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1e6b2b57468d248e3a805c0f62c7fef8156e4ba39b12e12ecf387ccfd7502ae0

The choice of even single words matters

Reeves 5 – Richard Reeves, Lecturer at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California “Words Matter in Politics”, The New Statesman, 1-24, http://www.newstatesman.com/200501240022

What's in a word? everything semantics are not the froth of politics, but its most important ingredients precise meaning of words is hardly trivial language shapes who we are words "do political work" words "frame" an issue in ways which virtually predetermine their reaction The choice of even single words can matter

What's in a word? In politics, everything Get the language right and you win arguments before they begin rhetoric and semantics are not the froth of politics, but its most important ingredients the precise meaning of words is hardly a trivial matter. language shapes who we are , it helps determine where we are going words "do political work" words "frame" an issue in people's minds in ways which virtually predetermine their reaction The choice of even single words can matter

most important ingredients the precise meaning of words is hardly a trivial matter. words "do political work" words "frame" an issue in people's minds virtually predetermine

['What\'s in a word? In politics, everything, argues Richard Reeves. Get the language right and you can win arguments before they begin. US Republicans know this, but new Labour still has much to learn Words get a bad press. On both sides of the principal divide in British politics - the one between the media and politicians - the use of language is a familiar target. Journalists accuse politicians of spouting mere "rhetoric"; MPs on the Today programme suggest that their interlocutor is playing at "semantics". Politicians are said to be all spin and no substance, hacks to be interested in the juiciest, rather than most apposite, quotations. Yet rhetoric and semantics are not the froth of politics, but its most important ingredients. There can be no politics without words. And the precise meaning of words - for example, in the phrase "a representative House of Lords" - is hardly a trivial matter. Labour - sorry, new Labour - is all too aware of the significance of words. "Language," Aristotle wrote in the Politics, "serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse . . . It is the peculiarity of man . . . that he alone possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and unjust." In other words, what makes a political community ("a city", as Aristotle called it) is the shared concepts of good and evil, right and wrong - and only through language can this sharing take place. This insight is as valuable in the modern world as in antiquity. Those who worry about a United States of Europe can stop fretting: the absence of a common language prevents a commonly articulated vision of Europe. The gap extends even to musical pitch. The note "A" is different in France, Germany and Britain, so musicians squabble when they play together - a clear-cut case, surely, for EU harmonisation. By contrast, the US, which is a more diverse social, economic and cultural region than Europe, has a sense of Americanness that depends vitally on linguistic unity. (Note that John Kerry\'s ability to speak French counted against him in last year\'s election.) If a nation is defined, in the Cornell University professor Benedict Anderson\'s terms, as a shared "imagined community", the role of a shared language in filling the imagination becomes clear. If language shapes who we are, it also helps to determine where we are going. As Norman Fairclough, author of New Labour, New Language? says, words "do political work". Words do not simply express an already perfectly formed idea; they often help to test, refine and develop an idea. Ideas and words are like a chicken and an egg. Labour\'s search for the right language is a good example of the way language can determine political action. Early in 1996, for example, it looked as if "stakeholding" would be Labour\'s big idea. Popularised by Will Hutton in his book The State We\'re In the previous year, it was at the heart of a speech by Tony Blair in Singapore. But, after a brief moment in the sun, it was replaced by "rights and responsibilities" and then "the Third Way". Philip Gould, Blair\'s disciple and polling guru, argues that while "the language of stakeholding has withered, the new approach underpinning it has prospered". But he underestimates the power of language. If Labour had stuck with stakeholding, some of its policies would almost certainly have been different. In Singapore, Blair said: "It is surely time to assess how we shift the emphasis in corporate ethos from the company being a mere vehicle for the capital market - to be traded, bought and sold as a commodity - towards a vision of the company as a community of partnership in which each employee has a stake." It is not possible to square these words - a "community . . . in which each employee has a stake" - with Labour\'s laissez-faire attitude in government to company law, structure and capital financing. Another critical intersection between language and politics is the way words "frame" an issue in people\'s minds - often in ways which virtually predetermine their reaction. George Lakoff, a US linguist and semi-hero in some Democratic circles, shows how brilliantly effective the Republicans have been at using language frames. His latest book is entitled Don\'t Think of an Elephant!: and the point is, you can\'t. Once the word has been uttered, the image of a big grey animal is unstoppably in your mind. The frame is in place. The Republicans understand this. Two of their most effective framing devices are the relabelling of tax cuts as "tax relief" and the invention of the term "partial-birth abortion". The first of these is a powerful metaphor. Once "relief" is added to tax, Lakoff points out, it becomes "an affliction. The person who takes it away is a hero, and anyone who tries to stop him is a bad guy." The Republicans use the phrase repeatedly: some right-wing think-tanks have swear-boxes for anyone who says "tax cut". Soon the media followed suit, referring to the Republicans\' "tax relief plan". And once the Democrats were using it, the game was pretty much over. "Should we have tax relief?" is a question that contains its own answer. Bush has similarly used the metaphor of not needing a "permission slip" to defend America - which frames the issue of multinational talks in such a way as to suggest that anyone taking the UN seriously is clearly a schoolchild asking for teacher\'s say-so. (Someone in Michael Howard\'s office has clearly read Lakoff, because he, too, used the term recently. The trouble is that it is American English, and no one knew what he was on about.) "Partial-birth abortion" refers to a rare procedure where the surgeon partly delivers the baby but leaves the head in the womb while he removes the brain. But if it is so rare - 1 per cent of all abortions - why all the right-wing fuss? "Because," as Lakoff notes, "it is the first step to ending all abortion. It puts out there a frame of abortion as a horrendous procedure, when most operations ending pregnancy are nothing like this." Paul Chilton, in his Analysing Political Discourse, calls these "ready-made moulds for the thinking of thoughts". So far British politicians - along with most US Democrats - are amateurs at this stuff. Yet perhaps the best reframing in recent UK politics was by the left, in the successful rebadging of the Tory community charge as a poll tax. Who could oppose a simple charge for something as lovely as a community? On the other hand, who could support a tax on such a fundamental democratic right as the vote? When Conservative ministers started to slip up and refer to "the poll tax" in media interviews, you knew the fight was over. Framing is going on all the time, whether consciously or not. Even apparently banal terms such as "welfare-dependent", "yobs" and (the current favourite) "hard-working families" carry with them a heavy load of assumptions and implications. The political right uses the term "nanny state" very effectively, with the frame carrying associations of bossiness, dependency and childishness. Once a Labour politician defensively says "it\'s not a question of the nanny state, but of . . .", the rest of the sentence is almost not worth bothering with. The damage has been done. The choice of even single words can matter. As Chilton points out, the meanings of the words kill, murder, assassinate and execute can be defined "in terms of stored frames in which different types of actor fill the agent and the victim roles, the killing is legal or not legal", and so on. Similarly, the question of whether a person receiving treatment in a hospital is a "patient", "client", "user" or "customer" is a hugely important semantic one. The chosen frame carries a range of implications for where power lies, how doctors should interact with people and how the success of medical institutions is defined.', '', '']

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ndtceda

Kentucky-RiSt-Neg-ADA-Round-1.docx

Kentucky

RiSt

0112e19245326fafdc1d34a656ccda4d71ec5a3be9d3832d51ca4e34e3f582e3

Alt cause: intensified pleading standards.

Bornstein 19, Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. (Stephanie, “Public-Private Co-Enforcement Litigation”, 104 Minn. L. Rev. 811, pg. 851-853)

For private plaintiffs a second obstacle : intensified pleading standards the Supreme Court the Supreme Court upped the ante for what a plaintiff must include survive a motion to dismiss the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that providers had conspired under Sherman As in the context of compelled arbitration the Court’s dissent argued this would limit private enforcement its holding applied beyond antitrust a standard has contributed to further subjectivity and confusion

For private plaintiffs seeking to enforce public law who are allowed to litigate another recent procedural development poses a second obstacle : intensified federal court pleading standards Around the same time as the Supreme Court began its move toward compelled arbitration , it made a significant procedural move toward requiring more from plaintiffs’ initial pleadings to begin a lawsuit. the U.S. Supreme Court upped the ante for what a plaintiff must include in a court pleading to survive a motion to dismiss , moving from a standard of “notice pleading” to a requirement of “plausible pleading.” in antitrust case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly the Court majority reinterpreted Conley and all of its subsequent precedent The Court established a new standard Applying this standard, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that telephone and internet service providers had conspired to set prices under the Sherman Act As in the context of compelled arbitration the Court’s dissent argued that this would limit private enforcement of public law that its holding in Twombly applied beyond antitrust matters to all federal pleadings a standard that has only contributed to further subjectivity and confusion for plaintiffs seeking to file federal lawsuits to enforce public

second obstacle intensified federal court pleading standards compelled arbitration significant procedural move more from plaintiffs’ initial pleadings survive a motion to dismiss antitrust reinterpreted dismissed providers had conspired Sherman Act in the context of compelled arbitration dissent limit private enforcement beyond further subjectivity confusion for plaintiffs

['', '2. Intensified Pleading Standards', 'For those private plaintiffs seeking to enforce public law who are allowed to litigate rather than compelled to arbitrate, another recent procedural development poses a second obstacle: intensified federal court pleading standards.206 Around the same time as the Supreme Court began its move toward increasingly compelled arbitration, it also made a significant procedural move toward requiring more from plaintiffs’ initial pleadings to begin a lawsuit.', 'Since 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted, Rule 8(a) had established a broad standard for complaints filed in federal court, referred to as “notice pleading.”207 As the Court described it in the 1957 case Conley v. Gibson, a plaintiff need only provide “a short and plain statement of the claim”208 showing that “the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.” 209 This broad standard served the goal of the Federal Rules “to do substantial justice,” 210 the Court explained, and established that a complaint should be dismissed only when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”211', 'In two cases decided in 2007 and 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court upped the ante for what a plaintiff must include in a court pleading to survive a motion to dismiss, moving from a standard of “notice pleading” to a requirement of “plausible pleading.”212 In 2007, in antitrust case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 213 the Court majority reinterpreted Conley and all of its subsequent precedent, reasoning that the “no set of facts” language in Conley had been misapplied: it was not meant to create a “minimum standard of adequate pleading” but, instead to “describe[] the breadth” of possible proof for an “adequate complaint.”214 The Court established a new standard for Rule 8(a): a complaint pleaded with enough facts to “plausibly suggest[]” rather than be “merely consistent with” the plaintiff’s alleged claims.215 Applying this standard, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that telephone and internet service providers had conspired to set prices under the federal Sherman Act because their complaint failed to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”216 As it did in the context of compelled arbitration,217 the Court’s dissent argued that this changed standard would limit private enforcement of public law. Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens explained that Congress’s choice to allow for treble damages and attorneys’ fees in the Sherman Act showed “inten[t] to encourage . . . private enforcement of the law,”218 which made it especially important to “not add requirements to burden the private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Congress.”219', 'Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 220 the Court clarified that its holding in Twombly applied beyond antitrust matters to all federal pleadings when it dismissed the civil rights claims of a Pakistani detainee alleging abuse in federal custody for failing to meet the new “plausibility” standard.221 The Court elaborated on its Twombly test, describing it as a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense”222—a standard that has only contributed to further subjectivity and confusion for plaintiffs seeking to file federal lawsuits to enforce public law. Justice Souter, who had sided with the majority in Twombly, authored the Iqbal dissent, in which he criticized the majority for reading the pleadings so narrowly as to “den[y] [plaintiff] Iqbal a fair chance to be heard . . . .”223', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-Peter-Revare-Neg-1%20-%20Harvard-Round5.docx

Kansas

PeRe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/PeRe/Kansas-Peter-Revare-Neg-1%2520-%2520Harvard-Round5.docx

4d4c3777fd9eeb62ef1e7a16aea79788d65f1d9b285951e79d63a604a21860f5

The plan has to bestow personhood. It’s a fundamental requirement for the provision of rights and duties.

Dyschkant 15, PhD in Philosophy (Alexis, “LEGAL PERSONHOOD: HOW WE ARE GETTING IT WRONG,” 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 2075)

What it means to be a person is fundamental to the law The term "person" bears special meaning legal persons are the sole bearers of rights and duties

What it means to be a legal person is fundamental to any understanding of the law The term "person" bears special meaning legal persons are the sole bearers of rights and duties the key element of legal personhood seems to be the ability to bear rights and duties

legal persons sole bearers

['', 'What it means to be a legal person is fundamental to any understanding of the law. The term "person" bears special meaning in the U.S. Constitution, 1 in order to make contracts or hold property you must be a legal person, 2 and most importantly legal persons are the sole bearers of rights and duties. 3 While there is disagreement about how precisely to formulate a definition of legal personhood, the key element of legal personhood seems to be the ability to bear rights and duties. 4 Black\'s Law Dictionary defines a legal person as an entity "given certain legal rights and duties of a human being; a being, real or imaginary, who for the purpose of legal reasoning is treated more or less as a human being." 5']

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ndtceda

Kansas-HaSo-Neg-Texas-Round-3.docx

Kansas

HaSo

c507a08ca768011a81debf467043d75211c14a2e9d3eaf18fa4aac3b19b782d6

Refusing treaty activism frees the US from the obligations it has to tribes and reconfigures power in favor of colonial governance.

Matson 18 – 2014 magna cum laude graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School. She also holds a PhD in Geography, Environment, and Society (Laura, "Multiple Sovereigns and Transient Resources: Contested Ecosystems and Expanding Tribal Jurisdiction in the Great Lakes Region." (2018).

Treaty Rights as Sovereign Rights tribes and GLIFWC had been so successful at asserting tribes’ treaty-protected practices rights had come to be interpreted as synonymous with gathering when treaties were about sovereignty Anishinaabe leaders sovereignty precedes the treaties and relationships with the settler state They made strategic decisions through treaties to relinquish certain rights to the United States in exchange for certain grants But they never ceded sovereign authority to make decisions on behalf of their own communities tribal sovereignty exists independent of federal structure, but must function in relation to it The first treaties, were creation, the universe, the clan systems treaties established obligations and responsibilities foundation of a selfregulatory system While rights delineated in the treaties may have been the rights to gather what was intended was preservation of responsibility to Anishinaabe people Bands use all of the tools available to them litigation was bolstered by traditional practices court cases not as a recognition of own authority, but a limits of the states’ authority These court decisions do not grant anything the tribes did not already possess they hold the states and the federal government to obligations and responsibilities Bands do not root their jurisdictional authority in the treaties themselves that authority predates relationships with the U.S. Rather court decisions bind governments to recognize that this authority exists

Treaty Rights as Sovereign Rights policy analyst stated that the tribes and GLIFWC had been so successful at asserting the tribes’ treaty-protected practices (hunting, fishing, gathering treaty rights had come to be interpreted by courts and the public as synonymous with hunting, fishing, and gathering , when really treaties were about sovereignty Anishinaabe leaders in the region have consistently maintained that their sovereignty precedes and exceeds the treaties and their relationships with the settler state . They made strategic decisions through the treaties to relinquish certain rights to the United States in exchange for certain grants But they never ceded their sovereign authority to make decisions on behalf of their own communities tribal sovereignty exists independent of the federal structure, but by necessity must function in relation to it The first treaties, he noted, were those of creation, the universe, the clan systems treaties established the obligations and responsibilities that are the foundation of a selfregulatory system and are taught through stories and reminders of how to maintain the whole structure of creation What was established in the written treaties was an agreement for respecting other sovereigns and taking responsibility for one another clashing. While the specific rights delineated in the treaties may have been the rights to hunt, fish, and gather , the Elder contended that what was intended in reserving them was actually the preservation of a way of life, embodied by a collective responsibility to the resources and Anishinaabe people Bands had to use all of the tools available to them to preserve that way of life, and that the litigation was just one of those tools, but was bolstered by the spiritual and traditional practices that guided the communities throughout the walleye conflicts. any tribal leaders view the court cases not as a recognition of their own authority, but a recognition of the limits of the states’ authority These court decisions do not grant anything that the tribes did not already possess ; but they do hold the states and the federal government to their obligations and responsibilities The Bands discussed above do not root their own jurisdictional or legal authority in the treaties themselves — that authority predates the treaties and any relationships with the U.S. Rather , the federal court decisions , and the treaties themselves, are useful because the bind the States and federal governments to recognize that this authority exists .

Treaty Rights as Sovereign Rights tribes and GLIFWC had been so successful at asserting tribes’ treaty-protected practices rights had come to be interpreted as synonymous with gathering when treaties were about sovereignty Anishinaabe leaders sovereignty precedes the treaties and relationships with the settler state They made strategic decisions through certain rights to the United States in exchange for certain grants But they never ceded their sovereign authority to make decisions on behalf of their own communities tribal sovereignty exists must function in relation to it The first treaties, he noted, were those of creation, the universe, the clan systems treaties established While rights delineated in the treaties may have been the rights to gather what was intended was responsibility to litigation court cases not as a recognition of own authority, but a limits of the states’ authority These court decisions do not grant anything that the tribes did not already possess ; but they do hold the states and the federal government to their obligations and responsibilities Bands do not root their relationships with the U.S. Rather , the federal court decisions , and the treaties themselves, are useful because the bind the States and federal governments to recognize that this authority exists .

['The minute you start to write … it…, you limit it”: Treaty Rights as Sovereign Rights', 'In an interview with staff members at GLIFWC, a policy analyst stated that the tribes and GLIFWC had been so successful at asserting the tribes’ treaty-protected practices (hunting, fishing, gathering), that treaty rights had come to be interpreted by courts and the public as synonymous with hunting, fishing, and gathering, when really treaties were about sovereignty. In these recent cases, the Courts tend to more narrowly focus on reserved usufructuary rights and only broadly touch on the foundational relationship upon which the United States acknowledged the tribes as legitimate negotiating partners. Anishinaabe leaders in the region have consistently maintained that their sovereignty precedes and exceeds the treaties and their relationships with the settler state. They made strategic decisions through the treaties to relinquish certain rights to the United States—such as the right to occupancy in the ceded territories—in exchange for certain grants. But they never ceded their sovereign authority to make decisions on behalf of their own communities.', '', ' Thus tribal sovereignty exists independent of the federal structure, but by necessity must function in relation to it. When tribes have acceded to the jurisdiction of the federal courts and federal government, legal scholar Matthew L.M. Fletcher argues that they have merely consented to that jurisdiction, and not to the wholesale absorption of their sovereignty into the federalist structure.', 'I had the privilege of attending an inter-tribal meeting of resource managers and community leaders in January of 2017, during which a discussion arose about what treaty rights meant to each of the participants. As they went around the table, a number of the speakers highlighted Anishinaabe values of taking only what one needs, providing for family and community, upholding the tradition of a respectful relationship with the animals and plants that are harvested. Some expressed frustration that young people thought of treaty rights as only related to hunting and fishing. A Chairman from one of the member Bands emphasized that treaty rights were much more than that. Treaty rights are about “sovereignty, nationhood, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”', 'An Elder from another band spoke in detail about how the rights reserved in the treaties were far more than what was written on the paper in the mid-1800s. The first treaties, he noted, were those of creation, the universe, the clan systems. These first treaties established the obligations and responsibilities that are the foundation of a selfregulatory system and are taught through stories and reminders of how to maintain the whole structure of creation. What was established in the written treaties was an agreement for respecting other sovereigns and taking responsibility for one another. But those agreements are now understood to be a place where different sets of values are clashing. While the specific rights delineated in the treaties may have been the rights to hunt, fish, and gather, the Elder contended that what was intended in reserving them was actually the preservation of a way of life, embodied by a collective responsibility to the resources and Anishinaabe people. A former tribal chairman and one of the leaders of the treaty spearing movement in Wisconsin in the 1980s and 1990s, argued that the Bands had to use all of the tools available to them to preserve that way of life, and that the litigation was just one of those tools, but was bolstered by the spiritual and traditional practices that guided the communities throughout the walleye conflicts.', 'While the courts weigh the degree to which the tribes’ authority may be recognized in regulating treaty resources, many tribal leaders view the court cases not as a recognition of their own authority, but a recognition of the limits of the states’ authority. These court decisions do not grant anything that the tribes did not already possess; but they do hold the states and the federal government to their obligations and responsibilities under the agreements that were signed and validated by the U.S.’s own laws and constitutional mandates.', 'There remains an anxiety among some tribal leaders, though, that the mandates and requirements for demonstrating regulatory capacity that were established in the preceding cases further impinge sovereign practice. As one Elder argued at that meeting, “The minute you start writing down what [sovereignty] means, you start limiting it. Writing these codes starts to limit tribal sovereignty.” This tension is something that Band members throughout the region are working to reconcile. While the trappings of data collection and record sharing and harvest regulations bolster Bands’ legal arguments and bargaining position with state and federal agencies, there is, for some, a tangible loss in the Bands’ ability to govern themselves as they see fit. Further, the fact that the LCO cases were only litigated through the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, means that the very particularized regulatory holdings in those cases are not binding upon the states of Michigan (which is in the Sixth Federal Circuit) or Minnesota (in the Eighth Circuit). While the Mille Lacs cases lay out broadly similar mandates for state/tribal comanagement,237 the jurisdictional structure of the federal court system poses challenges for establishing a common inter-tribal regulatory framework that exists throughout the ceded territories, and resists giving undue credit to the “artificial boundaries of the states.”', 'Even in the aftermath of the Mille Lacs case, the State of Minnesota continues to fine Band members exercising their treaty rights in the 1855 ceded territories, calling to mind Vine Deloria’s proposition that court holdings dealing with Indian tribes are inconsistently interpreted as over-inclusive when they deal with rules restricting Indian behavior238 or under-inclusive when they recognize Indian’s rights.239 While the 1855 signatory Bands are awaiting an opportunity to litigate the cases of members ticketed for harvesting in the ceded territories, the State has strategically declined to prosecute Band members, and thus the next phase in treaty-rights litigation in the state remains a future prospect. Meanwhile, a number of Bands have codified reserved treaty rights in their own ordinances as an expression of their sovereign authority. The Fond du Lac Band’s Ordinance for Gathering in the 1837 and 1842 Ceded Territory, for instance, establishes that the Band’s regulatory code is enacted “pursuant to the inherent sovereign authority of the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, as reserved under the Treaty of LaPointe…”240 The Mille Lacs Band goes farther, drawing upon its sovereign authority to hold the U.S. accountable to its duties under the treaties. Title 2 of the Mille Lacs Band’s Statutes include a section on treaty rights, which reflects the U.S. governments obligations: “The Band Assembly hereby declares that the United States of America is possessed of a legal and moral obligation to guarantee usufructuary rights of members of the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians by virtue of Congress ratification of the Treaty of 1837.”', 'Shiri Pasternak argues that jurisdiction is “the authority to have authority”, which means that “the very substance of what authorizes law is at stake.”242 The Bands discussed above do not root their own jurisdictional or legal authority in the treaties themselves—that authority predates the treaties and any relationships with the U.S. They likewise do not recognize the federal court decisions as granting them authority or extending authority to them. Rather, the federal court decisions, and the treaties themselves, are useful because the bind the States and federal governments to recognize that this authority exists. And, as we’ll see in the following chapters, that recognition compels the states to account for tribal jurisdiction and authority in regulatory and administrative decision-making throughout the ceded territories.']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-CaVa-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-2.docx

Dartmouth

CaVa

daa217f9f02f50c5b97ff1728ea0e6df7c1c2c025ea4332e1628fa6b66a67d97

FU decks solvency.

Bruce G. Blair et al. 18, PhD, Research Scholar, Program on Science & Global Security, Princeton. Co-Founder, Global Zero; Jessica Sleight, Senior Policy Associate, Global Zero. Former Research Associate, Japan Policy Research Institute. Former Research Associate, Nautilus Institute for Security & Sustainability; Emma Claire Foley, MA, Research & Policy Assistant, Global Zero, "Executive Summary," in The End of Nuclear Warfighting: Moving to a Deterrence-Only Posture, 2018, pg. 7-8.

risks of a failure remain high due to chronic neglect of C3 and strong operational inclination of strategy toward preemptive strikes strengthening “connectivity” of forces is crucial transition vastly reduce scope of current plans, promote more robust and reliable C3 and allow substantial sums of money to be re-allocated

shift to a deterrence-only nuclear strategy with its commitment to retaliation implies top priority in modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be strengthening the resilience and survivability of C3 networks risks of a failure of control remain unnecessarily high due to the chronic neglect of C3 networks and the strong operational inclination of strategy toward preemptive strikes modernization strengthening the “connectivity” of leadership and far-flung nuclear forces is crucial to ensuring the credibility of a deterrence-only strategy an immense but surmountable challenge transition to a deterrence-only strategy would vastly reduce the scope of current plans, promote building a more robust and reliable C3 system to support post-attack operations, and allow substantial sums of money to be re-allocated to pressing security needs

deterrence-only commitment modernizing strengthening C3 networks control chronic neglect of C3 networks strong operational inclination of strategy toward preemptive strikes “connectivity” crucial credibility immense but surmountable vastly reduce the scope more robust and reliable substantial re-allocated

['A shift to a deterrence-only nuclear strategy with its commitment to retaliation implies that the top priority in modernizing the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be strengthening the resilience and survivability of C3 networks. Elements of these vulnerable networks still use 1950s technology and are in desperate need of upgrades. Care must be taken to ensure that the president can order nuclear use reliably in response to enemy nuclear attack (positive control) and that such forces cannot be used without direct presidential authorization or through a series of accidents, C3 disruption, or other circumstances (negative control). The risks of a failure of either type of control remain unnecessarily high due to the chronic neglect of C3 networks and the strong operational inclination of current strategy toward preemptive strikes and prompt launch on warning. C3 modernization strengthening the “connectivity” of the leadership and the far-flung nuclear forces is crucial to ensuring the credibility of a deterrence-only strategy that requires the ability to respond after absorbing a large-scale enemy strike. This is an immense but surmountable challenge.', 'Another major benefit of adopting this strategy is that it would afford the opportunity to scale down current plans for U.S. nuclear modernization. The United States could fully support the strategy with a monad composed of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). Five new submarines would suffice if, as would be certain in any real conflict, conventional and cyber forces were mixed with nuclear forces in programming attack assignments. This transition would also entail a reduction in U.S. deployed nuclear warheads from the current level of 2,000 on multiple different platforms to less than 700 warheads on the five SSBNs (see Table 1).', '[Table omitted]', 'Almost all of the existing forces and the rest of the new nuclear-weapon programs in the modernization pipeline—including seven additional new SSBNs beyond the five called for by this report, the existing 400 silo-based intercontinental-range missiles slated for replacement, 100 new and 75 old heavy long-range bombers, and the tactical nuclear weapons delivered by dual-capable aircraft—would become superfluous and subject to cancellation.', 'A transition to a deterrence-only strategy would thus vastly reduce the scope of current modernization plans, promote building a more robust and reliable C3 system to support post-attack operations, and allow substantial sums of money to be re-allocated to more pressing non-nuclear defense and security needs.', '']

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ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Aff-NDT-Round-6.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

2697ec234cf2db861072ba340ea637dc01bc15ecd5d8d86418c073b3385ef8c7

NC3 hacks are logistically impossible — we control them with floppy disks.

Fung, 16 — Brian Fung; Reporter focusing on telecommunications, media, and competition—MSc, international relations. Citing Maj. General Jack Weinstein. (5-26-2016; "The real reason America controls its nukes with ancient floppy disks,” Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/05/26/the-real-reason-america-controls-its-nukes-with-ancient-floppy-disks/; //GrRv)

America’s nuclear arsenal depends on the floppy disk. floppy disks run Strategic Automated C C a communications network the Pentagon uses to issue launch orders and share intel low-tech is safer tech. America’s nuclear forces are disconnected from digital networks acts as a buffer against hackers older systems provide huge safety Cyber engineers found out that the system is extremely secure the way it's developed. We're not up on the Internet. obsolete systems can serve a valuable purpose.

America’s nuclear arsenal depends on relic of the 1970s the floppy disk. The floppy disks help run what’s known as the Strategic Automated C ommand and C ontrol System, a n important communications network that the Pentagon uses to issue launch orders to commanders and to share intel ligence . low-tech is safer tech. The fact that America’s nuclear forces are disconnected from digital networks acts as a buffer against hackers older systems provide huge safety when it comes to cyber issues Cyber engineers found out that the system is extremely safe and extremely secure on the way it's developed. We're not up on the Internet. the rise of hackers and cyberwarfare is exactly why even technologically obsolete systems can still serve a valuable purpose.

relic of the 1970s floppy disk. communications network issue launch orders share intel ligence low-tech is safer tech. disconnected from digital networks buffer huge safety cyber issues extremely safe extremely secure not up on the Internet. obsolete systems valuable purpose.

["America’s nuclear arsenal depends on a surprising relic of the 1970s that few of us may recall: the humble floppy disk. It’s hard to believe these magnetic, 8-inch data storage devices are what’s propping up the most fearsome weapons humanity has ever created. But the Department of Defense is still relying on this technology to coordinate key strategic forces such as nuclear bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles, according to a new government report. The floppy disks help run what’s known as the Strategic Automated Command and Control System, an important communications network that the Pentagon uses to issue launch orders to commanders and to share intelligence. And in order to use the floppy disks, the military must also maintain a collection of IBM Series/1 computers that to most people would look more at home in a museum than in a missile silo. This isn’t the first time we’ve heard about the military’s reliance on seemingly archaic tech: back in 2014, U.S. nuclear warriors showed CBS’s “60 Minutes” one of the top-secret floppy disks that helps it store and transmit sensitive information across dozens of communications sites. So to hear from the Government Accountability Office that the Pentagon has still not phased out the technology — and doesn’t plan to until the end of fiscal year 2017 — is remarkable. Still, there is a major reason — other than simply being behind the times — for the military's continued use of floppies: Sometimes, it says, low-tech is safer tech. ", "That may come as a surprise at a time when digital technologies have almost completely superseded analog ones — heck, some companies literally give away USB flash drives these days because they’re so cheap. It highlights the yawning gulf between consumers and government. President Obama has highlighted that as a problem he wants to solve. The White House has pushed strongly to use technology more widely in government. From opening up stores of public data to creating a whole website for Internet petitions, President Obama has tried to make government more tech-savvy. And yet it’s still not enough. Speaking at the South By Southwest Interactive festival in Austin earlier this year — marking another first for the White House — Obama’s pitch to geeks and coders was simple: Join us. “The reason I'm here is really to recruit all of you,” he said. Data from Carnegie Mellon University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology show how difficult it is for government to attract top tech talent. In 2015, only 1.1 percent of MIT graduates took jobs in government. Of that year’s graduates at Carnegie Mellon, only a handful took jobs at government agencies — and all of those were abroad, in places such as Singapore and South Korea. Colleges and universities are also coming up short in terms of training America’s next generation of digital warfighters. Information security training is not required at any of the nation’s top-10 computer science programs. The sluggish talent pipeline doesn’t make the Pentagon’s task of tripling the U.S. Cyber Command’s workforce any easier, either. The military’s investments in cybersecurity illustrate how some parts of the Department of Defense have made deep commitments to technology, even as other parts, such as America’s nuclear forces, have lagged behind. The U.S. Navy and Air Force are both highly interested in autonomous drones. Unmanned vehicles have the potential to lurk quietly underwater and survey the enemy, or to supplement human pilots in the air. But high-profile examples have also arisen showing how the military can regard technology too optimistically, revealing some of the risks of embracing it. For example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was envisioned as a flexible, all-purpose craft that could suitably serve every branch of the U.S. military. Instead, it’s become a costly, time-consuming experiment that — according to multiple reports over the years — doesn’t even work. Its parts wear out before they’re supposed to. It can’t defeat older planes in dogfights. It’s vulnerable to hacking. And that’s before the fighter has ever encountered any real enemies. There are parallels here to fiction, which can be just as instructive. In the 2004 hit TV series “Battlestar Galactica,” humanity comes under assault from robots that it created. Much of the human space fleet is taken by surprise, crippled by a robot-built computer virus that spreads from ship to ship thanks to the sophisticated networks linking the crafts together. The Galactica, an obsolete warship due to be mothballed, is one of the few to survive the initial surprise attack. Why? Because the Galactica’s systems were not part of the humans’ IT network, sparing it from the virus that disables the rest of the fleet. The lesson seems clear: Sometimes, newer is not better. ", "As it happens, a similar logic underpins the U.S. military’s continued use of floppy disks. The fact that America’s nuclear forces are disconnected from digital networks actually acts as a buffer against hackers. As Maj. General Jack Weinstein told CBS’s “60 Minutes” in 2014: Jack Weinstein: I'll tell you, those older systems provide us some -- I will say huge safety when it comes to some cyber issues that we currently have in the world. Lesley Stahl: Now, explain that. Weinstein: A few years ago we did a complete analysis of our entire network. Cyber engineers found out that the system is extremely safe and extremely secure on the way it's developed. Stahl: Meaning that you're not up on the Internet kind of thing? Weinstein: We're not up on the Internet. Stahl: So did the cyber people recommend you keep it the way it is? Weinstein: For right now, yes. In other words, the rise of hackers and cyberwarfare is exactly why even technologically obsolete systems can still serve a valuable purpose.", '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-KoLe-Neg-8---NDT-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

KoLe

d9299ab6582e91ea15e69ff30e86d14ba480aca1b8bdebded4399b0290f8bf2f

The IAEA is effective at inducing cooperation and preventing the spread of nukes.

Rafael Mariano Grossi 21. Director General of the IAEA. “The NPT and the IAEA’s critical role in steering nuclear towards peaceful uses.” https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/the-npt-and-the-iaeas-critical-role-in-steering-nuclear-towards-peaceful-uses.

NPT legal framework nations steer nuclear science towards peace development away from nuc s the centrepiece of global efforts prevent spread promotes cooperation peaceful uses seeks disarm IAEA safeguards fundamental pillar of non-prolifer safeguards strengthening coop

the NPT has been the international legal framework by which nations have worked to steer the use of nuclear science and technology towards peace and development away from developing nuc lear weapon s NPT is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons promotes cooperation peaceful uses of nuclear applications and seeks nuclear disarm ament IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-prolifer ation regime under the NPT role in nuclear safeguards strengthening coop eration with countries

NPT centrepiece promotes cooperation peaceful uses fundamental pillar safeguards coop eration

['Since the dawn of the nuclear age in the middle of the 20th century, the possibilities for the atom have been two-sided like a coin: one face held the destructive power of nuclear weapons; the other, the limitless potential of peaceful nuclear applications. Since its entry into force in 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been the international legal framework by which nations have worked to steer the use of nuclear science and technology towards peace and development, and away from developing nuclear weapons. The NPT is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It promotes cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear applications and seeks nuclear disarmament. The IAEA is named several times in past review conferences of the Treaty, including as one of the main vehicles that fosters international cooperation for peaceful nuclear applications (Article IV) and as the organization explicitly entrusted with key nuclear verification responsibilities (Article III). In January 2022, the NPT, so critical to maintaining world peace over half a century, will be under the spotlight at its Tenth Review Conference. To mark the occasion the IAEA Bulletin delves into ways the Agency’s work is directly relevant to its implementation. This edition of the Bulletin explores the many benefits of peaceful nuclear applications with examples from Viet Nam and Bangladesh. We highlight how Indonesia champions nuclear South-South collaboration and touch on new IAEA initiatives such as ZODIAC, for addressing zoonotic disease outbreaks, and NUTEC Plastics, for tackling plastic pollution. It examines nuclear safety and security in Moldova, describes the IAEA’s low-enriched uranium bank in Kazakhstan, and shows how we are building capacity for managing nuclear emergencies. More than 400 IAEA projects have been made possible by funds raised through the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), which originated from a proposal made during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Since then, PUI has raised more than €200 million to help expand IAEA support to Member States in areas such as health care, agriculture, energy development and more. IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime under the NPT. The Bulletin also reviews the Agency’s role in nuclear safeguards; profiles its close collaboration with Tajikistan, and explains the importance of COMPASS, our initiative strengthening cooperation with countries; and brings attention to our support in establishing nuclear weapon free zones. Having up-to-date safeguards agreement in place is important not only for those that use nuclear power, but also for countries with little to no nuclear material, such as those with Small Quantities Protocol (SQP). I call on states with the SQPs based on old standard text to amend or rescind them and encourage all NPT States parties that have not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol (AP).']

[(15, 21), (22, 24)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-1---NUSO-Round-3.docx

Emory

MiPi

757bbd6bcf27ed0129f6ea562631d9e602065625d6e170fc725ea19033b6217d

Terrorism isn’t existential.

Walt 16 Stephen M. Walt, international relations professor at Harvard University. [My Top 5 Foreign-Policy Unicorns — and Why I Want to Kill Them, 9-8-2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/08/my-top-5-foreign-policy-unicorns-and-why-i-want-to-kill-them/]//BPS

Osama made extravagant threats they never come close to toppling a government, winning millions or threatening life majority are incompetent even the best short of genius . They stage small attacks that cause modest harm incapable of orchestrating complicated op s none poses existential threat

Osama and Abu made extravagant and dire threats they ’ve never come close to toppling a foreign government, winning millions of followers, or threatening our way of life the vast majority of contemporary terrorists are incompetent misfits even the best of them fall well short of evil genius . They stage small -scale attacks that cause modest amounts of harm they repeatedly show themselves incapable of orchestrating complicated op eration s A few terrorists are moderately clever; most are not. None rises to the level of a “mastermind,” and none poses an existential threat

extravagant dire threats the vast majority incompetent misfits fall well short of evil genius small -scale attacks modest amounts of harm incapable orchestrating complicated op eration s none poses an existential threat

['3. The terrorist mastermind. A close cousin to the nuclear rogue is the terrorist mastermind, busily concocting elaborate and highly destructive plots to bring the world to its knees. People like Osama bin Laden and Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi have made extravagant and dire threats, but the good news is that they’ve never come close to toppling a foreign government, winning millions of followers, or threatening our way of life. I don’t deny that some terrorist groups have devised and executed successful assaults — of which the 9/11 attacks were by far the most damaging — but a word like “mastermind” conjures up images of Dr. Evil-style villains who will inevitably outwit our feeble efforts to stop them and unleash fearsome destruction on an innocent world. In fact, as John Mueller and others keep reminding us, the vast majority of contemporary terrorists are incompetent misfits, and even the very best of them fall well short of evil genius. They can and do stage small-scale attacks that cause modest amounts of harm, but they have repeatedly shown themselves to be incapable of orchestrating complicated operations that could actually bring a stable country to its knees. There have been serious terrorist attacks in Boston; London; Paris; Brussels; Orlando, Florida; and several other places in recent years, for example — yet in each case, these societies proved resilient, and they are thriving again today. Or just look at New York City, which suffered the worst single attack ever and has since fully recovered. Terrorism is a problem, the lives lost to it are an unfortunate tragedy, and those who employ it are dangerous criminals. A few terrorists are moderately clever; most are not. None rises to the level of a “mastermind,” and none poses an existential threat. Reporters, pundits, and speechwriters should drop this term from their lexicon, because this particular animal doesn’t exist. Fortunately.', '', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-8---ADA-Round-1.docx

Kansas

MaPa

674cc99d36cc0eca8440e9b1e9c01b1a91dabc513b9f68aa7caae9d2b1edea8f

The US deterrent is incredible.

Dr. Min-hyung Kim 23, PhD, Professor, Political Science, Kyung Hee University, "Under What Conditions Would South Korea Go Nuclear? Seoul’s Strategic Choice on Nuclear Weapons," Pacific Focus, Vol. 38, No. 3, pg. 421, December 2023, Wiley Online Library.

extended deterrence to allies is not popular exposes to dangers as well as free ride cred is a major problem for So Ko growing voice U S will not sacrifice American cities to defend Seoul fears increased since No Ko improved capabilities question cred worries over Russia in Ukraine dramatically illuminates limits on U.S. counter-escalation

providing an extended deterrence to US allies is not popular with the American public it exposes the U S to significant dangers as well as costs and permits protected states to a free ride cred ibility is a major problem with US extended deterrence US security assurances for So Ko are not an exception there is a growing voice in security circles that the U S will not sacrifice American cities to defend Seoul against conventional as well as nuclear weapons attacks from No Ko fears of abandonment increased since No Ko declared that it had completed its nuclear and ICBM capabilities improved nuclear capabilities raise a question about the cred ibility of US extended deterrence worries over the use of Russia n nukes in the Ukraine war dramatically illuminates the limits on U.S. counter-escalation when facing a nuclearized opponent

extended deterrence not popular exposes U S cred ibility major problem So Ko growing voice U S not sacrifice American cities to defend Seoul No Ko increased No Ko raise a question cred ibility use of Russia n nukes Ukraine dramatically illuminates limits on U.S. counter-escalation

['The United States typically provides security guarantees to its allies via an extended deterrence. However, providing an extended deterrence to US allies is not always popular with the American public. The main reason is that it exposes the United States to significant dangers (e.g., entrapment) as well as costs and permits protected states to a free ride.60 As such, credibility is a major problem with US extended deterrence. The US security assurances via an extended deterrence for South Korea are not an exception, In South Korea, there is currently a growing voice in security circles that the United States will not sacrifice American cities to defend Seoul against the conventional as well as nuclear weapons attacks from North Korea, which is capable of launching nuclear-armed ICBMs.61 South Korea’s fears of abandonment from the United States have increased since North Korea declared that it had completed its nuclear and ICBM capabilities. Even Dartmouth professors Lind and Press contend that North Korea’s improved nuclear capabilities raise a question about the credibility of US extended deterrence.62 Unequivocally, NATO’s worries over the use of Russian nukes in the ongoing Ukraine war dramatically illuminates the “potential limits on U.S. counter-escalation when facing a nuclearized opponent.”63']

[(14, 20)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-BiGa-Aff-Minnesota-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

BiGa

8726aa031133751b8c19079475b14e3aac401eff5f860b14431fa11902b10d16

No emerging tech impacts – gradualism and hype.

Sechser 19 – Todd S. Sechser, Public Policy Professor at the University of Virginia. Neil Narang, Political Science Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Caitlin Talmadge, Security Studies Professor at Georgetown University. [Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42(6), Taylor and Francis]

history counsels against alarmism tech do not live up to promise , and have countervailing effects that temper consequences few reshape conflict innovations amounted to increment some disappeared despite hype techn take decades easy to exaggerate effects today’s tech have under some conditions stabilis factors mediate effects geography material power domestic politics

the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism tech nologies do not live up to their promise , and have countervailing or conditional effects that temper their negative consequences the fear emerging technologies will cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict most technological innovations amounted to increment al advancements some disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change war Yet turned out to be less practical , easier to counter , and less effective even when techn ologies do have significant strategic consequences , they take decades to emerge , as airplanes and tanks illustrate it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies even if today’s emerging tech nologies drive important changes in the international system, they have variegated and even contradictory effects . Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions , but stabilis ing in others other factors mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography material power , military strategy , domestic and organisational politics , and social and cultural variables

the history technological revolutions their promise countervailing or conditional effects their negative consequences emerging technologies sudden and spectacular changes caution fundamentally reshape most technological innovations disappeared into irrelevance widespread hype about their promise chemical weapons widely expected immediately change less practical easier to counter less effective even when significant strategic consequences decades to emerge exaggerate strategic effects nascent technologies even if important changes variegated even contradictory effects destabilising some conditions stabilis ing in others other factors the effects of new technologies geography material power military strategy domestic and organisational politics social and cultural variables

['Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect.', 'First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7', 'Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9', '']

[(0, 7), (8, 10)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeLo-Neg-ADA-Doubles.docx

Emory

HeLo

204cc071dca4c19c27409f68ce808bcaa3c228cc879cdeb83dc1c484406380f9

CCP threats are irrelevant---Xi’s threats are manufactured AND overblown.

Weiss ’23 [Jessica Chen; March 21; Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University, senior advisor to the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholar; “Don’t Panic About Taiwan,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-chinese-invasion-dont-panic]

Fears China invade Taiwan overblown little evidence Chinese see window for action domestic challenges moderated Chinese fo po authoritarian less likely to initiate crises in unrest choose other means to quell discontent Chinese given few signs Xi C C P sought to project confidence and patience engaged in harsh saber rattling , but avoid outright war China only fight battles it is sure of winning CCP reiterated peaceful reunification Even hawkish major general cautioned against nationalist agitation Taiwan by force too costly

Fears China will invade Taiwan are overblown There is little evidence Chinese leaders see a closing window for action fears driven by Washington’s assessments of own military vulnerabilities Chinese leaders not started wars to divert attention from domestic challenges problems at home moderated Chinese fo reign po licy West exaggerate risk of Chinese invasion they might create a self-fulfilling prophecy U.S. thread needle between deterrence and provocation diversionary aggression little reason to think domestic challenges tempt China’s leadership to launch a war little consistent evidence of world leaders starting hostilities to whip up domestic support authoritarian leaders less likely to initiate crises in domestic unrest leaders facing domestic challenges choose other means to quell discontent Chinese leaders given few signs domestic insecurity prompt lash out against Taiwan Xi and C hinese C ommunist P arty sought to project image of confidence and patience Chinese leaders temper foreign policy during times of domestic turmoil they have engaged in harsh rhetoric and saber rattling , but rarely launched military operations Even Chairman Mao Zedong sought to mobilize the Chinese population while avoid ing an outright war over Taiwan, warning that China must only fight battles it is sure of winning no relationship between domestic unrest and China’s use of force externally China’s involvement in militarized interstate disputes declined when domestic unrest increased Chinese leaders have done the opposite CCP reiterated “ peaceful reunification ” remains its “ first choice .” Even the hawkish Qiao Liang, a retired major general in the Chinese air force, has cautioned against the tide of nationalist agitation for action against Taiwan Taiwan by force would be “ too costly ” and should not be Beijing’s top priority

invade overblown little evidence closing action own vulnerabilities not divert domestic home moderated exaggerate self-fulfilling prophecy deterrence provocation diversionary little reason tempt little consistent evidence domestic authoritarian less likely unrest domestic other quell discontent few domestic insecurity lash out Xi C C P sought confidence patience temper domestic turmoil harsh saber rattling rarely Mao avoid ing outright war only sure no relationship domestic unrest use of force declined increased opposite reiterated peaceful reunification first choice hawkish major general cautioned nationalist agitation too costly not top

['Fears that China will soon invade Taiwan are overblown. There is little evidence that Chinese leaders see a closing window for action. Such fears appear to be driven more by Washington’s assessments of its own military vulnerabilities than by Beijing’s risk-reward calculus. Historically, Chinese leaders have not started wars to divert attention from domestic challenges, and they continue to favor using measures short of conflict to achieve their objectives. If anything, problems at home have moderated Chinese foreign policy, and Chinese popular opinion has tended to reward government bluster and displays of resolve that do not lead to open conflict.', 'If Western policymakers exaggerate the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, they might inadvertently create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead of worrying that Beijing will gin up a foreign crisis to bolster its standing at home or assuming that Beijing feels pressured to invade in the near term, the United States should focus on arresting—or at least decelerating—the action-reaction spiral that has steadily ratcheted up tensions and made a crisis more likely. That does not mean halting efforts to bolster Taiwan’s resilience to Chinese coercion or to diversify the United States’ defense posture in the region. But it does mean avoiding needless confrontation and identifying reciprocal steps that Washington and Beijing could take to lower the temperature.', 'The hard but crucial task for U.S. policymakers is to thread the needle between deterrence and provocation. Symbolic displays of resolve, unconditional commitments to defend Taiwan, and pledges of a surge in U.S. military power in the region could stray too far toward the latter, inadvertently provoking the very conflict U.S. policymakers seek to deter.', 'WAG THE DOG?', 'Although the logic of diversionary aggression has an intuitive appeal, there is little reason to think that domestic challenges will tempt China’s leadership to launch a war abroad. In a 2008 review of cross-national studies of international conflict, the scholars Matthew Baum and Philip Potter found little consistent evidence of world leaders starting military hostilities to whip up domestic support. Moreover, authoritarian leaders may be less likely than democratic ones to initiate crises in the wake of domestic unrest because they have greater latitude to repress their people, the political scientist Chris Gelpi has found. And rather than embark on risky military adventures, leaders facing domestic challenges often choose other means to quell discontent, including working with other states to address threats from within—for instance, by settling border disputes to calm unrest on their frontiers—or resorting to repression.', 'China’s response to once-in-a-generation protests against its draconian COVID-19 restrictions late last year is a case in point. After demonstrators took to the streets in dozens of cities carrying sheets of blank paper—symbols of resistance in the face of censorship—the Chinese government did not seek to deflect attention from domestic discontent with aggressive foreign policy measures. Instead, it eased its COVID-19 restrictions, detained and interrogated protesters, and continued its post-pandemic efforts to reassure foreign investors.', 'Chinese leaders have given few signs that domestic insecurity might prompt them to lash out against Taiwan. On the contrary, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party leadership have sought to project an image of confidence and patience in the face of growing international risks and challenges. Despite pessimism in China about trends in public opinion that show Taiwan pulling away from the mainland politically and culturally, Xi told the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022 that “the wheels of history are rolling on toward China’s reunification.”', 'Xi has sought to project an image of confidence and patience.', 'Historically, Chinese leaders have tended to temper their foreign policy during times of domestic turmoil. Sometimes, they have engaged in harsh rhetoric and saber rattling, but they have only rarely launched military operations in such periods. Even Chairman Mao Zedong, who ordered the shelling of offshore islands in 1958, sought to mobilize the Chinese population while avoiding an outright war over Taiwan, warning that China must only fight battles it is sure of winning.', 'According to the political scientist M. Taylor Fravel, China has compromised in 15 of the 17 territorial disputes it has settled with its neighbors since 1949—most of them during periods of regime insecurity arising from domestic political challenges, including unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, and renewed unrest in Xinjiang in the early 1990s. In an analysis of Beijing’s behavior in militarized interstate disputes between 1949 and 1992, moreover, the political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston found “no relationship between domestic unrest and China’s use of force externally.” If anything, the frequency of China’s involvement in militarized interstate disputes declined when domestic unrest increased. On the whole, in other words, Chinese leaders have done the opposite of what many analysts are warning: they have sought to reduce external tensions in order to tackle domestic challenges from a position of greater strength while attempting to deter foreign efforts to exploit internal tensions.', 'Beijing’s behavior in the East and South China Seas has followed this pattern. During two flare-ups with Tokyo in the 1990s over the island chain known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China, for instance, Chinese leaders quashed expressions of popular antipathy toward Japan with the aim of preserving economic ties with Tokyo, according to the international relations scholars Phillip Saunders and Erica Downs. And the political scientist Andrew Chubb has shown that between 1970 and 2015, Chinese leaders tended to be less aggressive at sea during periods of internal strife. When Beijing did act assertively in these maritime territorial disputes, it did so mainly to thwart perceived challenges with new capabilities, not to distract from heightened domestic insecurity.', 'BARK NOT BITE', 'Claims that Beijing is looking for opportunities to lash out for domestic political purposes aren’t just wrong. They are dangerous because they imply that U.S. actions have no bearing on China’s calculus on Taiwan and that the only way to deter Beijing from diversionary aggression is to deny it the ability to prevail in such an endeavor.', 'Domestic considerations and the military balance of power are not the only factors Xi will weigh when deciding whether to attack Taiwan. Even if he prefers to avoid a near-term conflict and believes that China’s military prospects will improve over time, he might still order a military operation if he and other Chinese leaders perceive a sharp increase in the risk that Taiwan could be lost. As Fravel has shown, China has often used military force to counter perceived challenges to its sovereignty claims in territorial and maritime disputes.', 'Such challenges, including U.S. actions that endorse Taiwan as an independent state or suggest that Washington might be on the cusp of restoring a formal alliance with the island, might trigger such a reaction from China. Even so, Beijing has less risky ways to respond to perceived provocations, including rhetoric and actions that could burnish its nationalist credentials without escalating to military conflict. As I have previously argued in Foreign Affairs, China’s leaders frequently engage in rhetorical bluster to appease domestic audiences and minimize the popular costs of not using military force. They may also choose from a variety of escalatory measures short of war to signal resolve and impose costs on Taiwan, including military, economic, and diplomatic efforts to squeeze the island and deter it from pulling away from the mainland. Behavior of this sort should not be mistaken for preparations for war.', 'KEEP CALM', 'In any society, there are people who go looking for a fight. But among the ranks of China’s top leaders, those people still appear to be less influential than those who recognize that it is better to win without fighting. Although Xi warned in 2021 that China would take “decisive measures” if provoked by “forces for Taiwan independence,” the CCP reiterated in 2022 that “peaceful reunification” remains its “first choice.” Even the hawkish Qiao Liang, a retired major general in the Chinese air force, has cautioned against the tide of nationalist agitation for action against Taiwan. “China’s ultimate goal is not the reunification of Taiwan, but to achieve the dream of national rejuvenation—so that all 1.4 billion Chinese can have a good life,” Qiao said in a May 2020 interview. He went on to warn that taking Taiwan by force would be “too costly” and should not be Beijing’s top priority.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-Texas-Round-4.docx

Michigan

DoPh

85f22476626db12e97c23fc3bbf44b2c07c5f7c80c358a56472e514d4da46781

The government won’t adopt new IT innovations.

Kennedy 16—(bachelor's degree in international relations from Stanford University, master's degree in international human rights law from The American University in Cairo). Merrit Kennedy. May 26, 2016. “Report: U.S. Nuclear System Relies On Outdated Technology Such As Floppy Disks”. NPR. . Accessed 10/25/21.

U.S. nuc s still runs on a 1970s computing system Beyond the nuclear program , much tech used is woefully outmoded budget goes toward maintenance rather than development and enhancement the Pentagon's Command and Control System which "coordinates i c b m s bombers , and aircrafts runs on an IBM Computer introduced in 1976

The U.S. nuc lear weapon s system still runs on a 1970s -era computing system that uses 8-inch floppy disks according to the Government Accountability Office. Beyond the nuclear program , much of the tech nology used by the federal government is woefully outmoded 75 percent of the government's information technology budget goes toward operations and maintenance , rather than development , modernization and enhancement . the Pentagon's Strategic Automated Command and Control System which "coordinates the operational functions of the United States' nuclear forces, such as i nter c ontinental b allistic m issile s , nuclear bombers , and tanker support aircrafts " runs on an IBM Series/1 Computer , first introduced in 1976

U.S. nuc s 1970s -era computing system 8-inch floppy disks Beyond the nuclear program tech woefully outmoded budget maintenance development , modernization and enhancement Command and Control System i c b m bombers aircrafts IBM Series/1 Computer

['', 'The U.S. nuclear weapons system still runs on a 1970s-era computing system that uses 8-inch floppy disks, according to a newly released report from the Government Accountability Office.', "That's right. It relies on memory storage that hasn't been commonly used since the 1980s and a computing system that looks like this:", "Beyond the nuclear program, much of the technology used by the federal government is woefully outmoded, the report says. About 75 percent of the government's information technology budget goes toward operations and maintenance, rather than development, modernization and enhancement.", '"Clearly, there are billions wasted," GAO information technology expert David Powner said at a congressional hearing Wednesday, The Associated Press reports.', 'The GAO report found that the Pentagon\'s Strategic Automated Command and Control System — which "coordinates the operational functions of the United States\' nuclear forces, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear bombers, and tanker support aircrafts" — runs on an IBM Series/1 Computer, first introduced in 1976.', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-3%20-%20Harvard-Round3.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-3%2520-%2520Harvard-Round3.docx

f8002c5700d81dd492cff001a86f3b7cb821913d7fd13d10097e4d85d6da14b0

Strictly retaliation for a nuclear attack.

Ankit Panda 18. Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7-17-2018. "‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons," https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-use-and-nuclear-weapons.

NFU refers to statement to never be the first to use these weapons in conflict, reserving them strictly to retaliate after a nuclear attack

NFU refers to any authoritative statement by a nuclear weapon state to never be the first to use these weapons in a conflict, reserving them strictly to retaliate in the after math of a nuclear attack against its territory or military personnel

strictly to retaliate

['A so-called NFU pledge, first publicly made by China in 1964, refers to any authoritative statement by a nuclear weapon state to never be the first to use these weapons in a conflict, reserving them strictly to retaliate in the aftermath of a nuclear attack against its territory or military personnel. These pledges are a component of nuclear declaratory policies. As such, there can be no diplomatic arrangement to verify or enforce a declaratory NFU pledge, and such pledges alone do not affect capabilities. States with such pledges would be technically able to still use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, and their adversaries have generally not trusted NFU assurances. Today, China is the only nuclear weapon state to maintain an unconditional NFU pledge.']

[(6, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoYa-Neg-nu-Round-6.docx

Emory

CoYa

c1eb5c9fea59bc867b68632848e11162f51aaf83b72e1ce458a5da0bbb548c08

No info war impact

Raitasalo 17 (Jyri Raitasalo, docent of strategy and security policy at the Finnish National Defence University, “Western Societies Shouldn't Buy Into the Russia Hype,” National Interest, April 9, 2017, accessed 10-18-20 , WC)

info war overemphasise the Kremlin to see Russia behind every problem empowers Russia . providing new tools creating panic and opening up new “seams” media charade .

The more info rmation war fare or “hybrid warfare” become established as the Western perspective the more we will overemphasise the coherence and effectiveness of the Kremlin as a hub of power and at the same time risk simplifying domestic discussions in Western societies. Yes, “the Kremlin” is trying to maximize its leverage using a multitude of tools, including information. This is called statecraft. But to see Russia behind every problem within Western societies actually empowers Russia as a strategic actor rather than curtails its power . Western audiences tend to give Russia much more credit than it actually deserves By focusing on Russian narrative power and Western inability to counter it, the West is, in fact, providing Russia with new tools —or weapons—to use against Western interests Western states are by their own actions creating panic and thus opening up new “seams” through which its societies become more vulnerable and susceptible to external influence Russia as a n actor. Russia may very well have tried to corrode the American political system However , the ongoing media charade in the United States owes to problems of longer pedigree .

war overemphasise the coherence and effectiveness of the Kremlin empowers Russia rather than curtails its power . providing Russia with new tools creating panic opening up new “seams”

['*edited for language', '', 'The more “information warfare,” “the weaponization of information” or “hybrid warfare” become established as the Western perspective on Russia’s relations with the West, the more we will overemphasise the coherence and effectiveness of the Kremlin as a hub of power and at the same time risk simplifying domestic discussions in Western societies.', 'Yes, “the Kremlin” is trying to maximize its leverage across issues with strategic interest to Russia using a multitude of tools, including information. This is called statecraft. But to see Russia behind every problem within Western societies actually empowers Russia as a strategic actor rather than curtails its power.', 'Western audiences tend to give Russia much more credit than it actually deserves. By focusing on Russian narrative power and Western inability to counter it, the West is, in fact, providing Russia with new tools—or weapons—to use against Western interests. Western states are by their own actions creating hysteria panic throughout the Western security community and thus opening up new “seams” through which its societies become more vulnerable and susceptible to external influence attempts.', 'The recent—and still ongoing—U.S. political circus and media frenzy around President Trump’s potential Russia connections, coupled with Russia’s possible election hacking in the United States, have more to do with Russia as a theme of U.S. domestic politics than Russia as an actor. Russia may very well have tried to corrode the American political system during the presidential race and it may even have tried the same over many years. However, the ongoing media charade in the United States owes to problems of longer pedigree.']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Neg-Harvard-Round5.docx

Minnesota

AmPr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmPr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Neg-Harvard-Round5.docx

839c21c4dff1d51eed8b5ae2901b1ade63868fed164046ea0578e3262e361ad3

Collapsing US leadership eliminates checks on Russian aggression.

Brands & Montgomery 20 *Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, **senior fellow and the director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. (Hal, Evan Braden, 07/22/20, “Opportunistic Aggression in the Twenty-first Century”, Survival; 62:4; pg. 174; DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2020.1792129)

increased reliance on other states could create capability limitations and collective-action problems that increase deterrence failure Europ would struggle to meet the Russian threat without strong US leadership which catalyses action and unifies states Bereft of strong US support states might accommodate revisionist s Emboldened revisionist s might push harder

the U S could give its NATO allies more responsibility for deterring Russian aggression An increased reliance on other states could erode US influence and create capability limitations and collective-action problems that increase the probability of deterrence failure . While Europe’s economic power dwarfs Russia’s Europ ean states would still struggle to meet the Russian geopolitical threat without strong US leadership which catalyses collective action and unifies states with vastly differing threat perceptions Bereft of customarily strong US support , local states might simply accommodate revisionist power s . Emboldened revisionist power s themselves also might push harder

could deterring Russian aggression increased reliance erode US influence capability limitations collective-action problems deterrence failure dwarfs Russia’s struggle Russian geopolitical threat strong US leadership catalyses collective action unifies vastly differing threat perceptions customarily strong US support accommodate Emboldened revisionist power s push harder

['In the contemporary context, the United States could give its NATO allies more responsibility for deterring and checking Russian aggression.60 In the Asia-Pacific, the US could prod its security partners to bolster their capacity to resist an assault by China. And in the Middle East, Washington might exhort local states to take the lead in deterring expansionist behaviour by Iran. Although the United States would undoubtedly help its allies and partners with intelligence, arms sales and other enablers prior to or during a crisis, it would rely on its friends for geopolitical initiative and combat power. An increased reliance on other states, however, could erode US influence and create capability limitations and collective-action problems that increase the probability of deterrence failure. While Europe’s economic power dwarfs Russia’s, for instance, European states would still struggle to meet the Russian geopolitical threat without strong US leadership, which catalyses collective action and unifies states with vastly differing threat perceptions.61 Bereft of customarily strong US support, local states might simply accommodate revisionist powers. Emboldened revisionist powers themselves also might push harder.']

[(0, 6), (20, 22)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-2.docx

Michigan

McSk

8d56b62f1c72f074a7a8dc44bb9dd6334426ee649de2a647bb9ce2ad36f0cbad

Reducing the number of ICBMs makes nuclear coercion and conventional conflict more likely---causes nuclear war – turns case

Kroenig 21 [Matthew Kroenig, professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; Mark J. Massa, master of arts from Georgetown University’s security studies program, associate director in the Forward Defense practice of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; and Christian Trotti, Assistant Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, “The Downsides of Downsizing: Why the United States Needs Four Hundred ICBMs,” March 2021, The Atlantic Council, ., Go Green!]

if U S had a smaller land leg, nuclear deterrence threatened because adversaries more willing to initiate and escalate challenges research shows states more vulnerable to exchange are more likely to be targeted with threats reducing size of ICBM force would increase US vulnerability and decrease adversary vulnerability to coercion shifting balance of resolve toward adversaries shift increase risk of nuclear war from a conventional conflict in Europe Indo-Pacific , or Korean Peninsula adversaries are likely to initiate and escalate against U S with smaller ICBM force dangerous crises could spiral result in catastrophic nuclear exchange

if the U S had fewer nuc lear weapon s due to a smaller land leg, nuclear deterrence might also be threatened because US adversaries might be more willing to initiate and escalate militarized challenges against the United States and its allies Recent social-science research shows states that are more vulnerable to a nuclear exchange are more likely to be targeted with military threats from nuclear-armed states and less likely to achieve their basic goals in a nuclear crisis reducing the size of the US ICBM force would simultaneously increase US vulnerability and decrease adversary vulnerability to nuclear coercion shifting the balance of resolve toward US adversaries Adversaries might be more willing to challenge , and stand firm in crises against, the U S resulting shift in balance of resolve could also increase the risk of nuclear war most plausible pathway stems from escalation of a conventional conflict US adversaries might employ nuclear weapons in conventional conflict in Eastern Europe , in the Indo-Pacific , or on the Korean Peninsula If adversaries are more likely to initiate and escalate crises against a U nited S tates with a smaller ICBM force there is also a greater risk that Washington will find itself in dangerous crises that could spiral out of control and result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange

U S fewer nuc s nuclear deterrence threatened more willing initiate escalate social-science research more vulnerable more likely targeted threats nuclear-armed states reducing size increase US vulnerability decrease adversary vulnerability shifting balance of resolve US adversaries challenge U S increase risk nuclear war escalation conventional conflict Europe Indo-Pacific Korean Peninsula adversaries more likely initiate escalate crises U S smaller ICBM force dangerous crises spiral out of control result catastrophic nuclear exchange

['Moreover, if the United States had fewer nuclear weapons due to a smaller land leg, nuclear deterrence might also be threatened because US adversaries might be more willing to initiate and escalate militarized challenges against the United States and its allies. Nuclear deterrence has long been conceptualized as a game of nuclear brinkmanship. Although nuclear states cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, they can credibly threaten to risk one by initiating and escalating crises.12 A state’s willingness to stand firm in these crises depends, in part, on its vulnerability to nuclear war. Recent social-science research shows that states that are more vulnerable to a nuclear exchange are more likely to be targeted with military threats from nuclear-armed states and less likely to achieve their basic goals in a nuclear crisis.13 Accordingly, reducing the size of the US ICBM force would simultaneously increase US vulnerability and decrease adversary vulnerability to nuclear coercion, thereby shifting the balance of resolve toward US adversaries. Adversaries might be more willing to challenge, and stand firm in crises against, the United States, and Washington might be more eager to seek offramps in a crisis. ', 'This resulting shift in the balance of resolve could also increase the risk of nuclear war. The most plausible pathway to nuclear war in the contemporary international security environment stems not from a bolt-from-the-blue strike but from escalation of a conventional conflict. US adversaries might employ nuclear weapons in the event of a conventional conflict in Eastern Europe, in the Indo-Pacific, or on the Korean Peninsula.14 If adversaries are more likely to initiate and escalate crises against a United States with a smaller ICBM force, as argued above, then there is also a greater risk that Washington will find itself in dangerous crises that could spiral out of control and result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BuGe-Neg-Hoosier-Invitational-HIT-Round-1.docx

MichiganState

BuGe

3b747a815c8bbf38310e5874c529c5a69018496c27d74882f50d39f5aa31be9b

Polling numbers are dire.

Salamy ’2-14 [Elissa; 2022; reporter, citing Dr. Mark Caleb Smith, director of the Center for Political Studies at Cedarville University; ABC 15 News, “With Biden's low approval numbers, midterms could be 'even worse' for Democrats,” https://wpde.com/news/connect-to-congress/with-bidens-low-approval-numbers-midterms-could-be-even-worse-for-democrats-gop-republicans-cedarville-university-elections-congress-inflation-afghanistan-ukraine-white-house]

Biden’s numbers don’t bode well Historically the sitting president loses seats during midterm s data suggests his decline is from his own party , which is worse Biden’s ratings are worse than Ford Carter Bush All went on to lose their next election

Smith said Biden’s polling numbers don’t bode well for the upcoming midterm elections Historically , the sitting president ’s party loses seats during the midterm election s The data suggests his decline is coming from his own party , which is even worse Biden’s approval ratings are “worse than every president except for Trump.” “His numbers are worse than Ford Carter H W Bush All those presidents went on to lose their next election .” in Afghanistan in Ukraine The White House just simply looks weak

don’t bode well upcoming midterm elections Historically loses seats his own party even worse every president worse All next election just simply looks weak

['Dr. Mark Caleb Smith, director of the Center for Political Studies at Cedarville University, said Biden’s polling numbers don’t bode well for the upcoming midterm elections.', "“There's no way you can really sugarcoat this for the White House or for President Biden. These are not good numbers,” said Smith to The National Desk’s Jan Jeffcoat.", 'Historically, the sitting president’s party loses seats during the midterm elections.', "“With approval numbers like this, you wonder if it's going to be even worse for the Democrats,” said Smith. “The data suggests that his decline is really coming from his own party, which I think is even worse for the president. It reflects the tension within the Democratic Party right now over the progressive wing and the more moderate wing.”", 'Historically, Biden’s approval ratings are “worse than every other president at this point, except for Donald Trump.”', "“His numbers are worse than Gerald Ford. They're worse than Jimmy Carter. They're worse than George Herbert Walker Bush,” said Smith. “All those presidents went on to lose their next election.”", 'Another poll from the Pew Research Center shows just 20% of Americans believe Biden will be a successful president. Forty-three percent believe he will be unsuccessful and 37% think it is too early to tell.', "“There are real problems on the ground,” said Smith. “We have generational inflation rates right now. Food prices are higher, gasoline is higher, appliances cost more, cars cost more, and since wages aren't keeping up with that, Americans are looking at a real decline in their standard of living.”", 'In addition, Smith said Biden is struggling with problems on the world stage.', "“Problems in Afghanistan, emerging problems in Ukraine right now. The White House just simply looks weak, and it looks unable to deal with these crises,” said Smith. “More than anything, I think President Biden needs to lead. He needs to make a very clear direction and say, this is where we're going, this is how we're going to get there.”"]

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Aff-ADA-Doubles.docx

Michigan

MaMu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/MaMu/Michigan-Margolin-Muse-Aff-ADA-Doubles.docx

b752a7fc5d510d3567f65f921347ac9ebfef75cad3d20fb496101a47269405ce

1] Alt comes first – starting with social focus short-circuits movements

Erevelles 14 – Professor of Social and Cultural Studies in Education at the University of Alabama [Nirmala, “Thinking with Disability Studies,” Disability Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, Nol. 2 14, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/4248/3587]

disability scholars pursue edgy questions of possibility that have little significance for activists writing can be irrelevant and exclusionary for the majority of disabled people who live under destitute economic conditions guilt is inadequate materiality historicizes fraught relationships between theory and activism accountable to conditions of capital

the time has come for disability studies scholarship to locate itself uneasily and yet hopefully at the apprehensive boundaries between academia and activism the time has come for us to disrupt the lazy assumptions we make about what we value as critical scholarship and what we imagine as passionate activism disability studies scholars whom I so passionately admire pursue dazzling , edgy questions of endless possibility that may have little significance for the gritty disability activists surviving at Ground Zero while writing intersectionally, materially, and justly I too am responsible for scholarship that while edgy, clever, abstruse can be both irrelevant and exclusionary for the vast majority of disabled people who live under the most destitute of social and economic conditions guilt is an inadequate tool of transformation forcing us into knee-jerk creations of useless binaries and immobilizing (mis)readings of struggles that are not our own Guilt is only another way of avoiding informed action a relational analysis that engages the materiality of difference within specific historical contexts It is an analysis that historicizes the fraught relationships between theory and activism It is an analysis that seeks to foreground the material conditions that can enable academia and activism to work symbiotically in the struggle for unexpected and evocative possibilities of living productive and celebrated lives And most importantly, it is an analysis that is always accountable to the reality that under the current historical conditions of transnational capital ism , the transgressive possibilities in some of our lives are often times realized through the exploited labor, oppressive representations, and/or painful exclusions of other lives it is in these painful tensions between academia and activism that disability studies may ultimately move towards a more accountable praxis for transformative justice

may have little significance for the gritty disability activists live under the most destitute of social and economic conditions fraught relationships between theory and activism the material conditions accountable current historical conditions of transnational capital ism

['It is in this fraught context that perhaps the time has come for disability studies scholarship to locate itself uneasily and yet hopefully at the apprehensive boundaries between academia and activism. Perhaps the time has come for us to disrupt the lazy assumptions we make about what we value as critical scholarship and what we imagine as passionate activism. Consciously aware of both intellectual and economic privilege accorded to be me as a tenured academic, I sometimes wallow in academic guilt. I realize in this essay that buoyed by a guilty reflexivity I have inadvertently set up the problematic binary of academia v. activism. I realize that I tentatively suggest that disability studies scholars whom I so passionately admire pursue dazzling, edgy questions of endless possibility that may have little significance for the gritty disability activists surviving at Ground Zero while writing intersectionally, materially, and justly. I freeze up at my guilty recognition that I too am responsible for scholarship that while edgy, clever, abstruse can be both irrelevant and exclusionary for the vast majority of disabled people who live under the most destitute of social and economic conditions.', 'And yet, all of us who have experienced oppression at some point in our lives know that guilt is an inadequate tool of transformation forcing us into knee-jerk creations of useless binaries and immobilizing (mis)readings of struggles that are not our own. My favorite scholar/activist/poet/feminist Audre Lorde (1981) wrote:', '[G]uilt is just another name for impotence, for defensiveness destructive of communication; it becomes a device to protect ignorance and the continuation of things the way they are, the ultimate protection for changelessness…. Guilt is only another way of avoiding informed action, of buying time out of the pressing need to make clear choices, out of the approaching storm that can feed the earth as well as bend the trees (9)', 'To move past guilt necessitates a return to the relational analysis I have described throughout this essay. It is a relational analysis that engages the materiality of difference within specific historical contexts. It is an analysis that historicizes the fraught relationships between theory and activism; between disabled and non-disabled subjectivities; between imagined possibility and radical struggle. It is an analysis that seeks to foreground the material conditions that can enable academia and activism to work symbiotically in the struggle for unexpected and evocative possibilities of living productive and celebrated lives. And most importantly, it is an analysis that is always accountable to the reality that under the current historical conditions of transnational capitalism, the transgressive possibilities in some of our lives are often times realized through the exploited labor, oppressive representations, and/or painful exclusions of other lives. While I will be quick to argue that this is not the only analysis to be undertaken in disability studies, I tentatively venture to say that this is an example of an analysis that may enable us to push even more into this division between edgy/dazzling theorizing and transformative accountable praxis reveling in a partnership that is nevertheless tension- filled/complicated/tenuous. Perhaps, it is in these painful tensions between academia and activism that disability studies may ultimately move towards a more accountable praxis for transformative justice.', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Emory-DoSa-Neg-Franklin-R-Shirley-at-Wake-Forest-Round-3.docx

Emory

DoSa

e2815d61c226757b1f1601e81c64fd68ecfdbb4d5504173562e255b45f93feff

History proves the turn and disproves the impact. If NATO is still strong, then the alliance weathers the plan.

McCrisken 19 (*Trevor McCrisken: Associate Professor, US Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, *Maxwell Downman: Co-Director of BASIC, Executive Management Team, “‘Peace through Strength’: Europe and NATO Deterrence beyond the US Nuclear Posture Review,” International Affairs, Vol. 95, No. 2, https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/95/2/277/5320514#131717013)

changes to nuclear policy damaged cohesion ‘peace through strength’ will deepen divisions to bolster assurance have unintended consequences . changes interpreted as signalling a lowering threshold and projecting disregard for consensual decision-making . NATO continues to be resilient and has experience in bridging perspectives Europeans remain uneasy about deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats has deepened tensions damaged trust such an approach does not reinforce assurances

changes to US nuclear policy following the NPR have complicated NATO dynamics and damaged NATO cohesion There is a real risk US ‘peace through strength’ will continue to deepen transatlantic divisions and the existing arms control crisis. While US nuclear policy represents an attempt to bolster deterrence against Russia and provide increased assurance it may have unintended consequences . In Europe, changes in US policy are being interpreted as signalling a lowering threshold for nuclear use and a willingness to engage in arms race , and projecting a disregard for consensual decision-making . Although NATO continues to be resilient and has long experience in bridging US and varying European perspectives Washington is finding it difficult to persuade Europeans to give vigorous support to a ‘ peace through strength ’ approach to nuclear issues. Europeans remain uneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats and use limited nuclear strikes to control escalation. increasing the nuclear threat , has deepened tensions with European allies. While nuclear cooperation has historically been a way of managing alliance relations and creating NATO cohesion, ‘peace through strength’ has damaged trust within the alliance. If such an approach fails to command broad European support, promotes neither NATO cohesion nor trust and does not reinforce security assurances , while creating risks its success must be considered questionable

US nuclear policy NPR NATO dynamics cohesion deepen divisions unintended consequences lowering threshold arms race disregard consensual decision-making continues to be resilient long experience bridging perspectives difficult peace through strength uneasy non-nuclear threats strikes increasing the nuclear threat tensions managing relations trust questionable

['', "This article has shown that changes to US nuclear policy following the NPR have complicated NATO dynamics and damaged NATO cohesion on nuclear issues. There is a real risk that the US ‘peace through strength’ approach will continue to deepen transatlantic divisions and the existing arms control crisis. While US nuclear policy clearly represents an attempt within the Trump administration's ‘peace through strength’ foreign policy to bolster deterrence against Russia and provide increased assurance to allies, it may have unintended consequences. In Europe, changes in US policy are being interpreted as signalling a lowering threshold for nuclear use and a willingness to engage in a destabilizing arms race, and projecting a disregard for consensual decision-making. Such conclusions are felt even more keenly in view of the President's adversarial and often erratic behaviour in his interactions with European leaders, and the administration's increased willingness to openly criticize its allies. Although NATO continues to be resilient and has long experience in bridging US and varying European perspectives, for the reasons explored in this article Washington is finding it difficult to persuade Europeans to give vigorous support to a ‘peace through strength’ approach to nuclear issues. Europeans remain uneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats and to use limited nuclear strikes to control escalation. Trump administration plans that increase the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO planning revive unresolved discussions about European contributions to NATO's nuclear deterrence capabilities that could in turn undermine the credibility of its deterrent value in the long term. Finally, the Trump administration's strategy on arms control, which relies on increasing the nuclear threat, has deepened tensions with European allies. While nuclear cooperation has historically been a way of managing alliance relations and creating NATO cohesion, the Trump administration's ‘peace through strength’ approach has damaged trust within the alliance. If such an approach fails to command broad European support, promotes neither NATO cohesion nor trust in the alliance, and does not reinforce security assurances, while creating risks in arms control and non-proliferation, its success must be considered questionable, to say the least."]

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PrWe-Aff-3--Harvard-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PrWe

910f02e20e52dada448d3bba5e3e59bd4562cf65d49717c9881427b04e079d4f

2. ASBMs AND super-EMP attacks

Pry 20 [Dr. Peter Pry, PhD in History from the State University of New York, PhD in International Relations from the University of Southern California, “Surprise Attack: ICBMs and the Real Nuclear Threat,” 10-31-20, ] [language modified]

ASBMs could destroy even if SSBN location is not known precisely ICBMs could be used as ASBMs even with uncertainty about locations Moscow could destroy all U.S. SSBNs , if at-sea locations are roughly known locations are disclosed by launching one missile mission that makes sense for Poseidon is destroying SSBNs Poseidon programmed to recognize acoustic signature and detonate Super-EMP weapons deployed by Russia , China , and No Ko exceeding U.S. military EMP hardening even best protected military forces could be [vulnerable SSBNs cannot launch without EAM includes unblocking code Super-EMP destroy communications to convey EAMs neutralizing them. EMP attack at sea directly

ASBMs armed with nuclear warheads could destroy submarines, even if the SSBN location is not known precisely ICBMs could be used as ASBMs to destroy submarines even with considerable uncertainty about their locations study suggested calculated that Moscow , using only SS-19 ICBMs, could destroy all U.S. SSBNs , if their at-sea locations are very roughly known submarines will be vulnerable if their locations are disclosed by launching even one missile Russian nuclear autonomous “torpedo” may be a secret weapon to destroy SSBNs Poseidon is a nuclear-powered torpedo mission that makes the most sense for Poseidon is trailing and destroying at-sea SSBNs Artificially intelligent, Poseidon could be programmed to recognize the acoustic signature of its target submarine and detonate on command Super-EMP weapons deployed by Russia , China , and probably No rth Ko rea can generate 100 kilovolts/meter or more exceeding U.S. military standard for EMP hardening even the best protected U.S. military forces —including the strategic Triad and its C3I— could be [vulnerable ] U.S. SSBNs at sea cannot launch without EAM includes an unblocking code Submarines cannot execute nuclear strikes without the EAM Super-EMP attack could destroy satellites , land-based VLF communications , TACAMO aircraft , and other redundant means to convey EAMs to submarines on patrol, neutralizing them. EMP could also attack submarines at sea directly

even if not known precisely used as ASBMs study destroy all U.S. SSBNs disclosed one missile SSBNs Russia China No rth Ko EAM unblocking code satellites land-based VLF communications TACAMO aircraft other redundant means convey EAMs neutralizing at sea directly

['Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)', 'ASBMs are a new technology that combines ballistic missiles with maneuvering warheads having electro-optical, infrared, or other seekers to precisely target even moving vessels for destruction. China’s DF-26 and DF-21 pose long-range threats to U.S. aircraft carriers, outranging carrier aircraft, threatening to upset the balance of power in the Pacific.40 Even Iran has developed ASBMs, the medium-range Khalij Fars (Persian Gulf) and short-range Fateh-110, that have been used successfully to target a ship, appearing to demonstrate an accuracy of 8 meters.41', 'ASBMs armed with nuclear warheads could destroy submarines, even if the SSBN location is not known precisely, just approximately. The underwater shockwave from a nuclear weapon travels more efficiently through water, to much longer distances than through air, having a very large lethal radius extending many kilometers against an SSBN.42', 'ICBMs too could be used as ASBMs to destroy submarines with a nuclear barrage of their ocean patrol areas, even with considerable uncertainty about their locations. A 1981 study by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment suggested the Soviets could conceivably attack submarines with ICBMs.43', 'President Reagan’s White House Science Advisor, George Keyworth, in a 1984 TV interview warned: “A…warhead such as the SS-18 carries ten of when dropped in the water…will destroy any submarine within a distance of about seven miles.” According to Keyworth, if the Soviets could roughly locate U.S. submarines “find out approximately where they are, not track them the way we did in the Second World War, but just know approximately if they are in that 100-mile by 100-mile square…then they can be destroyed in a preemptive attack.”44', 'My book Nuclear Wars: Exchanges and Outcomes (1990) calculated that Moscow, using only their SS-19 ICBMs, could destroy all U.S. SSBNs, if their at-sea locations are very roughly known, at a time when the U.S. had 36 SSBNs (not as today 14 reducing to 12 SSBNs). My calculations indicated our submarines will be most vulnerable if their locations are disclosed by launching even one missile for a limited nuclear strike—as is now planned for tactical nuclear scenarios employing SLBMs armed with the W76-2.45', 'Poseidon', 'My report POSEIDON: Russia’s New Doomsday Machine (2018) warns that this new Russian nuclear autonomous “torpedo” may be a secret weapon to destroy U.S., British and French SSBNs.46 Poseidon is a nuclear-powered robot submarine or torpedo, armed with a nuclear warhead described by various Russian sources as ranging from 2-200 megatons, the later by far the most powerful nuclear weapon ever built.47 The yield may be mission selectable.', 'Moscow advertises Poseidon’s mission as a doomsday machine, designed to raise radioactive tsunamis to inundate U.S. coasts, or to destroy U.S. ports, or to trail and destroy U.S. aircraft carrier groups.48 None of these missions makes sense for Poseidon, as Russia can already accomplish all of them by other existing means.', 'The one mission that makes the most sense for Poseidon, not mentioned by Russia, is trailing and destroying at-sea SSBNs. Nuclear-powered, Poseidon could tail SSBNs for months or years, waiting outside ports for their target to resume patrols. Artificially intelligent, Poseidon could be programmed to recognize the acoustic signature of its target submarine and detonate on command. The lethal radius of a 100-megaton warhead against submarines is over 100 kilometers.49', 'Russia plans to deploy 32 Poseidons.50 Perhaps not coincidentally, enough to assign two Poseidons to tail each of 12 Columbia SSBNs and 8 Poseidons to target the 8 SSBNs of allies Britain and France.', 'Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)', 'Super-EMP weapons now deployed by Russia, China, and probably North Korea can generate 100 kilovolts/meter or more, far exceeding the U.S. military standard for EMP hardening—50 kilovolts/meter.51 Thus, even the best protected U.S. military forces—including the strategic Triad and its C3I—could be [vulnerable] paralyzed.', 'U.S. SSBNs at sea cannot launch without receiving an Emergency Action Message. The EAM includes an unblocking code to arm nuclear warheads. Submarines cannot execute nuclear strikes without the EAM.', 'A Super-EMP attack could destroy satellites, land-based VLF communications, TACAMO aircraft, and other redundant means to convey EAMs to submarines on patrol, neutralizing them. EMP could also attack submarines at sea directly.52', 'A high-yield warhead detonated 400 kilometers above the ocean would generate an EMP field 2,300 kilometers in radius, an area nearly as large as North America. E3 EMP would penetrate the ocean depths and possibly couple into submarines, damaging electronics. Submarines would be especially vulnerable when deploying their very long antennae—which they need to do in order to receive EAMs.53']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-Northwestern-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

62bd5e052c2a854a16ed23e2c58c50d24e8efd761ef169cc0edeb9aa75d6c9f8

That escalates to nuclear war.

Brands ’19 [Hal; October 12; professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies; Bulletin, “Commentary: How Russia could force a nuclear war in the Baltics,” https://www.bendbulletin.com/opinion/commentary-how-russia-could-force-a-nuclear-war-in-the-baltics/article_dbf40df4-a72a-5711-af47-0756587b54eb.html]

possibility of nuclear escalation over the Baltic region is high NATO mobilizing would require a dangerous campaign striking targets in Russia A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia escalates to preserve gains NATO strikes lead to a general nuc war Russia might mistake a limited strike for a strike against Russia itself

the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is high er than one might imagine NATO mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign Critically, that campaign would require striking targets located with in Russia itself , as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic , or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms This concept is known as “ escalate to de-escalate the Russians are serious about it . A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “ escalates ” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict It could also go nuclear If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead to a general nuc lear war ? There is always some possibility that Russia might mistake a limited strike for part of a larger or more dangerous nuclear strike against Russia itself .

nuclear escalation the Baltic region high er than one might imagine NATO mobilizing longer war would require dangerous military campaign striking targets with in Russia itself NATO counteroffensive nuclear doctrine meant to avert limited nuclear strikes in the Atlantic force the alliance to make peace escalate to de-escalate serious about it NATO-Russia war go nuclear Russia “ escalates preserve the gains NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes general nuc lear war might mistake limited strike nuclear strike against Russia itself

['Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.', 'There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers.', 'After the Cold War ended, the U.S. and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Yet today, with Russia rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear statecraft is returning.', 'The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have the capability to prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in two to three days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO could respond by mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would require striking targets located within Russia itself, as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines.', 'Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the Russians are serious about it.', 'A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead to a general nuclear war?', 'So what to do? One option would be for the West to pull back. The logic here is superficially compelling. After all, the U.S. could survive and thrive in a world where Russia dominated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, just as it survived and thrived during the Cold War, when those countries were part of the Soviet Union.', 'A second option, emphasized by the Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, would be to devise new limited nuclear options as a way of strengthening deterrence. For example, the U.S. might develop low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used, in a relatively limited fashion, against a Russian invasion force or the units supporting it.', 'The dangers here are, well, obvious and drastic. There is always some possibility that Russia might mistake a limited strike against military targets in the Baltics for part of a larger or more dangerous nuclear strike against Russia itself.', '', 'NAC CP']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-NDT-Round-5.docx

Michigan

DoPh

38885e7465d1e79de5154a6aafc54aa0c646b00a2b222da78669cdb22c1f81f4

It's competitive—‘United States’ means the federal government.

Anderson 55—(Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Minnesota). William Anderson. 1955. “The Nation and the States, Rivals Or Partners?”. University of Minnesota Press.

In contrast with " the United States " framers used the phrase " the states " to refer to separate states and local governments United States is singular . It is one country not a plurality of states

the framers of the Constitution , just ten years after the Articles were drafted, spoke of the United States as one nation "The government of the United States " is recognized as a distinct government and evidently as something separate from and not dependent upon the state government s ; In contrast with the term " the United States " the framers used the phrase " the several states " to refer to the separate states and their local or particular governments Foreigners use the full designation, " United States of America ," or the abbreviation U.S.A., in-stead of just United the term " United States " is now used almost exclusively in the singular . "The United States is ," not " are ." It is internationally recognized as one country and one nation , not as a plurality of states Thus "United States" and "Union" are the only terms used in the Constitution to designate the national entity as a whole

framers of the Constitution the United States one nation the United States distinct government separate from not dependent upon state s In contrast the United States the several states separate states and their local or particular governments Foreigners United States of America in-stead of just United United States exclusively in the singular is are one country one nation not as a plurality of states whole

['', 'On the other hand, the framers of the Constitution, just ten years after the Articles were drafted, spoke of the United States and the people of the United States as if they already existed as one nation. "The government of the United States" is recognized as a distinct government, in Article I, section 8, paragraph 18, of the Constitution, and evidently as something separate from and not dependent upon the state governments; while the Congress of the United States is spoken of as such, and never as "the United¶ States in Congress assembled." In contrast with the term "the United States" the framers used the phrase "the several states" to refer to the separate states and their local or particular governments.¶ (Foreigners more often than Americans use the full designation, "United States of America," or the abbreviation U.S.A., in-stead of just United States. Although apparently plural in form the term "United States" is now used almost exclusively in the singular. "The United States is," not "are." It is internationally recognized as one country and one nation, not as a plurality of states.)¶ Union. The preamble to the Articles designates the agreement reached between the states as "Articles of Confederation and per-petual Union between the States of Newhampshire," etc., while the preamble to the Constitution states one of the objectives of that document to be the formation of "a more perfect Union." In Article IV of the Constitution the term "Union" is used twice: in section 3, "New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"; and in section 4, "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern¬ment . . •¶ Thus "United States" and "Union" are the only terms used in the Constitution to designate the national entity as a whole.', '']

[(0, 10), (10, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaMu-Neg-BTO-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

DaMu

aecb5c64f75b59e4c661a4526c33c31ab443bfaa170d4d4859456b13f2a51b35

No operational shifts---it cant be a mandate of the plan otherwise they’d be a full NFU, but the plan sparks backlash that causes a massive boost in nuclear modernization.

George Perkovich 21, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Chair and vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Pranay Vaddi, fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021, “Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review,” https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Perkovich_Vaddi_NPR_full2.pdf

Russia and China pay more attention to capabilities than declared intentions n f u without reduction of weapons would be meaningless political capital president would expend to push declaration through leave little to overcome resistance to alter force posture . Opponents produce quotes from military leaders decrying change accusing weak on national security To balance perceived diminution of deterrence admin face added pressure to increase spending on modernization

Russia and China pay more attention to capabilities than declared intentions n o- f irst- u se without reduction of the weapons that are most tied to first use would be relatively meaningless Yet, the political capital a president would expend to push this declaration through would leave little to overcome traditional resistance to alter the force posture . Opponents , including vocal members of Congress, would produce quotes from military leaders decrying the change and accusing the president of being weak on national security and the threats from Russia and China. To balance perceived diminution of nuclear deterrence , the admin istration would face added pressure to increase spending on nuclear modernization

capabilities than declared intentions n f u meaningless political capital little to overcome traditional resistance alter the force posture quotes from military leaders weak on national security balance perceived admin added pressure increase spending on nuclear modernization

['Ultimately, Russia and China, like the United States, pay more attention to capabilities than declared intentions. A no-first-use declaration without reduction of the weapons that are most tied to first use would be relatively meaningless to Moscow and Beijing. Yet, the political capital that a president would expend to push this declaration through the U.S. system and allied governments would leave little to overcome traditional resistance to alter the force posture. Opponents, including vocal members of Congress, would produce quotes from current and recently retired military leaders decrying the change and accusing the president of being weak on national security and the threats from Russia and China. To balance the perceived diminution of nuclear deterrence, the administration would face added pressure, including from Democratic members of Congress, to increase spending on nuclear modernization or at least not to pause or cut controversial programs under review.6']

[(7, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Neg-ADA-Round-3.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

a43abbc3b6f3109cbf8b48cf0ade8a3121efa7a55c6d69af3552440312fffb4e

The 1AC solvency is disconnected from its impacts—putting nuclear warheads inside a silo does not reify the impacts of colonialism. The counterplan solves without disarming.

Mcbride 19 (Jameson McBride is a Senior Research Analyst in the energy program at Breakthrough; Jessica Lovering is a Fellow at Energy for Growth and former Director of Energy at Breakthrough; Ted Nordhaus is Founder and Executive Director of Breakthrough; 9—26—2019, "Beyond Yucca Mountain," Breakthrough Institute, doα: 11-12-2023 url: https://thebreakthrough.org/articles/beyond-yucca-mountain)

Drawing on decades of research deep geological disposal is the solution for disposal of radioactive waste Building Yucca Mountain would mining out with depths in the hundreds of meters At such depth risks of radiation or water quality would be dramatically reduced no coherent fuel management can take hold if the public remains hostile to nuclear the government should consider consent-based siting to pick the disposal site reverse auctions minimize conflict the local community. nuclear advocates must take public concern about fuel seriously Developing innovative solutions to the waste problem is severely needed for the past, present, and future of in US

Drawing on decades of research deep geological disposal is widely agreed to be the best solution for final disposal of the most radioactive waste Building Yucca Mountain would entail mining out caverns with depths in the hundreds of meters They plan to use horizontal drilling to create small, deep passageways for spent fuel containers At such a depth containers of waste would be unaffected by seismicity risks of radiation or water quality would be dramatically reduced the idea appears to be technically feasible no coherent spent fuel management regime can take hold if the public remains hostile to nuclear the government should consider consent-based siting to pick the disposal site reverse auctions at the airport gate for giving up a seat — could help minimize conflict with the local community. nuclear advocates must take public concern about the fuel cycle seriously Developing innovative solutions to the waste problem is severely needed for the past, present, and future of nuclear in the US

Yucca Mountain would entail mining out caverns with depths in the hundreds of meters At such a depth risks of radiation or water quality would be dramatically reduced coherent spent fuel management can take hold if the public remains hostile to nuclear Developing innovative solutions to the waste problem is severely needed for the past, present, and future of nuclear in the US

['', '', 'In the absence of a geological disposal at Yucca Mountain, spent nuclear fuel has been stored on reactor sites, aboveground in dry casks. While generally safe, this isn’t the ideal technical option for long-term storage. Drawing on decades of research and projections, the World Nuclear Association argues that “deep geological disposal is widely agreed to be the best solution for final disposal of the most radioactive waste produced.” Building Yucca Mountain would entail mining out caverns with depths in the hundreds of meters. But what if we could go deeper?', 'Private entrepreneurs are still making headway. Deep Isolation, founded by the same team of climate researchers who launched Berkeley Earth, aims to bring deep borehole waste disposal to fruition in the next few years. They plan to use horizontal drilling to create small, deep passageways for spent fuel containers. At such a depth, containers of waste would be unaffected by seismicity, while risks of radiation or water quality would be dramatically reduced. Since the horizontal drilling technique has been proven in the oil and gas industry, the idea appears to be technically feasible.', 'Geology isn’t the only solution. In France, to keep the fuel cycle as cyclical as possible, spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed and reused. No facilities for reprocessing exist yet in the US, and reprocessing would not itself be a complete solution — it still requires waste transport, reactors able to utilize reprocessed fuel, and eventual disposal facilities for the byproducts of reprocessing. But many of the dozens of companies developing advanced reactors in North America are working on designs that utilize recycled fuel. It’s an option worth keeping on the table.', 'Finally, and maybe most importantly, there is the issue of public acceptance. Neither a new wave of nuclear deployment nor a more coherent spent fuel management regime can take hold if the public remains hostile to nuclear energy. On-site deep geologic storage, as Deep Isolation has proposed, might mitigate public concerns, but we shouldn’t expect them to disappear entirely. If and where a management method is adopted, the government should consider consent-based siting to pick the disposal site, as is done in Canada and Scandinavia. A voluntary and competitive process for site selection — like reverse auctions at the airport gate for giving up a seat — could help minimize conflict with the local community.', 'Recent support for advanced nuclear generation technology has come on a bipartisan basis in Congress. Similar broad support should be given for advanced nuclear waste management technology. Even if Yucca Mountain does get built, it still won’t be large enough to hold the spent fuel already generated in the US. The government will either have to try to build a Yucca Mountain 2 — with the decades of political uncertainty that would entail — or try something entirely different. In any event, the challenge of nuclear waste is not “solved,” and nuclear advocates must take public concern about the fuel cycle seriously. Meanwhile, if progress is made on waste management, state moratoria on new nuclear construction can end and the industry will have room to grow. Developing innovative solutions to the waste problem is severely needed for the past, present, and future of nuclear in the US.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-8---Texas-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

3e91ce55a607b6d972612d263e0bdd42a84646897d5ba14421d4dd900d8c85ec

No spillover especially to criminal law

Meeyoung Cha et al. 21, Chief Investigator in the Data Science Group at the IBS Pioneer Research Center for Mathematical and Computational Sciences and Associate Professor in School of Computing at KAIST, The Conflict Between People’s Urge to Punish AI and Legal Systems, https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frobt.2021.756242/full#B11

AI systems could be granted standing regardless of their ability to fulfill duties An important distinction in legal personhood is its adoption under criminal and civil law Rights and duties come in distinct bundles a legal person may be required to pay for damages and yet not be held liable for a criminal offense

AI systems could be granted legal standing regardless of their ability to fulfill duties by granting them certain rights for legal protection An important distinction in the proposal to extend legal personhood to AI systems is its adoption under criminal and civil law While civil law aims to make victims whole by compensating them criminal law punishes offenses Rights and duties come in distinct bundles such that a legal person may be required to pay for damages under civil law and yet not be held liable for a criminal offense Granting legal personhood to AI systems may facilitate compensating those harmed under civil law while providing general deterrence and psychological satisfaction to victims if these systems are criminally punished. Extending civil liability to AI systems means these machines should hold assets

standing regardless fulfill duties distinction personhood to AI systems civil law whole Rights and duties come in distinct bundles pay for damages not be held liable for a criminal offense

['We note that AI systems could be granted legal standing regardless of their ability to fulfill duties, e.g., by granting them certain rights for legal and moral protection (Gunkel, 2018;\xa0Gellers, 2020). Nevertheless, we highlight that the EU proposal to extend a specific legal status to machines was predicated on holding these systems legally responsible for their actions. Many of the arguments opposed to the proposal also rely on these systems’ incompatibility with legal punishment and pose that these systems should not be granted legal personhood because they cannot be punished.', 'An important distinction in the proposal to extend legal personhood to AI systems and robots is its adoption under criminal and civil law. While civil law aims to make victims whole by compensating them (Prosser, 1941), criminal law punishes offenses. Rights and duties come in distinct bundles such that a legal person, for instance, may be required to pay for damages under civil law and yet not be held liable for a criminal offense (Kurki, 2019). The EU proposal to extend legal personhood to automated systems has focused on the former by defending that they could make “good any damage they may cause.” However, scholarly discussion has not been restricted to the civil domain and has also inquired how criminal offenses caused by AI systems could be dealt with (Abbott, 2020).', 'Some of the possible benefits, drawbacks, and challenges of extending legal personhood to autonomous systems are unique to civil and criminal law. Granting legal personhood to AI systems may facilitate compensating those harmed under civil law (Turner, 2018), while providing general deterrence (Abbott, 2020) and psychological satisfaction to victims (e.g., through revenge (Mulligan, 2017)) if these systems are criminally punished. Extending civil liability to AI systems means these machines should hold assets to compensate those harmed (Bryson et al., 2017). In contrast, the difficulties of holding automated systems criminally liable extend to other domains, such as how to define an AI system’s mind, how to reduce it to a single actor (Gless et al., 2016), and how to grant them physical independence.', '']

[(9, 22)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-DeWe-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-1.docx

Northwestern

DeWe

c5b6be4ee2bce50d6e59a2f21efd768b321487de5305dae4dff557ccf1c66ef7

3—Independently—PTD compels Public Utility Commission sustainable ratemaking—solves through resource interlinkages.

Collins 19 (Lance D. Collins, President and Principal Attorney, Law Office of Lance D. Collins, B.A. Political Science, University of Hawaii, M.A., Indigenous Politics, University of Hawaii, Ph.D., Political Science and Philippine Studies, University of Hawaii, J.D., University of Hawaii; May 22nd, 2019; “APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF; LIFE OF THE LAND and HUI ALOHA 'ĀINA O KA LEI MAILE ALI'I; In re The Gas Co. dba Hawaii Gas”; Supreme Court of Hawaii, SCOT-19-0000044; University of Kansas Libraries, Lexis Nexus)

PUC's risk climate impacts storms temp s erosion sea rise will wreak havoc exacerbating acidification altering crops and water disease PUC violated trust shall conserve resources including water minerals and energy promote development consistent with conservation PUC failed to examine how ratemaking would conserve resources application of p t d to PUC would require duty to maintain resources on a case-by-case basis as a trustee has a duty to water resources PUC must not relegate itself to a umpire but instead take initiative in considering the resource at every stage to reduce GHG dependence on fossil

specifically raised practices and the potential impacts of PUC's risk exacerbating climate change impacts . ROA V. 38 at 22 ROA V.52 at 8 climate change impacts that include storms and rising temp erature s rendering key points unrecognizable Coastal erosion sea level rise intrusion of saltwater into freshwater aquifers will wreak havoc on coastal areas forced migrations exacerbating social welfare efforts rising temperature and ocean acidification altering marine species distribution areas are under attack from saltwater intrusions into the freshwater aquifers coastal erosion and rapid sea level rise flooding home sites fishponds the loss of salt cultivation beach erosion and contamination of crops and fresh water resources forests are under attack causing declining health infected mosquito populations ruining disease -free refuges PUC violated its duties as a public trust ee the State shall conserve natural resources including water air minerals and energy sources and shall promote development and utilization consistent with conservation The PUC failed to fulfill its obligations as a public trustee by failing to examine how its ratemaking approval would conserve natural resources PUC required to balance conservation and protection of natural resources with utilization of these resources consistent with their conservation application of the p ublic t rust d octrine adapted to PUC 's obligations would require (1) duty to maintain natural resources for future generations and to assure uses are reasonable (2) determination whether uses are consistent with the public trust (3) applying presumptions in favor of resource protection (4) evaluating on a case-by-case basis (5) applying scrutiny and (6) examining proposed use in relation to other public and private uses PUC as a public trustee has a duty to take the public trust into account in the planning of water resources PUC must not relegate itself to the role of a 'mere umpire ' but instead take the initiative in considering public rights in the resource at every stage of the planning and decision-making process to ensure prescribed measures are actually being implemented after a thorough assessment of the possible adverse impacts the development would have PUC did not prescribe measures to reduce GHG emissions or reduce dependence on fossil fuels because it did not account for them and thereby violated its public trust obligations

impacts of PUC's exacerbating climate change impacts storms rising temp erature s erosion sea level rise saltwater freshwater aquifers wreak havoc migrations rising temperature acidification species intrusions freshwater erosion sea level rise loss of salt cultivation erosion contamination of crops fresh water resources forests declining health disease violated public trust ee conserve resources water air minerals energy sources development conservation PUC failed public trustee ratemaking approval PUC balance protection utilization consistent conservation p ublic t rust d octrine PUC 's obligations maintain future generations reasonable public trust presumptions resource protection case-by-case basis scrutiny public trustee duty public trust into account water resources not relegate 'mere umpire ' initiative rights in the resource planning decision-making being implemented possible adverse impacts reduce GHG emissions dependence on fossil fuels violated its public trust

['', "Ka Lei Maile specifically raised its members' Hawaiian cultural practices and the potential impacts of PUC's approval of the HG application on [*58] those practices due to the risk of exacerbating climate change impacts. ROA V.21 at 69-70, ROA V. 38 at 22, ROA V.52 at 8. Ka Lei Mail raised climate change impacts on cultural practices that include:", "traditional landmarks[] being obliterated by storms and rising temperatures, rendering key navigation points for Hawai'i's seafaring peoples unrecognizable . . . Coastal erosion, sea level rise, and the intrusion of saltwater into freshwater aquifers will wreak havoc on coastal areas. . . . Hokule'a was forced to adjust its sailing plans due to [climate change] . . . . forced migrations of Polynesian communities, exacerbating culture, identity, social welfare, and self-determination efforts . . . rising temperature and ocean acidification altering marine species distribution, impacting lawai'a, and their cultural knowledge and practices. The low-lying Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument will lose nesting sites for Hawaiian Monk Seal pupping sites. Green Turtle nesting areas and Laysan Finch habitat. . . Coastal areas are under attack from saltwater intrusions into the freshwater aquifers, coastal erosion and rapid sea level rise which threatens the cultural practice of burying [*59] 'iwi kupuna along Hawai'i's shores, which prevents the 'uhane from joining the 'aumakua, interrupting the delicate balance between salt and fresh water in loko i'a, flooding and loss of burial grounds, home sites, fishponds, historic trails, heiau, and petroglyphs, the loss of salt cultivation, beach erosion, and contamination of crops and freshwater resources. The forests are under attack causing declining health of the forests, ohia lehua losses from Rapid Ohia Death, 'ahinahina species on Mauna Loa, Mauna Kea and Haleakala under threat, avian malaria infected mosquito populations moving up mountains ruining their few remaining disease-free refuges for native birds.", "ROA V.36 at 66-68. Pursuant to its obligations under article XII, § 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution, the PUC was obligated to make specific findings and conclusions about the scope of valued cultural, historical, and natural resources that may be affected by its decision, the extent to which Hawaiian cultural practitioner rights could be affected, and then prescribe feasible actions to protect those rights and resources. Id., 94 Hawai'i at 31, 47, 7 P.3d at 1084. The PUC failed to do so and therefore its order was issued in violation of Appellants' constitutional [*60] rights and made upon unlawful procedures.", "E. PUC violated its constitutional duties as a public trustee. Article XI, § 1 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides: For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.", 'All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people. Id. The PUC failed to fulfill its obligations as a public trustee by failing to examine how its ratemaking approval would conserve and protect natural resources or to promote their development in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. These obligations include an obligation to protect Hawai\'i natural resources from harms consequent to GHG emissions. See In re Contested Case Hearing Re Conservation Dist. Use Application (CDUA) HA-3568 for the Thirty Meter Telescope At [*61] the Mauna Kea Sci. Reserve, Hawai\'i , 431 P.3d 752, 773 (2018) ( Mauna Kea II) (Pollack, J., concurring) (noting "[t]his court has never precisely demarcated the dimensions of the public trust doctrine as incorporated in Article XI, Section 1."). Interpreting the "plain language" of article XI, § 1 as providing "that all public natural resources, including land, are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people[,]" this Court concluded conservation district lands owned by the State are public resources held in trust for the benefit of the people. Id.', 'Under article XI, § 1, the PUC was required to balance the conservation and protection of Hawai\'i natural resources with "the development and utilization of these resources on the other in a manner consistent with their conservation." Id., Hawai\'i , 431 P.3d at 774. Kauai Springs, Inc. v. Planning Commission of County of Kauai, 133 Hawai\'i 141, 324 P.3d 951 (2014) set forth a framework "[t]o assist agencies in the application of the public trust doctrine." Id., 133 Hawai\'i at 174-75, 324 P.3d at 984-85. As adapted to the PUC\'s obligations, the Kaua\'i Springs framework would require: (1) a duty to maintain the natural resources for future generations and to assure resource uses are reasonable and beneficial; (2) determination [*62] as to whether the proposed uses are consistent with purposes of the public trust; (3) applying presumptions in favor of public use, access, enjoyment, and resource protection; (4) evaluating proposals on a case-by-case basis, recognizing no vested rights in public resources; (5) applying a high level of scrutiny to private or commercial uses; and (6) examining the proposed use in relation to other public and private uses. Id.; see also Mauna Kea II, Hawai\'i , 431 P.3d 752 (Pollack, J. concurring).', "The Kaua'i Springs framework is not mandatory and does not preclude other means of determining whether an agency met its public trust obligations. Id., 133 Hawai'i at 174 n.25, 324 P.3d at 984 n.25. However, PUC did not make any findings or perform any analysis of the impacts of its approval of the HG application on Hawaii's environment, natural resources, or air quality. See inter alia ROA V.56 at 6-238. The PUC's only pertinent finding in this regard was that HG represented that GHG emissions would decrease due to reduced use of fuel for equipment used to produce SNG. ROA V.56 at 134.", "The instant situation is distinguished from the Intermediate Court of Appeals' conclusion that the PUC's decision on a rate increase does not involve public [*63] trust considerations where the amount or method of water extraction was unchanged. In re Molokai Pub. Utilities, Inc., 127 Hawai'i 234, 237, 277 P.3d 328, 331 (App. 2012). In re Moloka'i pivoted on the representation that the applicant's effect on the public trust water resources would be the same whether or not the rate increase was approved by PUC. Here, HG's 30% SNG conversion project was only approved on an interim basis. ROA V.02 at 18. The PUC's approval of the HG application therefore included an increase in the amount HG could recover from the 30% conversion project and thus extended the project's duration, during which GHG emissions consequent to replacement of SNG would continue and be unaccounted for. Id.", 'The PUC, as a public trustee, has an "affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." In re Water Use Permit Applications, 94 Hawai\'i 97, 141, 9 P.3d 409, 453 (2000) (" Waiāhole I") (footnote and citations omitted). As a public trustee, PUC "must not relegate itself to the role of a \'mere umpire\' . . . but instead must take the initiative in considering, protecting, and advancing public rights in the resource at every stage of the planning [*64] and decision-making process." Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 111 Hawai\'i 205, 231, 140 P.3d 985, 1011 (2006) (citations omitted). The PUC was required to not only review HG\'s application for "prescribed measures [that] appear to be in compliance with state regulation, but also to ensure that the prescribed measures are actually being implemented after a thorough assessment of the possible adverse impacts the development would have on the State\'s natural resources." Id. citing art. XI, § 1 Haw. Const. PUC did not prescribe measures to reduce GHG emissions or reduce long term dependence on fossil fuels because it did not account for them and thereby violated its public trust obligations.', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

6ce4c9b6978b40bf1194bf874acd8c7b2972673cff8cfdb20461439c0cd71d2b

The process of disarming makes great power relations worse, not better

Brad Roberts 9, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, professorial lecturer in international affairs at the George Washington University, 2009, “On Order, Stability, and Nuclear Abolition,” in Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, ed. Perkovich & Acton, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf

authors argue disarm requires effective collective security reconciliation of interests among major powers collective security is a century old record can hardly be encouraging failures of nonprolif are tied to divergent interests among major powers Would disarm somehow break this pattern let us grant political circumstances change Would institutions meet unique tests posed by state that brandishes bombs on ambition of aggression major powers confront new instability as they reduce nuc s As numbers come down U S and Russia worry increasingly how quickly other might send them back up imbalances in remaining capabilities become more prominent Russia and China will worry more about the conventional level deeper reductions motivate China’s sprint to parity new stability problems emerge as newest proliferators increase arsenals search for unilateral advantage add tremendous fragility

the authors argue disarm ament in an imperfect world requires effective collective security what would effective collective security responses to threatened or actual breaches of the nuclear peace require? significant reconciliation of interests and approaches ” among the major powers willingness to put international stability ahead of national advantages creation of compliance processes that enjoy broad international legitimacy ; and availability of non-nuclear means of punishment seen as credible by the targets of deterrence effort to build institutions, processes, and norms of collective security is much more than a thought experiment. This effort is a century old record to date can hardly be encouraging for rapid achievement of the type of world the authors invite us to envision most failures of nonprolif eration are directly tied to divergent interests among the major powers or ineffectiveness as guarantors of countries that perceived the risks sufficient to seek nuclear deterrents Would a renewed disarm ament effort somehow break this pattern and bring the needed discipline to the major powers? let us grant political circumstances might change Would these institutions then meet the unique tests in a world where abolition has taken hold incompletely? the problem posed by a state that openly brandishes its bombs and then sets out on some bold ambition of coercion or aggression How would the major powers do their jobs as global sheriffs against a nuclear-armed challenger? Could deterrence be effective by conventional means alone? international political conditions that could enable abolition do not currently exist . They require fundamental , reorientations in the roles and responsibilities of most of the actors in the international system Because I assess international political conditions enabling abolition as not proximate the landscape between the near horizon and the far prospect is rather large a number of problems stand out major powers will confront new problems of instability if and as they reduce their reliance on nuc lear weapon s As numbers come down the U nited S tates and Russia will worry increasingly about how quickly and competitively the other might try to send them back up If and as the numbers come down, imbalances in remaining capabilities will become more prominent U nited S tates will worry increasingly about Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons as the numbers come down, Russia and China will worry more about imbalances at the conventional level Stability among nuclear-weapon states at lower numbers will not be achieved simply by cutting to lower numbers deeper reductions in the two largest existing nuclear arsenals may also motivate existing members of the nuclear club to new nuclear status China’s sprint to parity building up its arsenal to match the U nited S tates and Russia is a rising worry new stability problems emerge as the newest proliferators increase their arsenals India, Pakistan, and Iran may assemble arsenals of warheads numbering in the hundreds search for unilateral advantage seems likely to add tremendous fragility we can expect emergence of states committed to a revolutionary ideology that also has nuclear weapons. Such a development could well make the “rogue state” problem look easy in comparison How different a world would we face if a revolutionary regime were to emerge committed to the use of nuclear threats, and nuclear attacks , to broadly remake international borders or advance an ideology of purported global import, or simply to wage civil war? the experience would likely be hugely decisive in shaping the next nuclear order

disarm threatened or actual breaches of the nuclear peace significant reconciliation of interests and approaches ahead of national advantages broad international legitimacy a century old hardly be encouraging nonprolif divergent interests disarm somehow break this pattern let us grant political circumstances might change unique tests incompletely? openly brandishes its bombs do not currently exist fundamental new problems of instability nuc s U S worry increasingly send them back up imbalances in remaining capabilities will become more prominent U S worry more about imbalances at the conventional level not be achieved simply by cutting to lower numbers new nuclear status sprint to parity U S new stability problems emerge search for unilateral advantage add tremendous fragility revolutionary ideology nuclear attacks

['In fact, of course, the authors do not anticipate the end of conflict. They recognize that conflicts may be stabilized but not resolved, that confidence may rise but not yield full trust, and that some states cheat. Thus they argue that disarmament in an imperfect world requires effective collective security. And what would effective collective security responses to threatened or actual breaches of the nuclear peace require? They highlight the following: a “significant reconciliation of interests and approaches” among the major powers; a willingness on their part to put international stability ahead of the single-minded pursuit of national advantages; the creation of compliance processes that enjoy broad international legitimacy; and the availability of non-nuclear means of punishment (that would be seen as credible by the targets of deterrence).', 'The effort to build the institutions, processes, and norms of collective security is much more than a thought experiment. This effort is now roughly a century old. The record to date can hardly be seen as encouraging for rapid achievement of the type of world the authors invite us to envision. After all, most of the failures of nonproliferation through the nuclear era are directly tied to divergent interests among the major powers or to their ineffectiveness as guarantors of countries that perceived the risks sufficient to seek nuclear deterrents. In dealing with the threat of weapons of mass destruction in particular, the record of the United Nations Security Council is not particularly distinguished. The moment of hope reflected in the “New World Order” envisioned by President George H. W. Bush in 1991, built around collective enforcement of global norms, has given way to mounting skepticism as the Security Council has failed to prevent or reverse proliferation by India, Pakistan, and North Korea; has proven ineffective at curtailing Iran’s programs of concern; and has publicly fallen out over its roles and objectives vis-à-vis Iraq. Can a viable nuclear-free world be built on this track record? Would a renewed disarmament effort somehow break this pattern and bring the needed discipline to the major powers? Do their interests in fact coincide in nuclear abolition? In the quest for a world ready to permit the final moves to nuclear disarmament, these conditions seem especially difficult to fulfill.', 'But let us grant that political circumstances might change and that collective security institutions could be made to work as envisaged and that others might accept their compliance role as legitimate. Would these institutions then be ready and able to meet the unique tests that might come in a world where abolition has taken hold incompletely? In analyzing this particular problem, the paper paints too benign a picture, in my view. It focuses too much on the problem posed by the cheating state that has hidden the proverbial atomic bomb in the basement and too little on the problem posed by a state that openly brandishes its bombs and then sets out on some bold ambition of coercion or aggression. The question of how to deal with a nuclear-armed renegade gets little more than one paragraph in the discussion of enforcement. How would the major powers do their jobs as global sheriffs against a nuclear-armed challenger? Would their publics be willing to do so without nuclear weapons of their own? Could deterrence of such a challenger be effective by conventional means alone? Could defeat of such a state be done in a sufficiently rapid and decisive way by conventional means to safeguard the lives of those millions who might perish in a longer war? More thinking is needed on such questions.', 'In sum, the international political conditions that could enable abolition do not currently exist. They seem to require major, and in some ways fundamental, reorientations in the roles and responsibilities of most of the actors in the international system. These observations leave me skeptical that the conditions that would make abolition feasible are in any way proximate. This is not to argue that we should not work to bring them into being. After all, we want to live in a world in which most of the conflicts have been eliminated, or at least stabilized, and where major powers act in concert to maintain the peace. It would be (and has been) a worthy use of U.S. power to bring such a world closer.', 'On Stability and the Movement Toward Abolition', 'That brings me to my second focus. The paper speaks alternately of the near-term steps toward the “near horizon” and the more distant steps to the “far prospect” of actual abolition. How many steps might there be in between (if the latter indeed proves possible)? Might they prove to be small steps or large steps? Because I assess the international political conditions enabling abolition as not proximate, I must conclude that the landscape between the near horizon and the far prospect is rather large. And I anticipate that the terrain will sometimes be easy to traverse but will other times require some great leaps and even some backtracking and indirect travel. I would expect also that experience along the way will significantly color beliefs about the desirability of disarmament and the means to achieve it. Hence I feel that the paper has given this part of the journey short shrift. From my perspective, a number of problems stand out in this particular part of the landscape as being worthy of deeper study. Four are highlighted here.', 'First, the major powers will confront new problems of instability if and as they reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons and adapt their strategic postures to new circumstances. As numbers come down, both the United States and Russia will worry increasingly about how quickly and competitively the other might try to send them back up, and each has different capacities to reassure itself that it would not be taken advantage of in this manner. If and as the numbers come down, imbalances in remaining capabilities will become more prominent; the United States will worry increasingly about Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, while Russia will worry increasingly about emerging imbalances with states along its periphery that possess intermediate-range nuclear capabilities. If and as the numbers come down, Russia and China will worry more about imbalances at the conventional level of war (for which they compensate by nuclear means). They are already keenly concerned about being able to offset growing U.S. advantages in non-nuclear strategic strike and also missile defense. Stability in relations among the nuclear-weapon states at lower numbers will not be achieved simply by cutting to lower numbers.', 'Second, deeper reductions in the two largest existing nuclear arsenals will have an impact on the behaviors of other states. The authors touch on the incentives that this might create for new states to enter the nuclear club, as the cost of entry to peer status would have been reduced. Such reductions may also motivate existing members of the nuclear club to new nuclear status. For example, China’s possible “sprint to parity” (by building up its arsenal to match that of the United States and Russia in a numerical sense) is a rising worry today for policy makers in both Washington and Moscow. Some in Asia also express concern about what level of nuclear prowess India might ultimately deem necessary to its desired political status. As the authors rightly argue, mitigating this problem will require bringing nuclear-armed states other than Russia and the United States into the formal reduction process. So far at least, this has proven far easier to say than do. Determining how it might be done requires a deeper understanding than has been evident so far of how leaders in these countries are trying to adapt force structures in response to increasingly complex security environments.', 'Third, new stability problems will emerge if and as the newest proliferators increase their arsenals and their strategic reach. Most states preach the virtues of minimum deterrence, but most also have found the search for a survivable deterrent to be long and arduous. In the coming decades, states such as India, Pakistan, and Iran may assemble arsenals of warheads numbering in the hundreds and delivery systems capable of global reach, adding tremendous complexity to the web of deterrence. The occasional search for unilateral advantage seems likely to add tremendous fragility to that web.', 'Fourth, if the decades ahead are anything like the decades past, we can expect to see the emergence of one or more states committed to a revolutionary ideology, a challenge that would take on a particular new and ominous hue if that state also has nuclear weapons. Such a development could well make the “rogue state” problem look easy in comparison. After all, so far at least, our experience with “rogue states” is that they have sought to commit aggression against their immediate neighbors and to use violence against their own citizens. How different a world would we face if a revolutionary regime were to emerge, one committed to the use of nuclear threats, and perhaps also nuclear attacks, to broadly remake international borders or advance an ideology of purported global import, or simply to wage civil war? Some in al-Qaeda have articulated just such a vision—the creation of a nuclear-armed caliphate that would exploit its status as a “nuclear superpower” to first purify the umma and then remake the global order. Whatever the ultimate fate of such a state, the experience would likely be hugely decisive in shaping the next nuclear order.', '']

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ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Neg-ADA-Nationals-at-Indiana-University-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

1f62ab5b723a964dc039c7fd75811d43efb56a86614cdae7c3f70c2b5b28bd1f

Vote negative is a material praxis requires securing universal goods for the entire working class.

Smulewicz-Zucker & Thompson 15 Gregory, Editor of Logos and adjunct professor of Philosophy at Baruch College, CUNY; and Michael J., Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, “Introduction,” in Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics, pg. 1-32

lack in political criticism that made left political discourse relevant the academy so far removed from political issues t movements lost political momentum shift in focus produced incoherence of politics political discourse serv as cathartic space further stabilizing power There is no class cannot be seen in the divisions of labor political power rooted in unequal property ought be a basic political imperative rational radical politics should seek to enrich common goods erode class democratize society and orient toward common ends. widening struggles of labor can we envision a workers’ movement

Radical politics finds itself in a state of crisis progressive transformation political radicalism is found wanting radical theory has blossomed. Žižek ly discuss Marxism in documentaries new journals have emerged Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive political , social, and cultural criticism of the kind that once made progressive and rational left political discourse relevant to the machinations of real politics and the broader culture Today leftist theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles. social movements have lost political momentum they are focused on shallow discussions of class obsessed with issues of identity racial, sexual, and so on rather than on the g social question of unequal economic power As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and illusory visions of anarchic democracy economic inequality has ballooned into oligarchic proportions, working people have been increasingly marginalized and ethnic minority groups turned into a coolie labor force. This has been the result of a lack of concern with real politics contemporary political theory on the Left has witnessed a decisive shift in focus a shift that produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age. a series of trends in theory reshaped the ways that politics is practiced Foucault Lacan and Derrida and newer voices like Badiou Rancière and Butler have risen to the status of academic icons political discourse has become dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics postcolonialism and other intellectual fads. This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant it ends up serv ing as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism, further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose. The transformation of radical a politics is characterized by a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property in the capacity for some to command and to control labor ought not to be a basic political imperative . what we would call a rational radical politics should seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics but rather to enrich common goods erode the great divisions of wealth and class , democratize all aspects of society and economy and seek to orient the powers of individuals toward common ends. only by widening the struggles of labor and rethinking the ends of the labor movement connecting the struggles of labor to issues beyond the workplace education environment ublic life, issues of racial and gender equality and the nature of the social order more broadly can we envision a revitalization of a workers’ movement that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals

crisis substantive political relevant machinations of real politics so far removed critical mass shallow discussions economic power radical mandarins “desire,” illusory visions oligarchic proportions, increasingly marginalized shift in focus incoherence dominated so irrelevant cathartic space justifiable anxieties stabilizing integrative power unwitting allies basic political imperative a rational radical politics toward common ends. widening the struggles of labor education environment racial gender equality alienated theory

['Radical politics in contemporary Western democracies finds itself in a state of crisis. When viewed from the vantage point of social change, a progressive transformation of the social order, political radicalism is found wanting. This would seem to go against the grain of perceived wisdom. As an academic enterprise, radical theory has blossomed. Figures such as Slavoj Žižek openly discuss Marxism in popular documentaries, new journals have emerged touting a radical “anti-capitalism,” and whole conferences and subfields are dominated by questions posed by obscure theoretical texts. Despite this, there is a profound lack in substantive, meaningful political, social, and cultural criticism of the kind that once made progressive and rational left political discourse relevant to the machinations of real politics and the broader culture . Today, leftist political theory in the academy has fallen under the spell of ideas so far removed from actual political issues that the question can be posed whether the traditions of left critique that gave intellectual support to the great movements of modernity—from the workers’ movement to the civil rights movement—possess a critical mass to sustain future struggles. Quite to the contrary, social movements have lost political momentum; they are generally focused on questions of culture and shallow discussions of class and obsessed with issues of identity— racial, sexual, and so on—rather than on the great “social question” of unequal economic power, which once served as the driving impulse for political, social, and cultural transformation. As these new radical mandarins spill ink on futile debates over “desire,” “identity,” and illusory visions of anarchic democracy, economic inequality has ballooned into oligarchic proportions, working people have been increasingly marginalized, and ethnic minority groups turned into a coolie labor force.', 'This has been the result, we contend, of a lack of concern with real politics in contemporary radical theory. Further, we believe that this is the result of a transformation of ideas, that contemporary political theory on the Left has witnessed a decisive shift in focus in recent decades—a shift that has produced nothing less than the incoherence of the tradition of progressive politics in our age. At a time when the Left is struggling to redefine itself and respond to current political and economic crises, a series of trends in contemporary theory has reshaped the ways that politics is understood and practiced. Older thinkers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, and newer voices like Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, David Graeber, and Judith Butler, among others, have risen to the status of academic and cultural icons while their ideas have become embedded in the “logics” of new social movements. As some aspects of the recent Occupy Wall Street demonstrations have shown, political discourse has become increasingly dominated by the impulses of neo-anarchism, identity politics, postcolonialism, and other intellectual fads. This new radicalism has made itself so irrelevant with respect to real politics that it ends up serving as a kind of cathartic space for the justifiable anxieties wrought by late capitalism, further stabilizing its systemic and integrative power rather than disrupting it. These trends are the products as well as unwitting allies of that which they oppose.', 'The transformation of radical and progressive politics throughout the latter half of the twentieth and the early decades of the twenty-first centuries is characterized by both a sociological shift as well as an intellectual one. A core thesis has been that the shift from industrial to postindustrial society has led to the weakening of class politics. But this is unsatisfying. There is no reason why class cannot be seen in the divisions of mental and service labor as it was with an industrial proletariat. There is no reason why political power rooted in unequal property and control over resources, in the capacity for some to command and to control the labor of others as well as the consumption of others ought not to be a basic political imperative. To this end, what we would call a rational radical politics should seek not the utopian end of a “post-statist” politics, but rather to enrich common goods, erode the great divisions of wealth and class, democratize all aspects of society and economy, and seek to orient the powers of individuals and the community toward common ends. Indeed, only by widening the struggles of labor and rethinking the ends of the labor movement—connecting the struggles of labor to issues beyond the workplace, to education, the environment, public life, issues of racial and gender equality, culture, and the nature of the social order more broadly—can we envision a revitalization of a workers’ movement, one that would have no need of the alienated theory of the new radicals.1']

[(0, 30)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-5---Texas-Round-6.docx

Emory

LoKi

51f9d49139ff5c5d03d9e7080e115dd5c4980a0aa3f688befc8649ffff49f1ac

Antitrust is massive, unprecedented, AND triggers ‘scope’ links.

Bernstein ’22 [Michael; February 2; Partner at Arnold and Porter’s Bankruptcy and Restructuring practice; Mondaq, “What to Expect In 2022 Merger Enforcement: Trends and Developments From 2021,” https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/antitrust-eu-competition-/1156670/what-to-expect-in-2022-merger-enforcement-trends-and-developments-from-2021]

2021 ushered aggressive antitrust with Kanter and Khan Biden brought high-profile merger s , with three deals abandoned provides insights for 2022 Ex O issued wide-ranging policy laying out 72 initiatives Commission authorized FTC staff , for the next 10 years , to investigate " repeat offenders " tech companies healthcare harms against workers mergers this action a departure from practice and expands scope of conduct

2021 ushered in new leadership and an aggressive antitrust enforcement agenda with Kanter and Khan the Biden Administration has moved to aggressively enforce US antitrust laws the new leadership brought a number of high-profile merger challenge s , with three deals being abandoned in the face of a challenge in the last couple of months of 2021 provides insights for 2022 Biden Ex ecutive O rder issued a wide-ranging Executive Order establishing a government-wide policy to bolster economic competition and laying out 72 specific initiatives seeking to promote the interests of American workers businesses and consumers urged FTC to exercise its rulemaking authority to address unfair competition New Leadership Khan was appointed FTC Chair Bedoya was nominated as an FTC Commissioner Vedova as Director of the Bureau of Competition Kanter was confirmed to head the Antitrust Division FTC Omnibus Investigation the Commission authorized FTC staff , for the next 10 years , to use compulsory process to investigate a number of antitrust enforcement priorities including " repeat offenders " tech nology companies and digital platforms healthcare businesses including pharmaceutical companies harms against workers and small businesses proposed mergers this Commission action marks a departure from prior FTC practice and expands the scope of conduct to a particular company authorizations remove oversight this gives the Chair even more control over individual investigations

antitrust Kanter Khan high-profile challenge s three deals being abandoned insights for 2022 Ex O wide-ranging 72 New Leadership FTC staff 10 years compulsory process repeat offenders tech healthcare businesses workers proposed mergers departure expands the scope remove even more control

['Overview and Key Issues from 2021', 'Despite the ongoing economic impact from the coronavirus pandemic, deal activity in 2021 continued to set new records with global mergers and acquisitions topping $5.5 trillion dollars—far exceeding prior peaks in 2007 and 2015.1\xa0At the same time, 2021 ushered in new leadership—and an aggressive antitrust enforcement agenda—with Jonathan Kanter becoming Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Lina Khan becoming Chair of the Federal Trade Commission.', "Consistent with its 2020 campaign statements, the Biden Administration has moved to aggressively enforce US antitrust laws. And, the new leadership brought a number of high-profile merger challenges, with three deals being challenged or abandoned in the face of a challenge in the last couple of months of 2021, including US Sugar/Imperial Sugar (DOJ challenge), Nvidia/Arm (FTC challenge), and Great Outdoors/Sportsman's Warehouse (abandoned due to FTC concerns).", "Although the practical consequences of the Biden Administration's antitrust policy are not yet fully known, 2021 provides a number of insights for parties to contemplate as they consider transactions in 2022 and beyond.", 'The Biden Administration\'s Executive Order and Antitrust Agenda. On July 9, 2021, President Joe Biden issued a wide-ranging Executive Order (EO) establishing a government-wide policy to bolster economic competition and laying out 72 specific initiatives seeking "to promote the interests of American workers, businesses, and consumers" across the economy.2\xa0As discussed in Arnold & Porter\'s Advisory\xa0, the EO singled out "Big Tech" and "dominant Internet platforms," and identified several areas warranting closer scrutiny: acquisitions of nascent competitors, aggregation of data, surveillance of users, and network effects. The EO also urged FTC to exercise its rulemaking authority to address unfair competition in major Internet marketplaces. In addition, the EO established a new White House Competition Council within the executive branch, which will coordinate competitionrelated initiatives across agencies.', 'New Leadership. With the new presidential administration, 2021 also saw changes to the antitrust leadership. At FTC, former professor Lina Khan was appointed FTC Chair and former professor Alvaro Bedoya was nominated as an FTC Commissioner (to replace Commissioner Rohit Chopra).3\xa0Subsequently, Chair Kahn named Holly Vedova (former advisor to Commissioner Rohit Chopra) as Director of the Bureau of Competition.4\xa0At DOJ, antitrust lawyer Jonathan Kanter was confirmed to head the Antitrust Division,5\xa0following the interim stewardship of Deputy AAG for Criminal Enforcement Richard Powers. At the White House, Tim Wu, former professor and former senior advisor to FTC, serves as the new Special Assistant for Technology & Competition Policy.', 'FTC Omnibus Investigation. On July 1, 2021 and September 14, 2021, the Commission authorized FTC staff, for the next 10 years, to use compulsory process (such as civil investigative demands and subpoenas) to investigate a number of antitrust enforcement priorities, including, notably:', '"repeat offenders";', 'technology companies and digital platforms;', 'healthcare businesses including pharmaceutical companies, pharmacy benefits managers, and hospitals;', 'harms against workers and small businesses;', 'proposed mergers;', 'consummated mergers; and', 'any simultaneous service as an officer or director of, or a contemporaneous financial stake in, two or more competing entities.', "These priorities are no surprise as they have long been a focus of FTC enforcement. However, this Commission action is notable because it both marks a departure from prior FTC practice and expands the scope of conduct typically covered by FTC compulsory process resolutions. In the past, FTC staff typically conducted an initial investigation into identifiable conduct by a company or group of companies. If FTC staff determined that there was enough evidence or concern to launch an in-depth investigation, staff would typically recommend to the full Commission that it authorize the use of compulsory process pursuant to FTC's Rules of Practice. A majority of the Commission was then required to vote to approve the use of compulsory process and a majority of the Commission was required to vote to close any investigation in which compulsory process authority was granted to staff. As a result of FTC's July 1 action (discussed in Arnold & Porter's Advisory\xa0), FTC staff now need approval from only one Commissioner before issuing a subpoena or civil investigative demand to a particular company as long as it concerns one of the broad enforcement areas. These authorizations remove full bi-partisan Commission oversight of the launch of in-depth investigations into particular companies or specific conduct. Since the Chair has more direct influence over FTC staff compared to other Commissioners through her appointment of senior staff (such as the Director of the Bureau of Competition and the Director of the Bureau of Economics), this decision gives the Chair even more control over individual investigations than she otherwise would have."]

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-NDT-Round4.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-NDT-Round4.docx

ee9708247c9cca41169ecf0b2f94224f31fbd70d8b0713c9efa335809f050257

Political education in debate need not have a linear relation to nuclear policy outcomes but complement broader activist imaginations.

Vincent J. Intondi 23, a professor of history and the director of the Institute for Race, Justice, and Civic Engagement at Montgomery College, 2023, ‘Saving the World from Nuclear War: The June 12, 1982, Disarmament Rally and Beyond.’ Johns Hopkins University Press, Project MUSE, pp. 101-105, muse.jhu.edu/book/110662

While policy didn’t change overnight they hear us in Washington work as organizers needs to work on more than one level that includes Congress or civil disobedience We need political education nuclear weapons do not take precedence over racism AIDS Police brutality Yet for many it did not matter if they achieved justice if they were dead from nuclear war issues were connected They organized researched sang and danced to ensure we would be alive They changed policy. That is significant. It matters through policy making, Students need to learn they have power even if we didn’t stop nuclear weapons We are not in the moment We don’t measure our impact in the short time we are on this planet It’s not linear We can be imaginative

the questions remain: Where do we go from here? While policy didn’t change overnight , they hear d us in Washington Our work as organizers needs to always work on more than one level part of that includes writing letters to the editor, visiting members of Congress , or engaging in civil disobedience We need basic political education These organizers maintain that for many, nuclear weapons simply do not take precedence over fighting systemic racism , concentrated poverty, unequal education, climate change, unemployment, and a lack of healthcare The 1980s were riddled with issues that directly affected marginalized communities, from the AIDS epidemic to the War on Drugs. Police brutality was rampant in the 1980s. Yet millions, including thousands of people of color and members of the LGBTQ community, committed themselves to a world free of nuclear weapons for many it did not matter if they achieved social justice if they were dead from nuclear war They realized how these issues were connected and the message was clear They organized , marched, rallied, researched , wrote, spoke, sang , and danced to ensure we would all be alive They changed policy. That is significant. It matters through policy making, Students need to learn they have the power and that even if we didn’t stop nuclear weapons , we did do something significant and that is really important We are not just living in the moment . We don’t measure our ability to have an impact in the short time we are on this planet . It’s not a linear measurement We can be imaginative

the questions remain: Where do we go from here? organizers more than one level Congress civil disobedience political education over racism AIDS Police brutality for many it did not matter if they achieved social justice if they were dead from nuclear war issues were connected They changed policy. That is significant. It matters policy making, they have the power even if in the moment short time we are on this planet linear imaginative

['Although the ban treaty has provided a tool and pathway to eliminating nuclear weapons, the questions remain: Where do we go from here? What lessons can be learned from June 12?', 'Leslie Cagan asserted:', 'Now you can organize on the internet. We did this all before email. I think we had one or two computers in the office, and they were only used for finances and record keeping. While activists today have social media, we should not throw away the basic organizing tools. The next thing I would tell young activists is that it does make a difference. Not every demonstration. But from time to time, gathering masses of people together can and does make a difference. And I do think we made a difference. While policy didn’t change overnight, they heard us in Washington. They knew that massive amounts of people had turned out with a disarmament message. Maybe more importantly, the groups that came together for the march stayed together and kept organizing. And I think that’s one of the big positive values or reasons to have demonstrations— to help people, especially from smaller cities and rural areas to be in the space and movement together . . . to literally walk on the street together and stand shoulder to shoulder at a rally and see that you are part of something that’s bigger than yourself and to take that energy into the next day, the week, year. And I think that was proven.29', 'Looking forward, Cagan explained:', 'It’s a challenge to our imagination and creativity to find a way to articulate connections where it’s not just a laundry list. It’s easier to focus on just one issue, but life isn’t easy. Our message needs to be clear. Our work as organizers needs to always work on more than one level. And we need to think of concrete ways that citizens can get involved so they feel they are doing something. So part of that includes writing letters to the editor, visiting members of Congress, or engaging in civil disobedience. We also need to make sure people understand how nuclear disarmament is connected to other issues and other people’s emotions around those issues. We need basic political education—things like how do you read the newspaper and make sense of it. On any given day there are a lot of issues in there. I still think you need to read books. I think you need to listen, not just to a twenty-second soundbite, but longer talks about how the world works.30', '“You know the nuclear issue is just so hard to mobilize public concern about it now. I don’t know how to build the support,” David Cortright declared. “Climate change, healthcare, immigration are all issues of the day. I keep asking, where is the peace movement? We need to be part of all of these other movements and bring in disarmament issues.”31', 'David McReynolds echoed these sentiments, especially when discussing intersectionality. “Yes, today it [nuclear disarmament] should be combined with other issues. But the danger is then you open the door to the alphabet city of causes and you end up with nothing. One of the great insights on the march in 1963 was it was not just about civil rights. It was about jobs and freedom too. It was very important to see how those were connected. But it wasn’t jobs and freedom for gays, ecology, etcetera. So I think the great genius of 1963 was combining the economic issue which was essential to Black liberation . . . so we also need to focus on the economics. Because the arms race is so tied to the economy. But I would not favor an alphabet city of a list of thirteen things that are most on your mind. I think you have to limit it to several key issues.”32', 'The success of the antinuclear movement in the 1980s was also due in large part to organizing through fear and hope. Leading up to June 12, it seemed as though Helen Caldicott was everywhere. And in many ways, she was. One could not turn on the television without hearing Caldicott discussing what nuclear weapons did to human beings. Along with books showing horrific images drawn by the hibakusha and films like The Day After, fear worked. It moved people to action. Today, however, there are those who contend that the movement should not organize through fear. Moreover, some younger activists argue that today is different, especially for people of color. These organizers maintain that for many, nuclear weapons simply do not take precedence over fighting systemic racism, concentrated poverty, unequal education, climate change, unemployment, and a lack of healthcare. However, it is a mistake to assume that these issues were not present in the 1980s. The 1980s were riddled with issues that directly affected marginalized communities, from the AIDS epidemic to the War on Drugs. Police brutality was rampant in the 1980s. Yet millions, including thousands of people of color and members of the LGBTQ community, committed themselves to a world free of nuclear weapons. Why? Because for many, it did not matter if they achieved social justice if they were dead from nuclear war. They realized how these issues were connected and the message was clear.', 'Throughout my time writing this book, Russian leader Vladimir Putin escalated the invasion of Ukraine by putting his nuclear forces on high alert. New York City issued a public service announcement on how to “survive a nuclear attack,” and the US government continued spending exuberant amounts of money on nuclear weapons. People all over the world are once again discussing nuclear war. Panic and anxiety seem to be setting in, as many are beginning to educate themselves about the nuclear threat. Seeing this all play out as I was writing about the height of the antinuclear movement made me think deeply on the nuclear issue and June 12. I thought about the words by writer Rebecca Solnit: “The true impact of activism may not be felt for a generation. That alone is reason to fight rather than to surrender into despair.”33', 'The importance of June 12 is that it shows that even though problems existed throughout the organizing— some of the same problems that exist currently—and at the time it looked like nuclear war may be inevitable, millions of people in New York and, indeed, around the world refused to believe that was their fate. They organized, marched, rallied, researched, wrote, spoke, sang, and danced to ensure we would all be alive. That said, what June 12 also makes clear is that providing hope is essential. Those who attended the June 12 rally left with a feeling that they could stop this madness. They returned home motivated to organize and believed they could make a difference. And they did. They changed policy. That is significant. It matters. Or as Kathy Engel explained to me:', 'There are moments and they only happen when you know that there is a righteousness and readiness and you are going to break the mold, struggle, and disagree. But humans can come together across all geographic, class, ethnic, religious, and all differences to say we are human and we want to survive . . . and we are going to do this through puppeteering, lecturing, pastoring, policy making, and by trusting the power of the people. Students need to learn that they have the power and that even if we didn’t stop nuclear weapons, we did do something significant and that is really important. We are not just living in the moment. We don’t measure our ability to have an impact in the short time we are on this planet. It’s not a linear measurement. It’s the power of the human spirit and the belief that there are enough of us to stand in the street together just like the Arab Spring. We are at a moment where we have to galvanize people. As amazing as June 12 was, now we should do something different. Not sure what, but we should take from the best of what we did and evolve. We can be much more imaginative. Where we are now, I believe we are forced to act. We are primed.34']

[(11, 18), (19, 21)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Aff-Wayne-State-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

e2c3d37a79a4059d55e4be8c59ce71bcf3185ea1a5d034e42dfb6eacdaf398cd

7. Data deficiencies tank medical AI

Noone 21, Tech Monitor's features editor, his work has also appeared in The Atlantic, The Guardian and Outside (Greg Noone, 10-7-2021“The many false dawns of AI in healthcare,” Tech Monitor, )

AI is dependent on data ‘Garbage in , garbage out’ for healthcare AI data is recorded in ways algorithms find difficult to parse US a mishmash of handwritten notes and database entries 71% unable to access digitised records have to contend with reams of extraneous information there are “a huge number of inaccuracies ” to weed out

Data deficiencies The promise of AI is dependent on data used to train the application and the quality of the information it is using to make a decision . ‘Garbage in , garbage out’ is an all-too-familiar problem for those working in healthcare AI That’s because so much of medical data is recorded in ways that machine learning algorithms find difficult to parse . Health records in the US are often a mishmash of handwritten notes and database entries 71% of the social care sector is unable to readily access digitised medical records any machine learning algorithm designed to use these databases as ground truth would have to contend with reams of extraneous information contained in multiple systems that often don’t talk to one another there are potentially “a huge number of inaccuracies ” to weed out before such a corpus can be used to train an AI application

dependent ‘Garbage in garbage out’ difficult to parse mishmash 71% unable access extraneous information huge number of inaccuracies

['Data deficiencies', 'The promise of AI lies in its ability to automate complex, if mundane, tasks. Its ability to do so, however, is dependent on both the data used to train the application and the quality of the information it is using to make a decision. ‘Garbage in, garbage out’ is an all-too-familiar problem for those working in healthcare AI.', 'That’s because so much of medical data is recorded in ways that machine learning algorithms find difficult to parse. Health records in the UK and the US, for example, are often a mishmash of handwritten notes and database entries (in the former, some 71% of the social care sector is unable to readily access digitised medical records.) And while both countries have made progress in shifting to electronic records systems, any machine learning algorithm designed to use these databases as ground truth would have to contend with reams of extraneous information contained in multiple systems that often don’t talk to one another. As a result, there are potentially “a huge number of inaccuracies” to weed out before such a corpus can be used to train an AI application, says Wachter.']

[(0, 5), (6, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Aff-7---Texas-Round-4.docx

Kansas

PaSe

d2c0a842ac88fc551d0a89b2f9f0e54ba6ed26dcf933a921fd22c624c605eeb6

Disease structurally makes war more likely—4 reasons

Rohner 20 (Dominic Rohner is a professor of Political and Institutional Economics at HEC Lausanne, University of Lausanne and a research fellow in the Development Economics Programme at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). August 24, 2020, accessed on 7-31-2021, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, "COVID-19 and Conflict: Major Risks and Policy Responses", https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/peps-2020-0043/html)

COVID fuel violence aggravating poverty not far-fetched that poverty spikes fuel populists aggravate tensions schooling under strain education can constitute against conflict repression democracy has been under severe stress very real and substantial risk that this aggravated by COVID pretext for autocrats to restrain the freedom inter-dependence suffer series of articles found that trade promote peace trouble is governments rely on domestic production making the world less integrated and hence weaken ramparts against renewed wars

four major consequences of COVID -19 that may fuel social tensions and political violence , namely i) spiking poverty, ii) education under stress, iii) potential for repression, and iv) reduced inter-dependence COVID-19 entails a major risk of aggravating poverty and inequality those in temporary, informal or precarious employment are often hit hardest. Many of these jobs are gone for good Today’s era is characterized by widespread populist movements and it is not far-fetched that COVID-19 induced poverty spikes could fuel electoral support of populists (see Guiso et al. 2020) and thereby aggravate the stirring of political hatred and inter-group tensions . second, related risk is that universal schooling comes under strain education can constitute a powerful rampart against inter-group conflict can reduce the opportunity cost of “swapping the plough for the rifle”. hit different places and population groups very differently poor population groups disproportionally hit mounting repression democracy worldwide has been under severe stress , with overall global democracy scores displaying negative trends for the last 10 years very real and substantial risk that this negative tendency could be further aggravated by COVID -19 formidable pretext for (would-be) autocrats to restrain the freedom of assembly. attractive for political leaders to carry out unpopular measures when “the world is not watching” Last, but not least, international cooperation, inter-dependence and trade may suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic. series of articles found empirical analysis that inter-group business and bilateral trade can promote peace between two countries or groups. increases the opportunity costs of engaging in a conflict E U is a telling example trouble with the current situation is that governments choose to close borders and rely to a larger extent on domestic production entails the negative side effect of making the world less integrated , and diminished inter-dependence and dropping trade flows reduce the conflict costs of forgone trade, and hence weaken the business ramparts against renewed domestic or international wars

very real and substantial risk Last, but not least, international cooperation, inter-dependence and trade may suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic. E U

['', 'The COVID-19 pandemic entails a medium- and long-run risk of heightened political conflict. In this short essay we distinguish four major consequences of COVID-19 that may fuel social tensions and political violence, namely i) spiking poverty, ii) education under stress, iii) potential for repression, and iv) reduced inter-dependence. After discussing them in turn, we will formulate policy recommendations on how to attenuate these risks.', '1 The Shape of Things to Come: Conflict Risks Heightened by COVID-19', 'While in the very short-run some COVID-19 induced sanitary measures, such as lockdowns, may (mechanically) reduce the scope for political violence, in this essay we shall argue that in the medium- and long-run the COVID-19 pandemic entails the risk of heightening the likelihood of conflict. In particular, in what follows we shall outline through what main channels the current COVID-19 pandemic may result in higher conflict risk. We shall distinguish between four major dimensions, namely i) spiking poverty, ii) education under stress, iii) potential for repression, and iv) reduced inter-dependence. After discussing them in turn, policy recommendations on attenuating these risks will be formulated.', 'A typical feature of canonical conflict models is that poverty, low human capital and lack of economic perspectives and opportunities provide a fertile breeding ground for conflict (see Hirshleifer 2001; Konrad 2009). When lawful employment and integrating the labour force only yields dismal returns – barely enough to survive – the opportunity cost of leaving productive activities and becoming a combatant is low. A person who is poor, desperate and destitute may on average more easily be coaxed into leaving legal employment. Having large fringes of the population suffering from poverty may hence make it easier and cheaper to recruit a rebel army. Empirical results have by and large been in line with this standard prediction of conflict theory, as there is indeed a strong association between poverty and conflict. As surveyed by Dell, Jones, and Olken (2014), there is ample evidence of negative income shocks fuelling political violence, and as argued by Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009), poverty is empirically a key risk factor making an armed challenge to the state feasible.', 'COVID-19 entails a major risk of aggravating poverty and inequality. While in many countries parts of the labour force are barely affected economically by the pandemic – working remotely in secure jobs at full pay – those in temporary, informal or precarious employment are often hit hardest. Many of these jobs are gone for good and in many instances, there is not much of a social safety net allowing for the newly unemployed to maintain an income close to pre-pandemic levels. As highlighted by historical examples of major economic crises, those who have lost everything and lack perspectives for prosperity can be easy prey for political manipulation and radicalisation. This is powerfully illustrated by the expansion of fascist movements during the 1930s following the 1929 stock market crash and the subsequent great depression.[1] Today’s era is characterized by widespread populist movements and it is not far-fetched that COVID-19 induced poverty spikes could fuel electoral support of populists (see Guiso et al. 2020) and thereby aggravate the stirring of political hatred and inter-group tensions.', 'A second, related risk is that universal schooling comes under strain during the pandemic. As found in recent research (Rohner and Saia 2020), education can constitute a powerful rampart against inter-group conflict. When compulsory public schooling gets now discontinued for sanitary reasons, this entails the risk of parts of the population being stuck with substantially reduced human capital and dismal job market perspectives. As argued above, this can reduce the opportunity cost of “swapping the plough for the rifle”. While the risks linked to acute poverty spikes described above may kick in very rapidly, the impact of the human capital gap may be resented only later – yet could have longer-lasting negative implications. Another notable feature of this risk is that it may hit different places and population groups very differently – those from a privileged background may be barely affected (with home-schooling by educated parents, privately hired educators or online schooling making up for face-to-face interaction in schools), while poor population groups in poor countries may be disproportionally hit. This may further aggravate inequalities both in terms of education and eventually in income, with such a rise in inequalities persisting potentially over time.', 'A third major political risk of the COVID-19 pandemic is mounting repression, strains on freedom of expression and hollowing out of democracy.[2] Already before the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, democracy worldwide has been under severe stress, with overall global democracy scores displaying negative trends for the last 10 years (see Laurent-Lucchetti, Rohner, and Thoenig 2020, for a discussion of democracy trends and a rationale and evidence of why democracy fosters peace). There is a very real and substantial risk that this negative tendency could be further aggravated by COVID-19. The reason is that legitimate sanitary concerns call for social distancing and for avoiding too large accumulations of people. This, however, provides a formidable pretext for (would-be) autocrats to restrain the freedom of assembly. In the same vein, contact tracing constitutes a powerful tool for limiting the spread of infections. Again, however, contact tracing can also help autocratic regimes extending their grip on society by building up water-tight surveillance. Finally, it is attractive for political leaders to carry out unpopular measures when “the world is not watching” (Durante and Zhuravskaya 2018). This is typically frequently the case during a situation of acute crisis, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic, where the main focus of many governments lies on putting in place the appropriate domestic sanitary measures.', 'Last, but not least, international cooperation, inter-dependence and trade may suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on the classic liberal argument of inter-dependence fostering peace, a series of articles (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008; Polachek 1980; Rohner, Mathias, and Thoenig 2013), have found in formal game-theoretic models and empirical analysis that inter-group business and bilateral trade can promote peace between two countries or groups. The rationale is that inter-dependence increases the opportunity costs of engaging in a conflict with the other party, as this would result in forgone economics gains. Beyond the existing econometric results, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – giving eventually birth to the European Union – is a telling example of how bottom-up economic interaction and growing inter-dependence and trust building can drive down the risk of renewed wars. Put bluntly, by making war costlier, trade can contribute to peace. The trouble with the current situation is that governments may – in reply to epidemiological considerations— choose to close borders and rely to a larger extent on domestic production (fearing the disruption of global supply chains). While the sanitary logic is understandable, this entails the negative side effect of making the world less integrated, and diminished inter-dependence and dropping trade flows reduce the conflict costs of forgone trade, and hence weaken the business ramparts against renewed domestic or international wars.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Aff-Kentucky-Round6.docx

Minnesota

AmPr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmPr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Aff-Kentucky-Round6.docx

4dfcbdd188f764bc0170950f5604ab740f38741e7acc239aa8533eec1a9df509

3—Relying on conventional capability signals we’re willing to let allies be attacked.

Miller 16 (*Franklin C. Miller: Principal, The Scowcroft Group; Retired civil servant, served 22 years in senior positions in the Department of Defense and four years on the National Security Council; Member, Defense Policy Board and US Strategic Command Senior Advisory Group, *Keith B. Payne: President, Co-founder, National Institute for Public Policy; Professor, Department head, Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, 8-22-2016, "The dangers of no-first-use," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/the-dangers-of-no-first-use/)

Proponents assert conventional forces could defeat an opponent dominance is questionable in key geographic areas . confuses distinction between deterrence and war-fighting . allies want to deter force from ever taking place ; we do not want to wage war to recover lost allies . ambiguity appears central

Proponents of n o- f irst- u se assert high-tech conventional forces could defeat an opponent ’s massive use of military force without needing to resort to nuc lear weapon s This presumption of military dominance is questionable in key geographic areas . this claim confuses the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting . We and our allies want to deter an opponent’s use of force from ever taking place ; we do not want to be compelled to wage war , even winning a non-nuclear war to recover lost allies . Retaining ambiguity appears to be central to success of deterrence policy; we do not want a no-first-use policy that assures opponents they may safely ignore a US nuclear response if they themselves launch anything short of a nuclear attack. That is why key allies strongly oppose no-first-use

n f u high-tech conventional forces opponent nuc s key geographic areas deterrence war-fighting ever taking place compelled to wage war to recover lost allies deterrence anything short strongly oppose

['', 'Proponents of no-first-use often assert that US high-tech conventional forces could ultimately defeat an opponent’s massive use of military force, including advanced conventional weapons, and chemical and biological weapons, without the US needing to resort to nuclear weapons—and thereby claim that the US nuclear deterrent threat is unnecessary for this purpose.', 'This presumption of US military dominance is questionable in some key geographic areas. But more importantly, this claim fundamentally confuses the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting. We and our allies want to deter an opponent’s massive use of force from ever taking place; we do not want to be compelled to wage war, even winning a non-nuclear war, in order to recover lost allies. Fighting such a war would cause unprecedented levels of death and destruction wherever it is fought. That is why US policy for over seven decades has sought to deter war via the US nuclear deterrent, and why every Democratic and Republican administration for over seven decades has rejected a no-first-use policy. Retaining ambiguity regarding the US nuclear deterrent threat appears to be central to the success of that deterrence policy; we do not want a no-first-use policy that essentially assures opponents that they may safely ignore a US nuclear response if they themselves launch anything short of a nuclear attack. That is why key US allies also strongly oppose a no-first-use policy.', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Neg-7---RRR-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

5d43748c5afb1a3cbaec1005d36e9c1a075d1eb48c571f56776093a1df543c80

No China modernization AND the plan doesn’t solve it.

David Santoro 19. PhD; Director and Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy Pacific Forum International. “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission.” Hearing on “A ‘World-Class’ Military: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions.” 6-20-2019. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Santoro_USCC%20Testimony_FINAL.pdf

China’s nuc strategy has remained unchanged since 64 China did not change its strategy despite vulnerability to invasion or a first strike and despite continued vulnerability one word describes China’s strategy consistency the views on nuc s of leadership at the time China built its arsenal have had to this day , a powerful influence on strategy based on limited utility not pursuing any nuc warfighting even limited longstanding thinking has been weapons only serve to prevent coercion and deter Beijing “only” sought to develop a small force and refused to join any arms races why Beijing focused on developing missiles rather than gravity bombs and has adopted an NFU

China’s nuc lear strategy has remained unchanged since Beijing exploded its first nuclear device in 19 64 Significantly, China did not seek to change its nuclear strategy despite its vulnerability either to an invasion or a nuclear first strike by the U S and despite continued vulnerability after the Cold War, mostly vis-à-vis the U S one word best describes China’s nuclear strategy : consistency the CCP never delegated authority over nuclear strategy to senior officers of the PLA Chinese nuclear strategy was viewed, and continues to be viewed thereafter, as a matter of supreme national policy the views on nuc lear weapon s of the top leadership of the CCP at the time China built its arsenal had, and have had to this day , a powerful influence on Chinese nuclear strategy These views, based on the limited utility of nuclear weapons support maintaining a strategy of assured retaliation and not integrating nuclear strategy with conventional strategy or pursuing any form of nuc lear warfighting even limited longstanding Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons has been that these weapons only serve to prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attack Mao stated our country may produce a few atomic bombs, but we by no means intend to use them We will use them as a defensive weapon Beijing has always claimed to have a “self-defense nuclear strategy.” Beijing has “only” sought to develop a small nuclear force and refused to join any arms races Beijing focused on developing “the minimum means of reprisal,” just enough to conduct an effective nuclear counterstrike that explains why Beijing has focused on developing a nuclear force based on missiles rather than gravity bombs and why it has adopted an NFU policy and given negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states

nuc remained unchanged 64 China did not seek to change its nuclear strategy despite its vulnerability either to an invasion or a nuclear first strike U S despite continued vulnerability U S one word best describes consistency nuc s to this day powerful influence limited utility not nuc warfighting even limited longstanding Chinese thinking only prevent nuclear coercion deter Mao no means intend to use them always “only” refused to join any arms races adopted an NFU policy given negative security assurances

['China’s conventional military strategy has been dynamic, changing several times since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Yet by contrast, China’s nuclear strategy has remained unchanged since Beijing exploded its first nuclear device in 1964. Significantly, China did not seek to change its nuclear strategy despite its vulnerability either to an invasion or a nuclear first strike by the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and despite continued vulnerability after the Cold War, mostly vis-à-vis the United States. Accordingly, one word best describes China’s nuclear strategy: consistency.', 'Recent scholarship has shown that China’s nuclear strategy and program have several unique features.3 Three stand out. First, unlike conventional military strategy, the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) never delegated authority over nuclear strategy to senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). From the time it was first articulated, Chinese nuclear strategy was viewed, and continues to be viewed thereafter, as a matter of supreme national policy. That means that it had to be controlled at the highest level: the Central Military Commission (CMC), which reports to the Chairman, Xi Jinping today; in addition to his presidential duties, Xi Jinping serves as General-Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the CMC.', 'Second, as a result, the views on nuclear weapons of the top leadership of the CCP at the time China built its arsenal had, and have had to this day, a powerful influence on Chinese nuclear strategy.', '', '', ' These views, based on the limited utility of nuclear weapons, support maintaining a strategy of assured retaliation and not integrating nuclear strategy with conventional strategy or pursuing any form of nuclear warfighting, even limited. More specifically, longstanding Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons has been that these weapons only serve to prevent nuclear coercion and deter nuclear attack. 4 Mao Zedong, for instance, stated in 1960 that “our country in the future may produce a few atomic bombs, but we by no means intend to use them. Although we do not intend to use them, why produce them? We will use them as a defensive weapon.”5 Chinese officials have also held the belief that nuclear weapons provide other important benefits, notably major-power status to China and a source of national pride to all Chinese.', 'Third, and logically, that is why Beijing has always claimed to have a “self-defense nuclear strategy.” 6 That is also why Beijing has given the Second Artillery Force (SAF), the component part of the PLA created in 1966 to control Chinese nuclear weapons, the sole mission of conducting a nuclear counterstrike, and why Beijing has “only” sought to develop a small nuclear force and refused to join any arms races. Beijing, in other words, has focused on developing “the minimum means of reprisal,” just enough to conduct an effective nuclear counterstrike.7 In turn, that explains why Beijing has focused on developing a nuclear force based on missiles rather than gravity bombs (missiles are more adequate for counterstrike purposes), why it has maintained a de-mated force posture (because it has no intention to engage in nuclear warfighting), and why it has adopted an NFU policy and given negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states. 8']

[(6, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-DoPi-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-2.docx

Emory

DoPi

1c7cd55e9e68bd0a879ab220609ac83de998f78fed8366cd32f27a43ff622f60

No Prolif anywhere

Miller 22 - (Nicholas L. Miller, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College and author of the book Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy; 10-17-2022, Foreign Policy, "Why the War in Ukraine Won’t Spark a Nuclear Proliferation Cascade," doa: 6-20-2023) url:

prolif cascade not supported by history . number of states with nuc s grown slowly the N P T sanctions the N S G threat and use of force restrained the spread . This stronger than it has ever been . prolif not determined by security states are satisfied with a nuclear ally despite concerns over cred . Japan Sweden Germany bought into the norm . Argentina Brazil domestic divisions split the diff by developing civilian tech without an arsenal Taiwan U A E costs outweigh benefits

The lesson seems clear: Whether you’re a status quo power or a dissatisfied aggressor, you’ll be better off with the bomb. global nuclear prolif eration Commentators not specific about exactly which countries they believe will take part in this cascade , but one can imagine Iran Saudi Arabia Taiwan South Korea might seek a nuclear arsenal. Although the logic of these arguments is persuasive at first glance , they are not well supported by the history of nuclear proliferation , because they overlook the complexity of nuclear decision-making . From the 19 50s onward , analysts and government officials have been predicting proliferation cascades or domino effects These predictions were never borne out : The number of states with nuc lear weapon s has grown rather slowly Why ? since the 1960s, a powerful architecture for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been constructed. This includes the N on- P roliferation T reaty, economic sanctions policies adopted by the United States and others, the N uclear S uppliers G roup, and sometimes the threat and use of force —all of which have been shown to have restrained the spread of nuclear weapons . This architecture is still in place today and in some ways stronger than it has ever been . prolif eration outcomes are not determined by security incentives in the mechanistic way predicted . In other words, states that you may think would want nuclear weapons for protection or aggression often do not try to get them , and states that try to get them sometimes fail due to domestic pathologies or divisions . Many states in threatening security environments are satisfied with relying on a nuclear - armed ally despite perennial concerns over the cred ibility of extended deterrence . Japan is a classic example: It has considered developing nuclear weapons at various points but has concluded it’s better off relying on the U nited S tates than taking the risk of producing an arsenal of its own. Other states, such as Sweden and Germany , over time bought into the norm against developing nuclear weapons . In some cases, such as Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s, there are domestic divisions over the utility of nuclear weapons, and factions end up split ting the diff erence by developing civilian nuclear tech nology without developing an arsenal right away. For countries highly dependent on the international economy , such as Taiwan or the U nited A rab E mirates, the potential costs of going nuclear may outweigh the security benefits

global nuclear prolif eration Iran Saudi Arabia Taiwan South Korea persuasive first glance not well supported history of nuclear proliferation complexity 50s onward predicting proliferation cascades domino effects never borne out nuc s grown rather slowly Why ? powerful architecture N P T economic sanctions N S G threat use of force still in place today stronger than it has ever been prolif not determined security incentives may think often do not try to get them fail domestic pathologies divisions despite perennial concerns cred ibility extended deterrence considered various points concluded better off relying on the U S Sweden Germany bought into the norm Argentina Brazil domestic divisions split developing civilian nuclear tech highly dependent international economy Taiwan U A E potential costs outweigh the security benefits

['', 'The lesson thus seems clear: Whether you’re a status quo power or a dissatisfied aggressor, you’ll be better off with the bomb. According to Yale University historian Timothy Snyder, who has taken the argument perhaps the farthest, unless Ukraine dispels these lessons by defeating Russia, the result will be “global nuclear proliferation.”', 'Commentators are often not specific about exactly which countries they believe will take part in this cascade, but one can imagine Iran concluding a nuclear arsenal would give it more leeway in the Middle East, which would likely then lead Saudi Arabia to pursue a bomb program. Likewise, Taiwan or South Korea might become increasingly worried about facing an invasion by their nuclear-armed adversaries, causing them to seek a nuclear arsenal.', 'Although the logic of these arguments is persuasive at first glance, they are not well supported by the history of nuclear proliferation, in large part because they overlook the complexity of nuclear decision-making.', 'From the 1950s onward, analysts and government officials have been predicting proliferation cascades or domino effects, where there would be a rapid increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons. Most famously, then-U.S. President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that he foresaw the possibility of as many as 25 nuclear-armed states by 1980 unless the international community got a handle on the problem.', 'These predictions were never borne out: The number of states with nuclear weapons has grown rather slowly, especially since the 1970s. Between 1945 and 1970, six states acquired the bomb (about one every four years). Since then, only four countries have additionally done so (about one every 13 years).', 'Why has proliferation proceeded so slowly? In large part because leaders like Kennedy worried about it and adapted their policies to prevent proliferation cascades. Especially since the 1960s, a powerful architecture for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been constructed. This includes the Non-Proliferation Treaty, economic sanctions policies adopted by the United States and others, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and sometimes the threat and use of force—all of which have been shown to have restrained the spread of nuclear weapons.', 'This architecture is still in place today and in some ways stronger than it has ever been. Today, almost every state without nuclear weapons is a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and perhaps for the first time since 1945, there are no states currently known to be seeking nuclear weapons. (Iran is producing enriched uranium very close to weapons grade, but according to the U.S. intelligence community, as of December 2021, there is no evidence it has made the decision to build a bomb.)', 'We also know from recent research that proliferation outcomes are not determined by security incentives in the mechanistic way predicted by those worried about the war in Ukraine’s impact. In other words, states that you may think would want nuclear weapons for protection or aggression often do not try to get them, and states that try to get them sometimes fail due to domestic pathologies or divisions.', 'Many states in threatening security environments are satisfied with relying on a nuclear-armed ally rather than seeking their own arsenals, despite perennial concerns over the credibility of extended deterrence. Japan is a classic example: It has considered developing nuclear weapons at various points since the 1950s but has concluded it’s better off relying on the United States than taking the risk of producing an arsenal of its own.', 'Other states, such as Sweden and Germany, over time bought into the norm against developing nuclear weapons. In some cases, such as Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s, there are domestic divisions over the utility of nuclear weapons, and factions end up splitting the difference by developing civilian nuclear technology without developing an arsenal right away. For countries highly dependent on the international economy, such as Taiwan or the United Arab Emirates, the potential costs of going nuclear may outweigh the security benefits.', '', '', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PrHa-Aff-CEDA-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

PrHa

0cf14a49cc4d2ee72f0db9088c6d90ae350c4720425586655571d1b6399093c3

War warrant is wrong.

Fritz Dufour 21, MBA, DESS, "The Origins and Causes of War," in The Realities of 'Reality' – Part IV: The Reality Behind Achieving World Peace, Chapter 1, pg. 33-34, 10/27/2021, SSRN.

weakness was expected war did not materialize failed to analyze the socialist camp nationalism proved more powerful war between socialist states not unthinkable Soviet against Hungary Czechoslovakia and P R C conflict erupted between China and Vietnam wars of liberation such as mujahideen against Soviet Union

weakness of the theory was the expected types of war , the intracapitalist and capitalist-socialist did not materialize as frequently as theoreticians had predicted the theory failed to analyze the situation in the Soviet Union and socialist camp Even in communist countries nationalism seems to have proved more powerful than socialism movements appeared and had to be forcibly subdued in the Soviet Union war between socialist states was not unthinkable only the preponderance of Soviet forces prevented war against Hungary Czechoslovakia and P R C and armed conflict erupted between China and Vietnam after the latter country became the most powerful in Southeast Asia theory did not provide for wars of liberation against socialist states, such as the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union

weakness expected intracapitalist capitalist-socialist materialize failed communist countries more powerful forcibly subdued between socialist states preponderance Hungary Czechoslovakia P R C erupted China Vietnam most powerful wars of liberation mujahideen Soviet Union

['The weakness of the theory was that the two major expected types of war, the intracapitalist and the capitalist-socialist, did not materialize as frequently as Soviet theoreticians had predicted. Further, the theory failed to adequately analyze the situation in the Soviet Union and in the socialist camp. Even in communist countries, nationalism seems to have proved more powerful than socialism: “national liberation” movements appeared and had to be forcibly subdued in the Soviet Union, despite its communist regime. Also, war between socialist states was not unthinkable, as the doctrine indicated: only the colossal preponderance of Soviet forces prevented a full-scale war in 1956 against Hungary and in 1968 against Czechoslovakia; war between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China was a serious possibility for two decades after the Sino-Soviet split in 1962; and armed conflict erupted between China and Vietnam after the latter country became the most powerful in Southeast Asia. Finally, the theory did not provide for wars of liberation against socialist states, such as that conducted by the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989. Other causes of war are external and are worth analyzing. The following are among the most common.', '', '']

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Aff-NDT-Round6.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kentucky/DiGr/Kentucky-Di-Griffith-Aff-NDT-Round6.docx

c42d3a0f1a6e6466b4f17d024950a21cca50dfcea2a6178ed93e9c70d9c809b5

Our practice is a vital bridge between pure research and governance—we need to learn how to translate our theories into actionable policy recommendations to change policy structure

John Hird 17. Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. “How Effective is Policy Analysis,” in D. Weimer & L. S. Friedman (eds.) Does Policy Analysis Matter? Exploring Its Effectiveness in Theory and Practice. University of California Press. 44-76.

Even if it implies more power than analysts ever have policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through ways to address problems Bringing policy ideas to fruition is critical Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented , interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems but they understand the policy-making systems policy analysts anticipate counterarguments and frame analyses recognizing alternative options the mental map of a policy analysis advance public debate the problem orientation focuses attention on social problems , not just expediency role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research but to use creative means to turn available knowledge into actionable policy recommendations Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. the ability to understand and interpret the lit on a topic at a far deeper level connect pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy

Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have , classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems Bringing policy ideas to fruition , bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented , interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems " policy analysts become their human embodiment Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems , not just political expediency The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic lit erature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover Identifying and connect ing pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education.

Even if policy analysis critical to policy outcomes thinking through Bringing policy ideas to fruition critical skill disciplined thinking problem-oriented interdisciplinary ability to synthesize bring policy relevance anticipate counterarguments mental map advance public debate problem orientation focuses attention social problems critical roles as intermediaries understand interpret far deeper level connect pertinent knowledge analysis

['', 'Classical policy analysis, however absent from actual policy making, remains an important vehicle for teaching policy analysts the connections between their analysis and the policymaking world in which their recommendations would live. Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have, classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems. Bringing policy ideas to fruition, bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop. In addition, policy schools are instilling in prospective policy analysts the structure and habits of mind to engage successfully in the policy enterprise. 28 Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important. Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems" (Weiss 2009). In the absence of written classical policy analyses, policy analysts become their human embodiment. Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed. They can derive elements of policy analysis from writing position papers, briefing policy makers, and controlling meetings. They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options. In short, the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis. Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems, not just political expediency. The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients. This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research. Finally, prospective policy analysts are instructed repeatedly about the importance of their relationship to the client(s), yet far less attention is paid to the other part of the policy analyst\'s relationship: to the community of knowledge producers. Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic literature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover. Identifying and connecting pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education. Policy analysts may offer the central means to provide policy makers with the key elements of classical policy analysis, though not in the way, through written reports, it was originally conceived. Creating a profession for committed, accomplished, and well-trained individuals to participate in the world of public policy may be among the most important contributions of policy analysis education.', '', '']

[(5, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Aff-Navy-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

b7580af4e96c31b275b771ce88204d5f0eb23f0418d7b70c84297cf3fcdf9335

The plan artificially props up the smallest and least secure companies— turns cybersecurity

Tom Wheeler 19. Fellow in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution, former Chairman of the FCC. 9/3/2019. “Why 5G requires new approaches to cybersecurity.” https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-5g-requires-new-approaches-to-cybersecurity/#cancel.

Proactive cyber investment is the exception rather than the rule A favorite entrance point for cyberattacks remains smaller companies outside of the scope of these efforts where companies have a role in critical infrastructure could imperil public safety

Proactive cyber investment today is the exception rather than the rule A favorite entrance point for cyberattacks remains the smaller companies outside of the scope of these efforts where companies have a role in critical infrastructure or provide a product or service that could imperil public safety , Cyberattacks on 5G will be software attacks The speed and breadth of computer-driven cyberattacks requires the speed and breadth of computer-driven protections at all levels of the supply chain

cyber investment exception rule entrance point smaller companies scope these efforts critical infrastructure imperil public safety , software attacks speed cyberattacks protections

['Proactive cyber investment today is the exception rather than the rule. For public companies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others are driving change from the corporate board-level on down through management. A favorite entrance point for cyberattacks, however, remains the smaller companies, many of which are outside of the scope of these efforts. Unfortunately, the SEC’s efforts . At the very least, where companies have a role in critical infrastructure or provide a product or service that, if attacked, could imperil public safety, there must be the expectation that cybersecurity risks are being addressed proactively. Implementation of machine learning and artificial intelligence protection Cyberattacks on 5G will be software attacks; they must be countered with software protections. During a Brookings-convened discussion on 5G cybersecurity, one participant observed, “We’re fighting a software fight with people” whereas the attackers are machines. Such an approach was like “looking through soda straws at separate, discrete portions of the environment” at a time when a holistic approach and consistent visibility across the entire environment is needed. The speed and breadth of computer-driven cyberattacks requires the speed and breadth of computer-driven protections at all levels of the supply chain. ', '']

[(4, 14)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Ottinger-Rahaman-Neg-ADA-Round2.docx

Kansas

OtRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/OtRa/Kansas-Ottinger-Rahaman-Neg-ADA-Round2.docx

b59bf2fd09cdaca17319c4358a8361b9657a2f212f9defb921ba15fcbbe75aac

5---Their China fearmongering is Man’s discursive tool used to naturalize domination of the Eastern other

Kristen Hopewell, 21. Kristen Hopewell is Canada Research Chair in Global Policy in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia. "Strategic Narratives in Global Trade Politics: American Hegemony, Free Trade, and the Hidden Hand of the State." The Chinese Journal of International Politics 14.1 (2021): 51-86.

Debates about powers structured around “ revisionist ” these operate as constructions used “to frame discourses political persuasion while bearing little correspondence with what states have done concepts mobilized to form a narrative of a benevolent international order led by the U S whose advancements are jeopardized by China Despite evidence of “revisionist” behaviour on the part of the US China routinely identified as source of instability in the global order the concepts of “ “revisionist” powers are “inherently problematic and unreliable descriptors States use narratives to shape how actors are understood around a self/ other dichotomy, constructing China as “evil becomes untenable Narratives are discursive tools that “construct stories about the world that are crafted omitting certain parts while emphasizing others China narratives are prescriptive: they “authorize, specific policies Over time, the narratives they authorize come to be taken as natural

Debates about the rise and impact of new powers have been structured around the concepts of “status quo” and “ revisionist ” power these operate not simply as neutral analytical categories, but as social and political constructions used “to frame discourses intended for political persuasion and mobilization” while often bearing little correspondence with what the relevant states have actually said and done these concepts have been mobilized to form a powerful narrative of a n essentially benevolent , moral, and progressive international order created and led by the U nited S tates and other Western states, whose stability and advancements are now potentially jeopardized by rising powers such as China Despite evidence of considerable “revisionist” behaviour on the part of the US hegemon it is China and other rising powers that are routinely identified as potential source s of instability in the global order the concepts of “ status quo” and “revisionist” powers are thus “inherently problematic and unreliable descriptors where the US government first officially labels China a revisionist power, the United States complains that countries like China “espouse free trade rhetoric and exploit its benefits” but adhere only selectively to the rules and principles of the liberal trading order.24 What this ignores, however, is that so too does the United States States use strategic narratives —directed at both domestic and international audiences— to shape how the international order and specific actors and issues within it are understood . Narratives are often constructed around a self/ an other dichotomy, with a state casting an actor or group in the role of the “other” and defining its own identity through opposition to, and frequently vilification of, this other Narratives invoked by powerful states to shape international order are often presented in simplistic binaries—heroes and villains, good versus evil, East versus West, capitalism versus communism, and so forth.25 States can thus use such narratives to claim a moral purpose for their actions constructing China as “evil or “immoral” due to the high degree of state intervention in its economy becomes untenable when we recognize that the state has also played a significant role in the US economy. Narratives are discursive tools that “construct stories about the world that are crafted and selective, omitting certain parts while emphasizing others States work to frame their own identity and that of others “by selecting and highlighting some facets of their history or actions” while excluding or ignoring others, “in order to promote a particular interpretation and evaluation”. It is these selective omissions—what is omitted and why—that are important. As the analysis that follows will show, the construction of the United States as a free trader and liberal hegemon is based on a highly selective logic that entails omitting evidence of considerable state intervention and protectionism in the American economy China narratives are prescriptive: they “authorize, enable, and justify specific practices and policies Over time, the narratives and the practices they authorize come to be taken as natural , granted, and the only conceivable ones strategic narratives can shape perceptions of the danger that others pose.34 The narrative that China poses a threat to the existing liberal international economic order has rapidly come to dominate US discourse35 this is predicated, however, on the notion that the form of capitalism found in China and other emerging powers is fundamentally different or alien from that of the United States and other established Western powers. It is as though Huntington’s notion of a “clash of civilizations” has been transposed into the economic realm as an inevitable clash of economic systems or models. Ian Bremmer characterizes this clash as “the battle for free markets”.36 Similarly, Pat Choate contends, “while the great economic conflict of the twentieth century was capitalism against Marxism, the battle in the twenty-first century will be state versus market capitalism”.37 Emphasizing the “dangers” of state capitalism, he warns that “the trade warriors from state-capitalist nations will strip what remains of the US economy as surely as a conquering army would”.38

['Debates about the rise and impact of new powers have been structured around the concepts of “status quo” and “revisionist” power. Scholars have argued, however, that these have operated not simply as neutral analytical categories, but as social and political constructions used “to frame discourses intended for political persuasion and mobilization” while often bearing little correspondence with what the relevant states have actually said and done.18 Oliver Turner and Nicola Nymalm show that these concepts have been mobilized to form a powerful narrative of an essentially benevolent, moral, and progressive international order created and led by the United States and other Western states, whose stability and advancements are now potentially jeopardized by rising powers such as China and India.19 This narrative, wherein the US-led world order represents “civilizational progress,” contains echoes of an older imperialist discourse dividing the world into a “civilized” West and a “barbarian and savage” non-West.20 The result has been to render these labels “devoid of much analytical value”.21 Despite evidence of considerable “revisionist” behaviour on the part of the US hegemon,22 it is China and other rising powers that are routinely identified as potential sources of instability in the global order. If the concepts of “status quo” and “revisionist” powers are thus “inherently problematic and unreliable descriptors,”23 I argue that their manifestations in the economic realm—as a supposed battle between American “free-market capitalism” and the “state capitalism” of China and other emerging powers—are equally problematic. In the 2017 National Security Strategy, for instance, where the US government first officially labels China a revisionist power, the United States complains that countries like China “espouse free trade rhetoric and exploit its benefits” but adhere only selectively to the rules and principles of the liberal trading order.24 What this ignores, however, is that so too does the United States. States use strategic narratives—directed at both domestic and international audiences—to shape how the international order and specific actors and issues within it are understood. Narratives are often constructed around a self/another dichotomy, with a state casting an actor or group in the role of the “other” and defining its own identity through opposition to, and frequently vilification of, this other. Narratives invoked by powerful states to shape international order are often presented in simplistic binaries—heroes and villains, good versus evil, East versus West, capitalism versus communism, and so forth.25 States can thus use such narratives to claim a moral purpose for their actions. In this way, the juxtaposition of American “free-market capitalism” and Chinese “state capitalism” functions as a sort of morality tale, carrying quasi-moral messages about the inherent value of free markets and trade, as well as American hegemony. The United States casts itself as the hero in a struggle between good and evil,26 while portraying the heavy role of the state in the Chinese economy as immoral and regressive, and a threat to the liberal trade regime. President Trump, for instance, holds that China’s trading practices are “robbing,” “raping,” and “killing” the United States.27 His Attorney General, William Barr, meanwhile, has accused China of “predatory” and “unlawful” economic policies, of waging an “economic blitzkrieg,” and of seeking to “overthrow the rule-based international system” and “exploit the openness of our institutions in order to destroy them”.28 However, constructing China as “evil” or “immoral” due to the high degree of state intervention in its economy becomes untenable when we recognize that the state has also played a significant role in the US economy. Narratives are discursive tools that “construct stories about the world that are crafted', '', ' and selective, omitting certain parts while emphasizing others”.29 States work to frame their own identity and that of others “by selecting and highlighting some facets of their history or actions” while excluding or ignoring others, “in order to promote a particular interpretation and evaluation”.30 It is these selective omissions—what is omitted and why—that are important. As the analysis that follows will show, the construction of the United States as a free trader and liberal hegemon is based on a highly selective logic that entails omitting evidence of considerable state intervention and protectionism in the American economy. Narratives, especially in global politics, are often contested. But if successful, strategic narratives can come to be widely accepted, and taken for granted as self-evident and simply common sense. Indeed, as Snyder states, “often the proponents of these strategic rationalizations, as well as the wider population, come to believe them”.31 In the United States, the characterization of the American hegemon as a liberal free trader, in contrast to the illiberal state capitalism of China and other emerging powers, is now so deeply ingrained as to be largely unquestioned. Such narratives are prescriptive: they “authorize, enable, and justify specific practices and policies ... Over time, the narratives and the practices they authorize come to be taken as natural, granted, and the only conceivable ones.”32 As strikingly illustrated under President Trump, political leaders may use strategic narratives “to garner legitimacy for particular and highly contestable policy responses”.33 Importantly, strategic narratives can shape perceptions of the danger that others pose.34 The narrative that China poses a threat to the existing liberal international economic order has rapidly come to dominate US discourse35; this is predicated, however, on the notion that the form of capitalism found in China and other emerging powers is fundamentally different or alien from that of the United States and other established Western powers. It is as though Huntington’s notion of a “clash of civilizations” has been transposed into the economic realm as an inevitable clash of economic systems or models. Ian Bremmer characterizes this clash as “the battle for free markets”.36 Similarly, Pat Choate contends, “while the great economic conflict of the twentieth century was capitalism against Marxism, the battle in the twenty-first century will be state versus market capitalism”.37 Emphasizing the “dangers” of state capitalism, he warns that “the trade warriors from state-capitalist nations will strip what remains of the US economy as surely as a conquering army would”.38 ', '']

[(9, 22)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Neg-UMW-Debate-Tournament-Round-4.docx

Emory

PiWa

8816578c5f10f6b6770ef3646d5f8f5937d5426a78adfe9e0ea6d784be5fdfd0

First strike can’t deter CBW attacks---non-nuclear deterrence is better.

Christine Parthemore and Andy Weber 21, chief executive officer of the Council on Strategic Risks, leads the Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons, former senior advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, 10-18-2021, "The US must separate nuclear deterrence from biological weapons," Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/10/18/the-us-must-separate-nuclear-deterrence-from-biological-weapons/

end using nuclear weapons to deter bio threats This creates miscalc risks because of the challenge of understanding whether outbreak arises naturally by accident or attack Consider confusion and disinfo occur in highly tense circumstances deterring may be ineffective several chem attacks have been carried out No Ko and Russia have bio weapons programs China and Iran engaged in dual-use activities beyond what is allowed These threats will always remain sole purpose for nuclear weapons should be retaliating against a nuclear attack The solution shift to deterrence by denial threat of conventional weapons would remain intact biotech tools are married to advanced analytics and robotics sole-purpose and denial strategy will make nuclear deterrent more credible

It is time to end the U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons to deter bio logical weapon threats the U.S. nuclear posture positions nuclear weapons as a leading means of deterring strategic-level biological weapons activities This creates several problems . One is raising miscalc ulation risks in complex security environments in particular because of the challenge of understanding whether a disease outbreak arises naturally by accident or from a deliberate attack Consider COVID-19 The U.S. intelligence community still cannot determine with high certainty whether it emerged naturally or via a lab a ccident How would this nuclear policy be applied if such confusion and disinfo rmation occur red regarding a severe disease outbreak in a conflict setting or in highly tense circumstances deterring biological weapons with nuclear weapons may be ineffective . Deterrence by punishment requires that threats be credible As the United States has continued this nuclear policy, several chem ical weapons attacks have been carried out at targeted scales the Department of State’s 2021 arms control treaty compliance report determined No rth Ko rea and Russia already have offensive bio logical weapons programs It also registered continuing concerns that China and Iran have engaged in dual-use activities that extend beyond what is allowed by the Biological Weapons Convention. These types of threats will always remain in some form President Biden has already indicated the foundation of such a path: a “ sole purpose ” policy for U.S. nuclear weapons I believe that the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring — and, if necessary, retaliating against — a nuclear attack The solution is to shift to ward a strategy of deterrence by denial for biological weapons threats this would mean creating systems to ensure the nation can rob offensive biological weapons of their intended mass effects The threat of punishment with conventional weapons would remain intact as part of a deterrence by denial approach Building on basic science breakthroughs, biotech tools are now married to advanced analytics and robotics to make detection and response capabilities better and faster than ever The U.S. should include a sole-purpose doctrine in the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, sustain over time the investments in addressing biological threats that have brought new technologies into use, and formally adopt plans to move toward a deterrence by denial strategy for biological weapon threats. Such policies will make the U.S. nuclear deterrent even more credible and show U.S. leadership in reducing nuclear risks.

time to end deter bio logical weapon threats several problems miscalc ulation risks challenge of understanding COVID-19 intelligence community cannot determine confusion and disinfo rmation highly tense circumstances ineffective credible chem ical weapons No rth Ko rea and Russia China and Iran always remain sole purpose strategy of deterrence rob offensive biological weapons conventional weapons advanced analytics and robotics sole-purpose doctrine investments formally adopt plans U.S. nuclear deterrent

['Though much work remains to be done, the technologies and capabilities now being deployed for pandemic responses are giving rise to an historical opportunity for the nation: It is time to end the U.S. policy of using nuclear weapons to deter biological weapon threats.', 'Today, the U.S. nuclear posture positions nuclear weapons as a leading means of deterring strategic-level biological weapons activities. As the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review described, the roles of U.S. nuclear forces currently include acting as a “hedge against the potential rapid growth or emergence of nuclear and non-nuclear strategic threats, including chemical, biological, cyber, and large-scale conventional aggression.”', 'This creates several problems. One is raising miscalculation risks in complex security environments, in particular because of the challenge of understanding whether a disease outbreak arises naturally, by accident or from a deliberate attack. Consider the continuing confusion regarding COVID-19 nearly two years after its emergence. The U.S. intelligence community still cannot determine with high certainty whether it emerged naturally or via a lab accident. China, Iran, Russia and others have accused the United States of creating the culprit virus as a biological weapon.', 'How would this nuclear policy be applied if such confusion and disinformation occurred regarding a severe disease outbreak in a conflict setting or in highly tense circumstances? And would restraint regarding such a step contribute to the nation’s leaders not taking seriously enough the question of whether a biological weapon was used? The ambiguity of application of this nuclear weapons policy is seen as a tool to maintain flexibility during a crisis and avoid driving escalatory behavior. Yet it brings serious risks as well.', 'Further, deterring biological weapons with nuclear weapons may be ineffective. Deterrence by punishment requires that threats be credible and that the targeted entity believes the threatened action (in this case a nuclear strike) would be carried out. This is not likely to be the case. As the United States has continued this nuclear policy, several chemical weapons attacks have been carried out at targeted scales. Numerous significant cyber attacks and intrusions have been undertaken as well. For biological weapons, the Department of State’s 2021 arms control treaty compliance report determined North Korea and Russia already have offensive biological weapons programs. It also registered continuing concerns that China and Iran have engaged in dual-use activities that extend beyond what is allowed by the Biological Weapons Convention.', 'These types of threats will always remain in some form. Yet the United States now has potentially promising, different pathways to addressing them that simultaneously reduce nuclear risks while strengthening nuclear deterrence.', 'President Biden has already indicated the foundation of such a path: a “sole purpose” policy for U.S. nuclear weapons. As he wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2020: “I believe that the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring — and, if necessary, retaliating against — a nuclear attack. As president, I will work to put that belief into practice, in consultation with the U.S. military and U.S. allies.”', 'This is a sound step toward reducing nuclear risks. Yet the United States can’t halt its efforts to deter biological threats.', 'The solution is to shift toward a strategy of deterrence by denial for biological weapons threats. Put simply, this would mean creating systems to ensure the nation can rob offensive biological weapons of their intended mass effects. Just as this theory has been applied with regard to conventional armed forces and postures, the aim is to ensure that an adversary will not carry out an attack knowing that a) it would likely be ineffective, and b) that the consequences would be severe. The threat of punishment with conventional weapons would remain intact as part of a deterrence by denial approach.', 'As RAND expert Michael Mazarr described in 2018, “Most classic studies suggest that denial strategies are inherently more reliable than punishment strategies. Steps taken to deny, such as placing significant military capabilities directly in the path of an aggressor, speak loudly and clearly.”', 'In past decades, the technologies and tools needed for a denial approach to biological weapons were envisioned, but not yet advanced enough or deployable at scale. Today, that has changed, including due to significant Department of Defense efforts.', 'Key requirements for denying bioweapons effects would include catching an introduced infectious disease quickly, characterizing it fast and spreading that information to responders, using genetic-level information to rapidly develop diagnostic tests and medical countermeasures, and keeping personnel protected as best as possible while these steps are taken to quash transmission. The emphasis on each step may change based on the characteristics of specific pathogens.', 'Scientists and technologists in the United States and globally have advanced such technologies at an incredible pace in the past several years. Building on basic science breakthroughs, biotech tools are now married to advanced analytics and robotics to make detection and response capabilities better and faster than ever. This includes past DoD biodefense efforts that contributed to the mRNA platforms that were first used at mass scale for COVID-19 vaccines.', 'Creating systems for a deterrence by denial strategy for biological weapons will take time, but now is the time to start. The United States has fumbled many times in the first-ever crisis deployment of many of the technologies required. However, such deployment is already occurring around the nation. This can be sustained and expanded upon, and applied to military bases and other strategic locations around the world.', 'The U.S. should include a sole-purpose doctrine in the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review, sustain over time the investments in addressing biological threats that have brought new technologies into use, and formally adopt plans to move toward a deterrence by denial strategy for biological weapon threats. Such policies will make the U.S. nuclear deterrent even more credible and show U.S. leadership in reducing nuclear risks.']

[(10, 24), (30, 38)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-RaYe-Aff-Wayne-State-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

RaYe

a5e7b0547463313ee7c2bc269e443b00a2cfb99a8f87aecc0e93d03db9500fe1

Everything reliant on ‘overaccumulation’ is just dead wrong—big business is reducing their vulnerability

Berndt 21 (Antje Berndt: Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Finance, Actuarial Studies and Applied Statistics, Darrell Duffie: Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), Yichao Zhu: Australian National University (ANU), Research school of Finance, Actuarial Studies and Applied Statistics, 3-12-2021, “The Decline of Too Big to Fail”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3497897)

In the post-Lehman period reduced bailout prospects of GSIBs increased cost of debt financing This reduced incentives to grow large balance sheets Asset growth was discouraged after the GFC by increases in regulatory capital requirements equity is a more costly source of financing than debt significant improvements after 08 consistent with decrease in probability of large-bank failure from 92 to 53 basis points Heightened credit spreads due to increased expected losses and increased default risk premia before the GFC large-bank creditors had little awareness that banks could actually fail creditors have become aware of risks after the GFC creditors lowered expectations of a bailout

market prices and financial statement data are consistent with a significant post-Lehman decrease in bailout probabilities and an associated increase in the debt financing costs of large banks with a significant reduction in the market value of their equity per unit of assets in place an April 2020 survey of about 350 financial economists who were asked Going forward what is your subjective probability that the U.S government would bail out a U.S systematically important financial institution 62% of the participants responded with a bailout probability estimate of 80% or higher In the post-Lehman period we find that the reduced bailout prospects of GSIBs increased their cost of debt financing by 50% to 100% at a given level of solvency This reduced incentives of firms to grow large balance sheets the post-Lehman growth rate of large-bank assets is more muted than the pre-Lehman growth rate Asset growth was also discouraged after the GFC by large increases in regulatory capital requirements From viewpoint of legacy shareholders equity is a more costly source of financing than debt Figure 4 shows significant improvements after 20 08 in asset-weighted average solvency ratios of the largest U.S financial institutions improved solvency of large banks is due to significantly higher regulatory bank capital requirements for GSIBs dramatic increases in capital buffers of the largest banks that were induced by the post-GFC reform of bank capital regulations The post-crisis improvement in GSIB solvency is consistent with the decrease in actual probability of large-bank failure average GSIB failure probability declined from 92 basis points in the pre-Lehman period to 53 basis points in the post-Lehman period a post-TBTF-reform decline in the average one-year for GSIBs from 90 to 60 basis points a post-Lehman decline in failure probabilities implies lower post-Lehman large-bank insolvency risk data suggest that wholesale credit spreads of large banks were significantly higher after the GFC than before despite Heightened GSIB credit spreads over the decade are due to increased expected losses to wholesale creditors and increased default risk premia rather than higher probabilities of insolvency a decline of TBTF meaning a lower reliance by large-bank creditors on the prospect of a government bailout has resulted in a significant post-Lehman increase in large-bank debt financing costs at a given level of insolvency risk before the GFC large-bank creditors had little awareness that these banks could actually fail once Lehman failed and several other large banks had close calls creditors could have become much more aware of risks of failure that were already elevated well before the GFC but had been badly under-estimated This would have caused wholesale bank credit spreads to remain elevated after the GFC after the GFC creditors to large U.S banks substantially lowered their expectations of a bailout the next time that a large bank approaches insolvency

reduced bailout prospects cost debt financing reduced incentives large discouraged regulatory capital requirements more costly significant improvements 08 decrease probability of large-bank failure increased expected losses increased default risk premia actually fail aware of risks expectations of a bailout

['***GSIBs: Globally Systemically Important Banks\n***GFC: Global Financial Crisis', '', 'VII. Discussion and Concluding Remarks ', 'As we have shown, market prices and financial statement data are consistent with a significant post-Lehman decrease in bailout probabilities, and an associated increase in the debt financing costs of large banks, and with a significant reduction in the market value of their equity per unit of assets in place. This result holds independent of the assumed post-Lehman likelihood of government intervention.', 'Our strategy is to quantify data-consistent changes in bailout probabilities, not their absolute levels. To identify the level of bailout probabilities, additional assumptions must be made. For example, one could impose the additional assumption that the credit spreads implied by our structural model match observed credit spreads, at least on average. According to the results reported in Table G4, this would suggest a post-Lehman bailout probability slightly above 0.8 for GSIBs, and between 0.6 and 0.7 for OLBs. While these bailout probability estimates are subject to model misspecification, they are roughly consistent with an April 2020 survey of about 350 financial economists,29 who were asked “Going forward, what is your subjective probability that the U.S. government would bail out a U.S. systematically important financial institution?” Over 62% of the participants responded with a bailout probability estimate of 80% or higher. These subjective probability estimates likely exceed their risk-neutral counterparts, given the positive risk premium for bank failure. ', 'In the post-Lehman period, we find that the reduced bailout prospects of GSIBs increased their cost of debt financing by 50% to 100%, at a given level of solvency. This in turn reduced the incentives of these firms to grow large balance sheets (Andersen, Duffie and Song, 2019). As shown in Figure 3, the post-Lehman growth rate of large-bank assets is much more muted than the pre-Lehman growth rate. Asset growth was also discouraged after the GFC by large increases in regulatory capital requirements. From the viewpoint of legacy shareholders, equity is a more costly source of financing than debt.', 'Figure 4 shows significant improvements after 2008 in the asset-weighted average solvency ratios of the largest U.S. financial institutions, the same firms whose assets are depicted in Figure 3. We define the solvency ratio of a firm to be the firm’s accounting tangible common equity, measured as a fraction of tangible assets, divided by the estimated standard deviation of annualized asset growth. The improved solvency of large banks is due to significantly higher regulatory bank capital requirements, especially for GSIBs. Carney (2014), Rosengren (2014) and Tucker (2014) describe the dramatic increases in capital buffers of the largest banks that were induced by the post-GFC reform of bank capital regulations.', 'The post-crisis improvement in GSIB solvency is consistent with the decrease in actual probability of large-bank failure depicted in Figure G4. The figure shows the time series of the actual likelihood that a bankruptcy, missed payment or materially adverse debt restructuring event occurs for a given GSIB over the next year, averaged across the six GSIBs in our sample. The underlying failure probability data are provided by the Risk Management Institute at the National University of Singapore. They imply that the average GSIB failure probability declined from 92 basis points in the pre-Lehman period to 53 basis points in the post-Lehman period.30 Similarly, the Financial Stability Board (2020) reports a post-TBTF-reform decline in the average one-year Moody’s Expected Default Frequency for GSIBs from 90 to 60 basis points. Barring a post-Lehman increase in the likelihood of government intervention, a post-Lehman decline in failure probabilities implies lower post-Lehman large-bank insolvency risk.', 'Overall, the data suggest that wholesale credit spreads of large banks were significantly higher after the GFC than before despite an overall improvement in largebank solvency. Heightened GSIB credit spreads over the decade following the GFC are thus due to some combination of increased expected losses to wholesale creditors in the event of insolvency and increased default risk premia, rather than higher probabilities of insolvency. In contrast, Sarin and Summers (2016) suggest that the high credit spreads of large U.S. banks that prevailed in 2015 reflect high levels of default risk at that time, and that these firms were then about as likely to default as they were before the GFC. Their argument runs counter to the significant improvements by 2015 in the solvency ratios of the largest U.S. financial institutions, and the decrease in large-bank failure probability estimates. ', 'Our primary hypothesis is that a decline of TBTF, meaning a lower reliance by large-bank creditors on the prospect of a government bailout, has resulted in a significant post-Lehman increase in large-bank debt financing costs at a given level of insolvency risk. An alternative, behavioral, explanation for high post-GFC largebank credit spreads is that, before the GFC, large-bank creditors had little awareness that these banks could actually fail (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2018). By this line of reasoning, once Lehman failed and several other large banks had close calls, creditors could have become much more aware of risks of failure that were already elevated well before the GFC, but had been badly under-estimated. This would have caused wholesale bank credit spreads to remain elevated after the GFC. This story does not rely on changes in the likelihood of bailout, but rather changes in the behaviorally perceived likelihood of insolvency. ', 'If this alternative story applies, then the fact that large-bank credit spreads have remained high relative to their pre-Lehman levels would imply that the GFC-induced increase in the behavioral perception of bank insolvency risk would need to have persisted for some years after the crisis. Historically, however, we are not aware of previous financial crises in which a large crisis-induced jump in wholesale largebank credit spreads persisted well beyond the end of the crisis. For example, Gorton and Tallman (2016) use the “currency premium” as a gauge of wholesale bank (Clearinghouse) obligations, around nineteenth century banking crises. Regarding the banking panic of 1893, for example, they write: “As gold inflows helped to restore reserve levels following suspension of convertibility on August 3, reports of redeposit of funds in New York Clearing House banks (presumably by interior correspondents) all contributed to an improvement to the financial setting. The key indicators for the banking system—the reserve deficit and the currency premium— become noticeably benign in newspaper articles. By August 31, the currency premium was less than one percent (0.625% in New York Tribune page 3, column 1). We find evidence from both the stock and bond markets that is consistent with the hypothesis.” This quote and the data analysis supporting it, shown in Figures 7 and 8 of Gorton and Tallman (2016), suggest that credit spreads jumped up during the 1893 crisis and then quickly went back down again within weeks after the panic.', 'In the setting of our research, were it not for a post-Lehman drop in the creditorperceived probability π of a government bailout, we might expect large-bank wholesale credit spreads to have returned to closer to their pre-GFC levels, at a given level of solvency, given the general improvement in the economy and in large-bank solvency. That is not what we find. It seems that the simplest explanation for the data is that, after the GFC, wholesale creditors to large U.S. banks substantially lowered their expectations of a bailout the next time that a large bank approaches insolvency.', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-7%20-%20Texas-Round1.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-7%2520-%2520Texas-Round1.docx

c0a9da3657052624d1a016f414ed853d6ecb10dabe884071a2e410de38f55a56

China only invades if the American nuclear threat is off the table.

Hastins ’23 [Max; February 5; military historian, Charterhouse scholar, former editor-in-chief, The Daily Telegram; Bloomberg, “What the War in Ukraine Tells Us About Deterring China,” https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-02-05/russia-ukraine-war-china-must-know-us-would-protect-taiwan#xj4y7vzkg]

Xi accept m a d Even if the threshold is not breached Ukraine demonstrates how devastating conflict can become . Every nation must choos between surrender and going nuclear Leaders war because they believe they win It is feasible to reinforce US capabilities to point Beijing doubt ability to prevail

Xi accept the logic of m utually a ssured d estruction . Even if the nuclear threshold is not breached , however, the Ukraine conflict demonstrates how devastating a conflict can become . Every prudent nation must be ready to defend its vital interests statesmen choos ing between surrender and going nuclear Leaders go to war because they believe they can win It is entirely feasible to reinforce US capabilities to a point at which Beijing must doubt its ability to prevail

accept m a d nuclear threshold not breached devastating become Every defend vital interests surrender nuclear believe they can win entirely feasible reinforce doubt prevail

['Putin and President Xi Jinping of China appear to accept the logic of mutually assured destruction. Even if the nuclear threshold is not breached, however, the Ukraine conflict demonstrates how devastating a conflict can become. Every prudent nation must be ready to defend its vital interests by conventional means. The great British historian and strategist Michael Howard wrote in 1979, while the Cold War was still pretty chilly, that the price we must expect to pay for our continuing independence is to sustain credible armies, navies and air forces: “Only if adequate conventional forces are maintained will statesmen be spared the agonizing dilemma” of choosing between surrender and going nuclear.', 'In modern times, too many Western nations have flinched from accepting the logic of this imperative, and even now remain slow to accept its budgetary consequences.', 'There is much that Taiwan and the US can do to strengthen the former’s defensive capability, without offering explicit provocation to Beijing. The island’s current fuel stocks, perhaps as little as seven days’ worth, could be increased; munition stockpiles for US forces can be pre-positioned in the region; Taiwan can invest in new-wave drones and subsurface unmanned naval craft. It can purchase data from commercial Synthetic Aperture Radar satellites such as Ukraine is using to good effect, to improve its early warning and surveillance.', 'Leaders go to war because they believe they can win, as did Putin in Ukraine. It is entirely feasible to reinforce both Taiwanese and US capabilities in the region, to a point at which Beijing must doubt its ability to prevail in the necessary amphibious assault, a perilous and difficult undertaking.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-NDT-Round-2.docx

Michigan

DoPh

089d9af5906c5b27df5b9ffd55040ee4a0a586f5fbd4ee6fa855fcb92a063143

Plank one solves war

O’Brien and Gray 22 (Robert C. O’Brien, Former National Security Advisor of the United States, and Alexander B. Gray, SENIOR FELLOW IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS @ AFPC and former National Security Council chief of staff, 2-24-2022, "Opinion," Wall Street Journal – WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/deterring-russia-russia-china-assets-gas-energy-sanctions-banking-ukraine-donetsk-luhansk-invasion-taiwan-keystone-pipeline-poland-finland-sweden-11645716233, accessed 2-26-2022)

U.S. steadfastness is required adversaries constantly monitor Beijing is watching how Washington responds to Moscow as it gauges what to do To deter approv Abrams Main Battle Tank support Helsinki and Stockholm NATO membership reassess legacy basing in Germany stop Nord Stream 2 remov Russia’s banks from Swift and taking all oligarch assets

U.S. steadfastness is required because America’s adversaries are constantly monitor ing our actions to determine where they can advance Beijing is watching how Washington responds to Moscow as it gauges what to do next To deter Russia and China Biden must act now approv Abrams Main Battle Tank sale to Poland The administration should expedite similar requests Washington should support sentiment in Helsinki and Stockholm to seek NATO membership U.S. should reassess legacy basing in Germany With NATO having moved east Germany is no longer a frontline state U.S. forces there should be repositioned to outposts in Poland Baltics and Indo-Pacific stop Nord Stream 2 the U.S. must restore energy leadership Biden administration’s sanctions proved insufficient to dissuade Putin That means remov ing Russia’s banks from the Swift system and taking all oligarch assets world-wide Russia should be made to understand that Ukraine’s government would be recognized by the U.S.

constantly monitor ing Abrams Main Battle Tank NATO membership reassess legacy basing stop Nord Stream 2 remov ing Russia’s banks

['**edited for language', '', 'U.S. steadfastness against Russian aggression isn’t about perpetuating the “rules-based order” or other slogans of Davos and Munich. It is required because America’s adversaries are constantly monitoring our actions to determine where they can advance. The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam preceded the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran hostage crisis, and the global adventurism of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the 1970s and early 1980s. Last year’s Afghanistan debacle appears to have emboldened Russia, China and Iran.', 'Beijing’s increased aggressiveness toward Taiwan has led some commentators to argue that we should ignore Mr. Putin’s Ukraine gambit and focus solely on China. While this sentiment is understandable, it misses the point: Beijing is watching how Washington responds to Moscow as it gauges what to do next. If Russia faces a determined insurgency supported by the West, finds its economy shut off from Europe, watches its oligarchs’ assets frozen and tied up world-wide and is bordered by a united and strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization, China will surely think twice before attempting to conquer Taiwan.', 'To deter Russia and China, the Biden administration must act now. Here are six steps it should take:', 'First, key European partners like Poland, Romania and the Baltic states have requested significant military hardware that remains unapproved or stuck in the U.S. bureaucracy. We have been calling for approval of the Abrams Main Battle Tank sale to Poland for more than a year and commend Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken for approving the deal last week. The administration should expedite all similar requests.', 'Second, Finland and Sweden are highly concerned about Russian adventurism. Both maintain capable militaries and defense industrial bases, along with impressive intelligence services. Washington should support the growing sentiment in Helsinki and Stockholm to seek NATO membership. They would strengthen the alliance’s northern flank, including in the critical Arctic area.', 'Third, the U.S. should reassess legacy basing in Germany. Berlin has shown itself unwilling to undertake a leadership role throughout the Ukraine crisis. This development shouldn’t come as a surprise given the German industrial elite’s dependence on Russian gas and the Chinese export market. With NATO having moved east, Germany is no longer a frontline state. U.S. forces there, other than those manning [running] hospital facilities and airbases, should be repositioned to outposts in Poland and the Baltics and bases in the Indo-Pacific.', 'Fourth, the Biden administration energy policy requires urgent re-examination. Oil at $100 a barrel not only hurts U.S. consumers, it puts billions into Mr. Putin’s war machine and Iran’s nuclear program. Appeasing Russia and Germany by reversing the Trump administration’s policy on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline clearly failed. It is time to stop Nord Stream 2 once and for all. Further, the U.S. must restore its energy leadership. Finishing the Keystone XL pipeline would send Russia and the world a potent message that America is committed to energy independence.', 'Fifth, NATO must show its adversaries unwavering resolve. Allies that fail to increase defense spending to the required 2% of gross domestic product within three years shouldn’t play a leading role in NATO. During Donald Trump’s presidency, the alliance’s defense spending commitment grew by nearly $400 billion through 2029, but American taxpayers still carry a disproportionate burden for defending Europe. Under such circumstances it makes sense for only countries that pay 2% of their GDP for defense to enjoy full voting privileges in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s main decision-making body.', 'Finally, Russia needs to face real consequences for deterrence to work. The West threatened sanctions but exacted no real penalties when Moscow annexed Crimea and set up a proxy government in Donbas. The Biden administration’s sanctions in response to the assertion that parts of Ukraine are “independent” were welcomed but proved insufficient to dissuade Mr. Putin from further action. The free world must make clear to Mr. Putin that Russia’s economy will be fully cut off if he doesn’t de-escalate forthwith. That means, at a minimum, removing Russia’s banks from the Swift system and [taking] seizing all oligarch assets world-wide.', 'Further, Russia should be made to understand that Ukraine’s current government would be recognized in exile by the U.S., NATO and most of the world. All diplomatic property and seats at the United Nations and multilateral organizations would be controlled by the legitimate government of Ukraine, not a Putin-installed puppet regime.', 'The U.S. remains the world’s indispensable power and retains global interests. The primacy of the China challenge and justifiable skepticism of U.S. overseas entanglements, born out of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, don’t mean we can ignore American interests in other areas of the world, particularly today in Ukraine.', '', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Neg-Kentucky-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

7c633312650f9e0d16080b779b1d46f4d1fb178ba19c2830448af7057c907ec1

China rejects every BBNJ provision.

Wen Duan 22. Lecturer at Law School of Hainan University and an adjunct research fellow at Southern Marine Science and Engineering Guangdong Laboratory Ph.D. from Utrecht University. “China’s participation in the discussion on marine protected areas in the BBNJ negotiations and its implications.” Marine Policy, , November 2022.

China is not in favour of any arrangement that subject to decision-making process China desires a veto so it may block any proposal China’s position is inconsistent with the Draft under which parties automatically legally bound any MPA designated must get through consensus prior to legal effects China would block recognition maintain its national interests such fishing shipping m g r s and research obstruct coordination and cooperation

China is not in favour of any arrangement that may subject China to the measures relating to MPAs whose decision-making process does not involve China China is in favour of the purely consensus-based decision-making process This shows that China desires a veto in the decision-making process under the BBNJ agreement so that it may block any ABMT proposal with which it disagrees China’s position is inconsistent with Article 20(6) of the First Draft under which the parties to the BBNJ agreement would be automatically legally bound by the MPAs any MPA designated by other relevant bodies must get through a procedure for recognition and be approved by consensus prior to having legal effects on the parties China would be able to block the recognition of an MPA designated by other relevant bodies by using its veto and prevent the ABMT from having legal effects on China consensus-based decision-making demonstrates the intention of China to ensure its views and considerations be fully taken into account Otherwise the MPA may not be established or recognised China would be able to maintain its national interests such as fishing interests shipping interests m arine g e-netic r esource s and research interests during the process obstruct relevant regional regimes from being universally appli-cable imply the difficulty for achieving the coordination and cooperation relating to MPAs desired

China is not in favour of any arrangement that may subject China to MPAs whose decision-making process does not involve China China desires a veto any proposal with which it disagrees inconsistent prior to having legal effects block the recognition maintain its national interests difficulty for achieving the coordination and cooperation

['It should also be noted that China’s position in respect of ABMTs/MPAs in the BBNJ negotiations is not perfect. Despite supporting the development of an BBNJ agreement and establishing a decision-making body thereof competent to deal with the matters relating to MPAs in ABNJ, China is not in favour of any arrangement that may subject China to the measures relating to MPAs whose decision-making process does not involve China. In terms of the decision-making procedure, China is in favour of the purely consensus-based decision-making process rather than a vote by majority or vote by majority as a last resort. This shows that China desires a veto in the decision-making process relating to ABMTs/MPAs under the BBNJ agreement so that it may block any ABMT proposal with which it disagrees. In terms of the relationship between the parties to the BBNJ agreement and the MPAs designated by other relevant bodies, China’s position is inconsistent with Article 20(6) of the First Draft under which the parties to the BBNJ agreement would be automatically legally bound by the MPAs established by other relevant bodies [78]. Rather, according to China’s position, any MPA designated by other relevant bodies must get through a procedure for recognition and be approved by consensus through the COP to the BBNJ agreement prior to having legal effects on the parties to the BBNJ agreement. In this case, China would be able to block the recognition of an MPA designated by other relevant bodies by using its veto and prevent the ABMT from having legal effects on China. Calling for a procedure of recognition and consensus-based decision-making demonstrates the intention of China to ensure its views and considerations be fully taken into account during the process for establishing an MPA in ABNJ under the BBNJ agreement or recognising an ABMT designated by other relevant bodies. Otherwise, the MPA may not be established or recognised due to the use of veto by China. In this way, China would be able to maintain its national interests such as, among others, fishing interests, shipping interests, marine ge-netic resources and research interests, during the process for establish-ing MPAs under the future BBNJ agreement. However, as noted in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.2, China’s position in that respect might to some extent cause inconsistency or incoherence between the applicable measures under the BBNJ agreement and applicable measures under other relevant regimes. It might also obstruct the ABMTs/MPAs desig-nated under relevant regional regimes from being universally appli-cable. This may also imply the difficulty for achieving the coordination and cooperation relating to MPAs desired by Article 19 of the Second Draft of the BBNJ agreement. Nevertheless, it may be noted that China’s position in that respect is also shared by a number of other big users of the high seas such as the US and Russia. This reflects a conflict between the national interests of the big users of the high seas and designating the areas in need of special protection as MPAs/ABMTs. The position of these States is understandable in the sense that promoting the estab-lishment of MPAs/ABMTs in ABNJ for the conservation of marine biodiversity needs to be balanced with the interests of States concerned. Otherwise, the States whose interests are ignored and affected may choose not to participate in the BBNJ agreement, and the lack of the participation of those States may lead to the failure of the BBNJ agree-ment to establish an effective mechanism for ABMTs/MPAs. As noted by Tang et al., lack of the participation of sufficient number of States or the critical States in the BBNJ agreement may “lead to further fragmentation of governance and overlapping of international mechanisms” [79].']

[(4, 11)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Neg-ada-Round-6.docx

Emory

GiKe

8c80f49fdcf8aefff6a289cb6439d0bc8547e41b7083866d76a4172aff296e8b

Ensuring that the liability standard is flexible in response to advancing technology is key.

Benedict See 21. Associate Editor at the Brooklyn Law Review. “Paging Doctor Robot: Medical Artificial Intelligence, Tort Liability, and Why Personhood May Be the Answer.” 87 Brook. L. Rev. 417 (2021). https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol87/iss1/10.

algorithms unable to be understood by medical professionals assess reasoning black box problem forced to take recommendations running risk of lawsuits retest cost time algorithms constantly learning refine future predictions tech advancing faster than the standard remedy the black box problem help ensure companies are not fearful of developing tech presents unprecedented legal issues

Deep learning algorithms present issues in the health care context because they "cannot explain why or how they reach the conclusion they do." black box algorithms either have trouble providing any type of explanation or they give explanations that are technically accurate but are unable to be understood by the medical professionals trying to assess the reasoning behind the algorithm's decision lack of transparency creates a black box problem medical professionals are forced to either take the Al's recommendations and analyses at face value running the risk of potentially using a faulty result that can lead to malpractice lawsuits they must manually retest and assess the situation, which can cost time medical AI algorithms are constantly learning over time the algorithm can refine its future predictions creates issues when it comes to establishing a standard of care t o which to hold medical AI tech nology may be advancing faster than the standard of care. algorithms present this black box problem capable of making mistakes tremendous potential to improve in the facets of medicine such as prognostics, diagnostics, image analysis, resource allocation, and treatment recommendations." predict cardiovascular risk and are capable of improving accuracy in predicting cardiovascular risk Finding a way to remedy the black box problem help save lives and ensure that companies are not fearful of developing new medical tech nologies hospitals and doctors are not hesitant to integrate new technologies . While AI's capabilities to improve science and medicine are undoubted technology presents troubling and unprecedented legal issues

the algorithm can refine its future predictions tech nology may be advancing faster than the standard of care. prognostics, diagnostics, image analysis, resource allocation, and treatment recommendations." technology presents troubling and unprecedented legal issues

['Deep learning algorithms present issues in the health care context because they "cannot explain why or how they reach the conclusion they do."60 The black box algorithms either have trouble providing any type of explanation, or they give explanations that are technically accurate but are unable to be understood by the medical professionals trying to assess the reasoning behind the algorithm\'s decision.6\' This lack of transparency creates a black box problem, where medical professionals are forced to either take the Al\'s recommendations and analyses at face value—running the risk of potentially using a faulty result that can lead to malpractice lawsuits62—or they must manually retest and assess the situation, which can cost time. To complicate the issue, medical AI algorithms are constantly learning over time.63 As more data becomes available for AI, the algorithm can refine its future predictions.64 This creates issues when it comes to establishing a standard of care to which to hold medical AI,65 as the technology may be advancing faster than the standard of care. Although algorithms present this black box problem and are capable of making mistakes, they have tremendous potential to improve in the facets of medicine, such as "prognostics, diagnostics, image analysis, resource allocation, and treatment recommendations."66 These algorithms have been able to identify skin cancer, both melanoma and nonmelanoma, with results that are comparable to those of dermatologists.G7 They can also predict cardiovascular risk and are capable of improving accuracy in predicting cardiovascular risk.68 Finding a way to remedy the black box problem could help save lives and ensure that companies are not fearful of developing new medical technologies and that hospitals and doctors are not hesitant to integrate new technologies. While AI\'s capabilities to improve science and medicine are undoubted, the new technology presents troubling and unprecedented legal issues.']

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ndtceda

Emory-MoSa-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-1.docx

Emory

MoSa

c74612e5faa6ac7baa6461e273aea63190196e3d0df5b1a45f8e3a9024596c2c

8. Farm bill won’t solve climate change.

Lisa Held 23. "Is a Climate-Smart 2023 Farm Bill Even Possible?". Civil Eats. 4-26-2023. https://civileats.com/2023/04/26/climate-smart-farm-bill-heat-flooding-resilience-policy-conservation/

climate farm bill changes are barely on the table addressing climate crisis require a big shift in money that bill will bring that kind seem slim won’t move the needle on reducing meat diversifying farms cutting food waste

Although it seems like everyone in D.C. is buzzing about a “ climate farm bill ,” some of the most impactful changes , including crop diversification and shifting diets from meat toward plants, are barely on the negotiating table . the 2023 Farm Bill will it play a meaningful role in addressing and responding to the climate crisis ? “I would try as quickly as possible to shift subsidies and programs that encourage large-scale monocropping and high-input intensive farming to those that support a system that is more diversified and uses agroecological strategies for production said Kerr, when asked about how a climate scientist might rewrite the bill. “That would require a big shift in where the money goes .” So far, however, the odds that the bill will bring about that kind of sea change seem slim Based on the early negotiations and conversations, it looks like it won’t move the needle on many of the things that would have the greatest impact: reducing meat (especially beef) in American diets, diversifying farms from coast to coast, and cutting food waste .

D.C. buzzing climate farm bill shifting diets meat toward plants, barely on the negotiating table meaningful role responding climate crisis big shift money goes sea change seem slim won’t move the needle on reducing meat diversifying farms cutting food waste

['Although it seems like everyone in D.C. is buzzing about a “climate farm bill,” some of the most impactful changes, including crop diversification and shifting diets from meat toward plants, are barely on the negotiating table.', 'For the past decade, Emma Jagoz has been stewarding and expanding a thriving organic farm that now spans 25 acres near Frederick, Maryland. At Moon Valley Farm, she grows a wide variety of vegetables that end up in CSA boxes and restaurant kitchens in Maryland, Washington, D.C., and Virginia year-round.', 'Increasingly, she has had to contend with extreme weather: early frosts threaten her fall crops. False springs have caused her winter crops to bolt too soon. Rain comes all at once and then not at all.', '“Over the past 12 years, it does feel like the seasons are getting less predictable,” she said in early March at the Farmers for Climate Action: Rally for Resilience in D.C., where she held a hand-drawn sign decorated with beets and tomatoes.', 'As an organic grower focused on building healthy, carbon-holding soil, Jagoz’s climate activism may seem predictable. But the already-devastating impacts of more frequent extreme weather on farms, combined with calls for agriculture to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, have now pushed farmers and farm groups across the political spectrum into the climate change conversation.', 'On a few key issues, such as paying more farmers to use climate-friendly conservation practices, farm groups that don’t always agree—including the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition (NSAC), the National Farmers’ Union, and the American Farm Bureau Federation, a leading member of the Food and Agriculture Climate Alliance—are now in accordance.', 'Can an unwieldy government bill, shaped by a bureaucratic system heavily influenced by the powerful agriculture lobby, really shift the food system toward a lower-emission, climate-resilient future?', 'It’s no wonder: In the last round of reports published by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the world’s top climate experts warned of “a rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a livable and sustainable future for all.” The reports confirmed what many farmers are experiencing firsthand: Droughts, floods, and wildfires are destroying crops and threatening livelihoods and food supplies in more frequent and severe ways than ever before. Increasing temperatures are also causing heat and water stress that directly impacts the productivity of both crops and livestock.', '“If we don’t reduce our greenhouse gas emissions, the severity of those impacts will be greater with each subsequent year,” explained Rachel Bezner Kerr, the lead author of the food and agriculture chapter in the IPCC’s impacts and adaptation report. At the same time, agriculture’s emissions have been rising, especially when it comes to the extra-potent but shorter-lived greenhouse gas methane.', 'So, as negotiations around the 2023 Farm Bill, the country’s most important piece of food and farm legislation, heat up, the question is: will it play a meaningful role in addressing and responding to the climate crisis?', 'Furthermore, can an unwieldy government bill, shaped by a bureaucratic system heavily influenced by the powerful agriculture lobby, really shift the food system toward a lower-emission, climate-resilient future?', '“I would try as quickly as possible to shift subsidies and programs that encourage large-scale monocropping and high-input intensive farming to those that support a system that is more diversified and uses agroecological strategies for production,” said Kerr, when asked about how a climate scientist might rewrite the bill. “That would require a big shift in where the money goes.”', 'So far, however, the odds that the bill will bring about that kind of sea change seem slim. Based on the early negotiations and conversations, it looks like it won’t move the needle on many of the things that would have the greatest impact: reducing meat (especially beef) in American diets, diversifying farms from coast to coast, and cutting food waste.', '']

[(5, 12)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-1---NUSO-Round-5.docx

Emory

MiPi

21aee6ab678ba2e2704341d9b2a36552d7901796bb3455c2fa9ba88cf38b2cb1

No debris cascades, but even a worst case is confined to low LEO with no impact

Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler_syndrome_is_over_hyped/

Kessler is overhyped . A chorus of commenters are wrong Low LEO Things burn up quickly High LEO where junk orbits Mid Orbit - GPS and nav sat s here volume is so huge , and number so few we don’t worry here GEO is sat s moving the same speed Also only one per 1000km not a problem imagine a worst case odds of hitting are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000 we don’t lose access In real life a lot of factors make Kessler even less a problem Debris spread over volume not a single surface , making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely Most have slower velocity this makes it deorbit much sooner Small objects deorbit in months Larger objects can be tracked and avoided constellations are in Low LEO all new launches include a plan to deorbit

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped . A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space they are wrong Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen? The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait and the problem would be over High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other nav igation sat ellite s travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge , and the number of satellites so few , that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all sat ellite s here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity Also , it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here imagine a worst case scenario An evil alien chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death spread evenly Is humanity cut off from space? the world has launched 10,000 tons of satellites total I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites currently in High LEO then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes there would be one cube per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000 even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space Kessler at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits In real life , there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface , making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO , but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler Most importantly, all new launches since the 90’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbit ing) the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit . Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites , this wouldn’t even have a huge effect

overhyped chorus of online commenters wrong Low LEO doesn’t matter High LEO Mid Orbit GPS nav sat s volume of space is so huge number of satellites so few don’t need to worry here GEO sat s one satellite per 1000km not a problem worst case 839,985,870 1cm cubes tiny - less than 1 in 10,000 even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space certain orbits real life lot of factors even less of a problem spread volume single orbital surface orders of magnitudes less likely slower orbital velocity much sooner few months tracked avoided not in High LEO Low LEO aren’t an issue 90’s deorbit insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit current trend much smaller, cheaper micro satellites

['Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong.', 'What is Kessler Syndrome?', 'Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites.', 'It is a dark picture.', 'Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen?', 'I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit.', 'The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions.', 'Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over.', 'High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue.', 'Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here.', 'GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here.', 'How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be?', 'Let’s imagine a worst case scenario.', 'An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space?', 'I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.', 'So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space.', 'Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits.', 'In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment.', 'Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely.', 'Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner.', 'Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided.', 'The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler.', 'Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting)', 'So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect.', 'I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.']

[(11, 16), (17, 19)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Neg-Gonzaga-Quarters.docx

Michigan

PiPh

cc85445b495cbd632f76bc99d2fa4534508bb87690938c55971c6b3b074593c5

1---AUTHORITY---EU regulations are ineffective, would be shut down by members and litigation.

Thomas Burri 18, Assistant Professor of International Law and European Law at the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland, “The EU is right to refuse legal personality for Artificial Intelligence,” Euractiv, 5/30/18, https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/opinion/the-eu-is-right-to-refuse-legal-personality-for-artificial-intelligence/

the Commission should not address a i personhood the E U and its institutions lack power to determine a “person This resides with Member States EU law, it is up to each Member to determine who is a person only curbed by i h r l national law determines nationality National law determines a legal person the Court laid down limits to powers of the Member States the EU has not gained the power to determine who is a legal person

there are substantive reasons why the Commission should not address a rtificial i ntelligence personhood . First, the E U and its institutions , including the Commission and Parliament , lack the power to determine who is a “person ”. This power resides with Member States . It encompasses the definition of the term “person” in all respects Under EU law, it is up to each Member to determine who is a person . This power is only curbed by i h r l national law determines who acquires nationality under which circumstances National law equally determines when an entity becomes a legal person , such as a company or foundation the Court of Justice of the EU has carefully laid down limits to these powers of the Member States in long lines of authority the EU has not , as a result of case law, gained the power to determine who is a legal person it would be unlawful , under the EU Treaties, for the Commission to propose the creation of personhood for a i

not address a rtificial i ntelligence personhood E U institutions Commission Parliament power Member States definition of the term “person” all respects up to each Member i h r l nationality legal person company foundation carefully laid down limits long lines of authority be unlawful a i

['However, there are two more substantive reasons why the Commission should not address artificial intelligence personhood.', 'First, the European Union and its institutions, including the Commission and Parliament, lack the power principally to determine who is a “person”. This power resides with the Member States. It encompasses the definition of the term “person” in all respects.', 'Under EU law, it is up to each Member State to determine who is a natural person. This power is only curbed by international human rights law. Similarly, national law determines who acquires nationality under which circumstances, while EU citizenship merely ties in automatically with this determination – see only Cyprus’s controversial citizenship programme as a case in point.', 'National law equally determines when an entity becomes a legal person, such as a company or a foundation, while a legal person thus created on the basis of national law can consequently rely upon EU law, notably the fundamental market freedom of establishment.', 'Indeed, the Court of Justice of the EU has carefully laid down limits to these powers of the Member States in long lines of authority dating back to the 1980s, but the EU has not, as a result of case law, gained the power to determine who is a legal person. One therefore could only fall back on the EU’s sole power in the domain of personhood, namely to establish EU agencies with legal personality, and argue that such agencies are akin to artificially intelligent persons – which would obviously be a stretch. In short, it would have been unlawful, under the EU Treaties, for the Commission to propose the creation of personhood for artificial intelligence.', '']

[(7, 12), (13, 15)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaMa-Aff-Texas-Open-Round-3.docx

Kansas

PaMa

06bdfa33795d867fe5b005853f7eac7a44da10027972481929b664bfe59a63ed

Buildup goes nuclear.

Axe 18—(Editor-in-Chief of War is Boring, MFA from the University of South Carolina, Military Correspondent, Writer, and Editor, Regular Contributor to The Diplomat and Wired). David Axe. “The Risk to the World: Massive Nuclear Proliferation”. The Daily Beast. 7/16/2018. .

NATO helped prevent the spread of nuc s France fields 300 U.K. , 215 the U S maintains 3,800 with France possessing so few warheads deterrence could collapse France expand their nuclear capabilities that instability and resulting mistrust between allies could tempt Putin to launch nuclear strike

Unconstrained nuclearization is one nightmare scenario For three quarters of a century, America have made it unnecessary for many Europe an countries to possess nukes of their own. Because of that, these countries could safely sign on to the N P T bolstering international efforts to limit nuclearization all over the world. "Among the benefits of NATO , a key one is that it has helped to prevent the spread of nuc lear weapon s ," NATO's 29 member states range from Turkey, Hungary and Poland on the eastern flank to France and Germany at the heart of the continent and the U K in the west At present just two non-U.S. NATO states – the U.K. and France – possess nuclear weapons. France fields around 300 nukes. The U.K. , around 215 . By contrast, the U nited S tates maintains an arsenal of no fewer than 3,800 atomic warheads, only slightly fewer than Russia possesses. Practically speaking, America is Europe's nuclear shield . Under Article V the alliance is obligated to respond. That applies to a nuclear strike If Russia nuked Lithuania or Poland, the U S would be obligated to nuke Russia right back with France and the U.K. possessing so few atomic warheads compared to Russia, deterrence in Europe could begin to collapse without America . And that risk could drive European countries to create their own , more powerful deterrents would prompt France and the U.K. to expand their nuclear capabilities . The realignment could get complicated. that instability and the resulting mistrust between former allies could even, in the most extreme scenario, tempt Putin to launch his own limited nuclear strike

Unconstrained nuclearization nightmare scenario America unnecessary Europe N P T limit nuclearization all over key one nuc s U K the U.K. and France France 300 U.K. 215 U S 3,800 America is Europe's nuclear shield Article V nuclear strike U S France and the U.K. so few atomic warheads collapse America European countries create their own France U.K. expand their nuclear capabilities that instability resulting mistrust between tempt Putin to launch his own limited nuclear strike

['', 'Unconstrained nuclearization is one nightmare scenario that is becoming increasingly plausible as Trump escalates his criticism of the 69-year-old North Atlantic alliance. For three quarters of a century, American nukes have made it unnecessary for many European countries to possess nukes of their own. Because of that, these countries could safely sign on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, bolstering international efforts to limit nuclearization all over the world. "Among the benefits of NATO, a key one is that it has helped to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons," Kingston Reif, an analyst with the Arms Control Association, told The Daily Beast. But that was long before Trump’s rise as a political force. In 2017, the former reality-T.V. star declared NATO "obsolete." In Brussels on July 11, Trump again questioned the organization\'s usefulness. "What good is NATO?" he asked. The next day at a meeting of NATO leaders, Trump threatened that he might "do his own thing" if alliance members didn\'t immediately increase their military spending. Trump\'s words sent a chill through European capitals. The United States is by far the biggest military spender in NATO and, according to Mark Simakovsky, a fellow with the Atlantic Council\'s Eurasia Center, the "glue" that holds the alliance together. "Don\'t forget, there are huge divisions in Europe," Simakovsky said. NATO\'s 29 member states range from illiberal Turkey, Hungary and Poland on the alliance\'s eastern flank to stalwarts France and Germany at the heart of the continent and the restive United Kingdom in the west. At present just two non-U.S. NATO states – the U.K. and France – possess nuclear weapons. France fields around 300 nukes. The U.K., around 215. By contrast, the United States maintains an arsenal of no fewer than 3,800 atomic warheads, only slightly fewer than Russia possesses. The U.S. military keeps 180 warheads in Europe for use by its own forces and the forces of certain NATO members, most notably Germany. Practically speaking, America is Europe\'s nuclear shield. Under Article V of the NATO charter, an attack on any NATO state represents an attack on every other state – and the alliance is obligated to respond. That applies to a nuclear strike as well as conventional attack. If Russia nuked, say, Lithuania or Poland, the United States would be obligated to nuke Russia right back. That mutual nuclear threat has helped to keep the peace in Europe since the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in a test in 1949, the same year as NATO\'s founding. But with France and the U.K. possessing so few atomic warheads compared to Russia, deterrence in Europe could begin to collapse without American nukes. And that risk could drive European countries to create their own, more powerful deterrents – either collectively or individually. "The loss of U.S. reliability to deter aggression against NATO Europe would prompt France and the U.K. to expand their nuclear capabilities and Germany and other non-nuclear countries to consider building their own nuclear arsenals despite strong public opposition," Blair said. Some European officials are already thinking in those terms. In 2017, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, chairman of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party, called for Europe to build up a combined nuclear arsenal as powerful as Russia\'s own arsenal. Conservative German parliamentarian Roderich Kiesewetter endorsed the idea. If the United States were to leave NATO, Europe could build its own deterrent under the umbrella of a diminished NATO structure, or opt for a new structure based on the European Union. In the last decade or so, the E.U. has begun to establish a rudimentary military organization, but has deployed troops only rarely – and then mostly in Africa on peacekeeping duties. The realignment could get complicated. Albania, Canada, Iceland, Norway and Turkey are in NATO, but aren\'t in the E.U. Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are in the E.U., but aren\'t in NATO. Ireland, for one, is strictly opposed to nuclear weapons. "There are European Union members with nuclear capabilities, but how those capabilities would be employed outside of a NATO context – it\'s never been fleshed out," Simakovsky said. For Trump to even threaten to pull back America\'s atomic umbrella is dangerous, Simakovsky said. "What it encourages is instability." And that instability – and the resulting mistrust between former allies – plays into the hands of Russian president Vladimir Putin. It could even, in the most extreme scenario, tempt Putin to launch his own limited nuclear strike in the context of a wider war in Europe.', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaHe-Aff-Indiana-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

HaHe

f404d8b097aab564b19b7a772b04b4054786ddb5dac9e9df1fce7e91450f3a29

Extinction.

Michelle Chen, 6/12/2018. Contributing writer for The Nation. “A Third of the World’s ‘Protected’ Areas Are Under Threat.” https://www.thenation.com/article/third-worlds-protected-areas-threat/.

we may be vastly underestimating ecological threats Trump steamrolled reg s deregulation exploit land air and water undermined When food chains are disrupted life devastated consequences reverberate destabilizing societies and economies globally protected areas can be very effective The problem is not following through with enforcement

Globally, the real-life footprint of habitat loss is spreading researchers warn we may be vastly underestimating both the ecological damage that’s already taken place, and the threats looming on the horizon The “protected” designation covers everything from rain forests to grasslands to icy tundras As a political instrument , the protected designation serves as the last line of defense to conserve nature and maintain biod Though the U S has historically been a leader in wildlife conservation efforts Trump and EPA have steamrolled C A and C W A reg s , while championing policies to spur the commercialization of public lands Trump is mirroring the assault on protected areas now trending across the globe: a steady creep of commercialization and deregulation , promoted by governments that seek to exploit and privatize whatever land has not yet been consumed The gap between formal maps and the actual landscape suggests that current laws and regulations are wildly out of sync with what’s happening on the ground in every area impacted by humans, local air and water quality could be undermined by the sprawl of industry and transportation and the overarching pressures of continuous population growth The impact of a single road’s cutting into a forested area could have a profound impact on soil and pollution levels When food chains are disrupted , animal and plant life could be devastated consequences reverberate in human communities destabilizing societies and economies locally and then globally The impacts we are finding are in many cases not sustainable —we’re talking about cities, massive road and railway projects, industrial agriculture these are government-supported and conflict with regional ecosystems the better equipped society is to restructure environmental protections to place appropriate limitations on industrial and social activity in conservation areas dynamically, not just on a piece of paper I don’t think that human encroachment is inevitable We know that protected areas , when well-funded and well-managed , can be very effective at stopping human activities which threaten biod The problem is not actually following through with the regulations and enforcement needed to make these areas effective

vastly underestimating ecological threats looming on the horizon political instrument protected designation last line of defense maintain biod deregulation undermined food chains devastated reverberate destabilizing societies economies globally not sustainable protected areas well-managed very effective not actually following through with the regulations and enforcement needed to make these areas effective

['Globally, the real-life footprint of habitat loss is spreading—more than half the areas designated over the past quarter century have seen increased human pressure. Overall, researchers warn we may be vastly underestimating both the ecological damage that’s already taken place, and the threats looming on the horizon.¶ The “protected” designation covers everything from rain forests to grasslands to icy tundras. As a political instrument, the protected designation serves as the last line of defense in the effort to conserve nature and maintain biodiversity in an era when human societies are intermeshing with nearly every terrain around the planet.¶ Though the study doesn’t go so far as to suggest the label of “protected” is useless, it’s a call to environmental authorities to incorporate more extensive data mapping into their environmental monitoring to gain a more realistic picture of the nature and scale of surrounding environmental threats.¶ Though the United States has historically been a leader in wildlife conservation efforts, the Trump administration and EPA chief Scott Pruitt have steamrolled Clean Air and Clean Water Act regulations, while championing policies to spur the commercialization of public lands. The administration has directly attacked wilderness areas by working to strip protections from national monuments, such as the Bears Ears and Grand Escalante sites in Utah—which cover several million acres of iconic Western landscapes—while conservative lawmakers last year moved to promote oil drilling on the coastal plain of the pristine Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Trump is mirroring the assault on protected areas now trending across the globe: a steady creep of commercialization and deregulation, promoted by governments that seek to exploit and privatize whatever land has not yet been consumed.¶ The gap between formal maps and the actual landscape suggests that current laws and regulations are wildly out of sync with what’s happening on the ground. This is in part because of arbitrary, widely varying legal definitions of protection across national and regional borders. Moreover, the study’s analysis does not include longer term trends influencing the terrain, including human-induced climate change or conflict, which might have even more extreme long-term environmental impacts.¶ Yet, in every area impacted by humans, local air and water quality could be undermined by the sprawl of industry and transportation and the overarching pressures of continuous population growth. The impact of a single road’s cutting into a forested area could have a profound impact on soil and pollution levels. Even settling a small town could eliminate crucial range lands that grazing species rely on. Razing forests for farmland could displace critical species and stifle local biodiversity. When food chains are disrupted, animal and plant life could be devastated, and the consequences eventually reverberate in human communities, destabilizing societies and economies locally and then globally.¶ According to researcher and co-author of the study Kendall Raward Jones of University of Queensland, “The impacts we are finding are in many cases not sustainable—we’re talking about cities, massive road and railway projects, industrial agriculture, etc.” Often these are government-supported infrastructure projects aimed at boosting economic development, and their conflict with regional ecosystems attests to the challenges of sustainable development in areas where populations keep demanding more space, resources, and transit networks.¶ It may be too late to turn back the clock on human development, but researchers hope the new data help governments chart a course toward a more sustainable regulatory regime. The more accurate data authorities have on the real human impact in protected lands, the better equipped society is to restructure environmental protections to place appropriate limitations on industrial and social activity in conservation areas dynamically, not just on a piece of paper.¶ According to Jones, regulators need to take a more three-dimensional approach to assessing the level of human activity on an area designated for official conservation: “I don’t think that human encroachment is inevitable. We know that protected areas, when well-funded and well-managed, can be very effective at stopping human activities which threaten biodiversity. The problem is that by focusing mainly on the size of the area under ‘protection,’ global conservation targets allow nations to get away with designating land as ‘protected’ while not actually following through with the regulations and enforcement needed to make these areas effective.”', 'Environmentality K']

[(9, 13), (20, 24)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GrKi-Neg-Northwestern-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

GrKi

27f2c87e07b74c65742702608532fbd72a9a27f56f7b894e8d6741afa22ece87

Data proves—progress is occurring AND institutions aren’t immutable.

Hughes 19—(fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research). Hughes, Coleman. 2019. “The Case for Black Optimism.” The Quillette. September 28, 2019. .

black Americans have been making rapid progress incarceration for black men declined the mortality rate shrank for cancer , diabetes , and heart disease . students who earned degrees increased 82 percent 60 percent say they’re better financially than their parents However the same data can appear to justify pessimism . one lens reducing racial gaps borders on the absurd . any black progress can be invisible through the gap-lens, given sufficient white progress . the dubious presumption that white outcomes are the best benchmark the median white is a decade older than the median black American. confounding variables make it overly simplistic black progress can be celebrated ignorance leads many to mistakenly believe institutions are so racist nothing short of overhaul suffice those institutions have ushered in huge progress in recent years We should not burn the system down

The narrative of doom and gloom is misleading. black Americans have been making rapid progress along most important dimensions of well-being since the turn of the millennium. Let’s start with incarceration. From 2001 to 2017, the incarceration rate for black men declined by 34 percent . For young black women, the story is similar: a 59 percent drop for those aged 25–29, a 43 percent drop for those aged 20–24, and a 69 percent drop for those aged 18–19. the mortality rate for black Americans aged 65 and over shrank by 29 percent for cancer , 31 percent for diabetes , and 43 percent for heart disease . Between the 1999 –2000 and 2016– 2017 school years black students who earned bachelor’s degrees increased by 82 percent , from 108,018 to 196,300. the number of associate’s and master’s degrees awarded to black students more than doubled 60 percent of blacks at every level of educational attainment say they’re doing better financially than their parents —a higher percentage than either whites or Hispanics. data tell an optimistic story about the recent history of black America. However the same data that justify this optimism can appear to justify pessimism if you look at it differently. here’s the same data framed differently: In 2001, black men aged 18–19 were nine times more likely to be behind bars than comparable white men. ev idence against racial progress tends to compare black-white gaps today to black-white gaps in the past . white metrics are used as benchmarks against which to measure black progress. The question of black progress is a matter of weighing the reality of progress against the reality of regress than it is a matter of looking at the same reality through two different lenses . Through one lens , progress means reducing the size of black-white racial gaps ; Though the rationale behind it is powerful, the gap-lens, taken to its logical end, borders on the absurd . Imagine we had a button that doubled the amount of everything good for each racial group and halved the rate of everything bad—so, black wealth doubles, white wealth doubles, black incarceration is halved, white incarceration is halved, and so on. As we pressed the button repeatedly, America would increasingly approach utopia . Yet the racial gaps—that is, the ratios between black and white outcomes—would remain unchanged. any amount of black progress can be invisible when viewed through the gap-lens, given sufficient white progress . That’s a problem The gap-lens also relies on the dubious presumption that white outcomes are the best benchmark against which to measure black outcomes. the median white American is a full decade older than the median black American. when we compare black outcomes to whit e outcomes we treat American society as if it were a simple 8th-grade science experiment : white people are treated as the “control group”; black people are treated as the “experimental group”; and the “independent variable,” applied only to blacks is institutional racism . On this oversimplified paradigm, we could reasonably assume that all racial outcome gaps are caused by institutional racism. But reality is more complex. confounding variables make it overly simplistic to pin all racial gaps on institutional racism. Despite such flaws, the gap-lens is the default lens through which many scholars and journalists view black America today. racial tensions are not the inevitable consequence of living in a racially disparate society. I’m not arguing that we should abolish the use of the gap-lens in every case. I’m arguing that, in the great majority of cases, the past-lens yields a more useful picture of the state of black America. black progress can be understood independent of white progress and celebrated on its own terms. ignorance of how much progress blacks have made in recent years leads many to mistakenly believe American institutions are so racist that nothing short of complete overhaul would suffice to repair them. those very same institutions have ushered in huge amounts of progress for black people in recent years suggests a more sober-minded approach. We should not burn the system down We should reform it one increment at a time

rapid progress incarceration rate 34 percent mortality rate cancer diabetes heart disease 1999 2017 black students 82 percent 60 percent better financially than their parents However same data appear ev today in the past one lens black-white racial gaps absurd doubled everything good approach utopia ratios invisible sufficient white progress That’s a problem white outcomes decade older 8th-grade science experiment institutional racism all racial outcome gaps confounding variables not the inevitable celebrated ignorance mistakenly believe so racist overhaul huge amounts of progress We should not burn the system down

['', 'The narrative of doom and gloom, however, is misleading. Though it has gone largely unnoticed, black Americans have been making rapid progress along most important dimensions of well-being since the turn of the millennium.', 'Let’s start with incarceration. Without doubt, there is plenty of reason to be pessimistic about the U.S. prison system. America incarcerates a larger proportion of its citizens than any nation on earth. Black Americans, at 13 percent of the U.S. population, made up one-third of the nation’s incarcerated population in 2017. To make matters worse, conditions inside many prisons are ill-suited for rehabilitation. Alabama’s state prisons, for instance, are so rife with violence and sexual assault that Trump’s Justice Department has charged them with violating the eighth amendment to the constitution, which bans “cruel and unusual punishments.”', 'Nevertheless, there are reasons to be optimistic. From 2001 to 2017, the incarceration rate for black men declined by 34 percent. Even this statistic, however, understates progress by lumping black Americans of all ages together. When you look at age-specific incarceration outcomes, you find two opposing trends: Older black Americans are doing slightly worse than previous generations, but younger black Americans are doing better—so much better that they more than offset, in statistical terms, the backslide of their elders. To put the speed and size of the trend in perspective, between my first day of Kindergarten in 2001 and my first legal drink in 2017, the incarceration rate for black men aged 25–29, 20–24, and 18–19 declined, respectively, by 56 percent, 60 percent, and 72 percent. For young black women, the story is similar: a 59 percent drop for those aged 25–29, a 43 percent drop for those aged 20–24, and a 69 percent drop for those aged 18–19.', 'As a result of the divergent generational trendlines, the black prison population is not only shrinking; it’s aging too. In 2017, nearly three in ten black male prisoners were 45 years of age or older, up from one in ten in 2001. That may not seem like good news, but it is. The incarceration trendline for young blacks in the recent past predicts the trendline for all blacks in the near future. So the fact that the post-2001 incarceration decline for blacks in general was entirely caused by the plunging incarceration rate for young blacks in particular suggests that, as generational turnover occurs, the black prison population will not only continue to shrink, but will shrink at an accelerating rate. To paraphrase the economist Rick Nevin, our prison system may be overflowing today, but the “pipeline” to prison is already starting to run dry.', 'The great incarceration decline for black youth has been matched by a decline in teenage motherhood. Between 2001 and 2017, the birth rate for black women aged 15–19 declined by 63 percent. In fact, the black teenage birth rate in 2017 was lower than the white teenage rate as recently as 2002.', 'Nor has progress been confined to the younger generation. Between 1999 and 2015, the mortality rate for black Americans aged 65 and over shrank by 29 percent for cancer, 31 percent for diabetes, and 43 percent for heart disease. What’s more, all of those percentage drops were larger than the drops experienced by comparable whites over the same period. As deaths from disease have plummeted, black lives have extended. In 2017, black female life expectancy was 78.5 years, up from 75.1 years in 2000. Life expectancy for black men increased from 68.2 to 71.9 years over the same timespan.', 'Not only are black Americans healthier and longer-lived than they were two decades ago, they’re also more educated. Between the 1999–2000 and 2016–2017 school years, the number of black students who earned bachelor’s degrees increased by 82 percent, from 108,018 to 196,300. Over the same period, the number of associate’s and master’s degrees awarded to black students more than doubled, rising from 60,208 to 129,874, and 36,606 to 89,577, respectively (population growth accounts for some, but not all or even most, of this growth). 2018 census data showed that 37 percent of black Americans aged 25–34 had some kind of college degree. If black America were its own country, that would place it in between Germany (31 percent) and Spain (43 percent) in terms of educational attainment. What’s more, the economist Raj Chetty has found that black women, though less likely to attend college than white women, are now more likely to attend college than white men from similar socioeconomic backgrounds.', 'Along with more education has come more upward mobility. The Federal Reserve recently reported that over 60 percent of blacks at every level of educational attainment say they’re doing better financially than their parents—a higher percentage than either whites or Hispanics. And although black men still lag behind white men in terms of upward mobility, Chetty has found that black women now go on to earn slightly higher incomes than white women from similar socioeconomic backgrounds.', 'All told, there is more than enough data with which to tell an optimistic story about the recent history of black America. However, the same data that justify this optimism can appear to justify pessimism if you look at it differently. Recall, for instance, the 72 percent drop in the incarceration rate for black men aged 18–19 from 2001 to 2017. Framed as such, it looks like progress. But here’s the same data framed differently: In 2001, black men aged 18–19 were nine times more likely to be behind bars than comparable white men. By 2017, they were twelve times more likely to be behind bars. Framed as such, it looks like regress.', 'This particular framing effect is just one example in a larger pattern: The evidence against racial progress tends to compare black-white gaps today to black-white gaps in the past. Here, white metrics are used as benchmarks against which to measure black progress. By contrast, the evidence in favor of progress tends to compare black metrics today against black metrics in the past. White metrics do not enter the equation. Crucially, the same data can often be made to look like either progress or regress depending on which framework is chosen.', 'The question of black progress, therefore, is less a matter of weighing the reality of progress against the reality of regress than it is a matter of looking at the same reality through two different lenses. Through one lens, progress means reducing the size of black-white racial gaps; let’s call this the gap-lens. But through another lens, progress means improving black outcomes relative to where they were in the past; let’s call this the past-lens.', 'The rationale for choosing the gap-lens is this: if not for our racist history, the racial gaps we observe today would not exist. That history includes not only two and a half centuries of chattel slavery, but also the many and varied Jim Crow era policies, from school segregation to redlining, that prevented blacks from taking advantage of the American dream. To measure the width of a racial gap, this view holds, is to measure the depth of America’s failure to redress that history. What’s more, if we fail to close statistical gaps between blacks and whites, then we would be surrendering ourselves to live in a permanently racially-stratified society, a society in which—even if everyone were doing better than their parents—whites would hold more economic power than blacks in perpetuity.', 'Though the rationale behind it is powerful, the gap-lens, taken to its logical end, borders on the absurd. Imagine we had a button that doubled the amount of everything good for each racial group and halved the rate of everything bad—so, black wealth doubles, white wealth doubles, black incarceration is halved, white incarceration is halved, and so on. As we pressed the button repeatedly, America would increasingly approach utopia. Yet the racial gaps—that is, the ratios between black and white outcomes—would remain unchanged. Therefore, viewed through the gap-lens, we will have made no progress at all. Indeed, any amount of black progress can become invisible when viewed through the gap-lens, given sufficient white progress. That’s a problem. A framework for progress that, under certain conditions, would not recognize the difference between our current world and a quasi-utopia seems, frankly, to miss the point of the word.', 'The gap-lens also relies on the dubious presumption that white outcomes are the best benchmark against which to measure black outcomes. One reason this presumption fails is that the median white American is a full decade older than the median black American. Thus, comparing all blacks to all whites on any outcome that varies with age—for instance, incarceration or wealth—is comparing apples to oranges.', 'More importantly, when we compare black outcomes to white outcomes and blame all of the gaps on institutional racism, we treat American society as if it were a simple 8th-grade science experiment: white people are treated as the “control group”; black people are treated as the “experimental group”; and the “independent variable,” applied only to blacks, is institutional racism. On this oversimplified paradigm, we could reasonably assume that all racial outcome gaps are caused by institutional racism. But reality is more complex. Black Americans and white Americans are unique groups of people with different histories, different demographics, and different sociological characteristics. Such confounding variables make it overly simplistic to pin all racial gaps on institutional racism.', 'Despite such flaws, the gap-lens is the default lens through which many scholars and journalists view black America today. Whether it’s wealth, incarceration, or education, the habit of framing black metrics relative to white metrics is so deeply ingrained that it seems naïve to obsserve that we do not view other racial groups this way. Which is to say, when we ask whether white Americans have made progress, we compare whites not against some other group but against themselves at an earlier point in time. Why, then, do we treat the analysis of black America differently?', 'For many, the answer lies in history. It makes sense to analyze black America with a unique lens precisely because black Americans trail a unique history of oppression. There is no way to acknowledge that ugly history, in this view, without looking directly at the gaps caused by it.', 'I understand this rationale, and have some sympathy with it. However, it ignores the downsides associated with focusing on racial gaps. There is a spectrum of possible outcomes in multi-ethnic societies with violent, segregated conflict at one end, and peaceful, integrated cooperation at the other. Somewhere in between lies a circumstance, neither disastrous nor ideal, in which members of different racial groups are encouraged to measure themselves against one another, generating racial envy and resentment. Americans in general, and black Americans in particular, currently exist in such a circumstance. Yet because it is the water in which we swim, it is difficult to recognize that such racial tensions are not the inevitable consequence of living in a racially disparate society.', 'It is easier to see the role played by the commentariat in generating racial tensions by looking at situations in which such tensions were absent. For example, in his essay, “The Politics of a Multiethnic Society,” the late Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer made the following observation about European immigrant groups in the American Northeast:', 'If these groups had analyzed the statistics, they might have found much to grouse about. Since the Irish dominated electoral politics, all other groups were by that token “deprived.” Since the Jews were the most successful in terms of high occupational status, all the others were by that token “deprived.” Yet that is not the way the political debate went, and all the European ethnic groups believed they had done well in America, and there is scarcely a one that bears grievances.', 'The key observation in Glazer’s analysis is not that these ethnic groups were successful (though they were), but that they believed they were successful. Implied in that observation is the idea that a group of people can be doing quite well but can nevertheless be made to believe the opposite—so long as they are habitually compared to other groups in the media. It’s a truism that a single person suffers when he measures himself by the yardstick of another, particularly when the other person had various advantages and head starts that he lacked. In a similar way, by forever measuring blacks against an improper yardstick, the gap-lens, though intended as a way of acknowledging the unique history of oppression blacks have endured, in effect punishes them twice for it.', 'To be sure, there are circumstances in which it makes sense to define progress in terms of closing racial gaps. For instance, having political leaders who reflect the population in terms of race and ethnicity is, everything else held equal, good for the social fabric of a multi-ethnic society. To that end, I’m not arguing that we should abolish the use of the gap-lens in every case. I’m arguing that, in the great majority of cases, the past-lens yields a more useful picture of the state of black America. Which is to say, black progress can be understood independent of white progress and celebrated on its own terms.', 'What do we gain by acknowledging progress? For one thing, ignorance of how much progress blacks have made in recent years leads many to mistakenly believe American institutions are so racist that nothing short of complete overhaul would suffice to repair them. The fact that those very same institutions have allowed for, if not ushered in, huge amounts of progress for black people in recent years suggests a more sober-minded approach. We should not burn the system down. We should reform it one increment at a time.', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 9), (91, 118)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-8%20-%20Districts-Round2.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-8%2520-%2520Districts-Round2.docx

a00f7b7eb48871ac76eec31b9f689616a7be6ca6a9361ed2ba4cdddadfd1e812

The perm severs. Rights must constrain policies that violate them, which the CP does.

Livermore and Guim 21- Mauricio Guim is a professor of law at ITAM. Michael A Livermore is a Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law (Guim, Mauricio, and Michael A. Livermore, "Where Nature's Rights Go Wrong." Virginia Law Review, vol. 107, no. 7, November 2021, pp. 1347-1420. HeinOnline)

land use, pollution control, and natural resources have positive and negative effects touching landscapes in complex ways and giving rise to controversy policymakers are faced with comparing consequences of a decision against each' other and must make judgments about best way to respond to pressures environmental policy in terms of rights does not avoid need to make comparisons between courses of action. rights assert the lexical priority of some claim over others rights as "side constraints" on political decisions fits political decision maker is free to achieve goals to constraints that are derived from rights

land use, pollution control, and natural resources have a ide range of both positive and negative effects , touching people, cultures, species, ecosystems, and landscapes in many complex ways and giving rise to considerable controversy Instead, policymakers are faced with the task of comparing the various consequences of a decision against each' other and must make judgments about the best way to respond to competing pressures . environmental policy in terms of rights does not avoid the need to make comparisons between alternative courses of action. 10' Under one popular conception, rights are invoked to assert the lexical priority of some normative claim over others .1 02 The notion of rights as "side constraints" on political decisions fits within this tradition constraint model, a political decision maker is free to achieve some general set of goals such as maximizing social well-being-subject to some set of constraints that are derived from people's rights

land use, pollution control, and natural resources have a landscapes in controversy comparing consequences of a decision against each' other competing environmental policy in terms of rights does not avoid need to make comparisons between courses of action. 10' Under one popular conception, rights are invoked to assert the lexical priority of some normative claim over others .1 02 The notion of rights as "side constraints" on political decisions fits within this tradition constraints that are derived from rights

["Choices about land use, pollution control, and access to natural resources have a wide range of both positive and negative effects, touching people, cultures, species, ecosystems, and landscapes in many complex ways and giving rise to considerable controversy.10 0 Cases where every affected party agrees about the best path forward to address an environmental challenge are rare. Instead, policymakers are faced with the task of comparing the various consequences of a decision against each' other and must make judgments about the best way to respond to competing pressures.", 'Framing environmental policy in terms of rights does not avoid the need to make comparisons between alternative courses of action. There is a considerable philosophical literature on the concept of rights and how it relates to moral and legal reasoning. 10\' Under one popular conception, rights are invoked to assert the lexical priority of some normative claim over others.1 02 The notion of rights as "side constraints" on political decisions fits within this tradition. 103 Under the side constraint model, a political decision maker is free to achieve some general set of goals such as maximizing social well-being-subject to some set of constraints that are derived from people\'s rights. For example, if the right to freedom of expression is a side constraint, then it would not be permissible for the government to ban certain forms of speech, even if such a ban would lead people to be, all things considered, better off. Ronald Dworkin\'s notion of rights as "trumps" is one way to formulate the notion of lexical priority.']

[(0, 21)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Neg-5---Georgetown-Round-1.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

ca8afb30210fdd748f8e53969b048e1d72e9d36c82e16cbcd9e03b697a3f47b1

Robots aren’t answerable for violations---that means the aff is unenforceable.

Joanna J. Bryson et al. 17. Professor at Hertie School in Berlin, with Mihailis E. Diamantis & Thomas D. Grant, 9-8-2017. "Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons," Artificial Intelligence and Law volume 25, pages273–291 (2017). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9.

robots will inevitably infringe the legal rights of humans In the conflict only the former would be answerable to the latter; humans would have no legal recourse This would not be a problem, if problems like standing and availability of dispute settlement procedures —were solved; and the electronic person were answerable for violations it is unclear how to operationalize either Who will represent the robot conferring legal personality on robots is unnecessary and legally troublesome . Trying to hold an electronic person to account claimants would experience all the problems that have arisen in the past with novel legal persons Future claimants, if they were to sue an electronic person, likely would confront the accountable but empty the fully-financed but unaccountable, like the U N

By design, collective legal persons like corporations and international organisations have legal persons behind them , who might stand to answer for violations of the rights of human legal persons. Advanced robots would not necessarily have further legal persons to instruct or control them there may be no human actor directing the robot after inception. The principal-agent model that veil piercing rests upon would then be hard to apply Autonomous or semi-autonomous robots interacting with humans will inevitably infringe the legal rights of humans In the conflict between robot and human legal rights, only the former would be answerable to the latter; humans would have no legal recourse . This would not necessarily be a problem, if the other problems of legal personality— like standing and availability of dispute settlement procedures —were solved; and the electronic legal person were solvent or otherwise answerable for rights violations But it is unclear how to operationalize either In the case of corporate legal persons, humans composing the corporation can manage dispute settlement on behalf of the corporation in which they have an interest. But what we are imagining here is a robot legal person, untethered from an interested human principal Who will represent the robot we may encounter this problem well before AI capable of effective court advocacy is developed the robot could hire its own legal counsel, but this brings us to the second step: robot solvency It is unclear what it would mean for a robot to hold assets or how it would acquire them once the account is depleted, the robot would effectively be unanswerable for violating human legal rights When insolvent human legal persons violate others’ legal rights, other tools are available to hold them to account anything from apology to jail time. In the case of robots, these options are unavailable, unsatisfying, and/or ineffective. Good faith efforts, like designing robots in order to avoid infringement of human legal rights, would not solve all the problems either. A machine made to endeavour to avoid breaches of legal obligation still would present risks. Any actor in society will encounter frictions and mischances resulting in legal incident. This is an unavoidable feature of the complex legal and social space that proponents of robot legal personhood would have robots enter conferring legal personality on robots is morally unnecessary and legally troublesome While it may have emotional and economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. Trying to hold an electronic person to account , claimants would experience all the problems that have arisen in the past with novel legal persons There almost inevitably would arise asymmetries in particular legal Future claimants, if they were to sue an electronic person, likely would confront the accountable but empty the fully-financed but unaccountable, like the U nited N ations

legal persons behind them The principal-agent model that veil piercing rests upon would then be hard to apply inevitably infringe the legal rights of humans standing dispute settlement procedures unclear how to operationalize either untethered Who will represent the robot well before AI capable of effective court advocacy is developed robot solvency unclear unanswerable for violating human legal rights unavailable, unsatisfying, and/or ineffective. legally troublesome superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us.

['Robots as themselves unaccountable rights violators', 'Even if the legal system sensibly provided mechanisms for veil piercing in the case of robot legal persons, that solution could only go so far. By design, collective legal persons like corporations and international organisations have legal persons behind them, who might stand to answer for violations of the rights of human legal persons. Advanced robots would not necessarily have further legal persons to instruct or control them. That is to say, there may be no human actor directing the robot after inception. The principal-agent model that veil piercing rests upon would then be hard to apply.', 'Autonomous or semi-autonomous robots interacting with humans will inevitably infringe the legal rights of humans. Giving robots legal rights without counter-balancing legal obligations would only make matters worse. In the conflict between robot and human legal rights, only the former would be answerable to the latter; humans would have no legal recourse. This would not necessarily be a problem, if', '1. the other problems of legal personality—like standing and availability of dispute settlement procedures—were solved; and', '2. the electronic legal person were solvent or otherwise answerable for rights violations.', 'But it is unclear how to operationalize either of these two steps.', 'In the case of corporate legal persons, humans composing the corporation can manage dispute settlement on behalf of the corporation in which they have an interest. But what we are imagining here is a robot legal person, untethered from an interested human principal. Who will represent the robot in the dispute? With the right AI, the robot might be able to represent itself. But we may encounter this problem well before AI capable of effective court advocacy is developed. Conceivably, the robot could hire its own legal counsel, but this brings us to the second step: robot solvency.', 'It is unclear what it would mean for a robot to hold assets, or how it would acquire them. It is possible that the law could contemplate mechanisms for robots to own property or hold accounts, as it does for corporate legal people. The law could also require the creators of robots to place initial funds in these accounts. But money can flow out of accounts just as easily as it can flow in; once the account is depleted, the robot would effectively be unanswerable for violating human legal rights. When insolvent human legal persons violate others’ legal rights, other tools are available to hold them to account—anything from apology to jail time. In the case of robots, these options are unavailable, unsatisfying, and/or ineffective.', 'Good faith efforts, like designing robots in order to avoid infringement of human legal rights, would not solve all the problems either. A machine made to endeavour to avoid breaches of legal obligation still would present risks. Any actor in society will encounter frictions and mischances resulting in legal incident. This is an unavoidable feature of the complex legal and social space that proponents of robot legal personhood would have robots enter.', 'Conclusion', 'We have shown that it is completely possible to declare a machine a legal person. The impulse to do so exists both at the individual level with academic proponents, and at the level of international governance with the European Parliament recommending consideration. We have also argued here that conferring legal personality on robots is morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While it may, either now or in the future, have emotional and economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. The basic concern is for protecting human and corporate legal rights against abuse by—or more accurately, by exploiting—robots. Trying to hold an electronic person to account, claimants would experience all the problems that have arisen in the past with novel legal persons. There almost inevitably would arise asymmetries in particular legal systems, situations like that of the investor under investment treaties who can hold a respondent party to account but under the same treaties is not itself accountable. Future claimants, if they were to sue an electronic person, likely would confront the accountable but empty, like the International Tin Council; the fully-financed but unaccountable, like the United Nations; and sui generis arrangements like the Bank for International Settlements that novel legal persons tend to instigate.']

[(10, 26)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-KiYe-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-5.docx

Northwestern

KiYe

b2c58527cd1594733d6795c1e1d4c3442fb93d66502518d3bc294d3695860ad9

No Chinese 5G dominance---their claims are military lies, hyped for funding

SCMP 19 [South China Morning Post, citing a variety of experts, “China Experts: US Still Out Front In Tech Race Despite Pentagon Claim”, 11/3/2019, ]

experts reject the claim US is lagging China in 5G China’s progress had been exaggerated its achievements were only partial US had been “ unarguably more successful and experienced , far ahead Despite 5G , there was a clear gap between China and world leaders For 80 years US led and set standards in almost all tech to shape a global ecosystem Brown had his agenda military wants more budget And China threat is a excuse

Chinese experts reject ed the claim that the US is lagging behind China in key dual-use technologies Brown said earlier that China was competitive in the areas of 5G mobile networks China’s progress had been exaggerated and many of its achievements were only partial successes so far the US had been “ unarguably more successful and experienced , far ahead of anyone” Despite breakthroughs in 5G , there was more generally a clear gap between China ’s digital information and electronics technologies and the world ’s technological leaders , according to Beijing-based naval expert Jie For the past 80 years , the US had led the way and set the standards in almost all important tech nologies and industries In doing so, the US had been able to build and shape a global ecosystem and enjoy its advantages since the end of World War II Brown had his own agenda in making his comments The US military wants more budget , more new equipment, more new R&D projects. And the theory of a China threat is , of course, a handy excuse

experts reject 5G exaggerated only partial successes unarguably successful experienced far ahead 5G generally a clear gap China world ’s technological leaders 80 years led the way set the standards almost all tech global ecosystem enjoy its advantages own agenda more budget handy excuse

['', 'Chinese experts have rejected the claim by a senior Pentagon official that the US is lagging behind China in some key dual-use technologies.', 'Michael Brown, director of the US Department of Defence’s innovation unit, said at a seminar earlier this week that China was either competitive or catching up in the areas of hypersonics, artificial intelligence, quantum sciences, 5G mobile networks, genetic engineering, and space.', 'With the exception of hypersonics, these technologies had not only military applications but were also critical for long-term economic prosperity, making them important to the future of US-China competition, he said.', '“I believe that national security and economic security are inextricably linked,” Brown told the think tank Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.', 'China prepares to send its own astronauts to the moon 50 years after Apollo 11', 'But Chinese experts said China’s progress had been exaggerated and many of its achievements were only partial successes so far.', 'Hong Kong-based military commentator Song Zhongping said the US had been “unarguably more successful and experienced, far ahead of anyone” in space technology. “Look at Project Apollo and the Space Shuttle programme – decades later no other country has ever matched those achievements,” he said.', 'Despite breakthroughs in certain fields like 5G, there was more generally a clear gap between China’s digital information and electronics technologies and the world’s technological leaders, according to Beijing-based naval expert Li Jie.', 'In the field of hypersonics, China may have achieved milestones in glider vehicles, but in another important technology – ramjet engines – there was no evidence of any major breakthroughs, and the US was still far more experienced in the field, said Zhao Tong, senior fellow at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy.', 'China exhibited hypersonic missiles and drones at last month’s National Day parade, and has just launched a commercial 5G – fifth generation mobile network – service on Friday, which is the biggest in the world.', 'Huawei, China’s telecommunication giant has won contracts to construct the 5G infrastructures for many countries, despite the US campaign to ban Huawei equipment over security concerns.', 'Brown said China was “already ahead of the US in quantum sciences” – citing the Chinese launch in 2016 of Micius, the world’s first quantum communications satellite. China had also made more launches into space than the US in 2018 as it speeded up its space programme, he said.', 'Brown added the US had used Chinese equipment for genome sequencing, which meant China had more data on the genetic sequencing of the US population than the US itself, he said, and the US was also playing “a catch up game” with China in AI-based facial recognition.', '5G is available now in China for just US$18', 'For the past 50 to 80 years, the US had led the way and set the standards in almost all important technologies and industries, he said. In doing so, the US had been able to build and shape a global ecosystem and enjoy its advantages since the end of World War II.', 'But, Brown warned, for China to set the pace for these technologies would be “game-changing”.', '“Imagine what the world would look like if China was setting standards,” he said. “Over time, that means we have fewer levers to shape what the US wants to do, both from a global technology standpoint and also what are the values that are highlighted around the world as ones to be looked up to.”', 'Ni Lexiong, a Shanghai-based military commentator, said Brown had his own agenda in making his comments.', '“The US military wants more budget, more new equipment, more new R&D projects. And the theory of a China threat is, of course, a handy excuse,” Ni said.', '']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-UMW-Round3.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

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Asian energy shocks cause great power conflict and extinction

Dr. Michael T. Klare 20, Five Colleges Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College, Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute, BA and MA from Columbia University, Member of the Board of Director at the Arms Control Association, Defense Correspondent for The Nation, All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, Metropolitan Books, Paperback

events , spread across the planet they destabilize numerous states simultaneously imperil systems essential for every country Many rely on energy when shortages unrest and conflict erupt upheavals produce follow-on effects , including migrations and pandemics , that undermine other countries . States fail today’s world is highly reliant on natural gas including Japan China and India demand is to climb shocks produce instant shortages around the world a shock generate havoc in nations that rely heavily major nations adopt a nationalistic militaristic stance generating tensions . This lead to conflict among major powers shock will ricochet leaving chaos in all nations , as global networks break down systemic collapse raise the prospect of catastrophic risks failures cascade

Arab Spring exemplified a new security threat one arising not from a single natural disaster but from a compound series of events , spread ing quickly across the planet climate shock waves—are far more threatening as they have the capacity to destabilize numerous states simultaneously they can imperil the world-spanning trade and logistical systems upon which the international economic order rests. These systems are essential for the well-being of every country on Earth , yet highly vulnerable Many nations rely on energy when shortages arise, their prices soar and all those with limited means begin to suffer unrest and conflict can erupt in multiple countries at once. Such upheavals can also produce follow-on effects , including mass migrations and pandemics , that undermine yet other countries . States that are already vulnerable to dissolution can fail one after another intelligence analysts they have sounded the alarm about breakdowns in global energy systems today’s world is highly reliant on global commerce for many essential fuels, especially oil and natural gas most industrial powers— including Japan depend on imports China relies on imported petroleum for 65 percent and India for 82 percent import dependence is projected to climb in many parts of the world, especially Asia consumption is projected to continue growing surges in demand outweigh declines elsewhere The worldwide demand for natural gas is also expected to climb , as countries phase out coal analysts have long been concerned disruptions in the global flow of energy future shocks could produce instant shortages around the world This, could result in an economic recession and political unrest . As with the 2010–11 spike in food prices, “ a n oil-price shock could increase instability , particularly in a situation that is already politically sensitive .” interruptions could generate havoc in advanced nations that rely heavily on imports major energy-consuming nations may adopt a nationalistic and militaristic stance toward energy generating yet additional international tensions . This could lead to conflict among the major powers one shock after another will ricochet across the planet , leaving chaos The most likely consequence of a multi-shock calamity would be the failure of fragile states and resulting anarchy But it will not be just fragile states in the developing world that will suffer from the impacts of these shocks, but all nations , as the global networks on which we all rely for essential goods and services begin to break down The potential for systemic collapse was given close attention A long history of research on complex systems has shown that systems that depend on one another are subject to new and often complex behaviors.… These behaviors, in turn, raise the prospect of unanticipated, and potentially catastrophic risks failures can cascade from one system to another

compound series of events spread ing quickly across the planet far more threatening numerous states simultaneously international economic order every country on Earth highly vulnerable energy shortages unrest conflict erupt in multiple countries follow-on effects mass migrations pandemics undermine yet other countries dissolution fail one after another global energy systems natural gas Japan imports China India climb Asia continue growing elsewhere climb disruptions global flow of energy instant shortages around the world political unrest a shock increase instability already politically sensitive generate havoc rely heavily nationalistic militaristic international tensions conflict among the major powers ricochet across the planet chaos failure of fragile states resulting anarchy all nations global networks break down systemic collapse catastrophic risks cascade

['COMPOUNDING SYSTEM SHOCKS', 'The Arab Spring exemplified a new type of security threat from global warming: one arising not from a single natural disaster, limited in time and space, but from a compound series of events, spreading quickly across the planet. Such events—call them climate shock waves—are far more threatening than the dangers discussed earlier in this book, as they have the capacity to destabilize numerous states simultaneously rather than just one at a time. Moreover, they can also imperil the world-spanning trade and logistical systems upon which the international economic order—and American prosperity—rests. These systems, such as the grain markets so affected by the Russian heat wave of 2010, are essential for the well-being of almost every country on Earth, yet are highly vulnerable to global climate shocks. Other critical networks, such as the worldwide flow of energy and the global public health system, are equally at risk to shocks of this sort. When such systems fail, vital commodities become scarce and chaos may ensue—posing a severe risk to fragile states and a potential threat to U.S. national security. Accordingly, climate shock waves represent an even higher level of danger than the other warming-related perils we have examined up to this point.', 'The risks to national and international stability from climate shock waves have been a concern of America’s military and intelligence communities for some time. In its initial 2008 National Intelligence Assessment on the security threats posed by climate change, the National Intelligence Council underscored America’s reliance on reliable global networks. The United States, it pointed out, “depends on a smooth-functioning international system ensuring the flow of trade and market access to critical raw materials such as oil and gas, and security for its allies and partners.” Climate change could imperil all of that, it noted, resulting in the downfall of friendly states, a loss of access to vital materials, and disruptions to “the global economy more broadly.”18', 'Following the Arab Spring, the U.S. Intelligence Community sought to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the role that climate change might play in triggering such far-reaching calamities. To this end, the IC commissioned the National Research Council of the American Academy of Sciences to conduct a study of warming’s socioeconomic consequences, which was published in 2013 as Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis. The NRC study examined a number of scenarios already discussed in earlier chapters of this book, including humanitarian disasters, resource scarcities, and state collapse. But it also included a section on “global system shocks,” continent-spanning crises triggered by some combination of climate change and “globally integrated systems other than the climate itself.” As world temperatures rise and global supply networks become more interdependent, the report noted, “there are numerous ways in which climate events could create shocks to integrated global social, economic, health, or technological systems and thus have effects far removed geographically from where the events occur.”19', 'Because we have become so dependent on these global supply networks, the NRC’s analysts concluded, a major climate event that disrupts or damages a significant component of them can inflict immediate and substantial pain. Many nations rely on those systems for deliveries of food, energy, and other vital commodities; when shortages of such goods arise, their prices soar and all those with limited means begin to suffer. If governments fail to address these challenges in a timely and equitable manner, unrest and conflict can erupt in multiple countries at once. Such upheavals can also produce follow-on effects, including mass migrations and pandemics, that undermine yet other countries. States that are already vulnerable to dissolution can fail one after another.20', 'The authors of the NRC report were particularly struck by the degree to which climate change is combining with globalization to increase the risk of upheaval. Not only are extreme climate events occurring more frequently, they noted, but warming’s effects are being amplified by our reliance on international trading networks for essential goods and services—in particular, the globe-spanning matrix of pipelines, rail lines, and shipping lanes used to transport food and energy supplies. These networks are relatively robust under ordinary conditions, but can be severely disrupted by extreme climate-related events, as with hurricane damage to refineries, pipelines, and oil terminals.21 To make matters worse, severe climate events are occurring more frequently in “clusters,” magnifying the shock to the system—much as when the 2010 heat wave in Russia coincided with severe flooding in Pakistan and drought in China.22', 'Global supply chains’ vulnerability to severe climate effects is especially evident in the case of food. The crops that account for a large share of the world’s caloric intake—wheat, maize (corn), rice, soy beans, and a few others—require copious amounts of water to achieve maximum yield, along with temperatures that remain within a certain range. Always unpredictable in the best of times, these benign growing conditions will prove increasingly uncommon as severe heat waves, prolonged droughts, and catastrophic floods become the norm. Under these circumstances, shortages of one staple or another are likely to occur on a recurring basis.23 On top of this, the number of grain-producing nations capable of generating a surplus for export is rather small, while the number of countries dependent on those few exporters for their essential food requirements is large. A clustering of extreme weather events that reduces or eliminates exports from just two or three of the major exporters would thus have a powerful effect on the global market, squeezing supplies for all importers and sending prices skyward.24', 'The disruptiveness of such price increases is amplified by the social and economic difficulties in a number of the countries dependent on food imports. In water-stressed areas of the developing world, many poor farmers—no longer able to secure an adequate livelihood from their increasingly barren fields as temperatures rise and rainfall diminishes—are migrating to the cities in search of alternative options, and must scramble to acquire food there. This trend, the NRC pointed out, can only increase these countries’ vulnerability to global food-supply problems, creating larger urban populations that are particularly sensitive to food prices. With more displaced agriculturalists moving to the cities, it stated, “the dependence of low-income populations on imported food supplies provided by global markets may increase their vulnerability to climatic or economic events in other parts of the world that sharply increase the prices of the foods they have come to depend upon.”25', 'This combination of circumstances, IC analysts believe, can only lead to more Arab Spring–like upheavals in the future—a risk given close scrutiny in the National Intelligence Council’s 2015 report, Global Food Security. Although humans are theoretically capable of producing enough foodstuffs to meet the basic caloric requirements of everyone on the planet, that report indicated, large segments of the global population are vulnerable to food shortages and sudden price spikes of the sort witnessed in 2010–11 because of unreliable distribution systems, flawed government policies, and relentless poverty.26 “We judge that the overall risk of food insecurity in many countries of strategic importance to the United States will increase,” the NIC report concluded. “In some countries, declining food security will almost certainly contribute to social disruptions or large-scale political instability or conflict.”27', 'This concern—that growing world food insecurity and climate-driven price spikes will generate widespread instability and conflict—continues to permeate U.S. strategic calculations. It is evident, for example, in the “worldwide threat assessment” delivered each year to Congress by the director of national intelligence on behalf of the IC as a whole. In his February 2018 presentation, the current director, Daniel R. Coats, stated that “extreme weather events in a warmer world have the potential for greater impacts and can compound with other drivers to raise the risk of humanitarian disasters [and] conflict,” with “food shortages” and “price shocks” playing major contributing roles.28', 'ENERGY SHOCK WAVES', 'Warming’s threat to global food distribution networks has, in general, constituted the primary focus of U.S. military and intelligence analysts concerned about climate shock waves. However, they have also sounded the alarm about the potential for other highly disruptive events: breakdowns in global energy systems, outbreaks of global pandemics, and new, destabilizing mass migrations. As with a collapse of global food-supply chains, these climate shocks would involve extreme climate events that arise in one or more parts of the world and provoke havoc in many others, ultimately endangering American national security and prompting U.S. military action of some sort.', 'After global food supplies, American security analysts have worried most about warming’s capacity to disrupt the world’s vital energy systems. As with food supplies, today’s world is highly reliant on global commerce for many essential fuels, especially oil and natural gas. While a handful of countries are largely self-sufficient in one or both of those fuels, most industrial powers—including Japan, the United States, and the EU countries—depend on imports for at least some of their energy needs. In 2018, for example, Japan relied on imports for nearly 100 percent of its petroleum requirements, the EU countries for 89 percent, and the United States for 25 percent. These import dependencies are expected to persist well into the future, with the developing nations of Asia assuming an ever-increasing share of global energy demand. China now relies on imported petroleum for 65 percent of its requirements and India for 82 percent; by 2040, their import dependence is projected to climb to 80 and 91 percent, respectively.29', 'It is true, of course, that some countries are working very hard to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels, including oil and natural gas, so as to diminish their contributions to global warming. Japan, for example, has reduced its oil consumption from a peak of 4.7 million barrels per day in 2012 to 3.9 million battels in 2018. Most European countries have also experienced a decline, with consumption by the European Union as a whole dropping from 14.8 million barrels per day in 2008 to 13.3 million barrels in 2018.30 Some analysts believe, therefore, that the global demand for petroleum will gradually subside. But in many parts of the world, especially Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, oil consumption is projected to continue growing, especially as more people enter the middle class and purchase cars, trucks, and motorcycles; these surges in demand are expected to outweigh declines elsewhere, ensuring continuing increases in global oil consumption. The worldwide demand for natural gas is also expected to climb, as countries around the world work to phase out older coal-powered electrical plants. As a result of all this, the trade in oil and gas is likely to remain a critical feature of international commerce for decades to come.', 'To transport oil, coal, natural gas, and electricity from one end of the world to another, energy-exporting and -consuming nations have constructed a vast matrix of railroads, pipelines, transmission lines, and maritime shipping routes. On any given day, a large share of the world’s energy supply is being transported via one of these vital conduits. According to BP, on an average day in 2018, some seventy-one million barrels of crude petroleum and refined fuels—approximately 75 percent of daily world output—were being shipped from one country to another; for natural gas, the share of world output in transit was about 24 percent.31 In many cases, the pipelines and tankers used in carrying these supplies pass through or near areas of recurring conflict, such as the Middle East and North Africa; most of the time, moreover, they travel across areas vulnerable to storms, wildfires, flooding, and other climate-related disasters.', 'American security analysts have long been concerned about disruptions in the global flow of energy arising from war and political interference. Those concerns were given particular urgency in the 1970s following two crippling “oil shocks” generated by political turbulence in the Middle East—the first, occurring in 1973–74, when Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo on exports to the United States in retaliation for its support of Israel in the October War of 1973; the second in 1979–80, following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In response to those two oil shocks, the United States charged its military with taking ever greater responsibility for ensuring the safety of oil deliveries from the Persian Gulf.32 Following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed that any hostile effort to impede those deliveries “will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,” and, as such, “will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”33', 'To enforce that edict—quickly dubbed the “Carter Doctrine”—the Department of Defense established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and assigned it responsibility for protecting Persian Gulf oil exports; that force later served as the nucleus of the U.S. Central Command. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and appeared to be poised for an attack on Saudi Arabia, President George H. W. Bush invoked the Carter Doctrine to justify the deployment of American forces to the Gulf and the onset of what became Operation Desert Storm.34 Although the United States no longer relies on Persian Gulf oil for a large share of its energy needs—as a result of advances in extraction technology, this country now obtains an ever-greater proportion of its energy needs from domestic shale formations—U.S. leaders continue to worry about the safety of the global oil flow, given its critical importance to the world economy. In particular, they worry about threats being made by Iranian leaders to block oil traffic through the Gulf in case of a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear facilities; to counter any such move, Centcom has long deployed a powerful array of ships and planes in the region.35', 'But while American strategists continue to think about the threats to oil flow posed by terrorism and hostile powers, they are becoming increasingly concerned about dangers to the global web of energy systems arising from the effects of climate change. A great deal of the world’s energy is transported via extended pipelines, shipping lanes, and transmission lines that are naturally at risk from such climate-related perils as severe flooding, turbulent seas, and major wildfires. This danger is compounded by the fact that, in search of ready access to maritime shipping channels, a very substantial proportion of the world’s oil and natural gas infrastructure is situated in coastal areas, which in many cases are highly vulnerable to hurricanes and storm surges. As global warming advances, therefore, international energy trade will become increasingly susceptible to severe climate shocks.36', 'With the world increasingly dependent on these extended, highly vulnerable energy-supply networks, the NRC concluded in its 2013 report, future climate shocks could produce instant shortages and price hikes around the world, much as with the food-price shock waves it had studied.37 In support of this assessment, the report pointed to a series of powerful hurricanes that struck America’s Gulf Coast in the early years of the twenty-first century: Katrina and Rita in 2005, followed by Gustav and Ike in 2008. These storms damaged or destroyed many offshore rigs and disrupted operations at refineries and distribution facilities, sharply reducing U.S. oil and gas output and causing a spike in global prices.38 Sea-level rise, the NRC noted, will amplify the disruptive consequences of future storms and hurricanes, as many power plants—both nuclear and coal-fired—are located in low-lying coastal areas; when storms occur, these plants are at risk of flooding, causing systemic damage and power outages. This occurred, for example, in the New York metropolitan region following Superstorm Sandy in 2012: several of the region’s power plants, including all of its nuclear stations, were either damaged or experienced temporary shutdowns due to high winds and flooding.39', 'The NRC further noted that climate change may disrupt the global energy supply system in other ways. Prolonged droughts and heat waves can reduce the amount of water available to hydropower facilities and water-cooled thermoelectric power plants, cutting into the electricity delivered to international grids.40 A disruption of just this sort occurred during a European heat wave in 2003 that was blamed for the deaths of over thirty-four thousand people. As river levels dropped in France—Europe’s leading exporter of electricity—the government was forced to shut down several nuclear reactors for lack of adequate cooling water. This, in turn, resulted in a 50 percent decline in France’s power exports, producing electricity shortages throughout the region.41', 'Major disruptions to the global energy system have occurred before, and no doubt will occur again in the future for a variety of reasons, including those cited above. Given the multiplicity of international networks available for energy delivery, the world economy can probably absorb several such disruptions happening sequentially, as they have in the past. What worried the authors of the NRC report, however, is the possibility that advancing climate change will result in several major disruptions occurring simultaneously, severely testing the ability of global supply networks to cope. Such a scenario, they warned, could produce significant energy shortages around the world and a rapid spike in prices. This, in turn, could result in an economic recession and political unrest. As happened with the 2010–11 spike in food prices, “an oil-price shock could increase instability, particularly in a situation that is already politically sensitive.”42', 'Initially, such an outcome would prove most disruptive in developing countries that are highly dependent on energy imports and can ill afford a sudden spike in prices. But climate-related supply interruptions could also generate havoc in advanced nations that rely heavily on imports, as well as in energy-exporting states that depend on foreign sales to finance government operations. Any significant disruption in Persian Gulf oil exports, for example, will punish oil-producing countries as well as their overseas clients. As warming advances and global supply chains prove more unreliable, major energy-consuming nations may adopt a more nationalistic and militaristic stance toward energy, thereby generating yet additional international tensions. This could also lead to conflict among the major powers—a topic to be addressed in the next chapter.', 'GLOBAL PANDEMICS', 'In addition to their concern about global food-price and energy-price shocks, American strategists worry about another potential climate-instigated shock wave: the rapid spread of lethal infectious diseases across the globe, causing widespread illness in multiple locations and, in so doing, adding to the pressures on already overstressed societies. Deadly pandemics have, of course, long bedeviled human society, going back to the outbreaks of plague that periodically decimated European populations. Modern medicine has helped reduce the risk of such calamities, but now climate change is threatening to overwhelm those gains. Rising world temperatures, increased precipitation, and higher levels of humidity all facilitate the spread of diseases transmitted by mosquitoes and other insects. Mosquitoes need pools of water to breed, and the hotter and wetter it is, the faster they can reproduce. As global warming widens the geographic extent of hot, moist breeding areas, the range of many virus-bearing mosquitoes will grow as well.43', 'Malaria, one of the deadliest diseases transmitted by mosquitoes, is already thought to be spreading from the tropics to temperate zones as a consequence of climate change.44 Other “vector-borne” diseases, such as the Zika virus and dengue fever, are also expected to spread into new areas as global warming advances.45 “Increased temperatures and more frequent and intense precipitation events can create conditions that favor the movement of vector-borne diseases into new geographic regions,” the U.S. Global Change Research Program noted in its Fourth National Climate Assessment.46 Adding to the danger of future pandemics is the looming breakdown of public health systems in many poor and conflict-ravaged countries. Epidemics that can effectively be controlled by medical authorities in well-functioning societies are likely to gain momentum when health systems collapse—an outcome that will prove increasingly likely as more and more states are impacted by climate shock waves.47', 'Globalization is also contributing to the risk of global pandemics, by facilitating air and sea travel from one corner of the world to another. “Outbreaks occurring in other countries can impact U.S. populations and military personnel living abroad and can sometimes affect the United States,” the Fourth Assessment warned.48 Unless a quarantine is imposed when a potential epidemic is first detected, visitors to a country with mosquito-borne diseases may become infected and return to their home country before any symptoms have appeared, potentially creating new centers of infection. In this manner, the effects of climate change could combine with international transportation networks to ignite a global health shock wave, akin to the food and energy shock waves described above.', 'As suggested by analysts at the National Research Council, climate effects and globalization are combining to increase the risk of global health shocks. “Weather and climate changes,” they noted, “have the potential of interaction with other factors to alter both the geographic range and the intensity of transmission of a number of infectious diseases, thereby creating the potential for pandemics.”49 If these pandemics arise in or spread to developing nations with inadequate public health systems, they can lead to widespread panic and civic unrest, prompting terrified citizens to seek refuge in other countries—possibly carrying the pathogens with them and so igniting fresh outbreaks of contagion. Once this occurs, it is but a short step to a global humanitarian crisis, which could easily result in the involvement of the American military due to its unique ability to deploy on short notice to virtually any location on the planet and provide emergency services.50', 'All this was given dramatic immediacy by the West African Ebola epidemic of 2014–16, which ravaged Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and affected several other countries, claiming an estimated 11,300 lives. An often fatal viral disease, Ebola is thought to be transmitted to humans from bats and other wild animals, usually in situations where humans live in close proximity to such creatures and rely on them as a supplemental source of food, as is true in some poor, rural areas of Africa.51 The 2014–16 Ebola outbreak, the most severe of its kind, first arose in Guinea and then quickly spread to neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone when panicked citizens—some carrying the infection—moved from one country to another across poorly marked borders in search of safety from the outbreak. Local public health systems, poorly staffed and poorly equipped to begin with, quickly became overwhelmed as medical workers themselves came down with the disease. By some estimates, one in ten of Ebola fatalities during the early stages of the epidemic were among nurses, doctors, medical students, and other clinical staff.52', 'The Ebola epidemic also threatened to spread to other parts of the world as foreign health workers returned to their home countries after volunteering in one of the affected West African states and as panicked citizens of those countries traveled elsewhere in the hope of avoiding infection. Indeed, several Ebola cases were identified in Europe and the United States under exactly such circumstances, prompting fears of a global pandemic and accompanying social disorder. As an indication of what might occur, fighting broke out in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, when police tried to cordon off the heavily infected neighborhood of West Point and panicked residents fought back.53 For American security officials, it had all the earmarks of a potential international crisis.', 'In a remarkable expression of these fears, President Obama explicitly warned of Ebola’s threat to global security, announcing a major U.S. effort to combat the disease:', 'In West Africa, Ebola is now an epidemic of the likes that we have not seen before. It’s spiraling out of control. It is getting worse. It’s spreading faster and exponentially. Today, thousands of people in West Africa are infected. That number could rapidly grow to tens of thousands. And if the outbreak is not stopped now, we could be looking at hundreds of thousands of people infected, with profound political and economic and security implications for all of us. So this is an epidemic that is not just a threat to regional security—it’s a potential threat to global security if these countries break down, if their economies break down, if people panic. That has profound effects on all of us, even if we are not directly contracting the disease.', 'With stakes this high, combating the Ebola outbreak was declared a “national security priority,” and every relevant arm of government would be mobilized to prevent its spread.54', 'To manage this effort and conduct its most urgent missions, Obama turned to the U.S. Africa Command. Africom, he announced in September 2014, would establish a “military command center in Liberia to support civilian efforts across the region,” with General Darryl Williams, commander of Africom’s U.S. Army contingent, overseeing the operation. This was an unusual arrangement, as the Department of Defense had never before conducted what it termed “a disease-driven foreign humanitarian assistance mission.”55 However, given the magnitude of the peril and the lack of any other institution capable of taking on such a Herculean task, Obama placed this responsibility on the U.S. military. “Our Department of Defense is better at that, our Armed Services are better at that, than any organization on Earth,” he declared.56', 'At Obama’s behest, Africom undertook a massive logistical effort in West Africa, establishing emergency hospitals and clinics in each of the three most heavily affected countries and providing support services for a bevy of doctors and other health workers flown in from the United States and other countries. At least three thousand U.S. military personnel participated in this extraordinary effort, dubbed Operation United Assistance. Although not directly involved in the medical treatment of patients—that task was performed solely by civilian personnel—these troops played a vital role in fighting Ebola by providing essential logistical support to the doctors and nurses on the front lines of treatment.57', 'For many observers, the Ebola epidemic of 2014–16 represents a preview of what can be expected in the future as global warming advances, certain infectious diseases extend their range, and vulnerable states prove unable to cope with the multiple challenges of extreme weather, resource scarcity, and inadequate public institutions. This peril was highlighted again in early 2019, as a fresh outbreak of Ebola occurred in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where inadequate government institutions and ethnic strife impeded efforts by the international community to provide emergency care. And, as the NRC points out, the danger will only increase as temperatures continue their rise and extreme events cluster together more frequently, undermining the ability of the international community to provide emergency relief and assistance. Should a pandemic occur at a time when international supply systems for medications are already impaired by climate change, the consequences would be dire.58', 'MASS MIGRATION EVENTS', 'Whenever U.S. security analysts have considered the risks of climate change, a perpetual concern has been that extreme events and prolonged droughts could trigger a massive flight of desperate people seeking refuge in other locales, provoking chaos and hostility wherever they travel. This anxiety was evident in some of the analysts’ earliest public statements on the national security implications of warming, and it has remained a major theme to the present day. In its initial 2007 report on climate change, for example, the CNA Corporation warned that severe climate effects “can fuel migrations in less developed countries, and these migrations can lead to international political conflict.”59 Defense Secretary Hagel sounded a similar note in his 2014 address to the Conference of the Defense Ministers of the Americas. “Drought and crop failures can leave millions of people without any lifeline, and trigger waves of mass migration,” he declared.60', 'In talking about the risk of mass migrations, U.S. security analysts are typically discussing long-term pressures—such as prolonged drought and coastal erosion—that deprive people of their livelihoods and force them to move elsewhere in search of jobs and income. “When water or food supplies shift or when conditions otherwise deteriorate (as from sea level rise, for example), people will likely move to find more favorable conditions,” the CNA explained.61 The ongoing relocation of impoverished farmers from scorched inland areas to urban centers, for instance, fits this pattern. But American analysts also worry about sudden-onset climate events that would spark rapid, large-scale movements of people from one country to another, setting off a political firestorm. Such destabilizing events, which could become more frequent as global warming advances, are akin to the other types of climate shock waves discussed in this chapter.', 'A migratory shock wave of this type could be ignited by various kinds of climate events, such as a cluster of severe hurricanes or crop failures. If, under these circumstances, local governments prove unable to provide adequate emergency assistance or collapse entirely, vast numbers of people may simultaneously choose to move to adjacent (or even distant) countries in search of refuge and a new start in life. Some environmentalists are predicting that the numbers of such “climate refugees,” as they have sometimes been termed, could reach into the hundreds of millions as global warming advances; others have cautioned against such predictions, saying the evidence for them is still inconclusive. Whatever the exact numbers, the arrival of large groups of outsiders—many, if not most, in need of substantial assistance—is bound to generate unease and, in all likelihood, hostility in the destination countries. The fact that the newcomers often differ in their race and religion from the natives only adds to the risk of antagonism.62', 'A foretaste of what this might look like was provided by the migratory surges from North Africa and the Middle East into southern Europe following the Arab Spring of 2011, as desperate residents of battleground countries such as Libya and Syria sought to escape the fighting and accompanying decline in economic conditions. The situation in Libya was particularly fraught for migrant workers from the Sahel region and sub-Saharan Africa, who made up as much as 10 percent of Libya’s population prior to the revolt against Gadhafi. Those workers (mostly young men) had already fled their own countries because of drought, desertification, and joblessness, seeking low-level positions in various state-backed enterprises in Libya under the old regime. After Gadhafi’s removal, they lost their jobs and faced intense hostility from native Libyans, who viewed them as interlopers and Gadhafi loyalists. Reluctant to return to their own impoverished countries, huge numbers of these migrant workers sought to move farther north, fleeing in rickety ships across the Mediterranean to Europe—where, if they survived the journey, they usually encountered fresh animosity.63', 'An even greater number of people sought to flee the fighting and abysmal living conditions in Syria. Beginning in 2012, and reaching a flood tide in 2015, vast multitudes of desperate Syrians sought to reach the relative security of Europe, mostly by traveling by raft from southwestern Turkey to Lesbos and other Greek islands in the Aegean Sea; from there they sought passage to wealthier European countries farther north, especially Germany, Austria, and Norway. Although welcomed at first by sympathetic Europeans (most notably German chancellor Angela Merkel), the Syrian refugees started arriving in such massive numbers that many residents of the receiving nations turned hostile, embracing measures such as fencing off their borders and using armed police to repel the migrants—steps taken by Hungary in 2015 as hundreds of thousands of refugees moved north from Greece.64 With anti-refugee sentiment growing throughout the region, European officials were forced to adopt ever more stringent means to stem the flow, including mobilizing NATO’s naval fleets to patrol waters of the Aegean Sea and assist the Greek coast guard in blocking migrant vessels from Turkey.65', 'When examining the causes of the massive migrant flood that overwhelmed Europe in 2015, most analysts have concluded that the principal driving forces were the ongoing violence in Syria and the lack of meaningful economic opportunities both there and in transit countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Nevertheless, some analysts believe that climate change had a contributing role in sparking the migratory shock wave, largely by causing a severe drought in 2007–10 that decimated Syrian agriculture and drove impoverished farmers into overcrowded urban centers, where they helped launch the anti-Assad rebellion.66 “Syria’s drought has destroyed crops, killed livestock and displaced as many as 1.5 million Syrian farmers,” observed John Wendle in Scientific American. “In the process, it touched off the social turmoil that burst into civil war,” impelling millions of people to flee.67 Other analysts discount the role of climate change in provoking the Syrian civil war and resulting migratory impulse, insisting on the primarily political nature of the conflict.68 But even if warming’s role was relatively modest in this case, the events of 2012–15 provide an indication of what we might expect from future migratory shock waves as temperatures rise, farming becomes untenable in vast areas of the planet, and masses of people move about in search of new ways to survive.', 'While Europe—given its proximity to climate-sensitive areas of Africa and the Middle East—is expected to prove the principal objective of many of these migratory surges, North America is also considered a likely destination for future mass migrations. The CNA Corporation, for example, has suggested that the greatest climate-related threat to American security—other than its direct impacts on the U.S. homeland itself—would arise from the migratory implications of climate disasters occurring in nearby countries, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. As warming advances, it noted, severe climate events will afflict many of these areas, destroying entire habitats and impelling millions of people to head north in search of refuge and employment opportunities.69', 'General John F. Kelly, while serving as commander of the U.S. Southern Command, spoke of such occurrences as “mass migration events,” and emphasized the importance of taking steps to prevent future climate refugees from entering the United States. With that goal in mind, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2014, “We regularly exercise our rapid response capabilities in a variety of scenarios, including responding to a natural disaster [and a] mass migration event.”70 In one such exercise, Southcom revealed, Kelly’s staff established a Joint Task Force-Migrant Operations (JTF-MIGOPS) at Naval Station Guantánamo Bay to oversee a mock crisis-response mission. According to Rear Admiral Jon G. Matheson, deputy Joint Task Force commander of JTF-MIGOPS in 2013, this allowed Southcom to “flesh-out some of the processes and resources we would need if a mass migration were to occur.”71', 'Southcom conducted another iteration of these exercises two years later, with Fort Sam Houston, Texas, serving as the host of a reconstituted JTF-MIGOPS. The 2015 exercise, a Pentagon reporter noted, “anticipated the mass migration of people from multiple Caribbean islands after a series of hurricanes devastate the area.” With this in mind, “the goal of the exercise scenario was to effectively interdict and repatriate the migrants at sea who were attempting to enter the United States.” In other words, the military services are practicing to do whatever might be needed to prevent large numbers of disaster-driven refugees from gaining access to U.S. territory.72 As participants in the exercise explained, this means stopping migrant-laden ships at sea and transporting the migrants to the U.S. Navy base at Guantánamo, where they would be detained in giant tent camps until they can be ferried back to their home country.73', 'Whether originating in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, or the Caribbean, mass migration events are destined to become more common in the years ahead as global warming takes an ever greater toll on the livelihoods and living conditions of people in highly exposed areas. As the European migrant crisis of 2015 demonstrates, moreover, such events are likely to prove highly disruptive and to trigger military-type responses. The construction of fortified border walls and fences is one expression of this, as are the preparations being undertaken by Southcom to house vast numbers of detained migrants at Guantánamo Bay. Wherever and whenever such events occur, the outcome is almost certain to prove wrenching and violent.', 'WHEN SYSTEMS COLLAPSE', 'For American military and intelligence analysts, the implications of all this are hard to escape: as global warming advances, one climate shock after another will ricochet across the planet, leaving chaos and misery in their wake. Try to picture a food-price crisis occurring at more or less the same time as a major pandemic and a mass migration event: the resulting chaos, distress, and contention are almost unimaginable. The most likely consequence of such a multi-shock calamity would be the failure of fragile states and resulting anarchy—with the failures occurring not one at a time, as in some less fearsome scenarios, but one right after another, as during the Arab Spring. But it will not be just fragile states in the developing world that will suffer from the impacts of these shocks, but all nations, as the global networks on which we all rely for essential goods and services begin to break down.', 'The potential for systemic collapse of this sort was given close attention by the Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in November 2018. Like the NRC study before it, the Fourth Assessment highlights the world’s growing reliance on global networks and the ways these systems have become inextricably linked—and so have become vulnerable to unexpected shocks. “A long history of research on complex systems,” it noted, “has shown that systems that depend on one another are subject to new and often complex behaviors.… These behaviors, in turn, raise the prospect of unanticipated, and potentially catastrophic risks. For example, failures can cascade from one system to another.” Climate change, it observed, is likely to provide exactly the sort of external jolt that could trigger such a cascade of failures, sowing havoc across the planet.74']

[(15, 23)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DaSt-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

DaSt

84c27b5ef7fe7c7febe2d56df8f3bb343430c9c1034e6822c359ca9c6d1a432a

Courts circumvent—aff gets taken to court

Newman 19, University of Miami School of Law professor and a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division. (John, 4-5-2019, "What Democratic Contenders Are Missing in the Race to Revive Antitrust", Atlantic, )

courts represent a massive stumbling block for antitrust inevitable appeals eventually end up in court No matter how strongly worded a law ideological judges can find a way around enforcing it history is proof judges wield limitless power megamergers barely raise eyebrows Robinson-Patman is zombie law . regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it . If Dem s want antitrust they will first need to change the judges who apply it the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts Real antitrust will require more than legislative tweaks

federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge . When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges not Congress are the ultimate arbiters . The Department of Justice files all its cases in federal courts the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideological judges can usually find a way around enforcing it . The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area. Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors barely raise eyebrows vertical mergers are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream Chicago School critics found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary Robinson-Patman is now known as “ zombie law . ” It remains on the books , but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it . If Dem ocrat s want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it Yet none of the contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit antitrust proposals overlook the central role judges play in our political system Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks ; it will require the right judges .

federal courts massive stumbling block any progressive antitrust movement enforcing a law persuading a judge not Congress ultimate arbiters all federal courts inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well No matter how strongly worded a law ideological judges can usually find a way around enforcing it cyclical history proof limitless institutional power chip away at its effectiveness erode megamergers barely raise eyebrows all but immune antitrust enforcement eviscerated mainstream receptive audience Robinson-Patman zombie law remains on the books no longer bother trying to enforce it first and foremost change the judges who apply it mentioned great lengths conservative antitrust experts central role play in our political system Real antitrust reform regulatory legislative tweaks right judges

['', 'But the federal courts represent a massive stumbling block for any progressive antitrust movement. Reformers have identified two paths forward; both lead eventually to the court system. The first is relatively moderate: appoint regulators who will actually enforce the laws already on the books. Warren’s plan rests in part on this straightforward idea. The second, more audacious path requires congressional action to amend and strengthen our current laws. Warren’s call for a new ban on technology companies’ buying and selling via their own platforms falls into this category. Klobuchar has also proposed new antitrust legislation that would make it easier to block harmful mergers and acquisitions. But no matter its content, enforcing a law requires persuading a judge. When it comes to U.S. antitrust laws, federal judges—not Congress, and not regulatory agencies—are the ultimate arbiters. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division, one of our two public enforcement agencies, files all its cases in federal courts. And although the Federal Trade Commission (the other) can decide cases internally, the inevitable appeals eventually end up in court as well. No matter how strongly worded a law may be, ideologically driven judges can usually find a way around enforcing it. The cyclical history of U.S. antitrust law is proof that judges wield nearly limitless institutional power in this area. Soon after Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890, a conservative Supreme Court began to chip away at its effectiveness. Congress reacted in 1914 with the Clayton Act, which sought to ban anticompetitive mergers. In 1936, at the height of the New Deal era, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination (charging different prices to different buyers for the same product). These laws were actively enforced for decades. But starting in the late 1970s, conservative judges began to erode the Clayton Act. Today, megamergers among competitors such as Bayer and Monsanto barely raise eyebrows. So-called vertical mergers, which combine suppliers and their customers, are now all but immune from antitrust enforcement—see the DOJ’s failed challenge to AT&T and Time Warner’s recent tie-up. Under the business-friendly Roberts Court, the Robinson-Patman Act has similarly been eviscerated. By the 2000s, the ideas of the conservative Chicago School had become mainstream in antitrust circles. Robinson-Patman, a law intended to protect small businesses, was an easy target for Chicago School critics narrowly focused on efficiency and low consumer prices. Their attacks found a receptive audience in the federal judiciary. Among insiders, Robinson-Patman is now known as “zombie law.” It remains on the books, but regulators no longer bother trying to enforce it. If Democrats want to change antitrust law, they will first and foremost need to change the judges who apply it. Yet none of the 2020 contenders championing antitrust reform have even mentioned the possibility of appointing progressive antitrust thinkers to the bench. Conservatives, on the other hand, have long recognized the centrality of antitrust to broader questions about the apportionment of power in society. In his seminal work, The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork called antitrust a “microcosm in which larger movements of our society are reflected.” Battles fought in this arena, Bork wrote, “are likely to affect the outcome of parallel struggles in others.” Strong antitrust enforcement keeps powerful monopolies in check. Toothless antitrust allows the unlimited accumulation of corporate power. Recognizing the high stakes, the Republican Party has gone to great lengths to appoint conservative antitrust experts to the federal judiciary. Bork was an antitrust professor at Yale Law School before becoming an appellate judge in 1982.* Frank Easterbrook practiced and taught antitrust before donning the black robe in 1985. Douglas Ginsburg served as the head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division before he became a federal judge in 1986. None of the three managed to join the Supreme Court, but not for lack of trying. Reagan nominated both Bork and Ginsburg to serve as justices, though Ginsburg withdrew and Bork was famously rejected after a contentious Senate hearing. And whom did the GOP select as its very first U.S. Supreme Court nominee during the Trump Administration? None other than Neil Gorsuch, who practiced antitrust law for more than a decade before joining the Tenth Circuit. Even as a judge, Gorsuch continued to teach a law-school course on antitrust until his confirmation to the Supreme Court in 2017. Once upon a time, progressives demonstrated similar concern about judicial treatment of antitrust laws. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example, served as special assistant to the head of the DOJ Antitrust Division before his judicial appointment by President Jimmy Carter. Earlier still, Justice John Paul Stevens was an antitrust lawyer, scholar, and professor before his appointment to the bench. Today’s Democratic 2020 hopefuls seem to have forgotten the lessons of history. Their antitrust proposals focus exclusively on appointing the right regulators and amending our current statutes. These are right-minded ideas, but they overlook the central role judges play in our political system. There is an old saying in the legal community: “Hard cases make bad law.” That may be true, but it is just as often the case that bad judges make bad law. Real antitrust reform will require more than regulatory and legislative tweaks; it will require the right judges.', '', '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Mary%20Washington-Quarters.docx

Minnesota

FrPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/FrPa/Minnesota-Frese-Parrish-Neg-Mary%2520Washington-Quarters.docx

24373e7d392192bbf3a77bf6ad0a06d40bd56d0b5c2c7cd66de5fd688eda687c

C. INF: No arms racing in the status quo, but the plan causes it via allied prolif.

Benjamin Schreer 20, Professor of Strategic Studies and Head of the Security Studies and Criminology Department at Macquarie University, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Kiel, “After the INF: What Will US Indo-Pacific Allies Do?”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1736885

alarmism about nuclear arms races post-INF is unwarranted end of the INF is about imbalances conventional systems U S has no plans to deploy land-based nuclear missiles However US nuclear posture is reducing pressures on Tokyo and Seoul to consider their own nuclear deterrent Japan welcomed strengthening nuclear deterrence For Seoul, moves improve understanding the North Korean threat Australia welcome re- allies understand Washington’s decision to end the INF Russia’s violations were at the heart Tokyo’s perspective Beijing’s unrestrained investment has been the key challenge contributing to termination

alarmism about possible nuclear arms races post-INF is unwarranted The end of the INF is not about major US nuclear deployments but imbalances in conventional strike systems . The U nited S tates has no plans to deploy land-based nuclear missiles However , a mod ernized US nuclear posture is not equivalent to a major nuclear build-up. It is instead useful for strength ening nuclear extended deterrence guarantees for Japan and the ROK, reducing pressures on Tokyo and Seoul to consider their own nuclear deterrent the Japan ese government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe welcomed the 2018 NPR, cognizant of the importance of strengthening US nuclear extended deterrence For Seoul, these moves provide a good opportunity to improve its understanding of the role of US nuclear weapons in deterring the North Korean nuclear threat Australia is likely to welcome the re- deployment key allies expressed understand ing for Washington’s decision to end the INF from Canberra’s perspective, Russia’s treaty violations were at the heart of the INF’s demise Suga commented the situation is undesirable an implicit acknowledgment of the rationale behind the US decision indicating Tokyo’s perspective Beijing’s unrestrained investment in long-range cruise and ballistic missiles has been the key strategic challenge contributing to termination

unwarranted U S no plans to deploy land-based nuclear missiles not equivalent reducing pressures on Tokyo and Seoul to consider their own nuclear deterrent Japan understand key strategic challenge

['Nevertheless, America’s Indo-Pacific allies are aware that alarmism about possible nuclear “arms races” in the region post-INF is unwarranted.17 The end of the INF is not about major US nuclear deployments to the region but about addressing imbalances in conventional strike systems. The United States has no plans to deploy land-based nuclear missiles in Asia akin to NATO’s 1979 “double track” decision and the stationing of nuclear-armed Pershing-2 missiles in Europe during the Cold War. 18', 'To be sure, the United States is likely to strengthen its nuclear posture in the Indo-Pacific to reassure allies such as Japan and the ROK that had become concerned about the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence, especially after the Obama administration announced in 2010 that it would retire the sea-based nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (TLAM/N). The Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) thus confirmed the development of a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) and foreshadowed the reintroduction of these tactical nuclear weapons to the region. In its view, these missiles “for decades had contributed to deterrence and the assurance of allies, particularly in Asia.”19 In February 2019, the United States also concluded the first production unit of a new low- yield nuclear warhead (the W76 mod 2 or W76-2) for its UGM-133A Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).20', 'However, a modernized US nuclear posture in the Indo-Pacific is not equivalent to a major nuclear build-up. It is instead useful for strengthening nuclear extended deterrence guarantees for allies such as Japan and the ROK, reducing pressures on Tokyo and Seoul to consider their own nuclear deterrent. 21 Tellingly, the Japanese government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe welcomed the 2018 NPR, cognizant of the importance of strengthening US nuclear extended deterrence in East Asia.22 For Seoul, these moves also provide a good opportunity to improve its understanding of the role of US nuclear weapons in deterring the North Korean nuclear threat through the US-ROK Extended Deterrence Strategic Coordination Group (EDSCG).23 Australia is also likely to welcome the re-deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons, as it is a long-time beneficiary of US nuclear extended deterrence. In the context of the first-ever written US nuclear extended deterrence guarantee for Australia in the 2019 US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),24 such systems will add further credibility to its regional nuclear deterrent posture.', 'Within this strategic context, key US Indo-Pacific allies have expressed understanding for Washington’s decision to end the INF treaty. Australia’s Foreign Minister Marise Payne stressed that, from Canberra’s perspective, Russia’s treaty violations were at the heart of the INF’s demise. 25 Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga commented that “the situation under which the Treaty is forced to be terminated is undesirable”—an implicit acknowledgment of the rationale behind the US decision.26 Likewise, when Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kano called for a “multilateralization” of the treaty, he pointed out that “China already possessed missiles (of the range covered in the pact),”27 indicating Tokyo’s perspective that Beijing’s unrestrained investment in long-range cruise and ballistic missiles has been the key strategic challenge contributing to the treaty’s termination.', '', '']

[(9, 16), (17, 19)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GaSl-Neg-ADA-Nationals-Round-6.docx

Kentucky

GaSl

816f54d67f942744f72647d88fba908f0f155e51fc2803059bf03df80df45cb9

Even if, watered down is sufficient.

Lehigh 1-13 (Scot Lehigh: Columnist at the Boston Globe, 1-13-2022, "Democrats need to get real on Build Back Better," BostonGlobe, )

after a year Democrats have a transformative toward a greener future Manchin seems OK with all of it provisions have been largely worked through and financed Manchin said climate is one we can come to agreement [on] Manchin did oppose tax breaks even without that provision experts say the package would bring very significant progress on reducing g h g emissions

after a year in which the long-predicted ravages of climate change have arrived with a vengeance Democrats have a potentially transformative to push toward a greener future Manchin seems OK with almost all of it climate and clean energy provisions in the package have been largely worked through and financed Manchin recently said he thought the climate package is one that we probably can come to agreement [on] much easier than anything else Doing so would pave the way for much wider utilization of electric vehicles promote home solar-panel installation and a switch from fossil-fuel furnaces to heat pumps advance energy efficiency expand and strengthen the nation’s power grid and further the country’s wind- and solar-power manufacturing capacity Manchin did oppose tax breaks for utilities that invest in clean power production even without that provision experts say the climate package would bring very significant progress on reducing the nation’s g reen h ouse g as emissions

transformative greener future OK all of it largely worked through financed climate come to agreement [on] tax breaks even without that provision very significant progress g h g

['', 'After Manchin’s recent\xa0\xa0announcement that he was a no on BBB, the mood among pragmatic Capitol Hill Democrats has changed from an optimistic New Deal-reduxism to a resigned realization that, at least for this year, Democrats have little choice except to take what Manchin will give.', 'In fact, that’s pretty much what progressive stalwart\xa0, Democrat of Massachusetts, told Manchin on a recent Senate Zoom call. As Markey recounted to me, he told Manchin: “You and President Biden, and Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi, should get in a room and whatever you can agree with, all of the others should give our proxies to support that agreement.”', 'Markey feels that way because, after a year in which the long-predicted ravages of climate change have arrived with a vengeance, Democrats have a potentially transformative\xa0\xa0to push toward a greener future. Further, Manchin seems OK with almost all of it.', '“The climate and clean energy provisions in the package have been largely worked through and financed,” said Markey, adding that Manchin recently said he thought the climate package “is one that we probably can come to agreement [on] much easier than anything else.”', '“So let’s pass them,” Markey said.', 'Doing so would help pave the way for much wider utilization of electric vehicles, promote home solar-panel installation and a switch from fossil-fuel furnaces to heat pumps, advance energy efficiency, expand and strengthen the nation’s power grid, and further the country’s wind- and solar-power manufacturing capacity.', 'Manchin did oppose what had been an important part of that plan: tax breaks for utilities that invest in clean power production. Still, even without that provision, experts say the climate package would bring very significant progress on reducing the nation’s greenhouse gas emissions.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-ADA-Round1.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-ADA-Round1.docx

c6ae7f202ca7b6aa1ec8ebfd2dca815099cfcda7e7132ef0df89b75e13952803

No ‘multilateral meltdown’ impact.

Ferry 18 Jean Pisani-Ferry, Economics Professor with Sciences Po of Paris and the Hertie School of Governance of Berlin, former campaign director for Emmanuel Macron and Commissioner-General of France Stratégie, the Founding Director of the think tank Bruegel. [Should we give up on global governance? Policy Contribution 17, October 2018, https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PC-17-2018.pdf (table 1 omitted)]

effects compounded by inadequate governance Even if multilat remain valid features are outdated there was no consensus reform is a long demanding process it requires unanimity , when countries have diverging interests and require ratification where there is no majority rules exhibit inertia that prevents adaptations reason for dissatisfaction is its unbalanced nature imbalances can be found in a series of domains The final obstacle has to do with complexity interdependence escape agreements to an unprecedented degree putting aside geopolitic and assuming commitment to multilat complexity test the limits of governance

the adverse effects can be compounded by inadequate governance existing rules and institutions were conceived for a different world Even if the principles of multilat eralism remain valid , important features of the rules and institutions in which they are embedded are increasingly outdated Developments in the climate field illustrate the point there was no consensus for such an approach. Rules can be reform ed and institutions can adapt. But this is a long and demanding process , especially when it requires unanimity , when participating countries have diverging interests and when changes require ratification by parliaments where there is no majority to support them. Global rules exhibit a strong inertia that prevents necessary adaptations A further reason for dissatisfaction is its unbalanced nature . The deeper international integration becomes, the broader the scope of policy should cover The imbalances of global governance are by no means limited to taxation The same can be found in a series of domains , for example biodiversity and the preservation of nature The final obstacle to multilateral solutions has to do with the sheer complexity of the challenges to tackle channels of interdependence escape the reach of international agreements to an unprecedented degree Even putting aside geopolitic al consequences and assuming a shared commitment to openness and multilat eral solutions complexity is bound to test the limits of existing international governance arrangements

the adverse effects inadequate governance existing rules and institutions the principles of multilat eralism important features of the rules and institutions increasingly outdated no consensus a long and demanding process unanimity diverging interests ratification by parliaments a strong inertia necessary adaptations its unbalanced nature a series of domains The final obstacle to multilateral solutions the sheer complexity channels of interdependence the reach of international agreements an unprecedented degree Even putting aside a shared commitment the limits of existing international governance arrangements

['C. Obsolescence of global rules and institutions Although the previous argument primarily rests on the broad pattern of international trade and finance, the adverse effects of external liberalisation can be compounded by inadequate governance. As far as trade is concerned, two cases in point are, first, inertia in the categorisation of countries, especially the fact that emerging countries, including China, still enjoy developing country status in the WTO; and, second, failures to enforce the adequate protection of intellectual property (an issue on which the EU recently joined the US and filed a complaint at the WTO against Chinese practices; see European Union, 2018). These grievances, and others concerning subsidies or investment, are not new: they were clearly spelled out by policymakers from the Obama administration (see for example, Schwab, 2011, and Wu, 2016). The underlying concern is that the systemic convergence on a market economy template that was expected from participation in the WTO has failed to materialise. The rules and institutions of global trade have brought shallow convergence but not the deeper alignment of economic systems that was hoped for. More generally, existing rules and institutions were conceived for a different world. This is very apparent in the trade field: the GATT/WTO framework dates from what Baldwin (2016) has called the “first unbundling” of production and consumption. They were not designed for the “second unbundling” of knowledge and production that gave rise to the emergence of global value chains. For decades, the implicit assumption behind the structure of trade negotiations has been that nations have well-defined sectoral trade interests: they are either exporters or importers. But in a world of global value chains, they are both importers and exporters of similar products simultaneously. Even if the principles of multilateralism remain valid, important features of the rules and institutions in which they are embedded are increasingly outdated. In the same way, opening to capital movements was supposed to result in net financial flows from savings-rich to savings-poor countries. What has happened instead is a massive increase in gross flows resulting in the interpenetration of financial systems and the coexistence of sizeable external assets and liabilities. The consequence has been the emergence of a global financial cycle (see for example Rey, 2017) and of policy dilemmas that are quite different from those arising in a simple Mundell-Fleming framework, in which interdependence takes place through net inflows and outflows of capital. Developments in the climate field further illustrate the point. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was negotiated under the assumption that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions would continue to originate in the advanced countries. But by the time the Protocol was meant to enter into force, it was clear already that the hypothesis was deeply wrong. The exemption of developing countries from emissions reductions was one of the reasons why the US did not ratify the treaty. The failed Copenhagen agreement of 2009 was an attempt to replicate Kyoto on a global scale, but there was no consensus for such an approach. Rules can be reformed and institutions can adapt. But this is a long and demanding process, especially when it requires unanimity, when participating countries have diverging interests and when changes require ratification by parliaments where there is no majority to support them. Global rules therefore exhibit a strong inertia that often prevents necessary adaptations. Trade rules, amendments to which require unanimity, are a case in point. Institutions are nimbler and can adapt to changing priorities or perspectives on interdependence. The IMF for example has succeeded in adjusting to major changes in the international economic regime and major shifts in the intellectual consensus. But even institutions face limitations to their ability to keep up with underlying transformations. This is one of the reasons why solutions to emerging problems have often been looked for outside the existing multilateral, institution-based governance framework (Table 1). D. The imbalances of global governance A further reason for popular dissatisfaction with global governance is its unbalanced nature. The deeper international integration becomes, the broader the scope of policy its management should cover, and the more acute the tension between the technical requirements of global interdependence and the domestically-rooted legitimacy of public policies. This is most apparent in the field of taxation. International tax optimisation by multinationals has become an issue of significant relevance and it is estimated that 40 percent of their profit is being artificially shifted to low-tax countries – with major consequences for national budgets (Tørsløv et al, 2018). But the fact that taxation remains at the core of sovereign prerogatives limits the scope and ambition of initiatives conducted at international level. The result, which can be regarded as an illustration of Rodrik’s trilemma, is that global coordination in tax matters falls short of what equity-conscious citizens regard as desirable and, at the same time, exceeds what sovereignty-conscious citizens consider acceptable. The imbalances of global governance are by no means limited to the taxation field. The same can be found in a series of domains, for example biodiversity and the preservation of nature. E. Increased complexity The final obstacle to multilateral solutions has to do with the sheer complexity of the challenges global governance has to tackle. In recent decades channels of international interdependence have both multiplied and diversified. They now link together countries with significantly differing levels of technical, economic or financial development. Because they have developed outside the scope of negotiated rules and established institutions, some of channels of interdependence also escape the reach of international agreements to an unprecedented degree. This is especially, but not only, the case of the internet and the multiple networks that rely on it. The world does not fit anymore the usual representation whereby individual nations trade goods, capital and technology. Even putting aside geopolitical consequences and assuming a shared commitment to openness and multilateral solutions, such complexity is bound to test the limits of existing international governance arrangements.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Dartmouth%20Round%20Robin-Round3.docx

Michigan

PiRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-Dartmouth%2520Round%2520Robin-Round3.docx

14d4142276601ee574026f3e0f77688ff315531080570290af9f557a846a2c83

b---Giving AI legal personality collapses the financial system

Daniel Schlaepfer & Hugo Kruyne 18, Daniel holds an M.B.A. from the Concordia University John Molson School of Business and is the President and CEO of Select Vantage, and Hugo is the COO of Select Vantage, “AI and robots should not be attributed legal personhood”, https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/opinion/ai-and-robots-should-not-be-attributed-legal-personhood/

financial services will be severely disrupted this could undermine trust and responsibility on which the system relies whether robots should be attributed legal personhood to ascribe them with liabilities. is clearly the wrong approach machine learning, can lead to code which is no longer explainable Unleashing Artificial Intelligence let alone personalising it to act as a trading decision maker could pose great risks capabilities erode the very fabric of financial services reliant on human incentives and liabilities legal personhood is not compatible with underlying pillars of finance

financial services will be the industry most severely disrupted by the arrival of AI this could fundamentally undermine the twin pillars of trust and responsibility on which the financial system relies . When AI controls financial services it poses serious questions the most prominent debate concerns whether or not robots should be attributed legal personhood in order to ascribe them with liabilities. Endowing robots with personhood is clearly the wrong approach Whereas present algorithmic trading strategies are intelligible and explainable the ambition of contemporary AI engineers is to develop machine learning, essentially ‘decision-making’ though pattern recognition This can lead to code which generates output that is no longer clearly explainable by its creators in finance the highest ambition is to teach machines to ‘learn’ how to make profit Yet while clients can be won over by profits in their portfolios regulators will not be who will be held accountable if an AI engages in activity which violates regulations? Unleashing Artificial Intelligence into the financial industry let alone personalising it to act as a trading decision maker could pose great risks capabilities might gradually erode the very fabric of financial services reliant as they are on human incentives and liabilities . Ascribing robots legal personhood is not compatible with or complementary to, the underlying pillars of finance Both require moral agents to be responsible for their actions in order for the concepts of right and wrongdoing to be intelligible .

financial services most severely disrupted fundamentally undermine on which the financial system relies it poses serious questions attributed legal personhood ascribe them with liabilities. is clearly the wrong approach no longer clearly explainable profit let alone personalising it pose great risks erode the very fabric of financial services human incentives liabilities is not compatible with moral agents intelligible

['It’s likely that financial services will be the industry most severely disrupted by the arrival of AI, and this could fundamentally undermine the twin pillars of trust and responsibility on which the financial system relies. When AI controls financial services, and humans no longer take an active role in decision making, it poses serious questions about who is responsible for mistakes.', 'Accordingly, the most prominent debate surrounding robotics and AI presently being discussed at EU level concerns whether or not robots should be attributed legal personhood – as corporations can be – in order to ascribe them with liabilities.', 'Endowing robots with personhood, however, is clearly the wrong approach. Paradoxically, the philosophy that informs our thinking on AI regulation should be that which prioritises human agents over computerised actors.', 'The reason is simple. Whereas present algorithmic trading strategies are intelligible, and explainable, the ambition of contemporary AI engineers is to develop machine learning, essentially ‘decision-making’ though pattern recognition. This can lead to code which generates output that is no longer clearly explainable by its creators.', 'So in finance, the highest ambition is to teach machines to ‘learn’ how to make profit; to program predictive capabilities into systems that would anticipate price changes before they happen in the market.. Yet while clients can be won over by profits in their portfolios, regulators will not be. So who will be held accountable if an AI engages in activity which violates regulations?', 'One answer has been suggested in a European Parliament\xa0\xa0to the Commission on Civil Law Rules and on Robotics. In Section 59(f), Members of European Parliament invite the Commission to consider giving the more sophisticated algorithms and computers carrying out these trades legal personhood.', 'This should be worrying. It is in the interests of both Europe and North America to ensure that the “European approach to Artificial Intelligence” is in no way animated by the spirit of Section 59(f).', 'Unleashing Artificial Intelligence into the financial industry – let alone personalising it – to act as a trading decision maker could pose great risks. Unchecked, its capabilities might gradually erode the very fabric of financial services, reliant as they are on human incentives and liabilities.', 'A strong argument exists stating that the legal status of personhood should only be conferred on an entity if doing so is consistent with the overarching purposes of the legal system. Ascribing robots legal personhood is not consistent with that for the same reason that it is not compatible with, or complementary to, the underlying pillars of finance. Both require moral agents to be responsible for their actions in order for the concepts of right and wrongdoing to be intelligible.', '']

[(7, 17), (18, 19), (25, 31), (32, 34)]

ndtceda

Emory-PiWa-Neg-ADA-Nationals-at-Georgetown-Round-2.docx

Emory

PiWa

be15b6069e963143ad2075d9df3f087197f1aade32310f6ba8bc944d4870adf3

Nuclear deterrence is a prerequisite to credible conventional forces.

Stephan Frühling & Andrew O’Neil 22. *Acting Head and Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University. Former Fulbright Professional Fellow at Georgetown University, ‘Partner across the globe’ research fellow at the NATO Defense College. Member of the Australian Government’s External Panel of Experts. PhD from ANU. M.A. in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri State University. **Professor of political science and Acting Dean of the Graduate Research School at Griffith University. PhD in Political Science and Government from Flinders University. “Alliances and Nuclear Risk: Strengthening US Extended Deterrence.” Survival 64.1, Pages 77-98.

potential for escalation lies at the heart of nuclear deterrence US views on escalation become relevant in assessing the credibility of conventional deterrence for alliances , US need to focus on the importance of damage-limitation capabilities If the US wishes to avoid questions about extended-deterrence and alliances it must be willing to risk a nuclear exchange if the US is to fight a conventional war it has to address the vulnerability of conventional forces to nuclear attack and understand nuclear deterrence influences the strategic credibility of its conventional forces

Escalation risks are intrinsic to nuclear strategy and featured prominently in the calculations of policymakers the potential for deliberate or inadvertent escalation lies at the heart of nuclear deterrence US views on inadvertent escalation and nuclear risk become relevant in assessing the credibility of US conventional deterrence as well. To offset doubts about US resolve among allies, the Biden administration needs to signal a willingness to hold adversary targets at risk for the sake of its alliances , US policymakers need to focus more on how Washington can dominate or at least credibly implement escalation pathways, and less on how to avoid escalation these considerations reinforce the importance of the US national missiledefence system and general damage-limitation capabilities If the US wishes to avoid a situation in which serious questions are raised about the credibility of its extended-deterrence guarantees – and by association the strength of its alliances worldwide – it must be willing to risk a nuclear exchange . P ast NPRs have argued that improved conventional capabilities can help the United States reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. But if the US is to fight a conventional war against nuclear-armed peer powers, it also has to address the vulnerability of conventional forces to nuclear attack and understand that the ability to manage nuclear escalation through nuclear deterrence influences the strategic credibility of the use of its conventional forces

escalation conventional deterrence for the sake of its alliances damage-limitation capabilities risk a nuclear exchange conventional war nuclear attack through nuclear deterrence influences the strategic credibility of the use of its conventional forces

['Escalation risks are intrinsic to nuclear strategy and featured prominently in the calculations of policymakers during the Cold War. Indeed, the potential for deliberate or inadvertent escalation lies at the heart of nuclear deterrence. Kerry Kartchner and Michael Gerson observe: ‘If nuclear weapons are a force for peace between nuclear-armed states, it is in large part because of the possibility of vertical escalation – from conventional to nuclear conflict, from limited to general war, from counterforce to countermilitary to countervalue targets.’32 Along with accidental escalation resulting from miscalculation based on technical error, inadvertent escalation – that is, escalation that is deliberate but based on mistaken assumptions – is often seen as the most probable pathway to nuclear war.33 Escalation can be inadvertent in two different ways. Firstly, a country could assume it is (or is about to be) under nuclear attack when that is not the case – for instance, by misidentifying incoming warheads.34 Secondly, it could interpret conventional attacks on its forces or command-and-control systems as an attempt to disable its nuclear arsenal.35', 'China’s nuclear posture reflects concerns about disarming US (and potentially Russian) strikes.36 Co-mingling conventional and nuclear forces in operational deployments and broadening the range of nuclear-capable forces through dual conventional and nuclear capability help address such concerns. Recent scholarship has pointed to the escalatory risks associated with the dual-use attributes of China’s mobile land-based missiles in particular, and DF-21 and D-26 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles reportedly have actual or planned capability for conventional and nuclear missions.37 The co-mingling of nuclear and conventional capabilities raises the questions of whether the US, in the fog of a crisis over Taiwan, would be capable of distinguishing a defensive dispersal of Chinese nuclear-capable missiles from preparation to launch a first strike against US or allied targets, and whether Washington’s concerns about inadvertent escalation would lead it to restrict and constrain conventional operations against China’s missile force.38', 'It is very likely that China and Russia have deliberately co-mingled their nuclear and conventional military systems on the assumption that the US would not risk nuclear escalation in the midst of a crisis. Unlike their US counterparts, ‘Chinese leaders believe that nuclear weapons are “paper tigers”, and because of the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they are unlikely to be used’.39 In this respect, US views on inadvertent escalation and nuclear risk become relevant in assessing the credibility of US conventional deterrence as well. To offset doubts about US resolve among allies, the Biden administration needs to signal a willingness to hold adversary targets at risk as required to prevail in any regional conflict, including in cases where these targets are likely to be dual-use and whose destruction would carry risks of inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This should not involve issuing threats of major escalation in response to minor or even moderate escalation from adversaries, but the United States must be able, as Kartchner and Gerson write, to ‘threaten lower-level actions that, if executed, risk starting an uncertain process that could lead to further escalation’.40', 'Put another way, for the sake of its alliances, US policymakers need to focus more on how Washington can dominate or at least credibly implement escalation pathways, and less on how to avoid escalation. In the Indo-Pacific, these considerations reinforce the importance of the US national missiledefence system and general damage-limitation capabilities of US strategic forces against China.41 In Europe, in response to the threat from Russia’s mixture of conventional and nuclear forces, NATO members agreed in 2021 to ‘strengthened integrated air and missile defence; advanced defensive and offensive conventional capabilities; steps to keep NATO’s nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective; efforts to support and strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; intelligence; and exercises’.42 They also reinforced the importance of Alliance integrated air and missile defence.43', 'If the US wishes to avoid a situation in which serious questions are raised about the credibility of its extended-deterrence guarantees – and by association the strength of its alliances worldwide – it must be willing to risk a nuclear exchange. P', '', '', 'ast NPRs have argued that improved conventional capabilities can help the United States reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. But if the US is to fight a conventional war against nuclear-armed peer powers, it also has to address the vulnerability of conventional forces to nuclear attack and understand that the ability to manage nuclear escalation through nuclear deterrence influences the strategic credibility of the use of its conventional forces. The next NPR should therefore avoid stating or implying that escalation must be avoided if it runs the risk of inadvertently triggering a nuclear exchange, and articulate how the totality of US forces – not just nuclear systems – needs to evolve to manage and ultimately reduce the risk of nuclear conflict.']

[(8, 18), (26, 35)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-5---Texas-Round-1.docx

Emory

LoKi

b9bb322d2d60e47b05d56882b2d345b79f568633fba21cabcbb32d11e4aaaf9b

--There’s a de-population crisis.

Balz 21—(B.S. in communications and M.S. in communications from the University of Illinois). Dan Balz. May 9, 2021. “A blinking light ahead: Slowing population growth raises questions about America as a land with unlimited horizons”. . Accessed 8/17/21.

the Census reported in the last decade the U.S. population grew slowest since the Great Depression , and the second-slowest since the nation’s founding Reversing these patterns will not be easy, as other nations have learned . Added was declining immigration amid anti-immigration policies Slowing population growth threatens less robust economic growth

For generations, Americans have thought of themselves as part of a dynamic, innovative and ever-expanding country April 26, the Census Bureau reported that in the last decade the U.S. population grew at its slowest rate since the Great Depression , and the second-slowest rate for any 10-year period since the nation’s founding . Reversing these patterns will not be easy, as other nations have learned . Added to those factors was the impact of declining immigration — the key to replenishing and rejuvenating the population throughout the country’s history — as the numbers of new arrivals shrank amid fractious debates over the anti-immigration policies of former president Donald Trump. Slowing population growth threatens less robust economic growth highlighting fears that the long-held belief that people’s children will have more prosperous lives than their parents is in danger of disappearing

in the last decade the U.S. population grew at its slowest rate since the Great Depression second-slowest rate for any 10-year period since the nation’s founding other nations have learned declining immigration fractious debates over the anti-immigration policies less robust economic growth

['', 'For generations, Americans have thought of themselves as part of a dynamic, innovative and ever-expanding country, with an almost limitless horizon. In recent weeks, they have seen a portrait of a different nation, one that challenges assumptions about America as a land of continuing growth and unlimited opportunity.', 'On April 26, the Census Bureau reported that in the last decade the U.S. population grew at its slowest rate since the Great Depression, and the second-slowest rate for any 10-year period since the nation’s founding. Last week, the government reported that the nation’s birthrate had declined for the sixth straight year, including a precipitous drop in births in December, adding up to fertility rates too low to keep the country’s population growing by births alone.', 'To demographers and others who study these trends, the official figures were not a surprise, merely confirmation of patterns visible for some time. Nor are they unique to the United States. Other industrialized nations from Japan to those throughout Europe have been facing the same or worse for years. But coming as they did in rapid succession — and with the imprimatur of the decennial census on the slowing population growth — the numbers amounted to a blinking light about the path ahead.', 'The reports have brought into sharper focus the longer-term trends and, as important, the challenges they present — politically, economically and socially. Reversing these patterns will not be easy, as other nations have learned. New public policies could help, but they are no guarantee, even assuming that the country’s broken political system is able to enact such changes. Others believe that slowing growth may be beneficial.', 'Experts are reluctant to describe America as a shrinking or contracting nation, given its history, inherent strengths, character and human assets. But maintaining the nation’s vibrancy could mean embracing the concept and values of a much different America than existed in the last century. Beyond that, if the current patterns persist, they are likely to result in regional and intergenerational struggles — and possibly more political unrest.', 'To some demographers, embracing the new realities of a changed country will be crucial to the overall well-being of the United States.', '“I don’t think we need to think of ourselves as a country in decline if we open our gates and open our arms to this younger and more racially diverse population, through immigration and through investment in our people of color,” said William Frey, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Metropolitan Policy Program.', 'Even before the latest numbers were reported, there were indications that many Americans saw a future that could bring fewer opportunities, rather than more. The Pew Research Center produced a report two years ago that found majorities of Americans offered a pessimistic view of the future.', '“When Americans peer 30 years into the future, they see a country in decline economically, politically and on the world stage,” the report said. “While a narrow majority of the public (56%) say they are at least somewhat optimistic about America’s future, hope gives way to doubt when the focus turns to specific issues.” Among the worries were a weaker economy, less affordable health care, a deteriorating environment and older Americans having more economic problems.', 'Lanhee Chen, a public policy fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, said conversations he has had have led him to conclude that many people no longer see the United States in its most rosy descriptions.', '“I think people still broadly believe in the American Dream and possibility, but I do think that there’s a little bit more of a realistic hinge on where the limits are,” he said. “I think for many, it’s not a completely boundless dream anymore.”', 'Slower population growth over the past decade resulted from a confluence of factors. For years now, younger people have been marrying later and choosing to start families later or not at all. The hangover from the Great Recession of 2008-2009 stunted opportunities for many people, particularly millennials, who struggled to find good-paying jobs and delayed marriages or family.', 'Added to those factors was the impact of declining immigration — the key to replenishing and rejuvenating the population throughout the country’s history — as the numbers of new arrivals shrank amid fractious debates over the anti-immigration policies of former president Donald Trump. In Trump’s vision, a nation that long has welcomed people from around the world would be a nation with high walls and closed borders.', 'When the Census Bureau completed its work, it found that as of April 1, 2020, the total U.S. population was 331.4 million, an increase of 7.4 percent over the previous decade. That compares with 7.3 percent growth during the 1930s, a decade that saw the worst economic downturn in the history of the industrialized world. More recent census reports found robust but slowing growth: 13.2 percent during the booming decade from 1990 to 2000 and 9.7 percent between 2000 and 2010.', 'Immigration numbers, which count both legal and undocumented immigrants, had reached about 1 million people annually in the two years before Trump was elected, then began to decline, falling to fewer than 500,000 by the end of his presidency.', 'Trump sought to stem the flow of undocumented immigrants across the U.S.-Mexico border. He also embraced changes to legal immigration that, had they been enacted, would have cut the numbers dramatically. He slashed the number of refugees allowed into the country, as well. An already controversial matter became much more so over the life of his presidency.', 'Over the past year, Americans — and those in the rest of the world — have been sequestered because of the coronavirus pandemic, putting lives on hold, causing economic hardship and prompting younger people in particular to think about the kind of future they may inherit.', 'The number of births in the United States dropped by 4 percentage points between 2019 and 2020, the biggest drop in decades, and the overall fertility rate hit another record low last year. There was a precipitous drop in births in December compared with the previous year, and a recent Brookings Institution report projects a possible decline in births this year of around 300,000, due to the pandemic.', 'Immigration has been central to the American story, but at this point, the system is broken, and politicians appear incapable of fixing it. Outside of the political arena, there might be a consensus about the broad outlines of what needs to be done. Inside the arena, there is acrimony and political stasis.', 'President Biden has proposed changes, including a path to citizenship for millions of undocumented immigrants who are in the country, but prospects for action are mixed. And that alone may not solve the problems. Frey said coming to terms with immigration, particularly legal immigration, will be essential if America hopes to avoid continued declines in population growth.', '“This is something we haven’t taken seriously as a country for a long time simply because it’s become a political football and people have been worrying about who’s undocumented and people of color and all of these things that wind up to be identity politics one way or another,” he said. “It’s really legal immigration which has not been given serious attention. It’s clear from these numbers that’s going to be the safety valve for us to not even have much more reduced growth than we already have.”', 'Chen said that, in the absence of a resolution on the issue of immigration, “It is going to be hard for us to have a steady flow of people who are willing to come to the United States and contribute to our economy and contribute to the structure of our country and for us to create rules around who can and can’t be here in a way that promotes the broader national interest.”', 'Trump’s view of immigration has hardened the position of Republicans, whose conservative base has repeatedly blocked efforts in Congress to change the laws, even when advanced by former Republican president George W. Bush.', 'But Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, said the Democrats do not have a clear immigration policy of their own “other than they don’t want to be seen as Trump,” which he said is “not an immigration policy either.”', 'He added, “The need for new immigration policy may become clearer because of these demographic trends, but the politics of it is very difficult, and it requires one or both of the parties to get off of where they’re dug in currently.”', 'Slowing population growth threatens to result in less robust economic growth, highlighting fears — expressed in some surveys — that the long-held belief that people’s children will have more prosperous lives than their parents is in danger of disappearing.']

[(0, 7)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-INTEC-HaDa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-6.docx

Minnesota-INTEC

HaDa

d765e085f122b63162da7eb390b9e42a8978fbe03b63190fecfb263601a45946

Takes years—Microsoft proves

Jeffers ’19 [Glenn Jeffers, journalist, citing Mark McCareins, Clinical Professor, Business Law, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, “Why Antitrust Regulators Don’t Scare Big Tech,” KELLOGG INSIGHT, 8—19—19, , accessed 9-3-21]

Feds Don’t Have Time regulatory agencies are slow to investigate anticompetitive practices nvestigations will take years to unfold, and even longer to prosecute. Microsoft. FTC launched investigation in 1990 In 2000, a federal judge ordered split

Feds Don’t Have Time on Their Side federal regulatory agencies are notoriously slow to investigate anticompetitive practices by tech companies i nvestigations will take years to unfold, and even longer to prosecute. Microsoft. FTC launched an investigation in 1990 In 2000, a federal judge ordered the company to be split into separate entities, but an appeals court reversed the rulin

slow years longer

['', 'The Feds Don’t Have Time on Their Side', 'Even where there may be cause for concern, federal regulatory agencies are notoriously slow to investigate anticompetitive practices by tech companies. The investigations of any of these four firms will take years to unfold, and even longer to prosecute.', 'Take, for example, Microsoft. The FTC launched an investigation into the software firm’s bundling practices in 1990, with the DOJ following suit eight years later. At the time, the company’s Windows operating system accounted for 90 percent of the PC market. The DOJ eventually charged Microsoft, claiming that its Internet Explorer browser, which was built into Windows, had an unfair advantage over other web browsers like Netscape.', 'In 2000, a federal judge ordered the company to be split into separate entities, but an appeals court reversed the ruling. The DOJ and Microsoft finally settled the case in 2002—a full twelve years after a regulatory agency first launched an investigation. Microsoft was ultimately required to give computer manufacturers identical licensing contracts for Windows, which gave other companies more equal access to the browser market, as well as undergo nine years of court supervision into its business practices.', 'The punishment was, to say the least, much reduced from its original form. “The U.S. Department of Justice was not overly successful in that attack,” says McCareins, who was a partner in the firm that represented Microsoft, Winston & Strawn.', '', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Munson-Rudd-Neg-UTD-Round4.docx

Minnesota

MuRu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/MuRu/Minnesota-Munson-Rudd-Neg-UTD-Round4.docx

b8a247475a4f968442940d630a078a704474feb658c8356c2dd15a91714fa05b

Assurances are iron-clad now an NFU absolutely would change commitments US has already made with Japan

Tatsujiro 23 (Suzuki Tatsujiro, vice director and a professor @ the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Tokyo, professor @ Nagasaki University, 4-7-2023, "Heading the Wrong Way? Japan and the Growing Nuclear Threats in Northeast Asia," Asia Pacific Leadership Network, https://www.apln.network/news/member_activities/heading-the-wrong-way-japan-and-the-growing-nuclear-threats-in-northeast-asia, accessed 8-15-2023)

responding to threats from No Ko and China, Japan’s ority has been to ensure US nuclear deterrence It is the same for So Ko leaders issued a joint statement emphasizing US commitment to defend is ironclad and backed by capabilities, including nuclear

In responding to growing nuclear threats from No Ko and China, Japan’s top pri ority has been to ensure US extended nuclear deterrence It is the same for So Ko top leaders of the US , So Ko and Japan issued a joint statement emphasizing strengthening extended nuclear deterrence Biden reiterated US commitment to defend Japan and the R o K is ironclad and backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear

growing threats No Ko top pri ority nuclear deterrence same So Ko US So Ko Japan emphasizing extended reiterated commitment R o K ironclad full range nuclear

['', 'STRENGTHENING EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE', 'In responding to growing nuclear threats from North Korea and China, Japan’s top priority has been to ensure that the US extended nuclear deterrence would not be compromised. It is the same for South Korea. On Nov. 13, 2022, the top leaders of the US, South Korea and Japan issued a joint statement emphasizing strengthening extended nuclear deterrence: “President Biden reiterated that the US commitment to defend Japan and the [Republic of Korea] is ironclad and backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear. As the regional security environment grows more challenging, President Biden reaffirms that the US commitment to reinforce extended deterrence to Japan and the ROK will only strengthen.”9', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-BeWe-Neg-3--CEDA-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

BeWe

755b48e7c2fccf2e82ae2cb00b19bee5f1496bc23002229ec83791e33ae586d6

The environment’s rebounding

Dr. Alex Berezow 19, PhD in Microbiology from the University of Washington, Vice President of Scientific Communication at the American Council on Science and Health, Non-Resident Fellow at The Council on Strategic Risks, Speaker at The Insight Bureau, Former Adjunct Faculty Member at Northwest University, “The Environment: Getting Better All The Time”, American Council on Science and Health, 7/23/2019, https://www.acsh.org/news/2019/07/23/environment-getting-better-all-time-14176

Contrary to news, the environment is getting better there is more tree cover than 35 years ago Tech including ag helps decouple resources Soon hydroponics may grow in skyscrapers Wealth is the other driver as countries become richer, they benefit the environment the e K c has been confirmed by great research Biod will return

Contrary to what you see reported in the news, the environment is , bit by bit, getting better The latest evidence comes from France, which is becoming heavily re-forested Europe is not an outlier. The U S has more trees now than it did 100 years ago. A study in Nature concluded that there is more tree cover on Earth now than 35 years ago Why? Because of technology and wealth . Tech nology, including ag ricultural technology, helps decouple the economy from natural resources Soon , using hydroponics , we may be able to grow food in skyscrapers Wealth is the other major driver as countries become richer, they use wealth to benefit the environment the e nvironmental K uznets c urve " has been confirmed by a great deal of further research pessimists will note that biodiversity is lower have patience . Biod iversity will return . The (DMZ) between North and South Korea has become a haven for wildlife

getting better heavily re-forested not U S more tree cover technology wealth Tech ag hydroponics Wealth e nvironmental K uznets c urve confirmed great deal further research have patience Biod return haven

['In 1967, the Beatles released Sgt. Pepper\'s Lonely Hearts Club Band, one of the best albums ever made. One of its hit songs was titled "Getting Better," and part of the chorus goes like this:', "I've got to admit it's getting better", 'A little better all the time', 'The song was about life in general, but it could have been dedicated to the environment. Contrary to what you see reported in the news, the environment is, bit by bit, getting better.', 'The Environment: Getting Better All the Time', 'The latest evidence for this comes from France, which is becoming heavily re-forested. According to The Economist:', 'Since 1990, thanks to better protection as well as to a decline in farming, France’s overall wooded or forested areas have increased by nearly 7%. And France is far from being alone. Across the EU, between 1990 and 2015, the total forested and wooded area grew by 90,000 square kilometres—an area roughly the size of Portugal. Almost every country has seen its forests grow over the period.', 'Believe it or not, Europe is not an outlier. The United States has more trees now than it did 100 years ago. A study in Nature concluded that there is more tree cover on Earth now than 35 years ago1.', 'Why? Because of technology and wealth. Technology, including agricultural technology, helps decouple the economy from natural resources. In other words, we humans are becoming less reliant on Mother Nature for our well-being. We can grow more food on less land, for instance. Soon, using hydroponics, we may be able to grow food in skyscrapers.', "Wealth is the other major driver. When a poor country becomes wealthier, it usually does so at the expense of the environment. (That's why China is belching out pollution and Brazil is destroying the Amazon rain forest.) The primary concern of these countries is to escape poverty. But as countries become even richer, they decide to use some of that wealth to benefit the environment. Green spaces and parks are often seen as a luxury that only the wealthy can afford.", 'This concept is neither new nor a myth propagated by industry. It\'s known as the environmental Kuznets curve. (Source: Govinddelhi via Wikipedia.) A textbook co-authored by Paul Krugman (yes, that Paul Krugman) called International Economics: Theory and Policy said that the relevance of the environmental Kuznets curve "has been confirmed by a great deal of further research."2', 'None of this is meant to suggest that there are no environmental problems. Poor regions really are doing some very bad things to the planet. Asia and Africa, for example, are primarily responsible for dumping plastic into the ocean3.', "As is often the case, the cure is wealth. If we want these countries to treat the planet well, we should do whatever we can to help make them richer. Incidentally, they'll also have fewer kids.", 'Notes', "Naysayers, pessimists, and Debbie Downers will note that biodiversity is lower in new forests than in old-growth forests. That's probably true but have patience. Biodiversity will return. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea has become a haven for wildlife, including endangered species."]

[(9, 19)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

31b913c96b4c023b9ffb01ea29b8801f38c4ee9abe8fc29edf4c7cde0469604b

Institutional hurdles will block executive action—only the AFF is enough.

Cassidy 7—12—(staff writer). John Cassidy. July 12, 2021. “The Biden Antitrust Revolution”. The New Yorker. . Accessed 7/14/21.

there are reasons for skepticism regarding the x o . federal agencies operate on a timeline of years . it is far from certain courts will go with key items such as mergers it will take years to reverse the hegemony conservative economic ideas in the judiciary that the market rose on Friday suggests Wall Street isn’t worried about crimping big companies. But policy crusades have to start somewhere

there are reasons for skepticism regarding how much the e x ecutive o rder will actually ach ieve. Some obvious moves to curtail corporate abuses would require new legislation . Even in areas where federal agencies do have authority under existing law, they operate on a timeline of years , rather than months . new rules that the F.T.C. proposes have to go through a lengthy process of public comment before being enacted. it is far from certain that courts will go along with key items of the new policy agenda, such as changing the rules for approving corporate mergers . Even in a best-case scenario it will take years or maybe even decades, to reverse the near- hegemony that conservative economic ideas have established in the judiciary that the stock market rose on Friday suggests that Wall Street isn’t very worried about the executive order crimping the profits of big companies. But policy crusades have to start somewhere No one should be under any illusions about the scale of the task that the Biden Administration has taken on, or how quickly it might be accomplished. at least, the effort has begun

reasons for skepticism x o Some obvious moves new legislation have authority timeline of years lengthy process of public comment far from certain key items mergers best-case scenario years hegemony market rose on Friday isn’t very worried But policy crusades have to start somewhere any illusions how quickly effort has begun

['', 'To be sure, there are reasons for skepticism regarding how much the new executive order will actually achieve. Some obvious moves to curtail corporate abuses, such as empowering Medicare to negotiate drug prices with Big Pharma, would require new legislation. Even in areas where federal agencies do have authority under existing law, they tend to operate on a timeline of years, rather than months. Any new rules that the F.T.C. proposes, for example, will have to go through a lengthy process of public comment before being enacted.', 'Furthermore, it is far from certain that the courts will go along with key items of the new policy agenda, such as changing the rules for approving corporate mergers. “There’s a headwind there that may or may not be overcome,” William J. Baer, a former head of the antitrust division at the Justice Department, told the Times. Even in a best-case scenario for the new antitrust movement, it will take years, or maybe even decades, to reverse the near-hegemony that conservative economic ideas have established in the judiciary.', 'The fact that the stock market rose on Friday suggests that Wall Street isn’t very worried about the executive order crimping the profits of big companies. But all policy crusades have to start somewhere, and, as Wu indicated in his 2018 book, the stakes involved in this one couldn’t be higher. Absent a successful effort to demonstrate to the American people that the economic system can be made to work fairly for them, the foundations of democracy will continue to erode. No one should be under any illusions about the scale of the task that the Biden Administration has taken on, or how quickly it might be accomplished. But, at least, the effort has begun, and in a memorable manner. “Let me be very clear,” Biden said, on Friday. “Capitalism without competition isn’t capitalism; it’s exploitation.” When was the last time you heard a Democratic President speak so plainly about economics?', '']

[(0, 9), (9, 10), (10, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Neg-ADA-Round4.docx

4a758eb8170cddeb9ed4785bfd4a32fd77a529a60405674f61bbd3cac0505b09

No water wars — international institutions check AND alt-causes.

Kramer et al. 13 (Annika Kramer1, Aaron T. Wolf2, Alexander Carius3 and Geoffrey D. Dabelko4, 1: Senior Project Manager at Adelphi in Berlin (Germany), a public policy research institute on environment, development and foreign policy; 2: Professor of Geography, College of Earth, Ocean and Atmospheric Sciences, and Director, Program in Water Conflict Management, Oregon State University; 3: Director of Adelphi; 4: Professor and Director of Environmental Studies, Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs, Ohio University, Senior Advisor, Environmental Change and Security Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, “The key to managing conflict and cooperation over water,” A World of Science, volume 11, number 1, January 2013, ccm)

Systematic research on water conflict arid climates no more conflict-prone and international coop increased during droughts institutional capacity key to success in a water-scarce environment people adapt by developing institutional strategies treaties working groups conflict is likely if setting undergoes change or if institutions are unable to manage change institutions become a matter of dispute water institutions lack the resources decision-making authority spread among different institutions that serve contradictory objectives Formal and customary practices contradictory peasants claim water rights on historical accounts in contradiction with state law institutions allocate water inequitably risk of conflict increases South Africa allocated water to white minority heightened grievances Tensions emerge when info not exchanged Disparities in stakeholders’ capacity to generate data lead to mistrust

Many analysts who write about water politics assume that scarcity of such a critical resource drives people to conflict. It seems intuitive Systematic research on indicators for transboundary water conflict , however, did not find any statistically significant physical parameters arid climates were no more conflict-prone than humid ones and international coop eration actually increased during droughts In fact, almost no single variable proved causal : democracies were as susceptible to conflict as autocracies, rich countries as much so as poor ones, densely populated countries as much so as sparsely populated ones and large countries as much so as small ones When Oregon State University researchers looked closely at water management practices in arid countries, they found institutional capacity was the key to success . Naturally arid countries cooperate on water to live in a water-scarce environment , people adapt to it by developing institutional strategies formal treaties , informal working groups or generally warm relations The researchers also found that the likelihood of conflict increased significantly if two factors came into play First, conflict is more likely if the basin’s physical or political setting undergoes a large or rapid change , such as the construction of a dam , an irrigation scheme or territorial realignment Second, conflict is more likely if existing institutions are unable to absorb and effectively manage that change Institutions responsible for managing water resources have to be strong to balance conflicting interests over allocation and to manage water scarcity, which is often the result of previous mismanagement These institutions can even become a matter of dispute themselves water management typically fails to manage conflicts when there is no treaty spelling out each nation’s rights and responsibilities with regard to the shared river, nor any implicit agreements or cooperative arrangements at the national and local levels , it is not the lack of water that leads to conflict but the way it is governed and managed countries need stronger policies to regulate water use and enable equitable and sustainable management . Especially in developing countries water management institutions often lack the human , technical and financial resources to develop comprehensive management plans and ensure their implementation Moreover decision-making authority is spread among different institutions responsible for ag riculture, fisheries , water supply, regional development, tourism , transport or conservation and environment, so that different management approaches serve contradictory objectives Formal and customary management practices can also be contradictory as demonstrated for example in the Achamayo River Basin in Junin Peru where peasants claim territorial and riparian water rights on t he grounds of mythical and historical accounts in clear contradiction with the official water licence system enacted by state law . countries without a formal system of water use permits or adequate enforcement and monitoring, more powerful water users can override the customary rights of local communities If institutions allocate water inequitably between social groups , the risk of public protest and conflict increases In South Africa , the apartheid regime allocated water to favour the white minority This ‘ ecological marginalization’ heightened the black population’s grievances and contributed to social instability which ultimately precipitated the regime’s downfall various parties to water conflicts often have differing perceptions regarding legal rights, the technical nature of the problem, the cost of solving it and the allocation of costs among stakeholders. Reliable sources of infor mation acceptable to all stakeholders are therefore essential for any joint effort A reliable databas e is a fundamental tool for deliberate and farsighted water management. Tensions between different water users can emerge when info r mation is not exchanged Disparities in stakeholders’ capacity to generate , interpret and legitimize data lead to mistrust of those with better information and support systems In the Incomati and Maputo River Basins the South African monopoly over data generation created such discomfort in downstream Mozambique that the basins’ Piggs Peak Agreement broke down

scarcity seems Systematic research indicators water conflict physical parameters arid climates conflict-prone humid ones increased droughts institutional capacity success cooperate water-scarce environment adapt institutional strategies treaties working groups construction dam irrigation scheme territorial realignment more likely institutions institutions matter dispute rights responsibilities implicit agreements cooperative arrangements national local levels lack of water conflict the way governed managed stronger policies regulate equitable sustainable management developing countries human technical financial resources authority contradictory objectives contradictory Peru territorial riparian water rights mythical historical accounts allocate inequitably social groups risk conflict South Africa ecological marginalization’ heightened grievances social instability exchanged mistrust

['Many analysts who write about water politics assume that scarcity of such a critical resource drives people to conflict. It seems intuitive: the less water there is, the more dearly it is held and the more likely it is that people will fight over it. Systematic research on indicators for transboundary water conflict, however, did not find any statistically significant physical parameters: arid climates were no more conflict-prone than humid ones and international cooperation actually increased during droughts. In fact, almost no single variable proved causal: democracies were as susceptible to conflict as autocracies, rich countries as much so as poor ones, densely populated countries as much so as sparsely populated ones and large countries as much so as small ones. When Oregon State University researchers looked closely at water management practices in arid countries, they found institutional capacity was the key to success. Naturally arid countries cooperate on water: to live in a water-scarce environment, people adapt to it by developing institutional strategies: formal treaties, informal working groups or generally warm relations. The researchers also found that the likelihood of conflict increased significantly if two factors came into play. First, conflict is more likely if the basin’s physical or political setting undergoes a large or rapid change, such as the construction of a dam, an irrigation scheme or territorial realignment. Second, conflict is more likely if existing institutions are unable to absorb and effectively manage that change. Institutions responsible for managing water resources have to be strong to balance conflicting interests over allocation and to manage water scarcity, which is often the result of previous mismanagement. These institutions can even become a matter of dispute themselves. In international river basins, water management typically fails to manage conflicts when there is no treaty spelling out each nation’s rights and responsibilities with regard to the shared river, nor any implicit agreements or cooperative arrangements. Similarly, at the national and local levels, it is not the lack of water that leads to conflict but the way it is governed and managed. Many countries need stronger policies to regulate water use and enable equitable and sustainable management. Especially in developing countries, water management institutions often lack the human, technical and financial resources to develop comprehensive management plans and ensure their implementation. Moreover, in many countries, decision-making authority is spread among different institutions responsible for agriculture, fisheries, water supply, regional development, tourism, transport or conservation and environment, so that different management approaches serve contradictory objectives. Formal and customary management practices can also be contradictory, as demonstrated for example in the Achamayo River Basin in Junin (Peru), where peasants claim territorial and riparian water rights on the grounds of mythical and historical accounts, in clear contradiction with the official water licence system enacted by state law. In countries without a formal system of water use permits or adequate enforcement and monitoring, more powerful water users can override the customary rights of local communities. If institutions allocate water inequitably between social groups, the risk of public protest and conflict increases. In South Africa, the apartheid regime allocated water to favour the white minority. This ‘ecological marginalization’ heightened the black population’s grievances and contributed to social instability, which ultimately precipitated the regime’s downfall. Institutions can also distribute costs and benefits unequally: revenues from major water infrastructure projects, such as large dams or irrigation schemes, usually benefit only a small elite, leaving local communities to cope with the resulting environmental and social impact, often with little compensation. The various parties to water conflicts often have differing perceptions regarding legal rights, the technical nature of the problem, the cost of solving it and the allocation of costs among stakeholders. Reliable sources of information acceptable to all stakeholders are therefore essential for any joint effort. This not only enables water-sharing parties to make decisions based on a common understanding; it also helps build trust. A reliable database, including meteorological, hydrological and socio-economic data, is a fundamental tool for deliberate and farsighted water management. Hydrological and meteorological data collected upstream are crucial for decision-making downstream. In emergencies like floods, this information is essential to protect human and environmental health. Tensions between different water users can emerge when information is not exchanged. Disparities in stakeholders’ capacity to generate, interpret and legitimize data can lead to mistrust of those with better information and support systems. In the Incomati and Maputo River Basins, the South African monopoly over data generation created such discomfort in downstream Mozambique that the basins’ Piggs Peak Agreement broke down; Mozambique used this negotiation impasse to start developing its own data. ', '']

[(0, 16)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpBa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-4.docx

Kansas

SpBa

46f96ddff1ccdc4aef640c3ac91c3e3921dba45d4b25979d3b0e40e61f1c0088

Yoon’s Comments do not mean prolif is inevitable

Panda 23 [Ankit Panda, Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Nuclear Temptations and the U.S.-South Korean Alliance,” 02-03-23, War on the Rocks, ] [language modified]

Yoon’s remarks do not represent policy planning process or indicate decision to procure nuc s “realistically possible” option, “for now,” was the alliance with the U S realistic option is to respect the [ NPT]

Yoon been outspoken about possibility that Seoul could “acquire our own nuke Yoon’s remarks do not represent the result of a considered policy planning process or indicate decision to procure nuc s will be soon made in So Ko the “realistically possible” option, “for now,” was the alliance with the U S realistic and rational option is to fully respect the [ NPT]

do not alliance U S

['Amid drastic negative changes to its security environment and fundamental questions about the long-term reliability of the United States, South Korea is drawn — as it once was in the 1970s — to nuclear weapons. On Jan. 11, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, a conservative who has been outspoken about North Korea’s nuclear threats, voiced the possibility that Seoul could “acquire our own nuke.” Alluding to his country’s advanced scientific prowess, delivery systems, and long-acknowledged nuclear latency, Yoon noted that, should such a decision be made, Seoul’s advanced “science and technology” would ensure that the time required to build such a capability would be short. Yoon’s words have made global headlines and jolted alliance hands in Washington. ', 'Yoon’s remarks, while concerning, do not represent the result of a considered policy planning process or indicate that a decision to procure nuclear weapons will be soon made in South Korea. Instead, the South Korean president alluded to the possibility of pursuing nuclear weapons in a wide-ranging set of remarks to South Korean foreign and defense officials. According to one unofficial translation of a released Korean transcript, Yoon premised the possibility of nuclear weapons acquisition on a conditional: “if problems become more serious, ', '[South Korea] could deploy tactical nuclear weapons here, or we could acquire our own nuke as well.” He concluded this section of his remarks by reverting to the status quo, noting that the “realistically possible” option, “for now,” was the alliance with the United States. In the days since his remarks went public, Yoon has tried to manage perceptions: for instance, Yoon publicly noted that South Korea’s “realistic and rational option is to fully respect the [NPT] [Non-Proliferation Treaty] regime” and that he remained “fully confident about the U.S.’s extended deterrence', '', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GuMi-Neg-Harvard-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

GuMi

066ed11d37134ad7dae386da344bb84d79559bfa40945f933542c35cb56d6f88

Plan focus is inadequate for health policy – social imaginary of health creates long term institutional effects for implementation.

João NUNES Postdoctoral Fellow Politics & Int’l Studies @ Warwick ’14 Security, Emancipation, and the Politics of Health p. 107-108

Health provides a vocabulary and a frame of reference for legitimizing decisions and actions part of the political imagination in which decisions actions occur political impact of health goes well beyond short-term policymaking seen as part of longterm dynamics in mobilization of power and in the reproduction reconfiguration of the political realm health is also political it is not fixed and determined If health is made in certain ways, it can be ‘unmade’ and ‘remade’ health can be the site where alternative ideas transformative efforts are deployed health may also be the focal point for new politics to be imagined.

health is political Health provides a vocabulary and a frame of reference for legitimizing decisions and actions it is part of the political imagination in which decisions and actions occur . the political impact of health goes well beyond short-term policymaking it should be seen as part of longterm dynamics in the mobilization of power and in the reproduction and reconfiguration of the political realm the fact that health is also political in the sense that it is not fixed and determined . If health is made in certain ways, it can be ‘unmade’ and ‘remade’ . health can be the site where alternative ideas and transformative efforts are deployed health may also be the focal point for a new politics to be imagined.

Health provides a vocabulary and a frame of reference for legitimizing decisions and actions part of the political imagination in which decisions actions occur political impact of health goes well beyond short-term policymaking seen as part of longterm dynamics in it is not fixed and determined transformative efforts are deployed health may also be the focal point for new politics to be imagined.

['Conclusion', 'Politics as we know it is, in part, the outcome of ideas and practices of health. This chapter argued that, more than being made in certain ways, health is also political inasmuch as it does things. Throughout history, diseases have confronted humans as political experiences: they pose challenges and dilemmas to the way society and the political sphere are organized, and they often lead to their reconfiguration. Importantly, security - in the form of an anxiety over the definition and safeguarding of the self - plays a central role in the justification and operationalization of the political work of health.', 'The argument highlighted the extent to which health concerns have framed the transformation of the state into an extensive administrative and bureaucratic system. Health is present in the way cities are planned, in the way the social space is defined, and also in the interactions between individuals and groups within that space. Health produces subjects: be it pathological states of being or healthy ideals to be achieved (or purchased, or consumed). Health provides a vocabulary and a frame of reference for legitimizing decisions and actions; it is part of the political imagination in which decisions and actions occur. As the case of tropical medicine shows, the political impact of health goes well beyond short-term policymaking; it should be seen as part of longterm dynamics in the mobilization of power and in the reproduction and reconfiguration of the political realm. In this context, this chapter demonstrated the usefulness of working with a notion of power comprising government (a multifaceted power over life) and domination, that is, an assemblage of inequalities, systematic disadvantages and outright harm.', 'The political work of health is long-standing, and its future is as yet uncertain. In his reflection about some recent technological developments in the field of biomedicine, Rose (2007) raises important questions about the future impact of ideas and practices of health. What will be the social and political consequences of recent technologies that allow for the human body to be known in new ways, and that provide the opportunity for the physiology and functions of body parts and organs to be recast? How will these technologies be framed by new ideas about the meaning of being human and the meaning of being in society? And what health challenges does the future reserve? The political work of health will continue to evolve through the interaction between challenges, ideas and technical instruments.', 'This points to another crucial dimension of the politics of health: the fact that health is also political in the sense that it is not fixed and determined. If health is made in certain ways, it can be ‘unmade’ and ‘remade’. As the next chapter shows, health can be the site where alternative ideas and transformative efforts are deployed. Given that it plays such a crucial role in the making of politics, health may also be the focal point for a new politics to be imagined.']

[(5, 10), (66, 69)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Race-6.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

3995542b9ccdd44c667bacb438569a3a0bb680c743c5e20c6632a8f68b4b2c1c

3. Challenging neoliberal mindsets precedes policies---key to alternate visions for global politics

Mathieu Hilgers 13. Laboratory for Contemporary Anthropology, Université Libre de Bruxelles, and Centre for Urban and Community Research, Goldsmiths, University of London, [“Embodying neoliberalism: thoughts and responses to critics,” Social Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 1, February 2013, p. 75-89, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

implementation of neolib goes beyond policies If we wish to grasp the depth we cannot neglect its systems of dispositions it is necessary to describe the symbolic operations Neoliberalism is embodied in agents and representations dispositions become durable There lies importance of broadening the notion of ‘implementation’, so we may appreciate the role of culture in neoliberal expansion It is because of embodiment that we are nowhere near the end if we hope to think beyond the neoliberal age the first thing to do is decolonize our mind

The implementation of neolib eralism goes beyond policies . It cannot be reduced to institutional changes If we wish to grasp the depth of the changes that neoliberalism causes, we cannot neglect its effects on systems of dispositions . To analyse this impact, it is necessary to describe the symbolic operations that give rise to government-enabling representations as well as to categories that support neoliberalism and are propagated by it Neoliberalism is embodied in the agents and representations through which it is put into action the dispositions that it generates become durable and transposable There in lies the importance of broadening the notion of ‘implementation’, so that we may appreciate the role of culture in the dynamics of neoliberal expansion . It is precisely because of the embodiment of neoliberalism that we are nowhere near the end of the neoliberal era today it is capitalism that is in crisis, not neoliberalism information that helps people to stabilize their perceptions and activities is mainly produced within a neoliberal context They impact the way in which one conceives and carries out academia is a for neoliberalism If neoliberalism is so present in our mind and in the way in which academia is designed and works it appears more than necessary for researchers to consider how this shapes their relation to production of knowledge If we wish to avoid the eviction of critical perspectives in this time of crisis, if we hope to think within but beyond the neoliberal age , if we want to develop alternatives and different horizons, one of the first thing s to do is to decolonize our mind by objectifying our own neoliberal dispositions this kind of objectivation has led some researchers to call for a radical change in the academy academia is still a space of critiques and alternatives

beyond policies embodied in the agents and representations role of culture embodiment of neoliberalism nowhere near decolonize our mind

['The implementation of neoliberalism goes far beyond the mere appearance of its policies. It cannot be reduced to the application of a programme or to institutional changes. This implementation is deployed within a triangle constituted by policies, institutions and dispositions. This last component has remained at the margins of our debate. If we wish to grasp the depth of the changes that neoliberalism causes, we cannot neglect its effects on systems of dispositions. To analyse this impact, it is necessary to describe the symbolic operations that give rise to government-enabling representations as well as to categories that support neoliberalism and are propagated by it. This task requires accounting for the historicity of the spaces in which policies are put into action, the intentional constructions but also involuntary historical formations in which they become entangled, and the transactions, negotiations, associations, working misunderstandings and chains of translation that give them their flexibility and support their deployment.', 'Neoliberalism is embodied in the agents and representations through which it is put into action. Through a historical process, the dispositions that it generates become, as Bourdieu would say, durable and transposable, as well as increasingly autonomous from their initial conditions of production. As such, when these conditions disappear or transform, or when policies are modified or abandoned, some of them spread into other social spaces and contexts and take on new meanings. Therein lies the importance of broadening the notion of ‘implementation’, so that we may appreciate the role of culture in the dynamics of neoliberal expansion. It is precisely (but not only) because of the embodiment of neoliberalism emphasized in this paper that at the moment we are nowhere near the end of the neoliberal era. Thus I arrive, by a different path, at the same observation that Kalb (2012) formulated in this debate: today it is capitalism that is in crisis, not neoliberalism.', 'In some parts of the world, information that helps people to stabilize their perceptions, practices and activities is mainly produced within a neoliberal context, forms and procedures. The figures, statistics, norms, audits and discourses that I evoke in this paper are fashioned by a constellation of institutions; they condition, train and shape a mental and practical space. They impact the way in which one conceives and carries out research. Indeed, academia is not outside of this neoliberal world; on the contrary, it is a centre of development and support for neoliberalism. While many academics are critical of neoliberalism, this does not mean that they have a permanent deconstructionist relation to the world and to themselves. In many parts of academia, a neoliberal way of functioning has become common sense. If neoliberalism is so present in our mind and in the way in which academia is designed and works today, it appears more than necessary for researchers to consider how this shapes their relation to production of knowledge.', 'If we wish to avoid the eviction of critical perspectives in this time of crisis, if we hope to have some chance to think within but beyond the neoliberal age, if we want to develop alternatives and different horizons, one of the first things to do is to decolonize our mind by objectifying our own neoliberal dispositions. The reflexive return to the tools of analysis is thus ‘not an epistemological scruple but an indispensable pre-condition of scientific knowledge of the object’ (Bourdieu 1984: 94), if we are to prevent the object and its definition from being dictated to the researcher by non-scientific logics, such as the necessity of being visible and marketable in the academy. To achieve a break with neoliberal common sense, anthropologists could follow Bourdieu (2003) in his will to engage in a ‘participant objectivation’.14 It is clearly this kind of objectivation even if not phrased in such terms that has led some researchers to call for a radical change in the academy, supported by new arguments and put into practice through the initiation of a ‘slow science’ movement.15 In some places, academia is still a space of critiques and alternatives.', '']

[(8, 15), (16, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeMi-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-4.docx

Emory

HeMi

d315b52e037f465ec32cffb9ff6ca2cd8809721e91d5a0c07b2c69eeb5feedcc

12. No natural ex risk.

Ord 20 [Toby Ord, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, “The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity,” 2020, Hachette Books, EA]

a global pandemic fall short of a threat to humanity biological observations and theories suggest pathogens are unlikely to lead t extinction the anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% infected tendency of pandemics to become less virulent and optimal virulence 50 percent was not enough to collapse civilization civilization is likely to make it even if global Extinction risk above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with evidence of how long humanity lasted

Could a pandemic threaten humanity ’s future? the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity ’s longterm potential In addition to historical evidence, there are some deep er biological observations and theories suggest ing that pathogens are unlikely to lead t o the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality , the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected , the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover . The regional 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if global The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted

humanity fall short humanity historical deep biological suggest pathogens are unlikely to lead t o the extinction empirical anti-correlation infectiousness lethality extreme rarity tendency become less virulent optimal virulence recover 50 percent not enough precipitate a continent-wide collapse likely to make it through even if global fossil record 0.1 percent per century incompatible evidence how long

['Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10 ', 'The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11 ', 'When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox. ', 'During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13 ', 'Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined. ', 'Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15 ', '[FOONOTE]', 'In addition to this historical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories suggesting that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence. However, there is no watertight case against pathogens leading to the extinction of their hosts.', '[END FOOTNOTE]', 'In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale. ', 'The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16 ', 'It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk.', '']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-DaPa-Aff-Georgetown-Round-3.docx

Dartmouth

DaPa

53c309151152cc6ca288947d6299088c71ff7c56ab3a704e0d587824e5d25862

The link is linear---eliminating nuclear roles causes corresponding conventional upgrades

Michael Gerson 9, division lead, project director, and senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, staff member on the Nuclear Posture Review, has published numerous articles and book chapters on nuclear issues, co-chaired a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)-funded commission on the future of US-Russia nuclear arms control, and served as a committee member of a CSIS-funded commission on US-China nuclear relations, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters, 2009, https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Conventional-Deterrence-in-the-2nd-Nuclear-Age-by-Gerson-090901.pdf

As the United States seeks to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening conventional forces it has to also work to offset the asymmetric options used to balance against conventional power A reduction in the role that nuclear weapons play requires a corresponding increase in conventional capabilities . conventional weapons will occupy a significant portion of the discourse in the new century

This incentive for nuclear acquisition underscores the continued necessity of nuclear deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist. As the United States seeks to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening conventional forces , it has to also work to offset the asymmetric options used to balance against its conventional power A reduction in the role that nuclear weapons play in America’s national security strategy requires a corresponding increase in conventional capabilities . Whereas nuclear weapons dominated the research and debate on deterrence in the twentieth century, conventional weapons will likely occupy a significant portion of the discourse in the new century .

reduce reliance on nuclear weapons strengthening conventional forces offset the asymmetric options used to balance against its conventional power reduction in the role that nuclear weapons play corresponding increase in conventional capabilities occupy a significant portion of the discourse in the new century

['This incentive for nuclear acquisition underscores the continued necessity of nuclear deterrence as long as nuclear weapons exist. As the United States seeks to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by strengthening conventional forces, it has to also work to offset the asymmetric options used to balance against its conventional power. Consequently, as the United States expands the role of conventional capabilities in deterrence, a credible nuclear deterrent is still required, at least for the foreseeable future, to help convince current and potential adversaries that nuclear weapons are not an effective tool to restore freedom-of-action or gain coercive leverage over its neighbors or the United States. ', 'Conclusion', 'In his 5 April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama stated that the United States intends to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” This reduction, if achieved, does not signify the beginning of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The President was careful to note that nuclear deterrence would be necessary as long as other nations possess nuclear weapons, and that the goal of a nuclear-free world “will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in my lifetime.” ', 'A reduction in the role that nuclear weapons play in America’s national security strategy requires a corresponding increase in conventional capabilities. Whereas nuclear weapons dominated the research and debate on deterrence in the twentieth century, conventional weapons will likely occupy a significant portion of the discourse in the new century.', '', '']

[(8, 14), (15, 16)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-CaEl-Neg-Kathryn-Klassic-Round-8.docx

Dartmouth

CaEl

90e06f17487f8ef772bd3a2b9e9d8ae670495375e3608bfa7eec179be1ea3c0a

ASEAN fails to moderate conflict

Hartcher 17, Australian journalist and the Political and International Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute, a Sydney-based foreign policy think tank (Peter Hartcher, 8-28-2017, "ASEAN: The Asian strategic player that stinks," Sydney Morning Herald, https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/asean-the-asian-strategic-player-that-stinks-20170828-gy5g7f.html)

there were powerful voices they have gone quiet This is ASEAN's 50th anniversary and there's been gushing But which crises has it solved ? ASEAN is useless Splitting ASEAN was child's play for Beijing ASEAN can't even issue a communique that breathes the least criticism for a crisis, there's no way ASEAN can play a role ASEAN is like durian . Looks large and spiky On closer inspection it stinks

there were plenty of powerful voices they have gone quiet This is ASEAN's 50th anniversary and there's been much gushing about its success. But which of the region's crises has it solved ? ASEAN is useless . But isn't ASEAN a key strategic player that can help manage China's ambitions and maintain peace That's the claim of its boosters. Unfortunately not . Splitting ASEAN was child's play for Beijing ASEAN can't even issue a communique that breathes the least criticism of Beijing for a serious crisis, there's simply no way ASEAN can play a serious role ." ASEAN is a bit like South-east Asia's so-called king of fruits , the durian . Looks impressively large and spiky from a distance . On closer inspection it stinks

they have gone quiet But which of the region's crises has it solved ? useless Unfortunately not ASEAN is a bit like South-east Asia's so-called king of fruits durian impressively large spiky from a distance On closer inspection it stinks

['The hope of a better Myanmar under the much-admired Aung San Suu Kyi now looks forlorn. The crisis of Myanmar\'s Muslim minority community, the Rohingya, continues to escalate. Since Friday, news has been emerging of mass violence between the Myanmar army and Rohingya militants. At least 90 people are reported dead. The Rohingya are the world\'s biggest community of stateless people. Somewhere around 1 million of them live among Myanmar\'s 50 million Buddhists.They\'ve lived in northern Myanmar\'s Rakhine state for centuries yet are despised and denied the right to citizenship. Some reported being called "Bengal bastards" as their Buddhist neighbours joined the army in clubbing them on the weekend. Thousands of Rohingya civilians responded to the fighting by trying to flee the country, crossing the Naf River into Bangladesh. Some made it but the Bangladeshis are turning most back.The Rohingya are not blameless; their militia reportedly started the violence on Friday by attacking 30 police stations in Myanmar. But they are not the sole culprits. In fact, it seems that the Rohingya resistance is fighting back after brutal years-long repression by the authorities. Late last year the government forces committed crimes of rape and murder and arson against the Rohingya that "seem to have been widespread as well as systematic, indicating the very likely commission of crimes against humanity," according to a February report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Aung San Suu Kyi\'s response? The State Councillor and de facto ruler of Myanmar said the reports were made up. Consistently, she blames the Rohingya and refuses to accept any government responsibility. While Suu Kyi was an outstanding ambassador for her repressed opposition party while it suffered under the heel of the military regime, she seems quite indifferent, even hostile, to the oppressed minority suffering under the heel of her regime. The news across the border in Thailand on Friday wasn\'t terribly good either. The former prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, fled the country rather than face the verdict of the Supreme Court on a charge that she was negligent in operating a national rice-buying scheme. Not that she had any chance of a fair hearing. She\'d already been fined $1 billion over the same matter. She was facing 10 years in prison. The case against her was merely part of the military junta\'s consolidation of power. Sadly, Thailand\'s conservative establishment simply refuses to allow the people to choose their own government. It will sometimes allow elections but then overturns them if it doesn\'t like the result. First her brother\'s popular, pro-poor government was overthrown by a military coup in 2006. Then, when she replaced him as head of his party and had the temerity to win an election, it was her turn. Now it seems she will join him in exile, living between Dubai and London. The Bangkok court ruling was to merely tidy up, by firmly taking her out of future politics. It wasn\'t so much the rice-buying scheme that the establishment objected to, although it was a botch job that collapsed leaving the government billions in debt. Their real complaint was that Yingluck Shinawatra used the scheme to redistribute income to farmers - mostly poor family enterprises - by paying above-market prices for their harvest. That, while disdaining the rich elites, was her true crime. Democracy, good governance, political freedom, personal liberty from the state are in shabby condition in both Myanmar and Thailand. And looking a little further, the state of the neighbourhood isn\'t much better, unfortunately. "There are brief moments of exuberance and optimism," says an ANU expert on South-east Asia, Nicholas Farrelly, "but when you look at the deep structure of forces across the board you see that democracy across South-east Asia is very shallow and nobody is really prepared to give it the nourishment it needs. "As recently as the mid-2000s there were plenty of powerful voices across the region looking for a different kind of politics; they have gone quiet," says Farrelly, founder of the New Mandala website on South-east Asian affairs. Farrelly ranks the 10 principal countries of the region according to their success as democratic systems, and "there is not much dissent among experts that Indonesia is on the top rung". Next, he says, is the Philippines, despite President Rodrigo Duterte\'s startlingly brutal human rights abuses and the advent of a new Daesh, so-called Islamic State, outpost. This is followed by Myanmar, and then the two neighbouring quasi-autocracies of Malaysia and Singapore. Sixth place in Farrelly\'s reckoning is Thailand: "If you have a hardline military dictatorship and you\'re prepared to give it mid ranking in the democracy stakes, that tells you a lot about the state of the region." Last are Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Brunei. But what of their regional association, the much-vaunted Association of South East Asian Nations? This is ASEAN\'s 50th anniversary and there\'s been much gushing about its success. But which of the region\'s crises has it solved, and which is it attempting to tackle? The truth is that, whether it\'s the region\'s economic crisis of 1997, the Rohingya refugee crisis of today or anything in between, ASEAN is next to useless. But isn\'t ASEAN a key strategic player that can help manage China\'s ambitions and maintain the peace in South-east Asia? That\'s the claim of its boosters. Unfortunately not. Splitting ASEAN was child\'s play for Beijing. Two of China\'s client states, Laos and Cambodia, object whenever other ASEAN members try to complain about China\'s conduct. So ASEAN can\'t even issue a communique that breathes the least criticism of Beijing, much less takes any action. China has picked off the ASEAN states one by one in the South China Sea while ASEAN looks on uselessly. ASEAN is useful for intermediating between the elites of the region\'s capitals, says Farrelly, "keeping a certain kind of conversation. But for a serious crisis, there\'s simply no way ASEAN can play a serious role."ASEAN is a bit like South-east Asia\'s so-called king of fruits, the durian. Looks impressively large and spiky from a distance. On closer inspection it stinks.', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 11)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Soper-Maverick-Neg-Rutgers-Semis.docx

Kansas

SoMa1

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/SoMa1/Kansas-Soper-Maverick-Neg-Rutgers-Semis.docx

a8a91f669755a5a652ae8060badf3d87884aef54991c7757bbbb0b70459e9b0a

Biden is using PC on AUMF and it’s key

Looker, 3/16/23 – USA Today

Biden is backing Kaine's bill Kaine credited support from the Biden for re-introducing the bill saying the president understands the role of Congress

Biden is backing Kaine's bill and support passage Kaine credited support from the Biden administration as part of his reasoning for re-introducing the bill this Congress, saying the president understands the role of Congress from his time in the upper chamber.

Kaine credited support from the Biden administration as part of his reasoning for re-introducing the bill this Congress, saying the president understands the role of Congress from his time in the upper chamber.

['(Rachel, “Biden backs Senate efforts to repeal old military authorizations for Iraq and Gulf wars”, USA Today, March 16, 2023, p. //Dinger) ', '', "Biden, who previously served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is backing Kaine's bill and would support passage of the legislation. ", 'Repealing the authorizations would not impact current military operations, according to a statement from the Biden administration, because the United States does not have ongoing military activities related to the decades-old authorizations.', 'Kaine credited support from the Biden administration as part of his reasoning for re-introducing the bill this Congress, saying the president understands the role of Congress from his time in the upper chamber. ', '']

[(0, 12)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Neg-0---NDT-Round-2.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

ddb2a7a725066c3086d8573e8a63484c090e07d61ba87d6522136442796e0de0

Strong signaling of U.S. nuclear resolve has preserved NATO alignment.

Andrew Futter 23. Professor in International Politics at the University of Leicester. Previous Visiting Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington DC, a Visiting Scholar at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, and a former fellow at the Norwegian Nobel Peace Institute in Oslo. PhD in Military Security Policy and Strategy from the University of Birmingham. 6-19-2023. "Five nuclear reflections on the Ukraine War," https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/five-nuclear-reflections-on-the-ukraine-war/.

NATO emerged stronger and more politically aligned than at any time for a generation, and nuclear deterrence has been given a new lease of life conflict brought an abrupt end to nuclear complacency the immediate challenge appears to be maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence capability rather than making steps towards disarmament Maintaining the NATO deterrence posture signalling greater resolve from the continued possession of nucl weapons by the US

NATO and the West have emerged from the first year and a bit of the war looking stronger and more politically aligned than at any time for a generation, and the NATO nuclear deterrence mission has been given a new lease of life the conflict brought an abrupt end to nuclear complacency and apathy that has characterised European politics since the Cold War. the immediate challenge facing governments across the Euro-Atlantic space appears to be maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence capability rather than making significant steps towards disarmament Maintaining the NATO deterrence posture involve signalling greater resolve from the case for the continued possession of nucl ear weapons by the US

stronger more politically aligned at any time nuclear deterrence mission new lease of life abrupt end nuclear complacency immediate challenge nuclear rather than towards disarmament Maintaining the NATO deterrence posture signalling greater resolve continued possession

['NATO and the West have arguably emerged from the first year and a bit of the war looking stronger and more politically aligned than at any time for a generation, and the NATO nuclear deterrence mission has been given a new lease of life. This is almost certainly the reverse of what President Putin (and perhaps President Xi) had hoped for. But the conflict has also reignited a number of difficult questions and decisions for European policymakers and citizens. Not least, it has brought an abrupt end to a certain nuclear complacency and apathy that has characterised European politics since the Cold War. This shift will necessitate divisive political choices, not least the acceptance that the immediate challenge facing governments across the Euro-Atlantic space appears to be maintaining a credible nuclear and conventional deterrence capability and pursuing risk reduction and confidence-building measures rather than making significant steps towards disarmament. Maintaining the NATO deterrence posture could also – at least in the short term – involve signalling greater resolve and even higher spending on military forces in general, especially if one accepts that Russia is only one-half of the revisionist challenge facing the West. This, in turn, will require engaging European publics and making the case for a greater commitment to defence, including nuclear deterrence, in an era of significant economic pressures. This will be far from straightforward because it is not entirely clear whether evidence from the last 15 months of war strengthens or weakens the case for the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the US, UK, France, and NATO.', '']

[(7, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Kentucky-RR-Round-5.docx

Emory

KeRa

78988c3da3615ca0c6e84a6d73842181926f5aeec853279884b3a0bb2b7dea13

That’s not the counterplan.

Louis Henkin 87, University Professor at Columbia University, “The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny,”, Harvard Law Review, vol. 100, February 1987

international and U S law determined by reference to principle c i l supersedes any U S and conflicts with Congress countries accepted supremacy over domestic legislation

The relationship between international and U nited S tates law has to be determined by reference to principle c ustomary i nternational l aw supersedes any U nited S tates law and should be given effect when it conflicts with a subsequent act of Congress . The law of customary law, is binding on the U nited S tates countries accepted the supremacy of international law courts give effect to international law over domestic legislation C ustomary i nternational l aw is universal and lasting and has better claim to supremacy treaties

international U S reference c i l supersedes U S conflicts Congress binding U S supremacy courts over legislation C i l universal lasting supremacy

['The relationship between international and United States law, then, cannot be determined by declaring international law to be common law and therefore inferior to legislation. It has to be determined by reference to some principle that would locate the United States on the monist-dualist spectrum. In fact, one could advance persuasive arguments that customary international law supersedes any United States law and should be given effect even when it conflicts with a subsequent act of Congress. The law of nations, including both treaties and customary international law, is binding on the United States. The framers of the Constitution respected the law of nations, and it is plausible that they expected the political branches as well as the courts to give effect to that law. 100 Other countries have accepted the supremacy of international law: their courts give effect to international law over domestic legislation. 101 Our legal system subordinates treaties to subsequent congressional acts, because the Court has determined that the supremacy clause imposes that hierarchy. But no similar textual basis exists for subordinating customary international law. Customary international law is universal and lasting and has better claim to supremacy than do treaties, which govern only the parties and can be readily terminated or replaced by those parties.']

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdWe-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-4.docx

Kentucky

AdWe

71bd44cd12ad82aa90105cd3ab41d3f07c6b0c015049a2f7d3b86df0ba23ed52

8 Reassurance solves.

Ramesh Thakur. 16. emeritus professor in the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University, Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Peace Institute, Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and was an R2P commissioner and one of three authors of its report. “Why Obama should declare a no-first-use policy for nuclear weapons”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 8-19-16. https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/why-obama-should-declare-a-no-first-use-policy-for-nuclear-weapons/

umbrella will hold not clear security guarantees change much if Washington adopted n f u U S not going to use first Allies who believe otherwise attached to fiction n f u with diplomatic efforts to reassure allies shouldn’t be any long-term damage or practical change to security commitments

The umbrella will hold . One of the loudest objections to no-first-use is that it could disrupt the nuclear deterrence Washington extends to allies extended nuclear deterrence has its limitations it’s not clear American security guarantees would change much if Washington adopted a n f u U S security commitments do not include a specific commitment to use nuclear weapons in their defense especially against non-nuclear attacks. The U S is not going to use nuclear weapons first Allies who believe otherwise attached to a fiction n f u with diplomatic efforts to reassure allies of ongoing security commitments shouldn’t be any long-term damage to relationships or any practical change to the security commitments themselves.

umbrella will hold . loudest objections has its limitations would change much specific commitment especially attached to a fiction shouldn’t be any long-term damage any practical change

['The umbrella will hold. One of the loudest objections to an American no-first-use declaration is that it could disrupt the nuclear deterrence Washington extends to its non-nuclear allies, countries like Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The Japanese government in particular has expressed concern about this, as have Britain, France, and South Korea. Yet extended nuclear deterrence has its limitations, and it’s not clear if American security guarantees would change much if Washington adopted a no-first-use policy.', 'While the United States has firm security commitments to countries in northern Asia, for example, these do not include, according to the arms-control expert Jeffrey Lewis, a specific commitment to use nuclear weapons in their defense—especially against non-nuclear attacks. Michael Krepon, writing recently for Arms Control Wonk, put it this way: “The United States is not going to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Allies who believe otherwise are attached to a fiction and a psychological crutch.”', 'Thus while an American no-first-use declaration would certainly cause some commotion in the short term, with the proper diplomatic efforts to reassure allies of Washington’s ongoing security commitments, there shouldn’t be any long-term damage done to those relationships—or any practical change to the security commitments themselves.', '']

[(7, 18)]

ndtceda

Emory-LiRa-Aff-Sunflower-Swing-Round-2.docx

Emory

LiRa

24aa8719405edfc2c325b6d9672193446a8d7172a547a22272512a54ee8e06f0

Turns Case – over-investing in the ballot’s “political force” renders challenges to antiblackness into local self help.

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

drawing on Butler the trained imagination can alter the physical world [i]t’s as easy to manifest one dollar as one million if you have the right mindset magical voluntarism argue that structural change is possible for anything you desire through conscious thought and choice the outcome is narcissistic complacency if we’re really angry at a war that’s going on we’re adding our energy to it although the rhetoric of magic exemplified by The Secret acknowledges structural injustice, it gets explained away in mystical terms that urge the reader to turn her back to the world and seek within localized ‘‘self-help’’ can do little to curtail broader abuses of capitalist globalization as if the (magical) options available actually apply to sweatshop workers The Secret counsel passivity in the face of oppression letting purveyors of inequality off the hook

drawing on Butler Foss, Waters, and Armada argue that orienting oneself as the ‘‘director’’ of one’s life is in tune with a tenet acknowledged by a number of diverse perspectives, ranging from social constructionism to quantum physics. Simply put, it is that symbols create reality . . . . Symbolic choices . . . can and do affect the structural world . . . . Because the structural world is itself a construction, individuals are capable of changing that world by thinking and making choices about it. Such a position is entirely in keeping with the ‘‘core concept’’ of magic: ‘‘that mind affects matter , and that . . . the trained imagination can alter the physical world ’’ . Similarly, Byrne writes, ‘‘ [i]t’s as easy to manifest one dollar as it is to manifest one million dollars’’ if you simply have the right mindset (p. 68). Although we do not dismiss certain forms of constructivist thought, it is important to detail the consequence or ‘‘outcome’’ of choosing magical voluntarism . Both The Secret and Foss, Waters, and Armada invoke physics to argue that structural change is possible for anything you desire through conscious thought and choice . the outcome of adopting this ontological view about ‘‘structural’’ conditions? The Secret is quite clear on the answer: narcissistic complacency . ‘‘Anything we focus on we do create,’’ explains Hale Dwoskin, ‘‘so if we’re really angry , for instance, at a war that’s going on , or strife or suffering, we’re adding our energy to it ’’ (pp. 141–142). So although the rhetoric of magic exemplified by The Secret acknowledges structural injustice, it gets explained away in mystical terms that urge the reader to turn her back to the world and seek within . localized ‘‘self-help’’ can do little to curtail broader abuses of capitalist globalization as if the (magical) options available actually apply to sweatshop workers we ask our readers to consider seriously the possibility that it might be true under all conditions. Even in the contexts of famine and genocide changing one’s interpretation of events is the correct strategy The Secret counsel passivity in the face of the most brutal exploitation and oppression , letting the purveyors of inequality off the hook for their actions, urging millions to think positively in the face of their immiseration. 9

narcissistic complacency really angry localized ‘‘self-help’’ capitalist globalization purveyors

['Constructivism and the Malleable World. Presumably drawing on the work of Judith Butler (1993, p. 28),5 Foss, Waters, and Armada argue that orienting oneself as the ‘‘director’’ of one’s life is in tune with a tenet acknowledged by a number of diverse perspectives, ranging from social constructionism to quantum physics. Simply put, it is that symbols create reality. . . . Symbolic choices . . . can and do affect the structural world. . . . Although the reality of everyday life appears prearranged, ordered, and objective, and therefore outside of agents’ sphere of influence . . . the structural world not only ‘‘bears cultural constructions’’ but is itself a construction. (p. 220) Because the structural world is itself a construction, individuals are capable of changing that world by thinking and making choices about it. Although the authors acknowledge that ‘‘agents cannot . . . lay out precisely the routes through which their desires will be fulfilled,’’ they nevertheless believe that ‘‘desires are realized in outcomes that align with agents’ choices’’ because of the ontological status of the structural world as a construction (p. 220). The key to understanding the ideal of agentic orientation is full consciousness: In order to change the construction of the world, one must understand what options are available and put faith in unforeseen possibilities yet to come (pp. 220–221). Such a position is entirely in keeping with the ‘‘core concept’’ of magic: ‘‘that mind affects matter, and that . . . the trained imagination can alter the physical world’’ (Luhrman, p. 7).6 Not surprisingly, Rhonda Byrne also aligns ‘‘The Secret’’ with quantum physics (p. 156); however, constructivism appears in The Secret most conspicuously in the guise of ‘‘the law of attraction,’’ which Bob Doyle, ‘‘author and law of attraction specialist,’’ defines simply as ‘‘like attracts like’’ at ‘‘a level of thought.’’ Byrne elaborates: The law of attraction says like attracts like, and so as you think a thought, you are also attracting like thoughts to you. . . . Your life right now is a reflection of your past thoughts. That includes all the great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life . . . Until now! Now you are learning The Secret, and with this knowledge, you can change everything. (pp. 8–9) Changing everything depends on understanding the ontological primacy of attraction, which is best grasped as a form of magnetism (even though magnetism is, in physics, the attraction of opposites): ‘‘Thoughts are magnetic, and thoughts have a frequency,’’ explains Byrne. ‘‘As you think, those thoughts are sent out into the Universe, and they magnetically attract all like things that are on the same frequency’’ (p. 10). Nevertheless, as with Foss, Waters, and Armada, Byrne and her army of specialists insist on the constructedness of reality and the mutability of structure. ‘‘Time,’’ for example, is just an illusion: Einstein told us that. If this is the first time you have heard it, you may find it a hard concept to get your head around. . . . What quantum physicists and Einstein tell us is that everything is happening simultaneously. . . . It takes no time for the Universe to manifest what you want. Any time delay you experience is due to your delay in getting to the place of believing, knowing, and feeling that you already have it. (p. 63) The concept of temporality is used here to teach readers a certain version of constructivism, which is similar to the version Foss, Waters, and Armada advance in their reading of Run Lola Run: all three runs in the film happen at the same time, but reflect different levels of believing, knowing, and feeling. Once Lola understood the mutability of reality and the power of her manipulation of symbols, she could magically bend the laws of the Universe for money. Similarly, Byrne writes, ‘‘[i]t’s as easy to manifest one dollar as it is to manifest one million dollars’’ if you simply have the right mindset (p. 68). Although we do not dismiss certain forms of constructivist thought, it is important to detail the consequence or ‘‘outcome’’ of choosing magical voluntarism. Both The Secret and Foss, Waters, and Armada invoke physics to argue that structural change is possible for anything you desire through conscious thought and choice. Hence, magical voluntarism denies that some material and social conditions are not changeable: Agentic orientations . . . are achieved within, rather than simply given by, the conditions of individuals’ lives. Thus, individuals may be in a dominant position as defined by economic and other structural conditions or in a subordinate position as defined by a lack of access to such resources, but they may choose any agentic orientation and produce any outcome they desire. We acknowledge that such a view may be difficult to accept in extreme cases such as imprisonment or genocide; even in these situations, however, agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency. Even in these situations, adoption of the agentic orientation of director opens up opportunities for innovating in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims. (p. 223, emphasis added) In other words, the starving prisoner in a concentration camp should choose the director orientation and dream-up the possibility of her liberation or escape.7 Aside from the offensiveness of such a perspective on imprisonment and genocide, what is the outcome of adopting this ontological view about ‘‘structural’’ conditions? The Secret is quite clear on the answer: narcissistic complacency. ‘‘Anything we focus on we do create,’’ explains Hale Dwoskin, ‘‘so if we’re really angry, for instance, at a war that’s going on, or strife or suffering, we’re adding our energy to it’’ (pp. 141–142). So although the rhetoric of magic exemplified by The Secret acknowledges structural injustice, it gets explained away in mystical terms that urge the reader to turn her back to the world and seek within. The video and book openly discourage social protest, invoking Carl Jung’s phrase, ‘‘what you resist persists’’ (p. 142). ‘‘Don’t give energy to what you don’t want,’’ intones one of the video’s ‘‘teachers.’’ For example, the DVD segment on wealth begins with black-and-white footage of sweatshop laborers in dreary factories, but sweatshops are a mere blip on the screen. Immediately, the text explains that today one can be free from such exploitation and drudgery simply by wishing for money.8 The real world outcome of the constructivism that supports magical voluntarism is ultimately selfish inaction. ‘‘You cannot help the world by focusing on the negative things,’’ says Byrne. ‘‘When I discovered The Secret I made a decision that I would not watch the news or read newspapers anymore, because it did not make me feel good’’ (pp. 144–145). Although professional scholars in the United States may be buffered from some of the vagaries of economic crisis and barriers to achievement, there are, in fact—as opposed to the fantasy of a filmic game or magnetizing your desires into reality—millions of people around the world who cannot wish away the ‘‘conditions, people, or events external to them’’ (p. 209). Nongovernmental organizations, grassroots banks and crafts projects, and other forms of localized ‘‘self-help’’ can do little to curtail the broader abuses of capitalist globalization. But Foss, Waters, and Armada chastise critical postcolonial scholars Radha Hegde and Raka Shome, as if the (magical) options available to a fictional Lola actually apply to sweatshop workers in India (p. 223). Similarly, The Secret encourages readers to turn on to the law of attraction and stop resisting injustice: ‘‘The antiwar movement creates more war,’’ explains Jack Canfield (quoted in Byrne, p. 142). Shockingly, however, Foss, Waters, and Armada carry their magical voluntarism beyond the fuzzy magnetism of The Secret to a most extreme conclusion: Symbolic choices, Run Lola Run argues, can and do affect the structural world. We acknowledge that a belief in this tenet is disputable in the presence of certain kinds of conditions, but we ask our readers to consider seriously for a moment . . . the possibility that it might be true under all conditions. (p. 220) Even in the contexts of famine and genocide, Foss, Waters, and Armada believe that changing one’s interpretation of events is the correct strategy, especially because ‘‘what you resist, persists.’’ While demonstrably different, both their article and The Secret counsel passivity—implicitly and explicitly respectively—in the face of the most brutal exploitation and oppression, letting the purveyors of inequality off the hook for their actions, urging millions to think positively in the face of their immiseration.9', '']

[(0, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-KiSh-Neg-Georgetown-Round-3.docx

Emory

KiSh

6497cf83c894297f81225a8f042efa9f5527fd6ef8d6df9e671d83b3f127f5b6

Russia will prevent escalation---calls for nuclear escalation are propaganda designed to bring the West to the bargaining table.

Maxim Starchak 23, Fellow at the Queen’s University Centre for International and Defence Policy, Ph.D. in Political Science from Irkutsk State University, “Russian Nuclear Threats — A Cry for Attention, Not Armageddon’s Dawn,” Center for European Policy Analysis, 10-18-2023, https://cepa.org/article/russian-nuclear-threats-a-cry-for-attention-not-armageddons-dawn

Russia wants to prevent clash enter strategic dialogue statements look concocted for Western consumption words amount to diplomatic pressure military experts do not echo words, despite the fact they work on methods to conduct war Not a single captain or colonel considers nuclear strike a solution musings are posed as if Russia has a binary choice war or nuclear strike not the case nuclear deterrence implemented through patrolling exercises readiness and doctrines Putin is influenced by generals, who understand nuclear policy and believe there is no limited war nuclear strike is extreme Russia is not ready to leap across the steps of the ladder

Russia wants to prevent a clash of nuclear powers it seeks to escalate to the point where the U nited S tates will enter a strategic dialogue Russia hopes for negotiation The US determination not to engage in the nuclear game causes irritation statements look to be concocted for Western consumption words amount to an attempt at diplomatic pressure military experts do not echo words, despite the fact they work on methods to conduct a global war and on countering the U nited S tates Not a single captain or colonel interviewed considers a nuclear strike to be a solution Russia has mechanisms for escalation. It can increase the activity of nuclear forces near the borders It can carry out demonstrative launches musings are posed as if Russia has a binary choice : to wage war in a normal manner or to carry out a nuclear strike This is not the case nuclear deterrence can be implemented through patrolling borders conducting military exercises , demonstrating capabilities increasing combat readiness and changing military doctrines Russia may change its nuclear deterrence strategy A change in nuclear doctrine would represent a strong, demonstrative, and rapid means to introduce a nuclear factor into the Ukrainian conflict Putin is influenced by his Cold War generals, who do understand nuclear weapons policy and believe there is no such thing as limited nuclear war A nuclear strike is an extreme measure, not a means of victory Russia is not ready to leap across the steps of the escalation ladder , whatever it would like the West to believe

prevent U S enter a strategic dialogue hopes for negotiation concocted for Western consumption diplomatic pressure U S Not a single captain or colonel considers a nuclear strike to be a solution This is not the case understand nuclear weapons policy believe there is no such thing as limited nuclear war extreme measure, not a means of victory not ready to leap across the steps of the escalation ladder

['On the one hand, Russia wants to prevent an escalation — a clash of nuclear powers — that would destroy cities and possibly human civilization. On the other, it seeks to escalate the conflict to the point where the United States will enter a strategic dialogue and consider concessions. ', 'Russia’s demands were laid out in a December 2021 document that would effectively have defanged NATO in Central and Eastern Europe and caused the withdrawal of the US tactical nuclear umbrella for all European allies. It was dismissed by the US. ', 'Since then of course, Russia has launched its all-out invasion of Ukraine. Yet it still hopes for negotiation and continues (figuratively speaking) to bang its shoe on the desk in the hope of being noticed. The best way to do this? Endless public threats from both politicians (including heavy hints from Putin himself) and propaganda outlets suggesting it may “go nuclear” by launching weapons against Ukrainian targets and Western cities ranging from Poznań\u202f to London and New York. ', 'There is a problem, however. The United States has not only rejected escalation through direct conventional military intervention to halt Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine but has also refused to increase the combat readiness of its nuclear forces. As a result, this route to crisis negotiations has been blocked. ', 'Ideas like stationing nuclear weapons in Poland or (more radically) transferring them to Ukraine have not become popular. Worse, for the Kremlin, the US has more than once stated that it sees no indications that Russia intends to use nuclear weapons and, accordingly, does not intend to adjust its own strategic nuclear deterrence. ', 'The US determination not to engage in the nuclear game causes irritation among Russian policy-makers and — perhaps worse for its sense of greatness — a feeling that it is failing to inspire fear. ', 'Now, Sergey Karaganov, one of the most famous Russian experts in the world, an adviser to Putin, professor, doctor of sciences, and scientific director of the Faculty of the Higher School of Economics, is making statements about the need for a nuclear strike (firstly in June and again on September 26) in which, among other things, he argued that Russia must restore fear of nuclear war and dispel the myth that it would automatically escalate “to a global thermonuclear conflict.” ', 'His statements look to be concocted for Western consumption. The status of Karaganov and his known connections in Russia is an attempt to tell Western elites that he speaks not just for himself but also indicates the thinking of those senior officials with whom he is involved. Western officials and think tanks were being told that Karaganov’s language did not merely represent one man’s eccentricities. ', 'His words therefore amount to an attempt at diplomatic pressure. We can see this because military experts, former or current officers of the Ministry of Defense, and its scientific and journalistic units, do not echo his words, despite the fact that they work on methods to conduct a global war and on countering the United States. No reputable Russian general claims that a preemptive nuclear strike will lead to victory. Not a single captain or colonel interviewed by this author considers a nuclear strike to be a solution to the problem of war or to improve the great-nation status of Russia. ', 'This is largely because Russia still has mechanisms for escalation. It can increase the activity of nuclear forces near the borders of Western countries and make them more provocative. It can carry out demonstrative launches of nuclear missiles. For example, Russia could test a Sarmat strategic missile or a nuclear-powered Burevestnik missile, with its supposed 12,500-mile range. ', 'There are other steps it could take. In October, at the Valdai Club, President Vladimir Putin said that Russia should consider the possibility of revoking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.) This would certainly be the next step on the escalation ladder. ', 'Karaganov’s musings are posed as if Russia has a binary choice: to wage war in a normal manner or to carry out a nuclear strike. It’s as if strategic deterrence was not working, and Russia has already found itself at the top of the escalation ladder. This is not the case. Russia has more than enough mechanisms for fear-mongering. ', 'According to the Russian military, nuclear deterrence can be implemented through patrolling the state borders of opponents, conducting military exercises, demonstrating the capabilities of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, increasing the level of combat readiness of nuclear forces and changing military doctrines or withdrawing from international agreements. Some of these steps have been implemented. Russia raised the alert level of its strategic forces, conducted nuclear exercises, and withdrew from the New START treaty. ', 'In addition to nuclear weapons, the use of the latest Kinzhal hypersonic missiles in Ukraine has also become part of the mechanism of strategic non-nuclear deterrence. Russia also carried out strikes on the energy infrastructure of Ukraine. The destruction of a hydroelectric power plant, pipelines, and the threat of nuclear power plants can also act as steps on the escalation ladder. The Russian military believes that the impact of such activities can increase the effectiveness of its strategic deterrence. ', 'A higher stage of escalation would involve a strike on the US or its allies’ space satellites used in the war in Ukraine, a strike on the Ukrainian army’s supply points with Western weapons and ammunition, and any attack on nuclear power plants. Some hawks also believe that Russia should not give a damn about the NPT and transfer nuclear technologies to any receptive Latin American state. ', 'Russia may also change its nuclear deterrence strategy. The Foreign Ministry has repeatedly pointed out that nuclear doctrine provides exhaustive scenarios for the country‘s theoretical use of nuclear weapons. Introducing a clause on a preventive nuclear strike would be the main signal to the United States and NATO that Russia is making nuclear weapons not only a deterrent but a means of warfare. ', 'This might take the form of a clause stating that a nuclear strike is possible to prevent the expansion and/or prolongation of the war. Or that a nuclear strike might be triggered by a threat to any region of Russia if conventional armed forces are unable to regain control. ', 'A change in nuclear doctrine would represent a strong, demonstrative, and rapid means to introduce a nuclear factor into the Ukrainian conflict. Ministry of Defense experts in their theoretical work have already proposed the use of the strategic missile forces on individual enemy targets and the creation of a separate group of missiles for a first nuclear missile strike. ', 'In the West, many suggested the threat of losing Crimea could lead to a nuclear strike. But if so, why this was not spelled out in the doctrine itself? ', 'It’s likely Putin is influenced by his Cold War generals, who do understand nuclear weapons policy and believe there is no such thing as limited nuclear war. It will always result in global catastrophe with mutual destruction. A nuclear strike is an extreme measure, not a means of victory. ', 'The safest conclusion is that Russia is not ready to leap across the steps of the escalation ladder, whatever it would like the West to believe. ']

[(6, 17)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-00-NDT-Round-1.docx

Michigan

ShGa

cb976148a00c375902836d4ea83d6c411730a944a2a09e77be0c42f26e157598

That excludes non-nuclear weapon states, solving their offense.

Jimmy Bhatia 14, Air Marshal, India Strategic, India’s Nuclear Doctrine, 5-1-15, http://www.pressreader.com/india/india-strategic/20140501/282643210767726, DOA: 9-16-18, y2k

The quoted statement of National Security Advisor signaling a shift from “ no first use” to “ no first use against non-nuclear states falls short of being cogent as it does not stand to logic on what grounds can one use the term no first use” against an adversary which does not possess nuclear weapons in the first place The statement needs to be discarded as misquote a quote totally out of context

India’s Nuclear Doctrine reflects abhorrence to the use of nuclear weapons India perceives nuclear weapons only as weapons of deterrence against WMDs The oft- quoted statement of National Security Advisor signaling a shift from “ no first use” to no first use against non-nuclear weapons states speech falls short of being cogent as it does not stand to logic on what grounds can one use the term no first use” against an adversary which does not possess nuclear weapons in the first place . The statement needs to be discarded as misquote a quote totally out of context

abhorrence deterrence no first use” no first use against non-nuclear weapons states cogent as it does not stand to logic term no first use” does not possess nuclear weapons discarded as misquote a quote totally out of context

['It must be amply clear by now that India’s Nuclear Doctrine reflects unmistaken abhorrence to the use of nuclear weapons. India perceives nuclear weapons only as weapons of deterrence against WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and not as weapons of war. The oft-quoted statement of India’s NSA (National Security Advisor) signaling a significant shift from “no first use” to “no first use against non-nuclear weapons states” while delivering a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the NDC (National Defence College) in New Delhi on October 21, 2010 falls short of being cogent as it does not stand to logic – on what grounds can one use the term “no first use” against an adversary which does not even possess nuclear weapons in the first place. The alleged statement therefore, needs to be discarded as a mischievous misquote or, at best, a quote totally out of context.']

[(6, 15)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiWi-Aff-Sunflower-Swing-Part-2-hosted-by-Kansas-State-University-Round-1.docx

Kansas

WiWi

f677c5f2630c52771519350b80f3de407348da99d3b22e4fff7dd6b0798fd9ae

China does not have an offensive weapons program and won’t risk it because of economic links and public opposition within China

Pilch 20, director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (Richard, Engaging China on Bioweapons and Beyond, https://nonproliferation.org/engaging-china-on-bioweapons-and-beyond/

Would pursuing offensive bio weapons fit the strategy of the PRC China’s strategy is founded upon economic expansion covert BW program would threaten external relationships with WTO and World Bank but also China’s internal stability Bio weapons are widely abhorred in China where people suffered BW attacks at the hands of Japan China has other predictable military options which form the basis of its national military strateg There is no indication from leadership state media government budgetary allocations and scientific publications that China has made any such decision

Would pursuing an offensive bio logical weapons capability similarly fit the prevailing strategy of the PRC China’s grand strategy is founded upon economic expansion a covert offensive BW program in China would threaten China’s external relationships with WTO ), and World Bank but also China’s internal stability . Bio logical weapons are widely abhorred in China , where the Chinese people suffered BW attacks at the hands of the Japan ese China has other predictable military options for area denial and deterrence, which form the basis of its national military strateg y Biological weapons development requires a conscious decision There is no indication – including statements from Chinese leadership , state media reports, government budgetary allocations , and scientific publications that China has made any such decision

['In today’s world, virtually every country has access to the building blocks necessary to make a biological weapon.[5] The question is whether a country would attempt to do so. Moral and ethical arguments aside, biological weapons are prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a multilateral disarmament treaty of 183 states parties that bans biological weapons development and related activities. While countries such as Iraq and the Soviet Union have breached the BWC in the past, an argument can be made that each country’s breach was strategic: Iraq to counter superior military manpower and perceived WMD threats in the region (e.g., on the part of Iran),[6] and the Soviet Union to gain an asymmetric advantage over the US in the great power competition that characterized the Cold War. Would pursuing an offensive biological weapons capability similarly fit the prevailing strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)? China’s grand strategy is founded upon technological superiority and economic expansion in the Global South. That strategy has enjoyed remarkable success: China’s corresponding Belt and Road Initiative has engaged more than 60 countries and invested over $200B to corresponding infrastructure development of to date.[7] However, one enduring risk to the strategy’s ultimate success is China’s perception on the global stage. A negative perception would undermine China’s ongoing soft power investment, which might explain the PRC’s concerted efforts during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic not only to project strength but to emerge as a global leader in the area of global health security. The discovery of a covert offensive BW program in China would threaten not only China’s external relationships with both partner nations and key international organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank, but also China’s internal stability. Biological weapons are widely abhorred, perhaps nowhere more so than in China, where the Chinese people suffered BW attacks at the hands of the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War that coincided with World War II.[8] COVID-19 can only be expected to exacerbate those sentiments, placing long overdue emphasis on China’s central role in preventing future outbreaks with pandemic potential.[9] And China has other, more predictable military options for area denial and deterrence, which form the basis of its national military strategy.[10] Biological weapons development requires a conscious decision to invest money, human and material resources, and time in contravention to interventional law. There is no indication in the open source domain – including statements from Chinese leadership, state media reports, government budgetary allocations, and scientific publications or lack thereof – that China has made any such decision, despite its access to the necessary building blocks. Accordingly, the US State Department’s 2019 report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments assessed that “[i]nformation indicates that the People’s Republic of China (China) engaged during the reporting period in biological activities with potential dual-use applications, which raises concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC.”[11] However, the only way to know for sure is to engage China collaboratively.', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-HaBa-Aff-ADA-Round-4.docx

Kansas

HaBa

f6fda6f307c7dbf5672ae1f4bcc1e55125428ee5c4d2ef340983927eda0a7713

3—“Should” requires immediacy.

Summers 94—(Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court). “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, .

Should is " present indicative " the phrase denotes law is immediately effective as opposed to in the future

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. [Footnote 13] Should is used as a " present indicative " Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability "should" would mean the same as "must " In praesenti means literally "at the present time." In legal parlance the phrase denotes law is immediately effective , as opposed to something that will become effective in the future

present indicative immediately effective in the future

['', '4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti. The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar; it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge\'s intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.', '[Footnote 13]', ' "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK\'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, , 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaPa-Neg-3--Harvard-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

07d0e4315a6848d1770b1728ab48598cca92bfb8eb5af25fd20e2011b23142f8

AVs solve food shortages---ensures logistical success.

Lucas Group 2022. Agribusiness consulting firm. “Self-Driving Trucks Could Solve Food Shortages.” Lucas Group. 1/27/22. https://lucasgroup.com.au/self-driving-trucks-could-solve-food-shortages/

Autonomous trucks solve food shortages help to ease pressures on sectors rely significantly on prompt movement of produce industry realised going driver-free way forward drop c p m save 10% in fuel increase annual per truck revenue by 300% and reduce delivery times

Autonomous trucks could solve current food shortages use of automation was a key way to relieve pressure on an industry suffering from a lack of available labour autonomous vehicles could help to ease pressures on sectors that rely significantly on the prompt movement of fresh produce industry has realised that going driver-free is the way forward drop the c ost p er m ile from $1.76 to $0.96 , save 10% in fuel costs, increase annual per truck revenue by 300% and reduce delivery times by 40% help drive adoption of zero-emission trucks on short-haul routes, and reduce food waste

['Autonomous trucks could solve current food shortages and help to reduce the spread of COVID-19 across Australia according to Andrew R Timming, deputy dean of research and innovation at RMIT’s school of innovation.', 'Commenting on the continued food supply shortages caused by the response to the Omicron variant, Mr Timming said that the use of automation was a key way to relieve pressure on an industry suffering from a lack of available labour.', '“Already we have the technology to deploy self-driving trucks that can transport goods across the country with zero COVID-19 risk,” he said.', 'The use of driverless trucks would be welcome news across the supply chain as a significant number of employees are affected by COVID. In South Australia, an entire abattoir was shut down after 140 workers tested positive to COVID-19, while as many as 40% of employees in the dairy industry were either off sick or in quarantine.', 'Fredrico Collarte – CEO of LiDAR tech company Baraja, said that autonomous vehicles could help to ease pressures on sectors that rely significantly on the prompt movement of fresh produce.', '“The key benefit is you can get fresh produce to the market sooner, so the shelf-life can be longer.”', 'Driverless Truck Technology on the Horizon', 'In America, the highly competitive race to commercialise driverless trucks could mean that long-distance routes will be operated autonomously in the not too distant future.', 'Texas – the US epicentre of remote vehicle development – passed laws in 2018 to allow autonomous vehicles on the road. With vast distances to travel and an increasingly smaller pool of truck drivers, the industry has realised that going driver-free is the way forward.', 'According to Embark Technology, driverless fleets would drop the cost per mile from $1.76 to $0.96, save 10% in fuel costs, increase annual per truck revenue by 300% and reduce delivery times by 40%.', '“Because Embark-powered trucks don’t need to rest, we will empower our carrier partners to move foods faster than human-driven trucking at a fraction of the costs,” said Embark CEO Alex Rodrigez.', '“We know the technology we’re building together can maximise fuel efficiency, help drive adoption of zero-emission trucks on short-haul routes, and reduce food waste,” he added.']

[(0, 11), (14, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-MoSa-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-4.docx

Emory

MoSa

ee94e2a0f6e63885815caa3822e14724bac662eb17c43141e7f7032e017808a2

Chesterman goes AFF---we read blue.

Chesterman, 21 – Prof @ National University of Singapore, Senior Director of AI Governance @ AI Singapore

ability to be sued is one of the primary attractions of personality This presumes there are meaningful accountability gaps these gaps are often overstated even if it did serve a gap-filling function granting personality would also shift responsibility it would create an incentive to transfer risk to ‘electronic persons That is a problem with corporations also In the case of AI veil-piercing mechanisms could be developed

The ability to be sued is one of the primary attractions of personality for AI systems This presumes there are meaningful accountability gaps these gaps are often overstated A different reason for wariness about such a remedy is that, even if it did serve a gap-filling function , granting personality to AI systems would also shift responsibility away from existing legal persons it would create an incentive to transfer risk to ‘electronic persons ’ That is a problem with corporations also The reallocation of risk is justified on the basis that it encourages investment In the case of AI systems, similar veil-piercing mechanisms could be developed

these gaps are often overstated even if it did serve a gap-filling function , granting personality to AI systems would also shift responsibility create an incentive

["(Chesterman, Simon: Dean and Provost's Chair Professor of the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law and Senior Director of AI Governance at AI Singapore, We, the Robots? Regulating Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of the Law (Introduction) ( 2021). Simon Chesterman, We, the Robots? Regulating Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2021), NUS Law Working Paper No. 2022/015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4231363)//", 'The ability to be sued is one of the primary attractions of personality for AI systems, as the European Parliament acknowledged.31 This presumes, of course, that there are meaningful accountability gaps that can and should be filled. Much of the book up to this point has argued that these gaps are often overstated. A different reason for wariness about such a remedy is that, even if it did serve a gap-filling function, granting personality to AI systems would also shift responsibility under current laws away from existing legal persons. Indeed, it would create an incentive to transfer risk to ‘electronic persons’ in order to shield natural and traditional juridical ones from exposure.32 That is a problem with corporations also, which may be used to protect investors from liability beyond the fixed sum of their investment – indeed, that is often the point of using a corporate vehicle in the first place. The reallocation of risk is justified on the basis that it encourages investment and entrepreneurship.33 Safeguards typically include a requirement that the names of limited liability entities include that status (‘Ltd’, ‘LLC’, and so on) and the possibility of piercing the corporate veil to prevent abuse of the form.34 In the case of AI systems, similar veil-piercing mechanisms could be developed – though if a human were manipulating AI in order to protect him- or herself from liability, the ability to do so might suggest that the AI system in question was not deserving of its separate personhood.35', '']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeLo-Aff-Texas-Round-1.docx

Emory

HeLo

e9ebca4d947a95111b2ed2235c4586f3f56f6c8f411c5fea154da7b227d1f4b0

Futurity is good---anything else is a privileged rejection of progress and possibility

Manalansan ’15 Martin F. Manalansan IV - Associate Professor of all of the following at The University of Illinois: Gender and Women's Studies, Asian American Studies, Anthropology, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, LAS Global Studies, Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, and Center for Global Studies. The author holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from The University of Rochester and studied philosophy, Asian Studies and anthropology at the University of the Philippines. As part of claims about futurity, the author references lived excahnges with queer trans women of color. The author also references concurring professional exchanges with David L. Eng, Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania; Gayatri Gopinath, who is an associate professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and director of Asian/Pacific/American Studies at New York University.; Roderick Ferguson, who is a professor of African American and Gender and Women's Studies in the African American Studies Department at the University of Illinois, Chicago; Chandan Reddy, who is an Associate Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality Studies at the University of Washington; and the late José Esteban Muñoz, was an American academic in the fields of performance studies, visual culture, queer theory, cultural studies, and critical theory; “A Question from Bruno Latour” This article is part of the series Queer Futures. Fieldsights - Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology Online, July 21, 2015 - https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/703-a-question-from-bruno-latour

My response comes from my conversations under the aegis of queer-of-color critique However, there was a general sense that the issue of “no future” comes from a comfortable perch of privilege. As a scholar immersed in the plight of queers of color, futurity is not just a possibility but a necessity. we cannot not think of a future it is the very fuel of existence that animates energies The promise of queer is precisely in its hopeful dimensions. Consider undocumented immigrant queers of color they live in precarious conditions but they live moments that showcase fabulosity These moments provide some way for them to think of another day While this might be called naïve hopefulness thinking of a future that is an alternative to the present is a potent way to think beyond and against the status quo to plant the seed for transformation. we need to unravel the negativity inherent in the “no future” stance

My response comes from my encounters, engagements, and conversations under the aegis of queer-of-color critique We appreciate camp which states that we should not subscribe to a future entrenched in heteropatriarchal dreams However, there was a general sense that the issue of “no future” comes from a vantage point and a comfortable perch of privilege. As a scholar immersed in the plight of queers of color, futurity is not just a possibility but a necessity. To paraphrase queer-of-color critique colleagues we cannot not think of a future it is the very fuel of existence that animates energies feelings, and other bodily capacities. The promise of queer both as a stance and as a field of study is precisely in its hopeful dimensions. Queer is constituted by a yearning and a longing for something better than what is here right now It is a horizon that we are drawn to and which is not yet here. Consider the group of undocumented immigrant queers of color in New York City whose lives I have been following for years. they live in precarious conditions but they live moments that showcase fabulosity These moments provide some way for them to think of another day While this might be called naïve hopefulness thinking of a future that is an alternative to the present is a potent way to think beyond and against the status quo to plant the seed for transformation. In other words, there is a political potential to queer futurity. we need to complicate and unravel the negativity inherent in the “no future” stance and to be open to the various alternative ways futures can be imagined particularly by those in the margins.

However, there was a general sense that the issue of “no future” comes from a comfortable perch of privilege. futurity is not just a possibility but a necessity. we cannot not think of a future it is the very fuel of existence that animates energies is precisely in its hopeful dimensions. thinking of a future that is an alternative to the present is a potent way to think beyond and against the status quo

['My response to the question of “no future” comes from my encounters, engagements, and conversations with colleagues under the aegis of queer-of-color critique, scholars like David Eng, Gayatri Gopinath, Roderick Ferguson, Chandan Reddy, and the late José Esteban Muñoz, among others. We appreciate the renegade antireproductive stance of the “no future” camp, which states that we should not subscribe to a future that is entrenched in heteropatriarchal dreams of marriage and procreation. However, there was a general sense among us that the issue of “no future” comes from a vantage point and a comfortable perch of privilege. As a scholar invested and immersed in the plight of queers of color, futurity is not just a possibility but a necessity. To paraphrase my queer-of-color critique colleagues, we cannot not think of a future—it is the very fuel of existence, the pivot that animates and propels energies, performances, feelings, and other bodily capacities. The promise and peril of queer, both as a stance and as a field of study, is precisely in its anticipatory and hopeful dimensions. Queer is constituted by a yearning and a longing for something better than what is here right now. It is, as Muñoz would say, a horizon that we are drawn to and which is not yet here. Consider the group of undocumented immigrant queers of color in New York City whose lives I have been following for years. Dwelling in cramped domiciles and working in contingent jobs, there is very little to witness in their lives that suggests a kind of gay/lesbian triumphalism or the bright markers of the new normal. In fact, they live in precarious conditions but—a very important caveat—they live in moments that showcase fleeting gestures and images of fabulosity set amidst the squalor and mess of their lives. These moments, while fleeting, provide some way for them to think of another day, giving them a brief glimpse of a time and a place where there are sequined gowns, plush salons, and many sparkling things. While this might be called naïve hopefulness, thinking of a future that is an alternative to the present is a potent way to think beyond and against the status quo—to plant the seed for social transformation. In other words, there is a political potential to queer futurity. Or, to put it another way, we need to complicate and unravel the negativity inherent in the “no future” stance and to be open to the various alternative ways a future or futures can be imagined, particularly by those in the margins. Otherwise, we can all just pack our bags, go back home, put on some makeup, close the door, and hide under the bedcovers. ']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Neg-8---NDT-Round-5.docx

Kansas

PaSe

ddb10aee4f0ec00a10338f7f64aa33e4cee287e1c9dc0442cf6b60a057fe045e

Vote negative to celebrate Black social life.

Mubimurusoke, 22—Intercollegiate Department of Africana Studies, Claremont McKenna College (Mukasa, “The Black Home as Black Social Space/Time,” Black Hospitality, Chapter 3, 75-142, SpringerLink, dml)

actions take place within an excessive economy of desires that precede and exceed any one place or time In the political the grammar of black suffering set upon exclusions there is no true sense of the black self black sociality is beyond individuation black people’s affirmation is undeniable even amidst hardship and terror black social life is something to be celebrated or the very meaning of celebration celebration turns out to be the condition of possibility of black thought which animates the black operations that will produce absolute overturning the absolute turning of this motherfucker out celebration is not simply reaction to black social life but the essence of its possibility Celebration may be distinguished from political hope the coercive force that motivates political subjectivity Black optimism lays beyond hope not the same trajectory but beyond Hope cannot be extracted from the nihilistic ontology that overdetermines the experience of being human Celebration is not transcendence not black joy not an affect not an escape from a day of labor escape into the night an inaugural midnight dance

one’s actions and decisions take place within an excessive economy of desires and inspiration that precede and exceed any one place or time this helps conceptualize blackness and black selfhood against the transcendental autonomous subject that dominates modern conceptions of agency In the realm of the political civil society the state and so on the grammar of black suffering is decidedly set upon exclusions and oppressions and there is no true or tangible sense of the black self when one aims to conceptualize it within this realm at the level of the social there is a sense of black life and a black self because black sociality is beyond individuation In social life black people’s affirmation is undeniable even amidst hardship and the terror of civil society We might even contend that black social life is something to be celebrated or better the very meaning of celebration Our aim even in the face of the brutally imposed difficulty of black life is cause for celebration [T]he cause for celebration turns out to be the condition of possibility of black thought which animates the black operations that will produce the absolute overturning the absolute turning of this motherfucker out Celebration is the essence of black thought the animation of black operations which are in the first instance our undercommon underground submarine sociality The possibility of black sociality and selfhood despite the circumstances that civil society has placed on black people is almost impossible to conceive and therefore its existence is undoubtedly a means for celebration Moten appears to contend that celebration is not simply the reaction to black social life but in reality the essence of its possibility blackness as the condition of possibility and black social life as its manifestation can only exist as celebration possibility as blackness the turning of this motherfucker out is not a reason for celebration but always is celebration the existence or actions of the black self as manifest in the fugitive movement of black social life are not a means for celebration like a traditional political subject may celebrate themselves The black self through black social life is celebration as the exuberant condition of possibility of always and necessarily being be-side oneself together Celebration the animation of black operations and black optimism as black thought may be helpfully distinguished from political hope afropessimism’s true antagonist Modern political ontology may be conceptualized as a politics of hope whereby the democratic nation state and the capitalist political economy have settled on hope as the coercive force that motivates political subjectivity Black optimism lays beyond hope not along the same trajectory but beyond trajectory beyond telos a celebration that is so much more than hope Hope cannot be extracted from the nihilistic political ontology that overdetermines the experience of being human today Celebration is not a transcendence of the temporal logic of hope it is not black joy an existential reprieve from the toils and alienation from society celebration is not an affect It is not an escape from a day of labor it is an escape into the night it’s both big and small life before after and in-between death a broadening of the impossible giving attention to those other truths it is an inauguration an inaugural midnight dance that never ends and only absconds from basement to basement which in the end would be the most celebratory understanding of celebration since whether you’re happy sad or mad it is always more it’s always past midnight

excessive economy precede exceed against dominates political civil society state decidedly set upon exclusions oppressions no true tangible sense social black life black self beyond individuation undeniable hardship terror celebrated very meaning of celebration brutally imposed difficulty celebration condition of possibility animates absolute overturning absolute turning of this motherfucker out essence animation impossible undoubtedly reaction essence can only exist as celebration blackness turning of this motherfucker out reason is existence actions fugitive movement means traditional political subject exuberant condition of possibility helpfully distinguished political hope true antagonist hope coercive force beyond same trajectory beyond so much more cannot be extracted overdetermines transcendence not black joy existential reprieve affect day night broadening inaugural midnight dance most celebratory understanding always more always past midnight

['Moten’s illumination of the ‘irreducibility’ of black sociality plays a crucial role for the conception of the black home. With traditional accounts of the liberal autonomous agent, the constitutive role of space, sociality, and even history, for the most part, go unaccounted for or underappreciated. However, the concept of home already evokes a sense of sociality, materiality, spatiality and temporality. In the home, one’s actions and decisions take place within an excessive economy of desires and inspiration that precede and exceed any one place or time even though they evolve and revolve around a conception of location and temporality. It is in this respect that I want to begin to suggest that the black home helps conceptualize the nature of blackness and black selfhood against the transcendental autonomous subject that dominates modern conceptions of agency, even though in the end these characteristics of home will be seen in a much different light.', 'In the realm of the political—that is, civil society, institutions of the state, and so on—the grammar of black suffering is decidedly set upon exclusions and oppressions and, therefore, there is no true or tangible sense of the black self when one aims to conceptualize it within the terms or the desires to participate in this realm. However, at the level of the social, there is a sense of black life and a black self, even in these shadows, precisely because black sociality is beyond individuation. The two are mutually constitutive: this self is exposed by a social communion, which, of course, implies otherness. Consequently, through the black home, the paraontological relationship of the black self and black social life to blackness come together, even though this home is never settled because it is black, and blackness is always unsettling. In social life, black people’s affirmation is undeniable, even amidst hardship and the terror of civil society. We might even contend that black social life is something to be celebrated or, better, the very meaning of celebration. In “Blackness and Nothingness” Moten provocatively introduces the idea of celebration to his conception of black thought. He writes:', 'Our aim, even in the face of the brutally imposed difficulty of black life, is cause for celebration … [T]he cause for celebration turns out to be the condition of possibility of black thought, which animates the black operations that will produce the absolute overturning, the absolute turning of this motherfucker out. Celebration is the essence of black thought, the animation of black operations, which are in the first instance, our undercommon, underground, submarine sociality. (Moten 2018, 197; my emphasis)', 'Now, Moten does not give any extensive articulation of what he may mean by celebration, or even who he may include using the possessive pronoun ‘our’. However, the term may be a great way to start thinking of the self beyond individuation or individualism that we have in mind.Footnote16 The possibility of black thought, of black sociality and selfhood, despite the circumstances that civil society has placed on black people, is almost impossible to conceive and therefore its existence is undoubtedly a means for celebration. And yet, Moten appears to contend that celebration is not simply the reaction to black social life but in reality the essence of its possibility, that blackness as the condition of possibility and black social life as its manifestation can only exist as celebration. In other words, possibility as blackness, the “turning of this motherfucker out,” is not a reason for celebration but always is celebration. Therefore, the existence or actions of the black self, as manifest in the fugitive movement of black social life and the spacing/temporalizing of the black home, are not a means for celebration like a traditional political subject may celebrate themselves after the purchasing of a home or the birth of a child. The black self through black social life is celebration as the exuberant condition of possibility of always and necessarily being be-side oneself together; it is a celebration so common, so mundane, there is not even the possibility of black celebrities.', 'Celebration, which is the ‘animation of black operations’ and black optimism as black thought, should not be seen as an opposition to afropessimism, but may be helpfully distinguished from a concept of political hope, afropessimism’s true antagonist. Modern political ontology may be conceptualized as a politics of hope, a politics whereby the principles of modernity, which include the democratic nation state and the capitalist political economy, have settled on hope as the coercive force that motivates political subjectivity. Hope for citizenship and for economic success reifies a subject formation and a capacity that correlates with the despair of afropessimism as its explicit consensus fluctuates it terms of a politics of politeness. Returning to his reflections on Arendt and her politics of consensus universalis Moten writes, “[If] hope cannot be kept alive, this need not lead to despair since what is beyond hope, in terrible enjoyment, is an absolute sufficiency, an irreducible optimism, given in more in less, in everything in nothing, as scheme and variation, critically anticipating, speculatively accompanying, on the edge of arrival, never to return” (Moten 2018, 74). Black optimism, as irreducible as black sociality, lays beyond hope, not in the sense as a further extension along the same trajectory, but in an expanse beyond trajectory, beyond telos, an exonomy without return, a celebration that is so much more than hope. Hope cannot be extracted from the nihilistic, solipsistic, individualistic milieu of the political ontology that overdetermines so much of the experience of being human, of human beings, today. Celebration, as optimism and sociality, is not really a transcendence of the temporal logic of hope, nor, as I understand it, is it an analogy for an emotional articulation of optimism; that is, it is ‘not black joy’, at least in the colloquial sense of an existential reprieve from the toils and alienation from society. The idea of black celebration may invoke a feeling, but it is not an affect, positive or negative. It is not an escape from a day of toiling physical or affective labor, it is an escape into the night, it’s both big and small, life before, after, and in-between death, it’s, in effect, a broadening of the impossible giving attention to those other truths; it is an inauguration, an inaugural midnight dance that never ends and only absconds from basement to basement, which in the end would be the most celebratory understanding of celebration, since whether you’re happy, sad, or mad, it is always more, it’s always past midnight.']

[(0, 16)]

ndtceda

Michigan-HaRa-Neg-6-Texas-Doubles.docx

Michigan

HaRa

ba0474d3ca10ae16b04c45e55babe45574f096514b06dc3c76ffd521972f7ada

No death drive

Kirsch et al. 22 (Michael Kirsch, Associate Professor for the Institute of Physiological Chemistry at Essen University Hospital, Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, clinical psychological counselor in private practice, PhD in Clinical Psychology from the University of Belgrade, Michael B. Buchholz, Senior Professor of Social Psychology at the International Psychoanalytic University, PhD in Psychoanalysis from Frankfurt University, 2022, Frontiers in Psychology Volume 13)

Freud’s “death drive” was never fully scientifically explored if such an inborn tendency exists, we should be able to find it “somewhere”—in human genes, tissues, hormones, neurotransmitters the “death drive” cannot be omnipresent masochistic activities will not be automatically activated when essential drives are satisfied essential drives seem independent of one another and the universal hierarchical primacy of one of them cannot be confirmed the biochemical mechanisms related to death drive” cannot belong to the same level of importance as the life drives The dynamic among the drives is more complex than psychoanalytic models expect “death drives” are only surrogates of essential drives psychoanalytic drive theory was too simplified there are more than two drives operating simultaneously abandon the idea of an independent “death drive,”

Freud’s idea of a “death drive” was initially very speculative and referred to cosmological, physical, psychological, and clinical dimensions Sadly, these two general attitudes one that proneness to aggression is inborn, the other that it is a consequence of traumatization were never fully scientifically explored It seems logical that if such an inborn tendency exists, we should be able to find it “somewhere”—in human genes, tissues, hormones, neurotransmitters … Freud claims that the physiological correlate of drives must be hormones mechanisms lead from the satisfaction of hunger, thirst, sleep, sex, and attachment needs, to the secretion of 5-hydroxytryptamine, and, subsequently, β-endorphin – the reporter molecule for human satisfaction each of these satisfactions, or various combinations thereof, can be seen as independent drives The logical next step now would be to look for the same or similar neurophysiological reaction to the satisfaction of the so-called “death drive.” the so-called “death drive” cannot be omnipresent For most people under regular circumstances, sexual masochistic activities or gambling in an amusement hall are nothing more than latent alternative options that will not be automatically activated when the essential drives are optimally satisfied They only become active in a repetitive manner once the essential drives are persistently corrupted and become disorders when this frustration is chronic The essential drives seem to be to a large extent independent of one another and the universal hierarchical primacy of one of them (in Freud’s model—sexuality, in Melanie Klein’s—destructiveness) cannot be confirmed the biochemical mechanisms related to “ death drive” do not get active when the essential drives are satisfied, and consequently they cannot be seen as belong i ng to the same level of importance as the life drives The dynamic among the drives is also more complex than the psychoanalytic trauma models expect trauma seems to play the role of a trigger more than of a cause Biochemical mechanisms are latently present in every brain but will not be activated unless there is a chronic external frustration that introduces dysfunction in the satisfaction of the essential drives the so- called “death drives” are only surrogates of the essential drives psychoanalytic drive theory must be fundamentally revised when it comes to admitting that the model was too simplified , because there are more than two drives operating simultaneously hunger, thirst, sleep, sexual drive, attachment, and possibly many more still unidentified drives abandon ing the idea of an independent “death drive,” which was in theory related to repetition compulsion and aggressiveness

never fully scientifically explored It seems logical that if such an inborn tendency exists, we should be able to find it “somewhere”—in human genes, tissues, hormones, neurotransmitters … independent drives cannot be omnipresent will not be automatically activated when the essential drives are optimally satisfied The essential drives seem to be to a large extent independent of one another the universal hierarchical primacy of one of them (in Freud’s model—sexuality, in Melanie Klein’s—destructiveness) cannot be confirmed do not get active when the essential drives are satisfied, and consequently they cannot be seen as belong i ng to the same level of importance as the life drives The dynamic among the drives is also more complex than the psychoanalytic trauma models expect the so- called “death drives” are only surrogates of the essential drives psychoanalytic drive theory must be fundamentally revised the model was too simplified there are more than two drives operating simultaneously abandon ing the idea of an independent “death drive,”

['Freud’s idea of a “death drive” was initially very speculative and referred to cosmological, physical, psychological, and clinical dimensions. Over time, it was further developed by some psychoanalysts, and criticized, or indeed rejected, by others. Sadly, these two general attitudes—one that proneness to aggression is inborn, the other that it is a consequence of traumatization—were never fully scientifically explored (Dimitrijević, 2018). It seems logical that if such an inborn tendency exists, we should be able to find it “somewhere”—in human genes, tissues, hormones, neurotransmitters…', 'We followed the only reasonable hypothesis, proposed actually by Freud himself, which claims that the physiological correlate of drives must be hormones. Previous research has clearly highlighted the existence of mechanisms that lead from the satisfaction of hunger, thirst, sleep, sex, and attachment needs, to the secretion of 5-hydroxytryptamine, and, subsequently, β-endorphin – the reporter molecule for human satisfaction (Kirsch and Mertens, 2018; Kirsch, 2019; Kirsch and Buchholz, 2020). One could thus conclude that each of these satisfactions, or various combinations thereof, can be seen as independent drives that sometimes can be united. The logical next step now would be to look for the same or similar neurophysiological reaction to the satisfaction of the so-called “death drive.” To test this, we have reviewed research studies focused on the biochemical reactions related to two hypothesized derivatives of this “drive”: masochism and Gambling Disorder.', 'The currently existing body of biochemical research focused on these two conditions reveals that healthy human beings tend to establish a characteristic level of β-endorphin (and maybe also of other endorphins) in their brains. In principle, a physiological level of β-endorphin signals to the individual that everything is all right. Additional release of β-endorphin induces satisfaction (or well-being, or even euphoria). If the mechanism leading to the satisfaction of one of the essential drives (attachment needs, hunger, sexuality, sleep, and thirst) is corrupted, the β-endorphin supply becomes suboptimal and human beings begin to search for other sources of satisfaction (β-endorphin release). The two auto-addictive disorders under our scrutiny (masochism and Gambling Disorder) can also lead to the release of β-endorphin and compensate the deficit induced by the malfunctioning essential drives. In that sense, one can establish a pattern of masochism or pathological gambling because they lead to pleasure similar to the pleasure of the satisfaction of the essential drives.', 'It is, however, important to note, that the so-called “death drive” (now classified as a collection of auto-addictive disorders) cannot be omnipresent. For most people under regular circumstances, sexual masochistic activities or gambling in an amusement hall are nothing more than latent alternative options that will not be automatically activated when the essential drives are optimally satisfied. They only become active in a repetitive manner once the essential drives are persistently corrupted and become disorders when this frustration is chronic.', 'We believe that these findings can also lead to improvement of psychoanalysis as therapy. Most psychoanalysts would agree that a chronic “death drive” (i.e., masochism, pathological gambling, and maybe also Anorexia Nervosa) is often only marginally responsive to individual psychotherapy. We have claimed that “death drive” acts as a surrogate for impaired essential drive(s), and in nearly all the cases it is the attachment drive that is corrupted. Therefore, psychotherapeutic treatments should focus on revitalizing the impaired attachment drive by emphasizing interpersonal orientation and incorporating group psychotherapy into treatment plans.', 'We believe that this review should (and probably has to) lead to the revision of psychoanalytic drive theory in several important points:', 'There are several independent (drug-free) impulses that lead to β-endorphin dependent pleasure via a largely shared biochemical mechanism. To the best of current scientific knowledge, these include, on the one hand, attachment needs, hunger, sexuality, sleep, and thirst, and, on the other hand, auto-addictive disorders.', 'The essential drives seem to be to a large extent independent of one another and the universal hierarchical primacy of one of them (in Freud’s model—sexuality, in Melanie Klein’s—destructiveness) cannot be confirmed. As clinical and everyday social experiences show, even persons without mental or somatic disorders find it challenging to achieve balance between these drives and may exaggerate with satisfying one when others are frustrated (i.e., overeating due to loneliness or sexual frustration).', 'Although Freud spent decades trying to develop a model of conflict between two drives equally powerful and fundamental both chronologically and ontologically, the biochemical mechanisms related to what he termed “death drive” do not get active when the essential drives are satisfied, and consequently they cannot be seen as belonging to the same level of importance as the life drives. In other words, as long as we have emotionally available persons we will not searching for activities that lead to addiction.', 'The dynamic among the drives is also more complex than the psychoanalytic trauma models expect. Though the connection between trauma and the “death drive” is obvious, trauma seems to play the role of a trigger more than of a cause. Biochemical mechanisms are latently present in every brain but will not be activated unless there is a chronic external frustration that introduces dysfunction in the satisfaction of the essential drives. They seem to be always ready to jump from the bench and join the game, if one of the first team players gets injured for whatever reason, to use a metaphor related to sports. Thus, the so-called “death drives” are only surrogates of the essential drives.', 'Naturally, our study suffers from limitations and will hopefully inspire future efforts superior to this one:', 'In order to prevent getting into the labyrinth of biochemical possibilities, only well analyzed signal molecules, like β-endorphin, were advocated to have key importance for the processing of both essential drives and harmful impulses. Although such a strategy is supported by actual knowledge, our rationalizations might be prone to a revision when at present under-evaluated metabolites would have unexplored capabilities on our suggested signal-molecules. For instance, if endogenous cannabinoids would be able to regulate the μ-receptor, β-endorphin would lose its key importance for achieving satisfaction.', 'Although we (believe that we) have reviewed all available studies of the phenomena under scrutiny, their number is not very high and we are looking forward to further biochemical research in this domain.', 'Besides the already existing studies of the essential drives, there are other strong candidates whose biochemical mechanisms are still understudied. We hope researchers will turn their attention to curiosity, playfulness (also suggested in Solms, 2012, 2013, 2015), humor, generosity, possibly even aesthetic and religious feelings, as psychologist and even some psychoanalysts are speculating.', 'Since human aggression can be grouped in three independent parts (Meyer et al., 2016), it cannot be viewed as a “primary aggressive drive,” which may lead to conclusion that enhanced aggression is probably initiated by frustration (also suggested in Boag, 2014, 2017). However, more biochemical studies are necessary before we can fully understand this phenomenon or the related powerful sources of human motivation like narcissism, greed, jealousy, etc.', 'Our review suggests that the activation of the “death drive” is triggered by a traumatic cessation of satisfaction of the essential drives. Again, further research is needed that would elucidate how exactly this process unfolds.', 'Our review of the biochemical research of phenomena related to Freud’s notion of the “death drive” has, despite some limitations, brought forth important conclusions. It makes it very obvious that psychoanalytic drive theory must be fundamentally revised after important new scientific findings were gathered. The revision seems to be most necessary when it comes to:', 'admitting that the model was too simplified, because there are more than two drives operating simultaneously (hunger, thirst, sleep, sexual drive, attachment, and possibly many more still unidentified drives),', 'abandoning the idea of an independent “death drive,” which was in theory related to repetition compulsion and aggressiveness, while the evidence shows that it is activated if and only if the primary drives remain chronically unsatisfied.', '']

[(0, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Aff-Harvard-Round-8.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

976b066261fb3c9c922917b607246fbffaf8833c954281a0fdf1d877ccf96e8e

IP rights for AI does not spillover to other non-humans.

Withers ’18 [Rachel; May 3; Melbourne, Australia–based writer and producer, covering tech and culture; Future Tense, “A Monkey Can’t Hold Copyright. But What About a Robot?” https://slate.com/technology/2018/05/artificial-intelligence-may-soon-have-more-rights-than-animals-in-the-u-s.html]

U.S. Office emphasized “human authorship” as precedent in non-human rights But A.I. craftsmanship and creativity quickly surpassing animals we are more comfortable conferring to machines than non-human­but-still-living beings flesh in this case economics . Robots are themselves i p Time and human intelligence went into A.I humans want to reap the benefits

the U.S. Copyright Office has re- emphasized “human authorship” in intellectual property some experts looking to this latest court ruling as an important precedent in non-human rights But when it comes to A.I. craftsmanship and creativity is quickly surpassing animals reaching levels at which copyright may be necessary if we don’t give robots IP we are failing to protect value we give intelligence Many experts advocate for other forms of robot rights as they gain sentience as a species we are more comfortable conferring privileges to machines than non-human­but-still-living beings We ascribe more value to chips than to flesh and blood in this case economics . Robots are themselves i ntellectual p roperty. Time , and human intelligence went into A.I . humans want to reap the benefits

non-human rights But A.I. quickly surpassing animals necessary more comfortable non-human­but-still-living beings economics are i p reap the benefits

['In the time that the monkey selfie case has been ongoing (it even has its own Wikipedia page) the U.S. Copyright Office has re-emphasized the requirement of “human authorship” in intellectual property claims, updating its guidelines to explicitly rule out monkey selfies and elephant murals. According to the Next Web, some experts were looking to this latest court ruling as an important precedent in the non-human rights arena, with PETA lawyers claiming that “any law passed (or not) in Naruto’s favor could reflect the rights of other non-human entities.” Other non-human entities includes robots—because for now, bots don’t have intellectual property rights, either.', 'But when it comes to A.I., the craftsmanship and creativity of the “non-human entity” is quickly surpassing that of animals (sorry, Suda)—potentially even reaching levels at which copyright consideration may be necessary. As John Frank Weaver once noted in Future Tense, robots are excelling in the creative fields, painting, writing, and composing original work, and they’ve only matured since then, writing novels and even poems. All this raises significant questions for copyright law. Do we want to protect the “intellectual property” of artificial intelligence?', 'Some have suggested that yes, we do. As Paresh Kathrani points out in the Conversation, intellectual property law is designed to recognize intelligence and incentivize progress—if we don’t give robots IP rights, some argue, we are failing to protect the value we give intelligence, In failing to recognize and appropriately reward complex work, even that done by robots, we dis-incentivize it, potentially slowing down human (?) progress to boot. Many experts, including Weaver, advocate for other forms of robot rights—from the right to free speech to the right to citizenship—especially as they gain sentience.', 'It’s not clear yet what rights we may eventually ascribe to robots. But it is clear that robots are in with a better shot at these rights than animals. No one outside of PETA is particularly up in arms about the anti-Naruto ruling—in fact, PETA has been portrayed as something of a joke in the coverage and by the courts. Robot rights, meanwhile, are being taken very seriously. While U.S. copyright can currently only be held by “legal persons,” this may not rule out robots for long. The EU is considering creating a specific category of personhood just for bots, meaning they may be eligible even without a change in IP law (though these overlapping jurisdictions are going to be messier than Suda’s handwriting). Others have suggested that if not robots, copyright benefits could instead flow to their owners or creators—copyright by human proxy.', 'What does it say about us as a species that we are more comfortable conferring privileges to machines than to non-human\xadbut-still-living beings? We apparently ascribe more value to chips and circuits than to flesh and blood, and we seem we more willing to listen to vested interests than to animal interests. Is it fear of Roko’s Basilisk that keeps us deferring to bots? Perhaps, as Nathan Heller suggests in this New Yorker essay, we feel—irrationally—as uncomfortable with robot cruelty as we do with animal cruelty because robot minds are made in our own image. This makes us better at anthropomorphizing bots than monkeys, despite our shared DNA with the latter. Or perhaps, in this case, it’s economics. Robots are themselves intellectual property. Time, thought, and human intelligence went into A.I., into making it capable of making valuable work—humans still want to reap the benefits of their creation’s creations. An A.I. developer wants in on the profits of a critically acclaimed, robot-penned novel—or maybe he just wants to write the sequel.']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Aff-Gonzaga-Round-4.docx

Michigan

PiPh

09a67da8f59e14e0fb03265921ef64d7ee1cc9d8df9897449c3a6f84c6268f73

Nuclear salience causes prolif, but drawdown solves.

Lauren Sukin & Toby Dalton 21. *Pre-doctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation. **Senior fellow at, and co-director of, the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Reducing Nuclear Salience: How to Reassure Northeast Asian Allies.” The Washington Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 2.

Increasing the salience of nuc s in Asia backfire emphasis on the usability of nuc s raised fears in So Ko Japan about whether policies make nuclear conflict more likely efforts to make extended deterrence appear credible increase support for the acquisition of nuc s worries about a rash decision to use nuc s drive allies to seek independence spur beliefs nuc s are necessary surveys clear prefer that So Ko possess its own nuclear arsenal when US nuclear guarantees presented as highly credible

Increasing the salience of nuc lear weapon s in Northeast Asia may not only fail to adequately address durability and capability concerns about US extended nuclear deterrence but also could backfire . Allies want reassurance U nited S tates will not rashly or precipitously use capabilities entangling ally in conflict emphasis on expanding nuclear capabilities and perceptions about the increased “ usability ” of nuc lear weapon s raised fears in So uth Ko rea and Japan about whether these policies would make nuclear conflict in the region more likely . efforts to make extended deterrence appear highly credible can actually increase support in ally states for the acquisition of nuc lear weapon s for two reasons. First, states worry that they will be dragged into conflict escalation initiated or provoked by their alliance partners, and they consequently seek reassurances that this won’t occur. Second, worries about a rash US decision to use nuc lear weapon s could drive allies to seek greater military independence , including by developing their own nuclear weapons . At the same time, US over-valuing of nuclear deterrence can spur beliefs among allies that nuc lear weapon s are a necessary capability . Two original surveys of South Korean citizens — in 2018 and 2019 — provide clear evidence for the potential proliferation consequences of efforts to increase the salience of US extended nuclear deterrence . respondents were more likely to prefer that So uth Ko rea possess its own nuclear arsenal , rather than rely on the United States' nuclear capabilities, when US nuclear guarantees were presented as highly credible

Increasing nuc lear weapon s fail backfire U S rashly precipitously use usability nuc lear weapon s So Ko Japan nuclear conflict more likely extended deterrence highly credible increase support ally states acquisition nuc lear weapon s dragged into conflict escalation rash US decision nuc lear weapon s allies greater military independence nuclear weapons over-valuing nuclear deterrence nuc lear weapon s necessary capability surveys South Korean clear evidence proliferation increase nuclear deterrence respondents prefer So Ko nuclear arsenal nuclear guarantees highly credible

['Increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia may not only fail to adequately address durability and capability concerns about US extended nuclear deterrence but also could backfire. Allies not only want assurance that the United States would be willing and able to use nuclear capabilities in their defense; they also want reassurance that the United States will not rashly or precipitously use these capabilities, thus entangling its ally in conflict. Notably, the 2018 NPR’s emphasis on expanding nuclear capabilities and perceptions about the increased “usability” of nuclear weapons raised fears in South Korea and Japan about whether these policies would make nuclear conflict in the region more likely.26 ', 'Though US security guarantees to European and Asian allies are intended to stymie nuclear proliferation, among other objectives, efforts to make extended deterrence appear highly credible can actually increase support in ally states for the acquisition of nuclear weapons for two reasons. First, states worry that they will be dragged into conflict escalation initiated or provoked by their alliance partners, and they consequently seek reassurances that this won’t occur.27 (The traditional understanding of the entanglement problem in alliances—mainly about risks to the nuclear guarantor—overlooks this problem, which specifically stems from a situation in which an ally perceives escalation risks from a guarantor’s nuclear threats.) Under the Trump administration, Northeast Asian allies worried that Trump’s “fire and fury” rhetoric and inconsistent approach to denuclearization could have resulted in an unwanted, unnecessary, and possibly nuclear conflict with North Korea.28 After all, a majority of South Koreans would prefer not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, even in the event of a full-scale invasion.29 ', 'Second, worries about a rash US decision to use nuclear weapons could drive allies to seek greater military independence, including by developing their own nuclear weapons. At the same time, US over-valuing of nuclear deterrence can spur beliefs among allies that nuclear weapons are a necessary capability. South Korean and Japanese proponents of independent nuclear capabilities have highlighted their purported value for wresting greater control of the security environment, deterring conflict with North Korea, and avoiding the risks they perceive with the US alliance. ', 'The combination of these two phenomena means that the US actions to increase the visibility of nuclear operations over the last decade have laid the foundation for a backfire effect. For example, the 2013 flights of US B-52 and B-2 aircraft over South Korean airspace and of B-52 aircraft over contested territory in the East China Sea seemingly had little positive effect on US credibility with its allies (and arguably no effect on deterring threats from North Korea).30 At the same time, these symbolic missions fed fears of crisis escalation and contributed to South Korean steps to strengthen its military capabilities independent of the alliance.31 Indeed, to the extent that these flights raised the perceived relevance of nuclear weapons in the face of North Korean threats, they also contributed to bolstered calls among conservative South Korean politicians—and the solidification of majority public support—for a “South Korean bomb.”32 US actions to increase the visibility of nuclear operations could have a backfire effect ', "Two original surveys of South Korean citizens — in 2018 and 2019 — provide clear evidence for the potential proliferation consequences of efforts to increase the salience of US extended nuclear deterrence.33 In both surveys, respondents were more likely to prefer that South Korea possess its own nuclear arsenal, rather than rely on the United States' nuclear capabilities, when US nuclear guarantees were presented as highly credible. This effect was even bigger among South Koreans who opposed the use of nuclear weapons against a possible North Korean invasion, demonstrating a clear linkage between South Korean desire for nuclear autonomy and concern that the ongoing reliance on the United States could entangle South Korea in an unwanted nuclear conflict with its northern neighbor.", '']

[(7, 14), (20, 29)]

ndtceda

Emory-OkYa-Aff-kansas-Round-6.docx

Emory

OkYa

28ce2da6ba96ed7aff74789c2be7639ddb3b8e073ad1006ceeedc8fca14c4768

a) Damage limitation solves the impact! Preemptive capabilities minimize chances of inadvertent nuclear war AND solve the impact to escalation caused by technical glitches

Nancy W. Gallagher 23, research professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, the director of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former director of the Clinton administration’s Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Ratification Task Force; and Jaganath Sankaran, assistant professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a nonresident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, September 2023, “Minimizing the Negative Effects of Advances in Military-Relevant Space Capabilities on Strategic Stability,” https://www.amacad.org/publication/military-capabilities-space-diplomacy-strategic-stability/section/2

aspect of strategic stability is minimizing chances of inadvertent deterrence failure closing pathways to nuc war nobody wanted to happen . One involves incentives to reduce damage by preemptively striking in an escalating crisis These incentives are a function of force structure optimized for rapid attacks Pathways to inadvertent war include problems with C3I false warning unauthorized launch, accidental detonation and much more

second aspect of strategic stability is minimizing chances of inadvertent deterrence failure closing various pathways to a nuc lear war that nobody wanted to happen . One route involves incentives to reduce how much damage an opponent can do to you by preemptively striking military and leadership targets in an escalating crisis or early phase of a war. These incentives are a function of force structure characteristics ( optimized for rapid , high-accuracy attacks on hard targets or surviving a first strike and retaliating later Pathways to inadvertent nuclear war also include problems with C3I ), such as false warning of an impending attack, unauthorized launch, accidental detonation , miscommunication, and much more

minimizing chances of inadvertent deterrence failure nuc nobody wanted to happen reduce how much damage an opponent can do force structure characteristics inadvertent nuclear war C3I false warning much more

['A second aspect of strategic stability is minimizing the chances of inadvertent deterrence failure—that is, closing various pathways to a nuclear war that nobody wanted to happen. One route involves incentives to reduce how much damage an opponent can do to you by preemptively striking military and leadership targets in an escalating crisis or early phase of a war. These incentives are partly a function of force structure characteristics (optimized for rapid, high-accuracy attacks on hard targets or for surviving a first strike and retaliating later). They also reflect beliefs about nuclear war. Could some combination of preemption and missile defense give high confidence that damage suffered in a nuclear war could be limited to an “acceptable” level? Once any nuclear weapons have been used, how difficult would it be to control escalation and terminate a conflict on acceptable terms rather than fighting to the finish? Pathways to inadvertent nuclear war also include problems with nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I), such as false warning of an impending attack, unauthorized launch, accidental detonation, miscommunication, and much more.', '']

[(9, 21), (310, 318)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AgRu-Neg-Indiana-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

AgRu

9cacf043a89b5613a9f7315ad1e6f198348ed31302e611664c3be0efb0b41113

AI confinement solves extinction BUT robot rights make it impossible

Yampolskiy 22, Computer scientist at the University of Louisville (Roma Yampolskiy, 6-20-2022, “The AI containment problem,” The Institute of Art and Ideas, , accessed: 10-25-2022)

external causes might allow an AI to escape robot rights may lead to reductions in security of confinement AI function on limited resources control against explosion all security be duplicated at multiple levels AI be shut down automatically subject to periodic resets if they suspect escape turn off the power facility self- destruct deserted island mine or space be guarded facility block all GPS internet provide sensory deprivation to eliminate leakage AI should not be given access to code Super-intelligence is not omnipotent ; it is a piece of software If it is put in a situation with no options it is not any more powerful filtered communication have a much harder time in obtaining freedom Confinement is not completely secure but it is an addition in our arsenal of security techniques prisons containing undesirable elements confinement may be just what humanity needs to responsibly benefit from singularity

we must not ignore external causes which might allow an AI to escape robot rights may lead to reductions in the security of confinement AI function on limited or randomly changing resources provide control s against internal intelligence explosion all security components be duplicated at multiple levels the AI is still numerous levels away from escaping and could be shut down perhaps automatically AI should be subject to periodic resets allowing researchers to turn off the system if they suspect an unavoidable escape by turn ing off the power supply the facility self- destruct taking the AI with it A deserted island , deep mine or a space object the facility should be guarded facility block all types of GPS , wireless internet , TV, radio , and cell phone provide sensory deprivation for the AI to eliminate information leakage the AI should not be given access to its own source code Super-intelligence is not omnipotent ; it is a piece of software If it is ever put in a situation with no options or only with options which provide a very small probability of success it is not any more powerful a system forced to communicate via a filtered communication channel may have a much harder time in obtaining its freedom AI Confinement rules aimed at creating an environment from which an AI would find it difficult or at least time consuming to escape. What we propose is not completely secure but it is an addition al option in our arsenal of security techniques prisons do a pretty good job of containing undesirable elements away from society the AI confinement protocol may be just what humanity needs to responsibly benefit from the approaching singularity .

robot rights reductions in the security of confinement limited randomly resources intelligence explosion security duplicated levels AI levels away escaping shut automatically AI subject resets turn off suspect escape turn ing off the power facility destruct island mine space facility guarded block GPS internet radio deprivation AI eliminate leakage AI not given source code not omnipotent piece of software no options not powerful much harder time not completely secure arsenal of security techniques responsibly benefit

['2.1.4 External Causes of Escape', 'In the previous sections we have outlined a large repertoire of techniques an AI could use to attempt to get out from its confinement space. However we must not ignore external causes which might allow an AI to escape into the world. Acts of God such as hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, asteroids, etc. may make the confinement facility less secure. Man caused disasters such as wars, terrorist acts, actions of robot rights activists, competing companies and governments may all lead to reductions in the security of the confinement environment increasing the chances of escape.', '2.1.5 Information In-Leaking', 'Depending on the terms of the confinement protocol there might be a need to keep AI from obtaining information about the outside world, not just keeping it from sending information out. This might be useful to prevent AI from finding escape paths, designing social engineering attacks and modeling human psychology in hopes of finding loop-holes. While it is easy to not provide AI with direct access to the library, Internet and human experts, other ways of obtaining information are much harder to block out. First, an AI may be able to detect radio and TV broadcasts, communications of emergency-services providers and wireless network signals, as well as sound, light and possibly other signal modalities of its immediate environment.', 'More importantly, the AI will have access to covert sources of information such as its own hardware and software and could analyze its design and source code to infer information about the designers. For example analysis of the source code may reveal to the AI that human programmers are slow (based on the file modification dates), inefficient (based on code redundancy), illogical (based on bugs in the code), have bad memory (based on the long and descriptive variable names), and don’t think in code (based on unnecessary comments in the code). All this information could be used to conclude that humans are fallible and so could be outsmarted or manipulated into releasing the AI. Obviously if during the system design inspection the AI finds a design flaw allowing it to directly escape, ‘information in-leaking’ is the least of our problems. It has also been stipulated that even if the AI fails to obtain concrete information about us, it may brute force a number of escape plans which will likely work against a broad range of designers (Chalmers, 2010).', 'Similarly, the type of hardware architecture (mechanical, electrical, quantum, etc.) on which the AI is implemented will reveal information about our knowledge of physics, chemistry and related engineering disciplines. AI’s initial capacity for information processing, self-improvement and the mere act of its creation will reveal information about our knowledge with regards to information theory, nature of intelligence and cultural attitudes about technology and safety. If the AI is confined in a simulated world it is likely to be a virtual representation of our reality similar to Second Life or Entropia Universe. Such worlds while are different in many ways from our world are also a treasure trove of information about what it is like to be a human and what the reality is like', '3. Critique of the AI-Boxing Critique', 'While a lot of criticism has been made against possibility of AI confinement, a lot of it is based on Yudkowsky’s AI-Boxing experiments. Careful analysis of the protocol used by Yudkowsky in conducting his AI-Box experiments reveals that they were unscientific and explicitly designed to show impossibility of confinement. Without getting into technical details, first, the participant selection was not random. In fact, Yudkowsky has handpicked participants among those who have participated in the singularity related forums run by Yudkowsky and so are disproportionately likely to subscribe to his world view. Second, participants have not undergone any AI-safety training as would be expected of any true guards tasked with supervising an AI-Box. Also, the guards were given a right to release AI at their own discretion without a chance to consult with anyone and without any punishment for failing to keep AI contained; all are highly unrealistic conditions for a supposed prison security guard. The communication itself was completely open with no filters of any kind and no 3rd party supervision. Also, the guards were required to communicate with the AI for a prolonged period of time. Finally, any valuable scientific insights from the experiments were completely lost as one of the conditions of the protocol stated that ‘... neither party shall ever reveal anything of what goes on within the AI-Box experiment...’ (Yudkowsky, 2002).', 'All supervision, maintenance and interactions with the AI need to be done only via unintelligent programs, which have no option to release the AI.', '3.1 Countermeasures Against Escape', 'In this section we propose countermeasures for different escape paths an AI system may exploit. The suggested measures are not meant to guarantee that the escape will be impossible, but following them may delay an escape which in itself is a desirable outcome. We begin by reiterating that the four confinement rules suggested by Lampson: isolation, transitivity, masking and enforcement (Lampson, 1973) should be adhered to. Specific strategies described below should help in reducing a possibility of social engineering, system, physics and information in-leaking attacks.', '3.1.1 Preventing Social Engineering Attacks', 'Human intellect is no match to that of a superintelligent machine. Human beings are fallible and even with adequate training are not secure against a well planned SE attack. The only solution to this problem is to completely isolate the AI from any contact with human beings. This means no human personal working directly around the system, communicating with the system via voice, chat, Morse-code or by any other means via open channels. Also human beings should not directly observe behavior of the AI in the confined environment or examine its source code or memory space. All supervision, maintenance and interactions with the AI need to be done only via unintelligent programs, which have no option to release the AI.', '3.1.2 Against System Resource Attacks and Future Threats', 'To prevent system resource-based attacks, the AI should function on limited, diminishing or randomly changing resources. Confinement environments should be housed in specially build hardware with limited sensors and restricted output devices. Regardless of the utilized computation paradigm no reconfigurable hardware should be employed. Ideally the confinement environment should be running on a virtual machine with no direct access to the hardware. This would also allow for easy adjustments to the clock speed with which the simulation progresses further allowing handicapping of the AI to provide additional controls against internal intelligence explosion (Chalmers, 2010). In general all security components of the confinement environment should be duplicated at multiple levels, in such a way that if one of the levels is breached the AI is still numerous levels away from escaping and could be shut down before that happens, perhaps automatically. For example the virtual machine should be running on another virtual machine and so on.', 'In some confinement scenarios it may be desirable to avoid escalating self-improvement of the AI, which might lead to additional escape possibilities. The AI should be subject to periodic resets in which a previous version of the program is put in the place of the more current one. Comparisons to previous versions of the program may also be used to detect self-modifications. Such functionality could also be used as an off button allowing researchers to turn off the system if they suspect an unavoidable escape, for example by turning off the power supply.', 'Our current state of knowledge does not allow us to develop countermeasures against attacks based on knowledge of physics we do not currently have or as of yet unproven pseudoscientific disciplines. As such knowledge becomes accumulated; changes to the security protocol will need to be made. One might hope that the access of the AI to such future technology could be limited by the selection of components from which the system is made.', '3.1.3 Against External Causes of Escape', 'There is not much we can do about the acts of God, but a confinement facility should be designed in such a way that if a major security breach is unavoidable, the facility should self-destruct taking the AI with it. The best strategy for counteracting man-made disasters is to build the confinement facility in an undisclosed, hard to reach secure location. A deserted island, deep mine or a space object, such as asteroid, would make a great candidate for building a hopefully indestructible facility. Just in case the location of the facility becomes known, the perimeter of the facility should be guarded to prevent entrance by unauthorized agents.', '3.1.4 Against Information In-Leaking', 'An AI will attempt to learn about humanity, our knowledge and the world we live in to improve its chances of escape. For confinement protocols which stipulate no information in-leaking it is important to remove any possibility of AI getting access to libraries, computer networks and direct communication channels with human beings. The confinement facility needs to block all types of communication signals such as GPS, wireless internet, TV, radio, and cell phone. At the local level the facility needs to provide sensory deprivation for the AI including sound, light, smell and all other traditional sensory inputs, as well as infrared, radiation and other signals outside of human sensory spectrum.', 'In order to eliminate information leakage which could happen as a result of self-analysis, the AI should not be given access to its own source code or any sensors which would allow it to precisely measure properties of its hardware. If that is not possible, to prevent the AI from inferring information about us via self-analysis, to a certain degree we may rely on security by obscurity. The source code and hardware configuration of the system needs to be obfuscated (Yampolskiy & Govindaraju, 2007a) and important modules of the program should be provided only in the homomorphicly encrypted (Gentry, 2009) form, meaning that it could be used for computation or self-improvement (Hall, 2007), but not for self-analysis.', 'The AI’s initial capacity may be difficult to obscure, but randomization of available computational resources may provide necessary obfuscation. Additionally, the AI could never be sure that its initial design represents the best the humanity can do and is not purposefully limited for a specific experiment in limited-resource intelligence analysis. It has also been suggested that we should try to minimize any peculiarities in the AI’s design (Chalmers, 2010). Better yet we need to simulate an environment which does not look designed but could be naturally occurring, a situation in which humanity has found itself (Bostrom, 2003).', '4.1 How to Safely Communicate with a Superintelligence', 'The AI confinement environment, which incorporates our proposed escape countermeasures, makes it possible to secure an AI from directly affecting the outside world in an uncontrolled manner. Unfortunately, without an ability to obtain information from the AI, the whole system serves no purpose. Consequently a way to obtain some information from the AI needs to be developed. While no communication with superintelligence could ever be completely safe we have devised an approach aimed at decreasing potential risks associated with such communication. In this section we propose and formalize a communication protocol which might help to delay access of superintelligent artificial minds to the world, while allowing the AI to be a source of useful knowledge to humanity.', 'An open communication channel with the AI is fundamentally unsafe as demonstrated in the preceding sections of this paper. Asking the AI to answer open ended questions opens up the possibilities for social engineering attacks as well as numerous other dangerous consequences. Our proposed protocol is based on the idea of asking what we will call ‘safe questions’ with restricted answers. We define a safe question as one for which a human being could find an answer without any help from superintelligence, all on his own merit. Why is this useful? Suppose that a scientist working on a cure for cancer is looking at two potential cures. Each one could be developed and tested without assistance from the AI, but would take about 3 years of hard work each. Which one to try first if the scientist believes that they have about an equal chance of working? If a wrong option is chosen to be tested first, humanity will still obtain a cure for cancer but it will happen 3 years later. What if we could ask the AI to suggest which option to try first?', 'This question is safe for a number of reasons. First, each potential answer has an equal probability of being correct. Second, a human being could answer it without assistance from the AI and so asking AI for help will only speed up progress but in no way change the out- come. It is essentially equal to being very lucky multiple choice guesser. Finally, the answer to this question could be encoded in a single bit making it hard to hide additional messages in the provided answer.', 'To make sure that a potential question is safe, a group of experts could be used to review it. The experts should all be trained AI safety engineers, meaning that they are familiar with the design of the AI and its confinement environment as well as the latest developments in machine ethics (Allen et al., 2006; Anderson & Anderson, 2007; Hall, 2000; Moor, 2006; Tonkens, 2009). Experts may also need to be trained in computer psychology a currently non-existent profession which might become a reality in the future (Epstein, 1997). An existing discipline which might be of greatest help for training of AI question review experts is Artimetrics — a field of study proposed by the author that identifies, classifies and authenticates AI agents, robots, and virtual reality avatars for security purposes (Yampolskiy, 2007; Yampolskiy & Govindaraju, 2008; 2007b, Gavrilova and Yampolskiy, 2010).', 'To reiterate, only safe questions with two possible answers of even likelihood which are independently computable by people should be submitted to the AI. This should be done via an intermediary non- intelligent software interface in random order and only after expert review to ascertain question’s safety. This represents the limited inbound channel of the proposed communication protocol.', 'The limited outbound channel shell consist of binary (0 or 1) answers next to original unmodified safe questions presented by the intermediary non-intelligent software in random order as to avoid communication via covert timing or resource channels which make steganography possible. The output should in no way be controllable by the AI, outside of the multiple choice menu.', 'We believe our communication protocol to be verifiably secure against information leaking even if the AI had full access to the description of the security protocol. If the protocol is correctly implemented, humanity will essentially have access to a superintelligent oracle, which might be extremely beneficial and safer than an unconstrained AI.', 'Further refinement and development of the AI confinement protocol in the face of the ever changing knowledge about the nature of intelligence, hardware engineering and basic physics is a challenge which we would like to pose to the scientific community. The work on it will always be in progress and will never be completed. In this paper we have formalized the notions of AI confinement problem, escape, and safe questions. We would also like to propose a few additional terms which might be useful in streamlining discussions about the AICP. An AI confinement environment could be appropriately called JAIL — ‘Just for AI Location’.', 'Finally, we would like to introduce a visual symbol indicating a presence of hazardous intelligent software confinement facility (Figure 1, rightmost). Such signs could be posted in the vicinity of different JAILs to warn about the nearby danger. The sign is designed in a manner similar to that for Bio, Radiation and Magnetic field hazards. It consists of the ‘@’ symbol which is well recognized as relating to the computer and information industry and has an appropriate meaning of ‘located at’. The symbol is also already available on all key- boards making its adaptation very cost effective.', '5. Conclusions and Future Work', 'Restricting access of superintelligent machines to the real world is a commonly proposed solution for the AI safety problem. Super-intelligence is not omnipotent; it is a piece of software capable of looking at all the options it has in a given situation and properly evaluating probabilities for each option. If it is ever put in a situation with no options or only with options which provide a very small probability of success it is not any more powerful than any other agent. While it is obvious that an AI with an unrestricted communication channel will be able to escape, a system forced to communicate via a filtered communication channel may have a much harder time in obtaining its freedom.', 'In this article we have formally introduced the AI Confinement Problem and suggested a set of rules aimed at creating an environment from which an AI would find it difficult or at least time consuming to escape. What we propose is not a completely secure solution, but it is an additional option in our arsenal of security techniques. Just like with real prisons, while escape is possible, prisons do a pretty good job of containing undesirable elements away from society. As long as we keep the Unknown Unknowns in mind and remember that there is no such thing as perfect security, the AI confinement protocol may be just what humanity needs to responsibly benefit from the approaching singularity.', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaPa-Neg-ADA-Nationals-at-Georgetown-Quarters.docx

Kansas

PaPa

76df01ac4c4a55145f614f0d5fd3927a289cb5f5613facfabb0bc0f6a46699c4

Jevon’s Paradox is wrong.

Noah Smith 20, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Michigan, Columnist writing about economics, “Jevons' Paradox won't slow the energy transition,” Noahpinion, 12-07-2021, https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/jevons-paradox-wont-slow-the-energy

Green energy is getting cheaper fast Jevons’ Paradox won’t happen think about car batteries a substitute for oil Cheaper batteries mean we use less cost of getting energy goes do wn cost of oil stays the same barrel costs the same to pump internal combustion gets the same energy quantity of oil consumed goes down will no longer be worth it Jevons’ Paradox is efficiency, not substitution Green energy is substitution like when cars replaced horses

Green energy is cheap and getting cheaper fast Jevons’ Paradox won’t happen green energy tech isn’t about efficiency; it’s about substitution. Jevons’ Paradox doesn’t apply. If the increase in energy use is large enough it causes an increase in oil usage let’s think about what happens when car batteries get cheaper Car batteries are a substitute for oil When substitutes get cheaper, that good falls in price Cheaper batteries mean that oil gets cheaper, and that we use less oil. the cost of getting energy from batteries goes do wn , but the cost of getting energy from oil stays exactly the same A barrel of oil still costs the same to pump out An internal combustion car still gets the same amount of energy out of a gallon of gasolin what happens when batteries get cheaper is that the quantity of oil consumed just goes down Marginal , expensive-to-extract oil will no longer be worth it for the same cost, you would be better off building batteries Jevons’ Paradox is about efficiency, not about substitution Green energy is about substitution It’s like when cars came along and replaced horses while Jevons’ Paradox can be a problem for energy efficiency policies, it’s not a problem for green energy

getting cheaper fast Jevons’ Paradox won’t happen exactly the same no longer be worth it efficiency, not about substitution Green energy is about substitution not a problem for green energy

['Green energy is cheap and getting cheaper fast:', '', 'I’ve seen some people worry that Jevons’ Paradox will slow or even prevent the transition from fossil fuels to green energy. But don’t worry! This won’t happen!', 'Jevons’ Paradox is about efficiency. When you get more efficient at providing something, sometimes you actually end up using more of it instead of less. This is why policies that increase energy efficiency can occasionally lead to higher energy usage.', 'But green energy tech isn’t about efficiency; it’s about substitution. Jevons’ Paradox doesn’t apply.', 'To see why, let’s explain why Jevons’ Paradox works. Suppose we’re talking about the market for oil. Let’s represent this with a simple supply-and-demand graph:', '', 'OK, so now suppose we become more efficient at using oil. Wikipedia depicts this situation in the following way:', '', 'But cost doesn’t just move on its own. What’s really happening here is that the supply curve — which isn’t shown in the Wikipedia graph — has shifted to the right. If we become more efficient at turning oil into energy, it means that sellers of energy are able to provide more energy at any given price. So what’s really happening is this:', '', 'If the increase in energy use is large enough (which happens if the blue demand curve is flat enough, i.e. if demand is elastic enough), then it actually causes an increase in oil usage, despite the fact that we got more efficient at turning oil into energy!', 'That’s Jevons’ Paradox.', 'OK, but now let’s think about what happens when car batteries get cheaper. This is completely different from the example above. Car batteries are a substitute for oil. When substitutes for a good get cheaper, that good falls in price. Just think about pens and pencils. If pens get cheaper, people become less willing to pay high prices for pencils, since they can go buy cheap pens now instead. So demand for pencils falls.', 'Car batteries and oil are just like that. When car batteries get cheap, demand for oil falls. The situation looks like this:', '', 'Cheaper batteries mean that oil gets cheaper, and that we also use less oil.', 'At this point, you might ask: “OK Noah, but energy gets cheaper as a result of cheap batteries. Doesn’t that mean that people will use more energy, just like in the first example earlier? And doesn’t that mean that the people who still get their energy from oil will use more oil?”', 'Nope!', 'The reason is that in the second example, the cost of getting energy from batteries goes down, but the cost of getting energy from oil stays exactly the same. A barrel of oil still costs the same to pump out of the ground and refine and deliver to the gas station. An internal combustion car still gets the same amount of energy out of a gallon of gasoline.', 'So what happens when batteries get cheaper is that the quantity of oil consumed just goes down. Marginal, expensive-to-extract oil like the Canadian tar sands will no longer be worth it to extract; for the same cost, you would be better off just building some batteries instead. So people will just leave the expensive oil in the ground.', 'Remember: Jevons’ Paradox is about efficiency, not about substitution. Green energy is about substitution. It’s like when cars came along and replaced horses. So while Jevons’ Paradox can be a problem for energy efficiency policies, it’s not a problem for green energy. Don’t worry!', '']

[(5, 13)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGa-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-3.docx

Kentucky

DiGa

b2b754828f20cb7b9f1d878df53d13efad9e9c6a6641b04ea35211b1dbc56160

Biden is hemorrhaging political capital—only changing the conversation saves it.

Gift 9—5 - (Thomas Gift, Associate Professor Of Political Science At UCL, Where He Is Director Of The Centre On Us Politics (Cusp), 9-5-2021, USAPP, "Biden’s mishandled Afghanistan withdrawal is unlikely to have a large effect on the 2022 midterms," 9-13-2021) url: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2021/09/07/bidens-mishandled-afghanistan-withdrawal-is-unlikely-to-have-a-large-effect-on-the-2022-midterms/

How will Afghanistan affect p c Biden’s approval dipped negative Republicans using Kabul to paint a portrait of an unreliable commander Even Dem allies questioned Biden’s recent moves whether this proves a blip or a protracted loss of p c will depend on how effectively the administration can change the conversation

How will Biden’s tough recent stretch , especially in Afghanistan , affect the White House’s p olitical c apital? The last few weeks have been an undeniable jolt to the White House. Biden’s approval ratings have dipped into negative territory . Republicans are using the devastating images out of Kabul to paint a portrait of an unreliable commander -in-chief . Even Dem ocratic allies have questioned how Biden’s recent moves square with a leader who promised to be a steady hand and to restore American trust whether this proves to be a temporary blip for Biden— or the start of a protracted loss of p olitical c apital— will depend on how effectively the administration can change the conversation . The White House communications office is clearly trying to pivot back to domestic issues . But there’s no safe harbor given COVID August job numbers inflation and so on.

tough recent stretch Afghanistan p c undeniable jolt approval ratings negative territory Kabul unreliable commander -in-chief Dem questioned temporary blip protracted loss p c effectively change the conversation pivot back to domestic issues no safe harbor COVID job numbers inflation

['', 'How will Biden’s tough recent stretch, especially in Afghanistan, affect the White House’s political capital? ', 'The last few weeks have been an undeniable jolt to the White House. Biden’s approval ratings have dipped into negative territory. Republicans are using the devastating images out of Kabul to paint a portrait of an unreliable commander-in-chief. Even Democratic allies have questioned how Biden’s recent moves square with a leader who promised to be a steady hand and to restore American trust abroad. Afghanistan was Biden’s first true foreign policy test, and his execution failed. Politically, however, whether this proves to be a temporary blip for Biden—or the start of a protracted loss of political capital—will depend on how effectively the administration can change the conversation. The White House communications office is clearly trying to pivot back to domestic issues. But even here, there’s no safe harbor given continued depressing news on COVID-19, worse-than-expected August job numbers, mounting concerns about inflation, and so on. To the extent that presidents are granted even a modicum of a honeymoon period anymore, we’re well past that with Biden.', '']

[(0, 4), (5, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-1-NUSO-Round2.docx