanged in future editions of this Index.']

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ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Neg-Wake-Doubles.docx

Kansas

ReSo

a8bf4f8ae3c223e8cb70a9dac9b4f74f93d9d18318cca6dcc6a5d5745fce0a5f

Rapid MPA expansion backfires—two reasons

De Santo ’13 [Elizabeth M. De Santo, Marine Affairs Program, Dalhousie University, “Missing Marine Protected Area (MPA) Targets: How the Push for Quantity Over Quality Undermines Sustainability and Social Justice,” JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT v. 124, 2013, p. 137]

focusing o targets risks undermining sustainable longterm conservation Firstly, focusing on targets may weaken the science-policy interface in decision-making by prioritizing “ political ” over “ ecological ” networks Secondly, by encouraging increasingly large MPAs targets may also undermine social justice resulting in stakeholder distrust , which can lead to infringements as well as future opposition to MPAs.

focusing o n global protected area targets risks undermining the achievement of sustainable longterm conservation objectives in two ways . Firstly, focusing on targets may weaken the science-policy interface in environmental decision-making by prioritizing “ political ” over “ ecological ” networks Secondly, by encouraging the designation of increasingly large MPAs percentage targets may also undermine social justice in global biodiversity conservation, resulting in stakeholder distrust , which in turn can lead to infringements in the protected area as well as future opposition to the designation of MPAs.

focusing risks undermining sustainable longterm focusing weaken interface prioritizing political ecological encouraging undermine resulting distrust infringements future opposition

['', 'The past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number and size of large marine protected areas (MPAs) designated by nation states in order to meet international protected area targets set by the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Despite this increase in coverage, it was clear that protected area targets would not be met by their 2010/2012 deadlines, and they were consequently extended to 2020 at the 2010 Conference of Parties to the CBD in Nagoya, Japan. Whilst critiques of protected area targets are not new (Soulé and Sanjayan, 1998; Agardy et al., 2003; Pressey et al., 2003; Rodrigues et al., 2004a, 2004b; Chape et al., 2005; Locke and Dearden, 2005; Wells et al., 2007; Wood et al., 2008; Wood, 2011), to date there has been less debate regarding the influence of targets in marine environmental conservation. This paper argues that focusing on global protected area targets risks undermining the achievement of sustainable longterm conservation objectives in two key ways. Firstly, focusing on percentage targets may weaken the science-policy interface in environmental decision-making by prioritizing “political” over “ecological” networks of protected areas and/or ecological information over socioeconomic data. Secondly, by encouraging the designation of increasingly large MPAs closed to any human use, percentage targets may also undermine social justice in global biodiversity conservation, resulting in stakeholder distrust, which in turn can lead to infringements in the protected area down the line as well as future opposition to the designation of MPAs.', 'Two ways in which we can see the manifestation of protected area targets playing out in the marine environment is via the push for MPA networks on the one hand, and for increasingly large MPAs on the other. These two approaches are examined in the context of, respectively, the developing regime for MPAs in Canada, and the UK’s designation of one of the world’s largest MPAs, surrounding the Chagos archipelago. It goes without saying that the designation of increasingly large protected areas in the marine environment poses significant challenges for the long-term achievement of conservation objectives due to the inherent difficulty in monitoring and enforcing such enormous areas. The paper closes with a discussion of the importance of marine spatial planning (MSP) as a way forward, as a means of achieving a better balance of science-policy integration and stakeholder engagement, as well as compliance and thus long-term achievement of conservation objectives.', '', '']

[(0, 2), (3, 11), (11, 13)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaMu-Neg-BTO-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

0257e1c55c9f7149d595192e29b19f60f19737d9802392ae7b58453aa473731c

The narrative of “no progress” is ahistorical and misses the ongoing diminution of anti-Blackness.

McCarthy 20, assistant professor in the departments of English and of African and African American Studies at Harvard University. (Jesse, 07/20/20, "On Afropessimism", Los Angeles Review of Books, ) *”s” added to “example” to correct a typo

Afropess insists we are still slaves Black Americans are at the forefront of practicing civics We have seen a massive response from sources traditionally opposed to these concerns, who recognize the profoundly dysfunctional culture of US policing undertaking these endeavors does not require a narrative of optimism If we look to history , we can see concrete evidence and examples the defeat of Reconstruction was successful. But the building of Black institutions proceeded anyway Tulsa Black citizens rebuilt it the world of unquestioned white superiority is reduced to a twinkle white supremacists still crawl out But white supremacy is permanently confined to rear-guard actions because it has already lost it is trying to reverse a clock going forward

Afropess imism insists that we are still slaves Walker insisted that slaves are and were even then colored citizens of the U S That if we are oppressed it is only because we are ignorant of our true strength , because we have been taught to disbelieve and disavow our worth Which of these two views is correct ? the historical record and the present state of our politics tells us all we need to know on that score it is Black Americans who are once again trying to save the country , to invest in finishing the work of making this place a home that we can live in . In what is a long-standing pattern , the “ coloured citizens” of this country are at the forefront of practicing civics We have seen a massive response , including from sources traditionally opposed to these concerns, who recognize the profoundly dysfunctional culture of US policing , prisons , and courts Even many of those who do not agree that these are the result of actively racist policies no longer deny that our exceptionally poor record cannot plausibly be unrelated to a long history of antiblack violence likeminded people around the world are hoping for a decisive break with the past undertaking these endeavors does not seem to require a narrative of optimism in order to take the great risks they have incurred. They have a healthy indifference to both optimism and pessimism alike Perhaps it results from the demands of carrying out politics in the real world The incredibly difficult task of organizing and strategizing to elevate and amplify the best responses and to rein in and temper the counterproductive ones that delay and diminish a good cause One doesn’t need to hang on desperately to a mirage of hope . If we look to history , we can see more than enough concrete evidence and [ examples ] to support the conclusion that a racially defined caste system is unlikely to ever again prevail that doesn’t mean history is a smoothly upward-trending curve We have known terrible setbacks Yes, the violent defeat of Reconstruction was successful. But the building of Black institutions and the Niagara Movement proceeded anyway . Tulsa was burned to the ground. But its Black citizens turned right around and rebuilt it out of the ashes The Civil Rights movement was checked by reaction but the world of unquestioned white superiority and authority that George Wallace hoped to preserve is reduced now to a twinkle in David Duke’s blue eye Yes white supremacists still crawl out from under mossy stones at opportune moments to wail about their Nordic fantasies they are capable of carrying out horrific acts of terror But white supremacy is permanently confined to such rear-guard actions because it has already lost it is trying to reverse a clock going forward which explains the virulence and incoherence of its outbursts of spastic violence. The pandemic and the multiple underlying crises and fractures it has revealed make vivid that one need not wait so very long for “the end of the world.” it turns out there’s a morning after the end of the world. And one after that too What would Frantz Fanon , or David Walker, or Ella Baker tell us if they saw the streets today? Surely, not that we are at an impasse against an implacable enemy They would insist that we lift each other and rise together with the spirit of history at our backs. We have done it before . Every time we do it’s a new day.

insists that we are still slaves citizens ignorant of our true strength disbelieve disavow our worth historical record present state of our politics all we need to know once again trying to save the country home that we can live in long-standing pattern forefront of practicing civics massive response traditionally opposed profoundly dysfunctional culture policing prisons courts do not agree actively racist policies no longer deny cannot plausibly be unrelated long history of antiblack violence decisive break with the past undertaking these endeavors narrative of optimism great risks healthy indifference both optimism pessimism alike demands of carrying out politics incredibly difficult task elevate amplify delay diminish a good cause doesn’t need to hang on desperately mirage of hope look to history more than enough concrete evidence examples racially defined caste system unlikely to ever again prevail smoothly upward-trending curve terrible setbacks defeat of Reconstruction building of Black institutions Niagara Movement Tulsa But turned right around rebuilt it out of the ashes Civil Rights reaction unquestioned white superiority authority George Wallace reduced twinkle crawl out wail about their Nordic fantasies But permanently confined to such rear-guard actions because it has already lost reverse a clock going forward virulence incoherence outbursts of spastic violence. pandemic multiple underlying crises fractures need not wait so very long morning after after that Fanon not implacable enemy lift each other rise together done it before new day.

['Wilderson’s Afropessimism insists that we are still slaves. Walker insisted in 1829 that the slaves are (and were even then) “colored citizens” of the United States and of the world. That if we are oppressed it is only because we are ignorant of our true strength, because we have been taught to disbelieve and disavow our worth to the world, to the nation, and to each other. Which of these two views is the correct one? I think the historical record and the present state of our politics tells us all we need to know on that score. For it is no coincidence that today it is Black Americans who are once again trying to save the country, to invest in finishing the work of making this place a home that we can live in. In what is a long-standing pattern, the “coloured citizens” of this country are at the forefront of practicing civics. Indeed, what could be more republican than risking one’s health to restore the health of the body politic? To ensure that one of the most basic promises of the state is properly fulfilled: that it apply its law enforcement equally, humanely, and in a manner accountable to the people it serves.', 'As in past struggles, our principled defense of an ethical civil code has attracted others with its moral force. We have seen a massive response, including from sources traditionally opposed to these concerns, who recognize the profoundly dysfunctional culture of US policing, prisons, and courts. Even many of those who do not agree that these are the result of actively racist policies and attitudes no longer deny that our exceptionally poor record cannot plausibly be unrelated to a long history of antiblack violence and antagonism. For this same reason, likeminded people around the world are hoping for a decisive break with the past‚ taking to the streets across the globe to demand that state actors acknowledge that there really is a history of injury that needs to stop being denied, and that we can and should work together to design a new social contract that will restore the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement and criminal justice in the eyes of all citizens and not just some.', 'The generation undertaking these endeavors does not seem to require a narrative of optimism in order to take the great risks they have incurred. They have a healthy indifference to both optimism and pessimism alike. Perhaps it results from the demands of carrying out politics in the real world. The incredibly difficult task of organizing and strategizing in order to elevate and amplify the best responses and to rein in and temper the counterproductive ones that delay and diminish a good cause. That’s hard to do in the best of cases: in a turbulent, paranoid, and instantly videotaped public sphere, it’s a Sisyphean task that bad-faith commentators take advantage of.', 'None of this diminishes the fundamental need for greater self-capacity of the kind Walker called for 200 years ago. Much of the work ahead will necessarily involve a growing capacity for self-reflection, self-criticism, irony, and joy in our politics. It will require acknowledging that struggles against white oppression will never be successful without deepened self-healing in our communities: repairing the relations in families, between men and women; ending the violence directed at trans, queer, and otherwise non-conforming people in our neighborhoods; ending the heinous blood feuds between rival gangs and sets; restoring education and communal trust as our highest priorities and most cherished aspirations. These will always remain preconditional to the realization of freedom and autonomy. It is pursuing these aims as an ongoing collective activity that will make unavoidable the realization as Walker said, that this country is “more ours” than anyone else’s — that we are a historic people with a world-historical destiny that understands our suffering as endowing us with both the right and the responsibility of civilizing the United States in such a way that it reflects the values that our historical experiences bring to it, the freedoms, equalities, and cultural pluralisms that we have made vital and central to its identity.', 'One doesn’t need to hang on desperately to a mirage of hope. If we look to history, we can see more than enough concrete evidence and [examples] example to support the conclusion that a racially defined caste system is unlikely to ever again prevail. Of course, that doesn’t mean history is a smoothly upward-trending curve. We have known terrible setbacks. Yes, the violent defeat of Reconstruction was successful. But the building of Black institutions and the Niagara Movement proceeded anyway. Tulsa was burned to the ground. But its Black citizens turned right around and rebuilt it out of the ashes. The Civil Rights movement was checked by the forces of reaction and the assassin’s bullet; but the world of unquestioned white superiority and authority that George Wallace hoped to preserve is reduced now to a twinkle in David Duke’s blue eye. Yes, creepy white supremacists still crawl out from under mossy stones at opportune moments to wail about their Nordic fantasies in their over-sized khaki pants. Yes, like the militants of the Islamic State, they are capable of carrying out horrific acts of terror and violence. But like that barbaric and fanatical sect, white supremacy is permanently confined to such rear-guard actions because it has already lost — it is trying to reverse a clock going forward — which explains the virulence and incoherence of its outbursts of spastic violence.', 'We are not at the end, but near the beginning of something new. The pandemic and the multiple underlying crises and fractures it has revealed make vivid that one need not wait so very long for “the end of the world.” The problem, as generations of millenarians have discovered, is that it turns out there’s a morning after the end of the world. And one after that too. The hardest truth is that all the uncertainties that govern the question of what can be done, what will be done, and the difference between the two, remain in our hands. What would Frantz Fanon, or David Walker, or Ella Baker tell us if they saw the streets today? Surely, not that we are at an impasse against an implacable enemy. They would insist that we lift each other and rise together with the spirit of history at our backs. We have done it before. Every time we do it’s a new day.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-3.docx

Kansas

PaSe

af27bbd2696d846546dbd06fa12fdae4ee155326a15a19ebbbbf17a283e3ddb2

States cannot apply global antitrust remedies – they’re key to preventing the dependency trap cause by dominant platform’s conduct in developing countries

Funta ’18 [Rastislav; PhD, LLM, Associate Professor of European Union Law in Janko Jesenský Faculty of Law @ Danubius University; “Extraterritorial application of us-antitrust law on global cartels from comparative (EU LAW) perspective,” The Lawyer Quarterly 8(3); AS]

question referred to the Supreme Court focused on applicability of Sherman to foreign conduct Although many states enacted similar laws, they were limited to domestic trade Sherman’s law was based on Congress’s constitutional power to regulate interstate trade

The question referred to the Supreme Court has tended to be as whether the plaintiffs can assert claims under the Sherman Act to compensate for damages arising solely from transactions that took place outside the US market. The question focused on the applicability of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct The Sherman Act is to be considered if such activities have an effect on the US market The Sherman Act was the first measure adopted by the US Congress to ban trusts Although many US states have enacted similar laws, they were limited to domestic trade On the other hand, Sherman’s law was based on Congress’s constitutional power to regulate interstate trade

Supreme Court foreign conduct Sherman Act US states limited to domestic trade constitutional power regulate interstate trade

['The first question seemed to be largely clarified. The text of the law is based on the socalled “effects test”, which is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) and subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993). The differences between the various Circuit Courts are focused on the second question: Is it the applicant’s claim in the concrete procedure which is the result of the domestic impact,17 or satisfies such a claim a potential18 or potential19 plaintiffs? The question referred to the Supreme Court has tended to be as whether the plaintiffs can assert claims under the Sherman Act to compensate for damages arising solely from transactions that took place outside the US market. The question focused on the applicability of the Sherman Act to foreign conduct. The Sherman Act is to be considered if such activities have an effect on the US market (effects test). Unlike European law, the US Sherman Act focuses more on foreclosure practices and attempts to market monopolization20 Described according to Senator John Sherman, Chairman of the US Senate Financial Committee, Sherman’s antitrust law of 1890, has to protect against commercial practices designed to restrict or eliminate competition in the market. Sherman’s law is divided into two sections.21 According to them, it is forbidden to monopolize trade, all mergers and collusion, which would restrict competition within trade. The Sherman Act was the first measure adopted by the US Congress to ban trusts (or monopolies of any kind). Although many US states have previously enacted similar laws, they were limited to domestic trade. On the other hand, Sherman’s law was based on Congress’s constitutional power to regulate interstate trade.', '']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-1%20-%20Northwestern-Round4.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-1%2520-%2520Northwestern-Round4.docx

7cdda400c3120cedc3edfa4e4078f422a6c414e3c173c8139a7043d320b896ea

Antitrust is invisible.

Baum ’21 [Lawrence and Neal Devins; July; Political Science Professor at Ohio State University; Law Professor at William & Mary; the Company They Keep: How Partisan Divisions Came to the Supreme Court, “The Supreme Court and Elites,” Ch. 2, p. 29–30]

the majority of decisions are unknown to the public decisions get little coverage public receives little info the Court’s invisible Decisions in antitrust can have powerful effects but there is little reason to think there is awareness among the public . Even the visible trial received attention from a small proportion Even when aware they do not have views ambivalent , or issues not salient

It is clear the great majority of Supreme Court decisions are unknown to the public These decisions get little coverage in the news and the public receives little info rmation about them through other channels a great deal of the Court’s work is invisible to the public . This is especially true of the mass public Decisions in antitrust law can have powerful effects on the economic system, but there is little reason to think that there is much awareness of those decisions among the general public . Even the unusually visible and salient Microsoft antitrust trial received attention from only a small proportion of the public Even when people are aware of decisions, they do not necessarily have strong views about the desirability of those decisions . They may be ambivalent , or the issues in question may not be salient to them

clear great majority unknown little coverage in the news little info rmation a great deal invisible to the public especially true mass public antitrust law powerful effects little reason much awareness general public unusually visible and salient Microsoft antitrust trial only a small proportion of the public Even when aware not necessarily strong views desirability of those decisions ambivalent salient to them

['For assessment of the linkage between public opinion and the Court’s decisions, awareness of decisions is more important than basic knowledge about the Justices’ names or the Court’s institutional attributes. It is clear that the great majority of Supreme Court decisions are essentially unknown to the general public.72 These decisions get little coverage in the news media,73 and the public receives little information about them through other channels. As a result, a great deal of the Court’s work is essentially invisible to the public. This is especially true of the mass public; polling data suggest that elites are far more aware of the Court and its handiwork.74', '(p.30) This point should be underlined. Decisions in fields such as antitrust and patent law can have powerful effects on the economic system, but there is little reason to think that there is much awareness of those decisions among the general public. Even the unusually visible and salient Microsoft antitrust trial in 1998 and 1999 received attention from only a small proportion of the public.75', 'Another example, more directly relevant and more striking, concerns the Rehnquist Court’s revival of state powers under the Constitution. Between 1992 and 2006, the Court invalidated eleven federal statutes on federalism grounds.76 In doing so, it shifted the balance between the federal government and the states substantially. These decisions were the subject of considerable commentary in law reviews, and they received attention in the elite news media.77 Still, those decisions appeared to have low political salience. Of 229 Gallup Poll questions that explicitly referred to the Supreme Court during the period in which the decisions were handed down, there was not a single question about these decisions—or, for that matter, about any other decisions in which the Court invalidated federal statutes.78 The choice not to ask such questions reflected the reality that few voters knew much about these decisions.', 'Even when people are aware of decisions, they do not necessarily have strong views about the desirability of those decisions. They may be ambivalent, or the issues in question may not be salient to them. When either condition exists, Justices would not seem to have reason to fear adverse public reactions to their rulings.79']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-FullerTown-Round1.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-FullerTown-Round1.docx

d63235157b914582b9990dd585b6ddfaf73f1020dd3b791a700242d16d5574e3

Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

Waller & Morse 20, *John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law; Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law **J.D. Expected 2021, Loyola University Chicago School of Law (*Spencer Weber Waller **Jacob Morse, 7-26-2020, "The Political Face of Antitrust," Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial, and Commercial Law, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660946)

Competition issues are part of civic discourse separate from legislative proposals This is a sign antitrust has begun to be an important source of politics that engages the public One example is the number of books for lay audience plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy and new works which explore antitrust Long form and journalism have taken up antitrust diverse magazines business publications Web pages and social media proliferated all ideological perspectives Lobbying and policy groups are growing antitrust cases feature amicus briefs from legal and economic experts in the Supreme Court Antitrust provides legal commands dealing with how governments and individuals can challenge market behavior Antitrust has become a meaningful part of policy debate for civil society . What has changed is the degree antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once the domain of technocrats , antitrust issues have been debated by candidates legislators, pundits, journalists and voters alike. There are proposals would make significant changes Even if none of the proposals come to fruition antitrust debate is a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with economic concentration, globalization social and racial justice, and response to COVID as part of the progressive agenda

Competition issues are part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals This is a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with antitrust Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,” Stoller’s “Goliath,” Stucke and Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,” Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up and Dayan’s “Monopolized.” On the academic side , there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society Long form and more mass-market journalism have taken up the mantle of exploring antitrust and competition policy diverse magazines as The Atlantic Time New Republic American Prospect Rolling Stone New York Times Variety National Review Foreign Policy and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories involved in antitrust there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019 A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed in business -oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post local newspapers; as well as radio and television Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus the Open Markets Institute American Antitrust Institute Anti-Monopoly Fund Institute for Self-Reliance Public Citizen Public Knowledge Demos and the International Center for Law and Economics antitrust is flourishing Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for segments of civil society . What has changed , however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats , antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates , political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists , lobby groups, and voters alike. There are serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes This is all to the good . Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition , the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization , income inequality, social and racial justice, and proper response to the COVID -19 emergency proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda .

general civic discourse important source of small “p” politics increased number of non-technical books lay audience On the academic side plethora of government NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition broader ramifications of antitrust competition in society exploring antitrust similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives growing wide variety of perspectives broad legal commands challenge different types of market behavior policy debate segments of civil society What has changed Once mostly the domain of technocrats significant changes This is all to the good Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition antitrust debate broader engagement political economy issues part of the progressive agenda

['IV. Antitrust in Civil Society', 'Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139', 'Conclusion', 'Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda. ']

[(0, 6), (15, 17)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-Northwestern-Round4.docx

Kansas

PaSe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PaSe/Kansas-Park-Semrick-Aff-Northwestern-Round4.docx

838d09f31913e8b34c53578e652c1dd63b592a464736cea2638462aace226a6c

That wrecks American foreign policy credibility and invites info war.

Walt 19 - (Stephen M. Walt, A Columnist at Foreign Policy and The Robert And Renée Belfer Professor Of International Relations @ Harvard University; 3-11-2019, Foreign Policy, "America's Polarization Is a Foreign Policy Problem, Too," 7-20-2021) url: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/americas-polarization-is-a-foreign-policy-problem-too/

polarization prevents effective action opioid epidemic or other problems could erode fo po polarization leaves the country vulnerable to outside interference Russia exploit internal divisions become self-reinforcing also threatens ability to reach agreements presidents rely on executive agreements other states will be wary of agreements because they have no way to be sure an agreement will survive Another cost is erosion of America’s image for competence makes it harder to learn from the past we won’t agree on basic facts

How might excessive polarization undermine foreign policy? a degree of disagreement is both unavoidable and often desirable , how might such divisions get out of hand and begin to damage America’s ability to interact with the outside world sensibly and successfully ? one negative impact of excessive polarization is a decreased ability to do the things that can keep the country on top for a long time . If polarization prevents the federal government from taking effective action on climate change , decaying infrastructure , the opioid epidemic , primary education , financial regulation , the deficit , or any number of other problems , America’s long-term position of pow er could erode and leave the country less able to handle futur e fo reign- po licy challenges polarization leaves the country more vulnerable to outside interference , as Russia’s efforts to interfere illustrate at a minimum, Russia sought to exploit and exacerbate internal divisions that already existed . this sort of thing can rapidly become self-reinforcing , as opposing sides leap to accuse each other not just of bad judgment but of being actively disloyal. Schultz also points out that polarization threatens a nation’s ability to reach agreements with other countries. presidents have come to rely more and more on executive agreements rather than formal , ratified treaties : It has become increasingly difficult to get the latter through a divided Congress . Of equal concern is the possibility that other states will be wary of making mutually beneficial agreements with the United States, simply because they have no way to be sure whether an agreement reached this year will survive the next election . Once fo reign po licy begins to oscillate between two increasingly divided factions , each of the groups has an incentive to pursue its most ambitious , controversial , or extreme projects whenever it happens to be in power. Not only does the pendulum oscillate with greater frequency , the swings themselves become more extreme Another cost of polarization is the erosion of America’s broader image for competence and good sense. The more bitter , divided , gridlocked , venal , and downright stupid American politics become, the less appealing the American system of government is to outside observers the country’s moral voice gets reduced to a whisper. What sensible foreign country would listen to an American telling it how to organize a government , write a constitution , root out political corruption , or hold officials accountable , when the U.S. system itself seems increasingly broken Polarization also threatens to defeat the growing effort by Congress to wrest back some of the powers over fo reign po licy U.S. foreign policy would be better served if Congress performed effective oversight over many aspects of the country’s fo reign po licy. But a Congress divided into warring factions, that uses its powers not to debate but rather to distract is hardly an institution that is likely to have a positive impact on U.S. fo reign po licy. deep polarization also makes it harder for the country to learn the right lessons from the past . when politics becomes tribal each will simply believe its own self-serving narrative and will draw very different lessons from the past. One sees this already in the case of the Iraq War But where Democrats blame the administration of f Bush for leading the country to war Republicans now insist the United States was on the path to victory after the 2007 “surge” Once politics becomes sufficiently polarized, we won’t agree on lessons or even on basic facts

degree of disagreement unavoidable often desirable out of hand ability to interact sensibly successfully excessive polarization keep the country on top long time climate change decaying infrastructure opioid epidemic primary education financial regulation the deficit any number of other problems position of pow er could erode fo po outside interference Russia internal divisions already existed self-reinforcing reach agreements executive agreements formal ratified treaties divided Congress wary no way to be sure will survive the next election fo po oscillate increasingly divided factions incentive most ambitious controversial extreme projects greater frequency bitter divided gridlocked venal less appealing American system organize a government write a constitution root out political corruption hold officials accountable increasingly broken growing effort powers over fo po effective oversight fo po fo po right lessons past we won’t agree on lessons basic facts

['', 'How might excessive polarization—where members of a society increasingly cluster into separate “tribes” sharing political beliefs with each other, but not with members of the opposing group—undermine foreign policy? Granting that a degree of disagreement is both unavoidable and often desirable, how might such divisions get out of hand and begin to damage America’s ability to interact with the outside world sensibly and successfully?', 'We should begin by recognizing that today’s level of polarization may be partly a reflection of America’s privileged international position. Once the Soviet Union collapsed and left the United States at the pinnacle of power, the need for national unity declined and ambitious politicians had less need to show restraint in attacking their political rivals. As Michael Desch argued in a seminal article, states facing serious national-security challenges tend to be stronger and more unified, whereas those in a benign international environment are prone to grow more fractious. America’s trajectory since 1992 fits Desch’s argument quite well, notwithstanding the brief surge of patriotic feeling that followed the 9/11 terrorist attacks. To put it bluntly: Because the United States was now so safe and secure, politicians felt they could sow division at home without worrying too much about weakening the country abroad.', 'Unfortunately, one negative impact of excessive polarization is a decreased ability to do the things that can keep the country on top for a long time. If polarization prevents the federal government from taking effective action on climate change, decaying infrastructure, the opioid epidemic, primary education, financial regulation, the deficit, or any number of other problems, America’s long-term position of power could erode and leave the country less able to handle future foreign-policy challenges.', 'Morever, as Schultz notes, polarization leaves the country more vulnerable to outside interference, as Russia’s efforts to interfere in the 2016 election illustrate. We still don’t know exactly what Moscow did and what effects it ultimately had, but it is clear that at a minimum, Russia sought to exploit and exacerbate internal divisions that already existed. And this sort of thing can rapidly become self-reinforcing, as opposing sides leap to accuse each other not just of bad judgment but of being actively disloyal. This sort of thing is not unprecedented in U.S. political history: In the early days of the republic, Hamiltonians accused Thomas Jefferson of being overly sympathetic to revolutionary France, while Jeffersonians believed Hamilton to be a closet monarchist with a poorly disguised sympathy for Great Britain. It did not take much for either group to see the other as more than misguided.', 'Schultz also points out that polarization threatens a nation’s ability to reach agreements with other countries. It is no accident that presidents have come to rely more and more on executive agreements rather than formal, ratified treaties: It has become increasingly difficult to get the latter through a divided Congress. Of equal concern is the possibility that other states will be wary of making mutually beneficial agreements with the United States, simply because they have no way to be sure whether an agreement reached this year will survive the next election. People who think U.S. interests are best served by avoiding international agreements and maximizing the country’s freedom of action (e.g., John Bolton) might welcome such a situation, but this view is dangerously shortsighted. The United States has benefited greatly from a host of past agreements of various types, and it makes no sense to encourage other states to have less and less confidence in the value of U.S. pledges. Nobody expects the United States to act contrary to its interests, but how can it expect other countries to do something it wants in exchange for something they want, if they have no way of knowing whether it will deliver?', 'Indeed, the problem of inconstancy may be even worse than Schultz suggests. Once foreign policy begins to oscillate between two increasingly divided factions, each of the groups has an incentive to pursue its most ambitious, controversial, or extreme projects whenever it happens to be in a position of power. Not only does the pendulum oscillate with greater frequency, the swings themselves become more extreme.', 'Another cost of polarization is the erosion of America’s broader image for competence and good sense. The more bitter, divided, gridlocked, venal, and downright stupid American politics become, the less appealing the American system of government is to outside observers. When that happens, the country’s moral voice—already compromised by foreign-policy excesses—gets reduced to a whisper. I mean, seriously: What sensible foreign country would listen to an American telling it how to organize a government, write a constitution, root out political corruption, or hold officials accountable, when the U.S. system itself seems increasingly broken and the political ecosystem is populated by unprincipled popinjays, corrupt con men, habitual liars, and senior officials whose chief skill is failing upward? When a nation’s politics are sufficiently polarized, the worst people can still find safe sinecures within their tribe. Yeats got it exactly right: “The best lack all conviction, / While the worst are full of passionate intensity.”', 'Polarization also threatens to defeat the growing effort by Congress to wrest back some of the powers over foreign policy enshrined in the Constitution (such as the capacity to declare war), powers that presidents have gradually usurped over many decades. On balance, U.S. foreign policy would be better served if Congress provided a forum for genuine debate—in part to better inform the public—and if it performed effective oversight over many aspects of the country’s foreign policy. But a Congress divided into warring factions, that uses its powers not to debate, oversee, and refine U.S. policy, but rather to grandstand, distract, and advance a purely partisan agenda, is hardly an institution that is likely to have a positive impact on U.S. foreign policy.', 'Lastly, as I noted in my recent book, deep polarization also makes it harder for the country to learn the right lessons from the past. Learning from past mistakes is essential but also difficult, because any historical episode yields many lessons and reasonable people can disagree about which lessons to draw. But when politics becomes tribal and there is little overlap between rival camps, each will simply believe its own self-serving narrative and will draw very different lessons from the past. One sees this already in the case of the Iraq War, which about as clear an example of a foreign-policy debacle as one could name. But where Democrats blame the administration of former President George W. Bush for leading the country to war under false pretenses and then bungling the occupation, Republicans now insist the United States was on the path to victory after the 2007 “surge” and blame former President Barack Obama for pulling the country out too early. Once politics becomes sufficiently polarized, we won’t agree on lessons or even on basic facts.', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-10-NDT-Round1.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-10-NDT-Round1.docx

40461b5a4253928d4037e196eef6c7e3c1a0e053045c9f730e8000c2a0e1385f

Growth is slow AND numerous triggers risk deceleration.

Ziady ’10-12 [Hanna; October 12; M.A. from the University of Cape Town; CNN, “IMF slashes US growth forecast and warns of rising risks to the global economy,” ]

recovery from corona is weak and risks are rising The IMF slashed its forecast for U S by one full point the biggest by any economy Sachs its forecasts for this year and next , citing weak spending and winding down Covid relief risks increased spread of Delta threat of variants subdued employment inflation , food insecurity setback to capital and climate change

The global economic recovery from corona virus is weak ening and risks are rising The IMF slashed its 2021 growth forecast for the U nited S tates by one full point to 6%, the biggest reduction suffered by any G7 economy The cut reflects disruptions to supply chains and softening consumption in the third quarter The revision comes after Sachs its growth forecasts for the US economy this year and next , citing weak er consumer spending and the winding down Covid -19 relief Despite the modest revision economic risks have increased " Rapid spread of Delta and the threat of new variants increased uncertainty about how quickly the pandemic can be overcome," "Policy choices have become more difficult , confronting subdued employment growth, rising inflation , food insecurity , the setback to capital accumulation, and climate change

economic recovery weak ening risks are rising slashed growth forecast U S one full point biggest reduction any disruptions supply chains consumption forecasts US economy next spending winding down economic risks Rapid spread Delta new variants uncertainty more difficult employment rising inflation insecurity capital climate change

['The\xa0global economic recovery\xa0from the coronavirus pandemic is weakening and risks are rising, according to the International Monetary Fund.', 'The IMF on Tuesday slashed its 2021 growth forecast for the\xa0United States\xa0by one full percentage point to 6%, the biggest reduction suffered by any G7 economy in its latest World Economic Outlook.', 'The cut reflects disruptions to supply chains and softening consumption in the third quarter, the IMF said.', "The revision comes days after Goldman Sachs\xa0\xa0its growth forecasts for the US economy this year and next, citing weaker consumer spending and the winding down of the government's Covid-19 relief programs.", 'The IMF now expects the global economy to grow 5.9% in 2021, 0.1 percentage points lower than\xa0the July forecast. The outlook for 2022 remained unchanged.\xa0Despite the modest revision, the organization said that economic risks have increased.', '"Rapid spread of Delta and the threat of new variants have increased uncertainty about how quickly the pandemic can be overcome," it said. "Policy choices have become more difficult, confronting multidimensional challenges — subdued employment growth, rising inflation, food insecurity, the setback to human capital accumulation, and climate change — with limited room to maneuver."']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Shirley-Round4.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-Shirley-Round4.docx

d9df908a771da5c7d1bf7713cacc72f7d650ebc2e5642259bdd177612747de5c

Compensation causes forward deployment of nuclear weapons.

Frühling & O’Neil 17, *is a professor in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and Associate Dean (Partnerships and Engagement) in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University **is a professor of political science and Acting Dean of the Graduate Research School at Griffith University. (*Stephan **Andrew, 12-8-2016, “Nuclear weapons, the United States and alliances in Europe and Asia: Toward an institutional perspective,” Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 38, Issue 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2016.1257214)

extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to allies through forward deployment of nuclear systems remains the crown jewels of allies confidence Coop on nuclear weapons provides a means to maintain alliance cohesion when cohesion has come under threat the need arose because of concerns about U.S. policies Efforts by allies to bargain with DC on the extent of its guarantees will become more intense , as anxiety about abandonment grows allies negotiate ensuring the U S remains committed

extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to allies through forward deployment of nuclear systems remains an important element underpinning robustness of today warheads remain the crown jewels of allies confidence Coop eration on nuclear weapons in U.S. alliances provides a n institutional means to maintain alliance cohesion at times when that cohesion has come under threat from perceptions of differing strategic priorities among allies In these cases, the need for a new bargain arose because of allies’ concerns about U.S. policies institutional cooperation on nuclear weapons creates the impression of a “nuclear umbrella” is inseparable from alliances credibility Efforts by materially weaker allies to bargain with DC on the extent of its security guarantees will become more intense , and more explicit , as anxiety about abandonment grows allies negotiate the management of alliance ensuring that the U S remains committed strategically to the relevant theater in which the non-nuclear allies are located

extension nuclear umbrella through forward deployment of nuclear systems remains important element crown jewels of confidence Coop eration on nuclear weapons maintain alliance cohesion come under threat because of allies’ concerns about U.S. policies cooperation on nuclear weapons inseparable from alliances credibility weaker allies bargain more intense more explicit anxiety negotiate U S remains committed strategically

['Visible extension of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to allies through forward basing, deployment of nuclear capable delivery systems, official declarations, consultative fora or joint policy and planning thus remains an important element underpinning the robustness of U.S. alliances today. Nuclear warheads remain the crown jewels of military capability, and taking nonnuclear allies into confidence on nuclear matters is itself a political sign of the depth of U.S. commitment to these countries. But whereas it is a core purpose of U.S. alliances to extend deterrence—and deterrence is almost the sole-purpose of nuclear weapons—this article has shown that the concept of extended deterrence has limited utility in explaining the interests the United States and its allies pursue through institutional cooperation on nuclear weapons, and the forms this cooperation takes. ', 'Cooperation on nuclear weapons in U.S. alliances is important because it provides an institutional means to create and maintain alliance cohesion at times when that cohesion has come under threat from perceptions of differing strategic priorities among allies. All the iconic steps by which NATO developed into a genuinely “nuclear alliance”—including the reliance on nuclear weapons after the failure of the 1952 Lisbon Summit goals, the development of nuclear sharing in the late 1950s, the creation of the NPG in the 1960s and the dual-track decision of 1979—were ultimately taken to promote broader alliance bargains about relative costs and benefits embedded in NATO strategy and posture. In most of these cases, the need for a new bargain arose because of allies’ concerns about U.S. policies, rather than a changed threat from the adversary. Similarly, the more recent creation of the U.S.–Japan and U.S.–Republic of Korea extended deterrence dialogue forums essentially resulted from concerns that Washington, DC may be backtracking from its alliance commitments in East Asia, in addition to more immediate concerns about extended conventional deterrence credibility in relation to China and North Korea. ', 'In the end, the institutional cooperation on nuclear weapons that creates the impression of a “nuclear umbrella” is inseparable from the institutional basis that gives U.S. alliances credibility as a whole. Efforts by materially weaker allies to bargain with Washington, DC on the detail and extent of its security guarantees will become more intense, and more explicit, as perceived security threats increase, and as anxiety about abandonment and/or entrapment grows. Fears that the United States will become “decoupled” from its regional allies do not have to originate from, or be confined to, developments in the nuclear sphere. That said, as is evident in the case of Japan, any indication the United States may be diluting the strength of its nuclear commitment risks triggering concern about the broader credibility of alliance security assurances. The main benefit of nuclear consultation measures is therefore not to signal extended deterrence. Instead, they provide the means for allies to negotiate the management of alliance costs that relate to possible conflict, while ensuring that the United States remains committed strategically to the relevant theater in which the non-nuclear allies are located.']

[(0, 8), (9, 20)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-3---Havard-Round-3.docx

Kansas

MaPa

248789dfe7a90a1b2b965c761b662a8fe6a7667477d8a73d6c4f966f87857081

CMR is an outdated concept and their impacts are misattributed.

Rosa Brooks 21, Scott K. Ginsberg Professor of Law and Policy at Georgetown University, “Are US Civil-Military Relations in Crisis?”, The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3035&context=parameters

claims of crisis in c m r mischaracterize the issues things have less to do with c m r in terror disease, climate cyber Russia and Chinese influence, it is impossible to draw distinctions between military and civilian These categories no longer serve useful must develop new thinking Founders cared about c m r organized militaries were the sole ability to coerce, and control nonstate actors can cause death on a mass scale cyber and viruses to disinformation billionaires corporations and terrorist s compete with state militaries lines between military and civilian have grown indistinct . civilian control of the military is no longer effective its invocation is soothing without value we persuade ourselves we have accomplished something as we obscure new forms of coercion Financial cyber disinformation a i and emerging tech diminish the ability of state militaries to monopolize violence the problem is not civil-military threats stem less from an out-of-control military than gerrymandering , info war inequality fake news within the electorate and international system To focus on U S civil-military crisis, risks ignoring present perils

recent claims of crisis in c ivil- m ilitary r elations prove overstated or to mischaracterize the issues When it comes to civil-military relations things are not as bad as they seem. Or things that are bad have less to do with c ivil- m ilitary r elations than other challenges from civic disengagement to abuses of executive power preoccupation with civil-military crises may reflect increasing uncertainty and growing inability to define the distinction between political and military in today’s complex, hybrid challenges such as terror ism disease, climate cyber Russia n info war and Chinese global influence, it is impossible to draw neat distinctions between the role of the military and diplomacy with the lines between military and civilian growing ever blurrier, it is less clear what we mean about crises in civil-military affairs the categories we rely upon to structure our world military, civilian are categories we have created. These categories are neither sacred nor stable if they no longer serve a useful analytic purpose—if they are beginning to obscure more than they clarify we must develop new ways of thinking about power, force, control, and institutions This is an urgent challenge continued fondness for civil-military jeremiads risks diverting attention away from insidious threats to American democracy other forms of state capture and democratic dysfunction than civil-military relations The Founders cared about c ivil- m ilitary r elations for pragmatic reasons In 1789 organized militaries were the sole actors with the ability to cause mass destruction of life and property to capture, coerce, and control other political actors The framers’ normative goal was to prevent concentrations of power that could displace the will of the people, and civilian control of the military was valued only because it was one of several mechanisms to ensure that the will of the people would prevail Today formalistic commitment to civilian control of the military no longer achieves what it promised more than two centuries ago the US military today is nothing like the redcoats and ragtag militias the ability to destroy and control is no longer in the exclusive possession of military forces nonstate actors can cause death and destruction on a mass scale nonkinetic coercion from cyber attacks and bioengineered viruses to disinformation has become more diffuse and more concentrated. Individual billionaires corporations , hackers, and nonstate terrorist group s can compete with state militaries to control behavior the lines between military and civilian have grown increasingly indistinct . In today’s gray-zone conflicts military personnel train judges, eavesdrop on electronic communications, vaccinate cows, and develop microfinance and civilian employees conduct raids, plan drone strikes, and o c o s Both military and civilian actors influence operations we need to ask ourselves what is the concept of civilian control of the military doing today? What specific negative consequences would happen if retired generals make up half the cabinet when we worry about military involvement in domestic politics we would do well to define the harms with greater specificity The notion of civilian control of the military has come unmoored from its original purpose and is no longer an effective means to achieve the normative ends we value it is becoming a rule of aesthetics , not ethics its invocation is a soothing ritual without accomplishing anything of value in today’s world a formalistic conception of civilian control of the military at the expense of substantive ends, we may persuade ourselves that if we can just keep the generals inside the Pentagon and away from the White House, we will have accomplished something meaningful—even as we obscure new forms of power and coercion that increasingly destabilize our world Unlike in 1789 nonstate actors have found power and control even without large-scale death Financial manipulation , cyber attacks , social media-enabled disinformation shift balances of power a rtificial i ntelligence and emerging tech will make the use of physical force one technique among many technological changes have diminish ed the ability of state s militaries to monopolize violence and created nonkinetic means of coercion military power no longer represents the unique potential threat to American democracy today the problem is not fundamentally a civil-military one , if it ever was threats to American democracy stem less from an out-of-control military than from electoral gerrymandering , info rmation war fare , and influence campaigns, complicated by big data rising economic inequality , and partisan divisions In an era in hackers, the superrich, and fake news can manipulate the American electoral process by sowing division, mistrust, and violence within the electorate and international system , society must find effective ways to prevent the powerful from distorting democratic processes. To focus primarily on the notion the U S is experiencing a civil-military crisis, however, risks forgetting our history and ignoring our present perils

c m r less to do with c ivil- m ilitary r elations preoccupation with civil-military crises impossible to draw neat distinctions categories are neither sacred nor stable we must develop new ways of thinking urgent challenge fondness for civil-military jeremiads diverting attention organized militaries were the sole actors no longer achieves lines between military and civilian have grown increasingly indistinct o c o what is the concept of civilian control of the military doing today? define the harms with greater specificity come unmoored from its original purpose rule of aesthetics soothing ritual without anything of value new forms of power and coercion Financial manipulation cyber attacks disinformation military power no longer represents the unique potential threat not fundamentally a civil-military one less from an out-of-control military gerrymandering info rmation war fare focus primarily on the U S civil-military crisis, however, risks forgetting our history and ignoring our present

['Obscured by Overstatement', 'Thus far I have argued that many recent claims of a crisis in civil-military relations prove, when closely examined, to be somewhat overstated or to mischaracterize the issues. While there are genuine reasons for consternation with regard to some matters, the evidence of crisis is either lacking or ambiguous in others. When it comes to civil-military relations, perhaps things are not as bad as they seem. Or at any rate, often the things that are bad have less to do with civil-military relations than with other challenges—from widespread civic disengagement to abuses of executive power.', 'More than anything, our ongoing preoccupation with civil-military crises may reflect our increasing uncertainty about the overall purpose of the military and our growing inability to define the role of the armed forces—or the distinction between the political and military realms—in any coherent way. Considering today’s complex, hybrid challenges such as terrorism, epidemic disease, climate change, cyber threats, Russian information warfare, and expanding Chinese global influence, it is impossible to draw neat distinctions between the role of the military and the role of diplomacy, development, and trade policy—or for that matter, between foreign and domestic issues and threats.29 But with the lines between war and not war, foreign and domestic, and military and civilian growing ever blurrier, it is less clear what we mean when we talk about crises in civil-military affairs.', 'Of course, the categories we rely upon to structure and give meaning to our world—war, peace, foreign, domestic, military, civilian, and so on—are categories we have created. These categories are neither sacred nor stable, and if they no longer serve a useful analytic purpose—if they are beginning to obscure more than they clarify—then we must develop new ways of thinking about power, force, control, and the institutions and rules we need.', 'This is an urgent challenge. Indeed, it could be our continued fondness for civil-military jeremiads risks diverting attention away from different but just as insidious threats to American democracy— threats that may have more to do with other forms of state capture and democratic dysfunction than with a crisis in civil-military relations or civilian control of the military.', 'The Founders cared deeply about civil-military relations and civilian control of the military. But they cared about this relationship for quite pragmatic reasons—in the late eighteenth century, those who controlled organized militaries had a unique ability to control the state and its resources. The founders of the fledgling American republic crafted a representative democracy in which, they hoped, the will of the people would always prevail and not be hijacked by force of arms.', 'The commitment of the framers of the Constitution to civilian control of the military stemmed from their deep mistrust of concentrated power. The US Constitution represents a comprehensive effort to break up concentrations of power, to ensure no one branch of government can outmuscle the others, and to ensure no one individual, region, party, faction, or group can permanently capture the state. In 1789 organized militaries were the sole actors with the ability to cause mass destruction of life and property; they consequently possessed a unique ability to capture, coerce, and control other would-be political actors. A general commitment to diluting concentrations of power, then, translated into a specific commitment to ensuring that the military, in particular, would be subject to multiple checks and balances.', 'Moreover these Constitutional checks and balances relating to the use of military force took many different forms. The Constitution established a system in which the military was subordinated to the elected representatives of the people, and for good measure they also divided control over the use of military force between Congress and the president. The framers’ normative goal was to prevent concentrations of power that could displace or distort the will of the people, and civilian control of the military was valued because (and only because) it was one of several overlapping mechanisms to ensure that the will of the people would prevail over the will of the powerful.', 'Today, these core normative goals are as relevant as they were in 1789, for to believe in democracy is to believe that the political legitimacy of a government derives from the free and informed consent of the governed. Most of us believe that the choices of the American people— constrained by our constitutional commitment to individual rights and due process, but otherwise uncoerced and unmanipulated—should guide our foreign and domestic policies.', 'But a formalistic commitment to civilian control of the military no longer achieves what it promised to achieve more than two centuries ago. For one thing, the US military today is nothing like the redcoats of King George III, and nothing like the ragtag militias hastily assembled under General George Washington. Instead, the US military now has elaborate internal checks and balances and a deeply ingrained respect for democracy and the rule of law.30 Most critically, the ability to destroy— and hence to coerce and control—is no longer in the exclusive possession of those with military forces and weapons.', 'Unlike in 1789, nonstate actors—even lone individuals—can now cause death and destruction on a mass scale, and increasingly both states and nonstate actors also have a range of nonkinetic means of coercion at their disposal, from cyberattacks and bioengineered viruses to the deliberate global spread of disinformation and fake news. All over the world coercive power has become simultaneously more diffuse and more concentrated. Individual billionaires, multinational corporations, hackers, and nonstate terrorist groups can increasingly compete with state militaries in their ability to control the behavior of both ordinary people and political actors.31', 'At the same time, as noted earlier, the lines between military and civilian tasks have grown increasingly indistinct. In today’s murky world of gray-zone conflicts and persistent shaping operations, uniformed military personnel train judges, eavesdrop on electronic communications, vaccinate cows, and develop microfinance programs—and civilian Intelligence Community employees and contractors conduct raids, plan drone strikes, and execute offensive cyber operations. Both military and civilian actors engage in information and influence operations.', 'In this blurry world, we need to ask ourselves a serious question: what work, if any, is the concept of civilian control of the military doing today? When we say it was dangerous for Trump to offer too many senior administration positions to retired generals, or discourage President Biden from doing the same, what exactly do we mean? What specific negative consequences do we imagine would be more likely to happen if retired generals make up half the president’s cabinet—and what positive outcomes could result if we keep retired generals out of a president’s inner circle? When we say we do not want retired military officials to make partisan statements, why not? Similarly, when we worry about military involvement in domestic politics, or about military obedience to civilian commands, we would do well to define the harms with greater specificity.', 'Conclusion', 'The notion of civilian control of the military in America today has come unmoored from its original purpose and arguably is no longer an effective means to achieve the normative ends we still rightly value. Instead it is at risk of becoming a rule of aesthetics, not ethics, and its invocation is at risk of becoming a soothing ritual without accomplishing anything of value. Going further, in today’s world a purely formalistic conception of civilian control of the military carries with it potential dangers. If we focus on formalistic rules at the expense of substantive normative ends, we may persuade ourselves that if we can just keep the generals inside the Pentagon and away from the campaign trail and the White House, we will have accomplished something meaningful—even as we blind ourselves to [obscure] the frightening new forms of power and coercion that increasingly distort our democracy and destabilize our world. Unlike in 1789, both states and nonstate actors have increasingly found ways to achieve substantial power and control even without the ability to cause large-scale death and physical destruction. Financial manipulation, cyberattacks, social media-enabled propaganda, and disinformation campaigns can demonstrably shift balances of power. In the future, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies will continue to make the use of physical force just one technique among many. Humanity continues to wage war the old-fashioned way in many parts of the globe, with success and failure measured in broken bodies and terrain lost or gained. But technological changes have both diminished the ability of states and their organized militaries to monopolize violence and created numerous nonkinetic means of coercion and control. As a result, military power no longer represents the unique potential threat to American democracy it represented in 1789 (or 1861, 1941, or even 1970). Should we still worry about the capture of the American state through non-rights-respecting, nondemocratic means? Certainly. But today the problem is not solely or fundamentally a civil-military one, if it ever was. The greatest threats to American democracy stem less from an out-of-control military than from electoral gerrymandering, information warfare, and foreign and domestic influence campaigns, complicated by big data, big money, rising economic inequality, and partisan divisions distorting our political system. In an era in which foreign hackers, the superrich, and the purveyors of fake news can manipulate the American electoral process by sowing division, mistrust, and violence within the electorate and causing chaos in the international system, society must find effective ways to prevent the powerful from distorting or derailing democratic processes. To focus primarily on the notion the United States is experiencing a civil-military crisis, however, risks forgetting our history and ignoring our present perils. ']

[(5, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Aff-Texas-Round-2.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

6d2818431830285d127c062b81fc22abef5ac260368b3a3b0b9338e007b2b361

Everitt has an N of 21 and cites the people most likely to benefit from positing inevitability!

Everitt 18 – (Tom Everitt, PhD, Australian National University, Senior Research Scientist at DeepMind; The Australian National University (Australia) ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019, “Towards Safe Artificial General Intelligence,” doa: 11-20-2022) ProQuest Number: 27792134

AI researchers estimate AGI will be created 21 attendees 2045 for superhuman AGI . survey of 550 from conferences as well as the top 100 most cited authors in a i medians fell between 2040 and 2050. Grace got 352 and a median of 2061. There are also other indicators of when AGI might arrive Algorithmic progress tracked by AI Impacts and the costs of computing shows AGI is becoming mainstream .

Surveys of when AI researchers estimate that human-level AGI will be created have been made by Baum et al. (2011), V. C. M¨uller and Bostrom (2016), and Grace et al. (2017). Baum et al. (2011) asked 21 attendees at the 2009 A rtificial G eneral I ntelligence conference , and found a median of 2045 for superhuman AGI . a bigger survey of 550 people from the 2012 Philosophy and Theory of AI ( PT-AI ) and AGI conferences , the Greek Society for Artificial Intelligence ( EETN ), as well as the top 100 most cited authors in a rtificial i ntelligence. The medians for the various groups all fell between 2040 and 2050. Grace et al. (2017) got 352 responses from NIPS and ICML 2015 presenters on the slightly different question of when AGI will accomplish all tasks better than human workers, and got a median of 2061. There are also other indicators of when AGI might arrive . Algorithmic progress have been tracked by Grace (2013), Eckersley and Nasser (2018), and AI Impacts (2018b), and the costs of computing have been tracked by AI Impacts (2018a ). A new MIT course on AGI shows that the idea of AGI approaching is becoming more mainstream (Fridman, 2018) .

AI researchers 21 attendees A G I conference median of 2045 superhuman AGI 550 people PT-AI AGI conferences EETN top 100 most cited authors a i other indicators Algorithmic progress

['', 'Surveys of when AI researchers estimate that human-level AGI will be created have been made by Baum et al. (2011), V. C. M¨uller and Bostrom (2016), and Grace et al. (2017). Baum et al. (2011) asked 21 attendees at the 2009 Artificial General Intelligence conference, and found a median of 2045 for superhuman AGI. V. C. M¨uller and Bostrom (2016) made a bigger survey of 550 people from the 2012 Philosophy and Theory of AI (PT-AI) and AGI conferences, the Greek Society for Artificial Intelligence (EETN), as well as the top 100 most cited authors in artificial intelligence. The medians for the various groups all fell between 2040 and 2050. Grace et al. (2017) got 352 responses from NIPS and ICML 2015 presenters on the slightly different question of when AGI will accomplish all tasks better than human workers, and got a median of 2061. Interestingly, Asian respondents predicted AGI more than 30 years sooner than North American respondents, with Europeans in the middle slightly closer to the Asians than to the North Americans. It is also worth noting that estimates vary widely, from never to just a few years into the future.', 'There are also other indicators of when AGI might arrive. Algorithmic progress have been tracked by Grace (2013), Eckersley and Nasser (2018), and AI Impacts (2018b), and the costs of computing have been tracked by AI Impacts (2018a). A new MIT course on AGI shows that the idea of AGI approaching is becoming more mainstream (Fridman, 2018). Stanford has a course on AI safety (Sadigh, 2017). Jilk (2017) argues that an AGI must have a conceptual-linguistic faculty in order to be able to access human knowledge or interact effectively with the world, making a conceptual-linguistic faculty a necessary requirement for AGI. Jilk further argues that a conceptual-linguistic faculty is likely to be a strong indicator of AGI being near, and suggests ways in which we may test whether a system has a conceptual-linguistic ability.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GlMe-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

GlMe

d2311c8a85132ce09e30f9875135795d1a88d93b3cc49ba7777459fa0dd65c97

2. The CP boosts leadership and norms against nuclear threats---it’s the bravest thing we can do in the current security environment. That gets China on board.

Rachel Bronson 23, President and CEO, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5/10/23, “Ask the Experts: How Should the U.S. Address Nuclear Dangers?,” https://www.carnegie.org/our-work/article/ask-experts-how-should-us-address-nuclear-dangers/

To assert leadership U.S. should actively resist normalization of nuclear threats Most bravely U.S. should announce commitment to work with allies to develop shared vision in which future n f u is understood to strengthen, not weaken, a U.S. commitment to allies

To assert leadership , the U.S. should actively resist normalization of nuclear threats by countering those at home and abroad who suggest use and consequence of tactical nuclear weapons can somehow remain limited Most bravely , the U.S. should announce a commitment to work closely with friends and allies to develop a shared vision in which a future n o- f irst- u se is understood to strengthen, not weaken, a U.S. commitment to its Asia-Pacific allies and beyond

assert leadership actively resist Most bravely commitment shared vision future n f u strengthen, not weaken, a U.S. commitment

['To assert leadership, the U.S. should actively resist the normalization of nuclear threats by countering those at home and abroad who suggest that the use and consequence of tactical nuclear weapons can somehow remain limited. Additionally, planned spending on nuclear modernization is unnecessary and wasteful and some of that money should be reallocated. Most bravely, the U.S. should announce a commitment to work closely with friends and allies to develop a shared vision in which a future no-first-use policy is understood to strengthen, not weaken, a U.S. commitment to its Asia-Pacific allies and beyond.']

[(7, 17)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

96f7db4ae774a9b87cb6dd891d153d218d76818d40bacac587edf1d77a0836f6

Saying anything else is self-contradictory AND violates their so-called categorical obligation to prevent harm.

Suzanne Uniacke, University of Wollongong at Australia, June 1999, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, “Absolutely Clean Hands? Responsibility for What’s Allowed in Refraining from What’s Not Allowed,” Vol. 7 Issue 2, p189, 21p

The p i a is difficult to reconcile with Gewirth’s comment that breaking the promise would be the right course, by criterion of necessity for action’ the conflicting rights are of the same degree of importance’ The nature of what A needs to do o prevent C’s incurring Z is irrelevant to principle itself

The p rinciple of i ntervening a ction is difficult to reconcile with Gewirth’s earlier comment that if ‘ someone threatens . . . to kill innocent hostages if we do not break a promise . . . breaking the promise would be the obviously right course, by the criterion of degrees of necessity for action’ By the principle of intervening action, the person issuing the threat is responsible for the hostages’ deaths; and by parity of reasoning in Abrams’s case, since we are not responsible for these deaths, the fact that we can prevent them does not affect our moral duty to keep our promise. Gewirth may well intend to confine application of the principle of intervening action to cases where ‘ the conflicting rights are of the same supreme degree of importance’ .35 But this restriction is ad hoc. According to the principle, A’s responsibility for C’s incurring a certain harm Z is removed by B’s intervention. The nature of what A needs to do in order t o prevent C’s incurring Z is irrelevant to the principle itself

p i a conflicting rights same supreme degree nature what A needs to do prevent C’s incurring Z

['The principle of intervening action is difficult to reconcile with Gewirth’s earlier comment that if ‘someone threatens . . . to kill innocent hostages if we do not break a promise . . . breaking the promise would be the obviously right course, by the criterion of degrees of necessity for action’.34 By the principle of intervening action, the person issuing the threat is responsible for the hostages’ deaths; and by parity of reasoning in Abrams’s case, since we are not responsible for these deaths, the fact that we can prevent them does not affect our moral duty to keep our promise. Gewirth may well intend to confine application of the principle of intervening action to cases where ‘the conflicting rights are of the same supreme degree of importance’.35 But this restriction is ad hoc. According to the principle, A’s responsibility for C’s incurring a certain harm Z is removed by B’s intervention. The nature of what A needs to do in order to prevent C’s incurring Z is irrelevant to the principle itself. But surely it is precisely the nature of what A would have to do in order to prevent Z that is crucial to the absolutist claim that A is not responsible for Z in acute cases.']

[(8, 15), (63, 65)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-NDT-Round-8.docx

Michigan

DoPh

e28ff2d830efbda0514d7099e60fec59184e246dee445a6ed46192b62a147471

4. Status quo movements must engage one another---viewing problems as separate denies the necessity of solidarity. Claims that the aff’s struggle is most important ignore political realities that require coalitions.

Keeanga-Yamahtta TAYLOR 17, assistant professor in Princeton University's Center for African American Studies [“No Time for Despair,” Jacobin, January 28 17, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/trump-black-lives-racism-sexism-anti-inauguration/]

There is deep anger Occupy B L M pipeline struggles unearthed that Consider four stories There are two million people addicted to opioids a disproportionate number are white decline in life expectancy for white women Why Drug overdose, suicide, and alcohol abuse Chicago has the highest black unemployment rate it is the most segregated city in the country the richest 20 percent own 84 percent of the wealth while the bottom 40 percent own less than one percent These stories are often told separately, reinforcing the perception that different groups are wholly separate from each other If we told them together, it could allow us to see that anxieties are not owned by one group it would allow us to see that even if we don’t experience a particular kind of oppression , every working person is going through something white people have as much stake in the fight as anyone else We wouldn’t dismiss their suffering as privilege, because they do not suffer as much as black and brown people how does this one percent hold onto their wealth Racism, immigrant bashing, homophobia, transphobia, sexism, nationalism – they get us to fight each other and they keep our stories separate so we never understand the entire story, only our particular part knowledge alone of racism does not equip our side with the tools needed to fight for a socialist future we need politics “Solidarity” meaning even if you don’t experience a particular oppression, it doesn’t matter, because our fates are tied together one group’s liberation is dependent upon the liberation of all

There is deep anger and disgust with the political status quo Occupy B L M pipeline struggles in North Dakota have unearthed that When systemic problems become too large to ignore, when socialists start gaining millions of votes or when black people riot in the streets, the news media is forced to provide some explanation Consider four separate news stories the continuing opioid addiction crisis There are two million people addicted to opioids in the U S a disproportionate number of whom are white . From 2009 to 2014, almost half a million people have died from opioid overdoses A second story on the decline in life expectancy for white women Why is life expectancy for working-class white women in decline? Drug overdose, suicide, and alcohol abuse . In Chicago, the story has been the rise in shootings and murders in the city’s working-class black neighborhoods What is almost never offered as at least part of the answer is how Chicago has the highest black unemployment rate at 25 percent, that nearly half of black men aged 20 to 24 are neither in school nor employed, that Chicago has the third-highest poverty rate of large cities in the US, and that it is the most segregated city in the country Finally, there is the story of the shrinking of the so-called middle class the richest 20 percent of US households own 84 percent of the wealth in this country, while the bottom 40 percent own less than one percent These stories are often told separately, reinforcing the perception that different groups of ordinary people in this country live in their own world and have experiences that are wholly separate from each other . But what would happen if we put these stories together, and told them as a single narrative about life in this country? If we told them together, it could allow us to see that the anxieties , stresses and frustrations about life today are not owned by one group , but are shared by many. It would not tell us that everyone suffers the same oppression, but it would allow us to see that even if we don’t experience a particular kind of oppression , every working person in this country is going through something . Everyone is trying to figure out how to survive, and many are failing If we put these stories together, we would gain insight into how white people have as much stake in the fight for a different kind of society as anyone else We wouldn’t casually dismiss their suffering as privilege, because they do not suffer as much as black and brown people the wages of whiteness are not so great that they can stop millions of ordinary white people from drinking and drugging themselves to death If we put these separate stories into a single story, we could make sense of why socialism is rising in popularity You cannot have untold, obscene wealth unless you have untold, obscene poverty. That is the law of the free market how does this parasitic one percent hold onto their wealth when we are so many? Racism, immigrant bashing, homophobia, transphobia, sexism, nationalism – they get us to fight each other while they hoard their wealth, and they keep our stories separate from each other, so that we never understand the entire story, only our particular part of it knowledge alone of the existence of racism , inequality, poverty, and injustice does not equip our side with the political tools needed to fight the battles for a socialist future . We need struggle, but we also need politics , because we must contend with a political establishment We have to build organizations that are democratic, multiracial with a foundation in solidarity “Solidarity” meaning that even if you don’t experience a particular oppression, it doesn’t matter, because you understand that as ordinary people, our fates are tied together , and that one group’s liberation is dependent upon the liberation of all the oppressed and exploited Another U S is possible, but only if we organize and fight for it

wholly separate from each other not owned by one group even if we don’t experience a particular kind of oppression Racism, immigrant bashing, homophobia, transphobia, sexism, nationalism keep our stories separate knowledge alone does not equip We need struggle, but we also need politics our fates are tied together

['There is deep anger and disgust with the political status quo in the United States. The Occupy movement, Black Lives Matter, the heroic pipeline struggles in North Dakota, and the thirteen million people who voted for Bernie Sanders have unearthed that to the world.', 'When systemic problems become too large to ignore, when socialists start gaining millions of votes, for example, or when black people riot and rebel in the streets, the news media is forced to provide some explanation. And in doing so, they typically give us fractured glimpses of reality. But rarely do they piece together the entire picture. Consider four separate news stories from last year.', 'The first is the continuing crisis of the opioid addiction crisis in this country. There are two million people addicted to opioids in the United States, a disproportionate number of whom are white. From 2009 to 2014, almost half a million people have died from opioid overdoses, a fourfold increase since 1999.', 'A second story, briefly in the news, reported on the decline in life expectancy for white women. It is unprecedented for life expectancy to reverse in a so-called first-world country. In the United States peer countries, life expectancy is actually growing. Why is life expectancy for working-class white women in decline? Drug overdose, suicide, and alcohol abuse.', 'In Chicago, the story has been the rise in shootings and murders in the city’s working-class black neighborhoods. In 2016, there were 4,379 people shot in Chicago, and 797 people killed. The overwhelmingly majority of both were African-American.', 'The news media’s nonsensical explanations for the violence include retaliation. But that is only matched by the nonsense offered by elected officials, which includes the absence of role models and poor parenting. What is almost never offered as at least part of the answer is how Chicago has the highest black unemployment rate of the nation’s five largest cities at 25 percent, that nearly half of black men aged 20 to 24 are neither in school nor employed, that Chicago has the third-highest poverty rate of large cities in the US, and that it is the most segregated city in the country.', 'Finally, there is the story of the shrinking of the so-called middle class. In the 1970s, 61 percent of Americans fell into that vague but stable category. Today, that number has fallen to 50 percent. It is driven by the growing wealth inequality that exists in this country.', 'In the last year alone, the one percent saw their income rise by seven percent, and the .1 percent saw their income rise by 9 percent. In general, the richest 20 percent of US households own 84 percent of the wealth in this country, while the bottom 40 percent own less than one percent.', 'The media would have us believe that this is a story primarily about the Rust Belt and disgruntled white workers. In fact, it is also a story about 240,000 black homeowners, who lost their houses to foreclosures in the last eight years. It is also a story about urban school closures and the decimation of employment for black educators. Thousands of black teachers have been fired in the last decade.', 'These four prominent stories reported on over the last several years are often told separately, reinforcing the perception that different groups of ordinary people in this country live in their own world and have experiences that are wholly separate from each other. But what would happen if we put these stories together, and told them as a single narrative about life in this country?', 'If we told them together, it could allow us to see that the anxieties, stresses, confusions, and frustrations about life world today are not owned by one group, but are shared by many. It would not tell us that everyone suffers the same oppression, but it would allow us to see that even if we don’t experience a particular kind of oppression, every working person in this country is going through something. Everyone is trying to figure out how to survive, and many are failing.', 'If we put these stories together, we would gain more insight into how ordinary white people have as much stake in the fight for a different kind of society as anyone else.', 'We wouldn’t so casually dismiss their suffering as privilege, because they do not suffer as much as black and brown people in this country. In fact, we might find that the privileges of white skin run very thin in a country where nineteen million white people languish in poverty.', 'Apparently, the wages of whiteness are not so great that they can stop millions of ordinary white people from literally drinking and drugging themselves to death, to escape the despair of living in this “greatest country on earth.”', 'If we put these separate stories into a single story, we could make better sense of why socialism is rising in popularity, why people have taken to the streets over the last six years to protest the growing and racial and economic inequality. There are 400 billionaires in this country. They are the reason why there are forty-seven million poor people. You cannot have untold, obscene wealth unless you have untold, obscene poverty. That is the law of the free market.', 'And how does this parasitic one percent of the population hold onto their wealth when we are so many? Racism, immigrant bashing, homophobia, transphobia, sexism, nationalism – they get us to fight each other while they hoard their wealth, and they keep our stories separate from each other, so that we never understand the entire story, only our particular part of it.', 'But knowledge alone of the existence of racism, inequality, poverty, and injustice does not equip with our side with the political tools needed to fight the battles of today or fight for a socialist future. We need struggle, but we also need politics, because we must contend with a political establishment that wants to lower our expectations, to believe that this existing society is the best that we can expect from humanity.', 'Hillary Clinton ran a campaign of low expectations, a campaign that cynically pivoted around the notion that ordinary people shouldn’t ask for too much. For all the excitement that Bernie Sanders’ campaign generated for rightly demanding more, his commitment to remaining in the Democratic Party then threatens to neuter his political revolution. Expecting the Democratic Party to fight for the democratic redistribution of wealth and resources in this country is like expecting to squeeze orange juice out of an apple. It is impossible.', 'We must build independent organizations and political parties that are not connected to the Democratic Party, or that rise and fall with each electoral cycle. We have to build organizations that are democratic, multiracial, and militant, with a foundation in solidarity.', '“Solidarity” meaning that even if you don’t experience a particular oppression, it doesn’t matter, because you understand that as ordinary people, our fates are tied together, and that one group’s liberation is dependent upon the liberation of all the oppressed and exploited.', 'Another world is possible. Another United States is possible, but only if we organize and fight for it. In closing, I want to quote from a note that was taped to the front door of my son Ellison’s daycare center on Inauguration Day. It said simply: “Do not despair. Eyes wide open. Strength in numbers. Keep the faith. And stay strong.”']

[(17, 26)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Neg-wake-Round-6.docx

Emory

GiKe

b6c41596850d0c71d82e7537971ec2ef0e71fd2f8f37b49aaa4ffd7558c8227f

Even slight advancements quickly create ASI.

Yampolskiy ’15 [Roman; February; Associate Professor and Speed School of Engineering Director of the Cybersecurity Laboratory; Arxiv, “From Seed AI to Technological Singularity via Recursively Self-Improving Software,” https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1502.06512]

hardware improvements likely to speed up software necessary for improvements AI have advantages over programmers omniscience depth rationality if AI capable of producing only slightly more capable AI process leads to superintelligent performance

we will concentrate on RSI hardware improvements are likely to speed up while software necessary for meta- improvements AI will have advantages over human programmers advantages include work spans omniscience resources serial depth duplicability goal coordination rationality if an AI s capable of producing only slightly more capable AI process leads to superintelligent performance in AI

RSI hardware speed up software necessary meta- improvements advantages work spans omniscience resources serial depth duplicability goal coordination rationality AI only slightly more AI superintelligent AI

['Self-modifying and self-improving software systems are already well understood and are quite common. Consequently, we will concentrate exclusively on RSI systems. In practice performance of almost any system can be trivially improved by allocation of additional computational resources such as more memory, higher sensor resolution, faster processor or greater network bandwidth for access to information. This linear scaling doesn’t fit the definition of recursive-improvement as the system doesn’t become better at improving itself. To fit the definition the system would have to engineer a faster type of memory not just purchase more memory units of the type it already has access to. In general hardware improvements are likely to speed up the system, while software improvements (novel algorithms) are necessary for achievement of meta-improvements.', 'It is believed that AI systems will have a number of advantages over human programmers making it possible for them to succeed where we have so far failed. Such advantages include [28]: longer work spans (no breaks, sleep, vocation, etc.), omniscience (expert level knowledge in all fields of science, absorbed knowledge of all published works), superior computational resources (brain vs processor, human memory vs RAM), communication speed (neurons vs wires), increased serial depth (ability to perform sequential operations in access of about a 100 human brain can manage), duplicability (intelligent software can be instantaneously copied), editability (source code unlike DNA can be quickly modified), goal coordination (AI copies can work towards a common goal without much overhead), improved rationality (AIs are likely to be free from human cognitive biases) [29], new sensory modalities (native sensory hardware for source code), blending over of deliberative and automatic processes (management of computational resources over multiple tasks), introspective perception and manipulation (ability to analyze low level hardware, ex. individual neurons), addition of hardware (ability to add new memory, sensors, etc.), advanced communication (ability to share underlying cognitive representations for memories and skills) [30].', 'Chalmers [31] uses logic and mathematical induction to show that if an AI0 system is capable of producing only slightly more capable AI1 system generalization of that process leads to superintelligent performance in AIn after n generations. He articulates, that his proof assumes that the proportionality thesis, which states that increases in intelligence lead to proportionate increases in the capacity to design future generations of AIs, is true.', '']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Aff-Kentucky-Semis.docx

Michigan

PiPh

3a240c18b95742ecf12b11970f8cda6bb950c4ed4697a7a3f73eab6420969c18

Minimally-just principles ensure NATO follow-on.

Galliot 21 - (*Jai Galliott *Duncan MacIntosh ***Jens David Ohlin *Dr Galliot is Director of the Values in Defence & Security Technology Group at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Non-Residential Fellow at the Modern War Institute at the United States Military Academy, West Point and Visiting Fellow in The Centre for Technology and Global Affairs at the University of Oxford **Professor of Philosophy and Department Chair at Dalhousie University ***Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Cornell Law School; Oxford University Press, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Re-Examining the Law and Ethics of Robotic Warfare” doa: 9-25-2022) ISBN: 9780197546048

ethical principles Once they proliferate and are amended the same way civilian principle sets have , all sorts of military players will find them useful in developing future technologies and strategies concepts training etc . These will be useful in overcoming notions advanced in favor of halting AI weapons . All individuals must exercise due diligence , and every actor are contributing to potential risks . Minimally-Just AI systems are technically feasible a system would likely be accepted by the public given the humanitarian benefit and therefore stands a strong chance to be accepted by other nations enhancing interop . Such a system would stand a good chance of meet ing national requirements in all Western nations , given the focus on respect ing symbols rather [than] killing

ethical principles should not be construed as a strict list of commandments so much a range of recommendations that should be informed by scenario based methodology Once they proliferate and are amended by others in the same way that civilian principle sets have , the hope is that combatant commanders , service chiefs , and all sorts of different military players will find them useful in developing future technologies and drafting forthcoming strategies , concepts of operation , training guides , etc . there is a lot of planning, thinking, and training, so too if you are a technical actor tasked with developing the next generation of autonomous weapon , and the above principles should be informing these efforts . These p rinciples will also be useful in overcoming some of the common preconceived notions often advanced in favor of halting the development of AI in weapons technologies . In many respects, the classical problem of ‘many hands’ has become a false problem of no hands no such problem exists, and such assumptions would be detrimental to the concept of justice and might prove disastrous for the future of warfare . All individuals who deal with AI technology must exercise due diligence , and every actor in the causal chain leading through the idea in an innovator’s mind, to the designer’s model for realizing the concept, the engineer’s interpretation of build plans and the user’s understanding of the operating manual. Every time one interacts with a piece of technology one’s actions or omissions are contributing to the potential risks associated with the relevant technology and those in which it may be integrated . Ethical AI, ‘smart guns’ that remain locked unless held by an authorized user via biometric or token technologies to curtail accidental firings and cases of a gun stolen and used immediately to shoot people. Or a similar AI mechanism built into any military weapon , noting that even the most autonomous weapons have some degree of human interaction in their life cycle . These technologies might also record events , including the time and location of every shot fired, providing some accountability . With the right ethical principles , rather than a moratorium on AI weapons, these lifesaving technologies could exist today Minimally-Just AI Given the significant advances in visual machine learning over the last decade, such recognition systems are technically feasible Such a system would likely be accepted by the public given the humanitarian benefit and therefore stands a strong chance to be accepted by other nations , therefore enhancing interop erability if deployed . Such a system would stand a good chance of meet ing national requirements in all Western nations , given the focus on respect ing protected symbols rather [than] a more a maximal system focused on killing . What this does mean is that some technical progress can immediately be made toward Ethical Weapons that stem from or adhere to Ethical AI principles along the lines advanced in this chapter.

ethical principles strict list range of recommendations based proliferate amended civilian principle sets have combatant commanders service chiefs all sorts different military players useful developing future technologies drafting forthcoming strategies concepts of operation training guides etc technical actor developing next generation of autonomous weapon above principles informing these efforts overcoming common preconceived notions halting the development ‘many hands’ false problem no hands detrimental concept of justice disastrous future of warfare due diligence every actor potential risks remain locked authorized user any military weapon some degree human interaction life cycle record events providing some accountability right ethical principles lifesaving technologies Minimally-Just AI significant advances visual machine learning recognition systems technically feasible accepted public humanitarian benefit strong chance nations enhancing interop meet all Western nations focus respect protected symbols maximal system technical progress immediately be made

['**edited for readibility', '', '8.4: NOT A CHECK LIST BUT A STARTING POINT FOR\xa0TECHNOLOGY\xa0DEVELOPMENT', 'The suggested ethical principles should not be construed as a strict list of commandments so much a range of recommendations that should be informed by scenariobased methodology:\xa0What’s the most appropriate use of AI in one combat situation versus another? And they are not intended for a single user, specific service, or even a particular military force. Once they proliferate and are amended by others in the same way that civilian principle sets have, the hope is that combatant commanders, service chiefs, and all sorts of different military players will find them useful in developing future technologies and drafting forthcoming strategies, concepts of operation, training guides, etc. Whether you are a uniformed officer or a civilian, and you are trying to write a training manual and concept of operations, there is a lot of planning, thinking, and training, so too if you are a technical actor tasked with developing the next generation of autonomous weapon, and the above principles should be informing these efforts.', 'These principles will also be useful in overcoming some of the common preconceived notions often advanced in favor of halting the development of AI in weapons technologies, those which revolve around an overly optimistic view of technology in that it raises concerns regarding a lack of meaningful human control. These notions often fail to acknowledge the many small but nevertheless important causal contributions made by individual actors such as programmers, designers, engineers, or the many failures and omissions made by multi-agent corporations involved in the commissioning of AI-enabled equipment through to deployment and those of design, engineering, and development. To ignore the role of these actors who have actively given rise to these technologies and their virtues and vices is to fundamentally misunderstand not just the nature of causation but also the nature of the problems associated with autonomy, for so long as the discussion about military AI and associated weapons remain focused on new, absolutist international law focused on a ban rather than effective regulation, these many actors may view themselves as partially absolved of moral responsibility for the harms resulting from their individual and collective design, development, and engineering efforts. In many respects, the classical problem of ‘many hands’ has become a false problem of no hands (Galliott 2015, 211–232). ', 'But, of course, no such problem exists, and such assumptions would be detrimental to the concept of justice and might prove disastrous for the future of warfare. All individuals who deal with AI technology must exercise due diligence, and every actor in the causal chain leading through the idea in an innovator’s mind, to the designer’s model for realizing the concept, the engineer’s interpretation of build plans and the user’s understanding of the operating manual. Every time one interacts with a piece of technology or is involved in the technological design process, one’s actions or omissions are contributing to the potential risks associated with the relevant technology and those in which it may be integrated. Some will suggest that this is too reductive and ignores the role of corporations and state or intergovernmental agencies. Nothing here is to suggest that they do not have an important role to play or that they are excused from their efforts to achieve military outcomes. Indeed, if they were to hold the greater capability to effect change, the moral burden may rest with them. But in the AI age, the reality is that the ultimate moral arbiters in conflict are those behind every design input and keystroke. That is, if the potential dangers of AI-enabled weapons are to be mitigated, we must begin to promote a personal ethic not dissimilar to that which pervades the armed forces in more traditional contexts. The US Marine Corp’s Rifleman’s Creed is a good example. But rather the reciting, “without me, my rifle is useless. Without my rifle, I\xa0am useless. I\xa0must fire my rifle true,” we might say that “without my fingers, my AI is useless. Without good code, I\xa0am useless. I\xa0must code my weapon true.” At the broader level, such a personal ethic must reach all the way down the command chain to the level of the individual decision-maker, whether this ceases at the officer level or proceeds down the ranks, owing to the elimination of the relevant boundaries. For now, it is of the greatest importance that we begin telling the full story about the rise of autonomous weapons and the role of all causal actors within. From there, we can begin to see how Ethical AI principles in the military would serve to enhance accountability and eliminate the concerns of those seeking to prohibit the development of AI weapons. Take one example of Ethical AI, ‘smart guns’ that remain locked unless held by an authorized user via biometric or token technologies to curtail accidental firings and cases of a gun stolen and used immediately to shoot people. Or a similar AI mechanism built into any military weapon, noting that even the most autonomous weapons have some degree of human interaction in their life cycle. These technologies might also record events, including the time and location of every shot fired, providing some accountability. With the right ethical principles, rather than a moratorium on AI weapons, these lifesaving technologies could exist today.', 'As another example, the author of this chapter has contributed to the use of the abovementioned Military Ethical AI principle set to develop the concept and architecture for a Minimally-Just AI (MinAI) (Galliott and Scholz 2019)\xa0system or Ethical AI Weapon (Scholz and Galliott, forthcoming; Scholz et\xa0al., forthcoming). A\xa0simple illustration serves to illustrate. Consider the capability of a weapon to recognize the unexpected presence of an international protection symbol—perhaps a Red Cross, Red Crescent, or Red Crystal—in a defined target area and abort an otherwise unrestrained human-ordered attack. Given the significant advances in visual machine learning over the last decade, such recognition systems are technically feasible. So, inspired by vehicle automation, an Ethical Weapon system for our purpose is a weapon with inbuilt safety enhancements enabled by the application of AI. An Ethical Weapon with Ethical AI tracks and records the full range of inputs and outputs, that is, the full range of human input to a particular military outcome. It takes an attack order as input and makes a decision not to obey the order if it assesses the presence of unexpected protected object(s).2 What one means by ‘protected’ may include legal-identified entities from Red Cross marked objects, through to persons hors de combat and policy-identified entities specified in rules of engagement. ', 'Such a system would likely be accepted by the public given the humanitarian benefit and therefore stands a strong chance to be accepted by other nations, therefore enhancing interoperability if deployed. Such a system would stand a good chance of meeting national requirements in all Western nations, given the focus on respecting protected symbols rather [than] a more a maximal system focused on killing. The system would, therefore, be involved only in justified uses and incorporates a system for recording reliability and human input, as required under the explainability and human control principles. It is inherently ethical by design and allows personnel to flourish in the sense that they can more comfortably and consciously conduct combat while meeting basic legal requirements governing humanitarian protections. What this does mean is that some technical progress can immediately be made toward Ethical Weapons that stem from or adhere to Ethical AI principles along the lines advanced in this chapter. Indeed, a technical model has been proposed elsewhere. Clearly, any progress would constitute a humanitarian enhancement and serve as an example of the value of such principles.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Neg-Hoosier-Invitational-Tournament-2023-Round-3.docx

Kansas

PaMa

894bbe5fda42d2e8bf753666a9e5cf8a6978d19d7dcbe5d2602b178ff6a80cde

Courts are topical to fiat.

ABA ’15 [American Bar Association, HANDBOOK ON THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2015, p. 6-7]

Congress limited antitrust by statute as early as 1914 Judge-made limits were recognized to protect the political

Congress explicitly limited antitrust by statute as early as 1914 and did so many more times during the rise of organized labor and the price-and-entry regulatory regimes of the Progressive and New Deal eras Judge-made limits were likewise recognized as early as 1922 As new waves of health and safety regulation emerged defendants sought antitrust clemency with some increasing success Courts sought to protect the political process from antitrust

Congress limited antitrust organized labor Progressive New Deal Judge-made limits likewise recognized 1922 protect the political process

['', 'On the other hand, scope limits of various kinds have always existed. Congress explicitly limited antitrust by statute as early as 1914,19 and did so many more times during the rise of organized labor20 and the price-and-entry regulatory regimes of the Progressive and New Deal eras.21 Judge-made limits were likewise recognized as early as 1922, again mainly as a consequence of the new regulatory regimes.22 As new waves of health and safety regulation emerged during the 1960s and 1970s,23 defendants sought antitrust clemency with some increasing success.24 Courts have also long sought to protect the political process from antitrust, even though businesses have frequently turned to that arena for advantage within the marketplace.25to “within the marketplace.25”', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Prost-Spencer-Aff-Navy-Round2.docx

Minnesota

PrSp

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PrSp/Minnesota-Prost-Spencer-Aff-Navy-Round2.docx

ddcc38848f010dc5e2bcac90dbe4d1a14aeba5f5de43f2bb08e254b200e17bc0

Wars are started by choice not accident. Their scenarios conflate tactical with strategic miscalc.

Hal Brands 20, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow for Asian Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8-7-2020, If America and China Go to War, It Won’t Be an Accident, Bloomberg,

war won’t start by accident . There is a argument that states can stumble into a conflict The accidental war thesis was raised accidental collision between ships in the S C S It is hard to identify wars that came about even though no one wanted them It was that powers insisted on aggressive policies they knew risked a localized war The reality is that countries tend to avoid war there is no monumental decision than to initiate a conflict when countries do want to avert showdown, they are willing to tack or retreat, even at cost of embarrassment There were near misses Accidental war seems unlikely today U.S. and Chinese policymakers know a war could very well become If both sides truly seek to avoid one Conflict occur when one party decides that war is preferable to the status quo

U.S.-China relations are deteriorating and the bad news is that the two countries could end up fighting The good news is that such a war won’t start by accident . There is a venerable argument that states can stumble into a conflict that neither truly desires it has been revived as tensions between the two powers escalate history shows that big wars happen inadvertently. The accidental war thesis was raised recently by accidental collision between ships or planes in the S C S World War I is often considered the classic example It is hard to identify any major wars that came about even though no one wanted them . The trouble in 1914 was not that inflexible mobilization schedules It was that several powers insisted on pursuing aggressive policies that they knew risked a localized war at best and a continental war at worst. They nearly all believed that if war had to come it should come sooner rather than later . The reality is that countries tend to avoid war when neither really desires it . Yet there is no more monumental decision than to initiate a conflict when countries really do want to avert showdown, they are generally willing to tack or retreat, even at the cost of some embarrassment During the Cold War, there was plenty of superpower brinkmanship , and some hair-raising incidents There were several near misses But in that case and every other case, the crisis was defused the superpowers drew back because they didn’t believe the stakes merited a nuclear bloodbath . Accidental war seems unlikely today . There But U.S. and Chinese policymakers know that a war could very well become an extremely affair . If both sides truly seek to avoid one , they will probably find a way of doing so . This isn’t the same thing as saying that a war won't happen . Conflict tends to occur when one party decides that war is preferable to the status quo But in any of these cases, Beijing would be making a deliberate choice to seek key objectives through the use of coercion

relations deteriorating the bad news two countries fighting good news such a war start by accident venerable argument stumble conflict desires revived escalate that big wars happen accidental war recently collision ships or planes S C S often considered classic example identify any major even though no one them 1914 inflexible mobilization several powers pursuing aggressive risked a localized continental war nearly all believed sooner later reality tend to avoid war neither really desires it no more monumental conflict really do want to avert generally willing cost of some embarrassment plenty brinkmanship hair-raising incidents near misses every other defused drew back stakes nuclear bloodbath Accidental war unlikely today U.S. Chinese that a war become affair truly seek probably find doing so the same thing happen when one party preferable status quo any of these making a deliberate key objectives coercion

["U.S.-China relations are deteriorating by the day, and the bad news is that the two countries could end up fighting in the coming decade. The good news is that such a war won’t start by accident. There is a venerable argument that states can stumble into a major conflict that neither truly desires, and it has been revived as tensions between the two great powers escalate. Nevertheless, history shows that big wars don't just happen inadvertently. The accidental war thesis was raised recently by former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia. Noting the many flashpoints at which U.S. and Chinese interests collide, he argued that there is a growing danger of them “stumbling into conflict.” An accidental collision between ships or planes in the South China Sea, or several other plausible scenarios, could lead to crisis, escalation and war. Just as the great powers of the early 20th century “sleep-walked” into World War I, China and America could blunder their way to disaster today. World War I is often considered the classic example of an unwanted war: a devastating conflict that none of the participants would have chosen had they known what was coming. During the Cold War, U.S. policymakers worried that crises over Berlin or Cuba could get out of control. There is a body of political science literature devoted to understanding how accidental war can occur. Yet there is one big problem: It is hard to identify any major wars that came about even though no one wanted them. The trouble in July and August 1914, it turns out, was not that inflexible mobilization schedules and military plans thrust political leaders into conflict. It was that several powers, most notably but not solely Austria-Hungary and Imperial Germany, insisted on pursuing aggressive policies that they knew risked a localized war at best and a continental war at worst. They nearly all believed, moreover, that if war had to come, better it should come sooner rather than later. A generation after that, Franklin Roosevelt may not have foreseen that slapping an oil embargo on Japan would lead to the aerial assault on Pearl Harbor. But he certainly understood that war was a distinct possibility once the U.S. began strangling the economy of a country that was already pillaging Asia. Likewise, the Six Day War of 1967 is sometimes treated as an inadvertent conflict. But again, Egyptian leaders were hardly blind to the danger of war when they mobilized forces in the Sinai Peninsula, blockaded Israel’s port on the Red Sea and took other belligerent steps. The reality, as the historian Marc Trachtenberg has shown, is that countries tend to avoid war when neither really desires it. Yes, leaders do sometimes misjudge how wars will turn out and how destructive they will be. Tensions can gradually ratchet up in a way that makes de-escalation progressively harder. Yet there is no more monumental decision than to initiate a major conflict. So, when countries really do want to avert a showdown, they are generally willing to tack or retreat, even at the cost of some embarrassment. During the Cold War, there was plenty of superpower brinkmanship, and some hair-raising incidents involving U.S. and Soviet military forces. There were several near misses in the Cuban Missile Crisis alone. But in that case and every other case, the crisis was defused, and the superpowers drew back, precisely because they didn’t believe that the stakes merited a nuclear bloodbath. Accidental war also seems unlikely today. There are plenty of circumstances in which the U.S. and China could find themselves in a crisis: a replay of the EP-3 incident of 2001, when a midair collision led to a diplomatic standoff; or an interaction between the Chinese and Japanese air forces in the East China Sea that unexpectedly turns deadly. But U.S. and Chinese policymakers know that a war could very well become an extremely grave affair. If both sides truly seek to avoid one, they will probably find a way of doing so. This isn’t the same thing as saying that a Chinese-American war won't happen. Conflict tends to occur when one party decides that war, or actions risking war, is preferable to living with the status quo or backing down in a crisis. That could happen all too easily. If China concludes that Taiwan is distancing itself too far from the mainland politically, as the balance of power shifts in Beijing's favor militarily, then it might decide that war is better than letting the dream of reunification slip away. If Chinese leaders worry that their domestic legitimacy is slipping, they might behave more belligerently in a crisis, for fear that war is less dangerous than humiliation. Beijing might even gamble that the U.S. would stay out of a short, sharp war with Japan over the Senkaku Islands or the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, and that gamble might not pay off. But in any of these cases, Beijing would be making a deliberate choice to seek key objectives through the use of coercion or force, with the knowledge that a larger conflict is a real possibility. If a U.S.-China war results from such a choice, it could hardly be called an accident.", '']

[(4, 13)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-4---Wake-Forest-Round-4.docx

Emory

MiPi

8f383618b3590df2693a54eea5e45d89563e7dba706e90e12cb832ee337547ca

Accidents rhetoric is essential to challenge nuclear overconfidence – discursively imagining future scenarios for escalation spills-up to responsible policy-making which dampens conflict

Benoît Pelopidas 17 – Benoît Pelopidas holds the junior chair of excellence in security studies at Sciences Po. He is also an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University and a visiting fellow at Princeton University’s Programme on Science and Global Security. (Benoît, “The unbearable lightness of luck: Three sources of overconfidence in the manageability of nuclear crises”, European Journal of International Security, 2017, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-international-security/article/unbearable-lightness-of-luck-three-sources-of-overconfidence-in-the-manageability-of-nuclear-crises/BDE95895C04E7E7988D15DB4F217D1E4)//RCU

awareness of limits of knowledge and control over nuc s is crucial for accuracy nuclear learning , and fruitful policy debate that include strategic, ethical, and political concerns. preceding decades had been overconfident an experience of Crisis that is not based on fear does fuel overconfidence approach involve the question of ‘how close did we come to nuclear disaster’ as a starting point Comparative critical oral histories of nuclear close calls would address policy problems This allows analysts to work against overconfidence and have a responsibility to do so. This is crucial for policy-relevant learning

Full awareness of the limits of knowledge of and control over nuc lear weapon s is crucial for historical accuracy , for nuclear learning , and as a starting for a fruitful nuclear weapons policy debate that would include strategic, ethical, and political concerns. This is all the more important as overconfidence has been shown to be a cause of increased danger learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis is essential given that analysts have discovered it was one of the most dangerous events in the history of the nuclear age partly due to luck, and that the preceding three decades had been overconfident in the ability of good management to explain its peaceful outcome an experience and official memory of the Crisis that is not based on fear does fuel overconfidence in the safety, controllability, and predictability of nuclear crises. First, social scientists cannot let Fidel Castro take the unbearable lightness of luck with him to the grave further exploration of the politics of luck and how risk and uncertainty has been blurred would be a first critical step towards a reconceptualisation of nuclear controllability this approach would involve the question of ‘how close did we come to nuclear disaster’ as a starting point and focusing on pathways towards disasters rather than the past Second, cases of near-nuclear use need to be requalified as events worth investigating Comparative critical oral histories of nuclear close calls would help recover control over nuclear weapons while address ing the policy problems that result from misguided assumptions This allows analysts to start work ing against overconfidence without waiting for structural or institutional reforms and suggests that they have a responsibility to do so. Third, in security studies, it is crucial to reassert the socially constructed process of valuation of nuclear weapons instead of perpetuating the assumption for deterrence rejecting counterfactual thinking and documenting nuclear danger are ways to understand and counter overconfidence in their controllability This is crucial for policy-relevant learning

['Full awareness of the limits of knowledge of and control over nuclear weapons is crucial for historical accuracy, for nuclear learning, and as a starting for a fruitful nuclear weapons policy debate that would include strategic, ethical, and political concerns. This awareness is all the more important as overconfidence has been shown to be a cause of increased danger. Therefore, learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis is essential given that, over the last thirty years, analysts have discovered and confirmed that it was one of the most dangerous events in the history of the nuclear age, the peaceful outcome of which was partly due to luck, and that in the preceding three decades they had been overconfident in the ability of good management to explain its peaceful outcome. In order to understand the construction of such overconfidence, I have accepted the idea that learning occurred mostly at the national level and focused on the French case, in comparative perspective. I have first shown how those scholarly findings have not been adequately refuted and argued that those who do not take these elements seriously have done so via epistemological or practical inconsistencies. The rejection of counterfactual thinking as a legitimate scholarly practice is another way of rendering these findings invisible without having to refute them. Finally, I have used the French example to show that an experience and official memory of the Crisis that is not based on fear does over time fuel overconfidence in the safety, controllability, and predictability of nuclear crises. American and British elites and populations did not grasp the full extent of the dangers at the time but, unlike the French, they certainly experienced fear. These ideational and disciplinary factors would be sufficient to prevent the problem from emerging as an issue of public concern in France; they also call for responsible nuclear scholarship to address them without waiting for structural or policy change. This opens up three avenues for research. First, social scientists cannot let Fidel Castro take the unbearable lightness of luck with him to the grave. Following from the efforts of cognitive psychologists to uncover our tendencies to deny luck retrospectively, further exploration of the politics of luck and how the distinction between risk and uncertainty (as uncontrollability and unknowability even of the boundaries of the possible) has been blurred would be a first critical step towards a reconceptualisation of nuclear controllability, a reconceptualisation that would place luck at the heart of political and ethical action, power and responsibility over time.126 At the empirical level, this approach would involve treating the question of ‘how close did we come to nuclear disaster’ as a starting point, and focusing on pathways towards disasters rather than patterns identified in the past and expected to bind possible futures. Second, cases of near-nuclear use need to be requalified as events worth investigating.127 Diplomatic historians and security studies scholars could fruitfully join forces independently of their views on the value of counterfactuals. Indeed, we need further investigations into the history of nuclear-armed states both to unearth primary documentation about the past security and safety record of nuclear arsenals and to allow for rigorous counterfactual thinking, going beyond risk thinking.128 Comparative critical oral histories of nuclear close calls would likewise help recover the limits of control over nuclear weapons as a legitimate object of scholarly interest. Such an approach would also tackle directly the scholarly problem of uncritical reliance on accounts from former officials, while at the same time addressing the policy problems that result from misguided assumptions of a shared experience and interpretation of events like the Crisis.129 The empirical dimension of this article is only a first step in this direction.130 This research programme allows analysts to start working against overconfidence without waiting for structural or institutional reforms and suggests that they have a responsibility to do so. Third, in security studies, it is crucial to reassert the socially and historically constructed process of valuation of nuclear weapons instead of perpetuating the widespread assumption that the destructive capability of nuclear weapons triggers adequate fear, which in turn initiates a learning process that is sufficient for existential deterrence to work everywhere. If the relevant French decision-makers were indeed adequately afraid at the time but did not leave any evidence of it, the contentions of this article would remain valid: that absence of evidence would only be additional evidence of the scholarly blinders entailed by a rejection of counterfactual thinking; in any case, and whatever the unspoken thoughts of decision-makers at the time, their public display of fearlessness would be consequential for future generations of leaders. Evidence of private doubts on the part of statesmen would only bring to the fore the need to reconnect nuclear weapons scholarship with democratic theorising and the issue of citizens’ right to know. Identifying the effects of rejecting counterfactual thinking and documenting the diverse experiences and memorialisations of nuclear danger as components of a process of valuation of nuclear weapons are ways to understand and counter overconfidence in their controllability. This is crucial for policy-relevant learning because the coexistence of this diversity of memories with the retrospective illusions of unanimity and control gives an unsettling resonance to Peter Sloterdijk’s claim: ‘the only catastrophe that seems clear to all is the catastrophe which no one survives’. 131']

[(7, 19), (19, 19)]

ndtceda

Emory-FeWa-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Debates-Round-3.docx

Emory

FeWa

985715ce95237869200b78f90b73d0c8e24da6daf3e813e5043d0109873ae018

The United States is a revisionist power. Concerns of Chinese tech dominance are rooted in orientalist Sinophobia.

Nair 18 , founder and CEO of the Global Institute For Tomorrow (GIFT), an independent think tank based in Hong Kong. (Chandran, 12/21/2018, “Why Asia Should Be Worried By America’s Bullying of China,” The Diplomat, Date Accessed: 3/19/2021)

extraterritorial behavior is asymmetric only the U S is allowed to wield it “legitimately Huawei had been accused by Western politicians of being a front for the Chinese government Articles about China’s technology and surveillance worry about a techno-dystopia despite similar surveillance done in Western countries the source of suspicion has been based on the idea that the American culture and values are superior One could see racial supremacist undertones in these beliefs neither the U S nor Europe is mentally prepared for another country overtaking the West American exceptionalism is threatened when a country with different values does well The fear of China is real American-Chinese tensions come from Western, U.S.-led opposition to the “rise of the others

Imagine a scenario where a senior American business executive is detained overseas, at the behest of the Chinese government which accuses him or her of violating its national security Western media would undoubtedly express outrage the equivalent happened last week with Canada’s detention of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, on behalf of the United States it is important to note that the right to this extraterritorial behavior is asymmetric only the U nited S tates is allowed to wield it “legitimately .” No other country such as Malaysia, which is trying to recover 1MDB-related money from Goldman Sachs, can dare to act in this way. the U S made a choice to escalate tensions by taking this action Huawei had been accused by Western politicians of being a front for the Chinese government , and it has been denied access to Western markets this misses a more fundamental cause for the worries about China Articles about China’s technology and surveillance worry about a techno-dystopia , despite similar surveillance being done in Western countries (and by their own tech companies). The United States has expressed concern about the activities of university students from China the fear that Western observers have about China means that this benefit could be denied them. the source of suspicion is deeper and often not spoken about American exceptionalism has been based on the idea that the American culture , way of life, and values are superior One could see racial supremacist undertones in these beliefs as well these were the same sentiments that permeated the colonial era and were used to explain away or justify the shameful excesses of colonialism. neither the U nited S tates nor Europe is mentally prepared for the prospect of another country being successful let alone overtaking the West This is true for China a country long viewed as backward but which has now succeeded while following its own political, economic, and cultural model American exceptionalism is threatened when a country with different values does well We first saw this in the anti-Japan sentiment was sparked when Japanese companies started to buy American cultural symbols The United States and the West cannot accept China’s success on its own terms and this permeates almost all segments of society The fear of China and the rest is real . They cannot just accept that China’s success says nothing about how Western countries should govern themselves China’s model must be proven incorrect People assume that the rise of other developing nations would not threaten the international order this betrays a Western need to oppose China at all costs. American-Chinese tensions come from Western, U.S.-led opposition to the “rise of the others

['Imagine a scenario where a senior American business executive is suddenly detained overseas, at the behest of the Chinese government, which accuses him or her of violating its national security. American and Western media would undoubtedly express outrage and have a field day bashing China.', 'Yet when the equivalent happened last week with Canada’s detention of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, on behalf of the United States, questions about the arrest’s legitimacy, or the presence of political motives behind it, were largely absent.', 'This is not to argue that Meng is completely innocent of breaking American law. But it is important to note that the right to this extraterritorial behavior is asymmetric: only the United States is allowed to wield it “legitimately.” No other country, such as Malaysia, which is trying to recover 1MDB-related money from Goldman Sachs, can dare to act in this way. If other nations tired of U.S. judicial bullying – and there are many – start to retaliate by detaining Americans and citizens of its Western allies, things could become very messy, very quickly.', 'But Meng’s arrest leads to a different question. Despite protests to the contrary, the United States made a choice to escalate tensions by taking this action. Why?', 'Some have connected Meng’s arrest to the wider trade tensions between China and the United States. Huawei had already been accused by Western politicians of being a front for the Chinese government, and it has been denied access to Western markets. Given that technology is one of the few areas where the West is still clearly dominant, people have viewed this pressure as strategic economic leverage.', 'But this misses a more fundamental cause for the worries about China, which now spread beyond trade and economics. Articles about China’s technology and surveillance, such as its “social credit system,” worry about a techno-dystopia, despite similar surveillance being done in Western countries (and by their own tech companies). The United States has expressed concern about the activities of university students from China, while Australian politicians have spent months debating “foreign influence” in their domestic politics: a rather poorly veiled reference to China.', 'A good case study is Google’s cancelled re-entry into China with a Chinese-compliant version of Google search. This was met with controversy both by Western media and Google’s own employees. This is partly the company’s own fault, due to its loud and public withdrawal from China almost 10 years ago. But similar concessions by Google in smaller countries have not sparked such controversy; only China has. Interestingly, a Chinese version of Google might actually be of value to Chinese people, as local search engines like Baidu have been plagued with scandal, hoaxes, and frauds. But the fear that Western observers have about China means that this benefit could be denied them.', 'One could argue that this is part and parcel of the usual geopolitical conflict between an incumbent power and a rising one, or that they are merely representations of how the economic relationship between China and the West continues to change.', 'But the source of suspicion is deeper and often not spoken about. For a long time, “American exceptionalism” (and “Western exceptionalism” in general) has been based on the idea that the American or Western culture, way of life, and values are superior. One could perhaps see racial supremacist undertones in these beliefs as well. After all, these were the same sentiments that permeated the colonial era and were used to explain away or justify the shameful excesses of colonialism.', 'It is clear that neither the United States nor Europe is mentally prepared for the prospect of another country, especially a non-Western one, being successful, let alone overtaking the West. This is particularly true for China: a country long viewed as backward but which has now succeeded while following its own political, economic, and cultural model. For the first time in two centuries a non-Western nation with a wholly different political system is challenging the West, and this is causing great anguish.', '“American exceptionalism” is threatened when a country with different values does well. We first saw this in the 1980s: anti-Japan sentiment was sparked when Japanese companies started to buy American cultural symbols. This worry was reflected in American popular culture, best shown in any depiction of an American future dominated by Japanese companies. But this sentiment was nowhere near the level we can see today regarding China. Even the most liberal of Western media outlets have found it near impossible to portray China in a balanced way, finding it difficult to remove their inherent comfort with deep-rooted Western ideas and framings, and to confront their own prejudices.', 'The United States and the West by extension cannot accept China’s success on its own terms and this permeates almost all segments of society. This is one issue on which there is bipartisan support in the United States. The fear of China and the rest is real. They cannot just accept that China’s success says nothing about how Western countries should govern themselves. Instead, China’s model must be proven incorrect, by ignoring its successes in poverty reduction, education, and economic development and focusing on other issues.', 'There are hard lessons and warnings for here for developing countries, especially large ones finding their rightful place in the community of nations. People assume that the rise of other large developing nations, such as India, Indonesia, or Nigeria, will not be as disruptive as China’s, perhaps due to the belief that they would “balance” China or would not threaten to disrupt the international order. But this betrays a Western need to oppose China at all costs. Other countries need to be aware that they might be next if they begin to demand a say in world affairs. A rising India could be next.', 'If the roots of American-Chinese tensions come from something other than just geopolitics or economics, then the ascent of these large developing countries may not be as smooth as they hope. This would be due to the Western, U.S.-led opposition to the “rise of the others,” something the world has not seen in over two centuries. It is this that could well define and shape geopolitics in the 21st century. Denying that this sentiment exists and drives foreign policy would be to play into the hands of those who wish to preserve a Western world order at all costs.', 'One question many Americans asked themselves in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks was “Why do they hate us?” One wonders if people in China are asking themselves the same thing. They may not like the answer they get back.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Spiers-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

Kansas

HaSp

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaSp/Kansas-Harris-Spiers-Neg-Kentucky-Round5.docx

4e28a61f4d8c0118abac61446eebf3dea15fa9c34366c66c1844ca300df6218a

Executive action solves AI regulation.

Noone 16—(Feature Writer for Tech Monitor, MA in American Studies from King’s College London). Greg Noone. December 16, 2021. “Time might be running out for Joe Biden to tackle AI”. Tech Monitor.

there are measures Biden can take besides legislation. Agencies enjoy significant latitude in setting rules and regulations the D o T for example concerned itself mainly with driverless cars the FTC has authority to set consumer protections . could become the first point of contact with AI regulation in the U S

there are measures that the Biden administration can take besides legislation. Agencies of the federal government enjoy significant latitude in setting rules and regulations within their departmental purview their focus is fairly narrow : the D epartment o f T ransportation, for example , has concerned itself mainly with setting the guardrails for driverless cars and commercial drones . the Federal Trade Commission ( FTC ) has wide authority to set rules on consumer protections . The Federal Trade Commission could become the first point of contact with AI regulation in the U nited S tates Thierer can imagine a scenario where the Biden administration delegates a significant portion of rulemaking on commercial AI applications to the FTC

Biden administration Agencies of the federal government setting rules and regulations D o T driverless cars commercial drones FTC consumer protections first point of contact U S rulemaking commercial AI applications

['', 'If not, there are other measures that the Biden administration can take besides legislation. Agencies of the federal government enjoy significant latitude in setting rules and regulations within their departmental purview, says Adam Thierer of the Mercatus Institute. In most cases, their focus is fairly narrow: the Department of Transportation, for example, has concerned itself mainly with setting the guardrails for driverless cars and commercial drones. This is not the case for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), however, which has wide authority to set rules on consumer protections. And new chairperson Lina Khan has been outspoken in the past on the need for greater regulatory scrutiny of Big Tech.', '“The Federal Trade Commission could become the first point of contact with AI regulation in the United States,” says Thierer, citing the agency’s statement of concern about biased AI applications in April as well as its recent guidance on AI-assisted health and cybersecurity applications. As such, Thierer can imagine a scenario where the Biden administration delegates a significant portion of rulemaking on commercial AI applications to the FTC, “as opposed to having a big single overarching bill.”', '', '', 'T: Duties—', '']

[(0, 5), (6, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

460771f235b27f54df1b2c8eb9daddd0ef7444b4fdf3f8fc8e1195128ea846db

Food insecurity doesn’t cause war.

Vestby et al 18, *Jonas, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, **Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO, and ***Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU); and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography. (5/18/18, “Does hunger cause conflict?”, Climate & Conflict Blog, )

there is little merit in the notion a reduction in access to food increases conflict conflict requires people have the means and the will people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence there is misapprehension that social unrest relates to food shortages sources of discontent are more complex political structures land corruption desire for reforms and economic problems

there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence , whether against the government or other groups there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages In reality the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures , land ownership , corruption , the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

little scholarly merit increases conflict will break out means will brink of starvation not in the position to resort to violence social unrest food shortages In reality considerably more complex political structures land ownership corruption democratic reforms economic problems simple resource-related explanations more complex political relationships.

['It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.', 'Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.']

[(0, 6), (13, 15)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaPh-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-5.docx

Kansas

HaPh

b0d879a1eaf1bb327060fb97822069d0e3be1f19f7fc0b6110626b24804bfc57

*Expectations are sector-specific.

Jérémie Cohen-Setton & Martin Kessler 11, Cohen-Setton is a Research Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics; Kessler has been a research analyst with the Peterson Institute since September 2011 and works with Senior Fellow Arvind Subramanian and Visiting Fellow C. Randall Henning, “The uncertainty hypothesis,” Bruegel, 10-6-2011, https://www.bruegel.org/2011/10/the-uncertainty-hypothesis/

a paper found no ev uncertainty cause a decline in economic activity the divergence between prediction and real conjuncture conclude uncertainty does not cause wait-and-see regulations are sector-specific , and if they have an impact, it might be non-perceived

a NBER working paper found no ev idence that changes in uncertainty cause a wait-and-see effect , defined as a large decline in economic activity when uncertainty hits The economists used the Fed’s manufacturing survey since 1968 Using as an indicator the divergence between prediction and real conjuncture , they conclude that uncertainty does not cause a wait-and-see impact on production and employment regulations are sector-specific , and if they have an impact, it might be non-perceived at the macroeconomic level

NBER working paper no ev idence uncertainty wait-and-see effect indicator prediction real conjuncture uncertainty not cause a wait-and-see impact on production and employment sector-specific if non-perceived macroeconomic level

['In a recent NBER working paper, Ruediger Bachmann, Eric Sims, and Steffen Elstner found no evidence that changes in uncertainty cause a wait-and-see effect, defined as a large decline in economic activity when uncertainty hits followed later by fast rebounds. The economists used the Philadelphia Fed’s manufacturing survey since 1968 and the German Ifo business sentiment survey since 1980 and calculated uncertainty in various ways. Using as an indicator the divergence between prediction and real conjuncture, they conclude that uncertainty does not cause a wait-and-see impact on production and employment.', 'Policy and regulatory uncertainty', 'John Taylor makes the case against active interventionist policies. Stop all the interventions — the short-term discretionary fiscal stimulus packages and the massive quantitative easings and the operation twists of monetary policy. The unpredictability caused by these policies is causing uncertainty and holding the recovery back. Instead put in place more permanent reforms which will create economic recovery and return the economy to the kind of performance we saw in the 1980s and 1990s\xa0when rules-based, less interventionist policies were\xa0followed.', 'Robert Barro and Greg Mankiw argue that uncertainties on taxes and regulation reduce the returns of current investments. Mankiw points to the counterexample of the Reagan recovery in 1982, where non-residual fixed investment grew by 27% two years after the trough. As investment leads recoveries, taxes should be shifted to other bases to lower its cost. In a similar vein, Barro suggests establishing a VAT to lower the cost of capital.', 'Menzie Chinn, however, points that the “jobless recovery” does not seem to be an “investment-less recovery”: non-residential investment has rebounded faster than on average in other recessions (the Reagan recovery should be treated as a special case, precisely because of the particular macro and monetary environment at the time), whatever the metric used (from peak or from trough). The econometric relation between output and business investment is, if anything, more stable than in previous years.', 'Bruce Bartlett reports that, according to a BLS survey, the number of jobs involved mass lay-offs by companies citing new government regulations as a reason for is a mere 1% of the ones citing “lack of demand”. The number of small businesses reporting the regulatory environment as a problem is higher, but still accounts for less than half of the demand factor. Lawrence Michel, of the think tank EPI, adds that those concerns have always been high and roughly constant for small businesses, but that the lack of demand has suddenly risen as the main hurdle. Challenged by James Pethokoukis of the American Enterprise Institute, Michel further notes that investment in equipment and software during the 2009-2011 recovery has been more dynamic than in any of the four preceding ones.', 'Greg Ip argues regulations are sector-specific, and if they have an impact, it might be non-perceived at the macroeconomic level. They could also have a cost as part of a trade off (for example, in the case of the financial industry, a higher cost of capital against more financial stability).', '']

[(8, 22), (30, 40)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Landgraff-Wegener-Aff-Navy-Round6.docx

Northwestern

LaWe