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(California Invasion Of Privacy Act) 122. Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs as though set forth herein. 41 (Stored Communications Act) (Violation of California's Common Law Right of Publicity) (Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200) (Wiretap Act) 100. Plaintiffs incorporate each ofthe foregoing allegations as iffully set forth herein. 101. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, referred to as "ECPA, regulated wire and electronic communications interception and interception of oral communications, and makes it unlawful for a person to "willfully intercept[], endeavor[] to intercept, or procure[] any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication," within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1). 102. LinkedIn violated 18 U.S.C. § 2511 by intentionally acquiring and/or intercepting, by device or otherwise, Plaintiffs' and Class Members' electronic communications, without knowledge consent, or authorizations. For example, by hacking into a LinkedIn member's external email account, LinkedIn accesses that member's external email account without his or her knowledge or consent and copies information contained in that member's email account and stores it on Linkedln's servers. 103. LinkedIn unlawfully accessed and used, and voluntarily disclosed, the contents of the intercepted communications to enhance their profitability. l04. The ECPA provides a civil cause of action to "any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed or intentionally used" in violation of the ECPA. 38 -~, " .. _ .. _- (California Comprehensive Data Access And Fraud Act) 108. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 109. Defendants violated the California Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Penal Code 502, referred to as "CCCL" by knowingly and without permission accessing, taking and using Plaintiffs' and the Class Members' personally identifiable infonnation. 110. Defendants accessed, copied, used, made use of, interfered with, and/or altered data belonging to Plaintiffs and Class Members: (1) in and from the State of California; (2) in the states in which the Plaintiffs and the Class Members 39 57. Plaintiffs seek certification of this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b )(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 58. Plaintiff Class. The class sought to be represented is defined as follows: All natural persons in the United States who had an account registered on www.linkedin.com as of May 15, 2013, and had their names, photographs, likenesses, or identities associated with that account used ill an endorsement email sent to third parties by Linkedln. Excluded from the Class are (a) Linkedln, its officers and directors, legal representatives, successors or assigns; (b) any entity 30 6. Linkedln is a social networking company that directs its products and services to people whom it describes as "people in professional occupations." As of the flrst quarter of2013, Linkedln had at least 225 million members. Linkedln's purpose as a business entity is to generate revenue, which is achieved through three main avenues: Talent Solutions, Marketing Solutions, and the sale of Premium Subscriptions. Talent Solutions offers a variety of products aimed at companies and recruiters to allow them to quickly search for and contact prospective employees. Marketing Solutions consists of advertising to Linkedln members by placing ads on the Linkedln website. Premium Subscriptions are sold directly to individuals and small businesses who want to conduct advanced searching on LinkedJn's website, enhance their professional identities, and contact other members. The size and growth ofthe number of Linkedln users is directly correlated to the success of each of Linkedln's three main sources of revenue. Linkedln touts itself as "The World's Largest Professional Network." See, e.g., The Global Linkedln Audience, available at <http://marketing.linkedin.com/sites/default/flles/pdfs/ Tnfographic _ Linkedln _Audience _ Global_ 20 12.pdf> (last visited, May 22, 2013). 7. Linkedln harvests the email addresses that appear in the external email accounts of its members. These email accounts include Yahoo! Mail, Microsoft Mail, Google Gmail, and any number of other email service providers. 7 71. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 72. California's Common Law Right of Publicity law protects persons from the unauthorized appropriation of the person's identity by another for commercial gain. 33 83. Plaintiffs incorporate each ofthe foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 34 93. Plaintiffs incorporate each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 94. The ECPA broadly defines an "electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce. 36

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10. Sunoco reiterates its promise of 5¢ off every gallon in the terms and conditions that accompany the company’s advertised offer. The terms and conditions unequivocally state: When you use your Sunoco Rewards Card to purchase fuel, the price you pay will be reduced by five cents ($.05) per gallon. For fuel purchases made at the pump, the price per gallon will be reduced at the pump after you swipe your credit card, and for in- store purchases the discount will be applied prior to the completion of your purchase. See Ex. A; see also Ex. C (identical set of terms available through Sunoco’s website). 11. The terms continue: In the event discounts at the point of sale are unavailable for any reason, you will receive the discounts as a statement credit. In that case, you will not see a reduction in the price per gallon at the pump or prior to the completion of an in-store purchase. The statement credits will be automatically posted to your monthly billing statement. See Ex. A; see also Ex. C. 12. Thus, the 5¢/gallon discount should accrue for every fuel transaction at a Sunoco location, either immediately at the pump or in-store pay counter (e.g., gasoline advertised as $2.799/10/gallon would be charged at $2.749/10/gallon at the pump or register), or as an after-the- fact credit automatically calculated and posted to a cardholder’s account and reflected on a monthly statement. 14. Sunoco’s representations are false. Contrary to its clear and express representations, Sunoco does not apply a 5¢/gallon discount on all fuel purchases made by cardholders at every Sunoco location. Sunoco omits this material information to induce consumers to sign-up for the Sunoco Rewards Credit Card so they frequent Sunoco locations. A. Plaintiff’s Discovery of Sunoco’s Scheme 15. Plaintiff, Mr. Donald White, frequented various Sunoco locations to purchase gasoline for his personal or household use with his Sunoco Rewards Credit Card. 16. In January 2015, Mr. White noticed that the promised 5¢/gallon discount did not accrue at the pump or register for certain of his fuel purchases he made at Sunoco locations with his Sunoco Rewards Credit Card. 17. Upon realizing this, Mr. White reached out to customer service for the Sunoco Rewards Credit Card in late January 2015. He was assured that the discount would be applied after-the-fact on his statement if it did not accrue at the pump. 18. However, in February 2015, when Mr. White reviewed his January statement, the discount had not been applied. On February 26, 2015, he once again contacted customer service. Mr. White was told that same day by customer service that “not all stations honor the discount.” 19. This directly contradicted Sunoco’s representations, which Mr. White noted. 2. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed Classes before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate. 20. Nearly a month later, customer service confirmed that Sunoco is responsible for ensuring that the 5¢/gallon discount is properly applied, but could not adequately explain why the 5¢/gallon discount had not been applied in certain instances, could not identify whether the discount had been properly applied for earlier transactions, and could not say whether similar errors would occur in the future. 22. Sunoco substantially benefits from its fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair conduct. By enticing would-be cardholders with false promises of an automatic 5¢/gallon discount, Sunoco has lulled consumers into making gasoline (and other) purchases at Sunoco locations when they would have made their purchases elsewhere, and/or at a lower price. 23. Sunoco has also enriched itself by not paying the 5¢/gallon discount in all transactions by putative Class members, and keeping the money for itself. 24. Finally, Sunoco has unfairly put the onus on unsuspecting consumers to ensure that the promised 5¢/gallon discount is actually applied. Consumers are unlikely to be very vigilant because Sunoco’s false promises and omissions lull them into believing that the discount will be applied automatically, without consumers having to take any action. 25. Even when consumers such as Mr. White notice Sunoco’s failure to apply the promised discount, Sunoco does not offer any assurances that this error will not happen again. This places an unfair and undue burden on consumers, whom Sunoco promised would receive discounts automatically. 26. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23. 28. Excluded from the Classes are Sunoco, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, any entity in which Sunoco has a controlling interest, all customers who make a timely election to be excluded, governmental entities, and all judges assigned to hear any aspect of this litigation, as well as their immediate family members. 29. The members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder is impractical. The Classes consist of many thousands of members, the identities of whom are within the knowledge of and can be ascertained only by resort to Sunoco’s records. 30. The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Classes in that the representative Plaintiff, like all Class members, is a Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholder. The representative Plaintiff, like all Class members, has been damaged by Sunoco’s misconduct in that they have been harmed by the same deceptive, misleading, and/or fraudulent pretenses and practices. Furthermore, the factual basis of Sunoco’s misconduct is common to all Class members, and represents a common thread of unfair and unconscionable conduct resulting in injury to all members of the Classes. 31. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Classes and those common questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. 33. Other questions of law and fact common to the Classes include: g. The proper method or methods by which to measure damages; and h. The declaratory and injunctive relief to which the Classes are entitled. 34. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other Class members, in that they arise out of the same wrongful conduct and the same or substantially similar unconscionable conduct by Sunoco. Plaintiff has suffered the harm alleged and has no interests antagonistic to the interests of any other Class member. 35. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in the prosecution of class actions and, in particular, class actions on behalf of consumers. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. 37. Even if Class members themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation would significantly increase the delay and expense to all parties and to the Court. Individualized litigation would also create the potential for inconsistent or contradictory rulings. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties, allows claims to be heard which might otherwise go unheard because of the relative expense of bringing individual lawsuits, and provides the benefits of adjudication, economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 38. Plaintiff repeats the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 39. Sunoco affirmatively misrepresented and/or did not disclose sufficient facts to render non-misleading its statements about the 5¢/gallon discount offered in connection with the company’s promotion of the Sunoco Rewards Credit Card. These misrepresentations or omissions include, inter alia, whether the 5¢/gallon discount would be applied at the point of purchase or automatically after-the-fact for every fuel transaction made at a Sunoco location with a Sunoco Rewards Credit Card. 41. Sunoco’s misrepresentations or omissions were material and a substantial factor in Plaintiff and Class members’ becoming Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholders. 42. Sunoco intended its misrepresentations or omissions to induce Plaintiff and Class members to become (or to remain) Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholders, or had reckless disregard for same. 43. But for these misrepresentations (or omissions), Plaintiff and Class members would not have become Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholders, and/or would have purchased gasoline at cheaper prices. 44. Plaintiff and Class members were justified in relying on Sunoco’s misrepresentations. The same or substantively identical misrepresentations were communicated, and/or the same or substantively identical omissions were not communicated, to each Class member, including through promotional materials prepared and disseminated by Sunoco. 45. Plaintiff and Class members were damaged by reason of Sunoco’s misrepresentations or omissions alleged herein. 46. Plaintiff repeats the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 47. Sunoco had or undertook a duty to accurately and truthfully represent to consumers the truth regarding Sunoco’s statements about the 5¢/gallon discount associated with the Sunoco Rewards Credit Card. 48. Sunoco failed to exercise ordinary care in making representations concerning the 5¢/gallon discount associated with the Sunoco Rewards Credit Card. 50. Sunoco’s statements were false at the time the misrepresentations were made (or the omissions were not made. 51. Sunoco knew, or reasonably should have known, that its representations alleged herein were materially false or misleading, or that omission of material facts rendered such representations false or misleading. Sunoco also knew, or had reason to know, that its misrepresentations and omissions would induce Class members to become Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholders. 52. As a direct and proximate result of Sunoco’s acts and omissions described herein, Plaintiff and putative Class members have suffered harm, and will continue to do so. 53. Sunoco’s misrepresentations or omissions were material and a substantial factor in Plaintiff and Class members’ becoming Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholders. 54. Sunoco intended its misrepresentations or omissions to induce Plaintiff and Class members to become (or to remain) Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholders, or had reckless disregard for same. 55. But for these misrepresentations (or omissions), Plaintiff and Class members would not have become Sunoco Rewards Credit Card cardholders, and/or would have purchased gasoline at cheaper prices and/or elsewhere. 56. Plaintiff and Class members were justified in relying on Sunoco’s misrepresentations. The same or substantively identical misrepresentations were communicated, and/or the same or substantively identical omissions were not communicated, to each Class member, including through promotional materials prepared and disseminated by Sunoco. 58. Plaintiff repeats the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. 59. By means of Sunoco’s wrongful conduct alleged herein, Sunoco knowingly induced Plaintiff and members of the National Class to apply for and use the Sunoco Rewards Credit Card by fraudulent, unfair, deceptive, unconscionable, and/or oppressive means. 60. Sunoco knowingly received and retained wrongful benefits from Plaintiff and members of the National Class. In so doing, Sunoco acted intentionally or with conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and members of the National Class. 61. As a result of Sunoco’s wrongful conduct as alleged herein, Sunoco has been unjustly enriched at the expense, and to the detriment, of Plaintiff and members of the National Class. 62. Sunoco’s unjust enrichment is traceable to, and resulted directly and proximately from, the wrongful conduct alleged herein. 63. It is unfair and inequitable for Sunoco to be permitted to retain the benefits it received, and is still receiving, without justification, from the wrongful conduct alleged herein. Sunoco’s retention of such benefits under the circumstances is inequitable. 64. The financial benefits derived by Sunoco rightfully belong to Plaintiff and members of the National Class, in whole or in part. Sunoco should be compelled to account for and disgorge in a common fund for the benefit of Plaintiff and members of the National Class all wrongful or inequitable proceeds received from them. A constructive trust should be imposed upon all wrongful or inequitable sums received by Sunoco traceable to Plaintiff and the members of the National Class. 66. Sunoco’s fraud and/or unilateral decision not to apply the 5¢/gallon discount in all instances as promised amounts to an illusory promise rendering any agreement unenforceable, unconscionable, void, or voidable. 9. Sunoco makes similar representations online. For example, Sunoco represents on its website that: “The Sunoco Rewards Credit Card not only offers gas rewards but this fuel credit card will also instantly roll your gas prices 5¢ on every gallon, every time you fill up at Sunoco.” See https://www.sunoco.com/ways-to-save/gas-credit-cards/ (emphasis added) (Ex. B hereto). A. The Sunoco Rewards Credit Card Fraud and Fraudulent Inducement (On Behalf of the National Class) Negligent Misrepresentation or Omission (On Behalf of the National Class) Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of the National Class)

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22. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and as a class action on behalf of the following Fee Churning Class: All persons who filed a case under Title 11, Chapter 13 of the United States Code in the State of California in which the PHH Defendants filed an Objection to Confirmation asserting that the pre-petition arrearage amount set forth in the Chapter 13 Plan impermissibly attempted to modify the secured claim in violation of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(b)(2) or 1322(b)(5) at any time on or after April 17, 2016. 23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and as a class action on behalf of the following Unauthorized Fee Class: All persons who filed a case under Title 11, Chapter 13 of the United States Code in the State of California with a loan secured by a deed of trust on property of the estate serviced by the PHH Defendants in which the PHH Defendants failed to file timely the notice required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002.1(c) but added fees, expenses, and charges to the loan balance at any time on or after April 17, 2016. 24. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and as a class action on behalf of the following Unauthorized Practice of Law Class: All persons that filed a case under Title 11 of the United States Code in the State of California in which the Law Firm Defendants received attorney’s fees for representation of the PHH Defendants with a security interest in property of the estate at any time on or after April 17, 2016. 25. Defendants and their officers and directors are excluded from the Plaintiff Class. 3. As to Movant, its successors, transferees and assigns, the stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is: a. Terminated as to the Debtor and the ��������������������������� b. Modified or conditioned as set forth in Exhibit to this order. c. Annulled retroactively to the bankruptcy petition date. Any postpetition acts taken by Movant to enforce its remedies regarding the Property do not constitute a violation of the stay. 37. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 36 above as if the same were fully set forth at this point. 4. Movant may enforce its remedies to foreclose upon and obtain possession of the Property in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law, but may not pursue any deficiency claim against the Debtor or property of the estate except by filing a proof of claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 501. 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 47 above as if the same were fully set forth at this point. 5. Movant must not conduct a foreclosure sale of the Property before (date) . 55. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 54 above as if the same were fully set forth at this point. 56. California Corporations Code § 17701.04(e) provides, in pertinent part: Nothing in this title shall be construed to permit a domestic or foreign limited liability company to render professional services, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 13401 and in Section 13401.3, in this state. 57. California Corporations Code § 13401(a) provides, in pertinent part: “Professional services” means any type of professional services that may be lawfully rendered only pursuant to a license, certification, or registration authorized by the Business and Professions Code, the Chiropractic Act, or the Osteopathic Act. 58. California Corporations Code § 13401.3 provides, in pertinent part: As used in this part, “professional services” also means any type of professional services that may be lawfully rendered only pursuant to a license, certification, or registration authorized by the Yacht and Ship Brokers Act … 59. California Business & Professions Code § 6125 provides, in pertinent part: No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active licensee of the State Bar. 6. The stay shall remain in effect subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the Adequate Protection Agreement contained within this order. 7. In chapter 13 cases, the trustee must ������������������������������������������������������������������������� entry of this o��������������������������������������������������������������������� entry of this order without ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� the contrary, Movant must ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ secured claim after entry of this order. 8. The co-debtor stay of 11 U.S.C. § 1201(a) or § 1301(a) is terminated, modified or annulled as to the co-debtor, as to the same terms and conditions as to the Debtor. 9. The 14-day stay as provided in FRBP 4001(a)(3) is waived. 97. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by this reference each of the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 96 above as if the same were fully set forth at this point. 98. California Business & Professions Code § 6125 provides, in pertinent part: No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active licensee of the State Bar. FILED & ENTERED FEB 18 2020 CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT Central District of California NUMBER AMOUNT TO BE PAID ON THE NUMBER CLAIM TOTAL INTEREST RATE On or about July 19, 2004, Debtor executed a promissory note in the original principal sum of $520,600.00 ������Note�����������������������������New Century Mortgage Corporation. ��Lender�����������������������������������������������������������������������Deed of Trust��� encumbering the real property located at 1205 South Grandee, Compton, CA 90221 ������Subject Property������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Creditor. On September 30, 2019, Debtor filed the instant Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California � Oakland Division, and was assigned case number 19-42210. On September 30, 2019, Debtor filed his/her Chapter 13 Plan ��Plan���������������������� ��������������������Section 3. ������������������������������������������������������������������ �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������- petition arrearage due to Creditor in the amount of $16,726.96 whereas the Plan proposes to pay only $14,048.46. II. RECORDER OF SAID COUNTY. APN: 6022 024 022 EXCEPTING THE MOBILE HOME LOCATED THEREON. The Motion is granted under: a. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) b. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) c. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) d. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). The filing of the bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors that involved: (1) The transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, the Property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval; and/or (2) Multiple bankruptcy cases affecting the Property. (3) The court makes does not make cannot make a finding that the Debtor was involved in this scheme. (4) If recorded in compliance with applicable state laws governing notices of interests or liens in real property, this order shall be binding in any other case under this title purporting to affect the Property filed not later than 2 years after the date of the entry of this order by the court, except that a debtor in a subsequent case under this title may move for relief from this order based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown, after notice and a hearing. Any federal, state or local government unit that accepts notices of interests or liens in real property shall accept any certified copy of this order for indexing and recording. UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200-17208) (Against Defendants Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and PHH Mortgage Corporation) UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200-17208) (Against All Defendants) UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200-17208) (Against All Defendants) UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200-17208) (Against Defendant Robertson, Anschutz, & Schneid, P.L.)

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26. Throughout his entire employment, Plaintiff was paid an hourly rate of $8 per hour in cash for the hours for which he was paid. 27. Defendants unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members for all hours worked due to a policy of time-shaving. 28. Defendants unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half) or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half) for all hours they worked over 40 in a workweek, due to time-shaving. 35. At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in a policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for all hours worked due to time-shaving. 43. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were employed by the Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law, §§2 and 651. 44. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them for all hours worked due to a policy of time-shaving. 45. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them overtime compensation at the rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek, due to time-shaving. 46. Defendants failed to properly notify employees of their hourly pay rate and overtime rate, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law. 47. Defendants failed to provide a proper wage and hour notice, at the date of hiring and annually, to all non-exempt employees per requirements of the New York Labor Law. 48. Defendants failed to provide proper wage statements with every payment as required by New York Lab. Law § 195(3). 49. Due to the Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wages due to time-shaving, unpaid overtime, reasonable attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law. SOUTH ASSOCIATES, LLC d/b/a BIG DADDY’s. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND CLASS MEMBERS VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND FLSA COLLECTIVE PLAINTIFFS 31. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 30 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 32. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). Further, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). 33. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 34. At all relevant times, each of the Corporate Defendants had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000.00. d/b/a DUKE’S, 239 PARK AVENUE SOUTH ASSOCIATES, LLC d/b/a BIG DADDY’S, BIG DADDY’S II LLC d/b/a BIG DADDY’S, JOHN DOE CORP. d/b/a CITY CRAB SHACK,

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INDUCEMENT, AND CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS) ................................................................................................................47  COUNT III UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AGAINST AIG PARENT ONLY) ..............................48  ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(C) AND 18 U.S.C. § 1962(D) (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS) ...................................................................................37  A.  The Racketeering Enterprise ..................................................................................37  B.  Racketeering Activity and Predicate Acts .............................................................38  C.  Causation................................................................................................................45  D.  Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) ...........................................................................46  UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AGAINST AIG PARENT ONLY) 113. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 114. Plaintiffs bring this claim against defendant AIG Parent only. 115. AIG Parent was benefited by its uniform policy, pattern, and practice of deception and unjustly failed to pay the Plaintiffs or the members of the proposed class for those benefits. 116. AIG Parent’s failure to pay Plaintiffs or the members of the proposed class for those benefits was to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class. 117. Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed class have no contractual remedy for AIG Parent’s unjust enrichment, and the return of the benefits to the Plaintiffs and members of the class would not be inconsistent with any contracts between them and Defendants. VIOLATION OF RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) AND 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)

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(FLSA Overtime Violations) (Ohio Class) (Ohio Overtime Violations) 10. Defendant’s hourly employees included Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins and members of the Ohio Class. 11. At all times relevant, Defendant was an enterprise within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), and an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1). Defendant’s Business 12. Among other things, Defendant provides warehousing and logistics services to the automotive industry, including the Lordstown Assembly Complex. 13. Plaintiff worked at Defendant’s Austintown, Ohio location. 14. In addition to the Austintown, Ohio location, Defendant operates approximately five other warehousing and logistics locations throughout the country, including: Avon Lake, Ohio; Spring Hill, Tennessee; Dearborn, Michigan; East Moline, Illinois; and, Columbus, Mississippi. Hourly Employees’ Compensation 15. Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the members of the Ohio Class, are current or former hourly employees of Defendant. They were paid hourly wages as well as nondiscretionary attendance bonuses. Many received shift differential pay. 16. Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins who may join this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and the members of the Ohio Class worked more than forty (40) hours in a single workweek, entitling them to overtime compensation under the FLSA. 4 Defendant’s Miscalculation of Overtime Compensation 17. The FLSA and Ohio law requires Defendant to pay overtime compensation to its hourly employees at one and one-half times their “regular rate,” and to include in the calculation of their regular rates “all remunerations for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee,” including nondiscretionary bonus and incentive payments, as well as shift differential pay. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(3); 29 C.F.R. 778.208, 778.217; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03(A) (incorporating FLSA standards). 18. Defendant unlawfully excluded the nondiscretionary bonus payments and shift differential pay that it paid to its hourly employees in determining their “regular rates” for purposes of overtime compensation. Defendant thereby miscalculated and underpaid the overtime compensation it paid to hourly employees, including Plaintiff, the Potential Opt-Ins and members of the Ohio Class. 19. Plaintiff received a non-discretionary attendance bonus, which was not included in his regular rate for purposes of computing overtime. 20. Plaintiff received a $.15 shift differential, which was not included in his regular rate for purposes of computing overtime. 21. Defendant’s failure to include the attendance bonus payments and the $.15 shift differential payment in computing his regular rate for purposes of computing overtime has resulted in the underpayment of overtime. 22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 23. Plaintiff brings this case as an FLSA “collective action” pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which provides that “[a]n action to recover the liability “prescribed by the FLSA “may 5 be maintained against any employer … by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or himself and other employees similarly situated.” 24. The Potential Opt-Ins who are “similarly situated” to Plaintiff with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations consist of: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant throughout the country during the period three years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who received nondiscretionary bonus payments, including attendance bonuses, and/or received a shift differential, and who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks in which the nondiscretionary bonus and/or shift differential payments were earned. 25. Such persons are “similarly situated” with respect to Defendant’s FLSA violations in that all were hourly employees of Defendant, were subjected to and injured by Defendant’s unlawful practice of excluding the nondiscretionary bonus payments and shift differentials from the calculation of employees’ “regular rates” for overtime compensation, and all have the same claims against Defendant for unpaid wages and overtime compensation as well as for liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 26. Conditional certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that such persons may be sent a Court-authorized notice informing them of the pendency of this action and giving them the opportunity to “opt in.” 27. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of Potential Opt-Ins but avers, upon information and belief, that they consist of over 40 persons. Such persons are readily identifiable through the payroll records Defendant have maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 6 28. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 29. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and other members of a class of persons who assert claims under the laws of the State of Ohio (the “Ohio Class”), defined as: All present and former hourly employees of Defendant throughout the country during the period two years preceding the commencement of this action to the present who received nondiscretionary bonus payments, including attendance bonuses, and/or received a shift differential, and who worked more than forty hours in one or more workweeks in which the nondiscretionary bonus and/or shift differential payments were earned. 30. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff cannot yet state the exact number of class members but aver, upon information and belief, that they consist of over 40 persons. The number of class members as well as their identities are ascertainable from the payroll records Defendant has maintained, and was required to maintain, pursuant to the FLSA and Ohio law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) & 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a. 31. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to: a) Whether Defendant miscalculated the overtime compensation it paid to Plaintiff and other class members by excluding nondiscretionary bonus and shift differential payments from the calculation of their “regular rates” for purposes of overtime compensation. b) Whether Plaintiff and other class members would have received additional overtime compensation if nondiscretionary bonus and 7 shift differential payments had properly been included in their “regular rates” of pay, and, if so, in what amount. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of other class members. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Plaintiff’s interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of other class members. Plaintiff’s counsel have broad experience in handling class action litigation, including wage-and-hour litigation, and are fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 34. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 35. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 8 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 37. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions on behalf of himself and the Potential Opt-Ins. Plaintiff’s written consent to become a party to this action pursuant to § 216(b) will be filed with the Court. 38. The FLSA requires that hourly and other non-exempt employees receive overtime compensation of “not less than one and one-half times” the employees’ “regular rate.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 39. Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins should have been paid overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their “regular rate” for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 40. Defendant miscalculated and underpaid the overtime compensation it paid to Plaintiff and the Potential Opt-Ins by excluding nondiscretionary bonus payments, including attendance bonuses, and shift differential payments from the calculation of their “regular rates.” 41. By engaging in that practice, Defendant willfully violated the FLSA and regulations thereunder that have the force and effect of law. 42. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Potential Opt- Ins were injured in that they did not receive overtime compensation due to them pursuant to the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) entitles them to an award of “unpaid overtime compensation” as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Section 216(b) further provides that “[t]he court … shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or Plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the Defendants, and costs of the action.” 9 43. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 44. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, on behalf of himself and all members of the Ohio Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 45. At all times relevant, Defendant was an employer covered by the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 46. Defendant violated the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03, by excluding incentive payments, including non-discretionary attendance bonuses, and shift differential payments from the calculation of employees’ regular rates for purposes of overtime compensation. 47. Defendant’s violations of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03 injured Plaintiff and the Ohio Class members in that they did not receive all of the overtime compensation due to them pursuant to that statute. 48. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.10(A) provides that Defendant, having violated § 4111.03, is “liable to the employee[s] affected for the full amount of the overtime wage rate, less any amount actually paid to the employee[s] by the employer, and for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court.” 9. At all times relevant, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and corresponding provisions of Ohio law including the Ohio overtime compensation statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 3 Defendant’s Status As an “Employer”

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10. For some or all of the calls, ANTHEM used an auto-dialing mechanism wherein there was no caller on the line when Plaintiff answered. After a pause on each of these calls, the call was connected to a person by Anthem. 11. These phone calls were, according to the callers, for marketing purposes. 12. When one calls 877-268-9170, a prerecorded message says that the caller has reached the “direct sales team” at Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield. 13. Plaintiff did not consent to these calls. 14. Plaintiff asked that the calls stop and told the representatives on the line that there was no interest, but ANTHEM continued to dial his cell phone using its autodialer. 15. Plaintiff and the class have been substantially damaged by Defendant’s calls. Their privacy was improperly invaded, they were charged for the calls and they were annoyed. Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 740 (Jan. 18, 2012) (discussing congressional findings of consumer “outrage” as to autodialed and prerecorded calls); Soppet v. Enhanced 3 Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that unwanted cell phone robocall recipients are damaged because they are charged “out of pocket” cellular airtime minutes). 16. Plaintiff’s cell phone plan is “pay by the minute.” 17. Defendant’s violations were willful, or alternatively they were knowing; particularly calls that occurred after Plaintiff asked that they stop and indicated that he was not interested. 18. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs. 19. ANTHEM violated the TCPA by placing automated calls to Plaintiff and the class members’ cell phones using its predictive dialer and/or prerecorded or artificial voice without the consent of the called party. 20. ANTHEM has a policy, practice or procedure of placing calls to cell phones regarding the collection of an alleged debt without the prior consent of the called parties. 21. ANTHEM’s violations were negligent, or alternatively, they were willful or knowing. 47 U.S.C. §312(f)(1). 22. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class and a subclass, consisting of: All persons who, on or after July 15, 2009, defendant called a cell phone number using predictive dialing equipment and/or a prerecorded or artificial voice where defendant did not obtain the phone number called from the called party, with respect to the subject matter of the alleged debt being collected. Plaintiff alleges a subclass of persons who received calls after a demand that calls stop. 23. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Upon information and belief Plaintiff alleges that there are more than 40 members of the class. 4 24. There are questions of law and fact common to the class which predominate any questions affecting an individual class member. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether ANTHEM used an automatic telephone dialing system as is used in the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations and orders to place the calls at issue; b. Damages, including whether the violations were negligent, willful or knowing. 25. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 26. A class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 27. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. 28. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. 29. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by 5 individual members of the class, should they realize their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against ANTHEM for: A. Statutory damages of $500 per violation, and up to $1,500 per violation if proven to be willful; B. An injunction against further violations; C. A declaration that the equipment used by ANTHEM is regulated by the TCPA; D. Costs of suit; E. Reasonable attorney’s fees as part of a common fund, if any; F. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 7. ANTHEM has called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone numerous times within the four years immediately preceding the filing of this complaint. 8. For example, ANTHEM called Plaintiff’s cell phone on July 1, 2013 at 3:10 p.m., and then an hour later, at 4:10 p.m. 9. The caller ID for these calls was 877-268-9170.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a restaurant chain that operates WINGSTOP restaurants as well as the WINGSTOP website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 21. Defendant operates WINGSTOP restaurants across the United States, including its restaurant in New York City located at 289 Livingston Street, Brooklyn, NY 11217. 22. These restaurants constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s restaurants provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including restaurant locations and hours, the ability to browse the menu, order food online, purchase company apparel and gifts, and related goods and services available both in restaurants and online. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s restaurants. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s restaurants and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s restaurants on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s physical locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s restaurants are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s restaurants. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 85. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishments. 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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11 33. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 12 Procedure, individually and on behalf of the Class. The Class specifically excludes Defendants 13 herein, and any person, finn, trust, corporation or other entity related to, or affiliated with, any of 14 15 the Defendants. 16 17 34. 35. This action is properly maintainable as a class actico. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all mem'ers is impracticable. As of April 18 6,2012, Cost Plus had in excess of22 million shares ofcommc1 stock outstanding. Members of 19 the Class are scattered throughout the United States and are so n~lmerous that it is impracticable to 20 bring them all before this Court. 21 36. 22 others: 23 24 Questions of law and fact exist that are commo' to the Class, including, among (a) whether the Individual Defendants have hreached their fiduciary duties of 25 good faith, loyalty, independence or due care with respect to Plai tiff and the other members of the 26 Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; 27 2811 ~~-8~-~--- 1 40. Cost Plus is a leading specialty retailer of casual home furnishings and entertaining 10 products, As of January 28, 2012, the Company operated 258 stores in 30 states. The stores feature 11 an ever-changing selection of casual home furnishings, housewares, gifts, decorative accessories, 12 gounnet foods and beverages offered at competitive prices and imported from more than 50 13 countries. Many items are unique and exclusive to Cost Plus World Market. The value, breadth 14 and continual refreshment of products invites customers to come back throughout a lifetime of 15 changing home furnishings and entertaining needs. 16 17 62. Transaction. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 63. 7 8 9 A. Background 75. 76. 77. Claim for Breach ofFiducisry Duties Against the l,ldividual Defendants Plaintiff repeats and realieges each allegation set forth herein. The Individual Defendants have violated fiducial) duties of care, loyalty, disclosure By the acts, transactions and courses of condt,ct alleged herein, the Individual 10 Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive 11 Plaintiff and other members of the Class ofthe true value oftheir mvestment in Cost Plus. 12 78. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to 13 exercise the care required, and breached their duties of 10) ,lity, good faith, disclosure and 14 independence owed to the shareholders of Cost Plus because, among other reasons, they failed to take steps to maximize the value of Cost Plus to its public sharehc1ders. 15 16 17 79. The Individual Defendants dominate and control th,~ business and corporate affairs of 18 Cost Plus, and are in possession of private corporate informati'-n concerning Cost Plus's assets, 19 business and future prospects. Thus, there exists an imbalance and disparity of knowledge and 20 economic power between them and the public shareholders of Clost Plus ""hich makes it inherently 21 22 23 unfair for them to benefit their own interests to the exclusion of maximizing shareholder value. 80. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and (ourse of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise due care and diligence ir' the exercise of their fiduciary 24 25 obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 26 85. Bed Bath & Beyond and Merger Sub have acted 'l.nd are acting with knowledge of 17 18 the fact that the Individual Defendants are in breach of their fiduciary duties to Cost Plus's public shareholders, and have participated in such breaches of fiduciary cuties. 19 20 86. Bed Bath & Beyond and Merger Sub knowingly aided and abetted the Individual 87. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. 21 Defendants' wrongdoing alleged herein. In so doing, Bed Bath & Beyond and Merger Sub rendered 22 substantial assistance in order to effectuate the Individual Defendants' plan to consummate the 23 Proposed Transaction in breach of their fiduciary duties. 24 25 26 27 28 11 -="'-2~1-=-=--- 1 Cost Plus and the Individual Defendants have caused the Recommendation Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation set fCfth herein. On Behalf of Plaintiffand tbe Class Against Bed Bath & Beyond and Merger Sub for Aiding and Abetting tbe Individual Defendants' Breacb of Fiduciary Duty Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained 15 above, as though fully set forth herein. 16 On Behalfof Plaintiff for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants PJaintiffbrings this Exchange Act claim on behalf ,fhimselfas an individual. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth The Individual Defendants acted as controlling I)ersons of Cost Plus within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged hereill. By virtue of their positions as 25 officers and/or directors of Cost Plus, and participation in anc"or awareness of the Company's 26 27 operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Recommendation and good faith owed to public shareholders of Cost Plus. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

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10. Defendant called Plaintiff on her cellular telephone with enough frequency to constitute harassment under the circumstance. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 13. Defendant’s actions resulted in false and deceptive acts toward the Plaintiff. Defendant made the Plaintiff, at all relevant times, believe that legal action would be instituted against Plaintiff and that failure to heed the threats of legal action would result in the taking of Plaintiff’s property. 14. Defendant never received Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on her cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 19. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 6. At various and multiple times prior to the filing of the instant Complaint, including within the one year preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant contacted Plaintiff in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding debt. 7. Beginning in and around 2014, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on her cellular telephone in an attempt to collect an alleged outstanding debt. 8. Defendant was calling Plaintiff on her cellular telephone number ending in - 0861. 9. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its daily calls to Plaintiff seeking to collect the debt allegedly owed. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. � As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). � Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. Violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays that judgment be entered against Defendant for the following: A. Actual damages; B. Statutory damages for willful and negligent violations; C. Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, D. For such other and further relief as may be just and proper. Respectfully submitted this 17th day of December, 2014.

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19. Defendants are “person[s]” as the term is defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 20. The Plaintiff’s phone number ending in 1901, has been on the National Do Not Call List since prior to January 1, 2020. 21. The number has a Virginia area code. 22. The number is used by the Plaintiff for personal purposes. 23. The number is not associated with a business. 25. Indeed, the Plaintiff has previously filed suit against King’s Creek for making telemarketing calls to him without his permission. 26. Despite this, the Plaintiff has repeatedly received calls from Spinnaker promoting its King’s Creek vacation property. 27. On October 4, 2021, Plaintiff received a call from 757-553-3963. 28. The caller identification information for the call did not include the named of the telephone solicitor, and the 3963 number, when called back, did not permit, during regular business hours, the Plaintiff to make a request not to receive telephone solicitations. 29. Prior to the caller joining the call there was a delay and a bloop sound which is indicative of the use of calling software that makes automated calls and then queues answered calls for available agents. 30. The caller failed to identify himself or on whose behalf he was calling. 31. Ultimately, the caller promoted a time share presentation “under the name of Spinnakers” at “191 Cottage Cove Lane, Williamsburg”. 33. The next day on October 5, 2021, Plaintiff received another call from “David” from the same number, again promoting a Spinnaker time share presentation at the King’s Creek property. 34. Other consumers have complained about the same types of unsolicited calls regarding the King’s Creek property: Kings Creek Plantation (Realty) practices unethical marketing. They are spamming my phone constantly and I cannot stop them or contact a human being I get 6 or more calls a day, EVERY DAY, from Kings Creeks (Realty (Plantation/Timeshare). I have blocked the numbers but they just go to my voicemail and load it up. Despite "Do Not Call" lists and blocking from my phone, I still cannot stop these idiots. I think that these people are extremely unethical. I know your office knows about this timeshare business because the complaints on line about this company are ubiquitous. I tried to contact this company by phone without calling their "reserve an appointment" phone number to no avail. I am retired and Williamsburg is less than an hour away by car. We use to visit Williamsburg quite often but we have not lately simply because of the bad vibes this company is providing your city.. That is because this creepy, high-pressure sales/spamming business is sucking all the good feelings about Williamsburg right out of us. Please, do something about it. https://www.bbb.org/us/va/williamsburg/profile/timeshare-companies/kings- creek-resorts-llc-0583-51000709/complaints (last visited Nov. 2, 2021). 36. Plaintiff and all members of the Classes, defined below, have been harmed by the acts of Defendant because their privacy has been violated and they were annoyed and harassed. Plaintiff and the Class Members were also harmed by use of their telephone power and network bandwidth and the intrusion on their telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 39. Plaintiff brings all claims in this action individually and on behalf of Class Members against Defendants. Numerosity 40. Members of the Classes are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable. 41. On information and belief, based on the technology used to call Plaintiff, which is used to make calls en masse, Members of the Classes number in the thousands. 42. The precise number of Class Members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery. 43. Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution records of Defendants. Commonality 44. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class Members and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members. 46. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class because the named Plaintiff, like all other Class Members, received unsolicited telephonic sales calls from the Defendants without giving them his consent to receive such calls. Adequacy of Representation 47. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class Members he seeks to represent, he has retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions, and he intends to prosecute this action vigorously. 48. The interests of Class Members will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and his counsel. Superiority 49. The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Class Members. 50. Many of the Class Members likely lack the ability and/or resources to undertake the burden and expense of individually prosecuting what may be a complex and extensive action to establish Defendant’s liability. 52. Individualized litigation also presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. 53. In contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court on the issue of Defendant’s liability. 54. Class treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims and claimants are before this Court for consistent adjudication of the liability issues. 55. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein. 56. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act Autodial Class Members against Defendants. 58. A “telephonic sales call” is defined as a “telephone call, text message, or voicemail transmission to a consumer for the purpose of soliciting a sale of any consumer goods or services, soliciting an extension of credit for consumer goods or services, or obtaining information that will or may be used for the direct solicitation of a sale of consumer goods or services or an extension of credit for such purposes.” Fla. Stat. § 501.059(1)(i). 59. Defendants failed to secure prior express written consent from Plaintiff and the Class Members. 59.1-513. 60. In violation of the FTSA, Defendants made and/or knowingly allowed telephonic sales calls to be made to Plaintiff and the Class members without Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ prior express written consent. 61. Defendants made and/or knowingly allowed the telephonic sales calls to Plaintiff and the Class members to be made utilizing an automated system for the selection or dialing of telephone numbers. 63. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein. 64. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants and/or their affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, by making telemarketing calls, except for emergency purposes, to the Plaintiff and the Class despite their numbers being on the National Do Not Call Registry. 65. The Defendants’ violations were negligent, willful, or knowing. 66. As a result of Defendants’ and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Defendants’ behalf violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and members of the Class presumptively are entitled to an award of between $500 and $1,500 in damages for each and every call made. 68. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act National Do Not Call Registry Class Members against Defendants. 70. It is a violation of the VTPPA to “initiate, or cause to be initiated, a telephone solicitation call to a telephone number on the National Do Not Call Registry ….” Va. Stat. § 59.1-514(B). 71. A “telephone solicitation call” is a call made “for the purpose of offering or advertising any property, goods, or services for sale, lease, license, or investment ….” Id at § 59.1-510. 72. Defendants failed to secure prior express written consent from Plaintiff and the Class Members. 74. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, and pursuant to § 59.1-515 of the VTPPA, Plaintiff and Class members were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 75. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act Failure to Identify Class Members against Defendants. 77. It is a violation of the VTPPA to make or have made a telephonic sales call during which the caller fails to promptly identify themselves by first and last names and/or fails to promptly identify on whose behalf the telephone solicitation is being made. Va. Stat. § 59.1-512. 79. Defendants failed to secure prior express written consent from Plaintiff and the Class Members. 80. In violation of the VTPPA, Defendants made and/or knowingly allowed telephonic sales calls to be made to Plaintiff and the Class members without Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ prior express written consent even though during the calls the caller failed to promptly identify themselves by first and last names and/or failed to promptly identify the Defendants as the persons on whose behalf the telephone solicitations were being made. 81. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, and pursuant to § 59.1-515 of the VTPPA, Plaintiff and Class members were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 82. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 53 as if fully set forth herein. 84. It is a violation of the VTPPA to make or have made telephone solicitation calls that do not include the transmission of the name of the caller and/or from numbers that do not permit, if called back during regular business hours, an individual to make a request not to receive telephone solicitation calls. Va. Stat. § 85. A “telephone solicitation call” is a call made “for the purpose of offering or advertising any property, goods, or services for sale, lease, license, or investment ….” Id at § 59.1-510. 86. Defendants failed to secure prior express written consent from Plaintiff and the Class Members. 87. In violation of the VTPPA, Defendants made and/or knowingly allowed telephonic sales calls to be made to Plaintiff and the Class members without Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ prior express written consent even though the calls did not include the transmission of the name of the caller and/or were made from numbers that did not permit, if called back during regular business hours, an individual to make a request not to receive telephone solicitation calls. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the National Do Not Call Registry Class) Violation of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act, Va. Stat. § 59.1-513 On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act Caller Identification Class Violation of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act, Va. Stat. § 59.1-514 On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act National Do Not Registry Call Class Violation of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act, Va. Stat. § 59.1-512 On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act Failure to Identify Call Class Violation of the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.059 On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act Autodial Class

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20. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant between approximately 1999 and November 12, 2019. 21. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a production employee. 23. After extracting the base metal, Plaintiff poured the extracted metal into molds. 24. After transferring the material to the molds, Plaintiff removed the finished product from the molds and moved the finished product to a different area of the plant where it was weighed. 25. The weight of each finished product was recorded on paper and transferred to a computer system to track production amounts. 26. Plaintiff was paid a piece rate for the work he performed for Defendant. 27. For example, when Plaintiff smelted parts he was paid $0.0350 per pound for metal extracted from engines and $0.0250 per pound for metal extracted from transmissions. 28. For the work week ending November 13, 2019 Plaintiff processed 10,662 pounds of engine materials and 26,828 pounds of transmission materials. See Ex. B, attached hereto. For that work week Plaintiff was provided a paycheck in the gross amount of $1,043.87 (10,662*0.0350 plus 26,828*0.0250). See Ex. C, attached hereto. 29. Plaintiff used a timeclock to track the number of hours he worked each week. 30. During the last three years, Plaintiff worked in excess of forty hours in one or more individual work weeks during the prior three years. 31. In one or more individual work weeks in the last three years, Plaintiff was not paid overtime pay at the rate of one-and-one half times his regular rate of pay for the time he worked in excess of forty (40) hours. 33. The “Safety Equipment Uniform” deduction was for laundry service provided for by Defendant. 34. The uniform deductions made by Defendant from Plaintiff’s compensation were not required by law. 35. The uniform deductions made by Defendant from Plaintiff’s compensation were not to Plaintiff’s benefit. 36. The uniform deductions made by Defendant from Plaintiff’s compensation were not in response to a valid wage assignment or a wage deduction order. 37. The uniform deductions made by Defendant from Plaintiff’s compensation were not made with the express written consent of Plaintiff, given freely at the time the deductions were made. 38. During all weeks that Plaintiff performed labor for Defendant: a. Plaintiff’s work was to the benefit of Defendant; b. Plaintiff’s work was an integral part of Defendant’s business; c. Defendant had control or influence over the terms or conditions of Plaintiff’s employment, including the Plaintiff’s work schedule; d. Defendant owned or leases the premises where Plaintiff performed his work; and e. Defendant provided the tools or materials used by Plaintiff to perform the work. 39. In the prior three years, Defendant employed one or more other persons who were paid on a piece rate basis (“proposed FLSA collective”). 41. During all weeks that the proposed FLSA collective performed labor for Defendant: a. Their work was to the benefit of Defendant; b. Their work was an integral part of Defendant’s business; c. Defendant had control or influence over the terms or conditions of the proposed FLSA collective’s employment, including their work schedule; d. Defendant owned or leases the premises where the proposed FLSA collective performed their work; and e. Defendant provided the tools or materials used by the proposed FLSA collective to perform the work. 42. Plaintiff and other members of the proposed FLSA collective worked as non- exempt employees eligible for overtime pay. 43. The proposed FLSA collective used a timeclock to track the number of hours they worked each week. 44. The proposed FLSA collective worked in excess of forty hours in one or more individual work weeks during the prior three years. 45. The proposed FLSA collective was paid a piece rate for the work they performed. 46. The proposed FLSA collective was not paid overtime pay at the rate of one-and- one half times their regular rate of pay for the time they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 47. The proposed FLSA collective would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of this lawsuit for purposes of being informed of their opportunity to join. 49. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and other current and former employees who worked for Defendant and were paid on a piece rate basis and who had deductions taken from their compensation for uniforms. 50. The IMWL class Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as “all persons who worked for Defendant in the State of Illinois between June 10, 2017 and the present (the “IMWL class period”) who were paid on a piece rate basis (the “proposed IMWL Class”). 51. The IWPCA class Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as “all persons employed in the State of Illinois by Defendants as hourly employees from June 10, 2010 and the present (the “IWPCA class period”) who have been subject to Defendant’s uniform deduction policy (the “proposed IWPCA Class”).” 53. The proposed IMWL and IWPCA classes are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 54. During the IMWL class period, Defendant employed more than 40 persons who fall within the class description. 55. During the IWPCA class period, Defendant employed more than 40 persons who fall within the class description. 56. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical to the members of the proposed classes. 57. The named Plaintiff and the proposed IMWL Class worked more than forty (40) hours in one or more individual work weeks and were not paid overtime compensation. 58. Each member of the proposed IMWL class was paid on piece rate basis regardless of the number of hours they worked each week. 59. The named Plaintiff and the proposed IWPCA Class were all subject to Defendant’s uniform deduction policy. 60. Each member of the proposed IWPCA class had deductions taken from their compensation in one or more individual work weeks for uniform related expenses. 61. As a result, each member of the proposed IMWL class suffered the same harm. 62. As a result, each member of the proposed IWPCA class suffered the same harm. 63. Each proposed class members’ claim is controlled by Illinois’s wage and hour statutory scheme and one set of facts. Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), questions of law and fact are common to the class and predominate over any individual questions. 65. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 66. Prosecuting hundreds of identical, individual lawsuits would not promote judicial efficiency or equity, nor result in consistent results. Class certification will eliminate the need for duplicate litigation. 67. Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect the interests of the proposed classes. 68. Plaintiff seeks the same recovery as the classes, predicated upon the same violations of law and the same damage theory. 69. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in the prosecution of statewide wage and hour class actions. 70. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have interests that are contrary to, or conflicting with, the interests of the proposed classes. 71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the previous allegations of this Complaint. 72. This count arises from Defendant’s violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., for its failure to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff at a rate of one-and-one-half times his regular hourly rate of pay. 74. For overtime work performed, the pieceworker employee is entitled to be paid all his weekly earnings at his regular rate of pay for all hours worked in addition to half his regular rate of pay multiplied by all the hours worked in excess of forty in that work week. 29 C.F.R. § 778.111(a). 75. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff overtime wages for the hours he worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a work week. 76. Defendant did not pay one or more other production employees overtime pay for the hours he or she worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a work week. 77. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, for all weeks during which Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours, he was entitled to be compensated at a rate of one-and-one-half times his regular rate of pay. 78. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, for all weeks during which other production employees worked in excess of forty (40) hours, they were entitled to be compensated at a rate of one-and-one-half times their regular rate of pay. 79. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff for time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week was a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207. 81. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime wages for time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week was a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgment against Defendant as follows: A. A judgment in the amount of one-and-one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay for all time Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week; B. Liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime compensation found due; C. Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing this action; and D. Such other and further relief as this Court deems appropriate and just. 82. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the previous allegations of this Complaint. 83. The Plaintiff and the proposed IMWL class worked more than forty (40) hours in one or more individual work weeks and were not paid overtime compensation. 84. Pursuant to 820 ILCS 105/4(a), for all weeks during which they worked in excess of forty (40) hours, Plaintiff and the proposed IMWL Class were entitled to be compensated at one and one half times their regular hourly rate of pay for time they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week. 85. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the previous allegations of this Complaint. 86. Defendant made deductions from the wages of Plaintiff and the proposed IWPCA Class for, employee uniforms and laundering of uniforms worn by Plaintiff while working. 87. Such deductions were not: (1) required by law; (2) to the employee’s benefit; (3) in response to a valid wage assignment or wage deduction order; and (4) made with the express written consent of the employee given freely at the time the deductions were made. ILLINOIS WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION ACT Violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law -- Overtime Wages (Plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons) Violation of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act – Unlawful Deductions (Class Action) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act -- Overtime Wages (Plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated employees)

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38. All Web Leads generated the “leads” by placing telemarketing robocalls to consumers to see if they might be interested in purchasing insurance, and then transferring those calls to the Defendants. 39. On behalf of Defendants and at their direction, All Web Leads made hundreds of thousands of autodialed telemarketing calls to Plaintiffs and class members without their prior express consent to inquire whether Plaintiffs and the Class were interested in purchasing insurance. 40. Defendants, through All Web Leads, orchestrated a mass unlawful telemarketing campaign to Plaintiffs and the Class through the use of a single, uniform website— www.affordable-health-insurance-plans.org. (the “Affordable Health Care Website”)— that all of the Plaintiffs and Class Members visited for purposes of obtaining health insurance quotes online. 41. What’s more, the Affordable Health Care Website was deceptively designed to appear, similarly to the government-run “Healthcare.gov” marketplace website, as though it would generate health insurance quotes online. 42. After Plaintiffs and the Class visited the Affordable Health Care Website, Defendants, through their agent All Web Leads, placed autodialed telemarketing calls to their cellular phones for the purpose of selling insurance without their prior express written consent in violation of the TCPA. Calls to Plaintiffs 44. Plaintiff Cooper visited the Affordable Health Care Website in search of health insurance quotes online. 45. After Plaintiff Cooper visited the website, she received an autodialed telemarketing call placed by All Web Leads on behalf of Defendant CS Marketing on January 2, 2018 at or around 10:14 a.m. 46. Upon answering the call, there was an immediate pause on the other end, followed by a distinct “clicking” noise before the connection with a representative was made. 47. The All Web Leads representative asked Plaintiff Cooper a series of questions to determine whether she met certain criteria specified by Defendant CS Marketing in order to find out if she was a qualified consumer to whom Defendant could sell insurance. 48. After the series of questions concluded, Plaintiff Cooper was then transferred to a health insurance sales representative for Defendant CS Marketing. 49. During that call, Defendant CS Marketing proceeded to solicit Plaintiff Cooper to purchase insurance. 51. To compound matters, on information and belief, Plaintiff Cooper received numerous other autodialed telemarketing calls to her cell phone as a result of becoming entangled in Defendants’ unlawful telemarketing scheme. Calls to Plaintiff Rodriguez 52. Plaintiff Rodriguez visited the Affordable Health Care Website in search of health insurance quotes online. 53. After Plaintiff Rodriguez visited the website, he received multiple autodialed telemarketing calls placed by All Web Leads on behalf of Defendant Health Insurance Innovations on January 3, 2018 at 8:33 a.m. and then again at 1:49 p.m. 54. Upon answering the call, there was an immediate pause on the other end, followed by a distinct “clicking” noise before the connection with a representative was made. 55. The All Web Leads representative asked Plaintiff Rodriguez a series of questions to determine whether he met certain criteria specified by Defendant Health Insurance Innovations in order to find out if he was a qualified consumer to whom it could sell insurance. 56. After the series of questions concluded, Plaintiff Rodriguez was then transferred to a health insurance sales representative for Defendant Health Insurance Innovations. 57. During that call, Defendant Health Insurance Innovations proceeded to solicit Plaintiff Rodriguez to purchase insurance. 59. To compound matters, on information and belief, Plaintiff Rodriguez received numerous other autodialed telemarketing calls to his cell phone as a result of becoming entangled in Defendants’ unlawful telemarketing scheme. Calls to Plaintiff Niegsch 60. Plaintiff Niegsch visited the Affordable Health Care Website in search of health insurance quotes online. 61. After Plaintiff Niegsch visited the website, she received an autodialed telemarketing call placed by All Web Leads on behalf of Defendant Health Insurance Innovations on March 14, 2016 at 3:52 p.m. 62. Upon answering the call, there was an immediate pause on the other end, followed by a distinct “clicking” noise before the connection with a representative was made. 63. The All Web Leads representative asked Plaintiff Niegsch a series of questions to determine whether she met certain criteria specified by Defendant Health Insurance Innovations in order to find out if she was a qualified consumer to whom it could sell insurance. 64. After the series of questions concluded, Plaintiff Niegsch was then transferred to a health insurance sales representative for Defendant Health Insurance Innovations. 65. During that call, Defendant Health Insurance Innovations proceeded to solicit Plaintiff Niegsch to purchase insurance. 67. To compound matters, on information and belief, Plaintiff Niegsch received numerous other autodialed telemarketing calls to her cell phone as a result of becoming entangled in Defendants’ unlawful telemarketing scheme. Calls to Plaintiff Cortes 68. Plaintiff Cortes visited the Affordable Health Care Website in search of health insurance quotes online. 69. After Plaintiff Cortes visited the website, he received an autodialed telemarketing call placed by All Web Leads on behalf of Defendant Insurance Care Direct on May 5, 2018 at 7:36 a.m. 70. Upon answering the call, there was an immediate pause on the other end, followed by a distinct “clicking” noise before the connection with a representative was made. 71. The All Web Leads representative asked Plaintiff Cortes a series of questions to determine whether he met certain criteria specified by Defendant Insurance Care Direct in order to find out if he was a qualified consumer to whom it could sell insurance. 72. After the series of questions concluded, Plaintiff Cortes was then transferred to a health insurance sales representative for Defendant Insurance Care Direct. 73. During that call, Defendant Insurance Care Direct proceeded to solicit Plaintiff Cortes to purchase insurance. 75. To compound matters, on information and belief, Plaintiff Cortes received numerous other autodialed telemarketing calls to his cell phone as a result of becoming entangled in Defendants’ unlawful telemarketing scheme. Calls to Plaintiff Moss 76. Plaintiff Moss visited the Affordable Health Care Website in search of health insurance quotes online. 77. After Plaintiff Moss visited the website, he received multiple autodialed telemarketing calls placed by All Web Leads on behalf of Defendant Insurance Care Direct on May 24, 2018 at 2:10 p.m. and then again at 2:31 p.m. 78. Upon answering the call, there was an immediate pause on the other end, followed by a distinct “clicking” noise before the connection with a representative was made. 79. The All Web Leads representative asked Plaintiff Moss a series of questions to determine whether he met certain criteria specified by Defendant Insurance Care Direct in order to find out if he was a qualified consumer to whom it could sell insurance. 80. After the series of questions concluded, Plaintiff Moss was then transferred to a health insurance sales representative for Defendant Insurance Care Direct. 81. During that call, Defendant Insurance Care Direct proceeded to solicit Plaintiff Moss to purchase insurance. 83. To compound matters, on information and belief, Plaintiff Moss received numerous other autodialed telemarketing calls to his cell phone as a result of becoming entangled in Defendants’ unlawful telemarketing scheme. Calls to Plaintiff Williams 84. Plaintiff Williams visited the Affordable Health Care Website in search of health insurance quotes online. 85. After Plaintiff Williams visited the website, he received an autodialed telemarketing call placed by All Web Leads on behalf of Defendant MBS on December 14, 2015 at 12:43 p.m. 86. Upon answering the call, there was an immediate pause on the other end, followed by a distinct “clicking” noise before the connection with a representative was made. 87. The All Web Leads representative asked Plaintiff Williams a series of questions to determine whether het met certain criteria specified by Defendant MBS in order to find out if he was a qualified consumer to whom it could sell insurance. 88. After the series of questions concluded, Plaintiff Williams was then transferred to a health insurance sales representative for Defendant MBS. 89. During that call, Defendant MBS proceeded to solicit Plaintiff Williams to purchase insurance. 91. To compound matters, on information and belief, Plaintiff Williams received numerous other autodialed telemarketing calls to his cell phone as a result of becoming entangled in Defendant’s unlawful telemarketing scheme. Calls to Plaintiff Barnes 92. Plaintiff Barnes visited the Affordable Health Care Website in search of health insurance quotes online. 93. After Plaintiff Barnes visited the website, she received an autodialed telemarketing call placed by All Web Leads on behalf of Defendant MHP Insurance on December 29, 2017 at 1:27 p.m. 94. Upon answering the call, there was an immediate pause on the other end, followed by a distinct “clicking” noise before the connection with a representative was made. 95. The All Web Leads representative asked Plaintiff Barnes a series of questions to determine whether she met certain criteria specified by Defendant MHP Insurance in order to find out if she was a qualified consumer to whom it could sell insurance. 96. After the series of questions concluded, Plaintiff Barnes was then transferred to a health insurance sales representative for Defendant MHP Insurance. 97. During that call, Defendant MHP Insurance proceeded to solicit Plaintiff Barnes to purchase insurance. Defendants Engaged in a Concerted, Uniform and Unlawful Telemarketing Campaign Through Their Agent All Web Leads

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24. From approximately the years 2012 to 2016, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant. 25. In approximately August 2017, Defendant re-hired Plaintiff as a Food & Nutrition Aid working in Defendant’s Food & Nutrition Department. 26. Plaintiff is still currently employment with Defendant. 27. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant from approximately August 2017 to the present date, Plaintiff reported directly to James Feil, Food Service Director. 28. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was an hourly-paid, non- exempt employee for purposes of the FLSA and WWPCL. 30. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees performed compensable work for Defendant, on Defendant’s behalf, at Defendant’s direction, and/or with Defendant’s knowledge. 31. On a daily basis within the three (3) years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff’s normal and customary hours of work were 11:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. 32. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees frequently worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 33. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant compensated Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees bi-weekly via check. 34. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant maintained employment records and other documentation regarding Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees. 35. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant maintained a centralized system for tracking and/or recording hours worked by Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees. 37. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s “Standard Operating Policies and Procedures” applied to Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees. 38. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s compensation policies and practices applied to Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees. 39. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s “Differentials” policy, “HR-033-13,” applied to Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees. 40. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s “Differentials” policy, “HR-033-13,” stated, in part: First Shift was 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.; Second Shift was 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m.; and Third Shift was 11:00 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. 41. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s “Differentials” policy, “HR-033-13,” stated, in part: “Employees whose work schedule overlaps second shift will receive second shift differential for all hours worked from 11:00 am to shift end if the employee worked a minimum of 4 hours in second shift (3:00 – 11:00 pm). If employees do not work a minimum of 4 hours during second shift (3:00 – 11:00 pm), no shift differential is paid.” 43. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s “Differentials” policy, “HR-033-13,” stated, in part, that the monetary “Shift Differentials” ranged from $1.25 per hour worked to $4.00 per hours worked. 44. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s policies in practice failed to compensate Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees for any and all hours worked and worked performed each workweek, including at an overtime rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, by failing to compensate said employees with agree-upon monetary “Shift Differentials” for working a minimum of four (4) hours in second shift and/or third shift, in violation of the FLSA and WWPCL.. 45. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s policies in practice failed to include all forms of non- discretionary compensation, such as monetary bonuses, commissions, incentives, awards, and/or other rewards, in Plaintiff’s and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees’ regular rates of pay for overtime purposes in violation of the FLSA and WWPCL. 47. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendant’s policies in practice unlawfully and impermissibly failed to compensate Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees for all hours actually worked each workweek, including but not limited to at an overtime rate of pay. 48. During the three (3) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1) and during weeks when no overtime was due, Defendant suffered or permitted Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees to work without being paid appropriate, lawful, and agreed-upon compensation for all hours worked. 49. Defendant was or should have been aware that its policies in practice did not properly and lawfully compensate Plaintiff and all other hourly-paid, non-exempt employees for all hours actually worked each work day and each workweek, including at an overtime rate of pay. 51. Defendant, as a matter of policy and practice, suffered or permitted Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) to perform work during the workweek without proper compensation for all hours of work. The effect of such a practice was for Defendant to deny the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) overtime compensation at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for the hours worked (that were not counted as work) in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 52. Defendant, as a matter of policy and practice, failed to include all forms of non- discretionary compensation in Plaintiff’s and the FLSA Collective’s (Non-Discretionary Compensation) regular rates of pay for overtime calculation and compensation purposes. 53. The First and Second Claims for Relief is brought under and maintained as an opt-in Collective Actions pursuant to § 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), by Plaintiff on behalf of the FLSA Collectives. 55. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collectives are and have been similarly situated, have and have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendant’s decisions, policies, plans and programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules willfully failing and refusing to compensate them for each hour worked including overtime compensation. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are the same as those of the FLSA Collectives. 56. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collectives seek relief on a collective basis challenging, among other FLSA violations, Defendant’s practice of failing to: (1) properly and lawfully compensate employees for all hours worked, including Defendant’s failure to compensate said the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) with monetary “Shift Differentials” for working a minimum of four (4) hours in second shift and/or third shift; and (2) include all forms of non- discretionary compensation in the FLSA Collective’s (Non-Discretionary Compensation) regular rates of pay for overtime calculation and compensation purposes. 57. The FLSA Collectives are readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, the names, phone numbers, and addresses are readily available from Defendant. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collectives via first class mail to the last address known by Defendant and through posting at Defendant’s facility in areas where postings are normally made. 59. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated employees pursuant to the WWPCL, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The similarly situated employees include: WWPCL Class (Shift Differential): All hourly-paid, non-exempt employees employed by Defendant within the two (2) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1) who have not been compensated for all hours worked in a workweek – either at a regular rate of pay and/or at an overtime rate of pay for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek – as a result of Defendant’s failure to compensate said employees with monetary “Shift Differentials” for working a minimum of four (4) hours in second shift and/or third shift. WWPCL Class (Non-Discretionary Compensation): All hourly- paid, non-exempt employees employed by Defendant within the two (2) year period immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint (ECF No. 1) who have not been compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek at the proper, correct, and/or lawful overtime rate of pay as a result of Defendant’s failure to include all forms of non-discretionary compensation in said employees’ regular rates of pay for overtime calculation purposes. 60. The members of the Wisconsin Classes are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the members of the Wisconsin Classes are determinable from the records of Defendant. The job titles, length of employment, and the rates of pay for each member of the Wisconsin Classes are also determinable from Defendant’s records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendant. Notice can be provided by means permissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 62. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any members of the Wisconsin Classes, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each member of the Wisconsin Classes in separate actions. All of the members of the Wisconsin Classes were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendant, as alleged herein. Defendant’s corporate-wide policies and practices affected all members of the Wisconsin Classes similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each member of the Wisconsin Classes. Plaintiff and other members of the Wisconsin Classes sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 63. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Wisconsin Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the Wisconsin Classes. Plaintiff is represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in both collective/class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour cases. 65. Important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Wisconsin Classes would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Wisconsin Classes, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 66. Defendant has violated the WWPCL regarding payment of regular wages and overtime premium wages. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 68. The questions set forth above predominate over any questions affecting only individual persons, and a class action is superior with respect to considerations of consistency, economy, efficiency, fairness and equity, to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the state law claims. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential), reasserts and incorporates by reference all paragraphs set forth above as if restated herein. 70. At all times material herein, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) have been entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 71. At all times material herein, Defendant was an employer of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) as provided under the FLSA. 73. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) are victims of uniform compensation policy and practice in violation of the FLSA. 74. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to account for and compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) for overtime premium pay for each hour they worked in excess of forty (40) hours each workweek. 75. Defendant suffered or permitted Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) to perform work without being properly or lawfully compensated at the agreed- upon rate(s) of pay for each hour worked, including with monetary “Shift Differentials” for working a minimum of four (4) hours in second shift and/or third shift. The effect of such a practice was for Defendant to deny Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) agreed- upon wages, including overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 76. The FLSA regulates, among other things, the payment of an overtime premium by employers whose employees are engaged in commerce, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce, or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 77. Defendant was and is subject to the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA because Defendant is an enterprise engaged in commerce and/or its employees are engaged in commerce, as defined in FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(b). 79. As a result of the aforesaid willful violations of the FLSA’s provisions, overtime compensation has been unlawfully withheld by Defendant from Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) for which Defendant is liable pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 80. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential) are entitled to damages equal to the mandated overtime premium pay within the three (3) years preceding the date of filing of this Complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling because Defendant acted willfully and knew or showed reckless disregard of whether its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. 81. Pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), successful Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement of the costs and attorneys’ fees expended in successfully prosecuting an action for unpaid wages and overtime wages. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation), reasserts and incorporates by reference all paragraphs set forth above as if restated herein. 84. At all times material herein, Defendant was an employer of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) as provided under the FLSA. 85. At all times material herein, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non- Discretionary Compensation) were employees of Defendant as provided under the FLSA. 86. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) are victims of uniform compensation policy and practice in violation of the FLSA. 87. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to account for and compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) for overtime premium pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours each workweek. 88. Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to account for and compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) for overtime premium pay at the proper and correct overtime rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours each workweek. 89. The FLSA regulates, among other things, the payment of an overtime premium by employers whose employees are engaged in commerce, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce, or employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 91. Defendant’s failure to properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) and failure to properly include all forms of non-discretionary compensation in the regular rate of pay for overtime calculations purposes was willfully perpetrated. Defendant also has not acted in good faith or with reasonable grounds to believe its actions and omissions were not a violation of the FLSA, and as a result thereof, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) are entitled to recover an award of liquidated damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid overtime premium pay described above pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Alternatively, should the Court find that Defendant acted in good faith or with reasonable grounds in failing to pay overtime premium pay wages, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) are entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest at the applicable legal rate. 92. As a result of the aforesaid willful violations of the FLSA’s provisions, overtime compensation has been unlawfully withheld by Defendant from Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) for which Defendant is liable pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 93. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation) are entitled to damages equal to the mandated overtime premium pay within the three (3) years preceding the date of filing of this Complaint, plus periods of equitable tolling because Defendant acted willfully and knew or showed reckless disregard of whether its conduct was prohibited by the 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Wisconsin Class (Shift Differential), re- alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth herein. 96. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the Wisconsin Class (Shift Differential) were employees of Defendant within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 109.01(1r), 103.001(5), and 104.01(2)(a). 97. At all relevant times, Defendant was an employer of Plaintiff and the Wisconsin Class (Shift Differential) within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 109.01(2), 103.001(6), and 104.01(3)(a), and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.01(5). 98. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed, and continues to employ, Plaintiff and the Wisconsin Class (Shift Differential) within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 109.01 et seq., 103.01 et seq., 104.01 et seq., and Wis. Admin. Code § DWD 272.01. Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as Amended (Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective (Non-Discretionary Compensation)) Violations of the FLSA – Unpaid Overtime (Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective (Shift Differential)) Violation of the WWPCL – Unpaid Overtime (Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Wisconsin Class (Shift Differential))

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27. Performance provides transportation and logistics services to the oil and gas industry. 28. In order to create the goods, and provide the services, it markets to its customers, Performance employs personnel like Sonia and the Putative Class Members. 29. These workers carry out the hands-on, day-to-day production work of Performance. 30. Performance paid Sonia and the Putative Class Members the same sum for each hour worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) and failed to provide them with overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 31. For example, Sonia worked for Performance from approximately October 14, 2017 until April 30, 2018 as a Field Coordinator and Trainer. 32. Specifically, Sonia primarily worked for Performance in Bossier City, Louisiana and briefly in Wilson, North Dakota. 33. Sonia was paid on an hourly basis. 34. Sonia was not paid on a salary basis. 36. Performance paid Sonia $25-$35 for each hour worked. 37. Performance typically scheduled Sonia to work 14.5-hour shifts, for as many as 7 days a week. 38. Throughout his entire employment, Sonia regularly worked well in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 39. But Performance did not pay Sonia overtime. 40. For example, for the pay period beginning on October 16, 2017 and ending on October 31, 2017, Sonia worked for 115.5 hours, but Performance paid him for all of these hours, including those in excess of 40, at the same hourly rate ($25). 41. Similarly, for the pay period beginning on December 16, 2017 and ending on December 31, 2017, Sonia worked for 101.5 hours, but Performance paid him for all of these hours, including those in excess of 40, at the same hourly rate ($25). 42. The work Sonia performed was an essential part of producing Performance’s core products and/or services. 44. Sonia did not make any substantial investment in order to perform the work Performance required of him. 45. Performance determined Sonia’s opportunity for profit and loss. 46. Sonia’s earning opportunity was based on the number of days Performance scheduled him to work. 47. Sonia was not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other individuals working in the same job position) to perform their job duties. 48. Sonia was not employed by Performance on a project-by-project basis, but rather on a consistent basis. 49. While Sonia was classified as an independent contractor, he was regularly on call for Performance and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed. 50. Performance controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Sonia. 51. Performance controlled the hours and locations Sonia worked, the tools he used, and the rates of pay he received. 52. Even when Sonia worked away from Performance’s offices or job sites without the presence of a direct supervisor, Performance still controlled all aspects of Sonia’s job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with Performance’s and/or its client’s policies and procedures. 53. More often than not, Sonia utilized equipment provided by Performance to perform his job duties. 54. Sonia did not provide the essential equipment he worked with on a daily basis. 56. Sonia did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance. 57. Sonia was economically dependent on Performance during his employment. 58. Performance set Sonia’s rates of pay, his work schedule, and prohibited him (formally or practically) from working other jobs for other companies while they were working on jobs for Performance. 59. Very little skill, training, or initiative, in terms of independent business initiative, was required of Sonia to perform his job duties. 60. Indeed, the daily and weekly activities of Sonia and the Putative Class Members were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created or mandated by Performance. 61. Virtually every job function performed by Sonia and the Putative Class Members was pre- determined by Performance and/or its clients, including the tools to use at a job site, the data to compile, the schedule of work, and related work duties. 62. Sonia and the Putative Class Members were generally prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the pre-determined parameters. 63. Finally, for the purposes of an FLSA overtime claim, the Putative Class Members performed substantially similar job duties related to coordinating transportation and logistics services for oil and gas companies. 64. Sonia performed routine technical job duties that were largely dictated by Performance. 65. For example, Sonia regularly coordinated sand deliveries to Performance’s clients’ frac locations. 67. The Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 68. The Putative Class Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours each week. 69. Like Sonia, the Putative Class Members were generally scheduled for daily shifts of 14.5 (or more) hours for weeks at a time. 70. Performance did not pay Sonia on a salary basis. 71. Performance did not pay the Putative Class Members on a salary basis. 72. Performance paid the Sonia on an hourly basis. 73. Performance paid the Putative Class Members on an hourly basis. 74. Performance failed to pay Sonia overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 75. Performance failed to pay the Putative Class Members overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single workweek. 76. Performance knew, or acted with reckless disregard for whether, Sonia and the Putative Class Members were misclassified as independent contractors. 77. Performance classifies other workers who perform substantially similar work, under similar conditions, as employees. 78. Performance’s policy of failing to pay Sonia and the Putative Class Members overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for the purposes of the FLSA, employees. 80. Because Sonia and the Putative Class Members were misclassified as independent contractors by Performance, they should receive overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. 85. The illegal pay practices Performance imposed on Sonia were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 87. Numerous other individuals who worked with Sonia were classified as independent contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws. 88. Based on his experiences and tenure with Performance, Sonia is aware that Performance’s illegal practices were imposed on other Putative Class Members. 89. The Putative Class Members were improperly classified as independent contractors and not paid overtime when they worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 90. Performance’s failure to pay overtime at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 91. Sonia’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 92. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the various members of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 93. Sonia has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. 94. Like each Putative Class Member, Sonia has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed under state and/or federal law. 95. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 96. Absent a class and collective action, many members of the Putative Class Members will not obtain redress of their injuries and Performance will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor law. 98. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the Putative Class Members and provide for judicial consistency. 99. The questions of law and fact common to each of the Putative Class Members predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and fact are: a. Whether Performance employed the members of the Class within the meaning of the applicable state and federal statutes, including the FLSA; b. Whether the Putative Class Members were improperly misclassified as independent contractors; c. Whether Performance’s decision to classify the members of the Class as independent contractors was made in good faith; d. Whether Performance’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the members of the Class was made in good faith; e. Whether Performance’s violation of the FLSA was willful; and f. Whether Performance’s illegal pay practices were applied to the Putative Class Members. 100. Sonia and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Performance’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 101. Sonia knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action. 102. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment.

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55. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 56. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Financial Recovery Services, Inc and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 57. Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of Financial Recovery Services, Inc, and all of their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 58. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 59. The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 60. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling -9- consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 61. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in -10- handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of America. 62. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 63. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a -11- class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 64. Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 65. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 66. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through sixty five (65) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 67. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about January 24th, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g of the FDCPA as it failed to clearly, explicitly and unambiguously convey the amount of the debt. 68. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through sixty seven (67) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 69. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 70. The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about January 24th, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e of the FDCPA by using a false, deceptive and misleading representation in its attempt to collect a debt. 71. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered one (1) through seventy (70) herein with the same force and effect is if the same were set forth at length herein. 72. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 73. The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about January 24th, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f and § 1692e by charging or -13- attempting to charge non-interest charges or fees. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 74. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 75. Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows: (a) Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k); (b) Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and (c) Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the circumstances. Dated: Brooklyn, New York February 17th, 2017 /s/ Igor Litvak_____ Igor Litvak, Esq. Attorneys for the Plaintiff The Litvak Law Firm, PLLC 1701 Avenue P Brooklyn, New York 11229 Office: (718) 989-2908 Facsimile: (718) 989-2908 E-mail: [email protected] Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable. /s/ Igor Litvak_____ Igor Litvak, Esq. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g Failure to Adequately Convey the Amount of the Debt Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e False or Misleading Representations -12- Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f and § 1692e False or Misleading Representations

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- 2 - 11. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class consists of:  All New Jersey consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from Tate & Kirlin Associates, concerning a debt owed to ADT Security Systems, Inc., which: a. used a symbol and/or a string of numbers on or visible through the window of the envelope that when read reveals the addressee's account number.  The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 13. Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3). 14. On or about August 15, 2014, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to ADT Security Systems, Inc. ("ADT"). 15. The ADT obligation arose out of a transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 16. The ADT obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 17. ADT is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 18. At some time prior to August 15, 2014, the ADT obligation was placed with TKA for the purpose of collection. 19. At the time the ADT obligation was placed with TKA, the balance was past due. 20. On or about August 15, 2014, TKA caused to be delivered to Plaintiff a letter addressed to Plaintiff. Exhibit A. - 5 - 22. The August 15, 2014 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 23. The August 15, 2014 letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by TKA as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 24. The August 15, 2014 letter was mailed in a window envelope. 25. The envelope provide a window in the top left corner which displayed the follow: 2810 Southampton Road Philadelphia, PA 19154-1207 34. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 33 as if the same were set forth at length. 35. Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 36. TKA violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f by: a. using unfair and unconscionable collection practices in connection with the collection of a debt; b. using language and symbol on envelopes mailed to consumers that reveal information other than the debt collector's address, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8). FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. §1692f

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20. Plaintiff Ashlyn Meeks sued Trans Union and settled with Trans Union. On or about November 20, 2019, Ms. Meeks attempted to access her credit file disclosure through the www.annualcreditreport.com website. The website did not return a credit file disclosure, but rather the following message: “Unfortunately, your request cannot be fulfilled online at this time, based upon the data provided.” 22. Plaintiff Kenneth Mahl had a similar experience. Mr. Mahl sued Trans Union, settled his case, and now can’t access his credit file at www.annualcreditreport.com. Trans Union’s attorney has confirmed in an email that “when a consumer files a lawsuit against Trans Union, the file is locked for a period of generally about 3 years to prevent mishandling and to ensure only Trans Union operators can provide the report. Until that period is up, Mr. Mahl will not be able to use sites like the one below to view his report.” The reference to “sites like the one below” refers to www.annualcreditreport.com. 34. Plaintiffs seek to certify a class of those natural persons, who, in the last 5 years has had their access to their credit file disclosure via www.annualcreditreport.com blocked by Trans Union after the person sued Trans Union. 35. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Trans Union. 38. Based on discovery and further investigation Plaintiffs may, in addition to moving for class certification using modified definitions of the class, class claims, and the class period, and/or seek class certification only as to issues as permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). Such modified definitions may be more expansive to include consumers excluded from the foregoing definitions.

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20. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants' primary business was and is the sale of food and drinks for consumption. 2 1 . Each of the Corporate Defendants constitute a "restaurant" within the meaning of the New York Labor Law. 22. Defendant, MAURY RUBlN, actively participates in the day-to -day operation of the Bakery. For instance, Mr. Rubin persona lly hires and fires employees, supervises and directs the work of the empl()yees, instructs the empl()yees how to perfom1 their jobs, and corrects and/or 1·eprimands employees for any e1Tors made. 23. Defendant, MAURY RUBIN, creates and implements all crucial business policies, including decisions concerning the number of hours the employees are required to work, the amount of pay that the employees are entitled to receive, and the method and manner by which the employees are to be paid. 24. The Corporate Def-endants are associated as a single enterprise, utilizing Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees in a fw1gible and interchangeable manner as workers in the business operated by Defendants. 25. The Corporate Delendants each engage in related activities, namely, providing restaurant services to the general public for profit. The Corporate Defendants share Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees, act in the interest of each other with respect to employees , pay their employees by the same plan or scheme, and are themselves under common control. 27. The performance of Plaintiffs job responsibil ities, as well as the responsibilities of other similarly situated employees, was and is controlled by one person or group of persons, corporations, or other organizationa l units acting together. 28. In or about 2008, Defendants hired Plaintiff to work as a non-exempt cook and food preparer for Defendants' Bake1y, known as The City Bakery, located at 3 West 18'11 Street, New York, New York 10011. 29. Neither at the time of hire, nor at any time thereafter, diet Defendants provide Plaintiff with a written wage notice identifying Plaintifrs regular hourly rate of pay and corresponding overtime rate of pay. 30. Defendants employed Plaintiff in those capacities until on or about February 18, 2018. 31. Throughout the entirety of his employment, although Plaintiff's work shift fluctuated slightly week-to-week, Plaintiff normally worked six (6) days per week, and his work schedule norma lly consisted of ten and one-ha lf (l OY,) per day Tuesday th.rough Friday, and on Sunday from 8:00 a.m. until 6:30 p.m., and nine (9) hours on Saturday from 6:00 a.m. until 3 :00 p.m. 1 33. Beginning in or about January 2013 and continuing through the remainder of his employment on or about February 18, 20 18, Plaintiff was not paid proper overtime compensation. During this period, Plaintiff was improperly paid on a salal)' basis at the rate of $765 per week straight time for all hours worked, and worked in excess of sixty (60) hours per week. Work performed above forty (40) hours per week was not paid at the statutory rate of time and one-half as required by state and federal law. 34. Plaintiff was required to punch a time clock throughout the entirety of his employment. 35. Defendants knowingly and willfolly operate their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA ove1tim e rate (of time and one-halt), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half) , in direct violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 36. Defendants knowingly and willfully operate their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees "spread of hours" pre111ium, in direct violation of the New York Labor Law and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 38. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as class representat ive on behalf of himself and all other cun·ent and former non-exempt employees who have been or were emp loyed by the Defendants since March 13, 2015 through the close of the opt-in period as ultimate ly set by the Court (the "Collective Action Period"), and who were compensated at rates less than time and one-ha lf for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per workweek (the "Collective Action Mem bers"). 39. The collect ive action class is so numerous that jo inder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts upon which the calculation of that number are present ly within the sole control of the Defendant~, there are more than forty (40) Co llective Action Members who worked for Defendants durin g the Collective Action Period, most or whom would not be likely to file individual suits because they lack adequate fir1ancial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this matter should be certified as a collective action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 2 I 6(b). 40. Plaintiff will fairly and adequate ly protect the interests of the Collective Action Members and has retained counsel that is experienced and competen t in the fields of employment law and class action litigation . Plaintiff bas no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with !hose members of this collective action. 42. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efl1cient adjudication of thi.s controversy since j oinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossi ble for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the manage111ent of this action as a collective action. 44. Plaintiff knows of no difficu lty that will be encountered in the management of this I itigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 45. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by the Delendants ' wrongful conduct. CLASS ACl'ION ALLEGATIONS 46. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules 23(a), (b)(2) , and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 47. Plaintiff brings his New York Labor Law claims on behalf of all persons who were employed by Defendants at any time since March 13, 2012 until the entry of judgment in this case (the "Class Period") who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the New York Labor Law and have not been paid overtime compensation and/or "spread of hours" premium in violation of the New York Labor Law (the "Class"). 49. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adj udication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigat ion. where individuals Jack the financial resources to vigorously pJosecute a lawsuit in federal cou11 against a corporate defendant. 50. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injun ctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 51. Plaintiff has committed himself to pursuing this action and has retained counsel experienced in employment law and class action litigation. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequate ly protect the interests of the NY Class members. Plaintiff understands that, as class representative, he assumes a fiduciary responsi hility to the Class and Collective Action Members to represent their interests fairly and adequately, and that he must consider the interests of the Class and Collective Action Members j ust as he would represent and consider his own interests, and that he may not favor his own interests over those of the Class or Collective Action Members . 54. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the Class and Plaintifl's claims are typical of the Class. 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs" l" through "55" of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 57. At all times relevant hereto, upon information and belief, the Corporate Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLS/\, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are covered individuals within the meaning of the f'LSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 58. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 59. At least within each of the three (3) most recent years relevant to the allegations herein, the Corporate Defendants separately had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 60. At least within each of the three (3) most recen t years relevant to the allegations herein, the Corporate Defendants jointly had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 61. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were entit led to be paid at the statutory rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of the maximum hours provided for in the FLSA. 63. Defendants had, and continue to have a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensa tion at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per work week, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)( l) and 2 1 S(a). 64. Defondants knowing ly and willfully disrega rded the provisions of the FLSA as evidence d by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members at the statutory overtime rate of time and one-half for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per week, when they knew or should have known such was due and that non-payrnen t of overtime compensation would financially injure Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 65. As a result of Defendants' failure to properly record, report, credit and/or compensate its employees. including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. Defendants have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employ ees sufficient to determine the wages, hours and other cond itions and practices of emp loyment in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 20 I et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 2 15(a). 66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' violations of the FLSA. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitle-cl to liquidated damages pursuant to the FLSA. 68. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members are entitled to an award of their reasonab le anorneys' fees, costs and expenses, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) . 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and re-avers each and every allegation and statement contained in paragraphs " 1" through "68 " of this Complaint as if fully sel forth herein. 70. At all times relevant hereto, Defendants employed Plaintiff and members of the Class within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 71. Plaintiff and Class members were entitled to be paid al lhe statutory rate of time and one-ha lf for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek . 72. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class members ove11imc compe nsation in the lawful amount for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week in direct contravention of !he New York Labor Law. 73. Defendants had, and cont inue lo have a policy and practice of refusing to pay ove1time compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiff and Class members for all hours worked in excess of forty ( 40) hours per work week, which violated and cont inues to violate the New York Labor Law. 75. Defendants foiled to furnish Plaintiff and member~ of the Class with a statement with evecy payment of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravent ion of New York Labor Law§ 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations§ 146-2.3. 76. Defendants failed co keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 66 1. 77. DefcndanL~ failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked. gross wages, deductions, and net wages for each employee, in contravent ion of the New York Labor Law § 194( 4), and New York State Departme11t of Labor Regulations § 146-2. J. 78. Due to Defendants' New York Labor Law violations. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid overtime compensation. unpaid "spread or hours" premium, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York Labor Law§ 663(1) et al. and§ 198. 79. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor Law § 663(1 ), as well as civil penalties and/or liquidated damages pursuant lo the New York State Wage Theft Prevention Act. I Violation of the New York Labor Law J [Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act]

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26. Plaintiffs bring the First Cause of Action, pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons who work or have worked for Hertz as LMs at Defendant’s airport locations during the Relevant Period (the “FLSA Collective”). 27. All of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed has been assigned by Hertz, and/or Hertz has been aware of all of the work that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective have performed. 29. Hertz is aware or should have been aware that federal and state law required them to pay employees performing non-exempt duties, including Plaintiffs and members of the FLSA Collective, an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. 30. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective all perform or performed the same primary duties. 31. Hertz’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent. 32. Throughout their employment with Hertz, Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective consistently worked more than 40 hours per week. 33. Plaintiffs’ and the FLSA Collective’s primary duty was not management. 34. Plaintiffs’ and the FLSA Collective’s primary duties were non-exempt duties, including general customer service and vehicle preparation for rental. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective spent the vast majority of their time performing these non-exempt duties. 35. During the Relevant Period, Plaintiffs and the FLSA collective were paid a weekly salary for their services. 36. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were closely supervised by their directors, general managers and area managers. Area managers were responsible for the overall performance of the sales team and for coaching and developing sales employees. 37. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective did not exercise a meaningful degree of independent discretion with respect to the exercise of their duties and were required to follow the policies, practices, and procedures set by Hertz. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective did not have any independent discretionary authority to deviate from these policies, practices, and procedures. 39. Plaintiffs realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 40. Hertz engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the FLSA, as described in this Collective Action Complaint. 41. Plaintiffs have consented in writing to be parties to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 42. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former employees were engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 43. The overtime wage provisions set forth in §§ 201 et seq. of the FLSA apply to Hertz. 44. Hertz is an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 45. At all times relevant, Plaintiffs were employees within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 46. Hertz failed to pay Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former employees the overtime wages to which they were entitled under the FLSA. 48. Because Hertz’s violations of the FLSA were willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 49. As a result of Hertz’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 50. As a result of the unlawful acts of Hertz, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated current and former employees have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Fair Labor Standards Act – Unpaid Overtime (Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective)

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13. On or about December 27, 2016, New Leaf Recovery Services, P.C., received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine, from “Curexa.” 14. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 15. Defendants are responsible for sending or causing the sending of the fax. 16. Defendants, as the persons whose products or services were advertised in the fax, derived economic benefit from the sending of the fax. 17. Defendants either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the fax. 18. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 19. On information and belief, no patient authorized the sending of fax advertisement to plaintiff. 20. The fax was sent to plaintiff in an effort to advance the sale of defendant’s products or services. 22. The fax did not contain an opt-out notice that complied with 47 U.S.C. §227. 23. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 24. On information and belief, defendants have transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Pennsylvania. 25. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’ unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 26. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-22. 27. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 29. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 30. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 31. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. 32. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 33. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons (b) who, on or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), (c) were sent faxes from “Curexa” promoting goods or services for sale (d) and which did not contain an opt out notice as described in 47 U.S.C. §227. 34. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 37. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 38. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendants is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 40. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendant for: a. Actual damages; b. Statutory damages; c. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; d. Costs of suit; e. An order certifying this action to be a proper class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, establishing an appropriate Classes the Court deems appropriate, finding that plaintiff is a proper representative of the Class, and appointing the lawyers and law firms representing plaintiff as counsel for the Class; f. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted,

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24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff various products. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s various products, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 4155 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 4155 Number. 30. Plaintiff has been registered with the national do-not-call registry since 2011. 31. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 32. The text messages originated from telephone number 290-71, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 33. The number used by Defendant (290-71) is known as a “short code,” a standard 5-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 35. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such numbers from a list without human intervention. 36. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 37. The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 38. The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 39. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 40. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 41. The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant. 42. The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of text messages, which occurs without any human involvement. 44. The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human intervention, and almost instantaneously. Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less. 45. Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks. In other words, the platform controls how quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion. The platform performs this throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function. 47. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 48. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that he spent approximately fifteen minutes investigating the unwanted text messages including how they obtained his number and who the Defendant was. 49. Furthermore, Defendant’s text messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited text messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for text messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations like the ones sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 50. Defendant’s text messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text- message-spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 51. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 53. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 57. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 63. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 64. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 65. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 67. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 68. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 69. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-61 as if fully set forth herein. 70. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 71. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 72. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 73. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 75. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 76. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 77. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 78. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 79. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 81. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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11.Plaintiff and those similarly situated are all employees within the meaning of Section 23(e) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 203(e). Plaintiff is a covered employee within the meaning of the FLSA, and Ohio statutory law. 12.Defendant Nida’s is an employer within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 203(d). In connection with the operation of the restaurant, food, supplies, equipment and other goods are shipped to Defendant via interstate commerce. During the respective periods of their employment by Defendant, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were engaged in handling, selling or otherwise working on goods that were moved in or produced for interstate commerce and customers engaged in interstate commerce. By reason of these activities, the Plaintiff and those similarly situated, are or were engaged in commerce and in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of §3 (s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(s). By virtue Case: 2:20-cv-02477-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/18/20 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: 4 5 of its operations, Defendant is an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined in §3(s) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(s). 13.Defendants are subject to compliance with the overtime requirements and minimum wage requirements contained in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Ohio Revised Code § 4111.01, et seq. 14.Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants employed over four individuals. 15.At all relevant times, Defendants have maintained control, oversight, and direction over Plaintiff, including timekeeping, payroll and other employment practices that applied to her. 16.At all times relevant hereto, Defendants were primarily responsible for setting the compensation to be paid to employees at Nida’s, including Plaintiff, and for establishing and maintaining the company’s payroll policies. 17.Defendants, and each of them, are a covered employer within the meaning of the FLSA, and Ohio law, and, at all times relevant, employed Plaintiff. 18.At all relevant times, Plaintiff has been employed by an entity engaged in commerce and/or the production or sale of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and/or has been engaged in commerce and/or the production or sale of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. 19.At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed "employee[s]," including Plaintiff. 20.Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth above. Case: 2:20-cv-02477-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/18/20 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: 5 6 21.Since at least March 2017, Defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to pay employees the statutory minimum wage and of failing to pay required overtime by conduct including but not limited to the following: (a) Unilaterally deducting for “rules” violations remuneration from the wages and tips worked by employees of the Defendant. (b) Failing to properly pay any hourly wages (c) Running an illegal “tip pool” (d) Illegally retaining employees’ tips (e) Improperly claiming “tip credit” toward employees’ wages. (f) Failing to maintain records of the hours worked by Plaintiff and their other staff at Nida’s, as mandated by federal and state law. 22.By the above and other acts and conduct Defendant repeatedly have violated and are now violating the provisions of §§3, 6, and/or 5(a)(2) of the FLSA. 23.By the acts and conduct described above Defendant repeatedly has violated and is now violating the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§206 and 215(a)(1) and/or (2). 24.The records concerning the number of hours Plaintiffs were required to work and for which Plaintiffs have not been compensated have, upon information and belief, not been kept at all. If such records have been kept, they are in the exclusive possession and control of Defendant. 25.The above described pattern and practice of willful systemic violation of the FLSA complained of by Plaintiffs have similarly affected other employees so that such employees are common and typical to each other. 26.Defendant' s violations have been willful and/or in willful and reckless disregard of Plaintiffs' rights and entitle Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees to liquidated damages. Case: 2:20-cv-02477-ALM-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 05/18/20 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: 6 7 27.Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth above. 28.The Ohio Minimum Wage Act ("OMWA) requires an employer to pay each of his employees a minimum wage under O.R.C. Section 4111.02(A), which Plaintiff and those similarly situated did not receive and for which willfully or recklessly deprivations by Nida’s should be held liable for liquidated and punitive damages. 29.Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation set forth above. 30.As part of the employment contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiffs a specified hourly rate for all hours worked. 31.Plaintiff performed services for Defendant but were not paid for all hours worked. 32.Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff for all hours worked constitutes a breach of the employment contract. 33.As a result of the Defendant's breach, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the form of unpaid wages and are entitled to judgment in the amount of wages earned but not paid by Defendant.

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10. On information and belief, part of Defendant’s strategy for increasing its sales is to engage in telemarketing. In their zeal to market though, they systematically called consumers who did not consent to receive telemarketing calls and who were registered on the do not call registry. 11. Defendant made (and continues to make) these telemarketing calls to consumers nationwide without their prior express consent to do so. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant does not crosscheck or scrub its calling list for numbers registered on the National Do Not Call Registry. 13. Likewise, Defendant places repeated and unwanted calls to consumers whose phone numbers are registered with the National Do Not Call Registry. Consumers register their phone numbers on the Do Not Call list for the express purpose of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls like those alleged here. 15. Defendant knowingly made (and continues to make) these telemarketing calls without the prior express consent of the call recipients and knowingly continues to call them after requests to stop. In so doing, Defendant not only invaded the personal privacy of Plaintiff and members of the putative Class, but also intentionally and repeatedly violated the TCPA. 16. Starting in or around July 2014, Plaintiff Vebell began receiving multiple calls on her landline telephone from the phone number (860) 359-4133. 17. Plaintiff did not answer the calls that rang to her residential telephone but rather called the phone number back to figure out who was calling. The voice message on the call back number stated “Thank you for calling Verde Energy, we’ve been trying to reach you for marketing purposes, we’ll try you again later.” Since Plaintiff had never consented to receive marketing calls from Verde she continued to ignore their intrusive calls. 18. Plaintiff Vebell does not have a relationship with Defendant, has never submitted her telephone number to Defendant, or requested that Defendant call her or offer her their services. Simply put, Plaintiff has never provided her prior express consent to Defendant to place calls to her. 19. Plaintiff’s landline telephone number XXX-XXX-5031 has been registered with the National Do Not Call Registry since June 18, 2010, for the explicit purpose of avoiding telemarketing calls just like those alleged in this case. 21. Defendant was and is aware that the above-described telephone calls were and are being made to consumers like Plaintiff who had not consented to receive them and whose telephone numbers were registered with the National Do Not Call Registry. 22. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated individuals and entities defined as follows (the “Class”): All individuals in the United States (1) who had his or her telephone number(s) registered with the National Do Not Call Registry; (2) for whom Defendant have no record of consent to place telemarketing calls promoting Defendant's products or services to him or her; (3) who received more than one telephone call promoting Defendant's products or services; (4) within any 12-month period. Excluded from the Class are (1) Defendant, Defendant's agents, subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or their parents have a controlling interest and their current and former employees, officers, and directors, (2) the Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge’s or Magistrate Judge’s immediate family, (3) persons who execute and file a timely request for exclusion, (4) the legal representatives, successors, or assigns of any such excluded person; and (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant's counsel. 23. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant have made telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendant's records. 25. Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because Defendant have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s practice of making unsolicited telemarketing calls apply to and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge to those practices hinges on Defendant's conduct with respect to each of the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant's misconduct on an individual basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. Economies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be ensured. 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 28. 47 U.S.C. §227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 30. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (e), provides that § 64.1200 (c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers to the extent described in the Commission’s Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153, ‘Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991,’” which the Report and Order, in turn, provides as follows: The Commission’s rules provide that companies making telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers must comply with time of day restrictions and must institute procedures for maintaining do-not-call lists. For the reasons described above, we conclude that these rules apply to calls made to wireless telephone numbers. We believe that wireless subscribers should be afforded the same protections as wireline subscribers. 32. Defendant violated § 64.1200 (c) by initiating telephone solicitations to wireless and residential telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. These consumers requested not to receive calls from Defendant, as set forth in § 64.l200 (d)(3). 33. Defendant and/or their agents made more than one unsolicited telephone call to Plaintiff and members of the Class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent to receive such calls. Plaintiff and members of the Class never provided any form of consent to receive telephone calls from Defendant. 34. Defendant violated § 64.1200 (d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential and wireless telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the Class, without instituting procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them. 36. To the extent Defendant's misconduct is determined to be wilful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Class. 64.1200. 9. Defendant Verde sells energy products to consumers.2 Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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17. Defendant operates a nationwide chain of upscale bar/restaurants called Bar Louie. 18. Defendant employs bartenders to provide services to its restaurant patrons. 19. Plaintiff is currently employed as a bartender at Defendant’s San Antonio, Texas Bar Louie restaurant. Plaintiff was hired on or about March of 2013. Plaintiff works 35 to 40 hours per week. 20. Defendant pays its bartenders at an hourly rate below minimum wage ($2.13 per hour) plus tips. By paying Plaintiff and Class Members less than the minimum wage per hour, Defendant is taking advantage of a tip credit which allows Defendant to include in its calculation of wages a portion of the amounts Plaintiff receives as tips. 21. Defendant violated the FLSA when it required Plaintiff and Class Members to share tips with its salaried bar managers in violation of the FLSA’s tip pool requirements. In addition, by deducting more than the actual credit card fees associated with liquidated credit card tips, Defendant has violated the FLSA. 23. As such, the Plaintiff and other bartenders were not compensated at the federally mandated minimum wage. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ tips have also been misappropriated by Defendant as a result of its wage violations. 24. Defendant knows or should have known that its policies and practices violate the FLSA, and Defendant has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA. Rather, Defendant knowingly, willfully, and/or with reckless disregard of the law carried and continues to carry out its illegal pattern and practice regarding its tipped employees. Defendant’s method of paying Plaintiff in violation of the FLSA was not based on a good faith and reasonable belief that its conduct complied with the FLSA. This is not Defendant’s first FLSA lawsuit. It has been sued in other states for similar wage violations. However, it continues similar illegal pay practices today. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to a three-year statute of limitations. 29. Defendant takes a tip credit against its minimum wage obligations for the Plaintiff and all of its bartenders. Defendant also requires Plaintiff and all of its bartenders to share tips with its salaried bar managers. This pay practice applies nationwide to all of its restaurant locations. 30. The Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as the Plaintiff. 31. Class Members are not exempt from receiving pay at the federally mandated minimum wage rate under the FLSA. 32. As such, Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of job duties, pay structure, and/or the denial of minimum wage. 33. Defendant’s failure to pay for hours worked at the minimum wage rate required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the Class Members. 34. The experiences of the Plaintiff, with respect to his pay, are typical of the experiences of the Class Members. 35. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Class Member does not prevent collective treatment. 36. All Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to compensation for hours worked at the federally mandated minimum wage rate. 38. Due to the inherent nature of Defendant’s tip credit and tip pool policies, all of Defendant’s employees subject to a tip credit are similarly situated with respect to the violation. 39. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiffs is properly defined as follows: Current and former bartenders employed by Defendant nationwide at any time three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit to the present.

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13. Plaintiff brings this action as a state wide class action, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”), on behalf of himself and all Kansas consumers and their successors in interest (the “Class”), who have received debt collection letters, and/or notices from the Defendants which are in violation of the FDCPA, as described in this Complaint. 14. This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class consists of:  All Kansas consumers who received collection letters and/or notices from the Defendants that contained at least one of the alleged violations arising from the Defendants’ violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  The Class period begins one year prior to the filing of this action. 16. On or before April 1, 2013, Plaintiff’s alleged account with Emergency Services of Kan became past due and was in default. 18. On or before April 1, 2013, Emergency Services of Kan placed Plaintiff’s alleged account with HRRG for the purpose of collection. 19. On or before April 1, 2013, HRRG caused to be mailed to Plaintiff a letter attempting to collect the alleged debt. A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A. 20. Said letter requested payment in full. 21. Said letter stated in part, “If we can answer any questions, or if you feel you do not owe this amount, please call us toll free at 800-984-9115 or write us at the above address.” [Bold emphasis added.] 22. Upon receipt Plaintiff read said letter. 23. Pursuant to the FDCPA, a dispute of a debt must be in writing to cease collection of the debt until the debt is verified by the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 24. Defendant produced and mailed said letter to Plaintiff after a letter containing the same language was found by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to violate the FDCPA in an opinion filed March 1, 2013. Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2013). 25. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 24 as if the same were here set forth at length. 27. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires the debt collector to give what is commonly referred to as a thirty-day (30) notice within five (5) days of its communication with the consumer. 28. Section 1692g(a)(3),(4),(5) of the FDCPA requires the debt collector: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt…send the consumer a written notice containing --- (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector --- (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and --- (5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 29. HRRG’s letter to Plaintiff, dated April 1, 2013 contained the required validation notice on the back of the letter. 30. The second paragraph of HRRG’s letter to Plaintiff, dated April 1, 2013, states in its entirety, “If we can answer any questions, or if you feel you do not owe this account, please call us toll free at 800-984-9115 or write us at the above address. This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. (NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION.)” [Bold emphasis added.] 32. Upon reading paragraph two of the notice from HRRG, the least sophisticated consumer would believe that he should choose either of the instructions as set forth in the second paragraph of the notice and either call the toll free number or write to HRGG at the address on the letter, to dispute the alleged debt. 33. Pursuant to the FDCPA, a dispute of a debt must be in writing to cease collection of the debt until the debt is verified by the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 34. HRRG violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA by providing instructional language which is confusing and makes the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to what he must do to properly dispute the alleged debt. 35. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for declaratory judgment that Defendants’ conduct violated Section 1692g et seq., of the FDCPA, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 36. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 35 as if the same were here set forth at length. 37. Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692 VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5)

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22. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 23. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 24. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 25. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 26. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 27. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 28. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant caused a collection letter dated April 8, 2020, to be sent to Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 5 29. The Letter conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt. 30. The Letter is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 31. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 33. The failure by a debt collector to provide the written notice containing referenced above is a violation of the FDCPA. 34. The Letter was the initial communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 35. The Letter does not contain the information required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 36. Plaintiff did not pay the alleged Debt. 37. Plaintiff did not receive any other written communication from Defendant within five days of the Letter. 38. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 40. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 6 41. The Letter states, “Please be advised the thirty (30) day verification period has passed.” 42. The Letter further states, “This is a demand for payment in full. You can avoid further collection activity on this item by paying in full.” 43. However, the failure of a consumer to dispute a debt does not operate as a waiver of any right to dispute or challenge a debt. 44. The failure of a consumer to dispute a debt does not operate as a waiver of any right not to pay a debt. 45. A consumer can dispute a debt at any time, regardless of whether the consumer exercises her right to dispute the debt within the validation period. 46. The Letter would lead the least sophisticated consumer to believe that she cannot dispute the alleged debt. 47. The Letter would lead the least sophisticated consumer to believe that the only available option is to pay the alleged Debt in full. 48. As such, the Letter constitutes false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 49. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 50. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. 51. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter substantially and materially similar to the letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the 7 present. 52. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 53. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 54. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 55. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 56. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e

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17. On or about January 11, 2016, Doherty began receiving telephone calls from Defendant on his cellular telephone ending with “7814.” 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s calls were made via an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 49. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 50. The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. 227 et. seq. 51. As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 53. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 54. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 55. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff is entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. § 227 NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (TCPA) 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10. Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in the State of California, County of San Diego, and within this judicial district. 11. Sometime prior to December of 2016, Plaintiff allegedly incurred debts to Defendant for an account ending in 9942 and an account ending in 4396. 12. Beginning around June of 2017, Defendant initiated multiple telephonic communications to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone ending in “9532”. Plaintiff found these communications excessive, inconvenient and harassing. 28. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 29. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any text messages from Defendant or their agent/s and/or employee/s, not sent for emergency purposes, to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 30. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 43. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 44. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 46. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks, for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). • Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. • Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

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10. Defendant’s message constituted “telephone solicitation” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) and “unsolicited advertisement” as defined by the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5). 11. Defendant used a “telephone facsimile machine” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3) to place its message to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 12. Defendant’s message constituted message that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 15. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously consented to receiving such messages 16. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of All persons within the United States who received any telephone facsimile messages from Defendant to said person’s telephone facsimile number made through the use of any telephone facsimile machine and such person had not previously provided their telephone facsimile number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 17. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 8. Beginning in or around March of 2019, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on his telephone facsimile numbers ending in -4206, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant contacted Plaintiff via facsimile from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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20. Defendant is a property rental company that owns and operates www.vacasa.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant’s Website offers rental properties to the public, and offers features which ought to allow users to browse available rental properties, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse available properties offered for rent. 22. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS and NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 23. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in May of 2019, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s Website, www.vacasa.com, to browse an available vacation property for rent. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied an experience similar to that of a sighted individual. 25. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. Here, Plaintiff attempted to click on an image of “Hilton Head Beach Fronts,” however, Plaintiff encountered the error message “HTTP “404” instead. 26. Finally, the Website requires the use of a mouse to browse the Website. However, Plaintiff cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Defendant’s Website requires a mouse as it contains multiple pages with “drop-down” menus, which cannot be accessed absent the use of a mouse. For example, when attempting to select an intended destination, check-in and check-out dates, and number of guests the user is required to use a mouse. 27. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 30. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 31. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 32. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.1 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 73. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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20. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class consisting of all persons who purchased the common stock of SandRidge during the Class Period and who were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers and directors of the Company at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 22. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 23. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. 24. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (a) whether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants’ acts as alleged herein; (b) whether statements made by Defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the business, operations and management of SandRidge; and (c) to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the proper measure of damages. 26. On March 1, 2013 SandRidge filed its annual report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012 on Form 10-K with the SEC. The 10-K was signed by Defendants Ward, Bennett, and Cooley. The 10-K was separately certified by Defendants Ward and Bennett pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) attesting to the completeness and accuracy of the Company’s annual report. The financial statements contained in the 10-K were materially false and misleading because they failed properly to account for the penalties SandRidge accrued under the agreement with Occidental. 27. On May 8, 2013 SandRidge filed with the SEC its quarterly report for the first quarter of 2013 ended March 31, 2013 on Form 10-Q. The 10-Q was signed by Defendant Bennett; and separately certified by Ward and Bennett pursuant to SOX attesting to the completeness and accuracy of the Company’s quarterly report. The financial statements contained in the 10-Q were materially false and misleading because they failed properly to account for the penalties SandRidge accrued under the agreement with Occidental. 29. On November 6, 2013 SandRidge filed with the SEC its quarterly report for the third quarter of 2013 ended September 30, 2013 on Form 10-Q. The 10-Q was signed by Defendant LeBlanc; and separately certified by Bennett and LeBlanc pursuant to SOX attesting to the completeness and accuracy of the Company’s quarterly report. The financial statements contained in the 10-Q were materially false and misleading because they failed to properly account for the penalties SandRidge accrued under the agreement with Occidental. 30. On February 28, 2014 SandRidge filed with the SEC its annual report for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013 on Form 10-K. The 10-K was signed by Defendants Bennett, LeBlanc, and Cooley; and separately certified by Bennett and LeBlanc pursuant to SOX attesting to the completeness and accuracy of the Company’s annual report. The financial statements contained in the 10-K were materially false and misleading because they failed properly to account for the penalties SandRidge accrued under the agreement with Occidental. 32. On August 7, 2014 SandRidge filed with the SEC its quarterly report for the second quarter of 2014 ended June 30, 2013 on Form 10-Q. The 10-Q was signed by Defendant LeBlanc; and separately certified by Bennett and LeBlanc pursuant to SOX attesting to the completeness and accuracy of the Company’s quarterly report. The financial statements contained in the 10-Q were materially false and misleading because they failed to properly account for the penalties SandRidge accrued under the agreement with Occidental. 40. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 41. This claim is asserted against all Defendants. 43. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about the business, operations and future prospects of SandRidge as specified herein. 44. These Defendants employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud, while in possession of material adverse non-public information and engaged in acts, practices, and a course of conduct as alleged herein in an effort to assure investors of SandRidge’s value and performance and continued substantial growth, which included the making of, or the participation in the making of, untrue statements of material facts and omitting to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made about SandRidge and its business operations and future prospects in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, as set forth more particularly herein, and engaged in transactions, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers SandRidge’s securities during the Class Period. 46. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of material facts set forth herein, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed to ascertain and to disclose such facts, even though such facts were available to them. Such Defendants’ material misrepresentations and/or omissions were done knowingly or recklessly and for the purpose and effect of concealing SandRidge’s financial condition and future business prospects from the investing public and supporting the artificially inflated or distorted price of its securities. As demonstrated by Defendants’ misstatements of the Company’s financial condition and business prospects throughout the Class Period, Defendants, if they did not have actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions alleged, were reckless in failing to obtain such knowledge by deliberately refraining from taking those steps necessary to discover whether those statements were false or misleading. 48. At the time of said misrepresentations and omissions, Plaintiff and other members of the Class were ignorant of their falsity, and believed them to be true. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and the marketplace known the truth regarding SandRidge’s financial results, which were not disclosed by Defendants, Plaintiff and other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired SandRidge securities, or, if they had acquired such securities during the Class Period, they would not have done so at the artificially inflated prices or distorted prices at which they did. 49. By virtue of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 51. This action was filed within two years of discovery of the fraud and within five years of Plaintiff’s purchases of securities giving rise to the cause of action. 52. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 53. This Second Claim is asserted against each of the Individual Defendants. 55. In particular, each of these Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. 56. As set forth above, SandRidge and the certain Individual Defendants each violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by their acts and omissions as alleged in this Complaint. 57. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as they culpably participated in the fraud alleged herein. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company’s common stock during the Class Period. Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act Against and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants

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12. Plaintiff brings claims for relief as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all non-exempt employees, including cooks, food preparers, dishwashers, cashiers, hosts/hostesses, porters, bartenders, barbacks, servers, runners, 6 bussers and delivery persons, employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). 13. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them the proper overtime compensation at the rate of one and one half times the regular hourly rate for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek due to time-shaving. With regard to Plaintiff and a subgroup of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs who were tipped employees (“Tipped Subclass”) (i.e. bartenders, barbacks, servers, bussers, runners and delivery persons), Defendants were not entitled to take any tip credits because they failed to meet statutory requirements under the FLSA. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are essentially the same as those of FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 14. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to § 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 15. Plaintiff brings claims for relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt employees, including cooks, food preparers, dishwashers, cashiers, hosts/hostesses, porters, bartenders, barbacks, servers, runners, bussers 7 and delivery persons, employed by Defendants on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 16. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the position held, and rates of pay for each Class member are also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under F.R.C.P. 23. 17. The proposed Class is so numerous that a joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants, there is no doubt that there are more than forty (40) members of the Class. The Class further includes a subclass of tipped employees comprised of servers, bussers, runners, bartenders, barbacks and delivery persons (“Tipped Subclass”) who also number more than forty (40). Plaintiff is a member of both the Class and the Tipped Subclass. 18. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims, which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief, which would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of (i) failing to pay Class members for all hours worked (including overtime hours) due to time-shaving, (ii) failing to pay spread-of-hours premium, (ii) failing to provide proper wage statements per requirements of the New York Labor Law, and (iv) failing to provide proper wage and hour notices per requirements of the New York 8 Labor Law. With regard to Plaintiff and the Tipped Subclass, Defendants were not entitled to take any tip credits because they failed to meet statutory requirements under the New York Labor Law. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 19. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour cases. 20. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of the wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against a corporate defendant. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of 9 separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 21. Defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity, which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 22. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: (a) Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and Class members within the meaning of the New York law; (b) What are and were the policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans of Defendants regarding the types of work and labor for which Defendants did not pay the Class members properly; (c) At what common rate, or rates subject to common methods of calculation, was and are Defendants required to pay Plaintiff and Class members for their work; 10 (d) Whether Defendants properly notified Plaintiff and Class members of their regular hourly rate and overtime rate; (e) Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members the proper minimum wage under the New York Labor Law; (f) Whether Defendants provided proper notice to Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members that Defendants were taking a tip credit; (g) Whether Defendants provided proper wage statements informing Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members of the amount of tip credit taken for each payment period and other information required to be provided on wage statements; (h) Whether Defendants took the proper amount of tip credit allowance from Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members under the New York Labor Law; (i) Whether Defendants required Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members to perform non-tipped work for more than 20 percent of their workday; (j) Whether Defendants kept daily records of tips earned by Plaintiff and the Tipped Subclass members; (k) Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and Class members the proper overtime compensation under the New York Labor Law; (l) Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and Class members for all hours worked given Defendants’ illegal policy of time-shaving. (m) Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and Class members the “spread of hours” premium as required by the New York Labor Law; (n) Whether Defendants provided proper wage statements to Plaintiff and Class members per requirements of the New York Labor Law; and 11 (o) Whether Defendants provided proper wage and hour notices to Plaintiff and Class members per requirements of the New York Labor Law. 23. In or about June 2011, Plaintiff ANSBERTO JUAREZ GONZALEZ was employed by Defendants to work as a delivery person for Defendants’ “Angelo’s Pizza” restaurant located at 1043 2nd Avenue, New York, NY 10022. Plaintiff’s employment was terminated on February 21, 2017. 24. During the employment of Plaintiff ANSBERTO JUAREZ GONZALEZ, he worked over forty (40) hours per week. During Plaintiff ANSBERTO JUAREZ GONZALEZ’s employment by Defendants, he regularly worked shifts that exceeded ten (10) hours in length each workweek. 25. Throughout his entire employment, Plaintiff’s working hours included the following scheduled shifts: from 5:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on Mondays, from 11:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on Tuesdays, from 12:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Thursdays, from 11:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. on Fridays, and from 5:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on Saturdays; without a meal break, for a total of forty and a half (40.5) hours per week. However, Defendants deducted one (1) hour for a lunch break from Plaintiff’s and Class members’ payroll each workday, even though Plaintiff and Class members worked through all of their lunch breaks during their employment with Defendants. In addition, Defendants only paid Plaintiff and delivery persons for their scheduled working hours, but in reality, Plaintiff and delivery persons had to work one (1) hour past their scheduled shift each workday because they were instructed by the Defendants to make at least two to three deliveries, even after clocking out. Each workweek, the resulting shaved time was approximately ten (10) hours in length for Plaintiff and other delivery persons, and five (5) hours in length for 12 all other Class members. FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members were required to work similar hours and similarly suffered a policy of time-shaving. 26. From the beginning of his employment until in or about January 2016, Plaintiff received an hourly rate of $5.00 per hour. From in or about January 2016 until the end of his employment, Plaintiff received an hourly rate of $7.50 per hour. Based on Plaintiff ANSBERTO JUAREZ GONZALEZ’s direct observations and conversations with other employees, Tipped Subclass members worked similar hours and were similarly paid on an hourly basis. 27. At all relevant times, Defendants paid Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members below the prevailing minimum wage in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 28. Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members did not receive proper notice that Defendants were claiming a tip credit. In addition, Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members did not receive notice informing them that the tips they received must be retained by them except for a valid tip pooling arrangement, or that the tip credit taken by Defendants may not exceed the value of tips that they actually received. Further, Defendants failed to provide proper wage statements informing Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members of the amount of tip credit taken for each payment period. 29. During his employment with Defendants, Plaintiff and the Tipped Subclass members were required to engage in various non-tipped activities, such as accepting and unloading incoming supplies, taking out all garbage, sweeping the floor and cleaning the restaurant, for twenty (20) percent or more of their workday. Based on Plaintiff’s direct observations and conversations with other employees, Tipped Subclass members similarly spent at least twenty (20) percent of their workday performing such non-tipped activities. 13 30. At all relevant times, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members regularly worked over forty (40) hours per week, but Defendants failed to pay them the proper overtime compensation due to time-shaving, in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 31. At all times relevant, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class members for all hours worked due to a policy of time-shaving, in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 32. At all times relevant, the workdays of Plaintiff and Class members regularly exceeded ten (10) hours per day. However, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class members the “spread of hours” premium as required by NYLL. 33. At no time during the relevant time periods did Defendants provide Plaintiff or Class members with proper wage and hour notices or wage statements as required by NYLL. 34. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members either the FLSA minimum wage or the New York State minimum wage. With regard to Tipped Subclass members, Defendants were not entitled to take any tip credits because they failed to meet statutory requirements under the FLSA and 41. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 40 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 42. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 43. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 44. At all relevant times, each of the Corporate Defendants had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000. 15 45. At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in a policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for all hours worked due to time-shaving. 46. At all relevent times, Defendants had a policy and practice of failing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiffs and Tipped Subclass members for their hours worked. 47. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of failing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 48. Defendants knew of and/or showed a willful disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and Tipped Subclass members at the statutory minimum wage when Defendants knew or should have known such was due. 49. Defendants knew of and/or showed a willful disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs at the the statutory overtime premium of time and one-half for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week when Defendants knew or should have known such was due. 50. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 51. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e. double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 52. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid minimum wage and unpaid overtime compensation, plus an equal amount as liquidated damages. 16 53. Records, if any, concerning the number of hours worked by Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and the actual compensation paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are in the possession and custody of Defendants. Plaintiff intends to obtain these records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this case and, if necessary, will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the precise amount due. 54. Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 55. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 54 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 56. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were employed by Defendants within the meaning of the New York Labor Law §§ 2 and 651. 57. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Tipped Subclass members’ rights by failing to pay them the minimum wage required by the New York Labor Law. As factually described above, Defendants were not entitled to any tip credits under NYLL with respect to the Tipped Subclass. 58. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them the proper overtime compensation at rates of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, due to time-shaving. 59. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them for all hours worked due to a policy of time-shaving. 17 60. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiff’s and Class members’ rights by failing to pay the spread-of-hours premium for each workday that exceeded ten (10) hours. 61. Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to provide proper wage and hour notices to Plaintiff and Class members, as required by New York Labor Law § 195(1). 62. Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to provide proper wage statements to Plaintiff and Class members with every wage payment, as required by New York Labor Law § 195(3). 63. Due to Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wage, unpaid wages and overtime compensation due to time-shaving, unpaid spread-of-hours premium, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, statutory penalties, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW

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13. The United States Government Accountability Office noted in a June 2007 report on Data Breaches (“GAO Report”) that identity thieves use identifying data such as SSNs to open financial accounts, receive government benefits and incur charges and credit in a person’s name.1 As the GAO Report states, this type of identity theft is the most harmful because it may take some time for the victim to become aware of the theft and can adversely impact the victim’s credit rating. 14. In addition, the GAO Report states that victims of identity theft will face “substantial costs and inconveniences repairing damage to their credit records” and their “good name.”2 16. With access to an individual’s Sensitive Information, criminals can do more than just empty a victim’s bank account—they can also commit various types of fraud, including: obtaining a driver’s license or official identification card in the victim’s name but with the thief’s picture; using the victim’s name and SSN to obtain government benefits; or, filing a fraudulent tax return using the victim’s information (like Plaintiff Weinberg experienced in this case). In addition, identity thieves may obtain a job using the victim’s SSN, rent a house or receive medical services in the victim’s name, and may even give the victim’s personal information to police during an arrest resulting in an arrest warrant being issued in the victim’s name.5 Further, loss of private and personal health information can expose the victim to loss of reputation, loss of job employment, blackmail and other negative effects. 18. A study by Experian found that the “average total cost” of medical identity theft is “about $20,000” per incident, and that a majority of victims of medical identity theft were forced to pay out-of-pocket costs for healthcare they did not receive in order to restore coverage.7 Almost half of medical identity theft victims lose their healthcare coverage as a result of the incident, while nearly one-third saw their insurance premiums rise, and forty percent were never able to resolve their identity theft at all.8 Indeed, data breaches and identity theft have a crippling effect on individuals and detrimentally impact the entire economy as a whole. 19. Further, medical databases are particularly high value targets for identity thieves. According to a 2012 National Insurance report, “[a] stolen medical identity has a $50 street value – whereas a stolen social security number, on the other hand, only sells for $1.”9 In fact, the medical industry has experienced disproportionally higher instances of computer theft than any other industry. 20. Indeed, Intermedix’s Notice of Data Breach letter even recognizes the long- lasting harmful effects of its misconduct and recommends that Plaintiff and the Class remain vigilant and continue to monitor their credit indefinitely. The Data Breach. 22. The employee sought out these patients’ Sensitive Information so that he or she could disclose or sell that information to third parties who, in turn, used the information to file fraudulent tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service (so that they could recover those individuals’ tax refunds). 23. Intermedix designed and implemented its policies and procedures regarding the security of protected health information and Sensitive Information. These policies and procedures failed to adhere to reasonable and best industry practices in safeguarding protected health information and other Sensitive Information. For instance, Intermedix failed to supervise employees with access to patients’ Sensitive Information, provide adequate protections and safeguards limiting access to this information, or otherwise safeguard Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ Sensitive Information. 24. Further, Intermedix did not timely investigate or notify Plaintiff or the Class members by written, telephone, electronic or authorized substitute notice until Intermedix posted a Notice of Data Breach on its website in late 2014. The “notice” itself was problematic inasmuch as Plaintiff and the Class did not have a direct relationship (business or otherwise) with Intermedix and had no reason to visit Intermedix’s website (where they would still have to search for the Notice of Data Breach). That’s because Intermedix was merely the payment and billing processor used by Plaintiff’s and the Class’s medical service providers and thus, were “behind the scenes.” 26. Incredibly, and thanks to Intermedix’s wholly inadequate policies concerning the handling and security of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Sensitive Information (including the oversight of those employees with access to such information), an employee—without authorization—was able to systematically access potentially millions of patient records and put that data directly into the hands of thieves. 27. The risk and other consequences associated with this outcome are clear. Even Defendants—through their Notice of Data Breach regarding the data breach—advised those affected to “remain vigilant and monitor your credit reports periodically,” and further advised that those affected consider “enroll[ing] in a free credit monitoring service” or “placing a fraud alert or security freeze on your credit report.” Intermedix Violated HIPAA and Industry Standard Data Protection Protocols. 28. HIPAA was enacted and became effective in 1996. 29. Title II of HIPAA contains what are known as the Administrative Simplification provisions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301, et seq. These provisions require, among other things, that the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) create rules to streamline the standards for handling Sensitive Information, like the data unsecured by Intermedix. The HHS has subsequently promulgated five rules under authority of the Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA. 33. In another example, NIST also discussed means for establishing “Workstation Security” which included documenting “the different ways workstations are accessed by employees and nonemployees,” as well as how to maintain proper “Access Control” by determining, among other things, how users access and use information and how much information they should be permitted to access at any given time.11 34. These examples illustrate Intermedix’s failure to comply with even basic industry standards. Even more striking is that one of the exact examples recommended by NIST (i.e., monitoring and limiting access to Sensitive Information, a free and commonly used technique), would have prevented the unauthorized access of Sensitive Information at issue here. 35. Unfortunately, the above-described security measures were not implemented, which resulted in the unauthorized access to and use of Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Sensitive Information. Plaintiff Yehonatan Weinberg’s Experience. 36. In 2012, Plaintiff Weinberg sought emergency medical treatment and was taken to a hospital in an ambulance. 37. In order to use the ambulance, Plaintiff Weinberg was required to provide the ambulance service with his Sensitive Information. 39. The records accessed and viewed by the Intermedix employee discussed above included Plaintiff’s Sensitive Information. 40. Plaintiff Weinberg’s Sensitive Information was thereafter disclosed to or sold to a group of individuals who subsequently used that information to steal his identity and file a fraudulent tax return using his name and Social Security number. 41. After learning that his identity was stolen, Plaintiff Weinberg spent (and continues to spend) a substantial amount of time and resources fixing the identity theft that he experienced. 42. Prior to the Intermedix data breach, Plaintiff Weinberg’s identity had never been stolen. 43. Indeed, prior to learning about the Intermedix data breach, Plaintiff Weinberg took (and continues to take) considerable precautions to protect his Sensitive Information. Weinberg avoids transmitting his Sensitive Information over insecure sources. He stores documents containing Sensitive Information in a safe and secure location and destroys any documents that he receives in the mail that contain any of his Sensitive Information, or that contain any information that could otherwise be used to steal his identity, such as credit card offers. 45. Thus, given that before the data breach Plaintiff Weinberg had never previously suffered from identity theft and undertook considerable efforts to protect his Sensitive Information, Weinberg has sufficiently shown that the data breach caused identity theft here. 46. In short, but for Intermedix’s data breach, Weinberg’s identity would not have been stolen—and, in turn, his Sensitive Information would not have been used to file a fraudulent tax return purportedly on his behalf. 48. Numerosity: The exact number of members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, but on information and belief, there are thousands of Class members throughout the country, making joinder of each individual member impracticable. Ultimately, the members of the Class will be easily identified through Defendants’ records. 50. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct with Plaintiff and the Class. 51. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 52. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ policies challenged herein apply and affect members of the Class uniformly and Plaintiff’s challenge of these policies hinges on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff or any other Class member. 54. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 55. Intermedix requested and came into possession of the Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Sensitive Information, and had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting such information from being accessed. Intermedix’s duty arose from the legal and industry standards discussed above. 56. Intermedix had a duty to employ procedures to detect and prevent the improper access and misuse of the Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Sensitive Information. The breach of security, unauthorized access, and resulting injury to Plaintiff and the Class were reasonably foreseeable, particularly in light of Intermedix’s inadequate data security protocols and the other major data breaches impacting companies in the United States that fail to implement proper data security measures. 57. Intermedix, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to Plaintiff and the Class by failing to implement industry-standard protocols and exercising reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ Sensitive Information within Intermedix’s control. 59. But for Intermedix’s breach of its duties, Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Sensitive Information would not have been compromised. Plaintiff’s and the Class’s Sensitive Information was stolen and accessed as the proximate result of Intermedix failing to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding such information by adopting, implementing, and maintaining appropriate security measures. 60. As a result of Intermedix’s conduct, Plaintiff and the Class suffered and will continue to suffer actual damages including, but not limited to, expenses and/or time spent on credit monitoring and identity theft insurance; time spent scrutinizing bank statements, credit card statements, and credit reports; expenses and/or time spent initiating fraud alerts; decreased credit scores and ratings; and increased risk of future harm (such as fraudulent charges, fraudulently filed tax returns, and greater susceptibility to identity theft—along with all of the time and expenses associated with dealing with that). Further, Plaintiff and the Class have suffered and will continue to suffer other forms of injury and/or harm including, but not limited to, anxiety, emotional distress, loss of privacy, and other economic and non-economic losses. 61. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Identity Theft Subclass have suffered actual damages including suffering from identity theft. 62. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 66. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Identity Theft Subclass have suffered actual damages including suffering from instances of identity theft. 67. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein, excluding paragraphs 54–66. 68. Plaintiff and members of the Class conferred a monetary benefit on Intermedix. Intermedix received and retained money belonging to Plaintiff and the Class in the form of service or processing fees charged to their medical service providers for Intermedix’s billing and payment processing services. 69. Intermedix appreciates or has knowledge of such benefit. 70. The service or processing fees that Plaintiff and the Class (directly or indirectly) paid to Intermedix are used by Intermedix, in part, to pay for the administrative costs of data management and security. Intermedix even claims to have invested millions of dollars in its information security safeguards to protect patient related data. 72. Accordingly, Intermedix has received money from Plaintiff and the Class through the unlawful practices alleged herein, which in equity and good conscience should be returned. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) It is Well Established That Security Breaches Lead to Instances of Identity Theft, Like Those Experienced in This Case. Negligence (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Restitution/Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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14. At all relevant times, Plaintiff worked as a Membership Advisor for Defendant in Defendant’s Meriden location. Plaintiff and the other Membership Advisors were scheduled for forty-five (45) hours per week, but frequently worked more than forty-five (45) hours. 15. Plaintiff and Membership Advisors were paid pursuant to a common pay plan which did not include overtime premiums in violation of state and federal law. They were scheduled to work forty-five (45) hours per week and frequently worked longer hours, sometimes over fifty (50) especially at the end of the month, but were not paid overtime premiums for those extra hours. 16. Plaintiff’s regularly scheduled work hours varied between twelve (12) pm to nine (9) pm or one (1) pm to ten (10) pm and she worked Monday through Wednesday, Fridays and Saturdays. Plaintiff was off on Thursdays and Sundays. This scheduled totaled nine (9) hours per day and five (5) days per week for a total of forty-five (45) hours. 17. This pay plan included a base salary ($25,000) along with other income in the form of bonuses and commissions. 19. For example, during the month of November 2015, Defendant paid Plaintiff one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three dollars and six cents ($1,923.06) in salary and one hundred seventy dollars and fifty cents ($170.50) in commissions. 20. Additionally, in September 2016, Defendant paid Plaintiff one thousand nine hundred and twenty-three dollars and six cents ($1,923.06) and five hundred and eight dollars and twenty-seven cents ($508.27) in commissions. 21. At the beginning of 2017, Defendant changed the classification of Membership Advisors from exempt to non-exempt. It changed their pay plan from salary /commission to hourly /commission. 22. After this change in their compensation, Defendant began paying Membership Advisors overtime but failed to include their commissions in the calculation of their overtime pay in violation of state and federal law. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-76b(1); 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). 33. Based on the foregoing, Defendant violated the FLSA as to Plaintiff and the class of Membership Advisors who worked for Defendant from September 14, 2014 to December 31, 2016. 34. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated individuals who opt into this litigation are entitled to overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and court costs. 35. Based on the foregoing, Defendant violated the FLSA as to Plaintiff and the class of Membership Advisors who worked for Defendant from January 1, 2017 until the date of final judgment in this matter. 36. Plaintiff and all other similarly situated individuals who opt into this litigation are entitled to overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and court costs. 37. Based on the foregoing, Defendant violated the CWA as to Plaintiff and the class of Membership Advisors who worked for Defendant from September 14, 2014 to December 31, 2016. 39. Based on the foregoing, Defendant violated the CWA as to Plaintiff and the class of Membership Advisors who worked for Defendant from January 1, 2017 to the date of final judgment in this matter. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) VIOLATION OF THE CONNECTICUT WAGE ACT, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-58 et. seq. VIOLATION OF THE CONNECTICUT WAGE ACT, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-58 et. seq.

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18. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay them the all overtime wages. The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 19. The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. Plaintiff brings claims for relief as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants in New York State on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). 21. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the position held, and rates of pay for each Class member may also be determinable from Defendants’ records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under F.R.C.P. 23. 22. The proposed Class is so numerous such that a joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown because the facts on which the calculation of that number rests presently within the sole control of Defendants, there is no doubt that there are more than forty (40) members of the Class. 23. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims that could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief, that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants. Defendants’ corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 25. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of the wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 27. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. What are and were the policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols and plans of Defendants regarding the types of work and labor for which Defendants did not pay the Class members properly; c. At what common rate, or rates subject to common methods of calculation, was and are Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work; d. Whether Defendants failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and Class members for overtime under state and federal law for all hours worked over 40 per workweek; e. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class members the spread-of- hours premium as required by the NYLL; f. Whether Defendants provided to Plaintiff and Class members proper wage and hour notice, at date of hiring and annually, per requirements of the NYLL; and g. Whether Defendants provided to Plaintiff and Class members proper wage statements with each payment of wages as required by NYLL. 29. Plaintiff also regularly worked at Defendants’ Park Slope MeltKraft restaurant, located at 211 7th Avenue, Brooklyn, NY, 11215 and various other seasonal locations. 30. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, she regularly worked without taking breaks from 3:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. on Mondays through Fridays, from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays, for a total of up to fifty-six and half (56.5) hours per week. 31. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, she was never allowed to take lunch breaks. In addition, she was never paid a spread-of-hours premium for any Saturdays and Sundays when her work hours were above ten (10) hours per day. 32. Throughout her employment, Plaintiff was paid a straight rate of $11 per hour for all hours worked, including hours in excess of forty (40) hours per week. In addition, she was never provided with wage notices and wage statements. 33. Based on Plaintiff’s personal observation, discussions with co-workers, other non- exempt employees in all MeltKraft restaurants were subject to Defendants’ wage-and-hour policies. 34. Although Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members regularly worked over forty (40) hours per week, Defendants never paid them overtime wages in violation of the FLSA and NYLL. 36. Defendants never provided wage notices and wage statements to Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members in violation of the NYLL. 37. Plaintiff retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class members, in this litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services. 38. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 37 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 39. At all relevant times, Defendants were and continue to be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). Further, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are covered individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a). 40. At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA. 41. At all relevant times, Corporate Defendants had gross annual revenues in excess of $500,000. 42. At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in a policy and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 42. Defendants knew of and/or showed a willful disregard for the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for all hours worked and at the statutory rate of time and one-half for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week when Defendants knew or should have known such was due. 43. Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs of their rights under the FLSA. 44. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ willful disregard of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to liquidated (i.e., double) damages pursuant to the FLSA. 45. Due to the intentional, willful and unlawful acts of Defendants, Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount not presently ascertainable of unpaid overtime wages. 46. Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 47. Plaintiff realleges and reavers Paragraphs 1 through 46 of this class and collective action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 49. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff and Class members’ rights by failing to pay them overtime compensation at the rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 50. Plaintiff and other Class Members regularly worked for over ten (10) hours per day on each Saturdays and Sundays, but were never paid “spread-of-hours” premium. 51. Defendants failed to properly notify Plaintiffs and Class members of their hourly pay rate and overtime rate, in direct violation of the NYLL. 52. Defendants failed to provide a proper wage and hour notice, at the date of hiring and annually, to all non-exempt employees per requirements of the NYLL. 53. Defendants failed to provide proper wage statements with every payment as required by NYLL. 54. Due to the Defendants’ NYLL violations, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime wages, unpaid spread-of-hours premium, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, reasonable attorneys’ fees, liquidated damages, statutory penalties and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to the NYLL. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

win

21. Defendant is a bar and lounge that operates its bar and lounge as well as the Website to the public. The bar and lounge is located at 9532 Queens Boulevard, Rego Park, New York. Defendant’s bar and lounge constitutes a place of public accommodation. Defendant’s bar and lounge provides to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services which allow consumers to find information about the bar and lounge location and hours, information about menus, events, dress code, to inquire about pricing and other products available online and in the bar and lounge for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by the Defendant. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen- reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 24. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring on September 2, 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information on the location and hours of the bar and lounge, information about events, menus, dress code, inquiries about pricing and other products available online and in the bar and lounge for purchase and view privacy policies and other goods and services offered by Defendant. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 29. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually- impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is not sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently locate Defendant’s bar and lounge’s locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 36. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical location, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 47. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 48. Defendant’s bar and lounge is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s bar and lounge. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 50. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 51. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 53. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 55. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 56. Defendant’s physical location is located in the State of New York and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with this physical location. 57. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 63. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Defendant discriminates and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 70. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 71. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 72. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical location in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 73. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operate and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 84. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

lose

14. Within the last year, CRE began placing automated text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, number (765) XXX-8930. 15. The messages were sent from SMS short code 69273. 16. The messages advised Plaintiff that he should “Reply STOP to opt out.” 17. In accordance with the messages’ instructions, Plaintiff repeatedly messaged “STOP” to CRE in order to get it to stop sending him automated text messages. 18. However, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ repeated requests, CRE continued to send automated text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 19. True and correct copies of the text messages are reproduced below: 32. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 33. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following class: All persons within the United States to whom CRE or its agent/s and/or employee/s sent a text message to said person’s cellular telephone through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint, after said person had previously messaged “STOP” to CRE. 34. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the class members number in the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. B. Numerosity 35. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States, after receiving messages asking it to “STOP.” The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 36. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s call records. 8 C. Common Questions of Law and Fact 37. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class members. These questions include: a. Whether Defendant sent text messages to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent to send each text message; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing willful, and/or negligent; d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 38. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely places automated text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. D. Typicality 39. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all based on the same factual and legal theories. E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members 40. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 9 F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable 41. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of separate claims against CRE is small because it is not economically feasible for Class members to bring individual actions. 42. Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties. Several courts have certified classes in TCPA actions. These cases include, but are not limited to: Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC, 2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D. Cal., May 29, 2012). 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 44. Defendant negligently placed multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 45. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA. 46. Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call placed in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 47. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 10 48. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: a. Defendant violated the TCPA; b. Defendant utilized an ATDS to message Plaintiff and the Class; and c. Defendant placed automated text messages to the Plaintiff and the Class without prior express consent. 49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them herein by reference. 50. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 51. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA. 52. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 53. Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future. 54. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that: a. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA; b. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully used an ATDS to send text messages to Plaintiff and the Class; c. Defendant willfully placed automated text messages to non-customers such as 11 Plaintiff and the Class, knowing it did not have prior express consent to do so; and d. It is Defendant’s practice and history to place automated and artificial/prerecorded voice calls to non-customers without their prior express consent. A. The Class Dated: May 21, 2019 Respectfully submitted, By /s/ Amy Cueller Amy Cueller, Esq. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

win

(Count I: 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(1)) 11. Several courts have held that prospective, blanket certifications obtained by a consumer reporting agency from a user do not comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) because they run counter to Section 1681b(b)(1)’s use of the phrase “has complied,” which refers retrospectively to an action already taken. See, e.g., Syed v. M-I LLC, No. 1:14-742-WBS-BAM, 2014 WL 5426862, at **4-5 (E.D. Ca. Oct. 23, 2014); Robles v. Ampam Parks Mechanical, Inc., No. 14-02362-VAP, 2015 WL 1952311, at **4-5 (C.D. Ca. Apr. 28, 2015). Background Reports Furnished by Defendant 12. In August 2014, Plaintiff applied for a job with CA Ventures, LLC in Washington. 13. On or about August 8, 2014, CA Ventures, LLC, through Campus Acquisitions Investment Management LLC, procured or caused to be produced a consumer report regarding Plaintiff from Defendant. 14. On or about August 8, 2014, Defendant furnished Plaintiff’s consumer report to Campus Acquisitions Investment Management LLC. 15. The consumer report stated: Your acceptance and use of this report constitutes your certification that you are in full compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq., as amended) and all applicable state and federal laws, including but not limited to state and federal equal employment opportunity laws. Prior to requesting or using this report, clients must have signed a Statement of Terms and Conditions certifying that users are familiar with, will abide by and will use the report in compliance with all applicable laws, including but not limited to, the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 17. Upon information and belief, at all times relevant to this action, Defendant has required the users to whom it furnishes a consumer report to sign a Statement of Terms and Conditions, which requires that the user prospectively certify that it will comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, including Section 1681b(b)(1). 18. Defendant violated Section 1681b(b)(1) by furnishing consumer reports regarding Plaintiff and other class members for employment purposes without first obtaining from the persons who obtained such report a certification that such person “has complied with paragraph (2) [of Section 1681b(b)] with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) [of Section 1681b(b)] becomes applicable.” 19. Defendant knew or should have known about its legal obligations under the FCRA. The language of Section 1681b(b)(1) is plain and clearly ascertainable. According to Section 1681b(b)(1)(A), a “consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if -- (A) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that-- (i) the person has complied with paragraph (2) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) becomes applicable; and (ii) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation.” (Emphasis added.) 21. Defendant knew or should have known about its legal obligations under the FCRA. These obligations are well established in the plain language of the FCRA, in the promulgations of the Federal Trade Commission, and in well-established case law. Defendant obtained or had available substantial written materials that apprised it of its duties under the FCRA. Any reasonable consumer reporting agency knows about or can easily discover these obligations. 22. Despite knowing of these legal obligations, Defendant intentionally or recklessly acted consciously in breaching its known duties and depriving Plaintiff and other Class members their rights under the FCRA. Plaintiff believes that Defendant did not obtain proper and valid certifications before furnishing consumer reports to its clients because Defendant did not want to incur the expenses associated with obtaining such certifications as to each consumer as to whom a consumer report was generated and provided by Defendant. 23. As a result of these FCRA violations, Defendant is liable for statutory damages from $100 to $1,000 for each violation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A), punitive damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2), and attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Section 1681n and Section 1681o. 25. Numerosity: The members of the Class are believed to be in excess of 100,000 and are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. The names and addresses of the Class members are identifiable through documents maintained by the Defendant, and the Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by published and/or mailed notice. 26. Typicality: Plaintiff’s class claims are typical of the claims of Class members. Plaintiff for class certification purposes seeks only statutory and punitive damages. In addition, Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the class claims as the other members of the Class. 27. Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because Plaintiff’s interests coincide with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class Plaintiff seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel. 29. Superiority: Questions of law and fact common to the Class members predominate over questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The statutory and punitive damages sought by each member are such that individual prosecution would prove burdensome and expensive given the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. It would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class individually to redress effectively the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, it would be an unnecessary burden on the Courts. Furthermore, individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system presented by the complex legal and factual issues raised by Defendant’s conduct. By contrast, the class action device will result in substantial benefits to the litigants and the Court by allowing the Court to resolve numerous individual claims based upon a single set of proof in a case. 30. Plaintiff realleges Paragraph Nos. 1-29 as if fully set forth herein. 32. By failing to obtain the required specific certification from persons to whom Defendant furnished consumer reports as to each consumer report provided before providing the specific consumer report that was the subject of the certification, Defendant violated the express requirement of Section 1681b(b)(1). 33. The foregoing violations were willful. Defendant knew or should have known about its obligations under the FCRA. 34. Plaintiff and the Certification Class members are entitled to statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each and every one of these violations, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 35. Plaintiff and the Certification Class members are also entitled to recover their costs and attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3). 9. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) regulates the conduct of “persons” who furnish, use, procure or cause to be procured a “consumer report” for employment purposes as follows: (b) Conditions for furnishing and using consumer reports for employment purposes (1) Certification from user A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report for employment purposes only if – (A) the person who obtains such report from the agency certifies to the agency that— (i) the person has complied with paragraph (2) with respect to the consumer report, and the person will comply with paragraph (3) with respect to the consumer report if paragraph (3) becomes applicable; and (ii) information from the consumer report will not be used in violation of any applicable Federal or State equal employment opportunity law or regulation; and (B) the consumer reporting agency provides with the report, or has previously provided, a summary of the consumer’s rights under this subchapter, as prescribed by the Bureau under section 1681g(c)(3) of this title. The Statutory Landscape

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29. Just For Men® is a cosmetic hair care and dye product line intended to improve and alter hair and facial hair color. 86. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and as a representative of all others who are similarly situated. Pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and/or (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff seeks certification of a Nationwide Class and a California Class. 87. The Nationwide Class is initially defined as follows: All African American males residing in the United States who have purchased, used and incurred injury as a result of using the Just For Men® Jet Black color shade within the applicable statute of limitations, subject to appropriate tolling and estoppel (the “Nationwide Class”). 88. The California Class is initially defined as follows: All African American males residing in California who have purchased, used and incurred injury as a result of using the Jet Black color shade within the applicable statute of limitations, subject to appropriate tolling and estoppel (the “California Class”). 96. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every paragraph of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 97. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the Nationwide Class against Defendants. 98. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981, guarantees that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same rights…to make and enforce contracts…as is enjoyed by white citizens, includ(ing) the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (By Plaintiff and the Nationwide Class Against Defendants)

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1. The amount of the debt… 11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Tennessee; b. to whom Defendant ProCollect sent an initial letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. claiming that the listed balance may be inaccurate or may increase; e. without providing the amount of such inaccuracy or increase or a way to calculate it; f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats the allegations above as if set forth here. 21. On a date better known to Defendant, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt to non-party Centennial Gardens Apartments. 22. This alleged debt was incurred as a financial obligation that was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5), specifically a personal apartment rental. 23. Centennial Gardens Apartments is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a (4). 24. Upon information and belief, Centennial Gardens Apartments then contracted with Defendant ProCollect to collect this alleged debt. 25. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – the April 21, 2020 Letter 26. On or around April 21, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter. A true and accurate copy of this letter from Defendant is attached as Exhibit A. 27. The letter lists the amount due as $233.39*. 28. Towards the bottom of the letter its states: *Your agreement with the original creditor, or other applicable state law, may allow ProCollect to charge collection agency fees. If you have not already been put on notice of any applicable fee, this is your notice that a failure to pay the Amount Due within the applicable deadline set out in the agreement with the original creditor or state law, may result in ProCollect assessing collection agency fees allowed by such agreement or state law. 29. No amounts are listed for these “collection agency fees”. 31. No deadline is given for when these fees might be assessed. 32. The consumer is therefore unable to determine the actual total balance due. 33. This letter lacks the proper notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 34. In addition, upon information and belief, Defendant does not intend to collect “collection agency fees”. 35. The mention of these fees is just a scare tactic and misleads the consumer into paying the alleged debt. 36. As a result of Defendant's false and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 37. Plaintiff repeats the allegations above as if set forth here. 38. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 39. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 41. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 42. Plaintiff repeats the allegations above as if set forth here. 43. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 44. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 45. Defendant violated this section by failing to state the amount of debt and threatening that the amount of the debt may increase even though it would not actually increase. 46. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 47. Plaintiff repeats the allegations above as if set forth here. 48. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 50. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g by: a. Failing to provide the actual amount of the debt. 51. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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On or about December 26, 2019 Plaintiff purchased the Policy, which purports to be issued by both Nationwide and Allied. The additional named insureds under the Policy are:

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17. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 18. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas; b. to whom Defendant KMDA sent a letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that stated that • “Unless payment arrangements are made with this office within ten (10) days from the date of this letter”; • “I will advise my client to file a lien on the subject property.”; or • “Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it. If you do not dispute it within that period, this firm will assume that it is valid. If you do dispute it, by notifying this firm in writing to that effect, this firm will, as required by the law, obtain and mail to you proof of your original creditor”; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing 5 of this action. 19. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant KDMA and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 20. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 21. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. and the Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 292 et seq. 22. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff(s) nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 23. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. 6 b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. and the Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 292 et seq. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiffs have no interests that are averse to the absent class members. The Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiffs have also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated 7 persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 24. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 25. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 26. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 27. On July 15, 2019, Elevated’s representative Kenny Gammons sent Plaintiff a text message saying they would do a roof repair work for $12,459. 28. On July 16, 2019, Plaintiff and Elevated agreed to repair the roof, repaint the fence, fix a broken window and repair and repaint the garage door from hail damage for total price of $14,314.28 which did not include gutters and downspouts. 29. Elevated required half upfront before the work was to commence on July 24, 2019. 30. On the morning of July 24, 2019, Elevated without any explanation increased the 8 price for the work to $17,285.31 and demanded $8,642.66 and sent an invoice stating that the remained balance due at job completion was $8,642.65 and refused to honor its original agreement. 31. On July 24, 2019 Plaintiff paid Elevated $8,642.66 because work was needed as the roof was leaking in the master bedroom. 32. On September 9, 2019 at 9:13am Elevated’s representative Kenny Gammons send the Plaintiff a text message saying “Morning Shawn… we were able to get the insurance cover your gutters & downspouts. So I will get them changed out later this week. I wanted to make you aware. Thanks” 33. On September 9, 2019 at 9:15am Plaintiff replied back saying “Kenny we don’t want gutter [o]r downspouts” and “Not part of our agreement”. 34. On September 9, 2019 at 9:16am, Kenny Gammons replied saying “Ok… No problem we will just have to report it back to the insurance. Just wanted you to be aware… We will prepare the final bill and send it over. Thanks”. 35. On September 23, 2019 Elevated’s representative Doug Dobolek emailed Plaintiff an invoice for with a balance due of $18,504.96. 36. Plaintiff contacted Elevated several times to remove the charges for gutters and downspouts which were never installed but Elevated refused to adjust their bill. 37. Elevated is claiming that they are owed money for gutter and downspouts which were never installed because insurance disbursed funds to the Plaintiff. 38. Plaintiff has offered to pay Elevated the correct amount owed $5,671.62 but Elevated has refused and now demands $19,192.67 and continues to increase its balance. 39. On November 20, 2019 KDMA sent a collection letter (“Letter”) to Plaintiff in the Eastern District of Texas. 9 40. Defendant KDMA’s Letter threatened Plaintiff with legal arbitration action and demanding interests and attorney’s fees. 41. Defendant KDMA’s Letter demanded payment from Plaintiff of $19,192.67 within ten (10) days from the date of the letter. 42. Defendant KDMA’s Letter claimed the KDMA is a debt collector. 43. Defendant KDMA does not have a surety bond for debt collection and has not filed a copy such surety bond with the Texas Secretary of State. 44. Defendant KDMA Letter threatened the filing of lien on the subject property at 11126 Abercrombie Trail, Frisco, TX 75035 within 10 (ten) days of the date of the letter. 45. Plaintiff’s is married and his spouse did not sign any agreement or contract with Elevated or Defendant KDMA. 46. The subject property is Plaintiff’s homestead. 47. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 53.254 requires the signature of both spouses when fixing a lien on a homestead. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 53.254(c) (2007). Denmon v. Atlas Leasing, L.L.C., 285 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. App. 2009). 48. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 49. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 50. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, 10 or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt, including: a. The false representation of the character, amount, or legal status any debt, § 1692e(2); b. The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the … the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action 1692e(4); c. The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken 1692e(5); and d. The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer, § 1692e(10). 51. Defendant KDMA has violated § 1692e et seq. when KDMA: i. falsely represented in its Letter that Plaintiff owed $19,192.67; ii. falsely represented and threatened that KDMA or Elevated could legally file a lien on Plaintiff’s homestead when they legally cannot; iii. falsely threatened Plaintiff that with breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Payment Act, and violation of the Texas Trust Funds Act when Plaintiff has offered to pay the full amount due of $5,671.62; and iv. used representation and deceptive means because KDMA has engaged in illegal debt collection because KDMA has is not bonded as a debt collector in Texas and has not posted a bond with the Secretary of State. 52. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of 11 statutory and actual damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 53. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 54. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. a. The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, 1692f(1). 55. Defendant KDMA has violated § 1692f when KDMA: i. falsely attempted to collect an unauthorized amount of $19,192.67; ii. used an unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt when KDMA falsely threatened that it or Elevated could file a lien on Plaintiff’s homestead when they legally cannot; iii. falsely threatened Plaintiff that with breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Payment Act, and violation of the Texas Trust Funds Act when Plaintiff has offered to pay full amount due of $5,671.62; and iv. used representation and deceptive means because KDMA has engaged in illegal debt collection because KDMA has is not bonded as a debt collector in Texas and has not posted a bond with the Secretary of State. 56. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that 12 Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of actual and statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 57. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) reads: Notice of debt, contents: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing -- (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original 13 creditor, if different from the current creditor. 59. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) in relevant part reads: “Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.” 60. Defendant KDMA did not identify the true legal name of the creditor but simply claims the creditor is Elevated Roofing. 61. Defendant KDMA violated 1692g(a) and 1692(b) when KDMA used confusing and inconsistent language on its Letter “Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it. If you do not dispute it within that period, this firm will assume that it is valid. If you do dispute it, by notifying this firm in writing to that effect, this firm will, as required by the law, obtain and mail to you proof of your original creditor,…” 62. This statement makes an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer believe that a dispute is required in writing. 63. Defendant KDMA violated 1692g(b) when it demanded payment within ten (10) days from the Plaintiff because this overshadowed and was inconsistent with the disclosure of the Plaintiff’s consumer right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. 64. Defendant KDMA violated 1692g(b) when it threatened to file a lien on Plaintiff’s homestead if payment is not made within 10 days. This overshadowed and was inconsistent with the disclosure of the Plaintiff’s consumer right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. 14 65. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of actual and statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs in this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 67. Sec. 392.304(a) of the TDCA reads: “In debt collection, a debt collector may not use fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representation that employs the following practice: (1) Misrepresenting the character, extent, or amount of a consumer debt, or misreporting the consumer debt’s status in a judicial or governmental proceeding; and (2) Using any other false representation or deceptive means to collect a debt or obtain information concerning a consumer, Sec. 392.304(a)(19) 68. Sec 392.101 of the TDCA prohibits a third-party debt collector from engaging in debt collection unless the third-party debt collector has obtained a $10,000 surety bond issued by a surety company authorized to do business in the state for the benefit of any person who is damaged by a violation of this chapter. 69. Defendant KDMA violated the TDCA through its deceptive means when KDMA engaged in illegal debt collection activities against the Plaintiff without obtaining and posting a bond with the Secretary of State. 70. Defendant KDMA violated the TDCA when it mailed the Collection Letter to the Plaintiff which contained false representations and misrepresented the amount of the debt. 15 VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION ACT Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 292 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.

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(Violations of the Dodd-Frank Act) (Violations of the FDCPA) 10. This Class satisfies all the requirements of FRCP Rule 23 for maintaining a class action. 11 . The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Upon information and belief, hundreds of persons have received debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendants, which violate various provisions of the FDCPA. 12. The debt collection notices and/or letters/communications from Defendant, received by the Class, are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical "least sophisticated consumer". 13. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: (i) Whether Defendantviolated various provisions of the FDCPA; (ii) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant's conduct; (c) Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendants' wrongdoing and, if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutoryformula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and, (iv) Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. 15. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted, this being specifically envisioned by Congress as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA, as codified by 15 U.S.C. S 1692(k). 16. The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. 17. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties. 18. A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not othenarise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 19. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members' interests, in that the Plaintiffs counsel is experienced and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein. 20. Absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses borne from Defendant's breaches of their statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendants' conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendant to further enjoy the benefit of its ill-gotten gains. 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "1 " throu 9h"21" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. Upon information and belief, Defendants began collecting an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff. 24. Upon information and belief, and better known to the Defendants, Defendant SYNCHRONY began their collection efforts and campaign of communications with the Plaintiff by mailing the Plaintiff a letter. 25. Defendant SYNCHRONY's letter dated September 8,2014 is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 26. Defendant SYNCHRONY's letter featured an oversize heading in bold uppercase letters centered on the page. 27. The heading of stated: "CALL Genpact Services LLC IMMEDIATELY 1-877-828-1903 This is an urgent notice regarding your delinquent account. Call the number above as soon as possible to discuss your payment options. Failure to respond promptly could result in further steps being taken to collect the debt." 27. The body of Defendant's letter stated: "Calling now may be in your best interest and may help prevent additional damage to your credit report." 29. Defendant's January Letter featured a postscript as follows: "P.S. Further delay may only make matters worse. Call 1 -877-828-1903 to work out a payment plan. Don't wait. Call now." 30. At the very bottom of Defendant's letter was a legend formatted as a footnote [positioned flush beneath a one-inch line per footnote placement] in miniscule 6 or 7pt. font which provided a Mini-Miranda disclosure which did not identify either Defendant as a debt collector but only stated that the letter was an attempt to collect a debt and information obtained would be used for that purpose. 31. No 30-day verification disclosures were included in Defendant SYNCHRONY's initial letter to Plaintiff dated September 8,2014. 32. Ptaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through "31" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 34. 15 USC 51692 e - preface and e (10) prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. 39. 15 USC S1692e(11) requires that a debt collector provide the information that they are debt collectors attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose in every communication made with a consumer. 40. The Defendants violated 15 USC $1692e (1 1) by deliberately and purposely printing said disclosures in a typeface so small as to be unreadable and positioning them so as to be overlooked by the least sophisticated consumer, with the intention of preventing their notice. 41 . 15 USC S1692 f - preface prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable actions in connection with the collection of a debt. 43. Pursuant to 15 USC S1692 g (a) (3), (4) and (5), in an initial communication with a consumer, or within five days after making initial contact, a debt collector is required to send written notice informing the consumer that: (3) the subject debt will be considered valid unless they are contacted by the consumer within 30 days stating othenruise; (a) if the consumer writes to the debt collector within 30 days to dispute the alleged debt, the debt collector will obtain verification or copy of judgment against the consumer and mail same to the consumer; and, (5) at the consumer's written request within the 30-day period, the debt collector will provide the name and address of the original creditor. 44. As agent for Defendant GENPACT, SYNCHRONY has failed to provide the required disclosures under the statute, denying consumers information to which they are entitled. lf Defendants' letter originated from Defendant GENPACT, a debt collector, GENPACT, by pretending to write from Defendant SYNCHRONY, is thus avoiding the proper and required disclosures in or following initial communication, in violation of 15 USC 51692 g (a) (3), (a) and (5). 46. As a result of Defendant's violations of the FDCPA, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the FDCPA. 47. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "l " through "46" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 48. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Bulletin 2013- 07, "Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- Frank Act), all covered persons or service providers are legally required to refrain from committing unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices (collectively, UDAAPs) in violation of the Act." The CFPB Bulletin 2013-07, Section "C" defines unfair and abusive practices to include the misrepresentation about whether information about a payment or non-payment would be furnished to a credit reporting agency. 50. As a result of Defendant's violations of the FDCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act, Plaintiff has been damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the FDCPA.

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13. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 47 38. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 39. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: a.All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from Defendants West Coast Center, LLC d.b.a. Green World Pro, Yossi Ohayon, and/or Imane Haddada a.k.a. Imane Bytton, or their agents, calling on behalf of Defendants West Coast Center, LLC d.b.a. Green World Pro, Yossi Ohayon, and/or Imane Haddada a.k.a. Imane Bytton, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for the purpose of marketing solar services/systems including but not limited to the sale or installation of home solar systems, to non- customers of Defendants West Coast Center, LLC d.b.a. Green World Pro, Yossi Ohayon, and/or Imane Haddada a.k.a. Imane Bytton, at the time of the calls. 40. Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 42. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 43. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendants’ records and/or Defendants’ agent’s records. 45. As a person that received calls from Defendants in which Defendants used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 46. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 47. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 48. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in numerous individual claims. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 51. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 52. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 53. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 55. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 56. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 59. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 60. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 61. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 62. As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 63. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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12. Elevate admits plaintiffs purport to bring this action as a class action, but denies it meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 13. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 13. 13 (sic). Elevate repeats and reiterates its answer to the allegations in ¶¶ 1 through 13 as if same were set forth herein at length. 14. Elevate admits only that as part of its business it provides debt collection services to third-party clients and that it uses the mail, and telephone to do so. Except as specifically admitted, the allegations in ¶ 14 are denied. 15. Elevate admits only that it was retained to collect from plaintiffs an amount due and owing. Except as specifically admitted, the allegations in ¶ 15 are denied. 16. The letter referenced in ¶ 16 and attached as Exhibit “A” speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 16 state otherwise, they are denied. 17. The letter referenced in ¶ 17 speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 17 state otherwise, they are denied. 18. The letter referenced in ¶ 18 speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 18 state otherwise, they are denied. 19. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 19. 20. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 20. 22. Elevate admits only that it was retained to collect from plaintiffs an amount due and owing. Except as specifically admitted, the allegations in ¶ 22 are denied. 23. The letter referenced in ¶ 23 and attached as Exhibit “B” speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 23 state otherwise, they are denied. 24. The letter referenced in ¶ 24 speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 24 state otherwise, they are denied. 25. The letter referenced in ¶ 25 speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 25 state otherwise, they are denied. 26. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 26. 27. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 27. 28. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 28. 32. Elevate repeats and reiterates its answer to the allegations in ¶¶ 1 through 31 as if same were set forth herein at length. 33. The statute referenced in ¶ 33 speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 33 state otherwise, they are denied. 35. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 35. 36. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 36. 37. Elevate repeats and reiterates its answer to the allegations in ¶¶ 1 through 36 as if same were set forth herein at length. 38. The statute referenced in ¶ 38 speaks for itself and is the best evidence of its content. To the extent the allegations in ¶ 38 state otherwise, they are denied. 39. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 39. 40. Elevate denies the allegations in ¶ 40. Assuming plaintiffs suffered any damages, plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages or take other reasonable steps to avoid or reduce their damages. FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Any harm suffered by plaintiffs were legally and proximately caused by persons, individuals, corporations, or entities beyond the control or supervision of Elevate, or for whom Elevate is not responsible or liable.

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12. It has been estimated that there are between 2.7 and 5.2 million people in the United States infected with Hepatitis-C. The virus is transmitted by coming into contact with infected blood, such as shared needles, a blood transfusion, or sexual contact. Left untreated, it can lead to cirrhosis or liver cancer, and may require a liver transplant. Such conditions typically manifest many years after the initial infection occurs. Since 2007, there have been more deaths in the United States from Hepatitis-C than from HIV. Prior to Sovaldi, the available treatments cured only about half of Hepatitis-C patients, and often had debilitating side effects. 13. Sovaldi is a Hepatitis-C tablet that was originally developed by a company called Pharmasset, Inc. (“Pharmasset”). In November 2011, Pharmasset was acquired by Gilead. According to a press release issued by Gilead at the time, it acquired Pharmasset for $137 per share in cash, putting the value of the transaction at approximately $11 billion. Pursuant to the merger, Gilead acquired Pharmasset’s assets, including its patent portfolio associated with the development of Sovaldi. 14. A New Drug Application for Sovaldi was filed with the FDA on April 8, 2013. As noted above, the active ingredient in Sovaldi tablets is sofosbuvir. Sofosbuvir is a nucleotide analog that acts to inhibit the replication of the Hepatitis-C virus. 42. Plaintiff brings this action individually, and on behalf of a class, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to represent the following class: All persons or entities in the United States and its territories who were harmed as a result of the excessive pricing of Sovaldi by (a) purchasing or paying for some or all of the purchase price for Sovaldi, for consumption by themselves, their families, or their members, employees, insureds, participants, or beneficiaries, other than for resale, or (b) being prevented from obtaining a needed Sovaldi regimen.4 63. Plaintiff hereby repeats and incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 64. Gilead meets the qualifications for being a “health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial assistance” under section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 18116. Upon information and belief, the federal government provided grants and/or other financial assistance that contributed to the development of Sovaldi. 65. By definition, consumers and potential consumers of Sovaldi all have Hepatitis C, a debilitating disease. According to Stedman's Medical Dictionary, Hepatitis C is a viral infection that causes a progressive inflammation of the liver – a major and essential organ. The World Health Organization has described Hepatitis as “one of the most prevalent and serious infectious conditions in the world.” The CDC has stated that Hepatitis C “is the most common chronic bloodborne infection in the United States.” Hepatitis C reportedly accounts for a large percentage of cirrhosis, liver failure and liver cancer cases in the United States. 69. Plaintiff hereby repeats and incorporates by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth herein. 70. As a drug manufacturer, Gilead primarily sold Sovaldi directly to wholesalers and distributors. Upon information and belief, Sovaldi patients and third-party payors for it were intended third-party beneficiaries of those contracts. 71. Every contract contains a duty of good faith and fair dealing. A. Gilead and its Limited Sovaldi Patent Rights. Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing As an Intended Third-Party Beneficiary For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under Section 16 of the Clayton Act for Defendant’s Violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 2 Unjust Enrichment

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(Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants) (Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) 18. CBS is a mass media company with operations in the entertainment, cable networks, publishing, and local media segments. The Company’s voting Class A Common Stock and non-voting Class B Common Stock are listed and traded on the NYSE under the symbols “CBS.A” and “CBS”, respectively. Materially False and Misleading Statements Issued During the Class Period 19. The Class Period begins on February 14, 2014, when the Company filed its Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013 (the “2013 10-K”). In the 2013 10-K, CBS stated in relevant part: The Loss of Key Personnel, Including Talent, Could Disrupt the Management or Operations of the Company's Business and Adversely Affect Its Revenues The Company's business depends upon the continued efforts, abilities and expertise of its chief executive officer and other key employees and entertainment personalities. The Company believes that the unique combination of skills and experience possessed by its executive officers would be difficult to replace, and that the loss of its executive officers could have a material adverse effect on the Company, including the impairment of the Company's ability to execute its business strategy. 20. The 2013 10-K contained signed certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by the Individual Defendants, stating that the 2013 10-K “does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report[.]” 23. Section VI of the BCS provided: 47. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired CBS securities during the Class Period (the “Class”); and were damaged upon the revelation of the alleged corrective disclosures. Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 48. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, CBS securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by CBS or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 50. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 51. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: • whether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants’ acts as alleged herein; • whether statements made by Defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the business, operations and management of CBS; • whether the Individual Defendants caused CBS to issue false and misleading financial statements during the Class Period; • whether Defendants acted knowingly or recklessly in issuing false and misleading financial statements; • whether the prices of CBS securities during the Class Period were artificially inflated because of the Defendants’ conduct complained of herein; and • whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so, what is the proper measure of damages. 52. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 54. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 55. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2430 (1972), as Defendants omitted material information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information, as detailed above. 56. Plaintiff repeats and reallege each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 58. During the Class Period, Defendants engaged in a plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, pursuant to which they knowingly or recklessly engaged in acts, transactions, practices and courses of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; made various untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. Such scheme was intended to, and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; (ii) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of CBS securities; and (iii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase or otherwise acquire CBS securities and options at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, Defendants, and each of them, took the actions set forth herein. 59. Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of the Defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to influence the market for CBS securities. Such reports, filings, releases and statements were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and misrepresented the truth about CBS finances and business prospects. 61. Information showing that Defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth is peculiarly within Defendants’ knowledge and control. As the senior managers and/or directors of CBS, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of CBS internal affairs. 63. During the Class Period, CBS securities were traded on an active and efficient market. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, relying on the materially false and misleading statements described herein, which the Defendants made, issued or caused to be disseminated, or relying upon the integrity of the market, purchased or otherwise acquired shares of CBS securities at prices artificially inflated by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class known the truth, they would not have purchased or otherwise acquired said securities, or would not have purchased or otherwise acquired them at the inflated prices that were paid. At the time of the purchases and/or acquisitions by Plaintiff and the Class, the true value of CBS securities was substantially lower than the prices paid by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. The market price of CBS securities declined sharply upon public disclosure of the facts alleged herein to the injury of Plaintiff and Class members. 64. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants knowingly or recklessly, directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 65. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases, acquisitions and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing public. 67. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of CBS, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of CBS business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information about CBS misstatement of income and expenses and false financial statements. 68. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to CBS financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by CBS which had become materially false or misleading. 69. Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and public filings which CBS disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning CBS results of operations. Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised their power and authority to cause CBS to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein. The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of CBS within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct alleged which artificially inflated the market price of CBS securities. 71. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by CBS. Background

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10. Defendant made the Call to Plaintiff to sell its lending services. 11. Defendant made the Call using an autodialer. 12. Defendant made the Call using an artificial or pre-recorded voice. 13. Plaintiff has never given Defendant express consent to allow Defendant to call Plaintiff on his cellular telephone. 14. Prior to the Call, Plaintiff had never heard of Defendant. 15. Plaintiff has never done business with Defendant. 3 16. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of the following putative Class: All persons within the United States to whom one or more telephone calls were made, since April 18, 2012, by, on behalf, or for the benefit of Capital Advance Solutions, LLC (“Defendant”), which calls were made using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and for which (a) the called telephone numbers appear in Defendant’s records of such calls and/or the records of Defendant’s third party telephone carriers or the third party telephone carriers of Defendant’s call centers or (b) for which the called persons’ own records prove that they received such calls. 17. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable, given the expected Class size and modest value of individual claims. On information and belief, there are more than 100 persons meeting the above-referenced Class definition. Class members can be identified through Defendant’s records. 18. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are based on the same legal theory and arise from the same unlawful and willful conduct. 19. There are common questions of law and fact affecting members of the Class, which common questions predominate over questions that may affect individual members. These common questions include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency telephone calls to Class members’ cellular telephones using an autodialer and/or artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether Defendant had express consent of Class members to receive such calls; c. Whether Defendant acted knowingly or willfully; and d. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from making non-emergency telephone calls to cellular telephones using an autodialer and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 4 20. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with the interests of Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling consumer class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests that might cause them not to pursue these claims vigorously. 21. This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Class. 22. Whether Defendant failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g) can be easily determined by a review of its policies and records. 23. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, particularly given the modest size of claims. Management of the Class claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many individual claims. 24. Defendant made the Call to Plaintiff and similar calls to Class members knowing that it was using an autodialer. 25. Defendant made the Call to Plaintiff and similar calls to Class members knowing that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. 26. Defendant was aware, prior to making the Call to Plaintiff and similar calls to Class members, that it was prohibited by the TCPA from calling Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an autodialer and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 27. Defendant knowingly and willfully violated the TCPA. 28. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B), Plaintiff and each Class member is entitled to statutory damages of $500 for each of Defendant’s illegal calls. 5 29. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), Plaintiff and each Class member is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500 for each of Defendant’s illegal calls. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, requests that this Court enter judgment in his favor and against Capital Advance Solutions, LLC and award the following: a. Statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B); b. Treble damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B); c. Costs; d. An injunction enjoining Defendant from making calls that violate the TCPA in the future; and e. Such further relief as this Court deems just and proper. Plaintiff Demands a Trial By Jury SCOTT D.H. REDMAN, Plaintiff, By: s/ Paul F. Markoff One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys Paul F. Markoff (IL Atty. No. 6237614) Karl G. Leinberger (IL Atty. No. 6237537) Markoff Leinberger LLC 134 N LaSalle St, Ste 1050 Chicago IL 60602 312.726.4162 (p) 312.674.7272 (f) [email protected] 8. Plaintiff incorporates herein by references paragraphs 1-7. 9. On April 15, 2016, at 2:28 pm (central), Defendant, or its authorized agent, called Plaintiff on his cellular telephone (the “Call”), at the number xxx.xxx.4666. Violation of the TCPA

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10. Upon information and belief, on or about February 7, 2018 Defendants, without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission, arranged for and/or caused a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send unsolicited fax advertisements (hereinafter “the fax advertisements”), advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, to Plaintiff’s fax machine located in New Jersey. 11. Copies of the fax advertisement are attached hereto as Exhibit A and are incorporated herein by reference. 12. Upon receiving the Defendant’s fax, the Plaintiff’s fax machine was occupied during the time that the incoming fax was being processed. 13. Further, upon receiving the Defendant’s fax, the Plaintiff’s fax machine automatically printed out the fax, thereby depleting the Plaintiff’s ink, toner and paper. 14. The fax advertisement attached hereto as Exhibit A was wholly unsolicited in that it was sent to the Plaintiff by Defendants without Plaintiff’s express invitation or permission. Plaintiff does not currently do business with Defendant, and has never done business with Defendant. 15. Upon information and belief, Defendants either negligently, willfully and/or knowingly arranged for and/or caused the fax advertisements to be sent to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 20. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 22. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believe the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 23. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their telephone facsimile machines by either: 1) sending unsolicited fax advertisements; or 2) sending fax advertisements which failed to properly inform Plaintiff and the class members of their ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby. 24. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 25. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 27. As a recipient of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant and of fax advertisements which failed to properly advise of Plaintiff’s ability to opt-out, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Classes. 28. Plaintiff and members of the Classes were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their telephone facsimile machines by sending unsolicited fax advertisements; 29. Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby. 31. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 32. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 33. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and state laws. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 34. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 36. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 37. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 38. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 39. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from transmitting any advertisements in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 40. Defendants committed violations of N.J.S.A. § 56:8-158(a) against Plaintiff and the members of Class B by sending unsolicited fax advertisements to Plaintiff and the members of Class B. 41. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to N.J.S.A. § 56:8-159. VIOLATIONS OF NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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11. In an effort to increase collections on alleged debtor accounts, Defendant has made thousands of unsolicited phone calls to consumers nationwide. Many of these calls were placed to non-debtors. Most, if not all, of the calls featured a prerecorded voice. 12. As part of Defendant’s debt collection process, Defendant “loads referrals electronically, reconciles accounts with clients, provides standard and customized reports, provides flexible payment arrangement opportunities, accepts credit cards and check-by-phone, refers accounts to credit bureaus and/or undertakes legal judgment (with client approval), has an efficient month end process, and interfaces electronically with client hosts systems.” See http://m3fs.com/?page_id=5(last visited on May 8, 2015). 13. Beginning approximately January 2015, Plaintiff received a number of unsolicited phone calls to her wireless phone, for which Plaintiff provided no consent to call, in attempt to collect an alleged debt owed by a third party. 14. Such calls were always made by prerecorded voice message that stated: “Hello. This is not a sales call. This is a second attempt to reach June Kahn in regard to the account with M3 Financial Services. If you are that person or can deliver a message to that person please have them call 708-632-5680 4In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“FCC Declaratory Ruling”), 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 43 Communications Reg. (P&F) 877, 2008 WL 65485 (F.C.C.) (2008). 5FCC Declaratory Ruling, 23 F.C.C.R. at 564-65 (¶ 10). 5 tonight up until 8:30 p.m. or on Monday through Friday 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. central standard time with reference number 1[XXXXX]3. This is a very serious matter and it is very important we speak with them. Once again this is a second attempt from M3 Financial Services. The phone number to call back is 708-632-5680 and your reference number is 1[XXXXX]3. Thank you for delivering this message as it is very important. Press 2 to hear this message again. Goodbye.” 15. The incoming calls from M3 Financial received by Plaintiff came from the phone number (708) 632-5680, a number owned by Defendant. 16. Plaintiff received calls beginning approximately in January 2015, but more recently received calls on April 14, 2015 at 3:42 p.m., April 22, 2015 at 3:15 p.m., April 28, 2015 at 4:39 p.m. and on May 7, 2015. Each of these calls featured the above described prerecorded voice message. 17. These unsolicited phone calls placed to Plaintiff’s wireless telephone were placed via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1) and by using “an artificial or prerecorded voice” system as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A), which had the capacity to produce or store numbers randomly or sequentially, and to dial such numbers, to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 18. The telephone number that Defendant, or its agents, called was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurred a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). 19. These telephone calls constitute calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i). 20. Plaintiff did not provide Defendant or its agents prior express consent to receive unsolicited phone calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). Plaintiff has no prior business dealings with Defendant and is not the person (June Kahn) whom Defendant is attempting to 6 reach per the prerecorded voice message. Plaintiff believes that Defendant obtained her phone number through skip-tracing or other similar means because she never provided her number to Defendant. 21. These telephone calls by Defendant or its agents therefore violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 22. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on Defendant to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided express consent within the meaning of the statute. 23. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 24. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any unsolicited telephone calls from Defendant or its agents on their cellular telephones through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or pre-recorded voice system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(3), which telephone calls by Defendant or its agents were not made for emergency purposes or with the recipients’ prior express consent, within four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of trial. 25. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 26. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted 7 Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using unsolicited telephone calls, thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 27. This suit seeks only statutory damages and injunctive relief for on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 28. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 29. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date of trial, Defendant or its agents placed telephone calls without the recipients’ prior express consent (other than a telephone call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to a Class member using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial 8 or prerecorded voice system, to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; b. Whether the equipment Defendant, or its agents, used to make the telephone calls in question was an automatic telephone dialing system as contemplated by the TCPA; c. Whether Defendant, or its agents, systematically made telephone calls to persons featuring an artificial or prerecorded voice; d. Whether Defendant, or its agents, systematically made telephone calls to persons who did not previously provide Defendant with their prior express consent to receive such telephone calls; e. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and f. Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 30. As a person that received at least one unsolicited telephone call to her cell phone without Plaintiff’s prior express contest, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to any member of the Class. 31. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. 9 Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to individually seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 32. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 33. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all parties is impracticable. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 34. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 10 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 36. Each such telephone call was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to effectively make thousands of phone calls simultaneously to lists of thousands of wireless phone numbers of consumers without human intervention. These telephone calls also featured a prerecorded voice and were made without the prior express consent of the Plaintiff and other members of the Class to receive such telephone calls. 37. Defendant also made telephone calls featuring a prerecorded or artificial voice without the prior express consent of the Plaintiff and other members of the Class to receive such telephone calls. 38. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant and its agents constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 39. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 40. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 11 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above paragraphs 1 through 34 inclusive, of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. Each such telephone call was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to effectively make thousands of phone calls simultaneously to lists of thousands of wireless phone numbers of consumers without human intervention. These telephone calls also featured a prerecorded voice and were made without the prior express consent of the Plaintiff and other members of the Class to receive such telephone calls. 43. Defendant also made telephone calls featuring a prerecorded or artificial voice without the prior express consent of the Plaintiff and other members of the Class to receive such telephone calls. 44. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq. 45. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 46. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 12 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 47. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 48. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 49. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for herself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 50. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. * * * 51. An order certifying the Class as defined above, appointing Plaintiff Mason as Class Representatives, and appointing Ronald A. Marron of the Law Offices of Ronald A. Marron as Class Counsel. 52. An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees (in the event of a class recovery) and costs. 13 53. Any other relief the Court may deem reasonable, just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ.

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant, including and not necessarily limited to (424) 332-5843. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 13. During all relevant times, Defendant did not possess Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice on his cellular telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 14. Further, Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -0838 was added to the National Do-Not-Call Registry. 15. Defendant placed calls soliciting its business to Plaintiff on her cellular telephone ending in -0838 in or around September of 2016. 16. Such calls constitute solicitation calls pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) as they were attempts to promote or sell Defendant’s services. 17. Plaintiff received solicitation calls from Defendant within a 12-month period. 18. Defendant continued to call Plaintiff in an attempt to solicit its services and in violation of the National Do-Not-Call provisions of the TCPA. 19. Upon information and belief, and based on Plaintiff’s experiences of being called by Defendant after being on the National Do-Not-Call list for several years prior to Defendant’s initial call, and at all relevant times, Defendant failed to establish and implement reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations prescribed under 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 20. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the two proposed classes (hereinafter jointly referred to as the “Classes”). 22. The class concerning the National Do-Not-Call violation (the “DNC Class”) is defined as follows: All persons within the United States registered on the National Do- Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendant prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship, who received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendant that promoted Defendant’s products or services, within any twelve-month period, within four years prior to the filing of the complaint. 23. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the ATDS Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any collection telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 24. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the DNC Class, consisting of all persons within the United States registered on the National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least 30 days, who had not granted Defendant prior express consent nor had a prior established business relationship, who received more than one call made by or on behalf of Defendant that promoted Defendant’s products or services, within any twelve-month period, within four years prior to the filing of the complaint. 26. The Classes are so numerous that the individual joinder of all of its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of the Classes members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Classes includes thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that the Classes members may be ascertained by the records maintained by Defendant. 27. Plaintiff and members of the ATDS Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and ATDS Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and ATDS Class members to incur certain charges or reduced telephone time for which Plaintiff and ATDS Class members had previously paid by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and ATDS Class members. 28. Common questions of fact and law exist as to all members of the ATDS Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the ATDS Class. These common legal and factual questions, which do not vary between ATDS Class members, and which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any ATDS Class members, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant made any telemarketing/solicitation call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to an ATDS Class member using any automatic telephone dialing system or any artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; b. Whether Plaintiff and the ATDS Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and c. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 30. Plaintiff and members of the DNC Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiff and DNC Class members via their telephones for solicitation purposes, thereby invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the DNC Class members whose telephone numbers were on the National Do-Not-Call Registry. Plaintiff and the DNC Class members were damaged thereby. 31. Common questions of fact and law exist as to all members of the DNC Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the DNC Class. These common legal and factual questions, which do not vary between DNC Class members, and which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any DNC Class members, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or its agents placed more than one solicitation call to the members of the DNC Class whose telephone numbers were on the National Do-Not-Call Registry and who had not granted prior express consent to Defendant and did not have an established business relationship with Defendant; b. Whether Defendant obtained prior express written consent to place solicitation calls to Plaintiff or the DNC Class members’ telephones; c. Whether Plaintiff and the DNC Class member were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and d. Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of The Classes. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions. 34. A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since individual litigation of the claims of all Classes members is impracticable. Even if every Classes member could afford individual litigation, the court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous issues would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system, and protects the rights of each Classes member. 35. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Classes members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other Classes members not parties to such adjudications or that would substantially impair or impede the ability of such non-party Class members to protect their interests. 36. Defendant has acted or refused to act in respects generally applicable to The Classes, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Classes as a whole. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of his Complaint as though fully stated herein. 38. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 40. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of his Complaint as though fully stated herein. 42. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 43. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., Plaintiff and the class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 44. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of his Complaint as though fully stated herein. 46. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), and in particular 47 U.S.C. § 227 (c)(5). 48. Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of his Complaint as though fully stated herein. 50. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), in particular 47 U.S.C. § 227 (c)(5). 51. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are entitled an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 52. Plaintiff and the DNC Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 8. Beginning in or around September 2016, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in -0838, in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant’s services. Plaintiff received such call from Defendant while within the County of Los Angeles, California. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. On Behalf of the DNC Class NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(c) et seq. On Behalf of the DNC Class

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14. On August 19, 2016, Samsung released to the market its highly touted, high-end, flagship smartphone, the Galaxy Note7, which sells for approximately $850. Shortly after the smartphones’ highly anticipated release, however, reports began to surface that the new smartphones were overheating and “exploding” in the hands of consumers. 16. On September 2, 2016, after 35 incidents of overheating smartphones had been reported worldwide, Samsung suspended sales of the Note7 smartphone. As a result, Samsung announced the U.S. Product Exchange Program for Note7 owners and stated that the new Galaxy Note7 would be “available next week.” 17. This replacement program included an estimated 1 million phones in the United States and 2.5 million worldwide. 18. In its announcement, Samsung stated that it had conducted a thorough investigation and had found a battery cell issue in the Note7 phones. Samsung stated that it was working with its supplier to identify possible affected batteries in the field, but that because safety was an absolute priority, it had decided to stop sales of the Note7. For those customers already owning a Note7, Samsung announced that it would voluntarily replace each device with a new device “over the coming weeks.” 20. On September 10, DJ Koh, President of Mobile Communications Business at Samsung, further stated: Our number one priority is the safety of our customers. We are asking users to power down their Galaxy Note7s and exchange them as soon as possible. We are expediting replacement devices so that they can be provided through the exchange program as conveniently as possible and in compliance with related regulations. 21. Samsung directed consumers who had Note7 devices to contact their place of purchase or call their designated local call center as soon as possible to exchange their device for a new Galaxy Note7 (with an updated battery). Alternatively, consumers could choose to exchange their Note7 for a Galaxy S7 or Galaxy S7 Edge, both of which are less expensive and offer less advanced technology than the Note7. 22. Consumers quickly learned that although Samsung announced its recall on September 2 and told consumers to immediately exchange their smartphones on September 9, that replacement Note7s were not available. 23. It was not until September 21 that Samsung announced that it would begin the Note7 exchanges nationwide. And even on that date, only an estimated 500,000 replacement devices had arrived in the United States. In fact, as of September 27, approximately 40 percent of the unsafe Note7s sold in South Korea and the United States still had not been replaced with new devices. 25. Plaintiff Waudby purchased a Note7 on August 21, 2016, and incurred monthly device charges and monthly plan charges that have not been reimbursed through the Samsung recall program or other third parties. 26. Plaintiff Spuntak purchased a Note7 on August 26, 2016, and incurred monthly device charges and monthly plan charges that have not been reimbursed through the Samsung recall program or other third parties. 27. Plaintiff Ibrahim purchased a Note7 on August 24, 2016, and incurred monthly device charges and monthly plan charges that have not been reimbursed through the Samsung recall program or other third parties. 29. On October 14, the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued an “emergency order to ban all Samsung Galaxy Note7 smartphone devices from air transportation in the United States. Individuals who own or possess a Samsung Galaxy Note7 device may not transport the device on their person, in carry-on baggage, or in checked baggage on flights to, from, or within the United States. This prohibition includes all Samsung Galaxy Note7 devices. The phones also cannot be shipped as air cargo.” 30. The DOT announcement further stated “[i]f passengers attempt to travel by air with their Samsung Galaxy Note7 devices, the phones may be confiscated and passengers may face fines.” 31. Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements of the provisions of Rule 23. 32. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following “Nationwide Class”: All persons and entities in the United States who purchased or leased a Samsung Galaxy Note7. 34. The Nationwide Class, Nevada Class, Pennsylvania Class and California Class will be referred to collectively as the “Class” for purposes of Plaintiffs’ claims. 35. Excluded from all classes are the Judge(s) to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s immediate family, along with Defendant’s employees, officers, directors, agents, and representatives and their immediate family members. Also excluded are those persons who have suffered personal injuries as a result of the facts alleged herein. 37. Commonality: This action involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over any questions affecting individual Class members. These common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following; a. Whether Samsung engaged in the conduct alleged herein; b. Whether Samsung breached any warranties through its conduct as alleged herein; c. Whether Plaintiffs and other Class members are entitled to restitution for monthly device and plan charges for phones they could not safely use during the relevant period; d. Whether Plaintiff and other Class members are entitled to recover compensatory damages as a result of Samsung’s breach of warranty. 38. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the other Class members because, inter alia, all members of the Class were injured through the common misconduct described above and were subject to Samsung’s breach of warranty. Plaintiffs are advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of themselves and all members of the Class. 40. Superiority: The class litigation is an appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number of Class members to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort and expense that hundreds of individual actions would require. Class action treatment will permit the adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain Class members, who could not individually afford to litigate a complex claim against large corporate defendants. Further, even for those Class members who could afford to litigate such a claim, it would still be economically impractical. 42. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed class and subclasses before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate and as the parties engage in discovery. 43. The class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Because of the number and nature of common questions of fact and law, multiple separate lawsuits would not serve the interest of judicial economy. 45. Notice of a certified class action and of any result or resolution of the litigation can be provided to Class members by first-class mail, email, or publication, or such other methods of notice as deemed appropriate by the Court. 47. Plaintiffs and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 48. Defendant expressly warranted to Plaintiffs and the Class members that the Note7s were of high quality and, at a minimum, safe. 49. Defendant breached this warranty by selling to Plaintiffs and the Class members Note7s that were subject to a known and dangerous defect and known to fail prematurely. 50. As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiffs have suffered economic damages including but not limited to monthly charges and fees, loss of use of the Note7, substantial loss in value and resale value of their Note7s, and other related damage. 51. Defendant’s attempt to disclaim or limit these express warranties is unconscionable and unenforceable under the circumstances here. Specifically, Defendant’s warranty limitation is unenforceable because they knowingly sold a defective product without informing consumers about the defect. 53. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 54. Defendant made material misstatements and omissions concerning the availability of replacement Note7s. 55. As a result, Plaintiffs and Class members were fraudulently induced to continue incurring and paying monthly charges and fees for their Note7s, which they could neither use nor replace. 56. These misstatements and omissions were made by Defendant with knowledge of their falsity, and with the intent that Plaintiffs and Class memebrs rely upon them. 57. Plaintiffs and Class members reasonably relied on these misstatements and omissions, and suffered damages as a result. 58. Plaintiffs and the Class incorporate by reference each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully set forth at length herein. 60. Defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to notify Plaintiffs and Class members that replacement Note7s would not be made available in a timely manner, or that the Note7 would be discontinued entirely. 61. Defendant acted in bad faith and/or with a malicious motive to deny Plaintiffs and Class members some benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties, thereby causing them injuries in an amount to be determined at trial. BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania, California and Nevada Classes) BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania, California and Nevada Classes) COMMON LAW FRAUD (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class or, Alternatively, the Pennsylvania, California and Nevada Classes)

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1. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in their entirety. 1.5 times their regular rate of pay for each hour that they worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 12. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 13. Named Plaintiff brings this action for violations of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons presently and formerly employed by Defendant Herr as Route Sales Representatives in non- exempt positions subject to Defendants’ unlawful pay practices and policies described herein and who worked for Defendants at any point in the three years preceding the date the instant action was initiated (the members of this putative class are referred to as “Class Plaintiffs”). 14. Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs are similarly situated, have substantially similar non-managerial job duties, have substantially similar pay provisions, and are all subject to Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as described herein. 16. Similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable by Defendants, and can be located through Defendants’ records. 17. Therefore, Named Plaintiff should be permitted to bring this action as a collective action for and on behalf of himself and those employees similarly situated, pursuant to the “opt- in” provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 18. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 19. Named Plaintiff worked for Defendants from on or about October 4, 2005 until December 17, 2012. 2. Named Plaintiff brings his claims asserting violations of the Pennsylvania Wage Laws as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all persons presently and formerly employed by Defendants as Route Sales Representatives and/or in similar positions with similar non-exempt duties, and who were subject to Defendants’ unlawful pay practices and policies at any point in the three years preceding the date the instant action was initiated (the members of this putative class are a subclass of Class Plaintiffs and are collectively referred to as “Pennsylvania Plaintiffs”). 20. Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs worked/work for Defendants as Route Sales Representatives. 21. Named Plaintiff’s primary duties were driving a delivery truck along established routes and delivering and stocking products at franchise, local chain, and independent retailers. 22. Class Plaintiffs’ primary duties are/were driving a delivery truck along established routes and delivering and stocking products at franchise, local chain, and independent retailers. 23. All products that are sold in Pennsylvania by Defendant Herr are manufactured at in Pennsylvania. 24. All products delivered by Named Plaintiff were made in Pennsylvania. 25. All products delivered by Pennsylvania Plaintiffs are/were made in Pennsylvania. 26. Named Plaintiff drove an 8,000 pound step van when delivering Defendants’ products to retailers. 27. Class Plaintiffs drove/drive an 8,000 pound step van when delivering Defendants’ products to retailers. 28. Defendants compensated Named Plaintiff by paying him a base salary of $500 and a commission on proceeds that exceeded a base amount generated from sales to retailers along his delivery route. 3. The class is so numerous that the joinder of all class members is impracticable. Named Plaintiff does not know the exact size of the class, as such information is in the exclusive control of Defendants; however, on information and belief, the number of potential class members is estimated to be at least forty (40) employees. 30. Defendants compensate/compensated Class Plaintiffs by paying them a base salary and a commission on proceeds that exceeded/exceed a base amount generated from sales to retailers along their delivery routes. 31. Defendants do/did not pay Class Plaintiffs any additional compensation for hours worked beyond 40 per workweek. 32. Named Plaintiff regularly worked 50 or more hours per week. 33. Class Plaintiffs regularly work/worked 50 or more hours per week. 34. Prior sales experience was not a prerequisite of Named Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant Herr. 35. Prior sales experience was not a prerequisite of Class Plaintiffs’ employment with Defendant Herr. 36. Upon being hired, Named Plaintiff underwent less than a week’s worth of training which consisted of learning how to operate his step van and the hand-held computer used to process orders. 37. Upon being hired, Class Plaintiffs underwent less than a week’s worth of training which consisted of learning how to operate their step vans and the hand-held computers used to process orders. 38. At all times relevant, the amount of sales to a retailer along Named Plaintiff’s delivery route was mainly determined by the volume of the retailer’s sales to customers since Named Plaintiff’s last delivery. 4. Named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the putative class members, because Named Plaintiff, like all Pennsylvania Plaintiffs, was subject to the same unlawful wage policies and practices of Defendants. 40. Named Plaintiff did not have the authority to hire or fire employees of Defendants. 41. Class Plaintiffs do/did not have the authority to hire or fire employees of Defendants. 42. Named Plaintiff did not have the authority to schedule employees of Defendants. 43. Class Plaintiffs do/did not have the authority to schedule employees of Defendants. 44. Named Plaintiff did not have the authority to make discretionary decisions regarding matters of financial significance of Defendants. 45. Class Plaintiffs do/did not have the authority to make discretionary decisions regarding matters of financial significance of Defendants. 46. Accordingly, Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs are/were, within the meaning of the FLSA, non-exempt hourly employees of Defendants. 47. Defendants failed to pay Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs at the rate of at least 48. Moreover, Defendants failed to implement a system to track the number of hours worked each workweek by Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs. 49. As a result of Defendants’ aforesaid illegal actions, Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs have suffered damages. 51. At all times relevant herein, Defendants were and continue to be “employers” within the meaning of the FLSA. 52. At all times relevant herein, Defendants were and are responsible for paying wages to Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs. 53. At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs were and are employed with Defendants as “employees” within the meaning of the FLSA. 54. Under the FLSA, an employer must pay an employee at least one and one half times his or her regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. 55. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA include, but are not limited to, failing to pay Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 per workweek. 56. Defendants’ conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs properly was and is willful and was and is not based upon any reasonable interpretation of the law. 57. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs have suffered damages as set forth herein. 58. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 59. At all times relevant herein, Defendants have and continue to be employers within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Wage Laws. 6. Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole insofar as Defendants have applied consistent unlawful wage policies to the entire class and have refused to end these policies. 61. At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Plaintiffs were employed with Defendants as an “employees” within the meaning of the Pennsylvania Wage Laws. 62. Defendants’ conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Plaintiffs overtime compensation for all hours worked beyond 40 per workweek violated the Pennsylvania Wage Laws. 63. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Named Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Plaintiffs have suffered damages as set forth herein. 64. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 65. Defendants conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Plaintiffs all owed wages violated the Pennsylvania Wage Laws. 7. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The class will be easily identifiable from Defendants’ records. 8. A class action provides a fair and efficient method for adjudication of this controversy. Such treatment will allow all similarly situated individuals to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the putative class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. Furthermore, the amount at stake for individual putative class members may not be great enough to enable all of the individual putative class members to maintain separate actions against Defendants. Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (Named Plaintiff and Class Plaintiffs v. Defendants) Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) (Named Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Plaintiffs v. Defendants) Pennsylvania Wage Payment And Collection Law (Failure to All Wages Due) (Named Plaintiff and Pennsylvania Plaintiffs v. Defendants)

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10. Wells Fargo is unjustly enriched by these practices, as the firm receives the benefits and services of the New FAs for wages below minimum wage while providing little or no meaningful training to the New FAs. Worse, after terminating the employment of these new 3 https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2009/20090101_Wachovia_Merger. Wachovia itself had previously absorbed Prudential Securities in 2003 in addition to A.G. Edwards in 2006. 3 FAs, Wells Fargo continues to be unjustly enriched, as it retains the clients these new FAs have serviced and have brought to the firm, and the resulting client assets and fees and revenue generated by these clients. 11. Wells Fargo policies and practices regarding these so-called “Training Costs” violate state and federal wage laws and the civil rights of African American New FAs. The practice also constitutes an unlawful kickback under the FLSA that leaves New FAs not earning minimum wage or overtime if they are forced to pay “Training Costs.” 12. The experiences of named plaintiff Erika Williams illustrate the unlawfulness and unfairness of the challenged practices. Williams earned her Master’s in Business Administration from the University of Chicago in 2008. After obtaining her MBA, Plaintiff gained experience in the financial services and acquired her health and life insurance licenses and Series 7 license. 13. Plaintiff was contacted by a Wells Fargo Diversity Recruiter in 2012 and was recruited by the Firm as part of its efforts to increase its paltry representation of African American FAs. In February 2012, Wells Fargo hired Plaintiff as a New Financial Advisor (or FA Trainee) with a starting annual salary of $45,000. 14. As a prerequisite to employment, Wells Fargo forced Plaintiff to sign a “New Financial Advisor Training Agreement,” which required Plaintiff to reimburse $55,500 in “Training Costs” if she left the firm within the first five years of her employment. However, Wells Fargo provided no meaningful training to Williams. On the contrary, Wells Fargo subjected Williams to race discrimination and constructively discharged her from the Firm in June 2013. 15. On September 5, 2013, Lance Slaughter filed a putative class action against Wells Fargo, on behalf of African America Financial Advisors, entitled Slaughter et al. v. Wells Fargo 4 Advisors, LLC, No. 13-cv-6368, now pending in this Court before the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber. This action alleges, among other things, that Wells Fargo does not provide equal training and mentoring to African Americans. The same intentionally discriminatory acts alleged in that lawsuit cause further harm to African American New FAs, who fail at a higher rate and do not receive equal benefits of the training contracts. Wells Fargo’s “Training Costs” practices disproportionately harm African Americans, who Wells Fargo actively recruits, fails to train, subjects to race discrimination, and then disproportionately terminates. These contract provisions violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 16. Notwithstanding Wells Fargo’s failure to provide training to Plaintiff, the Firm demanded on February 3, 2014, that Williams repay $50,875 in “Training Costs,” an amount that exceeds Plaintiff’s $45,000 annual salary. 17. Williams is a putative class representative in Slaughter et al. v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 13-cv-6368. 18. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks collective action treatment of her claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 19. Plaintiff seeks class certification of her claims under state wage laws, Illinois common law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of New Financial Advisors hired by Wells Fargo and forced to execute agreements requiring their repayment of so-called “Training Costs” in the event of their separation from the firm. 20. Plaintiff also seeks to certify and represent a sub-class of African Americans who 5 worked for Defendant as New Financial Advisors and were forced to execute agreements requiring their repayment of so-called “Training Costs” in the event of their separation from the firm. 21. Plaintiff seeks certification of a liability and injunctive and declaratory relief class under Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4), and/or certification of a broader class under Rule 23(b)(3). All requirements of class certification are met by the proposed class. 22. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, realleges the above paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as though fully stated herein as part of Count I of this Complaint. 23. Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended, guarantees persons of all races the same right to make and enforce contracts, regardless of race. The term “make and enforce” contracts includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 24. Defendant maintained nationwide uniform, discriminatory employment practices that constitute illegal intentional race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 25. Plaintiff and all those similarly situated were subjected to and harmed by the challenged practices. 26. Defendant’s unlawful conduct harmed Plaintiff and all those similarly situated. 27. On behalf of herself and the class she seeks to represent, Plaintiff requests the 6 relief set forth below. 28. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated, realleges the above paragraphs by reference as though fully stated herein as part of Count II of this Complaint. 29. The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act prohibits an employer from taking back wages that have been paid to employees. Harrell v. U.S., 13 F.3d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Once an employee has earned wages by having done the work that under his explicit or implicit employment contract entitles him to those wages, he has a vested right to them.”). 30. In seeking reimbursement for “Training Costs,” Wells Fargo unlawfully attempts to take back wages in which Plaintiff and all those similarly situated have a vested right, causing them harm. 31. On behalf of herself and the class she seeks to represent, Plaintiff requests the relief set forth below. 32. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated, realleges the above paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as though fully stated herein as part of Count III of this Complaint. 33. The Illinois Minimum Wage Law generally requires that employees receive wages of not less than $8.25 per hour. 820 ILCS 105/4(a)(1). 7 34. The Illinois Minimum Wage Law further requires that applicable employees receive at least one and a half times their normal rate of wages for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. 820 ILCS 105/4a(1). Plaintiff and all those similarly situated are not exempt from the overtime requirements of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. See 820 ILCS 105/4a(2). 35. Plaintiff and all those similarly situated were recruited by Wells Fargo as Financial Advisor Trainees and earned and were paid wages. 36. Plaintiff and all those similarly situated worked well in excess of 40 hours per week as a Financial Advisor Trainee. However, Wells Fargo failed to compensate Plaintiff beyond her normal rate of pay on weeks she worked over 40 hours. 37. Wells Fargo forced Plaintiff and all those similarly situated to sign an agreement to pay the firm “Training Costs” if they left the Firm within the first five years of employment. 38. Additionally, Wells Fargo charged “Training Costs” pursuant to its employment agreements with Plaintiff. Repayment of training costs has the effect of reducing the net income earned by Plaintiff to below the minimum wage required by 820 ILCS 105/4(a)(1). 39. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and all others similarly situated have been underpaid for the work they performed. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated, realleges the above paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as though fully stated herein as part of Count IV of this Complaint. 41. Consistent with the requirements of the FLSA, see 29 C.F.R. § 531.35, Wells Fargo was required to pay to Plaintiff and those similarly situated all wages they had earned fully, 8 unconditionally, and “free and clear” of any claim by Wells Fargo to a set off, kickback or other recoupment. To the extent that Wells Fargo paid Plaintiff and those similarly situated a wage on the condition that Plaintiff pay back “Training Costs” up to $55,500, those wages were paid conditionally and not “free and clear” as required by the FLSA. 42. The Fair Labor Standards Act generally requires that employees receive wages of not less than $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206. 43. The Fair Labor Standards Act further requires that applicable employees receive at least one and a half times their normal rate of wages for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a week. 29 U.S.C. § 207. Plaintiff and all those similarly situated are not exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 213. 44. Plaintiff and all those similarly situated worked well in excess of 40 hours per week as a Financial Advisor Trainee. However, Wells Fargo failed to compensate Plaintiff beyond her normal rate of pay on weeks she worked over 40 hours. 45. Additionally, Wells Fargo forced Plaintiff and all those similarly situated to sign an agreement to pay “Training Costs” if they left the Firm within the first five years of employment. Such payment of “Training Costs” reduces the wages of Plaintiff to below the minimum wage required by 29 U.S.C. §206. 46. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and all others similarly situated have been underpaid for the work they performed. 9 47. Plaintiff on behalf of herself and all those similarly situated, realleges and incorporates the above paragraphs by reference as though fully stated herein as part of Count V of this Complaint. 48. Plaintiff and other New Financial Advisors, developed and serviced client accounts and assets for Wells Fargo during their tenure for the Firm, which generated revenues for Wells Fargo. 49. After the employment of New FAs was terminated, Wells Fargo retained the client accounts procured by New FAs, which continued to generate fees and revenues for Wells Fargo. The Firm did not compensate the New FAs for the benefits they retained as a result of their work and efforts but instead sought to recover their wages as “Training Costs.” 50. Plaintiff Erika Williams realleges the above paragraphs and incorporates them by reference as though fully stated herein as part of Count VI of this Complaint. 51. Defendant offered, and Plaintiff accepted, and employment agreement under which Plaintiff joined Wells Fargo as a New Financial Advisor. 52. In consideration of her employment agreement, Plaintiff provided Defendant with her time and services to acquire accounts, commissions, and revenues for Defendant, and Defendant provided Plaintiff with an annual salary. 10 53. The employment agreements between Plaintiff and Defendant provided that, during her time as a Financial Advisor Trainee, Plaintiff would be enrolled in Defendant’s Financial Advisor Training Program to prepare Plaintiff to become a Financial Advisor. The agreement also provided that Defendant’s training costs totaled $55,000, which would have to be repaid if Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant was terminated for any reason at any time prior to five years of employment. 54. Defendant breached the employment agreement by failing to provide Plaintiff with training. Notwithstanding its failure to train Plaintiff, after Plaintiff was constructively discharged as a result of Defendant’s discriminatory policies and practices, Defendant demanded repayment of training costs. 55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 7. Wells Fargo has devised a scheme whereby the Firm recruits trainees, called New Financial Advisors (“FAs”), and benefits from their services and the clients they develop and serve, but then can recover most of, or even more than, the New FAs’ wages as what the firm disingenuously calls “Training Costs” if these New FAs do not succeed in the worst economy in recent memory or are fired by the firm. This lawsuit challenges this practice on behalf of plaintiff Erika Williams and all other similarly situated Wells Fargo New FAs subjected to this practice. 8. As a condition of employment, Wells Fargo forces New FAs to execute a one- sided and unlawful written agreement that obligates the New FAs to pay Wells Fargo what the firm disingenuously calls “Training Costs.” In so doing, Wells Fargo seeks to recover wages earned by New FAs terminated within five years of being hired by the firm. These “Training Costs” are not a legitimate cost recovery measure for costs actually incurred by the firm or for training actually provided to New FAs. 9. In many cases, Wells Fargo seeks to recover more in “Training Costs” than the wages actually earned by and paid to the New FAs, or costs that would result in the New FAs earning less than the minimum wage after working tirelessly as Wells Fargo FAs. BREACH OF CONTRACT IN VIOLATION OF ILLINOIS COMMON LAW (Plaintiff Erika Williams) RACE DISCRIMINATION IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1981 UNJUST ENRICHMENT VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS MINIMUM WAGE LAW, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS WAGE PAYMENT AND COLLECTION ACT, 820 ILCS 115/1 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.

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14. Defendant Global 7 Environmental, Health & Safety Corporation provides safety and environmental monitoring services to its customers in the energy and manufacturing sectors. 15. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a safety representative from approximately November of 2018 to January of 2020. 16. Plaintiff worked for Defendant in Texas. 17. Defendant classified Plaintiff as an employee. 18. The work of a safety representative is essentially inspection work. Plaintiff was responsible for monitoring the work of Defendant’s clients to ensure that work met applicable safety and environmental requirements. 19. For his labor, Defendant paid Plaintiff a day rate but did not pay him overtime for his hours in excess of forty per week. In other words, Defendant misclassified Plaintiff as exempt. 20. Plaintiff was paid a day-rate. 21. Plaintiff is a non-exempt employee. 23. Plaintiff and other safety representatives commonly work in excess of 12 hours each day. 24. Safety representatives usually work five to six days each week, for a schedule that equates into workweeks well exceeding 40 hours. 25. However, despite working overtime hours, Defendant does not pay its safety representatives overtime because it pays the same flat day rate regardless on the number of hours worked. 26. Defendant also paid Plaintiff and all other safety representatives per diem and mileage in an amount that exceeds the reasonable reimbursement value for the legitimate work related expenses. 27. No exemption in the FLSA shelters Defendant from paying overtime to its safety representatives. 28. Safety representatives like Plaintiff are not guaranteed a set number of days to work per week. 29. Safety representatives like Plaintiff are not guaranteed a set weekly payment. 30. Safety representatives are paid on a day rate basis, not on a salary basis. 31. Plaintiff was paid on a day rate basis, not on a salary basis. 32. Plaintiff was not paid time-and-a-half for all hours worked over forty in a given workweek. 34. Other safety representatives employed by Defendant worked overtime as defined in the FLSA. 35. Because safety representatives are on a day rate, the executive, administrative, or professional exemptions cannot apply. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.100, 541.200, 541.300. 36. Safety representatives do not supervise other employees or manage a customarily recognized department of Defendant’s company. 37. Safety representatives have no authority to hire or fire other employees. 38. Safety representatives are field employees, not office employees. They perform work related to Defendant’s core business, not the management of the company’s operations. 39. The primary duty of a safety representative does not require independent judgment or discretion. Instead, safety representatives are required to carry out their work according to detailed step-by-step procedures promulgated by Defendant or Defendant’s customers. 40. Despite these facts, Defendant misclassified its safety representatives as exempt from overtime pay. 41. As a result of Defendant’s pay policies, Plaintiff and other safety representatives were denied overtime pay. 42. Defendant knew or showed reckless disregard for whether Plaintiff and the other safety representatives were entitled to overtime pay under the law. 43. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 45. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its employees are paid are applicable to Defendant, Plaintiff, or the FLSA Class Members. 46. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 47. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that FLSA Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek as a result of Defendant’s misclassification of its employees. 48. Plaintiff’s knowledge is based on his personal work experience and through communications with other workers of Defendant. Plaintiff personally worked with other safety representatives under the same compensation structure at multiple job sites for Defendant. 49. Other workers similarly situated to the Plaintiff worked for Defendant throughout the United States but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their regular rates of pay when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours in a workweek. 50. Although Defendant permitted and/or required FLSA Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, Defendant denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty (40). 51. Defendant misclassified and continues to misclassify FLSA Class Members as exempt employees. 53. Plaintiff had the same job duties as other employees of Defendant who had the same job title as Plaintiff and worked for Defendant at any time during the three years prior to the filing of this lawsuit. 54. FLSA Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime pay under the FLSA. 55. As such, FLSA Class Members are similar to Plaintiff in terms of relevant job duties, pay structure, misclassification as exempt employees and/or the denial of overtime pay. 56. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation at the rate required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of any FLSA Class Member. 57. Defendant employed at least 20 other safety representatives within the last 3 years who were paid on a day rate. 58. Defendant employed at least 100 other safety representatives within the last 3 years who were paid on a day rate. 59. Defendant employed at least 40 other employees with the same job title as Plaintiff who were not paid overtime. 60. Defendant employed at least 50 other employees with the same job title as Plaintiff who worked overtime for at least one week during their employment with Defendant and were not paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all overtime hours worked. 61. The experiences of Plaintiff, with respect to his pay, hours, and duties are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Class Members. 63. All FLSA Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 64. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among the FLSA Class Members, the damages for the FLSA Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple formula. The claims of all FLSA Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused harm to all FLSA Class Members. 65. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiffs for the FLSA Class is properly defined as follows: All current and former employees who worked for Defendant at any time during the three-year period before the filing of this Complaint to present that were paid a day rate.

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11. After his in-person interview, Plaintiff was preliminarily hired for the position to the results of his Criminal background check. 12. Plaintiff has no criminal history. 13. Having no criminal history, he did not anticipate any problem with his background report. 14. On September 19, 2015, Plaintiff contacted Lawson Little to advise of his availability so she could plan accordingly for the drafting of the next schedule. 15. In the meantime, Starbucks obtained and used a background report prepared by Accurate Background, Inc. to make an employment decision regarding Plaintiff. 16. The consumer report provided to Starbucks included a statement that Kevin W. Willis of Minnesota had been convicted twice of domestic violence. Plaintiff has never used the name Kevin Willis and does not spell his name like Kevin Willis, nor has he ever resided in Minnesota. 17. The information was erroneously mixed into his information by Starbucks Background reporting company. 19. Indeed, Lawson Little explicitly stated that the criminal history on his consumer report disqualified him from working for the coffee house. 20. On September 22, 2015, Plaintiff received a letter from Accurate Background, Inc. on behalf of Starbucks enclosing a copy of his background report. This was days after being orally declined employment, in violation of §1681b(b)(3)(A) of the FCRA. 21. Mrs. Little provided Plaintiff with the telephone number of the background company and called them to advise them of the error on or about September 22, 2015. 22. Starbucks routinely obtains and uses consumer reports, including background reports, on its job applicants as part of a standard screening process. 23. Starbucks typically does not provide job applicants with a copy of their consumer reports before it takes adverse action against them based on the information in such reports, despite being required to do so by §1681b(b)(3)(A) of the FCRA. 25. A primary reason that Congress required that a person intending to take an adverse action based on information in a consumer report provide the report to the consumer before taking the adverse action is so the consumer has time to review the report and dispute information that may be inaccurate, or discuss the report with the prospective employer before adverse action is taken. See Federal Trade Commission letter dated December 18, 1997 to Harold R. Hawkey, Esq. (“[T]he clear purpose of the provision to allow consumers to discuss reports with employers or otherwise respond before adverse action is taken”). 27. By means of these cases and others construing § 1681b(b)(3)(A), Starbuck had substantial notice that its conduct violated the FCRA. 28. By failing to provide Plaintiff and other Class members with copies of their consumer reports prior to taking adverse action against them based on the reports, Starbucks willfully disregarded the case law, regulatory guidance, and the plain language of the FCRA, § 1681b(b)(3)(A). 29. Starbuck’s conduct was a result of its deliberate policies and practices, and was taken in reckless disregard for a consumer’s rights under the FCRA, and further assumed an unjustifiably high risk of harm. 30. Starbucks was acting by and through its agents, servants and/or employees who were acting within the course and scope of their agency or employment, and under the direct supervision and control of Starbucks. 31. Plaintiff reiterates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action, pursuant to Rules 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the following Class: All natural persons residing in the United States (including all territories and other political subdivisions of the United States), who had an adverse action taken against them by Starbucks during the Class Period, based in whole or in part on a consumer report used for employment purposes by Starbucks, and to whom Starbucks did not provide a copy of the consumer report and a written description of rights as provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii) at least five business days before the adverse action was taken. 33. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the precise number of Class members is known only to Starbucks, Starbucks regularly obtains and uses information in consumer reports to conduct background checks on prospective employees and relies on such information, in whole or in part, as a basis for adverse action. Starbucks’s website states that Starbucks operates over 25,000 locations worldwide. See https://news.starbucks.com/uploads/documents/AboutUs- Timeline-1.26.17.pdf. (last visited 08/10/2017). 35. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. Starbucks typically uses consumer reports to conduct background checks on prospective employees. Starbucks typically does not provide copies of consumer reports to prospective employees before taking adverse action based on information in such reports. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter and has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims under the FCRA. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interests that might cause them not to vigorously pursue this claim. 38. This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Class, as well as a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 9. Plaintiff applied in person for employment with Starbucks in September 2015 at its Buford, Georgia store location.

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20. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“The Class”). 21. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, “The Class” defined as follows: “All persons in California whose outbound telephone conversations were recorded without their consent by Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of the original Complaint in this action.” 22. Defendant, and its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believe this number to be in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 7. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a professional corporation. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on the basis of that information and belief alleges, that at all times mentioned in this Complaint, Defendants were the agents and employees of their co-defendants, and in doing the things alleged in this Complaint, were acting within the course and scope of that agency and employment. 8. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an individual residing within the State of California. 9. Since July 2012, Plaintiff had numerous telephone communications with certain employees, officers and/or agents of Defendant. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that on certain occasions Defendant properly warns consumers that the conversation will be recorded while on other occasions Defendant does not warn consumers that the conversation is being recorded. INVASION OF PRIVACY: VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE § 632

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12. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 43. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 44. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: a.All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from Defendants Friendlum, Inc., d/b/a Direct Home Energy Solutions, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for the marketing purposes, to non-customers of Defendants Friendlum, Inc., d/b/a Direct Home Energy Solutions, at the time of the calls. 46. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendants or their agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 47. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 48. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendants’ records and/or Defendants’ agent’s records. 50. As a person that received calls from Defendants in which Defendants used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 51. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 52. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 54. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 57. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 58. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 59. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 61. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 62. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 64. As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 65. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 66. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. 67. As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 69. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

win

13. COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by a recently discovered novel coronavirus known as SARS-CoV-2 (“Coronavirus” or “COVID-19”). The first instances of the disease spreading to humans were diagnosed in or around December 2019. 14. According to the World Health Organization (“WHO”): “People can catch COVID19 from others who have the virus. The disease can spread from person to person through small droplets from the nose or mouth which are spread when a person with COVID-19 coughs or exhales. These droplets land on objects and surfaces around the person. Other people then catch COVID-19 by touching these objects or surfaces, then touching their eyes, nose or mouth. People can also catch COVID-19 if they breathe in droplets from a person with COVID- 19 who coughs out or exhales droplets.”3 16. According to a recent report in the New York Times, “[a]n infected person talking for five minutes in a poorly ventilated space can produce as many viral droplets as one infectious cough.”5 The more people in a conversation, the more droplets are dispersed. 17. Although these droplets are smaller and less visible than rust, mold, or paint, they are physical objects which can travel to other objects and cause harm. 18. These droplets can spread Coronavirus when they reach humans directly, or when they land on habitable surfaces where they can survive until that surface is touched by a potential human host.6 19. Droplets containing Coronavirus infect a variety of surfaces and objects for a period of hours, days, or weeks, if not longer. After inspecting a cruise ship inhabited by passengers carrying the Coronavirus, the CDC reported that Coronavirus was detectable on various surfaces inside the cruise ship up to 17 days after passengers had vacated the cabins.7 2. See also Ex. 10 at 2 (indicating that the City and County of Los Angeles issued closure orders “because, among other reasons, the COVID-19 virus can spread easily from person to person and it is physically causing property loss or damage due to its tendency to attach to surfaces for prolonged periods of time,”); Ex. 11 at 3 (reflecting similar findings and action by the City and County of San Francisco). 21. Testing involving similar viruses in the Coronavirus family shows that Coronavirus can likely survive on ceramics, silicon rubber, or paper for up to five days if not longer. 22. When public areas containing such surfaces may have been exposed to Coronavirus, a number of countries including China, Italy, France, and Spain have required such areas to be fumigated prior to re-opening.9 23. The Coronavirus has spread throughout New York, Connecticut, and the United States. B. Governments Around the Country Order Everyone to Shelter in Place 24. As the virus spread in New York and Connecticut, state officials began discussing wide scale business closures. 25. On March 13, 2020 President Trump declared the COVID-19 outbreak a national emergency. 27. Following this advice, and recognizing that there had been numerous confirmed cases of COVID-19 in their jurisdictions, many state government administrations across the nation recognized the need to take steps to protect their residents from the spread of COVID-19. As a result, many governmental administrations entered civil authority orders suspending or severely curtailing business operations of non-essential businesses that interact with the public and provide gathering places for the individuals. 28. Specifically, the governments of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey acted “jointly [to] reduce density,” adopted what Governor Cuomo described as a “common set of rules that will pertain in all of our states” and “implement a uniform standard.”10 This coordinated approach included shutting down on-site service at all restaurants and bars.11 29. Specifically, on March 16, 2020, Governor Cuomo, in conjunction with Governor Lamont,12 ordered the closure of all gyms, movie theaters, bars and casinos. Ex. 1 at 3; Ex. 2 at 30. In May and June, these state governments modified the March 16 orders to allow certain restaurants to serve diners outdoors in a limited and heavily regulated manner. Ex. 3 at 3; Ex. 4 at 3; Ex. 5 at 4. In mid-June, the Orders were again modified to allow for certain indoor service in a limited and heavily regulated manner in certain locations. Ex. 6 at 2; Ex. 7 at 4–5. Collectively, the above-referenced orders of the State of New York and Connecticut are referred to herein as the “Orders.” 31. On March 28, 2020 the United States Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum concerning the “Identification of Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During Covid-19 Response.”14 This memorandum provided guidance for the implementation and standardization of all state shelter in place orders and the restrictions they place on different essential and non-essential businesses. 32. Statewide efforts similar to New York and Connecticut’s have been implemented around the country in response to literally millions of confirmed infections in the United States. State governments have required large scale business closures and imposed other limitations on customer and employee movement that prevent restaurants from operating and/or force them to suffer business losses. For example, Governor Newsom of California issues a similar order on March 19, 2020. 34. The Orders were issued in response to direct physical loss of and/or direct physical damage to properties, and particularly the harm caused by Coronavirus attaching itself to surfaces in highly-trafficked areas. When Governor Cuomo first declared Covid-19 a state of emergency on March 7, 2020, his order indicated that the action was being taken “to assist local governments and individuals in containing, preparing for, responding to and recovering from this state disaster emergency, to protect state and local property.” Ex. 8 at 2. Echoing this, on May 9, 2020, Mayor de Blasio issued an emergency order within the state framework and acknowledged that it “is given because of the propensity of the virus to spread person-to person and also because the actions taken to prevent such spread have led to property loss and damage.” Ex. 9 at 36. In reaction to the spread of the Coronavirus, and the Orders, the Delis suspended operations on or around March 16, 2020. 37. As Coronavirus spread, the streets on which the Delis are located, and the buildings and objects in and around them, became a breeding ground for the disease. Numerous individuals around the Delis also tested positive for Coronavirus as it was assuredly being transmitted in or between properties throughout the areas near the Delis, including but not limited to transmission through the air, shared buildings and facilities, through ventilation systems, or through contact with contaminated surfaces. 38. Events in Westport, Connecticut underscored these facts. The Rye Ridge Delis have a third branch in Westport (which is insured by a different insurance policy unconnected to Defendant). On or around April 7, 2020, an employee at the Westport Deli contracted the Coronavirus, which then spread to other employees. This forced the Westport Deli to shut down for about five weeks, and underscores the immediacy and imminence of the risks. 40. Under the Orders, the Delis were required to close their dining rooms16 to the public, thereby prohibiting access to, use of, and operations at the Delis and rendering them untenantable. 41. Under the Orders, the Delis were required to suspend dine in food offerings at the Delis and service of dine in food to customers, thereby prohibiting access to, use of, and operations at the Delis and rendering them untenantable. 42. Under the Orders, customers were prohibited from accessing and using the Delis’ dining rooms, thereby prohibiting access to, use of, and operations at the Delis and rendering them untenantable. 43. Under the Orders, customers were prohibited by social distancing guidelines from accessing and utilizing the Delis’ dining rooms, thereby prohibiting access to, use of, and operations at the Delis and rendering them untenantable. 44. Under the Orders, the Delis’ employees were prohibited from traveling to or accessing the Delis for purposes of preparing and serving dine in food, thereby prohibiting access to, use of, and operations at the Delis and rendering them untenantable. 45. Under the Orders, the Delis’ employees were prohibited from traveling to or accessing portions of the Delis (and property therein) utilized exclusively for preparing and serving dine in food, thereby prohibiting access to, use of, and operations at the Delis and rendering them untenantable. 47. Under the Orders, both Delis lost access to portions of the Delis (and property therein), lost use of the Delis (and property therein), lost necessary use of necessary facilities at the Delis (and property therein), and suspended operations at the Delis which became untenantable. 48. Because, inter alia, the spread of Coronavirus rendered the Deli’s facilities no longer usable for their intended purpose(s), and in many cases impossible to operate safely, it directly caused them to suffer physical damage and loss. 49. As a result of the spread of Covid-19, and related government orders, customers and dependent properties were unable to and/or prohibited from holding events from which the Delis were contacted to generate and usually generated catering income. Due to the losses described above, the Delis were also unable to fulfill any such orders. 50. As a result, both Delis suffered and continue to suffer substantial lost business income and other financial losses. 51. These extraordinary losses of business income (and concern for their employees’ welfare) are precisely why the Delis took out insurance policies with Defendant that included business interruption coverage, which were meant to cover these losses. D. These Losses Are Covered Business Interruptions 52. The Delis purchased insurance policies from Defendant that included business interruption (and other related) insurance coverage. 54. Rye Ridge CT has promptly and dutifully paid its premiums and complied with all other elements of its agreements with Defendant. Its policy number is ECP 055 79 23. Collectively ECP 055 80 49 and ECP 055 79 23 shall be referred to as the “Policies.” 55. In many countries, property insurance is sold on a specific peril basis. Such policies only cover losses from causes that are expressly covered like an earthquake, fire, or terrorist attack. Most property policies sold in the United States are all-risk property damage policies which cover losses from all causes that are not expressly excluded. 56. The Policies are all-risk property damage policies because their terms indicate that they cover all risks which can cause harm to physical property except for risks that are expressly and specifically excluded. In the Building and Personal Property Coverage Form provided to Plaintiffs, under the heading “Covered Causes of Loss,” Defendant agreed to cover and pay for all “direct ‘loss’ unless the ‘loss’ is excluded or limited” by a later provision of the policy. Ex. 12aa at 39; Ex. 13a at 34. 57. The Policies provide coverage for Lost Business Income, promising that Defendant “will pay for the actual loss of ‘Business Income’ and ‘Rental Value’ you sustain due to the necessary ‘suspension’ of your ‘operations’ during the ‘period of restoration’. The ‘suspension’ must be caused by direct ‘loss’ to property at a[n insured] ‘premises.’” Ex. 12a at 52; Ex. 13a at 47. See also Ex. 12a at 112; Ex. 13a at 103.17 59. The Policies include a putative definition of the term “loss” as encompassing “accidental physical loss or accidental physical damage.” Ex. 12a at 72; Ex. 13a at 67. See also Ex. 12a at 120; Ex. 13a at 110. 60. The term “loss” itself is not defined in the policy. Id. 61. Similar and supplemental coverage is available for inability to utilize existing ingresses and egresses to the Delis and dependent properties. Ex. 12a at 79–80, 115; Ex. 13a at 72, 105. 62. As described above, the Delis suffered losses when Coronavirus and related government orders caused them to lose physical access to, use of, and operations at and by the Delis, their employees, and their customers. This includes, among other things, loss of the ability to welcome customers onto the Delis’ physical premises, offer the physical dining experience of eating on site, access or utilize any of the physical property associated with these activities, access and utilize the ingresses and egresses at or to the Delis or properties upon which they depend in order to generate income. As a result of the Orders, physical components of the Delis became unusable, untenantable, damaged, and/or lost the ability to generate income. 63. As a direct result of this physical loss or damage, the Delis suspended operations, lost business income, and suffered other related covered losses (including but not limited to extended business income, lost inventory, and extra expenses). The extra expenses include (but are not limited to) outdoor seating and related equipment and protective equipment for employees. 65. The Orders required customers, employees, and members of the public to shelter in place. This included prohibiting members of the public, or even employees, from accessing areas immediately surrounding businesses like Plaintiffs’ (except potentially if those areas were necessary for a specifically permitted activity like seeking food or medicine). 66. The Delis are located in New York and Connecticut. As the Coronavirus spread, the streets on which the Delis are located, and the buildings and objects in and around them, became a breeding ground for the disease. 68. The prohibitions and limitations imposed by the Orders prohibited access to, use of, and operations at and by the Delis, their employees, and their customers. As a result of the Orders, components of the Delis became unusable and/or lost the ability to generate income. 69. As a result, the Delis lost business income, and suffered other related covered losses (including but not limited to extended business income, lost inventory, and extra expenses). 70. COVID-19 is a Covered Cause of Loss under the Policies. 71. The Building and Personal Property Coverage Form (FM 101 05 16) which defines the Policies’ Lost Business Income and Civil Authority coverage is a standardized form drafted by the Insurance Services Office (“ISO”). Ex. 12a at 35; Ex. 13a at 30. See also Ex. 12a at 112; Ex. 13a at 103. On information and belief, the form used for the Policy is also used by Defendant for numerous other insurance policies issued by Defendant to the Class members. 72. The ISO is a company that drafts standard policy language for use in insurance contracts used by insurers around the country. 74. When preparing CP 01 40 07 06, ISO circulated a statement to state insurance regulators that included the following acknowledgement: Disease-causing agents may render a product impure (change its quality or substance), or enable the spread of disease by their presence on interior building surfaces or the surfaces of personal property. When disease-causing viral or bacterial contamination occurs, potential claims involve the cost of replacement of property (for example, the milk), cost of decontamination (for example, interior building surfaces), and business interruption (time element) losses. Although building and personal property could arguably become contaminated (often temporarily) by such viruses and bacteria, the nature of the property itself would have a bearing on whether there is actual property damage. An allegation of property damage may be a point of disagreement in a particular case. 75. The insurance industry has thus recognized that the presence of virus or disease can constitute physical damage to property since at least 2006. 76. Defendant intentionally chose not to include CP 01 40 07 06 in the Policies and in its insurance policies issued to other Class members. 77. Defendant is aware of contractual force majeure clauses that suspend duties to perform in the event of a global pandemic. 78. Defendant chose not to use force majeure clauses in the Policies or in insurance policies issued to other Class and New York and Connecticut Subclass members. E. Defendant’s Denial of Plaintiffs’ Insurance Claim 79. In or around the week of March 16, 2020, Plaintiff Rye Ridge NY requested insurance coverage from Defendant through its broker. It then tendered by letter on June 5, 2020. This claim was later assigned the identifying number 3567132. 81. The June 24, 2020 letter contains nearly 7 pages of putative reasons for Cincinnati to deny the claim. Id. at 2–9. This language closely parallels the denial letter that Cincinnati would ultimately send Plaintiff. As of the writing of the letter, Cincinnati had already decided to deny the claim. Even so, notwithstanding how long the claim had been pending, Cincinnati did not inform the insured of this coverage decision. 82. Instead it asked Plaintiff a series of questions related to the legal basis for its claim. When Plaintiff responded with the information known to him, referencing events that have become common knowledge to most everyone in the United States, Cincinnati did not accept his answers and provide a coverage decision. 83. This strategy was designed to discourage Plaintiffs from obtaining a denial of coverage, allowing the claim to remain in an “investigation” stage indefinitely until it could be closed, Plaintiffs gave up, and/or the statute of limitations ran. 84. Only after Plaintiff retained counsel and through them insisted upon a coverage decision did Defendant ultimately deny the claim on August 25, 2020, more than three months after the claim was submitted. Ex. 14. 85. In or around the week of March 16, 2020, Plaintiff Rye Ridge CT requested insurance coverage from Defendant through its broker. It then tendered by letter on June 5, 2020. This claim was later assigned the identifying number 3567222. 87. The June 11, 2020 letter contains nearly 7 pages of putative reasons for Cincinnati to deny the claim. Id. at 2–9. This language closely parallels the denial letter that Cincinnati would ultimately send Plaintiff. As of the writing of the letter, Cincinnati had already decided to deny the claim. 88. Instead it asked Plaintiff a series of questions related to the legal basis for its claim. When Plaintiff responded with the information known to him, referencing events that have become common knowledge to most everyone in the United States, Cincinnati did not accept his answers and provide a coverage decision. 89. This strategy was designed to discourage Plaintiffs from obtaining a denial of coverage, allowing the claim to remain in an “investigation” stage indefinitely until it could be closed, Plaintiffs gave up, and/or the statute of limitations ran. 90. Only after Plaintiff retained counsel and through them insisted upon a coverage decision did Defendant ultimately deny the claim on August 25, 2020, more than three months after the claim was submitted. Ex. 15. 91. By denying Plaintiffs’ claims without inspecting the Delis premises, Defendant has waived any right to inspect those premises, deny coverage for any reason related to conditions at those locations, or raise any defense related to conditions at those locations or facts specific to the Delis. 93. Defendant accepted the premiums paid by the Delis with no intention of providing lost business income, physical damage, civil authority, or other applicable coverage for claims like those submitted by Plaintiffs and the proposed Class members and which were denied by Defendant. 94. Defendant’s rejection of the Delis’ claims was part of a policy by Defendant to limit its losses during this pandemic, notwithstanding that the Policies provide coverage for losses due to loss of use of property and from Covid-19 orders issued by civil authorities (among other coverage). 95. Although industry trade groups have argued that insurance companies do not have the funds to pay claims related to the Coronavirus and will require government assistance, the reality is that insurers are simply trying to minimize their exposure. “According to data from ratings firm A.M. Best Co., the insurance industry as a whole has $18.4 billion in net reserves for future payouts.18 97. Defendant’s wrongful denials of the Plaintiffs’ claims were not isolated incidents. Rather, on information and belief, Defendant has engaged in the same misconduct, alleged herein with respect to Plaintiffs, in connection with claims submitted by numerous of Defendant’s insureds who have suffered losses related to the Coronavirus pandemic and submitted claims which were categorically denied. 98. Plaintiffs’ claims and those of the proposed Class all arise from a single course of conduct by Defendant: its systematic and blanket refusal to provide any coverage for business losses related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the related actions taken by civil authorities to suspend business operations. 99. Defendant’s wrongful conduct alleged herein has caused significant damage, and if left unchecked will continue to cause significant damage to Plaintiffs and the other members of the proposed Class. 100. Defendant’s categorical treatment, failure to investigate in good faith, and denial of Plaintiffs’ and the Class members’ claims appears to be part of a broader strategy being employed by the insurance industry generally, to broadly deny claims for business interruption coverage related to the Coronavirus pandemic, as has been widely reported by the media and resulted in numerous lawsuits brought by businesses against property insurance companies throughout the country. V. A. The Rapid Spread of Coronavirus.......................................................................... 4 B. Governments Around the Country Order Everyone to Shelter in Place ................ 6 C. The Delis Suspend Operations ............................................................................. 10 D. These Losses Are Covered Business Interruptions .............................................. 12 E. Defendant’s Denial of Plaintiffs’ Insurance Claim .............................................. 17 V. A. The Rapid Spread of Coronavirus FAIR DEALING .............................................................................................................. 26 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349, ET SEQ. .................................................................................. 28 STAT. § 42-110A, ET SEQ. ............................................................................................ 31 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION DECLARATORY RELIEF ......................................................... 35 VII. VI. CAUSES OF ACTION .................................................................................................... 25 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION BREACH OF CONTRACT ........................................................ 25

lose

10. On September 10, 2019, Plaintiff patronized one of Defendant Jam’n’s coffee shops located in Grand Rapids, Michigan while he was in the city on business. 11. Plaintiff’s decided to patronize Jam’n’s establishment, in part, in order to access a WiFi network. 12. Although Jam’n provided a WiFi network for use by its patrons, the network was password protected and Plaintiff did not see the password posted. 13. On Plaintiff’s table, Jam’n had placed a card stating that in order to obtain the password for establishment’s WiFi network, he could text the word “Jam’n” to the short code “69922.” 14. This card did not state that by doing so Plaintiff was giving his consent to be contacted by Defendants using an Automatic Telephone Dialing System. 15. Plaintiff did not in any other way give his consent to be contacted by Defendants using an Automatic Telephone Dialing System. 16. Following the instructions on the card, Plaintiff texted the word “Jamin” to the short code “69922” from his personal cellular telephone. 17. Almost immediately, Plaintiff received a reply text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Welcome to JamnBean’s VIP program. 2.00 OFF Lattes, FREE WIFI & more. Check out our new wholesale program: https://slkt.io/GbZ wifi psw: betterhalf 4 Msgs/Month. Reply STOP to cancel, HELP for help. Msg&data rates may apply. Terms: http://bit.ly/2lbEw25 [ 3 ] 18. The url http://bit.ly/2lbEw25 leads to a webpage operated by Defendant SlickText giving terms and conditions. 19. The url https://slkt.io/GbZ then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. 2.00 OFF any Latte w/ reusable coupon. Check out our large variety of loose leaf tea! https://slkt.io/Hwk 20. Plaintiff did not respond to this message. 21. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff returned to Ohio. 22. On September 16, 2019 at 9:05 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Jam’nBean VIP’S, how about a Pumpkin Spice Latte. Save 23. The url https://slkt.io/Hwk then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. 24. On October 7, 2019 at 10:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey VIP’s – 10 reasons to visit Jam’nBean Coffee & Tea Co. & 2.00 off latte coupon https://slkt.io/Hwk 25. The url https://slkt.io/Hwk then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations, as well as advertising material for Jam’n. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. [ 4 ] 26. On October 14, 2019 at 10:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey Jam’nBean VIP’S – This weeks Specials: 2.00 OFF Lattes, .50 cents off Batch Brew & 1.00 off organic teas with reusable coupon!. https://slkt.io/Hwk 27. The url https://slkt.io/Hwk then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes, a reusable $0.50 off coupon for “Batch Brew,” and a reusable $1.00 off coupon for organic teas redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. 28. On October 21, 2019 at 8:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey Jam’nBean VIP’s! – Taste the difference of Freshly Roasted Coffee w/ a Delicious Latte & SAVE 2.00 with reusable coupon: https://slkt.io/Hwk -SUPPORT LOCAL- 29. The url https://slkt.io/Hwk then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. 30. On November 4, 2019 at 8:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey Jam’nBean VIP’s-SAVE 2.00 OFF Lattes, 1.00 OFF Hot Teas with this weeks reusable coupon: https://slkt.io/44bRn 31. The url https://slkt.io/44bRn then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes and a $1.00 off coupon for teas redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. [ 5 ] 32. On November 11, 2019 at 9:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey Jam’nBean VIP’s-SAVE 2.00 OFF Lattes with this weeks reusable coupon: https://slkt.io/44bRn Coffee Roasted to Perfection by our own Master Roaster! 33. The url https://slkt.io/44bRn then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. 34. On November 18, 2019 at 9:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey VIP,This Weeks JamnBean Specials,FREE 5.00 Gift Card with Select Gift Boxes,SAVE 2.00 off Lattes & Coffee Beans.Coupon: https://slkt.io/44bR 35. The url https://slkt.io/44bR then led to, on information and belief, a statement that “This mobilecoupon.io page can’t be found.” At present, it leads to the same statement. 36. On November 25, 2019 at 9:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Jam’nBean Coffee & Tea Company – Hey {first_name|VIP}}, FREE Large Latte w/ Fresh Roasted Beans, 2.00 OFF Latte Coupon: https://slkt.io/4hY2 37. The url https://slkt.io/4hY2 then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. [ 6 ] 38. On December 3, 2019 at 1:07 P.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Holiday Easy Gifts – 5.00 FREE Jam’nBean Gift Card with every Coffee/Tea Gift Box purchased. Order here link: http://www.jamnbean.com/gift or pickup in store! 39. The url http://www.jamnbean.com/gift then led to, on information and belief, Jam’n’s online store. At present, it leads to the same. 40. On December 9, 2019 at 8:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey VIP,2.00 OFF all Lattes with reusable coupon! Fresh roasted coffee from Jam’nBean makes the perfect gift. Coupon: https://slkt.io/4vNH 41. The url https://slkt.io/4vNH then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a statement that the coupon has expired. 42. On December 30, 2019 at 8:01 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey Jam’nBean VIP – New Year Savings with a 2.00 OFF Latte Coupon: : https://slkt.io/4lgS “But first, coffee!” 43. The url https://slkt.io/4lgS then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for lattes redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to a USPS package tracking report. [ 7 ] 44. On February 4, 2020 at 8:00 A.M., Plaintiff received another text message from the short code “69922,” reading: Hey Jam’nBean VIP, Shake off the Winter Blues & SAVE 2.00 on any awesome Latte & Fresh Baked Muffin Combo. Use Coupon: https://slkt.io/52qt “But first, coffee!” 45. The url https://slkt.io/52qt then led to, on information and belief, a reusable $2.00 off coupon for any latte and muffin combination redeemable at Jam’n coffee shop locations. At present, it leads to the same. 46. In total, Defendants have sent thirteen text messages to Plaintiff. 47. On information and belief, Defendant Jam’n entered the text of each text message into an interface provided by Defendant SlickText, and Defendant SlickText then sent them out using a device capable of storing and dialing through a list of Jam’n WiFi users’ telephone numbers in rapid succession. 48. This action follows. 49. Plaintiff realleges the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 50. The TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), prohibits “making any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or recorded voice . . .(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone device . . . unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed or guaranteed by the United States. [ 8 ] 51. A text message is a “call” for the purposes of the TCPA. 2003 TCPA Order, 18 FCC Rcd at 14115, ¶ 165. 52. “Prior express consent” means “prior express written consent,” not merely proof of an existing business relationship, although “written consent” may be signed by the recipient in any form permitted by the E-Sign Act. 2012 TCPA Order, 27 FCC Rcd at 1830, ¶¶ 20, 34. 53. “The term prior express written consent means an agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . (i) The written agreement shall include a clear and conspicuous disclosure informing the person signing that: (A) By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice.” 47 C.F.R. 54. An “automatic telephone dialing system” (“ATDS”) is any “equipment which has the capacity … to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 55. The facts that Defendants’ text messages were in no way personalized, that Defendants intentionally sought to acquire many telephone numbers to which they might advertise, and that nearly all of Defendants’ text messages were sent exactly at [ 9 ] 8:00 A.M., 9:00 A.M., or 10:00 A.M., together indicate that Defendant SlickText sent the text using an ATDS. 56. At no time did Plaintiff give prior express written consent to Jam’n or SlickText permitting them to contact Plaintiffs by means of an ATDS. 57. On information and belief, SlickText sent each of the text messages at issue at Jam’n’s instructions. 58. Defendants therefore violated the TCPA by sending at least thirteen text messages to Plaintiff’s cellular phone using an ATDS without his prior consent express written consent. 59. Defendants’ conduct in violating the TCPA was knowing and willful. 60. Plaintiffs are entitled to $500 per call under this count, trebled for knowing or willful violations. 61. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3). 62. The class consists of: All individuals to whom SlickText sent a text message, where that text message was drafted by Jam’n or was drafted at Jam’n’s request, and where that text message was received on or after February 20, 2016. 63. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable. On information and belief, there are hundreds of class members. 64.1200(f)(8). 64. There are questions of law and fact common to the class members that predominate over any questions relating to individual class members. The only [ 10 ] significant question with respect to any class member is whether Defendants’ method of obtaining consent—requiring that patrons provide their phone numbers to access WiFi without disclosing that patrons would thereafter receive further text messages sent by means of an automatic telephone dialing system—satisfies the “prior express written consent” requirement of the TCPA. 65. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 66. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel familiar with TCPA and class action litigation and with the resources necessary to pay for class notice and discovery costs. 67. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that individual actions are not economically feasible and many if not most class members are unaware of their rights. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment as follows: a. Certifying this case as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3); b. Appointing Plaintiff as class representative and Plaintiff’s counsel as class counsel; c. Declaring that the practices complained of herein are unlawful and violate the aforementioned bodies of law; [ 11 ] d. Awarding statutory damages of $500 per plaintiff per text message, trebled for knowing or willful violations; e. Awarding Plaintiff as class representative statutory damages of $500 per text message for twelve text messages, trebled for knowing or willful violations; f. Awarding Plaintiff the costs of this action; g. Awarding any other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and appropriate.

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11. Defendant Real Value is a wholesale pharmacy supplier offering prescription pharmaceuticals, including name brand and generic drugs. 12. On information and belief, Defendant Real Value does business as Hospital Pharmaceutical Consulting or HPC RX. 13. Defendant Real Property is licensed in Illinois as an active pharmacy, an active wholesale drug distributor, and an active controlled substance distributor. 15. Plaintiff has received at least two of Defendant’s advertisements by facsimile. A true and correct copy of the fax received on or about April 18, 2017 is attached as Exhibit A. A true and correct copy of a second fax received on or about April 18, 2017 is attached as Exhibit B. 16. Exhibit A is a one-page document Defendant sent by fax promoting Defendant’s prescription pharmaceutical products. The fax advertises the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. Exhibit A provides Defendant’s fax information to contact Defendant to order Defendant’s pharmaceuticals. Exhibit A. 17. Exhibit A promotes the quality of Defendant’s services stating that Real Value is an OptumRx approved vendor and that its VAWD accreditation is pending. Exhibit A. 18. Exhibit A states “FREE SHIPPING and NO ORDER MINIMUM On Your First Order!” Exhibit A. 19. Exhibit B is a one-page document Defendant sent by fax promoting Defendant’s prescription pharmaceutical products. The fax advertises the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. Exhibit B provides Defendant’s fax information to contact Defendant to order Defendant’s pharmaceuticals. Exhibit B. 21. Exhibit B further promotes the quality of Defendant’s services by telling fax recipients that nest day service is available, no contract is required, and Defendant has a “No Hassle Return Policy.” Exhibit B. 22. Defendant’s faxes promote its commercially available pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical supply services. 23. Plaintiff did not expressly invite or give permission to anyone to send Exhibit A, Exhibit B, or any other advertisement from Defendant to Plaintiff’s fax machine. 24. Exhibit A does not include an opt-out notice as required by the TCPA. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) & (E) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii) & (v). 25. On information and belief, Defendant sent advertisements by facsimile to Plaintiff and more than 39 other persons in violation of the TCPA. 26. Plaintiff and the other class members owe no obligation to protect their fax machines from Defendant. Their fax machines are ready to send and receive their urgent communications, or private communications about patients’ medical needs, not to receive Defendant’s unlawful advertisements. 28. Excluded from the class are Defendant, Defendant’s officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, any parent, subsidiary or affiliated company of Defendant, and any Judge assigned to this action, including his or her immediate family. 29. In this action, Plaintiff intends to discover, include, and resolve the merits of claims about all advertisements Defendant sent by fax. Exhibit C, a Demand for Preservation of All Tangible Documents Including Electronically Stored Information. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies Rule 23 (a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 33. Typicality of claims. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other class members, because Plaintiff and all class members were injured by the same wrongful practices. Plaintiff and the members of the class received Defendant’s advertisements by facsimile and those advertisements did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendant’s conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the other putative class members will prevail as well. 34. Adequacy of representation. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the class its seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and TCPA litigation in particular, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff and its counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interest of members of the class. 36. A class action is the superior method of adjudicating the common questions of law or fact that predominate over individual questions. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. The likelihood of individual class members prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every class member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Relief concerning Plaintiff’s rights under the laws herein alleged and with respect to the class would be proper. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 37. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 39. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 40. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 41. The TCPA provides a private right of action as follows: 42. The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if it determines that a violation was knowing or willful. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 43. The TCPA requires that every advertisement sent by facsimile must include an opt-out notice clearly and conspicuously displayed on the bottom of its first page. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) and (E); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4). 45. Here, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) and (E) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii) & (v) by failing to include a compliant opt-out notice. Exhibit A, Exhibit B. 46. Facsimile advertising imposes burdens on recipients that are distinct from the burdens imposed by other types of advertising. The required opt-out notice provides recipients the necessary information to opt-out of future fax transmissions, including a notice that the sender’s failure to comply with the opt-out request will be unlawful. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a) (4) (iii). 47. Exhibit A and Exhibit B do not state that Defendant’s failure to comply with an opt-out request within 30 days is unlawful. 48. Exhibit A and Exhibit B do not inform the recipient that he/she/it has a legal right to request that Defendant not send any future fax. 49. Exhibit A and Exhibit B do not inform the recipient that an opt-out request will be valid only unless and until the person making the request subsequently provides express invitation or permission to the sender, in writing or otherwise, to send such advertisement to such person at such telephone facsimile machine. 51. Even if Defendant did not intend to injure Plaintiff and the other class members, did not intend to violate their privacy, and did not intend to waste their valuable time with Defendant’s advertisements, those facts are irrelevant because the TCPA is a strict liability statute. 52. If Defendant’s actions were knowing or willful, then the Court has the discretion to increase the statutory damages up to three times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 55. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons and against Defendant. 56. By sending advertisements to their fax machines, Defendant improperly and unlawfully converted the class’s fax machines to Defendant’s own use. Where printed (as in Plaintiff’s case), Defendant also improperly and unlawfully converted the class members’ paper and toner to Defendant’s own use. Defendant also converted Plaintiff’s time to Defendant’s own use, as they did with the valuable time of the other class members. 57. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time. 59. Defendant knew or should have known that their misappropriation of paper, toner, and employee time was wrongful and without authorization. 60. Plaintiff and the other class members were deprived of the use of the fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant. CONVERSION TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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10. Defendant is regularly engaged, for profit, in the collection of debts allegedly owed by consumers. 11. The principal purpose of Defendant's business is the collection of such debts. 12. Defendant uses the mails in its debt collection business. 13. Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 14. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 15. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 16. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 17. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 18. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 19. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 20. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff by calls to Plaintiff's telephone. 35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 36. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) specifically prohibits threatening “to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 39. The Letter contains a partially shaded box in the center of the Letter which states in bolded and enlarged font, “FINAL NOTICE”, followed by “Pay online at MidlandCredit.com or Call 877-214-7799.” 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 57. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New Jersey. 58. Plaintiff seeks to certify the following class: 59. All consumers to whom Defendant sent a collection letter substantially and materially similar to the Letter sent to Plaintiff, which Letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 9. Defendant regularly collects or attempts to collect debts asserted to be owed to others.

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17. Plaintiff Harris is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 19. Beginning at least as early as December 2015, American Express repeatedly called Harris’s cellular telephone. Harris received repeated, harassing calls at all hours of the day. 20. The majority of the calls were prerecorded. As a result, Harris could not request that the calls end or to voice her complaints to a real person, despite attempts to do so. The prerecorded voice offered to lower Harris’s interest rate, even though she did not have any account with American Express, interest-bearing or otherwise. 21. A few calls involved a live person on the other end. During a call on July 14, 19, or 21, Harris told the live caller she had the wrong number and not to call again. 22. During a call on November 1, 2016, at 2:28 PM, Harris told a live caller that she had the wrong number (and that the information had previously been conveyed to American Express) and not to call again. The caller told Harris that a “Mary Harris” had applied for an American Express credit card. 23. Despite these attempts, the automated calls continued. 24. The calls continued through November 2016. 25. Harris received phone calls to her cellular telephone on numerous occasions, including on the following dates and times from telephone number 801-945-5000, as identified by Harris’s identification system: a. July 14, 2016, 12:20 PM b. July 19, 3:39 PM c. July 19, 3:45 PM d. July 21, 11:15 AM e. October 31, 2016, 11:30 AM f. November 1, 2016, 2:28 PM 27. On January 25, 2017, a paralegal in Plaintiff’s counsel’s office called 801- 945-5000. A prerecorded voice stated “Thank you for calling the American Express Service Center in Salt Lake City.” 28. A Google search for the number 801-845-5000 confirms that the number is registered to American Express. 29. Harris was unable to definitively determine the purpose behind American Express’s automated calls, but they appear to constitute an attempt to market lower interest rates. 30. During the relevant period and until September 7, 2016, Harris subscribed to a cellular phone plan that provided for limited minutes (250 daytimes, 1,000 night and weekend). The unwanted, automated calls before September 7, 2016 reduced the cell phone minutes available to her. 31. American Express is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 32. Many or all of the calls by American Express to Harris on her cellular telephone occurred via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and/or used “an artificial or prerecorded voice” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 33. The telephone number that American Express used to contact Harris, with an “artificial or prerecorded voice” and/or made by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 34. Harris did not provide “prior express consent” allowing American Express to place telephone calls to her cellular phone utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 36. American Express’s telephone calls to Harris’s cellular phone utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system” for non- emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiff’s prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 37. The burden is on American Express to demonstrate that Harris provided prior express written consent within the meaning of the statute.6 38. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”). 40. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Classes, but based upon the representations of Defendant as to its market share, Plaintiff reasonably believes that Class members number at minimum in the tens of thousands. 41. Plaintiff and all members of the Classes have been harmed by the acts of Defendant, because their privacy has been violated, they were subject to annoying and harassing calls that constitute a nuisance, and they were charged for incoming calls. 42. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 43. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Classes can be identified easily through records maintained by American Express. 45. As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without her prior express written consent within the meaning of the TCPA and Rules, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Telemarketing Class member. As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls after she informed American Express that it had a wrong number, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Do-Not-Call Class member. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 46. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes, including claims under the TCPA. 47. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for violation of the TCPA are relatively small. Management of these claims is likely to present substantially fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated and the Class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under the statute to authorize calls to their cellular telephones. 49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 50. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 51. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, Plaintiff and each member of the Telemarketing Class are entitled to treble damages of $1,500.00 for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 52. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, Plaintiff and each member of the Do-Not-Call Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 53. Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by Defendant in the future. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 55. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 56. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, Plaintiff and Telemarketing Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 57. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, Plaintiff and Do-Not-Call Class members are entitled to an award of up to $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(c)(5). 58. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 59. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200

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[Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.) By Plaintiff and all Class Members Against All Defendants] [Violation of California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Cal. Civil Code §§1750 et seq.) By Plaintiff and Purchaser and Upgrade CLRA Class Members against Defendant) [Violation of California’s False Advertising Laws (Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17500 et seq.) By Plaintiff and all Class Members Against All Defendants] 16. Incorporated in 1977, Apple designs, manufactures and markets mobile communication and media devices, personal computers and portable digital music players, and sells a variety of related software, services, accessories, networking solutions and third-party digital content and applications. The Company sells its products worldwide through its retail stores, online stores and direct sales force, as well as through third-party cellular network carriers, wholesalers, retailers and value-added resellers. 17. Apple is in the business of manufacturing and selling its line of “iPhone” cellular telephones. The first iPhone model was released on or about June 29, 2007, and the most recent model, iPhone 6 and 6+, were introduced on or about September 9, 2014. Predecessor iPhone models include the iPhone 5S and 5C introduced on or about September 10, 2013, and the iPhone 4S introduced on or about October 10, 2011. 18. Apple represents in its advertising that the iPhone 6 and 6+ are available with a hard drive capacity of 16 GB. With respect to earlier versions of the iPhone, Apple makes similar representations regarding its 16 GB and 8 GB storage capacities. 19. In addition to iPhones, Apple also manufactures and sells a line of “iPad” tablet devices and “iPod” audio players. The iPad was first introduced on or about April 3, 2010. The iPod was first introduced on or about October 23, 2001. 20. During the relevant time period, Apple made representations -5- 44. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of asserting the claims alleged in this Complaint on a common basis. Plaintiff brings -15- 53. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 54. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq. (“CLRA” or the “Act”), which provides that enumerated listed “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful,” CLRA § 1770, and that “[a]ny consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action against such person to recover or obtain” various forms of relief, including injunctive relief and damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 1780. 55. Plaintiff was deceived by Defendant’s unlawful practices as described above, which included the promotion and advertising of the storage -19- 62. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 63. The Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. (“UCL”), prohibits any “unlawful”, “unfair”, or “fraudulent business” act or practice and any false or misleading advertising. 64. In the course of conducting business, Defendant committed unlawful business practices by, inter alia, making the representations (which also constitute -21- 76. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 77. Business & Professions Code § 17500 et seq. provides that it is “unlawful for any person, firm [or other party] . . . to make to disseminate before the public . . . any statement which is untrue or misleading” in connection with the sale or disposition of goods or services. -23- Company Background and Representations

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15. Plaintiff is a current employee of Defendant as an at-home VQA. 16. The position of VQA does not require any specific certifications, licensures, or education. In fact, only a high school diploma is required for the position. See Career Opportunity Job Posting, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 17. Defendant assigns Plaintiff to complete remote virtual inspections of its customers throughout the United States. 18. Plaintiff’s primary job duties do not involve the exercise of independent judgment or discretion regarding matters of significance to Defendant’s business. In fact, on information and belief, Plaintiff—and the Class—make all assessments using pre-approved scripts and procedures, which they are required to follow. 19. 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(g) provides that: Ordinary inspection work generally does not meet the duties requirements for the administrative exemption. Inspectors normally perform specialized work along standardized lines involving well-established techniques and procedures which may have been catalogued and described in manuals or other sources. Such inspectors rely on techniques and skills acquired by special training or experience. They have some leeway in the performance of their work but only within closely prescribed limits. See also Blotzer v. L-3 Communications Corp., No. CV-11-274-TUC-JGZ, 2012 WL 6086931 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2012). 54. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) individually and on behalf of: All current and former Virtual Quality Auditors, Virtual Cellular Installation Inspectors, and/or other job titles completing the same or similar job duties who worked for SIGNAL HILL at any time in the last three years. (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this definition as necessary. 58. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein. 59. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was an “employer” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), subject to the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. 60. Defendant is engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES

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49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Collective Members, realleges and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 50. On or around March 31, 2019, Plaintiff began employment with Defendants as a cashier and server. 51. Plaintiff’s primary job duties included seating customers, waiting tables, clearing dishes from tables, and cashing out customers. 52. Plaintiff would regularly work over 40 hours a week and was not compensated overtime wages. 53. For example, during the pay period of May 31, 2019, Plaintiff worked 13 hours of overtime in which she was not compensated time-and-a-half. 54. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Collective Members, realleges and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Collective Members, realleges and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 70. Plaintiff and the Collective Members were non-exempt employees entitled to the statutorily mandated overtime wages. 71. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked numerous hours of overtime that Defendants did not pay. 72. As a result, Defendants have intentionally failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Members all owed overtime according to the provisions of the FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO PAY OVERTIME

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45. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 46. Plaintiffs and Class members used Alexa Devices in their residences or otherwise had their private conversations overheard, recorded, intercepted, or monitored by an Alexa Device. 47. When Plaintiffs and Class members used Alexa Devices or otherwise had their communications recorded, stored, intercepted, or monitored by an Alexa Device, Amazon recorded their communications, transmitted the communications to cloud servers, and retained copies of the communications, in violation of WA Rev. Code § 9.73.030, which prohibits the willful interception of any oral communication and the willful use of any device to intercept any oral communication. 48. Amazon did not adequately disclose to Plaintiffs and Class members that it would record and store their communications that occurred in the vicinity of Alexa Devices. 49. Plaintiffs and Class members did not believe that Amazon would record and store their interactions with Alexa Devices. 50. Plaintiffs and Class members reasonably expected that their Alexa interactions would remain private. 51. Plaintiffs and Class members did not consent to have their communications recorded, stored, intercepted, or monitored by Amazon through Alexa Devices. 52. Amazon intentionally recorded and stored interactions Plaintiffs and Class members had with Alexa. 53. Amazon’s conduct violated the statute complained of herein. 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 61. Plaintiff and Class members used Alexa Devices in their residences or otherwise had their private conversations overheard, recorded, intercepted, or monitored by an Alexa Device. 75. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiffs and Class members used Alexa Devices in their residences or otherwise had their private conversations overheard, recorded, intercepted, or monitored by an Alexa Device. 77. When Plaintiffs and Class members used Alexa Devices or otherwise had their communications recorded, stored, intercepted, or monitored by an Alexa Device, Amazon recorded their communications, transmitted the communications to cloud servers, retained copies of the communications, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703, which prohibits the willful interception of any oral communication. 78. Amazon did not adequately disclose to Plaintiffs and Class members that it would record and store their communications that occurred in the vicinity of Alexa Devices. 79. Plaintiffs and Class members did not believe that Amazon would record and store their interactions with Alexa Devices. 80. Plaintiffs and Class members reasonably expected that their Alexa interactions would remain private. 81. Plaintiffs and Class members did not consent to have their communications recorded, stored, intercepted, or monitored by Amazon through Alexa Devices. 82. Amazon intentionally recorded and stored interactions Plaintiffs and Class members had with Alexa. 83. Amazon’s conduct violated the statute complained of herein. SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104 (206) 622-2000 By: /s/ Bradley S. Keller Bradley S. Keller Violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretapping Statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs Pamela Zager, Maureen Urbach, James Urbach, and the Pennsylvania Subclass) Violation of the Maryland Wiretapping Statute, Md. Cts. & Jud. Pro. § 10-402 (On Behalf of Plaintiff Caron Watkins and the Maryland Subclass) Violation of the Washington Wiretapping Statute, WA Rev. Code § 9.73.030 (On Behalf of Plaintiffs Jeffrey Hoyt, Lorlie Tesoriero, and the Washington Subclass)

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19. SignPost offers customer relationship management software for businesses. 20. To generate new customers, SignPost relies on telemarketing. 21. One of SignPost’s strategies for telemarketing involves the use of automatic telephone dialing system to solicit business. 22. This includes using a pre-loaded list of telephone numbers. 23. The list of telephone numbers is then automatically dialed in sequence. 24. When an individual answers the phone, they are then transferred to a customer service representative of the Defendant. 25. Defendant use these technologies because they allow Defendant to deliver thousands of telemarketing messages in a short period of time, but its sales representatives only talk to individuals who affirmatively respond. 27. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 28. The Plaintiff’s telephone number, (805) 405-XXXX, is registered to a wireless, cellular telephone service. 29. On July 3, 2019, the Plaintiff received automated calls from the Defendant. 30. When Plaintiff answered one of the calls, there was a lengthy pause and a click followed by silence before a live person came on the line. 31. The Caller ID number for the call was (805) 779-4025. 32. This Caller ID number was “spoofed,” as that number is not in service. 33. In other words, the Defendant manipulated the dialing system to use a Caller ID number that was local to the Plaintiff in hopes that he would answer. 34. This is also consistent with the use of an ATDS, as it takes computerized dialing software to manipulate a Caller ID. 35. The dialing system has the capacity to store telephone numbers in a database and dial them automatically with no human intervention. 36. Loading a list of telephone numbers into the dialing system and pressing a single command does this. 37. On information and belief, the dialing system can also produce numbers using a sequential number generator and dial them automatically. 38. The dialing system can do this by inputting a straightforward computer command. 40. First, it would dial a number such as (555) 000-0001, then (555) 000-0002, and so on. 41. This would be done without any human intervention or further effort. 42. These facts, as well as the generic content of the call, which was not personalized to Mr. Loftus, indicate that the calls were made with an ATDS as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 43. Other individuals have complained about receiving spam calls from this number, including complaints about calls from SignPost: “Telemarketer” “Sales Call” “SignPost Telemarketing (Call centre) reported by Eva Answered the phone, they asked "can you hear me" I said yes, but later I thought about the scam that went around about that, she then proceeded to ask me if I had a minute for her to talk to me about why she called. I said if its a sales call I'm not interested, she said it's only a sales call if you want to buy something from me. I then hung up.” See https://www.shouldianswer.com/phone-number/8057794025 (Last Visited July 31, 2019). 44. During the call, Plaintiff learned that the purpose of the call was to sell SignPost’s services. 45. Confirming that fact, the Defendant sent the Plaintiff an e-mail regarding their services. 46. The e-mail came from “[email protected]“. 48. Plaintiff and the other call recipients were harmed by these calls. They were temporarily deprived of legitimate use of their phones because the phone line was tied up, their time was wasted with unsolicited communications, and their privacy was improperly invaded. 49. Moreover, these calls injured the Plaintiff and the other call recipients because they were frustrating, obnoxious, annoying, were a nuisance, and disturbed the solitude of the Plaintiff and the Class. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 51. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) or (3). 52. Plaintiff proposes the following class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: Automated Telemarketing Call Class All persons within the United States to whom: (a) Defendant or a third party acting on their behalf made one or more calls using the same or similar dialing system used to call the Plaintiff; (b) to a cellular telephone number; (c) within the four years before the date of the filing of this Complaint. 54. The Class defined above is identifiable through phone records and phone number databases and Defendant’s internal records. 55. The potential class members number at least in the thousands, since automated and pre-recorded telemarketing campaigns make calls to hundreds or thousands of individuals a day. Individual joinder of these persons is impracticable. 56. Plaintiff is a member of the proposed Class. 57. There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and to the proposed Class, including but not limited to the following: ▪ Whether Defendant placed calls using an ATDS; ▪ Whether Defendant placed calls without obtaining the recipients’ prior express written consent for the call; ▪ Whether the Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to statutory damages because of Defendant’ actions; ▪ Whether the actions of the Defendant were knowing or willful. 58. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims, like the claims of the Class arise out of the same common course of conduct by Defendant and are based on the same legal and remedial theories. 60. Common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members. The only individual question concerns identification of class members, which will be ascertainable from records maintained by Defendant and/or its agents. 61. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated. 62. Class treatment is superior to multiple individual suits or piecemeal litigation because it conserves judicial resources, promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication, provides a forum for small claimants, and deters illegal activities. There will be no significant difficulty in the management of this case as a class action. 63. The likelihood that individual members of the Class will prosecute separate actions is remote due to the time and expense necessary to prosecute an individual case. 64. Plaintiff is not aware of any litigation concerning this controversy already commenced by others who meet the criteria for class membership described above. 64.1200(a)(1)(iii) & 64.1200(a)(2). 65. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 67. As a result of the Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, or up to $1,500 in statutory damages for each willfully or knowingly made violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 68. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from engaging in the use of an automatic telephone dialing system. AUTOMATED CALL VIOLATIONS (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS) OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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11. In addition, the TCPA prohibits making “any call” using “an artificial or prerecorded voice” to a wireless number. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 12. According to findings by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), such calls are prohibited because autodialed and prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls are costly and inconvenient. 13. The FCC has issued rulings clarifying that in order to obtain an individual’s consent, a clear, unambiguous, and conspicuous written disclosure must be provided by the individual. 2012 FCC Order, 27 FCC Rcd. at 1839 (“[R]equiring prior written consent will better protect consumer privacy because such consent requires conspicuous action by the consumer—providing permission in writing—to authorize autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls. . . .”). B. Defendants’ Robocalls to Plaintiff and Class Members 14. Prior to the calls at issue in this action, Plaintiff had never had any contact with Defendants. Plaintiff has never consented in writing, or otherwise, to receive telephone calls from Defendants. Plaintiff has never provided Defendants with her telephone number. 15. The following chart shows each date and time that Defendants called Plaintiff on her cellular telephone number to sell her electricity: 19. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. 20. Plaintiff proposes the following Robocall Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons within the United States who (a) received a non- emergency telephone call; (b) on his or her cellular telephone or residential telephone line; (c) made by or on behalf of Defendants in order to promote their products or services; (d) for whom Defendants had no record of prior express written consent; (e) and such phone call was made with the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice; (f) at any time in the period that begins four years before the filing of the complaint in this action to the date that class notice is disseminated. 21. Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as the “Robocall Class.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, this proposed class. Excluded from the Robocall Class are Defendants and any entities in which Defendants have a controlling interest, Defendants’ agents and employees, any Judge and/or Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judges’ staffs and immediate families. 23. Collectively, all these persons will be referred to as the “Autodialer Class.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, this proposed class. Excluded from the Autodialer Class are Defendants and any entities in which Defendants have a controlling interest, Defendants’ agents and employees, any Judge and/or Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judges’ staffs and immediate families. 24. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the proposed classes, but reasonably believes based on the scale of Defendants’ business, and the number of autodialed robocalls that she received, that the classes are so numerous that individual joinder would be impracticable. 25. Plaintiff and all members of the proposed classes have been harmed by the acts of Defendants in the form of multiple involuntary telephone and electricity charges, the aggravation, nuisance, and invasion of privacy that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unsolicited and harassing telephone calls, and violations of their statutory rights. 26. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The proposed classes can be identified easily through records maintained by Defendants. 28. As a person who received numerous and repeated calls on her telephone using an autodialers and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice without her prior express written consent, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each member of the classes. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the proposed classes, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the proposed classes. 29. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes. 30. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class wide relief is essential to compel Defendants to comply with the TCPA. The interest of the members of the proposed classes in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants are small because the statutory damages in an individual action for violation of the TCPA are relatively small. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated and the members of the classes, by definition, did not provide the prior express consent required under the statute to authorize calls to their telephones. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 33. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 34. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and members of the proposed classes are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 35. Plaintiff and members of the proposed classes are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by Defendants in the future. 36. Plaintiff and members of the proposed classes are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 37. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 38. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 40. Plaintiff and members of the proposed classes are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by Defendants in the future. 41. Plaintiff and members of the proposed classes are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 9. In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA in response to a growing number of consumer complaints regarding certain telemarketing practices. A. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act Of 1991 KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

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11. Defendant JGAI is a real estate agency that contracts with individuals to assist them in buying and selling properties. The calls at issue in this case were made on behalf of, for the benefit of, and with the knowledge and approval of 26. Plaintiff Gindin is the owner and customary user of a telephone number ending in 4837. 27. On January 11, 2007, Plaintiff Gindin registered his telephone number on the National Do Not Call Registry to avoid receiving unsolicited telemarketing calls. 28. In or around early 2016, Gindin listed his home for sale. 29. Later, in or around July 2016, Gindin made the decision to retain his home and remove all sale listings. 30. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff began receiving non-stop telemarketing calls from the Defendants soliciting Plaintiff to utilize their home listing and other real estate brokerage services. 31. All of the calls were made by associates of JGAI at the direction and oversight of Glover. The calls all came from JGAI phone numbers as indicated on Plaintiff’s Caller ID and all of the callers are associates of JGAI. JGAI and Glover knew about, directed, ratified, and benefitted from the calls. 32. Plaintiff received telemarketing calls from Defendants from a variety of telephone numbers, including: 734-259-1278, 734-259-1121, 248-633-6947, 248-930-0198, 248-633-6947, and others. 34. On information and belief, Defendant Sweis is the primary and customer user of the telephone number 734-259-1278. Sweis placed at least three known calls to Plaintiff in a twelve-month period and/or more than thirty (30) days after Plaintiff requested to no longer be called on September 6, 2016. 35. On information and belief, Defendant Loomis is the primary and customer user of the telephone number 734-259-1121. Loomis placed at least two known calls to Plaintiff in a twelve-month period and/or more than thirty (30) days after Plaintiff requested to no longer be called on September 6, 2016. 36. On information and belief, Defendant Bertrand is the primary and customer user of the telephone number 248-633-6947. Bertrand placed at least three known calls to Plaintiff in a twelve-month period and/or more than thirty (30) days after Plaintiff requested to no longer be called on September 6, 2016. 37. After receiving repeated telemarketing calls from Defendants, on or around September 6, 2016, Plaintiff posted a complaint on Defendant JGAI’s website requesting that Defendants stop all telemarketing calls to his telephone. 38. Later that same day, September 6, 2016, Defendant Glover responded and acknowledged Plaintiff’s request to no longer be called and further informed Plaintiff that he would remove his name and number from Defendants’ calling list. 40. Plaintiff received over twenty-five calls from or on behalf of JGAI that were placed, in part, by the individual Defendants more than 30 days after Plaintiff’s September 6, 2016 request to be placed on Defendants’ internal do not call list. 41. On or around August 2017, after having listed his home for sale again, Plaintiff removed the listing for a second time. 42. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was, again, flooded with calls from the Defendants attempting solicit Plaintiff to utilize their home listing and other real estate brokerage services. 43. Then, on or around May 2018, having listed his home for sale a third time, Plaintiff made the decision to change real estate agents and briefly removed his listing. 44. Unsurprisingly, Defendants continued to bombard Plaintiff with calls attempting to again utilize their home listing and other real estate brokerage services. 46. Defendants were, and are, aware that the above-described telemarketing calls were made to consumers like Plaintiff who have not consented to receive them. 47. Moreover, Defendants deliberately and intentionally refuse to honor requests by consumers to place their numbers on Defendants’ do not call list, to the extent it maintains any such list or has a policy regarding the maintenance of any such list. 49. To redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Classes of similarly situated individuals, brings this suit under the TCPA, which prohibits unsolicited telemarketing calls to cellular telephones. On behalf of the Classes, Plaintiff seek an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unauthorized calling activities and an award of statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 51. The following people are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assignees of any such excluded persons. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the class definitions following a period of appropriate discovery. 52. Numerosity: The exact number of members within the Classes is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have placed telemarketing calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the defined Classes. However, the exact number of members of the Classes can only be identified through Defendants’ records, including the Defendants’ phone records. 54. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions, including cases under the TCPA. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 56. Conduct Similar Towards All Class Members: By committing the acts set forth in this pleading, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds substantially similar towards all members of the Classes so as to render certification of the Classes for final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2). 58. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 62. Defendants violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the DNC Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry. These consumers requested to not receive calls from Defendants as set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3). 64. Defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) by placing more than one call to Plaintiff and the Class in a 12-month period despite the fact Plaintiff and the Class members’ telephone numbers were registered on the national Do Not Call list for more than 30 days. 65. Defendants also violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to residential telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the DNC Registry Class, without instituting procedures that comply with minimal regulatory standards, including having a written policy for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them, and by not informing and training their personnel engaged in telemarketing in the existence and use of any such do-not-call policy or list. 67. Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the DNC Registry Class. 68. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff and other members of the DNC Stop Class expressly requested that Defendants no longer placed calls to them, after which Defendants failed to place Plaintiff and other members of the DNC Stop Class on its internal do not call list (or failed to do so within a reasonable time period). 70. More than thirty days following Plaintiff and the other members of the DNC Stop Class express stop requests to cease their receipt of future calls from Defendants, Defendants placed additional calls to Plaintiff and the class members without their consent and contrary to their prior requests not to be called. 72. Defendants made these calls without instituting procedures that comply with minimal regulatory standards, including having a written policy for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them, and by not informing and training their personnel engaged in telemarketing in the existence and use of any such do-not-call policy or list. 73. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and each member of the DNC Stop Class are each entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 74. In the event the Court determines that Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the DNC Stop Class. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the DNC Registry Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and the DNC Stop Class)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a financial services company, and owns and operates the website, www.robinhood.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.robinhood.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse investment services for purchase, view news, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in January 2021, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various investment services for purchase, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 92. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Forced fee deductions violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments) (State tort law of conversion of property for replevin and restitution of property) 53. Plaintiffs bring this class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. (b)(3). The class includes all individuals employed by an Oregon public employer who had forced nonmember fees deducted from their wages and transferred, directly or indirectly, to any of the defendants at any time during the limitations period. The class includes everyone who has ever fallen within this definition at any time for the period(s) forced nonmember fees were deducted, including former and retired employees who have moved to other states and those who eventually joined the union and knowingly waived their First Amendment rights. 54. The number of persons in the class makes joinder of the individual class members impractical. 62. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the paragraphs set forth above. 63. During the employment of plaintiffs and class members within the bargaining unit represented by the respective defendants, plaintiffs and class members earned lawful wages from their respective public employers. ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 294 OF THE OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES UNION; MULTNOMAH COUNTY EMPLOYEES EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, CTW, CLC; SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION (SEIU) LOCAL INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO; AFSCME, LOCAL 3336; ASSOCIATION OF ENGINEERING EMPLOYEES OF

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25. On or about August 8, 2018, Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 6305 (“6305 Number”) with a prerecorded message. 26. Upon Plaintiff answering the phone, a prerecorded message stated the following: “this is an important message from Mr. Cooper, your home loan company, please call us at your earliest convenience, our toll-free number is 1-866-316-2432. Thank You.” Plaintiff recognized the message as a prerecorded voice, and could tell that it was not a live voice. 27. The prerecorded message constitutes marketing because it asks Plaintiff to call Defendant for the ultimate purpose of purchasing a home loan. Defendant’s core business consists of providing home loans to consumers and Defendant makes a profit from writing those home loans. 28. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 6305 Number. 29. Plaintiff is not a mortgagor of Defendant and Defendant is not Plaintiff’s mortgagee. 30. Defendant called Plaintiff from 866-316-2432, a number owned and/or operated by Defendant. 31. Plaintiff received the subject call within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. 33. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be contacted using a prerecorded message. 34. The internet is replete with complaints regarding Defendant’s use of prerecorded messages to contact consumers including the following: 2 3 4 5 35. Defendant’s unsolicited calls caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s calls also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 37. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint; were sent a prerecorded call; from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf; to said person’s cellular telephone number. 38. Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 42. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely calls telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 48. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded or artificial voice… to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 49. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used pre-recorded calls to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 50. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 52. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Cody Becker, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using pre-recorded messages to call telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Declaratory Relief) 115. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 114 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 116. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Drmartens.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Drmartens.com and by extension Dr. Martens Stores, which Dr. Martens owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 117. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 26 (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 103. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 102 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 104. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 105. Dr. Martens Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). Drmartens.com is a service, privilege or advantage of the Dr. Martens Stores. Drmartens.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 106. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Dr. Martens Stores and Drmartens.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 107. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Drmartens.com, causing Drmartens.com and the services integrated with the Dr. Martens Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This 24 inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 108. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 109. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 110. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Drmartens.com and the Dr. Martens Stores under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the 25 Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 111. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 112. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 113. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 114. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) 27. Defendant, Dr. Martens, operates Dr. Martens Stores in New York State and provides shoes, boots, and accessories. 28. Drmartens.com is a service and benefit offered by Dr. Martens in New York State and throughout the United States. Drmartens.com is owned, controlled and/or operated by Dr. Martens. 29. Drmartens.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for 8 online sale that are available in the Dr. Martens Stores. The online store allows the user to browse shoes, boots, and accessory, make purchases, learn about styles, and perform a variety of other functions. 30. Among the features offered by Drmartens.com are the following: (a) learning about store information including, allowing persons who wish to visit Dr. Martens Stores to learn their location, hours of operation, and phone numbers; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase shoes, boots, and accessories; and (c) learning about the company, career opportunities, and promotions. 31. This case arises out of Dr. Martens’ policy and practice of denying the blind access to Drmartens.com, including the goods and services offered by Dr. Martens Stores through drmartens.com. Due to Dr. Martens’ failure and refusal to remove access barriers to drmartens.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Dr. Martens Stores, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through drmartens.com. 32. Dr. Martens denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Drmartens.com by preventing them from freely navigating Drmartens.com. 33. Drmartens.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 9 34. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Drmartens.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Drmartens.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate Dr. Martens Stores’ web pages and/or make purchases. 35. Drmartens.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Drmartens.com, these forms include search fields to locate 1460 Smooth Boots, fields that specify the number of items desired, size, color, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise and locations, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 36. Similarly, Drmartens.com lacks accessible drop-down menus. Drop-down menus allow customers to locate and choose products as well as specify the quantity of certain items. On Drmartens.com, blind customers are not aware if the desired products, such as 1460 Smooth Boots, have been added to the shopping bag because the screen-reader does not indicate the type of product or quantity. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Drmartens.com. 10 37. Furthermore, Drmartens.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on drmartens.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 38. Drmartens.com also lacks accessible forms. Quantity boxes allow customers to specify the quantity of certain items. On Drmartens.com, blind customers are unable to select specific quantity because the screen-reader does not indicate the function of the box. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the quantity box. Furthermore, Plaintiff is unable to locate the shopping bag because the shopping basket form does not specify the purpose of the shopping bag. As a result, blind customers are denied access to the shopping bag. Consequently, blind customers are unsuccessful in adding products into their shopping bags and are essentially prevented from purchasing items on Drmartens.com. 39. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Drmartens.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 40. Drmartens.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, 11 Drmartens.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Drmartens.com. 41. Due to Drmartens.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at a Dr. Martens Stores. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the Stores or require assistance in navigating the Stores. By contrast, if Drmartens.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and programs and make purchases and/or reservations via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.0 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Drmartens.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Drmartens.com. 42. Drmartens.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Drmartens.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Dr. Martens Stores in New York State and throughout the United States. 43. Plaintiff, Marion Kiler, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Drmartens.com, most recently in February 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Drmartens.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- 12 impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to make an online purchase of a women’s 1460 Smooth Boot. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Drmartens.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 45. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Drmartens.com and the Dr. Martens Stores. 46. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Drmartens.com and Dr. Martens Stores, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal 13 Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Drmartens.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Dr. Martens Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 50. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Drmartens.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Dr. Martens Stores, during the relevant statutory period.” 51. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 52. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Drmartens.com and the Dr. Martens Stores. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Drmartens.com and by extension the goods and services offered through Defendant’s website to Dr. Martens Stores. 53. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Drmartens.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Drmartens.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; 14 (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Drmartens.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Drmartens.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 54. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Dr. Martens has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Drmartens.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 55. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 56. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 57. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial 15 system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 58. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 59. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 60. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 61. The DR. MARTENS Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(E). Drmartens.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Dr. Martens Stores. Drmartens.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 62. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Dr. Martens Stores. 63. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful 16 discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 64. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 65. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 66. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 67. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited 17 to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Dr. Martens Stores who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Drmartens.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 70. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Drmartens.com and Dr. Martens Stores in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 71. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 18 75. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 74 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 76. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 77. The Dr. Martens Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Drmartens.com is a service, privilege or advantage of Dr. Martens Stores. Drmartens.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 78. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Dr. Martens Stores and Drmartens.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Drmartens.com, causing Drmartens.com and the services integrated with Dr. Martens Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 80. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages 19 or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 81. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 82. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 83. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or 20 (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Drmartens.com and Dr. Martens Stores under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 86. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 87. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 89. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 90. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 89 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 21 91. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 92. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 93. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 94. The Dr. Martens Stores located in New York State are a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Drmartens.com is a service, privilege or advantage of the Dr. Martens Stores. Drmartens.com is a service that is by and integrated with the Stores. 95. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Dr. Martens Stores and Drmartens.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 96. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Drmartens.com, causing Drmartens.com and the services integrated with the Dr. Martens Stores to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility 22 denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 97. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 98. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 99. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 100. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 101. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are 23 being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 102. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense.

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20. Plaintiff, the FLSA Class Members, and the North Dakota Class Members worked for Defendant as a Chemical Van Operator. 22. Plaintiff worked in excess of 8 hours per day, and well over 40 hours per week. A Chemical Van Operator typically works a 12 hour shift at the well site, 7 days a week for a total workweek of 84 hours. 23. During the relevant period, Defendant paid Plaintiff, the FLSA Class Members, and the North Dakota Class Members various bonuses in addition to their regular pay rate. 24. In particular, Defendant paid a bonus known as the “Job Bonus.” The Job Bonus is a nondiscretionary bonus awarded based on the amount of daily fracking. 25. The amount of the bonuses that Plaintiffs, the FLSA Class Members, and the North Dakota Class Members received varied from week to week. 26. The bonuses paid to the Plaintiffs, the FLSA Class Members, and the North Dakota Class Members were not factored into their regular rates for purposes of determining overtime pay. 27. Consequently, they were paid at rates lower than what the law requires. 28. 29 C.F.R. § 778.209(a) provides that “[w]here a bonus payment is considered a part of the regular rate at which an employee is employed, it must be included in computing his regular hourly rate of pay and overtime compensation.” 29. Defendant failed to include the Job Bonuses in Plaintiff’s regular hourly rate of pay and overtime compensation. 30. The factual statements above apply equally to Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members and the North Dakota Class Members. 32. The same conduct outlined above also violates North Dakota state law codified in the North Dakota Administrative Code § 46-02-07. Like its federal counterpart, North Dakota state law mandates overtime compensation must be paid at one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate. 33. By failing to include the bonuses in the overtime calculation, Defendant violated North Dakota state law. N.D. Admin. Code § 46-02-07-02(15). 34. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that the FLSA Class Members have been denied full overtime pay for hours worked over forty hours per workweek. 35. Other employees similarly situated to the Plaintiff work for Defendant in a similar capacity, but are not paid full overtime at the rate of one and one-half their regular rate when those hours exceeded forty hours per workweek. 36. The FLSA Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as the Plaintiff. Like the Plaintiff, the FLSA Class Members work as Chemical Van Operators and are paid in the same fashion as Plaintiff. 37. FLSA Class Members are not exempt from receiving overtime under the FLSA. 38. As such, FLSA Class Members are similar to the Plaintiff in terms of job duties, pay structure, and the denial of overtime pay. 39. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime compensation at the rate required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the FLSA Class Members on an individual basis. 41. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each FLSA Class Member does not prevent collective treatment. 42. All FLSA Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to overtime compensation. 43. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among FLSA Class Members, the damages for the FLSA Class Members can be easily calculated by a simple formula. The claims of all FLSA Class Members arise from a common nucleus of facts. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by the Defendant that caused harm to all FLSA Class Members. 44. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiff is properly defined as follows: All Chemical Van Operators, and all other employees in substantially similar positions employed by Defendant during the three year period prior to the commencement of this lawsuit to the present. 50. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and as a representative party, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiff seeks class certification of the North Dakota state law claims with a class definition as follows: All Chemical Van Operators, and all other employees in substantially similar positions employed by Defendant in North Dakota during the two year period prior to the commencement of this lawsuit to the present. 51. Defendant’s policy of failing to pay the amount of overtime dictated by North Dakota state law affects members of the North Dakota Class in a substantially similar manner. Plaintiff and the North Dakota Class Members have claims based on the same legal and remedial theories. Plaintiff and the North Dakota Class Members have claims based on the same facts. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the North Dakota Class Members’ claims. 52. Although Plaintiff does not know the precise number of the members of the proposed class, there are hundreds of members. The identity of the members of the class is readily discernible from Defendant’s records. 53. There are questions of law and fact that are common to all members of the proposed class and those questions predominate over any question affecting only individual members of the class. 55. The Class Action is a superior form to resolve the North Dakota state law claims because of the common nucleus of operative fact centered on the continued failure of Defendant to pay Chemical Van Operators according to the provisions of North Dakota state law. 56. In this action, common issues will be the object of the majority of the efforts of the litigants and the Court. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. A class action will also thwart unduly duplicative litigation resulting in inconsistent judgments pertaining to Defendant’s policies.

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq.—Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) 25. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide Class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally metabolically-disabled individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Public Facility during the relevant statutory period.” 26. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York Subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all metabolically-disabled individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period.” 27. Millions of people have a physical disability that is partly treatable by diet in the United States, including in New York. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 28. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible Public Facility, denying metabolically-disabled persons access to the events, goods, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of imposing access barriers, metabolically-disabled persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to the Public Facility. 30. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to Plaintiff, have metabolic disorders that render them metabolically-disabled, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by imposing access barriers on the Public Facility, such that it is not accessible to the Class of people who are legally disabled due to eating constraints. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 33. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with metabolic disabilities throughout the United States. 34. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 35. Defendant operates the Public Facility located at 149 West 45th Street, New York, NY 10036 . 36. The Public Facility is a service and benefit offered by Defendant in New York. The Public Facility is owned, controlled, and/or operated by Defendant. Defendant sells tickets to events at the Public Facility and on their Website, including in New York State. 37. The Public Facility, which is marketed to consumers located in New York State, is a commercial Public Facility that hosts events and sells goods and services. 39. Defendant denies the metabolically-disabled access to goods, services, and information made available through the Public Facility by preventing them from freely entering the Public Facility with the food they need to treat their disability. 40. Allowing disabled people to bring medical supplies into the Public Facility presents no significant obstacles or difficulties for Defendant. Other public facilities allow diabetic individuals to bring insulin supplies onto their premises. However, simply bringing insulin supplies is insufficient because: 1) diabetic individuals need readily available food in case their blood sugar drops, 2) many diabetic individuals (including Plaintiff) need to bring pre-measured food to match their insulin to the quantity of food consumed, and 3) Defendant’s policy ignores metabolically-disabled individuals with other disabilities that are treated by food. 41. The Public Facility states clearly on the Website that it does not allow outside food, which constitutes an access barrier that prevents free and full use by Plaintiff and metabolically- disabled persons. See Exhibit A. 42. The Public Facility thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Public Facility and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Defendant. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s Public Facility contains access barriers causing the Public Facility to be inaccessible to—and not independently usable by—metabolically-disabled individuals. 45. These barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Plaintiff did not attempt to attend an event at the Public Facility because he understood Defendant’s discriminatory policy and knew that such an attempt would be futile. The ADA explicitly does not require “a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization . . . does not intend to comply [with Title III of the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). This is particularly true for Plaintiff, for whom going out in public without available snacks would be a health risk. Disabled Ams. for Equal Access, Inc. v. Ferries del Caribe, Inc., 405 F.3d 60, 65 n.7 (1st Cir. 2005). 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Plaintiff and the Class are disabled for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102 reads in pertinent part: (1) Disability. The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— ▪ (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; . . . . (2) Major life activities. ▪ (A) In general. For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to . . . eating . . . . 49. Accordingly, courts have interpreted diseases such as food disorders and diabetes as disabilities because those diseases interfere with eating. 51. Even episodic disabilities less severe than Plaintiff’s disease would qualify for protection under Title III. Service v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“Plaintiff need not be in a constant state of distress or suffer an asthmatic attack to qualify as disabled under the ADA.”). Plaintiff’s disease is severe enough to decisively limit his major life activity of eating. 52. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 54. The Public Facility, located in New York, is a public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) because it is “a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” (emphasis added). 55. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Public Facility. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 57. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 59. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Many public facilities allow outside food into their venues (as required under the ADA). The policy of allowing outside food does not unduly burden those venues. Plaintiff and the Class merely seek to bring into the Public Facility the food they need for medical reasons. This would not disrupt the Public Facility’s operations. 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Defendant who are metabolically-disabled have been denied full and equal access to the Public Facility, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 69. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 70. The Public Facility, located in New York State, is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Public Facility is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. 72. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 73. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 74. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food would not alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 77. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 81. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 82. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 86. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 88. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 89. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food to would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 91. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 94. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 95. Plaintiff and Subclass members are entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 96. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 98. The Public Facility and the Website, targeting New York citizens in New York State, are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Public Facility and the Website are services, privileges, and/or advantages of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. Events at the Public Facility are integrated with ticket sales and information on the Public Facility website.

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(Failure to Pay Overtime Wages – FLSA, Brought by Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs) (Failure to Provide Accurate Pay Statements – NYLL § 195(3) Brought by Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and the Class) (Failure to Pay Wages and Overtime Wages – NYLL, Brought by Plaintiffs on Behalf of Themselves and the Class) 14. Defendant is a nationwide distributor of dental supplies with a main office at 300 Jericho Quadrangle, Jericho, New York 117531. 1 http://www.google.com/finance?cid=11596890 accessed May 17, 2016. 4 15. Defendant sells over 40,000 dental supply products to dental clinics and dentist offices throughout the United States. Defendant conducts its business through telephone sales and an e-commerce website. Defendant operates regional warehouse and distribution centers in Arizona, Florida, Michigan, New York, Wisconsin, and Tennessee2. Defendant claims to be the largest all-telesales national distributor of dental merchandise3. 16. Plaintiffs, the Putative Collection Action Members, and the Class Members worked for Defendant as hourly paid account managers. Account managers were assigned to work at Defendant’s main office located at Jericho, New York and at locations in Coral Springs, FL; Chandler, Arizona; DePere, Wisconsin; Michigan; and Memphis, TN. In addition, some account managers worked from their homes. 17. Account managers’ primary duties include selling dental products by calling and texting dental clinics and dentists’ offices. 18. When Defendant first employs account managers, defendant expects account managers to build up a customer base by making “cold calls” to dental offices and dental clinics to solicit business4. 19. Account managers make or receive calls to dental clinics, dentists’ offices, and manufacturers during their normal workday. Account managers also e-mail manufacturers regarding products and conduct internet searches regarding products. 2 http://www.google.com/finance?cid=11596890 accessed May 17, 2016. 3 https://www.darbydental.com/home/press.aspx accessed May 17, 2016. 4 http://www.indeed.com/cmp/Darby-Dental-Supply,-LLC/reviews accessed May 17, 2016. 5 58. Plaintiffs bring the First Claim for Relief as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all similarly situated Account Managers who were employed by Defendant in the United States on or after the date that is three years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the entry of judgment in this case. All said persons, including Plaintiffs, are referred to herein as the “FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”. 59. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements, and job duties, and are and have been subject to Defendant’s decision, policy, plan, practice, procedure, routine and rules of willfully failing and refusing to pay them at least one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for all work performed for Defendant in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. The claims of Plaintiffs herein are essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 60. Other Account Managers currently or formerly employed by Defendant should have the opportunity to have their claims for violations of the FLSA heard. Certifying this action as a collective action under the FLSA will provide other Account Managers notice of the action and allow them to opt in to such an action if they so choose. 61. The First Claim for Relief is properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in collective action pursuant to § 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendant. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last addresses known to Defendant. 62. Plaintiffs bring the Second and Third Claims for Relief pursuant to the Fed. R. Civ. P. (“FRCP”) Rule 23, to recover unpaid wages, unpaid overtime pay, and statutory damages on behalf of a class of all individuals employed by Defendant as Account Managers in 11 New York State on or after the date that is six years before the filing of this Complaint until the present (the "Class Period"). All said persons, including Plaintiffs, are referred to herein as the “Class Members” and/or the “Class”. 63. The number, names and addresses of the Class Members are readily ascertainable from the records of the Defendant. The dates of employment and the rates of pay for each Class Member, the hours assigned, and the wages paid to them, are also determinable from Defendant’s records. Notice can be provided by means permissible under FRCP Rule 23. 64. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class Members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the Court. While the precise number of such persons is unknown to Plaintiffs and is presently within the sole control of Defendant, Plaintiffs believe that through discovery they will obtain evidence to establish that there are well over one hundred members of the Class. 65. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those claims of the Class Members, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each Class Member in separate actions. All the Class Members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendant, in that they were not properly compensated for all hours worked up to forty hours and for all overtime hours worked as required by 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. Moreover all of the Class members were subject to Defendant's policy of including the number of hours compensated rather than the number of actual hours worked on their pay statements in violation of NYLL § 195(3). Defendant’s corporate-wide policies and practices affected all Class Members similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class Member. 66. As fellow employees of Defendant, which failed to adequately compensate Plaintiffs and the members of the Class as required by law, Plaintiffs and the other Class Members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 67. Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys who are 12 experienced and competent in employment and wage and hour litigation and class action litigation who have many times previously represented plaintiffs in wage and hour class cases. 68. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because the losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual Class Members are relatively small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class Members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and resulting in the impairment of Class Members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 69. Upon information and belief, employees are often afraid to individually assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation and former employees are fearful of bringing individual claims because the fear that doing so could harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. A class action provides Class Members who are not named in the Complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 13 70. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members, including, whether Defendant required Class Members to work uncompensated hours and uncompensated overtime hours and failed to adequately compensate the Class Members for all hours worked and all overtime hours worked as required by 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2 and whether the pay statements that Defendant issued to the Class violated NYLL § 195(3). 71. Absent a class action, many of the Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will retain the proceeds of its violations of the NYLL. 72. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, reallege and incorporate by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 73. Plaintiffs consent in writing to be parties to this action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs’ written consents are attached hereto as Exhibit “A”. 74. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 75. At all relevant times, Defendant had a policy and practice of refusing to pay all of the wages and overtime compensation it owed to its employees for all of their hours worked, including hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. At all relevant times, Defendant willfully, regularly, repeatedly and knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs the required overtime rates for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 76. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid hours and overtime compensation, liquidated (double) damages as provided by the FLSA for overtime violations, pre-and post-judgment 14 interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 77. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, reallege and incorporate by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 78. It is unlawful under New York law for an employer to suffer or permit a non- exempt employee to work without paying overtime premiums for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any workweek. 79. It is unlawful under New York law for an employer to suffer or permit an employee to work without compensation for all hours worked. 80. Throughout the Class Period, Defendant willfully, regularly, repeatedly and knowingly failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members for all hours worked and for all of the overtime hours worked at the required overtime rates for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 81. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, as set forth herein, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have sustained damages, including loss of earnings, in an amount to be established at trial. 82. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, seek damages in the amount of their respective unpaid wages, unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, pursuant to the NYLL, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 15 83. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, reallege and incorporate by reference all previous paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 84. Section 195(3) of the NYLL requires every employer to "furnish each employee with a statement with every payment of wages… For all employees who are not exempt from overtime compensation as established in the commissioner's minimum wage orders or otherwise provided by New York state law or regulation, the statement shall include the regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the overtime rate or rates of pay; the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked." 85. Defendant provided pay statements to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class that did not include an accurate number of hours worked. 86. The pay statements that Defendant provided to Plaintiffs and the members of the Class included the number of regular and overtime hours paid, not the number of regular and overtime hours actually worked as required by the NYLL. 87. In addition, the overtime rates of pay listed on the pay statements were inaccurate insofar as they did not include commissions when calculating the listed overtime rates of pay. 88. Defendant violated NYLL § 195(3) and consequently owes Plaintiffs and the members of the Class statutory damages as specified by NYLL § 198(1-d). 89. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the Class Members, seek statutory damages as specified by NYLL § 198(1-d), reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper.

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13. A relatively inexpensive type of marketing involves advertising through Short Message Services. The term “Short Message Services” or “SMS” describes a messaging system that allows cellphone subscribers to use their cellphones to send and receive short text messages, usually limited to 160 characters. 14. An “SMS message” is a text message call directed to a wireless device through the use of the telephone number assigned to the device. When an SMS message call is received, the recipient’s cellphone rings or makes a sound, alerting the recipient that a text message call has been received. 16. Moreover, in contrast to regular forms of advertising that are paid for solely by the advertiser, SMS calls can actually cost their recipients money, because cellphone users like Plaintiff have to pay their respective wireless service providers either for each text message call they receive, incur a usage allocation deduction to their text messaging plan, or pay a fixed or variable usage fee, regardless of whether or not the message was authorized. 17. Accordingly, Congress enacted the TCPA to prevent unsolicited advertising calls to consumers’ cellphones. “Voluminous consumer complaints about abuses of telephone technology – for example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes – prompted Congress to pass the TCPA.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012). 19. When it passed the TCPA, Congress intended to provide consumers a choice as to how telemarketers may call them and found that “[t]echnologies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universally available, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the consumer.” Pub. L. No. 102–243, § 11. Congress also found that “[m]any consumers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls,” and that “the evidence presented to the Congress indicates that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy . . . .” Id. §§ 12-13. 2. (Figure 2). 20. The TCPA’s ban on unsolicited automated calls has been interpreted to extend to automated text messages sent to cellular phones. See, e.g., In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 27 F.C.C.R. 15391, 2012 WL 5986338 (Nov. 29, 2012); Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667 (2016); Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2009). Allegations Specific to Plaintiff 21. Defendant cultivates and produces marijuana and other cannabis products, and sells medical and recreational cannabis products through a network of Reef Dispensary retail stores located in Nevada and Arizona. 23. However, Defendant often fails to ensure that the recipients of its messages have provided prior express written consent as required under the TCPA. 24. Beginning at least as early as August 2018, and continuing thereafter, Defendant began transmitting automated text message advertisements to the cellphones of those whom it hoped would be potential customers of its Reef Dispensary stores. 25. For instance, on August 31, 2018, at 9:44 AM, Plaintiff’s cellphones rang, indicating that a text message call was being received. The “from” field of the message was identified as “(317) 561-4779,” which is a longcode—a specialized telephone number utilized by Defendant and/or its agents for the transmission of automated text messages en masse. 26. The text message that Plaintiff received on August 31st appears below in Figure 1. (Figure 1). 28. The text message that Plaintiff received on September 20th appears below in Figure 29. As seen in Figures 1 and 2 above, the scripts of the automated text messages that Plaintiff received were generic and non-personalized. The text messages did not refer to Plaintiff by name, nor did they include his phone number or any other personally identifying information. Rather, the contents of the automated text messages Plaintiff received were the same as the contents of the many other automated messages Defendant sent to other recipients. 31. Defendant did not obtain Plaintiff’s express written consent before sending him the text message advertisements he received. 32. The unauthorized text messages Plaintiff received caused actual, concrete injuries, not only because the messages were sent in violation of the TCPA, but also because they invaded Plaintiff’s privacy, interfered with Plaintiff’s unrestricted use of his cellphone, and caused Plaintiff to waste time and effort reviewing and deleting the unauthorized messages sent by Defendant. 33. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and a nationwide class (the “Class”), defined as: All persons in the United States who, during the period of four years prior to the filing of this Class Action Complaint through the present, subscribed to or regularly used a cellphone number that was sent one or more automated text message advertisements by or on behalf of Defendant, and for whom Defendant does not have a record of prior express written consent to receive such messages. 34. Expressly excluded from the Class are any members of the judiciary assigned to preside over this matter; any officer, director, or employee of Defendant; and any immediate family members of such officers, directors, or employees. 35. Upon information and belief, the Class contains hundreds, if not thousands, of members such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 37. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class in that the factual and legal bases of Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class are the same. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have all suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. 39. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole. 40. Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their claims to be prohibitive and would have no effective remedy. The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants, and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication. 41. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 42. Defendant made unsolicited text message calls to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an automatic telephone dialing system, that is, using equipment that had the capacity at the time the calls were placed to automatically dial sequentially from a list of such wireless telephone numbers, as well as to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator and to automatically dial such numbers without human intervention. 44. Defendant’s text message calls constitute advertising under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(1) and telemarketing under § 64.1200(f)(12), because Defendant’s text messages advertise the commercial availability of its cannabis goods and services, and because Defendant sent these messages for the purpose of encouraging the called parties to purchase property, goods, and services from Reef Dispensary retail stores. 45. Defendant failed to obtain express written consent from Plaintiff and the other members of the Class before sending the messages at issue. 46. Defendant has, therefore, violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 47. As a result of Defendant’s illegal conduct, Plaintiff and the Class members have had their privacy rights violated, have suffered actual and statutory damages, and, under § 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 48. To the extent Defendant knew or should have known that the Class members did not provide prior express written consent to be sent the wireless spam at issue, the Court should, pursuant to section 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the Class members. Background Violation of Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227) on behalf of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class

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24. Defendant’s text message was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text message constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff leads for generating business. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s services for helping remove past education cost with a link, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Plaintiff received the subject text within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 6445 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 6445 Number. 30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016)(“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 31. The text messages originated from telephone number (203) 408-9229, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 32. The number used by Defendant (203)-408-9229) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. 35. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 36. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 37. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the purpose of soliciting their purchase of a Defendant membership, and (4) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 38. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 41. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 42. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)). 50. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 51. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 52. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 53. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 54. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 55. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-46 as if fully set forth herein. 56. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 57. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 58. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 59. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. Great American Power has violated, and continues to violate, the TCPA and its implementing regulations by placing, or having placed on its behalf, prerecorded calls to residential telephone subscribers (a) who have not expressly consented to receiving such calls and/or (b) who have expressly requested not to receive such calls. 11. As Congress recognized: Many customers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers…. Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.1 12. Senator Larry Pressler, one of the original drafters of the TCPA, explained the need for the TCPA by observing that “[u]nlike other communications media, the telephone commands our instan[t] attention. Junk mail can be thrown away. Television 1 Pub. L. No. 102-243 § 2(6, 12) (1991), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227. 4 commercials can be turned off. The telephone demands to be answered.” 137 Cong. Rec. S18785 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler). 13. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)2, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02- 278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). 14. Yet, in violation of this rule, Defendant fails to obtain any prior express written consent to place prerecorded calls to consumers’ residential telephone numbers. 15. In response to the liability risk associated with the TCPA, numerous commercially available services exist to help companies that call others using prerecorded voices, such as Defendant, to identify residential subscribers and otherwise ensure that calls are only made to consenting consumers. For instance, companies such as Infutor, Nextmark List, and Contact Center Compliance advertise their ability to instantly identify and flag disconnected telephone numbers from residential telephone number data lists on a recurring basis (such as weekly or monthly). This type of service can identify disconnected numbers before they are recycled, thereby alerting mobile marketers that any consent associated with those telephone numbers has been terminated. 16. Despite the FCC’s ruling, the industry guidelines, and the commercial availability of programs that help callers filter out non-consenting numbers, Defendant 2 The FCC is the federal agency given the administrative authority to interpret and enforce the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 5 fails to take the necessary steps to ensure that its prerecorded calls are placed only to consenting recipients. 17. Rather, to increase revenue and skirt additional costs, Defendant simply ignores the law when contacting individuals via prerecorded calls to their residential telephones. 18. Indeed, Great American Power has already been sued multiple times for alleged TCPA violations,3 and has entered into a number of settlements with state regulators regarding allegedly misleading or deceptive marketing practices.4 19. Great American Power’s marketing practices have long been under scrutiny. Since 2013, Great American Power has entered into at least three settlements regarding sales and marketing practices with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission alone.5 20. Defendant knows or should know that its prerecorded calls are placed to non-consenting residential telephone subscribers. Ultimately, Defendant is responsible for verifying telephone number ownership and obtaining consent before placing prerecorded calls to residential telephone subscribers. 3 See Frey v. Great American Power, LLC et ano., No. 1:19-cv-02450 (N.D. Ga. filed May 29, 2019); Lechuga v. Great American Power, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-05989 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 6, 2019). 4 See e.g. “PUC Fines Great American Power LLC $10,000 for Violations Regarding Marketing Practices” available at http://www.puc.pa.gov/about_puc/press_releases.aspx?ShowPR=3235; “PUC Approves Settlement with Great American Power LLC; Directs Revisions to Electric Supplier’s Marketing and Sales Practices” available at http://www.puc.pa.gov/about_puc/press_releases.aspx?ShowPR=3846 5 Id. See also “PUC Approves Settlement Agreement with Great American Power LLC Concerning Company’s Sales and Marketing Practices” available at http://www.puc.pa.gov/about_puc/press_releases.aspx?ShowPR=4239 6 21. Defendant was, and is, aware that its unsolicited prerecorded calls were, and are, unauthorized as it fails to obtain prior express written consent before placing those calls to consumers. Ultimately, consumers are forced to bear the costs of receiving these unsolicited prerecorded calls. 22. By placing the unsolicited prerecorded calls at issue in this Complaint, Defendant caused Plaintiff and the other members of the Class actual harm and cognizable legal injury. This includes the aggravation, nuisance, and invasions of privacy that result from the sending and receipt of such prerecorded calls, a loss of value realized for the monies consumers paid to their carriers for the receipt of such prerecorded calls, and a loss of the use and enjoyment of their phones, including wear and tear to the related data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components, among other harms. 23. In response to Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff filed this action seeking (a) an injunction requiring Defendant to cease all unsolicited prerecorded calling activities and, (b) an award of actual or statutory damages to the members of the Class under the TCPA, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 24. Plaintiff Savett is the registered account owner and regular user of a voice over internet protocol (VoIP) telephone number 610-xxx-4550. 25. On October 4, 2019 at 6:26 pm, Plaintiff received an unsolicited, pre- recorded phone call on his VoIP telephone number from, or on behalf, of Defendant. 26. The October 4, 2019 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that New Wave was calling to offer Plaintiff discounted electricity and natural gas. 7 27. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of New Wave’s telephone representatives. 28. New Wave’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for his electricity billing account number, asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with his electric bill, confirmed that Great American Power would be the electricity supplier, and provided Great American Power’s customer service phone number. 29. Plaintiff has never provided prior express written consent to Defendant to receive prerecorded calls to him on the 610-xxx-4550 number. 30. Defendant failed to obtain prior express written consent that included, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8)(i) a “clear and conspicuous” disclosure informing the person signing that: (A) By executing the agreement, such person authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the signatory telemarketing calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (B) The person is not required to sign the agreement (directly or indirectly), or agree to enter into such an agreement as a condition of purchasing any property, goods, or services. 31. By placing the prerecorded calls as alleged herein, Defendant has caused consumers actual harm in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy. In addition, the prerecorded call disturbed Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on Plaintiff’s phone. 32. In order to redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 8 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited prerecorded calls to residential telephones. 33. On behalf of the Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unsolicited pre-recorded calling activities and an award of actual or statutory damages to the class members, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 55. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: 12 Robocall No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from a date four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint to the present: (1) Defendants (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendants) called; (2) on the person’s residential telephone number using an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (3) for whom Defendants lacked prior express consent to call that residential telephone number at the time the call was made. 56. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest, and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 57. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the definition of the Class following class discovery, including discovery revealing the manner by which Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent to place autodialed and/or pre-recorded calls to the Plaintiff. 58. Numerosity: The exact number of members within the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant has placed unsolicited calls to hundreds or thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 13 59. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct, namely its unauthorized telemarketing calls. Plaintiff is a member of the Class defined herein, and if Plaintiff is able to recover for the claims set forth in this Complaint, then the other members of the Class will have a right to recover as well. 6. Great American Power is a certified supplier in the Ohio Energy Choice Program, offering electricity and natural gas to consumers in Ohio. 60. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions, including class actions under the TCPA and related statutes. Plaintiff has no conflicts with, or interests antagonistic to, those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 61. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) Whether Great American Power is liable for the conduct of its third-party vendor; b) Whether Defendant made calls, or had calls made on its behalf and for its benefit, with a prerecorded message; c) Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; d) Whether Defendant utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice to place calls to members of the Class; e) Whether members of the Class are entitled to statutory and treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendant’s conduct; 14 f) Whether Defendant obtained prior express consent to contact any class members; g) Whether Defendant’s calls constitute telemarketing or were dual purpose messages; and h) To the extent Defendant’s conduct does not constitute telemarketing, whether Defendant obtained prior express oral consent to contact any class members. 62. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all parties is impracticable, and the damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action. Individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 63. Adequate notice can be given to the members of the Class directly using information maintained in Defendant’s records or through notice by publication. 15 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 65. Defendant and/or its agents placed unsolicited calls to residential telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class. 66. These calls were made without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class to receive such calls. 67. These calls, including those to Plaintiff, utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice. 68. To the extent prior written express consent was required, Defendant failed to obtain prior written express consent that disclosed to the consumer that agreeing to receive pre-recorded calls was not a condition of purchase or use of any goods or service. Neither was oral consent provided. 69. To the extent Great American Power’s agent, New Wave, placed the calls at issue, Great American Power’s agent acted with actual or apparent authority and/or in accordance with a contract between Great American Power and its agent, New Wave. Great American Power’s agent acted under Great American Power’s control and for Great American Power’s benefit and/or with Great American Power’s knowledge and approval. Great American Power controlled its agent and knew about, and received the benefits of, the agent’s calling activities. Great American Power ratified the agent’s conduct with respect to the placing of such calls. 16 7. In recent years, energy suppliers such as Great American Power have turned to unsolicited telemarketing to increase their customer bases. Widespread 3 telemarketing is a primary method by which Great American Power solicits new customers. 70. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 71. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was wilful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall No Consent Class. 8. In pursuit of this goal, a company called New Wave Power, LLC (“New Wave”) initiated prerecorded telemarketing calls to the residential telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class to promote Great American Power in violation of the TCPA. Great American Power hired New Wave to originate new customers and is liable for its illegal telemarketing conduct. 9. The TCPA prohibits companies, such as Great American Power, from placing calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice (“prerecorded calls”) when making calls to residential telephones without first obtaining consent. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Robocall No Consent Class)

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14. Mr. Diamond is a public-school teacher in the Chichester School District, where he has taught since 1990. Mr. Diamond refuses to join the PSEA or its affiliates because he disapproves of their political advocacy as well as the excessive salaries paid to even low-ranking members of the state union and its national affiliate. 15. Mr. Schwartz is a public-school teacher in the South Middleton School Dis- trict. He has taught in the Pennsylvania public schools since 1992. Mr. Schwartz re- fuses to join the PSEA or its affiliates because the union advocates for policies that contradict his religious beliefs. 16. Ms. Ziegler is a retired public-school teacher who taught at Chestnut Ridge Middle School in Bedford County for 24 years. Ms. Ziegler refused to join the PSEA or its affiliates because the union advocates for policies that contradict her religious beliefs. 17. Nevertheless, the collective-bargaining agreements negotiated by the PSEA have compelled the representative plaintiffs and their fellow objectors to pay a financial penalty for exercising their constitutional right to not join a union. Nonunion mem- bers must either: (1) Pay a “fair-share fee” directly to the union; or (2) Pay the equiv- alent of the “fair-share fee” to a nonreligious charity approved by the union. See 71 Pa. Stat. § 575(e), (h). Option (2) is available only to those who object to the union’s activities on “bona fide religious grounds.” 71 Pa. Stat. § 575(e)(2), (h); see also 29

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(Unjust Enrichment) (Violation of Massachusetts Unfair Trade Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A) 18. Plai~tiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 19. Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93 § 105(a) provides that: No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other business entity that accepts a credit card for a business transaction shall write, cause to be written or require that a credi~ card holder write personal identification information, not required by the credit card issuer, on the credit card transaction form. Personal identification information shall include, but shall not be limited to, a credit card holder's address or telephone number. The provisions of this section shall apply to all credit card transactions. 20. Container Store is a corporation that accepts credit cards for retail transactions. 22. The ZIP code is part of a credit card holder's address, and is therefore personal identification information under Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 93 § 105(a). Container Store and other retailers are also able to use a customer's name and ZIP code to determine their address or telephone number I:lsing commercially available databases. 23. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93 § 105(c) provides that the collection ofpersonal identification information is a per se violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 2: "Any violation of the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be an unfair and deceptive trade practice, as defined in section 2 of chapter 93A." 24. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A § 9 provides that: Any person ... who has been injured by another person's use or employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two ... may bring an action in the superior court ... for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems to be necessary and proper ... Any persons entitled to bring such action may, if the use or employment of the unfair or deceptive act or practice has caused similar injury to numerous other persons similarly situated and if the court finds in a preliminary hearing that he adequately and fairly represents such other persons, bring the action on behalf of himself and such other similarly injured and situated persons. 26. In compliance with Mass. Gen. Laws. Ch. 93A § 9(3), on March 15,2013, Plaintiffs counsel sent Defendant a written demand for relief by Federal Express, identifying Ms. Monteferrante as a claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act alleged herein and the injury she and other Class members suffered. 27. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 28. Defendant knowingly and willingly accepted benefits from Plaintiff and the Class, to wit, their economically valuable personal identification information which Defendant used for its own profit, while providing Plaintiff and the Class nothing in return. 29. Under the circumstances described herein, it is inequitable for Defendant to retain the full monetary benefit of that information at the expense of Plaintiffand the Class.

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14. Defendant Exit Realty is a real estate agent or brokerage. 15. Defendant John Doe 1 is an authorized agent of Defendant Exit Realty. 16. As a way to cut corners yet also increase its advertising reach, Defendant and its authorized agents, including John Doe 1, repeatedly called thousands of cellular and residential phones at a time using an automatic telephone dialing system in violation of the TCPA. 17. When the Class members answered their cellular phones, they heard silence for several seconds and a distinct “click” sound before being transferred to a live agent, which denotes the use of an automatic telephone dialing system. 19. On or about July 3, 2019, Plaintiff received a call on his cellular phone number ending in 1146. 20. The Caller ID displayed that the phone number originated from 520-277-9156. 21. When Plaintiff answered his phone, Plaintiff said “hello” several times, but there was silence for approximately 4 seconds. Plaintiff then heard a “click” sound. There was an additional silent delay after the distinct “click” before a live agent answered. 22. Upon information and belief, the technology used to robocall Plaintiff had the capability to store phone numbers and dial those numbers automatically. 23. The live agent informed Plaintiff that he was calling on behalf of Defendant Exit Realty and advertising Defendant’s Exit Realty’s services. The live agent gave Plaintiff some information about Defendant Exit Realty and asked if Plaintiff would be interested in more information. 24. In order to investigate the company calling, Plaintiff agreed to receive more information about Defendant Exit Realty. The live agent told Plaintiff that he would be sending Plaintiff a video regarding Defendant Exit Realty and that one of his partners would follow up. 25. On or about July 10, 2019, Plaintiff received a follow up telephone call from a real estate agent with Defendant Exit Realty. Plaintiff did not answer the telephone call as Plaintiff did not recognize the telephone number 612-702-1869. Defendant’s voicemail stated, in pertinent part, “Hi this is for Terry. This is Cade from Upper Midwest Realty. We had one of our associates reach out and connect with you here last week …” 26. Plaintiff never consented to be contacted by Defendants. 27. Prior to the robocall, Plaintiff had no relationship with Defendants. 29. Class Definition: Plaintiff Shanahan brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class defined as follows: TCPA Class. All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) who received at least one telephone call; (3) on his or her cellular or residential telephone; (4) that used an automatic telephone dialing system; (5) for the purpose of promoting Defendant’s services; (6) where Defendant did not first obtain the person’s express written consent. 30. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 31. Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 32. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited telephone calls. 34. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 36. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy as joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant Exit Realty and Defendant John Doe 1’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant Exit Realty and Defendant John Doe 1’s misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action, because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered, and uniformity of decisions ensured. 40. The May 2013 FCC Ruling rejected a narrow view of TCPA liability, including the assertion that a seller’s liability requires a finding of formal agency and immediate direction and control over the third-party who placed the telemarketing call. Id. at 6587 n. 107. 41. Prior to conducting discovery in this litigation, due to the anonymous nature of robocalling, Plaintiff has no way to identify the exact party who called his cellular phone whether it was Defendant Exit Realty, Defendant John Doe 1 or some other unknown company. 42. However, for the purposes of TCPA liability, Plaintiff is not expected to know this information at the pleading stage. 44. Even if Defendant Exit Realty alleges that it did not personally make the TCPA-violating calls, Defendant Exit Realty is liable because it took steps to cause the calls to be made by hiring a third party to market the services Defendant Exit Realty, or because the calls were made pursuant to Defendant Exit Realty’s actual authority, apparent authority and/or ratification, or pursuant to joint enterprise or acting in concert liability. 79. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 80. Defendants and/or its agents placed calls using an automatic telephone dialing system to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. 81. The system used by Defendants to place such automated calls had the capability to store a list of numbers and automatically dial those numbers. 82. Defendant Exit Realty’s and Defendant John Doe’s calls were made for the purpose of advertising and marketing employment opportunities and realty services with Defendant Exit Realty. 83. Defendants used an automatic telephone dialing system as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) to generate Plaintiff’s phone number as well as the phone numbers of the Class members. 85. Defendants made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 86. If the court finds that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 Telecommunications Consumer Protection Act (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against all Defendants)

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10. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and the FLSA and the authority to grant declaratory relief under the FLSA pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2201 et seq. 11. During Plaintiff’s employment with Dynamex, Dynamex earned more than $500,000.00 per year in gross sales. 12. During Plaintiff’s employment with Dynamex, Dynamex employed two or more employees which handled goods, materials and supplies which had travelled in interstate commerce. 14. Therefore, Dynamex is considered an enterprise covered by the FLSA, and as defined by 29 U.S.C. §203(r) and 203(s). 3. Plaintiff worked as a driver for Dynamex wherein he has been classified as an independent contractor. 4. Plaintiff has worked for Dynamex and its predecessors for approximately twenty-five (25) years. 5. Plaintiff, along with numerous other drivers, worked for Dynamex out of their Kennesaw location in the Greater Atlanta area. 6. Dynamex is a foreign limited liability company which operates and conducts business in, among other locations, Cobb County, Georgia and is therefore, within the jurisdiction of this Court. 7. Dynamex is a transportation management solutions company which services customers throughout the country by providing outsourced delivery/courier services, among other transportation services. See www.dynamex.com 9. This action is brought under the FLSA to recover from Defendant overtime compensation, minimum wage compensation, liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. This action is intended to include each and every driver who was classified as an independent contractor and who worked out of the Dynamex location in the greater Atlanta area at any time within the past three (3) years within the State of Georgia. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS GENERAL ALLEGATIONS GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

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11. Defendants allege Plaintiff owes a debt (“the Debt”). 12. The Debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes and is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 13. Sometime after the incurrence of the Debt Plaintiff fell behind on payments owed. 14. Thereafter, at an exact time known only to Defendants, the debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendants for collection. 15. In their efforts to collect the debt, Defendants contacted Plaintiff by letter (“the Letter”) dated June 16, 2017. (“Exhibit 1.”) 16. The letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 17. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 18. The Debt was incurred on a credit card underwritten by WebBank. 19. The Letter sets forth a “Principal Amount Due” of $23,410.98. 20. The Letter sets forth “Interest Due” of $1,879.39. 3 47. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 5 83. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendants attempted to collect a consumer debt using a substantially similar form collection letter, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. 84. This action seeks a finding that Defendants’ conduct violates the FDCPA, and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 85. Defendants regularly engage in debt collection. 86. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendants attempted to collect delinquent consumer debts using a substantially similar form collection letter. 87. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 88. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 8 Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e

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30. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 31. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of February 28, 2011, Central Vermont had 13,361,029 shares of common stock outstanding. Members of the Class are scattered throughout the United States and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court. 33. . . Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests ofthe Class. 34. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 36. Central Vermont is the largest electric utility in Vermont. The Company engages in the purchase, production, transmission, distribution, and sale of electricity to residential, commercial, and industrial customers. It serves nearly 160,000 customers in 163 cities and towns across Vermont, and employs approximately 520 people. It reported annual revenue of $342 million for the year 2010, and has been listed by Forbes ,~!iiit,;o",,,~>;~,),,,,; ,,\;,i\;;;"Mag'azihe as one ofthe most trusted companies in the United States for 60 straight months. 37. On May 5, 2011, Central Vermont issued a press release announcing consolidated earnings of $8.4 million, or 62 cents per diluted share of common stock, for the first three months of2011, compared to $4.2 million, or 35 cents per diluted share of common stock, for the same period in 2010. The improved earnings were driven in part by increases in operating revenue and decreases in operating expenses and storm restoration costs compared to the first quarter of201O. According to Defendant Reilly, "First quarter earnings were significantly improved compared to the same period last year. Our improved performance reflects differences in weather effects, timing of some expenditures, and higher sales volume, which increased due to colder winter weather and the slowly improving economy in the state." 39. On May 30,2011, Central Vermont issued a press release announcing that it had entered into the Fortis Merger Agreement. Under the terms of the Proposed Fortis Transaction, Fortis would acquire Central Vermont by purchasing all of the outstanding shares of common stock of Central Vermont at a purchase price of $35.10 per share. 41. The consideration offered to Central Vermont's public stockholders in the Proposed Fortis Transaction was unfair and grossly inadequate because, among other things, the intrinsic value of Central Vermont's common stock was materially in excess of the amount offered for those securities in the proposed acquisition given the Company's prospects for future growth and earnings. 42. Further, as admitted by Defendant Reilly in the May 30, 2011 press release, "While the share offer price by Fortis was a critical consideration by the CVPS Board, the fact that CVPS would essentially be preserved as a stand-alone autonomous company within the Fortis Group was also an important consideration for the CVPS Board." Notwithstanding the Board's duty to maximize shareholder value and obtain the highest possible sale price for Central Vermont, Defendant Reilly admitted that the Individual Defendants, in breach of their fiduciary duties, allowed their preferences, as well as those of the Company's management, regarding how the Company would be managed after a change of control to be an important factor in its decision to enter into the Fortis Merger Agreement with Fortis, as opposed to pursuing deals with alternate bidders. C. The Proposed Transaction 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation set forth herein. 57. The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, disclosure and good faith owed to public shareholders of Central Vermont. 58. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, the Individual Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiff and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in Central Vermont. 59. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, disclosure and independence owed to the shareholders of Central Vermont because, among other reasons, they failed to take steps to maximize the value of Central Vermont to its public shareholders, and they have failed to fully disclose to Plaintiff and the Class all material information necessary to make an informed decision regarding the Proposed Transaction. 61. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and course of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise due care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. < 62. As a result of the actions of the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair portion of the value of Central Vermont's assets and businesses and have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their common stock. 63. Unless the Individual Defendants are enjoined by the Court, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, all to the irreparable harm ofthe members ofthe Class. 64. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court's equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which the Individual Defendants' actions threaten to inflict. 66. Central Vermont, Gaz, and Merger Sub have acted and are acting with knowledge of the fact that the Individual Defendants are in breach of their fiduciary duties to Central Vermont's public shareholders, and have participated in such breaches of fiduciary duties. 67. Central Vermont, Gaz, and Merger Sub knowingly aided and abetted the Individual Defendants' wrongdoing alleged herein. In so doing, Central Vermont, Gaz, and Merger Sub rendered substantial assistance in order to effectuate the Individual .. ·~:.,:"",;ii~0~>:·;"";"';D~fendarits; plan to consummate the Proposed Transaction in breach of their fiduciary duties. 68. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. A. Background Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against the Individual Defendants On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against Central Vermont, Gaz, and Merger Sub for Aiding and Abetting the Individual Defendants' Breach of Fiduciary Duty

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10. Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to sell or solicit its business services. 11. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 12. Defendant’s calls were placed to telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 16. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, as a member the proposed class (hereafter, “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 17. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, The Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who received any solicitation telephone calls from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously not provided their cellular telephone number to Defendant within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint. 8. Defendant contacted Plaintiff on or about January 12, 2021 and January 25, 2021 on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone ending in -3803, in an effort to sell or solicit its services. 9. Defendant called Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone multiple times from two separate phone numbers confirmed to belong to Defendant, (209) 318-6340 and (209) 314-8520. Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3)(C); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. LLC, and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B); and • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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(Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq.—Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) 25. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide Class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally metabolically-disabled individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Public Facility during the relevant statutory period.” 26. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York Subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all metabolically-disabled individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period.” 27. Millions of people have a physical disability that is partly treatable by diet in the United States, including in New York. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 28. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible Public Facility, denying metabolically-disabled persons access to the events, goods, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of imposing access barriers, metabolically-disabled persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to the Public Facility. 30. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to Plaintiff, have metabolic disorders that render them metabolically-disabled, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by imposing access barriers on the Public Facility, such that it is not accessible to the Class of people who are legally disabled due to eating constraints. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 33. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with metabolic disabilities throughout the United States. 34. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 35. Defendant operates the Public Facility located at 1260 6th Ave, New York, NY 10020 . 36. The Public Facility is a service and benefit offered by Defendant in New York. The Public Facility is owned, controlled, and/or operated by Defendant. Defendant sells tickets to events at the Public Facility and on their Website, including in New York State. 37. The Public Facility, which is marketed to consumers located in New York State, is a commercial Public Facility that hosts events and sells goods and services. 39. Defendant denies the metabolically-disabled access to goods, services, and information made available through the Public Facility by preventing them from freely entering the Public Facility with the food they need to treat their disability. 40. Allowing disabled people to bring medical supplies into the Public Facility presents no significant obstacles or difficulties for Defendant. Other public facilities allow diabetic individuals to bring insulin supplies onto their premises. However, simply bringing insulin supplies is insufficient because: 1) diabetic individuals need readily available food in case their blood sugar drops, 2) many diabetic individuals (including Plaintiff) need to bring pre-measured food to match their insulin to the quantity of food consumed, and 3) Defendant’s policy ignores metabolically-disabled individuals with other disabilities that are treated by food. 41. The Public Facility states clearly on the Website that it does not allow outside food, which constitutes an access barrier that prevents free and full use by Plaintiff and metabolically- disabled persons. See Exhibit A. 42. The Public Facility thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Public Facility and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Defendant. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s Public Facility contains access barriers causing the Public Facility to be inaccessible to—and not independently usable by—metabolically-disabled individuals. 45. These barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Plaintiff did not attempt to attend an event at the Public Facility because he understood Defendant’s discriminatory policy and knew that such an attempt would be futile. The ADA explicitly does not require “a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization . . . does not intend to comply [with Title III of the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). This is particularly true for Plaintiff, for whom going out in public without available snacks would be a health risk. Disabled Ams. for Equal Access, Inc. v. Ferries del Caribe, Inc., 405 F.3d 60, 65 n.7 (1st Cir. 2005). 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Plaintiff and the Class are disabled for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102 reads in pertinent part: (1) Disability. The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— ▪ (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; . . . . (2) Major life activities. ▪ (A) In general. For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to . . . eating . . . . 49. Accordingly, courts have interpreted diseases such as food disorders and diabetes as disabilities because those diseases interfere with eating. 51. Even episodic disabilities less severe than Plaintiff’s disease would qualify for protection under Title III. Service v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“Plaintiff need not be in a constant state of distress or suffer an asthmatic attack to qualify as disabled under the ADA.”). Plaintiff’s disease is severe enough to decisively limit his major life activity of eating. 52. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 54. The Public Facility, located in New York, is a public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) because it is “a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” (emphasis added). 55. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Public Facility. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 57. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 59. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Many public facilities allow outside food into their venues (as required under the ADA). The policy of allowing outside food does not unduly burden those venues. Plaintiff and the Class merely seek to bring into the Public Facility the food they need for medical reasons. This would not disrupt the Public Facility’s operations. 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Defendant who are metabolically-disabled have been denied full and equal access to the Public Facility, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 64. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 69. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 70. The Public Facility, located in New York State, is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Public Facility is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. 72. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 73. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 74. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food would not alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 77. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 81. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 82. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 86. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 88. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 89. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food to would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 91. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 94. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 95. Plaintiff and Subclass members are entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 96. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 98. The Public Facility and the Website, targeting New York citizens in New York State, are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Public Facility and the Website are services, privileges, and/or advantages of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. Events at the Public Facility are integrated with ticket sales and information on the Public Facility website.

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13. Plaintiff brings this Class action on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 14. The Class which Plaintiff seeks to represent is defined as: All consumers to whom Defendant, within two years from the date of filing this action, provided an electronically printed receipt at the point of a sale or transaction at any of Defendant’s physical store locations, on which receipt Defendant printed more than the last 5 digits of the consumer's credit card or debit card (the “Class”).1 15. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its directors, officers, and employees. 16. Numerosity (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of their claims through this Class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 17. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that there are, at a minimum, thousands (i.e., two thousand or more) of members that comprise the Class. 18. The exact size of the Class and identities of individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including but not limited to Defendant’s sales and transaction records. 20. Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)): Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the entire Class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 21. Plaintiff and members of the Class were each customers of Defendant, each having made a purchase or transacted other business with Defendant within two years from the date of filing this action, using a credit card or debit card. At the point of such sale or transaction with Plaintiff and members of the Class, Defendant provided to Plaintiff and each member of the Class a receipt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1681c(g) (i.e., a receipt on which is printed more than the last 5 digits of the credit card or debit card). 22. Common Questions of Fact and Law (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3)): There are a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting the members of the Class. 24. Adequacy of Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class which Plaintiff seeks to represent. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in the prosecution of Class action litigation. 25. Superiority (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3)): A Class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class. While the aggregate damages which may be and if awarded to the Class are likely to be substantial, the actual damages suffered by individual members of the Class are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each member of the Class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. 26. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in this Complaint. 27. Plaintiff asserts this claim on behalf of herself and the Class against Defendant. 29. By its express terms, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) applies to “any cash register or other machine or device that electronically prints receipts for credit card or debit card transactions” after December 3, 2006. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(3). 3. The law gave merchants who accept credit and or debit cards up to three years to comply with its requirements, requiring full compliance with its provisions no later than December 4, 2006. Although Defendant had up to three years to comply, Defendant willfully violated this law and failed to protect Plaintiff and others similarly situated against identity theft and credit and debit card fraud by printing more than the last 5 digits of the card number on receipts provided to credit card and debit card cardholders transacting business with Defendant. This conduct is in direct violation of FACTA. 30. Defendant transacts business in the United States and accepts credit cards and debit cards in the course of transacting business with persons such as Plaintiff and members of the Class. In transacting such business, Defendant uses cash registers and or other machines or devices that electronically print receipts for credit card and debit card transactions. 31. After December 3, 2006, and within two years from the date of filing this action, Defendant, at the point of a sale or transaction with Plaintiff Joan Pasini, provided Plaintiff Joan Pasini with one or more electronically printed receipts on each of which Defendant printed more than the last 5 digits of her credit card number. More specifically, Defendant printed the first 6 digits and the last 4 digits of Plaintiff Joan Pasini’s credit card number on her customer receipt(s). 32. After December 3, 2006, and within two years from the date of filing this action, Defendant, at the point of a sale or transaction with members of the Class, provided each member of the Class with one or more electronically printed receipts on each of which Defendant printed, for each respective Class member, more than the last 5 digits of their credit card or debit card number. 34. Defendant knew of and was well informed about the law, including specifically 35. For example, but without limitation, several years ago, VISA, MasterCard, the PCI Security Standards Council (a consortium founded by VISA, MasterCard, Discover, American Express and JCB), companies that sell cash register and other devices for the processing of credit or debit card payments, companies that sell software to operate payment card devices, companies that maintain and repair hardware or software used to process payment card transactions, and other entities informed Defendant about FACTA, including its specific requirements concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates, and Defendant's need to comply with same. 36. Other entities, including but not limited to Defendant’s merchant bank (also known as the acquiring bank or acquirer) which processes credit and debit card payments for transactions occurring at Defendant’s stores, likewise informed Defendant about FACTA, including its specific requirements concerning the truncation of credit and debit card numbers and prohibition on the printing of expiration dates, and Defendant’s need to comply with same. 4. Nor is Defendant’s willful violation of FACTA a trifling matter. In the statement provided during his signing of FACTA in 2003, the President underscored the importance of the legislation in combating rampant identity theft: This bill also confronts the problem of identity theft. A growing number of Americans are victimized by criminals who assume their identities and cause havoc in their financial affairs. With this legislation, the Federal Government is protecting our citizens by taking the offensive against identity theft. 44. Defendant knowingly, willfully, intentionally, and recklessly violated FACTA in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and the Class. 45. Defendant has also harmed Plaintiff and the Class by exposing them to at least an increased risk of identity theft and credit and or debit card fraud. 5. Courts have likewise emphasized the purpose of FACTA. For example, the Ninth Circuit recently emphasized that “[i]n fashioning FACTA, Congress aimed to ‘restrict the amount of information available to identity thieves.’” Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 718 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 149 Cong. Rec. 26,891 (2003) (statement of Sen. Shelby)). 6. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit recently explained that “[i]dentity theft is a serious problem, and FACTA is a serious congressional effort to combat it.” Redman v. Radioshack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 639 (7th Cir. 2014). For Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class as against Defendant) prohibition on the printing of expiration dates. receipts in violation of FACTA.

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53. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth in each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein. 54. The Defendants violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. chap. 407 (“MMPA”), by systematically using an arbitrary and unfair discriminatory pricing scheme in selling the “Tinder Plus” service to all Missouri residents 30 years of age or older. 55. For at least the multiple independent reasons set forth supra, Defendants’ discriminatory pricing scheme constitutes an “unfair practice” pursuant to the MMPA, and is thus illegal under Missouri law. 56. Pursuant to Defendants’ numerous violations of the MMPA, Plaintiffs were damaged, suffering ascertainable losses in the amount of additional fees paid over the life of their subscriptions to “Tinder Plus” due to Defendants’ discriminatory pricing scheme. 57. Due to Defendants’ illegal conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of all funds improperly obtained by Defendants. 58. Particularly because Defendants have long been on notice that their discriminatory pricing scheme is illegal and contrary to public policy yet have refused to reform and/or cease such unfair practice, Defendants are liable to pay punitive damages under the MMPA. 59. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set forth in each and every preceding paragraph of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein. 60. The Defendants, in forcing all subscribers to “Tinder Plus” to agree to a procedurally and substantively unconscionable arbitration agreement, violated the MMPA. 11 61. The employment of any unconscionable term in connection with a transaction is an “unfair practice” in violation of the MMPA. See, 15 Mo. C.S.R § 60–8.080(1) (2011). 62. Pursuant to Defendants’ numerous violations of the MMPA, Plaintiffs were damaged, suffering ascertainable losses in the amount of fees paid to Defendants for “Tinder Plus.” 63. Due to Defendants’ illegal conduct, Plaintiffs are entitled to restitution of all funds improperly obtained by Defendants. 64. Pursuant to Defendants’ numerous violations of the MMPA, Plaintiffs may recover compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages.

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) COMPLAINT-CLASS ACTION in her official capacity, )

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10. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant sent a response to a consumer’s dispute; c. that deceptively and misleadingly fails to clearly state the balance due; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 13. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue 4 is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e et seq. 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 16. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent 5 class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 18. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 19. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 6 20. Some time prior to February 5, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to creditor Citibank, N.A. 21. The Citibank, N.A. obligation arose out of transactions involving personal, family or household purposes obtained by Plaintiff from Citibank, N.A. and was incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 22. Specifically, Plaintiff allegedly bought goods for personal and/or family use using his Citi Diamond Preferred credit card. 23. The alleged Citibank, N.A. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 24. Citibank, N.A. is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (4). 25. Upon information and belief, Defendant subsequently purchased the Citibank, N.A. debt for the purpose of debt collection. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (6). Violation – February 5, 2021 Collection Letter 26. On or about February 5, 2021, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a response to a dispute made by the Plaintiff regarding the alleged debt, originally owed to Citibank, N.A. (See a true and correct copy of the 2-page response letter attached at Exhibit A and defined as “Letter”) 27. Towards the top portion of the Letter on page one, it states in relevant part: Verification Information Concerning Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (“PRA, LLC”) 37. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 38. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 39. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 40. Defendant violated §1692e : a. As the Letter is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate in violation of §1692e (2); b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 41. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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22. America’s lending industry has divorced itself from the borrowers it once served. 23. Among other things, securitization has created an industry of companies in the lending industry who no longer make money primarily from interest on the loans they originate. Thus, lenders no longer have the financial interest in the repayment of loans that they once did. Instead, financial institutions, through their network of subsidiaries, operating entities and divisions, service or administer mortgages for hedge funds and investment houses who own the loans. Rather than earn income from the interest on these loans, financial institutions like Mortgage Defendants are paid a fee for their loan administration services. 24. Additionally, under agreements with investors (pooling and service agreements), loan servicers like Mortgage Defendants assess fees on borrowers’ accounts for default-related services in connection with their administration of borrowers’ loans. These fees include Broker’s Price Opinion fees, appraisal fees, and property inspection fees. Mortgage Defendants’ collection of these fees, however, exemplifies how America’s lending industry has run off the rails. 26. For financial institutions like HSBC Bank and PHH, who are determined to maximize the money they earn from loans serviced by HSBC Mortgage and PHH Mortgage, the right to charge third party fees has opened the door to a world of exploitation. As a result of the disassociation between loan servicers and the monies generated from the interest borrowers pay on their loans, Defendants have been incentivized to find other ways to grow their profits. 27. Defendants, with their subsidiaries, affiliated companies, intercompany divisions, and third-party “property preservation” vendors, each formed an unlawful enterprise and decided to game the system. 28. In short, as explained by Adam J. Levitin, Associate Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, in testimony to the United States House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, “Servicers’ business model also encourages them to cut costs wherever possible, even if this involves cutting corners on legal requirements, and to lard (sic) on junk fees and in-sourced expenses at inflated prices.”7 32. Rather than being motivated by a specific concern that a lender’s interest in a property is at risk, Mortgage Defendants’ system is programmed to order property inspections and BPOs at intervals demanded by private investors and the various government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) that own the mortgages serviced by Mortgage Defendants. 34. Every home mortgage contains provisions specifying when payments are due and when they are considered late and providing that only reasonable fees may be assessed if payments are not timely. 36. In fact, GSEs like Fannie Mae expressly warned Mortgage Defendants not to charge borrowers’ accounts for multiple default-related services unless the circumstances of the particular property require it. Fannie Mae’s servicing guidelines explicitly provide that a BPO shall not be conducted more than every 120-days (unless the borrower is being evaluated for a loan modification program in which case the lender must order a BPO within the last 90-days).8 Likewise, HUD guidelines explicitly provide that a lender may not charge a borrower for the cost of repeat occupancy inspections “if there is evidence that the [lender] knew the [borrower] was still in occupancy, such as documented communication with the [borrower], counseling agency, the [borrower’s] attorney or the local HUD office…” as such charges are “inappropriate.”9 37. Defendants HSBC Bank and PHH, their subsidiaries, Defendants HSBC Mortgage and PHH Mortgage, their “property preservation” vendors, and the real estate brokers who provide BPOs for HSBC, formed an enterprise and devised a scheme to defraud borrowers and obtain money from them by means of false pretenses. 39. Mortgage Defendants conceal these fees for unnecessary default-related services on borrowers accounts by identifying the charges only as “Total New Fees and Charges,” “Other Fees,” and “Assessed Expenses” on borrowers’ statements. Under these categories, Mortgage Defendants assess fees for property inspections and BPOs on borrowers’ accounts.10 40. Mortgage Defendants’ automated loan management system is set up to order property inspections and BPOs, and to assess related fees against borrowers when they are a certain number of days late on their mortgage, regardless of whether the assessment of such fees is necessary. Although such inspections and BPOs purportedly are conducted to guard against property loss, Mortgage Defendants’ practices are in fact designed to ensure that these fees are charged to as many accounts as possible, even if the inspections and BPOs are unnecessary. 41. Moreover, so long as a borrower’s account is past due on one payment by the requisite number of days programmed into the loan management software, and without regard to the condition of the property, Mortgage Defendants’ system automatically continues to order inspections, regardless of whether they are necessary. 43. The Fidelity MSP system transmits property inspection and BPO work orders to one of the approved vendors with which Mortgage Defendants have an agreement. The vendors who conduct BPOs on Mortgage Defendants’ behalf include Old Republic Default Management Services and FLSI. The vendors who conduct property inspections on Mortgage Defendants’ behalf include Safeguard Real Estate Properties, LLC d/b/a of Safeguard Properties, LLC (“Safeguard”). 44. Once the approved vendor receives the computer generated work order, the inspection and/or BPO is performed and the cost is charged to the borrower’s account. 45. The vendor uploads a finished property inspection report directly into Mortgage Defendants’ computer mainframe. Therefore, the computer system, rather than any person, checks the condition of the property and alerts Mortgage Defendants if a property is at risk. 47. Further, because the property inspections are ordered based on a computer program rather than human decision-making, property inspections may be performed on a borrower’s property regardless of whether the property has already been inspected numerous times and was previously deemed occupied, well-maintained and in good condition. 48. Likewise, Mortgage Defendants allegedly conduct BPOs to assess the value of the property in anticipation of a foreclosure sale. However, Mortgage Defendants continue to conduct BPOs and assess the fees to borrowers over the course of several years from the time the property initially goes into foreclosure up until the time that the property ultimately sells during a foreclosure sale. In New York State it takes approximately one to three years for a foreclosure sale date to be assigned to a property after foreclosure proceedings have been commenced. Thus, during those years between foreclosure and the ultimate sale of the property, Mortgage Defendants conduct BPOs every several months. This practice is not reasonable or appropriate because such appraisals become outdated and cannot provide an accurate assessment of the property value at the time the property actually sells during a foreclosure sale. 50. Mortgage Defendants regularly conducted their mortgage servicing operations by designing, operating and managing the Fidelity MSP computer software to intentionally charge borrowers unreasonable, improper and unlawful fees. 51. The Fidelity MSP system is not tied to the Plaintiff’s or Class members’ mortgage agreements, but was designed and operated in a centralized fashion to defraud hundreds of thousands or millions of borrowers that had their mortgages serviced by Mortgage Defendants. 53. That these computer-generated inspections are unreasonable, confer no benefit on the lender, and serve no discernible purpose other than to generate revenue for Mortgage Defendants is further evidenced by the limited nature of the inspections themselves. The property inspections ordered by Mortgage Defendants’ computer system are mere “drive-by” inspections, i.e., the inspector “drives by” the property ostensibly to assess whether the house is occupied, being maintained, and has not been damaged – a practice that provides little, if any, real opportunity to determine whether the lender’s interest in the property is at risk. 54. As part of its scheme to generate fees, Mortgage Defendants repeatedly sent to Plaintiff and Class members materially false and misleading agreements, contracts and monthly mortgage statements by mail and wire. Mortgage Defendants’ scheme was also designed to conceal its existence and dissuade borrowers from challenging the unlawful fee assessments. Specifically, Mortgage Defendants conceal the nature of the improper and unlawful inspection fees from borrowers by listing them on the borrower’s statement only as “Other Fees” and “Assessed Expenses.” 79. Plaintiff brings this action, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a class action under Rules 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 81. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, any entity in which a Defendant has a controlling interest or is a parent or subsidiary of, or any entity that is controlled by a Defendant, and any Defendants’ officers, directors, employees, affiliates, legal representatives, heirs, predecessors, successors, and assigns. 82. The proposed Class encompasses hundreds of thousand or millions of individuals who are geographically dispersed throughout the United States. Therefore, the proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 94. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and the members of the Nationwide Subclass. Breach of Contract 131. Plaintiff incorporates by reference in this cause of action each and every allegation of the preceding paragraphs, with the same force and effect as though fully set forth herein. 132. Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a mortgage contract pursuant to which Defendants agreed to charge only reasonable and appropriate fees for default-relates services, including property inspections and BPOs. 133. Defendants breached that agreement by charging unreasonable and inappropriate fees for inspections and BPOs. 134. Plaintiff was injured as a result because Defendants charged, and Plaintiff paid, unauthorized fees to her account; Defendants failed to fully credit subsequent payments owing to deductions from these fees; and Defendants caused Plaintiff to incur additional late fees because they failed to credit the full amount of monthly payments owing to such unauthorized fees. 135. Defendants also breached their duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to reasonably exercise their discretion with respect to default related fees by instead ordering unreasonable and unnecessary property inspections and BPOs. 136. Plaintiff and members of the Class seek damages from Defendants resulting from its beach of the mortgage agreement. Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962(c))

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VIOLATIONS OF WASHINGTON’S MEAL AND REST PERIOD REQUIREMENTS RCW 49.12.020 AND WAC 296-126-092 (On behalf of the Washington Class Representative and the Washington Class) 20. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The employees similarly situated are as follows: FLSA Collective: All Persons who have been employed by Defendant as mortgage underwriters within the United States at any time starting three years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in this action until trial of this action. 21. Upon information and belief, Defendant knew that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective performed work that required overtime pay. Defendant operated under a scheme to deprive these employees of overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all hours worked. 23. Plaintiff (as “Washington Class Representative”) brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following defined class: Washington Class: All Persons who are, have been, or will be employed by Defendant as mortgage underwriters within the State of Washington at any time from three years prior to the filing of this complaint through the trial of this action. 24. Numerosity: Upon information and belief, the Proposed Washington Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that during the applicable statutory period, Defendant employed over forty people who satisfy the definition of the Proposed Washington Class. 25. Typicality: The Washington Class Representative’s claims are typical of the members of the Washington Class. The Washington Class Representative, like other mortgage underwriters, routinely worked more than forty hours per week during the Washington Class Period. The Washington Class Representative had the same duties and responsibilities as other Class members. The Washington Class Representative and the Washington Class were subject to Defendant’s policy and practice of improperly treating and classifying employees in this position as “exempt” from wage and hour laws and failing to pay appropriate overtime compensation and failing to provide legally required meal and rest periods. 26. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute separate lawsuits in federal court against large corporate defendants. 32. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 33. At all relevant times, Defendant was an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendant employed employees, including Plaintiff and each member of the Collective. 34. Plaintiff and additional opt-in Plaintiffs have consented in writing to be a part of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Their consent forms are attached as Exhibit A. As this case proceeds, it is likely that other individuals will sign consent forms and join as plaintiffs. 35. The FLSA requires each covered employer, such as Defendant, to compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours per work week. 41. The Washington Class Representative and the Washington Class allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 42. RCW 49.46.130 requires employers to pay employees one and one-half times the regular rate at which they are/were employed for all hours worked over forty (40) per work week. 43. RCW 49.46.090 makes employers who violate RCW 49.46.130 liable to the affected employees in the amount of unpaid wages, costs, attorney’s fees, and other appropriate relief under the law. 44. Defendant’s actions, policies, and/or practices as described above violate RCW 46. The Washington Class Representative and the Washington Class allege and incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 47. RCW 49.12.010 provides that “[t]he welfare of the state of Washington demands that all employees be protected from conditions of labor which have a pernicious effect on their health. The state of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power declares that inadequate wages and unsanitary conditions of labor exert such pernicious effect.” 48. RCW 49.12.020 provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful to employ any person in any industry or occupation within the state of Washington under conditions of labor detrimental to their health.” 49. Pursuant to RCW 49.12.005 and WAC 296-126-002, conditions of labor “means and includes the conditions of rest and meal periods” for employees. 50. WAC 296-126-092 provides that employees shall be allowed certain paid rest and meal periods during their shifts. 51. By the actions alleged above, including the failure to provide mortgage underwriters with proper rest and meal periods, Defendant have violated the provisions of RCW 49.12.020 and WAC 296-126-092. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective) VIOLATIONS OF THE WASHINGTON MINIMUM WAGE ACT RCW 49.46.130 & RCW 49.46.090 (On Behalf of the Washington Class Representatives and the Washington Class)

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66. Plaintiff incorporates each preceding paragraph as if fully set forth herein. 67. Plaintiff and each member of the Class is a “Consumer” as that term is defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). 68. The Products are a “Good” as that term is defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(a). 81. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 82. Plaintiff and the Class have standing to pursue a cause of action for false advertising under Bus. & Prof. Code §17500, et seq. because Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered an injury-in-fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. 83. Defendant advertised, marketed, and otherwise disseminated misleading information to the public through the product labels. 84. Defendant continues to disseminate such statements. 85. Defendant’s statements are misleading. 86. Defendant knows that these statements are misleading, or could have discovered their misleading nature with the exercise of reasonable care. 87. Plaintiff and Class members relied on Defendant’s marketing and labeling. 92. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 93. Plaintiff and the Class have standing to pursue a cause of action for false advertising under Bus & Prof. Code §17200, et seq. because Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered an injury-in-fact and lost money as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. 94. Defendant’s actions as described herein constitute unfair competitions within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, in that Defendant has engaged in deceptive business practices by falsely advertising the content of whey protein in the Products. 95. Defendant’s actions as described herein constitute unfair competition within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, in that Defendant has engaged in unlawful, unfair and deceptive business practices by violating California’s Sherman Food Drug & Cosmetic Act and California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act. 96. Defendant’s actions as described herein constitute unfair competition within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code §17200, on the additional grounds that Defendant has failed to properly label the Products in accordance with 21 C.F.R. 101, et seq. The Differences Between Whey Protein & Free Form Amino Acids Unjust Enrichment (On Behalf of the Classes) 108. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding factual allegations as if fully set forth herein. 109. Plaintiff and Class Members conferred benefits on Defendant by purchasing the Products. 110. Defendant has been unjustly enriched in retaining the revenues derived from Plaintiff and Class Members’ purchase of the Products. Retention of those monies under these circumstances is unjust and inequitable because Defendant’s labeling of the Products was misleading to consumers, which caused injuries to Plaintiff and Class Members because they would have not purchased the Products, or would not have paid as much for them, if the true facts would have been known. 111. Because Defendant’s retention of the non-gratuitous benefits conferred on them by Plaintiff and Class Members is unjust and inequitable, Defendant must pay restitution to Plaintiff and the Class Members for their unjust enrichment, as ordered by the Court. Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of the California Subclass Members) Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §1750, et. seq. (On Behalf of the California Subclass Members) Violation of the California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, et seq. (On Behalf of the California Subclass Members)

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14. “Capital One is a diversified bank that offers a broad array of financial products and services to consumers, small businesses and commercial clients. A Fortune 500 company, Capital One has one of the most widely recognized brands in America. As one of the nation’s top 10 largest banks based upon deposits, Capital One serves banking customers through branch locations primarily in New York, New Jersey, Texas, Louisiana, Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.” See Capital One website: https://www.capitalone.com/about/who-we-are. 15. Defendants recently announced that they would exit the mortgage and home equity business. See https://www.dallasnews.com/business/economy/2017/11/07/capital-one- shutter-home-loan-division-call-center-plano. 17. Defendants paid Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers on a draw against commission basis. As a result, Defendants recaptured any minimum wage and/or overtime compensation paid to Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers which essentially resulted in Defendants paying them on a commission only basis. 18. By way of example, Plaintiff began working for Defendants in November 2014. Defendants did not pay him minimum wages and/or overtime compensation despite the fact that he routinely worked over eight hours per day and more than 40 hours per week. Defendants also offset any minimum wage payments to Plaintiff from his commissions. 19. Defendants did not require Plaintiff and the other Mortgage Loan Officers to utilize any timekeeping system during this time period. 20. Defendants subsequently changed Plaintiff and the other Mortgage Loan Officers to hourly, non-exempt employees whose hourly pay was a draw against their commissions. 21. Defendants then ostensibly used a timekeeping system for Plaintiff and the other Mortgage Loan Officers. 22. Defendants, however, refused to allow Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers to record all of their overtime hours such that Defendants failed to pay them all of the legally required minimum wages and/or overtime compensation. 23. Defendants also offset any overtime compensation paid to Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers from their paid commissions. 24. Defendants uniformly applied its payment structure to all Mortgage Loan Officers. 26. For example, while a Mortgage Loan Officer, Plaintiff’s schedule fluctuated from day-to- day. His regular schedule had her working Mondays through Fridays, generally from 8:30 am until 5:00 pm. Additionally, Plaintiff worked at least five (5) to six (6) weekend days every month. Plaintiff also performed additional hours of work each week using his mobile device to send and receive business-related emails, texts, and/or phone calls. As such, during this time period, Plaintiff’s regular schedule had him working an average of at least 60 hours per week. 27. As further example, for the week beginning June 7, 2015, Plaintiff worked approximately 65 hours that week as a Mortgage Loan Officer for Defendants performing duties which included taking loan applications and collecting required documents for loan processing. Defendants, however, failed to pay him overtime compensation for his approximately 25 hours of overtime work for that week. 29. Defendants uniformly denied Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers minimum wages and/or overtime pay. 30. In reality, Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers are and were non-exempt sales employees who are and were entitled to minimum wages and /or overtime pay for all hours worked. 31. Defendants are/were in the business of selling mortgages. 32. Plaintiff and the other Mortgage Loan Officers had the same primary duty of selling loan products. 33. Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers are and were non-exempt sales employees who are and were entitled to minimum wages and/or overtime pay. 34. Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers did not customarily and regularly make sales at their customers’ home or place of business. 35. Instead, Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers regularly made sales over the phone, via the internet, or in person at Defendants’ offices. 36. Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers did not regularly supervise the work of two or more employees. 37. Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers did not exercise discretion and independent judgment as to matters of significance. 39. Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers had no advance knowledge in a field of science or learning which required specialized instruction that was required to perform the job. 40. Defendants do not require Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers to have a college degree to obtain a Mortgage Loan Officer job. 41. All Mortgage Loan Officers are similarly situated in that they share common job duties and descriptions, Defendants treated them as exempt and non-exempt employees at relevant times, and were all subject to Defendants’ policy and practice that treated them as commission only employees, and they all performed work without minimum wages and/or overtime compensation for all hours worked. 42. Defendants did not keep accurate records of the hours Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers worked. Because Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers for all the hours they worked, including overtime hours, Defendants’ wage statements did not accurately reflect all hours Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers worked. 43. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and the other Mortgage Loan Officers with paychecks and/or accurate paychecks. 44. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers for all of their minimum wages and/or overtime hours. Accordingly, Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers with all compensation owed to them, including their unpaid overtime, at the time they separated from the company. 46. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and other Mortgage Loan Officers. FLSA Collective 47. Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees as authorized under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The similarly situated employees are: All persons who are, have been, or will be employed by Defendants as “Mortgage Loan Officers” “Mortgage Loan Originators,” “Senior Mortgage Loan Officers,” and other individuals who originated loan products with similar job titles within the United States at any time during the last three years through the entry of judgment in this case (“FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff will subgroup the FLSA Collective as necessary for certification and/or litigation purposes. 48. Upon information and belief, Defendants paid Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective essentially on a commission basis because Defendants offset any minimum wage and/or overtime compensation from their commissions, and suffered and permitted them to work more than forty hours per week without minimum wages and/or overtime compensation. 49. Defendants’ draw against commission pay plan and failure to pay for work hours over 40 per week is a uniform policy, decision, and/or plan that applies to all Mortgage Loan Officers. 51. Another former Mortgage Loan Officer has already joined this case and his consent to join form is attached as an exhibit. 52. Defendants’ unlawful FLSA conduct has been widespread, repeated. and consistent. 53. Upon information and belief, Defendants knew that Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective performed work that required minimum wages and/or overtime pay. Defendants required them to work long hours and weekends without the proper pay, Plaintiff and/or those similarly situated complained to Defendants about these practices, and it is common industry knowledge that loan officers are non-exempt employees who must be paid for all hours worked. Defendants operated under a scheme to deprive these employees of overtime compensation by failing to properly compensate them for all hours worked. 54. Defendants’ conduct, as set forth in this Complaint, was willful and in bad faith, and has caused significant damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 56. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint into this count. 57. The FLSA requires each covered employer such as Defendants to compensate all non- exempt employees at the applicable minimum wage for all hours worked up to forty hours per week, and a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours per work week. 58. Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are entitled to be paid minimum wages and/or overtime compensation for all hours worked. 59. Defendants, pursuant to their policies and practices, failed and refused to pay minimum wages and/or overtime premiums to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for all of their hours worked. 60. Defendants violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for all minimum wages and/or overtime compensation. 61. By failing to record, report, and/or preserve accurate records of hours worked by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, Defendants failed to make, keep, and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other conditions and practice of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 62. The foregoing conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Collective Action under §216(b) of the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Minimum Wage and Overtime Claims

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10. Plaintiff opened and used her Citi Preferred Card account for personal, family or household purposes. Plaintiff did not open the account for business purposes. 11. Plaintiff did not answer the phone call from P&B, which went to voicemail. 12. P&B’s employee left a voicemail message for Plaintiff. The voicemail message identified the caller as “Robert Powers,” stated that the caller was “a debt collector for P&B Capital Group,” and was calling about Plaintiff’s “Citi Preferred Card.” 13. Plaintiff received a second phone call from P&B on May 17, 2016, at 6:21 PM. 14. The call on May 17, 2016 also went to Plaintiff’s voicemail. 15. P&B’s employee left another voicemail message for Plaintiff. As with the May 2, 2016 phone call and voicemail, the May 17, 2016 voicemail message again identified the caller as “Robert Powers,” stated that the caller was “a debt collector for P&B Capital Group,” and was calling about Plaintiff’s “Citi Preferred Card.” 17. Plaintiff received a third phone call from P&B on May 27, 2016, at 8:07 AM. 18. The call on May 27, 2016 also went to Plaintiff’s voicemail. 19. P&B’s employee left another voicemail message for Plaintiff. The message was also from “Robert Powers” and followed the same script as the previous two calls. 20. As of June 23, 2016, Plaintiff has not received any written communications from 34. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 35. P&B first contacted Plaintiff by telephone on May 2, 2016. 36. P&B contacted Plaintiff by telephone again on May 17, 2016 and May 27, 2016. 37. P&B never provided a written debt validation notice to Plaintiff. 38. P&B's conduct is misleading and confusing to the unsophisticated consumer, in that the notice of Plaintiff’s debt validation rights was never provided. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 39. The Defendant has therefore violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692g(a) and 1692g(b). 41. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 42. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether the Defendant complied with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), 1692g, and 1692g(a)(2). 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 44. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 45. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible. 8. On or about May 2, 2016, at 5:20 PM, P&B called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone regarding an alleged debt, allegedly owed to Citibank. 9. The alleged debt that was the subject of P&B’s telephone call on May 2, 2016, was a “Citi Preferred Card” credit card account.

lose

19. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a member of the proposed class (hereafter “The Class”) defined as follows: All persons in the United States whose bank accounts were debited on a reoccurring basis by Defendant without Defendant obtaining a written authorization signed or similarly authenticated for preauthorized electronic fund transfers within the one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. 20. Plaintiff represents, is a member of, The Class, consisting of all persons within the United States whose bank account was debited on a recurring basis by Defendant without Defendant obtaining a written authorization signed or similarly authenticated for preauthorized electronic fund transfers within the one year prior to the filing of this Complaint. 21. Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded from The Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in The Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. Violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act 15 U.SC. §1693 et seq.

lose

103. Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant the remedy of restitution to themselves and to all members of the class who made payments to Chase for Payment Protector. The Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant the following relief: a) a refund of all Payment Protector payments made to Chase; b) a refund to any consumer who was retired at the time they were sold Payment Protector by Chase; c) a refund to any consumer who was a senior citizen at the time they were sold Payment Protector by Chase; d) a full refund to any consumer who was otherwise not eligible for Payment Protector due to the restrictions in the coverage at the time the product was sold to the consumer and who paid for the product. 104. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief enjoining Chase from continuing to engage in the fraudulent, deceitful, unlawful and unfair common scheme as alleged herein. d. 113. The acts of Defendant constitute the tort of conversion under Arkansas law through Chase's unlawful imposition of control over the personal property of Plaintiffs and class members. 114. Plaintiff and class members ask the Court for damages for the tortious acts of conversion committed by Defendants. 32. The Plaintiffs are among the thousands of Arkansas citizens who were targeted by Chase as part of that company's credit card marketing programs, which include Chase's sales of a product it calls "Payment Protector". 33. In September, 2008, Chase purchased the assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual and is therefore liable for acts committed in the sale and management of Payment Protector by Washington Mutual prior to the purchase. 34. Chase markets and sells "Payment Protector" as a product that Chase tells cardholders will prevent cardholders from being "caught off guard" by providing benefits to cardholders should they experience an "unexpected life event", such as unemployment or disability. Chase charges the cardholder $.89 per hundred dollars of monthly account ending balance. In return, Chase tells the cardholder that they are "enrolled" in the program and Chase will make the minimum payments on the cardholder's account should the cardholder may be unemployed or disabled or experiences another event that qualifies the cardholder for Payment Protector benefits. These promises are illusory. 35. Chase sells Payment Protector through misleading statements, incomplete statements, and misrepresentations. The product is sold through print ads, printed inserts mailed along with credit card statements and direct telemarketing. 37. At the time of sale, Chase does not ask the cardholder any qualifying questions to determine if the cardholder is eligible for Payment Protector benefits or to determine if the cardholder will ever be eligible for Payment Protector benefits. Defendants do not disclose the terms of Payment Protector until after the consumer accepts or is charged for the product. The prolix documents that Chase eventually provides to cardholders, including plaintiff, that purports to contain a list of exclusions or grounds for denial of benefits, but those documents do not contain complete information about the claims practices Chase uses when denying benefits, and are worded in such a way that the documents are meaningless and incomprehensible to the average consumer. 38. There are thousands of Arkansas Chase cardholders who have paid for Payment Protector and are not eligible to receive benefits. The terms and exclusions for Payment Protector product are not adequately disclosed to consumers before the consumer buys the product, and Payment Protector coverage is so restricted in benefits, and processing claims under the coverage is made so difficult by Chase's use of numerous bureaucratic hurdles, that the product is essentially worthless. 39. Chase makes no effort at the time of sale to determine if the Payment Protector coverage is available to the consumer before charging for the product. For example, numerous senior citizens and retired Arkansas residents are charged for Payment Protector although they are excluded from receiving benefits by Chase because they are not employed. 41. Payment Protector is a product or service that Chase sold to its Arkansas credit cardholders during the class period for a price of $.89 per $100 of month ending credit card balance. 42. Credit card companies, including Chase, have a substantial amount of personal information about the cardholder. This information comes from the credit card application and from other consumer research that Chase performs. At a minimum, at the time of sale of the Payment Protector product, Chase has the cardholder's age, address and zip code. 43. Chase's marketing materials told Arkansas consumers that Payment Protector would provide peace of mind if something unexpected should happen because the minimum monthly payment on the cardholder's account balance will be paid and this will also help safeguard cardholders' good credit rating. 44. Chase promises Arkansas consumers that Payment Protector will pay the minimum monthly payment if the cardholder or the secondary cardholder is involuntarily unemployed or unable to work due to disability or experiences another covered event. 45. Before selling the Payment Protector product, Chase does not review its records or ask the cardholder a single question to determine if Payment Protector is appropriate for the customer. Chase could easily ask the customer's age, physical condition, or employment status, but Chase does not ask any ofthese questions. 47. Chase relies upon a deceptive practice known as "post claims underwriting" to deny claims and increase profits. This is the practice of asking few or no questions of the cardholder at the time of sale to determine if the customer is qualified for the product, then when the customer attempts to use the "benefits" of Payment Protector, Chase denies the benefits for a reason related to age, employment status, physical condition, or one of the many other reasons for denial listed in the preceding paragraph. 48. Chase does not have a policy of refunding unearned premiums, so customers paid for Payment Protector for years, made an application for a benefit, were turned down for benefit payments because of some reason for disqualification that was not disclosed at the time of sale, and then receive no refund ofthe premiums paid. Payment Protector compared to credit insurance 49. The marketing of Payment Protector makes the product sound like a form of credit insurance, but the customer is not told at the time of sale that the product is not credit life, disability insurance or credit insurance. 51. Chase's branding of this product as "Payment Protector" is a misleading or deceptive act that constitutes an attempt to obscure or conceal the nature and value ofthe product when selling it to Arkansas consumers. 52. Payment Protector was designed by Chase so that it could continue to sell credit insurance products while avoiding the consumer protections provided by the Arkansas Insurance Department, such as the licensing of sales agents, the regulation ofrates, the approval ofmethods of marketing, the regulation of products that can be sold, and the regulation of claims practices. 53. Arkansas consumers who purchased Payment Protector received documents days or weeks after the sale. 54. Among the Payment Protector documents are some exclusions buried in fme print. The exclusions are not clearly written or prominently displayed, and it is not possible for the Arkansas consumer to determine all of the exclusions that apply at the time the customer applies for Payment Protector or its benefits. 56. The Payment Protector product is worthless to a large number of Arkansas cardholders who paid for the product during the class period, in particular senior citizens and retired persons. Unlawful Conduct ofChase in the Sale ofPayment Protector. 57. Chase markets Payment Protector to consumers, including those who fall into the "subprime" credit category and therefore have low credit limits on their credit cards. 58. Chase sells the Payment Protector product as a service that will safeguard the consumer's credit and provide peace of mind by making minimum credit card payments upon some contingency that results in the cardholder's inability to make payments. 59. Chase does not provide essential terms of the product at the time of sale. Key terms governing Payment Protector are not disclosed. 60. The product terms and qualifiers that are disclosed after sale are incomplete, misleading, deceptive, and difficult to read and understand for the ordinary Arkansas Chase cardholder. 62. Chase fails to provide adequate information regarding Payment Protector coverage and restrictions prior to selling the product, and then provides information about the product that is deceptive, misleading, obfuscatory and incomplete. 63. As an example of misleading and obfuscatory language, Payment Protector appears to be a fmancial product or service that is ordinarily sold as credit life or disability insurance, yet the product materials carefully avoid any use of the word "insurance". The product materials do, however, refer to making "claims", which is either truthful (if this is insurance) or deceptive and misleading (if this product is something other than insurance). 64. Although represented to the consumer as something in the nature of an insurance product, the Payment Protector product is virtually worthless to many Arkansas Chase cardholders because of the numerous restrictions and exclusions that are imposed after the consumer buys the product, and because of the administrative and bureaucratic hurdles that are placed in the way of the Arkansas consumer who attempts to secure payments from Chase under this coverage. 66. The Payment Protector product serves Chase's interest in generating substantial fee income, and has the added benefit to Chase of lowering available credit to its subprime cardholders through the imposition of this additional fee. Senior Citizens 67. Chase violated Ark. Code Ann. §4-88-201 et seq. in marketing this product to Arkansas senior citizens and is therefore liable for additional civil penalties for acts committed against senior citizens. See A.C.A. §4-88-201 et seq. V. 68. Plaintiff Harold G. Smith was a senior citizen at all times that he received and paid for Payment Protector from Chase. 69. Plaintiff was the recipient of Chase marketing for Payment Protection during the class period, purchased Payment Protection, and paid the charges for Payment Protector. 70. Although he paid for the Payment Protector product, Mr. Smith was never eligible for the advertised benefits of Payment Protector coverage due to the product's restrictions and exclusions because he was self-employed. 72. No information was provided by Chase that provided Harold Smith with sufficient knowledge about the product limitations and exclusions of Payment Protector that he could make an informed decision about the value of the product. 73. Payment Protector coverage exclusions and restrictions are revealed to the consumer only after the coverage has already been sold to the Chase cardholder, and even then the disclosures are incomplete and are written in fme print in language that is hard for the ordinary customer to understand. 74. Chase makes no efforts to determine if the cardholder is eligible for Payment Protector benefits prior to charging for this service. b. Facts as to PlaintiffWarren Prince 75. Plaintiff Warren Prince was self-employed and owned his own business when he obtained a Washington Mutual (WaMu) card, and purchased and paid for Payment Protector. Washington Mutual is now owned by Defendants and is referred to here as WaMuiChase 76. Plaintiff received a mail solicitation to sign up for Payment Protector with one of his monthly statements, along with marketing materials for the Payment Protector product. Plaintiff signed the enclosed enrollment form and mailed it back. 77. Although he paid for the Payment Protector product, Mr. Prince was never eligible for the advertised benefits of Payment Protector due to the product's restrictions and exclusions, specifically because he was self-employed. 79. On information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that WaMu/Chase denied Mr. Prince Payment Protector benefits because he was self-employed, owning his own business. 80. Payment Protector coverage exclusions and restrictions were revealed to the consumer only after the coverage has already been sold to the WaMu/Chase cardholder, and even then the disclosures were incomplete and were written in fine print in language that is hard for the ordinary customer to understand. 81. WaMuChase made no efforts to determine if the cardholder was eligible for Payment Protector prior to selling the product to the cardholder. VI. 82. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated (the "Class"), pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. 84. Excluded from the proposed Class are defendants and any person, firm, trust, corporation or other entity related to or affiliated with any defendants. 85. The Class is composed of hundreds or thousands of Arkansas Chase cardholders, the joinder of which in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the claims of the proposed class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court. The identities of individual members of the Class are readily ascertainable through the defendants' billing records. 87. Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of the Class. They were targeted by Chase for sale of Payment Protector, they were subjected to Chase's standardized mass marketing practices, and he purchased and paid for Payment Protector, and they were subjected to Chase's fraudulent claims practices. Plaintiffs and the Class members have similarly suffered harm arising from Chase's violations of the law as alleged in this amended complaint. 88. Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class because their interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members they seek to represent. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs' interests are not antagonistic to those of the Class members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent and experienced in the prosecution of class litigation. 90. Plaintiffs restate and reallege the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as though set out here word for word. 91. Defendants' actions in connection with their Payment Protector plan, as described throughout this Complaint, constitute unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or affecting commerce, for purposes ofArkansas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 92. Each Plaintiff is an "individual, organization, group, association, partnership, corporation, or any combination of them," for purposes of Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-1 02(4), who has purchased Payment Protector coverage. 93. Each Defendant is an "individual, organization, group, association, partnership, corporation, or any combination of them" for purposes of Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-1 02(4). 94. Plaintiffs have been injured as a result of Defendants' activities which violate the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs have become responsible for the payments attributable to Payment Protector coverage, even though that service is virtually worthless to Plaintiffs. 95. Defendants' conduct constitutes false, misleading and/or deceptive practices within the meaning of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-101, et seq., specifically, § 4-88-107. 97. Defendants' conduct is subject to civil penalties pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 4­ 88-113, attorney fees pursuant to Ark Code Ann. §4-88-113, and is subject to civil penalties pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §4-88-202. In addition Defendant's conduct is subject to an award of attorney fees and costs. 98. Plaintiffs and class members seek court-ordered relief of an equitable nature against Defendants, including, but not limited to, orders declaring Defendants' practices as alleged to be unlawful, unfair, unconscionable ancIJor deceptive, and enjoining Defendants from undertaking any further unlawful, unfair, unconscionable ancIJor deceptive acts or omissions. 99. Plaintiffs and class members seek disgorgement and restitution of charges paid for Payment Protector, plus interest on damages at the legal rate, as well as three times the amount of their economic damages based on Defendants' knowing and intentional violations of this statute. Plaintiffs seek restitution for acts committed against a senior citizen, defined by Arkansas Statutes as a person over the age of60 years. Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-201(a). 100. Because Plaintiffs and class members seek to enforce an important right affecting the public interest, Plaintiffs request an award of attorneys' fees and costs on behalf of themselves and the class. 10 1. As a result of Defendants' violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices, Plaintiffs and members of the Class have suffered monetary damages for which Defendants are liable. b. Class Action Allegations. Trade Practices Act. a. Facts as to PlaintiffHarold G. Smith

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