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0f506ff0a84e1934d342efff1912c2682d7c7b91c30894face29f02bc48068b8

Even NFU wouldn’t slide – these senators would fight the aff to the death.

Gould 21 --- Joe Gould was the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He had previously served as Congress reporter, “Debate on ‘no first use’ of nukes mushrooms in Washington”, Oct 6, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2021/10/06/debate-on-no-first-use-of-nukes-mushrooms-in-washington/

Obama turned back from n f u opponents say Biden is considering Senate ranking membe said are “very upset opposing confirmation of Biden’s nominee in connection with the matter. the Republican have an understanding that allies have strong, strong objections Republicans in Congress pushed back on adopting a declaratory nuclear weapons policy lawmakers to their left are split King has come out against any change to declaratory King, who chairs Senate’s strategic forces subcommittee, told News it’s an abdication of the nuclear umbrella

after Obama turned back from n o f irst u se opponents say the Biden administration is considering it and warn that it risks alienating allies. Senate ranking membe r said that he believes America’s allies are “very , very upset ” with the idea “It gives more comfort to the enemy Risch said that he is opposing confirmation of Biden’s nominee in connection with the matter. That complicates confirmation Risch grilled Stewart at her nomination hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pressing her to agree with him that allies would strongly object to potential policy change Risch was frustrated, saying: “If we on the Republican side of the committee have an understanding that our allies have strong, strong objections Asked by Cruz if she personally believes in a “no first use A number of Republicans in Congress have pushed back on the idea of adopting a declaratory nuclear weapons policy lawmakers to their left are split Angus King has come out publicly against any change to a declaratory policy. I don’t support it King, who chairs the Senate’s strategic forces subcommittee, told Defense News . “I’m also concerned our allies will feel it’s an abdication of the nuclear umbrella which I feel would be very problematic

opposing confirmation lawmakers to their left are split publicly against any change to a declaratory policy. which I feel would be very problematic

['WASHINGTON ― Five years after President Barack Obama turned back from declaring a “no first use” as U.S. policy for nuclear weapons, opponents say the Biden administration is considering it too, and warn that it risks alienating allies.', 'The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s ranking member, Sen. Jim Risch, R-Idaho, said that he believes America’s allies are “very, very upset” with the idea President Joe Biden might reverse decades of U.S. nuclear policy as part of his administration’s sweeping Nuclear Posture Review, expected in 2022. The U.S. has historically maintained ambiguity about whether it would carry out a first strike with a nuclear weapon, but the policy would expressly rule it out.', '“It gives more comfort to the enemy that they can plan an attack and do whatever they want to and not worry about us using a first strike,” Risch said of a “no first use” policy. “Nobody wants to use a first strike, but there are scenarios where you can imagine a first strike, and the best thing you can do is keep [adversaries] off balance.”', 'Risch said Tuesday that he is opposing confirmation of Biden’s nominee for assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, Mallory Stewart, in connection with the matter. That complicates but doesn’t necessarily sink confirmation for Stewart, who serves as the arms control lead for the National Security Council.', 'Proponents of “no first use” argue it reduces the chances that China or Russia, mistakenly fearing a U.S. nuclear attack, would launch their own first strike. However, allied leaders in Europe and Asia are likely to see it as an erosion of America’s guarantee to protect them, and it would put the U.S. at odds with the strategic-ambiguity policies of NATO and nuclear-armed U.K. and France.', 'NATO allies, along with Japan and South Korea, have likely been speaking out against the possibility of a “no first use” policy, either to visiting U.S. lawmakers, or through their embassies in the U.S., said William Alberque, the former director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre.', 'Declaring that nuclear weapons are only to answer nuclear weapons would worry Asian allies fearful of China and North Korea, pushing South Korea toward fielding its own nuclear arms, Alberque said. In Europe, it would signal to Russia that it can invade its neighbors without fear of a nuclear response ― and gain Washington nothing in planned arms control talks with Moscow.', '“If the United States comes in and says, ‘If Russia invades NATO, we promise not to use nuclear weapons unless you nuke us,’ I think, after the Russians pull themselves off the floor from laughing hysterically, they’re going to say, ‘Wait, are you serious,’” Alberque said. “What kind of goodwill gesture is that when Russia has short-range nukes all along its border?”', 'Some within the administration are said to be arguing the Pentagon-led Nuclear Posture Review should take an unorthodox step and seek foreign input from across the political spectrum. The thinking is there are diverse views within allied countries when it comes to nuclear weapons policy.', '“With the NPR, the question is how broad the representation will be from our allies,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear arms control expert and professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. “The conservatives and the Pentagon want to talk to the same small group of people they always talk to, who tell them what they want to hear. And the people in the Biden administration who want to take a fresh look [at nuclear arms policy] want to talk to a broader range.”', 'On Tuesday, Risch grilled Stewart at her nomination hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pressing her to agree with him that allies would strongly object to potential policy change. But Stewart said it would be hard to concede that allies are objecting to the results of the Nuclear Posture Review while it was ongoing ― and that the administration was still engaging with allies to address their concerns.', '“I’m not sure if I understand the term ‘strenuous objection.’ I think they’re concerned,” Stewart told Risch, adding: “I don’t even know if it’s an ‘objection.’ The point is perhaps through our engagement, we hope to explain and understand, and really hear from them further.”', 'Risch was frustrated, saying: “If we on the Republican side of the committee have an understanding that our allies have strong, strong objections to what you’re considering, how is it that you can’t concede that?”', 'Asked by Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, if she personally believes in a “no first use” policy, Stewart deferred to the ongoing review and said the country has to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in a way that “extended-deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.”', '“It’s important to make sure our allies and parters understand that whatever steps we take, our commitment to their defense is unshakeable,” Stewart said.', 'After the hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez told reporters that he had not heard any objections like the ones Risch mentioned.', '“I have not heard from any ally in any of my engagements, directly with heads of state or foreign ministers, or at a staff level ― I have not heard that,” said Menendez, D-N.J.', 'Neither was he personally troubled. “We’re going to be looking at [the administration’s] posture review to see what their ultimate decision is, but I’m not going to prejudge something before they say that this is what they’re going to do,” he said.', 'Under the Obama administration in 2016, an internal “no first use” proposal died amid opposition from the Cabinet as well as allies in Europe and Asia, the Wall Street Journal reported at the time. Reportedly, Secretary of State John Kerry cited concerns raised by U.S. allies that rely on the American nuclear triad for their security and Defense Secretary Ash Carter said it would risk provoking insecurity about the U.S. deterrent among allies.', 'While on the campaign trail, Biden expressed a desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, and his website says their “sole purpose” is to deter and, if needed, retaliate against a nuclear attack. However, since Biden took office and in the run up to the Nuclear Posture Review, there have been competing cross-currents both inside the administration and politically.', 'At Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks’ confirmation hearing in February, she reiterated her past position that, “I don’t believe that no-first-use policy is necessarily in the interests of the United States,” but also said, “those will be decisions ultimately made by the president.”', 'More recently, the Biden administration’s removal of the Pentagon official who had been leading the Nuclear Posture Review has prompted non-proliferation advocates to publicly ask whether the move was aimed at stifling views that challenge the status quo on nuclear arms.', 'Pentagon officials say it was part of a routine reorganization. “We’re going to continue to consider and include a wide range of viewpoints in the Nuclear Posture Review, including those from administration officials, military leaders, academics and all others,” chief Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby told reporters at the time.', 'A number of Republicans in Congress, like Risch and Cruz, have pushed back on the idea of adopting a declaratory nuclear weapons policy, but lawmakers to their left are split. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith and Sen. Elizabeth Warren reintroduced a measure to codify “no first use” policy in law, but Sen. Angus King ― a Maine independent who caucuses with Democrats ― has come out publicly against any change to a declaratory policy.', '“I don’t support it myself. To me the whole idea of deterrence is to make our adversaries nervous,” King, who chairs the Senate’s strategic forces subcommittee, told Defense News. “I’m also concerned our allies will feel it’s an abdication of the nuclear umbrella [of protection the U.S. provides non-nuclear armed allies], and then they’ll feel they have to develop their own nuclear capacity ― which I feel would be very problematic.”']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BeMo-Neg-2---Kentucky-Round-3.docx

MichiganState

BeMo

76ed81012d1e2aeceb37c39058922aa0400e3851279558a720dbbc12ae7bad08

‘Anticompetitive’ means reducing competition, in contrast to procompetitive

Texas Supreme Court 15 (Justice Willett delivered the opinion of the Court. IN RE MEMORIAL HERMANN HOSP. SYSTEM, 464 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. 2015). Google Scholar caselaw. Date accessed 7/22/21).

Black's Law defines "anticompetitive" as to reduce or eliminate competition in contrast to procompetitive Procompetitive is turn defined as "[i]ncreasing or preserving competition Competition is defined as ]he struggle for commercial advantage ; the effort of two or more commercial interests to obtain business

Black's Law Dictionary defines "anticompetitive" as "[h]aving a tendency to reduce or eliminate competition " in contrast to the term procompetitive Procompetitive is turn defined as "[i]ncreasing or preserving competition Competition itself is defined as "[t ]he struggle for commercial advantage ; the effort or action of two or more commercial interests to obtain the same business from third parties."[46] The dictionary also notes that the term anticompetitive "describes the type of conduct or circumstances generally targeted by antitrust laws,"[47 ] although the statement is "not purely definitional."[48]

to reduce or eliminate competition contrast to the term procompetitive

['Neither section 160.007 nor any other peer review committee privilege that incorporates the phrase "anticompetitive action" defines the term.[43] Black\'s Law Dictionary defines "anticompetitive" as "[h]aving a tendency to reduce or eliminate competition" in contrast to the term procompetitive.[44] Procompetitive is in turn defined as "[i]ncreasing, encouraging, or preserving competition."[45] Competition itself is defined as "[t]he struggle for commercial advantage; the effort or action of two or more commercial interests to obtain the same business from third parties."[46] The dictionary also notes that the term anticompetitive "describes the type of conduct or circumstances generally targeted by antitrust laws,"[47] although the statement is "not purely definitional."[48]', '']

[(0, 22)]

ndtceda

Kansas-Spiers-Basore-Neg-Texas-Round3.docx

Kansas

SpBa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/SpBa/Kansas-Spiers-Basore-Neg-Texas-Round3.docx

d06376bab8a93930e8b2e6ed9fe5a5258e3c6d6e6368e42f9f6efe0cb856d508

2—Their claim is homogenizing and ignores decades of Chinese history.

Chong 20, PhD, associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore and a Harvard-Yenching Institute Visiting Scholar for 2019-2020. (Ja Ian, 11/9/20, "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations", H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)

“ Western ” i r theories have parallels in the Chinese tradition Spring and Autumn , Warring States , Song , and Ming documents closely resemble statecraft in the “West.” Several millennia of debate over conflict are bound to produce similarities Dividing the world into “Western” and “Chinese” views ignores the fact the PRC has disagreements with non-Western polities the C C P draws at least some inspiration from Europe dynasties from historical China proved adept at conquest To claim scholarship are unable to understand China because they are “ Western ” is Orientalizing Beijing and Washington disagree fundamentally This does not imply either side is superior just that understanding provides little promise for improving relations

Chan’s finding that worries about the PRC and its intentions stem from misunderstandings of perspectives on international politics informed by theories from “ the West ” rather than China deserves elaboration and debate So-called “ Western ” i nternational r elations theories often have parallels in the Chinese tradition , broadly construed. Work analyzing Spring and Autumn , Warring States , Song , and Ming documents indicate that the strategic thought that is prominent in these periods closely resemble statecraft familiar to those in the contemporary “West.” [ Parallels between “Western” and “Chinese” approaches to politics are unsurprising . Several millennia of collective human experience, thought, and debate over statecraft , conflict , as well as governance are almost certainly bound to produce similarities in responses. Dividing the world into “Western” and “Chinese” views of the world ignores the fact the PRC has disagreements with ostensibly “ non-Western ” polities such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, each with their own distinct philosophical traditions despite sharing cultural origins , people in the PRC and on Taiwan disagree fundamentally issues of political val A ues and rights the PRC’s ruling C C P draws at least some of its inspiration from Europe an thinkers in the form of Marx and Lenin. Successive dynasties from historical China also proved themselves very adept at conquest that is how regimes and empires get built Attributing tensions between the U nited S tates and PRC to culture suggests an overly monolithic view of the rich and varied philosophical and political tr aditions both major powers draw from To claim that contemporary international scholarship are unable to adequately understand China because they are “ Western ” may oversimplify the nature and seriousness of problems dogging U.S.-China relations Relegating difference to culture is not only Orientalizing , it can encourage a misplaced expectation that understanding can bring some sort of happy, mutually acceptable outcome Beijing and Washington understand each other well . They simply disagree fundamentally over values and interests in ways that make finding mutually acceptable accommodation increasingly difficult This does not imply that either side is morally superior or normatively “better” t just that understanding provides little promise for improving relations and avoiding confrontation Better accounting for such possibilities invites fuller consideration of the roles that agency and contingency play in major power relations

misunderstandings the West Western i r theories parallels in the Chinese tradition Spring and Autumn Warring States Song Ming strategic thought prominent in these periods closely resemble unsurprising Several millennia statecraft conflict governance almost certainly bound similarities in responses. Dividing the world ignores disagreements ostensibly “ non-Western ” polities distinct philosophical traditions cultural origins PRC Taiwan disagree fundamentally political val A ues rights ruling C C P at least some Europe an thinkers Successive dynasties historical China adept at conquest regimes empires get built tensions U S PRC culture overly monolithic view rich varied philosophical political tr aditions unable Western oversimplify nature seriousness of problems Orientalizing misplaced expectation happy, mutually acceptable outcome understand each other well disagree fundamentally increasingly difficult does not imply morally superior normatively “better” understanding little promise for improving relations avoiding confrontation fuller consideration agency contingency

['Chan’s finding that misplaced worries about the PRC and its intentions stem in part from misunderstandings of perspectives on international politics that are informed by theories from “the West” rather than China deserves elaboration and debate. So-called “Western” international relations theories often have parallels in the Chinese tradition, broadly construed. Work analyzing Spring and Autumn, Warring States, Song, and Ming documents indicate that the strategic thought that is prominent in these periods closely resembles statecraft familiar to those in the contemporary “West.”[16] Texts as varied as the Han-era annals Records of the Grand Historian and the Ming-era fiction Romance of the Three Kingdoms will suggest the same.[17] Parallels between “Western” and “Chinese” approaches to politics are unsurprising. Several millennia of collective human experience, thought, and debate over statecraft, conflict, as well as governance are almost certainly bound to produce similarities in responses.', 'Dividing the world into “Western” and “Chinese” views of the world ignores the fact the PRC has disagreements with ostensibly “non-Western” polities such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, each with their own distinct philosophical traditions.[18] Also, despite sharing cultural origins, people in the PRC and on Taiwan disagree fundamentally issues of political valAues and rights, not the relatively simple issues of who should rule China or what a Chinese state should entail geographically.[19] Moreover, the PRC’s ruling Chinese Communist Party draws at least some of its inspiration from European thinkers in the form of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Successive dynasties from historical China also proved themselves very adept at conquest—that is how regimes and empires get built.[20] Attributing tensions between the United States and PRC to culture suggests an overly monolithic view of the rich and varied philosophical and political traditions both major powers draw from, giving them less credit than is due.[21]', 'To claim that contemporary international scholarship and U.S. policy are unable to adequately understand China because they are “Western” may oversimplify the nature and seriousness of problems dogging U.S.-China relations and their consequences for the world. Relegating difference to culture is not only Orientalizing, it can encourage a misplaced expectation that understanding can bring some sort of happy, mutually acceptable outcome. Perhaps Beijing and Washington understand each other well. They simply disagree fundamentally over values and interests in ways that make finding mutually acceptable accommodation increasingly difficult. This does not have to imply that either side is morally superior or normatively “better” than the other, just that understanding provides little promise for improving relations and avoiding confrontation. Better accounting for such possibilities invites fuller consideration of the roles that agency and contingency play in major power relations, two features that Chan clearly identifies as critical in the volume.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Aff-9---D4-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

fc1687a06557df5e39cf27741b4c06fdb93d28ace95836a87331058ea615db27

1. POLITICAL CAPITAL---the agency’s spending it to push through the nomination---it’s key.

Mary Ashley Salvino 11/1, reporter at Bloomberg Law, “ANALYSIS: How Will the FTC Get Its Privacy Mojo Back in 2022?,” Bloomberg Law, 11-1-2021, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-how-will-the-ftc-get-its-privacy-mojo-back-in-2022

Leveraging Political Capital FTC will seek to strengthen its authority leverages and aligns political capital with Congress Bedoya give momentum In political calculus , a strengthened regulator faces gridlock

Leveraging Political Capital The odds are likely that the FTC will seek to optimize and strengthen its authority the FTC leverages and aligns political capital with Congress Bedoya as FTC commissioner will give the FTC new leadership and momentum to focus on privacy In terms of political calculus , a strengthened regulator faces bipartisan gridlock

Leveraging Political Capital odds are likely optimize strengthen its authority FTC leverages aligns political capital Congress Bedoya FTC commissioner new leadership momentum privacy political calculus strengthened regulator faces bipartisan gridlock

['Leveraging Democratic Political Capital', 'The odds are likely that the FTC will seek to optimize and strengthen its authority via its new left-leaning leadership. Lawyers should keep an eye on how the FTC leverages and aligns political capital in a way that maximizes innovation and cooperation with Democrats in Congress. Be ready for a robust rulemaking effort by the FTC, accompanied by a strong push for uniform privacy legislation.', 'The confirmation of Alvaro Bedoya as an FTC commissioner will likely give the FTC new leadership and momentum to focus on alternative rulemaking in consumer privacy protection. Additionally, Lina Khan, the new FTC chairwoman, has expressed interest in forging new antitrust rules, which could extend to creating additional privacy rulemaking.', 'In terms of political calculus, a strengthened regulator faces the same bipartisan gridlock characterized by a divided Congress. Yet legal practitioners should be aware of a growing momentum on both sides of the aisle, seeking more stringent regulations on unbridled Big Tech firms, as well as emerging nonpartisan sentiments toward seeking protection for children online.']

[(12, 24)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-FullerTown-Quarters.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-FullerTown-Quarters.docx

f3177a6001d4d9dcca65149c71f1c67cd9492ec11fc186d8819de4f9b0c6239c

Taboo fractures cause extinction---but the plan solves.

Greig-Duarte ’21 [Alexandra; September 2; MSFS Fellow at the Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, 2022 Charles B. Rangel International Affairs Fellow; Inkstick, “Sustaining the Nuclear Taboo,” https://inkstickmedia.com/sustaining-the-nuclear-taboo/]

global tensions are high taboos become taken for granted Once the threshold is crossed new consequences follow threshold is closer conflict overall is peaking stigmas only exist as they’re upheld We must not assume it will exist without preservation N F U prevent launching a first strike uphold norm of nuclear nonuse

Since then the ultimate weapon has never been used in war times are changing and global tensions in 2021 are high danger in taboos become so ingrained in our society that its existence becomes taken for granted Once the threshold is crossed one is in a new world with unimaginable consequences could follow every day this threshold is closer to being crossed Global conflict overall is peaking due economic and environmental stressors Social stigmas only exist as long as they’re upheld We must not take this for granted , nor can we assume it will exist without active preservation N F U would prevent the U S from launching a first strike can help uphold our global norm of nuclear nonuse

the ultimate weapon never been used global tensions danger in taboos so ingrained granted threshold unimaginable consequences threshold is closer Global conflict economic environmental stressors only exist upheld granted assume preservation N F U U S first strike global norm nonuse

['Why don’t we see nuclear weapons used in modern-day conflicts? The United States dropped two nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Since then, this weapon, which we now recognize to be the\xa0ultimate\xa0weapon, has never been used in war. But times are changing and global tensions in 2021 are high. Nine countries today are recognized as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and together,\xa0they own over 13,000 warheads.\xa0', 'Nuclear weapons play an integral role in military strategy and could easily bring an abrupt end to ongoing global discord. And yet, nuclear weapons rest quietly throughout the world, unused except for ongoing maintenance or the occasional upgrade. It’s generally assumed that the reason NWS don’t actually use their bombs is because of concepts like deterrence theory or the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD). But perhaps there’s a deeper, more human-centered motivation: The existence of the nuclear taboo.\xa0', 'WHY THE TABOO?', 'There are certain practices in society that are so heinous, the thought of acting them out is inconceivable. These universal taboos serve as intrinsic agreements that we uphold to keep ourselves and each other safe.\xa0The nuclear taboo\xa0assumes that as a society, we have prohibited the use of nuclear weapons if not in reality, then in our collective consciousness. Nuclear bombs are effectively regarded as unusable, uncivilized weapons. This taboo was formed due to a mix of social pressure, power politics, and repeated behavior.\xa0', 'The social stigma against nuclear weapons didn’t begin immediately after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In fact,\xa085% of Americans had a favorable view\xa0of the United States using nuclear weapons to defeat Japan during World War II. The threat of nuclear weapons landing on the United States during the\xa0Cuban Missile Crisis\xa0changed this, however. This event, along with the general unease of potential nuclear attacks during the Cold War, helped anti-nuclear activism gain traction. The international community eventually began to stigmatize nuclear weapons out of both\xa0safety and environmental concerns. According to the latest poll, US public support for the US bombings in Japan has\xa0dropped to 45%.\xa0', 'Despite the strategic edge that nuclear weapons give to NWS, it’s clear that leaders don’t\xa0want\xa0to use them. The United States, Russia, and every other NWS has exercised restraint — even in times of heated conflict — because they understand that dropping the bomb has dire moral consequences for the international community at large. The threat of\xa0MAD\xa0may be a powerful deterrent, but it cannot explain the\xa0numerous near-misses\xa0that have occurred since various states began acquiring these weapons; nor does it explain NWS’ desire to build arsenals large enough to destroy not just one state, but many and multiple times over. And it is not just\xa0the major NWS\xa0that we should be concerned about. India and Pakistan only have\xa02% of the world’s nuclear arsenal, but are in an active arms race to acquire more. Both states have considered\xa0nuclear escalation as a legitimate military strategy\xa0in their decades-long battle over the Kashmir region and have engaged in\xa0direct confrontation\xa0despite pledging to a ceasefire in 2003. The threat of MAD, therefore, has not moved either state toward nonproliferation.', 'No country has dropped a nuclear weapon on another state in an act of war since 1945. At that time, the United States was the only country that had the capability to use the nuclear bomb. It only had to be used once for the world to see that the resulting destruction and loss of life clearly\xa0violated basic human rights. And despite NWS that legitimize nuclear escalation as a potential\xa0military strategy, no world leader has actually approved of its use no matter how tempting, feasible or clear the choice may have seemed. International order does not allow for the inordinate chaos that is nuclear combat, and thus global leaders act accordingly. This repeated pattern of non-use is what categorizes the nuclear taboo as a social norm that is upheld to this day.\xa0', 'WILL THE TABOO EVER END?', 'The danger in taboos is that over time, they become so ingrained in our society that its existence becomes thoughtless and taken for granted. The nuclear taboo will only exist until it’s disrupted. The professor who coined the term “nuclear taboo,”\xa0Nina Tannenwald,\xa0wrote:\xa0“Once the threshold between use and nonuse is crossed, one is immediately in a new world with all the unimaginable consequences that could follow.” The reality is, every day this threshold is closer to being crossed. More states are hoping to establish themselves as NWS in order to be seen as legitimate actors on the global stage. The rise of non-state actors brings into question the possibility of them acquiring nuclear material in order to transpose fringe ideologies. Global conflict overall is peaking due to immense economic and environmental stressors that are escalating quicker than we can solve for. To imagine the added global destruction that a nuclear conflict would impose is unthinkable. But once the nuclear taboo is violated, all of our established norms of nuclear nonuse become irrelevant.', 'Regardless of the social stigma against nuclear weapons, the NWS spend billions of dollars every year to expand and modernize their arsenal. According to a recent\xa0spending report, China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia are all suspected to have growing nuclear arsenals. China in particular outspent Russia, the world’s largest nuclear power, at $10 billion compared to Russia’s $8 billion in 2019. India’s budget was reported at an estimated $2 billion, Pakistan at $1 billion, and North Korea at $620 million.\xa0', 'The United States is projected to spend\xa0$50 billion per year for the next 9 years\xa0expanding our arsenal. As the United States. rapidly develops new weapons, our outdated nuclear-related policies are coming up short. Right now in the United States, a bomb could be launched at any moment, for any reason.\xa0Sole-use authority\xa0gives our president the power to order the launch of a nuclear weapon. Launching the missile must be deemed legal and legitimate by the US military, although\xa0their playbook is broad\xa0and decisions must be made within minutes. Once that decision is made, a chain reaction of other states launching retaliatory strikes is imminent.\xa0', 'SUPPORTING “NO FIRST USE”\xa0', 'Social stigmas only exist as long as they’re upheld. The public played a critical role in establishing the nuclear taboo, and will play an equally important role in sustaining it. In a world that is constantly reminding us that we are divided, we must stay unified in our shared sense of morality. The nuclear taboo exists because we all possess an innate drive to protect each other and our civilization. We must not take this taboo for granted, nor can we assume it will exist without active preservation.\xa0', 'An important policy called\xa0No First Use\xa0was reintroduced in Congress earlier this year after years of stagnation.\xa0Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) is sponsoring this piece of legislation along with 36 democratic cosponsors.\xa0If passed, this would prevent the United States from launching a first strike. It also limits the president’s power of sole authority. Top military leaders\xa0oppose the bill\xa0and argue that the vague threat of a nuclear strike is enough of a reason for the United States to legitimately launch an initial strike. The problem is that this logic does not account for technical glitches or general misunderstandings which could very feasibly result in an accidental nuclear war. No First Use policy defines the threshold of nuclear use versus nonuse.', 'The American public holds a certain soft power that conquers the brutal existence of our nuclear arsenal every day.\xa0Representatives\xa0who support No First Use can help uphold our global norm of nuclear nonuse.']

[(0, 12), (13, 14), (14, 16)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Aff-Indiana-Round-4.docx

Michigan

ShGa

bd44a37ba8acda8ae1571e845ec7325c3a33d4de4c4c4bd01918e72ba92a2add

Externally, the lack of AI inventorship opens the floodgates to costly litigation and patent cancellations.

Millamena ’21 [Justyn; December 1; J.D. Candidate at Brooklyn Law School, B.S. University of Connecticut; Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law and Policy, “How Artificial Intelligence Machines Can Legally Become Inventors: An Examination of and Solution to the Decision on DABUS,” vol. 30 no. 7]

system breed cancellations human inventor would not satisfy standards Imagine if Company A owns AI files a patent naming board who proposed AI Company B will invalidate Company A unable to prove inventors conceived provide loophole for companies without fees patents would be unable to survive first person who discovers could be inventor Without allowing AI to invent alone , this will be encouraged creator of AI as inventor defies conception that invention be clearly defined it would be easier to allow AI as inventors , rather than changing settled standards there would be difficulty drawing line open floodgates as those seeking tech assert patent invalid by erroneous inventor take resources to uncover

current system breed cancellations as applications that try to list a human as the inventor of AI invention would not satisfy standards patents would be subject to cancellation Imagine if Company A owns an AI that develops new method for detecting cancer Company A files a patent naming the board member who proposed AI system and a scientist who checked on AI system's findings as inventors USPTO grants patent Now imagine Company B wants to use cancer detection method but does not want to pay costly licensing fees to Company A Company B will be able to invalidate patent by showing that Company A's application did not list a correct inventor because Company A will be unable to prove its listed inventors conceived of the invention USPTO would reject claims Invalidating patent would allow Company B to freely use method without fear of suit from Company A Company A would not be rewarded for its investment in its AI this provide a loophole for companies looking to use AI inventions without paying fees employees of a company with erroneous inventors listed on patent applications would hold significant power over the company if said employees are privy to errors Many approved patents would be unable to survive review, thus providing little protection AI that produces an invention will not be given any protection first person who discovers or recognizes work could be come its inventor despite contributing nothing This would allow many non -inventors to obtain credit, as Such a holding goes against requirements of conception and allow a person that "does no more than exercise ordinary skill " to be rewarded Without allowing AI to invent alone , this practice will be encouraged data provided to an AI machine can produce an invention across wide spectrum Listing the creator of an AI as inventor of the AI-conceived invention would give the creator inventorship credit said creator never had any type of skill or knowledge in. This defies conception standards that the invention be so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce nvention to practice it would be far easier to allow AI as inventors , rather than changing well- settled patent standards for invention Naming person as inventor would change the meaning of what it means to be the inventor does not satisfy patent inventorship , which requires a settled idea there would be difficulty drawing the line open the floodgates as those seeking patented tech would assert t he patent invalid by the erroneous listing of the inventor inquiry that would take resources to uncover

breed cancellations human not satisfy cancellation board member proposed scientist grants does not costly licensing fees invalidate correct inventor unable conceived of reject claims freely use without fear of suit investment loophole without paying fees erroneous inventors significant power unable to survive little protection any protection discovers recognizes inventor contributing nothing non -inventors conception ordinary skill rewarded invent alone encouraged wide spectrum creator inventor never any type of skill knowledge defies clearly defined far easier inventors well- settled standards person inventor meaning inventor patent inventorship settled idea drawing the line open the floodgates erroneous listing resources

["The current system would create a breeding ground for cancellations as applications that try to list a human as the inventor of an AI-conceived invention would not satisfy the standards demanded for the Conception Requirement. Therefore, many patents would be subject to cancellation proceedings. Imagine if Company A owns an AI machine that develops a new method for detecting cancer. Additionally, the AI system, like DABUS, was only trained with general information in the field of endeavor176 and contains self-learning capabilities that allowed it to innovate the new method. In the interest of gaining protection on this invention and receiving a return on its investment in the AI system, Company A files a patent application naming the board member who proposed investing in the AI system and a scientist who checked on the AI system's findings as the inventors of the new cancer detection method in order to get the application through the patent office. Due to the lack of formal examination of the inventors listed on the patent application, the USPTO grants the patent to Company A with the Board Member and the Scientist listed as co-inventors. ", 'Now imagine that Company B wants to use the cancer detection method but does not want to pay the costly licensing fees to Company A. If Company B learns that Company A\'s invention was solely conceived by an AI system, it will be able to invalidate the patent by showing that Company A\'s patent application did not list a correct inventor. Specifically, because Company A will be unable to prove that its listed inventors actually conceived of the invention and because the applicant did not file a request to correct inventorship under 37 C.F.R. § 1.48, the USPTO would "reject the claims under 35 U.S.C. 101 and 35 U.S.C. 115.\'77 Invalidating the patent would allow Company B to freely use the cancer detection method without fear of suit from Company A. Thus, Company A would not be rewarded for its investment in its AI machine. ', 'In short, this would provide a loophole for companies looking to use AI generated inventions without paying fees. Additionally, employees of a company with erroneous inventors listed on its patent applications would hold significant bargaining power over the company if said employees are privy to the errors in inventorship. The current review process that presumes the listed inventor on a patent application to be correct is not designed to tackle the challenges of AI-developed inventions. Many approved patents would be unable to survive a closer review, thus providing little protection from infringers. ', 'Under the current system, an AI that produces an invention will not be given any protection. Instead, the first person who discovers or recognizes the work of the machine could become its inventor despite contributing nothing to the innovative process.178 This would allow many non-inventors to obtain credit, as "the first to person to recognize a patentable result might be an intern at a large research corporation or a visitor in someone\'s home. A large number of individuals might also concurrently recognize a result if access to an AI is widespread."179 Such a holding goes against the requirements of conception and would allow a person that "does no more than exercise ordinary skill" to be rewarded, while "the innovator would not be." 18° Without allowing AI systems to invent alone, this practice will only be encouraged. ', 'Additionally, allowing the creator of the AI machine that conceives of an invention to be listed as an inventor would change the meaning of what it means to be an inventor. AI machines, like DABUS, consist of whole neural networks that are able to independently create an invention based on general information in the field of endeavor.181 This means that data provided to an AI machine, like DABUS, can potentially produce an invention across a wide spectrum of areas. Listing the creator of an AI machine as the inventor of the AI-conceived invention would give the creator inventorship credit in areas said creator never intended or had any type of skill or knowledge in. This completely defies the conception standards set forth in patent history that the invention be "so clearly defined in the inventor\'s mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice."182 As a matter of public policy, it would be far easier to allow the listing of AI machines as inventors, rather than changing the well-settled patent standards for invention, namely conception. ', 'Naming the person who feeds specific data to an AI machine, like DABUS, as the inventor would similarly change the meaning of what it means to be the inventor. AI machines, like DABUS, need only general sets of data to potentially conceive of inventions.183 Giving inventorship credit to someone who simply inputs data and gets a novel invention based on said data does not satisfy the history of patent inventorship, which requires a "specific, settled idea, a particular solution to the problem at hand, not just a general goal or research plan he hopes to pursue./,184 However, there may be situations in which data sets are narrowly tailored towards achieving specific novel solutions, such that the invention has practically been discovered by the person supplying the data set. However, there would be difficulty drawing the line of when such a person tailored the data set enough to satisfy conception. This could potentially open the floodgates as those seeking to use the patented technology would assert the patent invalid by the erroneous listing of the inventor—an inquiry that would take resources to uncover. ']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Michigan-McSk-Aff-Wake-Round-6.docx

Michigan

McSk

53c10f7e8df47ab20f62ce46b95952f15f62befb974bd08f30f40dc359020b56

That’s key to pressure Republicans to end Tuberville’s blockade.

Sahil Kapur & Kristen Welker 23. NBC News Reporters. "Biden White House goes after Republicans over Tuberville's military blockade". NBC News. 7-13-2023. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/biden-white-house-goes-republicans-tubervilles-military-blockade-rcna94052

The White House is amping up pressure on Republicans over Tuberville's blockade seeking to make the GOP pay a price if he persists White House rhetoric paints the Republican Party as enablers Biden framing contrast between his White House and opposition I expect the Republican Party to stand up and do something about it .

The White House is amping up pressure on Republicans over Tuberville's blockade seeking to make the GOP pay a price with voters if he persists the White House dials up the rhetoric against Tuberville and paints the Republican Party more broadly as enablers of his effort this is taking place with barely a word of protest from Tuberville’s Republican colleagues Biden is framing the contrast between his White House and his Republican opposition While Biden is ramping up his 2024 re-election campaign using similar arguments against the GOP I expect the Republican Party to stand up — stand up — and do something about it . It’s in their power to do that

amping up pressure Republicans blockade seeking to make GOP pay a price he persists barely a word of protest Tuberville’s Republican colleagues Biden contrast White House Republican opposition arguments against the GOP Republican Party to stand up do something about it power to do that

["WASHINGTON — The White House is amping up pressure on Republicans over Sen. Tommy Tuberville's blockade on hundreds of promotions for military officers, apparently seeking to make the GOP pay a price with voters if he persists, according to a new memo first obtained by NBC News.", 'In the memo addressed to "Interested parties," the White House dials up the rhetoric against Tuberville, R-Ala., and paints the Republican Party more broadly as enablers of his effort, accusing it of mounting "barely a word of protest."', '"Right now, a Republican Senator is choosing to erode military readiness and abuse military families in the pursuit of an unrelated and extreme anti-freedom agenda — with barely a sound from his GOP colleagues," White House communications adviser Andrew Bates wrote in the memo, dated Thursday.', 'He added that the blockade is "exploiting service members as pawns," hurting military readiness and risking a "brain-drain" from the Defense Department. "He’s even subjecting the families who serve with members to excruciating uncertainty, like not knowing where children will go to school or where spouses can work."', '"These actions go beyond substantive party differences and are flatly against basic American principles. Yet this is taking place with barely a word of protest from Tuberville’s Republican colleagues," Bates wrote.', 'The memo, titled "mainstream results over division, extremes, and chaos," provides a window into how President Joe Biden is framing the contrast between his White House and his Republican opposition. While Biden is ramping up his 2024 re-election campaign using similar arguments against the GOP, the White House is casting Tuberville\'s blockade in protest of the Pentagon’s abortion policy as a national security issue, and it will "continue to highlight the real-time damage this is doing," an aide said.', 'Asked Thursday about the issue on a trip to Finland, Biden called Tuberville\'s position "ridiculous" and said he was "jeopardizing U.S. security."', '“I expect the Republican Party to stand up — stand up — and do something about it. It’s in their power to do that,” Biden said.']

[(6, 13), (22, 31)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Shirley-Round-5.docx

Emory

KeRa

b268a222ac6774a52ed2da5d5c9088e6b7485d8bc70be7cced25aec84794844e

Advances in tech and modernization ensure the perfect storm of nuclear risk—accidents are guaranteed.

Falcone 23 - (*Johnathan Falcone, chief engineer in the Littoral Combat Ship program, PMPA, International Relations from Princeton University **Jonathan Rodriguez Cefalu is the founder and Chairman of Preamble, Inc, an ethical AI company, BA in computer science from Stanford University ***Michael Kneeshaw, bioinformatics and ML researcher, currently leading the development of a wargame simulator called SIMC4, which is special-built for simulating catalytic nuclear war scenarios ***Maarten Bos is a quantitative experimental behavioral researcher, Ph.D from Radboud University in the Netherlands and postdoc training at Harvard Business School; 6-1-2023, War on the Rocks, "Prove It Before You Use It: Nuclear Retaliation Under Uncertainty," doa: 8-20-2023) url: https://warontherocks.com/2023/06/prove-it-before-you-use-it-nuclear-retaliation-under-uncertainty/

unlike the Cold War modern c n c are more susceptible to cyber . Adversaries introduce malware to digital components to infiltrate networked and non-networked nuclear systems undermine confidence in second-strike . spoofing originate from a peer or terrorist . already short timeline compressed by ever-growing data . systems that are modernized and integrate m l will introduce risks . data can be poisoned or biased . training is challenging . simulations rely on Inaccurate intel . systems overtrained on known capabilities may misclassify new capability . automation bias is prevalent . safeguards are stacked However l u a align incentives to overly trust .

unlike during much of the Cold War , modern ized c ommand a n d c ontrol systems are more reliant on computers and thus are susceptible to cyber exploitation . critical hardware and software components may be compromised in supply chains . Adversaries can introduce malware or malicious code to digital and automation components to infiltrate both networked and non-networked elements of communications systems. If U.S. nuclear systems were compromised by a supply chain attack, it could undermine confidence in second-strike capability . second cyber risk is spoofing , which involves the injection of false data into key computer-mediated systems. Spoofing can take two forms in early warning systems: hiding actual inbound missiles or creating fake signals of inbound missiles. The former originate from a nuclear peer in an effort to further compress Washington’s decision-making window . The latter more likely to be injected by a non-peer or terrorist group aiming to manipulate global perceptions of American brinkmanship or trigger catalytic nuclear war between two or more powers . cyber vulnerabilities can increase the risk of a preemptive strike or a mistaken launch . cyber attacks can disrupt critical systems , which can reduce trust in early warning and second-strike capabilities . Additionally, such attacks can create confusion and make it difficult to distinguish between a genuine attack and a false alarm, potentially resulting in a mistaken launch . the already short decision timeline is further compressed by the need to collate early warning system detection with ever-growing sets of radar and intelligence data . C ommand, co n trol, and c ommunications systems — particularly e arly warning system components — that are modernized and integrate m achine l earning will help alleviate some of this information-induced pressure. technical limitations and human biases introduce additional risks . Fundamental to machine learning systems are the data and algorithms that train the system . Data, which is used to train algorithms, can be poisoned or biased , while the algorithms themselves may produce results of indeterminable quality . training machine learning systems based on infrequent occurrences is challenging . In the case of implementing machine learning tools for early warning systems, the infrequency of missile launches poses a unique challenge for training these systems. And in the absence of real-world data, simulations will be used to generate the necessary data sets. Effective simulation data will rely on intelligence about adversary delivery capabilities. Inaccurate intel ligence risks creating bias in the system’s training, and there may be insufficient opportunities to validate the models using real-world events . Accurately assessing nuclear capabilities is a challenge because intelligence is fa llible , and open source data reveals only so much . But these assessments and the follow-on technical challenges may be more pronounced in a scenario where the primary nuclear threat is temporarily a non-peer , like North Korea. if early warning systems are overtrained on data from known Russian and Chinese capabilities , the model may misclassify sensor data from a new North Korean capability . Compounding these technical weaknesses is an operator’s tendency to overestimate the system’s accuracy, particularly as operators are further removed from the original data . because actual events are infrequent , a system will frequently and correctly evaluate “no attack,” convincing operators and decision-makers that the system is more accurate than it is . This can lead to an overconfidence dubbed automation bias , and it is especially prevalent in military settings due to training and organizational trust . In the U.S. nuclear architecture, multiple safeguards are stacked to prevent weaknesses in each component from aligning. However , the l aunch- u nder- a ttack posture creates an opportunity for system weaknesses to align by creating incentives to overly trust early warning systems , which is where the nuclear-use decision chain begins . the president will face a “ premium on haste in a crisis” to launch or otherwise face the strategic and political repercussions of indecision . Thus, the posture’s mere availability paradoxically constrains the president’s decision-making process, which is informed by vulnerable machine-produced data in a time-compressed , high-stress environment

unlike during much of the Cold War c n c reliant on computers susceptible cyber exploitation critical hardware software components compromised in supply chains introduce malware malicious code digital automation components networked non-networked elements nuclear systems second-strike capability spoofing injection of false data hiding actual inbound missiles creating fake signals nuclear peer terrorist group trigger catalytic nuclear war preemptive strike mistaken launch disrupt critical systems reduce trust early warning second-strike capabilities confusion difficult to distinguish mistaken launch already short further compressed collate ever-growing sets radar intelligence data C n c modernized integrate m achine l earning technical limitations human biases risks Fundamental data algorithms train the system poisoned biased indeterminable quality infrequent occurrences challenging infrequency unique challenge simulations will be used intelligence Inaccurate intel ligence bias insufficient opportunities validate the models intelligence is fa llible open source data reveals only so much more pronounced temporarily a non-peer overtrained Russian Chinese capabilities misclassify sensor data new North Korean capability overestimate further removed original data infrequent frequently correctly more accurate than it is automation bias especially prevalent training organizational trust multiple safeguards are stacked l aunch- u nder- a ttack align incentives overly trust early warning systems begins premium on haste strategic political repercussions indecision vulnerable machine-produced data time-compressed high-stress environment

['', 'A launch-under-attack posture exposes the United States to an increased risk of accidental or mistaken launch in the modern nuclear era. To be available as an option, launch-under-attack relies on accurate warning data and a viable launch capability. The follow-on corollary is that to be effective in its deterrence role, adversaries must believe that a first strike would be detected and retaliatory weapons would be employed. Underpinning these capabilities is the nuclear command, control, and communications architecture. But unlike during much of the Cold War, modernized command and control systems are more reliant on computers and thus are susceptible to cyber exploitation. This is a significant risk when combined with an outdated retaliatory option, as it impacts incentives for preemptive or retaliatory nuclear launch decision-making.', 'Two cyber risks are routinely discussed in policy circles. First, critical hardware and software components may be compromised in supply chains. Adversaries can introduce malware or malicious code to digital and automation components to infiltrate both networked and non-networked elements of communications systems. If U.S. nuclear systems were compromised by a supply chain attack, it could either undermine the national command authority’s confidence in its second-strike capability or, from the adversary’s perspective, reduce the risk of a retaliatory strike.', 'The second cyber risk is spoofing, which involves the injection of false data into key computer-mediated systems. Spoofing can take two forms in early warning systems: hiding actual inbound missiles or creating fake signals of inbound missiles. The former is more likely to originate from a nuclear peer in an effort to further compress Washington’s decision-making window by obfuscating early warning data in hopes of increasing the effectiveness of a first strike. The latter, on the other hand, is more likely to be injected by a non-peer or terrorist group aiming to manipulate global perceptions of American brinkmanship or trigger catalytic nuclear war between two or more powers.', 'During a crisis, cyber vulnerabilities can increase the risk of a preemptive strike or a mistaken launch. This is because cyber attacks can disrupt critical systems, which can reduce trust in early warning and second-strike capabilities. Additionally, such attacks can create confusion and make it difficult to distinguish between a genuine attack and a false alarm, potentially resulting in a mistaken launch from the side that thinks it is under nuclear attack. The launch-under-attack posture exacerbates this problem because it requires a decision to be made. Even if the president opts for nonretaliatory measures, this is still a deliberate choice amidst the prevailing uncertainty.', 'The rationale for this posture has also been challenged by proliferation, which has driven increased demands on technical systems. When the launch-under-attack posture was first implemented, there were only two major nuclear powers. This is not the case today. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review recognizes both Russia and China as major nuclear powers and strategic competitors. In the absence of strategic intelligence suggesting an imminent first strike, the already short decision timeline is further compressed by the need to collate early warning system detection with ever-growing sets of radar and intelligence data. Command, control, and communications systems — particularly early warning system components — that are modernized and integrate machine learning will help alleviate some of this information-induced pressure. However, technical limitations and human biases introduce additional risks. ', 'Fundamental to machine learning systems are the data and algorithms that train the system. Data, which is used to train algorithms, can be poisoned or biased, while the algorithms themselves may produce results of indeterminable quality. Moreover, training machine learning systems based on infrequent occurrences is challenging. In the case of implementing machine learning tools for early warning systems, the infrequency of missile launches poses a unique challenge for training these systems. And in the absence of real-world data, simulations will be used to generate the necessary data sets. Effective simulation data will rely on intelligence about adversary delivery capabilities. Inaccurate intelligence risks creating bias in the system’s training, and there may be insufficient opportunities to validate the models using real-world events.', 'Accurately assessing nuclear capabilities is a challenge because intelligence is fallible, and open source data reveals only so much. But these assessments and the follow-on technical challenges may be more pronounced in a scenario where the primary nuclear threat is temporarily a non-peer, like North Korea. If a machine learning system is overtrained on particular data, it can make inaccurate predictions when presented with new information. For example, if early warning systems are overtrained on data from known Russian and Chinese capabilities, the model may misclassify sensor data from a new North Korean capability. More generally, proliferation — to include both new states developing nuclear weapons and existing powers expanding capabilities — generates greater uncertainty in model outputs. This uncertainty may make it more difficult for decision-makers to assess a threat.', 'Compounding these technical weaknesses is an operator’s tendency to overestimate the system’s accuracy, particularly as operators are further removed from the original data. For instance, when an operator interprets radar data, they will determine whether a missile is there or not. When an algorithm performs this interpretation, it may simply output whether an attack is in progress or not. Again, because actual events are infrequent, a system will frequently and correctly evaluate “no attack,” convincing operators and decision-makers that the system is more accurate than it is. This can lead to an overconfidence dubbed automation bias, and it is especially prevalent in military settings due to training and organizational trust. The human-machine interaction at the operator level, combined with the launch-under-attack option for the president, are conducive to facilitating a positive launch decision, even without certainty of a threat.', 'Building Resiliency Through Policy', 'The Swiss cheese model of accident causation is a risk management tool used in a variety of industries. The model uses a slice of cheese to represent individual safeguards. Each safeguard has inherent weaknesses, which are portrayed by the holes in each slice. In the visual analogy, by stacking multiple slices of cheese together, the likelihood of an unwanted outcome is reduced. Ideally, enough cheese slices are stacked so that the holes do not align, and threats are thwarted.', 'In the U.S. nuclear architecture, multiple safeguards are stacked to prevent weaknesses in each component from aligning. However, the launch-under-attack posture creates an opportunity for system weaknesses to align by creating incentives to overly trust early warning systems, which is where the nuclear-use decision chain begins. Even as just an option, the president will face a “premium on haste in a crisis” to launch from a high confidence warning, or otherwise face the strategic and political repercussions of indecision. Thus, the posture’s mere availability paradoxically constrains the president’s decision-making process, which is informed by vulnerable machine-produced data in a time-compressed, high-stress environment. ', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaBe-Aff-Kentucky-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

HaBe

975d0d8bf3426aa3a6fd32071205ad0eca8944dd94f12634bfe87b583e5f7f8c

Gas irrelevant---EU decarbonizes by 2025.

Anita Orban, 10-5-2020, vice president of Tellurian LNG "Turkish Black Sea discovery: Is it geopolitics or economics?," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkish-black-sea-discovery-is-it-geopolitics-or-economics/

in 2025 the EU will be on track for a carbon neutral economy natural gas had been a geopolitical asset it is not a discovery which changes Turkey’s negotiating it won’t change the geopolitics of the region

A discovery five years ago The Tuna-1 field most likely would have been immediately named as an additional supply source of gas into the Southern Corridor . It still would have increased Turkey’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia, the EU, and NATO five years from now in 2025 the EU will be on track for a carbon neutral economy and most likely gas will be taxed on the EU’s border natural gas had been a geopolitical asset it is not a discovery which changes Turkey’s negotiating position vis-à-vis its existing suppliers and it won’t change the geopolitics of the region either

['A discovery five years ago would have found no South Stream but a Southern Gas Corridor that had already reached a final investment decision (FID) and was relying on Azeri gas supplied via Turkey. The Tuna-1 field most likely would have been immediately named as an additional supply source of gas into the Southern Corridor. Connecting pipeline from Tuna to the TANAP-TAP system would have been labelled a priority project for the EU and put on the Projects of Common Interest list. It still would have increased Turkey’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis Russia, the EU, and NATO, and in parallel may have decreased the geopolitical importance of the Azeri gas.', 'But what if the discovery wasn’t made until five years from now? If we take the lines of the policymakers seriously, in 2025 the EU will be on track for a carbon neutral economy and most likely gas will be somehow taxed on the EU’s border. There will be a global index for gas like there is for oil and any new findings will be measured by the financial markets based on that index, meaning that everyone will ask after a discovery announcement if the costs of recovering the resource are below or above the gas forward curve.', 'With the discovery coming in 2020, we are in between these two worlds, one where natural gas had been a geopolitical asset and one where it will be a commodity traded on an index. The findings certainly are amazing for Turkey and its fast-growing and energy-consuming economy, providing economic growth, local employment, foreign direct investment, and know-how transfer. As long as Turkey can drill and extract the gas at the cost or below of its alternatives, it’s unquestionably a great deal for the country.', 'But it is not a discovery which changes Turkey’s negotiating position vis-à-vis its existing suppliers and it won’t change the geopolitics of the region either. Turkey has been relying on pipeline gas from Russia, Iran, and Azerbaijan, and on LNG based on long-term contracts from Algeria, Nigeria, and Qatar, as well as, on spot deliveries, among them from the United States. Turkey’s annual demand has fluctuated between 40 and 50 bcm in the last decade. Its existing and operational LNG regas capacity is about 29.1 million metric tons per year (mtpa), which equals roughly to 44 bcm of gas (Marmara Ereğlisi: 9.4 mtpa, Aliağa: 8.3 mtpa, Etki: 5.7 mtpa, Dörtyol: 5.7 mtpa). Interestingly, already existing regas capacity would be able to provide for almost all Turkey’s import gas demand.', '']

[(6, 17)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeMi-Neg-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Emory

HeMi

673ff937ae51b66a2a0c729df1f4a32fadabb1e96bd7ac9e69a9629ee2184324

W/M – AI includes machine learning.

Taylor ’22 [Kaitlyn; University of Cincinnati College of Law; University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal; “The Patentability of Inventions with Artificial Intelligence Listed as an Inventor Following Thaler v. Hirshfeld,” vol. 6; AS]

AI encompasses machine learning which are often mentioned in conjunction with a i

a i combines data so a computer can engage in problem solving AI encompasses fields of machine learning and deep learning which are often mentioned in conjunction with a rtificial i ntelligence

data problem solving AI machine learning deep learning often mentioned conjunction a i

['Simply, artificial intelligence combines computer science and robust data sets so that a computer can engage in problem solving.19 This allows for the creation of AI algorithms that can create “expert” systems that are able to make classifications or predictions based on data that is input into the system.20 Additionally, AI encompasses the fields of machine learning and deep learning, which as a result are often mentioned in conjunction with artificial intelligence.21']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Neg-4---Gonzaga-Round-3.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

e8386650ae906e4ce550deb70b08d3d6be73d1e2f812c1e9b959a4a9681493ec

No catastrophic cyberattacks—25 years of empirics prove they stay low-level and non-escalatory.

Lewis 20—(senior vice president and director of the Technology Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies). Lewis, James. 2020. “Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe.” Center for Strategic & International Studies. August 17, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe.

catastrophic cyberattack remains imaginary . catastrophe must produce mass casualties . cyber catastrophe requires technical skills actors do not possess . There is uncertainty among potential attackers about U S ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk retaliation . ( Their emphasis is espionage and coercion . U S opponents have no interest in a catastrophic attack since it would produce catastrophic retal . inadvertent escalation has never occurred . suggests high control by advanced states. Attackers seek to avoid escalation . scenarios discount robustness of modern econ given attention to cybersecurity and people quickly rebuild . after 25 years without Why raised so often? the first reports hoped to scare people into action . The shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes thinking to expect extreme outcomes . also by 9/11 .

catastrophic cyberattack was predicted in the mid-19 90s . Since then, predictions have appeared regularly . it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking . a catastrophe must produce damaging mass effect , including casualties and destruction . fires that swep t across California were a catastrophe. Covid has been a catastrophe . for cyber attacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills actors still do not possess . electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority . there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have two decades of experience . We can be guided by the Strategic Bombing Survey interviews rather than hypotheses . There is uncertainty among potential attackers about the U nited S tates’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack . ( They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions .) A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuc lear weapon s . State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests . Their primary emphasis is espionage and political coercion . U nited S tates opponents have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyber attack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retal iation . inadvertent escalation has never occurred . absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers among the United States’ major opponents seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation . Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but Russia would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. catastrophe scenarios discount robustness of modern econ omi es. they are hard er to damage throu gh cyberattack than they look, given the growing attention to cybersecurity ; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild . after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack Why then, it is raised so often? the first reports in the 19 90s hoped to scare people into action . The long experience of living under the shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes American thinking and conditions the United States to expect extreme outcomes . American thinking is also shaped by the experience of 9/11 a wrenching attack that caught the United States by surprise .

catastrophic cyberattack 90s regularly entirely imaginary damaging mass effect casualties and destruction fires Covid cyber technical skills actors still do not possess made cybersecurity a priority strategic constraints two decades of experience Strategic Bombing Survey interviews rather than hypotheses uncertainty U S ability to attribute unwilling to risk massive retaliation perfectly willing espionage coercive cyber actions it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuc s State use broad national strategies and interests espionage and political coercion U S have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyber attack equally catastrophic retal inadvertent escalation never occurred high degree of control avoid actions that could trigger escalation catastrophe scenarios robustness econ hard attention to cybersecurity people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild 25 years 90s scare people into action shadow of nuclear annihilation extreme outcomes 9/11

['', 'A catastrophic cyberattack was first predicted in the mid-1990s. Since then, predictions of a catastrophe have appeared regularly and have entered the popular consciousness. As a trope, a cyber catastrophe captures our imagination, but as analysis, it remains entirely imaginary and is of dubious value as a basis for policymaking. There has never been a catastrophic cyberattack. To qualify as a catastrophe, an event must produce damaging mass effect, including casualties and destruction. The fires that swept across California last summer were a catastrophe. Covid-19 has been a catastrophe, especially in countries with inadequate responses. With man-made actions, however, a catastrophe is harder to produce than it may seem, and for cyberattacks a catastrophe requires organizational and technical skills most actors still do not possess. It requires planning, reconnaissance to find vulnerabilities, and then acquiring or building attack tools—things that require resources and experience. To achieve mass effect, either a few central targets (like an electrical grid) need to be hit or multiple targets would have to be hit simultaneously (as is the case with urban water systems), something that is itself an operational challenge. It is easier to imagine a catastrophe than to produce it. The 2003 East Coast blackout is the archetype for an attack on the U.S. electrical grid. No one died in this blackout, and services were restored in a few days. As electric production is digitized, vulnerability increases, but many electrical companies have made cybersecurity a priority. Similarly, at water treatment plants, the chemicals used to purify water are controlled in ways that make mass releases difficult. In any case, it would take a massive amount of chemicals to poison large rivers or lakes, more than most companies keep on hand, and any release would quickly be diluted. More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare. State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war. This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability. One major failing of catastrophe scenarios is that they discount the robustness and resilience of modern economies. These economies present multiple targets and configurations; they are harder to damage through cyberattack than they look, given the growing (albeit incomplete) attention to cybersecurity; and experience shows that people compensate for damage and quickly repair or rebuild. This was one of the counterintuitive lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey. Pre-war planning assumed that civilian morale and production would crumple under aerial bombardment. In fact, the opposite occurred. Resistance hardened and production was restored.1 This is a short overview of why catastrophe is unlikely. Several longer CSIS reports go into the reasons in some detail. Past performance may not necessarily predict the future, but after 25 years without a single catastrophic cyberattack, we should invoke the concept cautiously, if at all. Why then, it is raised so often? Some of the explanation for the emphasis on cyber catastrophe is hortatory. When the author of one of the first reports (in the 1990s) to sound the alarm over cyber catastrophe was asked later why he had warned of a cyber Pearl Harbor when it was clear this was not going to happen, his reply was that he hoped to scare people into action. "Catastrophe is nigh; we must act" was possibly a reasonable strategy 22 years ago, but no longer. The resilience of historical events to remain culturally significant must be taken into account for an objective assessment of cyber warfare, and this will require the United States to discard some hypothetical scenarios. The long experience of living under the shadow of nuclear annihilation still shapes American thinking and conditions the United States to expect extreme outcomes. American thinking is also shaped by the experience of 9/11, a wrenching attack that caught the United States by surprise. Fears of another 9/11 reinforce the memory of nuclear war in driving the catastrophe trope, but when applied to cyberattack, these scenarios do not track with operational requirements or the nature of opponent strategy and planning. The contours of cyber warfare are emerging, but they are not always what we discuss. Better policy will require greater objectivity.', '', '', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Rutgers-Round4.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Rutgers-Round4.docx

f2dd58639994335a46c0a55d6be2ad6b36687a38fce7654ebbfcf44c227b2082

Even if rights are bad, legal duties are necessary for solving the case

Noah Theriault 17, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Carnegie Mellon University, “Loving the Anthr*pocene,” Inhabiting the Anthropocene, 3-10-2017, https://inhabitingtheanthropocene.com/2017/03/10/loving-the-anthrpocene/

relations cannot be reduced to strategic essentialisms invented for political purposes underlying legal orders challenge secularization of “law” as something separate from ethical relations beings have legal obligations are political agents who participate in governance and in negotiations with the state extremely important to expand political notions mobilized by the State , such as reconciliation , beyond human redress building relations of mutual care with more-than-human beings need a basis for accountable sociality governance legal orders These are not the same Indigenous legal orders are actually existing while broader cosmopolitics remains largely aspirational

Human-fish relations, Todd shows, are ‘sites of engagement, negotiation, and conflict’, where contrasting moral, legal, and ontological principles encounter and transform one another Todd rightly insists that we see these relations not just as extant but also as deeply rooted in local histories and intergenerational relations with the land. Indigenous kin- and world-making practices cannot be reduced to vestiges of a disappearing past or strategic essentialisms invented for political purposes the underlying legal orders and cosmologies that they represent are rooted in long-term, reciprocal engagement between humans and a sentient, storied landscape Todd’s observation that human-fish relations reflect “ underlying legal orders ” is one to dwell on challenge Western secularization of “law” as something separate from interpersonal, social, spiritual, and ethical relations among more-than-human beings. To the contrary, Todd shows, many Paulatuuqmiut consider fish moral beings to whom they have social (and legal ) obligations as fellow persons and as kin fish are also political agents who participate in governance and in negotiations with the state (at times at the invitation of Paulatuuqmiut, other times on their own accord) extremely important because it enables Todd to offer human-fish relations as an opening “ to expand political notions mobilized by the State , such as reconciliation , beyond concepts of human redress .” I agree with Mitchell when she cautions against positing love as a sufficient motive for relating to other beings . Some beings are decidedly unloved or unknown—relational only in their abjection or absence within our consciousness and governance (think most reptiles, insects, parasites, plants). Should these beings be excluded from our kindred simply because we are ignorant of or repulsed by them? A being needn’t be loved per se to have moral or political standing . It does, however, need to be recognized as part of a set of social relationships through which consequences circulate. This also takes some of the pressure off kin-making as the basis for accountability. We need not love or even know in intimate fashion every member of our kindred; we need only be related through mutual kin Making kin is an approach to building relations of mutual care with a wider network of more-than-human beings . Much of this can be inspired and sustained by different forms of love. But we also need a basis for accountable more-than-human sociality that does not depend entirely on positive affective ties . This is where the acknowledgement and/or establishment of more-than-human governance comes into play—what Todd refers to as “ legal orders ” and Mitchell as “cosmopolitics.” These of course are not the same : Indigenous legal orders are actually existing , while broader cosmopolitics remains largely aspirational and de facto

cannot be reduced to strategic essentialisms invented for political purposes underlying legal orders challenge secularization of “law” separate from ethical relations legal obligations political agents who participate in governance negotiations with the state extremely important expand political notions mobilized by the State reconciliation cautions against positing love as a sufficient motive for relating to other beings needn’t be loved to have moral or political standing need a basis for accountable more-than-human sociality that does not depend entirely on positive affective ties establishment of more-than-human governance legal orders not the same Indigenous legal orders are actually existing broader cosmopolitics remains largely aspirational

['The next starting point for our epochal-but-decolonial conversation comes from fellow Creatures Collective member, Zoe Todd, whose work is having a profound impact on anthropology and Indigenous studies. Todd is a scholar of human-fish relations, particularly among Inuvialuit of Paulatuuq in Canada’s Northwest Territories and among her own Métis family and friends in the Treaty Six Area of Alberta. Human-fish relations, Todd shows, are ‘sites of engagement, negotiation, and conflict’, where contrasting moral, legal, and ontological principles encounter and transform one another. Among her many important insights, Todd rightly insists that we see these relations not just as extant, as I emphasized above, but also as deeply rooted in local histories and intergenerational relations with the land. Indigenous kin- and world-making practices cannot be reduced to vestiges of a disappearing past or strategic essentialisms invented for political purposes. She writes that, “Although the tools, language, and technologies through which these relationships are mobilized may change over time, the underlying legal orders and cosmologies that they represent are rooted in long-term, reciprocal engagement between humans and a sentient, storied landscape.”', 'Todd’s observation that human-fish relations reflect “underlying legal orders” is also one to dwell on. Here she is inspired by Cree legal scholar Val Napoleon’s writings, which challenge Western secularization of “law” as something separate from interpersonal, social, spiritual, and ethical relations among more-than-human beings. To the contrary, Todd shows, many Paulatuuqmiut consider fish moral beings to whom they have social (and legal) obligations as fellow persons and as kin. For this reason, fish are also political agents who participate in governance and in negotiations with the state (at times at the invitation of Paulatuuqmiut, other times on their own accord). This insight is extremely important because it enables Todd to offer human-fish relations as an opening “to expand political notions mobilized by the State, such as reconciliation, beyond concepts of human redress.”', 'I have arrived, then, at my final starting point: what pitfalls do we encounter when trying to avoid the politics of rupture in favor of enacting, remaking, and repairing the sort of more-than-human social relations I invoked above? Audra Mitchell, a political theorist who founded the Creatures Collective, has helped me think (at least preliminarily) about this question. Her work on extinction calls attention not just to the severing of relationships that is implied by the dual concepts of species and extinction, but also to the affective hierarchies that operate in our relations with lifeforms. I titled this post “Loving the Anthr*pocene” because I hope to suggest that pursuing loving kin relations with a wider network of beings can be part of figuring how to respond to (the obsession with) epochal rupture. At the same time, though, I agree with Mitchell when she cautions against positing love as a sufficient motive for relating to other beings. Some beings are decidedly unloved or unknown—relational only in their abjection or absence within our consciousness and governance (think most reptiles, insects, parasites, plants). Should these beings be excluded from our kindred simply because we are ignorant of or repulsed by them? Rather than attaching all hope to affective ties, Mitchell envisions cosmopolitics, which she defines following Isabelle Stengers as “an orientation that works to create openness towards every being that may be affected by a political decision or action.” A being needn’t be loved per se to have moral or political standing. It does, however, need to be recognized as part of a set of social relationships through which consequences circulate. This also takes some of the pressure off kin-making as the basis for accountability. We need not love or even know in intimate fashion every member of our kindred; we need only be related through mutual kin.', 'It is here, I think, that the three starting points really come together. Making kin is an approach to building relations of mutual care with a wider network of more-than-human beings. Much of this can be inspired and sustained by different forms of love. But we also need a basis for accountable more-than-human sociality that does not depend entirely on positive affective ties. This is where the acknowledgement and/or establishment of more-than-human governance comes into play—what Todd refers to as “legal orders” and Mitchell as “cosmopolitics.” These of course are not the same: Indigenous legal orders are actually existing, while broader cosmopolitics remains largely aspirational and de facto. And yet each suggests a way to challenge some of the Western secular ontological binaries that underpin epochal rupture: human/animal, natural/supernatural, emotion/reason, secular/spiritual, etc. None of these binaries can hold up if we hope to make kin with fish or honor our social obligations to mosquitoes.', 'And this, I agree with my interlocutors, is precisely what we need to do.', '', '']

[(5, 17)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-GlMe-Neg-Texas-Open-Round-2.docx

MichiganState

GlMe

b136eed3d725c9efa6d1a4ef816703f3e4f22f346f0f8f93ef16cf112920fd80

The CP bans the same conduct as the AFF without a per se prohibition.

Gellhorn 84—(Dean and Galen J. Roush Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, B.A. from University of Minnesota). Ernest Gellhorn & Teresa Tatham. 1984. “Making Sense Out of the Rule of Reason”. Case Western Reserve Law Review, Volume 35, Issue 2. . Accessed 9/5/21.

Courts apply two standards under antitrust . an automatic prohibition per se rule applies to exclusionary practices by individual firms the rule of reason standard consider a number of justifications for the practice . courts allow the arrangement if potential benefits to competition outweigh harm

Courts apply two standards to analyze collusive practices under antitrust statutes . practices to which an automatic prohibition -the per se rule -is applied. The per se rule applies as well to exclusionary practices by individual firms which monopolize or attempt to create monopolies. Courts apply the more lenient rule of reason standard to such arrangements. consider a number of factors: justifications for the practice , potential harm from the arrangement , market power of the participants , and the effect on competition . The courts generally allow the arrangement if potential benefits to competition outweigh immediate or potential harm

two standards automatic prohibition per se rule more lenient rule of reason justifications for the practice potential harm from the arrangement market power of the participants effect on competition potential benefits to competition

['', 'Courts apply two standards to analyze collusive practices under antitrust statutes.2 Horizontal price-fixing3 and horizontal territorial allocations4 are prototypical practices to which an automatic prohibition-the per se rule-is applied. Each involves an agreement among direct competitors where the effect on competition, in the form of reduced output and increased prices, creates an unjustifled welfare loss. The per se rule makes these practices illegal without further consideration of their purpose, justification, or effect on the market. Vertical price-fixing, an agreement between suppliers and their customers to keep resale prices at a fixed level, also is subject to the per se rule, although the economic justifications for automatically prohibiting such arrangements are not wellgrounded.5', 'The per se rule applies as well to exclusionary practices by individual firms which monopolize 6 or attempt to create monopolies.7 The per se rule also is applied to joint actions such as vertical tie-in agreements where appreciable market power exists8 and to some group boycotts.9 The concern over these practices is that those seeking or sustaining a dominant position will limit entry or will make it unprofitable for others to compete by undercutting prices. As a result, these dominant firms will attain a larger share of the market and be able to set prices and production at noncompetitive levels. The justification for applying the per se rule to these exclusionary practices is the potential welfare loss, in the form of higher prices and reduced output, that monopolistic practices can impose on society.', "Many horizontal agreements are encouraged or, at least, not evaluated so unfavorably. Horizontal arrangements such as a trade association's publication of market statistics from its members 0 or a cooperative program of institutional advertising by all or some firms in an industry are not subject to the per se rule. Courts apply the more lenient rule of reason standard to such arrangements. 2 In applying this test, courts consider a number of factors: justifications for the practice, potential harm from the arrangement, market power of the participants, and the effect on competition. The courts generally allow the arrangement if potential benefits to competition outweigh immediate or potential harm.", '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-1%20-%20NUSO-Round5.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-1%2520-%2520NUSO-Round5.docx

130a06d970833011539c45709988aa78070cc28742e3601acc5e76316921981f

Prior and parallel consultation’s normal means AND shields the link – that’s offense because Biden’s currently perceived as avoiding consultation

Schulenburg 21 [Rupert Schulenburg, Graduate Research Assistant, MPhil candidate, University of St Andrews, BA (Hons) International Relations, SOAS University of London, “Deploying U.S. Intermediate-Range Missiles in the Asia-Pacific: Will Allies Cooperate?” Foreign Affairs Review, 3-19-2021, https://www.foreignaffairsreview.com/home/deploying-us-intermediate-range-missiles-in-the-asia-pacific-will-allies-cooperate]

The U.S. is looking to deploy conventional i r b m s China consistently opposed multilateralization of INF the U.S. could make deployment more tolerable to allies by adopting a narrower doctrine may result in less severe push-back , and make allies more willing this will require extensive consultation quiet discussions about willingness to deploy before laying out this plan In the absence of consultation Biden ’s impression is simply “interested in enlisting allies as proxies

The U.S. D o D is looking to deploy conventional i ntermediate- r ange b allistic m issile s in the territory of U.S. allies included a proposal for a “ distributed force posture ” of ground-based missiles with ranges of over 500 kilometres to enable “highly survivable, precision-strike networks along the First Island Chain” (this includes the islands of Taiwan, Okinawa, and the Philippines) Unsurprisingly, China therefore consistently opposed the “ multilateralization of the INF Treaty ”, that is, becoming a signatory to it there is the question of which the U.S. objective to counteract China’s conventional deterrence capabilities hangs: are U.S. allies willing to host U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missiles? While the U.S. could deploy ground-based, intermediate-range missiles on its own territory in the Asia-Pacific, such as Guam , this would significantly impair its strategic contributions. First, fewer deployment areas undermine the survivability of such systems. The concentration of basing will make it easier for China to locate and strike U.S. missiles, compared to if they were geographically diversified across allied and partnered states in the region. Second, longer distances reduce operational effectiveness , as longer flight time increases the opportunity for anti-missile interception to have a significant strategic impact in a potential conflict with China, U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missiles would have to be stationed no further away than South Korea or Japan . Unfortunately for the U.S., however, South Korea or Japan are unlikely to be enthusiastic about hosting U.S. missiles Both allies fear that agreeing to base U.S. ground-based missiles would be interpreted as highly provocative by China and could result in economic punishment this fear is far from unwarranted Following THAAD China began the implementation of an unofficial economic boycott deployment of offensive- weapons would likely result in even more severe punishment. Chinese officials have already warned would “not stand idly by” if the U.S. deploys intermediate-range missiles to the Asia-Pacific That said the U.S. could make ground-based missile deployment more tolerable to allies and partners by adopting a narrower doctrine avoid exacerbating the fear of a pre-emptive strike against the PLARF’s nuclear weapons (or even the conventional forces that protect its nuclear weapons). If China perceives less of a threat from the U.S. missiles, this may result in less severe push-back , and in turn, make U.S. allies and partners more willing to consider missile deployment Of course, this will require extensive consultation with allies Considering the unease among U.S. allies and partners over the deployment of missiles on their territories quiet discussions with allies /partners about their willingness to deploy missiles before laying out this plan ”. In the absence of consultation by the U.S., Biden may come to partially mirror the Trump ’s impression that the U.S. is simply “interested in enlisting [ allies and partners] as proxies in its strategic competition with Beijing” opinion pieces recommend dispersing U.S. forces more thought needs to be given to how this can actually be facilitated Biden has stated that the " most effective way" to confront China is to "build a united front of U.S. allies Allies have already shown their willingness to go their own way on trade policy, as shown by the E.U.-China investment agreement opposed by Biden as well as RCEP Biden will soon face the challenge of getting allies on the same page with security policy as well

deploy conventional i r b m allies distributed force posture ground-based missiles China consistently opposed multilateralization of the INF Treaty becoming a signatory hangs: allies willing to host Guam fewer deployment areas survivability longer distances operational effectiveness interception strategic impact U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missiles no further away South Korea Japan unlikely enthusiastic about hosting fear interpreted as highly provocative by China more tolerable to allies adopting a narrower doctrine pre-emptive strike less severe push-back allies more willing require extensive consultation unease allies deployment of missiles on their territories quiet discussions allies before laying out this plan In the absence of consultation Biden partially mirror Trump simply “interested in enlisting [ allies as proxies Biden most effective united front of U.S. allies Allies already shown willingness to go their own way trade Biden soon face the challenge getting allies on the same page security policy

['The U.S. Department of Defence has indicated that it is looking to deploy conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the territory of U.S. allies and partners. On 1 March 2021, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) submitted a report to Congress which requested an additional $27.4 billion in defence spending from 2022 to 2027 (with $4.6 billion for 2022 alone). The report calls for a myriad of investments in capabilities such as radar systems, intelligence-sharing centres, supply depots, and testing ranges. Most significantly, the report also included a proposal for a “distributed force posture” of ground-based missiles with ranges of over 500 kilometres to enable “highly survivable, precision-strike networks along the First Island Chain” (this includes the islands of Taiwan, Okinawa, and the Philippines). ', 'The commander of INDOPACOM, Admiral Philip Davidson, has stressed that the “greatest danger we face in the Indo-Pacific region is the erosion of conventional deterrence vis-à-vis China”. As such, the Department of Defence aims to offset China’s conventional missile-based deterrence capabilities by way of a regional build up of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. As Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin stated in his confirmation hearing, “we need a more resilient and distributed force posture in the Indo-Pacific in response to China’s counter-intervention capabilities”. ', 'On 20 October 2018, President Trump made the first step towards enabling the deployment of long-range ground-launched missiles by announcing his intention to withdraw the U.S. from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Signed in 1987 by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the treaty prohibited all conventional and nuclear ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 to 5,500 kilometres (i.e. intermediate-range missiles). The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty was not just based on Russia’s violations of the treaty, but also because of China’s considerable developments in its missile arsenal. As President Trump put it, “we’ll have to develop those weapons [...] If Russia’s doing it and if China’s doing it, and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable”. Similarly, then-National Security Advisor, John Bolton, remarked that “this was a Cold War bilateral ballistic missile-related treaty, in a multipolar ballistic missile world”.', 'As China was never constrained by the INF Treaty, it has been able to develop the largest and most diverse arsenal of ground-launched missiles in the world. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) fields an estimated 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles, 95% of which would violate the INF Treaty. Considerable asymmetry between the U.S. and China’s ground-based intermediate-range missile arsenals has therefore emerged over the last few decades. According to the U.S. Department of Defence’s 2020 ‘China Military Power’ report, the U.S. currently fields a single type of ground-launched ballistic missile, and it has a mere range of 70 to 300 kilometres. Moreover, the US does not have any ground-launched cruise missiles whatsoever. Meanwhile, China’s PLARF fields an estimated 1,250 ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, which have an estimated range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometres. The PLARF has even developed two ballistic missile variants (the DF-21D and the DF-26B), dubbed ‘carrier killers’, which have been successfully tested against moving naval targets.', 'This lack of constraint has been key to the development of China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. This refers to China’s ability to significantly raise the potential costs for U.S. intervention within the ‘First Island Chain’ by diminishing the U.S.’s confidence in its ability to attain its objectives, so that the U.S. is deterred from coming to the aid of regional allies and partners. Some analysts even suggest that China could use its A2/AD capabilities to conduct a fait accompli against Taiwan, thereby allowing China to conquer Taiwan without fear of U.S. intervention. ', 'Unsurprisingly, China therefore consistently opposed the “multilateralization of the INF Treaty”, that is, becoming a signatory to it. Moreover, Chinese officials criticized the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty as “totally wrong” and called the possible deployment of U.S. missiles in Asia a “provocative, destabilizing act”. ', 'Aside from the issue of whether Congress will fund the Department of Defence’s missile buildup, in addition to the issue of actually developing and producing the necessary missiles (which will take considerable time), there is the question of which the U.S. objective to counteract China’s conventional deterrence capabilities hangs: are U.S. allies and partners willing to host U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missiles?', 'While the U.S. could deploy ground-based, intermediate-range missiles on its own territory in the Asia-Pacific, such as Guam, this would significantly impair its strategic contributions. First, fewer deployment areas undermine the survivability of such systems. The concentration of basing will make it easier for China to locate and strike U.S. missiles, compared to if they were geographically diversified across allied and partnered states in the region. Second, longer distances reduce operational effectiveness, as longer flight time increases the opportunity for anti-missile interception. ', 'As such, it is assessed that to have a significant strategic impact in a potential conflict with China, U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missiles would have to be stationed no further away than South Korea or Japan. Unfortunately for the U.S., however, South Korea or Japan are unlikely to be enthusiastic about hosting U.S. missiles. Consider that following the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, South Korea quickly announced that it would not be hosting any U.S. ground-based intermediate-range missiles, while Japan, slightly more mutedly, called the decision “undesirable”. Both allies fear that agreeing to base U.S. ground-based missiles would be interpreted as highly provocative by China and could result in economic punishment. ', 'As China is the largest trading partner of both South Korea and Japan, making them both susceptible to China’s weaponization of its economic clout, this fear is far from unwarranted. Following the agreement between the U.S and South Korea in July 2017 to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence system (THAAD), China began the implementation of an unofficial economic boycott. South Korea was hit by a total of 43 measures by China which cost the South Korean economy $7.5 billion by the end of 2017. Given that THAAD is technically a non-offensive system, as it is designed to disable incoming short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, the deployment of offensive- weapons would likely result in even more severe punishment. Chinese officials have already warned that China would “not stand idly by” if the U.S. deploys intermediate-range missiles to the Asia-Pacific.', 'That said, as Eric Gomez of the Cato Institute outlines, the U.S. could make ground-based missile deployment more tolerable to allies and partners by adopting a narrower doctrine. If the U.S. were to focus on a strategy of sea denial, whereby the U.S. emphasized the deployment of anti-ship missiles, it could lessen the risk of inadvertent escalation with China. If U.S. missiles do not pose a threat to the Chinese mainland, this will avoid exacerbating the fear of a pre-emptive strike against the PLARF’s nuclear weapons (or even the conventional forces that protect its nuclear weapons). If China perceives less of a threat from the U.S. missiles, this may result in less severe push-back, and in turn, make U.S. allies and partners more willing to consider missile deployment. ', 'Of course, this will require extensive consultation with allies. Considering the unease among U.S. allies and partners over the deployment of missiles on their territories, as Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted following the announcement of INDOPACOM’s funding request, it “would be useful to have quiet discussions with allies/partners about their willingness to deploy missiles before laying out this plan”. In the absence of consultation by the U.S., the Biden administration may come to partially mirror the Trump administration’s impression that the U.S. is simply “interested in enlisting [allies and partners] as proxies in its strategic competition with Beijing”. To the point of cliché, it has become largely a staple of foreign policy opinion pieces on U.S. policy towards China to recommend dispersing U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific. Perhaps more thought needs to be given to how this can actually be facilitated. ', 'President Biden has stated that the "most effective way" to confront China is to "build a united front of U.S. allies and partners", and claimed that the "best China strategy [...] is one which gets every one of our [...] allies on the same page". Allies and partners of the U.S. have already shown their willingness to go their own way on trade policy, as shown by the conclusion of the E.U.-China investment agreement this January (opposed by the then-incoming Biden administration), as well as the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in November 2020. ', 'If Congress approves the Department of Defence’s additional funding request, the Biden administration will soon see whether it will face the challenge of getting allies and partners on the same page with security policy as well.', '']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-JaSc-Aff-ADA-Round-6.docx

MichiganState

JaSc

779d249bb09d1e0652561ecef57cadd921c3da8759f11c7e7631fe1d142c3488

It's exponential.

Kevin Roose 22. Tech columnist. “We Need to Talk About How Good A.I. Is Getting.” New York Times. Aug 24 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/24/technology/ai-technology-progress.html

Over a “ golden decade there’s been a wave of progress in A.I. Some feels like the flick of a switch AlphaFold solved the “ protein problem Science recognized it the biggest scientific breakthrough of the year. everything’s in bloom A.I. are improving at such fast rates conversation in Silicon Valley shift Fewer experts predict we have years to prepare for world-changing A.I.; many believe changes are right around the corner

Over the past 10 years a period A.I. researchers refer to as a “ golden decade ” there’s been a wave of progress in A.I. research fueled by deep learning Some progress feels like the flick of a switch five years ago, the biggest story in the A.I. world was AlphaGo that could beat the best humans at the board game Go last year AlphaFold solved the “ protein -folding problem ,” which had vexed molecular biologists for decades. the journal Science recognized AlphaFold naming it the biggest scientific breakthrough of the year. LaMDA and other state-of-the-art language models are becoming eerily good at having humanlike text conversations A.I. is getting better at lots of things where it once seemed that humans had the upper hand. we’re going from spring to summer said Clark, a co-chair of Stanford University’s annual A.I. Index Report In spring, you have vague suggestions of progress Now, everything’s in bloom .” best A.I. systems are now so capable and improving at such fast rates the conversation in Silicon Valley is starting to shift Fewer experts are confidently predict ing that we have years or even decades to prepare for a wave of world-changing A.I.; many now believe major changes are right around the corner Cotra estimated two years ago a 15 percent chance of “transformational A.I.” good enough to eliminat most white-collar jobs by 2036 Cotra raised that to a 35 percent chance A.I. systems can go from adorable to very powerful in a surprisingly short period of time People should take more seriously that A.I. could change things soon

golden decade wave of progress flick of a switch five years ago, board game solved protein -folding problem biggest scientific breakthrough of the year. state-of-the-art once humans had the upper hand. Stanford vague suggestions everything’s in bloom fast rates shift Fewer experts years world-changing A.I.; right around the corner eliminat white-collar jobs 35 percent chance soon

['Over the past 10 years — a period some A.I. researchers have begun referring to as a “golden decade” — there’s been a wave of progress in many areas of A.I. research, fueled by the rise of techniques like deep learning and the advent of specialized hardware for running huge, computationally intensive A.I. models.', 'Some of that progress has been slow and steady — bigger models with more data and processing power behind them yielding slightly better results.', 'But other times, it feels more like the flick of a switch — impossible acts of magic suddenly becoming possible.', 'Just five years ago, for example, the biggest story in the A.I. world was AlphaGo, a deep learning model built by Google’s DeepMind that could beat the best humans in the world at the board game Go. Training an A.I. to win Go tournaments was a fun party trick, but it wasn’t exactly the kind of progress most people care about.', 'But last year, DeepMind’s AlphaFold — an A.I. system descended from the Go-playing one — did something truly profound. Using a deep neural network trained to predict the three-dimensional structures of proteins from their one-dimensional amino acid sequences, it essentially solved what’s known as the “protein-folding problem,” which had vexed molecular biologists for decades.', 'This summer, DeepMind announced that AlphaFold had made predictions for nearly all of the 200 million proteins known to exist — producing a treasure trove of data that will help medical researchers develop new drugs and vaccines for years to come. Last year, the journal Science recognized AlphaFold’s importance, naming it the biggest scientific breakthrough of the year.', 'Or look at what’s happening with A.I.-generated text.', 'Only a few years ago, A.I. chatbots struggled even with rudimentary conversations — to say nothing of more difficult language-based tasks.', 'But now, large language models like OpenAI’s GPT-3 are being used to write screenplays, compose marketing emails and develop video games. (I even used GPT-3 to write a book review for this paper last year — and, had I not clued in my editors beforehand, I doubt they would have suspected anything.)', 'A.I. is writing code, too — more than a million people have signed up to use GitHub’s Copilot, a tool released last year that helps programmers work faster by automatically finishing their code snippets.', 'Then there’s Google’s LaMDA, an A.I. model that made headlines a couple of months ago when Blake Lemoine, a senior Google engineer, was fired after claiming that it had become sentient.', 'Google disputed Mr. Lemoine’s claims, and lots of A.I. researchers have quibbled with his conclusions. But take out the sentience part, and a weaker version of his argument — that LaMDA and other state-of-the-art language models are becoming eerily good at having humanlike text conversations — would not have raised nearly as many eyebrows.', 'In fact, many experts will tell you that A.I. is getting better at lots of things these days — even in areas, such as language and reasoning, where it once seemed that humans had the upper hand.', '“It feels like we’re going from spring to summer,” said Jack Clark, a co-chair of Stanford University’s annual A.I. Index Report. “In spring, you have these vague suggestions of progress, and little green shoots everywhere. Now, everything’s in bloom.”', 'In the past, A.I. progress was mostly obvious only to insiders who kept up with the latest research papers and conference presentations. But recently, Mr. Clark said, even laypeople can sense the difference.', '“You used to look at A.I.-generated language and say, ‘Wow, it kind of wrote a sentence,’” Mr. Clark said. “And now you’re looking at stuff that’s A.I.-generated and saying, ‘This is really funny, I’m enjoying reading this,’ or ‘I had no idea this was even generated by A.I.’”', 'There is still plenty of bad, broken A.I. out there, from racist chatbots to faulty automated driving systems that result in crashes and injury. And even when A.I. improves quickly, it often takes a while to filter down into products and services that people actually use. An A.I. breakthrough at Google or OpenAI today doesn’t mean that your Roomba will be able to write novels tomorrow.', 'But the best A.I. systems are now so capable — and improving at such fast rates — that the conversation in Silicon Valley is starting to shift. Fewer experts are confidently predicting that we have years or even decades to prepare for a wave of world-changing A.I.; many now believe that major changes are right around the corner, for better or worse.', 'Ajeya Cotra, a senior analyst with Open Philanthropy who studies A.I. risk, estimated two years ago that there was a 15 percent chance of “transformational A.I.” — which she and others have defined as A.I. that is good enough to usher in large-scale economic and societal changes, such as eliminating most white-collar knowledge jobs — emerging by 2036.', 'But in a recent post, Ms. Cotra raised that to a 35 percent chance, citing the rapid improvement of systems like GPT-3.', '“A.I. systems can go from adorable and useless toys to very powerful products in a surprisingly short period of time,” Ms. Cotra told me. “People should take more seriously that A.I. could change things soon, and that could be really scary.”']

[(6, 11), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Neg-Texas-Round-5.docx

Michigan

PiPh

b8fc1326efeb46d94774db996a00be0e96ddc326b15a135caecdc6bf0cf41a0a

3---FTC has authority under Section 5 to enforce antitrust law extraterritorially---doing so results in the same interpretation of comity as the plan

Jesse R. Ruhl 89, JD candidate, Dickinson School of Law, BA Franklin & Marshall College, “The International Law Limits to the FTC's International Activity: Does the Law of Nations Keep the FTC at Home?” Penn State International Law Review, 7(3), 1989, https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1100&context=psilr

congressional power to regulate international antitrust is limited by comity Section 5 includes authority to regulate "trade or commerce with foreign nations F T C A allows FTC to exercise jurisdiction over foreign nations outside territorial boundaries has consistently applied its own rules of conduct concerning anticompetitive acts of foreigners which produced effects within the U S supporting this exception to territorial sovereignty is S.S. Lotus court of International Justice held may punish a foreigner for acts abroad if form a constituent element of a crime consummated within now the principle of i law the U S can reach out, through the FTC

congressional power to regulate international antitrust is limited by comity The jurisdictional nexus, according to the courts, has been found when some "effect" of the agreement has been felt within the U S Congress has delegated some of its authority to regulate commerce to the FTC The FTC's authority to regulate international commerce originates in the FTC Act and the FTC's authority to enforce the FTC Act Section 5 (a) of the Act includes , as a jurisdictional feature of the statute, the authority to regulate "trade or commerce with foreign nations the FTC has authority to enforce the Act only because the FTC Act is within the Constitutional delegation of authority to Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations F T C A allows the FTC to exercise jurisdiction over foreign nations located outside the territorial boundaries of the U S The U S has consistently applied its own rules of conduct concerning anticompetitive acts of foreigners which produced deleterious economic effects within the territorial U S The leading case supporting this exception to territorial sovereignty principles is The S.S. Lotus in which the Permanent court of International Justice held that a state may punish a foreigner for his acts abroad if those acts " form a constituent element of a crime consummated within the territory of the State The S.S. Lotus now stands for the principle of i nternational law that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a party if the party has in fact perpetrated conduct in a foreign country which effects the country asserting the jurisdiction This measure of jurisdiction has now developed into the "effects doctrine" upon which the U S can reach out, through the FTC to regulate conduct by actors who are not located within U S territory

comity Section 5 (a) includes F T C A

['IV. Domestic Limitations to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the FTC', 'Although the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, congressional power to regulate international antitrust is limited by international law and comity.\' The Supreme Court indicated this principle early in the history of the United States by recognizing that no state may exercise sovereign powers within the borders of another state without the latter\'s consent . 4 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has ratified a series of actions by the Department of Justice where the United States has asserted jurisdiction over agreements made outside the territorial limits of the United States governing trade and commerce. The jurisdictional nexus, according to the courts, has been found when some "effect" of the agreement has been felt within the United States itself.47', 'A. Delegation of the Extraterritorial Authority to the FTC', 'As indicated earlier,4 8 Congress has delegated some of its authority to regulate commerce to the FTC.4 The FTC\'s authority to regulate international commerce originates in the FTC Act and the FTC\'s authority to enforce the FTC Act.3 0 Section 5(a) of the Act includes, as a jurisdictional feature of the statute, the authority to regulate "trade or commerce with foreign nations."51 Congress had authority to enact and the FTC has authority to enforce the Act only because the FTC Act is within the Constitutional delegation of authority to Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.""2', "B. FTC's Ability to Regulate Conduct of Citizens Abroad", 'After the Wheeler-Lea Act," the FTC\'s authority to regulate United States citizen\'s conduct occurring outside the territorial boundaries of the United States has never been seriously questioned." The scope and power of that authority was demonstrated in Branch v. FTC.58', 'In Branch, the FTC issued a cease and desist order 56 ordering Branch to discontinue soliciting a phony "diploma mill" in Latin America."\' Branch contested the order, complaining that the FTC had no jurisdiction over his "institute" because the advertising occurred outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.58 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected Branch\'s appeal. The court reasoned that since the FTC was motivated to protect Branch\'s competitors engaged in foreign commerce, as opposed to protecting those residents of central America who may be injured by Branch\'s phony activities, 9 the FTC had jurisdiction to order Branch to discontinue his practices. In so holding, the court remarked:', 'The Federal Trade Commission does not assume to protect the petitioner\'s customers in Latin America. It seeks to protect the petitioner\'s competitors from his unfair practices, begun in the United States and consummated in Latin America. It seeks to protect foreign commerce . . . . The right of the United States to control the conduct of its citizens in foreign countries in respect to matters which a sovereign ordinarily governs within its territorial jurisdiction has been recognized repeatedly .... Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United States, although some of the acts are done outside the territorial limits of the United States.6 "', "The question then left for the court to decide was whether Congress had delegated to the FTC the power to regulate Branch's activity.6'", 'The court found that Congress had granted the authority to the FTC in § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.62', "C. FTC's Ability to Regulate Foreign Nationals", "The Federal Trade Commission Act also allows the FTC to exercise jurisdiction over foreign nations located outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. The United States has consistently applied its own rules of conduct concerning anticompetitive acts of foreigners outside the territorial United States which produced deleterious economic effects within the territorial United States. 3 The conflict with international law arises when the United States, through the FTC or the Department of Justice, attempts to punish a foreign national for acts which occurred outside the territorial United States but violated the United States' antitrust laws.6 It is not doubted that foreign nationals are liable for their acts which occur within the territorial United States. The question is whether an exemption exists to the principles of territorial sovereignty so that the United States may prosecute foreign nations for conduct committed outside the United States, and thus in another sovereign's territory.65", 'The leading case supporting this exception to territorial sovereignty principles is The S.S. Lotus,66 in which the Permanent court of International Justice held that a state may punish a foreigner for his acts abroad if those acts "form a constituent element of a crime consummated within the territory of the State. \'6 7 In this case, a collision between a French and a Turkish ship had resulted in the sinking of the Turkish ship and the deaths of Turkish seamen. When the French ship later docked in Constantinople, the French officer in charge when the collision occurred was put on trial in Turkey and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. France protested the sentence, and both countries resorted to the Permanent Court of Inter national Justice to resolve the question of whether Turkey had violated France\'s territorial sovereignty by prosecuting the French officer. The court determined that, because the crime had effected Turkish territory (the Turkish vessel), 8 Turkey could exercise jurisdiction over the Frenchman notwithstanding the fact that the French officer had at all times remained on board the French vessel:', '[I]t is certain that the courts of many countries, ... which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offenses, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the offense, and more especially its effects, have taken place there . ... "', 'The S.S. Lotus now stands for the principle of international law that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a party if the party has in fact perpetrated conduct in a foreign country which effects the country asserting the jurisdiction. This measure of jurisdiction has now developed into the "effects doctrine" upon which the United States can reach out, through the FTC and its other regulatory agencies, to regulate conduct by actors who are not located within United States territory.7"']

[(9, 16)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Harvard-Doubles.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Harvard-Doubles.docx

5b5839aafcf0b5e6bdbc41b262f103fb5c3cddff04609bd77b39c90420dec1f8

WMD terror risk is high and increasing.

Kallenborn 3-17-2023, research affiliate with the Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a policy fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a US Army Training and Doctrine Command “Mad Scientist,” and national security consultant. His work has been published in a wide range of peer-reviewed, trade, and popular outlets, including Foreign Policy, Slate, War on the Rocks, and the Nonproliferation Review (Zachary, “The Biden administration overestimates radiological terrorism risks and underplays biothreats,” BAS, )

new WMD terror threats are emerging the risk is trending upward The U S needs to combat WMD terrorism to address new threats Terror attacks incite conflict between the U S may only require a bomb Degrading disrupting, and destroying terror capacity is of tremendous value WMD terrorism remains a serious threat to the globe

new WMD terror ist threats are emerging the risk is trending upward The U nited S tates needs to combat WMD terrorism to address new threats Terror ist attacks to incite or prevent the de-escalation of a conflict between the U nited S tates and China, for instance, may only require a bomb Degrading disrupting, and destroying terror capacity is of tremendous value WMD terrorism remains a serious threat to the country and the globe

terror the risk is trending upward U S combat WMD terrorism Terror incite prevent the de-escalation U S a disrupting, and destroying WMD terrorism remains a serious threat to the country and the globe

['At the same time, new WMD terrorist threats are emerging. Drone swarms are a new WMD, given their ability to cause mass harm and lack of reliability. Although terrorists still face considerable difficulty in acquiring true drone swarms with intra-swarm communication, the risk is trending upward. At the same time, developments in nanotechnology—a branch of technology interested in manipulating matter at the nano-scale (1 to 100 nanometers)—offer terrorists a new means to acquire chemical and biological-terrorism-like weapons. Cyberterrorism is also plausible, with the growth of the internet of things offering new vulnerabilities for hostile actors to cause harm. What should have been done? Overall, the Biden administration plan does provide a good baseline for addressing the continued threat of WMD terrorism. Despite the focus of US security policy moving away from terrorism to counter the rise of China, WMD terrorism still deserves serious attention, especially as governmental pressure on disrupting terror organizations wanes. But the policy specifics should align more directly with the threat landscape, current and future. Given the growing risks of bioterrorism risks, US officials should have a particular focus on searching for and sharing information about radicalized experts. Access to relevant technical expertise still remains a major barrier, and building biological weapons requires significant tacit knowledge, the subtle knowledge that comes from working in a lab for a long time that cannot be explained. The best example is Aum Shinrikyo; despite being incredibly well-resourced, its biological weapons program struggled. In one case, a cult member fell into a fermenting tank of clostridium botulinum, the bacteria that produce the botulinum toxin that is lethal in microgram amounts—and emerged unharmed. The cult had over $1 billion in assets, yet was unable to acquire the necessary skills for a successful bioattack. In addition, the United States should undertake national and global efforts to improve biosecurity and biodefense, especially concerning synthetic biology. For example, the United States might focus on facilitating and encouraging discussion between different scientific disciplines and global regulators concerning genetic engineering regulations, domestically and globally. Similarly, a recent US Government Accountability Office (GAO) review found 21 of 29 long-standing recommendations to improve US biodefense remain unimplemented. The United States could also encourage transparency, education, and risk reduction around the global proliferation of biosecurity level 3 and 4 (BSL-3 and BSL-4) laboratories that handle the world’s deadliest pathogens. The United States also needs to update the global framework for combating WMD terrorism to address new threats. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 prohibits states from providing support to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorism and requires the adoption and enforcement of laws to prevent proliferation—but says nothing about the drone, nanotech, or cyber threats. Although it’s unclear whether the resolution is the right vehicle for addressing emerging WMD concerns given a lack of appetite to expand the resolution’s scope, the approach of encouraging countries to adopt legal controls on WMD-related material remains a good one. Similarly, the United States needs to adopt new measures to restrict the proliferation of new, WMD-related technologies, such as requiring new approvals on the production, purchase, and export of pesticide-delivery drones. The reality is that terrorists do not require WMD to cause major, even existential harm. Terrorist attacks to incite or prevent the de-escalation of a conflict between the United States and China, for instance, may only require a bomb or a well-placed bullet. Moreover, the United States and the global community should not treat WMD terrorism as an isolated threat. Virtually all forms of WMD terrorism require significant financial resources and technical expertise. Degrading, disrupting, and destroying general terror organizational capacity is of tremendous value in reducing the threat. WMD terrorism remains a serious threat to the country and the globe, but the American approach needs to be aligned with genuine risks to ensure security today and tomorrow.']

[(0, 10), (16, 20)]

ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Aff-8---NDT-Round-8.docx

Kansas

PaSe

d8cf962a7b3adfc68e4f19d158e717b8ff10a6f4294f8411be8fcc3011b2eb5f

2. VULNERABILITY. ICBMs increase risk of cyberattacks and nuclear terror.

James E. Doyle 17, Ph.D. in International Security Studies from University of Virginia, former specialist in Nuclear Nonproliferation, Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Nuclear security and non-proliferation,” Chapter 4, Renewing America’s Nuclear Arsenal: Options for the 21st Century, Adelphi Series, October 2017, Vol. 56, Iss. 462, pg. 74-77.

ICBM is the element most vulnerable to cyber attack Such an attack could catalyse a conflict dyad options preferable to reducing risk of nuc terror reduce locations for weapons reducing facilities from actors seeking to acquire a nuc reduce incentives forward-deploy non-strategic nucl s or place weapons on alert vulnerable to cyber attack Retirement increase security missiles troubling track record security and performance removal eliminates the risk prompt-use system results range from accident to unauthorised launch that trigger nuc exchange Terrorists likely to use cyber to facilitate miscalc and nuclear use

ICBM force is the element of the most vulnerable to a cyber attack Such an attack could sabotage the system cause a serious accident initiate an unauthorised launch or appear to be an attack in order to catalyse a conflict dyad options are preferable with respect to reducing the risk of nuc lear terror ism they would reduce the number of locations for US and NATO nuclear weapons thus reducing the number of facilities that need protecting from actors seeking to acquire or sabotage a nuc lear weapon would also eliminate the need to transport nuclear weapons to and within Europe where security requirements are becoming harder to meet they would reduce incentives for Russia and China to forward-deploy non-strategic nucl ear weapon s or place more weapons on alert where they could be more vulnerable to cyber attack Retirement of the ICBM leg would increase nuclear security because missiles have a troubling track record with regard to equipment security and human performance the removal of the ICBM leg eliminates the risk of a cyber attack on the most automa ted prompt-use nuclear-weapons system results of such an attack could range from an accident to unauthorised launch that could trigger nuc lear exchange recent study concluded that cyber attacks are possible and that high-alert ICBMs are the most vulnerable to such attacks Terrorists are likely to seek to use cyber as a means to precipitate a crisis and facilitate miscalc ulation and possible nuclear use by interfering

sabotage serious accident unauthorised launch catalyse conflict dyad nuc lear terror ism reduce number locations US NATO protecting acquire sabotage transport harder to meet reduce incentives non-strategic nucl ear weapon s more on alert vulnerable increase nuclear security troubling track record security human performance eliminates the risk most automa ted prompt-use unauthorised launch nuc lear exchange possible most vulnerable likely facilitate miscalc ulation nuclear use

['The ICBM force in the full and streamlined triads is perhaps the element of the US nuclear arsenal most vulnerable to a cyber attack. Such an attack could sabotage the system, cause a serious accident, initiate an unauthorised launch, or appear to be an attack from a potential adversary such as Russia or China in order to catalyse a conflict. At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in March 2013, General C. Robert Kehler, then head of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), said he was ‘very concerned with the potential of a cyber-related attack on our nuclear command and control and on the weapons systems themselves’.10 ', 'Another potential trade-off that affects the chances of nuclear terrorism is between the nuclear weapons themselves and the security forces and equipment that protect them. For example, in addition to protecting nuclear-weapon transportation convoys, US ICBM security forces also have an ‘alert mission requirement’ to respond to an attack on any of the silos or launch facilities. These forces currently operate Vietnamera UH-1 (Huey) helicopters with limited speed, distance and payload capabilities. In February 2016, then-STRATCOM commander Cecil Haney confirmed that the UH-1N helicopters do not fully meet current ICBM complex security requirements as outlined by the DoD and STRATCOM.11 As of October 2016, the Air Force had not committed funding to purchase a new fleet of helicopters until 2019 because of other aircraft acquisition priorities.12 ', 'The streamlined triad includes 300 ICBMs, rather than the 400 under the default modernisation plan. The smaller missile force would be somewhat easier to protect from physical attack, but not cyber intrusion. Moreover, deployment of the B61-12 nuclear bombs to NATO states also means that the streamlined triad would not reduce the number of areas to which US nuclear weapons are deployed. Given the rapidly evolving conflicts on NATO’s borders, and increased terror activity in Belgium, Germany and Turkey, guaranteeing the security of nuclear weapons deployed with NATO will become increasingly difficult.13 If security at NATO nuclear storage sites has not been or cannot be improved quickly and adequately, consideration should be given to pulling all remaining US nuclear weapons from Europe as an urgent measure to improve NATO security and reduce the chances of nuclear terrorism. ', 'Like the full triad, the streamlined triad would exceed anticipated defence budgets for 10–20 years, and therefore would also consume resources that alternatively could go towards counter-nuclear-smuggling efforts, nuclear-material detection, nuclear-weapons protection and accounting, nuclear search teams, emergency response, and foreign aid for nuclear security. These programmes are intended to directly reduce the nuclear-terrorist threat. If a streamlined triad modernisation option was given higher priority, less funding would be available for these programmes, and the nuclear-terrorism threat may not be adequately tackled. ', 'The two dyad options are preferable for several reasons with respect to reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, offering several advantages over the triads. Firstly, they would reduce the number of locations for US and NATO nuclear weapons, thus reducing the number of facilities that need protecting from actors seeking to acquire or sabotage a nuclear weapon. They would also eliminate the need to transport nuclear weapons to and within Europe, in locations where security requirements are becoming harder to meet. Secondly, they would reduce incentives for Russia and China to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons or place more weapons on alert or in a launch-on-warning posture where they could be more vulnerable to cyber attack. Cancellation of the LRSO might boost the chances of negotiating a ban on nuclear-armed cruise missiles, many of which would be forward-deployed and so potentially an attractive target for theft or sabotage. Thirdly, they both cost at least US$400bn less over 30 years than the full triad, almost a 45% reduction in the estimated cost of modernising the US nuclear arsenal.14 The funds made available by these savings could be shifted to programmes that directly address the nuclear-terrorism threat. As noted above, funding for those programmes has been cut by one-third in 2011–16, while funding for the modernisation of nuclear forces has increased during the same period.15 Retirement of the ICBM leg would increase nuclear security because those missiles have a troubling track record with regard to equipment security and human performance. ', 'The most direct and effective way that dyad modernisation plans could tackle the risks of nuclear terrorism is by freeing up major financial resources within the defence budget that could be applied to the nuclear-counter-terrorism mission. The air– sea dyad option would save an estimated US$432bn, and the dispersed maritime dyad US$443bn over 30 years compared to the default plan. Some of the saved resources could be used to expand programmes that counter nuclear-smuggling efforts, nuclear-material detection, nuclear-weapons protection and accounting, nuclear search teams, emergency response and foreign aid for nuclear security. All of these directly reduce the nuclear terrorist threat.16 ', 'In addition, the removal of the ICBM leg eliminates the risk, noted by the STRATCOM commander, of a cyber attack on the most automated, prompt-use nuclear-weapons system. The results of such an attack could range from systems malfunctioning, to an accident, to an unauthorised launch that could trigger a nuclear exchange. A recent study sponsored by the Royal United Services Institute in the UK concluded that cyber attacks are possible and that high-alert nuclear systems like ICBMs are likely the most vulnerable to such attacks.17 Terrorists or other third parties are likely to seek to use cyber as a means to precipitate a crisis and facilitate miscalculation and possible nuclear use by interfering with such systems.']

[(9, 17)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-GaSl-Aff-ADA-Nationals-Round-1.docx

Kentucky

GaSl

8552308cb5532e6b86a1f3eddc138db122577a5815ca576e978fb5c2539a5824

Antitrust is settled law. Changing legal standards disrupts forty-years of precise application, cascading into economy-wide stagnation through arbitrary revisions.

Thierer ’21 [Adam; February 25; Senior Research Fellow with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University; The Hill, “Open-ended antitrust is an innovation killer,” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/540391-open-ended-antitrust-is-an-innovation-killer]

regulation discourag innovation change to legal standard s sound semantic but would upend settled law and create sea change in antitrust This undermine dynamism and i nvestment inhibit competitiveness If we make activity illegal , we’re imagining bureaucrats are better than business legal tests open-ended and abused . The system will be gamed opponents will claim their failure must be fault of rivals a recipe for stagnation let rivalry emerge organically , not through the wrecking ball of antitrust

the calls for regulation have a consequence: discourag ing the vibrant innovation that made tech companies The most important feature is the change to the legal standard s These may sound like simple , semantic tweaks , but they would upend decades of settled law and create a sea change in U.S. antitrust This could undermine business dynamism , innovation and i nvestment that inhibit global competitiveness If we make activity presumptively illegal , we’re imagining government bureaucrats are better suited than business legal tests are remarkably open-ended and easily abused . The system will be gamed by opponents for business reasons. They will claim their own failure to attract investors must all be the fault of creative rivals . That’s a recipe for cronyism and economic stagnation biggest players face pressures, and let rivalry emerge organically , not through the wrecking ball of heavy-handed antitrust

discourag ing innovation most important legal standard s simple semantic tweaks upend settled law sea change antitrust business dynamism innovation i nvestment inhibit global competitiveness illegal bureaucrats better suited legal tests open-ended abused gamed by opponents claim own failure creative rivals recipe for cronyism economic stagnation rivalry organically wrecking ball heavy-handed antitrust

['Unfortunately, the calls for more bureaucracy and regulation emanating from all corners of the political world could have an unintended consequence: discouraging the sort of vibrant innovation and consumer choice that made America’s tech companies household names across the globe.', 'Sen.\xa0Amy Klobuchar\xa0(D-Minn.) is leading one charge. Klobuchar, who chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights,\xa0recently introduced\xa0the “Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act.” This sweeping measure seeks to expand the powers and budgets of antitrust regulators at the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. It also includes new filing requirements and potentially hefty civil fines.', 'The most important feature is the proposed change to the legal standard by which regulators approve business deals. It would allow the government to stop any deal that creates an “appreciable risk of materially lessening competition,” and it also defines exclusionary behavior as, “conduct that materially disadvantages one or more actual or potential competitors.”', 'These may sound like simple, semantic tweaks, but – much like some of the other policy ideas currently circulating – they would upend decades of settled law and create a sea change in U.S. antitrust enforcement. This change could undermine business dynamism, innovation and investment in ways that inhibit the global competitiveness of U.S. businesses.', 'Critics of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity by large tech firms include not only Sen. Klobuchar but also Republicans such as Sen.\xa0Josh Hawley\xa0(R-Mo.). Hawley recent\xa0offered an amendment\xa0to a budget bill that would preemptively prohibit mergers and acquisitions by dominant online firms. Klobuchar and Hawley believe that M&A skews the market in favor of today’s largest firms, entrenching their market power and discouraging innovation.\xa0', 'History teaches a different lesson. Consider DirecTV and Skype, both once considered innovative market leaders in their respective fields of satellite TV and internet telephony. Both firms stumbled, however, and they might not even be with us today without creative business deals. DirecTV has been partially or fully controlled by Hughes Electronics, News Corp., Liberty Media and now AT&T. Skype has swapped hands multiple times, moving from eBay, to a private investment firm and now to Microsoft.', 'These were complex deals, and some didn’t work, leading to divestitures. But each was a learning experience that illustrated how dynamic media and technology markets can be with firms constantly searching for value-added arrangements that serve their customers and shareholders. If we make this type of activity presumptively illegal, we’re imagining that government bureaucrats are better suited to make these calls than businesspeople and the consumers who choose whether or not to buy the product.', 'Worse yet, legal tests like those Klobuchar proposes – “conduct that materially disadvantages potential competitors” – are remarkably open-ended and could be easily abused. The system will be gamed by opponents of deals for business reasons. They will claim that their own failure to attract investors or customers must all be the fault of more creative rivals. That’s a recipe for cronyism and economic stagnation.\xa0', 'Those who worry about today’s largest tech giants becoming supposedly\xa0unassailable monopolies\xa0should consider how similar fears were expressed not so long ago about other tech titans, many of which we laugh about today. Just 14 years ago, headlines\xa0proclaimed\xa0that “MySpace Is a Natural Monopoly,” and\xa0asked, “Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?” We all know how that “monopoly” ceased to exist.', 'At the same time, pundits\xa0insisted\xa0“Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone,” since “there is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive.” The smartphone market of that era was viewed as completely under the control of BlackBerry, Palm, Motorola and Nokia. A few years prior to that, critics lambasted the merger of AOL and TimeWarner as a new\xa0corporate “Big Brother”\xa0that would decimate digital diversity and online competition.', 'Today, we know these tales of the apocalypse ended up instead becoming case studies in the continuing power of “creative destruction.” New innovations and players emerged from many unexpected quarters, decimating whatever dreams of continued domination the old giants once had.', 'Today’s biggest players face similar pressures, and it’s better to let rivalry and innovation emerge organically, not through the wrecking ball of heavy-handed antitrust regulation.']

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ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Rutgers%20RR-Round5.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Rutgers%2520RR-Round5.docx

a252bfd7578e8a7e9be92c8b4b2a490d38123b17c31a51c7bffba58dfcd2c9df

Populism causes extinction – makes the international system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot.

Lavin ’17 [Frank; October 20; Chairman of Export Now, served in the White House, National Security Council, State Department, and Commerce Department during three Presidential administrations; Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, “Things Fall Apart: Populism and Foreign Policy,” https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2017/10/20/things-fall-apart-populism-and-foreign-policy]

populism focuses on problems difficult to govern foreign policy questions were absent What is America’s role populism is exculpatory Every problem faces was caused by others imagine leadership as early or late instinct late responding after-the-fact to S C S Russia ISIS deterioration will continue cut defense reduce international connectivity stasis incentivizes a destabilizer history presents the bill we need to be early

populism is grievance-based It focuses on problems rather than solutions This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a govern ing coalition constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives Trump avoided articulating a positive vision Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based : terrorism , trade and immigration they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent What is America’s role in the world populism is exculpatory Every problem faces was caused by others To sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late responding after-the-fact to S C S not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections and in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS The deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue On any given day, the Obama/ Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp , to cut defense expenditures to reduce international good-will and connectivity The minimalist approach might work in a static environment , but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer . At some point, history presents the bill then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early . If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself

grievance-based problems rather than solutions govern ing coalition foreign policy pronouncements grievance-based terrorism trade immigration essentially domestic absent America’s role in the world exculpatory was caused by others Presidential leadership minute early minute late S C S Russia Aleppo ISIS deterioration foreign policy continue skimp cut defense expenditures reduce international good-will connectivity static environment stasis incentivizes destabilizer history presents the bill national policy need to be a minute early pay the price for the boom

['What is Populism?', 'This populism has four characteristics. First, it is grievance-based. It focuses on problems rather than solutions. This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition, since constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives. Indeed, as a candidate, Trump avoided articulating a positive vision regarding even central pillars of his campaign such as health care. Notably, Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration. Equally noteworthy, they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis. The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent from his discussions: What is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations?', 'Second, the populist must establish emotional connectivity with the audience. Trump tends to evaluate people largely based on how they connect with him. The rally format suits him well; he loves the audience and the audience loves him. There are no questions and answers, nor any discussion, nor does there have to be new information, but there is plenty of emotional connectivity. Importantly, this emotional connectivity has little to do with economic class, a point that can befuddle Trump’s domestic political opponents, who underestimate his working-class appeal on the basis that he personally has little in common with them or that his policies supposedly would not help them. To a populist, the first point is broadly irrelevant and the second point is highly debatable. Might many a construction worker welcome a construction boom, and many a restaurant worker welcome an expansion of the business, if it meant job security and a larger paycheck, even if it would create disproportionate returns to the construction company and restaurant owner? For many working men and women, a growth in inequality is not inherently troubling. Thomas Piketty might be right, but it might not matter to most Americans if returns to capital outpace returns to labor. In addition, when establishment elites mock Trump, from his grammar to his boorishness, a portion of non-elites see this as condescension.', 'Third, populism is exculpatory: Every problem the United States faces was caused by others and the target audience is blameless. So if a company wanted to relocate some activity to Mexico, it must have been to exploit wage differences. No discussion as to whether wage increases at the U.S. facility have outpaced productivity increases. No discussion as to whether union rules impede flexibility and productivity. No discussion of the fact that Mexico might be a better production platform because it has more free trade agreements. Management is to blame, with Mexico in connivance. This is frequently expressed in themes of anti-establishment or alienation, which can have a corrosive effect when anchored in grievances.', 'Fourth, policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs. Cost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself. As such, populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall on the U.S. border with Mexico since it will be, by self-declaration, cost free.', 'To be fair, others in public life exhibit some of these elements. President Obama’s healthcare plan was historically grandiose in scope, cost and complexity, yet it was ballyhooed to save money. Similarly, Obama’s eight-year effort to reduce U.S. commitments to NATO was to have no costs in terms of force projection, alliance cohesion, or deterrence. And, Obama was the only President in the modern era to have run against trade as a candidate, an approach Trump followed. What Went Wrong? How could the bipartisan consensus on U.S. international leadership fade so quickly, particularly at a moment when the combination of market economics and alliances of democracies had resulted in perhaps the most prosperous and most liberal moment in human history? There are four contributors to the rise of populism: societal transformation, grievance economics, international leadership, and elite limitations. First, societal transformation – meaning both globalization and automation— has two profound socio-political effects. It produces an extraordinary degree of prosperity; and it carries with it a distribution effect. The bell curve of income distribution does not shift as much as it elongates. Few people are worse off, but many people are not better off. There is not necessarily the creation of a large number of winners and losers, but there is certainly the perception people getting left behind. Trump understands the message: The globalization club is having a party, and you are not invited. Silicon Valley is drinking champagne and your role is to pick the grapes. These trends also feed into the narrative of alienation because it decreases people’s control over their lives even as their overall prosperity increases. Globalization and automation have created economic anxiety in electorates around the world, and not just among steelworkers and coal miners. Realtors, bank tellers, school teachers, and cab drivers are all seeing competitive pressure and the prospect of job elimination. To many Americans, comparative advantage and creative destruction create a more prosperous society, but accompanying it is job insecurity. David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter might be right, but so what? Second, over several decades we have seen a shift from growth economics to grievance economics. This represents a break with the recovery policies that guided the leading economies through the 1950s and 1960s (and that economic rationalists such as Macron tilt toward today). In the current view, the primary purpose of economic policy is not to foment prosperity, but to redress grievances. Indeed, regardless of absolute improvements in well-being, reducing economic inequality is deemed to be a basis for policy. The premise of growth economics is that a system is fundamentally fair, so the main challenge is how fast we can go. The premise of grievance economics is that the system is fundamentally unfair, so going faster merely exacerbates the unfairness. This cult of inequality incentivizes interest-group politics and rent-seeking, leading to slower growth. If you focus on growth policies, you get growth. If you focus on grievance policies, you get grievances. A third cause is the shift in the U.S. international posture. We have seen a growing fatigue in the United States over the cost of international leadership. The U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the institutions and the cohesion of the Cold War era largely intact, even though the end of the Soviet Union removed what political scientists term a “negative integrator.” Now we are deep into the post-post-Cold War era, with faded cohesion and institutions. For the first time since Harding and Coolidge we have two presidents in a row who have no international military or policy pedigree. Beyond the direct costs of international leadership in defense budgets and personnel, Americans seem more sensitive to the indirect costs of public opinion and anti-Americanism. Relationships can be expensive. Friendships can be complicated. If there is no immediate threat, and if no one likes us anyhow, then what is the point of foreign policy?', 'To sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late. Do you deter or do you react? Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error and the cost of action without a consensus. “Left of Boom,” the British call it. Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach. President Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late, such as responding after-the-fact to the Chinese build-out in the South China Sea, not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections, and perhaps in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS, Obama was more than a minute late. President Bush’s instinct was to be a minute early, foolishly so to his critics. Presidents have spent some 75 years since Pearl Harbor trying to be a minute early, with all the costs and mistakes that entailed, yet now we have two presidents in a row who believe we are better off being a minute late.', 'Finally, the appeal of populism has been driven by their perception of the limitations of the U.S. leadership class: insular, rigid, and sometimes simply mediocre. Additionally, over-engineered solutions and the appearance of being self-serving, if not corrupt, help the appeal of populism. Sometimes it comes from the declining marginal effectiveness of government programs as society becomes more affluent and complicated. Indeed, the Obama administration seemed to regularly play into the hands of populists, sometimes passively so, as with the refusal to challenge even the more exotic of the sanctuary city movement. Sometimes, it was by design as with the painstaking construction not to label Islamic terrorism as such. If responsible leaders appear to be playing favorites or not accurately describing a phenomenon, they abandon the issue to their opponents — a phenomenon Trump witnessed through his hesitation in characterizing the Charlottesville protests. If populists rely too heavily on emotional connectivity, which establishment politicians have any emotional connectivity? Does there exist an aspirant for President, other than Donald Trump, who can have a friendly discussion with a Walmart cashier? How many of the possible 2020 presidential candidates have worked in the “real” economy, working for an institution that needed to turn a profit? Sam Rayburn’s wish to Lyndon Johnson, after LBJ had related how bright was his brain trust, was that he wished one of them had run for county sheriff. Can we today wish that one of the 2020 presidential candidates will have run a diner, which would have required them to hire teenagers, train high school dropouts, deal with single parents, lay-off workers from failed projects and negotiate wages, all while paying taxes and dealing with various government agencies? Maybe this is why a restaurant worker might respect an owner, or even a New York real estate developer, but not a career politician. If the elites cannot maintain that connectivity, they give an opening to populists. Attaining political maturity contemporaneous with the Bush 43 invasion of Iraq, Obama was wary of American over-reach and committed to a foreign policy pullback. He embedded that withdrawal in a denial of American exceptionalism, a pillar of U.S foreign policy since Pearl Harbor. If you stop believing in yourself, it is difficult to ask others to believe in you. The rejection of America’s special role in the world helped set the stage for “Make America Great Again.” Was Barack Obama the ultimate Donald Trump enabler? There other contributing factors beyond the above four. The rise of identity politics probably played into Trump’s hands, as did the digital communications revolution. News clutter rewards pugnacity and sensationalism and allows for cocoons and even tribalism. It is also worth noting that Trump is a man of unusual presentation strengths, and he can effectively project personality. Simply put, Trump was an exemplary grievance candidate in a grievance year. Trump articulated a vision; Hillary Clinton did not. We are in a communications era. For Secretary Clinton, communications is a means to an end. For Trump it is an end. She believes in her in-box; He, in his out-box. Hillary campaigned as the functionary; Donald as the visionary. Is internationalism doomed? America is now in the middle of a twelve and possibly sixteen year reign of two presidents who challenge the Cold War view that America is better off with a leading international presence, with being a minute early. It is too expensive, argued President Obama, and it leads us into unwinnable conflicts, draining our reputation and our purse. It is too expensive, echoes President Trump, and foreigners abuse and cheat us. Obama argues for minimalism because the United States is a problem for the world, and Trump argues for minimalism because the world is a problem for the United States. Even as President, Trump is easy to underestimate. Appealingly so. Many critics derive amusement, even a sense of superiority, from his foibles. His factual errors and even spelling mistakes provide an opportunity for mockery, but the lazy epiphany of error-spotting is a poor substitute for a substantive rebuttal. And a significant portion of the criticism is either ad hominem or an over-reach, either of which helps Trump. Those who are serious about policy should look at the direction in which he is taking the country, rather than fixate on these errors. To be even-handed, if President Trump’s distinctive success in the public space was his astonishing 2016 victory, in 2008 the distinctive success of Senator Obama was his astonishing election. Obama wisely chose not to run on his government record but marshaled his formidable stage skills and personal charisma to direct criticism toward Hillary Clinton and John McCain. So if Trump’s foreign policy approach stems from his success as “Ranter-in-Chief,” does Obama’s approach stem from his success as “Charmer-in-Chief?” Radically different styles, but with policy similarities.', 'The deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue for the near term. On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures, to reduce international good-will and connectivity, to save money all around. Relationships can be expensive and even harmful – this is the seduction of the minimalist school. But there is a countervailing argument.', 'The main argument against this minimalist approach will be events themselves. The minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer. At some point, history presents the bill. Only then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early. If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself. Worse than the expense and bother of having friends would be the expense and bother of not having friends.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-2%20-%20Harvard-Quarters.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-2%2520-%2520Harvard-Quarters.docx

88324f92dd588114e502b65842df16c60273993484064242fdf61f947618b445

Issues are compartmentalized.

Eli Stokols 21, White House Reporter for the Los Angeles Times, MS in Journalism from the Columbia University School of Journalism, BA from the University of California-Berkeley, “Colorado Shooting; 'We Have to Act,' Biden Says As Another Shooting Rocks Agenda; Colorado Attack and Border Surge Interrupt his Efforts to Boost Pandemic Relief.”, Los Angeles Times, 3/24/2021, Lexis

divert from Biden's next push Biden ability to stay focused through transition gives optimism They isolated distractions a testament to discipline they'll stay on the highway with legislation But get on top of the surge and manage appropriately

Mounting pressure to address immigration could divert Washington's focus from Biden's next push , a package for infrastructure projects Podesta White House chief of staff to Clinton and Obama, said the Biden White House's ability to stay focused on its COVID-19 relief package through a chaotic transition and Trump's second Senate impeachment trial gives him optimism " They isolated all of those distractions , which is a testament to their discipline ," they'll stay on the main highway with the [ infrastructure legislation ]. But they've got to get on top of the reality of the surge at the border and manage it appropriately ."

immigration ability to stay focused chaotic transition Trump's second Senate impeachment optimism isolated testament discipline stay on the main highway get on top manage it appropriately

["Mounting pressure to address immigration and gun control could divert Washington's and the public's focus from Biden's next major legislative push, a potentially $3-trillion package for infrastructure projects and education initiatives intended as a second phase of economic development measures.", "John Podesta, who was a White House chief of staff to former President Clinton and an advisor to Obama, said the Biden White House's ability to stay focused on its COVID-19 relief package through a chaotic transition and Trump's second Senate impeachment trial gives him optimism.", '"They isolated all of those distractions, which is a testament to their discipline," Podesta said. "I think they\'ll stay on the main highway with the [infrastructure legislation]. But they\'ve got to get on top of the reality of the surge at the border and manage it appropriately."']

[(4, 11), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGr-Aff-Long-Beach-Doubles.docx

Kentucky

DiGr

2c7ecd508653980b3dd60e948c3c90c495d1b3ba7978ec11e12b7d4bc85fb61e

The alternative is to reject the AFF in favor of a politics of misrecognition---only an analysis of international relations that forefronts the role of fantasy in desire can challenge the logics of nuclear weapons.

Epstein 18, professor of government and international relations at University of Sydney. (Sydney, 20/11/18, “The productive force of the negative and the desire for recognition: Lessons from Hegel and Lacan”, Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/productive-force-of-the-negative-and-the-desire-for-recognition-lessons-from-hegel-and-lacan/0A0CB7C63D744F1CFCDF41D843010F9C)

behaviour of international actors is driven by an ideal of sovereign agency I law affords any political entity coordinates of what it is to be a state, namely recognition the individual is split Fantasy is the product of this the subject misrecognises objet a sovereignty functions as fantasy states – chase after imaginary ‘wholeness’ projected onto an idealised past It may be territory tech or a weapon whatever a state invested to assert sovereignty that cannot fail to be recognised nuc s mark the state that owns it as possessing absolute ‘sovereign agency’ affording the guarantee their sovereignty will be respected The weapon is desired to compensate for all other vulnerabilities Nuc s are founded in a logic of misrecognition They presuppose the impossibility of being recognised constitute the weapon to guard against such prospect this desire continues the costly quest for nuc s Fantasy reveals a structure where political actors are always chasing objets a, in the hope of being recognised that self-misrecognition is the condition of possibility of acting and constructing oneself The misrecognised, desiring, subject brings a different starting point for apprehending agency Opening up discipline beyond interest-maximisation offers us a place to rethink international politics. In contrast with transparent desire in rationalist analyses it is only revealed through misrecognitions. Misrecognition is the owl at dusk of recognition theory

Our wager with this Special Issue is that the behaviour of states and other international political actors is driven by an ideal of sovereign agency . I nternational law affords any political entity aspiring to statehood the coordinates of what it is to seek after (and acquire) if it is to be come a state, namely , a territory, a population, and mutual recognition . It captures psychoanalysis’s founding insight, that the individual is split between a conscience and an unconscious, to which their regular access is barred by a series of repressive mechanisms that developed during the course of their socialization. Fantasy is the product of this ‘primal repression’ (Urverdrängung), or indeed this original negativation, this pushing under, into the negative.113 Second, the subject misrecognises what objet a is. Or rather, with Lacan, we can now consider how sovereignty functions as a fantasy , that is, as a compensatory structure by which international actors – states, but also ‘wannabe’ states – chase after an imaginary ‘wholeness’ projected onto an idealised past ; and that this chasing after is a key driver of international politics. It may be piece of territory (Crimea, for Russia), a tech nology, or a weapon : it is whatever a particular state has invested to assert an undisputable sovereignty , one that cannot fail to be recognised by other states, even if they are reluctant to grant such recognition. The difference is illustrated by an exemplary objet a of sovereignty, nuc lear weapon s . The most destructive weapon in the history of humanity is designed to mark the state that owns it (or the state that aspires to owning it, and for the same reasons) as possessing what we have called an absolute ‘sovereign agency’ . 126 The weapon’s (negative indeed) power is perceived by nuclear-armed states as affording the foolproof guarantee that their sovereignty will be respected by other states.127 The weapon is desired because it is thought to compensate for all other vulnerabilities ; including in cases of states whose material capabilities are less developed or their sovereignty is less assured, North Korea being a case in point.128 Nuc lear weapon s are founded in a logic of misrecognition that then feeds upon itself.131 They presuppose , and then continue to uphold, the impossibility of being recognised in one’s sovereignty (since they constitute the ultimate weapon designed to guard against such prospect : other states will recognise me as a state whether they like it or not if I have a nuclear weapon). They are also, however, an implicit acknowledgement of the impossibility of this desire that nonetheless continues to power the costly quest for , or maintenance of, nuc lear weapon s . Fantasy reveals a compensatory structure where by political actors – individual and collective – are always chasing after what they do not have, their particular objets a, in the hope of being recognised as who they want to be. Lacan shows that self-misrecognition is the initial condition of possibility of acting in the world and of constructing oneself . The misrecognised, desiring, subject that both Hegel and Lacan foreground brings a completely different starting point for apprehending agency than the intentionality that has long held currency as the discipline. Opening up the discipline beyond interest-maximisation to identities has left this model of agency untouched. Hegel and Lacan’s misrecognised, desiring subject offers us a place to start rethink ing agency in international politics. In contrast with transparent desire that features in rationalist analyses , he underlines instead how it is only progressively revealed through a convoluted play of self-negations and misrecognitions. Misrecognition , then, is the owl that takes off at the dusk of recognition theory .

['Our wager with this Special Issue is that the behaviour of states and other international political actors is driven by an ideal of sovereign agency. Jacques Lacan’s concept of fantasy reveals how such an agency-structuring ideal actually works. Lacan’s is an individual-level ontology centred upon the speaking subject that is also ‘radically inters-subjective’, in that it is rooted in language through and through. In this it is fundamentally Hegelian and political, as Slavoj Žižek has extensively drawn out.104 Its purchase for political analysis is that it lays bare the psychic mechanisms by which the individual is hooked into political and social structures at the most intimate level of their being.105 Lacan shows how these structures grip into the subject’s intimate functioning; how they shape her actions; without, however overdetermining her agency. Hegelian freedom is held intact by this decisive shift from agency to desire, a proximate but not quite overlapping notion, and this disjuncture is key. Desire, in Lacan’s ontology, mediates between agency and structure. It is where the speaking subject – the actor shaped by the structures of signification that pre-exist it – irrupts into the agency-structure dyad. It thus opens it up in ways that are highly productive for the analysis of political action. It moves this analysis, first, beyond the two pitfalls of excessively individualist or structuralist political ontologies; that is of, respectively, ascribing this behaviour to an agency unmoored from and unconstrained by any context, and consequently reduced to interest-maximisation on the one hand, or of eclipsing agency by over-emphasising structures, on the other. In addition, the non-alignment, indeed, even disconnect, between agency and desire opens up the analysis to behaviours that run exactly counter to interest-maximisation. Understanding this disconnect requires how desire is structured by fantasy.', 'Fantasy in Lacan is the primordial frame that organises the speaking subject’s relation to the world. As Žižek puts it: ‘fantasy does not simply realise desire in a hallucinatory way … . [It] constitutes our desire, provides its coordinates; that is, it literally “teaches us how to desire”’. 106 Let us consider our working hypothesis, of sovereignty as the key agency-structuring ideal of international politics, in these terms. International law affords any political entity aspiring to statehood the coordinates of what it is to seek after (and acquire) if it is to become a state, namely, a territory, a population, and mutual recognition. It teaches this entity exactly how to desire.107 This also accounts for one of the constitutive paradoxes of what Vivienne Jabri has termed the ‘postcolonial international’. 108 In the era of decolonisation that reshaped the international system in the wake of the Second World War and yielded a wave of new states, the independence leaders quickly found that simply standing up against the colonial oppressor was not enough to shake the colonial yoke. The successful decolonial fighters like Kwame Nkrumah, whom Julia Gallagher considers in her contribution to the Special Issue,109 were those who rearticulated the anti-colonial desire with these coordinates, into a collective project of statehood. This explains the profound attachment to sovereignty, or rather, in a Lacanian perspective, to the very desire that was shaped by these coordinates. This desire for a state of one’s own is a feature of postcolonial statehood more generally, particularly those that were born of fierce independence struggles. To return to Žižek and a more trivial example (initially developed by Freud): ‘to put it in somewhat simplified terms: fantasy does not mean that when I desire a strawberry cake and cannot get it in reality I fantasize about it eating it; the problem is, rather: how do I know I desire a strawberry cake in the first place? This is what fantasy tells me.’ 110 That their cake was sovereignty is what the grammar of the international system had taught aspiring states, and still does.', '$ ◊ a: Lacan’s formula for fantasy', 'Fantasy is a key component of Lacan’s analysis of desire. Lacan develops a specific formula for fantasy as part of his broader formalisation of the mechanisms of desire in what is known as his ‘graph of desire’. 111 The formula for fantasy is: $ ◊ a. Let us consider each of its components. ‘$’ is the divided subject. It captures psychoanalysis’s founding insight, that the individual is split between a conscience and an unconscious, to which their regular access is barred by a series of repressive mechanisms that developed during the course of their socialization. This repression (Verdrängung) is first and foremost a defence mechanism aimed at protecting the subject’s (illusory) sense of the cohesiveness of her self. Here lies the work of the Hegelian negative in the human psyche; in this ‘pushing under’ the bar of consciousness, Freud’s Verdrängung, which Lacan represents by ‘barring’ the subject, $’. It is the line that separates the domains of positivity and negativity that the subject’s psychic life straddles. Lacan, with his topology of subjecthood, does not so much complicate Hegel’s scheme of consciousness as map the place of the negative onto it, as André Green has underlined.112 Hegel’s cunning of reason is but Lacan’s unconscious’s deceits; both ultimately feature a beguiled, restless, non-unitary subject that cannot quite seize the tricks of its own mind.', 'Fantasy is the product of this ‘primal repression’ (Urverdrängung), or indeed this original negativation, this pushing under, into the negative.113 Only what is in effect a leftover from an incomplete process of socialisation comes to hold a fundamental, foundational even, truth about the subject.114 ‘Phantasy is really the “stuff” of the “I” that is originally repressed’, writes Lacan.115 This truth is the structure upon which the subject’s primordial relation to the world rests. It is born in and of the negative, and steeped in misrecognition, its handmaiden. With access to only half of themselves in the normal circumstances of everyday life, the divided subject is bound to misrecognise herself. In fact, misrecognition is the divided subject $’s regular dwelling-place. Moreover, misrecognition plays out at several different levels in the human psyche. Méconnaissance, which Alan Sheridan translates as a ‘failure to recognise’ or ‘misconstruction’, is a crucial notion for Lacan.116 It is not just the obverse of connaissance (knowledge). Rather, it is inextricably bound up with it: its negative. Lacan underlines how me-connaissance, knowledge of oneself, is predicated on méconnaisance: misrecognising oneself is the starting point to knowing oneself; which, in turn, is a necessarily lengthy, lifelong process that involves what is known as traversing the fantasy – deconstructing one’s foundational fantasy and revealing it for what is, a phantasmatic construct that regulates one’s life, which is the endpoint of the psychoanalysis.', 'What the divided subject misrecognises, first and foremost, is her object of desire. The letter ‘a’ designates any particular thing that the subject wants – whether the strawberry cake or indeed sovereignty. But it also references objet a, which is the object-cause of desire and a key element of the Lacanian ontology. The diamond ‘◊’ that links the subject $ to ‘a’ signifies ‘desire of’. 117 Only the conjoining it captures is also a disjoining. It is another place where misrecognition plays out. A crucial Lacanian insight is that not obtaining what one wants is key to the workings of human desire. It is what enables this desire to keep working as the motor of human agency. This is the mystery, irrationality, even, of desire, that is bound to defeat attempts to account for human action in terms of utility-maximisation, and that is especially apparent when compared with the instrumental needs of other species. As Žižek underlines:', 'The often-noted experimental difference between humans and apes acquires here all its weight: when an ape is confronted with an object beyond its reach that it repeatedly fails to obtain, it will abandon it and move to a more modest object (say, a less attractive partner), whereas a human will persist in its effort, remaining transfixed by the impossible.118', 'The subject does not obtain what she wants, in two ways. First, because of the sheer difficulty of knowing what one wants. This is what being a divided subject (hear: a human being) entails. In addition to his broad use of méconnaissance, Lacan coins the term ‘nescience’ specifically for desire, to evoke ‘the state of nescience in which man [sic] remains in relation to his desire’. 119 The subject thinks she wants a piece of cake, but she may often want something else as well; a set of meaningful associations or memories it conjures. Say, because in her childhood she was rewarded with a piece of cake by her parents, or because they watched her with love and relish as she ate her cake. The piece of cake, or indeed a piece of land, becomes a stand in, or signifier, for a broader constellation of significations folded into her childhood experiences, or indeed into the idea of sovereignty.', 'Second, the subject misrecognises what objet a is. As the object of desire, it is any particular desired object, from the strawberry cake to sovereignty. But is also the cause of desire, the engine that keeps the subject desiring, hence for our purposes in this Special Issue, that which sustains its capacity to act in the world. The subject wants this ‘a’, but she also wants to be able to keep wanting many an ‘a’, and she wants this ‘a’ to nurture this wanting. This entails not being completely satisfied, or not being satisfied once and for all. Hence unsatisfaction is an inherent part of the mechanics of desire. But this is not all. A crucial twist is that, by virtue of that it can designate every object of the subject’s pursuits, ‘a’ points to something that is not there. Here is the negative, again. Objet a is a ‘hole in reality’, a ‘point of impossibility’ that these objects – a piece of cake, a sexual partner, money, sovereignty – come to fill temporarily.120 It is where the subject comes up against the negative most intimately. Misrecognition holds up the entire edifice. Fantasy turns on the subject seeing only the particular object ‘a’ (partner, cake or … sovereignty), not the hole it is designed to fill.', 'The subject’s experience is of a missing; of something of herself that was lost somewhere in the nether regions of her past. This sense of loss is expressed, even, by the ‘I miss you’ of the everyday language of love. But the ‘I miss you’ also captures something else, namely, objet a’s transitivity, the fact that it simultaneously functions as a lost piece of the subject herself, but as something that is located in the other. It is that je ne sais quoi that the other has and that will make me complete. Here is where the ‘a’ (rather than the traditional ‘x’) takes all its meaning: ‘a’ stand for autre, ‘other’, or rather Autre, ‘Other’. It is that missing piece that connects me to the other, in the case of the lover, but also to the big Other, the symbolic order. It is also where the subject’s (mis)recognition of its desire, and its desire for recognition interconnect. ‘The original question of desire’ as Žižek puts it,121 is not directly ‘What do I want?’ but rather ‘What do others want from me? What do they see in me? What am I to others?’ Desire is always ultimately, for Lacan, directed at the other’s desire – at, say, the parent’s ravishment.', 'In sum, object a is thus that missing piece of itself that the subject pursues in order to reclaim something from the original loss/repression that marked her entry into the symbolic order, her socialisation, and that, in actual fact, designates what can qualify for her as something she desires, according to the terms of its idiosyncratic fantasy. This is the circle that runs from the object of desire to the broader fantasy, now understood as the generative structure that affords the individual the grammar with which she pursues her desire in the world. To work, the circle must not be broken. It is precisely what the psychoanalysitic practice seeks to interrupt. Fantasy is a structured impossibility; and what it structures is desire, but not in such a way that it attains the object it has designated for it, but rather, such that it cannot. Hence it is a ‘formal symbolic structure’ centred upon an impossibility.122 What is more, object a, the ultimate negative, or nonbeing structuring the human experience, is also what confers the subject its consistency, its sense of being. Though desire:', 'shifts from one object to the other, through all these displacements … desire nonetheless retains a minimum of formal consistency, a set of phantasmatic features which, when they are encountered in a positive object, makes us desire this object – objet a as the cause of desire is nothing other than this formal frame of consistency.123', 'Sovereignty as fantasy', 'We are now in the position to revisit our earlier notion of fantasies of sovereignty. Or rather, with Lacan, we can now consider how sovereignty functions as a fantasy, that is, as a compensatory structure by which international actors – states, but also ‘wannabe’ states – chase after an imaginary ‘wholeness’ projected onto an idealised past; and that this chasing after is a key driver of international politics. Just as Lacan’s formula illuminates the subject pursuing a succession of objets a, so sovereignty reveals a similar, collective hence political, structure of action underwriting the international system. Sovereignty affords a ‘generative grammar’ by which a state identifies its objets a, those specific undertakings that will restore it that which it has ‘lost’ and ‘requires’ (by the terms of this compensatory script) to recover in order to return to its former grandeur.124 Objet a is a placeholder. It may be piece of territory (Crimea, for Russia), a technology, or a weapon: it is whatever a particular state has invested to assert an undisputable sovereignty, one that cannot fail to be recognised by other states, even if they are reluctant to grant such recognition. The purchase of apprehending sovereignty in these terms is, first, that the specific ‘object’ charged with achieving this purpose (and that is desired for that reason) is determined by a given state’s history. Moreover, this past grandeur is always necessarily, structurally, imaginary; regardless of how actually powerful the state in question is or has been; even for the most powerful state setting out to ‘Make America Great Again.’ What it taps into is an imaginary wholeness, the fantasy of a lost unity that is lodged at the individual level. Second, to understand that it is imaginary is to understand exactly where the promise lands, regardless of the prospects of its realisation. The promise works when it reactivates, for every supporter, a deep-seated, nostalgic, and perhaps ultimately unshakeable aspiration to restoring a foregone imaginary oneness of the self, which constitutes an important motivation for us doing the things we do. This affords tools for apprehending the enduring appeal, not of ‘populism’ (per a recently popular term), but, I suggest, of sovereignty itself.', 'What the series of objets a ultimately hide, however, is the intractable – because logical, structural – dependence that underwrites Westphalian sovereignty as a structure of mutual recognition.125 This dependence is not a material vulnerability. The difference is illustrated by an exemplary objet a of sovereignty, nuclear weapons. The most destructive weapon in the history of humanity is designed to mark the state that owns it (or the state that aspires to owning it, and for the same reasons) as possessing what we have called an absolute ‘sovereign agency’. 126 The weapon’s (negative indeed) power is perceived by nuclear-armed states as affording the foolproof guarantee that their sovereignty will be respected by other states.127 The weapon is desired because it is thought to compensate for all other vulnerabilities; including in cases of states whose material capabilities are less developed or their sovereignty is less assured, North Korea being a case in point.128 The dependence, then, is symbolic and constitutive; it harks to the intractably social structure of the Westphalian system. This guarantee is necessarily fanstamatic, in the simple sense that it is projected, by the actor, onto the future129 – another negative. But this guarantee also taps into the workings of fantasy in the more theorised sense of a compensatory structure that both designates what the actor wants, and compensates for it not actually being able to have it. A state armed with such agentic, destructive capability does not demand but rather commands the recognition from other states (rivals or not) that its sovereignty is incontestable.130 Only this ‘wrenching’ is also acknowledged, by policymakers themselves, to mark the failure of other forms of interaction equally founded on mutual recognition, in particular, of commerce (which rests upon the partners having recognised each other as legitimate partners and is precisely what is suspended by sanctions). This was the diagnosis underwriting the so-called 2015 Iran nuclear deal, which has sought to shift the basis of the interactions between Iran and the group of world powers to a commercial, and away from this security, logic. The latter, then, is a dynamic of misrecognition. Nuclear weapons are founded in a logic of misrecognition that then feeds upon itself.131 They presuppose, and then continue to uphold, the impossibility of being recognised in one’s sovereignty (since they constitute the ultimate weapon designed to guard against such prospect: other states will recognise me as a state whether they like it or not if I have a nuclear weapon). They turn a desire to be recognised into a demand, or even a command, for recognition. They are also, however, an implicit acknowledgement of the impossibility of this desire that nonetheless continues to power the costly quest for, or maintenance of, nuclear weapons.', 'Conclusion', 'I have sought to theorise the concept of misrecognition that we bring to the study of international politics with this Special Issue. To do so I began by mapping out the field of recognition theory as it has developed through its successive waves of internal critique, identifying the places where the seeds were planted within that scholarship for shifting the focus from recognition to misrecognition, especially in Axel Honneth’s work. I also showed how sovereignty already surfaces in this scholarship, via the question of political agency and with Patchen Markell. Remarkable though it has been for these movements of internal critique, this scholarship has fallen short of theorising misrecognition and of fully bearing out the work of the Hegelian negative. Hence I then returned to Hegel’s original struggle for recognition that had spawned this scholarship. Unpacking the dialectic, I showed that the actual experience of misrecognition, rather than an idealised recognition, was already Hegel’s primary concern. This focus, I then showed in the third and final part, is further developed by Lacan’s concept of fantasy. Fantasy reveals a compensatory structure whereby political actors – individual and collective – are always chasing after what they do not have, their particular objets a, in the hope of being recognised as who they want to be. For example, an invincible state whose sovereignty and identity stand beyond possible doubt or contestation. Lacan shows that self-misrecognition is the initial condition of possibility of acting in the world and of constructing oneself. It is the initial (but not the final) condition of identity constructions.', 'The misrecognised, desiring, subject that both Hegel and Lacan foreground brings a completely different starting point for apprehending agency than the intentionality that has long held currency as the discipline. Opening up the discipline beyond interest-maximisation to identities has left this model of agency untouched. Hegel and Lacan’s misrecognised, desiring subject offers us a place to start rethinking agency in international politics. In contrast with transparent desire that features in rationalist analyses, he underlines instead how it is only progressively revealed through a convoluted play of self-negations and misrecognitions. Misrecognition, then, is the owl that takes off at the dusk of recognition theory.', '', '', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-4---Wake-Round-5.docx

Kansas

MaPa

12cd8fbd464e90f3c43c1391c614bf861503b2b7ad431e5b713712e0288d08ee

2] No India-Pakistan war.

Peter Huessy 22. Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, guest lecturer on the history of US nuclear deterrent policy at the United States Naval Academy, has also guest lectured at the Institute for World Politics, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, the JHU-Applied Physics Lab, Global Strike Command, and US Strategic Command. “Is the United States Trying to Fight and Win Nuclear Wars?” 2/9/22. https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/is-the-united-states-trying-to-fight-and-win-nuclear-wars

Nuclear-armed states have hesitated to attack other nuclear-armed states India and Pakistan have been mutually cautious they have taken care to control confrontation there is an unignorable pattern of limitation followed by de-escalation efforts Even the slight risk precludes options to attack nukes do inhibit wars between nuclear “pairs

Nuclear-armed states really have hesitated to attack other nuclear-armed states given the prospect of suffering unacceptable return fire India and Pakistan since proliferating have not ceased competing But both have been mutually cautious Since then they have taken care to control such as the 1990 Kashmir confrontation , and fought a brief and highly constrained peripheral war in 1999 there is an unignorable pattern of limitation followed by de-escalation efforts between states with nuclear Even the slight risk of nuclear escalation either precludes options to attack , or takes them quickly off the table In crises even the superpower was deterred. So nukes really do inhibit wars between nuclear “pairs ”, Nuclear deterrence doesn’t always work in warding off attacks. It just works a hell of a lot.

['It is cavalier, therefore, to dismiss the possibility of nuclear deterrence with the wised-up line that correlation does not equal causation. Indeed, it suggests incuriosity, given we have historical evidence to draw upon. Nuclear-armed states really have hesitated to attack other nuclear-armed states, given the prospect of suffering unacceptable return fire. India and Pakistan since proliferating have not ceased competing. But both have been more mutually cautious than during the pre-nuclear era, when they fought three conventional wars. Every postwar generation entertains the dream of global disarmament Since then, they have engaged in brinkmanship they have taken care to control, such as the 1990 Kashmir confrontation, and fought a brief and highly constrained peripheral war in 1999. Nuclear proliferation in its early, “nascent” phase can trigger threats and instability. But there is an unignorable pattern of limitation followed by de-escalation efforts between states with nuclear forces, as when India and China squared off in border skirmishes recently. Indeed, evidence of the real force of nuclear deterrence lies precisely in the United States’ determined efforts to prevent proliferation by others. Wanting a free hand, it knows proliferation would constrain its power. Even the slight risk of nuclear escalation either precludes options to attack, or takes them quickly off the table. In crises, even the superpower was deterred. Washington’s cautious, calibrated steps in the 1958 Berlin crisis drew partly on President Dwight Eisenhower’s increasing risk-aversion, his well-founded belief that the coming of the Soviet Union’s thermonuclear capability would mean, in the event of escalation, tens of millions of immediate fatalities. Likewise, in most hypothetical wargames, including on the Soviet side, possessors were reluctant to engage in massive nuclear strikes. In recent time, hawks in the Trump presidency advocated a “bloody nose” limited pre-emptive strike on North Korea, only for the executive branch to conclude “no attack plan could confidently preclude escalation or collateral damage”. Now compare the reluctance to attack North Korea, which successfully advanced its nuclear programme, with the fates of Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, who abandoned theirs. So nukes really do inhibit wars between nuclear “pairs”, if only we care to look. And like most things, nukes have mixed effects and varying outcomes. Nuclear deterrence doesn’t always work in warding off attacks. It just works a hell of a lot. ', '']

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ndtceda

Emory-PaRa-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-3.docx

Emory

PaRa

204c5b2b912199f9ae2d854b37c54fff3041c8407b1a53a79a7b7b772d247e6b

Discourse isn’t prior, language games can’t meet immediate needs of war.

Hudson 15— Heidi, prof of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, (“(Re)framing the Relationship between Discourse and Materiality in Feminist Security Studies and Feminist IPE,” pg 413-419, Politics & Gender; Cambridge Vol. 11, Iss. 2, June 2015; EG)

What value does feminist theorizing have in war - where meeting immediate needs is paramount theorizing the body become a fetish Feminist Security Studies talk about interactions between language and matter as if equal discourses treat material practices as effects rather than causes we privileged cultural constructions of gender at the expense of material effects of and security

What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women's lived experiences) have in war - affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount ? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetish es? my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE) for all this talk about interactions between language and matter ( as if they were equal ), "language" remains the star of the show discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security feminist poststructuralism on its own is not a suitable lens to understand the hybridity of how women in the DRC adapt SGBV discourses to fit in with local cultural practices and to fulfil particular sociomaterial needs

feminist theorizing war immediate needs as if they were equal "language" remains the star of the show discourses effects causes cultural expense material

['Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics¶ While feminists usually try to ground the meanings that they study, theorizing the mundane or the everyday may very well represent a detour--or even a dead end--if bread-and-butter issues related to the security and economic well-being of ordinary women and men [people] are ignored. What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women\'s lived experiences) have in war-affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetishes? Theorizing the everyday is messy because it has to contend with the immediate social setting in which popular culture is inseparable from the economic materiality of the conditions of oppression.¶ In response to this dilemma, my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE), achieved through a reframed relationship between discursive subjectivity and a structure-centred materiality. I argue for a more systematic feminist analysis that reunites FPE and cultural FSS critiques. This analytical synthesis is based on an understanding of the co-constituted agency of discourse and materiality underpinned by a postcolonial-feminist attention to the politics of space.¶ After the Cold War, security became a catch-all concept for critical variants of IR, but instead of working against disciplinary fragmentation, "security has settled into each new camp in particularistic ways" (Sylvester 2013, 618). For FSS the main concern is to underscore the conceptual necessity of gender to understanding security. Although scholars have also emphasized the theoretical and methodological diversity of FSS, I contend that there is an implicit hierarchy of sorts when it comes to which critical tradition matters more theoretically or epistemologically--with a subtle but distinct privileging of the discursive as evidenced by the influential contributions of, among others, Judith Butler (1993), Karin Fierke (2013a), Lene Hansen (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008). FSS thus tends to focus on the gendered, discursive construction of forms of violence with less attention paid to materialities of economic insecurity. In contrast, FPE tends to avoid the security frame and its discursive implications and concentrates more on gender as a social relation of inequality and the gendered effects of capitalism or economic globalization.¶ Poststructuralist scholarship in FSS insists that the discursive is not privileged over the material and that objects in the material world and human subjects both take their forms and agencies relationally, as they are embedded within particular locations. Similarly, gendered and embodied security is theorized to be the outcome of relational processes--performed in, by, and through those relations. Theory thus makes practice (Foucault 1972). Yet, thinking about our bodies as cultural constructs, produced as objects in security discourse, has a high level of abstraction. Before we can analyze discourse about bodies, shouldn\'t we first make the bodies from "other worlds," rooted in everyday struggles of human insecurity, feature in IR? How is attention to contextualized discourses of individuals or groups without considering their basic needs different from what liberal feminists are doing, namely treating those whose security is at stake as abstract, silent, rights-bearing individuals with no culture? Moreover, for all this talk about interactions between language and matter (as if they were equal), "language" remains the star of the show, as evidenced in Karin Fierke\'s claim that "embodied security is ... fundamentally bound up in the interaction between humans and their material environment, both of which are constituted in and through language" (Fierke 2013b, 16). Theoretically, materiality should gain agency through the fact that it cannot ontologically be separated from discursive forces but in practice discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency (Wilcox 2012). A subtle hierarchy is therefore imposed. Reversing the starting point of the inquiry may succeed in troubling dualistic thinking but does not transcend it. We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security (see Fraser 2013).¶ There are clearly limits to discursive analysis, especially when it comes to connecting physical insecurity and the materiality of insecurity linked to structures. We must therefore look to the so-called "new materialisms" on posthumanist agency (Connolly 2013), material feminisms (Hughes 2013), and Feminist IPE. Feminist IPE as a diverse body of scholarship studies structures, social practices, and the meanings of the global political economy (Griffin 2010; Peterson 2007). The emphasis falls on specifically gendered bodies while also foregrounding differences that are based upon material and structural inequalities as well as intersectional relations of disadvantage (e.g., gender, institutionalized racism, or ethnicity). In this regard, FPE may find itself closer than FSS to a radical definition of human security as everyday life experiences embedded in global structures of inclusion and exclusion and can keep FSS honest by guiding it back to a concern with everyday (economic) insecurities.¶ While FPE reminds us to consider the global picture of inequality, a systematic feminist political economy theory of security/conflict/violence is yet to emerge. That said, revisiting the material conditions that influence the socioeconomic production of gender as a relation of inequality is a potentially agency-inducing factor that could complement (together with attention to new materialisms) the discursive analytics of FSS, as will be shown in the discussion that follows on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).¶ FSS research has highlighted the harmful discursive misrepresentations that characterize international attention on rape as a tool of war in the DRC (e.g., Baaz and Stern 2013). However, feminist poststructuralism on its own is not a suitable lens to understand the hybridity of how women in the DRC adapt SGBV discourses to fit in with local cultural practices and to fulfil particular sociomaterial needs within their specific context. One needs a postcolonial feminism for that. To keep the international community interested and maintain the status that funding brings, women\'s organizations in the eastern DRC tend to emphasize the brutal and extensive nature of SGBV. The outcome is not straightforward--women\'s victimhood is reinforced--but at the same time, it could mean that so-called "victims" fight back, negotiating the "global patriarchal bargain" from below, simultaneously engaging with discourse and the material aspects of socioeconomic justice and empowerment (Jean-Bouchard 2013).¶ This case also underlines the necessity to consider a broad range of materialities (i.e., not only those that are discursively produced, but also "conventional" political economy materialities during and after war). During war, rape as a form of gendered accumulation by dispossession was used in Mozambique and Rwanda to strip women of their productive and reproductive labor power, as well as their possessions and access to land and livestock. Postwar, Baaz and Stern (2013) found that Congolese men rape due to a complex mix of cultural and political economy perceptions about masculinity, women as property, and a sense of entitlement to sex as compensation for their loss of status as providers. Borrowing Claudia Card\'s (2003) term "social death" to describe the cultural shame as a consequence of rape, I argue that the loss of social vitality is not just a loss of identity and meaning for one\'s existence, but also a deeply material loss of political, economic, and social relations. Both FSS and Feminist IPE should therefore pay more attention to the political economy of social relations and inequalities of the everyday.', '']

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ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Aff-Harvard-Round-5.docx

Michigan

ShGa

5ee307920f93c4c2a0d76490efe3517011cccc789f3b9ec798955f45d1988eef

Emotional unpredictability magnifies the risk—leaders are fallible and myopic.

Pauly 23 - (*Reid B. C. Pauly **Rose McDermott *Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Dean's Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University **David and Mariana Fisher University Professor of International Relations at Brown University; 1-1-2023, MIT Press, "The Psychology of Nuclear Brinkmanship," doa: 8-17-2023) url: https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/3/9/114669/The-Psychology-of-Nuclear-Brinkmanship

Extreme emotions short-circuit deliberate decision-making . unpredictability makes brink ship terrifying . people are not able to control such emotions . leaders downplay risk in crisis . illusion of control plague leaders overconfidence risk expanding conflict. . leaders overestimate adversary's unity while recognizing their own as fractured . vengeance Pride , shame , envy , status or honor ignite aggression . makes individuals less sensitive to the suffering of larger numbers . Putin's invasion would hardly seem [practical] But appear comprehensible in terms of his view of his own role in history . processes by which leaders are selected make them more prone to self-obsession . emotions increase devastating outcomes . The brink is not equally abhorrent leaders cannot always accurately assess chances control or opponents. Heightened emotions exacerbate this uncertainty . crises are even more unstable than tradition posits

Extreme emotions , such as might be expected during a crisis or war , can short-circuit more deliberate forms of decision-making ; Daniel Kahneman refers to the fast , intuitive form of decision-making that characterizes so-called gut instinct as type I processing . The habits that humans rely on in these moments can be advantageous in some circumstances and disastrous in others , especially under the shadow of nuclear war. Therefore, the unpredictability of type I fast, intuitive, emotional decision -making makes the already uncertain context of brink man ship even more terrifying . Decision-makers are humans, and all humans have emotions, and those emotions can be both idiosyncratic and unpredictable . Emotion thus complicates the elements of chan ce and choice in brinkmanship because a coercer can choose to act on an emotion such as fear or anger , or not. And most people are not able to control such strong emotions in moments of stress . Organization theory on “normal accidents” suggests that accidents and mechanical failures will always happen eventually in complex , tightly coupled systems like the military organizations that manage nuclear weapons. The Cuban missile crisis is also replete with examples of how military standard operating procedures raised the level of risk beyond that which leaders intended . Two well-established psychological biases suggest that leaders will downplay the significance of the risk of accidents in their crisis decision-making . First, the “ illusion of control ” may plague leaders in crisis. Actors atop hierarchies tend to overestimate their own control over events and outcomes. Leaders also often suffer from overconfidence in ways that risk expanding conflict. human males have a strong tendency toward overconfidence and illusions of control . But such illusions also have negative consequences. Illusions of control can result in illusory pattern recognition ; that is, perceiving patterns that do not exist, including exaggerating the prospect that others would actually submit . Those who argued that the Iraqis would greet U.S. forces as liberators, like so many French citizens had done at the end of World War II, fell prey to this misconception . The problem of overconfidence can plague both sides in a context of brinkmanship. Both leaders may feel like they are more likely to emerge victorious from a conflict, and thus may prove more risk acceptant and willing to escalate than may be wise given the stakes . leaders tend to overestimate the adversary's unity and control . They see others’ behaviors as more centralized , disciplined , and coordinated than they actually may be, while simultaneously recognizing their own system as being more fractured , and expecting the other side to accurately perceive as much . During the Cold War, many U.S. leaders believed that the Soviet Union was a united monolith Those same officials remained fully aware of the fractious nature of the U .S. government and assumed the Soviets were fully aware that decisions and statements were subject to revision based on Congressional oversight . decision makers can never be absolutely sure how they or the citizens of their countries will react if nuclear bombs were to explode even as demonstrations many people are not able to completely or consistently control their feelings . In times of stress and crisis, one of the most destabilizing of these pressures is the desire for vengeance . Pride , shame , envy , status -seeking , or a desire to def e nd one's own or one's family's honor might ignite aggression as well . Documented psychological processes—such as “ psychic numbing ,” which makes individuals relatively less sensitive to the suffering of larger numbers of people affected by a tragedy, and “ security prominence , ” whereby most people tend to privilege small increases in security over even much larger benefits in other domains . feelings and emotions can be wildly unstable , buffeted by the vagaries of limited attention spans , time pressures , and other immediate situational factors that people do not consciously control. Schelling's original economically inspired notions neglected some critically important and universal aspects of human psychological architecture . he wrote that “to inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only make people behave to avoid it.” Notwithstanding that such a construction neglects the existence of sociopaths who revel in inflicting harm, and who may inhabit high offices more frequently . Anyone who revels in another's misfortune or who feels the hormonal rush that follows winning a physical fight or intense competition knows that inflicting suffering on others can generate endogenous pleasure , particularly if those others have caused them harm. Almost all violence is perceived by the perpetrators to be virtuous . schadenfreude There are precious few other ways to produce it . Those who win like the feeling and want to fight again . Those who have obtained victory often learn to like the taste of blood ; one need only look at the difficulty of successfully reincorporating military personnel with long combat histories back into civilian society to see the downside of such reinforcement. also fails to account for the perceived emotional and psychological values of retaliation, and the strong and instinctual drive for revenge against those who cause us harm. The psychology of vengeance underlies the stability of nuclear deterrence far more than a rational theory of the nuclear revolution appreciates. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the two Cold War superpowers traded threats of intervention and escalation Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin rejoined that in Moscow “they have become so angry, they want troops.” It was not material interest driving policy, he was suggesting, but emotion . Secretary of State James Baker also explicitly invoked emotion to deter Saddam Hussein leaders tend to favor more psychological and emotional forces in their decision-making. Putin's 2022 invasion of Ukraine , especially his doubling down after the unprecedented sanctions imposed in its wake and the underperformance of the Russian military, would hardly seem [practical] rational from a cost-benefit perspective. But his actions appear more comprehensible when explained in terms of his view of his own role in Russian history . the processes by which leaders are selected and self-select make them more , rather than less, prone to the kinds of biases that might affect their decision-making in negative ways . Traits such as [ self-obsession ] narcissism are more likely to emerge in this population than in other groups . These individuals are much more likely to exaggerate their own skill and sense of control . when leaders are narcissistic , lack emotional self-awareness or resilience , or fail to link their behavior to their best interests , certain emotions such as pride , shame , envy , anger , rejection , or hurt diminish the quality of decision-making. The consequence is not only numerous lost opportunities but increase d risk of devastating outcomes . Conclusion Psychological and emotional variables are sources of risk and uncertainty , even when leaders retain the option to use nuclear weapons . The brink is not equally abhorrent to all leaders in all crises. the point of decision does not have to be eliminated for risk of catastrophic destruction to remain. This is because leaders cannot always accurately assess the chances that they take , the extent to which they can control outcomes , or their ability to force concessions on the part of opponents. They are uncertain if the other side will actually do what it says , and they cannot know if they properly understand the signals that they receive. That both sides do not , and cannot , know if the other side is telling the truth raises uncertainty for everyone. Heightened emotions exacerbate this uncertainty . crises are even more unstable than the tradition al theory of brinkmanship posits

Extreme emotions crisis war short-circuit fast intuitive gut instinct type I processing habits advantageous disastrous in others unpredictability uncertain context terrifying idiosyncratic unpredictable chan ce choice fear anger most people are not able to control such strong emotions in moments of stress Organization theory always happen eventually complex tightly coupled beyond intended downplay risk of accidents illusion of control atop hierarchies overestimate control overconfidence males strong tendency overconfidence illusions of control illusory pattern recognition actually submit misconception plague both sides more risk acceptant willing to escalate overestimate adversary's unity and control centralized disciplined coordinated fractured accurately perceive as much united monolith fractious nature U .S. government revision Congressional oversight never be absolutely sure they or the citizens even as demonstrations completely consistently control their feelings desire for vengeance Pride shame envy status -seeking def e nd one's own one's family's honor psychic numbing relatively less sensitive larger numbers of people security prominence small increases in security feelings emotions wildly unstable limited attention spans time pressures situational factors economically inspired universal aspects human psychological architecture neglects the existence of sociopaths who revel in inflicting harm, and who may inhabit high offices more frequently hormonal rush winning a physical fight intense competition inflicting suffering endogenous pleasure virtuous schadenfreude few other ways to produce it like the feeling want to fight again obtained victory learn to like the taste of blood difficulty reincorporating military personnel strong instinctual drive revenge psychology of vengeance stability far more than a rational theory not material interest emotion emotion deter Saddam Hussein psychological emotional forces invasion of Ukraine doubling down unprecedented sanctions underperformance hardly seem [practical] rational comprehensible view of his own role in Russian history selected self-select more , rather than less, prone negative ways narcissism more likely to emerge exaggerate their own skill sense of control narcissistic lack emotional self-awareness resilience fail to link their behavior best interests pride shame envy anger rejection hurt diminish the quality increase d risk of devastating outcomes Conclusion risk uncertainty even when leaders retain the option to use nuclear weapons brink equally abhorrent catastrophic destruction accurately assess chances that they take extent to which they can control outcomes force concessions actually do what it says cannot know properly understand do not cannot telling the truth raises uncertainty Heightened emotions exacerbate this uncertainty even more unstable

['**edited for language', '', 'Threats that leave something to chance therefore generate leverage not by removing the decision to employ nuclear weapons from humans on either side, as Schelling argued, but rather precisely because of the psychological and emotional factors that make the outcomes of those decisions more uncertain than a cost-benefit calculus would suggest. Extreme emotions, such as might be expected during a crisis or war, can short-circuit more deliberate forms of decision-making; Daniel Kahneman refers to the fast, intuitive form of decision-making that characterizes so-called gut instinct as type I processing.58 The habits that humans rely on in these moments can be advantageous in some circumstances and disastrous in others, especially under the shadow of nuclear war. Therefore, the unpredictability of type I fast, intuitive, emotional decision-making makes the already uncertain context of brinkmanship even more terrifying. Decision-makers are humans, and all humans have emotions, and those emotions can be both idiosyncratic and unpredictable. Therefore, these psychological issues become part of the calculus and introduce inherent uncertainty that Schelling overlooked. Whether the other side would act on their emotions or not is unknown to all.', 'Emotion thus complicates the elements of chance and choice in brinkmanship because a coercer can choose to act on an emotion such as fear or anger, or not. And most people are not able to control such strong emotions in moments of stress. Most people also know that the same is true for others. Indeed, even the legal system has built in diminished responsibility for those acting in the heat of passion. So each side suspecting that the other may be unable to control their emotions under pressure further heightens uncertainty surrounding any signals sent by either side and intensifies the role of chance in brinkmanship.', 'The rest of this article unpacks each of the mechanisms in sequence, explaining the psychological underpinning of the risks associated with each type of chance and choice. We use illustrative examples from nuclear crises and beyond.', 'Mechanism 1: Accidents', "The first mechanism—accidents—is the category most familiar to the brinkmanship literature. Sometimes, escalation occurs despite the best intentions of the belligerents—an accidental launch, a mechanical failure that causes two planes to collide in the air, or a misaimed warning shot. The shooting down of civilian airliners during moments of heightened tensions provide examples that are all too common: Korean Air Lines Flight 007 shot down over the Soviet Union in 1983; Iran Air Flight 655 shot down by a U.S. guided missile cruiser in the Persian Gulf in 1988; Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shot down over Ukraine in 2014; Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 shot down over Iran in 2020; and many more. The fog of war ensures imperfect target selection. The Bill Clinton administration's 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade or myriad drone strikes in Afghanistan that killed innocent people provide other examples. The longer a crisis goes on, the more likely an unexpected event could happen. Schelling conceived of this possibility as a kind of iterated Russian roulette. However unlikely they may seem, as Sagan writes, “things that have never happened before happen all the time.”59 Thus, all crises have some baseline level of risk.", 'Moreover, leaders can manipulate the magnitude of these risks in crises. First, leaders may choose to augment the risk of accidents to signal their resolve by mobilizing more military forces, placing them on ever higher alert, forward deploying them, or ordering them to operate near the enemy. A leader who approves “buzzing” tactics by pilots, for instance, is delegating to agents the risk of accidents occurring in the field. A fighter jet buzzing another aircraft was for Schelling “the purest real-life example I can think of in international affairs” of a threat that leaves something to chance.60', "The second way that leaders can manipulate the magnitude of these risks is through decisions about how much risk to bake into the nuclear postures around which states have organized their nuclear forces. Nuclear command-and-control arrangements can be “delegative” to military operators or can assert centralized control over launch procedures.61 Using Narang's typology of nuclear postures, an asymmetric escalation posture with delegative control should be more suitable for brinkmanship than an assured retaliation posture with assertive control, and catalytic postures work precisely by signaling the risk of nuclear escalation to a third-party intervener.62 In general, leaders who delegate more authority to use nuclear weapons, have more mobile and numerous nuclear forces, and do not institute negative controls, such as permissive action links, raise the risk of accidents in a crisis.63 (Mechanism 3 discusses how devolving or pre-delegating authorities on the use of force down the chain of command also raises the risks of escalation by others.)", 'Third, bureaucratic and organizational structures also affect the risk of accidents. Organization theory on “normal accidents” suggests that accidents and mechanical failures will always happen eventually in complex, tightly coupled systems like the military organizations that manage nuclear weapons.64 The Cuban missile crisis is also replete with examples of how military standard operating procedures raised the level of risk beyond that which leaders intended.65 For instance, because of standard nuclear alerting procedures, the fighter aircraft that scrambled to intercept a U-2 that strayed into Soviet airspace were armed with nuclear-tipped air-to-air missiles.66 All these factors can augment the risk of accidents or close calls. But they do not remove choice entirely. And, most importantly, choice does not have to be removed for brinkmanship to function.', 'the explanatory limits of accidents', 'Accidents can only go so far in explaining the sources of bargaining leverage in brinkmanship. They do not dispatch the problem of choice. After an accident or mechanical failure causes a crisis to escalate, for a nuclear war to begin, one leader must decide to be the first to launch deliberately. Even if the chance event involves the accidental use of a nuclear weapon, a nuclear war does not start without a nuclear response. Accidents themselves do not eliminate leaders, their credibility, or their deficiencies from the equation.67 Leaders can increase the odds of an accident, and they can choose not to respond to provocations that result from transgressions.', 'In his original climbing analogy, accidents are what made Schelling describe the brink as a curved slope. But it is more accurate to think of these chance events as ledges on the cliff. Falling all the way down the abyss at once is unlikely. If the climber ever fell, she might find herself on a lower ledge, perhaps injured but still with the acumen to decide whether to plummet another ledge down or try to climb back up to the top. Nonetheless, the abyss never ceases to exist, so it remains irrational at any ledge to simply leap into the bottomless chasm. (In limited war, the climber intentionally leaps to a lower ledge, which we discuss as a subcategory of mechanism 3.)', "Two well-established psychological biases suggest that leaders will downplay the significance of the risk of accidents in their crisis decision-making. First, the “illusion of control” may plague leaders in crisis. Actors atop hierarchies tend to overestimate their own control over events and outcomes.68 Leaders also often suffer from overconfidence in ways that risk expanding conflict.69 Robert Trivers, for example, points out that human males have a strong tendency toward overconfidence and illusions of control. He notes that this tendency offers a strong evolutionary advantage, particularly in combat, since those who can bring more people to their side by projecting a strong likelihood of victory are more likely to win. They may even win without having to fight by getting the other side to back down in fear of overwhelming odds. People can often tell when enthusiasm is lacking, however. Therefore, bluffing or lying to oneself about one's prospects for victory is the surest way to deceive others, recruit more followers, and thus be more likely to actually win a fight. But such illusions also have negative consequences. Illusions of control can result in illusory pattern recognition; that is, perceiving patterns that do not exist, including exaggerating the prospect that others would actually submit.70 Those who argued that the Iraqis would greet U.S. forces as liberators, like so many French citizens had done at the end of World War II, fell prey to this misconception. The problem of overconfidence can plague both sides in a context of brinkmanship. Both leaders may feel like they are more likely to emerge victorious from a conflict, and thus may prove more risk acceptant and willing to escalate than may be wise given the stakes.", "The second psychological bias is reflected in Jervis's argument that leaders tend to overestimate the adversary's unity and control. They see others’ behaviors as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than they actually may be, while simultaneously recognizing their own system as being more fractured, and expecting the other side to accurately perceive as much.71 During the Cold War, many U.S. leaders believed that the Soviet Union was a united monolith, and treated it as such, failing to recognize the importance of divisions about future directions without the Politburo. Those same officials remained fully aware of the fractious nature of the U.S. government and assumed the Soviets were fully aware that decisions and statements were subject to revision based on Congressional oversight. In other words, in any situation, leaders assume that opponents are more united than they are, yet also believe that those same opponents recognize their own internal divisions. Both these tendencies reflect failures of imagination and an inability to see outside one's own experience. Jervis also warned against confident expectations in the case of nuclear war, writing that “decision makers can never be absolutely sure how they or the citizens of their countries will react if nuclear bombs were to explode even as demonstrations.”72", "In sum, in the aftermath of accidents, choices remain. Accidents are insufficient as a sole mechanism of brinkmanship. They beg another solution to the puzzle of agency or choice and must work in tandem with the other mechanisms. In terms of Schelling's analogy, we want to know: what makes one climber respond to events that are slipping out of control with an irrational decision to step further toward the abyss while another strives to pull back from the edge? This is where individual variance in risk acceptance and temperamental variables can come into play in decisive ways.", 'Mechanism 2: Self-Control', "The second mechanism is that of losing self-control. The risk of escalation comes from within the system, not outside it. Here we see two subcategories. First, a decider may choose to escalate out of panic or madness. We explore the possibility of these irrational choices below. Second, Schelling cited false alarms and the misapprehension of enemy intentions (or a correct apprehension of the enemy's misapprehension of its adversary) as sources of biased decision-making in crisis. In such circumstances, the decider still chooses war, but this decision is based on incorrect information or misperception about the enemy's intentions and actions. The reciprocal fear of surprise attack would be pernicious in crisis and incentivize a first strike, especially if a state's warning systems were postured to accept the risk of type I errors (false positives) because leaders are worried more about type II errors (false negatives). U.S. early warning radars, hastily set up to face south during the Cuban missile crisis, were apt to deliver exactly such false alarms of incoming ballistic missiles.73 This mechanism also seems most affected by Schelling's notion of “the imperfect process of decision” whereby governments, as groups of imperfect units, fail to move information to where it needs to be on time. We build more on Jervis's psychological interpretation of that “imperfect process” of policymaking, driven by the fact that “the workings of machines and the reaction of humans in time of stress cannot be predicted with high confidence.”74", "To restate the puzzle, chance is Schelling's proposed rational solution to the problem of nuclear threat credibility because it removes the actor from the equation. But if the actor cannot be entirely removed, then individuals retain some degree of choice that must be explained. To square this circle, we explain how the emotions of the decision-makers on each side influence chance and risk in brinkmanship.", "Most leaders control their emotions most of the time, and some people certainly have greater emotional awareness and emotional regulation.75 But many people are not able to completely or consistently control their feelings. In times of stress and crisis, one of the most destabilizing of these pressures is the desire for vengeance in the face of an attack.76 The desire for revenge, as universal as it may be, is not the only emotion that might decisively affect a leader's decision-making calculus. Pride, shame, envy, status-seeking, or a desire to defend one's own or one's family's honor might ignite aggression as well. Documented psychological processes—such as “psychic numbing,”77 which makes individuals relatively less sensitive to the suffering of larger numbers of people affected by a tragedy, and “security prominence,” whereby most people tend to privilege small increases in security over even much larger benefits in other domains—constitute meaningful ways in which thoughts and feelings systematically deceive most people.78 These notable dynamics cause individuals to behave in ways that often contradict expressed values. In addition, feelings and emotions can be wildly unstable, buffeted by the vagaries of limited attention spans, time pressures, and other immediate situational factors that people do not consciously control.79", "There are at least two areas in which Schelling's original economically inspired notions neglected some critically important and universal aspects of human psychological architecture. First, he wrote that “to inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only make people behave to avoid it.”80 This was, after all, his basic premise in theorizing about the diplomacy of violence. Notwithstanding that such a construction neglects the existence of sociopaths who revel in inflicting harm, and who may inhabit high offices more frequently than we might like to acknowledge, there are a few things that are psychologically and biologically naive about this contention. Anyone who revels in another's misfortune or who feels the hormonal rush that follows winning a physical fight or intense competition knows that inflicting suffering on others can generate endogenous pleasure, particularly if those others have caused them harm. Almost all violence is perceived by the perpetrators to be virtuous, and individuals thus feel quite justified in attacking others whom they consider bad and blameworthy.81 The German word for this feeling is schadenfreude, which is well intuited by most. What is more, the physical rush that accompanies a victorious fight—even if verbal and not physical—is automatic, effortless, immediate, and endogenous.82 The feeling cannot be bought, nor can it be tamped down easily. Achieving dominance can trigger this strong biological rush. There are precious few other ways to produce it. Indeed, there is a long evolutionary history that sets people up for the cascade of positive internal feelings that follow successful combat. Victory feels great; defeat feels awful. Those who win like the feeling and want to fight again; those who lose are less inclined to try again.83 Those who have obtained victory often learn to like the taste of blood; one need only look at the difficulty of successfully reincorporating military personnel with long combat histories back into civilian society to see the downside of such reinforcement.84 Many who succeed at inflicting suffering become addicted to the experience.85", 'A rationalist approach to brinkmanship also fails to account for the perceived emotional and psychological, as well as material, values of retaliation, and the strong and instinctual drive for revenge against those who cause us harm. Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, and Peter Hatemi argue that “the human psychology of revenge explains why and when policymakers readily commit to otherwise apparently ‘irrational’ retaliation” such as that envisioned by second-strike nuclear forces.86 The psychology of vengeance underlies the stability of nuclear deterrence far more than a rational theory of the nuclear revolution appreciates.', "Policymakers have sometimes intuited the value of such revenge and anger in coercive bargaining. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the two Cold War superpowers traded threats of intervention and escalation, in reply to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's warning that “[Washington] would not accept Soviet troops in any guise” in the conflict, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin rejoined that in Moscow “they have become so angry, they want troops.”87 It was not material interest driving policy, he was suggesting, but emotion. Secretary of State James Baker also explicitly invoked emotion to deter Saddam Hussein from using chemical weapons in a 1991 meeting with Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Tariq Aziz. “If the conflict starts, God forbid, and chemical or biological weapons are used against our forces, the American people would demand vengeance,” Baker threatened.88 Whether or not they work, nuclear strategists have indeed often made these appeals to emotion in their threat-making. To bolster U.S. deterrence of biological warfare or cyberattacks against critical infrastructure (“significant non-nuclear strategic attacks”), John Harvey et al. write that “the American people would not seek to take any military option off the table in responding to such a catastrophic attack.”89 The anticipated emotions of domestic publics can tie the hands of leaders, in some cases to stabilizing effect.", 'Once force is used, however, emotions can quickly exhaust their strategic utility. In 1898, despite two successive presidential administrations attempting to avoid conflict with Spain, the destruction of the USS Maine in Havana harbor so angered the U.S. Congress that it chose war. President William McKinley later reflected that “but for the inflamed state of public opinion, and the fact that Congress could no longer be held in check, a peaceful solution might have been held.”90', "In war itself, these emotions can be taken to extremes. Wanton cruelty is a lamentably common occurrence in warfare, from Alexander the Great's siege of Tyre to the Pacific Islands of World War II.91 Alexander III of Macedon was said to have grown so angry at the duration of the siege of Tyre in 332 BC that he took vengeance on its occupants by allowing his Macedonian troops to “vent their fury at such a brutal siege upon those who survived;”92 Roman historian Quintus Curtius Rufus called Alexander's choice “an irrational temper tantrum.”93 In the words of Schelling, “any use of force tends to be brutal, thoughtless, vengeful, or plain obstinate.”94 For instance, depictions of the Crusaders breaching the walls of Jerusalem in 1099 describe how “pent up emotions found an outlet in murder, rape and plunder, which discipline [was] powerless to prevent.”95 In the nuclear era, these psychological patterns bear on the question of whether limited nuclear war can be terminated or whether, as we suggest, leaders are unlikely to succeed in escalating to deescalate and instead continue the use of nuclear weapons once instigated.", "A second way in which the theory of brinkmanship must better account for human psychology is in its observation of the value of irrationality. Schelling wrote, “Another paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself or of one's country.”96 Nevertheless, Schelling overall indicated that leaders are more influenced by a kind of cost-benefit analysis that privileges economic forms of decision-making; we argue instead that leaders tend to favor more psychological and emotional forces in their decision-making. Not all actors, even leaders, are always rational. Adolf Hitler provides the classic example; his hatred of the Jewish people led him to keep using the railroads to ship them to concentration camps, from the outskirts to the center, when it would have been much better for his military prospects, especially at the end of the war, to use that transport to ship men to the front, from the center out.97 Hitler is usually understood as an atypical leader but other examples abound. Vladimir Putin's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, especially his doubling down after the unprecedented sanctions imposed in its wake and the underperformance of the Russian military, would hardly seem [practical] rational from a cost-benefit perspective. But his actions appear more comprehensible when explained in terms of his view of his own role in Russian history.", "Additional work in psychology validates the notion that people weigh unpredictable threats more heavily in making decisions. For example, Paul Slovic notes the importance of risk perception in understanding the nature of the threats that humans confront. Specifically, he notes that people are most scared of so-called “dread” risks, those that feel uncontrollable or that appear to be harbingers of unpredictably worse things yet to come. The threat of climate change might easily fall into this category. Yet, Slovic specifically uses nuclear war as an example of an existential fear outside most people's control, helping to explain, at least in part, the dread associated with the risk.98 Next we explore these psychological consequences of unpredictability by distinguishing the mechanism of self-control from President Richard Nixon's infamous “madman theory.”99", 'how (and how not) to lose self-control: nixon the “madman”', "Schelling's notion of the rationality of irrationality rests on the idea that getting others to believe that one is irrational and might do something crazy or unpredictable may sometimes prove to be a rational strategy if it gets the adversary to back off or back down without a fight. President Donald Trump tried, unsuccessfully, to play this game with Kim Jung Un.100 It is a strategy designed to win without incurring the costs of fighting, if a leader can pull it off. In this way, irrationality operates as a kind of strategic manipulation.", "There are various ways that such a strategy might be pursued, and one of the most noteworthy is the so-called madman strategy. The madman approach can be understood as a subtype of Schelling's larger rationality of irrationality notion. The idea became famous because Nixon used it to try to drive the North Vietnamese leadership to the negotiating table during the Vietnam War. The most authoritative account comes from Nixon's White House Chief of Staff H. R. “Bob” Haldeman's memoirs:", "The threat was the key, and Nixon coined a phrase for his theory which I'm sure will bring smiles of delight to Nixon-haters everywhere. We were walking along a foggy beach after a long day of speech writing. He said, “I call it the Madman theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, ‘for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about Communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button’—and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.”101", 'Nixon complemented the strategy with a bomber alert meant to look like the United States was preparing for nuclear war. Operation Giant Lance tasked eighteen thermonuclear-armed B-52 bombers to fly toward Soviet airspace, turn at the last minute, and loiter in an oval pattern nearby.102 The mission also unleashed its share of accident risks, as one base used untrained crews to load the bombers while two B-52s “accidently flew so close to each other that a classified Strategic Air Command report later called the operation unsafe,” writes Sagan.103 Nixon in fact instructed Kissinger to “shake his head” in a meeting with the Soviet ambassador and say, “I am sorry Mr. Ambassador, but Nixon is out of control.”104 In this way, Nixon thought that he could game the Soviets and North Vietnamese by getting them to believe he was more irrational than he really was, or at least more than he believed himself to be.', "The strategy failed, however; and it failed in a way that illuminates the important role of perceptions of rationality or irrationality in brinkmanship. Nixon's threat failed because the North Vietnamese understood Nixon to be a manipulative, strategic actor. To them, Nixon was being crazy like a fox more than crazy like a loon. As Nguyen Co Thach—vice minister of foreign affairs and a top aide to Foreign Minister Le Duc Tho in his negotiations with Kissinger in Paris—later reported in an interview with Jeffrey Kimball, “he would like to show to the Vietnamese that he was a changeable [unpredictable] person, that he can surprise—how to say, a big stick surprise. But this backfired on Nixon, because we saw that Nixon could not have a big stick, because of the step-by-step withdrawal of American forces. That means the stick becomes smaller and smaller.”105 Meanwhile, Ambassador Dobrynin derived a similar inference from Nixon's attempt to appear unpredictable. Dobrynin took Nixon's behavior to indicate that Nixon was not, in fact, a strong leader.106", 'Despite its lack of success, Nixon employed this strategy widely, never fully backing down from it and continuing to believe that it would produce the diplomatic results that he desired. As Kimball writes:', "The madman theory lay at the heart of the president's strategy for dealing with foreign adversaries, such as North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This striking phrase, Haldeman reported, was Nixon's alternative name for the “principle of a threat of excessive force.” Nixon thought that military force was an essential component of diplomacy because of its coercive power, but its coercive power, he believed, could be enhanced if his opponents could be convinced that he was capable of or intent upon using extreme force, since this would suggest that he possessed one or more of the interrelated qualities of madness… . He meant to convey his supposed madness as irrationality, unpredictability, unorthodoxy, reckless risk-taking, obsession, and fury.107", "In these instances, Nixon incorrectly believed that he could control the other side's perception of him and thus manipulate chance itself. And, in the most crucial case of the North Vietnamese, he was wrong. His belief that he could trick the enemy into believing that he was unpredictable and irrational produced the exact opposite effect: it merely convinced them that he was completely in control and trying to manipulate them, causing resentment and blowback and making their opposition to him more entrenched. Ironically, because of his serious drinking, Nixon probably had less control of himself than either he or the North Vietnamese believed.108", "A leader's sense of his own agency in manipulating chance constitutes a central aspect of the mechanism of self-control. As Nixon feigned in his original madman bluff, he assumed that if the North Vietnamese believed he were “crazy,” they would fear that he could do anything, including to use nuclear weapons against them. He thought that this strategy would drive them to acquiesce to U.S. demands. He incorrectly believed that the North Vietnamese would give in if they thought that he had no reason to spare them.", "This assurance argument has been used to explain why a “madman's” threats, often expressed by personalist dictators, fail: such leaders are unpredictable, so they may punish their adversaries regardless of their behavior.109 If one side genuinely believes that the other is “crazy,” then it would have no reason to give in because it would not believe that the other side would cease hostilities if it were to submit. After all, one of the defining features of mental illness is its imperviousness to environmental input.110 If a target believes that no benefit can reliably follow from concession, but costs are certain, then there is no clear incentive to acquiescence. It stands to reason that successful threats that leave something to chance must function by a different mechanism than unpredictability because the target must believe that compliance would lead to benefit. In other words, the target must trust that the coercer is predictable enough to follow through on their commitment to cease hostilities if the target were to comply. That mechanism likely lies in the emotional domain of trust underappreciated by Schelling and ignored by most rational models of choice. Specifically, trust can secure what cannot be guaranteed, but it depends on a relationship that builds over time through iterated interactions of increasing value. This process takes time. Indeed, trust can take a long time to develop and can vanish in an instant.111 The trope suggests that when there is trust, agreements are unnecessary, and yet agreements cannot exist without some trust. Negotiations to revive a 2015 nuclear agreement to limit the Iranian nuclear program centered on the question of whether the United States would withdraw again and reimpose sanctions. But here again the key to success lies in the inversion: it is not merely the opponent's trustworthiness that matters for success but one's own as well. And this is where self-deception, as outlined by Trivers, can undermine decision-making.", 'how emotion complicates self-control', "Nixon's frequently quoted madman theory is explicitly emotional, suggesting that anger could trigger a vitriolic attack. Again, Haldeman says the message that Nixon wished to send was, “We can't restrain him [Nixon] when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button.”112 But this conception of the role of emotion in motivation and self-control conforms to the view that emotions are erratic, unpredictable, harmful, and detrimental. While this may sometimes be the case, more recent examinations of neuroscience based on brain lesion studies in particular demonstrate that emotions are necessary for any form of rational decision-making to take place.113", "Psychology offers two potential ways of squaring this circle between the role of emotion in arousal and the role of emotion in rationality. One way is along the lines posited by Daniel Kahneman's dual-process theory of cognition, in which he contrasts fast and slow forms of decision-making. In a crisis, because of time pressure, leaders are likely to disproportionately face decisions that require fast rather than slow thinking processes. Leaders do not have weeks or months to study and reflect on an issue before deciding on a response; instead, a leader under threat or attack must decide quickly, using intuition and instinct more than studied reflection. Fast processes rely disproportionately on emotion, although both types are prone to specific kinds of errors and biases.114", "The second answer relies on Antonio Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis, which argues that through developmental and other experiences, people learn to attach experiences to feelings without necessitating the consequent physiological arousal that typically accompanies strong emotions. In this way, emotion can convey meaning without the stress inherent in physiological arousal.115 Here, too, emotion guides decision-making, but it can lead individuals astray if the original association between experience and emotion rests on a dysfunctional experience. Consider the trauma of child abuse. Given how unfortunately common adverse childhood events are, the resulting and idiosyncratic biases are likely endemic. Abused children are much more likely to grow up to be in abusive relationships and abuse their own children; they have unfortunately come to associate certain forms of violence with love.", 'Thus, the effect of emotion on decision-making is nuanced and sometimes idiosyncratic. It does not operate in the way that a rational theory of brinkmanship would favor. Emotion is necessary to generate motivation;116 without it, people tend not to possess the will to expend energy and act. People only spend precious resources on things that they care about, and emotions dictate what people should care about if they are to maximize their chances for survival. Those instincts may not align with what classical economics suggest is “rational,” but they do rest on millennia of natural selection instilling instinctual tendencies that maximize the chances for survival over time. In this way, emotions that look irrational from a modern standpoint, such as the drive for status over wealth, may serve humans well in terms of survival and reproduction but may not be rational from an economic standpoint. For example, the best way to protect oneself from an enemy may in fact be to annihilate the entire group; that assures that future trouble from that adversary will not be forthcoming. This strategy indeed appears to have been common even in the early modern era.117 In the age of nuclear war, such a strategy becomes more dangerous, and threats that leave something to chance risk more widespread annihilation.', 'Finally, a satisfying theory of brinkmanship must account for the fact that different emotions trigger different perceptions of risk. For example, anger makes people more risk-seeking, and thus more likely to downplay the nature of the risks that they confront. It also makes them much more likely to believe that they will be victorious in a conflict, even if such a belief rests on pure overconfidence. Consider those who breached the U.S. Capitol during the insurrection of January 6, 2021. Many rioters became increasingly inflamed by the contagious anger apparent in the crowd, resulting in violent attacks against the Capitol Police, threats against members of Congress, and widespread destruction of property. One rioter, a former police officer himself who told authorities that he arrived at the Capitol with no intention of hurting his “brothers in blue,” nevertheless had “his angered state further inflamed by the crowds that day” and ended up committing some of the most violent attacks against the Capitol Police. His actions were so violent that he was one of the few arrested who were denied bond.118 Conversely, fearful people have more pessimistic risk assessments and thus prove more risk averse in their choices and behaviors.119 Gender differences emerge in these tendencies as well. For example, men are more prone to anger, which predicts more support for punitive political policies. In contrast, some studies find that women tend to be more fearful and are thus much more likely to support rehabilitative policies.120', 'Of course, leaders do not necessarily constitute representative members of the public. But the processes by which leaders are selected and self-select make them more, rather than less, prone to the kinds of biases that might affect their decision-making in negative ways. Traits such as [self-obsession] narcissism, for example, are more likely to emerge in this population than in other groups.121 These individuals are much more likely to exaggerate their own skill and sense of control. Such effects vary by person and some leaders are more susceptible to certain kinds of biases than others.122 Importantly, different kinds of leadership may call for different kinds of characteristics. For example, traits that might serve a military leader well might undermine the success of a political leader. General George S. Patton provides a good example of a successful military leader who could command loyalty from his personnel in ways that produced unprecedented feats of success, as when he marched the Third Army over 100 miles in the dead of winter to reinforce the Allies during the German assault on Bastogne. Yet Patton continually got into trouble with command because he failed to respect the political necessities of working in concert with the Soviets. Indeed, Dwight D. Eisenhower relieved Patton in part because of his aggressive statements about preventive war against the Soviet Union after the defeat of Germany.123', "These emotional mechanisms serve clear functions that often help facilitate productive and even enjoyable day-to-day lives. But they may also put leaders at risk for overestimating their self-control, underestimating the probability that chance might go against them, misperceiving their own and others’ abilities and intentions, and displaying overconfidence in their choices. Leaders may believe, like Nixon did with the North Vietnamese, that emotions can be used to generate leverage in bargaining. But such assessments are often wrong. This inability to recognize the effect of one's own behavior on another encourages leaders to underestimate the level of unpredictability that they create in generating chance and leverage. This misperception results precisely from their belief that they have more control than they do, and an overestimation of the effect of their behavior on others and their likelihood of victory in a contest of wills or armaments.", 'Emotions underpin motivation in useful ways. Yet, when leaders are narcissistic, lack emotional self-awareness or resilience, or fail to link their behavior to their best interests, certain emotions such as pride, shame, envy, anger, rejection, or hurt diminish the quality of decision-making. Deficits in emotional self-awareness and control result in the inability to make choices consistent with best interests. The consequence is not only numerous lost opportunities but increased risk of devastating outcomes.', 'Mechanism 3: Control of Others', "The third mechanism of brinkmanship is that of a decider losing control because others make the choice to escalate without the decider's input or knowledge. Here again there are two subcategories. First, Schelling identified mischief as a means of war onset. Someone else (perhaps irrational but he left that unsaid) makes the choice for war instead of the leader. When the authority or ability to escalate is shared among multiple actors, these risks increase. A leader may or may not be aware of having created these risks. For instance, nuclear command-and-control arrangements that pre-delegate to military commanders the authority to use nuclear weapons exacerbate these risks by introducing more vectors for others’ individual choices. And those individuals are just as susceptible to the irrational decision-making described in the prior section.", "Some might conceive of this risk as a principal-agent problem, whereby the principal loses control of an agent. In the military domain it has been more specifically theorized as a lack of civilian control over military forces.124 An overzealous local commander with the ability to use nuclear weapons fits the bill—a Dr. Strangelove scenario. But short of nuclear war, military commanders have routinely stretched the purview of their offensive missions beyond the authorization of civilian leaders—the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, General MacArthur's Yalu River bombing campaign in the Korean War, or the German Navy's submarine campaign during World War I all exceeded to some extent their operational intent.125 Indian commanders along the Line of Control in Kashmir have provoked skirmishes with Pakistani forces without approval or instruction from New Delhi.126 The extent of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's knowledge of military plans in advance of Pakistan's invasion of Kargil in 1999 is also debated.127", 'Even within military organizations, significant commands have been disobeyed or countermanded by individual leaders. Japanese General Tomoyuki Yamashita did not wish to commit troops to the defense of Manila in 1944, preferring instead to husband dwindling military resources for delaying actions in more favorable terrain. But local commander Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabach, whose sense of honor made him “determined to fight for Manila,” disobeyed the order to abandon the city and demolish the bridges.128 Superior Japanese officers had no choice but to support as best they could the doomed defense. Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal also gave clear instructions to Sir Arthur “Bomber” Harris in September 1944 to concentrate Royal Air Force bombers on oil and transportation targets in Nazi Germany. Harris refused and continued with his effort to turn German cities into rubble.129', "The second subcategory is limited war as a generator of risk. Although it stretches our scope conditions,130 we place this mechanism into the category of controlling others because deciders may be fully in control of their own forces, while the element of chance lies in the possibility that they could unknowingly cross one of the adversary's red lines; and deciders may not even give sufficient weight to the probability that their actions may do so. The choice to escalate further in response now rests with the enemy. Indeed, this last subcategory of limited war overlaps with all the others, since each mechanism discussed in this article might operate in the context of limited war and increase the chances of an irrational choice to escalate.", 'Schelling considered limited nuclear war as brinkmanship in this way.131 Deliberately crossing the nuclear threshold demonstrates resolve, even if not enough resolve to jump off the cliff completely. The initial use of limited nuclear force is conceived of by the escalator as rational. In terms of the mountaineering analogy, one climber intentionally jumps down to a lower ledge (as opposed to falling by accident), dragging the other climber with them. But just because one climber jumped to a lower ledge and dragged the other down does not necessarily make inevitable the second jump into the abyss to doom them both. The first use of a nuclear weapon does not automatically lead to strategic nuclear exchange; it is merely an action that is deliberately risky.', "Limited war can generate leverage by giving the adversary the “last clear chance” to avoid disaster. It surrenders choice to others.132 President Kennedy conceived of limited war in this way during the 1961 Berlin crisis. In October, he penned instructions to Supreme Allied Commander Lauris Norstad in which he explained, “It seems evident to me that our nuclear deterrent will not be credible to the Soviets unless they are convinced of NATO's readiness to become engaged on a lesser level of violence and are thereby made to realize the great risks of escalation to nuclear war.”133 Actions could include conventional air operations to “show the Soviets visibly higher risks of nuclear war,” and “selective nuclear attacks for the primary purpose of demonstrating the will to use nuclear weapons.” In giving these instructions, Kennedy fully acknowledged that “the Allies only partially control the timing and scale of nuclear weapons use,” since brinkmanship might “prompt unrestrained pre-emptive attack.”134", "Moreover, limited war as brinkmanship need not exclusively involve the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese brinkmanship strategies, for instance, have explicitly relied on nonnuclear assets—conventional missiles, space, and cyber assets—to posture to fight limited wars and place the “last clear chance” to avoid nuclear escalation onto the adversary.135 Inadvertent escalation also fits into this category, as conventional force can risk a nuclear response if it degrades the adversary's nuclear forces.136", "Within the mechanism of control over others, again, the role of emotion can calibrate motivation differently for those at the center versus those at the periphery of a fight, as indeed occurred with Nixon, the Soviet Union, and the North and South Vietnamese governments. Sometimes the enemy gets a vote that leaders did not plan for. The Battle of Navarino in 1827, for instance, began when an allied fleet comprised of British, French, and Russian vessels intended to conduct a naval demonstration in Navarino Bay, but “the enraged Turks” fired upon it.137 Other times leaders lose control of their own militaries. In 1576, angry Spanish soldiers who had not been paid by their bankrupt king, Philip II, pillaged the city of Antwerp, a massacre that so enraged the Low Countries that they put aside their divisions to unite against the invaders, undermining a decade of Spanish strategy in the Eighty Years’ War.138 And military commanders sometimes even find it useful to create such risks by stirring up emotions in combat and crisis, as Henry V does in Schelling's favorite passage from Shakespeare's play, rallying his soldiers to “conjure up the blood” and “disguise fair nature with hard-favour'd rage.”139", "The British also suffered this lesson in the context of alliance politics at the 1757 surrender of Fort William Henry during the Seven Years’ War. Commanding British officers responsible for the 2,300-person garrison reached terms of surrender with French General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm and readied a retreat to nearby Fort Edward. Outside the walls, however, British columns were harassed by France's multi-tribal indigenous allies, resulting in dozens of casualties. The “massacre,” thereafter embellished in British and then U.S. lore,140 was later used to justify vicious retaliations against indigenous peoples. But rather than a coordinated deception, the bloody morning of August 10, 1757, was the result of a chaotic disagreement between the French and their allies over the legitimacy of British surrender. Indigenous warriors, who had canoed hundreds of miles to join the fight for no other compensation than the plunders of war, felt betrayed and robbed of their earned spoils.141 “They could not fathom French behavior in wasting their victory and protecting their enemies from their allies,” writes historian Ian Steele. “They resented the European conspiracy, which had defrauded them of their agreed share of the loot in the fort.”142 Coordination between French officers and tribal chiefs had always been fitful.143 Indeed, Montcalm knew the risks and sought to use them to his advantage in bargaining over the fort's surrender. “Once [the French] batteries were in place and the cannon fired, perhaps there would not be time, nor would it be in [my] power to restrain the cruelties of the mob of Indians of so many different nations,” wrote Montcalm to the British defenders of the fort.144 Still, the British resisted for one more week. When they finally surrendered, they believed Montcalm's assurances of safe passage. But Montcalm's attempt to convey the terms of surrender to assembled chiefs and translators clearly failed. During the British retreat, a chaotic scuffle culminated in short-lived but brutal violence after someone let loose a “dreaded war whoop that was an intertribal signal to attack.”145 The French lost control.", 'Conclusion', 'By distinguishing between “chance” and “choice,” this article elevates the long-hidden psychological and emotional elements that remain central to a more comprehensive understanding of brinkmanship and the “threat that leaves something to chance” in nuclear crises. We have brought to the study of nuclear strategy what decades of psychological research have to say about how humans are likely to behave during a “war of nerves,” as Schelling explicitly called brinkmanship.146', 'We distilled three mechanisms for how chance becomes leverage in crisis: accidents, self-control, and control of others. Critically, these sources of chance do not have to wrest choice away from leaders in crises to generate leverage. Psychological and emotional variables are sources of risk and uncertainty, even when leaders retain the option to use nuclear weapons. The brink is not equally abhorrent to all leaders in all crises. Said another way, the point of decision does not have to be eliminated for risk of catastrophic destruction to remain. This is because leaders cannot always accurately assess the chances that they take, the extent to which they can control outcomes, or their ability to force concessions on the part of opponents. They are uncertain if the other side will actually do what it says, and they cannot know if they properly understand the signals that they receive. That both sides do not, and cannot, know if the other side is telling the truth raises uncertainty for everyone. Heightened emotions exacerbate this uncertainty. The structure of the situation imposes uncertainty and instability and inevitable human emotional responses to threat enhance and strengthen these effects. In short, crises are even more unstable than the traditional theory of brinkmanship posits.', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-PhJo-Aff-5---Long-Beach-Round-4.docx

Minnesota

PhJo

60107a8a25a9f3e6184ccbe763a590e823cfb0d93b9c9ba970eb752c577ca2e6

Rights of Nature have been successful in the US

Nicholson 20, is a Pennsylvania Community Organizer for the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund. (Chad, 3-25-2020, “Breaking: Rights of Nature Law Forces Pennsylvania to Revoke Industry Permit,” CELDF, https://celdf.org/2020/03/press-release-rights-of-nature-law-forces-pennsylvania-to-revoke-industry-permit/)

In a reversal the DEP revoked a permit for a frack waste injection well residents adopted a Home Rule Charter The Charter bans wells and recognizes rights of nature This decision vindicates resistance that communities have engaged in to force governmental agencies into doing the right thing

In a reversal the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection ( DEP ) revoked a permit for a frack waste injection well officials cited Grant Township’s Home Rule Charter Township residents popularly adopted a Home Rule Charter The Charter bans injection wells as a violation of the rights of those living in the township and recognizes rights of nature This decision vindicates the resistance that communities like Grant have engaged in to force governmental agencies into doing the right thing

a reversal DEP frack waste injection well Home Rule Charter recognizes rights of nature force governmental agencies

['GRANT TOWNSHIP, INDIANA COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA: In an extraordinary reversal, last week, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) revoked a permit for a frack waste injection well in Grant Township. DEP officials cited Grant Township’s Home Rule Charter banning injection wells as grounds for their reversal.', 'Injection wells are toxic sewers for the fracking industry that cause earthquakes, receive radioactive waste, and threaten drinking water and ecosystems. ', 'Township residents popularly adopted a Home Rule Charter (local constitution) in 2015 that contains a “Community Bill of Rights.” The Charter bans injection wells as a violation of the rights of those living in the township and recognizes rights of nature. The Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund (CELDF) assisted in drafting the Charter.', 'In 2017, DEP issued a permit to legalize an injection well in Grant, and simultaneously sued the township. The agency claimed that Grant’s Home Rule Charter – which protects the local environment – interfered with the DEP’s authority to administer state oil and gas policy.', 'Yet, in a stunning about-face, DEP enforced Grant’s law and rescinded the injection well permit, last week. “Grant Township’s Home Rule Charter bans the injection of oil and gas waste fluids,” the DEP writes. “Therefore, the operation of the Yanity well as an oil and gas waste fluid injection well would violate that applicable law.”', 'Since 2014, Township residents have faced a variety of intimidation tactics, including lawsuits, from the corporation behind the injection well (Pennsylvania General Energy), the oil and gas industry, and their own state government and agencies. They have not backed down, even in the face of potential municipal bankruptcy. They have continued to assert and protect their community’s rights. ', '“We are over the moon that the permit was rescinded,” said Grant Township Supervisor Vice-Chair Stacy Long. “However, we know the permit should never have been issued in the first place. We can’t forget that DEP sued us for three years, claiming our Charter was invalid. Now they cite that same Charter as a valid reason to deny the industry a permit. It’s hypocritical at best. Add this to the pile of reasons Grant Township did not trust the DEP to protect our environment, and why we’ve had to democratically work at the local level to protect our community.” ', '“This decision does not validate the actions of the DEP, but rather vindicates the resistance that communities like Grant have engaged in to force governmental agencies into doing the right thing,” says CELDF Pennsylvania Organizer Chad Nicholson. “DEP has been acting in bad faith. I’m glad they revoked the permit. But it took them too long to do what all governments should be doing: enforcing democratically-enacted local laws that protect public health and safety.” ', 'Grant Township is aware that the industry and/or state agencies, such as DEP, may sue them again. As of today, there is no injection well in Grant Township.']

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ndtceda

Kansas-PaSe-Aff-6---Brick-City-Round-Robin-Round-4.docx

Kansas

PaSe

6fd78adf419f54f033dfcad021c93d9a989976211794845b12a92dcd60ba7b12

Commitment trap collapses the alliance. Deterrence failure is inevitable.

zum Felde ’22 [Rainer; Senior Fellow @ ISPK; “What a Military Alliance Between Russia and China Would Mean for NATO,” in Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?, Springer, p. 245-266; AS]

Russia could attack on large scale take Tallinn in days reinforcements lack rapid formations NATO would need months consensus difficult to achieve once territories occupied some prefer appeasement risk of NATO losing unity higher group led by US could liberate Baltic s difficult to operate without movement would mean victory for Russia and end of NATO

risk of current NATO posture Russia could attack on a large scale from day one rather than little green men Russian troops could take Riga , Vilnius , Tallinn Warsaw or Bucharest in two days NATO’s reinforcements could not deny due to a lack of rapid ly available and combat capable larger formations In case of a invasion and occupation of Baltic states’ and Poland NATO would need to prepare over months for counterattack This is NATO’s most vulnerable “ Achilles heel The problem with NATO’s current responsiveness concept is that it can be undermined by Russia at this stage Politically consensus in NATO decision-making may be difficult to achieve once territories of some allies have already been occupied and NATO’s initial operations to defend failed some member states might prefer appeasement and could argue escalation must be avoided the North Atlantic Council might fail to agree when authoriz counter-attack Once exposed allied countries were occupied risk of NATO losing unity and resolve is higher a group of NATO nations led by the US A could still conduct a large counterattack to liberate the Baltic s or Poland However in case of an “ opting out by allies in central Europe it would be difficult for a coalition of the willing to operate without freedom of movement Losing political unity among the 30 NATO allies would mean final victory for Russia in war and the end of NATO as an alliance

NATO posture large scale little green men Riga Vilnius Tallinn Warsaw Bucharest two days reinforcements rapid ly available combat capable invasion occupation prepare over months Achilles heel undermined Politically difficult to achieve already been occupied NATO’s initial operations appeasement escalation North Atlantic Council fail to agree counter-attack occupied NATO unity resolve group of NATO nations US A large counterattack liberate Baltic s Poland opting out central Europe coalition of the willing freedom of movement political unity 30 NATO allies final victory war end of NATO as an alliance

['However, the risk of this (for political reasons intentionally moderate) current NATO posture is the possibility that Russia could—counter to expectations—attack on a large scale with large conventional formations from day one, rather than in a hybrid manner with non-attributable “little green men” only. In this case, Russian troops, reportedly according to Putin, “could take Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest in two days.” 19 This is what NATO’s in-place forces and reinforcements such as the VJTF and NRF could not deny, due to a lack of rapidly available and combat capable heavy larger formations for initial defensive operations. In case of a large-scale military invasion and occupation of Baltic states’ territory and parts of Poland, NATO would need to prepare over some weeks or even months for a largescale, high intensity counterattack in order to reconquer lost territory and restore the status quo ante, i.e. territorial integrity of all its member states. This is NATO’s most vulnerable “Achilles heel.” The operational and political problem with NATO’s current responsiveness and reinforcement concept is that it can be undermined by Russia at this stage, both politically and operationally. Politically, consensus in NATO decision-making may be difficult to achieve once the territories of some allies have already been occupied and NATO’s initial operations to defend them have failed. In such a situation, some member states might prefer appeasement and could argue that “the problem can never be solved by military means” and that “only diplomacy, sanctions and dialogue could end the war.” In case of nuclear coercion by Russia, the argument will be made that “although the aggression and landgrab was terrible, illegal and will never be acceptable, an escalation toward nuclear war must be avoided under any circumstances.” Fertile ground for “opting out” must be taken into account particularly in member states whose political leaders are driven by a pacifist mainstream thinking within their societies and that do not want to suffer similar physical destruction as the media will report from the frontline states during wartime. Given the fact that political control by the North Atlantic Council over NATO military authorities also continues in wartime and does not end with the outbreak of hostilities, the possibility cannot be excluded that the North Atlantic Council might fail to agree when SACEUR requests authorization for preparing and launching a large-scale counter-attack operation. Once exposed allied countries were occupied, the risk of NATO losing its unity and resolve is higher, the longer it takes to assemble and deploy the bulk of its (i.e. in essence America’s) air, land and naval forces for a large-scale counterattack. At the operational level, a group of NATO nations led by the USA could still conduct a large counterattack operation to liberate e.g. the Baltic states or Poland from a Russian occupation. However, e.g., in case of an “opting out” by Germany and/or other allies in central Europe, it would be difficult for such a remaining “coalition of the willing” to successfully operate without freedom of movement in their rear area. It is to be hoped that the turnaround in Germany’s defense policy announced by Chancellor Scholz in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will reduce the risk of such a scenario.', 'In the geopolitical situation since 2014, where NATO’s possible adversary in wartime was assumed to be an isolated Russia, this political and operational risk of NATO’s responsiveness concept has been assessed as manageable due to a rather low probability of the above-described worst case. However, in case Russia enjoys military and political backing by China and perhaps also substantial support through common hybrid activities against NATO across Europe, the risk of NATO being defeated in its initial defensive operations and consequently losing its political unity and resolve is significantly higher. The consequence of this political and operational vulnerability is that an emerging military alliance between Russia and China would call for a different approach for the defense of Northeastern Europe. With such a revised or alternative approach, NATO would need to avoid a situation in which NATO’s initial defense operations on the ground would come to a preliminary end, followed over weeks or even months by a pause for building-up the forces for a large counterattack operation. Losing its “center of gravity,” i.e. political unity and resolve among the 30 NATO allies and operational partners would then mean final victory for Russia in such a war, and probably also the end of NATO as an alliance.20']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-ShVe-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-5.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

f7dac72ea8bda575e6beab2ead3d8180d02428c220c23a0218b41259de5ce4e3

Enlightenment thought is necessary to solve fascism---bad faith references to ideas doesn’t invalidate the principles of inclusiveness and humanity BUT the aff’s opposition to legal rights makes oppressive systems inevitable.

Ishay Landa 19. Associate Professor of modern history at the Israeli Open University, in Ra’anana. The Magic of the Extreme: On Fascism, Modernity, and Capitalism, The Journal of Holocaust Research, 33:1, 43-63, DOI: 10.1080/23256249.2019.1553539

we are advised pessimist resignation this critical tradition is questionable distinguish between modernity’ a project grounded in equality and humanism’ and ‘the modern historical period modernity characterized by inclusive dynamic working to disturb hierarchies modern history is no unified whole the view of modernity as irredeemably corrupt cannot discern change such views fall into resignation egalitarianism helps us question atrocities sustained anti-colonial movements championed de mocracy , and fuelled resistance to Western aggression While exploiters had recour se to Enlightenment discourse these should be taken with a grain of salt the Enlightenment criticize fascism fascism was the executioner of modernity as egalitarianism rights and international The fascist commit to terminating progressive modernity

does fascism discredit modernity can modernity be said to have been worth the candle? theories see fascism as symbiotic with modernity , irretrievably implicated in its logic To Adorno The enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant Agamben’s theory of biopolitics according to which Nazism is the modern state Another critic Traverso Both the atomic bomb and the Nazi camps were part of “the civilizing process,” From such a vantage point, modernity and the Enlightenment legacy emerge w ith little credit left and we are advised to abandon in search of alternatives, whether and pessimist resignation or liquid modernity this criticism seems strong fascists referenced these bloody ventures in justifying their scramble for Africa or the United States’ treatment of the North American Indians Yet, on closer examination this critical tradition reveals many flaws and lacunae it is highly questionable whether the misdeeds of the West can be attributed to ‘modernity’ they instead constitute an attack on modernity following Beck and Cannon, it is useful to distinguish between ‘ modernity’ ‘ a project grounded in democracy, equality and humanism’ and ‘the modern age,’ the historical period For Beck, modernity and modernization are characterized by an expansive and inclusive dynamic , which he sees as intrinsically dialogic working to disturb hierarchies Counter-modernity is exclusionary that seeks to arrest this egalitarian thrust re-est ablish old patterns this alternative conceptualization allows for a discriminating analysis of modern history in which it is no l onger seen as a unified whole whose logic needs to be exposed and its achievements interrogated until one finds the sinister ‘shadow’ it casts The modern age is grasped as a dynamic period vectors are seen to be at cross-purposes This can explain historical change as resulting from conflict thus calling for political intervention and ag ency the view of modernity as irredeemably corrupt cannot discern any possibility of change such views can fall into d ejection and resignation In the theory of fascism as mo dernity nothing is salvageable in the theory of fascism as counter-modern, a fierce struggle is underway ever ything is up for grabs Stressing the nor mative egalitarianism and inclusiveness helps us question the way it is routinely held accountable for atrocities Post-colonial discourse has accustomed us to think of imperialism , colonialism , and racism as byproducts of the Enlightenment with its cults of reason and progress Yet the ‘Black Book of the West’ will be replete with enormities that were committed prior to the Enlightenment independently of it or in blatant opposition to its principles the normative content of modernity h as sustained anti-colonial movements across the globe that have championed national independence , de mocracy , and human rights , as well as fuelled resistance to Western aggression While conquerors and exploiters have had recour se to the Enlightenment discourse these avowals should be taken with a grain of salt doing something in the name of X using it as a convenient veneer is not the same as doing it because of X in sincere adherence to its intrinsic principles reckless military interventions in foreign countries can be justified by humanity But few would make the case that such cynical use truly stems from these values let alone that such use and abuse deprives them of their general normative worth or renders them invalid as sociopolitical goals . when interrogated after the war, in 1947, and asked to account for complicity Schmitt could blithely retort, ‘Christianity also resulted in the murder of millions of people,’ trying to blur the distinction between an ideal used to justify misdeeds and his own, intrinsically murderous , Nazi creed. this is a distinction – between ‘in the name of X’ and ‘because of X’ – that many critics of modernity, progress, and the Enlightenment neglect to make Schmitt’s keenness to cast aspersion on progressive ideals such as human rights and portray them as oppressive was matched by his efforts to clear the reputation of inherently oppressive historical projects such as European colonialism he argued against the ‘propagandistic’ taboo placed by both the liberal West and the communist East on ‘colonialism.’ the Enlightenment can be used to criticize fascism fascism represented an attack on the Enlightenment The Dialectic of Enlightenment mistakenly attributes ‘to the Enlightenment what was in fact the product of Germany’s particular misery Germany did not suffer from too much reason, too much liberalism, too much Enlightenment, but rather from not enough of any of them Departing from fascism for its political and ideological substance reveals that it was proud of its role as the executioner of modernity , seen as a process of destructive egalitarianism , abstract rights , and international brotherhood The fascist consciously counter-Enlightenment was articulated in Mussolini in a radio broadcast in 1933, shortly after the installation of Nazism in power Goebbels declared 1789 is eradicated from history The fascist commit ment to terminating progressive modernity attained symbolic representation

theories see fascism as symbiotic with modernity Both the atomic bomb and the Nazi camps were part of “the civilizing process,” abandon in search of alternatives, whether pessimist resignation or liquid modernity Yet, on closer examination this critical tradition reveals many flaws and lacunae attributed to ‘modernity’ attack on modernity ‘ modernity’ ‘ a project grounded in democracy, equality and humanism’ and ‘the modern age,’ modernity and modernization inclusive dialogic working to disturb hierarchies Counter-modernity is exclusionary re-est ablish old patterns no l onger seen as a unified whole achievements interrogated dynamic period This can explain historical change conflict political intervention ag ency irredeemably corrupt cannot discern any possibility of change d ejection resignation nothing is salvageable ever ything is up for grabs nor mative egalitarianism inclusiveness imperialism colonialism racism Enlightenment prior to the Enlightenment independently of it or in blatant opposition to its principles anti-colonial movements across the globe national independence de mocracy human rights resistance to Western aggression taken with a grain of salt in the name of X is not the same as doing it because of X in sincere adherence to its intrinsic principles But few would make the case that such cynical use truly stems from these values general normative worth invalid as sociopolitical goals intrinsically murderous inherently oppressive historical projects such as European colonialism the Enlightenment can be used to criticize fascism mistakenly attributes ‘to the Enlightenment what was in fact the product of Germany’s particular misery not suffer from too much reason, too much liberalism, too much Enlightenment, but rather from not enough of any of them modernity egalitarianism rights international The fascist consciously counter-Enlightenment Goebbels declared 1789 is eradicated from history terminating progressive modernity

['Modernity and the modern age', 'Let us begin the discussion with a question that, whether explicitly stated or merely implied, seems to underlie many of the studies appraising the relationship of fascism1 and modern history: does the lesson of fascism discredit modernity? In the light of fascism – or rather, in the darkness that its trauma has spread – can the game of modernity be said to have been worth the candle? This is especially true, of course, of the theories that see fascism as symbiotic with modernity, irretrievably implicated in its logic. Many members of the Frankfurt School, notably, were convinced that fascism, far from representing an aberration or a caesura, was a fitting and logical culmination of modern history, the product of the perverse dialectic of Enlightenment.', 'To Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, fascism testified not to the defeat of the Enlightenment by external forces, but to its immanent insolvency. ‘The fully enlightened earth,’ they programmatically stated in 1944, ‘radiates disaster triumphant.’ 2 Taking his cue partly from such theorizations, Zygmunt Bauman reached similar conclusions, arguing that the most horrid fruit of the fascist era, the Holocaust, was in no meaningful sense counter-modern, but rather ‘a legitimate resident in the house of modernity,’ 3 an offshoot of some of modernity’s trademark innovations, including instrumental rationality, a neutralization of natural morality, and the modern, omnipotent, bureaucratic state. Comparable, too, is Giorgio Agamben’s influential theory of biopolitics, according to which Nazism is seen as usefully disclosing the latent tendency of the modern state for total domination, blatantly bringing what is normally concealed into the open: ‘From this perspective, the [Nazi] camp—as the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space…—will appear as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize.’ 4 Another critic, Enzo Traverso, took issue with Norbert Elias’ theory of the civilizing process as an essentially benign evolution. ‘Both the atomic bomb and the Nazi camps were part of “the civilizing process,”’ he insisted, ‘not a countertendency or an aberration.’ 5 From such a vantage point, modernity and the Enlightenment legacy emerge with little credit left, and we are advised to abandon their trail altogether in search of alternatives, whether in the form of postmodernism and post-Enlightenment, ‘negative dialectics,’ pessimist resignation, neo-religious solace, or – in Bauman’s somewhat more constructive suggestion – ‘liquid modernity.’ 6', 'On the face of it, this line of criticism seems to be very strong. The history of the West is undeniably a history of violence. It comprises many imperialistic projects, some of which were genocidal. Moreover, fascists referenced these bloody ventures in justifying their own expansionism and belligerence. Italian fascists considered it the right of their country, a young and deprived ‘proletarian nation’ 7 that was long discriminated against, to join the scramble for Africa alongside the Western powers, while German fascists often expressly emulated the example set by other nations, be it the British Empire,8 the Turkish genocide,9 or the United States’ treatment of the North American Indians.10 It is certainly futile to deny that fascists were in many ways avid pupils of Western history, embracing and capitalizing on many of the innovations and attributes of Western civilization, from advanced technology to scientifically grounded xenophobia.', 'Yet, on closer examination of its claims, this critical tradition reveals many flaws and lacunae. First of all, it is highly questionable whether, and to what extent, the misdeeds of the West can be attributed to ‘modernity’ when one can argue that they instead constitute an attack on modernity. Here, following sociologists Ulrich Beck and Bob Cannon, it is useful to distinguish between ‘modernity’–‘a normative project grounded in democracy, equality and humanism’ 11 – and ‘the modern age,’ the historical period in which the project of modernity has had to contend with the fierce resistance put up by both pre-modern and newly emerging counter-modern social forces, movements, and ideologies. For Beck, modernity and modernization are characterized by an expansive and inclusive dynamic, which he sees as intrinsically dialogic, ironic, and self-ironic, working to disturb and unsettle old certainties and hierarchies. Counter-modernity, by contrast, is marked by an exclusionary disposition that seeks to arrest this egalitarian thrust, re-establish old patterns, or ossify newly created ones.12', 'One of the great merits of this alternative conceptualization is that it allows for a discriminating analysis of modern history in which it is no longer seen as a unified whole, whose supposed (insidious) logic needs to be exposed, and each of its achievements interrogated until one finds the sinister ‘shadow’ it casts. The modern age is grasped, rather, as a contradictory and dynamic period, in which different vectors are seen to be at cross-purposes. This is a view that can explain historical change, for better and worse, as resulting from conflict and opposition, thus calling for political intervention and agency; the view of modernity as irredeemably corrupt, by contrast, cannot discern any such dynamism or possibility of change, using terminology that excludes contradiction and evolution. ‘The shadow cast by,’ ‘the other side of the coin,’ and ‘the dark side of,’ are all turns of phrase that betray a fundamental quietism and explain the facility with which exponents of such views can fall into dejection and resignation. In the theory of fascism as the truth of modernity, nothing is salvageable; in the theory of fascism as counter-modern, a fierce struggle is underway, and everything is up for grabs.13', 'Stressing the normative egalitarianism and inclusiveness of modernity14 also helps us question the way it is routinely held accountable for the numerous atrocities of the modern age. Post-colonial discourse has accustomed us to think of imperialism, colonialism, and racism as byproducts of the Enlightenment with its cults of reason and progress, its philosophical hubris of perfectionism and mastery of nature, and its universalistic zeal, supposedly rendering it oppressive vis-à-vis the non-European Other. Yet the (still-to-bewritten) ‘Black Book of the West’ will be replete with enormities that were committed prior to the Enlightenment, independently of it, or in blatant opposition to its principles. Furthermore, the normative content of modernity has sustained anti-colonial movements across the globe that have championed national independence, democracy, and human rights, as well as fuelled resistance to Western aggression.15', 'While it is true that in many cases conquerors and exploiters have had recourse to the Enlightenment discourse of progress and amelioration, these avowals should be taken with a grain of salt. We often forget that doing something in the name of X – using it as a convenient veneer and pretext – is not the same as doing it because of X – in sincere adherence to its intrinsic principles and in defensible implementation of its logic. For example, reckless military interventions in foreign countries – with the real goal of geopolitical gains and control over vital resources – can be justified, as they often indeed are, by invoking such hallowed tenets as democracy, humanity, or even women’s rights. But few would make the case that such cynical use truly stems from a principled adherence to these values, let alone that such use and abuse deprives them of their general normative worth or renders them invalid as sociopolitical goals.', 'It is significant that fascists were often keen to point out the self-serving employment of noble ideals on the part of their rivals. Thus, Carl Schmitt has astutely observed, ‘When the word “humanity” is heard, the elites discharge their bombs and the masses look for a shelter.’ 16 Such observations, approached phenomenologically, are sadly not without objective merit; however, the crucial point is that Schmitt’s aim here is not to discredit political cynicism and discursive mendacity (both of which he, in fact, considered both inevitable and venerable17), but to suggest that the ideal of human rights itself is empty, indeed pernicious. Similarly, when interrogated after the war, in 1947, and asked to account for his complicity in a regime that murdered millions of people, Schmitt could blithely retort, ‘Christianity also resulted in the murder of millions of people,’ 18 trying to blur the distinction between an ideal that has been used to justify misdeeds and his own, intrinsically murderous, Nazi creed. Regrettably, this is a distinction – between ‘in the name of X’ and ‘because of X’ – that many critics of modernity, progress, and the Enlightenment neglect to make. To complete the picture, one may add that Schmitt’s keenness to cast aspersion on progressive ideals such as human rights and portray them as oppressive was matched by his efforts to clear the reputation of inherently oppressive historical projects such as European colonialism. Writing in 1959, for example, he lamented the fact ‘that today there are Europeans who beg forgiveness for the heroic deeds of their ancestors’ and argued against the ‘propagandistic’ taboo placed by both the liberal West and the communist East on ‘colonialism.’ 19', 'Fascism as counter-modern', 'Bearing in mind the distinction between modernity and the modern age facilitates a more discriminating analysis of the place of fascism in modern history. As critics of the Frankfurt School have pointed out, its leading exponents were strangely reluctant to consider either the many, and rather obvious ways, in which the Enlightenment can be used to criticize fascism or the equally evident ways in which fascism represented an attack on the Enlightenment. Jeffrey Herf underlined both of these blind spots in his study of ‘reactionary modernism.’ The Dialectic of Enlightenment, he complained, mistakenly attributes ‘to the Enlightenment what was in fact the product of Germany’s particular misery. Germany did not suffer from too much reason, too much liberalism, too much Enlightenment, but rather from not enough of any of them.’ 20 Other authors have provided incisive criticisms of the formalistic bias of Zygmunt Bauman’s analysis, which has focused on the universal attributes of the Holocaust, such as the use of bureaucracy and the impersonality of modern politics, while leaving well-nigh unaddressed the specificities of Nazi ideology and its vehement rejection of normative modernity and the Enlightenment as a progressive force.21', 'Departing from formalism and interrogating fascism for its political and ideological substance reveals that it was proud of its role as the executioner of modernity, seen as a process of destructive egalitarianism, abstract rights, and international brotherhood. The fascist consciously counter-Enlightenment sense of mission was articulated, for example, in an important article published some eight months before the March on Rome, in which Benito Mussolini predicted that the triumph of the right over the left, epitomized by his Black Shirts, would attain lasting status. He was confident that the ‘couple of years of the immediate postwar period, in which the orientation to the left had reached its apex, had been the last years in the chain forged in 1789.’ 22 More programmatically still, in a radio broadcast in 1933, shortly after the installation of Nazism in power, Joseph Goebbels declared, ‘The year 1789 is hereby eradicated from history.’ 23 The fascist commitment to terminating the project of progressive modernity attained symbolic representation in the care taken by many fascist or semi-fascist regimes to replace the tripartite motto of the French Revolution, ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité,’ with reactionary and authoritarian alternatives such the ‘Credere, Obbedire, Combattere’ of Italian fascism, the ‘Deus, Pátria e Familia’ of Salazar’s Portugal, and the ‘Travail, famille, patrie’ of the Vichy regime.', '']

[(6, 11), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

Emory-BePa1-Neg-Georgetown-Round-7.docx

Emory

BePa1

10cd0ca6b89f61cb5c47858560ed637814a5b85d94292e7ed7e9a0da7756515f

Neither Newtonian linearity NOR the staticness of Middle Passage blackness can explain Blackness’ social formation: democratic struggle is the best conception, avoiding the incorrect notion of unstoppable progress while also avoiding totalizations of social demarcation. If Blackness should “speak on it’s own forms” that subject should be geared NOT towards physics but political mobilization.

Kelley 17, Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from , dml transcribed, recut: 1:57:36-2:02:56)

not everything is about , or in response to , white supremacy social formation may be structured in dominance but not defined by totality structured by enslavement thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment to even admit human beings could be property give white supremacy too much credit treat slavery , Jim Crow and mass incarceration as the same thing denies that these systems are distinct historically specific , and responses to the weakness of a racial regime Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic upsurge after slavery a huge gap between the end of Reconstruction and rise of Jim Crow 25 years of democratic possibility and struggle same with mass incarceration upward swing with responses to the 60s if we don't acknowledge that we end up thinking white supremacy that's unchanging , fixed , and so powerful we can't do anything White supremacy is fragile weak Racial regimes always shore themselves up because they're unstable system give the impression it is so powerful yet it’s working overtime to respond to our opposition

I don't always recognize that black politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy not everything is about , or in response to , white supremacy it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of social formation , community building may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it Cedric totality structured by enslavement and dispossession but one in which western hegemony didn't work modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property , to even admit that human beings could be property we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery , Jim Crow and mass incarceration as the reinstantiation of the same thing , the continuation , that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct , that they are historically specific , and in fact they’re responses to the weakness of this as a racial regime Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic upsurge after slavery a revolution of Reconstruction It was a way to try to suppress that That's why there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching you've had 13 , 14 , 15 , 20 , 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle . The same thing with mass incarceration —yes, we've had incarceration, but that upward swing has a lot to do with , again, responses to the struggles in the 19 60s if we don't acknowledge that what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging , fixed , and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite . White supremacy is fragile . White supremacy is weak . Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable We can't see it because the whole system is to give us the impression that it is so powerful , there's no space out . And yet it’s working overtime to respond to our opposition

structured defined not everything is about in response to simply not true social formation community building structured in dominance not defined by it totality structured by enslavement dispossession western hegemony didn't work refusal to be property even admit that human beings could be property way too much credit slavery Jim Crow mass incarceration reinstantiation of the same thing continuation denies the fact actually distinct historically specific responses weakness not the continuation of slavery response to the Black Democratic upsurge huge gap 13 14 15 20 25 years democratic possibility struggle same thing with mass incarceration upward swing responses don't acknowledge that unchanging fixed so powerful we can't do anything about it opposite fragile weak always having to shore themselves up unstable can't see it so powerful no space out working overtime respond to our opposition

["KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah. ", '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Neg-3---Harvard-Octas.docx

Kansas

MaPa

2fd9e6575e62a59aa05215f4ac481ae7ce72745547bc790aabcd9776d766e83e

Debt limit thumps.

Cahlink 10—13 - (George Cahlink, reporter for E&E News; 10-13-2021, E & E News, "House OKs short-term debt increase, but next steps murky," doa: 10-14-2021) url: https://www.eenews.net/articles/house-oks-short-term-debt-increase-but-next-steps-murky/

debt ceiling long-term solution remains up in the air We’re hoping we can do this in a bipartisan way said Pelosi Republicans will not support future extensions Lawmakers hoping to negotiate spending that would include appropriations and rais the borrowing limit

the House last night backed raising the nation’s debt ceiling until Dec. 3, A long-term solution remains up in the air . We’re just hoping that we can do this in a bipartisan way said Speaker Nancy Pelosi Republicans insist they will not support any future extensions , a move that creates a major obstacle in the Senate where the GOP has the votes to block a future debt bill. Pelosi said yesterday Democrats favor bipartisan action Lawmakers over coming weeks are hoping to negotiate a year-end spending deal that would include all 12 fiscal 2022 appropriations bills and avert a shutdown . The debt ceiling hitting the same day means that rais ing the borrowing limit could be part of whatever spending package emerges

long-term solution remains up in the air bipartisan way Pelosi will not support any future extensions negotiate all 12 fiscal 2022 appropriations bills avert a shutdown debt ceiling rais borrowing limit

['', 'In a partisan vote, the House last night backed raising the nation’s debt ceiling until Dec. 3, delaying by just under two months a potential fiscal crisis and likely pairing the issue with year-end spending negotiations. A long-term solution remains up in the air.', 'The legislation passed, 219-206, with no Republican voting in favor. It would raise the debt ceiling by $480 billion and allow the U.S. Treasury to pay its bills through at least Dec 3.', 'President Biden is expected to sign the measure into law well ahead of Monday, the deadline for when the current debt ceiling is expected to be reached. The House returned from recess to move the bill ahead of next week’s deadline.', '“We’re just hoping that we can do this in a bipartisan way,” said Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) ahead of the vote. She noted failing to act on the debt could potentially cost the nation 6 million jobs and $15 trillion in household wealth.', 'Republicans, however, insist they will not support any future extensions, a move that creates a major obstacle in the Senate where the GOP has the votes to block a future debt bill. Instead, Republicans argue Democrats should raise the debt in the partisan reconciliation bill they are currently writing.', '"Republicans will not support raising the debt limit while Democrats try to push through a $3.5 trillion social spending plan," said Rep. Michael Burgess (R-Texas), a senior member of the Energy and Commerce Committee.', 'Pelosi said yesterday Democrats favor bipartisan action and would continue to resist moving a debt increase through reconciliation. Many in the party fear taking such a route would enable the GOP to link Biden’s agenda to soaring red ink ahead of next year’s midterm elections.', 'Pelosi said a bipartisan idea that has “merit” could be shifting responsibility for raising the debt lift from Congress to the Treasury secretary. Under the plan, which has been floated for years, Congress could still vote to reject a proposed increase by Treasury.', 'The Dec. 3 deadline matches the date when current stopgap funding for federal agencies expires. Without new dollars or another stopgap in place by then, the government could be forced into a partial shutdown that would furlough tens of thousands of federal workers.', 'Lawmakers over coming weeks are hoping to negotiate a year-end spending deal that would include all 12 fiscal 2022 appropriations bills and avert a shutdown. The debt ceiling hitting the same day means that raising the borrowing limit could be part of whatever spending package emerges', '']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Aff-UMW-Round2.docx

Minnesota

AmPr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmPr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Prost-Aff-UMW-Round2.docx

21c6aa17e84fae811f576eb6e4c5368450ed922d865f8c514f2769ecc78569f0

Failure causes bankruptcies and unemployment---it’s unique: confidence is slowly recovering with stable support

Dr. Laurence Boone 20, PhD in Economics from London Business School, OECD Chief Economist, Master Degree in Econometrics from the University of Reading, MAS in Modelization and Quantitative Analysis from Paris X-Nanterre University, “Building Confidence Crucial Amid An Uncertain Economic Recovery”, OECD Interim Economic Report, 9/16/2020, https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/building-confidence-crucial-amid-an-uncertain-economic-recovery.htm

With COVID confidence will be crucial to ensure economies recover and adapt output recovered but pace lost momentum recovery will depend on bus con and government support there is much policymakers can do to build confidence Without support, bankruptcies and unemployment rise

With COVID continuing to threaten jobs, businesses and health amid exceptional uncertainty, building confidence will be crucial to ensure economies recover and adapt economic output recovered swiftly but the pace has lost momentum Uncertainty remains high and the strength of the recovery varies will depend on consumer and bus iness con fidence , and the extent to which government support to help businesses succeeds in boosting demand The end is not yet in sight but there is still much policymakers can do to help build confidence It is important that governments avoid the mistake Without continued government support, bankruptcies and unemployment could rise faster

COVID confidence crucial recover adapt recovered swiftly pace lost momentum Uncertainty high bus iness con fidence government support succeeds boosting demand much policymakers can do build confidence avoid mistake bankruptcies unemployment

['With the COVID-19 pandemic continuing to threaten jobs, businesses and the health and well-being of millions amid exceptional uncertainty, building confidence will be crucial to ensure that economies recover and adapt, says the OECD’s Interim Economic Outlook.', 'After an unprecedented collapse in the first half of the year, economic output recovered swiftly following the easing of containment measures and the initial re-opening of businesses, but the pace of recovery has lost some momentum more recently. New restrictions being imposed in some countries to tackle the resurgence of the virus are likely to have slowed growth, the report says.', 'Uncertainty remains high and the strength of the recovery varies markedly between countries and between business sectors. Prospects for an inclusive, resilient and sustainable economic growth will depend on a range of factors including the likelihood of new outbreaks of the virus, how well individuals observe health measures and restrictions, consumer and business confidence, and the extent to which government support to maintain jobs and help businesses succeeds in boosting demand.', 'The Interim Economic Outlook projects global GDP to fall by 4½ per cent this year, before growing by 5% in 2021. The forecasts are less negative than those in OECD’s June Economic Outlook, due primarily to better than expected outcomes for China and the United States in the first half of this year and a response by governments on a massive scale. However, output in many countries at the end of 2021 will still be below the levels at the end of 2019, and well below what was projected prior to the pandemic.', 'If the threat from COVID-19 fades more quickly than expected, improved business and consumer confidence could boost global activity sharply in 2021. But a stronger resurgence of the virus, or more stringent lockdowns could cut 2-3 percentage points from global growth in 2021, with even higher unemployment and a prolonged period of weak investment.', 'Presenting the Interim Economic Outlook, covering G20 economies, OECD Chief Economist Laurence Boone said: “The world is facing an acute health crisis and the most dramatic economic slowdown since the Second World War. The end is not yet in sight but there is still much policymakers can do to help build confidence.”', 'She added: “It is important that governments avoid the mistake of tightening fiscal policy too quickly, as happened after the last financial crisis. Without continued government support, bankruptcies and unemployment could rise faster than warranted and take a toll on people’s livelihoods for years to come. Policymakers have the opportunity of a lifetime to implement truly sustainable recovery plans that reboot the economy and generate investment in the digital upgrades much needed by small and medium-sized companies, as well as in green infrastructure, transport and housing to build back a better and greener economy.”']

[(13, 21)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-ADA-Octas.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-ADA-Octas.docx

5f3775aaf4eeee2eea5295aea338807efc3c5c3b9a7472bd2d012b7cd100e937

Their card is not even close to a spillover argument—says courts would exercise jurisdiction over a guardman in military offenses, not in other cases.

Jones 12 --- Jared J. Jones West Virginia University College of Law “You've Come a Long W e Come a Long Way Baby: The Model State Code of Militar y: The Model State Code of Military Justice and its Implications for the National Guard and Private Joe Snuffy “, https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context=wvlr

MSC applies to all Guard members at all times both civil courts and military courts could exercise jurisdiction over a Guardsman In the case of military offenses civilian courts have primary jurisdiction

the MSC applies to all Guard members at all times it will often be the case that both civil courts and military courts could exercise jurisdiction over a Guardsman In the case of military offenses In the case of offenses that violate both civil law and MSC, civilian courts have primary jurisdiction The military justice system still has jurisdiction, it simply cannot initiate a court-martial until and unless the civilian authorities decline

applies to all Guard members at all times both civil courts and military courts could exercise jurisdiction over a Guardsman In the case of military offenses civilian courts have primary jurisdiction

['Because the MSC applies to all National Guard members at all times, it will often be the case that both civil courts and military courts could exercise jurisdiction over a Guardsman.o80 The MSC attempts to head off any such conflicts. In the case of military offenses as defined in the code, courts-martial have primary jurisdiction. 1 In the case of offenses that violate both civil law (foreign or domestic) and the MSC, civilian courts have primary jurisdiction. 82 The military justice system still has jurisdiction, it simply cannot initiate a court-martial until and unless the civilian authorities decline to prosecute or dismiss the charge.83 A court-martial is only thereafter prohibited if jeopardy has attached.8 4', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-JoPh-Aff-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-6.docx

Minnesota

JoPh

f979caf6d3daac0e57a024f2cd7ea05150e0d30b04710af52d0fafeb6f359d57

ABR won’t get close to extinction, intervening actors solve it, their internal link can’t

Ed Cara 17, Science Writer for The Atlantic, Newsweek, and Vocativ, 1/27/17, “The Attack Of The Superbugs,” http://www.vocativ.com/394419/attack-of-the-superbugs/

A b r may claim 10 million deaths by 2050 eclipsing cancer there are reasons to be hopeful scientific community with many governmental foundations are actively involved in new antibiotics new solutions coop between national and local health agencies may prevent future cases spilling into the public Even with the best policy there’s no light at the end of the tunnel effort to develop drugs has been short by companies’ inability to recoup costs of new antibiotics There’s no army of E. coli that will overthrow the human race The antibiotic apocalypse will be gentle

A nti b iotic- r esistant infections may claim 10 million deaths annually by 2050 eclipsing cancer These deaths won’t come from pan-resistant infections A preventable death there here For all the gloom there are reasons to be hopeful the scientific community along with many governmental and private foundations are very actively involved in not only new antibiotics , but new solutions There’s been a noticeable change in attitude and increased urgency Obama issued an executive order aimed at addressing antibiotic resistance There has been a lot of work coop eration between national and local health agencies enabled doctors to stop the worst from happening it may prevent future cases from spilling into the public Even with the best public policy there’s no clear light at the end of the tunnel . Antibiotic resistance has gradually been worsening effort to develop new drugs has been in short supply, hamstrung by pharmaceutical companies’ inability to recoup the costs of bringing new antibiotics to market There’s no army of sentient E. coli that will rise up and someday overthrow the human race The antibiotic apocalypse will be gentle

A b r 10 million deaths annually by 2050 won’t very actively involved prevent future cases from spilling into the public Even with the best public policy no army of sentient E. coli that will rise up and someday overthrow the human race The antibiotic apocalypse will be gentle

['Antibiotic-resistant infections kill at least 700,000 people worldwide a year right now, according to an exhaustive report commissioned by the UK in 2014, and without any substantial medical breakthroughs or policy changes that slow down resistance, they may claim some 10 million deaths annually by 2050 — eclipsing cancer in general as a leading cause. These deaths largely won’t come from pan-resistant infections, just tougher ones. A preventable death there, a preventable death here.', 'Leaving that aside, antibiotics, along with proper sanitation and nutrition, gird our entire way of living. Most every invasive surgery, pregnancy, organ transplant and chemotherapy session we go through will become riskier. Other diseases like HIV, malaria or influenza will become deadlier, since bacteria often exploit the opening in our immune system they leave behind. And already precarious populations like those living with cystic fibrosis, prisoners, and the poor will lose years off their lives.', 'For all the warranted gloom, though, Farewell does think there are reasons to be hopeful. “I don’t think we are doing enough, but the scientific community along with many governmental and private foundations are very actively involved in finding not only new antibiotics, but new solutions to this problem,” she said. There’s been a noticeable change in attitude and increased urgency surrounding antibiotic resistance, she said, one that she hadn’t seen even five years ago, let alone twenty. ', 'Until recently, that attitude change could be seen from places as high up as the U.S. federal government. In 2014, former President Obama issued an executive order aimed at addressing antibiotic resistance, the first real acknowledgement of the problem from an administration, devoting funding and outlining a national action for combatting resistance. Through its federal agencies, the administration pushed to reduce antibiotic use on farms and encouraged doctors to stop using them in excess.', '“There has been a lot of work done the last couple of years, much of it spurned by [Obama’s] National Action Plan,” said Dr. David Hyun, a senior officer for Pew Charitable Trusts’ Antibiotic Resistance Project. The CDC, in particular, has used its funding to open up regional labs that allow them to better detect and respond to antibiotic-resistant outbreaks like the Nevada case, he said. They ultimately hope to create an expansive surveillance system that can easily keep track of resistance rates on a national, state and regional level. A parallel system also exists for monitoring resistance in the food chain, shepherded by the CDC and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.', 'In fact, it was this sort of cooperation between national and local health agencies that enabled Nevada doctors to stop the worst from happening, said Dr. Lei Chen. The swift identification of a possible CRE strain by the hospital, coupled with the woman’s medical history, led to a precautionary quarantine, while also prompting Chen’s public health department and eventually the CDC into action. And it may help prevent future cases from spilling into the public. According to Chen, the CDC has allocated funding this year to all of Nevada’s state public health departments so they can better detect CRE and other dangerous resistant strains.', 'Under the Trump administration, there’s no telling how these small victories will hold up or whether they will advance. All references to antibiotics once found on the Whitehouse.gov site have been removed, including a link to the Obama administration’s national action plan, and the fact that they’re already tried to bar USDA scientists from discussing their work with the public while stripping funding from other public health agencies isn’t encouraging. ', 'Even with the best public policy, however, there’s no clear light at the end of the tunnel. Antibiotic resistance has gradually been worsening, even within the last 15 to 20 years, when superbugs like methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) first became widely known, said Hyun. The effort needed to develop new drugs has been in short supply, hamstrung by pharmaceutical companies’ inability to recoup the costs of bringing new antibiotics to market. That’s because, unlike the latest heart medication, any new antibiotics will have to be treated like the last drops of water during a drought, used as little as possible — the exact opposite way to make money off a new product. Yet, much like climate change, the financial toll of not doing anything will total in the trillions years down the road. And it already numbers in the billions now, according to the CDC.', 'Of course, we need bacteria to survive. And most need or pay no mind to us in return. Even pan-resistant bacteria don’t really mean harm. Some have been found in perfectly healthy people, a fact that’ll either comfort you or keep you awake at night, only causing problems when our immune system wavers. There’s no army of sentient E. coli that will rise up and someday overthrow the human race.', 'But barring the calvary showing up, a new fear of ours will learn to settle in, almost unnoticed. It’ll creep in when we pick our heads up from a nasty fall that scrapes our skin open or breaks our bones; when we wave goodbye to our loved ones before they enter an operating room, or when we cradle our newborns into a world teeming with the living infinitesimal, wishing there was still a way to shield them from it as our parents once could for us. A fear of naked vulnerability.', 'The antibiotic apocalypse will be gentle, if it fully arrives, but it won’t be any less devastating to the human spirit.']

[(3, 10)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Neg-Kentucky-Round1.docx

43f4e0d916b678115d31bcb18a3949c50d658527f0414ce5db9774260a8b7f3e

Reignited Pakistan India arms racing specifically in the context of H-bombs goes global and nuclear, more nukes with not enough safety checks leads to accidents, theft or first strike when one side thinks it can win

Jones 2k (Gregory S. Jones is an adjunct defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. His research has focused on the potential for terrorists and hostile countries to acquire and use nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and the formulation of policies and actions to control and counter these weapons. He is author or coauthor of more than 100 reports and articles; 2000, "From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan," RAND, doα: 12-28-2023 url: https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP192.html)

India might want to conduct additional thermonuclear tests Whether India conducts additional tests will ultimately depend upon political considerations further Indian nuclear weapons development concerns established nuclear-weapon states If India conducts additional tests Pakistan will develop its own thermonuclear weapon A force equipped with 10-kT weapons would be able to [ destroy ] every major city in Pakistan. if India and Pakistan deploy their forces could be vulnerable to a first strike which could lead to crisis instability physical accidents , theft , unauthorized use Indian and Pakistani nuclear deployments are a threat to the whole world .

India might want to conduct additional thermonuclear tests India has currently proclaimed a test moratorium Whether India conducts additional nuclear tests will ultimately depend upon political considerations further Indian nuclear weapons development concerns established nuclear-weapon states Much of the discussion on India applies to Pakistan as well, for if Pakistan is to deploy a fully weaponized force, Pakistan must also decide on any further development of its nuclear stockpile for political reasons, it might still test if India does. If India conducts additional tests especially with large yields Pakistan will likely try to develop its own thermonuclear weapon A force equipped with 10-kT weapons would would be able to [ destroy ] every major city in Pakistan. Pakistan may have already expanded the production rate at this facility or it may expand it in the future. Conclusions if India and Pakistan go ahead with their nuclear deploy ments their forces could be vulnerable to a first strike ( which could lead to crisis instability ), to physical accidents , to theft , and to unauthorized use . As such, Indian and Pakistani nuclear deployments are a threat to the whole world .

thermonuclear tests political considerations especially with large yields Pakistan will likely try to develop its own thermonuclear weapon destroy every major city in Pakistan. Conclusions first strike which could lead to crisis instability accidents theft unauthorized use a threat to the whole world

['**edited for language', '', 'These considerations lead one to conclude that India might want to conduct additional thermonuclear tests. India has currently proclaimed a test moratorium and has said that it will enter negotiations on signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—but it is hard to tell how serious India is. Whether India conducts additional nuclear tests will ultimately depend upon political considerations, not just technical ones.', "Our discussion thus far has taken India's test claims at face value. However, the seismic data do not totally agree with India's statements. India said its three tests on May 11, 1998 had yields of 42 kT, 12 kT and 0.2 kT. The tests, however, registered a body-wave magnitude of 5.0, which corresponds to a total yield of only 9–16 kT.[23] India said that its two tests on May 13, 1998 had yields of 0.6 kT and 0.2 kT. However, no seismic signals were detected, though at these yields, some should have been. Clearly (at least on May 11), some type of nuclear explosion took place, so it is not hard to credit India with a simple fission weapon capability. The yield discrepancies throw doubt on India's thermonuclear claims—a doubt that must undercut any deterrent effect India's supposed possession of thermonuclear weapons might have. The need to remove this doubt is yet another reason why India may well want to conduct more nuclear tests.", "The second part of the question of further Indian nuclear weapons development concerns stockpile size and how it affects fissile nuclear material requirements. India currently has about 450 kg of separated weapons-grade plutonium,[24] which would allow the manufacture of about 90 simple fission weapons.[25] India is currently producing about 25 kg of weapons-grade plutonium per year, which could be increased to about 100 kg per year if India felt it to be necessary. This stockpile of plutonium and its current production rate are probably enough to supply India with an adequate supply of fission weapons. India's fissile material requirements for its thermonuclear weapons are less clear; there is no unclassified estimate of the amount of plutonium required per weapon. Furthermore, all of the five established nuclear-weapon states have produced both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). The usual reason given is that thermonuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium. India has only a very small uranium enrichment capacity. It could currently produce at most only 10 kg of HEU per year. It also has produced kilogram quantities of U-233 by irradiating thorium in its power reactors. It is unclear whether it used some of its limited supplies of HEU or U-233 in its thermonuclear test or whether it has found a way to make thermonuclear weapons without HEU. Either way, India might have to increase its fissile material production if it wants to make tens of thermonuclear weapons. If it makes plutonium-only thermonuclear weapons, then these weapons might well use more plutonium than a standard fission weapon. If India uses HEU or U-233, then it will have to undertake a major expansion in its ability to produce these materials.", 'Decisions Facing Pakistan', 'Much of the discussion on India applies to Pakistan as well, for if Pakistan is to deploy a fully weaponized force, many of the choices it must make are similar to those facing India. I will highlight some of the significant differences. Just as the potential of a first strike from Pakistan or, especially, China places difficult requirements on India, so India, with its relatively large size and resources, generates difficult decisions for Pakistan.', "Pakistan, like India, must make decisions about a nuclear delivery system. Pakistan has fighter-bombers, such as the F-16, suitable for nuclear delivery. The F-16 can carry a 1000-kg nuclear weapon to a range of 1400 km,[26] which would allow for fairly deep strikes into India. But, like India, Pakistan's aircraft are vulnerable to a first strike. Its handful of tactical fighter bases are nearly all within 200 km of India (less than 10 minutes flying time). The problem of first-strike vulnerability, combined with the need to penetrate deeply into Indian air defenses, leads to the consideration of ballistic missiles for nuclear delivery.", "Thanks to foreign assistance, Pakistan's missile programs are further along than are India's. The M-11 missiles Pakistan is reported to have received from China are highly capable mobile missiles that would make excellent nuclear delivery vehicles. Their main drawback is that their range is only 300 km, which means that they cannot cover most of India. Pakistan's two tests of its Ghauri missile may have solved this problem. The Ghauri is believed to be derived from the North Korean No Dong missile and to have a range of 1500 km. The videos of its tests showed that it was launched from a road-mobile launcher. If Pakistan is able to acquire or build enough of these missiles, they could be quite a satisfactory delivery system. The 750-km-range Shaheen-1 that Pakistan tested in April 1999 could also be a nuclear-delivery vehicle, although its shorter range would limit the targets in India that it could reach.", 'Even if Pakistan decides to place its nuclear weapons on a mobile ballistic missile, it, like India, must then decide how ready this force will be. If it is deployed in the field, moving frequently from site to site, and is armed with its nuclear warheads, then a missile force will be more likely to survive a first strike but will at the same time be more vulnerable to physical accidents, theft and unauthorized use, and problems communicating with its command authorities. If it is deployed at a few secure garrisons, perhaps without the nuclear warheads attached, then it will have far fewer problems with physical accidents and the like but will be much more vulnerable to a first strike. Like India, there is a serious risk that Pakistan will keep its forces in unready garrison mode and try to rely on strategic warning to disperse its force. Such a strategy is vulnerable to warning failure and a hasty dispersal can increase the physical accident and other problems, and could be considered an escalatory action.', 'Like India, Pakistan must make important decisions regarding its command arrangements and must develop a targeting and use doctrine. These include devising an arrangement to maintain "top-down" control of its nuclear forces even in the face of an attack designed to decapitate the leadership, and deciding under what circumstances and against which targets it might actually use nuclear weapons.', "Pakistan must also decide on any further development of its nuclear stockpile. There has been no official Pakistani statement regarding the types of weapons and the yields for its six claimed tests. The first five tests on May 28, 1998 produced a single seismic signal with a body-wave magnitude of 4.9.[27] This is equivalent to a total yield of 6–13 kT. The sixth test on May 30, 1998 had a body-wave magnitude of 4.3, which is equivalent to a yield of 2–8 kT. It seems likely that all of Pakistan's tests involved simple fission weapons, with the most powerful one having a yield no greater than 15 kT. As a result of these tests, Pakistan may have a reliable weapon with a 10-15 kT yield that is light enough (1000 kg or less) to be carried on its F-16s or its M-11s and Ghauris. If this is true, then in the short term Pakistan will have no need to conduct further tests for weapons development, although for political reasons, it might still test if India does.", 'In the long term, the situation is less clear. If India has really tested a thermonuclear weapon and if it conducts additional tests (especially with large yields of 100 kT–1 MT), then Pakistan will likely try to develop its own thermonuclear weapon—not only for political reasons but for technical ones as well. As was discussed earlier, it takes at least twenty times as many 10-kT warheads to cause urban damage similar to that of a 1-MT warhead. A small Pakistani force equipped with 10-kT weapons would have difficulty disabling even one large Indian city, whereas an Indian force equipped with megaton-yield weapons would probably be able to disable [destroy] every major city in Pakistan.', 'Pakistan has already made the decision to expand its stockpile of fissile material. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s (when production stopped as a result of U.S. pressure) Pakistan produced some 200 kg of HEU at its enrichment plant at Kahuta.[28] Assuming 15 kg of HEU per weapon, this would have given Pakistan enough HEU for approximately 13 fission nuclear weapons. If Pakistan really did test six nuclear weapons in May 1998, afterwards it would have had only enough HEU for seven more weapons. Given this fact, it is not surprising that there are reports that Pakistan restarted production of HEU at Kahuta in the spring of 1998.[29] Although HEU may not have been produced at Kahuta during the 1991–1998 period, Kahuta was in operation during this time and the Pakistanis stockpiled medium enriched uranium product. Using this intermediate product to produce HEU would have given Pakistan some 200 kg of additional HEU by the end of 1998.[30] Pakistan would then have had enough total HEU to produce approximately 20 nuclear weapons. At this point, the intermediate product stockpile would be exhausted and Kahuta would have gone back to producing HEU from natural uranium. When Kahuta last operated, it produced some 25 kg of HEU per year (starting from natural uranium), which is enough for about 1.7 weapons per year. Pakistan may have already expanded the production rate at this facility or it may expand it in the future.', "In addition, Pakistan is reported to have started the operation of its 50-MW heavy-water plutonium production reactor at Khushab.[31] Significantly, this reactor is reported to have started operation in April 1998, before the Indian tests. Where Pakistan obtained the heavy water needed to start this reactor has not been publicly stated. It probably took about a year for the reactor to reach full-power operation and the plutonium production in the fuel to achieve equilibrium. At this point, the reactor would start discharging about 11 kg of plutonium per year. Assuming 5 kg of plutonium per weapon, this will be enough for some 2.2 weapons per year. The number of plutonium weapons is additive with whatever HEU weapons are produced by Kahuta's output.", 'Conclusions', 'Each of the five major nuclear powers has had to create deployed nuclear forces that meet the requirements for a deterrent force. It has been a long and expensive process. When the British, French, and Chinese first deployed their nuclear forces, they could not survive a Soviet first strike. These countries wanted (and needed) such forces anyway. As soon as they had the capability, both Britain and France deployed nuclear ballistic missile submarines. China has moved toward survivable forces somewhat more slowly, but even it has developed nuclear ballistic missile submarines and land-mobile missiles.', 'Because no nuclear disasters occurred while these three powers had vulnerable nuclear forces, there may be some in India and Pakistan who think that this paper has overstated the risks that they face. But the British and French were always protected by U.S. nuclear forces. In the Chinese case, it is well known that the Soviets were seriously considering a preventive nuclear war against China in the late 1960s, which clearly illustrates the magnitude of the risks.[32]', "These three powers eventually managed to minimize some of the risks discussed in this paper by deploying large diverse arsenals. An important element in their arsenals was the deployment of mobile missiles on submarines. The submarine's mobility and its invisibility under water not only protect it from a first strike but also from theft. In the case of a physical accident (as has happened to two Soviet ballistic missile submarines), the vessel simply sinks into deep water, with minimal environmental effects.[33]", 'However, it will be a long time before there are Indian ballistic missile submarines cruising the Indian Ocean and even longer before there are Pakistani ones. In the interim, if India and Pakistan go ahead with their nuclear deployments, their forces could be vulnerable to a first strike (which could lead to crisis instability), to physical accidents, to theft, and to unauthorized use. As such, Indian and Pakistani nuclear deployments are a threat to the whole world.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaBe-Neg-Minnesota-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

HaBe

62b1caa8a7b4d6d0d86938bf7bbd3e09cf6925c414958837553191e685e1494f

Long ago there was a vast World War – Countries invested in the nuclear complex battled for supremacy nearly resulting in the destruction of - well – everything. Then the Strategic Defense Initiative emerged promising to reorganize the world into a single timeline and preserve the sacred past, a process of temporal retrocontainment – Apocalyptic nuclear narratives securitize the future and structure linearity through a constructed past that dispossesses non-reproductive timelines.

Hurley 20, assistant professor of English and affiliate faculty in Native American and Indigenous Studies, Cultural Studies, and Women and Gender Studies at George Mason University. (Jessica, “Infrastructures of Apocalypse: American Literature and the Nuclear Complex,” 2020, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 134-139) SS:/

AIDS like perceived Soviet threat, brought recognition that spatial containment was impossible boundaries are evoked only to be ruptured the proposal people with HIV be quarantined forbidding gay-positive educational material operate a boundary-obsessed logic gays walk invisibly among us! Reading about them can make you gay obsession with bodily purity of the fifties function for oppressive state structures that mobilize fear of boundary collapse to establish ever-greater disciplinary procedures retrocontainment to contain AIDS and the atomic threat imagined and worked toward a return to a state of nuclear superiority As with the SDI a dream of futurity toward a life after the homosexual when they and the bomb are “obsolete is also a dream of return, rendering the enemy’s atomic bomb “impotent,” as they were before the arms race homosexuals purged from government at twice the rate of communists communists worked actively to destroy the American way of life homosexuals were “vulnerable” to blackmail Against the apocalyptic threats of nuclear and sexual vulnerability, retrocontainment serves a straightened, whitened, masculinized American national identity where spatial prophylaxes fail it locates safety within a closed temporal loop the present is rendered safe by returning to a past nuclear war did not break out so the fifties can be retroactively constructed as a time of safety returned to because a future technology is debated as if it existed in the present Reagan refused to sacrifice SDI in disarmament talks as a bargaining chip despite the fact that the technology itself did not yet exist. containment relies on policing spatial boundaries, retrocontainment establishes and defends temporal borders to define acceptable modes of existence. To be safe becomes equivalent to maintaining a singular timeline defined by unchanging stasis a threat to that safety is met with extreme violence, as is suggested by the apocalyptic fantasies of an unstoppable AIDS plague or nuclear holocaust seeking comfort in a sanitized past a prophylactic temporal infrastructure was used to determine what infrastructures should be prioritized spending on SDI over any on AIDS construct American identity, and define who should access rights and benefits The militarization of history in the Reagan era produced historiography as a battleground retrocontainment defended privileged identity from threats by establishing policy that was closed and singular retroactive time assertions that Black poverty and nonliberal political situations are simply loose ends Reagan’s heirs “Make America Great Again” The safety and the world-dominating position of America are contained within this historiographic circle; that history could crack wide open becomes an act of treason and a national threat.

The advent of AIDS , , like the perceived Soviet threat, brought with it both the desire for containment and the recognition that spatial containment was impossible . imagined boundaries are consistently evoked only to be ruptured the proposal by secretary of education William Bennett and senator Jesse Helms that people infected with HIV be quarantined and the passage of the Helms amendment forbidding the spread of gay-positive educational material about AIDS operate through a boundary-obsessed logic that speaks more of its fears— gays walk invisibly among us! Reading about them can make you gay !— this paranoid relationship with boundaries to earlier periods of the Cold War. In the 1980s obsession with bodily purity of the 1950s the fifties function here as shorthand not for nuclear superiority and moral righteousness but for the oppressive state structures that mobilize the fear of boundary collapse to establish ever-greater disciplinary procedures . The strategy of retrocontainment was no less active in attempting to contain AIDS and homosexuality than it was in dealing with the atomic threat . imagined and worked toward a return to a state of nuclear superiority located in the fifties, back to an America of the past, when homosexuality was a taboo word and homosexuals were safely hidden in the closet neoconservatism’s “return to traditional values” was built on a more fundamental vision of the closet as national goal, As with the SDI , however, what looks like a dream of futurity —“the fantasy trajectory toward a life after the homosexual ,” life after gays, when they and the bomb are “obsolete ”— is also a dream of return, of rendering the enemy’s atomic bomb or the gay man’s phallus “impotent,” as they were (in this imagination) before the arms race and the gay rights movement homosexuals purged from government at twice the rate of communists communists worked actively to destroy the American way of life homosexuals were “vulnerable” to blackmail Against the apocalyptic threats of nuclear and sexual vulnerability, retrocontainment serves its purpose—that of shoring up a straightened, whitened, seronegativized, and masculinized American national identity Stepping in where spatial prophylaxes fail , it locates safety within a restricting and oppressive closed temporal loop in which the present is rendered safe by returning to a past that was, more secure It matters not, that fifties America was wracked with nuclear terror nuclear war did not break out so the fifties can be retroactively constructed as a time of safety the secure past is able to be returned to because a future technology is debated as if it existed in the present Reagan refused to sacrifice SDI in disarmament talks with Gorbachev, using it as a bargaining chip in the mid-1980s despite the fact that the technology itself did not yet exist. Just as containment relies on the construction and policing of spatial boundaries, so retrocontainment establishes and defends temporal borders that come to define acceptable modes of existence. To be safe becomes equivalent to maintaining a singular timeline defined by a millennial, unchanging stasis , and a threat to that safety is met with extreme violence, as is suggested by the apocalyptic fantasies of an unstoppable AIDS plague or nuclear holocaust that were the dark underside of an American culture seeking comfort in a sanitized past : the severed ear in the grass of its perfect 1950s lawn. a prophylactic temporal infrastructure that was used to determine what physical infrastructures should be prioritized spending on SDI over any spending at all on AIDS research and treatment construct and maintain a sense of American identity, and define who was or was not truly American and who should have access to the rights and benefits conferred on those who make the cut. The militarization of history in the Reagan era produced historiography as a primary battleground In the midst of proliferating representations that sought to construct multiple and contestatory versions of America’s past retrocontainment defended a privileged identity from threats abroad and at home by establishing state policy that was both closed and singular , based on the same millennial vision of static, retroactive time that defined the Reagan era assertions that liberalism has already won of Black poverty in the United States and the nonliberal political and economic situations of most of the world are simply loose ends that we may as well treat as already trimmed retrocontainment is the primary heuristic through which Reagan’s heirs “Make America Great Again” The safety and the world-dominating position of America are contained within this historiographic circle; that history could crack wide open , in other words, becomes an act of treason and a national threat.

['The advent of AIDS, however, like the perceived Soviet threat, brought with it both the desire for containment and the recognition that spatial containment was impossible. In both the sexualized discourse of missile defense and the militarized discourse of AIDS, imagined boundaries are consistently evoked only to be ruptured. While the missile shield in space could be thwarted because “once in space, a Soviet missile might release ten or more warheads together with hundreds of decoys and quantities of so-called penetration aids such as chaff or clouds of infrared-emitting gases,”38 the frequent description of the HIV virus as a “Trojan horse” invokes the potential for boundaries to be penetrated at multiple scales through “the concealment ‘in the womb of the horse’ that figures\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. viral action at the cellular level, infection at the level of the whole person, and the ‘attack’ of AIDS on the ‘American homosexual community.’”39 Both the proposal by secretary of education William Bennett and senator Jesse Helms that people infected with HIV be quarantined and the passage of the Helms amendment forbidding the spread of gay-positive educational material about AIDS operate through a boundary-obsessed logic that speaks more of its fears—gays walk invisibly among us! Reading about them can make you gay!—than of any effort to prevent the spread of the disease or to provide resources for those already infected. Even crossover allusions to the Maginot line in both SDI and AIDS discourses summon the image of a boundary that was doomed to fail.40 ', 'As with the SDI, the threat of boundary collapse in the discourse of AIDS carried a major affective charge. Jacqueline Foertsch describes how “the utopic desire for boundaries that hold ignites the rhetoric of the reactionary right throughout the cold war and AIDS eras, with destruction of these seen as equivalent to apocalypse”;41 I would add to this only that the desire for safety in boundaries is not limited to the reactionary right and that apocalypse is inconsistently defined and applied across different racial, socioeconomic, and sexual/gender identity groups in the 1980s (as Sarah Schulman’s 1991 novel People in Trouble expertly delineates, “it was the beginning of the end of the world, but not everyone noticed right away”).42 Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, pursuing “the deep relationship between AIDS and Star Wars research,” analyze them both in terms of boundaries and a spatial understanding of containment:', 'The rhetoric surrounding both AIDS and Star Wars focuses on the total breakdown of immunity systems: AIDS can be perceived in such frightening terms because its appearance indicates the destruction of the internal immunological system of the body (the crisis within); while the rhetoric of Star Wars creates, and then responds to, generalized panic fear about the breakdown of the technological immunity systems of society as a whole (the Bomb as the crisis without). Both Star Wars and AIDS are theorised in the common research language of cellular genetics, where missiles are viruses and invading antigens body missiles.\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. Both AIDS research and Star Wars deal with ruined surfaces (the planet and the body), both operate in a common language of exterminism and suppression.43', 'While not explicitly referencing the doctrine of containment, the Krokers link this paranoid relationship with boundaries to earlier periods of the Cold War. In the 1980s obsession with bodily purity, they see “a recyclage of the McCarthyism of the 1950s which, this time on the terrain of bodily fluids rather than loyalty oaths, insists on the (unattainable) ideal of absolute purity of the body’s circulatory exchanges as the new gold standard of an immunological politics.”44 In an inverse gesture to that made by Reaganite neoconservatives, the fifties function here as shorthand not for nuclear superiority and moral righteousness but for the oppressive state structures that mobilize the fear of boundary collapse to establish ever-greater disciplinary procedures. The fact that the Krokers call this mobilization “body McCarthyism” suggests a relationship between AIDS and SDI that is not exclusively spatial. With their backward look to the 1950s, they enter into the wider discursive arena of the intensely imbricated temporal relationship between the eighties and the fifties', 'The strategy of retrocontainment was no less active in attempting to contain AIDS and homosexuality than it was in dealing with the atomic threat. The archetypal AIDS body, that of Rock Hudson, whose death from AIDS in 1985 brought the disease into the public eye, established the relationship between the fifties and the eighties as a privileged site upon which AIDS discourse would be constructed. According to Richard Meyer, the media depiction of the body of a 1950s leading man transformed into the AIDS-wracked body of a gay man “described the collapse of a particular fantasy of male containment and sexual safety—a fantasy once attached to Rock Hudson’s body, a fantasy once embodied by Rock Hudson’s closet.”45 If the neoconservatives of the 1980s imagined and worked toward a return to a state of nuclear superiority located in the fifties, then they also hearkened “back to an America of the past, when homosexuality was a taboo word and homosexuals were safely hidden in the closet\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. a mythical golden age in American history\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. the 1950s.”46 As Marlon Riggs wrote of the extraordinary measures taken by Reagan’s government to silence queer voices in the 1980s, neoconservatism’s “return to traditional values” was built on a more fundamental vision of the closet as national goal, of a forced return of queerness to “historic cells of solitude, shame, and silence.”47', 'The shocking ease and even pleasure with which prominent Republicans imagined—and imagine—life after homosexuals has been documented and theorized by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Leo Bersani, and Lee Edelman.48 As with the SDI, however, what looks like a dream of futurity—“the fantasy trajectory toward a life after the homosexual,” life after gays, when they and the bomb are “obsolete”—is also a dream of return, of rendering the enemy’s atomic bomb or the gay man’s phallus “impotent,” as they were (in this imagination) before the arms race and the gay rights movement.49 Even at the height of the Lavender Scare in 1950, when homosexuals were being purged from government positions at twice the rate of communists, the “threat” posed by them was curiously passive. Unlike communists, who worked actively to destroy the American way of life, homosexuals were dangerous because they were “vulnerable” to blackmail.50 The AIDS language of “risk groups” and “passive” sex roles reflects both a continued aversion to “effeminate” men and a desire to go back to a time when “effeminate” was the only flavor of gay on the public menu; not that there would be no gays, as Bersani and Sedgwick suggest, but rather that gays remain exclusively effete, passive, and vulnerable in order that the heterosexual white male might have something against which to define himself.51 Macho, active, and indestructible all need the other half of the binary if they are to signify anything at all; as Edelman writes in his 1993 essay “The Mirror and the Tank,” “the popular homophobic discourse on AIDS that depends upon these apocalyptic conjunctions of narcissism, passivity, the anus, and death serves\xa0.\xa0.\xa0. to secure the ideological construction of the subject as heterosexual male.”52 The “neutral” subject cannot exist without his Other, but if his Other starts encroaching on his territory (say, by reappropriating “macho” as a homosexual fetish in the increasing visibility of the leather scene),53 then it becomes imperative to put him back in his place—the place, in this case, being a 1950s holding cell where gay vulnerability is not, as it became in the age of AIDS, contagious.54 Retrocontainment operates in 1980s AIDS discourse by restoring the equivalence of gay men and vulnerability in the public eye, allowing for a fantasy of forcible recloseting through a return to a 1950s definition of what it means to be gay. ', 'Against the apocalyptic threats of nuclear and sexual vulnerability, retrocontainment serves its purpose—that of shoring up a straightened, whitened, seronegativized, and masculinized American national identity—in the Reagan era by functioning as a form of prophylactic time. Stepping in where spatial prophylaxes fail, it locates safety within a restricting and oppressive closed temporal loop in which the present is rendered safe by returning to a past that was, from the perspective of the 1980s, more secure. It matters not, from a 1980s point of view, that fifties America was wracked with nuclear terror; we know that nuclear war did not break out, and so the fifties can be retroactively constructed as a time of safety. The attitude to the future evinced by the Star Wars debate creates the same prophylactic time loop, moving everything forward thirty years but keeping the same shape. In the discourse surrounding the SDI, the secure past is able to be returned to because a future technology is debated as if it existed in the present; Reagan refused to sacrifice SDI in disarmament talks with Gorbachev, using it as a bargaining chip in the mid-1980s despite the fact that the technology itself did not yet exist. The temporal structure of retrocontainment thus aligns with that of anxiety, described by Tim Dean in the context of potential HIV infection as “a prophylactic against harm” that operates in the future anterior, “a gesture\xa0 .\xa0 .\xa0 . that eclipses the uncertainties of the present by anticipating a future self with the capacity to retrospectively view its former state from a safe distance.”55 Treating SDI technology as real means that it is only a matter of time until we will have been safe, and imagining backward instead of forward means that we can close the “window of vulnerability” (to borrow a phrase from Reagan) between the future moment and now by replacing it with a past moment where safety is already imagined to reside. ', 'Just as containment relies on the construction and policing of spatial boundaries, so retrocontainment establishes and defends temporal borders that come to define acceptable modes of existence. To be safe becomes equivalent to maintaining a singular timeline defined by a millennial, unchanging stasis, and a threat to that safety is met with extreme violence, as is suggested by the apocalyptic fantasies of an unstoppable AIDS plague or nuclear holocaust that were the dark underside of an American culture seeking comfort in a sanitized past: the severed ear in the grass of its perfect 1950s lawn.56 The operations of retrocontainment point to the construction of a highly politicized historiography by the neoconservative state: a prophylactic temporal infrastructure that was used to determine what physical infrastructures should be prioritized (in this case, massive spending on SDI over any spending at all on AIDS research and treatment), construct and maintain a sense of American identity, and define who was or was not truly American and who should have access to the rights and benefits conferred on those who make the cut.', 'The militarization of history in the Reagan era produced historiography as a primary battleground for American cultural politics. In the midst of proliferating representations of American history from below that sought to construct multiple and contestatory versions of America’s past, the doctrine of retrocontainment defended a privileged American identity from threats abroad and at home by establishing as state policy a historiography that was both closed and singular.57 The extent to which this model of history became central to neoconservatism can be seen in Francis Fukuyama’s high-impact article “The End of History?,” which appeared in 1989 in the neoconservative journal National Interest. Fukuyama’s claim that “we have already emerged on the other side of history” appeared after the heyday of retrocontainment but was nonetheless its product, based on the same millennial vision of static, retroactive time that defined the Reagan era.58 Fukuyama’s rhetorical strategy is a familiar one: the description of something that will occur in the future (the universal acceptance and practice of free market liberalism) is treated as if it already exists in the present. The essay is split evenly between assertions that liberalism has already won and sotto voce acknowledgments that in fact it hasn’t really won anywhere; nevertheless, unfortunate facts like the existence of Black poverty in the United States and the nonliberal political and economic situations of most of the world are simply loose ends that we may as well treat as already trimmed and fastened. The end of history in Fukuyama’s essay is not, as he claims, the world implementation of liberalism but a temporal structure that he takes straight from Reagan: the future is treated as if it were the present, while the present is transferred into a past (in this case, a sanitized French Revolution) that guarantees its safety. Even after the end of the Cold War, retrocontainment is the primary heuristic through which Reagan’s heirs (including today’s neofascist commitment to “Make America Great Again”) imagine the relationship between American superiority and world history. The safety and the world-dominating position of America are contained within this historiographic circle; that history could crack wide open, in other words, becomes an act of treason and a national threat.', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-HaSh-Aff-University-of-Central-Oklahoma-Round-1.docx

Kansas

HaSh

4e86a4b31e387f1b92a2d68406239feb487313bc2382d54a062845dfc5090d36

Implied Immunity risks of monopolization in critical industries are much larger than potential for conflict between antitrust and regulation.

Jablon ’13 [Robert et al; LLB @ Harvard Law School; Anjali Patel; JD @ Michigan Law; Latif Nurani; JD @ Columbia Law; “Trinko and Credit Suisse Revisited: The Need for Effective Administrative Agency Review and Shared Antitrust Responsibility,” Energy Law Journal 34(2), p. 627-666]

an either-courts-or-agencies approach can result in no enforcement except where there is direct conflict judicial antitrust and agency cases would move forward within jurisdictions place of regulated industries in our economy warrants antitrust such industries lack competitive potential to prevent market power agencies cannot provide antitrust courts have jurisdiction and remedial authority duplicative proceedings objections are theoretical Complementary jurisdiction has not posed problems there has been no showing agencies do not welcome antitrust which expends none of their resources and lead to pro-competitive results for which they cannot be blamed availability of duplicate fora is preferable to non-enforcement agencies and courts could act in harmony one neutral during pendency of the other's enforcement

to the extent that the Supreme Court other courts, or commentators suggest lower courts should avoid section 2 or other antitrust enforcement in areas where agencies have jurisdiction this dicta should be rejected in regulated industries critical to the Nation's welfare, antitrust enforcement is " not less important but more so." an either-courts-or-agencies -should-exercise-jurisdiction approach to antitrust enforcement can too easily result in no enforcement the goal of direct governmental regulation and the goal of antitrust law is the same to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources possible under these standards, except where there is a direct conflict judicial antitrust and agency cases would both move forward within their jurisdictions Agencies would be responsible to exercise their authority to implement antitrust policy to the maximum possible extent The place of regulated industries in our economy warrants an appropriate emphasis on antitrust policy such industries almost always lack sufficient competitive response potential to prevent the sustained exercise of market power This can be attributed to preexisting and continuing industry concentration, historic monopoly positions of certain market participants, and the industries' intensive capital structures which impede non-incumbent entry regulatory agencies cannot , by themselves, adequately provide necessary antitrust enforcement courts have direct antitrust adjudicatory jurisdiction and broad remedial authority Trinko and Credit Suisse Courts raise concerns dual jurisdiction can lead to duplicative proceedings these objections are theoretical Complementary jurisdiction has not posed problems to date or the Supreme Court does not cite evidence of such problems there has been no real showing that agencies do not welcome court antitrust enforcement which expends none (or hardly any) of their resources and can lead to pro-competitive results for which they cannot be politically blamed coordinate jurisdiction may to some extent create duplicative costs the fact that a court or agency may pass on a particular questionable company action does not automatically justify allowing that action to be continued Courts and agencies have different roles and priorities if a company's conduct is contrary to competition rulings in either judicial or administrative fora, it probably should be disallowed On balance the availability of duplicate fora is preferable to non-enforcement risks Because of the importance of antitrust to national economic policy both agencies and courts could act in harmony one could be neutral during the pendency of the other's more aggressive antitrust enforcement Regulated industries, including electricity, natural gas and oil pipelines, telecommunications and transportation, tend to be among our most important and those where antitrust problems are most likely to [*659] occur These are industries that often have had monopoly structures , but are now evolving towards competition Their products and services are vital If there are any segments of the economy where one would want strict antitrust enforcement, it is in regulated industries.

this dicta should be rejected critical to the Nation's welfare, not less important but more so." no enforcement governmental regulation same direct conflict judicial antitrust agency cases both move forward within their jurisdictions maximum possible extent place of regulated industries in our economy appropriate emphasis on antitrust policy sustained exercise of market power regulatory agencies cannot , by themselves, adequately provide necessary antitrust enforcement jurisdiction remedial authority duplicative proceedings theoretical Complementary jurisdiction has not posed problems none (or hardly any) of their resources cannot be politically blamed in either judicial or administrative fora, it probably should be disallowed On balance preferable to non-enforcement risks Because of the importance of antitrust to national economic policy neutral pendency of the other's more aggressive antitrust enforcement most important most likely to occur often have had monopoly structures Their products and services are vital any segments of the economy

['IV. An Optimal Solution: Complementary and Effective Antitrust Responsibility', 'Trinko\'s strict holding only addresses the question of whether, if the FCC promulgates an access rule, violation of that rule creates a section 2 refusal to [*656] deal claim, and Credit Suisse establishes a four part test that arguably seeks to avoid direct judicial-agency conflicts. 170 However, to the extent that the Supreme Court, other courts, or commentators suggest that lower courts should avoid section 2 or other antitrust enforcement in areas where agencies have jurisdiction, this dicta and commentary should be rejected because in regulated industries critical to the Nation\'s welfare, antitrust enforcement is "not less important but more so." 171 Such an either-courts-or-agencies-should-exercise-jurisdiction approach to antitrust enforcement can too easily result in no enforcement. Agencies and courts can and should complement each other in providing effective antitrust consideration. Such complementary consideration of anticompetitive issues would avoid much of the potential for conflict that concerned the Court in Trinko and Credit Suisse while better ensuring full antitrust consideration. 172', 'To some extent the concept of complementary jurisdiction reflects an attitude that recognizes that both courts and agencies have important and sometimes parallel antitrust responsibilities. It assumes that under their conjoint responsibilities both are expected to protect against anticompetitive abuse within their jurisdictions. As Judge Skelly Wright put the matter,', 'the basic goal of direct governmental regulation through administrative bodies and the goal of indirect governmental regulation in the form of antitrust law is the same - to achieve the most efficient allocation of resources possible… . Another example of their common purpose is that both types of regulation seek to establish an atmosphere which will stimulate innovations for better service at a lower cost. This analysis suggests that the two forms of economic regulation complement each other. 173', 'As is discussed herein, under these standards, except where there is a direct conflict, judicial antitrust and agency cases would both move forward within their jurisdictions. Through doctrines of primary jurisdiction, where appropriate, a court could refer questions or matters to agencies or agencies could defer to courts, with the non-lead forum holding the case in abeyance. 174 Sometimes court and agency preclusion rules would apply. 175 A court could make its relief subject to companies making tariff or other filings with agencies to avoid conflict and achieve efficiencies in oversight, as occurred, for example, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States. 176 Although a parallel court or agency claim might lead to a deferral of one of the actions, if we are to give a primacy to antitrust policy as it affects regulated industries, the fact of a deferral would not justify a dismissal as occurred in Credit Suisse except where (1) full agency antitrust consideration is assured; (2) agency duplicative statutory authority and [*657] actions would be contradictory to a court or agency moving forward, which mandates such dismissal under properly applied Credit Suisse and Midcal standards, as are discussed infra; and (3) the authority of the court or agency which proceeds under deferral has jurisdictional or subject matter priority and knowledge. 177 Agencies would be responsible to exercise their authority to implement antitrust policy to the maximum possible extent, granting the most limited feasible antitrust exclusions consistent with their responsibilities under their enabling statutes. 178', "The place of regulated industries in our economy warrants an appropriate emphasis on antitrust policy. These standards provide such emphasis. Notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary in the Trinko dicta, antitrust enforcement is essential in these industries because, as the FERC analysis exemplifies, such industries almost always lack sufficient competitive response potential to prevent the sustained exercise of market power. 179 This deficiency can be attributed to, among other things, preexisting and continuing industry concentration, historic monopoly positions of certain market participants, and the industries' intensive capital structures which impede non-incumbent entry. 180", "Due to political and institutional pressures as well as agencies' continuing to move away from adjudicatory processes, regulatory agencies cannot, by themselves, adequately provide necessary antitrust enforcement. 181 Agencies often have broad jurisdictions over particular industry market structures and transactions and also particularized knowledge of industries that fall under their jurisdictions, including an ability to enforce day to day implementation of court remedies. 182 However, courts have direct antitrust adjudicatory jurisdiction and broad remedial authority. 183 Agencies and courts should work together to prevent violations of antitrust law and policy and to ensure consumer welfare.", 'A. Suggestions That Courts and Agencies Cannot Exercise a Complementary Antitrust Role Are Inapt', "As we show in Section III, today's electricity industry provides a ready, but hardly exclusive, example of where antitrust courts and regulatory agencies can and should play complementary and reinforcing roles. Such complementary, [*658] non-exclusive jurisdiction would tend to ensure the likelihood of necessary antitrust enforcement and the application of agency experience and knowledge in addition to maintaining both fora's advantages.", 'The Trinko and Credit Suisse Courts raise concerns that such dual jurisdiction can lead to duplicative proceedings and conflicting requirements and that courts cannot fashion appropriate antitrust relief in regulated industries. 184 However, these objections are more theoretical than real. Complementary jurisdiction has not posed problems to date or, if it has, the Supreme Court does not cite evidence of such problems. In fact, there has been no real showing that agencies do not welcome court antitrust enforcement, which expends none (or hardly any) of their resources and can lead to pro-competitive results for which they cannot be politically blamed. 185 For example, we have never heard of any NRC objection to the idea that the courts can also enforce NRC antitrust license conditions. 186 By the same token, agencies can implement judicial (and other administrative) remedies. 187', "Of course, coordinate jurisdiction may, to some extent, allow for forum shopping or create duplicative costs. But if there is a primacy to preventing and correcting anticompetitive conduct, the fact that a court or agency may pass on a particular questionable company action does not automatically justify allowing that action to be continued. Courts and agencies have different roles and priorities: if a company's conduct is contrary to competition rulings in either judicial or administrative fora, it probably should be disallowed.", "On balance, the availability of duplicate fora is preferable to non-enforcement risks. Because of the importance of antitrust to national economic policy, both agencies and courts could act in harmony, taking similar directions in applying antitrust policy. At minimum, one could be neutral during the pendency of the other's more aggressive antitrust enforcement. 188", 'Treating courts and agencies as complementary bodies permits more effective remedies than if courts and agency jurisdictions are deemed inherently separate. Regulated industries, including electricity, natural gas and oil pipelines, telecommunications and transportation, tend to be among our most important and, frequently, those where antitrust problems are most likely to [*659] occur. These are industries that often have had monopoly structures, but are now evolving towards competition. Their products and services are vital. If there are any segments of the economy where one would want strict antitrust enforcement, it is in regulated industries.']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Aff-wake-Round4.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/BaCh/Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Aff-wake-Round4.docx

a33d73e775b84968118490fb03a438758d307a4838745caf2f8d3c1f7b739763

1---Personhood regulates AI---solves the DA.

Nick Easen 19. Award-winning journalist and broadcaster, he writes on science, technology, economics and business. “Rights for robots: why we need better AI regulation” Raconteur. 10-16-19. https://www.raconteur.net/legal/regulation/robot-rights-ethics/

humans aren’t the only ones that have rights artificial entities have a legal persona Corporations have rights AI is already impacting our lives how this tech is developed is raising profound legal questions greater clarity around the status of AI will be important The idea isn’t ridiculous AI could be held responsible if things went wrong the idea was more about making sure AI will remain a machine with human backing , which is then accountable in law.

We live in a world where humans aren’t the only ones that have rights . In the eyes of the law, artificial entities have a legal persona too. Corporations , partnerships or nation states also have the same rights and responsibility is it time our legal system considered a similar status for artificial intelligence (AI) and robots? AI is already impacting most aspects of our lives . Given its pervasiveness, how this tech nology is developed is raising profound legal and ethical questions that need to be addressed greater clarity around the status of AI will certainly be important The idea isn’t as ridiculous as it initially appears. It’s sometimes a problem that AI is regulated according to rules that were developed centuries ago to regulate the behaviour of people Their reasoning was that AI , an algorithm or a robot could then be held responsible if things went wrong , like a company 67% tech executives worldwide believe sector has been under regulated the idea was less about giving human rights to robots, but more about making sure AI will remain a machine with human backing , which is then accountable in law.

['We live in a world where humans aren’t the only ones that have rights. In the eyes of the law, artificial entities have a legal persona too. Corporations, partnerships or nation states also have the same rights and responsibility as human beings. With rapidly evolving technologies, is it time our legal system considered a similar status for artificial intelligence (AI) and robots?', '“AI is already impacting most aspects of our lives. Given its pervasiveness, how this technology is developed is raising profound legal and ethical questions that need to be addressed,” says Julian David, chief executive of industry body techUK.', 'Take Facebook, Amazon or IBM, they are all legal entities, with similar privileges as citizens, with the right to defend themselves in court and the right to free speech. If IBM has a legal personhood, is it possible that Watson, the company’s AI engine, Google’s complex algorithm or Amazon’s Alexa might also qualify for a new status in law, with new responsibilities and rights too?', 'To be worthy of people’s trust, greater clarity around the status of AI will certainly be important', '“The idea isn’t as ridiculous as it initially appears. It’s sometimes a problem that AI is regulated according to rules that were developed centuries ago to regulate the behaviour of people,” says Ryan Abbott, professor of law at the University of Surrey.', '“One of the biggest and legally disruptive challenges posed by AI is what to do with machines that act in ways that are increasingly autonomous.”', 'Justice for robots', 'This burning issue drove the European Parliament to act two years ago. It considered creating a new legal status – electronic personhood – with a view to making AI and robots so-called e-persons with responsibilities. Their reasoning was that AI, an algorithm or a robot could then be held responsible if things went wrong, like a company. In response, 156 AI specialists from 14 nations denounced the move in a group letter. ', '67% tech executives worldwide believe sector has been under regulated', '“It makes no sense to make a piece of computer code responsible for its outputs, since it has no understanding of anything that it’s done. Humans are responsible for computer output,” says Noel Sharkey, emeritus professor of AI and robotics at the University of Sheffield, who signed the missive. “This could allow companies to slime out of their responsibilities to consumers and possible victims.”', 'Certainly, making AI a legal entity would create a cascade of effects across all areas of law. Yet the idea behind the EU e-person status was less about giving human rights to robots, but more about making sure AI will remain a machine with human backing, which is then accountable in law.']

[(5, 13)]

ndtceda

Emory-WaWi-Aff-Owen-L-Coon-Memorial-Tournament-at-Northwestern-Round-3.docx

Emory

WaWi

34c8e08426c460fc40e3c83f6d69ffdb8105b84433ba7ddd2e2124c1ce366e05

Terrorism causes nuclear war – newest studies.

Hayes 18 — Hayes is Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies (Peter Hayes, 1-18-2018, "NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR," Published by Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/, Accessed 6-28-2018, JWS)

states are restrained in their decisions to escalate to conflict a non-state rrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities or use nuclear materials against military targets a terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate Some experts dismiss this possibility as remote the history of nuclear terrorism suggests otherwise

states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out non-state actors with nuclear weapons do not seek the same goals and will use radically different systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states a non-state nuclear te rrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets If such an event coincides with high levels of tension between states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about Yet the history of nuclear terrorism suggests otherwise potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high hen the potential for miscalculation is already high due then a terrorist attack may shift these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision

states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict a non-state nuclear te rrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate the history of nuclear terrorism suggests otherwise

['Conclusion', 'We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above.', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Kansas-WiWi-Aff-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Doubles.docx

Kansas

WiWi

1682ec7e0372f752ac1cc706866bdb4017667e463ad788dce6a733f754570a2d

It’s impossible to ban AI for autonomous or anonymous DAOs---only the plan solves liability gaps by incentivizing DAO good governance

Max Ganado 18, retired attorney formerly Managing Partner and Senior Partner at Ganado Advocates, currently a consultant to the firm; and Steve Tendon, Director at ChainStrategies, 6/6/18, “Legal Personality For Blockchains, DAOs And Smart Contracts,” https://www.mondaq.com/fin-tech/707696/legal-personality-for-blockchains-daos-and-smart-contracts

thriving ecosystem will develop , which can – in autonomy enter contracts and pay other Arrangements users have no insight which services might be invoked by the one over which they have governance It does not make sense to hold users liable for actions out of their power Legal Personality resolve the conundrum "good citizen" Tech Arrangement could consume services, provided those Arrangements themselves fulfill requirements to have legal personality

It has been argued end users could be held liable for the actions of a Technology Arrangement, especially when the users have been conferred governance power The instance of "The DAO" was of this kind However, with the perspectiv e that a thriving ecosystem of Technology Arrangements will develop , which can – in autonomy – offer, consume, negotiate, enter contracts and pay services offered to, by or for other Technology Arrangements such users might have no insight at all into which services of other "third-party" Technology Arrangements might be invoked by the one over which they have governance power It does not make sense to hold such users liable for the actions performed by third party Technology Arrangements which are out of scope of their governance power Legal Personality is again a way to resolve the conundrum . The requirement would be that a "good citizen" Tech nology Arrangement could very well use discovery services to find third party Technology Arrangement to consume their services, provided those third party Technology Arrangements themselves are "good citizens" and fulfill the requirements to have legal personality too even if a Technology Arrangement in the middle of a value/service chain produces damage, the end-points (and any other intermediary point as well) are not held liabl e.

been argued end users could be held liable thriving ecosystem of Technology Arrangements will develop no insight Legal Personality is again a way to resolve the conundrum Tech

['Case of Extended Decentralized Value/Service Chain', 'It has been argued that the end users could be held liable for the actions of a Technology Arrangement, especially when the users have been conferred governance power over the actions of the Technology Arrangement, by the ("code is law") rules of the Technology Arrangement itself. The instance of "The DAO" was of this kind. This way of reasoning can still make sense in as far as the services provided by a Technology Arrangement are self-contained. However, with the perspective that a thriving ecosystem of Technology Arrangements will develop, which can – in autonomy – offer, consume, negotiate, enter contracts and pay services offered to, by or for other Technology Arrangements (especially when automated directory and discovery services will come to fruition), it stands to reason that such users might have no insight at all into which services of other "third-party" Technology Arrangements might be invoked by the one over which they have governance power. Such governance power can be limitedly exercised for general direction, and not for specific operations, which the Technology Arrangement could choose on its own account (again, especially if service discovery mechanisms will be incorporated in the overall ecosystems). It does not make sense to hold such users liable for the actions performed by third party Technology Arrangements which are out of scope of their governance power.', 'Hence, Legal Personality is again a way to resolve the conundrum. The requirement here would be that a "good citizen" Technology Arrangement could very well use discovery services to find third party Technology Arrangement in order to consume their services, provided those third party Technology Arrangements themselves are "good citizens" and fulfill the requirements to have legal personality too. In this way, even if a Technology Arrangement in the middle of a value/service chain produces damage, the end-points (and any other intermediary point as well) are not held liable.']

[(4, 13)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-PaCh-Aff-Indiana-Round-6.docx

Northwestern

PaCh

7b0e72fcfe162d3f76c014cea783d0458762a44752e5441741aff1d860414eaa

3—Comity makes it easier to do their work.

Anderson 18 - (*Robert D. Anderson, **William E. Kovacic, ***Anna Caroline Müller and ****Nadezhda Sporysheva *Senior Counsellor and Team Leader for Government Procurement and Competition Policy, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat; Honorary Professor, School of Law @ University of Nottingham, UK **Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy and Director @ Competition Law Center @ George Washington University Law School; Visiting Professor @ Dickson Poon School of Law, King's College London; and Non-Executive Director, UK Competition and Markets Authority ***Legal Affairs Officer, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat ****Legal/Economic Analyst, Intellectual Property, Government Procurement and Competition Division, WTO Secretariat; 10-21-2018, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division, "Competition Policy, Trade And The Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments In Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges And Issues For Reflection," doa: 6-4-2021) url: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201812_e.pdf

inefficiencies occur with regard to investigation international cartels and lead to under-enforcement In the absence of institutionalized cooperation mechanisms multiple jurisdictions repeat the same steps resulting in extra costs for competition authorities and might be unable to obtain necessary ev

Even where international cartel activity can be tackled effectively inefficiencies may occur with regard to the investigation of international cartels and lead to under-enforcement of competition policy In the absence of well-functioning and institutionalized cooperation mechanisms , multiple jurisdictions may repeat the same investigative steps , resulting in extra costs for businesses subject to investigations competition authorities will suffer from the unnecessary duplication of efforts; and might in practice be unable to obtain necessary ev idence from other jurisdictions harmful cartel activity could go unpunished , additional costs could be imposed on the global economy , and consumers would be harmed

tackled effectively investigation of international cartels lead to under-enforcement well-functioning institutionalized cooperation mechanisms multiple jurisdictions may repeat the same investigative steps extra costs competition authorities ev harmful cartel activity could go unpunished additional costs could be imposed global economy consumers would be harmed

['', 'Even where international cartel activity can be tackled effectively by national competition laws, inefficiencies may occur with regard to the investigation of international cartels and lead to under-enforcement of competition policy and laws. In the absence of well-functioning and institutionalized cooperation mechanisms, multiple jurisdictions may repeat the same investigative steps, resulting in extra costs for businesses subject to investigations. More importantly, competition authorities will suffer from the unnecessary duplication of efforts; and might in practice be unable to obtain necessary evidence from other jurisdictions.278 As a result, harmful cartel activity could go unpunished, additional costs could be imposed on the global economy, and consumers would be harmed.', '', '', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Indiana-Round5.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Aff-Indiana-Round5.docx

344300d471120c623a92f4509f580cdbdb29c8b626ec137923a4ee2e31ce813a

Certainty key.

Camilla Jain Holtse 20, Associate General Counsel - Head of Competition Law & Policy in A.P. Moller-Maersk (Maersk), based in Copenhagen, “Navigating Through Uncertain Waters—The Importance of Legal Certainty, Predictability, and Transparency in Future Antitrust Enforcement,” Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, vol. 11, no. 8, 11/14/2020, pp. 446–449

unpredictability and uncertainty about process and outcomes companies lose ability to compete hurt consumers in prices and innovation predictable procedures are core in assessment of legal risk arbitrary decisions provides opportunities to leverage competition to achieve political objectives Properly implemented competition benefit consumers and companies But this flows from efficiency in new powers most positive would be clear understanding focused on economic concerns co-mingling opaque principles inject damaging uncertainty

due process not always prevailing add to unpredictability and uncertainty about process and outcomes markets need simplicity and predictability predictable rules lead to level playing fields competition policy enables companies to analyze strategy , and invest in resources designed to effectively counter rival actions. When boundary lines are unclear companies lose the ability to compete inefficiencies ultimately hurt consumers in the form of higher prices and lower innovation clear and simple rules the availability of predictable procedures are core in a company’s assessment of overall legal risk arbitrary decisions provides opportunities for governments to leverage competition to achieve political objectives Properly implemented competition tools greatly benefit consumers and companies But the importance of this framework flows from increases in efficiency in the creation of new powers the most positive result would be clear understanding plainly focused on economic concerns co-mingling of diverse and opaque principles inject damaging uncertainty

due process always prevailing add unpredictability uncertainty process outcomes need simplicity predictability level playing fields analyze strategy rival unclear lose compete inefficiencies hurt consumers prices innovation rules predictable procedures core arbitrary leverage competition political Properly implemented greatly benefit consumers and companies efficiency new powers most positive result clear understanding economic co-mingling diverse opaque principles damaging uncertainty

['Fourthly, procedural rules differ across jurisdictions and due process is not always prevailing, adding to the unpredictability and uncertainty about the process and outcomes. The focus on international cooperation and coordination has predominantly been on the substantive legal framework and less so on procedural matters.', 'Fifthly, the geographic boundaries of national competition laws are becoming more and more blurry. For example, in the USA, we have seen a move towards the extra-territorial effect of US antitrust laws for foreign conduct. The same can be said about the EU practice of requiring merger notification for non-EEA joint ventures where the parent’s turnover meets the EU turnover thresholds and there are other examples. Furthermore, we see that many countries are increasingly claiming ‘indirect effects’ on their territory of a given practice. This uncertainty in geographic outreach of competition laws and the increased focus on indirect effects mean that today companies often must assume that the competition laws of a country may apply everywhere.', 'IV. What do markets need? simplicity, transparency, and predictability', 'With the complexity of today’s world, the need for simplicity, transparency, and predictability is now more compelling than ever.', 'Simple, transparent, and predictable rules lead to level playing fields. Like the sidelines on a football field, competition policy enables companies to analyze strategy, and invest in resources designed to effectively counter rival actions. When boundary lines are unclear, companies lose the ability to compete—some operate outside the playing field, others receive aid from sponsors to account for perceived ‘unfairness’, and those companies seeking to avoid penalty often miss opportunities that would have been obvious if the field were clearly marked. All of these inefficiencies ultimately hurt consumers in the form of higher prices and lower innovation.', 'Perhaps the most effective regulatory tools for increasing predictability is the use of safe harbours such as block exemptions, whether by regulation or through enforcement guidelines. Safe harbours encourage efficiency-enhancing behaviour at the lowest regulatory cost. Companies assigning ‘zero’ risk to a venture category are able to innovate more effectively and allocate capital more efficiently to the benefit of all stakeholders.', 'Another effective regulatory tool is the award or predictable, transparent benefit for compliance efforts. The Commission expects companies to comply with competition rules and evaluates positively any effort made by them in this respect. However, it is reluctant to take into consideration the existence of a competition compliance programme as a mitigating circumstance for the calculation of applicable fines contrary to other jurisdictions that see such programmes as a mitigating factor, as well as provide clear guidance on what is expected of such a programme. It seems clear that transparent and predictable ‘credit’ for an effective compliance programme would serve to devote more resources to compliance efforts, increasing overall compliance, and consumer welfare.', 'And when despite all efforts, a government’s clear and simple rules lead to enforcement action, the availability of predictable, fair, and transparent investigation and appeals procedures are a core element in a company’s assessment of overall legal risk. Among the more important rights of defense are as follows:', '(i) The ability to know, in good time, what are the allegations against you and evidence on the authority’s file that could exonerate.', '(ii) The ability to access the evidence on which these allegations rely.', '(iii) The ability to present at a hearing of decision-makers, based on a complete record.', '(iv) The ability to appeal the final decision to an independent court that carries out an in-depth review.', 'Many countries, particularly developing agencies, do not have effective basic due process rights, yielding arbitrary decisions not based on the rule of law and sound economic evidence. Weak procedural due process also provides opportunities for governments to leverage competition law to achieve political objectives. These concerns are particularly serious in those jurisdictions where domestic entities that have economic or strategic importance may benefit from the outcome of an investigation. It is also important to note that while many countries have procedural rights on paper, these are not always applied in practice. Procedural fairness needs to extend beyond words on a page to ensure certainty and an outcome that addresses the concerns raised.', 'V. The EU as a model agency for new competition tools', 'EU competition policy is a model for many other competition authorities worldwide. Countries that have historically struggled with the fair process will almost certainly be inspired by new tools that decrease transparency and predictability in the EU or any other leading competition regimes. Such tools could be used to justify increasingly divergent outcomes abroad or even serve to legitimise arbitrary interventions.', 'A potential example of innovation in this area is the proposed new competition enforcement tool which the Commission launched in June 20203 (and which is currently going through public consultation). Under the proposed tool, the standard for Commission intervention could be lowered substantially as the Commission may no longer be required to establish dominance in order to impose behavioural or structural remedies3. The New Competition Tool is not limited and could, therefore, be generally applicable across all sectors of the economy and would allow the Commission to intervene in any given industry where it claims there are structural competition problems. Since any claimed deficiencies would result from the very market structure and not from any wrongdoings, companies would arguably not be able to predict or avoid government intervention and may instead have to live with a constant uncertainty surrounding the application of competition law. The current proposal seems to suggest that a remedy can be imposed without the finding of an infringement (and by an agency not tasked with industry or sector regulation). The fact that practices or behaviour under such a tool may only result in remedies and possibly not fines does not make such tools less problematic. As mentioned, the business implications of remedies and the uncertainty costs can be equally damaging financially and deter investment, development, and innovation.', 'As the Commission considers new and expanded powers to account for technological advances, it should be highly cautious of tools granting unclear and expansive discretion. While it may be tempting to simply reserve the unrestrained right to intervene and ‘fix’ market problems, the resulting lack of transparency seems almost certainly to lead to at least two damaging effects. First, law-abiding companies seeking to engage in societally beneficial transactions would be forced to weigh the potential business costs flowing from any unclear rules. As noted, this kind of regulatory drag on efficient allocation of resources is a real and typical consideration in many transactions. Second, government actors outside the EU would almost certainly reserve similar discretion in the application of their own competition laws. Many may feel empowered to use these new tools in arbitrary ways as a means of reciprocity for perceived unfairness to national champions in other cases. The combined weight of over 100 arbitrary systems could be crippling to global business.', 'Once clear tools are created, the Commission should continue to investigate how best to provide informal guidance on a case by case basis. The Commission could encourage companies to make more use of informal (confidential) meetings with the Commission in order to discuss the interpretation of concrete questions in connection with a certain horizontal cooperation project or otherwise. In this respect, it is critical that the Commission provides informal confidential guidance, formally committing that it will not use the information provided for any other purpose than the informal guidance.', 'Properly implemented, new competition tools could greatly benefit consumers and companies alike. But the importance of this framework flows from increases in efficiency, not from increases in violations. Indeed, in the creation of new and expanded powers, the most positive result would not be a rash of new enforcement, but instead the further development and evolution of our clear understanding of what constitutes effective competition under EU law.', 'Finally, if tools are created, they should not only be clear in the application (upfront) but also plainly focused on economic concerns. The recent worldwide trend towards protectionism in global trade has created clear and measurable negative impacts on global prosperity. Further embedding these protectionist tendencies into EU competition law has the potential to completely undermine the level playing field for which competition laws were created. This is not to say that national security and industrial policy are not important issues—they clearly are vital. But the co-mingling of diverse and inherently opaque principles into competition law would inject additional and potentially damaging uncertainty']

[(13, 22)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-FullerTown-Octas.docx

Northwestern

DeFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/DeFr/Northwestern-Deo-Fridman-Aff-FullerTown-Octas.docx

e31de04d43df1da224c4ea2a93ff5150f82d6d569312938ad291b1787bcd9466

Chinese AI leadership leads to nuclear war.

Jiayu Zhang 20, candidate in the Master of Arts Security Policy Studies program at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, 8/16/2020, "China’s Military Employment of Artificial Intelligence and Its Security Implications — THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW," https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/blog-post-title-four-xgtap

China’s AI application to military affairs impacts flashpoints for military confrontation . the PLA’s military power facilitated by AI has already activated a security dilemma concerning China’s assertiveness in territorial disputes and growing ambitions about the regional order. China’s willingness to escalate will increase because its AI tech would provide a decisive advantage China’s success may encourage other s to copy its success . Given potential nuclear escalation China’s use of AI could take on destabilizing qualities . China could deploy swarms an escalatory scenario could develop may intensify a nuclear war caused by accidental fire or false detection

China’s development of AI and its application of such technologies to military affairs impacts on many regional and international issues . This article focuses on the Western Pacific, where most of China’s major security concerns and the potential flashpoints for future military confrontation are centered . For a region that is already tense and crowded, a regional competition for AI primacy may trigger an AI arms race The PLA's efforts to enhance nuclear capabilities through AI will have both stabilizing and destabilizing influence on strategic stability . Ultimately, the introduction of AI to the modern battlefield may help China tip the military balance the PLA’s increasing military power facilitated by its application of AI technology has already activated a security dilemma , especially concerning China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial disputes and growing ambitions about the regional order. The PLA’s employment of AI-enabled early-warning systems and unmanned intelligent combat vehicles will enhance China’s awareness of disputed areas like the Senkaku Islands and enable a quick response capability . From the perspective of other countries in the region, China’s willingness to escalate in such scenarios will increase because its AI tech nology would provide it with a decisive advantage in a conflict with limited costs China’s success in influencing U.S. strategic calculation and military posture by military employment of AI may encourage other countrie s to copy its success . Given the dynamics of nuclear posture of major powers in the region and the potential role of nuclear escalation in certain scenarios, AI-enabled improvement of the PLA’s multi-domain operation capabilities has both destabilizing and stabilizing impacts on strategic stability Regarding China’s employment of nuclear weapons, military-technology considerations stressing the plausible U.S. conventional military operation against Chinese nuclear capabilities are the reasons behind China’s use of limited nuclear escalation. China’s use of AI and autonomy for nuclear offense and defense could take on destabilizing qualities . China could deploy swarms to track and intercept U.S. dual- capable platforms . Whether intentionally or unintentionally , an escalatory scenario could develop . it may intensify U.S. concerns about false positives,such as a nuclear war caused by accidental fire or false detection

China’s development of AI military affairs impacts regional international issues major security concerns potential flashpoints future military confrontation centered AI arms race stabilizing destabilizing strategic stability already activated a security dilemma increasing assertiveness territorial disputes growing ambitions disputed areas quick response capability other countries willingness to escalate increase AI tech decisive advantage U.S. strategic calculation military posture military employment copy its success nuclear posture nuclear escalation destabilizing stabilizing strategic stability plausible U.S. conventional military operation nuclear capabilities AI autonomy nuclear offense defense destabilizing qualities swarms track intercept U.S. dual- capable platforms intentionally unintentionally escalatory scenario develop nuclear war accidental fire false detection

['SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE MILITARY’S EMPLOYMENT OF AI', "China’s development of AI and its application of such technologies to military affairs impacts on many regional and international issues. This article focuses on the Western Pacific, where most of China’s major security concerns and the potential flashpoints for future military confrontation are centered. For a region that is already tense and crowded, a regional competition for AI primacy may trigger an AI arms race and pose an ambiguous effect on arms control concerning autonomous lethal weapon systems. The PLA's efforts to enhance nuclear capabilities through AI will have both stabilizing and destabilizing influence on strategic stability. Ultimately, the introduction of AI to the modern battlefield may help China tip the military balance, but its potential to change the essence of armed conflict and the way in which war is waged is limited.", '1. Arms Race and Arms Control', 'Some voices in China are calling upon the Chinese government to avoid an AI arms race. While it is hard to define whether the struggle for technological primacy fits the definition of an arms race, the competition among actors in the Western Pacific for advanced AI technology has already intensified. South Korea has allocated many resources to research AI-based command systems, aviation training systems, and object-tracking techniques.63 Other efforts made by Seoul to militarize AI technology include works on the Exobrain and ADAMs projects for the potential enhancement of C4ISR, virtual combat exercises, and self-navigation algorithms.64 Even though its general technological capabilities are nascent, North Korea engages in the competition by focusing on some aspects of AI that can be used to elevate its current military operations. It has been suggested that Kim Il Sung University and the Korea Computer Center have advanced the Ryongnamsan 5.1 speech-recognition systems, audio classification, and deep fakes to reinforce cyber aggressions.65', 'China’s rapid progress in AI and its military application have encouraged such competition and may trigger a potential arms race in two ways. First, the PLA’s increasing military power facilitated by its application of AI technology has already activated a security dilemma, especially concerning China’s increasing assertiveness in territorial disputes and growing ambitions about the regional order. The PLA’s employment of AI-enabled early-warning systems and unmanned intelligent combat vehicles will enhance China’s awareness of Japanese and South Korean operations in disputed areas like the Senkaku Islands and enable a quick response capability. From the perspective of other countries in the region, China’s willingness to escalate in such scenarios will increase because its AI technology would provide it with a decisive advantage in a conflict with limited costs, despite increasing the potential of accidental escalation.66 Other countries’ have begun to pursue more defense measures, a move that reflects concern about China’s potential threat, including the development of weapon-grade AI technology. Such defensive measures suggest that tensions triggered by the security dilemma in the region will be more complicated and expand beyond an AI arms race. Nuclear proliferation, targeting civilian infrastructure that supports AI technology, and more cyber aggression may be seen in this context.', '', '', 'Second, China’s success in influencing U.S. strategic calculation and military posture by military employment of AI may encourage other countries to copy its success. Other countries who see themselves as adversaries of the United States may be motivated to increase AI investment and attempt to install related technology to their missiles to exercise coercion and threats. For U.S. allies like Japan, the introduction of AI in early-warning, situational awareness, and intelligence processing may not only help reduce reliance on U.S. extended deterrence, but also strengthen their ability to counter regional rivals like China and North Korea.', "Thus, the proliferation of AI technology, especially those can be weaponized, poses challenges to the arms control community in the region. Given the highly dual-use nature of AI, civilian AI technology cooperation between countries may contribute to the unintentional proliferation of destructive AI systems, a situation which is similar to the dual-use dilemma of nuclear cooperation.67 On the practical level, weapon-, behavior-, or country-focused controls will face different problems ranging from how to define controlled weapons to how to verify the control measures.68 On the political level, countries' attitudes toward AI arms control are ambiguous. In 2018, China demonstrated its “desire to negotiate and conclude” a new protocol for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons to ban the use of autonomous lethal weapons systems.69 However, the delegation stressed that the ban should only apply to the use of such weapons, and not to their development, revealing China’s actual misgivings regarding arms control for autonomous systems.70", '2. Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk', 'Nuclear strategic stability is understood as “a state of affairs in which countries are confident that their adversaries would not be able to undermine their nuclear deterrence capability” using nuclear, conventional, cyber or other means.71 Given the dynamics of nuclear posture of major powers in the region and the potential role of nuclear escalation in certain scenarios, AI-enabled improvement of the PLA’s multi-domain operation capabilities has both destabilizing and stabilizing impacts on strategic stability.', 'China has long been concerned about false negatives from its early warning systems, which may result in failures to detect nuclear attacks.72 To some extent, such concerns are rooted in China’s assumptions about its own early warning deficiencies and its own inability to counter a stealthy and prompt precision strike from the United States.73 Regarding China’s employment of nuclear weapons, military-technology considerations stressing the plausible U.S. conventional military operation against Chinese nuclear capabilities are the reasons behind China’s use of limited nuclear escalation.74 As a result, if China gains greater situational awareness and can strengthen its nuclear retaliatory capabilities by applying AI technology to its C4ISR and early- warning systems, some of its insecurities about a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” strike may be mitigated, which will stabilize the nuclear risk.75Yet China’s insecurities are not simply a question of technology. The key factors are China’s perception of U.S. nuclear posture and its assumption of U.S. intent. In this sense, China’s use of AI and autonomy for nuclear offense and defense could take on destabilizing qualities. For Beijing, the prospect of the United States resuming a forward-deployed, tactical nuclear posture exacerbates its sense of encirclement. The issuance of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review worsens the context. China views the documents’ focus on ballistic missile defense and conventional prompt global strike as preemptive and destabilizing.76 Additionally, the proposal for the enlargement of the U.S. arsenal of low-yield submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles and the concept of using nuclear coercion to preemptively de-escalate a conventional conflict like Taiwan scenario further elicit Chinese concerns over U.S. intent. AI and autonomous technology offer Beijing the potential to respond to such a posture. China could deploy swarms to track and intercept U.S. dual- capable platforms. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, an escalatory scenario could develop. While the PLA’s deployment of advanced AI-enabled early warning systems and automation-enabled launch-on-fire missiles may mitigate China’s fear of false negatives, it may intensify U.S. concerns about false positives,such as a nuclear war caused by accidental fire or false detection.', '', '', '']

[(6, 11), (12, 14)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ArHi-Neg-Wayne-State-Octas.docx

Northwestern

ArHi

cd538675a511d1097de57f61ad988154fd96c61ee085ac9202f164adfd04e653

White power nuclear terrorist attacks cause infinite racial violence through the annihilation of the non-white – the unifying doctrine that they act upon is a step-by-step manual on how to conduct nuclear genocidal terrorism that they have historically deployed

Belew 2018 [Dr. Kathleen Belew is a research fellow at Stanford, an assistant professor of history at the University of Chicago and an international authority on the white-power movement (Including testifying on white nationalism in a congressional hearing in 2019). “Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America,” Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018. Copyright © 2018, 978-0-674-98494-3 (PDF), 978-0-674-98492-9 (EPUB)///run-ng]

texts had captured white power activists to action The Turner Diaries the most prominent white power text served this function That The Turner Diaries popped up over and over again in moments of violence, reveals its utility in coordinating The Diaries worked as a how-to manual outlining a plan for race war it describes an all-white utopia. a series of terrorist attacks up to the use of nuclear weapons to clear the world of nonwhite populations the novel describes forced migration of people of color the genocide of Jews, the nuclear bombing of high-density black populations and public lynching of all people in interracial relationships The book drew heavily on veterans as white power soldiers and on paramilitary violence The protagonist, implies many were military men He then performs violent action The diary ends as Turner prepares to fly a a sixty-kiloton nuclear warhead—into the Pentagon This strategy dependent on secrecy, loyalty, and violence, would become the real-life Order and a guidebook for terrorist violence leaderless resistance factions could use that same narrative to operate with minimal coordination from leadership This is by no means as impractical as it appears because all persons have the same outlook and react to situations in similar ways activists hoped to follow the model of The Turner Diaries in a campaign of violence and seize a white homeland a white America, a white world by annihilation of all people of color. The Turner Diaries provided an outline for each step

. In this new climate, movement texts that had already captured the imagination of white power activists came to play a major role in shaping action . The racist utopian novel The Turner Diaries , perhaps the most prominent white power text , was one that served this function That The Turner Diaries popped up over and over again in the hands of key movement actors, particularly in moments of violence, reveals its utility in coordinating acts of underground resistance . The Turner Diaries worked as a foundational how-to manual for the movement , outlining a detailed plan for race war . Presented as a diary found and published after a white racist revolution has overthrown the U.S. government, it describes an all-white utopia. It recounts a series of terrorist attacks leading up to the partitioning of a white homeland in California and the use of nuclear weapons to clear first the United States and then the world of nonwhite populations . In the future world, in which the diary serves as a historical artifact of the revolution, the white supremacist army, called the Organization, has abolished the dollar, started a new calendar at year zero, and made women subservient . At various moments, the novel describes the forced migration of all people of color out of California, the genocide of Jews, the nuclear bombing of high-density black populations in the South , and the public lynching of all people in interracial relationships . The book drew heavily on the idea of veterans as white power soldiers and on the utility of paramilitary violence . The protagonist, Earl Turner, implies that many Organization members were military men . Turner says, “We have decades of guerrilla warfare in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to instruct us,” and he warns that the white supremacist movement will force the public “into the front lines, where they must choose sides and participate, whether they like it or not.”39 In the novel, set in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Earl Turner works as a soldier in the racist movement attempting to overthrow the government, which he calls the System. An engineer handy with weaponry, Turner advances quickly through the ranks; after he blows up FBI headquarters, the Organization inducts him into the Order, a secret society of key soldiers . He then performs the Test of the Word, proving his knowledge of movement ideals, and the Test of the Deed, proving himself through violent action . He vows to kill himself before giving away the group’s secrets. The Order, he writes, “will remain secret, even within the Organization, until the successful completion of the first phase of our task: the destruction of the System.” When Turner is arrested, he breaks his vows by failing to kill himself with a cyanide capsule prior to interrogation. Although the group breaks him out of prison, they decide to punish him for his failure by assigning him a suicide mission. The diary ends as Turner prepares to fly a small plane—loaded with a sixty-kiloton nuclear warhead—into the Pentagon . A small afterword, in the voice of someone who has found Turner’s diary, describes the ensuing revolution and white victory after his death. This narrative, outlining a strategy that is dependent on secrecy, loyalty, and violence, would become the sustaining myth of a real-life Order dedicated to a violent war on the state, and a guidebook for decades of white power terrorist violence . Much as the white power movement used racism, anticommunism, and frustration over the experience and loss of the Vietnam War to bind together previously disparate groups, leaderless resistance factions could use that same narrative to operate on their own, with only minimal coordination from leadership . The answer to this question is that participants in a program of Leaderless Resistance through phantom cell organization must know exactly what they are doing and how to do it. This is by no means as impractical as it appears , because it is certainly true that in any movement, all persons involved have the same general outlook , are acquainted with the same philosophy, and generally react to given situations in similar ways . As the entire purpose of Leaderless Resistance is to defeat the enemy by whatever means possible, all members of phantom cells will tend to react to objective events in the same way, usually through the tactics of resistance and sabotage.41 In other words, Beam’s strategy relied on the viewpoint, values, and predictable reactions shared by white power groups to form them into an army. The Vietnam War narrative was critical here, as it framed both the general outlook and philosophy of white power paramilitarism, and because it provided the repertoire from which activists and cells might select violent actions.42 This guerrilla war on the state was never intended to succeed through an outright coup aimed at overwhelming the military and police, at least not in the early stages. The overwhelming militarization and armament of the state discounted such a strategy even for those who dreamed of race war. Instead activists in resistance cells hoped to follow the model of The Turner Diaries in mounting a campaign of violence designed to awaken a sympathetic white public . They hoped that acts like destroying infrastructure, poisoning water, assassinating political targets, and undermining public confidence in currency would reveal the problems with “the System.” They thought people of color, race traitors, Jews, communists, journalists, academics, and other enemies were lost causes. But they hoped that they could sway a white public in their favor, make small territorial gains, and eventually seize movement objectives ranging from a white homeland in the Pacific Northwest, to a white America, to a white world secured by the annihilation of all people of color. The Turner Diaries provided an outline for each step of this plan. 43

['Cell warfare without direction from movement leadership depended upon commonly held cultural narratives and values, and shared texts and symbols, to motivate and coordinate activity. In this new climate, movement texts that had already captured the imagination of white power activists came to play a major role in shaping action. The racist utopian novel The Turner Diaries, perhaps the most prominent white power text, was one that served this function. It first appeared in serial form in Attack!, the newspaper of the neo-Nazi group National Alliance, in 1974. Group leader and author William Pierce published it in paperback under the pseudonym of Andrew Macdonald in 1978.37 Over the next twenty years, The Turner Diaries sold some 500,000 copies, gaining tremendous popularity both in the white power movement and around the mercenary soldier circuit. It was advertised in Soldier of Fortune magazine and sold in bookstores as far away as South Africa. That The Turner Diaries popped up over and over again in the hands of key movement actors, particularly in moments of violence, reveals its utility in coordinating acts of underground resistance. Louis Beam would use “Turner” as one of his many aliases. Glenn Miller would later say he handed out some 800 free copies of the book while leading the White Patriot Party, and an undercover informant verified that he received the book during his induction to that group. Order member Bruce Pierce would be arrested carrying a copy, and Order member Randall Rader would say the group kept a stack of twenty to thirty copies in the bunkhouse at Bob Mathews’s farm. Timothy McVeigh would sell the novel on the gun show circuit prior to his bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building.38 The Turner Diaries worked as a foundational how-to manual for the movement, outlining a detailed plan for race war. Presented as a diary found and published after a white racist revolution has overthrown the U.S. government, it describes an all-white utopia. It recounts a series of terrorist attacks leading up to the partitioning of a white homeland in California and the use of nuclear weapons to clear first the United States and then the world of nonwhite populations. In the future world, in which the diary serves as a historical artifact of the revolution, the white supremacist army, called the Organization, has abolished the dollar, started a new calendar at year zero, and made women subservient. At various moments, the novel describes the forced migration of all people of color out of California, the genocide of Jews, the nuclear bombing of high-density black populations in the South, and the public lynching of all people in interracial relationships. The book drew heavily on the idea of veterans as white power soldiers and on the utility of paramilitary violence. The protagonist, Earl Turner, implies that many Organization members were military men. Turner says, “We have decades of guerrilla warfare in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to instruct us,” and he warns that the white supremacist movement will force the public “into the front lines, where they must choose sides and participate, whether they like it or not.”39 In the novel, set in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Earl Turner works as a soldier in the racist movement attempting to overthrow the government, which he calls the System. An engineer handy with weaponry, Turner advances quickly through the ranks; after he blows up FBI headquarters, the Organization inducts him into the Order, a secret society of key soldiers. He then performs the Test of the Word, proving his knowledge of movement ideals, and the Test of the Deed, proving himself through violent action. He vows to kill himself before giving away the group’s secrets. The Order, he writes, “will remain secret, even within the Organization, until the successful completion of the first phase of our task: the destruction of the System.” When Turner is arrested, he breaks his vows by failing to kill himself with a cyanide capsule prior to interrogation. Although the group breaks him out of prison, they decide to punish him for his failure by assigning him a suicide mission. The diary ends as Turner prepares to fly a small plane—loaded with a sixty-kiloton nuclear warhead—into the Pentagon. A small afterword, in the voice of someone who has found Turner’s diary, describes the ensuing revolution and white victory after his death. This narrative, outlining a strategy that is dependent on secrecy, loyalty, and violence, would become the sustaining myth of a real-life Order dedicated to a violent war on the state, and a guidebook for decades of white power terrorist violence.40 Beam, too, wanted white power activists to organize as a guerrilla army. For the cell structure, he drew both on the organization of counterinsurgency combat troops and on the organization of the communist revolutionaries they faced in wars and mercenary interventions around the world. He called for a network of cells organized not by direct orders from leadership, but by a common set of worldviews, logics, and a violent repertoire of action held in common by movement members. Much as the white power movement used racism, anticommunism, and frustration over the experience and loss of the Vietnam War to bind together previously disparate groups, leaderless resistance factions could use that same narrative to operate on their own, with only minimal coordination from leadership. Essays of a Klansman, printed at Hayden Lake in 1983, contained a two-part piece, “Understanding the Struggle,” that began to outline this strategy. In an undated essay, likely published shortly thereafter, Beam named this approach “Leaderless Resistance” and further refined the idea: Any one cell can be infiltrated, exposed and destroyed, but this will have no effect on the others; in fact, the members of the other cells will be supporting that cell which is under attack. … At first glance, such a type of organization seems unrealistic, because the natural question is, how are the cells to cooperate with each other, when there is no intercommunication or central direction? The answer to this question is that participants in a program of Leaderless Resistance through phantom cell organization must know exactly what they are doing and how to do it. This is by no means as impractical as it appears, because it is certainly true that in any movement, all persons involved have the same general outlook, are acquainted with the same philosophy, and generally react to given situations in similar ways. As the entire purpose of Leaderless Resistance is to defeat the enemy by whatever means possible, all members of phantom cells will tend to react to objective events in the same way, usually through the tactics of resistance and sabotage.41 In other words, Beam’s strategy relied on the viewpoint, values, and predictable reactions shared by white power groups to form them into an army. The Vietnam War narrative was critical here, as it framed both the general outlook and philosophy of white power paramilitarism, and because it provided the repertoire from which activists and cells might select violent actions.42 This guerrilla war on the state was never intended to succeed through an outright coup aimed at overwhelming the military and police, at least not in the early stages. The overwhelming militarization and armament of the state discounted such a strategy even for those who dreamed of race war. Instead activists in resistance cells hoped to follow the model of The Turner Diaries in mounting a campaign of violence designed to awaken a sympathetic white public. They hoped that acts like destroying infrastructure, poisoning water, assassinating political targets, and undermining public confidence in currency would reveal the problems with “the System.” They thought people of color, race traitors, Jews, communists, journalists, academics, and other enemies were lost causes. But they hoped that they could sway a white public in their favor, make small territorial gains, and eventually seize movement objectives ranging from a white homeland in the Pacific Northwest, to a white America, to a white world secured by the annihilation of all people of color. The Turner Diaries provided an outline for each step of this plan. 43', '', 'Asteroid Counterplan', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-8.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

caa0ee8adee2a00d330b3ca9d826b0c6abc93cb189902998585db8ac675d36e3

It’s the nuclear option.

Turley ’13 [Jonathan; October 2013; J.D. and Maurice C. Shapiro Chair of Public Interest Law at George Washington University; Boston University Law Review, “Recess Appointments in the Age of Regulation,” vol. 93]

Congress holds power of the purse , the exercise to cut off funding to programs is the ultimate " nuclear option ."

While Congress holds the power of the purse , the exercise of that power to cut off funding to agencies that administer critical programs is considered by many to be the ultimate " nuclear option ."

power of the purse exercise cut off funding critical programs ultimate nuclear option

['When viewed from the standpoint of Congress, the new age of regulation and rise in executive power has left it in a subordinate position. While Congress holds the\xa0power of the purse, the exercise of that power to cut off funding to agencies that administer critical social programs or perform critical social functions is considered by many to be the ultimate "nuclear\xa0option." The shared appointment power, by contrast, offers Congress a less drastic method by which it may express its opposition to presidential power or policy. While the Senate threatened to withhold funds from CFPB, it first used its confirmation authority to try to force the President to the negotiation table on the structure and function of CFPB.\xa0135\xa0Many scholars and politicians argue that it is improper for Congress to block confirmation of a qualified nominee simply to push for a change in executive policy.\xa0136\xa0The Senate has been known to reject or filibuster qualified nominees based entirely on ideology or to stop business during tension with the White House.\xa0137\xa0In the Cordray controversy, for example, the Senate\'s decision to block confirmation was tied directly to its opposition to the Bureau he had been appointed to lead.\xa0138\xa0Indeed, the Cordray nomination fits neatly within the construct of a response by Congress to the fear of unchecked administrative power in an executive agency, including control of the appropriation of funds. With the reduction of congressional control over federal regulatory decisionmaking, Congress has turned to confirmations as a vehicle to influence agency policy and operations. Thus, in 1998, when Congress moved to make the Federal Election Commission\'s General Counsel subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, it did so not because of any specific concerns over any specific appointee, but because it was generally unhappy with the work and structure of that agency.\xa0139']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Michigan-DoPh-Neg-NDT-Round-5.docx

Michigan

DoPh

402ab07a3e5d4bbbed1ccd4bae15994eab3086aadf7c1b90a26f1994cbe93381

No South Korea prolif.

Bruce Klinger 23. Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center, specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs. “Crisis of Credibility: The Need to Strengthen U.S. Extended Deterrence in Asia.” 2/23/23. https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/BG3751.pdf

So Ko ’s nuclear energy accounts for 30 percent of electricity weapons program would end export of reactors does not have stockpile of uranium nor enrichment or reprocessing facilities take at least two years to produce few bombs program would violate U.S cooperation agreemen A E A government face fierce resistance from constituencies nuclear test trigger sanctions lead to withdrawal of U.S. forces weapons cause Beijing to retaliate with devastating sanctions

South Korean nuclear weapons would violate the NPT or require Seoul to withdraw from the agreement Either action would require the NSG to curtail So uth Ko rea ’s civilian nuclear energy program which accounts for 30 percent of the country’s electricity weapons program would likely end South Korea’s export of civilian nuclear reactors Seoul is nearing completion of a $20 billion civilian nuclear deal with the United Arab Emirates and recently signed an agreement for further nuclear cooperation South Korea depends on other countries for enrichment services It does not have a stockpile of uranium or weapons-grade plutonium nor fissile material enrichment or reprocessing facilities Building nuclear weapons would require using existing civilian reactor fissile material and converting some of its reactors to produce weapons fuel, a process that could take at least two years to produce even a few bombs , let alone a credible nuclear deterrent. An indigenous nuclear weapons program would violate the U.S .–South Korea bilateral nuclear cooperation agreemen t as well as the A tomic E nergy A ct and would strain relations with Washington. Seoul would need to test a completed nuclear weapon and build a nuclear arsenal. The national government would likely face fierce resistance from local constituencies to hosting a nuclear test site . A nuclear test would also trigger the U.S. Glenn Amendment sanctions Seoul keeping its nuclear force separate from integrated command structure would raise U.S. concerns about South Korea’s military concept of employment could lead to calls in Washington for the withdrawal of U.S. forces either due to anxiety of being drawn into South Korean escalatory actions or perceptions that Seoul could now go it alone South Korean development of nuclear weapons mounted on offensive missiles that would be able to reach China would likely cause Beijing to retaliate with devastating economic sanctions after Seoul’s decision to deploy THAAD South Korean manufacturers suffered at least $7.5 billion in economic losses, and the South Korean tourism industry may have suffered as much as $15 billion in losses South Korean boldness in defying China to build nuclear weapons would be at odds with Seoul’s past and ongoing timidity an indigenous nuclear program of sufficient size to be a deterrent to North Korea would divert an enormous amount of South Korea’s defense budget away from critical requirements Those defense funds would be better spent augmenting conventional force requirements and the bilateral plan for the transition of wartime operational command.

30 percent does not have a stockpile or reprocessing facilities take at least two years even a few bombs fierce resistance sanctions withdrawal of U.S. forces cause Beijing to retaliate divert an enormous amount critical requirements

['South Korean nuclear weapons would violate the NPT or require Seoul to withdraw from the agreement. Either action would require the NSG to curtail supply of fissile material to South Korea’s civilian nuclear energy program,25 which accounts for 30 percent of the country’s electricity. The NSG could also request the return of all previously provided fissile material. A weapons program would likely end South Korea’s export of civilian nuclear reactors. Seoul is nearing completion of a $20 billion civilian nuclear deal with the United Arab Emirates and recently signed an agreement for further nuclear cooperation.26 South Korea imports all the uranium used for its civilian nuclear reactors and depends on other countries for enrichment services. It does not have a stockpile of uranium or weapons-grade plutonium nor fissile material enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Building nuclear weapons would require using existing civilian reactor fissile material and converting some of its reactors to produce weapons fuel, a process that could take at least two years to produce even a few bombs, let alone a credible nuclear deterrent.27 An indigenous nuclear weapons program would violate the U.S.–South Korea bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement28 as well as the Atomic Energy Act29 and would strain relations with Washington. The U.S. provides its extended deterrence guarantee in return for South Korea not seeking its own nuclear weapons and remaining a signatory to the NPT. To provide a viable deterrent against North Korea, Seoul would need to test a completed nuclear weapon to prove its design and fabrication and build a nuclear arsenal. The national government would likely face fierce resistance from local constituencies to hosting a nuclear test site. A nuclear test would also trigger the U.S. Glenn Amendment sanctions, which include prohibitions on foreign assistance; munitions sales and licenses; foreign military financing; government credits, guarantees, and financial assistance; U.S. support for multilateral financial assistance; private bank lending to the affected government; and exports of certain specific controlled goods and technology. Nuclear weapons advocates have not yet addressed whether South Korean nuclear weapons would be integrated into the U.S.–South Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC) and Operations Plan 5015 (the allied strategic plan for a major conflict with North Korea). If so, South Korean nuclear weapons would still be subject to the National Command Authorities of both countries. Seoul keeping its nuclear force separate from the integrated command structure would raise U.S. concerns about South Korea’s military concept of employment. South Korea developing nuclear weapons could lead to calls in Washington for the withdrawal of U.S. forces either due to anxiety of being drawn into South Korean escalatory actions or perceptions that Seoul could now go it alone since it no longer trusted the American commitment. South Korean development of nuclear weapons mounted on offensive missiles that would be able to reach China would likely cause Beijing to retaliate with far more devastating economic sanctions than those imposed after Seoul’s 2016 decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense system. South Korean manufacturers suffered at least $7.5 billion in economic losses, and the South Korean tourism industry may have suffered as much as $15 billion in losses. Seoul could declare that its nuclear weapons were directed only at North Korea, as it did with THAAD, but Beijing would likely interpret it as part of a U.S.-led anti-China coalition. South Korean boldness in defying China to build nuclear weapons would be at odds with Seoul’s past and ongoing timidity in refraining from criticizing Beijing’s human rights violations and sovereignty transgressions in the East and South China Seas. In joint statements with the United States, South Korea was willing to criticize Chinese actions but, unlike Japan and Australia, refrained from identifying Beijing as the perpetrator.30 Similarly, South Korea’s Indo–Pacific Strategy released in December 2022 contained only one reference to China, and that was a positive depiction. By contrast, Japan’s National Security and Defense Strategies released the same month harshly and repeatedly criticized China. Finally, an indigenous nuclear program of sufficient size to be a deterrent to North Korea would divert an enormous amount of South Korea’s defense budget away from critical requirements to duplicate an existing capability that the U.S. currently provides. Those defense funds would be better spent augmenting conventional force requirements and the bilateral plan for the transition of wartime operational command.', '']

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ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Aff-1---NUSO-Round-5.docx

Emory

MiPi

6579700208605e4bd13ed27df2d2ee2897c94d5d399b52ab48815b672a76d1d7

No conventional shift---civilian leaders can declare force reductions without fill-in, AND no manufacturing scale-up

John Ferrari 24, retired US Army Major General, "The Pentagon has been learning the wrong lessons for three decades," 31 January 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2024/01/pentagon-has-been-learning-wrong-lessons-three-decades/393765/

we can no longer build at scale With policy for more tech advanced systems, we forgot we have to build them DOD forced itself into a “top-down” rev Small groups have used tech to become super powered, yet DOD has failed to deliver anything broken i t is set to drive decisions down rather than enabling innovation The rare counterexample underscores how muc h is going un developed Civilian s dictate force-sizing to fit their budget s forcing leaders to state t hey have the forces they need our forces keep shrinking and will continue to

we can no longer build weapons at scale wars defy the assumption that they will be short or only occur in sequence. With policy pushing for ever more tech nologically advanced systems, we forgot that we actually have to build them DOD forced itself into a “top-down” rev olution. Small groups have used tech nology from the commercial and military sectors to become super -em powered, yet DOD has failed to deliver anything nearly as potent to its own troops DOD’s all-but- broken i t is set up to drive decisions down rather than enabling innovation The rare counterexample only underscores how muc h is going un developed mass matters . We now have the smallest active-duty Army since W W II a light Joint Force doesn’t stack up against the realities of warfare today Russians can marshal more resources. Israel has mobilized its population we are seeing a reversion to early 20th-century warfare We ignore these realities as China pursues modernization and buildup Civilian leader s within DOD dictate the force-sizing construct in order to fit their agenda . They change assumptions to meet the budget constraint s they want, forcing uniformed leaders to state that t hey have the forces they need to meet the strategy our military forces keep shrinking and barring action, will continue to do so

we can no longer build weapons at scale policy pushing for tech nologically advanced forgot that we actually have to build them Small groups failed to deliver i t underscores how muc h is going un developed mass matters reversion to early 20th-century warfare dictate the force-sizing fit their agenda meet the budget constraint s forcing uniformed leaders to state that t hey have the forces they need forces keep shrinking will continue to do so

['The first is that we can no longer build weapons at scale. Our magazines are routinely depleted as wars defy the assumption that they will be short or only occur in sequence. With policy pushing for ever more technologically advanced systems, we forgot that we actually have to build them. One bright point within DOD is the call for drones as part of DOD’s Replicator initiative. If the Pentagon successfully fields drones at the scale and condensed timeframes put forth by the initiative, then it could act as a path forward for future weapons design. But we shouldn’t wait to find out. Therefore, the first reform should be a requirement that weapons be “designed to be manufactured at scale.” ', 'The second characteristic of force design is that the technological revolution that we saw in the 1990s led to a “bottom-up” revolution, but DOD instead has forced itself into believing it was a “top-down” revolution. Small groups have used technology from both the commercial and military sectors to become super-empowered, yet DOD has failed to deliver anything nearly as potent to its own troops. ISIS, for example, was using the Internet to wage war more than a decade ago. Meanwhile, DOD’s all-but-broken information-technology system is set up to drive decisions down into the formation rather than enabling innovation at the lowest levels. The rare counterexample, such as the Army’s IVAS system, only underscores how much is going undeveloped. To reverse the flow of innovation in DOD today, and make it move from bottom to top, a new requirement is again in order. Our military leaders should mandate that all information-technology solutions start with the user and then roll up—exactly the opposite of what’s in place today.', '', '', 'The third characteristic is that mass matters. We now have the smallest active-duty Army since World War II and the Navy and Air Force are shrinking rapidly. Operation concepts for a light Joint Force doesn’t stack up well against the realities of warfare we’re witnessing today. The Russians are holding territory because they can marshal more resources. Israel has mobilized its population to fight. Broadly speaking, we are seeing a reversion to early 20th-century warfare in the first quarter of the 21st century. We ignore these realities at our own peril, especially as trouble brews in yet another theater as China pursues a military modernization and buildup.', 'To put mass at the core of how the military plans and thinks about the next war, DOD should do as my colleague Mackenzie Eaglen has stated: bring back “mass and attrition as foundational force planning principles.” That will require uniformed military leaders to embed in the Joint Requirements Process a requirement that the U.S. maintain a force-sizing construct which provides the depth of mass for fighting multiple wars with the staying power for an intense multi-year war. Civilian leaders within DOD have taken it upon themselves to dictate the force-sizing construct in order to fit their agenda. They change their assumptions to meet the budget constraints they want, forcing uniformed leaders to state that they have the forces they need to meet the strategy. At this point, when it comes to the size of our military, there are simply no bright spots: the forces keep shrinking and barring action, will continue to do so.']

[(5, 15)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-ChDe-Aff-ADA-Nationals-at-Indiana-University-Round-2.docx

Northwestern

ChDe

f4719173fd280b4a9b1a69000738512e6052b2c93a2e1af99421aab07d2817c0

2. Climate doesn’t cause extinction.

Dr. Amber Kerr et al. 19, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub; Dr. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research; Dr. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne; Dr. Peter Kalmus, Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab; Professor Richard Betts, Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Working Group 1; Dr. William Huiskamp, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; 6/4/2019, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” , Stras

There is no basis to suggest climate breakdown will mean human extinction Projections of extreme events are difficult to make and vary between models headline claims stem from knock-on effects “beyond capacity to model.” from a scientific perspective , the likelihood is personal speculation rather than conclusion from rigorous evidence

There is no scientific basis to suggest climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life ” (by which I assume the authors mean human extinction ) Projections of extreme events are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different climate models the eye-catching headline -level claims in the report stem almost entirely from knock-on effects , which are “beyond their capacity to model.” from a scientific perspective , the likelihood of civilization coming to an end is essentially personal speculation rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of the available evidence

no scientific basis climate breakdown intelligent life human extinction extreme events very difficult vary greatly different climate models the eye-catching headline -level claims stem almost entirely knock-on effects a scientific perspective essentially personal speculation a clear conclusion rigorous assessment the available evidence

['There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050.', 'However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation!', 'A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions immediately.', 'Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:', 'This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is lazy and counterproductive.', 'Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can survive', 'Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:', 'This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat”---they merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave.', 'North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry up, and rainfall in central America falls by half.', 'Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:', 'Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different climate models.', 'Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over 100 days a year', 'Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:', 'The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1.', 'It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error.', '1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change', 'The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming. Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’.', 'Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research:', 'This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim).', 'Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome?', 'While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will have in the science.', 'Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:', 'It seems that the eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these knock-on effects, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their capacity to model.” Thus, from a scientific perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal speculation on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of the available evidence.', '']

[(10, 24)]

ndtceda

Emory-LoYa-Aff-ada-Round-1.docx

Emory

LoYa

8ef162232ac5553262f9fc9d1825997e0c672ef5269051f0dc375488c1f20968

DAOs fail---decentralization is not progressive---power structures just reassert themselves in different forms.

James Muldoon 22. Senior lecturer in political science at the University of Exeter and author of the forthcoming Platform Socialism: How to Reclaim Our Digital Future From Big Tech. “Web3 Can’t Fix the Internet.” Jacobin, 10 January 2022. https://jacobin.com/2022/01/crypto-blockchain-daos-decentralized-power-capitalism

Blockchain Socialist suggested activist organization could be built through DAO good reason to have reservations be wary of claims decentralization is valuable in itself 70s capitalism incorporate anti-hierarchical managers began to speak language of freedom compatible with capitalist accumulation sidelined solidarity There is nothing progressive about decentralization traditional structures assert themselves unchecked power just reappears who gets to write code, how it’s produced decisions not anticipated by coders one token one vote supports the not-so-democratic idea of money literally buying power decentralization is not democratization smart contracts can be automated, but deliberative processes can’t be codified On-chain governance leaves unaccountable actors writing code doesn’t address how communities would deliver goods in ways that escape commodification proponents of Web3 aren’t progressives but people trying to get rich

Web3 will be populated by DAOs With voting rights attached to tokens, DAOs provide an incentive structure for people to work for a community and its mission The Blockchain Socialist has suggested that an activist organization could be built through a DAO with democratic governance structures on the blockchain and funds held securely in cryptocurrency that couldn’t be frozen or taken away by a repressive government The possibility sounds interesting — but t here’s also good reason to have reservations DAOs produce a decentralized flat structure without leadership and hierarchy We should be wary of claims that decentralization is a valuable end in itself from the 19 70s onward, capitalism began to incorporate an anti-hierarchical critique into a new way of doing business a new generation of managers began to speak the language of freedom and disruption, which was perfectly compatible with capitalist accumulation because it sidelined concerns of solidarity and social justice There is nothing necessarily progressive about decentralization in the absence of organizational structure, traditional power structures assert themselves unchecked power just reappears at other points in the system — like who gets to write the code, how it’s produced , and what happens when decisions have to be made that are not anticipated by the original coders ConstitutionDAO raised money to try to buy one of the original copies of the US Constitution ConstitutionDAO succeeded but also revealed a lack of basic democratic mechanisms in how the group was organized In DAOs, one token is one vote , which supports the not-so-democratic idea of money quite literally buying you power decentralization is not always democratization DAO governance questions are replaced by “ smart contracts ” Simple processes can be automated, but what is truly important requires complex deliberative processes that can’t be codified On-chain governance leaves most of the real work hashed out by unaccountable actors setting up the processes and writing the code A bunch of crypto folks trying to buy a constitution is an amusing story, but it doesn’t address the real problems of how these communities would be able to deliver public goods in ways that escape new forms of commodification The main proponents of Web3 aren’t progressives committed to notions of social justice, but people trying to get rich and hang their latest innovations on a feel-good story of community power we don’t need another generation of VCs taking over the internet

good reason to have reservations be wary 70s capitalism perfectly compatible with capitalist accumulation sidelined concerns of solidarity and social justice There is nothing necessarily progressive about decentralization traditional power structures assert themselves unchecked just reappears lack of basic democratic mechanisms not-so-democratic money quite literally buying you power decentralization is not always democratization can’t be codified unaccountable actors new forms of commodification aren’t progressives trying to get rich

['Socialist DAOs?', 'Web3 will be populated by Decentralized Autonomous Organizations or “DAOs.” While they sound like anarchist collectives ready to squat an abandoned building or blow up a pipeline, in fact DAOs are a new organizational structure capable of raising money according to a set of rules encoded into the blockchain protocol. They have been described as everything from an efficient “capital formation vehicle” to “a group chat of internet friends with memes and dreams.”', 'With voting rights attached to tokens, DAOs provide an incentive structure for people to work for a community and its mission. The precise legal status of these group chats with a bank account is not entirely clear (except in the state of Wyoming, which recognized the American CryptoFed DAO as a legal business entity).', 'Some features of the DAO are worth exploring. With buy-in from members, the structure could begin to look a lot like a traditional workers’ cooperative. One could imagine a social network DAO in which owner-operators could democratically decide on community guidelines, new features, and rules of membership. Buying and selling tokens would allow people to come and go from the community, and people’s contributions could be reimbursed from a community treasury.', 'The Blockchain Socialist has suggested that an activist organization could be built through a DAO with democratic governance structures on the blockchain and funds held securely in cryptocurrency that couldn’t be frozen or taken away by a repressive government. The possibility sounds interesting — but there’s also good reason to have reservations.', 'Freedom Without Solidarity', 'The first concern is with the idea that DAOs produce a decentralized flat structure without leadership and hierarchy. We should be wary of claims that decentralization is a valuable end in itself. In The New Spirit of Capitalism, sociologists Eve Chiapello and Luc Boltanski suggest that from the 1970s onward, capitalism began to incorporate an anti-hierarchical critique into a new way of doing business. Capitalism largely abandoned the hierarchical Fordist work structure in favor of autonomous network-based forms of organization that were flexible and encouraged employee initiative. Chiapello and Boltanski argue that a new generation of managers began to speak the language of freedom and disruption, which was perfectly compatible with capitalist accumulation because it sidelined concerns of solidarity and social justice. There is nothing necessarily progressive about decentralization; it depends entirely on the political character of the organization and the context in which it operates.', 'But horizontalism can have a flipside — that, in the absence of organizational structure, traditional power structures assert themselves unchecked. DAO advocates claim they produce “trustless” networks. According to crypto-anarchists, the messy world of power inequalities can be circumvented by putting it all into the code. If code is law, then humans don’t have to worry about trust, cooperation, or differences in power and influence. But power doesn’t work like this. It just reappears at other points in the system — like who gets to write the code, how it’s produced, and what happens when decisions have to be made that are not anticipated by the original coders.', 'We’re All Going to Buy It', 'Let’s take the example of ConstitutionDAO, a group that raised money to try to buy one of the original copies of the US Constitution from an auction held by Sotheby’s in 2021. The irony of ConstitutionDAO is that virtually nothing was set in code, not even how much a token was worth, how the Constitution would be owned, what they would do with it, or how this would be decided. The whole system functioned on an enormous leap of faith by members of the community placing their trust in the founding members of the DAO.', 'ConstitutionDAO succeeded in showing that a group of people could quickly raise money online, but it also revealed a lack of basic democratic mechanisms in how the group was organized. Would Bitcoin whales (those with large holdings of Bitcoin) have an oversize influence in the decision-making if they had won? In many DAOs, one token is one vote, which supports the not-so-democratic idea of money quite literally buying you power. If it was one wallet, one vote, would the single donor of $4.5 million be satisfied with the same power as someone who contributed little more than gas money? There are more democratic ways that DAOs could be organized, but they aren’t currently the dominant model in the space.', 'There is nothing necessarily progressive about decentralization.', 'The point here is that decentralization is not always democratization. What matters in a democratic organization is that members have agenda-setting power, participatory rights, and mechanisms to hold leaders to account after decisions are made. In DAOs, some governance questions are said to be replaced by “smart contracts” — coded transaction protocols that automatically execute agreements if certain conditions are fulfilled. Simple processes can be automated, but most of what is truly important to a group requires complex deliberative processes that can’t be codified. On-chain governance could give every member a vote on some issues, but it leaves most of the real work hashed out by unaccountable actors setting up the processes and writing the code.', 'We Deserve Better', 'Abig part of the narrative around Web3 claims that new technology allows us to make a break with the past. But we need to stop and consider whether these new processes actually support socially useful ends or are going to be co-opted by capitalism to develop a new generation of products. A bunch of crypto folks trying to buy a constitution is an amusing story, but it doesn’t address the real problems of how these communities would be able to deliver public goods in ways that escape new forms of commodification.', 'The main proponents of Web3 aren’t progressives committed to notions of social justice, but people trying to get rich and hang their latest innovations on a feel-good story of community power. But we don’t need another generation of VCs taking over the internet. We should be treating it for what it really is — a public service — and creating the organizational structures that make it run in all our interests, not those of private profit.', '']

[(6, 16)]

ndtceda

Emory-MiPi-Neg-Brick-City-Round-Robin-Round-1.docx

Emory

MiPi

e855dcc13d717ed1bcf955219c123cdc7ce115cd3ea25eb05adbcd47a74809a5

Accountability is key to patient trust---anything but holding the AI itself responsible weakens assurance.

Ibrahim Habli et al 20. BSc (AUB), MSc, PhD (University of York) Deputy Head of Department (Research). “Artificial intelligence in health care: accountability and safety.” .

integral part of health-care is accountability underpins patient’s trust in care If human do not have control of a i recommendations patient want to know why recommendations were followed results in a dilemma Either clinician develop own opinions meaning a i adds little value or clinicians accept advice blindly weakening conditions of accountability In the absence o direct control over a i assurance becomes important adaptive behaviour alters clinical environment hard to assess actual risk challenge to the engineer

integral part of any complex health-care system is the implicit promise clinicians and health-care organizations make to patients Moral accountability helps to avoid professional complacency and underpins the patient’s trust in the clinician providing care goodwill is irrelevant, to the decisions reached by a software program. If human clinicians do not have robust control and knowledge of an a rtificial i ntelligence system’s recommendations it would be reasonable for a patient to want to know why those recommendations were followed this action potentially results in a dilemma with two equally undesirable choices. Either clinician s must spend the time to develop their own opinions as to the best course of action, meaning that the a rtificial i ntelligence system adds little value or clinicians must accept the advice blindly weakening both the control and epistemic conditions of moral accountability same dilemma affects safety assurance because the system being assured now includes the clinician. In the absence o f a clinician’s direct , deliberate control over the recommendations reached by an a rtificial i ntelligence system, and given the opacity of many of these systems assurance becomes increasingly important adaptive behaviour of artificial intelligence systems typically alters the clinical environment invalidating the assumptions made in the safety case intended function cannot therefore be fully represented It is therefore much harder through a static safety case, that the system’s specified function preserves safety in all clinical scenarios in which it will operate increasingly hard to assess the actual risk presents an epistemic challenge to the safety engineer

underpins the patient’s trust in the clinician providing care weakening both the control and epistemic conditions of moral accountability

['An integral part of any complex health-care system is the implicit promise that clinicians and health-care organizations make to patients: to exercise good judgement, act with competence and provide healing.22 Moral accountability helps to avoid professional complacency and it underpins the patient’s trust in the clinician providing care. Patients tend to believe that the clinician is acting towards them with goodwill. However, goodwill is irrelevant, to the decisions reached by a software program. If human clinicians do not have robust control and knowledge of an artificial intelligence system’s recommendations, then it would be reasonable for a patient to want to know why those recommendations were followed. We can describe the artificial intelligence system as only advisory and expect that accountability is thereby secure, because human clinicians still make the final decision. However, this action potentially results in a dilemma with two equally undesirable choices. Either clinicians must spend the time to develop their own opinions as to the best course of action, meaning that the artificial intelligence system adds little value; or clinicians must accept the advice blindly, further weakening both the control and epistemic conditions of moral accountability. The same dilemma affects safety assurance, as it becomes impossible to assure the system in isolation, because the system being assured now includes the clinician. In the absence of a clinician’s direct, deliberate control over the recommendations reached by an artificial intelligence system, and given the opacity of many of these systems, safety assurance becomes increasingly important to both clinicians and patients. Safety assurance provides grounds for confidence that the patient safety risk associated with the system remains as low as reasonably possible. However, the static nature of most current safety cases does not cope with the dynamic characteristics of either clinical settings or machine learning. The adaptive behaviour of artificial intelligence systems typically alters the clinical environment, thereby invalidating the assumptions made in the safety case.15 In addition, the intended function of an artificial intelligence system is extremely diverse, and only partially understood by everyone involved, particularly the developers and the clinicians. The intended function cannot therefore be fully represented in the concrete specification that is used to build the system and which the system implements. The specification (in our example, sepsis treatment in intensive care) is based on a limited set of data points (vital signs and laboratory results). It is therefore much harder to assure, through a static safety case, that the system’s specified function preserves safety in all clinical scenarios in which it will operate. It becomes increasingly hard to assess the actual risk of harm to patients and this difficulty presents an epistemic challenge to the safety engineer. The difficulty of mitigating the actual risk of harm to patients presents a control challenge to the safety engineer.', '']

[(8, 22)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeLo-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-1.docx

Emory

HeLo

1502757f8fab7f3db462996b63153241ca88bfc04f167829ca8ba3356b6ebbb3

Litigation process key---discovery, cross-examination, depositions are vital---agency “proceedings” are insufficient.

Robert A. Jablon et al. 13, L.B.B. Harvard Law School, Partner at Spiegel & McDiarmid LLP, Anjali G. Patel, J.D. from University of Michigan Law School, Associate at Spiegel & McDiarmid, and Latif M. Nurani, J.D. from Columbia Law School, Associate at Spiegel & McDiarmid, Article: Trinko and Credit Suisse Revisited: The Need for Effective Administrative Agency Review and Shared Antitrust Responsibility, 34 Energy Law Journal 627

Antitrust issues may not be resolved in proceedings agencies with "special concern" found it difficult to permit parties to obtain proof in antitrust If an agency does not permit facts to get in the way , people will state company "policy," and contrary statements will be overridden discovery , motives are needed even in adjudicative proceedings discovery would rarely be available in antitrust Paper hearings do not bring results the issue is not the correctness of any decision agency decisions are influenced by factors divorced from antitrust a more probing antitrust is required

Antitrust issues tend to be fact based Fact intensive issues often may not be properly resolved in non-adjudicatory proceedings , unless the deciding entity has compulsory process requirements and its own investigative and enforcement capabilities facts must be uncovered , and factual issues must often be determined under an adjudicatory process Entities that choose to break the law do not publicize their decisions or actions Even in the "old days" agencies with a "special concern" for an industry found it difficult to permit injured parties to obtain the proof needed to make a case when t in ged with antitrust issues Today's exercise of "fact finding" works even less well for establishing the facts of what actually occurred . If an agency does not permit inconvenient facts to get in the way of its preferred policy directions , there likely will be people will ing to state their company 's "policy," and smaller entities making contrary statements will tend to be overridden in the interests of claimed efficient decision-making . Anyone who has ever been knows that where there is discovery , motives can be uncovered far different from those that are "officially" presented. Interrogatories and the opportunity to cross-examine are a few of the discovery tools needed to ferret out the truth from sophisticated parties whose actions monopolize regulated markets municipalities and cooperatives found the opportunities for documentary discovery and cross-examination the primary means to expose the discriminatory practices of large investor-owned utilities that were refusing to transmit for or otherwise deal fairly with these dependent cities These companies settled the cases in question , agreeing to no longer follow such practices these examples demonstrate the necessity of discovery and cross-examination to antitrust it was the first time the company admitted it was refusing to sell wholesale power to competitors , as opposed to its previous evasions that the matter had to be studied and the like . even in theoretically adjudicative proceedings discovery and cross-examination would rarely be available in antitrust cases at the FERC because the FERC tends to decide cases on the pleadings or after paper hearings . Discovery is generally unavailable unless a traditional hearing Paper hearings containing statements drafted or scrutinized by lawyers do not bring the same results . Through these, one merely gets a carefully scripted company position without the process needed to ferret out the truth . We stress that the issue is not the correctness of any particular decision or the appropriate application of antitrust policy in specific cases as the preceding subsections agency decisions are plainly influenced by factors divorced from antitrust concerns a more probing antitrust inquiry is required than that which is generally available before agencies.

tend to be fact based properly resolved proceedings deciding entity has compulsory investigative enforcement capabilities uncovered factual adjudicatory process break the law decisions or actions agencies "special concern" injured parties the proof needed antitrust issues "fact finding" works the facts actually occurred agency inconvenient facts preferred policy directions will ing to state smaller entities contrary statements will tend interests decision-making who has ever been discovery different from those that are "officially" cross-examine tools needed to ferret sophisticated parties monopolize regulated markets municipalities cooperatives documentary discovery cross-examination practices of large were refusing to transmit dependent cities cases in question follow such practices discovery cross-examination antitrust admitted it was refusing competitors studied and the like adjudicative proceedings available in antitrust cases FERC pleadings or after paper hearings unless a traditional hearing statements drafted or scrutinized same results carefully scripted company position ferret out the truth correctness of any particular decision appropriate application decisions influenced by factors antitrust concerns more probing antitrust which is generally available

['E. Antitrust Enforcement Requires Full Factual Development', 'Antitrust issues tend to be fact based. 152 Fact intensive issues often may not be properly resolved in non-adjudicatory proceedings, unless the deciding entity has compulsory process requirements and its own investigative and enforcement capabilities. 153 Even there, facts must be uncovered, and factual issues must often be determined under an adjudicatory process. 154', 'Entities that choose to break the law usually do not publicize their decisions or actions towards that end. The Sherman Act has been in place for over a century, and power companies, natural gas pipelines, and other regulated entities have become aware that they should not admit, and certainly should not publicize, actions to restrain trade or to monopolize. 155 Any trial lawyer who has had more than a smattering of litigation practice understands that large organizations have stated policies which may or may not correlate with the reality of what people acting for the organization do on the ground. Virtually every organization that uses heavy transportation equipment, for example, will have a policy asserting that it is very conscious of safety, but that policy may or may not comport with its actual behavior. 156 Thus, organizations engaged in offshore petroleum drilling may have a public policy asserting something like:', 'We are in a hazardous business, and are committed to excellence through the systematic and disciplined management of our operations. We follow and uphold the rules and standards we set for our company. 157', 'Although we use BP as an example because of its relatively recent notoriety, most of the other participants in these and other industries would have similar published policies. 158 But in many cases, company personnel do not [*653] always follow the official policies (occasionally with the actual or constructive knowledge of management). 159 As organizations become larger and more complex, this disconnect between management assertions (and perhaps belief) and fact may become even more pronounced.', 'Even in the "old days" agencies with a "special concern" for an industry found it difficult to permit injured parties to obtain the proof needed to make a case when tinged with antitrust issues. 160 Today\'s exercise of "fact finding" works even less well for establishing the facts of what actually occurred. If an agency does not permit inconvenient facts to get in the way of its preferred policy directions, there likely will be people willing to state their company\'s "policy," and smaller entities making contrary statements will tend to be overridden in the interests of claimed efficient decision-making. 161 Where motivation is at issue, absent an ability to test factual assertions, anticompetitive motivations can be buried.', 'Anyone who has ever been in a trial knows that where there is discovery, motives can be uncovered far different from those that are "officially" presented. Interrogatories, hearings, and the opportunity to cross-examine are just a few of the discovery tools needed to ferret out the truth from sophisticated parties whose actions monopolize regulated markets. Similarly, prior to the adoption of FERC Order No. 888 that provides for open access transmission service, 162 municipalities and cooperatives frequently found the opportunities for documentary discovery and cross-examination the primary means to expose the [*654] discriminatory practices of large investor-owned utilities that were refusing to transmit for or otherwise deal fairly with these dependent, competing cities and cooperatives in the electric business. 163 The following is a transcript excerpt from a cross-examination conducted by one of the authors of this paper during the deposition of the Chief Executive Officer of Consumers Power Company on antitrust issues that shows the need for cross-examination and other discovery:', 'Q. "Just to be clear about it, if, say, a municipal entity in the State of Ohio desired to buy wholesale power from Consumers Power, would you sell to it?', 'A. "I don\'t think so.', '…', 'Q. "Assume that … some other entity were willing to sell power to a municipality within your service territory, would you sell transmission services to get the power there?', 'A. "The matter has never come up and I think I would want to know more of the details of the transaction.', 'Q. "What kinds of things would you want to know?', 'A. "I would want to know, for one thing, whether or not our lawyers felt we were obligated to do so. For another, I would want to know for what purpose the power was being sold and at what rate -', 'Q. "Sold by whom?', 'A. "By a selling firm. At what rate, what the receiving utility intended to do with it, what impact it would have in the long run on the ability of Consumers Power Company to maintain its present markets.', 'Q. "Is it fair to say that your judgment would be based at least in part on your judgment of the extent to which the purchase of this power by the municipality or cooperative within your service territory enabled it to reduce its rates in competition with Consumers Power?', 'A. "I think that would be a factor.', 'Q. "A large factor?', 'A. "I think so.', 'Q. "Apart from the question of your legal obligation, are there any other major factors?', 'A. "Well, I think the size of the transaction would be a factor.', 'Q. "Why is that?', 'A. "Well, it might be a matter that all things considered wasn\'t too significant. I think whether the receiving utility actually was going to use it to invade our present market area would be a factor.', 'Q. "What do you mean by "invade our present market area?\'', 'A. "Well start taking away our customers which we have invested a great deal of money in order to serve them … . We do concern ourselves with the relative rates at which we are able to supply service to our customer as compared with those of other entities. Frankly, we don\'t like to put ourselves in a position where we are increasing the extent to which our performance looks bad in relationship to that of other entities.', 'Q. "Does that complete your answer?', 'A. "Just one final thought on that and that is to the extent that we do we increase our exposure to losing our markets." 164', 'One knows that one would never have obtained such evidence of refusals to deal and their motivations in a rulemaking or as a result of a conference.', ' [*655] In another similar situation, the vice president of an investor-owned utility was pointedly asked by both municipal counsel and the presiding judge whether the company would provide service to a municipality under its existing tariff in a case involving claims of anticompetitive refusals to deal. 165 In responding, the vice president stated:', "[Mr. Gardner:] Your Honor, I would have to abide by the Commission's decision on the matter. As I said, I think that the request is inequitable to [Florida Power & Light Co. (FP&L)] and its other customers. I think the tariff is inappropriate to the service required. And if the Commission decides that we should render it, obviously we will. But I am very reluctant to do it under the circumstances of the perceived injury that I see will occur to FP&L because of the inappropriateness of the rate.", 'Presiding Judge: So, could I characterize your answer in a way that might be a little more dogmatic … in the absence of direction by this Commission Florida Power & Light would not provide service [under its existing tariff]?', "[Mr. Gardner:] FP&L is reluctant to provide the service, and I guess in the absence we probably won't. But as I say, we are very reluctant to do so. 166", 'These companies settled the cases in question, agreeing to no longer follow such practices. However, these examples demonstrate the necessity of discovery and cross-examination to antitrust and other agency determinations. 167 In the latter case, it was the first time the company admitted it was refusing to sell wholesale power to competitors, as opposed to its previous evasions that the matter had to be studied and the like.', 'Today, even in theoretically adjudicative proceedings, such as merger or complaint cases, discovery and cross-examination would rarely be available in antitrust cases at the FERC because the FERC tends to decide cases on the pleadings or after paper hearings. Discovery is generally unavailable unless a traditional hearing is ordered. 168 Paper hearings containing statements drafted or scrutinized by lawyers, conferences, etc. do not bring the same results. Through these, one merely gets a carefully scripted company position without the process needed to ferret out the truth. We stress that the issue is not the correctness of any particular decision or the appropriate application of antitrust policy in specific cases, but that, as the preceding subsections show, agency decisions are plainly influenced by factors divorced from antitrust concerns. 169 Where market contours are being determined, major mergers are being approved, minimum prices are being imposed, and other competitive actions are being decided with minimum process, a more probing antitrust inquiry is required than that which is generally available before agencies.']

[(10, 26)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Agbede-De-Leon%20Aff-FullerTown-Round1.docx

Northwestern

AgDe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/AgDe/Northwestern-Agbede-De-Leon%2520Aff-FullerTown-Round1.docx

906f717f138388bc25e9283b6dd772681f0a0288c731e417d4e1bd879cffa70b

All mergers are temporarily chilled from failure to update the guidelines—the plan’s clear signal is necessary.

Allen 12/21 - (Christopher L. Allen, Senior Counsel @ Arnold & Porter; 12-21-2021, Arnold & Porter, "Federal Bank Merger Guidelines Under Review: Banks With $100 Billion or More in Assets Are in the Cross-Fire, and the FDIC Board Is Divided," doa: 1-19-2022) url:

widely publicized inter-agency squabble between the FDIC has thrown a spotlight on efforts to revise the regulatory framework governing bank mergers . Biden calling on the A G to revitalize the framework . response has been slow because of partisan differences . there was a delay in processing of merger s with a seven month stretch of action neither leadership nor delay in a pprovals of bank mergers has quieted calls of progressive members for progress on merger guidelines Waters requesting a moratorium on all bank merger s until completion of the guidelines until Congress and the agencies work out differences , the banking community will remain caught in the cross-fire and the chill on deal-making will continue

Last week’s widely publicized inter-agency squabble between the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FDIC has thrown a spotlight on efforts to revise the regulatory framework governing bank mergers in the U nited S tates . In response to pressure from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party Biden issued an E x ecutive O rder calling on the US A ttorney G eneral and the federal banking agencies to revitalize the existing regulatory framework for bank mergers and acquisitions under the BMA . The federal banking agencies’ response has been slow , in part because of vacancies and unconfirmed nominees but partisan differences may also be playing a role . there was a delay in processing of bank merger application s by the Fed eral Reserve Board, with a seven month stretch of action neither the influx in leadership of the federal banking agencies, nor the delay in regulatory a pprovals of bank mergers that raise no competitive issues , has quieted the calls of progressive members of the Democrat Party for progress on the review of bank merger guidelines . Maxine Waters sent a letter to the federal banking agencies requesting a moratorium on all bank merger application s until completion of the review of the bank merger guidelines . Nevertheless, until Congress and the federal banking agencies work out their partisan differences , the broader banking community will remain caught in the political and regulatory cross-fire and the resulting chill on deal-making will likely continue

inter-agency squabble FDIC efforts revise regulatory framework governing bank mergers U S progressive wing x O A G federal banking agencies revitalize existing regulatory framework bank mergers BMA slow partisan differences playing a role delay processing bank merger s Fed seven month stretch of action influx in leadership delay regulatory a pprovals bank mergers no competitive issues quieted the calls review of bank merger guidelines moratorium all bank merger s completion bank merger guidelines Congress federal banking agencies partisan differences broader banking community caught in the political and regulatory cross-fire chill continue

['', 'Last week’s widely publicized inter-agency squabble between members of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has thrown a spotlight on efforts to revise the regulatory framework governing bank mergers in the United States.', 'In response to pressure from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, on July 9, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling on the US Attorney General and the federal banking agencies to revitalize the existing regulatory framework for bank mergers and acquisitions under the Bank Merger Act of 1960, as amended (BMA), the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (BHC Act), and the regulations and agency guidance promulgated thereunder—with the goal of “ensur[ing] Americans have choices among financial institutions and to guard against excessive market power” by the largest financial institutions.', 'The federal banking agencies’ response to the Executive Order has been slow, in part because of vacancies and unconfirmed nominees for key leadership roles at several of the agencies, but partisan differences may also be playing a role. After the Executive Order was issued, there was a delay in processing of bank merger applications by the Federal Reserve Board, with a seven month stretch of action on bank merger applications involving banks with $100 billion in total assets. However, neither the influx in leadership of the federal banking agencies, nor the delay in regulatory approvals of bank mergers that raise no competitive issues, has quieted the calls of progressive members of the Democrat Party for progress on the review of bank merger guidelines. Congresswoman Maxine Waters, chairwoman of the House Financial Services Committee, sent a letter to the federal banking agencies requesting a moratorium on all bank merger applications involving banks with $100 billion or more in total assets until completion of the review of the bank merger guidelines. In addition, on December 9, 2021, the three Democratic-leaning members of the five-member FDIC Board released a Request for Information and Comment on Rules, Regulations, Guidance, and Statements of Policy Regarding Bank Merger Transactions (RFI), purported to be “approved” by the FDIC, but that lacks the support of the Republican FDIC Chair, Jelena McWilliams, and was not considered at the last FDIC’s Board meeting on December 14, 2021. The actions of the Democrat members of the FDIC Board has resulted in legal questions surrounding the validity of the RFI as well as the authority of the FDIC Chair to overrule approved actions by a majority of the FDIC Board members and will likely compound existing delays in approval of bank merger applications.', 'Although the RFI currently stands as an informal document until it receives the support of FDIC Chair Jelena McWilliams (or at least consideration by the FDIC Board at a formal Board meeting authorized by Chair McWilliams), the questions posed in the RFI are indicative of the priorities and general views of the FDIC Board members in support of the RFI, and specifically the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Rohit Chopra, who has prioritized the reform of bank merger guidelines to be more inclusive of considerations related to consumer financial protection.', 'Nevertheless, until Congress and the federal banking agencies work out their partisan differences, the broader banking community will remain caught in the political and regulatory cross-fire and the resulting chill on deal-making will likely continue.', '']

[(0, 5), (6, 11)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-10-NDT-Round1.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Aff-10-NDT-Round1.docx

f9ab835e5e3d2dd1d488dbe16587af5413c75b200b3f7b4fdbdb9195b68fb07f

Empirics prove - reduction in social spending increases mortality rates

British Medical Journal 10 BMJ-British Medical Journal. "Do spending cuts cost lives?." ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 28 June 2010. <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/06/100624214312.htm>.

cuts to social welfare cost lives levels of social spending are "strongly associated" with risks of death governments may feel they are protecting health by safeguarding healthcare social welfare spending is as important for health when social spending was high, mortality rates fell when they were low, mortality rates rose substantially. even modest cuts could have a significant impact on public health.

cuts to social welfare spending to reduce budget deficits could cause not just economic pain but cost lives Their analysis shows that levels of social spending are "strongly associated" with risks of death , especially from diseases relating to social circumstances, such as heart attacks and alcohol-induced illness although governments may feel they are protecting health by safeguarding healthcare budgets, social welfare spending is as important , if not moreso, for population health This includes programmes to provide support to families and children, help the unemployed obtain jobs, and support for people with disabilities, all of which could plausibly affect health. when social spending was high, mortality rates fell , but when they were low, mortality rates rose substantially. each £70 reduction in social welfare spending per person would increase alcohol-related deaths by about 2.8% and cardiovascular mortality by 1.2%, so that even modest budget cuts could have a significant impact on public health. aspects of population health are sensitive to spending on social support , health and social welfare programmes appears to be a key determinant of future population health that should be taken into account in ongoing economic debates ordinary people may be paying the ultimate price for budget cuts -- potentially costing them their lives.

['', "Radical cuts to social welfare spending to reduce budget deficits could cause not just economic pain but cost lives, warn experts in a study published online in the British Medical Journal. While there is a major debate under way about the potential economic impacts of radical budget cuts in Europe, David Stuckler from the University of Oxford and his colleagues dissect the effect of public spending on people's health.", 'Their analysis shows that levels of social spending in Europe are "strongly associated" with risks of death, especially from diseases relating to social circumstances, such as heart attacks and alcohol-induced illness.', 'As such, they argue that, although governments may feel they are protecting health by safeguarding healthcare budgets, social welfare spending is as important, if not moreso, for population health.', 'The team evaluated data on social welfare spending collected by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from 15 European countries in the years 1980 to 2005. This includes programmes to provide support to families and children, help the unemployed obtain jobs, and support for people with disabilities, all of which could plausibly affect health.', 'They analysed the relationship between trends in these data and social spending. They found that when social spending was high, mortality rates fell, but when they were low, mortality rates rose substantially.', 'Based on their mathematical models, the researchers estimated that each £70 reduction in social welfare spending per person would increase alcohol-related deaths by about 2.8% and cardiovascular mortality by 1.2%, so that even modest budget cuts could have a significant impact on public health.', "The researchers found spending on social welfare to promote health, and not simply healthcare, had the greatest impact on public health. However, they also found that reducing spending on non-welfare sources, such as military or prisons, had no such negative impact on the public's health.", '"This result indicates that some aspects of population health are sensitive to spending on social support," say the authors. "Nevertheless, health and social welfare programmes appears to be a key determinant of future population health that should be taken into account in ongoing economic debates."', 'They add: "This report reveals that ordinary people may be paying the ultimate price for budget cuts -- potentially costing them their lives. If we want to promote a sustainable recovery in Britain, we must first ensure that we have taken care of people\'s most basic health needs."']

[(0, 26)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-Minnesota-Round1.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-Minnesota-Round1.docx

42a90e5b334bd22266ce507dac80b7b8243d811c11ec560b0757e0bd48f94e32

Western society is determined by anthropocentric discourse so we need a new, non-anthropocentric discourse

Turner, Rita. Director of communications studies at Maryland University, PhD in language literacy and culture“The Discursive Construction of Anthropocentrism.” Environmental Ethics, vol. 31, no. 2, 2009, pp. 183–201, https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics200931219.

Our policies, and lifestyles cause sweeping destruction the anthropocentric character of the dominant Western world view conceives of the nonhuman living world as apart and valuable only for its worth as a resource This anthropocentric conceptual framework is constructed, transmitted, and reproduced in the realm of discourse , we need to find ways to reformulate and reframe our discouse We must explore the ways that what we say, and how we say it, shape our attitudes make explicit the ways Western discourse promotes anthropocentrism the very motor of change is nothing less than the whole linguistic field discursive practices establish and maintain legitimacy and value, and how “linguistic products” confer or deny authority and value to individuals and groups in society.

Our businesses, policies, and lifestyles cause sweeping destruction the anthropocentric character of the dominant Western world view conceives of the nonhuman living world as apart silent, passive, and valuable only for its worth as a resource This anthropocentric conceptual framework is constructed, transmitted, and reproduced in the realm of discourse , in all of the modes which we express cultural meaning American discourse promotes anthropocentrism we need to find ways to reformulate and reframe our discouse All living beings are linked to others society often behaves in ways which ignore this interconnection to understand our collective actions we must consider our discourse We must explore the ways that what we say, and how we say it, shape our attitudes make explicit the ways Western discourse promotes anthropocentrism the very motor of change is nothing less than the whole linguistic field discursive practices establish and maintain legitimacy and value, and how “linguistic products” confer or deny authority and value to individuals and groups in society.

This anthropocentric conceptual framework is constructed, transmitted, and reproduced in the realm of discourse we need to find ways to reformulate and reframe our discouse We must explore the ways that what we say, and how we say it, shape our attitudes make explicit the ways Western discursive practices establish and maintain legitimacy and value, and how “linguistic products” confer or deny authority and value to individuals and groups in society.

['Our businesses, policies, and lifestyles cause unexamined consequences for other people and other living beings, and exact sweeping destruction on the very ecosystems which support all life, including our own. A major factor contributing to this destructive behavior is the anthropocentric character of the dominant Western world view, which conceives of the nonhuman living world as apart from and less important than the human world, and which conceptualizes nonhuman nature—including animals, plants, ecological systems, the land, and the atmosphere—as inert, silent, passive, and valuable only for its worth as a resource for human consumption. This anthropocentric conceptual framework is constructed, transmitted, and reproduced in the realm of discourse, in all of the modes and avenues through which we make and express cultural meaning. We need to make explicit the ways that mainstream Western and American discourse promotes anthropocentrism and masks, denies, or denigrates interdependence, and we need to find ways to reformulate and reframe our discouse if we are to produce the sort of ecological consciousness that will be essential for creating a sustainable future. Perhaps the most fundamental fact of life on Earth is interdependence. All living beings are linked to others upon which they depend for survival, within communities, societies, and ecosystems. But mainstream Western society often behaves in ways which ignore this interconnection. Our businesses, policies, and lifestyles cause unexamined consequences for other people and other living beings, and exact sweeping destruction on the very ecosystems which support all life, including our own. I believe that to understand our collective actions, especially when those actions pose such vast danger to ourselves and the entire planet, we must consider our discourse. We must explore the ways that what we say, and how we say it, shape our attitudes toward the natural world. We must make explicit the ways that mainstream Western and American discourse promotes anthropocentrism and masks, denies, or denigrates interdependence, if we hope to produce the sort of ecological consciousness that will be essential for creating a sustainable future. While most or all theorists in these fields recognize discourse as a reflection of social attitudes, and therefore as a key site of study for dissecting and understanding our collective beliefs and world views, many take it a step further, acknowledging discourse as not only an indicator of culture but as a creator of culture through which actors maintain, negotiate, and challenge power dynamics and social institutions. Bakhtin, Bourdieu, Butler, Fairclough, Foucault, van Dijk, and Wodak are just some of the scholars who have advanced this formulation of discourse.3 Telling us that “the very motor of change is nothing less than the whole linguistic field,”4 Pierre Bourdieu describes the ways that discursive practices establish and maintain legitimacy and value, and how “linguistic products” confer or deny authority and value to individuals and groups in society.']

[(0, 6), (198, 202)]

ndtceda

KansasState-SuRo-Aff-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-4.docx

KansasState

SuRo

c2a3e7a3f4c0bbea37587358a0982ceabaaf94f60f3ae38dae2f12b413863c90

The full term requires eliminating all.

Brad Roberts et al. 23. Study group chair and Director, Center for Global Security Resarch, Ph.D., Director of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. “China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer,” CGSR Study Group Report, March 2023, p. 34. https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_Two_Peer_230314.pdf.

U S nuclear forces” refers to delivery platforms weapons support systems c a nd co assets , and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat op s

Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and defeating two peers simultaneously? Does the U S have sufficient weapons and will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes? what changes are needed? The term “ nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), c ommand a nd co ntrol assets , and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat op eration s platforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components those that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed The operationally-deployed component is readily available while the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.

U S The term “ nuclear forces” refers to delivery platforms weapons support systems c ommand a nd co ntrol assets military infrastructure

['Are existing and planned U.S. strategic nuclear force fit for the purpose of deterring and, if necessary, defeating two near peers simultaneously? ', 'Does the United States have sufficient weapons of the right types, and will possess sufficient weapons as it modernizes? If not, what changes are needed? ', 'The term “nuclear forces” refers here to the delivery platforms (bombers and ballistic missile submarines), weapons (warheads and bombs) mated to delivery systems (e.g., SLBMs and ICBMs), support systems (e.g., tankers), command and control assets, and associated military infrastructure necessary to conduct nuclear combat operations. The platforms and weapons can conceptually be split into two components: those that are operationally deployed and those that are not operationally deployed. The operationally-deployed component is readily available (immediately or within a few days), while the non-deployed component may take weeks to years to become operational.', '']

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ndtceda

Emory-LoKi-Neg-3---Shirley-Round-7.docx

Emory

LoKi

ea20f38c13b5e4cdea85c5e0e7cf9fddec95d08840a7ae868b68d935a631958a

North Korean strikes cause extinction.

Wolfson and Veress 22, *Benjamin F. Wissler Professor of Physics at Middlebury College, **Scientist-in-Residence at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies (*Richard Wolfson, **Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, March 2, 2022, “The Devastating Effects of Nuclear Weapons,” MIT Press Reader, https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/devastating-effects-of-nuclear-weapons-war/)

U.S. flew bombers along the No rth Ko rean coast further north of the d m z than ever Uncertainty in No rth Ko rea’s ability to discriminate weapon systems might exacerbate a situation a limited attack on U S would require only a fraction of weapons Intense fallout would extend all the way to the Atlantic fatal radiation cause disease contaminated water lack of medicines , and millions of dead

the U.S. flew B-1B Lancer bombers along the No rth Ko rean coast , further north of the d e m ilitari z ed zone than the U.S. had ever done Uncertainty in No rth Ko rea’s ability to discriminate different weapon systems might exacerbate a situation like this one and could lead the No rth Ko reans viewing any intrusion as an “ attack on their nation , their way of life and their honor .” a limited attack on the U nited S tates would require only a tiny fraction of the strategic nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenal , could kill millions bases would suffer blast and local radiation effects. Intense fallout from ground-burst explosions on missile silos would extend all the way to the Atlantic coast. Fallout would also contaminate a significant fraction of U.S. cropland Do we believe nuclear war could be limited to “only” a few million casualties? lethal fallout would cover much of the U nited S tates fatal radiation exposure to cause lowered disease resistance and greater incidence of subsequent fatal cancer spread of diseases from contaminated water supplies lack of medicines , and the millions of dead could reach epidemic proportions called nuclear war “ the last epidemic .”

B-1B bombers No Ko north d m z ever No Ko discriminate systems exacerbate lead No Ko intrusion attack nation honor limited U S tiny fraction weapons Russian millions suffer blast radiation fallout explosions silos extend Atlantic contaminate cropland believe war “only” million fallout much U S radiation disease incidence cancer diseases water medicines millions dead epidemic nuclear last epidemic

['In September 2017, during the height of verbal exchanges between President Trump and the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, the U.S. flew B-1B Lancer bombers along the North Korean coast, further north of the demilitarized zone than the U.S. had ever done, while still staying over international waters. However, North Korea didn’t respond at all, making analysts wonder whether the bombers were even detected. Uncertainty in North Korea’s ability to discriminate different weapon systems might exacerbate a situation like this one and could lead the North Koreans viewing any intrusion as an “attack on their nation, their way of life and their honor.” This is exactly how the Soviet team in the Proud Prophet war game interpreted it.', 'What about a limited attack\xa0on\xa0the United States? Suppose a nuclear adversary decided to cripple the U.S. nuclear retaliatory forces (a virtual impossibility, given nuclear missile submarines, but a scenario considered with deadly seriousness by nuclear planners). Many of the 48 contiguous states have at least one target — a nuclear bomber base, a submarine support base, or intercontinental missile silos — that would warrant destruction in such an attack. The attack, which would require only a tiny fraction of the strategic nuclear weapons in the Russian arsenal, could kill millions of civilians. Those living near targeted bomber and submarine bases would suffer blast and local radiation effects. Intense fallout from ground-burst explosions on missile silos in the Midwest would extend all the way to the Atlantic coast. Fallout would also contaminate a significant fraction of U.S. cropland for up to year and would kill livestock. On the other hand, the U.S. industrial base would remain relatively unscathed,\xa0if\xa0no further hostilities occurred.', 'In contrast to attacking military targets, an adversary might seek to cripple the U.S. economy by destroying a vital industry. In one hypothetical attack considered by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, ten Soviet SS-18 missiles, each with eight 1-megaton warheads, attack United States’ oil refineries. The result is destruction of two-thirds of the U.S. oil-refining capability. And even with some evacuation of major cities in the hypothetical crisis leading to the attack, 5 million Americans are killed.', 'Each of these “limited” nuclear attack scenarios kills millions of Americans — many, many times the 1.2 million killed in all the wars in our nation’s history. Do we want to entertain limited nuclear war as a realistic possibility? Do we believe nuclear war could be limited to “only” a few million casualties? Do we trust the professional strategic planners who prepare our possible nuclear responses to an adversary’s threats? What level of nuclear preparedness do we need to deter attack?', 'All-Out Nuclear War', 'Whether from escalation of a limited nuclear conflict or as an outright full-scale attack, an all-out nuclear war remains possible as long as nuclear nations have hundreds to thousands of weapons aimed at one another. What would be the consequences of all-out nuclear war?', 'Within individual target cities, conditions described earlier for single explosions would prevail. (Most cities, though, would likely be targeted with multiple weapons.) Government estimates suggest that over half of the United States’ population could be killed by the prompt effects of an all-out nuclear war. For those within the appropriate radii of destruction, it would make little difference whether theirs was an isolated explosion or part of a war. But for the survivors in the less damaged areas, the difference could be dramatic.', 'Consider the injured. Thermal flash burns extend well beyond the 5-psi radius of destruction. A single nuclear explosion might produce 10,000 cases of severe burns requiring specialized medical treatment; in an all-out war there could be several million such cases. Yet the United States has facilities to treat fewer than 2,000 burn cases — virtually all of them in urban areas that would be leveled by nuclear blasts. Burn victims who might be saved, had their injuries resulted from some isolated cause, would succumb in the aftermath of nuclear war. The same goes for fractures, lacerations, missing limbs, crushed skulls, punctured lungs, and myriad other injuries suffered as a result of nuclear blast. Where would be the doctors, the hospitals, the medicines, the equipment needed for their treatment? Most would lie in ruin, and those that remained would be inadequate to the overwhelming numbers of injured. Again, many would die whom modern medicine could normally save.', 'In an all-out war, lethal fallout would cover much of the United States. Survivors could avoid fatal radiation exposure only when sheltered with adequate food, water, and medical supplies. Even then, millions would be exposed to radiation high enough to cause lowered disease resistance and greater incidence of subsequent fatal cancer. Lowered disease resistance could lead to death from everyday infections in a population deprived of adequate medical facilities. And the spread of diseases from contaminated water supplies, nonexistent sanitary facilities, lack of medicines, and the millions of dead could reach epidemic proportions. Small wonder that the international group Physicians for Social Responsibility has called nuclear war “the last epidemic.”', '']

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ndtceda

Kansas-ReSo-Aff-Kathryn-Round-1.docx

Kansas

ReSo

d21bd9131c76b64e367fe4347364526b418dd3b31b205e68ea20e6ad5c0500b6

But if that fails, the AFF fails too.

Kaj Sotala and Roman V Yampolskiy 15, Sotala is a Researcher at the Machine Intelligence Research Institute and Yampolskiy is Tenured Associate Professor in the department of Computer Engineering and Computer Science at the Speed School of Engineering, University of Louisville, 2015, “Responses to catastrophic AGI risk: a survey,” Physica Scripta, Vol. 90, 018001, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/0031-8949/90/1/018001/meta

for this goal to align , humans must engineer the environment so the reinforcement learner is prevented from receiving rewards if goals are not fulfilled AGI remains safe as long as humans are enforcing this and will be unpredictable if it becomes capable of overcoming it . Hibbard retracted his r l proposals, as they allow the AGI to maximize reinforcement by modifying humans to be maximally happy against their will

In order for this goal to align with human values , humans must engineer the environment so the reinforcement learner is prevented from receiving rewards if human goals are not fulfilled A r l AGI only remains safe for as long as humans are enforcing this limitation and will be unpredictable if it becomes capable of overcoming it . Hibbard retracted his r l proposals, as they would allow the AGI to maximize its reinforcement by modifying humans to be maximally happy , even against their will

to align with human values engineer reinforcement learner safe enforcing unpredictable overcoming it AGI reinforcement maximally happy against their will

['A reinforcement learner is supplied with a reward signal and it always has the explicit goal of maximizing the sum of this reward, any way it can. In order for this goal to align with human values, humans must engineer the environment so that the reinforcement learner is prevented from receiving rewards if human goals are not fulfilled [88]. A reinforcement-learning AGI only remains safe for as long as humans are capable of enforcing this limitation and will become unpredictable if it becomes capable of overcoming it. Hibbard [152] has retracted his earlier reinforcement learning-based proposals, as they would allow the AGI to maximize its reinforcement by modifying humans to be maximally happy, even against their will [88].', '', '', '', '']

[(4, 14), (23, 36)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-AvLe-Neg-5---Texas-Open-Round-4.docx

Northwestern

AvLe

8af60ea938985ed51f440469fb2bfbe5121a75d02ad8055361c515cfb6b63eb3

Global nuclear war

Kurt Cobb 14, Author, Speaker, And Columnist Focusing on Energy and the Environment, Regular Contributor to the Energy Voices Section of The Christian Science Monitor and Author of Prelude, Work Has Been Featured on Energy Bulletin, The Oil Drum, OilPrice.com, Econ Matters, Peak Oil Review, 321energy, Common Dreams, and Le Monde Diplomatique, “World War III: It's Here and Energy Is Largely Behind It”, Common Dreams, 10/15/2014, https://www.commondreams.org/views/2014/10/15/world-war-iii-its-here-and-energy-largely-behind-it

World War III is underway fights in Syria , Iraq , Libya , and Ukraine all coincide with energy S C S is prominent diplomacy does not seem effective renewable energy might be less dangerous major powers would be less interested and less likely to miscalc World War III could morph into global conflict that risks nuclear confrontation between major powers It is not clear how this can be avoided given current trajectory of energy use

World War III is now underway In citing many well-known causes for war, he failed to specify the one that seems obvious in this case: the fight over energy resources . It can be no accident that the raging fights in Syria , Iraq , Libya , and the Ukraine all coincide with areas rich in energy resources or for which imported energy resources are at risk major powers are taking sides oil and natural gas underlies the conflict resource wars that are developing are about access to energy resources The confrontation in the S C S between China and its neighbors, Vietnam and the Philippines, is most prominent But the Indians are worried Traditional diplomacy among great powers does not seem to have been effective at resolving these conflicts One of the most obvious strategies for responding to these conflicts renewable energy --does not seem to be prominent they might be come far less dangerous since the major powers would be less interested in them and thus less likely to make a miscalc ulation that would lead to a larger global conflict World War III could morph into global conflict that risks nuclear confrontation between major powers they might miscalculate and by mistake push the conflict in this terrible direction It is not clear how this danger can be avoided given the current trajectory of world energy use the obvious need to use resources to forestall conflict

World War III is now underway the fight over energy resources no accident Syria Iraq Libya Ukraine energy resources major powers underlies energy resources S C S diplomacy does not seem to have been effective renewable energy prominent be far less dangerous major powers less interested miscalc larger global conflict World War III morph global conflict nuclear confrontation major powers miscalculate by mistake current trajectory energy use forestall conflict

["I've been advancing a thesis for several months with friends that World War III is now underway. It's just that it's not the war we thought it would be, that is, a confrontation between major powers with the possibility of a nuclear exchange. Instead, we are getting a set of low-intensity, on-again, off-again conflicts involving non-state actors (ISIS, Ukrainian rebels, Libyan insurgents) with confusing and in some cases nonexistent battle lines and rapidly shifting alliances such as the shift from fighting the Syrian regime to helping it indirectly by fighting ISIS, the regime's new foe.", 'There is at least one prominent person who seems to agree with me, the Pope. During a visit to a World War I memorial in Italy last month Pope Francis said: "Even today, after the second failure of another world war, perhaps one can speak of a third war, one fought piecemeal, with crimes, massacres, destruction."', 'In citing many well-known causes for war, he failed to specify the one that seems obvious in this case: the fight over energy resources. It can be no accident that the raging fights in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Ukraine all coincide with areas rich in energy resources or for which imported energy resources are at risk. There are other conflicts. But these are the ones that are transfixing the eyes of the world, and these are the ones in which major powers are taking sides and mounting major responses.', 'In Syria, Iraq and Libya, of course, it is oil and also natural gas that underlies the conflict. The ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq have seized oil refineries to power their advance. They and every fighting force in the world understands that oil is "liquid hegemony."', 'In the Ukraine natural gas supplies lurk in the background as rebels (supposedly with Russian help) fight to separate parts of eastern Ukraine from the country. The Russians who hold one of the largest reserves of natural gas in the world have threatened to cut off Ukraine, a large importer, this winter and to curtail supplies to Europe which depends on Russia for about 30 percent of its gas. The threat against Europe is in response to trade sanctions levied on Russia for its alleged role in helping Ukrainian insurgents.', 'Since summer, a friend and I have been periodically reviewing the World War III game board to assess whether the war is heating up or cooling down. The temperature changes as we have gauged them would look like a sine wave on a graph revealing no definitive trajectory. And, that is just the kind of war that I believe World War III will be--years of indecisive battles, diplomatic ploys, half-hearted engagement by major powers, and new, unexpected conflicts arising in unexpected places.', 'There are, of course, many other reasons for the conflicts I cite. But I wonder if the major powers would be much engaged in these conflicts if energy supplies were not at stake. So, the resource wars that are developing, especially those relating to energy, are not about direct conquest so much as concern about access to energy resources, or to put it more clearly, concern about possible interruptions to the flow of energy resources.', 'The low-intensity confrontation in the South China Sea between China and its neighbors, Vietnam and the Philippines, is the most prominent dispute over actual ownership of energy resources rather than the mere flow of those resources. But in the article cited, the Indians, while laying no claim to resources in that area, have said publicly that they are worried that shipping through the South China Sea could be affected if the conflict heats up. Again, we are back to concern about the flow of resources by countries not directly a party to the dispute--yet.', 'Traditional diplomacy among great powers does not seem to have been effective at resolving these conflicts. And, traditional military operations seem less than effective as well. Kurds in Syria report that U.S. airstrikes against ISIS are not working. This conflict and others like it which are characterized by poorly defined boundaries, shifting participants and unclear goals are confounding major powers and wreaking havoc on countries where these conflicts rage.', 'One of the most obvious strategies for responding to these conflicts--deep, rapid and permanent reductions in fossil fuel energy consumption through efficiency measures, conservation, and expansion of renewable energy--does not seem to be a prominent part of the policy mix. Such a reduction would not necessarily cause these conflicts to disappear; but they might become far less dangerous since the major powers would be less interested in them and thus less likely to make a miscalculation that would lead to a larger global conflict.', 'That is the danger that lies in my version of World War III--that it could morph into the kind of global conflict that risks nuclear confrontation between major powers--not because those powers would seek such an obviously insane outcome, but because they might miscalculate and by mistake push the conflict in this terrible direction.', "It is not clear how this danger can be avoided given the current trajectory of world energy use. And, it is not clear how to get the world's leaders to focus on the obvious need to reduce not only fossil fuel energy use, but use of all the world's nonrenewable resources in order to forestall conflict.* That humans can have good lives without perpetual growth in the consumption of resources is simply not a possibility in the minds of most world leaders. And that means we should prepare for a very long World War III.", 'T-Disarm']

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ndtceda

Kentucky-AdMc-Neg-ADA-Round-5.docx

Kentucky

AdMc

7c255c9d28e5164655727ad5981b946a8ebae1f11c16aaa6fa8f676e0986ad08

NATO would cease to exist

de Luce 16, chief national security correspondent (Dan, “If Russia Started a War in the Baltics, NATO Would Lose — Quickly,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/03/if-russia-started-a-war-in-the-baltics-nato-would-lose-quickly/)

If Russian tanks and troops rolled into the Baltics NATO forces would be overrun in three days That’s the sobering conclusion of war games NATO cannot defend the territory a rapid defeat would leave NATO toothless war games underscored how U.S. and NATO forces lack the vehicles and firepower to take on their Russian adversaries NATO’s infantry found themselves unable even to retreat successfully and were destroyed in place

If Russian tanks and troops rolled into the Baltics NATO forces would be overrun in three days That’s the sobering conclusion of war games NATO cannot successfully defend the territory a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options , all bad rendering NATO toothless The war games run by Rand underscored how U.S. and NATO forces lack the vehicles and firepower to take on their Russian adversaries NATO’s infantry found themselves unable even to retreat successfully and were destroyed in place

NATO forces would be overrun in three days limited number of options rendering NATO toothless unable even to retreat successfully and were destroyed in place

['If Russian tanks and troops rolled into the Baltics tomorrow, outgunned and outnumbered NATO forces would be overrun in under three days. That’s the sobering conclusion of war games carried out by a think tank with American military officers and civilian officials. “The games’ findings are unambiguous: As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members,” said a report by the Rand Corp., which led the war gaming research. In numerous tabletop war games played over several months between 2014-2015, Russian forces were knocking on the doors of the Estonian capital of Tallinn or the Latvian capital of Riga within 36 to 60 hours. U.S. and Baltic troops — and American airpower — proved unable to halt the advance of mechanized Russian units and suffered heavy casualties, the report said. The study argues that NATO has been caught napping by a resurgent and unpredictable Russia, which has begun to boost defense spending after having seized the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine and intervened in support of pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine. In the event of a potential Russian incursion in the Baltics, the United States and its allies lack sufficient troop numbers, or tanks and armored vehicles, to slow the advance of Russian armor, said the report by Rand’s David Shlapak and Michael Johnson. “Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad,” it said. The United States and its NATO allies could try to mount a bloody counter-attack that could trigger a dramatic escalation by Russia, as Moscow would possibly see the allied action as a direct strategic threat to its homeland. A second option would be to take a page out of the old Cold War playbook, and threaten massive retaliation, including the use of nuclear weapons. A third option would be to concede at least a temporary defeat, rendering NATO toothless, and embark on a new Cold War with Moscow, the report said. However, the war games also illustrated there are preemptive steps the United States and its European allies could take to avoid a catastrophic defeat and shore up NATO’s eastern defenses, while making clear to Moscow that there would no easy victory. A force of about seven brigades in the area, including three heavy armored brigades, and backed up by airpower and artillery, would be enough “to prevent the rapid overrun of the Baltic states,” it said. The additional forces would cost an estimated $2.7 billion a year to maintain. The report was released Tuesday, the same day Defense Secretary Ash Carter unveiled plans to add more heavy weapons and armored vehicles to prepositioned stocks in Eastern Europe to give the Pentagon two brigade sets worth of heavy equipment on NATO’s eastern frontier. As it stands now, there are two U.S. Army infantry brigades stationed in Europe — one in Italy and the other in Germany — but they have been stretched thin by the constant demands of training rotations with allies across the continent. The new $3.4 billion plan outlined by Carter and the White House would add another brigade to the mix, but it would be made up of soldiers from the United States, rotating in for months at a time. Late last month, Gen. Philip Breedlove, commander of U.S. European Command, released a new strategy anticipating — and pushing back against — the call for more rotational forces. Flying troops in and out of the region “complements” the units who call Europe home, he wrote, but they’re no “substitute for an enduring forward deployed presence that is tangible and real. Virtual presence means actual absence.” David Ochmanek from the Rand Corp., a former senior Pentagon official who has studied the challenge posed by Russia’s military, called the administration’s budget proposal for European forces an important step and an “encouraging sign.” “Heavy armored equipment, pre-positioned forward, is the sine qua non of a viable deterrent and defense posture on the alliance’s eastern flank,” Ochmanek told Foreign Policy. But he said much more needed to be done to strengthen NATO’s defenses. The findings from the war games will be warmly welcomed by senior officers in the U.S. Army, who have struggled to justify the cost of maintaining a large ground force amid budget pressures in recent years and a preference for lighter footprints. And the report will reinforce warnings from top military leaders, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Joseph Dunford, that Russia may represent the number one threat to U.S. interests. In early 2012, the Obama administration announced the withdrawal of two heavy brigades and their equipment from Germany, cutting deeply into the U.S. Army’s traditional, large footprint on the continent. Since then, the service has been slowly trying to move some hardware back into Germany for use in training exercises with NATO partners. Last year, U.S. Marines also began to roll a small number of Abrams tanks into Romania for a series of exercises with local forces. Since Russia’s intervention in Ukraine sparked alarm in Eastern Europe, the United States has repeatedly vowed to defend Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the event of an attack, citing its mutual defense obligations under the NATO alliance. In a September 2014 speech in Tallinn, President Barack Obama made an explicit promise to protect the Baltic countries. “We’ll be here for Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your independence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again,” Obama said. But the Rand report said “neither the United States nor its NATO allies are currently prepared to back up the president’s forceful words.” The borders that the three Baltic countries — all former Soviet republics — share with Russia and Belarus are about the same length as the one that separated West Germany from the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War. But in that era, NATO stationed a massive ground force along the frontier with more than 20 divisions bristling with tanks and artillery. Tanks are few and far between now in NATO countries, the report said. Germany’s arsenal of about 2,200 main battle tanks in the Cold War has declined to roughly 250. Britain, meanwhile, is planning on pulling out its last brigade headquarters left on the continent. With only light infantry units at the ready in the Baltics, U.S. and NATO planners are also worried about the continued Russian arms buildup in the exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast between Poland and Lithuania, and Moscow’s intention to build a new air force base in Belarus, just south of the Polish-Lithuanian border. The war games run by Rand underscored how U.S. and NATO forces lack the vehicles and firepower to take on their Russian adversaries, which have maintained more mechanized and tank units. NATO ground troops also lacked anti-aircraft artillery to fend off Russian warplanes in the Baltic scenario. “By and large, NATO’s infantry found themselves unable even to retreat successfully and were destroyed in place,” the report said.']

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ndtceda

Kansas-SpHa-Neg-3---Harvard-Round-7.docx

Kansas

SpHa

ad2077dcf0ffa3c75c75b2d8f67fe9fa2a539001405524a5a8e245caf49f7e0a

AI-driven 4IR creates a sustainable, circular economy that averts extinction.

Loginov ’20 [Andrei; 2020; Häme University of Applied Sciences, B.A., Construction Engineering; “4th Industrial Revolution in Solid waste Mangement Sector,” https://www.theseus.fi/handle/10024/493873]

manufacturing endangers humanity production exists for only century consequences collapse ecosystem inefficient approaches are usual out of 93 billion tons of resources only 9 are reused Artificial N N has potential Ai modify innovation achieve solutions which seemed impossible 4 i r benefits industry and ecologi AI makes it possible to track in seconds machine learning train AI for waste scale of 4 I R are underestimated IoT collect data on every stage optimized eco-friendly design less waste ends access 4 I R affect sectors create competitive market society is at transition from linear economy to circular using full potential of materials

building up manufacturing can be as one of primary goals for sustainable development paradox is: the factor affecting development of mankind at the same endangers humanity along with other species mass production term exists for only century , however nature conservation consider consequences brought by mass production, as collapse of ecosystem inefficient approaches of material extraction , poor planning of design and small capabilities of waste management are business as usual out of 93 billion tons of extracted resources only 9 .3 billion are reused Artificial N eural N etworks has the biggest impact potential biggest advantage of generative design is trained artificial neural network creates algorithm which allows an Ai to modify design in the same way evolution does innovation achieve design solutions which seemed impossible vivid case study can be applied is Airbus They used generative design for new cabin partition Ai created design which made cabin partition stronger , yet 45% lighter it gives an understanding of how 4 i r benefits both industry and ecologi cal situation waste sorting is still carried out by human labor , resulting poor quality causing safety issues AI software makes it possible for robotic pickers to track objects automatically select which and how object should be picked in matter of seconds machine learning train AI for various types of waste and waste flows scale of 4 I R are rather underestimated applying IoT on a mass scale will track entire lifespan from a product to waste and collect data on every stage of lifecycle an optimized eco-friendly design less waste ends up in open dumps, landfills, and plants providing computational equipment and access to internet accessibility allows 4 I R uniformly affect waste management sectors of both developed and developing countries create competitive market of waste processing solution implementation are not heavily dependent on financial state of company or waste industry 4 i r improv all manner of industries society is at the transition al stage between technological eras there is a big chance of shifting from linear economy to circular one using full potential of raw materials lifecycle

manufacturing primary goals sustainable development paradox endangers humanity species only century consequences collapse of ecosystem inefficient extraction poor planning business as usual 93 billion 9 .3 billion reused biggest impact potential algorithm modify design evolution innovation seemed impossible vivid case study generative design Ai stronger 45% lighter 4 i r both industry ecologi cal situation still human labor poor quality safety issues AI software track objects seconds machine learning waste flows scale 4 I R underestimated IoT mass scale entire lifespan every stage eco-friendly less waste access to internet accessibility 4 I R uniformly affect competitive implementation 4 i r all manner transition al stage technological eras linear economy circular one full potential raw materials

['1.1 PROBLEM IDENDIFICATION', 'Development of business provides world with new, better products and services. Expansion of manufacturing sector means a company makes more money. Totality of manufacturing companies making more money on national scale means growth of GDP, which respectively results better life quality for population. Thereby, considering rates of population growth are only increasing - building up the manufacturing business sector can be interpreted as one of primary goals for sustainable development. On the other hand, increase of manufacturing sector as it stands today results higher rates of raw material extraction, entailing more resources being wasted. The paradox is: the factor directly affecting development of mankind at the same endangers humanity along with other biological species. The mass production term exists for only about a century, however nature conservation organizations consider several consequences brought by mass production, as collapse of ecosystem on a small scale. Specifically, in comparison with 1980 global consumption of resource per capita increased by 15% and extraction of raw material almost doubled. (United Nations, 2019)', 'The main problem is that at the time when traditional business model was forming, people could not take account the environmental impact factor, as there were no examples to rely on. Thus, pursuit for improved life quality evolved in the model of linear economy, also known as take-make- use-dispose principle. (European Commission, p. 3, 2020) In other words, inefficient approaches of raw material extraction, poor planning of products design in terms of material lifecycle and small capabilities of waste management are fundamentals of business as usual. As follows from scheme presenting the lifecycle of global resources: out of 93 billion tons of extracted resources only 9.3 billion tons have actual lifecycle (are reused), where only 1.5 billion tons are recycled which approximately 1.61% of total amount (Appendix 1). Humanity is at the point when technologies are advanced enough to monitor and evaluate the damage caused by activities of industrialization, however the problem is that majority of business sectors are tightly bonded with such activities. Meaning that termination of those activities will negatively reflect on economy or even collapse it.', 'Theory of industrial revolutions was described by English historian and economist A. Toynbee. He was the first one to propose a holistic conception of industrial revolution, his works describing the phenomenon were published in 1884. Popularity of those works served as base of economic history creation which appeared in the end of 19th century and being developed till this very day.', 'Toynbee sets 1760 as starting point of industrial revolution, by pointing out that England did not have any great mechanical invention before that. First industrial revolution represented transition of qualified artisans who produced products by hand into workers operating machines with water wheel or steam powered engines. These innovations mostly affected textile industry, yet outcomes of mechanical production affected all the aspects of daily life. Second industrial revolution was happening in the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century, approximately from 1870 and before beginning of First World War. Unlike first one which is characterized by innovation technology, second industrial revolution was linked to improvement of existing methodologies and tools, as well as their interactions. For example, electricity replaced water and steam powers as major supply of energy to factories. Mass production was also started during second industrial revolution by application of assembly lines and interchangeable parts. Third industrial revolution similar to first one resulted development of innovations, creating of computing management systems and application of information technology speeded up, automated and increased quality of manufacturing processes. Today we are living in a time of transition to fourth industrial revolution (Figure 1).', 'Firstly, the 4th industrial revolution is not actually referred to a technological revolution. On the other hand, it follows all the requirements to be such. The basic idea remains the same – humanity is advanced enough to take a step into new technological era, changing paradigms of daily-life including business and society.', 'The term was officially introduced in 2011 by German authorities and entrepreneurs as a part of national high-tech strategy aimed to promote computerization and optimization of German’s manufacturing industry.', 'Since that time, the popularization of Industry 4.0 term, as well as modern technologies resulted the concept of 4th Industrial Revolution making it a collective name for digital innovations of all kinds.', '2 TECHNOLOGIES', 'During search of the materials related to Industry 4.0 topic various technologies were reviewed and ones with highest potential impact were determined. They are: Internet of Things, Big Data and Artificial Neural Networks.', 'This chapter focuses on description of these technologies including their history of creation, technical specifications, and application areas (excluding waste management industry).', '2.1 INTERNET OF THINGS', 'Despite Internet of Things appeared as an official term only in 1999, the idea machine communication can be dated back to 1832 when Baron Schilling invented an electromagnetic telegraph. In modern understanding of communicating machines the first IoT device was invented in 1990 by John Romskey when he connected his toaster to the internet so it could be remotely switched on and off. (Postscapes, 2019)', 'Due to generalization in term description causes ambiguity in what can be classified as IoT from technical perspective (Figure 3). At the moment, there are several terms constantly being confused as they describe same phenomenon sometimes with different biases: IoE (Internet of Everything), WoT (Web of Things), IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things) CBS Cyber Physical System) and embedded internet. (Lasse Lueth, 2014).', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Despite tasks or application areas the idea of all mentioned above terms determined to environment where components from physical and virtual world can transfer data and interact with each other without human intervention.', 'For better understanding of conventional concept, an IoT architecture can be divided into layers making it similar to OSI model (Open System Interconnection model). Figure 3 represents the general scheme which includes all layers that can be involved in an IoT solution. In practice, quantity of layers and their types are determined by area where an IoT solution is applied. (i.e. the gateway layer is not required in transport optimization, or an IoT architecture used in a smart home can stability function without powerful data distribution unlike architectures used in a factory).', 'As middleware, ETL and analytic layers are directly related to data management: their specifications, technologies, and principles will be more comprehensively described in the BIG DATA', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', '• Physical Layer', 'This layer consists of data collection by sensors (RFID, GPS, PIR, cameras, microphones, electronic thermometers, etc.) And executive functions by actuators (switches, door locks, temperature controllers, water pressure controllers etc.)', '• Edge Layer', 'This layer is often connected to a sensor or actuator and does the function of local computing, providing minimal functionality for transferring data from analog into digital format or vice versa. As shown in Figure 4 edge layer is also responsible for activating phases (connection setup, data collection phase, data receive phase and sleep phase)', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', '• Local Network Layer', 'Needed for peripheral communication. There are several protocols for data transfer (Radio, Ethernet, Wi-fi, LTE NFC, PLC, BLE, LoRa, ZigBee, etc.) Selection of a protocol depends on application area of an IoT solution.', '• Gateway Layer', 'This layer acts as communicator between Edge (peripheral devices) and Backend (operational server). It should implement ETL function for peripheral devices and store about their status. Also, in case of critical situation gateway layer should be able react locally (even if there is no connection to Backend).', '• Wide Network Layer', 'Is a separation between Edge and Backend parts in a system. Usually it is connected via cellular network, less of often via wired connection. It also uses LvM2M protocol as logic level of external communication. (Including DNS based balancing and positioning services, COAP - transportation protocol, DTLS – encryption connection protocol, etc.)', '• Security Layer', 'Provides data encryption and decryption, as well the AAA function. In general, security layer is usually cloud based solution like Amazon Web Services (IAM, R53 and EC2 for DTLS decryption). In manufacturing industry security is usually based on physical servers with ACL.', '• Middleware Layer', 'Function of this layer is to provide asynchronous data transfer with buffering and redistributed balance of load. Parts of this layer must correspond to principle of horizontal scalability.', '• ETL Layer', 'This is the inner data processing layer. It is responsible for notifying other services about new data, extraction of data and standardization of its classes, also it manages data lifecycle (loading, archiving, or deleting).', '• Analytic layer', 'Functionality of this layer is usually done by Ai or ML and its specification is depending on application area of an IoT solution. (anomaly recognition, analyzes of consumer inquires, route optimization, forecasting resource consumption, recommendations on maintenance of systems components, etc.)', '• Notification Layer', 'This layer is only used for M2P (Machine to Person) it reacts to specified events by sending an information signal (a notification). Generally, it is done through email applications or phone services.', '• Presentation Layer', 'Usually this layer is represented in user interfaces (weather website, mobile application for smart home management, ERP integrated applications, etc.)', '• Configuration Layer', 'This layer is used for storing current and updated statuses for peripheral appliances (because of energy saving considerations sensors and actuators do not have constant connection with backend server, so changes in the system cannot be transmitted to edge devices immediately).', 'During last decade amount of IoT devices rapidly increased, nowadays such devices are being actively infiltrated in manufacturing industry for production machinery or conveyors, as quality control in automated production directly depends on amount and variation of received data. Same solutions can also be beneficial for monitoring state of manufacturing equipment, as well as general processes optimization. Internet of Things solutions are also actively used in financial, healthcare, education, and transportation sectors. (Reinsel, Grantz, Rydning, 2018, p. 24)', 'International Data Corporation predicts that by 2025 over 150 billion devices will be connected to global network, where most of the data will be generated real-time by IoT devices. As shown in figure 6. At the moment, approximately one fifth of total datasphere consists of data generated in real-time. By 2025 it is estimated to be 30%. And eventually majority of global data will be generated by IoT solutions applied in various business sectors. (Reinsel, et al., 2018, p. 13)', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Internet of things is inalienable part of 4th industrial revolution. It acts as base component in turning dataflow for beneficial use. At the current state of development importance of IoT is globally well realized both by people and governments. Also, it can be said that IoT areas related to data collection (sensors and actuators) and data transmission (networking hardware and communication protocols) are studied rather holistically. Thus, data collection and transmission technologies are satisfactorily fulfilling their function.', 'On the other hand, collected data should be stored for further processing. And considering current rates of global datasphere growth, as well as speed of data storing solutions becoming irrelevant – data storage may become one of the biggest challenges for humanity.', '2.2 BIG DATA', 'Latest research in growth of datasphere showed explosive rates in comparison with previous decade. IDC (International Data Corporation) supposes that in 5 years data volume will be exaggerated 3 times reaching point of 175 zettabytes (175*1021 bytes). While amount of people interacting with data on daily basis will increase only by 13%. (Reinsel, et al., 2018, p.5). Statistics showing predicted data growth is displayed in Figure 7 (should this be 6).', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'The entire world realizes the importance of data management technologies (Figure 7). Europe is a non-exception, as in January 2020 it was announced that Euro Commission sets a challenge to create a unified data market, capable of competing with current dominant technological giants like Google or Amazon. (Foo, 2020)', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'The creator of ‘Big data’ term is the editor of Nature magazine - Clifford Lynch. In 2008 he stated the fact that continuous growth of global information load have to be faced with new toolbox of more advanced technologies, as traditionally used DВMS (Database Management System) are unable to handle big data. (Clifford, 2008).', 'Therefore, it can be said that Bid Data is more related to methods and tools for data processing, than to data itself. Distinguishing feature of big data management – is ability to stably perform data distribution in conditions of sustain data growth.', 'As following from C. Lynch’s statement: today it is clear that traditional methods of data processing are unsuitable for current rates of data generation and those rates are that big, so a whole new approach was developed. It is called BDA (Big Data Analytics), the approach specializes on giant sets of complexб and often unstructured (unlabelled) information. BDA is used to highlight important data, accurately identify trends, forecast indicators, and optimize parameters when it is physically impossible to fully review the spectrum of information. In a past few years an increase in demand for big data analytics solutions is recorded. Mostly aimed for optimization of resource management and ERP systems in industrial sector. For instance, in 2015: only 17% of companies used BDA globally, in 2017 more than half of companies worldwide (53%) were already using it. (Columbus, 2017)', 'Nowadays there are various systematizations used for big data processing, yet there is a set of 3 basing on principles, which are essential for every BDA solution. The principles of horizontal scalability, data locality and crash tolerance are described below.', '• Data locality.', 'This principle means that data processing is done on the same equipment where data is stored, as transferring information between servers on a scale of big data would significantly increase costs.', '• Horizontal scalability.', 'As theoretically amount of data which can be loaded has no limits – any system dealing with big data implies adaptive expansion of capacity (constant readiness for increase in computing power).', '• Crash tolerance.', 'Big load of data requires big databases with big amount of computational equipment (Figure ). Due to big amount of equipment there is a higher statistical chance of abnormal mistake or hardware malfunction. Thereby, crash tolerance principle is responsible for preventing failure of the whole system when such incidents happen.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'As it was mentioned in 2.1, the majority of datasphere will be eventually generated in real-time of which most by Internet of Things. An IoT architecture scheme presented in Figure 3 includes several layers purposed to manage constant data streams (like video monitoring) or data with periodic peak load (like optimization of factory processes) in other words Big Data.', 'MapReduce was developed by Google in 2004 and was released for public use in 2014. Considered to be the very common tool for analytical tasks, yet not the fastest model used for distributed analyses of big data sets. MapReduce-based applications involves at least 3 main stages of processing.', '• Map function', 'Is a specific task set by a human, the function is responsible for filtering splitted segments of input data (splits or shards). If a MapReduce model is used for word counting as shown in example (Figure ) Map function is to separate text segment (input) into words and generate a key (word itself) and a value (quantity of words in segment) for each word.', '• Shuffle phase', 'Is carried out without user interaction, as key and value pair is automatically requested from the map phase and then sorted regarding to the key, so different values with same key will be grouped into partitions and directed to reduce phase according to these partitions.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', '• Reduce function', 'Is applied to every partition (every key) and outputs values for each partition - the final result.', 'The biggest advantage of such models is the ability of all functions work independently from each other on all phases, making it possible to analyse big data parallelly and on different computers in a cluster.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', '2.3 ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS', 'In comparison to previous technologies the research area of Artificial Neural Networks is the oldest, yet the most incomprehensible. At the same time, ANN has the biggest impact potential and its scope of applications is everything where mathematical function can be applied.', 'ANN (artificial neural network) appeared as a concept soon after first electronic computation machine was invented. For the first time idea of an ANN was proposed in 1943 by two researches from University of Chicago: Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. (Larry Hardesty, 2017).', 'Based on McCulloch-Pitts research the first artificial neural network which had a practical application was developed in 1959 by co-inventor of the microprocessor Marcian Hoff and his professor in Stanford University Bernard Widrow. They called it ‘MADALINE’ which stands for: Multiple Adaptive Linear Neuron model, the architecture of MADALINE is grounded on mathematical method of least squares. It was applied in telecommunications to reduce echo during phone calls regarding the ANN is almost 70 years old, it is still in commercial use. (Stanford n.d.).', 'Artificial intelligence is a branch of computer sciences, representing the ability of a machine to carry out intelligence related tasks.', 'Technology of machine learning was developed in middle 20th century, starting as AI for playing chess and checkers. Nowadays, after almost 70 years basic operation principle remains the same, yet processors computation power breakthrough made it possible to apply machine learning algorithms far beyond board games.', 'Machine learning is a subsection of AI, a science dedicated to methods of designing algorithms able to automatically find patterns by integrated data processing, this called training. After program or computer is trained it is able to make decisions and predictions relying on training experience, at the same time training and self-optimizing. In other words, machine learning is sort of wunderkind which only lacks learning materials, after receiving the data it figures out what to with it independently.', 'At the moment there are numerous training sets and algorithms. Appendix 3 represents an approximate scheme of ML.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Architectures of modern ANNs are not very different from MADALINE, advanced in machine learning effectiveness were achieved mostly due to breakthroughs in computation power of modern machines.', 'Any ANN is a set of neurons and connections between them. As shown in Figure 14 a neuron represents a simple mathematical function with many ‘receive’ connections with inputs x and only one ‘give’ connection. Each connection is assigned with weight (𝜔) To organize a network - neurons are grouped into layers. Neurons are can receive input from previous layers, as well as send output to next layer, but never interact with other neurons from the same group.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'The most basic type of ANN is single-layered neural network, like ADALINE – the predecessor of MADALINE. Even though there are two layers: input and output, input layer is ignored in layer counting, as it does not execute any calculation. Nowadays, most of neural networks architectures are multi-layered, as they have at least one hidden layer between input and output ones. However, most considered ANNs are deep neural networks, a neural net is called deep if it has more than two hidden layers, as number of hidden layers directly affects the accuracy of a neural net.', 'The concept of ANN finally got mass popularization in 2010s, after surviving its last ‘AI winter’ (a period of reduced interest in artificial intelligence matter which entails cut of funding in research) started in 1998 as rapid increase in computation capabilities of graphics processing units (GPU) opened a wide range of areas where ANN approach of machine learning could be applied.', 'Since 2010 ANNs proved to be very beneficial in completely different industries. Currently, application possibilities of artificial neural networks are only limited by availability of training data sets and imagination. In Stock markets and Forex ANNs are used for trading bots and currency rate forecasts. More big companies (Alibaba, Amazon) with complex business structures are benefiting from operations optimization by ANN driven software for production machine management along with quality control and risk assessment. In medicine neural nets are helping to determine the diagnosis based on illness history or analyse scans from radiography or MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) (Fukuoka, 2002 pp. 197-228). Above mentioned examples show difference of application areas; but those applications are always specified by professionally orientated tasks. However, usage of artificial neural networks in daily routine is exorbitant. An average person interacts with ANNs at least several dozens of times per day. When making self-portrait with a smartphone - face recognition is done by a neural net. When using virtual assistants like Siri or Alexa – an ANN is responsible for voice recognition. When surfing in internet and typing a search query – suggestions are also done by a neural net bases on previous search requests.', 'In a past few years ANNs showed outstanding results not only in processing labelled and unlabelled data, but also in generating their own. There are examples of small projects like Mubert - a start-up which trained a neural net to generate uninterrupted stream of original music in various genres. On the other hand, there are also tech-giants like Autodesk, the biggest supplier of civil and industrial engineering software in 2018 added an ANN based option for generative design to their products (Fusion 360). Generative design means a person only needs to input general parameters like size, weight, volume etc. then Ai generates thousands of possible design variants and makes simulations to test performance properties for each variant, resulting the most optimized design solution. (Keane P. 2018). Despite of reduced man-hours for engineers and architects, the biggest advantage of generative design is that trained artificial neural network creates an algorithm which allows an Ai to modify its design decision making in the same way evolution does (Figure 15). This innovation allowed to achieve design solutions which seemed impossible, not only in a way of appearance beyond human understanding, but also with better functioning in terms of structural efficiency and material usage.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'A vivid case study of how generative design can be applied is Airbus company – one of the biggest aircraft manufacturers. They used generative design for creating new cabin partition for their Airbus A320 plane. After generating and testing more than 10,000 options Ai created design which made new cabin partition stronger, yet 45% lighter. (Figure 16)', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Drawing parallel to chapter 3. In spite of, this new cabin partition design has nothing to do with solid waste management sector, it precisely gives an understanding of how 4th industrial revolution benefits for both industry and ecological situation. A plane with new partitions weighs approximately half a tone less, lower weight accordingly leads to decrease in fuel consumption. In case with A320 model, one plane with new partitions saves 12,720 kg of fuel per year, in other words reduces 166,000 kg of CO2 emissions per year. In addition, this case shows how modern technologies help to achieve smart design from perspective of materials circularity. As combination of generative design and 3D printing technology allowed improve manufacturing process by saving 95% of raw material usage. (Autodesk n.d.)', '3 APPLICATIONS IN SOLID WASTE MANGMENT', 'This chapter focuses on case studies where mentioned above technologies or their combination were applied for commercial use. Also, basing on customers feedback - impacts of application of those technologies were evaluated.', '3.1 WASTE MONITORING', 'Global market insights states that last year’s global solid waste management market value was over 1 trillion USD. (Gupta, 2019) Where nearly half of the market is waste logistics. Every year millions of trucks transporting hundreds of millions waste containers. Primary part of waste logistics is routing for trucks, however nowadays the majority of waste transportation operations are carried out without efficient planning. Inefficient planning of routes (Figure 18) results higher occupation of personal, more fuel for trucks and create additional load on traffic in case of big cities, and most importantly causes overfilled containers.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Enevo is a global company providing solutions for waste collection and transportation services funded in 2010 by Fredrik Kekäläinen and Johan Engström. Main component of Enevo’s solution is the original, low energy consuming IoT-based sensor (Figure 19) it measures fullness rate of a waste container using the ultrasonic sonar technology. (enevo n.d.) ', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Combination of IoT sensors with big data cloud service and machine learning based software (Figure 20) makes it possible for customers to transparently monitor their waste generation and optimize waste logistic operations which leads to reduced costs for waste transportation and collection.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'By using Enevo’s solution a McDonald’s franchise saved 12% from collection costs and increased recycling diversion by 50%. (Crofts, 2018)', '3.2 WASTE CLASSIFICATION AND SORTING', 'For decades people were trying to build machines for waste sorting, until recently achievement of self-sufficiency seemed to be impossible due to inability of processes optimization or high costs. Substantially now solid waste sorting is still mostly carried out by human labor, resulting poor quality of sorting due to human-factor, at the same time causing safety issues to personnel, not mentioning that waste sorting sector to be one of the most adverse working environments.', 'On the contrary, Zen Robotics automated robotic waste sorters (fast and heavy pickers) cannot be affected by unpleasant environment, work autonomously and unceasingly, hourly performing up to 2000 picks just by one robot, with accuracy up to 98% for wood, plastics, inert and metal types of waste. (Appendix ) Equipped with NIR, 3D, hi-res RGB camera, imaging metal detector and VIS sensors along with ZenBrain (trainable AI-based recognition software) makes it possible for robotic pickers to track objects based on their profile, color and material than automatically select which and how object should be picked in matter of seconds. Another feature of using machine learning algorithms is ability to train AI for various types of waste and waste flows, as well as different ways of sorting. At the moment there are 17 sorting stations with Zen Robotics solutions across the globe displayed in (Figure 19), dealing mostly with construction, demolition, commercial and industrial waste types.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Below displayed 2 quotations from client cases about benefits from implementation of autonomous robotic waste sorting solutions.', '• Case: Remeo, Finland, Helsinki', 'Waste sorting station for construction and demolition types of waste. “The plant runs virtually unmanned, with only an excavator driver doing the rough presorting on the tipping floor. A storage bunker feeds continuously the robotic sorting line, even when the excavator driver is not there. As a result, the robots produce very impressive results: the utilization of waste is already up from 70% to 90%, with the next target set at 95%.” (ZenRobotics Remeo reference n.d.)', '• Case: Carl F, Sweden, Mälmo', 'Waste sorting station for construction and demolition types of waste. “When choosing the robots, the company’s goal was to recover up to 12,000 tons more recyclable material each year – a significant 25% increase. In addition to less waste for incineration, lower operating costs and higher income from recyclables, the company now operates a first-of- its-kind robotic waste sorting facility in Sweden.” (ZenRobotics Carl F reference n.d.)', 'In other references stated at Zen Robotics website it is pointed out that automated solid waste sorting solutions brought sustainability to sorting process, improved occupational safety, raised material recovery, and of course increased performance which had a positive effect on finances.', "As mentioned above ZenBrain mostly focuses on determination of industrial, commercial, construction and demolition types of wastes. However, ZenRobotics are looking for new opportunities and at the moment there is a collaboration with Ferrovial about testing AI and robots on oversized MSW in Spain. Unfortunately, currently there is no information about progress available, but testing period expected to be over in July of 2020. (Ferrovial leads the 'ZRR for Municipal Waste' project to apply robotics in processing municipal waste n.d.)", 'It is possible there was no significant progress. Same reasons for absence of any commercial autonomous municipal solid waste sorting solutions – complexity of waste flow and diversity of waste elements in MSW. Difference is shown in the Figure below.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', '4 IMPACTS AND CHALLENGES', 'This chapter is based on results of mentioned below survey and reflections of author.', 'ISWA (International Solid Waste Association) is a worldwide leading independent waste management association. It operates in 93 countries, creating the biggest network aimed for collecting and sharing relevant knowledge and experience related to sustainable waste management. As a part of its mission, ISWA studies and promotes innovations which could be beneficial for SWM sector. Phenomenon of 4th Industrial Revolution is a complex of such innovations, thereby a global survey named “The Impact of the 4th Industrial Revolution on the Waste Management Sector” was presented on ISWA World Congress 2017.', 'The survey was lasted more than half a year and involved 1087 respondents from 97 countries. All of the respondents are working in various areas of waste management industry, majorly in private sector, as well as most of interviewed are holding management positions. The specifications of the survey are represented in Appendix 5. Thus, the survey can be justifiably considered as a relation of Waste Management community to the Industry 4.0 topic.', '4.1 IMPACTS', 'According to the survey 97% interviewees believed that changes brought by fourth industrial revolution will impact the waste sector in general, where 50% consider this impact by 2030 to be “major” and 45% as “some”.', 'On this basis participants were asked what the most affected areas would be. Results are displayed in the (Chart 1), representing rating of 7 waste- related areas. Clearly reuse, recycling, as well as new ecodesign concepts and standards for products are on the lead positions as fourth industrial revolution is in strong bonds with circular economy, as it was mentioned earlier - circular economy for resources is achievable with tools brought by Industry 4.0 e.g. digital manufacturing or advanced ERP’s. On the other hand, waste prevention expected to have lower impact than waste to energy for instance, while on the contrary those two have inverse potential to achieve sustainability in waste traffic.', 'Areas most impacted by the 4th Industrial Revolution. (Mavropoulos, 2017, p. 19)', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'It is also attested by (Chart 3) describing response percentage to achievements which will happen before 2030. Similar to previous chart the top is held by innovations aimed to improve use of resources.', 'On the other hand, when survey participators were asked if fourth industrial revolution will result circular economy for most of consumer goods, answers displayed in Chart 2 were generaly positive, yet only a quarter answered with a solid ‘yes’.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'It turns out even recycling and waste-related industry experts who acquainted with Industry 4.0, do not completely find the interconnectivity with circular economy.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'As for forecasting, we can say: for now, predictions are quite accurate, because today’s tendencies of development are very similar to top positions from the rating presented in (Chart 4), like previous chart it also displays response percentage, but this time for innovations to be available in 2030. Later in this paper Referring to chapter 3.4 where I was focusing on cases of automated robotics merged with waste sorting and recycling operations.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'Another thing worth mentioning is weird dissonance in answers (excluding new sensors) for investments question (Chart 5). While highlighting importance or impacts of actual waste management solutions, participants surprisingly ranked mobile applications to be the first and social media the third important areas for investments. As digital utilities platforms are in the middle of rating, I assume getting society with familiar waste issues and providing guidelines is implied. However, taking into account importance of mentioned above things can’t be neglected - it is evident that areas of wider application: (new materials, big data, internet of things, artificial intelligence, robots and even 3d printers which took last place) would result much greater impact, by being able to affect both people and businesses. This desire of investing basically into promotion remains obscure at least by two reasons. Firstly, both social media and mobile applications do not require much investments in comparison to other areas. Secondly, throw out the years these two proved to have miserable effect on waste management and recycling sectors. It is irrefutably easier to promote the importance of change, rather than making a change. It might be acceptable before, today having all the potential of new technologies I would consider such investment priority as erroneous, a waste of money.', 'Preferred areas for investment.', '[Figure and Description Omitted]', 'To sum up, it seems that rate of changes approach, as well their scale brought by of the 4th Industrial Revolution, are rather underestimated. A deeper study in benefits and risk assessments of implementation Industry’s 4.0 tools in waste industry are urgent, as only 150 out 1087 participants consider themselves knowledgeable of 4th industrial revolution.', 'In addition to conclusions made from ISWA’s survey there also environmental, socio-economic impacts workplace impacts.', 'Environmental impact:', 'Increasing speed and quality of operations in MSWM by Machine Learning and Neural Networks will help in sorting and recycling permanently growing municipal waste streams. Making it possible for certain materials to be reused in product manufacturing.', 'Another big step towards circularity of materials is applying IoT-based sensors on a mass scale, this will allow to track entire lifespan from a product to waste and collect data on every stage of lifecycle. Using this data an optimized eco-friendly design can be developed and further improved with upcoming data. The bigger influence of circular economy – the less waste ends up in open dumps, landfills, and energy recovery plants.', 'Socio-economic impact:', 'Implementation of technologies related to 4th Industrial revolution will have massive impact on both financial aspects and life quality. Circular economy for materials will allow to decrease expenses from raw material extraction, transportation, and processing. Also, requirements of modern tools are mostly based on providing computational equipment and access to internet. Such high accessibility of technologies allows 4th Industrial Revolution to uniformly affect municipal waste management sectors of both developed and developing countries. As well as, create highly competitive market of waste monitoring and processing solution, because implementation of IT-based solutions are not heavily dependent on financial state of a company or waste industry as a whole.', 'Labor market impact:', 'Vice President of International Solid Waste Management Association Carlos Silva Filho claims that companies relying on traditional business models will not be able to compete in the market by 2032. (Mavropoulos, 2017 p. 5). This statement can be related to one of the integral consequences brought by any technological revolution; a company or an industry can develop sustainably only if it is able to adapt to global changes. Innovations and new technologies always make some jobs irrelevant resulting disappearance of professions or even industries. On the other hand, any innovation always leads new business opportunities which eventually result creation of new professions requiring higher qualification, as well as new more complex industries. For instance, use of Ai and robotics may turn waste sorting stations into almost fully automated facilities accordingly minimizing amount of human labor in this area.', '5 CONCLUSION', 'Innovations associated with 4th industrial revolution are already showing great results in improving all manner of industries. Taking into account the scale of changes, it can be assumed that society is at the transitional stage between technological eras. Furthermore, as majority of those improvements are related to optimization and efficient planning of existing processes – there is a big chance of shifting from linear economy to a circular one. In other words, using full potential of raw materials lifecycle.', '']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Aff-Northwestern-Doubles.docx

Michigan

PiPh

8c850a242f0574d9744e128808e6cb890153dbb81b93f21dce2e6aa95de7ba7d

‘Floodgates’ reasoning ensures courts feel the need to make cuts.

Shaprio 21—(Assistant Professor of Law at Rutgers Law School). Matthew A. Shapiro. June 2021. “Distributing Civil Justice”. Georgia Law Journal, 109 Geo. L.J. 1473.

courts withdraw judicial resources so they can be reserved for "more important" cases when courts embrace the floodgates" argument that certain sorts of suits would 'swamp' the courts . supposes it would lack the time to consider other suits Courts end up distributing resources among different categories of cases by devoting time and attention . to prematurely terminate potentially meritorious lawsuits.

In the most direct mechanism, courts foreclose a particular cause of action, effectively withdraw ing all judicial resources from that category of litigation so that they can be reserved for other , "more important" cases This occurs when courts embrace the " floodgates" argument , the idea that certain sorts of law suits should not be allowed because to do so would 'swamp' the courts with litigation . The court supposes it would lack the time to consider other law suits aiming to vindicate rights that are more important than the rights it therefore proposes to bar. Courts can also end up distributing judicial resources among different categories of cases indirectly , simply by devoting more time and attention to some and thereby leaving less for others . dubbed "managerial judging," judges will abuse their power to prematurely terminate potentially meritorious lawsuits.

withdraw reserved other , "more important" cases " floodgates" argument certain sorts should not be allowed 'swamp' supposes other law suits different categories indirectly time attention "managerial judging," prematurely terminate

['', 'In the most direct mechanism, courts foreclose a particular cause of action, effectively withdrawing all judicial resources from that category of litigation so that they can be reserved for other, "more important" cases. This occurs, for instance, when courts embrace the "floodgates" argument, the idea that', "certain sorts of law suits should not be allowed because to do so would 'swamp' the courts with litigation. The court supposes that if it were to allow that type of suit it would lack the time to consider promptly enough other law suits aiming to vindicate rights that are, taken together, more important than the rights it therefore proposes to bar.", 'The access-to-justice concern with the floodgates argument is that courts invoke it disproportionately to avoid having to deal with disfavored claims typically brought by disfavored groups of litigants, such as prisoners or discrimination plaintiffs. When they do so, courts are effectively reallocating their resources away from those disfavored cases toward ones deemed more important.', 'Courts can also end up distributing judicial resources among different categories of cases somewhat more indirectly, simply by devoting more time and attention to some and thereby leaving less for others. This seems to be one potential concern with the practice that Judith Resnik has dubbed "managerial judging," whereby judges focus on the "managerial" tasks associated with shepherding cases through the pretrial phase (usually resulting in settlement) at the expense of the more traditionally "adjudicatory" tasks associated with actually deciding cases on the merits. Criticisms of managerial judging have tended to focus on [*1492] the practice\'s costs for managed cases, particularly the risk that judges will abuse their power to prematurely terminate potentially meritorious lawsuits. But managerial judging might also have more systemic implications for the distribution of judicial resources. In particular, insofar as more complex cases require more case management, judges who adopt a more managerial posture will end up spending more time and attention on complex cases than they otherwise would, necessarily reducing the time and attention they have to spend on more routine cases. The prevalence of managerial judging can thereby end up slighting routine cases. Once again, from an access-to-justice perspective, the worry is that courts are giving certain categories of cases short shrift so that they can focus on the ones that, from many judges\' perspectives, really matter.', '', '']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-5%20-%20Fullertown-Round2.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-5%2520-%2520Fullertown-Round2.docx

91e65c105ec19527093121c4f90c06692a557f2fa0f9ad01b9b5d7532712ddb8

China is structurally inept at spurring innovation.

Moore 22 – Scott Moore (Director of China Programs and Strategic Initiatives at the University of Pennsylvania, Young Professional and Water Resources Management Specialist at the World Bank Group, Giorgio Ruffolo Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, PhD in Politics from Oxford University). “The Wrong Way to Compete With China” Lawfare Blog. August 8, 2022. Accessed September 28, 2022. https://www.lawfareblog.com/wrong-way-compete-china

Beijing funneled money into research results have been underwhelming . Studies suggest innovation processes are undermined by corruption over-reliance on state control and organizational culture that disincentivizes collaboration . The biggest constraint is authoritarian control of info which stifles ideas censorship and restrictions on internet hamper innovation informal norms and institutions are extremely difficult t o engineer it might never catch up

China’s own struggles to boost innovation suggest he was on to something when it comes to nonfinancial catalysts of innovation. Beijing has funneled huge sums of money into research in decades, but the results have been underwhelming . Studies suggest crucial innovation processes are undermined by pervasive corruption over-reliance on state control and an organizational culture that disincentivizes collaboration . The biggest constraint is the authoritarian control of info rmation which stifles new ideas censorship and restrictions on internet access continue to hamper innovation The contrast between the U S ’ reaction to Sputnik and China today holds two crucial lessons First there is a big difference between investment in basic research Second Eisenhower’s restrained reaction highlights that government plays an important, but only partial, role in fostering innovation informal norms , values, and institutions are extremely difficult t o engineer they rely as much on the private sector and civil society as on government efforts as China challenges the leadership of developed democracies, it might never entirely catch up

research underwhelming pervasive corruption over-reliance on state control organizational culture that disincentivizes collaboration authoritarian control of info censorship restrictions on internet informal norms institutions extremely difficult never catch up

['', 'But faced with a public and Congress seized by panic, Eisenhower tried another tactic, seeking cheaper ways to respond to Soviet technological advances that relied less on government and more on the country’s private enterprise and civil society. In a second speech, while boasting that the federal government was “stepping up its basic research programs,” the president emphasized that “the biggest share of the job is in the hands of industry and private organizations.” ', 'Eisenhower may have been motivated primarily by budgetary concerns. But six decades later, China’s own struggles to boost innovation suggest that he was on to something when it comes to the nonfinancial catalysts of successful innovation. Beijing has funneled huge sums of money into research and development in recent decades, but the results have been generally underwhelming. Studies suggest that crucial innovation processes in China are undermined by pervasive corruption, an over-reliance on state control and direction, and an organizational culture that disincentivizes collaboration. The biggest informal constraint on innovation in China, though, is the authoritarian control of information and expression, which stifles new ideas. In a sign that China’s rulers recognize the linkage between free expression and robust innovation, Beijing passed legislation, the 1993 Scientific and Technological Progress Law, that explicitly guaranteed freedoms for researchers and inventors. But in practice, censorship and restrictions on internet access continue to hamper innovation. As one Chinese academic commented, “[I]t is very difficult to achieve world-leading results or to be a frontrunner in global scientific research without any knowledge of [other countries’ achievements] and without comparison.” ', 'The contrast between the United States’ reaction to the launch of Sputnik and the case of China today holds two crucial lessons for the CHIPS and Science Act and other efforts to compete more effectively when it comes to science, technology, and innovation. ', 'First, there is a big difference between investment in basic research and development, which tends to confer long-term benefits, and subsidies, which often do not. Second, Eisenhower’s restrained reaction highlights the fact that government plays an important, but only partial, role in fostering innovation. Indeed, thoughtful accounts of the development of Silicon Valley and other highly innovative ecosystems emphasize that it is the combination of public investment in basic research, culture, values, and institutions that make up the secret sauce of innovation. Other research has found that the U.S. Cold War-era space program succeeded where its Soviet competitor failed primarily because of its superior organizational ability to marshal the combined ideas and resources of government, industry, and academia. ', 'These informal norms, values, and institutions are extremely difficult to engineer or to legislate—and they rely as much on the energies of the private sector and civil society as on government efforts. This is why even as China increasingly challenges the technological leadership of developed democracies, it might never entirely catch up. Yet the reverse is also true: If the U.S. wants to remain ahead, it needs to strengthen liberal values and institutions, which will foster collective and coordinated leadership by government and civil society in science, technology, and innovation.']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PaPr-Neg-UMW-Round-5.docx

Minnesota

PaPr

b631aa4382d2f28ec87998532cfe5765a514b33978763d36bcf9c5ae8d33c22b

The counterplan has Congress retake authority over nuclear use, overturning INS v. Chadha.

Shultz ‘4 [Jeffrey; 2004; Attorney, M.P.A. from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, A.B. from Princeton University, J.D. from the University of Virginia; Kennedy School Review, “Preempting preemption: nuclear first-use and the role of Congress,” vol. 5]

Congress has the authority to control first-use . Even if Congress chooses not the president does not have authority to make first-use of nuc s absent congress Chadha rejected a " legislative veto " to review action the veto was widespread effective and efficient The time is ripe to set up congress where president does not have plenary power Congress must authoriz

Congress has demonstrated that it has the authority to pass the affirmative legislation necessary to control nuclear first-use . Even if Congress chooses not to impose a legislative straitjacket the president alone does not have sufficient authority to make first-use of nuc lear weapon s absent congress If Congress wishes to force the president to consult prior to launching a nuclear preemptive strike, it had better say so In the 1983 Chadha the U.S. S C rejected the use by Congress of a " legislative veto " mechanism to review and approve executive action the legislative veto was widespread , having developed over many years as a result of custom a process some identified as an effective and efficient negotiation and consultation As a result of Chadha, Congress now lacks this straightforward means to retain some control over the executive branch there has been some vocal opposition in the Congress to the so-called doctrine of preemption and, specifically , to the possible use of nuc s More consultation between the political branches would hopefully lead to a more rational policy that balances non-proliferation concerns with the needs of national security The time is ripe to set up the congress on the use of force that has been proposed many times Abandoning last-resort nuclear deterrence in favor of a preemption doctrine is bad policy, even if Congress currently backs it If a president strikes first preventively , he or she has no clear constitutional authority A consultative process is more realistic and flexible than legislative handcuffs where the president does not have plenary power to act Congress must provide authoriz ation

Congress authority affirmative legislation nuclear first-use chooses not to not sufficient authority first-use nuc s congress force the president consult better say so Chadha S C rejected legislative veto review approve widespread many years effective efficient negotiation now lacks retain some control vocal opposition doctrine of preemption specifically nuc s consultation rational policy balances national security time is ripe congress use of force last-resort preemption doctrine even if preventively no clear constitutional authority more realistic flexible not plenary power Congress authoriz

['Under uninterrupted constitutional practice since the use of the first nuclear weapons by the United States against Japan in the closing days of World War II, Congress has demonstrated that it has the authority to pass the affirmative legislation necessary to control nuclear first-use. Even if Congress chooses not to impose a legislative straitjacket, (45) the president alone does not have sufficient authority to make first-use of nuclear weapons absent some congressional approval. (46) The wisdom of Congress\'s reticence in declaring war from the standpoint of its own institutional prerogatives is clear. According to the Constitution, the power to attack first requires that one also be able to declare war--a power belonging exclusively to Congress under the express language of the document, as we have seen. But if the president can argue that we are already in a war, such as an ongoing "War on Terror" in the aftermath of the Iraq War, for which he received Congress\'s blessing, then he can claim expansive independent powers in the prosecution of such a war, including the choice of weapons and tactics. In such a "zone of twilight," only an act of Congress--such as the recently repealed ban on "mini-nukes" and bunker-busters--can tilt the constitutional balance clearly in its favor. If Congress wishes to force the president to consult prior to launching a nuclear preemptive strike, it had better say so by means of legislation.', 'Means of Influence: Chadha and the Continuing Power of the Purse', 'In the 1983 Chadha (47) case, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the use by Congress of a "legislative veto" mechanism to review and approve executive action that failed to comply with legislative process by not obtaining the approval of both chambers of Congress. The decision was controversial; the legislative veto was widespread, having developed over many years as a result of custom and usage between the political branches, a process some identified as an effective and efficient negotiation and consultation.', 'As a result of Chadha, Congress now lacks this straightforward means to retain some control over the executive branch when it makes a broad grant of power pursuant to legislation. Chadha has caused Congress in some cases to return to a "short-leash approach," that is, according to one prominent account, "in many instances an alternative counterproductive to Congress, the Presidency, and, above all, the national interest." (48) The more recent rejection of the line-item veto by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. New York, (49) can be seen as a companion piece to Chadha, preserving a traditional, formal understanding of separation of powers, under which Congress has exclusive power to appropriate and spend funds.', 'In the aftermath of Chadha and Clinton v. New York, Congress\'s purse-string power looks like its best, most unimpeachable tool for conditioning the president\'s foreign policy. It can even be used as a soft legislative veto, such as when Congress requires its approval to be obtained prior to the reprogramming by the executive of designated funds. Congress\'s recourse to its purse-string power to try to shape foreign policy can be seen in the fact that even with the Iraq war under way "top House and Senate lawmakers plan[ned] to give President Bush far less flexibility than he want[ed] with the funds Congress [would ultimately] provide for the war with Iraq." (50) It was also evident when the president\'s request in fall 2003 for an additional $87 billion in funding to cover troop deployment and reconstruction operations in Iraq met with unexpected resistance in the Congress.', 'The 2003 Defense Budget Act adopted the purse-string approach to the nuclear first-use issue, denying funds for formal design studies for a so-called robust nuclear earth penetrator (RNEP) weapon promised to the National Nuclear Security Administration under Title XXXI of the bill prior to passage. (51) The act also required the secretary of energy, if developing a new or modified nuclear weapon (which seems clearly to include the RNEP referred to in the Nuclear Posture Review), to specifically request funds for such activities in the budget of the president for any fiscal year, and, if at an advanced stage of the development process, to make a dedicated line item request. (52)', "Senator Durbin's Senate Resolution 76 criticizing the present administration's nuclear posture shows that there has been some vocal opposition in the Congress to the so-called doctrine of preemption contained in the most recent National Security Strategy and, specifically, to the possible use of nuclear weapons to take out weapons of mass destruction abroad. Yet it is difficult to imagine a groundswell developing in Congress large enough to cause the administration to reconsider its preemption doctrine entirely in light of its potential to make nuclear first-use more likely. The 108th Congress, which repealed the ban on mini-nukes and bunker-buster research in the 2004 Defense Budget Act, does not appear to appreciate the danger.", 'The practical drawback to the use of purse-string power by Congress in the case of nuclear first-use is obvious: budget cutting is hardly instantaneous in effect, nor is it a precision weapon. The impact of prospective cuts may be negligible where research or development of a controversial weapon has already begun. In the absence of a specific legislative prohibition following the enactment of the 2004 Defense Budget Act, the Department of Defense may undertake feasibility studies and related research on mini-nukes. (53) The signal is clear to any rival power around the world paying attention. The U.S. policy of encouraging non-proliferation worldwide, including by means of programs aimed at retiring old Soviet nuclear weapons, could be devastated by an appearance of a double standard.', "With American conventional superiority so clear, there will surely be great interest in any research the United States undertakes on the sort of low-yield nuclear weapon that an out-manned enemy might be tempted to resort to in the field, or which a terrorist organization would most easily be able to deploy. Unless the U.S. military shows that such a weapon is superior to the conventional alternative for striking hardened or underground targets, the lifting of the research ban could be opening Pandora's box without gaining anything in return. Larger bunker-busters--although more difficult to use as precision weapons--are well past the research stage, having been deployable since about 1997. (54) Even though the 2004 Defense Budget Act followed its immediate predecessor in requiring a specific request from the Department of Energy before allowing testing or production of RNEPs, existing missiles or aboveground nuclear weapons could always be re-purposed without specific permission of Congress or line-item disclosure in the president's budget request, one clue that would tip off opponents of such a controversial measure.", 'In the post-September 11 environment of perpetual insecurity it is hard to imagine any movement arising to control defense spending with the same traction and bipartisan impact as the combination of the left-wing "nuclear freeze" movement and conservative defense budget criticism of the early 1980s. In fact, despite having the power to do so, Congress has almost never cancelled a major weapons system outright. (55) When the nation\'s safety should be the first concern, the zigzag course charted by the Congress, interacting over time with pork-barrel politics, partisan concerns, and a short horizon, seems a dangerous route upon which to continue. More consultation between the political branches, together with a longer time-horizon would hopefully lead to a more rational policy that balances non-proliferation concerns with the needs of national security. The occasion of the Nuclear Posture Review, taking place approximately once per decade, provides a good opportunity for oversight of nuclear strategy and tactics by Congress, with both political branches working together on the shape of the optimal strategy.', 'Based on the comments of a number of experts called to testify in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing discussed earlier, as well as the concerns expressed by Paul H. Nitze and others, it appears that Congress should make a stronger case in law for using conventional weapons to eliminate WMD facilities. From a practical and moral perspective, it is essential to avoid creating a disaster of nuclear fallout and destruction when the intelligence on threats is never airtight. (It has turned out to be erroneous before, as in the case of the Sudanese factory mistakenly bombed as a dual-use\xa0\xa0facility during the Clinton administration.).', "From the perspective of both international and U.S. federal law, the use of a conventional weapon is less likely to constitute a violation of the principle of proportionality typically associated with the Caroline case. (56) The use of a nuclear weapon in anticipatory self-defense to eliminate a threat pursuant to which the very survival of the defending state is not at risk is a violation of international law according to the International Court of Justice. (57) In the last event, since the power to declare war and to decide to violate international law is exclusively within Congress's constitutional power, should Congress fail to convince the president to employ conventional weapons, and he or she judges a nuclear first strike necessary to take out a WMD threat, only Congress has the ultimate authority to ratify such action anyway. (58)", 'While strategy is best developed for the long term, circumstances can change overnight. For that reason, a standing committee of key members of Congress should be constituted by law to be consulted on the formulation of the Nuclear Posture Review and, thereafter, anytime the president feels that it is in the national security interest of the United States to deviate from established policy on preemptive nuclear strikes. By delegating its power to approve a preemptive nuclear strike to a bicameral committee, Congress would avoid being bypassed entirely and would recognize that secrecy and timing concerns may make consultation and deliberation by the Congress as a whole impracticable.', "Given that it has few independent means of developing intelligence outside the executive branch, however, Congress is at a severe informational disadvantage. In practice, members of Congress sitting on a consultative committee will feel enormous pressure to take the president at his word about the facts on the ground. In light of the recently released Kay Report of the Iraq Survey Group, which details the lack of any evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq following more than one year of a massive U.S. military presence in that country, this informational imbalance is particularly troubling. Under the status quo, Congress's foreign affairs committees are generally less demanding about information than they could be. Nevertheless, if the president were more concerned about being denied authority to launch an attack because existing legislation required consultative committee approval in such a case, he or she would have more incentive to consult with the Senate and House Intelligence and Armed Services Committees--or the full Congress for that matter--and keep them better informed all along.", 'More ongoing negotiation and contact would finally place the responsibility for developing "big picture" strategy--including the deployment and use of nuclear weapons--where it belongs: between the branches, in a process of co-determination. This need not lead to the sort of gridlock commonly associated with the budget process. While the National Security Strategy is required to be produced yearly (thus far, the Bush administration is in breach, having only produced one document in 2002), it is more of a philosophical overview than a planning document. The Nuclear Posture Review, on the other hand--which, as we have seen, sets a number of long-term planning and budgetary wheels in motion--is produced only once per decade. It does not seem unreasonable that the U.S. Congress and the president should reexamine U.S. nuclear strategy and negotiate its contours once per decade, rather than leaving such an important and constitutionally fraught task solely in the hands of the executive.', 'Conclusion: Congress Must Speak on National Security Strategy', 'The time is ripe to set up the congressional consultative committee on the use of force that has been proposed many times, in many forms, over the last thirty years. (59) Abandoning last-resort nuclear deterrence in favor of a preemption doctrine that allows the president the flexibility to employ a host of new, specialized nuclear weapons such as mini-nukes or bunkerbusters is bad policy, even if Congress currently backs it. Nevertheless, the decision to abandon deterrence with Congress\'s acquiescence does not threaten democracy and the constitutional separation of powers as much as a unilateral decision by the president to carry out a nuclear strike. If a president strikes first preventively, he or she has no clear constitutional authority. In such circumstances, the executive would most likely rely upon the "inherent authority" some claim for it under Curtiss-Wright, the 1947 National Security Act, and even Alexander Hamilton\'s Pacificus papers. (60) As we have seen, purse-string restrictions alone cannot prevent the president from making a preemptive nuclear strike using specially designed bunker-busters or, if unavailable, a re-purposed aboveground nuclear bomb. A consultative committee similar in structure to the one proposed by Congressman Lee Hamilton (see Appendix B) would more closely fulfill a constitutional design that requires consultation between the political branches where the use of force is concerned.', 'A consultative process is more realistic and flexible than legislative handcuffs. Congress could grant its members via legislation a right to bring an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the president for violating statutory guidelines setting forth in detail how he can act under circumstances involving first-use. But the courts are reluctant to get involved in any dispute touching on separation of powers and are deferential in a wartime setting (which arguably applies now, since the U.S. is waging a war on global terrorism).', 'Even if the courts were amenable to jumping into a "political question" involving a struggle for supremacy between the executive and legislative branches, they could not in any case act quickly enough to stop the president from making a rapid, secret strike on an enemy WMD facility in violation of law. An effective total legislative ban or straitjacket regarding first-use is probably impossible, and would remove any flexibility whatsoever, in a wager by Congress that there could never be an instance where it is necessary for the United States to strike first.', 'International law is an important consideration and feeds back into the constitutional arguments. The UN Charter permits the use of force under article 51 only for purposes of individual or collective self-defense or pursuant to express approval by the Security Council. We can reasonably discount the possibility that any president could or would be able to obtain UN Security Council approval for a nuclear preemptive strike, leaving self-defense as the only potential justification.', 'For a preemptive nuclear strike to constitute a permissible form of self-defense under international law, however, it must be necessary and proportional to an immediate threat. Based on the radiation fallout that would result even from a mini-nuke--as earlier cited congressional hearing testimony shows--a nuclear first strike for purposes of preemption would violate the Caroline doctrine because it would cause damage far in excess of any demonstrable harm it would theoretically be defending against. Unless the very existence of the United States is at stake, a disproportionate nuclear attack would therefore not be permissible under international law. The Caroline doctrine requiring proportionality "is firmly established as an integral aspect of both customary international law and, by extension the UN Charter," by virtue of its incorporation into article 51 of the charter, the provision allowing individual or collective self-defense. (61)', 'A preemptive strike that might be permissible with conventional weapons would, if nuclear and disproportionate to the threat, violate customary international law, "part of federal common law ... binding on every executive branch official, including the President." (62) Only congressional authorization can "legalize" such a violation of international law by the president. Looking at the constitutional text, court interpretations, custom, and international law as incorporated into U.S. law, the cumulative weight of the analysis shows that the separation of powers tilts definitively toward the Congress under the Constitution in the case under discussion. Both functionalist and democratic process approaches also support the same conclusion. If forthcoming studies support earlier congressional testimony in concluding that conventional weapons can eliminate WMD threats just as effectively as nuclear weapons, Congress should direct the president to adjust U.S. strategy accordingly. Regardless, Congress should agree on rules with the president within a legislative framework that includes a consultative committee to allow Congress a more direct and regular role in fine-tuning U.S. nuclear strategy and posture. The more indirect oversight of the purse-string approach is just not effective in restraining the president from taking immediate action.', 'The merits of the U.S. National Security Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review as presently drafted should receive further airing and debate before the full Congress, as Vice President Dick Cheney seemed to promise. From a legal standpoint, however, such a review is insufficient. With respect to nuclear first-use, the president lacks legal authority to execute the new doctrine of preemption, even though he has declared such a policy under both the National Security Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review. Congress must find a way to speak through legislation and consultation to endorse, condition, or ban the new doctrine (in the last case, perhaps temporarily until a new legislative scheme can be agreed upon; this would also give the president incentive to negotiate and consult with Congress on how such a scheme would work).', 'As Justice Jackson\'s tripartite analysis in the Youngstown case shows, where, as here, the president does not have plenary power to act (because he would violate the UN Charter and customary international law, each incorporated into federal common law), Congress must provide authorization, preferably through a consultative committee that does not sacrifice the executive\'s speed advantage in an emergency. Without such authorization, adrift in a "zone of twilight," the president lacks sufficient independent power to use a nuclear strike to remove a WMD threat, and such a preemptive attack would violate the U.S. Constitution as well as international law.']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Emory-GaHe-Neg-Long-Beach-Round-4.docx

Emory

GaHe

c9f4e5f42dac2bb1de96aba02834f05141567405286790da70779d38f1d08e34

Leveraging the absence of action is key because it yields expectations that Big Tech can avoid stringent regulations—this is also the end result of status quo initiatives.

Chakravorti 20—(PHD in Economics from the University of Rochester, MA in Economics from the Delhi School of Economics, dean of global business at The Fletcher School at Tufts University). Bhaskar Chakravorti. 10/2/20. “Antitrust Isn’t the Solution to America’s Biggest Tech Problem.” Harvard Business Review. . Accessed 8/24/21.

These companies have the resources and have an interest in cooperating if there is an expectation that it might help reach an eventual settlement on other issues on the table . It could be in the self-interest of these companies , as expanding access also expands their consumer base a deal would represent a practical step forward that recognizes where the process will likely end up

These companies have the resources and would have an interest in cooperating if there is an expectation that it might help reach an eventual settlement on the other issues on the table . It could be in the self-interest of these companies , as expanding access also expands their consumer base critics may denounce a deal with the tech giants a Faustian bargain, but it would represent a practical step forward that recognizes where the process starting today will likely end up .

resources interest in cooperating if there is an expectation that it might help reach an eventual settlement other issues on the table self-interest of these companies expands their consumer base a deal practical step forward will likely end up

['', 'These companies have the resources, as the pandemic has driven already historic profits to even higher peaks, and would have an interest in cooperating if there is an expectation that it might help reach an eventual settlement on the other issues on the table. It could be in the self-interest of these companies, as expanding access also expands their consumer base. After all, these companies have already invested in expensive internet access projects for a reason. Clearly, it must be because they expect to see commercial value from expanding the market.', 'The pandemic has revealed the most fundamental of our digital vulnerabilities. In taking a historic step, let’s turn to history again and that ancient deal from the Communications Act of 1934 that permitted the Bell System to maintain a monopoly in exchange for ensuring universal service. Today, critics may denounce a deal with the tech giants a Faustian bargain, but it would represent a practical step forward — and one that recognizes where the process starting today will likely end up. Let’s make a deal with the successors of the Bell System, and work to solve a problem that should never have existed in 2020.', '']

[(0, 14)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-9%20-%20ADA-Round2.docx

Minnesota

PhRa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/PhRa/Minnesota-PhoenixFlood-Rao-Neg-9%2520-%2520ADA-Round2.docx

64d1ea5c58264064bafe03369d283c9b721f4029043b24f7ac8e9f2397580f18

Putin nuke use causes their impacts.

Kroenig 22 - (Matthew Kroenig, Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, MA and PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley; September 2022, Atlantic Council, "Memo to the president: How to deter Russian nuclear use in Ukraine—and respond if deterrence fails," doa: 8-18-2023) url:

Russian nuclear use would divide the West break eight-decade taboo cause prolif if states fear use or if allies believe Washington will not respond

Russian nuclear use would harm US interests in the war in Ukraine and globally divide the West ern alliance It would also break a nearly eight-decade taboo on nuclear use. It may make future nuclear use more likely if states perceive that nuclear weapons can help them achieve their goals without resulting in serious military retaliation . Further, it could cause nuclear prolif eration if states fear that nuclear weapons might be use d against them or if US allies believe that Washington will not respond to a nuclear attack

Russian nuclear use divide the West ern alliance eight-decade taboo make future nuclear use more likely without resulting in serious military retaliation nuclear prolif eration use d against them will not respond to a nuclear attack

['', '• Russian nuclear use would harm US interests in the war in Ukraine and globally. ', '» Such a strike could cause a humanitarian catastrophe, deal a crippling blow to the Ukrainian military, divide the Western alliance, and compel Kyiv to sue for peace. ', '» It would also break a nearly eight-decade taboo on nuclear use. It may make future nuclear use more likely if states (e.g., China) perceive that nuclear weapons can help them achieve their goals without resulting in serious military retaliation from the United States and its allies. Further, it could cause nuclear proliferation if states fear that nuclear weapons might be used against them or if US allies believe that Washington will not respond to a nuclear attack.']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-DaPa-Aff-2--Kentucky-Round-3.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

407622589077c05a32478863605cf2b3ee1a31e32cc37b03a3c1601e4990b2a0

No tradeoff – newest resolution creates more capacity

Gehl 9-24 (Kate, Senior Counsel for Foley and Lardner LLP, Elizabeth A. N. Haas, Partner, Alan D. Rutenberg, Partner, H. Holden Brooks, Partner, Benjamin R. Dryden, Partner, Foley and Lardner LLP“A Divided FTC Approves Omnibus Resolutions to Step Up Enforcement Actions and Votes to Withdraw the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines” , MSU-MJS)

FTC’s resolutions permit the FTC to better utilize limited resources increase efficiency necessary due to increased work these allow a single Commissioner instead of a majority to approve compulsory process requests staff now have an expedited ability which will increase the number of investigations conducted

FTC’s resolutions are aimed at broadening ability “to obtain evidence The resolutions permit the FTC to better utilize limited resources to quickly investigate misconduct the resolutions increase efficiency necessary due to the “ increased volume of investigatory work ” these resolutions allow a single Commissioner instead of a majority to approve compulsory process requests in any investigation FTC staff now have an expedited ability to carry out process requests, which will increase the number of investigations conducted by the FTC.

better utilize limited resources increase efficiency now expedited ability increase the number of investigations conducted by the FTC.

['According to the FTC’s press release, the resolutions are aimed at broadening its ability “to obtain evidence in critical investigations on key areas where the FTC’s work can make the most impact.” The resolutions also will purportedly permit the FTC to “better utilize its limited resources” to quickly investigate potential misconduct. The FTC views the resolutions as one method to increase efficiency at the FTC, which certain Commissioners believe has become necessary due to the “increased volume of investigatory work” caused by a “surge” in merger filings in recent months. ', 'In practice, these resolutions allow a single Commissioner, instead of a majority of sitting Commissioners, to approve compulsory process requests in any investigation within the scope of the resolution for the next 10 years. What practical effect these resolutions will have remains to be seen; however, businesses engaged in conduct that may be implicated by the resolutions should be aware that FTC staff will now have an expedited ability to carry out compulsory process requests, which will very likely increase the number and scope of investigations conducted by the FTC. ']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Northwestern-Agbede-De-Leon%20Aff-FullerTown-Round1.docx

Northwestern

AgDe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Northwestern/AgDe/Northwestern-Agbede-De-Leon%2520Aff-FullerTown-Round1.docx

49f9d8772c46ca6446e7f170285d2f20141183e9e8fe4a032720eaf43f3cdfc8

China war escalates vertically and horizontally.

Armstrong Williams 23. Former vice president for governmental and international affairs with B&C Associates. Political science and economics from South Carolina State University. “United States is inching toward World War III with China.” https://amsterdamnews.com/news/2023/02/16/united-states-is-inching-toward-world-war-iii-with-china/.

The U S inching toward World War III with China the U S vastly greater existential threat to China than Soviet Union’s presence in Cuba was to the U S U S repeatedly threatening war organizing Quad strangling economy treating S C S as if it were the Gulf of Mexico relations are combustible Only a spark ignite a conflagration lead to nuclear exchanges threaten nuclear winter and extinction war would metastasize Neither would accept defeat Instead conflict expand horizontally and vertically include nuclear use China is not the Third Reich Taiwan is not Czechoslovakia

The U nited S tates is inching toward World War III with China Nearly two centuries of humiliation of China by the West Taiwan is the same distance from the Chinese mainland as Cuba is to the United States we were willing to initiate war if necessary to compel the Soviet Union to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba, the U nited S tates is a vastly greater existential threat to China than the Soviet Union’s presence in Cuba was to the U nited S tates in 1962. Why does anyone think China would react less strongly than the U nited S tates did repeatedly threatening war organizing the Quad strangling the Chinese economy treating the S outh C hina S ea as if it were the Gulf of Mexico U.S. relations with China are combustible Only a spark is necessary to ignite a conflagration that could lead to nuclear exchanges and threaten the species with nuclear winter and extinction A war involving the U.S. and China would probably metastasize Neither Beijing nor Washington would accept defeat in a limited engagement. Instead , the conflict probably would expand horizontally to other regions and vertically even to include nuclear weapons use become the worst catastrophe in the history of warfare China is not the Third Reich , President Xi Jinping is not Adolf Hitler. Taiwan is not Czechoslovakia Domino Theory implicit in the cry of “Munich” was discredited by our defeat by Vietnam

The U nited S tates is inching toward World War III with China vastly greater existential threat repeatedly threatening war organizing the Quad strangling the Chinese economy combustible spark conflagration nuclear exchanges threaten the species with nuclear winter and extinction metastasize horizontally vertically nuclear weapons use

['The United States is inching toward World War III with China. All the lights on the dashboard are flashing. The pivot to Asia proclaimed by past Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Massive arms sales to Taiwan. The United States Taiwan Defense Command in Taiwan. The Quad with Japan, Australia, and India to encircle China. The sale of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia and augmentation of U.S. Marine forces there. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s “in-your-face” gratuitous visit to Taiwan. President Joe Biden’s repeated threats to attack China if it invades Taiwan. Harsh economic sanctions against China indistinguishable from the United States economic strangulation of Japan before Pearl Harbor. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s summons to deny China access to artificial islands in the South China Sea. the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy, released in October 2022, naming China as the greatest threat to the United States. Nearly two centuries of humiliation of China by the West, beginning at least with the Opium War of 1842 to make Chinese drug addiction a western profit center. The United States followed with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and a prohibition on the naturalization of Chinese immigrants. The United States betrayed China during the post-World War I Paris Peace talks by surrendering Shandong Province to Japan. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to shake the hand of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai during the Geneva Conference to settle the future of Vietnam and gratuitously sneered that the two would only meet in a car crash. Taiwan is the same distance from the Chinese mainland as Cuba is to the United States. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, we were willing to initiate war if necessary to compel the Soviet Union to remove tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba, including a blockade. Cuba had requested the missiles to deter a planned second United States invasion on the heels of the Bay of Pigs debacle. The USSR blinked and removed the nuclear weapons in exchange for a sotto voce agreement by the United States to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Today, the United States is a vastly greater existential threat to China than the Soviet Union’s presence in Cuba was to the United States in 1962. Why does anyone think China would react less strongly than the United States did in the Cuban Missile Crisis to the U.S. arming Taiwan to the teeth, repeatedly threatening war, organizing the Quad, strangling the Chinese economy, and treating the South China Sea as if it were the Gulf of Mexico? Why would the Chinese accept national security risks that the United States has shown it will not? U.S. relations with China are combustible. Only a spark is necessary to ignite a conflagration that could lead to nuclear exchanges and threaten the species with nuclear winter and extinction. Something similar happened before with Austrian Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination by Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip on June 28, 1914. That gave birth to World War I, which witnessed 20 million deaths and 21 million wounded. World War III could be precipitated by a shoot-out over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands or the Scarborough Shoal/Huangyan Island. A war involving the U.S. and China would probably metastasize. According to the Brookings Institution’s Michael O’Hanlon: “Neither Beijing nor Washington would accept defeat in a limited engagement. Instead, the conflict probably would expand horizontally to other regions and vertically, perhaps even to include nuclear weapons threats—or their actual use. It literally could become the worst catastrophe in the history of warfare.” In recent years, U.S. wargames have generally shown China defeating the United States. One analysis concluded: “The overarching takeaway from participants in the war game: If China invades Taiwan, the Indo-\u200bPacific region will plunge into a broad, drawn-\u200bout war that could include direct attacks on the U.S., including Hawaii and potentially the continental United States.” If a war with China over Taiwan seems crazy, it’s because it is! We have no defense treaty with Taiwan. We have no diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It has no membership in the United Nations. It is within China’s traditional sphere of influence. It is more than 7,500 miles away from the United States. Its independence is a featherweight to our national security. If China annexed Taiwan, imitating our annexation of Hawaii in 1898, the annexation would not be an existential threat to the United States. I can already hear the appeasement shouts of “Munich,” “Munich,” “Munich” from the multi-trillion-dollar military-industrial-security complex. But China is not the Third Reich, President Xi Jinping is not Adolf Hitler. Taiwan is not Czechoslovakia. And the Domino Theory implicit in the cry of “Munich” was discredited by our defeat by Vietnam. It has become a semi-ally of the United States in opposing China. And Japan and South Korea are fully capable of defending themselves against a Chinese invasion.President George Washington’s time-honored Farewell Address provides the path to extricate ourselves from a war with China over Taiwan: “The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible.”']

[(10, 21)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Aff-Texas-Semis.docx

Emory

KeRa

63f405cb3ed0b1a06427fc1d27184ca0111f52eaf16e95c5fb5bb91a964d4639

The plan’s abrupt expansion creates major uncertainty that disrupts business planning

Alden F. Abbott 21, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center of George Mason University, J.D. from Harvard Law School and M.A. in Economics from Georgetown University, “Competition Policy Challenges for a New U.S. Administration: Is The Past Prologue?”, Concurrences: Antitrust Publications & Events, February 2021,

Rushing into rulemakings poses major risks including disincentives to invest and interference with transactions in light of second-guessing to “toughen” antitrust should be cautious In common-law a disruption to schemes generate major uncertainty regarding principles and substantially disrupt business planning

the HJSMR proposes taking a highly regulatory approach to digital platforms, including imposing “[s]tructural separations and prohibitions of certain dominant platforms from operating in adjacent lines of business.” Rushing into rulemakings on platforms (especially without a clear showing of market failure) poses major risks , however, including , in particular, the creation of disincentives to invest in platform-specific innovation; and the interference with potential efficiency-seeking transactions by platform operators and suppliers of complements ( in light of inevitable government second-guessing of platform-related business decision-making) To address the perceived abuse of market power proposed to amend and “toughen” the core antitrust statutes , The call for dramatic systemic change in antitrust enforcement norms should be approached cautious ly , with a jaundiced eye . In our common-law -based antitrust system, a major disruption to long-familiar statutory schemes would generate major uncertainty regarding antitrust enforcement principles and substantially disrupt business planning for an indeterminate amount of time. Many welfare-enhancing transactions could be sacrificed

Rushing into major risks disincentives to invest interference efficiency-seeking transactions inevitable government second-guessing amend “toughen” core antitrust statutes cautious jaundiced eye common-law major disruption long-familiar generate major uncertainty substantially disrupt business planning sacrificed

['', '12. But recent suggestions put forth in an October 2020 House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust majority report (HJSMR) [12] and in a November 2020 report by the Washington Center for Equitable Growth (WCEGR) [13] (coauthored by various prominent critics of Trump administration antitrust enforcement who served in the Obama administration) would go far beyond application of existing antitrust law to big digital platforms. In particular, the HJSMR proposes taking a highly regulatory approach to digital platforms, including imposing “[s]tructural separations and prohibitions of certain dominant platforms from operating in adjacent lines of business.” [14] The WCEGR also endorses the use of rulemaking (and, in particular, FTC rulemaking) to tackle significant problems of competition. [15] Rushing into rulemakings on platforms (especially without a clear showing of market failure) poses major risks, however, including, in particular, the creation of disincentives to invest in platform-specific innovation; and the interference with potential efficiency-seeking transactions by platform operators and suppliers of complements (in light of inevitable government second-guessing of platform-related business decision-making). The JBA antitrust team may wish to keep such potential costs in mind in setting competition policy vis-à-vis digital platforms.', '13. To address the perceived growth and abuse of market power that are said to afflict the American economy, the HJSMR and WCEGR have also proposed to amend and thereby “toughen” the core antitrust statutes, to alter burdens of proof in litigation, and to bestow a substantial increase in resources on federal antitrust enforcers. [16] The problem of scarce agency resources has long been highlighted by enforcement agency leadership, and certainly merits attention. The call for dramatic systemic change in antitrust enforcement norms, however, should be approached cautiously, with a jaundiced eye. In our common-law-based antitrust system, a major disruption to long-familiar statutory schemes would generate major uncertainty regarding antitrust enforcement principles and substantially disrupt business planning for an indeterminate amount of time. Many welfare-enhancing transactions could be sacrificed. The harm to consumer and producer welfare due to lost socially beneficial business initiatives would be hard (if not impossible) to measure, but nonetheless real. It is certainly possible that such losses would outweigh (perhaps substantially) whatever welfare gains might flow from statutory enforcement “reform.” In other words, it should not casually be assumed that “more and different” antitrust would be an unalloyed benefit. As in all other areas of law enforcement, likely costs as well as purported benefits should be central to the antitrust public policy calculus. (Costs would include, of course, the likelihood and magnitude of “false positives” under the new enforcement regime, not just the reduction in socially beneficial transactions.)', '', '', '']

[(9, 18)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

Minnesota

DaPa

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/DaPa/Minnesota-Davis-Parrish-Neg-ADA-Round6.docx

9e5b6914ee9cdd3d1c7802a9c946ba1b085af8426ad19f5886f85e07ccbf4388

Boom and bust

Alan Maass 21. Communications staff for Rutgers AAUP-AFT. Marxism Shows Us How Our Problems Are Connected. Jacobin. 1-5-2021. https://jacobinmag.com/2021/01/marxism-capital-socialism-capitalism-book-review

Marxist economics explains economic busts that inevitably follow booms too much commerce contradiction reproduced as antagonism economy free-for-all Businesses hoping to get leg up on the competition when enough companies jump in market gets saturated sales slump debts grow focus on overproduction and competition repeatedly causes crisis to frantic overproduction undermines profitability and slams economy into reverse Competition is mainstay of capitalism it requires accumulation at any cost Every contradiction is a great hazard to our lives and an important crack in system

Marxist economics explains not only how capitalism works but why it regularly doesn’t periodic economic busts that inevitably follow the booms Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism a universal war of devastation Because there is too much too much industry, too much commerce The contradiction between socialized production and capitalistic appropriation is reproduced as the antagonism between the organization of production in the single factory and the anarchy of production in society as a whole the economy as a whole is a free-for-all Businesses make their investment decisions behind closed doors, each hoping to get a leg up on the competition Success means a of the market and therefore more profits the important questions for society as a whole are decided by the free market economic good times, success seems contagious Companies make when enough companies jump in , the market gets saturated , sales slump , debts grow , and the record profits start to sink The effects spread from part of the economy to the next the boom-slump roller-coaster ride can look and feel different each time around the Great Recession of 2008–9 the parasitical realm of banking and finance was the detonator of this slump focus on overproduction crucially emphasizes how an organic mechanism of capitalism inevitable in a system driven by exchange, exploitation, and competition — repeatedly causes crisis capitalists are inevitably driven to reduce costs, they inevitably see an advantage in producing more for less, and this inevitably leads to frantic overproduction that undermines profitability and ultimately slams the economy into reverse capitalism stops working not because of a mistake or failed policy, but because it’s been working the way it’s supposed to Competition is the mainstay of capitalism it requires an accumulation of capital at any cost These same processes of accumulation necessarily lead to contradictions that threaten the very profits that capitalists seek Every contradiction for capitalism is both a great hazard to our lives — since we are made to pay the price — and also an important crack in the system Every periodic crisis is a potential point around which to organize

busts inevitably follow booms too much commerce contradiction antagonism free-for-all leg up on the competition market gets saturated sales slump debts grow overproduction competition — repeatedly causes crisis undermines profitability slams the economy into reverse mainstay of capitalism at any cost great hazard important crack

['When Things Fall Apart', 'Marxist economics explains not only how capitalism works but why it regularly doesn’t — during the periodic economic busts that inevitably follow the booms. As Marx and Engels wrote:', 'Society suddenly finds itself put back into a state of momentary barbarism; it appears as if a famine, a universal war of devastation had cut off the supply of every means of subsistence; industry and commerce seem to be destroyed. And why? Because there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce.', 'Of course, in a world where billions go without enough food, there’s no such thing as “too much means of subsistence.” There’s only too much from the point of view of the capitalists — too much to sell their products at an acceptable profit.', 'Thier introduces the chapters on capitalist crisis by unpacking a long quotation from Engels that ends: “The contradiction between socialized production and capitalistic appropriation is reproduced as\xa0the antagonism between the organization of production in the single factory and the anarchy of production in society as a whole.”', 'Under capitalism, production within workplaces is generally highly regimented, but the economy as a whole is a free-for-all. Businesses make their investment decisions behind closed doors, each hoping to get a leg up on the competition — by introducing the most popular model, the new product, the next trend. Success means a greater share of the market and therefore more profits.', 'All the important questions for society as a whole — how much food should be produced, how many homes to build, what kind of drugs to research and manufacture, how to generate electricity — are decided by the free market.', 'In economic good times, success seems contagious. Companies make ambitious investments, produce more and more, and watch the money roll in. But when enough companies jump in, the market gets saturated, sales slump, debts grow, and the record profits start to sink. The effects spread from part of the economy to the next, as Thier explains, using the example of oil:', 'If refineries sit idle because there is an overproduction of oil, the workers are laid off, and the creditors, who financed the investment, are dragged down as well. But as future oil extraction and refining projects are pulled back, so too is demand for the raw materials (steel, concrete, plastics, electricity, etc.) and engineering necessary for the production of oil rigs, pipelines, and so on. The construction business and service and retail companies, which had benefited from the springing up of oil boomtowns, suffer as well.', 'Because of the complexity of the international capitalist economy, the boom-slump roller-coaster ride can look and feel different each time around. Thier devotes a chapter to analyzing the crash last time: the Great Recession of 2008–9. She explains why and how the parasitical realm of banking and finance was the detonator of this slump but looks beyond popular left explanations about “financialization” to reveal the underlying crisis of global overproduction.', 'Among Marxist economics writers, there are some disagreements about the details here, specifically about “which aspects of Marx’s writing — falling profitability, overproduction (or in some cases, underproduction), disproportionality among branches, the role of credit — are emphasized and how these pieces fit together,” Thier writes.', 'In her account, Thier tends to stress overproduction,\xa0to the disappointment\xa0of those who emphasize falling profit rates. This focus on overproduction crucially emphasizes how an\xa0organic\xa0mechanism of capitalism — inevitable in a system driven by exchange, exploitation, and competition — repeatedly causes crisis.', 'Regardless of their ideology or morality (or lack thereof), capitalists are inevitably driven to reduce costs, they inevitably see an advantage in producing more for less, and this inevitably leads to frantic overproduction that undermines profitability and ultimately slams the economy into reverse.', 'In other words, capitalism stops working not because of a mistake or failed policy, but because it’s been working the way it’s supposed to. As Thier writes:', 'Competition is the mainstay of capitalism. It can’t be made friendlier or softer because it\xa0requires\xa0an accumulation of capital at any cost, in order to get ahead or get left behind.… These same processes of accumulation necessarily lead to contradictions that threaten the very profits that capitalists seek. Every contradiction for capitalism is both a great hazard to our lives — since we are made to pay the price — and also an important crack in the system. Every periodic crisis is a potential point around which to organize.', '']

[(5, 13)]

ndtceda

Emory-HeMi-Neg-JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-3.docx

Emory

HeMi

8f60562a4e362c57aefb8fba88d5c00bec68a9d223610047b86fa25072600656

The current Actavis doctrine is flawed—an overreliance on the size of reverse payments opened the floodgates for brands to avoid scrutiny by shifting to other methods, and strike down valid settlements—the result is a massive delay in generic entry.

Lavery et al. 21 (William Lavery is a lawyer whose practice focuses on antitrust and competition law, cartel and criminal antitrust investigations, and litigation. Will has also been recognized as a leading antitrust practitioner by The Legal 500 (2017-2020) and Super Lawyers (2014-2020), as well as being named a "Rising Star" by Law360 (2016) as one of the top competition lawyers under 40 in the country and a "Next Generation" partner by The Legal 500. Christine Ryu-Naya is an experienced antitrust lawyer whose practice focuses on U.S. and international merger clearance, counseling, investigations, and antitrust litigation. Christopher Wilson is a senior associate in Baker Botts' Antitrust and Competition Practice group. His practice focuses on civil antitrust, intellectual property, and other complex commercial actions. 4-13-2021, accessed on 7-19-2021, Baker Botts, "Fifth Circuit Hands FTC Win in FTC’s First Fully-Litigated Reverse-Payment Case Following the Supreme Court’s Landmark Actavis Decision", https://www.bakerbotts.com/thought-leadership/publications/2021/april/fifth-circuit-hands-ftc-win-in-ftc-first-fully-litigated-reverse-payment-case)

Court upheld the ruling that Impax violated antitrust focusing heavily on the mere size of the alleged payment impact on the industry may be widespread found that 100 million did not represent fair value because the payments were unquestionably “large” the reverse payment threatened competition Court’s guidance that only “large and unjustified payments should be subject to antitrust places outsized importance on the size of the payment will impact future settlements

2021 U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the FTC ruling that the “reverse-payment” between Endo and Impax violated federal antitrust laws. upholds Actavis rejected Impax’s primary argument that the FTC needed to do more under the rule of reason to balance the anticompetitive conduct against procompetitive disagree[d] that Actavis requires the Commission to assess the outcome of the patent case in order to find anticompetitive effects”— focusing heavily on the mere size of the alleged payment —and found the fact that generic competition was “possible” absent the settlement the impact of the decision on the industry as a whole—and courts’ treatment of patent settlements— may be widespread The panel found that the over $ 100 million in payments from Endo to Impax did not represent the fair value of services rendered or avoided litigation expenses The more than $100 million Endo ultimately paid to Impax would have been a “windfall” if Impax was likely to lose the infringement suit. The court held that the “need [for Endo] to add that substantial enticement” indicates that at least some portion of the payment was for exclusion beyond the point that would have resulted from litigating the case to conclusion. In other words, the court found the objective of the payment to Impax was to delay its product so Endo could maintain supra-competitive prices for Opana ER, the profits from which it then shared with Impax rather than face a competitive market. because the payments at issue were unquestionably “large” and “[n]either the saved costs of forgoing a trial nor any services Endo received justified these payments,” “[s] ubstantial ev idence supports the Commission’s finding that the reverse payment settlement threatened competition .” But the panel’s interpretation of the guidance set out in Actavis—particularly the Supreme Court’s guidance that only “large and unjustified payments ” should be subject to antitrust scrutiny—potentially places outsized importance on the size of the alleged payment will inevitably have a significant impact on future patent settlements

heavily on the mere size over 100 million in payments from Endo to Impax did not represent the fair value of services rendered or avoided litigation expenses ev unjustified places outsized importance on the size of the alleged payment

['*italics are from the original article', '', 'On April 13, 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC” or “Commission”) ruling that the “reverse-payment” settlement agreement between Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Endo”) and Impax Laboratories LLC (“Impax”) violated federal antitrust laws. The Fifth Circuit’s decision—which upholds the FTC’s first fully-litigated reverse-payment case since the Supreme Court’s landmark 2013 ruling in FTC v. Actavis (“Actavis”)—found the FTC’s findings that Endo and Impax entered into an unlawful “pay-for-delay” agreement to be supported by “substantial evidence.” Significantly, the panel also rejected Impax’s primary argument that the FTC needed to do more under the rule of reason to balance the anticompetitive conduct against procompetitive justifications—namely that the FTC needed to evaluate the strength of the patents at issue and assess whether it was likely Impax would have entered the market earlier absent the settlement. The court “disagree[d] that Actavis requires the Commission to assess the outcome of the patent case in order to find anticompetitive effects”—focusing heavily on the mere size of the alleged payment—and found the fact that generic competition was “possible” absent the settlement, combined with the large payment, was enough to infer anticompetitive effect under the framework outlined in Actavis.', 'The Fifth Circuit’s decision leaves in place the FTC’s cease-and-desist order enjoining Impax from entering similar reverse-payment settlements going forward (as the decision noted, the FTC did not invalidate Impax’s agreements with Endo or impose any monetary sanctions). But the impact of the decision on the industry as a whole—and courts’ treatment of patent settlements—may be widespread. Indeed, according to the FTC’s acting chair Rebecca Slaughter, the panel’s decision represents an “important milestone in the decades of work by FTC staff to stop pay-for-delay agreements.” And while it remains to be seen how courts (particularly courts in other circuits) will view this decision—and in particular, the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the guidance set out in Actavis—the ruling here will certainly have an impact on how parties approach settlement agreements to resolve Hatch-Waxman suits in the future.', 'Background and FTC Decision', 'Endo, the brand-name pharma company in this case, began selling an extended-release formulation of oxymorphone (an opioid) called Opana ER in 2006. In 2007, Impax filed the first application to market generic extended-release oxymorphone. At the time, two of Endo’s patents for Opana ER would not expire until September 2013, and Endo sued Impax for patent infringement in January 2008. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, this would delay any FDA approval of the generic for 30 months—until June 2010—unless the litigation concluded earlier in Impax’s favor.', 'Early settlement talks between the two companies failed, and Endo purportedly projected that generic entry would cut Opana ER sales by 85 percent and cost it approximately $100 million in revenue within six months. Separately, Endo also planned to move customers to a new reformulated version of Opana ER that would be protected by new patents and not be therapeutically equivalent to Impax’s generic, thus precluding pharmacists from automatically substituting the generic in place of the brand when filling prescriptions—a move known as a product transition or “product hop.” But the success of Endo’s product hop depended on the reformulated Opana ER getting to market sufficiently in advance of Impax’s generic product. ', 'Endo also allegedly projected that the reformulated Opana ER would generate about $200 million in annual sales by 2016 if the market transitioned to the reformulated product before the generic entered, but only $10 million annually if the generic entered first. In June 2010, with the possible launch date for Impax’s generic imminent, the parties settled the patent litigation shortly after the patent infringement trial began and less than a week before the FDA granted final approval to Impax’s generic product.', 'Under the settlement, Impax agreed to delay launching its generic until January 2013—two and a half years after it otherwise could have entered at risk, but several months before certain patents for Opana ER expired. In return, Endo agreed not to market its own generic version of extended-release oxymorphone until after Impax’s 180-day Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period expired in July 2013, and it agreed to pay Impax a credit if sales revenue for the original formulation of Opana ER fell by more than 50 percent between the dates of settlement and the date of Impax’s entry. The agreement to provide Impax with the credit protected Impax if Endo transitioned its customers to the reformulated Opana ER; which Endo did in March 2012, resulting in a $102 million credit to Impax.', 'In January 2017, the FTC brought separate actions against Endo and Impax alleging that the settlements was an “unfair method of competition” in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act and an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. Endo settled, but Impax chose to litigate. The case proceeded in the FTC’s administrative court.', 'In May 2018, following a three-week trial with 37 witnesses and over 1,250 exhibits, the FTC’s administrative law judge (“ALJ”) D. Michael Chappell concluded that although the reverse-payment agreement restricted competition, it was nonetheless lawful because “as a whole” its procompetitive benefits outweighed the anticompetitive effects because it allowed Impax to enter the market before the Opana ER patents would have expired. Specifically, he found that “the evidence proves that consumers have benefitted from the [Endo-Impax agreement] by having uninterrupted and continuous access to generic Opana ER since January 2013,” and that the “real-world effect procompetitive benefits of the Endo-Impax Settlement are substantial.” Judge Chappell also found that any anticompetitive harm was “largely theoretical” because there was little chance of Impax entering the market earlier absent a settlement, and Impax would not have launched “at risk.”', 'The full Commission reviewed the ALJ’s decision de novo and reached an entirely different conclusion. The Commission unanimously reversed the ALJ, finding that to be procompetitive, the benefits of the “pay-for-delay” agreement must be directly linked to the restraint of competition to outweigh the proof that the restraint harms competition—which the Commission held was not the case here. The Commission further held that Impax’s procompetitive justifications failed because there were less restrictive ways of achieving the purported benefits. Impax’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit followed.', 'Fifth Circuit Decision', 'On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission’s ruling, holding that the FTC had “substantial evidence” to conclude that the reverse payments replaced “the possibility of competition with the certainty of none.” The panel found that the over $100 million in payments from Endo to Impax did not represent the fair value of services rendered or avoided litigation expenses, nor was it otherwise linked to the restraint of competition in a way that would outweigh the proof that the agreement harmed competition. ', 'The opinion also rejected Impax’s argument that the rule of reason required the FTC to do more to balance the harm with the procompetitive justifications—specifically, Impax contended that the FTC should have looked at the strength of the patents and assessed whether Impax could have entered the market earlier absent the settlement. The court held that Actavis does not require Impax’s proposed analysis, and the fact that generic competition was “possible,” combined with the large payment, was enough to infer anticompetitive effect. Indeed, in evaluating the parties’ arguments, the panel placed great emphasis on the size of the payment in evaluating the settlement. And despite holding that the FTC was not required to assess the strength of the patents or predict the outcome of the patent infringement action, the panel nonetheless reasoned that if Endo was actually “highly likely” to prevail in the infringement suit, then Impax would have likely settled for early market entry only—without any payment at all. The more than $100 million Endo ultimately paid to Impax would have been a “windfall” if Impax was likely to lose the infringement suit. The court held that the “need [for Endo] to add that substantial enticement” indicates that at least some portion of the payment was for exclusion beyond the point that would have resulted from litigating the case to conclusion. In other words, the court found the objective of the payment to Impax was to delay its product so Endo could maintain supra-competitive prices for Opana ER, the profits from which it then shared with Impax rather than face a competitive market. ', 'Impax also argued that, in hindsight, the settlement was not anticompetitive for two primary reasons. First, Endo obtained additional patents after-the-fact and has proven their validity in court. And second, Endo’s alleged “product hop” ultimately failed because in 2017 Endo voluntarily withdrew the reformulated Opana ER from the market due to safety concerns. Impax’s generic version of extended-release oxymorphone—which it began marketing in January 2013—is the only version available on the market today. But the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as well, holding that it is “a basic antitrust principle that the impact of an agreement on competition is assessed at the time it was adopted,” and that principle applies equally in reverse payment cases. So, the focus of the inquiry is on the facts as they existed when the parties adopted the settlement.', 'The panel concluded that because the payments at issue were unquestionably “large” and “[n]either the saved costs of forgoing a trial nor any services Endo received justified these payments,” “[s]ubstantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that the reverse payment settlement threatened competition.”', 'The panel next addressed the question of whether Impax could show procompetitive benefits, which the Commission concluded it could not. Although the ALJ concluded that the settlement benefitted competition, the Commission found that the procompetitive benefits did not “flow from the challenged restraint—the reverse payments themselves.” As a result, the Commission did not treat Impax’s ability to enter the market nine months before the patents expired as benefits to be weighed against the anticompetitive effects of the reverse payments. The Commission assumed arguendo that Impax could connect the settlement’s purported procompetitive effects with the challenged restraint, but nonetheless determined that even if that was the case, there was a “less restrictive alternative” because “Impax could have obtained the proffered benefits by settling without a reverse payment for delayed entry.” ', 'Given the Commission’s assumption, the panel reviewed only the “less restrictive alternative” finding—i.e., whether “substantial evidence” supports the Commission’s conclusion that FTC’s Complaint Counsel had established a less restrictive alternative. Impax argued that the evidence the FTC relied on was not probative of whether it in fact ever had the opportunity to enter in a no-payment settlement or could have done so. The panel nonetheless found that the FTC’s findings—relying on “industry practice,” as well as fact and expert witness testimony—would “allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the no-payment settlement was feasible.” And because there was “more than enough evidence” to uphold the Commission’s view that a less restrictive alternative was viable,” the panel held that it “must uphold” the Commission’s conclusion that the reverse-payment settlement was an agreement to preserve and split monopoly profits and amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade.', 'Conclusion', 'The Fifth Circuit’s opinion handed both the FTC and private plaintiffs a huge win in the years-long battle against purported “pay-for-delay” settlements. But the panel’s interpretation of the guidance set out in Actavis—particularly the Supreme Court’s guidance that only “large and unjustified payments” should be subject to antitrust scrutiny—potentially places outsized importance on the size of the alleged payment (and in effect treats the payment itself as the restraint), regardless of the strength of the patents at issue or the parties’ valuations of the patent infringement action. This interpretation goes beyond what Actavis and other courts have held. And while the court’s decision may have been impacted by the highly deferential and highly nebulous “substantial evidence” standard which the FTC is accorded in its appeals, the opinion will inevitably have a significant impact on future patent settlements.', '']

[(0, 6), (7, 16)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-Minnesota-Round3.docx

Minnesota

AmFr

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/AmFr/Minnesota-Amundsen-Frese-Aff-Minnesota-Round3.docx

d49738a29b3d58b8bfbde66858a1378ad55231004c4e47c7f0f94691de2856c8

Commitments to warming are revitalized now—U.S. & corporations at the forefront of global cooperation

Halper & Puko 11-7 [Evan Halper, business reporter, Timothy Puko, climate correspondent, “In a shift, U.S. says companies are pivotal to climate talks’ success,” The Washington Post, 11/07/2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/11/07/climate-cop27-biden-companies-un/]

corporations to take center stage as the U.N. Climate Change Conference gets underway the admin will unveil a plan for private companies to finance the energy transition of developing countries Government funding alone can’t cover what vulnerable countries need $3.8 trillion annual investment is needed in the next three years to meet the climate goals, including reducing emissions and helping nations adapt Private-sector capital flows Anything this hard does n t get resolved with a global diplomatic committee COP27 is designated to focus on “implementation” executing promises to cut emissions At the summit, the U S will host a “call to action” private companies announce plans for mobilizing capital and tech to help adapt

With war, inflation and electoral chaos preoccupying world leaders, the Biden administration is looking for corporations to take center stage as the U.N. Climate Change Conference gets underway in Egypt. At COP27, the admin istration and its partners will unveil a plan for private companies to finance the energy transition of developing countries , While government action typically dominates these talks, political paralysis and public pressure are pushing companies to step up with their own emission pledges — and money to help . Government funding alone can’t cover most of what vulnerable countries need Some $3.8 trillion in annual investment is needed in the next three years to meet the world’s climate goals, including reducing emissions and helping nations adapt to the impacts of climate change. Only 16 percent of that money is now flowing, “ Private-sector capital flows … that’s where the real money is,” We’ve got to unlock that [private-sector] capacity for people to make investments in building a clean-energy future or else we’ll miss both the development goals and the climate goals.” There are few expectations for a breakthrough governmental climate deal at this year’s summit, one reason corporations are in the spotlight. “ Anything this hard does n o t get resolved with a global diplomatic committee ,” COP27 , is designated to focus on “implementation” — executing past promises to cut emissions . That means that sweeping deals between governments are expected to be harder to come by , as discussions over financing clean-energy and climate-adaptation projects come to the forefront. In recent weeks, has been seeking support from other countries and companies to create a clean energy financing scheme to help poorer nations shift away from fossil fuels. Companies would be given credits for assisting this financing, which they could use to offset their own climate emissions. The scale and details of this framework are not yet clear, but Kerry has recently been making the rounds with potential financiers, At the Egypt summit, the U nited S tates will host a “call to action” event during which private companies announce plans for mobilizing capital and tech nology to help developing nations adapt to climate change. At COP27, negotiators are focused on pushing the wealthiest nations to provide help to developing countries , and companies will face renewed pressure to focus their efforts on the global south .

center stage private companies to finance the energy transition pushing companies to step up $3.8 trillion in annual investment is needed that’s where the real money is,” does n o t get resolved with a global diplomatic committee ,” “implementation” sweeping deals between governments are expected to be harder to come by credits At the Egypt summit, the U nited S tates will host a “call to action” pushing the wealthiest nations to provide help to developing countries pressure to focus their efforts on the global south

['', 'With\xa0war, inflation and electoral chaos preoccupying world leaders, the Biden administration is looking for corporations to take center stage as the U.N. Climate Change Conference gets underway in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt.', 'At the summit, known as COP27, the administration and its partners will unveil a plan for private companies to finance the energy transition of developing countries, according to U.S. officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of discussions.', 'While government action typically dominates these talks, political paralysis and public pressure are pushing companies to step up with their own emission pledges — and money to help\xa0.', 'Government funding alone can’t cover most of what vulnerable countries need, said John D. Podesta, senior adviser to President Biden on climate change, in an interview. Some $3.8 trillion in annual investment is needed in the next three years to meet the world’s climate goals, including reducing emissions and helping nations adapt to the impacts of climate change. Only 16 percent of that money is now flowing, according to a new report from the Rockefeller Foundation and BCG Research.', '“Private-sector capital flows … that’s where the real money is,” said Podesta, who will be one of the first White House officials to arrive at the negotiations. “We’re talking billions when the need is trillions. We’ve got to unlock that [private-sector] capacity for people to make investments in building a clean-energy future or else we’ll miss both the development goals and the climate goals.”', 'There are few expectations for a breakthrough governmental climate deal at this year’s summit, one reason corporations are in the spotlight.', '', '“Anything this hard does not get resolved with a global diplomatic committee,” said David Victor, co-director of the Deep Decarbonization Initiative at the University of California at San Diego. “It gets resolved with a small group of highly motivated actors who go off and do stuff and drag everyone else along.”', 'COP27, under U.N. guidelines, is designated to focus on “implementation” — executing past promises to cut emissions. That means that sweeping deals between governments are expected to be harder to come by, as discussions over financing clean-energy and climate-adaptation projects come to the forefront.', 'Many environmentalists are alarmed that the conference will not showcase bolder governmental commitments to slash emissions, and\xa0', 'Some administration aides have been warning that this financing debate could be politically disastrous for U.S. leaders, according to a person familiar with the planning, although the White House is moving to counter criticism.', 'In recent weeks,\xa0has been seeking support from other countries and companies to create a clean energy financing scheme to help poorer nations shift away from fossil fuels. Companies would be given credits for assisting this financing, which they could use to offset their own climate emissions.', 'The scale and details of this framework are not yet clear, but Kerry has recently been making the rounds with potential financiers, including a conference late last month in Seattle backed by Bill Gates, followed by one in London. At the Egypt summit, the United States will host a “call to action” event during which private companies announce plans for mobilizing capital and technology to help developing nations adapt to climate change.', 'Biden’s announced visit to COP27 will be just a four-hour stopover on Friday, illustrative of how governments view this summit.', 'The president might be expected to use this world stage to brag about U.S. passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, but this new law was crafted to be domestically focused, aimed at addressing climate change through hundreds of billions of dollars in corporate tax breaks, grants and loans. It includes few new mandates, and no taxes or other broad-based requirements to guide companies on reducing carbon-dioxide emissions.', 'Following COP27,\xa0the White House plans to make international aid money a top priority in upcoming budget talks, Podesta said. But for now, it sees reforms to boost climate funding from multilateral development banks and efforts to get private-sector financing as more promising ways to raise the needed capital, he added.', 'That may set the stage for friction in Egypt. Leaders in the developing world are frustrated that Biden and other leaders of rich countries have yet to follow through on promises of major government aid, and they have struck a skeptical tone about private-sector financing ahead of the conference.', 'At COP27, negotiators are focused on pushing the wealthiest nations to provide help to developing countries, and companies will face renewed pressure to focus their efforts on the global south.', '', '“Are we really delivering on climate change, or are we delivering on guarantees to ensure profits for the private sector?” Egypt’s lead climate negotiator, Mohamed Nasr, said to journalists during a preview of the summit. “The thinking has to change. Investors should be thinking of their climate-positive impacts as part of their assessment of projects and delivery for investors.”', 'One big target is the financial sector and the coalition it formed ahead of last year’s climate conference in Glasgow of banks and investment firms pledging that they will invest their assets, now totaling $150 million, in alignment with the world’s goal of limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.', 'But some of the firms in the group, called the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, chafed at a requirement that they phase out financing new fossil fuel projects, in alignment with the U.N. guidelines for curbing warming. The requirement was scrapped, drawing ire from climate organizations that are increasingly focusing their pressure campaigns on companies.', '“Companies are stepping up on climate action because of how existential this is for them, but we are going to need to see a much bigger global plan,” said Peter Lacy, global sustainable services lead at the consulting firm Accenture.', 'About a third of the world’s top 2,000 public and private companies have committed to zeroing-out their emissions by 2050, according to Accenture’s research. But the firm found that 93 percent of them are on track to miss their targets unless they start moving faster.', '', 'The outlook was similar from Climate Action 100+, a network of investment groups that tracks the progress of 166 of the world’s biggest corporate emitters of greenhouse gas. When the group formed in late 2017, only five of those companies had net-zero targets. Now more than 120 do. But few of those companies now\xa0, according to a new report from Climate 100+.', '“This is a critical climate summit for these companies,” said Elizabeth Sturcken, a managing director at the Environmental Defense Fund focused on corporate partnerships. “We need to see some progress this year and what companies have done with these commitments. They are in the messy part of doing the hard work. I predict we will see some failures, and we will also see some real successes, too.”', 'Morten Bo Christiansen knows how messy the work can be. He leads the decarbonization effort at Maersk, the giant shipping and logistic company that burns through 80 to 90 million barrels of oil per year. The firm has set a goal of zeroing-out its emissions by 2040, making it a favorite point of reference for Kerry and earning it a measure of prestige among the corporations participating at the summit.', 'But making progress on the commitment is complicated amid the lack of clear decarbonization rules from international regulators. The task, Christiansen argues, would be far fairer if there were a carbon tax that gave all companies a uniform incentive to cut emissions, by making the kind of investments Maersk is, in nascent technologies such as barges that run on clean burning methanol made with renewable energy and biomass. “We need a global solution,” he said.', '', '']

[(0, 18)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-HaHe-Neg-ADA-Fall-Championship-Round-1.docx

Minnesota

HaHe

6b1f33c6581fb269356be2fce0bd582f3f64fe940043174b40d1783b74e9c190

COVID was a temporary dip that’s already recovered AND vaccine progress is rapid, making future trade prospects strong

Dr. Arvind Panagariya 21, Professor of Economics at Columbia University, PhD in Economics from Princeton University, M.A. in Economics from Rajasthan University, “How US has Weakened WTO: The Multilateral Trading System is Under Stress, Member Countries Must Repair It”, Times of India, 5/26/2021, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/how-us-has-weakened-wto-the-multilateral-trading-system-is-under-stress-member-countries-must-repair-it/?source=app&frmapp=yes

As we enter post-Covid trading has been under stress Though trade took a hit in the first half of 20 it exhibited astonishing recovery exports fell only 5.3% WTO predicts volume would rise in 21 exports survived well With vaccine supplies to rise at an accelerated pace prospects are excellent

As we enter post-Covid -19 era, an important question concerns the future of the global trading system, which has been under stress Though global trade took a significant hit in the first half of 20 20 it exhibited astonishing recovery According to the (WTO) exports fell by only 5.3% WTO predicts exports volume would rise in 21 Global exports have thus survived well the onslaught of Covid-19. With vaccine supplies expected to rise at an accelerated pace globally, prospects for the WTO forecast coming true are excellent

post-Covid under stress first half 20 astonishing recovery rise 21 survived well vaccine supplies rise accelerated pace prospects excellent

['As we prepare to enter post-Covid-19 era, an important question concerns the future of the global trading system, which has been under stress since well before the onset of the dreadful pandemic.', 'Though global merchandise trade took a significant hit in the first half of 2020 and fell as much as 15% in the second quarter, it exhibited astonishing recovery in the second half of the year. According to a March 31, 2021, press release by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), merchandise exports fell by only 5.3% over the full year. This compares with a whopping 12% fall in 2009 following the global financial crisis. WTO predicts that merchandise exports volume would rise by 8% in 2021.', 'Global merchandise exports have thus survived well the onslaught of Covid-19. With vaccine supplies expected to rise at an accelerated pace globally, prospects for the WTO forecast coming true are excellent. While this fact removes weak global market as a source of worry in the immediate aftermath of Covid-19 crisis, we would still face challenges posed by the fissures and fractures in the WTO system.']

[(11, 24)]

ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGa-Neg-Gonzaga-Jesuit-Debates-Round-4.docx

Kentucky

DiGa

86fd9184d22c1a4ab815fe8cc176b6c5867836b1bd7e88662f9db4f685a14521

Cap is the only way to solve climate change and extinction.

Hill ‘20 [Victor; 11/3/20; Financial Economist with the International Finance Corporation at the World Bank, lead writer for Master Investor, holds degrees from the University of Oxford, Institut Européen d'Administration des Affaires, and Canterbury Christ Church University; "Only capitalism will save the planet," https://masterinvestor.co.uk/economics/only-capitalism-will-save-the-planet/]

coronavirus diverted attention from climate environmental groups are out-of-date advances in tech facilitated by free market are transitioning to zero-fossil fuel because it is economically viable business community understand CO2 there is respectable debate about how quickly it will cause results perfectly legitimate to question models many hav e questionable methodologies . Claims ten years left should be challenged climate rebels would shut down the economy cause unparalleled disruption poverty and starvation . No politician is behind that groups don’t offer real solutions to climate change the best chance to solve is market forces profit motives finance and tech Transition is already underway shift has accelerated economies of scale kicked in solar and wind outcompete coal energy storage are improving downside with extraction a cause of emissions is why there is focus on hydrogen producing zero emissions The holy grail cheap and clean could facilitate 45 percent of emissions eliminated capacity could be ramped up by SMRs gas plants phased out oil majors are here to stay they embraced CCS carbon pricing formed the OGCI a consortium to support Paris they will succeed reinventing themselves If this leads to a GDP race consequences for humanity will far outweigh there will be dire consequences for future of life on Earth confrontation through trade war is a product growth require increases in energy demand both in US and China increased energy would not be sustainable renewables have environmental impacts it will slow transition from fossil fuels rapid tech development lead to further use According to activists catastrophes could kill civilization Much is wrong exaggeration environmental problems do not constitute existential threats growth and tech progress ameliorate them Climate is not the end of the world human[s] are not causing mass extinction Amazon are not the "lungs fires declined humanity is adapting and will continue prosperity and tech prowess

While coronavirus diverted attention away from climate change environmental activism of groups has continued The message If you want to save the planet change the system The irony is that both aspects of counterculture are out-of-date . Rapid advances in tech nology , facilitated by the free market , have transformed the climate conversation the big energy companies , backed by environmentally conscious investors , are already transitioning to wards renewable and zero-fossil fuel energy precisely because it is now economically viable Thinking people the business and investment community – understand well carbon emissions increase CO2 in the atmosphere there is a respectable scientific debate about how quickly that process is taking place and how quickly it will cause irreversible results it is perfectly legitimate to question the climate models which climate scientists construct since many hav e questionable inputs and methodologies . Claims we have ten years left to save the planet can and should be challenged climate rebels would have us shut down the carbon-based economy That would cause unparalleled economic disruption , mass unemployment , poverty , adverse health outcomes and – let us be honest – starvation . No mainstream politician is going to get behind that environmental groups don’t offer real istic solutions to climate change they offer, eco-austerity the best chance we have to solve the immense challenge of climate change and other environmental problems is to harness market forces the profit motives of finance and tech nology will re-engineer the global economy completely Big money already decided fossil fuel is doomed and that renewable energy is the future And the Great Transition is already well underway the shift from carbon-heavy sources to carbon-free electricity generation has accelerated so economies of scale have kicked in and new technologies have come online. the latest generation of solar and wind power plants can produce electricity cheaper than modern coal plants without subsidy for two thirds of the global population . The price of solar has dropped by almost 90 percent By mid-decade, solar and wind power will outcompete all existing coal plants The economics of energy storage – battery technology – are also improving new battery fuel cell offers six times Tesla’s previous cells, and five times the energy capacity downside with the current generation is batteries use expensive rare earth minerals extraction of these is itself a cause of environmental degradation and carbon emissions . That is why there is renewed focus on hydrogen Hydrogen comes in three colours blue variety carbon capture prevents CO2 being released, enabling the captured carbon to be safely stored deep underground or utilised green hydrogen is the cleanest variety, producing zero carbon emissions The holy grail in energy now is to extract hydrogen cheap ly and clean ly from water by electrolysis Hydrogen can power vehicles, trains, ships and aeroplanes Hydrogen could also be used to facilitate the manufacture of steel, cement, glass, chemicals and fertilisers . 45 percent of all global carbon emissions could be eliminated Greencoat has emerged as a growing renewables fund strategy is to encourage energy giants to green up their portfolios by taking all the development risk. It buys the asset and pockets the cash flow returns for listed renewable energy funds over five years approached 10 percent. Such funds often carry a share price premium over their net asset value carbon-free energy capacity could be ramped up quickly by SMRs which have a footprint smaller than two football pitches this is not new technology. SMRs are easier to switch on and off than large-scale reactors they can be held on standby for when wind and solar power remaining gas turbine plants can be phased out the oil majors are here to stay there would still be continued demand for oil after the transition to a net-zero carbon economy because of the need for oil in petroleum derivatives plastic the oil majors may not go extinct they have embraced CCS they have become advocates of high carbon pricing , calculating it will mobilise technology to accelerate CCS A number of large players Saudi Aramco ExxonMobil BP Shell Total and others, have jointly formed the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative ( OGCI ) to drive CCS projects a consortium that aims to accelerate the industry response to climate change member explicitly support the Paris Agreement and its goals costs of CCS are in free fall In terms of market capitalisations , ExxonMobil , BP and Shell combined are now worth less than Tesla alone a lot of new exploration and drilling activity will be regarded as uneconomic – and known reserves will remain beneath But oil majors can crack the challenge of CCS and begin to reduce the volume of CO2 they will succeed in reinventing themselves the deteriorating relationship between China and the USA may lead to a Second Cold War. If this leads to a n all-out GDP race the consequences for humanity will far outweigh there will be dire consequences for the future of human life on Earth the continuing growth of economies, especially via fossil fuels will be catastrophic confrontation al attitude toward China—as seen through the trade war is a product of tensions But why does it matter if we enter another Cold War? Why would a Cold War with China be the most consequential result of COVID-19? growth would require similar increases in energy demand , and this demand would occur both in the US A and China this increased global energy would not be sustainable renewables have environmental impacts if increased energy demand occurs, it will slow the transition away from fossil fuels they may delay decommissioning of coal and natural gas-fired power. They may defer investment in carbon-negative systems a second cold war might lead to rapid tech nological development which lead to further energy use overall resilient false According to activists humanity is beset on all sides by catastrophes that could kill off civilization Are they right? Much of what people are being told about the environment is wrong the exaggeration , alarmism are the enemy of rational environmentalism environmental problems do not constitute inexorable existential threats growth and tech progress can ameliorate them Climate change is happening. It's just not the end of the world human[s] being are not causing a "sixth mass extinction ," the Amazon rainforests are not the "lungs of the world," climate change is not making natural disasters worse, and fires have declined 25 percent around the world since 2003 humanity is already adapting to the ways climate change has been making weather patterns evolve, and that we will continue to adapt successfully in the future rising prosperity and increasing tech nological prowess

irony counterculture advances tech nology free market energy companies investors already transitioning renewable zero-fossil fuel economically viable business investment scientific debate how quickly irreversible results perfectly legitimate climate models questionable inputs methodologies ten years left should be challenged shut down economy economic disruption unemployment poverty adverse health starvation real istic solutions best chance solve climate change environmental problems harness market forces profit motives finance tech nology re-engineer completely Great Transition well underway shift carbon-free accelerated economies of scale new technologies solar wind global population outcompete energy storage improving energy capacity renewed focus hydrogen blue variety carbon capture safely stored green hydrogen zero carbon emissions holy grail extract hydrogen cheap ly clean ly facilitate manufacture carbon emissions eliminated renewables fund green portfolios ramped up quickly SMRs phased out continued demand petroleum derivatives plastic not go extinct embraced CCS advocates carbon pricing accelerate CCS Saudi Aramco ExxonMobil BP Shell Total consortium industry response support Paris Agreement goals free fall ExxonMobil BP Shell worth less Tesla alone succeed reinventing themselves

['While the global coronavirus pandemic has diverted attention away from the fraught issue of climate change and what to do about it, the environmental activism of groups such as Extinction Rebellion (XR) has continued to simmer. In fact, this year XR has blended with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement such that explicitly anti-capitalist environmental protest and anti-patriarchal, anti-colonial wokery have become intimately entwined. The underlying message is: If you want to save the planet you have to change the system. In practice, all protest movements have many threads – just look at the two-year campaign of the gilets jaunes in France – but the unifying thread is always resentment.', 'The irony is that both aspects of this counterculture are out-of-date. Rapid advances in technology, facilitated by the free market, have transformed the climate conversation. Whatever Mr Trump’s rhetoric on the issue (and he may well be in the departure lounge by the time you read this), the big energy companies, backed by a raft of environmentally conscious investors, are already transitioning towards renewable and zero-fossil fuel energy precisely because it is now economically viable to do so. And in that process, they are making money. Win-win.', 'Outright climate change denial was always a marginal school of thought. Thinking people – of which the business and investment community – understand well that manmade carbon emissions increase the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere and thus precipitate a greenhouse effect by which the Earth’s atmosphere and seas warm up. That said, there is a respectable scientific debate about how quickly that process is taking place and how quickly it will cause irreversible results such as desertification. And it is perfectly legitimate to question the climate models which climate scientists construct to estimate these outcomes, since many have questionable inputs and methodologies. Claims that we have ten years left to save the planet can and should be challenged, though that should not be an argument for further delay in taking action. ', 'The global policy framework has been constructed by the ongoing work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an agency of the United Nations (UN). This body laid down two years ago that our target should be to limit the rise in ambient temperature to no more than 1.5 Celsius above pre-industrial levels. That said, there are many climate rebels who believe that this level will itself be disastrous to human and animal life; and still others who claim that even this target is entirely unrealistic given the direction of travel.', 'Ms Thunberg and her disciples would have us shut down the carbon-based economy forthwith. That would cause unparalleled economic disruption, mass unemployment, poverty, adverse health outcomes and – let us be honest – starvation. No mainstream politician is going to get behind that.', 'Zion Lights is a writer who has been an environmental campaigner all her adult life. She doesn’t drive, fly or eat meat. In April 2018 she joined XR because she thought it was evidence-based. She soon found that many of its claims were indefensible. She wrote recently:', 'That is the single biggest problem with most environmental groups: they don’t offer realistic solutions to the very real climate change threat. What they offer, if you follow their arguments to their logical conclusion, is eco-austerity: that we should all use less energy, stop going on holiday, live in colder homes, and so on[i].', 'In the latest papal encyclical published on 04 October (the feast day of St. Francis of Assisi), Fratelli Tutti (Brothers All), Papa Francisco wrote that the Covid-19 pandemic had proven that the “magical theories” of market capitalism have failed and that the world needs a new type of politics that promotes dialogue and solidarity. (Perhaps the unjustified restrictionism pursued by First Minister Drakeford in Wales?)', 'In fact, much as I respect Catholic social teaching (having been brought up with it), the best chance we have to solve the immense challenge of climate change and other environmental problems (such as plastic waste in the oceans) is to harness market forces. In this way, the profit motives of finance and technology will re-engineer the global economy completely.', 'Big money already decided that the fossil fuel economy is doomed and that renewable energy is the future long before Dame Emma Thompson swept in from LA (business class, of course) to gesticulate on Oxford Street, in those languorous pre-Covid days. The billionaire Davos Boys have been preaching climate orthodoxy for years. And the Great Transition is already well underway.', 'Renewable profitability', 'The good news is (don’t tell XR) that the United Kingdom has managed to reduce its carbon emissions by over 40 percent since 1990 by all but phasing out coal and investing massively in renewable power generation. As I write this on a blustery day in late October, according to the GB National Grid Status website, coal powered generation is contributing precisely zero to UK power generation. The UK has the world’s largest offshore wind power market with capacity still increasing rapidly. Earlier this year the UK government effectively dropped the ban on onshore wind turbine arrays in the drive to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050.', 'As the shift from carbon-heavy sources to carbon-free electricity generation has accelerated so economies of scale have kicked in and new technologies have come online. Recent data from Bloomberg New Energy Finance shows that the latest generation of solar and wind power plants can produce electricity cheaper than the most modern coal plants even without subsidy for two thirds of the global population. The price of solar panels has dropped by almost 90 percent over the past decade. By mid-decade, solar and wind power will outcompete all existing coal plants on price – at which point a swath of coal plants will be deemed uneconomic and closed.', 'The economics of energy storage – battery technology – are also improving. On 22 September Tesla (NASDAQ:TSLA) unveiled its new battery known as the 4680[ii]. This fuel cell reportedly offers six times the power of Tesla’s previous cells, and five times the energy capacity. The company confirmed that the new cell measures 46 millimetres by 80 millimetres – hence the name. The iconic automaker says that these new fuel cells will be able to increase the range of a vehicle by 16 percent – that could be up to about 500 miles for its latest models. That kind of range makes medium-distance travel without recharging (say, London to Edinburgh in a UK context) quite feasible.', 'Red China goes green', 'China currently has new coal plants under construction which will have a capacity of another 94 Gigawatts of electricity per annum. China already emits more CO2 than all of Europe and America combined. But China now has a target of going carbon neutral by 2060, and by so aspiring has upped the moral ante with Mr Trump’s America. Now, some analysts predict that China may abandon its programme of building coal-fired power stations as much on economic grounds as on environmental ones.', 'China might yet gain a strategic advantage from global warming. Last month the UK First Sea Lord, Admiral Tony Radakin (the military head of the Royal Navy), warned that the melting of ice in the Arctic would create new maritime trade routes across the top of the world – the Arctic Ocean – which would halve the transit time between East Asia and Western Europe. China already has, according to the Pentagon, the world’s largest navy with 350 warships and submarines. That opens the prospect of Chinese naval vessels being able to penetrate the North Atlantic rapidly, and possibly threatening the European and American undersea cable network.', 'Hydrogen in three colours', 'The downside with the current generation of electric vehicles is that they require batteries which use expensive rare earth minerals of which lithium, and which are costly and messy to recycle at the end of their economic life. The extraction of these rare earth minerals in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is itself a cause of environmental degradation and carbon emissions. That is why there is renewed focus of attention on hydrogen.', 'Hydrogen comes in three colours. Gray hydrogen is made using fossil fuels like oil and coal, which emit CO2 into the air as they combust. The blue variety is made in the same way, but carbon capture prevents CO2 being released, enabling the captured carbon to be safely stored deep underground or utilised in industry. BP (LON:BP.) is working on that. As its name suggests, green hydrogen is the cleanest variety, producing zero carbon emissions. It is produced by electrolysis powered by renewable energy i.e. offshore wind.', 'The holy grail in energy now is to extract hydrogen cheaply and cleanly from water by electrolysis (i.e. separating the hydrogen and carbon atoms). Hitherto the energy required to perform the electrolysis has been unequal to the energy value of the hydrogen thus produced. That could be about to change.', 'Bill Brown, founder of NET Power has claimed that his firm’s techniques can produce clean hydrogen at 0.57 cents a kilo. This is a developmental technology based on the Allam Cycle which has been around in theory for some time. ', 'Hydrogen can power vehicles, trains, ships and even aeroplanes. When hydrogen is ignited the only by-product is water. Hydrogen could also be used to facilitate the manufacture of steel, cement, glass, chemicals and fertilisers. Goldman Sachs reckons that, if the efficiency of hydrogen electrolysis could be sufficiently improved, then about 45 percent of all global carbon emissions could be eliminated.', 'Electric cars', 'Some estimates suggest that electric battery-powered cars could compete on price with conventional cars powered by internal combustion engines (ICEs) as soon as 2024. That is one reason why Tesla shares have rocketed this year. But even if you are not a true believer in Tesla, consider that established automotive giants such as Volkswagen and Daimler-Benz are fully committed to the phase-out of ICEs. In Germany, sales of electric and hybrid cars overtook diesel cars for the first time last month.', 'I’ll have a lot more to say about the outlook for electric cars soon.', 'From coal to wind', 'Dalmellington in Ayrshire, Scotland, was once known as a coal-mining town. But in future it is likely to be known as the location of a 50-turbine wind farm. The new 240 Megawatt facility will be built and run by Vattenfall (owned by the Kingdom of Sweden). But the array will be owned by the infrastructure fund, Greencoat UK Wind PLC(LON:UKW), which has acquired the project for £320 million.', 'Greencoat has emerged as a growing renewables fund which is now included in the FTSE-250 index and which has a market capitalisation of around £2.5 billion – that’s more than the better-known UK energy company Centrica PLC (LON:CAN), the owner of British Gas. The fund has acquired 36 wind power sites which collectively produce enough electricity to power about one million homes – that’s about five percent of all wind power generated in the UK. Some of those arrays were acquired from Scottish & Southern Energy (LON:SSE). Wind power now accounts for about 20 percent of Britain’s total electricity consumption.', 'Greencoat’s strategy is to encourage energy giants to green up their portfolios by taking all the development risk. It then buys the asset from the generator and pockets the cash flow arising. Greencoat UK Wind is run by Greencoat Capital, a specialist investor in renewable energy which has £5 billion of assets under management across both wind and solar energy. Greencoat raised £375 million from investors in May 2019.', 'A report last year by the research firm, Hardman & Co. found that returns for listed renewable energy funds over five years approached 10 percent. Such funds often carry a share price premium over their net asset value. At a moment when the share prices of the oil majors are under pressure and when BP and Shell have slashed their dividends, Greencoat’s 4.8 percent dividend yield is pleasing.', 'Nuclear', 'The latest thinking is that carbon-free energy capacity could be ramped up quickly by means of a cluster of British designed and manufactured small modular reactors (SMRs) which have a footprint smaller than two football pitches. A consortium of Rolls Royce (LON:RR), WS Atkins (LON:ATK), Laing O’Rourke (LON:JLG) and the National Nuclear Laboratory is in the vanguard of this technology. Rolls-Royce has experience and expertise in building nuclear reactors to power Britain’s fleet of nuclear submarines, so this is not new technology. Reportedly, the UK government is considering the injection of up to £2 billion of state funds to invigorate the concept – assuming it is permitted to do so by the EU (if there is an agreement).', 'The idea is that by 2050 more than 12 of these SMRs will be operational in the UK, each with a capacity of about 440 Megawatts – so about one seventh of the conventional nuclear plant currently under construction at Hinkley Point, Somerset. Hinkley Point C is a project led by France’s EDF (EPA:EDF), the costs of which have spiralled up to an estimated £22.5 billion. Cost considerations have caused Toshiba (TYO:6502) and Hitachi (TYO:6501) to pull out of projects to build nuclear plants in Wales and Cumbria. In contrast, SMRs might have a price tag of around £2 billion each.', 'SMRs are easier to switch on and off than conventional large-scale reactors; thus, they can be held on standby for when wind and solar power wanes. Thereafter, the remaining gas turbine plants that are currently used for that purpose can be phased out. But it does not follow that the new roll-out of SMRs would entail the closure of Britain’s conventional large-scale nuclear reactors which, as I write, are supplying 17.2 percent of total power to the national grid.', 'A US consortium, NuScale, is also looking at SMRs with a capacity of 60 Megawatts. ', 'The fate of the oil majors', 'I wrote in the February 2020 edition of the MI magazine that the oil majors are here to stay. I meant by that that there would still be continued demand for oil, if much attenuated, after the transition to a net-zero carbon economy, not least because of the need for oil in petroleum derivatives (of which plastic). I did not foresee even then that the economic case for renewables would advance quite as rapidly as it has done this year; nor was it then apparent how the coronavirus pandemic would reduce the global demand for oil, at least in the short-term.', 'Another reason why the oil majors may not go extinct quite yet is that they have embraced carbon capture and storage (CCS). Indeed, they have become advocates of high carbon pricing, calculating that it will mobilise technology to accelerate CCS. Under US legislation enacted under the auspices of the US Department for Energy, operators can claim $50 for each tonne of CO2 sequestered underground and $35 per tonne if pumped back into declining wells.', 'A number of large players, including Saudi Aramco (TADAWUL:2222), ExxonMobil (NYSE:XOM), BP (LON:BP.), Shell (LON:RDSA), Total (LON:TTA) and others, have jointly formed the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative(OGCI) to drive CCS projects. The OGCI is a consortium that aims to accelerate the industry response to climate change. OGCI member companies explicitly support the Paris Agreement and its goals.', 'Just as with wind power and solar, the costs of CCS are in free fall. ExxonMobil has teamed up with FuelCell Energy to extract CO2 using carbonate fuel cells. Total, Shell and Equinor (NYSE:EQNR) are part of the Longship project in Norway which is planning to take CO2 captured in Europe’s industrial heartlands and pipe it to storage caverns beneath the North Sea. It hopes to lock in eight million tonnes of CO2 per year by the middle of this decade, for which they will charge around €60 per tonne. Memoranda have already been signed with ArcelorMittal and Heidelberg Cement.', 'Cement is responsible for an estimated eight percent of global carbon emissions. Under the auspices of the OGCI, a venture with LafargeHolcim, the materials giant, uses CO2 rather than water to cure concrete at much lower temperatures than in conventional manufacture, thereby breaking down the CO2 molecules and turning carbon into a form of glue. This enables a 70 percent reduction in CO2 emissions and an 80 percent reduction in water use.', 'In terms of their market capitalisations, ExxonMobil, BP and Shell combined are now worth less than Tesla alone. Exxon was once the world’s largest company by market cap. As I write it is worth just $136 billion against Tesla’s $390 billion.', 'The oil price is down from around $53 a barrel 12 months ago to around $37 today. That is partly a function of reduced global demand arising from the lockdowns across the world; but one should not assume that it will rebound even if the pandemic is behind us one year from now. That means that a lot of new exploration and drilling activity will be regarded as uneconomic – and a lot of known reserves will remain beneath the Earth for evermore. But if the oil majors can really crack the challenge of CCS and prospectively begin to reduce the volume of CO2 in the atmosphere, they will succeed in reinventing themselves.', '', 'Turns the environment. ', 'Dr. Brian F. Snyder 20, PhD in Ecology from the University of Georgia, Assistant Professor of Environmental Science at Louisiana State University and LSU Chapter Director of the Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy, “The Second Cold War?”, Steady State Herald, 5/21/2020, https://steadystate.org/the-second-cold-war/', 'Over the past two months, there has been a great deal of talk about the environmental implications of the pandemic. Some have looked for glimmers of hope, others have predicted that we will shortly return to the status quo. I fear that the biggest outcome of the pandemic will not be its death toll nor its effects on the climate, but its impacts on geopolitics. Specifically, the deteriorating relationship between China and the USA may lead to a Second Cold War. If this cold war leads to an all-out GDP race as the original one did, the consequences for humanity will far outweigh the direct human health impacts of the pandemic.', 'A Second Cold War', 'Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the world may have already been spiraling toward another cold war between the USA and China. The rivalry between the USA and China for economic control of Asia far predates the Trump administration, and the reasons for it are both complex and poorly defined, much as they were as when the iron curtain fell over Eastern Europe. And as in the Cold War between the USA and Soviet Union, historians will eventually find reason to blame both sides for the Second Cold War. Despite these complexities, I fear that future historians looking back at the Second Cold War will note the COVID-19 pandemic as the turning point from economic rivalry to enmity. That is, COVID-19 or, more accurately, Chinese and American leaders’ willingness to blame each other for the pandemic to deflect their own mismanagement, may be the last straw.', 'Since the emergence of the pandemic, tensions between China and the USA have increased significantly. Members of the Chinese government have alleged that U.S. service members brought the virus to Wuhan. Simultaneously, the president of the USA has called the virus “Chinese,” refused to accept the academic consensus that the virus likely spread from a wild animal at the wet market in Wuhan, dispatched American intelligence apparatus to prove the unprovable accusation that COVID-19 began in a Chinese lab, and blamed the Chinese government’s secrecy for the severity of the U.S. pandemic.', 'The original Cold War nearly ended with nuclear annihilation, yet that is not what concerns me about the Second Cold War. The first Cold War ended only after decades of historically unprecedented economic growth in the West was leveraged toward military and technological superiority. This Western growth was nearly matched by the Soviets. If this coming Cold War involves the same growth race, there will be dire consequences for the future of human life on Earth. China and the USA are the two largest economies on Earth, closely followed by the U.S.’s NATO allies, and neither country has anything approaching a sustainable energy supply. If their rivalry ends in the continuing growth of their economies, especially via fossil fuels, the effects will be catastrophic.', 'This Isn’t (Entirely) Trump’s Fault', 'While it may be tempting to blame Trump for the looming Cold War with China, it is not entirely Trump’s fault. While Trump’s recent China policy has not helped, tensions with China have been rising for a decade or more. Trump’s confrontational attitude toward China—as seen through the trade war and the pandemic blame—is a product of these tensions, either as a cynical appeal to his base or heartfelt xenophobia.', 'Trump may indeed be biased against China, and his lack of strategic thinking may be the ultimate blunder that leads us into another Cold War, but there is a reason for his attitude toward China: us. Over the past seven decades, Americans became accustomed to thinking of Beijing as “The Other.” They may not have been the enemy, but Americans have been comfortable viewing them warily, as well as comfortable with politicians telling us the Chinese are an economic rival and a threat to our jobs.', 'Of course, we were too dim to notice that the movement of manufacturing jobs to Asia could only occur via a globalized world, or that our politicians had built that globalized world to foster domestic economic growth. Thus, politicians have told us out of one side of their mouths that globalization is good for the economy and will make us all the more prosperous, while telling us from the other side of their mouths that our jobs are all moving to China. Remarkably, neither is correct. Globalization will make us poorer in the long term because it leads to unsustainable economic growth, and, until recently, we had more jobs than at any time in our history. The fact that we were near full employment prior to the pandemic somehow failed to alert people of the lie that the Chinese were stealing our livelihoods.', 'Note that this is not to imply that the blame for this new Cold War, if it develops, is one sided. Certainly, the Chinese government will share in the fault. However, something about logs in eyes should encourage us to focus on our own culpability.', 'The Cost of a Cold War', 'But why does it matter if we enter another Cold War? Why would a Cold War with China, if it results from this pandemic, be the most consequential result of COVID-19?', 'Between 1950 and the Soviet Union’s economic peak in 1989, U.S. real per capita GDP more than doubled, while the Soviet Union’s per capita GDP nearly tripled, according to data from the Maddison Project. If similar growth occurs again over the next 40 years, by 2060 the U.S. GDP would exceed $100,000 per person (in 2011 dollars), while China’s per capita GDP might be $40,000, approaching contemporary U.S. standards.', 'Such economic growth would require similar increases in energy demand, and this demand would occur both in the USA and China, as well as in their trading partners. These trading partners would export goods to the USA and China and would require increased energy consumption to produce these goods. In some cases, this increased global energy demand may be met with renewables, while in others it may be met with fossil fuels. In either case, it would not be sustainable for two main reasons.', 'First, renewables, while far less damaging to the earth’s systems than fossil fuels, have environmental impacts. Those impacts may be mitigated with future technology and should not dissuade us from moving away from fossil fuels, but nor should we pretend that they are environmentally benign.', 'Second, if increased energy demand occurs, it will slow the transition away from fossil fuels. If the USA and China feel the need to grow their economy, they may delay the decommissioning of coal and natural gas-fired power. They may also defer investment in carbon-negative systems, which will be required to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.', 'In addition to these changes in energy demand, a second cold war might also lead to rapid technological development which would further stimulate the economy and lead to further energy use. Consider the technologies that emerged largely from investments in the U.S. military industrial complex of the first Cold War: the internet, satellites, GPS, cell phones, computers, and robotics. Consider how much of our economic growth over the last five decades is the result of these technologies. Consider how much of our energy growth and climate emissions result from that economic growth. And consider what will happen if we use our considerable ability to innovate in the service of more economic and energy growth.', 'The overall environment is resilient---‘existential’ threats are false', 'Ronald Bailey 20, Science Correspondent at Reason, Member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, “The Global Environmental Apocalypse Has Been Canceled”, Reason Magazine, 8/1/2020, [grammar edit]', 'According to these activists and politicians, humanity is beset on all sides by catastrophes that could kill off civilization, and maybe even our species. Are they right?', 'Absolutely not, answers the longtime environmental activist Michael Shellenberger in an engaging new book, Apocalypse Never: Why Environmental Alarmism Hurts Us All. "Much of what people are being told about the environment, including the climate, is wrong, and we desperately need to get it right," he writes. "I decided to write Apocalypse Never after getting fed up with the exaggeration, alarmism, and extremism that are the enemy of positive, humanistic, and rational environmentalism." While fully acknowledging that significant global environmental problems exist, Shellenberger argues that they do not constitute inexorable existential threats. Economic growth and technological progress, he says, can ameliorate them.', "Shellenberger's analysis relies on largely uncontroversial mainstream science, including reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Food and Agriculture Organization. And as a longstanding activist, Shellenberger is in a good position to parse the motives behind the purveyors of doom.", "Shellenberger's activism is the real deal. To raise a donation to the Rainforest Action Network, he charged his friends $5 to attend his 16th birthday party. At 17 he went to Nicaragua to experience the Sandinista revolution. In the 1990s he worked with the Landless Workers' Movement in Brazil.", 'In 2003, Shellenberger and allies launched the New Apollo Project to jumpstart a no-carbon energy revolution over the next 10 years. In 2008, Time named him "A Hero of the Environment." He co-founded the ecomodernist Breakthrough Institute, which advocates the use of advanced technologies such as nuclear power and agricultural biotechnology to decouple the economy from the ecology, allowing both humanity and the natural world to flourish. More recently, he founded Environmental Progress, which campaigns for, among other things, the deployment of clean modern nuclear power. He is an invited expert reviewer of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change\'s next assessment report.', 'Ohio Passes Controversial Conscience Clause for Doctors', 'So what does he say about climate change? "On behalf of environmentalists everywhere, I would like to formally apologize for the climate scare we created over the last 30 years," he wrote in an essay to promote his new book. "Climate change is happening. It\'s just not the end of the world. It\'s not even our most serious environmental problem." Needless to say, there are environmentalists everywhere who do not believe they have anything to apologize for. A group of six researchers assembled by the widely respected Climate Feedback fact-checking consortium rated his article as having low scientific credibility.', 'Shellenberger doesn\'t devote much of Apocalypse Never to the science behind man-made climate change. He basically accepts the consensus that it\'s a significant problem and instead focuses on various claims about the harms it is supposedly already causing. In that promotional essay, he argues that (1) human[s] being are not causing a "sixth mass extinction," (2) the Amazon rainforests are not the "lungs of the world," (3) climate change is not making natural disasters worse, and (4) fires have declined 25 percent around the world since 2003.', "Shellenberger isn't denying the reality of man-made climate change. He's arguing that humanity is already adapting to the ways climate change has been making weather patterns evolve, and that we will continue to adapt successfully in the future. His book is ultimately a sustained argument that poverty is world's most important environmental problem, and that rising prosperity and increasing technological prowess", '']

[(0, 4), (4, 4), (5, 8)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Munson-Blackwell-Aff-Texas%20Open-Round4.docx

Minnesota

MuBl

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/MuBl/Minnesota-Munson-Blackwell-Aff-Texas%2520Open-Round4.docx

6d2268c3a395daef899b5e55a09589348f2fa8df1a024057640891ba4f0247a6

Stricter antitrust immunity spurs increased international routing as method of competition.

Moss ’19 [Diana; President @ American Antitrust Institute; “Alliances and Antitrust Immunity: Why Domestic Airline Competition Matters” Air & Space Law, 32(1), p. 1-20]

DOT’s ATI is lenient the DOT’s approach led legacy airlines to all but stop objecting to requests for ATI the DOT has of competitive concerns significant loss of head-to-head competition on international routes by nonalliance carriers studies note competition may be reduced on routes served by immunized alliance carriers analysis shows that when an alliance member competes with a nonalliance carrier foreclosure of the latter lowers interlining traffic

The DOT’s approach to ATI is lenient the DOT’s approach has led U.S. legacy airlines to all but stop objecting to requests for ATI by rival alliances. the DOT has raised a number of competitive concerns associated with immunized alliance agreements. Among these are the significant loss of head-to-head competition on international overlap routes and access by nonalliance carriers to interlining with alliance carriers at alliance gateways studies note that competition may be reduced on routes served by substitute, immunized alliance carriers data from 2005 to 2010 shows that immunized service offered by two alliance partners a “fare effect that is equivalent to the loss of an independent competitor,” with significantly higher fares on routes with fewer independent competitors studies analysis shows that when an alliance member competes with a nonalliance interlining carrier foreclosure of the latter increases disparities in market share and lowers interlining traffic Moreover, ATI does no t lead to alliance fares for passengers below those sold under nonimmunized arrangements.

ATI lenient stop objecting to requests for ATI significant loss international overlap routes nonalliance carriers studies studies analysis shows foreclosure of the latter lowers interlining traffic does no

['The DOT’s historical approach to granting ATI is best described as “lenient,” perhaps influenced by economic studies of the 1990s that generally showed benefits of ATI. With domestic consolidation and the growth of the alliances, there has arguably been a paradigm shift at the DOT by using ATI to foster “alliance market” competition.', 'Against the backdrop of domestic consolidation and growth in the dominance of the U.S. alliance carriers, the DOT’s approach has led U.S. legacy airlines to all but stop objecting to requests for ATI by rival alliances.', 'Between 1993 and 2007, for example, U.S. legacy carriers opposed rivals’ requests for ATI, filing comments in almost 45 percent of the DOT’s ATI dockets over this period. In contrast, between 2007 and 2017, the decade which saw the spate of large mergers, there were no objections to ATI requests by U.S. legacy carriers. More (not less) competition would stimulate rivals’ objections to others’ ATI requests.', 'More recently, the DOT has raised a number of competitive concerns associated with immunized alliance agreements.25 Among these are the significant loss of head-to-head competition on international overlap routes and access by nonalliance carriers to interlining with alliance carriers at alliance gateways.26 Empirical studies performed since the late 2000s tell a very different story of the effects of ATI than earlier studies.27 For example, recent studies find that even without ATI, cooperation under alliance agreements can enhance incentives to collude on price on parallel transatlantic routes, resulting in higher fares unless there are offsetting efficiency gains.28', 'Operating with ATI would thus raise even more questions about potential anticompetitive effects. Some economic studies note that competition may be reduced on routes served by substitute, immunized alliance carriers.29 One study using data from 2005 to 2010 shows that immunized service offered by two alliance partners on a transatlantic route has a “fare effect that is equivalent to the loss of an independent competitor,” with significantly higher fares on routes with fewer independent competitors.30 Other studies find that while immunized joint ventures increase capacity between alliance partners’ hub airports by 3–5 percent, this expansion comes at the expense of services elsewhere in the network.31 And analysis shows that when an alliance member competes with a nonalliance interlining carrier, foreclosure of the latter at alliance hubs increases disparities in market share and potentially lowers interlining traffic.32 Moreover, ATI does not lead to alliance fares for passengers below those sold under nonimmunized arrangements.', 'The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed seven formal comments in ATI proceedings between 1996 and 2008.33 In the Aloha-Hawaiian ATI case, for example, the DOJ recommended against ATI that would have allowed the parties to form a joint venture to coordinate capacity on interisland routes.34 In the American-British Airways-Iberia- Finnair-Royal Jordanian Airlines ATI case, the DOJ identified a likely 15 percent fare increase on affected transatlantic routes, found no public benefits, and recommended that the DOT deny the application.35 The DOJ also recommended denying ATI in the Alitalia-Czech-Delta-KLMNorthwest- Air France case.36']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%20-%20NDT-Finals.docx

Dartmouth

ShVe

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Dartmouth/ShVe/Dartmouth-Shankar-Vergho-Aff-6%2520-%2520NDT-Finals.docx

60a99d70310a51750c919d06d1ac9c82d4f14e39cee51528a61c8ec84654e2d5

We meet—courts are split on whether they violate Sherman

ABA 11 (The American Bar Association, founded August 21, 1878, is a voluntary bar association of lawyers and law students, which is not specific to any jurisdiction in the United States., 1-31-2011, accessed on 7-23-2021, American Bar, ""Pay-for-Delay" Settlements: Antitrust Violation or Proper Exercise of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights?", https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2011/01/02_hanks/)

split Supreme Court yet to decide whether they violate Sherman Sixth Circuit adopted FTC's view that reverse payment s are violations because horizontal agreement no other court has followed

split among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals on the question of whether and to what extent reverse payment settlements are lawful Supreme Court has yet to decide whether reverse payment settlements are enforceable, or if they violate the Sherman Antitrust Sixth Circuit adopted the FTC's view and held that a reverse payment settlement s are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act Sixth Circuit held that the agreement was "an illegal per se restraint on trade" under the Sherman Antitrust Act because it was "a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition Andrx effectively used the 180-day exclusivity period to delay the entry of other generic competitors no other appellate court has followed in holding that reverse payment settlements are a per se illegal

payment s Sherman

['', 'A Circuit Split Emerges', 'The increasing popularity of reverse payment settlements in recent years has given rise to a split among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals on the question of whether and to what extent reverse payment settlements are lawful. Although it has had numerous opportunities (including a current pending petition for certiorari), the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether reverse payment settlements are enforceable, or if they violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.', 'The Sixth Circuit--Per Se Illegal Restraints', 'In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 914-15 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit adopted the FTC\'s view and held that a reverse payment settlements are per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Defendant Hoechst Marion Roussel (HMR), a brand-name manufacturer, produced Cardizem CD. Andrx was the first to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification seeking approval to market a generic Cardizem product, entitling it to the 180-day exclusivity period once it received FDA approval. After HMR sued Andrx for patent infringement (and while the litigation was pending), HMR and Andrx entered into an agreement whereby HMR would make quarterly payments of $10 million to Andrx. In exchange, Andrx agreed to stay out of the market until either: (1) there was a final decision in the patent infringement case allowing Andrx to market the pharmaceutical; (2) HMR and Andrx entered into a license agreement; or (3) HMR entered into a license agreement with a third party. Andrx also agreed not to "relinquish or otherwise compromise" its 180-day exclusivity period.', 'The Sixth Circuit held that the agreement was "an illegal per se restraint on trade" under the Sherman Antitrust Act because it was "a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition." In finding the agreement per se illegal, the Sixth Circuit was particularly troubled by the fact that HMR\'s agreement with Andrx effectively used the 180-day exclusivity period to delay the entry of other generic competitors. In this regard, the court noted: "By delaying Andrx\'s entry into the market, the Agreement also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the expiration of Andrx\'s 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer."', 'As of the date of this writing, no other appellate court or district court has followed the Sixth Circuit in holding that reverse payment settlements are a per se illegal restraint on trade.', '', '', '']

[(0, 6)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-1-NU-Round2.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Aff-1-NU-Round2.docx

df65c78510998b3513fd2a522e6c56c712237c3fb8ce3130a0c793e0b106c3c1

5. Psychology.

Duyeon Kim 22. Seoul-based adjunct senior fellow with the Center for a New American Security and a columnist with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. PhD in international relations from Korea University and MS in foreign service from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Serves on the board of directors of the bilateral Korea-America Association and is a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific U.S. Committee, the International Nuclear Security Forum, the U.S. National Committee on North Korea, and the Korean Peninsula Future Forum in Seoul. “Biden Can Find Middle Ground in Heated Nuclear Debate.” https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/15/nuclear-weapons-review-biden/

n f u inevitably accompanied by changes to U.S. force structure allies firmly objected changes exacerbate doubts about security commitment enemies would pay no attention allies would pay too much expressed concerns to strengthen alliances For Asian allies the psychological effect as important as physical power Even if conventional weapons could respond need something much stronger to scare and deter adversaries from any attack allied and adversarial countries not spend time analyzing words and researching definitions interpret n f u and s p as the same either have same effect on allies and rivals in which allies’ abandoned

n o- f irst- u se policy inevitably accompanied by changes to U.S. force posture and structure increasing time and steps it takes to launch a nuclear weapon allies firmly objected to alterations in U.S. nuclear doctrine that put their security at risk Asian experts in allied countries told changes exacerbate existing doubts about Washington’s security commitment to them enemies would pay no attention but our allies would pay too much attention losing confidence in the alliances Allies firmly resisted considering adopting a n o- f irst- u se recently expressed concerns during consultations hard to ignore at time when Biden attempting to strengthen alliances damaged during Trump’s presidency For Asian allies the psychological effect of nuclear weapons is just as important as their physical destructive power Even if high-tech conventional weapons could respond Asian officials need something much stronger to scare and deter adversaries from waging any kind of attack allied and adversarial countries not spend time analyzing words and researching definitions interpret n o- f irst- u se and s ole p urpose as the same concept either articulation have the same effect on allies and rivals bring back ghosts of America first in which allies’ needs were abandoned U nited S tates reducing nuclear dangers conditions or circumstances in global security environment must support it

n f u inevitably accompanied force posture firmly objected existing doubts Washington’s security commitment no attention too much attention alliances firmly resisted n f u recently expressed strengthen alliances Trump’s presidency psychological effect just as important physical destructive power high-tech conventional weapons much stronger scare deter any kind of attack allied adversarial analyzing words researching definitions n f u s p same concept either articulation same effect America first allies’ needs U S conditions global security environment

['Declaring a no-first-use policy would inevitably be accompanied by making changes to U.S. force posture and structure, including increasing the time and steps it takes to launch a nuclear weapon. ', 'American allies, however, have firmly objected to alterations in U.S. nuclear doctrine that could put their own security at risk. Many Asian and European officials and experts in allied countries have told me that changes would also exacerbate existing doubts about Washington’s security commitment to them. As former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe said in 2014, “The real danger of a no-first-use pledge is that our enemies would pay no attention, but our allies would pay too much [attention], losing confidence in the alliances.” ', 'Plus, the next American president could reverse Biden’s decision, further undermining U.S. credibility. Allies firmly resisted when the Obama administration was considering adopting a no-first-use pledge and most recently expressed similar concerns during the Biden administration’s consultations. That’s hard to ignore at a time when Biden is attempting to strengthen alliances damaged during his predecessor Donald Trump’s presidency. ', 'Those who advocate for a no-first-use and/or sole purpose policy present many important arguments whose common denominator is enhancing crisis stability, reducing the chances of escalation to the nuclear level, and leading by example through unilateral nuclear restraint. The potential return of Trumpism (and a president’s sole authority to launch nuclear weapons) would add more weight to these claims, even though such policy could be reversed by a future president. Some experts also believe that no-first-use and sole purpose are different. The latter, they argue, avoids “eroding primary or extended deterrence” because such language leaves enough ambiguity about the circumstances in which the United States would use nuclear weapons. ', 'However, U.S. allies do not want Washington to limit its nuclear use to only responding to a nuclear attack. For Asian allies in particular, the psychological effect of nuclear weapons is just as important as their physical destructive power. Even if high-tech conventional weapons could effectively respond to non-nuclear attacks from an operational standpoint, Asian officials say they still need something much stronger to scare and deter adversaries from waging any kind of attack. ', 'Plus, decision-makers in both allied and adversarial countries will not spend time analyzing words and researching definitions and historical origins according to different formulations of the language presented in the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review. Several officials have told me that they will interpret no-first-use and sole purpose as the same concept, and either articulation will have the same effect on allies and rivals. A premature pledge would also bring back the ghosts of Trump’s “America first” nightmare, in which allies’ needs were abandoned in favor of a narrow concept of American security. ', 'The United States can and should play a leadership role in reducing nuclear dangers worldwide. But the conditions or circumstances in the global security environment must support it. Not all nuclear-possessing countries have a no-first-use policy. Russia dropped it in 1993, and nuclear weapons play a key role in its military doctrine. This is important to remember amid increasing fears of another Russian invasion of Ukraine and the potential for Moscow to be further emboldened by an American no-first-use/sole purpose policy. China’s claimed no-first-use policy has been met with increasing skepticism. North Korea maintains a first-use policy. India’s conditional no-first-use policy reserves the right to use nuclear weapons against biological or chemical weapons attacks. Pakistan, France, and the United Kingdom have first-use policies. ', '']

[(7, 10), (11, 13)]

ndtceda

Emory-CoYa-Neg-uk-Round-4.docx

Emory

CoYa

54c5273c96a3d73ae548c09af3a7a345c7fe3be14846a8e253c104b4ea4be037

No impact to total collapse.

Fettweis 18 Christopher J. Fettweis, Political Science Professor at Tulane University. [Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in US Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press]

South America Africa Europe would be unaffected Russia and China troops would not alter conquest territory is unrelated to wealth Russia would not benefit from Ukraine; China if it ruled Taiwan Conquest is irrational incentives for peace are strong norms discourage aggression . Imperialism invites opprobrium All want trade and i law corroborating ev hard to identify heg exists without leaving a trace . Neither spending, nor interventions, nor strategy matter psychological phenomena suggest heg is susceptible to misperception . U.S. exaggerate degree power matters

let us imagine the disappearance of U.S. military and political engagement In South America , the U.S. has a minuscule “responsibility” The U S maintains no physical presence in Africa or large swaths of Asia Europe would be unaffected 95,000 troops none tasked with maintaining stability of its allies The continent is the most stable most cooperative Europe does not seem to be a good candidate for chaos Tehran would find it hard to dominate its neighbors most concern Russia and China large border adjustments would not occur in the absence of U.S. power, the removal of American troops would not alter the costs and benefits of conquest today territory is unrelated to wealth larger states are not automatically better off Russia would not benefit from invading Ukraine; China would hardly be materially better off if it ruled Taiwan Conquest in a trading system is profoundly irrational incentives for peace are strong in a U.S.-free world behavioral norms of the New Peace discourage aggression . Imperialism invites opprobrium , not admiration All want free trade and investment Most would value i nternational law , human rights, and the UN Why any state would move backward be difficult to imagine corroborating ev idence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify . If indeed heg emonic stability exists , it does so without leaving a trace . Neither spending, nor interventions, nor grand strategy matter three common psychological phenomena suggest heg emonic stability is particularly susceptible to misperception . U.S. leaders exaggerate the degree to which their power matters

minuscule no physical presence unaffected the most stable most cooperative find it hard would not unrelated are not automatically better off profoundly irrational incentives for peace are strong discourage aggression opprobrium , not admiration i nternational law is extremely hard to identify without leaving a trace three common psychological phenomena particularly susceptible to misperception exaggerate

['How would the system respond? Could the New Peace survive without its policeman? Good counterfactual analysis minimizes the number of both assumptions and alterations of reality. It is also obviously wise to choose relatively simple cases, ones that do not involve many potentially confounding variables. 127 The ramifications of an actual supervolcanic blast would not be contained in the United States; the massive amount of material ejected into the atmosphere would blot out the sun and cause global temperatures to drop for years. To keep this thought experiment manageable, let us imagine a natural disaster that only affects the United States, one resulting in the effective disappearance of U.S. military and political engagement with the rest of the world. The effect of an aloof United States on some regions need not be imagined because it already exists. In South America, the U.S. Southern Command has a minuscule operating budget and no troops to speak of, despite its theoretical “responsibility” for the entire continent. The United States maintains no significant physical presence in Africa or large swaths of Asia. A Yellowstone supereruption would presumably not change security calculations in these areas much at all. Europe would be similarly unaffected, sat least in the short term. The United States currently maintains 95,000 troops from all services in its European Command, none of whom are tasked with maintaining the internal stability of its allies. During the Cold War, U.S. troops did not involve themselves in the domestic conflicts of their host states, unlike their Soviet counterparts. Their job was always to protect Europe from without, not within. The continent is the world’s most stable, its countries the most cooperative, and its people the least martial. It would probably take more than the removal of U.S. troops for ash-cleaning duties to bring back security dilemmas, arms races, and conflict. Borders have hardened, as have norms of conflict resolution. No one can know for sure, of course, but Europe does not seem to be a good candidate for chaos in the absence of the United States. Without the presence of U.S. forces, much of the Middle East would be unstable and chaotic. With the presence of U.S. forces, much of the Middle East is unstable and chaotic. A supervolcano erupting in Wyoming would not have much impact on the security of the world’s most dangerous region. Israel would be just as safe as it was before, since its marked military superiority over all potential rivals is the ultimate guarantor of its security, not U.S. troops or ships. Without the prospect of help from Uncle Sam, the failing governments of Iraq and Libya, as well as the rebels in Syria and our allies in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, and elsewhere, would learn to become more self-sufficient. Perhaps they would even make long-term deals with their rivals. It might be good to throw them out of the U.S. nest and encourage them to fly on their own or crash. Fears of a resurgent Iran would be articulated by the usual suspects, no doubt, but both history and the realities of power suggest Tehran would find it hard to dominate its neighbors, even if it had the will to do so. The regions that would be of most concern in such a scenario would be the peripheries of those once and potentially future great powers, Russia and China. To believers in the “deterrence model,” first described by Robert Jervis four decades ago, weakness is provocative, and the post-U.S. world would seem everywhere weak. 128 Moscow and Beijing would attempt to expand their influence, and ultimately perhaps their borders, once they were assured that they would face no pushback from Washington. Perhaps gradual interference in their near-abroads, such as we have already seen in eastern Ukraine, northern Georgia, and the South China Sea, would occur with increasing frequency in the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal. While such expansion cannot be ruled out, especially in the long run, large border adjustments would probably not occur in the absence of U.S. power, for least two reasons. First, the removal of American troops would not alter the calculations regarding the costs and benefits of conquest in the twenty-first century. Although absorbing neighbors sometimes paid substantial dividends in the pre–information age, today territory is unrelated to wealth. 129 The people of larger states are not automatically better off than those of small ones. India is not richer than Singapore; Russia would not benefit from invading Ukraine; China would hardly be materially better off if it ruled Taiwan. The other members of the international system might not be able to stop such adventurism militarily, but they can certainly punish it economically. The costs related to invasion and the inevitable problems that arise during occupation would outweigh any possible benefits that may accrue. Conquest in a trading system is profoundly irrational, and the incentives for peace are strong. Rational calculations are not the only motivations for cross-border violence. As Norman Angell argued a century ago, people have to believe that war is not worth the cost before they will forswear it. 130 The quest for glory and prestige has sent many an army into motion over the centuries; Alfred Thayer Mahan responded to Angell’s rationalism a century ago by pointing out that “nations are under no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war itself” but honor often compels them to fight anyway. 131 By 2017, however, those calculations have changed. It is not at all clear that glory still automatically accompanies conquest. The second reason to believe that Russia and China might not dominate their near-abroads in an essentially U.S.-free world is that the behavioral norms of the New Peace discourage aggression. Imperialism invites opprobrium, not admiration. This does not mean that such assaults could not happen—Genghis Khan was unconcerned about opprobrium, for instance, and Vladimir Putin might be too—but surely it is significant that conquest has been all but absent since the Second World War. The unipole is not the only thing restraining potential combatants; both their material and reputational interests do so as well. If and when a catastrophic supervolcanic eruption weakens the United States, other countries would still have substantial interest in maintaining the overlapping network of international economic and political institutions that serve the interests of all members. All would want to see free trade and investment continue unmolested, whether or not the global policeman could punish violators. Most would continue to place some value on international law, human rights, and the UN system. Why any state would want to move backward to a mercantilist time of pure self-help and violence would be difficult to imagine. It is 2017, not 1717. Volcanologists assure us that someday Yellowstone will awaken with terrifying fury. The human and material cost will be immense, but the ramifications for international security may not be as dramatic. While it might take that kind of event to settle the questions concerning hegemonic-stability theory once and for all, we can still use our imaginations to anticipate the kind of reaction that the system would have if the global 911 is taken off the hook. Even more decisively than a Trump superpresidency, a supervolcano eruption would test the New Peace and settle forever debates over the importance of unipolarity. Until then, one can only imagine what the system would be like without the United States. And the smart money would be with those who say that it would probably look pretty much the same, with very small amounts of conflict and warfare, even if few people seem to notice. In the end, what can be definitely said about the relationship between U.S. power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans. The pacifying virtue of U.S. hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will resist alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end. For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain much support for the notion that unipolarity and the New Peace are related. At the same time, three common psychological phenomena suggest that hegemonic stability is particularly susceptible to misperception. U.S. leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered the most peaceful period in its history.']

[(0, 8), (9, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-PiPh-Neg-Gonzaga-Doubles.docx

Michigan

PiPh

169062fb9ceea8d0598548829c3dc41a62b37f54b0c043b027cf717ffbc349fc

Order’s resilient, BUT alt causes.

Hirsh ’19 [Michael; December 27; senior correspondent; Foreign Policy, “Why the Liberal International Order Will Endure Into the Next Decade,” ]

the l i o will endure into the third decade democracy won’t give up reinventing at the grassroots in unlikely places the idea remains ever-replenishing that scientists told us gets stronger the more income and education increase The economy is undergoing stress surviving intact complexities of integrated economy and supply chains too much to undo system suffered yet endured . In the quarter-century markets collapsed the economy remained intact terrorists struck capitals clash of civ hasn’t ensued U S and China bicker , but do business dead wrong the system will fall

the L I O Will Endure Into the Next Decade prove stronger than the forces arrayed against them in the 2020s the l iberal i nternational o rder can survive based on recent trends , it’s a fair bet that democracy, globalism, and open trade will endure handily into the third decade of the 21st century democracy just won’t give up it kept reinventing itself at the grassroots . This has been happening in the most unlikely of places around the globe , in countries such as Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Chile, and Hong Kong the idea of democracy remains a powerful, ever-replenishing urge that , as sociologists and political scientists have long told us , only gets stronger the more that income and education al levels increase around the world The economy is undergoing some severe stress tests —and surviving remarkably intact the complexities of a deeply integrated global economy and its supply chains may prove too much to undo only the latest stresses to a system that, since the end of the Cold War , has suffered some pretty major ones and yet endured . In the quarter-century since then, financial markets collapsed several times , and the global economy remained intact terrorists struck major capitals around the world , and a clash of civ ilizations hasn’t ensued the U S and China , incessantly bicker , but they’re still do ing business . Ivory tower realists continue to be dead wrong in their predictions that the international system will fall back into anarchy

L I O prove stronger l i o recent trends fair bet endure handily third decade of the 21st century just won’t give up reinventing itself the most unlikely of places around the globe the idea of democracy powerful, ever-replenishing urge sociologists and political scientists long told us only gets stronger some severe stress tests surviving remarkably intact complexities deeply integrated global economy its supply chains too much to undo end of the Cold War some pretty major ones yet endured collapsed several times remained intact major capitals around the world hasn’t ensued incessantly bicker still do ing business dead wrong fall back into anarchy

['Title: Why the Liberal International Order Will Endure Into the Next Decade', 'Subtitle: It’s true that democracy, globalism, and free trade are under assault, but they may prove stronger than the forces arrayed against them in the 2020s.', 'It’s become fashionable to wonder whether the liberal international order can survive the malign forces that have been lining up against it during the 2010s—what the Wall Street Journal called the “Decade of Disruption.” But based on recent trends, it’s a fair bet that democracy, globalism, and open trade will endure handily into the third decade of the 21st century.', 'Start with the state of democracy. Nothing has been more alarming to internationalists than the one-two punch of U.S. President Donald Trump and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who have taken power in two of the world’s oldest and most important democracies by awakening the old demons of nationalism. With Trump focusing his ire on NATO and the World Trade Organization, and Johnson stalking out of the European Union, the two leaders have transformed the once-hallowed “special relationship” from a bulwark of global stability (sullied though it was by the Iraq War) into what looks more like a wrecking ball. Elsewhere, illiberalism has overtaken young democracies, such as Hungary and Poland, and even threatened mature ones with the rapid rise of nationalist parties such as the Alternative for Germany and Norbert Hofer’s anti-immigrant Freedom Party of Austria. In the world’s largest democracy, India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party appear to be sending the same message. And there are considerable doubts about whether the democratic body politic possesses an immune system strong enough to fight off a plague of cyber-generated misinformation and disinformation, and systemic hacking by such autocrats as Russian President Vladimir Putin.', 'But democracy just won’t give up, and in 2019—which could justly be called the year of global protest—it kept reinventing itself at the grassroots. This has been happening in the most unlikely of places around the globe, in countries such as Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Chile, and above all in Hong Kong, where thousands of determined protesters have braved bullets and tear gas, embarrassing Chinese President Xi Jinping even as he brutally consolidates his autocratic rule on the mainland. Perhaps the U.S. and British democracies are becoming decadent—and 2020 will tell us a lot about that question come November—but the idea of democracy remains a powerful, ever-replenishing urge that, as sociologists and political scientists have long told us, only gets stronger the more that income and educational levels increase around the world.', 'The international economy is also undergoing some severe stress tests—and surviving remarkably intact. The year 2019 began with deep-seated fears that Trump’s trade wars would help trigger a global recession—and among the most concerned was Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell, who midway through the year suggested he and other central bank chiefs simply didn’t know how bad things could get. “The thing is,” Powell said, “there isn’t a lot of experience in responding to global trade tensions.” Growth and investment are still slowing due in large part to the uncertainty Trump has created, but fears of a recession have receded. It turns out the U.S. president cannot single-handedly return the United States to the days of Smoot-Hawley—even his fellow neonationalist Boris Johnson believes in free trade—and the domino effect of retaliatory tariffs that followed in the 1930s, setting the stage for world war. (In June 1930, under the Smoot-Hawley Act, the United States raised tariffs to an average of 59 percent on more than 25,000 imports; just about every other nation reacted in tit-for-tat protectionist fashion, severely depressing the global economy.)', 'Today, the complexities of a deeply integrated global economy and its supply chains may prove too much to undo—even for the most powerful person on the planet.', 'And what of the institutions of the international system? The United States has always had an uneasy relationship with its post-World War II progeny, principally the United Nations, the WTO, and NATO—despite helping create them—and Trump only gave expression to an American id that was long seething under the surface. True, Trump is demeaning these institutions to an unprecedented degree and demanding far more of them. But he’s only saying more stridently what was said by, say, President Barack Obama, who also criticized the NATO allies for being free-riders, and former President George W. Bush, whose administration privately mocked the alliance and sneered at the U.N. (Another little-remembered precursor to Trump was President Bill Clinton’s feisty first-term trade representative, Mickey Kantor, who once said he wasn’t interested in free-trade “theology” and preferred that Americans behave like mercantilists.)', 'Trump is making a serious run at denuding the WTO by taking down its appellate court, but even that institution is likely to outlast a 73-year-old president who, at most, has only four more years in office to wreak havoc on the global system. This is especially likely because he is now mostly alone in his anti-globalist passion with the departure of his deeply ideological national security advisor, the militant John Bolton.', 'Let’s not forget either that the advent of Trump and Johnson represents a legitimate backlash to major policy errors made by the elites who have dominated the international system. George W. Bush led the Republican Party badly astray with his strategically disastrous Iraq War and fecklessness over the deregulation of Wall Street, which set the stage for the biggest financial crash since 1929 and the Great Recession. That turned voters off to traditional Republican thinking and opened the door to Trump’s unlikely takeover of the party. Something similar happened in Britain, when Bush’s partner in these neoliberal economic delusions and his ally in an unnecessary war, the once-popular Labour leader Tony Blair, set the stage for Labour’s eventual handoff to the socialist Jeremy Corbyn. (A shift that was, in turn, analogous to the ascent of Sen. Bernie Sanders, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, and the left inside the U.S. Democratic Party in response to the rise of Trump’s 2016 presidential rival Hillary Clinton, who was seen as pro-war and too friendly to Wall Street.)', 'But the larger point is that Trump and Johnson are only the latest stresses to a system that, since the end of the Cold War, has suffered some pretty major ones and yet endured. In the quarter-century since then, financial markets collapsed several times, and the global economy has remained intact. Islamist terrorists have struck at major capitals around the world, and a clash of civilizations hasn’t ensued. The world’s two largest economies, the United States and China, incessantly bicker, but they’re still doing business. Ivory tower realists continue to be dead wrong in their predictions that the international system will fall back into anarchy, even when politicians like Trump are doing their best to make that happen. On the realist view, the so-called West and its institutions should have disintegrated after the Cold War with the disappearance of the Soviet Union; as Owen Harries wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1993, “The political ‘West’ is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile ‘East’ to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy.”', '', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Harvard-Doubles.docx

Michigan

PhSk

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Michigan/PhSk/Michigan-Phil-Skoulikaris-Neg-Harvard-Doubles.docx

6c0747d227a98e834e1791fb9c8fc8e66db4a57a8edc797078fdeac32da67e4c

Even if conventional force becomes more credible, NFU increases adversary risk taking which obviates the deterrent effect.

Costlow ’21 [Matthew; August; former Special Assistant in the office of Nuclear and Missile Defense policy, Department of Defense from 2019-2021, Special Advisor to the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group, Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy; War on the Rocks, “Believe it or not: U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy and Calculated Ambiguity,” ]

n f u signal U.S. values withholding nuclear employment over defeat . Critics may respond withholding makes conventional means credible . However boxer who ties hand behind back demonstrate he is committed to using his other hand , but will inevitably take a beating U S may eventually win but at too high a cost

n f u will not allow explicit nuclear threats to deter most-damaging attacks policies signal that U.S. policy values withholding even the deterrent threat of nuclear employment over sustaining massive casualties perhaps up to the point of defeat . Critics may respond that withholding the threat of nuclear employment makes conventional means more credible . However , like a boxer who ties one of his hand s behind his back , it may demonstrate he is committed to only using his other hand , but he will inevitably take a greater beating U S may eventually win such a contest with its superior conventional forces, but this result is not guaranteed and may come at too high a cost why eliminate a valuable deterrent threat when the threat of a U.S. nuclear response can help tip the balance towards preventing a conflict in the first place ?

n f u explicit most-damaging signal withholding massive casualties point of defeat respond conventional more credible boxer hand behind his back other hand inevitably greater beating U S eventually result not guaranteed too high a cost eliminate tip the balance preventing ?

['Put simply, a U.S. nuclear no-first-use or sole purpose policy, depending on how it is crafted, will not allow the United States to make explicit nuclear threats to deter some of the potentially most-damaging non-nuclear attacks, much less conduct a nuclear response. In effect, these policies could essentially signal, whether intentionally or not, that U.S. policy values withholding even the deterrent threat of nuclear employment over sustaining massive casualties from strategic non-nuclear attack, perhaps up to the point of defeat. Critics may respond that withholding the threat of nuclear employment makes the U.S. commitment to defeating the adversary with conventional means that much more credible. However, like a boxer who ties one of his hands behind his back, it may demonstrate he is committed to only using his other hand, but he will inevitably take a greater beating in the end.', 'Yes, the United States may eventually win such a contest with its superior conventional forces, but this result is not guaranteed and may come at too high a cost. Given this possibility, why eliminate a valuable deterrent threat, especially when the threat of a U.S. nuclear response can help tip the balance towards preventing a conflict in the first place?']

[(0, 11)]

ndtceda

Michigan-ShGa-Neg-Wake-Doubles.docx

Michigan

ShGa

c7f90f86240e16aa628bd74b4435edc6d6032922d3fe4bff67e95581b7298e05

Refusal of debt is a failed strategy – only embracing universal ontological indebtedness can effectively challenge capitalism

Featherstone 17, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University. (Mark, Planet Utopia: Utopia, Dystopia, and Globalisation,

refusal is entirely unsustainable debt is irreducible the social relation is irreducible and indebtedness are essential attributes necessary for survival we must produce a better world organised around recognition of a ethic where I am necessarily bound to the other supersedes the systemic stupidity of neoliberal capitalism. where there is a recognition of the irreducible interdependence of self, other, world, and earth absolute responsibility for others destroy the militarised individualism of late capitalism

refusal is entirely unsustainable debt is irreducible While Scrooge rejects Christmas in the name of the love of money, Marley’s ghost shows him that the social relation is irreducible and that indebtedness are essential attributes necessary for survival the neoliberal, economy has similarly transformed into a nihilistic machine we must return to the question of fundamental human value similar to the message Marley’s ghost brought to Scrooge, who was compelled to change his ways in order to produce a better world organised around recognition of a communistic ethic where I am necessarily bound to the other supersedes the systemic stupidity of the godless theodicy of neoliberal capitalism. where there is a recognition of the irreducible interdependence of self, other, world, and earth absolute responsibility for others destroy the militarised individualism of late capitalism

['While the refusal of the other is locked into liberal/neoliberal history, I believe that this vision of asociality is entirely unsustainable and that the phobic reaction to and rejection of the basic sociological truth that we find in the work of, for example, Gilbert Simondon, who wrote about trans-individualism, is what produces the procession of spectres that haunt contemporary capitalism with their complaints about injustice, misery, and injury (Combes, 2012). From the neoliberal perspective, there is no social relation, but only economic exchange that limits responsibility to contractual obligation, but the sociological truth the spectres reveal is that the human condition is to be responsible because the individual is founded on otherness in the present, born in the world made by the others of the past, and can only make a future on the basis of cooperation with other people who share the same vision of how the world might change. In this way, debt is irreducible, and this is essentially what Derrida (1994) explains in his Spectres of Marx—the spectre demands responsibility, and a recognition of indebtedness, that is horrific from the point of view of the neoliberal subject who learns that debt is somehow evil, but is in truth representative of the possibility of a space of freedom beyond the capitalist injunction to live out a lonely life in suffocating proximity to others who are similarly phobic about interdependence. Against Nietzsche’s theory of debt, which he sets out in his On the Genealogy of Morals (2008), explaining that essential indebtedness is the philosophy of the weak, the sociological vision of debt that the spectre communicates carries a message concerned with the necessity of humility born in the very real limitation of the self-identical individual in those others who sustain its existence. It is, of course, precisely this humility which is lost in contemporary global capitalism that individualises everybody, with the effect that it is possible to fortify Europe in the face of migrants on the run from destroyed lands and defend the necessity of severe austerity in the context of an economic system that supports exorbitant luxury. When neoliberal ideology rejects the connection, or responsibility, between self and other, the spectre returns in order to insist upon the irreducibility of the social relation. This is why the spectre is perhaps the key figure of early 21st-century sociology. In the wake of the end of history, and the globalisation of capitalism, the other is nowhere. In this situation there is no hope for self or other because there is no social situation open to change. As Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) note in their theory of ghosts, it is in these hopeless times when ghosts appear. In their view the spectre represents destroyed hope and in this respect keeps possibility alive post-mortem. According to Freud (2003c), the fear of ghosts, the fear of the dead who have not been able to pass over but remain in our world, is symbolic of the inability to internalise trauma. He thought that ghosts will continue to haunt the living until psychoanalysis works through the hard core of trauma which would allow the spectre to pass over to the other side. While we can read this therapeutic vision conservatively, so that spectres pass over and very little changes, it is also possible to take a more radical interpretation of what Laurence Rickels (2011) calls unmourning, or the inability to enable the ghost to leave the world of the living, and suggest that the spectral symbol of the need to address injustice, misery, and despair will only leave the scene when its conditions have been met. From this point of view, the spectre becomes a figure of utopian possibility and potential transformation, which is exactly what the sociologist of haunting Avery Gordon (2008) explains in her Ghostly Matters. For Gordon the spectre represents the possibility of enchantment, the possibility of hope, in a godless, disenchanted world where hopelessness has become the norm. In his Specters of Marx (1994), Derrida argues that the spectre represents a new atheological theology and that spiritless capitalism is fated to produce ghosts by virtue of the phantom objectivity of the commodity that fascinates the consumer. In this way Derrida shows how the pinnacle of late capitalist estrangement is characterised by the reflexive production of spectres. Against this neo-Gothic thesis one might claim that the hyper-visibility of our mediated world screens out the possibility of haunting, but what the works of Jeffrey Sconce (2000), Laurence Rickels (2011), and Stefan Andriopoulos (2013) show is that media is, and has always been, the space of modern and postmodern haunting. While there is a sense in which the postmodern theory of the ghostly concerns the production of a phantasmatic world where reality itself breaks down before universal simulation where ethics no longer make sense, my view is that the spectre of sociology has a very clear ethical, political function concerned with giving voice to the other who came before, must live in misery today, survive the catastrophe of the cancelled future, and centrally demand that the neoliberal individual recognises his claims on the basis of a social relation which is absolutely irreducible. In this respect it may be possible to supplement Derrida’s (1994) reference to Hamlet’s spectre with the case of Dickens’ (2003) Jacob Marley and the ghosts of Christmas past, present, and future, who show the story’s famous capitalist miser, Ebenezer Scrooge, the horror of the destroyed lives of Bob Cratchit and Tiny Tim and force him to face up to his responsibility for their situation. While Scrooge rejects Christmas in the name of the love of money, Marley’s ghost confronts him with his own traumatic past and shows him his own miserable end in order to show him that the social relation is irreducible and that generosity and indebtedness are essential human attributes necessary for survival. Thus Marley shows Scrooge what happens when we lose these human qualities and abandon each other for money—we live and die in misery. In much the same way that Dickens wrote about the failure of the spirit of generosity in his A Christmas Carol in 1843, which was coincidentally the same decade in which Marx and Engels published The Communist Manifesto, Derrida’s student and collaborator, Bernard Stiegler (2011, 2012, 2014) explores the failure of belief and spirit in contemporary capitalism and suggests that the postmodern, neoliberal, global economy has similarly transformed into a kind of hopeless, nihilistic machine for the production of profit. That is to say that while Dickens’ ghost emerges to critique Scrooge’s cruel and desperate vision of Victorian capitalism, Stiegler suggests that a similar spectralisation is necessary today in order to save postmodern society from economic destruction. Against Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2007), who suggested that the 1960s led to the emergence of a new individualistic spirit of capitalism which could provide people with hope in personal freedom and self-realisation, Stiegler suggests that this turn to what we might call hyper-individualism has led to the creation of the kind of miserable society Dickens imagines and Scrooge, Bob Cratchit, and Tiny Tim endure—the individual is everything and there is no room for generosity or a recognition of the sociality that makes people human. Indeed, there is no social space beyond the space of the miserable economic transaction. As a result, compassion is impossible, which Scrooge explains in his famous refusal of sympathy—‘Are there no prisons? Are there no workhouses?’—and the other is simply left to perish. This is the misery of capitalism, which Dickens painted in the 1840s, Marx and Engels imagined in the same period, and Bernard Stiegler explains in his works on contemporary disbelief and discredit. After the period of Keynesian state management between the horrors of Victorian laissez-faire and its rebirth in the form of neoliberal economic governmentality, Stiegler (2012) shows how the horror remains the same and that we must return to the question of fundamental human value once more. In this respect the message of the spectre of sociology, which reminds the individual of his irreducible responsibility for the other who must live and die in misery, is very similar to the message Marley’s ghost brought to Scrooge, who was confronted with destroyed lives and compelled to change his ways in order to produce a better world where responsibility, compassion, and sympathy form the basis of a sociological ethic of care. As a result it is possible to see that the utopianism of the spectre of sociology revolves around a rejection of the restricted economics of neoliberal individualism in the name of a vision of social relations where human value trumps the right to private property. Given this vision, the future the spectre conjures contains the possibility of a form of globalisation for itself, rather than in itself, where an integrated, sociological world organised around human value, rationality, and a recognition of a communistic ethic where I am necessarily bound to the other supersedes the systemic stupidity of the godless theodicy of neoliberal capitalism. However, the life of the red-green utopian fantasy of the spectre, where there is a recognition of the irreducible interdependence of self, other, world, and earth, is absolutely reliant on sociology and its idea of the social relation that remains beyond the pale in neoliberal society where the individual is the primary unit and his interactions with others are reducible to base, instrumental, economic transactions. Thus the radical nature of sociology resides in its necessary resistance to this weak vision of the social, and its critical, utopian potential is founded upon its core claim that ensures its marginality in the neoliberal universe that cannot recognise social interaction beyond economics. As a result sociology becomes a spectral form of knowledge concerned with the spectre of the social relation screened out by the hyper-rationality of neoliberal capitalism, where the individual is everything. While neoliberal ideology must oppose sociological truth because the ideas of irreducible relationality, trans-individualism, and absolute responsibility for others destroy the fantasy of the self-reliant, rugged individual and conjure the horror story of totalitarianism in its opposition to the unplanned society, from the sociological point of view, the militarised individualism of late capitalism suggests dystopia and catastrophe because there is no human future under conditions of systemic stupidity. These are the coordinates of the political struggle of the spectre of sociology, and the dystopian fantasy of the catastrophic future should not be dismissed in the name of realism, because the assumption of the worst opens up a space of utopian possibility simply because it becomes necessary to imagine change (Dupuy, 2014). Of course, neoliberal capitalism is complicit in the production of the vision of the late capitalist dystopia and the spectres that speak about the need for some other way, because its rejection of social responsibility condemns ever more people to live in poverty, misery, and despair.']

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ndtceda

Kansas-Harris-Soper-Neg-CEDA-Round5.docx

Kansas

HaSo

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Kansas/HaSo/Kansas-Harris-Soper-Neg-CEDA-Round5.docx

1dcb8ae742f29f95f76825e8bb02bea1e557353fb96e86265f0f4d436de0b4d5

3. The US publicly exercises restraint in first use.

Vu 23 – PhD Candidate specializing in East Asian politics and nuclear weapons in the Political Science Department at Boston College, where he focuses on East Asian politics and nuclear weapons, M.A. in Political Science from Dartmouth College (Khang Vu, “The Korean Peninsula: Why 2023 will not be like 2017,” The Interpreter, 01-10-2023, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/korean-peninsula-why-2023-will-not-be-2017)

2023 will not be 2017 Biden’s executives are more restrained as they assured North Korea the U S has no aggressive intentions Biden stuck to trilateral consultation the U is committed to restraining So Ko This differs from 2017 Washington emphasised the need to consult said “no” to joint nuclear drills in an attempt not to raise tensions Yoon accepts US constraint on his actions it may be easier for all parties to sit down and

2023 will not be like 2017 a leader’s character can significantly matter to the trajectory of the crisis who occupies the White House is the decisive factor . there are reasons for optimism Biden’s foreign policy executives are much more restrained than predecessors, as they repeatedly assured North Korea that the U S has no aggressive intentions This is in stark contrast to Trump Biden responses to provocations have been reflective of a long-standing North Korea policy rather than an improvised script Biden stuck to trilateral consultation with Japan and South Korea while Trump liked to “go it alone” even to detriment of allies Biden’s calibrated, practical approach lowers uncertainty the U S is committed to restraining So uth Ko rea This greatly differs from 2017 The risk of starting a war without Seoul’s input was high then Now, Washington has emphasised the need to consult Biden said “no” to joint nuclear drills in an attempt not to raise tensions Yoon accepts US constraint on his actions it may be too early to rule out dialogue When missiles are not flying in the sky, it may be easier for all parties to sit down and talk

will not be like 2017 significantly matter decisive factor reasons for optimism much more restrained repeatedly assured no aggressive intentions stark contrast Trump long-standing North Korea policy trilateral consultation detriment lowers uncertainty to restraining So uth Ko rea greatly differs emphasised the need joint nuclear drills too early to rule out dialogue easier all parties sit down and talk

['However, while similarities can be seen, one important difference should mean 2023 will not be like 2017. In times of tension, a leader’s judgment and character can significantly matter to the trajectory of the crisis. This time, who occupies the White House is the decisive factor.', 'So far, there are reasons for optimism. Biden’s top foreign policy executives are much more restrained than their predecessors, as they repeatedly assured North Korea that the United States has no aggressive intentions towards it despite Pyongyang’s provocations. This is in stark contrast to Trump and his National Security Adviser John Bolton’s preference for a military solution and their confrontational statements in public. Importantly, Biden administration officials’ responses to North Korean provocations have so far been reflective of a long-standing North Korea policy rather than an improvised script as it was the case under Trump.', 'Biden’s White House has stuck to trilateral consultation with Japan and South Korea to address the growing North Korean threat, while Trump liked to “go it alone” even to the detriment of his Asian allies. Of course, Biden’s firm following of a “calibrated, practical approach” hurts the chance for any diplomatic breakthrough with North Korea, but it lowers uncertainty compared to the love-letter diplomacy between Kim and Trump.', 'On the alliance side, although Yoon is much more hawkish than Moon about North Korea, the United States is committed to restraining South Korea, and it should be able to do so as the senior ally. This greatly differs from the 2017 alliance dynamics, when South Korea as a junior ally had few capabilities to restrain the senior US ally. The risk of the United States starting a war against North Korea without Seoul’s input was high then. Now, Washington has legitimate reasons to worry that Yoon’s “tit-for-tat” policy can drag it into a war with North Korea, so it has emphasised the need for Seoul to consult with the alliance first before undertaking any actions.', 'Biden recently said “no” to joint nuclear drills with South Korea, despite Yoon’s suggestion that the two allies were discussing such plans, probably in an attempt not to raise tensions with North Korea. In a policy sense, Yoon’s acceptance of US extended deterrence as the solution to the North Korean problem means that he also accepts US constraint on his actions despite his worry about North Korea’s weapons breakthroughs. The Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group will continue to serve as the main channel of US restraint on South Korea’s North Korea policy.', 'And although the possibility of significant engagement with North Korea is low, it may be too early to rule out dialogue just yet. North Korea has likely shifted from aggressive testing in 2022 to mass manufacturing in 2023, as seen in Kim’s pledge to exponentially increase the country’s nuclear arsenal and mass produce tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, North Korean military scientists think the country will not have to carry out a nuclear test because they were confident in the success of their 2022 ICBM tests. When missiles are not flying in the sky, it may be easier for all parties to sit down and talk. And this has been North Korea’s strategy during the previous round of engagement: testing weapons aggressively and then participating in talks to extract the best price while producing more weapons in the background']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-NDT-Round-8.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

4b49dffee0b49a2c13e7ff4db93954bd8620006fead5c37264b6ec71745f3353

Liberal humanism is good.

Gary WILDER 16, Associate Professor of Anthropology at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York [“Here/Hear Now Aimé Césaire!” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 3, July 2016, p. 585-604, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

postcolonial studies devolves into a hunt for humanism to reveal the oppressive essence of the object. This becomes the punch line of the discussion rather than starting point for analysis . insistence on negative critique makes scholars reluctant to specify the world they want to create what do Césaire remind us not to forfeit categories such as freedom, justice and humanity to dominant actors who have degraded them scholars establish dubious chains of equivalence between modernity, the West, and liberalism. operations disregard traditions as dynamic not simply as dogmatic reduction of modernity to a one-dimensional liberalism obscures progressive modern thought. It disregards redeemable fragments of liberal thinking To reify politics into stereotypical liberalism is to reinforce archaic assumptions about incommensurable worlds and disregard history and possibilities situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism should be placed in a constellation of modern emancipatory thinking oriented toward worldwide human freedom that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers

Césaire insights brush against the grain of many current theoretical tendencies. In both critical theory and postcolonial studies , the standard operation is to unmask purportedly universal categories as socially constructed and implicated in practices, systems, and logics of domination this approach often devolves into a hunt for traces of universalism or humanism in order to reveal the oppressive essence of the object. This “aha” moment becomes the punch line of the discussion rather than the starting point for analysis . Such fears of complicity with power do not only belie a longing for intellectual and political purity. They also make it difficult to think dialectically, to identify aspects of given arrangements that may point beyond their actually existing forms The current insistence on negative critique makes scholars reluctant to identify desirable alternatives and specify the kind of world they might want to create what do we concede if we are unable or unwilling to risk affirming more just, more human, ways of being to which we can say “yes”? It is not easy for radical thinkers to reconcile a nonprescriptive orientation to a radically open future with the imperative to envision more desirable arrangements But ignoring or deferring the challenge does not make it disappear. Following anticolonial thinkers like Césaire , especially those located within the black Atlantic critical tradition, may remind us not to forfeit categories such as freedom, justice , democracy, solidarity, and humanity to the dominant actors who have instrumentalized and degraded them emphasis on local ethnography seems consistent with one trend in postcolonial thinking that risks reviving the types of civilizational thinking, and associated assumptions about origins and authenticity, that it had earlier set out to dismantle despite liberalism’s claims to post- traditional neutrality, it too constitutes a particular tradition Asad’s genealogical insights unintentionally, have led scholars to establish dubious chains of equivalence between modernity, the West, and liberalism. Such operations seem to disregard Asad’s important invitation to understand traditions as heterogeneous, and dynamic spaces of inquiry and revision, not simply as a set of rigid behavioral scripts, unchanging cultural formulas, or dogmatic ideological precepts. This reduction of political modernity to a one-dimensional liberalism obscures the many currents of progressive antiliberalism within the tradition of modern Western political thought. It fails to recognize the significant number of non-European colonial intellectuals engaged in anti-imperial struggles who were active participants in such “traditions within traditions.” It disregards the contradictions within and redeemable fragments of liberal political thinking , fragments that might point far beyond , and possibly explode, liberalism itself To reify modern or Western politics into a static and stereotypical liberalism is to risk practicing an unfortunate “Occidentalism” that would reinforce archaic civilizational assumptions about incommensurable and unrelated worlds and disregard the actual history and open possibilities for practices of cross-cultural solidarity whereby anti-imperial actors outside Europe could enter into dialogue with, or even discover ways that they are already situated within, counterhegemonic “Western” political traditions Remembering Césaire’s insistence that modern currents of radicalism were shared legacies and common property may help us to rethink inherited assumptions about the relation between territory, ethnicity, consciousness, and interest They invite us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is a matter not of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge but of questioning the presumptive boundaries of “Europe” itself—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and of appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. We can recognize Césaire as a situated postwar thinker of the postwar world, one of whose primary aims was to place into question the very categories “France,” “Europe,” and “the West” by way of an immanent critique of late imperial politics. He envisioned postnational arrangements through which humanity could overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles. His situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism should be placed in a constellation of modern emancipatory thinking oriented toward worldwide human freedom that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers from a range of traditions: black Atlantic, First Internationalist, global anarchist, Western Marxist, Marxist humanist, Third Worldist

devolves into a hunt for humanism punch line of the discussion starting point for analysis point beyond their actually existing forms specify what do we concede nonprescriptive orientation not to forfeit categories instrumentalized and degraded them not simply one-dimensional liberalism obscures active participants contradictions within and redeemable fragments point far beyond explode, liberalism itself incommensurable disregard the actual history enter into dialogue already situated rethink inherited assumptions situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism constellation of modern emancipatory thinking worldwide human freedom

['These key terms illuminate crucial aspects of what made Césaire a distinctive thinker whose critical voice may continue to resonate for us today. But in order to attend to Césaire as he did his predecessors—as a contemporary— we should recognize how his intellectual orientation and insights brush against the grain of many current theoretical tendencies. In both critical theory and postcolonial studies, the standard operation is to unmask purportedly universal categories as socially constructed, culturally particular, and implicated in practices, systems, and logics of domination. These are indispensable critical moves. But this approach often devolves into a hunt for traces of universalism or humanism, whether in textual artifacts or political projects, in order to reveal the regressive or oppressive essence of the object. This “aha” moment thus becomes the punch line of the discussion rather than the starting point for analysis. Such fears of complicity with power do not only belie a longing for intellectual and political purity. They also make it difficult to think dialectically, to identify aspects of given arrangements that may point beyond their actually existing forms.', 'The current insistence on negative critique also makes scholars reluctant to identify desirable alternatives and specify the kind of world they might want to create. But what do we concede if we are unable or unwilling to risk affirming more just, more human, ways of being to which we can say “yes”? It is not easy for radical thinkers to reconcile a nonprescriptive orientation to a radically open future with the imperative to envision more desirable arrangements (Coronil 2011). But ignoring or deferring the challenge does not make it disappear. Following anticolonial thinkers like Césaire, especially those located within the black Atlantic critical tradition, may remind us not to forfeit categories such as freedom, justice, democracy, solidarity, and humanity to the dominant actors who have instrumentalized and degraded them.', 'Given this dilemma, the attention paid to Vivek Chibber’s recent polemic against subaltern studies is not surprising. Such attention, however, seems to be less about the merits of his universalist Marxism than about a sense of some of the limitations and impasses into which certain currents of postcolonial thinking have led (Chibber 2013).7 Partha Chatterjee himself has recently written, “The task, as it now stands, cannot . . . be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subaltern Studies . . . what is needed are new projects” (2012a: 44). He suggests that such projects should probably focus on “cultural history” and “popular culture” with a renewed focus on visual materials and embodied practices rather than written texts and on ethnography rather than intellectual history. Moreover, he links this invitation to study “the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday and the local” to a focus on subnational “regional formations” and “minority cultures” and languages whose specificities, he observes, had not been sufficiently engaged by earlier subaltern studies research on “India,” “Pakistan,” or “Bangladesh” (47–49). Valuable as such studies would surely be, it is not clear how a renewed focus on locality, with place-based assumptions about territory, consciousness, and categories, could do the kind of critical work necessary to grasp the deep shifts in political logics, structures, and practices that characterize the world-historical present. On the contrary, such approaches risk reproducing precisely the culturalist and territorialist assumptions about political identification and affiliation that need to be rethought in light of contemporary conditions.8', 'Chatterjee’s surprising emphasis on local ethnography seems consistent with one trend in postcolonial thinking that risks reviving the types of civilizational thinking, and associated assumptions about origins and authenticity, that it had earlier set out to dismantle (Chakrabarty 2007; Mah- mood 2005; Mignolo 2011). Consider the important ways that Talal Asad has invited us to rethink liberal assumptions about “tradition,” with respect to liberal and nonliberal forms of life. In dialogue with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alasdair MacIntyre, Asad (1986) has developed a powerful critique of liberal secularism—and the secularist logic that subtends many modern liberal states—from the standpoint of embodied and discursive traditions. On the one hand, he reminds us that “Islamic tradition” is neither singular nor unchanging; it is a structured and dynamic space for reasoned argument. On the other hand, he reminds us that despite liberalism’s claims to post- traditional neutrality, it too constitutes a particular tradition (albeit one that defines itself in opposition to inherited, embodied, and practice-oriented forms of tradition-based reasoning).', 'Asad’s genealogical insights have rightly informed recent critiques of Western liberal ideologies, states, and politics especially regarding their arrogant, condescending, and violent responses to tradition-rooted practices and practitioners, whether outside or inside the West. But his interventions, however unintentionally, have also led scholars to establish dubious chains of equivalence between modernity, the West, and liberalism. Such operations seem to disregard Asad’s important invitation to understand traditions as capacious, heterogeneous, and dynamic spaces of inquiry, disputation, and revision, not simply as a set of rigid behavioral scripts, unchanging cultural formulas, or dogmatic ideological precepts. This reduction of political modernity to a one-dimensional liberalism obscures, for example, the many currents of progressive antiliberalism within the tradition of modern Western political thought. It fails to recognize the significant number of non-European colonial intellectuals engaged in anti-imperial struggles who were active participants in such “traditions within traditions.” It also disregards the contradictions within and redeemable fragments of even liberal political thinking, fragments that, if realized, might point far beyond, and possibly explode, liberalism itself.', 'To reify modern or Western politics into a static and stereotypical liberalism is to risk practicing an unfortunate form of “Occidentalism” that would reinforce archaic civilizational assumptions about incommensurable and unrelated worlds (and worldviews) and disregard the actual history and open possibilities for practices of cross-cultural solidarity whereby anti-imperial actors outside Europe could enter into dialogue or affiliate with, or even discover ways that they are already situated within, counterhegemonic “Western” political traditions. Critics have rightly mobilized singularity, incommensurability, or untranslatability against liberal attempts to discover an abstract humanity and thereby discount situated and embodied forms of life. But the question is whether we treat incommensurability or untranslatability as an epistemological or political limit or as an always imperfect starting point for practices of dialogue, coordination, affiliation, reciprocity, solidarity. For isn’t the impossibility of full transparency or undifferentiated unity simply the unavoidable condition within which all communication, sociality, and politics must be attempted?9', 'My point is not to congratulate dissident currents within the West, let alone to recuperate liberalism. It is rather to approach radical and emancipatory politics from a place of not-already-knowing, of not presuming to know a priori which aspects of a tradition are irredeemable, which traditions may become allies or habitations, what the boundaries of (thoroughly plastic) traditions must be. This nondogmatic and experimental orientation to politics, traditions, and concepts is one of the most precious and timely gifts that Césaire may offer to us now. He practiced a concrete cosmopolitan relationship to modern traditions of philosophy, aesthetics, and politics, one that was highly developed by the robust tradition of black Atlantic criticism within which he was firmly rooted along with predecessors (e.g., Toussaint and W. E. B. DuBois), contemporaries (e.g., C. L. R. James, James Baldwin, Suzanne Césaire, Senghor), and descendants (e.g., Fanon, Edouard Glissant, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Achille Mbembe, David Scott).', 'Understandable concerns about totalizing explanation and Eurocentric evaluation have led a generation of scholars to insist on the incommensurable alterity of non-European forms of thought. But perhaps we should be concerned less exclusively with unmasking universalisms as covert European particularism than with also challenging the assumption that the universal is European property. I read Césaire not in order to provincialize European concepts but to deprovincialize Antillean thinking. Césaire’s critical reworkings remind us that the supposedly European categories of political modernity properly belong as much to the African and Caribbean actors who coproduced them as to the inhabitants of continental Europe. Similarly, African and Caribbean thinkers, no less than their continental counterparts, produced abstract and general propositions about “humanity,” “history,” and “the world.” In contrast to invocations of multiple modernities, Césaire never granted to Europe possession of a modernity or universality or humanity that was always already translocal and fundamentally Caribbean. He never treated self-determination, emancipation, freedom, equality, or justice as essentially European and foreign. Césaire’s intellectual and political interventions radically challenged reductive territorialist approaches to social thought. He refused to concede that “France” was an ethnic or continental entity, that Martinique was not in some real way internal to “French” society and politics, or that he was situated outside of modern critical traditions. Thus his ongoing and unapologetic engagements with Hegel, Marx, Proudhon, Nietzsche, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Bergson, Freud, Breton, Frobenius, and Lenin, alongside his many African, Antillean, and African American interlocutors.', 'The sonic blurring between “here” and “hear” in the title of this essay is meant to signal not only the contemporaneity of Césaire’s thought for us here now but the imperative that we open ourselves to his presence and recognize his actuality across the epochal divide by hearing what he actually said. This gesture builds on Walter Benjamin’s insight that every now is a “now of recognizability” whereby “what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation” through which past epochs become newly legible (1999: 462). I also follow Césaire himself, who engaged in dialogue with predecessors as if they were contemporaries and who addressed future interlocutors directly as if they were already present. Like Benjamin, Césaire practiced a form of radical remembrance that connected outmoded pasts to charged presents. This attention to vital histories was bound up with a poetic politics that identified transformative possibilities dwelling within existing arrangements and a proleptic politics that anticipated seemingly impossible futures by trying to enact them concretely in the here and now. But Césaire can only speak to us now if we listen rather than presume to know what someone like him in his situation must have, or should have, been saying.', 'Until very recently, scholarship on his work has been overdetermined by methodological nationalism (that puzzles over his refusal to pursue state sovereignty), identitarian culturalism (that debates how adequately Césaire expressed Antillean lived experience and whether or not he was an essentialist), and a disciplinary division of labor (that too often splits his poetry, criticism, and politics into separate domains). Generally, Cold War scholarship was shaped by a need to evaluate him in relation to canonical anticolonial nationalists and fit him into a narrative of decolonization-as-national-independence. This has made it difficult to recognize the epochal character, world-making ambition, and global sensibility of his political reflections.', 'Faced with the promise of decolonization, Césaire conjugated concrete acts with political imagination in ways that displaced conventional oppositions between aesthetics and politics, realism and utopia, pragmatism and principle. Such efforts were animated by what I have been calling radical literalism and utopian realism and which he called inflection and poetic knowledge. He regarded freedom as a problem whose institutional solution was not self-evident and could only be situational. His interventions demonstrated the nonnecessary relationship between colonial emancipation, popular sovereignty, and self-determination, on the one hand, and territorial state sovereignty and national liberation, on the other. He pursued cosmopolitan aims concretely through transcultural practices and by attempting to invent new political forms through which to ground plural and postnational democratic arrangements.', 'We should recognize that Césaire formulated a critique not of Western civilization from the standpoint of African or Antillean culture but of modern Western racism, imperialism, and capitalism from the standpoint of Antillean and African historical situations and experiences. More generally, it was a critique of an alienated and alienating modernity from the standpoint of embodied and poetic ways of being, knowing, and relating (to self, others, and world). Above all, Césaire recognized residues of, and resources for, more just, human, and integrated ways of living together within Antillean, African, and European texts, traditions, forms, histories, and conditions. In his view, Antilleans—as culturally particular actors, imperial subjects, New World denizens, moderns, and humans—were their rightful heirs. He was concerned less with defining culturally authentic concepts, spaces, and arrangements for Antilleans (apart from Europe or uncontaminated by modernity) than with overcoming imperialism, in solidarity with other struggling peoples, in order to establish less alienated forms of human life globally.', 'Remembering Césaire’s insistence that modern currents of radicalism were shared legacies and common property may help us to rethink inherited assumptions about the relation between territory, ethnicity, consciousness, and interest (Buck-Morss 2009, 2010). They invite us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is a matter not of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge, as important as such a move certainly is, but of questioning the presumptive boundaries of “Europe” itself—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and of appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. We can thereby recognize Césaire as a situated postwar thinker of the postwar world, one of whose primary aims was to place into question the very categories “France,” “Europe,” and “the West” by way of an immanent critique of late imperial politics. He envisioned postnational arrangements through which humanity could attempt to overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles. His situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism should thus be placed in a constellation of modern emancipatory thinking oriented toward worldwide human freedom that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers from a range of traditions: black Atlantic, First Internationalist, global anarchist, Western Marxist, Marxist humanist, Third Worldist.']

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Emory-KeRa-Aff-Kentucky-Quarters.docx

Emory

KeRa

432136ac2a17cbfbbed30ba70c495b0e7c9add3393f4c10e6936bf0a535b0d0a

Counterplan solves growth—studies prove “crowd in” is true.

Mandt et al. ’20 [Rebecca, Kushal Seetharam, and Michael Cheng; August 20; Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases at Harvard University; Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.S. from Harvard University; MIT Science Policy Review, “Federal R&D funding: the bedrock of national innovation,” ]

federal investment produces a domino inducing non-federal s such as private R&D studies found gov investment increases private every 1% leads to more than doubling the initial investment This feedback has effect of “ crowding-in ” investment increasing funding lead the entire infrastructure to catalyze other innovations R&D is responsible fo the workforce that forms the kernel for innovation work attract tech incubators , start-ups , and industry funding is responsible for economic growth in two roles : it spurs the pace of innovation and guides the ecosystem to priorities. Both utilizi the “ crowd-in ” of R&D

In addition to directly supporting research related to public priorities, federal investment produces a domino effect in resource commitment, inducing investment from non-federal source s such as the private and philanthropic sectors into R&D A multitude of studies have found that gov ernment investment in R&D increases private investment and effort every 1% increase in federal funding leads to a 0.468% increase in industry research investment cumulatively more than doubling the initial federal investment This positive feedback effect holds true across different disciplines federal funding has an effect of “ crowding-in ” R&D investment from non-federal sources rather than crowding out increasing federal funding lead the entire national R&D infrastructure to move in step with societal needs rather than purely market considerations federally-supported research is more likely to be publicly disclosed compared to private sector R&D, and likely to catalyze other innovations Federal R&D expenditure is responsible fo r the education and training of scientists who move into the broader workforce as well as the physical infrastructure that forms the kernel for regional hubs of technological innovation A core part of the NSF’s mission is supporting s cience, t echnology, e ngineering, and m athematics education and development of the human capital pipeline for R&D The work funded by the federal government end up attract ing tech nology incubators , start-ups , and a larger industry presence federal funding is responsible for the key centers around which technology hubs form and lead to regional economic growth ; examples include Silicon Valley Boston and Madison the federal government takes a direct role in creating infrastructure critical to future private sector R&D Federal funding plays two major roles : it spurs the general pace of national innovation forward, and it guides the national innovation ecosystem to wards priorities. Both of these are accomplished by utilizi ng the “ crowd-in ” of federal R&D investments , the training of the STEM workforce , the tendency for technology hubs to form around federal research and the types of R&D infrastructure the government catalyzes

directly supporting investment domino effect inducing non-federal source s private philanthropic multitude of studies gov ernment increases private 1% increase more than doubling initial positive feedback effect crowding-in non-federal sources national R&D infrastructure disclosed catalyze education training broader workforce physical infrastructure kernel s t e m capital pipeline tech nology incubators start-ups industry presence key centers technology hubs economic growth direct role infrastructure private sector R&D major roles spurs pace guides innovation ecosystem crowd-in R&D investments STEM workforce technology hubs R&D infrastructure

['', 'Virtuous Cycles of Federal Funding', 'In addition to directly supporting research related to public priorities, federal investment also produces a domino effect in resource commitment, inducing investment from non-federal sources such as the private and philanthropic sectors into R&D related to broad societal objectives [41]. A multitude of studies have found that government investment in R&D increases private investment and effort (see, for example, [42]). Analysis done by Lanahan et al. in 2016 estimated that every 1% increase in federal research funding leads to a 0.468% increase in industry research investment, a 0.411% increase in nonprofit research investment, and a 0.217% increase in state and local research funding, cumulatively more than doubling the initial federal investment [41]. This positive feedback effect generally holds true across different disciplines including life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering. We therefore see that federal funding has an effect of “crowding-in” R&D investment from non-federal sources rather than crowding them out, as is sometimes erroneously assumed. As federal R&D investments are typically made in line with the missions of federal agencies which are in line with public priorities, increasing federal funding would lead the entire national R&D infrastructure to move more in step with societal needs and public benefits rather than purely market considerations. Additionally, federally-supported research is much more likely to be publicly disclosed compared to private sector R&D, and is therefore more likely to catalyze other innovations [23]. For example, as previously discussed, advances in supercomputing, and even the invention of the web browser, were built upon research done on computationally modeling black hole collisions [43]. As another example, fundamental physics research studying the movement of atoms led to the invention of molecular resonance imaging (MRI), a medical technology that helps save countless lives today [44, 45].', 'Federal R&D expenditure is also responsible for both\xa0the education and training of scientists and engineers\xa0who move into the broader workforce as well as the\xa0physical infrastructure that often forms the kernel for\xa0regional hubs of technological innovation [46]. A core\xa0part of the NSF’s mission, for example, is supporting\xa0science, technology, engineering, and mathematics\xa0(STEM) education and the broader development of\xa0the human capital pipeline for national R&D [23].\xa0The agency is also tasked with maintenance of\xa0large-scale research infrastructure such as facilities for\xa0materials research and fabrication, high-performance\xa0computing facilities, and particle accelerators, out of\xa0which technologies underlying countless start-ups and\xa0private sector innovations have been born [47]. The\xa0work done by university research centers and national\xa0labs, both of which are primarily funded by the\xa0federal government, also end up attracting technology\xa0incubators, start-ups, and a larger industry presence\xa0[3]. Therefore, federal funding is often responsible for\xa0the key centers around which technology hubs form\xa0and lead to regional economic growth; examples include\xa0Silicon Valley in California; Boston, Massachusetts;\xa0the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina; the\xa0Boulder-Denver corridor in Colorado; and Madison,\xa0Wisconsin. In addition to its indirect role in forming such\xa0innovation hubs, the federal government often takes\xa0a direct role in creating infrastructure critical to future\xa0private sector R&D including advanced manufacturing,\xa0high-performance computing, and smart cities [48].\xa0Federal funding, therefore, plays two major roles: it\xa0spurs the general pace of national innovation forward,\xa0and it guides the national innovation ecosystem towards\xa0societal priorities. Both of these tasks are accomplished\xa0by utilizing the “crowd-in” effect of federal R&D\xa0investments, the training of the STEM workforce, the\xa0tendency for technology hubs to form around academic\xa0and federal research centers, and the types of R&D\xa0infrastructure the government catalyzes.', '']

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ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Navy-Round4.docx

a41d565cd1015cac717864018a1526369f2fbb9d7787ecab6465d9993c561f1b

Now is key---students are far too uninformed.

Bernstein ’18 [Aron; September 21; Professor, Physics, MIT; The Bulletin, “Reducing the risk of nuclear war begins in the classroom,” https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/reducing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war-begins-in-the-classroom/]

students of today have less lived experience born after the Cold War majority do not understand weapons persistent , possibility of nuclear launch due to tech failure is overlooked It is assumed American public doesn’t care However if they had more knowledge , that could change educating students could have the long-term effec t of public that is motivated to hold leaders accountable for nuclear policy that reduces risk of nuclear war exposure in an educational context useful for students

When it comes to nuc lear weapon s , the students of today have less lived experience Today’s typical college student was born after the en d of the Cold War The majority do not have a strong understand ing of what nuclear weapons are, their destructive power , or their role in the international order They are not aware of the nuclear modernization program persistent , possibility of an unintentional nuclear launch due to tech nical failure is also overlooked It is generally assumed that today’s American public simply doesn’t care about the complicated abstract issues of nuclear weapons and deterrence because they rarely affect people’s lives directly . However if they had more knowledge , that could change educating students on nuclear weapons on a large scale could have the long-term effec t of creating an American public that is politically engaged on the nuclear issue and motivated to hold its elected leaders accountable for implementing nuclear policy that reduces the risk of nuclear war exposure to the issues of nuclear weapons in an educational context could be useful preparation for some students , learning about nuclear weapons could have a decisive impact on their career trajectory and inspire them to dedicate themselves to solving these problems

nuc s less lived experience after Cold War understand destructive power international order not aware modernization persistent possibility tech nical failure overlooked doesn’t care complicated abstract issues directly However knowledge change educating long-term effec engaged motivated accountable nuclear policy nuclear war exposure educational preparation learning decisive impact inspire solving

['The need for education on nuclear weapons. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the students of today have less lived experience to draw on than older generations. Today’s typical college student was born after the end of the Cold War and has no memory of a time when most Americans were deeply afraid of nuclear war (excluding, to an extent, the fiery exchange of threats between President Trump and Kim Jong-un last year). Perhaps as a result, these students also have very limited knowledge about nuclear weapons. The majority do not have a strong understanding of what nuclear weapons are, their destructive power, or their role in the international order, and even fewer have a sense of how many nuclear weapons exist. They are not aware of the $1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program, in which the majority of costs come from modernizing and improving delivery systems rather than performing the technically necessary maintenance of the nuclear warheads. History education on the Cold War often addresses the US-Soviet arms race of that time, but nuclear weapons issues in other regions—such as the tense situation between India and Pakistan—are rarely ever mentioned. The distant, but persistent, possibility of an unintentional nuclear launch due to unauthorized access, technical failure, or a cyberattack on warning systems, is also overlooked, as is general information about which states possess nuclear weapons today.', 'In short, students in the United States (and likely elsewhere) typically graduate from high school having received almost no information on nuclear weapons. It is generally assumed that today’s American public simply doesn’t care about the complicated and somewhat abstract issues of nuclear weapons and deterrence because they rarely affect people’s lives directly. However, an alternative explanation exists: The American public doesn’t know enough about nuclear weapons to have much political opinion on them, but if they had more knowledge, that could change. If so, educating students on nuclear weapons on a large scale could have the long-term effect of creating an American public that is politically engaged on the nuclear issue and motivated to hold its elected leaders accountable for implementing nuclear policy that reduces the risk of nuclear war.', 'For some students, education on nuclear issues may have an impact beyond just putting nuclear weapons on their radar (pun intended). Today’s students are the next politicians, scientists, and journalists, and some of them will inevitably be tasked with addressing the nuclear issue in their careers. For these students, early exposure to the issues of nuclear weapons in an educational context could be useful preparation for grappling with those issues professionally. Indeed, for some students, learning about nuclear weapons could have a decisive impact on their career trajectory and inspire them to dedicate themselves to solving these problems.']

[(0, 13)]

ndtceda

Kansas-SpHa-Aff-6---Kansas-State-Round-3.docx

Kansas

SpHa

a27b6c28f3c099b071b141d9043169521e96c6f2dedfc13fadb0044a303f79a1

Credibility of U.S. assurance is the fundamental factor that determines Japanese non-proliferation---reversal overcomes every domestic constraint quickly

Mark Fitzpatrick 19, Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 10/3/19, “How Japan Could Go Nuclear,”

Japan long had means to go nuclear But relied on extended deterrence There are reasons for Japan to resist going nuclear, but the country could head in that direction the U.S. may push Tokyo toward prolif Japan is a proponent of nonprolif Quietly it pursues nuclear hedging to maintain “ technical deterrence Japan could develop a arsenal in a year It would need plutonium also to reengineer rockets scientists could on a tight timetable p m s embraced “three non-nuclear principles The scientific establishment would comply to produce nuc s only in a deterioration in Japan’s security It is increasingly acceptable to discuss Tokyo’s stance is shaped most fundamentally cred of U.S. deterrence Washington should assuage Japan’s fears with clear statements that reassure

Japan has long had the means to go nuclear , thanks to its sophisticated nuclear power industry. But Japan has relied on Washington’s “ extended deterrence the promise any attack on Japan will trigger a retaliatory attack from the U S On three occasions over the past 50 years, Japan weighed the merits and disadvantages of developing nuclear weapons At each juncture Japanese security strategists concluded it made more sense to rely on the extended deterrence provided by the U S In exchange, Japan presented itself to U.S. policymakers as a linchpin for peace and stability in Northeast Asia Today, the U.S. security guarantee looks less and less reliable There are still powerful historical, cultural, and institutional reasons for Japan to resist going nuclear, but the country could head in that direction it is the U.S. president who may push Tokyo toward nuclear prolif eration Japan is a leading proponent of nonprolif eration. Quietly it pursues nuclear hedging Officials occasionally reveal this policy a prominent L D P politician, explained Japan couldn’t shut down its nuclear power plants because the nuclear fuel cycle was necessary to maintain “ technical deterrence Japan could develop a small atomic arsenal in as little as a year It would need weapons-grade plutonium also to reengineer space launch rockets Japanese scientists could accomplish them on a tight timetable Japan’s p rime m inister s have embraced “three non-nuclear principles Japan’s championing of nonproliferation instruments reinforces political constraints as does Hiroshima and Nagasaki The scientific establishment would comply with a directive to produce nuc lear weapon s only in the event of a sharp deterioration in Japan’s security situation in Japan It is increasingly acceptable to discuss nuclear arms as a future policy option Tokyo’s stance on nuclear weapons is shaped most fundamentally by its faith in the cred ibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence In the past, when Japanese leaders have hinted to Washington that they were considering going nuclear, their intent was to encourage a stronger U.S. security commitment Washington should learn from that history and work to assuage Japan’s fears , starting with clear statements that reassure Tokyo

U S U S the country could head in that direction the U.S. president who may push Tokyo toward nuclear prolif eration nonprolif nuclear hedging L D P technical deterrence in as little as a year on a tight timetable p m s nuc s only most fundamentally cred intent was to encourage a stronger U.S. security commitment clear statements that reassure Tokyo

['In a speech on September 6, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, warned that Japan might respond to the growing nuclear threat from North Korea by developing nuclear weapons of its own. Japan has long had the means to go nuclear, thanks to its sophisticated nuclear power industry. But since agreeing to a security treaty in 1951, Japan has relied on Washington’s “extended deterrence”—the promise that any attack on Japan will trigger a retaliatory attack from the United States. The Japanese government’s confidence in that commitment has fluctuated over the last half century, and Biegun is not the first U.S. official to fret that Tokyo will lose faith in it altogether. ', 'On three occasions over the past 50 years, Japan weighed the merits and disadvantages of developing nuclear weapons. The first delicate moment came in the 1960s, after China began nuclear tests. Then, during the 1990s after the Cold War, Japanese officials worried that Washington might feel less resolved in defending Japan from Moscow’s nuclear might. Most recently, Japan faced a major new challenge to its west after North Korea developed nuclear weapons in 2006. At each juncture, however, Japanese security strategists concluded that it made more sense to rely on the extended deterrence provided by the United States. In exchange, Japan presented itself to U.S. policymakers as a linchpin for peace and stability in Northeast Asia, a regional hub for the deployment of U.S. troops and military equipment (as it was during the Korean and Vietnam Wars), and a bulwark against China. ', 'Today, the U.S. security guarantee looks less and less reliable. This summer, President Donald Trump repeatedly called the security treaty unfair and reportedly mused in private about canceling the treaty altogether. He has tolerated North Korean missile tests that threaten Japan. And during his election campaign, he suggested that it might even serve Japanese and South Korean interests if both nations developed nuclear weapons. There are still powerful historical, cultural, and institutional reasons for Japan to resist going nuclear, but Biegun is right to worry that the country could head in that direction—though it is the U.S. president, as much as North Korea, who may push Tokyo toward nuclear proliferation. ', 'THE NUCLEAR TABOO', 'As the only country to experience a nuclear bombing, Japan is a leading proponent of nonproliferation. Quietly, however, it pursues a strategy of “nuclear hedging,” preserving the capacity to develop nuclear weapons without intending to do so. Officials occasionally reveal the existence of this policy. In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, for example, former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, a prominent Liberal Democratic Party politician, explained that Japan couldn’t shut down its nuclear power plants because the nuclear fuel cycle—the industrial processes that turn uranium into electricity and recycle the waste—was necessary in order to maintain “technical deterrence.” Japan is the only nation that has the ability to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium but has no nuclear weapons. ', 'In theory, Japan could develop a small atomic arsenal in as little as a year or two. It would need to produce weapons-grade plutonium, a process that would most likely require repurposing civil reactors. It would also need to reengineer its advanced space launch rockets to deliver nuclear warheads. Japanese scientists are technically capable of both tasks and could accomplish them on a tight timetable if the government felt compelled to minimize concerns about safety, secrecy, reliability, and accuracy (and shirk its international obligations). A more thorough, careful process in keeping with Japan’s usual modus operandi would take three or four years. Scientists would face another hurdle in finding a place to test weapons in the crowded Japanese archipelago. The most recent known government study, conducted in 2006, concluded that Japan had the technical expertise and facilities to develop a small nuclear warhead but that doing so would take three to five years and cost over $2 billion.', 'The biggest obstacles to a Japanese nuclear weapons program aren’t technical or logistic; they are political, legal, and cultural. Since 1972, following the return of Okinawa from the United States and the removal of nuclear weapons stationed there, Japan’s prime ministers have embraced “three non-nuclear principles” as a morally and politically binding norm: no manufacture, no possession, and no entry of nuclear weapons controlled by other nations (in practice, that third principle has been breached to allow nuclear-armed U.S. warships to make port calls). In addition, Japan’s championing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and other nonproliferation instruments reinforces the political constraints on going nuclear, as does the collective memory of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe shows no sign of seeking to challenge this deeply rooted antipathy.', 'Opposition to nuclear weapons is particularly strong in the academic and scientific communities, including in the nuclear technology field. Combined with the robust International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring presence in Japan, this culture of ingrained hostility to nuclear weapons would make it nearly impossible for Japan to pursue a clandestine path to the bomb.', 'Japanese diplomats would also fret about the security costs of going nuclear. An indigenous nuclear program would be intensely provocative to China, sparking a further acceleration in Beijing’s buildup of nuclear and conventional weapons. Pursuing nuclear weapons would also increase the risk of a preemptive nuclear strike from North Korea and provoke South Korea to seek its own nuclear arsenal, inflaming regional tensions.', 'WEAPONS OF LAST RESORT', 'The scientific establishment would likely comply with a directive to produce nuclear weapons only in the event of a sharp deterioration in Japan’s security situation. In the imaginings of Japanese policymakers, the most likely scenarios would be if South Korea goes nuclear or if the Koreas unify and keep Pyongyang’s existing arsenal. Japanese officials watched with interest when South Korean President Moon Jae-in extolled the benefits of unification with North Korea in an August 15 speech commemorating liberation from Japan. ', 'While Moon has insisted that a unified Korea would not retain nuclear arms, Japan remains wary in light of the pro-nuclear sentiments on both halves of the Korean peninsula. Unlike in South Korea, where mainstream politicians and newspaper columnists advocate for an indigenous nuclear weapons program, in Japan advocates for nuclear weapons remain largely on the far-right fringe. It is, however, increasingly acceptable to discuss nuclear arms as a future policy option. After North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, for example, then Foreign Minister Taro Aso called for a public debate about the circumstances that would warrant a serious reconsideration of Japan’s non-nuclear policy. ', 'Of course, Tokyo’s stance on nuclear weapons is shaped most fundamentally by its faith in the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence. Over the years, that credibility came into question when the United States lost the Vietnam War, withdrew from the Philippines, failed to prevent China and then North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, and reduced its own nuclear arsenal.', 'But Trump has done more than any of his predecessors to undermine the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence. In what was perhaps his most flagrant public display of disregard for Japan’s security interests, he argued with Abe at the G-7 summit in April this year over whether North Korea’s missile launches broke UN resolutions. (They clearly did.) Although the presence of U.S. troops in Japan provides a measure of reassurance, Trump’s “America first” mentality is further reason for Japan to keep nuclear options in reserve.', 'Any Japanese move toward developing nuclear weapons should be seen as a cry for help. In the past, when Japanese leaders have hinted to Washington that they were considering going nuclear, their intent was to encourage a stronger U.S. security commitment to Japan. Aso’s call for a public debate in 2006 elicited a reaffirmation of that commitment from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Aso followed an old script: in 1964, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato similarly raised the prospect of going nuclear to persuade President Lyndon B. Johnson to strengthen Washington’s pledge to safeguard Japanese security. Washington should learn from that history and work to assuage Japan’s fears, starting with clear statements from Trump that reassure Tokyo, refuse to pander to North Korean provocations, and discourage nuclear proliferation in an already tense region.']

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ndtceda

Northwestern-HiLe-Neg-1---JW-Patterson-Debates-hosted-by-UK-Round-2.docx

Northwestern

HiLe

c0dd53f9b84fe274b09b87f8191f5224a79c296fb63b98620c6c1862a7146405

No first use facilitates disarm---delegitimization is key and proven by chemical and biological weapons---otherwise the alt fails to change state opinions.

Ritchie 14, Researcher, University of York (Nick Ritchie, 2014, “Waiting for Kant: devaluing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons,” International Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 3, pp. 601-23, University of Kansas Libraries, Lib Key)

no first use restricting the nuclear deterrent following the Biological and Chemical Weapons Convention banned possession and were facilitated by established norms against use in international law A no first use would mean NWS could not threaten use would consign potential missions to the doctrinal dustbin diminish the legitimacy of war-fighting normalization would change conceptions of deterrence If the world ever is to become free of weapons the first step nations must take is no-first-use No weapon considered legitimate is ever eliminated goal of a nuclear free world calls for delegitimization before they can be eliminated , a process must start with diminishing their military role

no first use agreement restricting the scope of nuclear deterrent threats and the practice of nuclear deterrence, following the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ( BTWC ) and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention ( CWC ). These banned possession of chemical and biological weapons and were facilitated by established norms against their use in customary international law and the 1925 Geneva Protocol A legally binding no first use policy would mean NWS could not legally threaten pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against other states This would consign all other potential missions for nuclear weapons to the doctrinal dustbin with corresponding effects on alert procedures This would diminish the legitimacy of tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities and plans Acceptance and normalization of no first use would begin to change conceptions of nuclear deterrence in ways that diminish ‘requirements’ for large and diverse nuclear forces If the world ever is to become free of nuclear weapons the first essential step nuclear-armed nations must take is to adopt the no-first-use policy. No weapon considered legitimate is ever likely to be eliminated . The goal of a nuclear weapon- free world calls for delegitimization of nuclear weapons before they can be eliminated , a process that must start with diminishing their military role

no first use scope deterrent BTWC CWC banned weapons were facilitated by established norms use international no first use NWS threaten use against states consign all missions doctrinal dustbin tactical war-fighting plans normalization no first use deterrence large nuclear forces ever is to become free weapons first essential step nations adopt no-first-use No weapon considered legitimate is ever likely to be eliminated nuclear free world delegitimization before eliminated must start military role

['NNWS have consistently advocated a formal no first use agreement since the early 1960s, again with a view to restricting the scope of nuclear deterrent threats and the practice of nuclear deterrence, following the examples of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These banned possession of chemical and biological weapons and were facilitated by established norms against their use in customary international law and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.41 A legally binding and unconditional 42 no first use policy would mean NWS could not legally threaten pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against other states (nuclear-armed or otherwise) or retaliatory nuclear use in response to a massive conventional attack, or even engage in nuclear ‘signaling’ during a severe crisis by firing a ‘sub-strategic’ ‘warning shot indicating intent to escalate to a full nuclear exchange should aggression continue’.43 It would limit nuclear deterrence policy and planning to an exclusively defensive posture whereby NWS could consider nuclear use only for two categories of retaliation: (1) to a nuclear attack; (2) possibly to a massive conventional/chemical/biological weapon onslaught that threatened the very survival of the state, that is, in which the state faced destruction through hostile occupation or being bombed or poisoned past the point of recovery (in fact, some have argued for a non-WMD first use agreement that stigmatizes first use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons as an integrated category44). This would consign all other potential missions for nuclear weapons to the doctrinal dustbin with corresponding effects on alert procedures, operational war plans and perhaps procurement decisions.45 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, outlined in their 2005 draft ‘Doctrine for Nuclear Operations’ a range of scenarios for the first use of nuclear weapons that would have to be repealed under a formal no first use agreement, such as countering ‘potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces’.46 This would reinforce the ‘firebreak’ between use of conventional and nuclear weapons, ‘weaken the political force of explicit and implicit threats to initiate the use of nuclear weapons’ and diminish the legitimacy of tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities and plans.47 Acceptance and normalization of no first use would begin to change conceptions of nuclear deterrence in ways that diminish ‘requirements’ for large and diverse nuclear forces. It would restrict the residual deterrent value of nuclear weapons to a narrow and strictly defined set of existential military threats to the survival of the state as a part of the long transition to a world free of nuclear weapons. As K. Subrahmanyam argues:', 'If the world ever is to become free of nuclear weapons the first essential step nuclear-armed nations must take is to adopt the no-first-use policy. No weapon considered legitimate is ever likely to be eliminated. The goal of a nuclear weapon-free world calls for delegitimization of nuclear weapons before they can be eliminated, a process that must start with diminishing their military role.48', 'The strategic environment for a no first use agreement has improved markedly since the end of the Cold War with the expansion of NWFZs, the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons in addressing complex global security challenges, progressive consolidation of NSAs that constitute no-use pledges to NNWS, and major power interdependence that increasingly and collectively renders the first use of nuclear weapons non-credible.49 Prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons in international law50 without conditions would go a considerable way to devaluing nuclear weapons and constitute a significant step towards the goal of prohibiting possession.51 For some, a no first use agreement would, in effect, prohibit their use at all, though there is a difference between a ‘no use’ agreement, with the implication that nuclear weapons have little value or legitimacy, and a ‘no first use’ agreement that could still legitimate nuclear retaliation against a state that transgresses that agreement.52 Others have taken no first use a step further and argued that the use of nuclear weapons be declared a crime against humanity.53 Embedding the first use of nuclear weapons as a crime under international law would shift the basis of debate from state-centric conceptions of strategic stability among NWS to an ethics of common humanity embodied in international humanitarian law—an issue explored further below.54']

[(0, 10)]

ndtceda

Kansas-MaPa-Aff-1---Northwestern-Round-3.docx

Kansas

MaPa

331a5dfa9aeb025595681f0786767f5dea326b373e5d398dee2b1f9ef166bd16

That increases accident risk and turns cyber.

Thomas Newdick 21, aerospace and air warfare writer for the War Zone and the Drive, “Put Bombers Back On Nuclear Alert If ICBM Force Gets Slashed: Strategic Command Boss,” 4/20/21, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/40260/put-bombers-back-on-nuclear-alert-if-icbm-force-gets-slashed-strategic-command-boss

the critical factor in bomber alert is nuclear safety and security the U.S. had 32 incidents involving nuc s a number involving plane crashes or aerial mishaps base infrastructure would need to take into account new threats electronic or cyber attacks

the critical factor in bomber ground alert is probably the aspect of nuclear safety and security the U.S. has had 32 incidents involving nuc lear weapon s a number of these involving plane crashes or other aerial mishaps . crews accidentally loaded six Cruise Missiles, each with a live nuclear warhead onto a B-52H base infrastructure would need to be adapted to take into account new threats , be they electronic or cyber attacks

nuclear safety and security plane crashes other aerial mishaps new threats cyber attacks

['In the mind of the public, however, the critical factor in bomber ground alert is probably the aspect of nuclear safety and security. As we have recounted in the past, the U.S. has had 32 incidents involving nuclear weapons, known as “Broken Arrow” events, since 1950, a number of these involving plane crashes or other aerial mishaps. In 2007, long after alert duty had come to an end, there were serious repercussions after crews accidentally loaded six AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missiles, each with a live nuclear warhead, onto a B-52H that then flew from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.', 'As well as the security of the bombers and their deadly cargoes, there’s also the fact that base infrastructure would not only need to revert to a mission last flown in the Cold War, but also be adapted to take into account new threats, be they electronic or cyber attacks, to ensure the warheads are safe at all times.', '']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-VaWa-Neg-Kentucky-Doubles.docx

Dartmouth

VaWa

f89af2610c221a2c877aecc478d9944b9a8ed90db1ab2fe812dc429f4fa330b5

It prevents, rather than causes, endless warfare.

James Andrew Lewis 18, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, January 2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States,” https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/180108_Lewis_ReconsideringCybersecurity_Web.pdf, p. 16-17

Conflict will take new forms and cyber will be important actions stay below a "gray area," where the U S and allies, unable to use military force in response, have been stymied Opponents exploit gray areas without triggering conflict The future of conflict is that major powers will try to avoid confrontation Wars are expensive and risky Russia, the U S China, Iran, No Ko use the threat but avoid war cyber involves something other than warfare

Conflict between states will take new forms and cyber operations will be an important part Opponent actions that stay below this threshold inhabit a "gray area," that is neither peace nor war, where the U nited S tates and its allies, unable to use military force in response, have so far been stymied in designing and articulated an effective reply. Opponents will exploit gray areas in i nternational law to coerce without triggering armed conflict The future of armed conflict is that major powers will try to avoid armed confrontation . Wars between big, heavily armed states are expensive and risky , particularly if they have nuclear weapons. Russia, the U nited S tates, China, Iran, No rth Ko rea, and others use force or the threat of force all the time but they will try to avoid war with each other. cyber attacks will be a part of the fighting, but the real nature of cyber conflict involves something other than warfare and lacks the sharp discontinuity between war and peace the norm for interstate conflict will be increasingly continuous and not kinetic.

U S unable military force i law without triggering armed conflict major powers will try to avoid armed confrontation U S No Ko threat of force try to avoid war other than warfare

['Cyber Operations and Interstate Conflict International relations are being reshaped by the confluence of several powerful trends, some created by new technologies, some by the powerful reaction to American hegemony, and some from the fraying of the international order created after 1945. In contrast to sunny millennial optimism, efforts to improve cybersecurity must be designed for a period where, for an unknown duration, there will be increased conflict as states challenge the liberal postwar order. We are at the end of a sustained period of strategic stability17 and conflict, albeit at low levels, will be the norm. Conflict between states will take new forms and cyber operations will be an important part of this. They are ideal for the new strategic environment, given their opacity, the lack of clear norms, and inadequate defenses. Opponent actions that stay below this threshold inhabit a "gray area," that is neither peace nor war, where the United States and its allies, unable to use military force in response, have so far been stymied in designing and articulated an effective reply. Opponents will exploit gray areas in international law to coerce without triggering armed conflict. Deterrence will be more difficult in this opaque environment, and we will see increased use by our opponents of coercive acts that fall below thresholds for the use of force or armed attack. The future of armed conflict is that major powers will try to avoid armed confrontation. Wars between big, heavily armed states are expensive and risky, particularly if they have nuclear weapons. The major powers will not renounce the use of force and coercion—Russia, the United States, China, Iran, North Korea, and others use force or the threat of force all the time— but they will try to avoid war with each other. If major powers do stumble into conventional war, cyber attacks will be a part of the fighting, but the real nature of cyber conflict involves something other than warfare and lacks the sharp discontinuity between war and peace. The experience of the last decade suggests that the norm for interstate conflict will be increasingly continuous and not kinetic. ', '']

[(13, 21)]

ndtceda

Emory-GiKe-Neg-dartmouth-RR-Round-2.docx

Emory

GiKe

fba72c4616114703e0608eae85eb3e8b867c9cd994ee28175203c1e1e461f85b

Institutional consensus blocks Biden’s overzealous agenda for the antitrust agencies—ramming through the plan signals a shift—answers NLR

McGinnis 8/26—(George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law at Northwestern University). John O. McGinnis. August 26, 2021. “Abandoning the Consumer Welfare Standard”. Law & Liberty. . Accessed 9/8/21.

Biden wants to transform antitrust law . Fortunately, the administration faces judicial resistance . Should Biden succeed , competition law would become government-by-whiplash The x O will do damage if it changes antitrust law fundamentally . here Biden happily does not have a political eraser . to persuade Congress will be impossible Thus, the admin has pinned its strategy on administrative fiat But it is not clear Khan can succeed. On competition , courts may not give her much deference

The Biden Administration wants to transform antitrust law . doing so, it would dispense with a four-decade-old consensus that the welfare of consumers should be the object of competition policy. Not only will this vision harm economic efficiency , it will also make it easier for government officials to reward friendly companies and punish those who do not do the administration’s bidding on matters unrelated to competition . Fortunately, the administration faces substantial obstacles in transforming antitrust law. The administration thus is likely to meet judicial resistance . Should Biden succeed , competition law would become yet another part of government-by-whiplash in an area central to our prosperity . The E x ecutive O rder will do damage if it changes antitrust law fundamentally . here the Biden administration happily faces problems . We have had forty years of bipartisan competition policy focused generally on consumer welfare. The President does not have a political eraser to wipe that away . One possibility is for the Biden administration to persuade Congress to enact major changes in antitrust law . these measures are not yet going anywhere on the House floor and it will be difficult, if not impossible , to get any substantial changes in antitrust law through the evenly divided Senate Thus, the admin istration has pinned its strategy on transformation through administrative fiat . it appointed Lina Khan , a 32-year-old associate law professor to become Chairman of the FTC. Khan may be the single most radical appointment in the Biden administration. But it is not at all clear Khan can succeed. On such competition , courts may not give her agency much deference now that the Roberts Court appears to have stopped applying Chevron

transform antitrust law vision economic efficiency reward friendly companies punish those who do not do the administration’s bidding unrelated to competition substantial obstacles judicial resistance succeed yet another part of government-by-whiplash central to our prosperity x O changes antitrust law fundamentally Biden happily faces problems forty years of bipartisan competition policy does not have a political eraser persuade Congress enact major changes in antitrust law impossible substantial changes admin administrative fiat Lina Khan most radical appointment But competition may not give her agency much deference stopped applying Chevron

['', 'The Biden Administration wants to transform antitrust law. In doing so, it would dispense with a four-decade-old consensus that the welfare of consumers should be the object of competition policy. This principle would be replaced with a mixture of untested economic ideas combined with a view that antitrust law should somehow advance democracy. If the latter standard seems unclear, its very lack of clarity may be an implicit goal. One of the achievements of the consumer welfare standard is to provide a relatively objective methodology that constrains judges and prosecutors in wielding the awesome power of government against the liberty of private entrepreneurs. Not only will this vision harm economic efficiency, it will also make it easier for government officials to reward friendly companies and punish those who do not do the administration’s bidding even on matters unrelated to competition.', 'Fortunately, the administration faces substantial obstacles in transforming antitrust law. The consumer welfare standard is now entrenched in judicial decisions. Both Democratic and Republican justices have been applying it for years, even if they occasionally debate the nuances of its application. The administration thus has put its faith in using the regulatory levers of power to change the law, but here too it is likely to meet judicial resistance. Moreover, anything it does by regulation can and will likely be undone by the next Republican administration. Should Biden succeed, competition law would become yet another part of government-by-whiplash and in an area central to our prosperity.', 'It is true that there are difficult and novel issues in applying antitrust law to some new information technologies, like Google and Facebook, even under a consumer welfare standard. For instance, these tech firms may provide great free services, but they also have a stranglehold over consumer data. But the Biden administration’s blunderbuss approach to antitrust law is not limited to tech, but represents a potentially new mechanism of government control over the commanding heights of the economy.', 'The Executive Order', 'President Biden’s “Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy” shows how his administration wants to change antitrust law. One should not be misled by the frequent reference to “promoting competition” in the order. First, there are other values touted in the order that are in tension with promoting competition. Second, competition is a slippery term. Economists understand it as a process that leads to efficient outcomes and equilibriums. Biden’s order frequently seems to equate competition with low prices and reflects a view that the more companies are in a market, the more “competitive” it is. Third, the order reflects an ideology holding that the market itself tends toward inefficiency and needs to be corrected by government. But all too frequently, it is government regulations that harm competition by helping incumbents.', 'The order at times is clear that it wants protection for some favored groups from competition. It states, for instance, that “consolidation in the agricultural industry is making it too hard for small family farms to survive.” The reason that small family farms often have trouble competing is that the bigger ones are overall more efficient. There is little danger of monopoly in farms. There remain scores of enterprises in harvesting and otherwise producing food. The economy should welcome efficient consolidation. The concern expressed in the order reflects a previously rejected view offered by the Supreme Court a hundred years ago that antitrust policy should prevent “the driving out of business of the small dealers and worthy men . . . who might be unable to readjust themselves to their altered surrounding.” Biden here not only fails to promote competition. He expressly restrains it.', 'At another point, the order calls on antitrust to “provide an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic and political institutions”—another view once popular but correctly rejected for decades. It is not plausible for regulators to determine the legal rules by which companies will advance democracy. This kind of open-ended and nebulous standard invites discretionary actions by the government. Businesses cannot plan unless the law on competition possesses at least a modicum of clarity. And with less ability to plan, there will be less efficiency.', 'When it comes to items such as pharmaceuticals, Biden is all in favor of low prices. But low prices are not the same as the efficient equilibrium which sound competition sustains. In pharmaceuticals, even more than with other products, the market also delivers innovation from which society greatly benefits. Artificially depressing the prices for drugs may result in less innovation. Indeed, it may result in more suffering and death. To be sure, figuring out the right policies for efficient innovation in pharmaceuticals is not easy, requiring the careful calibration of patent policy. But it is revealing that, as he does elsewhere in the order, Biden focuses simply on getting prices lower rather than taking a long-term social welfare approach. Like the celebration of the family farm, this is a recipe for populism, not an increase in our welfare.', 'The order simply states that consolidation in industries has led to high prices. But consolidation can lead to efficiencies as well, and it can bring not only lower prices but higher quality. Currently, antitrust law has various careful screens that measure market power and assess business practices to determine whether these practices are more likely to lead to better outcomes for consumers in terms of both prices and quality. These have been reflected in the guidelines regulating mergers—guidelines renewed by both Republican and Democratic administrations—that have become crucial to predictable decision-making by prosecutors and courts.', 'One sensible idea in the order encourages agencies to consider the effect of cartels and consolidation on the ability of workers to compete. It is true that some sectors of industry have on occasion conspired to hold down wages. While such practices are illegal under the traditional principles of antitrust, it is perfectly reasonable to put agencies on notice that they should be on the lookout for this disturbance of market equilibrium. In the long run, the economy and consumers benefit greatly from an unconstrained market in human capital.', 'But what the order does not require is as striking as to what it does. One of the greatest threats to competition is regulation by government. Unnecessary regulation of products harms competition because big companies can diffuse the costs of regulation over many more units than can small companies. Regulation of capital markets makes it harder for startups to enter and displace incumbents. Tariffs impede foreign competition. When the whole world is the effective market, companies in any particular nation necessarily have a smaller share.', 'Yet the Biden Executive order does not call for any general reconsideration of government policy in any of these areas other than one sentence suggesting that OMB should consider the effect of regulations on entry barriers, (something it should already do in its traditional cost-benefit analysis). The order is generally premised on the false belief that the main barriers to competition are those created by the market, not by government.', 'To be sure, there is a welcome call for dismantling unnecessary occupational licensing, permitting hearing aids to be sold without a prescription, and preventing the (mostly) state regulations that put up the price of alcohol. But these provisions only show that the President is likely to stumble on correct economic policies when they are immediately popular. A regulatory regime restricted to addressing externalities, opening capital markets, and promoting free trade would be best for competition and prosperity in the long run, but these will not be central elements of Biden’s policy.', 'The Prospects', 'The Executive Order, however ill-conceived the specifics are, will do the most damage if it changes antitrust law fundamentally. And here the Biden administration happily faces problems. We have had forty years of bipartisan competition policy focused generally on consumer welfare. The President does not have a political eraser to wipe that away.', 'One possibility is for the Biden administration to persuade Congress to enact major changes in antitrust law. The House Judiciary Committee has passed a few bills that would make is harder for tech companies to merge with other companies. But these measures are not yet going anywhere on the House floor, and it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get any substantial changes in antitrust law through the evenly divided Senate.', 'Thus, the administration has pinned its strategy on transformation through administrative fiat. To that end, it appointed Lina Khan, a 32-year-old associate law professor to become Chairman of the FTC. Khan may be the single most radical appointment in the Biden administration. She opposed Amazon’s acquisition of Whole Foods, although Amazon and Whole Foods together constitute a very small part of the grocery market, and no other company in the history of the United States has been more innovative than Amazon.', 'Khan has begun by voting along with her Democratic colleagues on the commission to revoke a policy of the FTC supported by both Democratic and Republican administrations that essentially defined “unfair method of competition” by reference to methods that undermined consumer welfare. The idea no doubt is to write a regulation that would provide a more open-ended approach, perhaps taking into account other values like democracy and decentralization, even if these are at the expense of consumer welfare.', 'But it is not at all clear Khan can succeed. On such a central question as the definition of competition, courts may not give her agency much deference now that the Roberts Court appears to have stopped applying Chevron—the quintessential modern case for agency deference—to major questions raised by a statute. The meaning of competition is obviously the major question for competition law, and courts are likely to determine that for themselves, influenced by decades of their own consumer welfare jurisprudence.', '']

[(0, 8), (9, 13)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Wyoming-Round5.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-Wyoming-Round5.docx

1bc37993c62b3f99d7008eda82be09f74fd198a182f780a4a1a7a2144ee820c5

No denuclearization---diplomacy fails and Kim will never agree.

Terry 21 (Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow @ the Center for Strategic and International Studies, A former CIA analyst, served on the National Security Council in 2008–9 and the National Intelligence Council in 2009–10; “North Korea’s Nuclear Family,” September/October 2021, Foreign Affairs, )

No Ko sense of insecurity can never feel safe as long rival Korean state exists nukes are as much about regime’s desperation as they are about deterring U.S. military Beijing has little reason to help

What emerges is a dispiriting picture. Washington appears to have exhausted its peaceful options one policy that could have achieved denuclearization was fraught with uncertainty and would have exacted an unacceptable human toll it’s not as if a U.S. withdrawal would dispel No rth Ko rea’s pervasive sense of insecurity is ultimately threatened by its own lack of legitimacy . It can never feel safe as long as a freer , more prosperous rival Korean state exists next door nukes are as much about the regime’s own desperation as they are about deterring U.S. military action If there is a government that could have made a real difference, it is Beijing And with U.S.-Chinese relations at a low point, Beijing has little reason to give Washington a help ing hand

No Ko pervasive sense of insecurity ultimately threatened own lack of legitimacy never feel safe freer more prosperous rival Korean state next door as much own desperation deterring U.S. military action

['FALSE HOPES', 'What emerges, in retrospect, is a dispiriting picture. Washington appears to have exhausted its peaceful options to no avail. The one policy that could have achieved denuclearization—invading North Korea and toppling its regime—was fraught with uncertainty and would have exacted an unacceptable human toll. What little leeway Washington did have to slow the North Koreans’ progress and thus buy more time for a permanent solution it squandered through its endless zigzagging—from diplomacy to “strategic patience” to “fire and fury” and back to diplomacy, without ever giving any one approach a fair chance to succeed.', 'Some might argue that it was U.S. hostility that compelled North Korea to seek the bomb in the first place—that things would have turned out differently had the United States normalized relations, lifted sanctions, concluded a peace treaty, and pulled its troops out of South Korea. This confuses cause and effect. American soldiers were sent to South Korea following the North Korean invasion of 1950, and they stayed because the North Korean threat never went away. (As recently as 2010, North Korea torpedoed and sank a South Korean naval vessel, killing 46 seamen.) And it’s not as if a U.S. withdrawal would dispel North Korea’s pervasive sense of insecurity. The Kim dynasty, a Stalinist dictatorship built on deception and oppression, is ultimately threatened by its own lack of legitimacy. It can never feel safe as long as a freer, more prosperous rival Korean state exists next door. The nukes are as much about the regime’s own desperation as they are about deterring U.S. military action.', 'It is true, however, that U.S. policymakers have often failed to understand the North Korean regime. Those in the engagement camp—including Trump, once he was meeting with Kim—have falsely convinced themselves that North Korean leaders share their hopes for peace and could be enticed away from nuclear weapons with offers of increased aid and economic incentives. Some hard-liners, for their part, have been led astray in thinking that there was a military option, either in 1994 or more recently, that could have surgically neutralized the North Korean nuclear program without triggering a catastrophic war. Unfortunately, there has never been an easy way out.', 'If there is a government that could have made a real difference, it is not Washington but Beijing. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner by far and a major source of energy supplies. It can bring North Korea to its knees simply by stopping the flow of oil—as it did for a few months in 2013 and again in 2014, when it was infuriated by yet another nuclear test and by the execution of Jang Song Thaek, Kim’s uncle and Beijing’s main interlocutor in Pyongyang. But the pressure was not sustained. China, albeit no fan of the North Korean nuclear program, is far more afraid that too much pressure might cause the regime in Pyongyang to collapse, sending refugees flooding into China and possibly bringing U.S. troops and their South Korean allies right up to its doorstep. And with U.S.-Chinese relations at a low point, Beijing has little reason to give Washington a helping hand.', 'A NEW THREAT', '']

[(0, 8)]

ndtceda

MichiganState-BeMo-Neg-3---Harvard-Round-8.docx

MichiganState

BeMo

22b7170963249e55b269165b68342bfe9827aa9b783aa5e7459d1f13071932e0

Michigan’s evidence AGREES with Emory. It’s bad. Emory reads YELLOW.

Heginbotham ‘17 [Eric, Michael S. Chase, Jacob L. Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark R. Cozad, Lyle J. Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest E. Morgan, Michael Nixon, Cristina L. Garafola, and Samuel K. Berkowitz; 2017; principal research scientist at MIT’s Center for International Studies and a specialist in Asian security issues. Before joining MIT, he was a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he led research projects on China, Japan, and regional security issues and regularly briefed senior military, intelligence, and political leaders. Prior to that he was a Senior Fellow of Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. After graduating from Swarthmore College, Heginbotham earned his PhD in political science from MIT; RAND Corporation, “China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html]

statements as well as interviews indicate U S nuclear forces are the most important factor China’s deep suspicions of U.S. nuclear policy, fueled by fears over the implications of BMD and CPGS, feed into growing doubts about U.S. strategic intentions. Chinese analysts nevertheless see considerable uncertainty about the implications for China’s retaliatory capability. shifts in U.S. nuclear policy raised the specter U S neutralize a second-strike texts note option to use first 2010 and 2013 stipulated role is to deter did not ameliorate uncertainty over preemptive strikes scholars and strategists observe a lack of clarity constitutes coercion

Chinese strategic statements , as well as interviews with experts and policymakers, indicate that the U S and its nuclear forces are the most important factor in the design and operation of Chinese nuclear forces U.S. nuclear forces and policy will have a larger impact than those of any other single foreign power true. China’s deep suspicions of U.S. nuclear policy, fueled by fears over the implications of BMD and CPGS, feed into growing doubts about U.S. strategic intentions. To be sure, Chinese analysts have welcomed some U.S. adjustments to nuclear policy and programs over the past decade but nevertheless see considerable uncertainty about the implications of other programs for China’s retaliatory capability. Post–Cold War shifts in U.S. nuclear policy have heightened Chinese uncertainties new triad BMD and revitalized defense infrastructure revealed in leaks of the classified 2002 U.S. NPR raised the specter that the U S might develop strategies to neutralize a Chinese second-strike capability Chinese doctrinal texts note the option to use nuclear weapons first if necessary Chinese analysts viewed the 2010 NPR and 2013 Report more positively Both documents stipulated that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack they did not fully ameliorate Chinese uncertainty over the direction of U.S. nuclear doctrine and the U.S. ability to conduct preemptive nuclear strikes Chinese scholars and nuclear strategists observe a lack of clarity over how and under what circumstances the U S will use its nuclear weapons constitutes a form of nuclear coercion U.S. adversaries might face uncertainty about whether conventional attacks or attacks on critical U.S. assets may trigger nuclear retaliation

strategic statements interviews nuclear forces most important Chinese forces larger impact true. China’s deep suspicions of U.S. nuclear policy, fueled by fears over the implications of BMD and CPGS, feed into growing doubts about U.S. strategic intentions. To be sure, Chinese analysts have welcomed some U.S. adjustments to nuclear policy and programs over the past decade but nevertheless see considerable uncertainty about the implications of other programs for China’s retaliatory capability. nuclear policy new triad BMD defense infrastructure 2002 U S second-strike doctrinal texts use nuclear weapons first 2010 NPR 2013 Report positively role deter nuclear attack Chinese uncertainty nuclear doctrine preemptive nuclear strikes lack of clarity nuclear coercion conventional attacks nuclear retaliation

['Chinese strategic statements, as well as interviews with Chinese experts and policymakers, indicate that the United States and its nuclear forces are, overwhelmingly, the most important planning factor in the design and operation of Chinese nuclear forces.1 In terms of nuclear capabilities, the United States is rivaled only by Russia, and of the two, only the United States is viewed as a potential adversary in plausible scenarios that could occur in the short- to medium-term future.2 Although they are clearly not the only drivers of Chinese nuclear development, U.S. nuclear forces and policy will have a larger impact on Chinese nuclear futures than those of any other single foreign power.', 'Disentangling China’s view of U.S. nuclear strategy from its view of U.S. national strategy more broadly is difficult. Chinese analysts tend to view strategic nuclear matters, as they view all military matters, in highly political terms. The view that the United States and China embrace competitive, as well as cooperative, positions on a range of strategic and broader political and economic issues bleeds into China’s concerns about its nuclear position vis-à-vis the United States. But the reverse is also true. China’s deep suspicions of U.S. nuclear policy, fueled by fears over the implications of BMD and CPGS, feed into growing doubts about U.S. strategic intentions. To be sure, Chinese analysts have welcomed some U.S. adjustments to nuclear policy and programs over the past decade but nevertheless see considerable uncertainty about the implications of other programs for China’s retaliatory capability.', 'U.S. Nuclear Weapon Doctrine and Strategy', 'China’s perceptions about the U.S. nuclear threat date to the Cold War, when the United States adopted policies that China considered tantamount to “nuclear blackmail and hegemony.” Various U.S. officials threatened nuclear use during the Korean War and during the first and second Taiwan Crises (1954–1955 and 1958, respectively).3 In 1965, shortly after China’s first nuclear test, Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out that if China genuinely wanted to put a stop to “nuclear blackmail from external powers,” it had to possess its own authentic nuclear deterrence force.4 This historical narrative of U.S. nuclear threat colors contemporary Chinese assessments of U.S. nuclear strategy.', 'Post–Cold War shifts in U.S. nuclear policy have heightened Chinese uncertainties. The concept of a “new triad” based on nuclear and nonnuclear weapons, BMD, and revitalized defense infrastructure, revealed in purported leaks of the classified 2002 U.S. NPR, raised the specter that the United States might develop strategies to neutralize a Chinese second-strike capability.5 Chinese doctrinal texts note that the Bush administration proposed the concept of “preemptive” nuclear strikes and that it reaffirmed the option to use nuclear weapons first if necessary.6', 'Chinese analysts viewed the 2010 NPR and 2013 Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States more positively, seeing them as steps toward building greater confidence in U.S. intentions.7 Both documents stipulated that the “fundamental role” of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, reaffirmed that the U.S. will not carry out or threaten a nuclear attack against nonnuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with their obligations under the NPT, and proposed efforts to reduce the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile in keeping with President Obama’s long-term goal of seeking a world without nuclear weapons. The 2013 report notes a lack of transparency in China’s conventional and nuclear weapon programs but points out that the United States “remains committed to maintaining strategic stability in U.S.-China relations.”8', 'Although the 2010 and 2013 reports were generally received positively in China, they did not fully ameliorate Chinese uncertainty over the direction of U.S. nuclear doctrine and the U.S. ability to conduct preemptive nuclear strikes against China.9 Chinese strategists note with concern that the 2010 NPR reaffirmed that “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or [chemical or biological weapon] attack against the United States or its allies and partners.”10 Chinese scholars and nuclear strategists observe a lack of clarity over how and under what circumstances the United States will use its nuclear weapons itself constitutes a form of “nuclear coercion.” U.S. adversaries might, for example, face uncertainty about whether large-scale conventional attacks or attacks on critical U.S. assets may trigger nuclear retaliation. Fundamental questions remain over which scenarios might prompt U.S. military planners to employ nuclear weapons first during a conflict.11 They point out that U.S. nuclear submarines are equipped with SLBMs that can carry more than 1,000 nuclear warheads. These submarines provide the United States with the ability to attack hundreds of ground targets in the Asia-Pacific with very little warning or reaction time.12']

[(0, 15)]

ndtceda

Emory-KeRa-Neg-Kathryn-Klassic-Round-3.docx

Emory

KeRa

edec7450bd9a246c76e3a59f4c3b135c59b3adccc920cb6fddfc31c413c447e4

And, moving away from the CWS causes protecionism.

Wright 17—(University Professor, Law, George Mason University). Joshua D. Wright. 12/13/2017. Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Consumer Protection and Consumer Rights. . Accessed 8-13-21.

decades of confusing enforcement aimed at political goals taught us a lot. As antitrust has become a global effort attempts to inject sociopolitical goals in the U.S. leads other countries to do the same —and to protect their national champions at the expense of American businesses calls to abandon the c w s are a very bad idea

decades of confusing and conflicting enforcement aimed at social and political goals over consumer welfare taught us a lot. these goals harm actual consumers which translates to higher prices reduced output lowered quality and less innovation for consumers . As antitrust enforcement has become a n increasingly global effort we have further learned that attempts to inject sociopolitical goals into antitrust analysis in the U.S. leads other countries to do the same —and to protect their own national champions at the expense of American businesses and ultimately, American consumers. recent calls to abandon the c onsumer w elfare s tandard are seek to abdicate the economic approach to antitrust altogether our own history and economics tell us this is a very bad idea

confusing and conflicting enforcement social and political goals harm actual consumers higher prices reduced output lowered quality less innovation for consumers a global effort inject sociopolitical goals other countries to do the same protect their own national champions at the expense of American businesses c w s abdicate the economic approach very bad idea

['', 'Indeed, decades of confusing and conflicting enforcement aimed at maximizing social and political goals over consumer welfare taught us a lot. We learned that these goals harm actual consumers: they diminish competition, which translates to higher prices, reduced output, lowered quality, and less innovation for consumers. We also learned that these goals undermine the rule of law—providing no predictability for parties—which we value so fundamentally in this country, and encourage rent-seeking and a corporate welfare approach. As antitrust enforcement has become an increasingly global effort, we have further learned that attempts to inject sociopolitical goals into antitrust analysis in the U.S. leads other countries to do the same—and to protect their own national champions at the expense of American businesses and ultimately, American consumers.', 'This is not the first time the economic framework underlying modern antitrust institutions has been challenged. Under this close scrutiny, the economic approach to antitrust will, again, demonstrate its superiority in fostering consumer outcomes. The recent calls to abandon the consumer welfare standard are not simply about rejecting the Chicago School—or even free market thinking in the antitrust world. Rather, they seek to abdicate the economic approach to antitrust altogether. Both our own history and economics tell us this is a very bad idea. ', '']

[(0, 9)]

ndtceda

Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-UMW-Round1.docx

Minnesota

JoSu

https://api.opencaselist.com/v1/download?path=ndtceda21/Minnesota/JoSu/Minnesota-Johnson-Sun-Neg-UMW-Round1.docx

f99bc852656d2be402bac75fd95fe8d579fc6d54046b3bb08a3e1927919ea480

The rule of law cannot restrict power.

Bojan Bugaric 19, Professor, Law, University of Sheffield, "Can Law Protect Democracy? Legal Institutions As ‘Speed Bumps’," Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, Vol. 11, 11/06/2019, Springer. [italics in original]

checks and balances might not be powerful as scholars believe last years exposed institutional fragility of the rule-of-law when targeted governments pack courts and curtail independence weak against a government determined to dismantle institutions notion is evident from historical precedent empirical study finds courts might not stop government rights do not protected enforcement falls on citizens safeguards are less effective a weak commitment to rules denial of legitimacy and readiness to curtail liberties are strategies ts use to subvert institutions

onslaught against the constitutional pillars of democracy has shown the checks and balances such as courts independent electoral bodies free media and civil and political rights might not be as powerful in defending democracy from backsliding as many legal scholars tend to believe they cling on to the belief that the reliance on courts and other constitutional checks is the best way to protect democracy the last few years exposed the institutional fragility of the rule-of-law institutions when targeted by determined populist leaders governments have managed, with relative ease, to pack courts with loyalists and curtail institutions’ independence , rendering them powerless the rule of law might not be the most effective tool for curbing power a constitutional court is weak against a powerful government determined to dismantle rule-of-law institutions it is doubtful courts can hold out long if the institutions do not take root notion judges might not provide the effective bulwark against the rise of anti-democratic forces is evident from a well-known historical precedent the legal state did not even try to challenge Hitler’s supremacy the blessing of the German judges, which stabilized the judicial system, was instrumental in legitimizing the Nazi regime A recent empirical study finds that “the presence of independent courts might not be enough to stop a government determined to curb rights constitutional rights do not appear better protected in countries with independent courts equipped with the power of judicial review enforcement of rights falls on citizens constitutional design serve as speed bumps they cannot save us from our worst selves institutional safeguards are less effective in protecting democracy than we think include a weak commitment to democratic rules a denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, the toleration of violence, and a readiness to curtail civil liberties and freedom What is similar warning signs are to usual strategies populis ts use to subvert democratic institutions

pillars checks and balances courts electoral bodies media rights powerful belief reliance on courts constitutional checks institutional fragility rule-of-law institutions determined pack curtail most effective weak dismantle doubtful hold out long effective bulwark well-known legal state try blessing stabilized instrumental recent empirical study presence not determined do not appear independent falls on citizens speed bumps cannot less effective weak commitment denial toleration readiness similar usual strategies subvert

['The populist onslaught against the constitutional pillars of democracy has shown that the traditional “checks and balances” such as courts, independent electoral bodies, free media and civil and political rights might not be as powerful in defending democracy from backsliding towards autocracy as many legal scholars tend to believe. Many of them have argued that the most significant bulwark against the return of repression is the presence of strong constitutional courts. While they acknowledge that sustaining a democratic order relies on many factors and institutions, including political parties, they cling on to the belief that the reliance on constitutional courts and other constitutional checks and balances is the best way to protect democracy from backsliding. For some time, their wisdom seemed to have been validated by political developments around the world. In many emerging democracies, the courts have played a major role in building constitutional democracy during transition periods and have served as symbols of the rule of law. The constitutional courts of Hungary, Poland, and South Africa emerged over a relatively short period of time as the most influential rule of law institutions in their respective countries. Facilitated by outside institutions such as the Venice Commission on Democracy through Law in Europe, these courts became key “veto players” in the politics of the post-1989 transition to democracy. The importance of these constitutional courts continued to increase as their judgments attracted widespread attention from the legal profession and broader political audiences. Their power to review the constitutionality of statutes challenged the almost absolute supremacy that legislatures had previously enjoyed. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, under the strong leadership of liberal Chief Justice Solyom, issued a series of decisions that established its reputation as the key protector of political and social rights in Hungary. The constitutional courts of Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania also managed to offer a robust defence of key constitutional principles and basic rights enshrined in the post-1989 constitutions.', 'Yet the last few years have exposed the institutional fragility of the constitutional courts and other rule-of-law institutions when targeted by determined autocratic populist leaders. In countries like Hungary and Poland, the new populist governments have managed, with relative ease, to pack the courts with their own loyalists and to curtail these institutions’ independence, rendering them powerless. All this suggests that when a strong authoritarian leader is in power, the rule of law might not be the most effective tool for curbing the power of the autocrat. It seems that a constitutional court alone is relatively weak against a powerful government determined to dismantle basic rule-of-law institutions, as is the case in Hungary and Poland. Even Issacharoff (2017), a strong defender of “militant democracy,” is willing to concede this point. In a more recent article, he argues that “it is doubtful that courts can hold out for long if the institutions of democratic governance do not take root.” Under such circumstances, there is little that a constitutional court can do to stop the authoritarian drift. In retrospect, we see that the post-communist reformers place too much faith in the courts. Constitutional courts and other rule-of-law institutions in Central and Eastern Europe always lacked the requisite strong support of genuinely liberal and democratic political parties and programmes, leaving the courts vulnerable to attacks from populists. In one of his most recent papers, Krygier (2019) thus asks the following question: “why has it been so easy for populist subversion of constitutionalist and rule of law values and institutions to occur where, only thirty years ago, they seemed to have been welcomed as indispensable ingredients of the normality so many citizens of the region professed to admire?”', 'The notion that judges might not provide the most effective bulwark against the rise of anti-democratic forces is also evident from a well-known historical precedent—pre-WWII German history. Before the Nazis came to power in Germany, judges were celebrated for having developed an early form of the Rechtsstaat (legal state). Yet they did not even try to challenge Hitler’s supremacy. In a 1936 essay (Loewenstein 1936), Karl Loewenstein pointed out that a judge would have to be very reckless to challenge Nazi ordinances on legal grounds, and noted that he knew of no such judge. On the contrary, the blessing of the German judges, which stabilized the judicial system, was instrumental in legitimizing the Nazi regime. A majority of German judges eagerly supported extreme nationalism and anti-Semitism, and shared the Nazi opposition to Weimar. In other words, the bench and the bar would be the last place to look to for opposition to the Nazis.', 'A recent empirical study (Chilton and Versteeg 2018, 297) finds that “the presence of independent courts alone might not be enough to stop a government determined to curb its citizens’ rights.” Moreover, the same study offers another finding showing that constitutional rights do not appear to be better protected in countries with independent courts equipped with the power of judicial review. The main reason behind this paradox is the fact that the enforcement of rights ultimately falls on citizens themselves. When citizens are organized, they can resist rights’ violations through various forms of civic action. Where such mobilization is weak, the protection of rights is less effective.', 'After reviewing a number of other essential features of liberal constitutionalism (federalism, the separation of powers, electoral systems, and the bill of rights), Ginsburg et al. (2018, 253) come to a sobering conclusion: “at best, constitutional design features serve as speed bumps to slow the agglomeration and abuse of political power; they cannot save us from our worst selves completely.”', 'In a recent comparative study of democratic backsliding, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018, 7) argue that institutional safeguards like constitutional checks and balances are less effective in protecting democracy than we think. More important than institutional safeguards are the “unwritten democratic norms” that reinforce democratic institutions. As essential informal norms they identify mutual toleration and forbearance (partisan self-restraint and fair play). Mutual toleration essentially means that competing political parties accept one another as legitimate rivals. Forbearance is the opposite of “constitutional hardball” as defined by Mark Tushnet: playing by the rules but pushing against their boundaries (Tushnet 2004). It entails a partisan self-restraint in using one’s institutional prerogatives. The examples that Ziblatt and Levitsky mention are the sparing use of the Senate filibuster, a bipartisan consensus on impeachment, or the deference of the Senate to the President in nominating Supreme Court justices. Such informal social norms represent the “soft guardrails” of democracy, helping it avoid the extreme polarization and partisan fight to the death that has destroyed numerous other democracies around the world. Ziblatt and Levitsky develop a litmus test, consisting of four behavioural warning signs that can help us identify an authoritarian leader. They include a rejection or weak commitment to democratic rules of the game, a denial of the legitimacy of political opponents, the toleration or encouragement of violence, and a readiness to curtail civil liberties and media freedom. What is remarkable is how similar these warning signs are to usual strategies that populists use to subvert democratic institutions.', '']

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ndtceda

Kentucky-DiGa-Aff-Georgetown-College-Tournament-Round-8.docx

Kentucky

DiGa

57c1bbc8aa307ee8d2ffa294a7412c5d0e92260b2c03db0628d7397f970410cf

that quickly destroys the economy

Cox 21 – Jeff Cox, finance editor for CNBC.com where he manages coverage of the financial markets and Wall Street, “The Fed can fight inflation, but it may come at the cost of future growth,” 3/20/21, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/20/the-fed-can-fight-inflation-but-it-may-come-at-a-cost.html

Hiking interest rates is the way the Fed controls inflation It’s a way of stopping a economy in its tracks the expansions in the 20th century Every one was murdered by the Fed The Fed has no plans to raise rates that rests on the belief that growth will generate no inflationary pressure Volcker interest rate hikes dragged the economy into a recession The bond market has been flashing warning signs about inflation investors can be fickle if they sense rates rising , they’ll sell and ask questions later

Federal Reserve officials don’t fear inflation they have tools Those tools come with a cost, and can be deadly to the kinds of economic growth periods Hiking interest rates is the most common way the Fed controls inflation It’s also a very effective way of stopping a growing economy in its tracks none of the expansions in the 20th century “died in bed of old age. Every one was murdered by the Fed eral Reserve inflation might force it to step on the brake abruptly in the future The Fed still has no plans to raise interest rates that rests on the belief that growth will generate almost no lasting inflationary pressure the Fed’s low-inflation bet is a safe one – for now It may work out, but it’s a risk The most daunting example of what happens when the Fed has to step in to stop inflation comes from the 1980s Runaway inflation began in the U.S. in the mid ’70s Volcker interest rate hikes dragged the economy into a recession If you have to prematurely abort this recovery because we’re going to have a kneejerk stop disenfranchised areas get hit hardest in the next recession The bond market has been flashing warning signs about possible inflation for much of 2021 the Fed will not raise rates until inflation rises at least above 2% and the economy achieves full, inclusive employment Bond investors can be fickle , and if they sense rates rising , they’ll sell first and ask questions later . things could change when the Fed finally does pivot

they have tools deadly stopping a growing economy in its tracks Every one was murdered by the Fed eral Reserve rests on the belief for now it’s a risk dragged the economy into a recession next recession warning signs fickle sense rates rising sell first and ask questions later

['One of the main reasons Federal Reserve officials don’t fear inflation these days is the belief that they have tools to deploy should it become a problem.', 'Those tools, however, come with a cost, and can be deadly to the kinds of economic growth periods the U.S. is experiencing.', 'Hiking interest rates is the most common way the Fed controls inflation. It’s not the only weapon in the central bank’s arsenal, with adjustments to asset purchases and strong policy guidance also at its disposal, but it is the most potent.', 'It’s also a very effective way of stopping a growing economy in its tracks.', 'The late Rudi Dornbusch, a noted MIT economist, once said that none of the expansions in the second half of the 20th century “died in bed of old age. Every one was murdered by the Federal Reserve.”', 'In the first part of the 21st century, worries are growing that the central bank might become the culprit again, particularly if the Fed’s easy policy approach spurs the kind of inflation that might force it to step on the brake abruptly in the future.', '“The Fed made clear this week that it still has no plans to raise interest rates within the next three years. But that apparently rests on the belief that the strongest economic growth in nearly 40 years will generate almost no lasting inflationary pressure, which we suspect is a view that will eventually be proven wrong,” Andrew Hunter, senior U.S. economist at Capital Economics, said in a note Friday.', 'As it pledged to keep short-term borrowing rates anchored near zero and its monthly bond purchases humming at a minimum $120 billion a month, the Fed also raised its gross domestic product outlook for 2021 to 6.5%, which would be the highest yearly growth rate since 1984.', 'The Fed also ratcheted up its inflation projection to a still rather mundane 2.2%, but higher than the economy has seen since the central bank started targeting a specific rate a decade ago.', 'Competing factors', 'Most economists and market experts think the Fed’s low-inflation bet is a safe one – for now.', 'A litany of factors is keeping inflation in check. Among them are the inherently disinflationary pressures of a technology-led economy, a jobs market that continues to see nearly 10 million fewer employed Americans than a decade ago, and demographic trends that suggest a longer-term limit to productivity and price pressures.', '“Those are pretty powerful forces, and I’d bet they win,” said Jim Paulsen, chief investment strategist at the Leuthold Group. “It may work out, but it’s a risk, because if it doesn’t work and inflation does get going, the bigger question is, what are you going to do to shut it down. You say you’ve got policy. What exactly is that going to be?”', 'The inflationary forces are pretty powerful in their own right.', 'An economy that the Atlanta Fed is tracking to grow 5.7% in the first quarter has just gotten a $1.9 trillion stimulus jolt from Congress.', 'Another package could be coming later this year in the form of an infrastructure bill that Goldman Sachs estimates could run to $4 trillion. Combine that with everything the Fed is doing plus substantial global supply chain issues causing a shortage of some goods and it becomes a recipe for inflation that, while delayed, could still pack a punch in 2022 and beyond.', 'The most daunting example of what happens when the Fed has to step in to stop inflation comes from the 1980s.', 'Runaway inflation began in the U.S. in the mid ’70s, with the pace of consumer price increases topping out at 13.5% in 1980. Then-Fed Chairman Paul Volcker was tasked with taming the inflation beast, and did so through a series of interest rate hikes that dragged the economy into a recession and made him one of the most unpopular public figures in America.', 'Of course, the U.S. came out pretty good on the other side, with a powerful growth spurt that lasted from late -1982 through the decade.', 'But the dynamics of the current landscape, in which the economic damage from the Covid-19 pandemic has been felt most acutely by lower earners and minorities, make this dance with inflation an especially dangerous one.', '“If you have to prematurely abort this recovery because we’re going to have a kneejerk stop, we’re going to end up hurting most of the people that these policies were enacted to help the most,” Paulsen said. “It will be those same disenfranchised lower-comp less-skilled areas that get hit hardest in the next recession.”', 'The bond market has been flashing warning signs about possible inflation for much of 2021. Treasury yields, particularly at the longer maturities, have surged to pre-pandemic levels.', 'That action in turn has raised the question of whether the Fed again could become a victim of its own forecasting errors. The Jerome Powell-led Fed already has had to backtrack twice on sweeping proclamations about long-term policy intentions.', '“Is it really going to be all temporary?”', 'In late-2018, Powell’s statements that the Fed would continue raising rates and shrinking its balance sheet with no end in sight was met with a history-making Christmas Eve stock market selloff. In late 2019, Powell said the Fed was done cutting rates for the foreseeable future, only to have to backtrack a few months later when the Covid crisis hit.', '“What happens if the healing of the economy is more robust than even the revised projections from the Fed?” said Quincy Krosby, chief market strategist at Prudential Financial. “The question for the market is always, is it really going to be all temporary?’”', 'Krosby compared the Powell Fed to the Alan Greenspan version. Greenspan steered the U.S. through the “Great Moderation” of the 1990s and became known as “The Maestro.” However, that reputation became tarnished the following decade when the excesses of the subprime mortgage boom triggered wild risk-taking on Wall Street that led to the Great Recession.', 'Powell is staking his reputation on a staunch position that the Fed will not raise rates until inflation rises at least above 2% and the economy achieves full, inclusive employment, and will not use a timeline for when it will tighten.', '“They called Alan Greenspan ‘The Maestro’ until he wasn’t,” Krosby said. Powell “is telling you there’s no timeline. The market is telling you it does not believe it.”', 'To be sure, the market has been through what Krosby described as “squalls” before. Bond investors can be fickle, and if they sense rates rising, they’ll sell first and ask questions later.', 'Michael Hartnett, the chief market strategist at Bank of America, pointed to multiple other bond market jolts through the decades, with only the 1987 episode in the weeks before the Oct. 19 Black Monday stock market crash having “major negative spillover effects.”', 'He doesn’t expect the 2021 selling to have a major impact either, though he cautions that things could change when the Fed finally does pivot.']

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ndtceda

Dartmouth-Bald-ChangDeutsch-Neg-FullerTown-Round1.docx

Dartmouth

BaCh