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(Plaintiff Ceballos and the Tennessee Class against All Defendants except Javier Martinez Drywall and Javier Martinez) 176. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 177. There is no legally enforceable express contract between the parties. 178. Plaintiff Ceballos and the Tennessee Class provided valuable labor and services to Defendants in Tennessee. Defendants retained the benefits of this labor and these services without compensating Plaintiff Ceballo and the Tennessee Class for the value of this labor and services, which includes hourly wages and overtime premiums required by law for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 179. Under the circumstances, the parties reasonably understood that Plaintiff Ceballo and the Tennessee Class expected to be paid their legal wages. 180. It would be unjust for Defendants to retain the benefits of the value of this labor and these services without compensating Plaintiff Ceballo and the Tennessee Class for them. 24. In the period between September 2015 and the present, Plaintiffs entered into employment relationships with Circle Group, LA Drywall, Javier Martinez Drywall, Gulf Coast Construction, Jose Mendiola, Jesus Ornelas, and Javier Martinez to provide drywall labor at the SkyHouse Denver project. 25. All Plaintiffs were recruited and hired by LA Drywall and its agents for the purpose of working on Circle Group’s contract at the SkyHouse Denver site. 26. The role and functions of Javier Martinez Drywall at the SkyHouse Denver site considerably overlapped with the role and functions of LA Drywall. After she was recruited to work at least one worker was “switched” from Javier Martinez Drywall to LA Drywall. This formal change did not alter her day-to-day employment. 28. Some members of the Colorado Class lived in housing provided by LA Drywall. Often this housing took the form of cramped trailers. LA Drywall, Circle Group, and Gulf Coast Construction deducted rent payments from wages for those who lived in housing provided by LA Drywall. 29. Other Plaintiffs and some members of the Colorado Class lived in Denver before beginning work at the SkyHouse Denver project. LA Drywall and Javier Martinez Drywall recruited these members through the Internet and word of mouth. 30. Plaintiffs’ work involved various aspects of the drywall mounting process. This work included drywall, framing, and clean-up work related to drywall installation. 31. While working on the SkyHouse Denver site, Plaintiffs were managed and supervised by agents of LA Drywall, Javier Martinez Drywall, and Circle Group. 32. Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Javier Martinez Drywall agents together told Plaintiffs when they needed to arrive at work and when they could leave work each day. Plaintiffs were not free to come and go as they pleased. 33. Each day Plaintiffs reported to work, they signed in on sheets provided by LA Drywall, Javier Martinez Drywall, and Circle Group. 35. On other occasions, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated signed time sheets for both LA Drywall and Circle Group on the same day. 36. Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Javier Martinez agents jointly supervised Plaintiffs’ day-to-day work, including by telling Plaintiffs what floor to work on and what their responsibilities were for any given day. 37. The work Plaintiffs performed for Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Javier Martinez Drywall was integral to the businesses of Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Javier Martinez Drywall because the principal purpose of these businesses is the installation of drywall, which cannot be done drywall installers like the Plaintiffs. 38. Plaintiffs did not exercise any managerial control that affected an opportunity for profit or loss. Plaintiffs reported to work when Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Javier Martinez Drywall (and their agents) told them to report to work, and they left work when Circle Group and LA Drywall told them they could leave work. 39. Many Plaintiffs did not have significant experience working in drywall before beginning their work on the SkyHouse Denver project, and some Plaintiffs did not have any drywall experience before starting work on the SkyHouse Denver project. 41. On various occasions, when they complained about underpayment of wages, Plaintiffs complained to LA Drywall, Javier Martinez Drywall, and Circle Group. In some cases both LA Drywall and Circle Group told them that they would receive their wages. 42. When Plaintiffs and others similarly situated complained about their wages they often complained to the agents of Circle Group and LA Drywall. Agents of Circle Group and LA Drywall were aware that Plaintiffs were not being paid their legal wages but continued to make assurances that they would receive their legal wages while frequently becoming angry and dismissive about Plaintiffs’ complaints. 43. Circle Group, LA Drywall and their agents habitually reduced the wages of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated in response to their complaints about Defendants’ failure to pay legal wages. 44. When Plaintiffs received wages for their work on the SkyHouse Denver project, those wages came in the form of checks from Gulf Coast Construction. B. SkyHouse Nashville Project: Plaintiff Ceballos and others similarly situated were employed by Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Gulf Coast Construction. 45. In 2015, Plaintiff Ceballos entered into an employment relationship with Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Gulf Coast Construction to provide drywall labor in a large development project in Nashville. 46. LA Drywall recruited Plaintiff Ceballos for the Nashville project through Ceballos’s family member. 48. During his work in Nashville, Plaintiff Ceballos was supervised by Circle Group and LA Drywall, which provided drywall labor for the SkyHouse Nashville project. Circle Group instructed him where and when to show up and what tasks to perform each day. 49. During his work in Nashville, Plaintiff Ceballos did not have control over his hours or his work. He was dependent on Circle Group and LA Drywall for his assignments, instructions, and pay. 50. Circle Group and LA Drywall closely and directly supervised Plaintiff Ceballos’s work in Nashville. 51. After he completed his work on the in Nashville, LA Drywall and Circle Group told Plaintiff Ceballos that he could report to Denver for more work. 52. When Plaintiff had not received all of his wages for his work in Tennessee, he was told he should complain to LA Drywall and its agents. 53. He complained to Defendants Mendiola and Ornelas. But he was never paid all of his legal wages. 54. When Plaintiff Ceballos received wages for his work on the Nashville project those wages came in the form of a check from Gulf Coast Construction. C. Defendants’ Failure to Pay for All Hours Worked & Failure to Pay Overtime for Hours Worked in Excess of 40 Hours Per Week 56. No matter how many hours they worked, Plaintiffs were never paid overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. When they were paid for their work, they were paid the same wage for every hour they worked during the week. 57. Plaintiffs were also frequently denied pay entirely for some of the hours they worked. For example, Plaintiff Salas was routinely denied pay for exactly 10 hours of work performed during the course of a week on the SkyHouse Denver project. Plaintiff Solis was denied pay for over 100 hours of work. 58. When Plaintiffs complained to either Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Javier Martinez Drywall about their failure to pay wages, Circle Group, LA Drywall, and Javier Martinez Drywall often informed Plaintiffs that they would receive pay soon. In many cases, however, Plaintiffs did not receive their pay. And when they did receive wages, they never received overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 59. On at least one occasion, an Defendant Ornelas, an LA Drywall agent, informed Plaintiff Salazar that “they” had 1000 employees and “only one person doing payroll.” Therefore, LA Drywall’s agent explained, Plaintiff would have to be patient but would ultimately receive his wages. Plaintiff never received all of his wages and never received any overtime pay notwithstanding that he frequently worked more than 40 hours per week. 60. Defendant Ornelas agent seems to have been referring to Circle Group’s payroll practices. D. Defendants’ Businesses 62. During their work for Defendants, Plaintiffs’ work involved interstate commerce. Plaintiffs handled goods, tools, and materials transmitted in interstate commerce, and worked with employees who had moved for the purpose of working for Defendants or had themselves moved to work for Defendants. 63. Defendants’ operations are highly interrelated, because Defendants work together on multiple construction projects around the U.S., for which they jointly recruit and supervise employees to perform drywall services (Defendants’ primary business). Defendants’ control of labor relations is centralized, with payroll for all employees of Defendants coming from Defendant Gulf Coast Construction. Defendants share common managers who jointly supervise the work of employees and who direct that work on behalf of all Defendants interchangeably. 64. Defendants are joint employers of all Plaintiffs, except that Defendant Javier Martinez Drywall and Defendant Javier Martinez are not joint employers of Plaintiffs or class members working outside Colorado. Each Defendant had a major role in controlling Plaintiffs’ work on a day-to-day basis, including hiring, work assignments, provision of housing, tools, safety training, and transportation, direction of work through supervisors, and decisions about how many of Plaintiffs’ hours of work would be compensated and how and when Plaintiffs would be paid. E. Defendants Knew or Should Have Known That Plaintiffs Were Entitled to Minimum Wage, Overtime, and Pay for all of the Hours they Worked 66. Plaintiffs were subject to the daily and direct supervision and control of Defendants. But Plaintiffs did not receive pay for all of the hours they worked and never received overtime pay. 67. At least some Plaintiffs and putative class members complained to Defendants about the underpayment of wages. Notwithstanding these complaints, Defendants continued to deny Plaintiffs and putative class members pay for all of the hours they worked and, as a routine policy, denied Plaintiffs overtime pay for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 68. On some occasions Defendants even punished Plaintiffs who complained about not receiving wages by paying those Plaintiffs less. 69. Plaintiffs Solis worked as Cleaner/Laborers for Defendants at SkyHouse Denver. 70. Female workers were assigned to “Cleaner/Laborer” positions when they applied for work, and were not given the opportunity to work as Drywallers. 71. Plaintiff Solis was hired by Defendant Jesus “Chuy” Ornelas. 72. Upon information and belief, no women worked as Drywallers at SkyHouse Denver project, because Defendants refused to hire women to work as Drywallers. 73. Male employees without drywall experience were hired by Defendants to work as Drywallers at SkyHouse Denver project. 75. Ms. Solis received paychecks from Defendant Gulf Coast Construction. 76. Cleaner/Laborer employees were paid less than Drywallers. 77. Working as a Cleaner/Laborer was heavier, more physically demanding work than working as a Drywaller. Cleaner/Laborers had to lift heavy pieces of drywall and other debris and make constant trips to throw the debris into the dumpster. They also had to scrape debris off the floor. 78. Jeff told the Ms. Solis and other employees that women were better at hard work than men, and that was why he assigned women to Cleaner/Laborer positions, which he felt were the best place for women. 79. Although most Cleaner/Laborers were female, a handful of men were assigned to work as Cleaner/Laborers as well. 80. These men had identical duties to the Female Named Plaintiffs. 81. Upon information and belief, these men requested this assignment but would have been allowed to work as Drywallers if they chose. 82. Upon information and belief, male Cleaner/Laborers were paid more per hour and were paid their correct wages more often than Ms. Solis. 83. Upon information and belief, white female Cleaner/Laborers were paid more per hour and were paid their correct wages more often than Ms. Solis. 85. In a meeting of all employees working on drywall (including Drywallers, Cleaner/Laborers, and supervisors), a supervisor named Stuart said that based on his religion, women shouldn’t be working in construction. 86. Female workers were catcalled and asked on dates by men at SkyHouse Denver project. 87. Jeff mocked Plaintiff Solis for being a “poor Mexican” when she demanded wages owed to her. 88. Jeff frequently had angry and violent outbursts towards Hispanic/Mexican-born workers. 89. Ms. Houston often called Hispanic/Mexican-born workers “stupid,” “mensa,” “tonto,” or “donkeys,” yelled at them, and made fun of them for not speaking English. 90. Plaintiff Solis left her employment due to an injury on or about November 9, 2015. 91. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all previous paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully re-written herein. 92. Plaintiffs assert their Counts III-VI as a Fed R. Civ P. 23 class action on their own behalf and on behalf of classes for which they seek certification. 93. Pending any modifications necessitated by discovery, Plaintiffs preliminarily define a class (the “Rule 23 Nationwide Class”) as follows: A. SkyHouse Denver Project: Plaintiffs were employed by Circle Group, LA Drywall, Javier Martinez Drywall, Gulf Coast Construction, Jose Mendiola, Jesus Ornelas, and Javier Martinez.

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15. On or about September 12, 2019, Plaintiff received medical services from New York Presbyterian Hospital. 16. Thereafter, New York Presbyterian Hospital claimed Plaintiff incurred a debt of $75.00 for the medical services (“the alleged Debt”). 17. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 18. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 19. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 20. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. 21. Rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf. 22. As part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 23. The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party vendor included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, and the fact that the alleged Debt concerned Plaintiff’s/his son’s medical treatment, among other things. 25. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 26. The third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. 27. That letter, dated November 21, 2020, was received and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 28. The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 29. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 30. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” 32. The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 33. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party vendor concerning the alleged Debt. 35. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these purposes thousands of times. 37. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. 38. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 39. Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. 40. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 41. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 42. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 44. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. 46. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor. 47. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 48. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New Jersey. 49. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 50. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 51. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 52. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 54. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)

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14. Throughout the relevant time period, CSRs were employed by Defendant at their Dallas, Texas Customer Service Department. 50. Plaintiff seeks to bring this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on her own behalf as well as those in the following collective: All persons employed by Defendant as Customer Service Representatives within Dallas, Texas during the relevant time period, who have been subject to Defendant’s policy “on call” policy. 51. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was similarly situated to all such individuals in the FLSA Collective1 because while employed by Defendant, Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs performed similar tasks, were subject to the same laws and regulations, were paid in the same or substantially similar manner, were paid the same or similar rate, were required to work in excess of forty (40) hours per work week, and were subject to Defendant’s unlawful “on call” policies and practices of willfully failing to pay them at the statutorily required rate of one and a half (1½) times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 52. Defendant is and has been aware of the requirement to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Plaintiffs at a rate of one and a half (1½) times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week, yet willfully failed to do so. 53. The FLSA Plaintiffs, under Plaintiff’s FLSA claim, are readily discernable and ascertainable. All FLSA Plaintiff’s contact information is readily available in Defendant’s records. Notice of this collective action can be made as soon as the Court preliminarily certifies the collective. AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A VIOLATION OF The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., Made by Plaintiff on Behalf of All FLSA Plaintiffs I. General Facts.

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(FLSA Overtime Violations, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Brought by Plaintiff on Behalf of Himself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members) (New York Overtime Violations, New York Labor Law § 650 et seq., N.Y.C.C.R. § 142 et seq., N.Y.C.C.R. § 146 et seq., Brought by Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members) (New York Violations, NYLL §§ 195, 198 (1-b) et seq.) 20. Plaintiff brings and seeks to prosecute their FLSA claims as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 207, and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all non- exempt persons currently or formerly employed by Defendants, including all employees who were employed by Defendants for manual positions including, but not limited to, veterinary technicians, receptionists, and kennel workers, and any other similarly situated current and former employees holding comparable positions (“FLSA collective Plaintiffs”), at any time on or after the date that is three years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Collective Action Period”). 21. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the FLSA collective plaintiffs are and have been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and are and have been subject to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans and common policies, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, including willfully failing and 4 refusing to pay class members one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rate for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek for work they provided thereafter. The claims of Plaintiff are essentially the same as those of the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs. 22. The FLSA Claims for Relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt- in collective action pursuant to FLSA Section 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 207, and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 23. The FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to Defendants. 24. Plaintiff brings New York State law Claims for Relief pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F.R.C.P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants, including all non-exempt persons currently or formerly employed by Defendants, including all employees who were employed by defendants for manual positions including, but not limited to, veterinary technicians, receptionists, and kennel workers, and any other similarly situated current and former employees holding comparable positions, on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 25. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rates of pay for each Class member are also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P. 23. 26. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the court. 5 Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than fifty (50) Members of the Class. 27. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, including willfully failing and refusing to pay class members one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rate for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek for work they provided thereafter. Defendants’ office-wide policies and practices affected all class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 28. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by an attorney who is experienced and competent in both Class Action litigation and employment litigation and has previously represented both plaintiffs and defendants in wage and hour cases. 29. A Class Action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy - particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate Defendants. Class Action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. Because the losses, injuries and damages suffered by each of the individual class members are small in the sense pertinent to a Class Action analysis, the expenses and burden of 6 individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual class members to redress the wrongs done to them. On the other hand, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a Class Action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a Class Action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual Members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, Class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a Class Action. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendants and other employers throughout the State violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class Actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 31. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: (a) Whether Defendants paid the Class members the federal and state minimum wage for all hours worked; (b) Whether Defendants properly compensated Plaintiff and class members for overtime by paying them overtime pay for the hours worked in excess of 7 forty (40) hours per workweek within the meaning of New York Labor Law, Art. 6, § 190 et. seq., and Art. 19, § 650 et. seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor regulations, 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 142; (c) Whether Defendants paid employees New York’s “spread of hours” premium when their workdays exceeded 10 hours (d) The nature and extent of the class-wide injury and the appropriate measure of damages for the Class; (e) Whether Defendants can prove that their unlawful policies were implemented in good faith; and (f) Whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the Class the requisite wage notices and other documents required under the NYLL. 32. As noted above, HBAC is a full-service veterinary care and animal boarding facility. At all relevant times, it has been owned and operated by defendants Steven Weinstein and Peter Roufail and managed by defendant Lucecita Gurrera. 33. Defendants hired Ms. Chader to work as a veterinary technician at Howard Beach Animal Clinic, PC (“HBAC”) in October 2014. She continued working for HBAC until May 9, 2019, when she was terminated.1 34. Although her job title was veterinary technician, a large portion of Ms. Chader’s time working was spent on manual tasks including, but not limited to, doing laundry, cleaning cages, cleaning surgery rooms and tables, cleaning various spaces throughout HBAC’s offices, answering and making telephone calls, and shoveling snow. Ms. Chader had no independent discretion with respect to the performance of her job duties. 1 HBAC premised her Ms. Chader’s termination on several false accusations, including time sheet manipulation and dishonesty. HBAC’s claims about Ms. Chader were lies. 8 35. Ms. Chader’s schedule changed very little throughout her time working for HBAC. From October 2014 until approximately April 2019, Ms. Chader worked 44 hours from Monday through Friday, and 7.5 hours twice per month on Saturdays. During the final two months of her employment she occasionally took off Wednesdays, reducing her weekly hours by about 4 hours. 36. Ms. Chader was not permitted to take a break during her workdays. 37. HBAC paid Ms. Chader $18.00 per hour from October 2014 until approximately January 2015; $22.00 per hour from January 2015 until October 2015; $24.00 per hour from October 2015 until October 2017; $25.00 per hour from October 2017 until October 2018; and $26.50 per hour from October 2018 until her termination in May 2019. 38. Ms. Chader worked more than 50 hours per week throughout the vast majority of her employment. Nonetheless, at no time did HBAC pay her overtime at a rate of 1.5 times her regular hourly rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week, as HBAC was required to do under the Federal Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”), the New York Labor Law (the “NYLL”) and supporting regulations. 40. At all relevant times, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and Class Members’ employment at HBAC has been under the direct oversight of the Individual Defendants, who were and remain the owners and managers of HBAC. 41. At all relevant times, Individual Defendants had total operational control over 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs. 53. Throughout the statute of limitations period covered by these claims, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members regularly worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and continue to do so. 54. At all relevant times, Defendants operated under a decision, policy and plan, and under common policies, programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines and rules of willfully failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members at one-and-one-half times their regular hourly rates for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, even though Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members have been and are entitled to overtime. 55. At all relevant times, Defendants willfully, regularly and repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members at the required overtime rates, one- and- one-half times their regular rates for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members, seeks damages in the amount of their respective unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages as provided by the FLSA for overtime violations, attorneys’ fees and costs, pre- and post-judgment interest, and such other legal and equitable relief as this Court deems just and proper. 11 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs. 58. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members were employees and Defendants were employers within the meaning of NYLL. 59. The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting regulations apply to Defendants. 60. It is unlawful under New York law for an employer to suffer or permit a non- exempt employee to work without paying overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any workweek. 61. Throughout the class period, Defendants willfully, regularly and repeatedly failed to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members at the required overtime rates, one-and-one-half times their regular rates for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 62. By failing to pay Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, they have willfully violated NYLL Article 19, § 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations, including, inter alia, the regulations in 12 N.Y.C.R.R., Parts 142 and 146. 63. As a result of Defendants’ willful and unlawful conduct, Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to an award of damages, including liquidated damages, in amount to be determined at trial, pre- and post-judgment interest, costs and attorneys’ fees, as provided by N.Y. Lab. Law § 663. 12 64. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference all previous paragraphs. 65. Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiff, FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members with wage notices, as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), containing their rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary. 66. Through their knowing and intentional failure to provide Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members with the wage notices required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 67. Due to Defendants’ willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to statutory penalties for Defendants’ failure to provide them with wage notices, plus, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b).

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68. Plaintiff brings the First Claim against defendants as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of himself and other similarly situated individuals, which include all car wash workers employed by defendants at the Car Washes at any time three years prior to the filing of this action through the entry of judgment in this action (the “FLSA Collective”). 69. The FLSA Collective consists of approximately 20 similarly situated current and former car wash workers who have been victims of defendants’ common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA by willfully denying them overtime pay and other wages. 71. This policy, pattern, or practice includes, inter alia: a. failing to pay overtime at the rate of one and one-half times the FLSA Collective’s regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek. 72. Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith and has caused significant damage to the FLSA Collective. 73. The FLSA Collective would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to defendants and are readily identifiable and can be located through defendants’ records, which they are required to maintain pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL. Those similarly situated employees should be notified of and allowed to opt into this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 74. Plaintiff brings the Second and Third Claims against defendants for unpaid minimum wage and unpaid overtime on behalf of himself and other employees similarly situated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25, which provides in pertinent part, “An employee shall be entitled to maintain such action for and on behalf of himself or other employees similarly situated, and such employee and employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and on behalf of all employees similarly situated.” 75. Plaintiff is a member of a class of employees of similarly situated individuals which includes all car wash workers employed by defendants at the Car Washes at any time two years prior to the filing of the action through entry of judgment in this action (the “New Jersey Class”). 77. The identity of the New Jersey Class members is known to the defendants and is contained in the employment records that the defendants are required to create and maintain pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL. 78. Plaintiff is similarly situated to the New Jersey Class because plaintiff and the New Jersey Class performed similar work under similar terms and conditions of employment, and sustained similar damages arising out of defendants’ conduct in violation of the NJWHL. 79. The New Jersey Class members work, or have worked, for the defendants in New Jersey as car wash workers and were not paid New Jersey State mandated minimum wage and overtime pay by the defendants. They have sustained similar types of damages as a result of defendants’ failure to comply with the NJWHL and supporting regulations of the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workplace Development contained in the New Jersey Administrative Code (NJAC). 80. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the New Jersey Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation. 81. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the other members of the New Jersey Class. 82. This action is properly maintainable as a class action under N.J.S.A 34:11-56a25. 83. At all relevant times, Shoulman operated and managed Clinton Car Wash, 45 West, and Royal Touch. 85. Clinton Car Wash, 45 West, and Royal Touch shared car wash workers. 86. Throughout his employment, Scarpis’s primary duties included washing, drying, vacuuming, and cleaning motor vehicles. 87. At all relevant times, defendants recorded Scarpis and other car wash workers’ hours of work by having car wash workers clock in and out by placing a punch card into a machine. 88. At all relevant times, Scarpis and other car wash workers typically worked 69 hours per workweek. 89. Throughout his employment, Scarpis and other car wash workers generally worked seven days per week with the following schedule: Monday through Saturday, 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and Sunday 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 90. Scarpis and other car wash workers did not receive any meal or rest breaks during the workday. 91. Scarpis and other car wash workers were paid on a weekly basis in cash. 92. Effective January 1, 2015, the New Jersey hourly minimum wage became $8.38, and effective January 1, 2017, the New Jersey hourly minimum wage became $8.44. 93. Scarpis was paid $8.00 per hour for all hours worked, in violation of the New Jersey state minimum wage rate. 94. Other members of the New Jersey Class were paid equal to or less than $8.00 per hour for all hours worked, in violation of the New Jersey State minimum wage rate. 96. The car wash workers received tips at the end of each day, which were collected in a box at the end of the car wash. 97. Defendants did not provide Scarpis or the other car wash workers with the required notice informing them of any intention of defendants to take a tip credit toward defendants’ obligations to pay minimum wages and/or overtime pursuant to the FLSA and

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47. Defendants undertake residential and commercial construction projects in Louisiana. Defendant’ services include construction, carpentry, remodeling and renovations. Defendants employ more than 30 employees at any one time. 49. Defendants paid Plaintiffs by check. 50. Plaintiffs normally worked more than (40) hours a week for the Defendants. Defendants required Plaintiffs to work six days per week. 51. Defendants never paid Plaintiffs one-and-half times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 52. Defendants willfully violated Plaintiffs’ rights under the FLSA because Defendants knew or showed reckless disregard for the fact that their compensation practices violated the FLSA. Defendants were and are aware of the custom and practice of overtime pay from their experience and expertise in the industry in which they work. 53. Defendants paid the named Plaintiffs, and other similarly situated employees at an hourly rate for work performed. 54. Defendants treated the named Plaintiffs, and other similarly situated employees as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements. 56. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each of the preceding allegations as though fully set forth herein. 57. Plaintiffs bring the claims set forth in Count I, alleging violations of the FLSA, as a putative collection action on behalf of themselves and an “FLSA Overtime Class,” consisting of all current and former employees of the Defendants who are or have been employed by Defendants during the three years immediately preceding the filing of this suit as hourly or non- exempt employees and who, during that period, worked in excess of forty hours in any work week and failed to receive premium pay, at the rate of one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 58. Defendants willfully violated the overtime provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) by not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees one-and-a-half times their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek from at least August 2012 and continuing until the present. 59. As a consequence of Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, plus an additional amount in liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Fair Labor Standards Act – FLSA Overtime Class

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10. Neuro-Psychology Associates describes the services it provides to patients utilizing the Current Procedural Terminology (“CPT”) code set developed and maintained by the American Medical Association and used to facilitate communication and reporting between health care providers and health care payors like CIGNA. 11. CIGNA has continually denied reimbursement for several CPT codes submitted to CIGNA by Neuro-Psychology Associates for services that are necessary and properly payable. 12. The codes in dispute are CPT codes 96118, 96119, and 96120. 13. CPT code 96118 is a “professional” code and may only be submitted for services rendered by a fully-licensed psychologist or physician. 14. CPT code 96119 is a “technical” code used for face-to-face testing administered by an individual who is licensed at less than the Ph.D. level. 15. CPT code 96120 is the used for testing administered by computer. 16. Health care providers in the United States may bill one or more codes simultaneously using Modifier -59, used to indicate distinct procedural services all reimbursable by the health care payor. 17. CIGNA has repeatedly denied reimbursement to Neuro-Psychology Associates using Modifier -59 for CPT codes 96119 and 96120 when these services are properly payable. 18. The dollar amount of services improperly denied by CIGNA solely to the named Plaintiff alone totals $11,295.56. 19. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 20. This class action is brought by the Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all health care providers in the United States and its territories who submit CPT codes 96118, 96119, and 96120 to CIGNA for reimbursement of properly payable services. 21. Plaintiffs sue on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 23. Based on the number of individuals enrolled in CIGNA individual and group health plans and the size of the reimbursements at issue, Plaintiffs reasonably believe the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. 24. All members of the class have been subject to and affected by the same conduct. The claims are based on health care benefits contracts and uniform provider reimbursement requirements. There are questions of law and fact that are common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class. These questions include, but are not limited to the following: a. Whether the reimbursement practices complained of constitute a breach of the insurance contracts; b. Whether and to what extent Plaintiff and Class Members were harmed by the Defendant‟s improper conduct; and c. The proper measure of damages sustained by Plaintiff and Class Members. 25. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the class claims and do not conflict with the interests of any other class members in that both the Plaintiff and the other class members were subject to the same or similar health care benefits contracts, uniform provider reimbursement requirements, and/or other agreements/policies issued by the Defendant, and subject to the same conduct of the Defendant, namely, denial of reimbursement for properly payable services. 27. A class action is superior to other methods for the fast and efficient adjudication of this controversy. A class action regarding the issues in this case does not create any problems of manageability. 28. This putative class action meets at least one of the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 29. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 30. Plaintiffs bring this claim on their own behalf and on behalf of each member of the Class described above. 31. Neuro-Psychology Associates is an intended third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract(s) between CIGNA and patients of Neuro-Psychology Associates. 32. CIGNA‟s denial of reimbursement constitutes a breach of contract with its insured, and a breach of contract rights granted to Neuro-Psychology Associates as an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract(s). 33. As a result of CIGNA‟s breach of contract, Neuro-Psychology Associates has suffered damages and incurred fees and costs. 34. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 35. Plaintiffs bring this claim on their own behalf and on behalf of each member of the Class described above. 36. Defendant is obligated by contract and common law to act in good faith and to deal fairly with each insured and each provider. 38. As a result of Defendant‟s failure to act in good faith and the absence of fair dealing, Neuro-Psychology Associates has suffered damages and incurred fees and costs. 39. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege every allegation above as if set forth herein in full. 40. Plaintiffs bring this claim on their own behalf and on behalf of each member of the Class described above. 41. GIGNA‟s denial of properly payable reimbursements is an unfair and deceptive act or practice under Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 93A, § 11. 42. The named Plaintiff has pursued every administrative remedy and sent a Demand for Relief to GIGNA and no payments have been made. 43. As a result of CIGNA‟s unfair and deceptive practices, Neuro-Psychology Associates has suffered damages and incurred fees and costs. BREACH OF CONTRACT BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING VIOLATION OF MASS. GEN. LAWS, CHAPTER 93A, SECTION 11

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38. POSTMATES manufactures, distributes, markets, advertises, and sells the Service, which claims to be able to (1) deliver “Anything. Anytime. Anywhere.” when in fact, it is not, because the Service will not deliver anything, anytime, anywhere, and (2) allow use of their Service for a set “Delivery Fee”, but whose Service charges other non-tax variable fees. 39. Defendant’s statements that it can deliver “Anything. Anytime. Anywhere.” for a set “Delivery Fee” prominently displayed on the Service’s main, primary screen (i.e., it is necessary to view to use the Service) and its other marketing, including packaging and/or labeling, is false, misleading, and likely to deceive reasonable customer, such as Plaintiff and members of the Class, because the Service does not allow delivery of “Anything. Anytime. Anywhere.”, as evinced by the options available in the Service, and also charges more than a simple “Delivery Fee”, as evinced by a hidden “Service Fee”. 40. Delivery of “Anything. Anytime. Anywhere.” would mean to a reasonable NYC customer that delivery was possible for anything sold in the local NYC stores to a NYC location since it is reasonable to believe a business could provide such a service, since competitors exist and do provide such services (e.g., TaskRabbit, Uber). Contrary to Defendant’s express or implied representations, the Service does not provide for delivery of “Anything. Anytime. Anywhere.”, even in local NYC. 54. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 55. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiff brings this class action and seeks certification of the claims and certain issues in this action on behalf of a Class defined as: all New York persons (i.e., consumers and non-consumers) who have used Postmate’s services, during the period extending from January 15, 2012, through and to the filing date of this Complaint. 56. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Class definition if further investigation and discovery indicates that the Class definition should be narrowed, expanded, or otherwise modified. Excluded from the Class are governmental entities, Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendant’s officers, directors, affiliates, legal representatives, employees, co-conspirators, successors, subsidiaries, and assigns. Also excluded from the Class is any judge, justice, or judicial officer presiding over this matter and the members of their immediate families and judicial staff. 57. Defendant’s practices and omissions were applied uniformly to all members of the Class, including any subclass arising out of the New York statutory claims alleged herein, so that the questions of law and fact are common to all members of the Class and any subclass. 81. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations set forth in each of the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, and alleges now the same allegations above regarding POSTMATES, noting specifically that the allegations include that POSTMATES injured business clients (e.g., partnerships, corporations) as well as unaffiliated individuals in their individual capacity. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates all allegations made above. UNJUST ENRICHMENT VIOLATION OF NEW YORK’S GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 349

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) Case: 1:19-cv-01025-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/03/19 Page: 8 of 11 PAGEID #: 8 (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03 and Article II, § 34A of the Ohio Constitution) 14. Defendant operates call centers throughout the United States. 15. Defendant also employs call center/customer care representatives who work remotely and perform the same tasks as the call center/customer care representatives who work in the call centers. 16. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant at their Springdale, Ohio call center from about December 3, 2018 through about October 29, 2019. 17. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were employed as call center/customer care representatives or performed similar tasks as call center/ customer care representatives. 18. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees are non-exempt employees under the FLSA. 19. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees are paid an hourly wage. Case: 1:19-cv-01025-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/03/19 Page: 3 of 11 PAGEID #: 3 (Failure to Pay For Time Spent Starting and Logging Into Computer Systems, Applications, and Phone System) 20. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were required by Defendant to perform unpaid work before clocking in each day, including but not limited to starting and logging into Defendant’s computer systems, numerous software applications, and phone system. 21. Defendant arbitrarily failed to count this work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees as “hours worked.” 22. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees performed this unpaid work every workday, and it constituted a part of their fixed and regular working time. 23. This unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees was practically ascertainable to Defendant. 24. There is no practical administrative difficulty of recording this unpaid work of Plaintiff’s and other similarly-situated employees. It could be precisely recorded for payroll purposes simply by allowing them to clock in and be paid before they brought up Defendant’s computer systems, applications, and phone system. 25. This unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees constituted a part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant, and was performed for Defendant’s benefit. 26. Moreover, this unpaid work is an integral and indispensable part of other principle activities performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees. They cannot perform their work without bringing up Defendant’s computer systems, applications, and phone system. (Failure to Pay for Time Spent on Post-Shift Calls, Shutting Down Computer Systems, Applications, and Phone System) 27. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were required by Defendant to Case: 1:19-cv-01025-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/03/19 Page: 4 of 11 PAGEID #: 4 perform unpaid work after their shift ended each day including but not limited to shutting down and logging out of Defendant’s computer systems, numerous software applications, and phone system. 28. Defendant arbitrarily failed to count this work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees as “hours worked.” 29. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees performed this unpaid work every workday, and it constituted a part of their fixed and regular working time. 30. This unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees was practically ascertainable to Defendant. 31. There was no practical administrative difficulty of recording this unpaid work of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees. It could have been precisely recorded for payroll purposes simply by allowing them to clock out after shutting down Defendant’s computer systems, applications, and phone system and before and after other meetings and work time. 32. This unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees constituted a part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant, and was performed for Defendant’s benefit. 33. Moreover, this unpaid work was an integral and indispensable part of other principle activities performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees. (Failure to Pay for Time Spent working but not logged into a fundraising campaign) 34. Defendant utilized a timekeeping system such that Plaintiff and similarly situated employees are not paid for all hours worked. 35. Plaintiff and similarly situated employees are not compensated for the time spent not logged into call programs or any other time spent working to log in or out of the computer Case: 1:19-cv-01025-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/03/19 Page: 5 of 11 PAGEID #: 5 systems, applications, and phone system. (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) 36. As a result of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees not being paid for all hours worked, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. 37. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. (Failure to Keep Accurate Records) 38. Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve records of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated employees before clocking in each day. 39. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on his own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 40. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All former and current call center/customer care representatives or persons with jobs performing substantially identical functions and/or duties to call center/customer care representatives employed by Humana Pharmacy, Inc. during the statutory period covered by this Complaint. 41. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of more than 100 persons. 42. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § Case: 1:19-cv-01025-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/03/19 Page: 6 of 11 PAGEID #: 6 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 43. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 44. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All former and current call center/customer care representatives or persons with jobs performing substantially identical functions and/or duties to call center/customer care representatives employed by Humana Pharmacy, Inc. in the State of Ohio during the statutory period covered by this Complaint. 45. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 100 persons. 46. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to its customer care/call center representatives for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and Case: 1:19-cv-01025-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/03/19 Page: 7 of 11 PAGEID #: 7 (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff and other members of the Class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10 and Article II, § 34A of the Ohio Constitution. 47. The claims of the named Plaintiff is typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant and are based on the same legal theories as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. 48. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 49. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 50. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 52. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for work performed before clocking in each day violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. Case: 1:19-cv-01025-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/03/19 Page: 9 of 11 PAGEID #: 9 59. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for work performed before clocking in each day violated the OMFWSA, R.C. 4111.03 and Article II, § 34A of the Ohio Constitution. 60. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for work performed after their shift ended violated the OMFWSA, R.C. 4111.03 and Article II, § 34A of the Ohio Constitution. 61. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for work performed when not logged into Defendant’s computer systems, applications, and phone system violated the OMFWSA, R.C. 4111.03 and Article II, § 34A of the Ohio Constitution. 62. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all of the hours they worked over 40 in a workweek violated the OMFWSA, R.C. 4111.03 and Article II, § 34A of the Ohio Constitution 63. By failing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees’ overtime compensation, Defendant willfully, knowingly and/or recklessly violated the provisions of the OMFWSA, R.C. 4111.03 and Article II, § 34A of the Ohio Constitution. 64. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly- situated employees have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the OMFWSA and the Ohio Constitution.

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10. Benzon brings this claim under the FLSA as a collective action. 11. The members of the FLSA Class are similarly situated in all relevant respects. While their precise job duties might vary somewhat, these differences don’t matter for the purposes of determining their entitlement to overtime. They are all entitled to overtime after 40 hours in a week and the overtime they are entitled to must be calculated in a manner consistent with the requirements of the FLSA. Because NOV excluded non-discretionary bonuses from the regular rate of pay for all hourly employees who worked in the oilfield, Benzon and all of the Putative Class Members are similarly situated within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 12. Defendant employed a substantial number of hourly employees like Benzon in the United States during the past 3 years. These workers are geographically disbursed, residing and working in states across the county. Because these workers do not have fixed work locations, these individuals may work in different states across the country in the course of a given year. 13. Absent a collective action, many members of the Putative Class likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Defendant will retain the proceeds of its violations of the FLSA. 14. Furthermore, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 16. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA. 17. Defendant employed Benzon and each member of the Putative Class. 18. Defendant’s pay policy denied Benzon and the Putative Class Members overtime compensation at a rate based on all remuneration received as required by the FLSA. 19. Defendant’s failure to pay Benzon and the Putative Class Members overtime at rates not less than one and one-half times their proper regular rate violates 29 U.S.C. § 207. 20. The foregoing conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. Due to Defendant’s FLSA violations, Benzon and the Putative Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses of this action. 7. Benzon and all those similarly situated to him worked for Defendant in the oilfield as hourly employees. Benzon and all those similarly situated to him regularly worked in excess of 40 hours a week. 8. Benzon and all those similarly situated to him were eligible to receive and did in fact receive non-discretionary bonuses. These non-discretionary bonuses consisted of, but were not limited to, Rig Pay, Safety Bonuses, Completion Bonuses and Retention Bonuses. Violation of the FLSA

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23. Defendant is an airline company that employs more than 47,000 workers. 25. Plaintiff worked in Defendant’s customer service call center in Albuquerque, New Mexico along with approximately 500 other customer service representatives. 26. Plaintiff’s primary duty was to communicate with customers to book customer reservations, answer questions, handle flight cancellations, and resolve general questions from Defendant’s customers. 27. Defendant paid Plaintiff and the Class Members on an hourly basis. 28. Before the Plaintiff and Class Members began their work for Defendant, Defendant required an approximately six week training session. 29. This training session focused on customer relations skills as well as Defendant’s operations. 30. The training session included a classroom module during which the Plaintiff and Class Members were paid their hourly rates. 31. However, this classroom module required extensive homework. The Plaintiff and Class Members were required by Defendant to complete the homework and the homework was directly related to their work for Defendant. 32. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff and Class Members were not paid for the time spent completing this homework. 34. The Plaintiff and Class Members typically spent one hour to one and one half hours each night to complete the homework. 35. After completion of the training session, the Plaintiff and Class Members were allowed to work at the call centers. The call center is essentially an open room filled with hundreds of work stations. 36. However, the work stations are not pre-assigned but are filled by customer service representatives on a first come basis. 37. The call centers operate twenty hours each day with overlapping shifts. At times, the Plaintiff and Class Members spent 15 to 30 minutes to find an open computer and to log in to the computer system. Defendant did not compensate the Plaintiff and the Class Members for this time. 38. After finding an open work station, the next step is to turn on the computer. After turning on the computer, a customer service representative opens a series of programs in an order required by Defendant, including a program for processing reservations. The final program a customer service representative is to open is the phone system. The phone program serves as the time clock. Once this program is opened, the Plaintiff and Class Members were considered “clocked in.” 40. At the end of the shift, the Plaintiff and Class Members were required to first close the phone program, which then clocked them out. Afterwards, the Plaintiff and Class Members were required to close the remainder of the computer programs. This process took approximately 10 minutes. 41. Furthermore, Defendant instituted a policy whereby the Plaintiff and Class Members were only paid for 15 minutes for calls occurring at the end of their shift. In other words, if the Plaintiff and Class Members were on a call that extended 45 minutes past the end of their shift, they would only be paid for 15 minutes of that call and would not be paid for the remaining 30 minutes. 42. This rounding policy resulted in the Plaintiff and the Class Members not being paid for all time worked. Defendant’s policy was that the Plaintiff and Class Members were to be “clocked out” at their scheduled end time for their shirt regardless of whether they were still working. 44. Defendant violated the law by not paying the Plaintiff and Class Members for these daily rest breaks. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.18. 45. By not paying for the time worked as described above, Defendant failed to pay for all hours worked. The Plaintiff and Class Members routinely worked at least 40 hours each week. Thus, they are owed substantial overtime wages for the time spent working over 40 hours each week that went unpaid. 46. Defendant’s actions in this case were willful. Defendant knew the requirement to pay overtime at the rate of time and one half the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek but intentionally and/or recklessly chose to disregard the law. 47. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 48. Defendant’s practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek violates the law. See 29 U.S.C. § 207. 50. Due to its violations of the FLSA, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members for their unpaid overtime, an equal amount as liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and court costs. 51. Plaintiff brings this suit as an FLSA collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all customer service representatives during the three-year period prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present. 52. Plaintiff has actual knowledge, through conversations with and personal observation of other employees, that a class of similarly situated workers exists who have been denied overtime pay by being subjected to the same illegal pay practices described above. 54. Defendant uses the same compensation structure regardless of the supervisor of a particular Class Member. 55. All customer service representatives perform the same job functions. 56. The names and address of the Class Members of the collective action are available from Defendant’s records. The Class Members should be allowed to receive notice via First Class Mail, email and via a website with basic information about the lawsuit or by use of techniques and a form of notice similar to those customarily used in representative actions. 57. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among individual Class Members, the damages for each individual can be easily calculated using a simple formula. 58. The class of similarly situated FLSA Class Members may be properly defined as follows: All current and former customer service representatives at any time during the three-year period prior to the filing of this Complaint up to the present. 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs. 61. At all relevant times, Defendant has been, and continues to be, an “employer” within the meaning of the NMMWA. At all relevant times, Defendant has employed and continues to employ, “employees,” including the New Mexico Class Members and Plaintiff, within the meaning of the NMMWA. 62. The NMMWA requires payment of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate for each hour worked per week over 40 hours. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4- 66. Plaintiff brings his overtime claims arising under the NMMWA as a Rule 23 class action on behalf of the following class: All current and former customer service representatives in New Mexico at any time during the three-year period prior to the filing of this Complaint up to the present. 67. Although Plaintiff does not know the precise number of members of the proposed class, Plaintiff believes there are more than 500. 68. The members of the class are so numerous that their individual joinder is impractical. 69. The identity of the members of the New Mexico Class is readily discernible from Defendant’s records. 70. Plaintiff and the proposed New Mexico Class on one hand, and Defendant on the other, have a commonality of interest in the subject matter and remedy sought, namely back wages plus penalties, interest, attorneys’ fees and the cost of this lawsuit. 72. These and other common questions of law and fact, which are common to the members of the class, predominate over any individual questions affecting only individual members of the class. 73. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class because Plaintiff was not paid overtime wages in accordance with New Mexico law, just as was done with respect to the New Mexico Class Members. 74. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the class that he seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel, highly experienced in complex class action litigation, and they intend to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and his counsel. VIOLATION OF THE NEW MEXICO MINIMUM WAGE ACT VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. § 207

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a designer and manufacturer of personal transporters and operates www.razor.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services, including the ability to browse products for delivery, including manual and electric scooter products, find information on promotions, as well as related goods and services available online. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in December 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse manual and electric scooter products available for delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those manual and electric scooter products available for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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1. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 10. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 12. The Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were primarily for personal, family or household purposes. 13. The alleged Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 14. Defendant PRA, contracted with the Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. to collect the alleged debt. 15. Defendant PRA collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – February 20, 2020 Collection Letter 16. On or about February 20, 2020, Defendant PRA sent Plaintiff an initial collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Capital One Bank (USA) N.A. See Exhibit A. 17. The Letter states a balance of $1000.10. 18. The Letter offers two options regarding the balance: Either pay the full amount or select a “savings plan” that allows the consumer to pay the balance for a discounted amount. 19. Below the offer to pay in full, the letter states: “Your Account will be considered paid-in-full after your final payment is successfully posted.” 2. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Minnesota; b. to whom Defendant PRA sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. that included materially misleading and deceptive language regarding whether the account would be considered paid-in-full or considered paid-in-full for less than the full balance after final payment is made; d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 21. Below both offers, the Letter includes a sentence that states: “Within approximately 30 days of your final payment successfully posting, we will request that the three major credit reporting agencies delete our tradeline related to your account from your credit bureau report.” 22. The statement that Defendant will request deletion from the credit bureaus upon final payment is not qualified in any way and the plain reading implies that these deletion will take place in both scenarios; whether the balance is paid in full or paid for less than the full balance. 23. Upon Defendant’s request to delete the tradeline from the credit bureaus upon final payment, the account will no longer appear on the credit report of the Plaintiff in any form. 24. Therefore, there is no consequence to Defendant’s earlier statements in the Letter that the account will be “considered” paid in full or “paid in full for less than the full balance,” because in either scenario, the account will simply not appear on Plaintiff’s credit report. 25. The earlier statements are deceptive and misleading, because they propose to offer a benefit of considering the account “paid-in-full,” which essentially does not exist, because the account will be deleted entirely upon final payment. 26. Just the fact that letter at all states that there is a status for each type of payment option is misleading, when in fact either option results in a complete wiping away of the account having existed at all. 27. In the alternative, if Defendant’s statement that they will request a deletion of tradeline is hinged upon selection of only one of the payment options, then the Letter is unclear and misleading for not properly elucidating that fact. 29. As a result of Defendant deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 3. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 30. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 31. Defendants debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 32. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 33. Defendants violated §1692e: a. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 34. By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 4. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 6. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 8. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 9. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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28. Plaintiff is alleged to have incurred and defaulted on a financial obligation to “Automobile Club.” (“Automobile Club Obligation”). 29. The Automobile Club Obligation arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services that were the subject of the transaction were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 30. Defendant contends the Automobile Club Obligation is in default. 31. The alleged Automobile Club Obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 32. The alleged Automobile Club Obligation is a “consumer debt” as defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(2). 33. Plaintiff is, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, a “consumer” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 34. Plaintiff is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “consumer” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(1). 36. AWA collects, and attempts to collect, defaulted debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. mail, telephone, and Internet. 37. AWA is, at all times relevant to this complaint, engaged in the act and/or practice of “debt collection” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(5). 38. AWA is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 39. AWA is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “debt collector” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(6). 40. AWA is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “third-party debt collector” as that term is defined by Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(7). 41. On or about March 23, 2016, AWA mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff concerning the Automobile Club Obligation, which was dated March 23, 2016, and which Plaintiff received in the ordinary course of mail. (“3/23/2016 Letter”). A true and correct copy of the 3/23/2016 Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A, except that the undersigned counsel has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, partially redacted the financial account numbers and Plaintiff’s home address in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy. 42. The 3/23/2016 Letter was mailed, or caused to be mailed, to Plaintiff by persons employed by AWA as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 43. The 3/23/2016 Letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 45. The 3/23/2016 Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 46. The 3/23/2016 Letter provides the following information: Client Name 75. With respect to the Class, this claim is brought on behalf of all natural persons with addresses in the State of Texas, to whom AWA mailed a written communication in substantially the same form as Exhibit A, in connection with its attempt to collect a debt during the period beginning two years prior to the filing of this action and ending 21 days thereafter, which either: (i) failed to accurately identify the creditor of the alleged debt; (ii) failed to accurately disclose the amount of the debt; (iii) stated the balance due may include accrued prejudgment interest; or (iv) stated future prejudgment interest may be added as permitted by law or by “Wis. Stats. Sec. 138.04” if the Balance Due is not paid. 76. With respect to the Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a sub-class of all persons who meet the class definition set forth, supra, and who paid their alleged debt(s) and were charged “Interest & Fees” or any other sums that are not authorized by the agreement creating the obligation or legally chargeable to the consumer. 77. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of AWA and its clients on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts. 78. Excluded from the Class and Sub-Class are the Defendants and each of their respective officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 80. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 81. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and Sub- Class defined in this complaint. Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 83. Certification of a class(es) under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate in that a determination that Defendants’ standardized written collection communications to Texas consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A, violates Tex. Fin. Code §§ 392.301(a)(8), 392.303(a)(2), 392.304(a)(4), 392.304(a)(8), 392.304(a)(12), 392.304(a)(13), and § 392.304(a)(19) would permit Plaintiff and the Classes to obtain injunctive relief pursuant to Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403(a)(1). 84. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 86. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 88. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 89. Defendants violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.301(a)(8) by threatening to take an action prohibited by law—including, but not limited to, collecting and attempting to collect amounts that are incidental to the principal obligation, which amounts are not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law, and causing, attempting to cause, and or threatening to cause charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose of the communication including, but not limited to, collect telephone calls, messaging fees, and telegram fees. 90. Defendants violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.303(a)(2) by attempting to collect a charge, fee, or expense incidental to the obligation that is not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the obligation or legally chargeable to the consumer. 92. Defendants violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(8) by making false, deceptive, and misleading statements regarding the character and extent of the debt it sought to collect. 93. Defendants violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(12) by making false, deceptive, and misleading statements that a consumer debt may be increased by the addition of attorney’s fees, investigation fees, service fees, or other charges that are not authorized by the agreement creating the obligation or legally chargeable to the consumer. 94. Defendants violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(13) by making false, deceptive, and misleading statements that a consumer debt will definitely be increased by the addition of attorney’s fees, investigation fees, service fees, or other charges when the award of the fees or charges is subject to judicial discretion. 95. Defendants violated Tex. Fin. Code § 392.304(a)(19) by using false, deceptive, and misleading representations and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS) VIOLATIONS OF THE TEXAS DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)

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21. Sometime prior to June 11, 2012, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial obligation to Citibank/Sears, (“Sears Obligation”). 22. The Sears Obligation is alleged to have arisen out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 23. Defendants contend that the Sears Obligation is in default. -5- 24. The alleged Sears Obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). 25. Plaintiff is, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, a “consumer” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3). 26. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that sometime prior to June 11, 2012, the creditor of the Sears Obligation either directly or through intermediate transactions assigned, placed, transferred, or sold the debt to LVNV for collection. 27. LVNV is a purchaser of performing and non-performing consumer debts, which are in default at the time the debts are acquired. 28. LVNV collects, and attempts to collect, defaulted debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and Internet. 29. In connection with its debt servicing operations, LVNV routinely hires lawyers and law firms, such as MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS, to file lawsuits against consumers in the State of New York in an effort to collect money by obtaining civil judgments on the defaulted debts it acquires. 30. LVNV is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 31. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that sometime prior to June 11, 2012, and within the one year period immediately preceding the filing of the initial complaint in this action, LVNV either directly or through intermediate transactions assigned, placed, or transferred the Sears Obligation to MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS for collection including, but not limited to, the filing of a lawsuit. -6- 32. MEL HARRIS LLC collects, and attempts to collect, debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and Internet. 33. MEL HARRIS LLC is, at all times relevant to this complaint, a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 34. On information and belief, HARRIS is a principal owner, director, shareholder, and/or managing partner of MEL HARRIS LLC. 35. HARRIS attempts to collect debts incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, for personal, family, or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the U.S. Mail, telephone, and Internet. 36. HARRIS personally implemented, and with knowledge such practices were contrary to law, engaged in, acted consistent with, managed, and oversaw the illegal policies and procedures used by other employees of MEL HARRIS LLC. 37. HARRIS is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). 38. In an attempt to collect the Sears Obligation, MEL HARRIS LLC debt collector employees began placing telephone calls to Plaintiff beginning on at least June 6, 2012. During these telephone calls MEL HARRIS LLC left telephone messages for Plaintiff in which the callers falsely implied to Plaintiff that they were attorneys employed by MEL HARRIS who were attempting to call Plaintiff in connection with the collection of a debt. Plaintiff is now informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that none of these callers were attorneys who are licensed to practice law in New York or in any other state. These calls continued for months. 39. In a further attempt to collect the Sears Obligation, Defendants sent Plaintiff a letter dated June 11, 2012 (“06/11/12 Letter”). A true and correct copy of the 06/11/12 Letter is -7- attached hereto as Exhibit A. 40. Plaintiff did not receive the 06/11/12 Letter until June 17, 2012. 41. The 06/11/12 Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 42. Plaintiff presumed that the 06/11/12 Letter was in fact the work product of a licensed attorney as it stated “Please be advised we are the attorneys for the above” (Emphasis in original) and was personally signed by one of MEL HARRIS LLC’s attorneys. 43. Plaintiff further presumed that the 06/11/12 Letter was in fact the work product of a licensed attorney as it stated “Demand is hereby made upon you for payment of this outstanding indebtedness” (Emphasis in original) and was personally signed by one of MEL HARRIS LLC’s attorneys. 44. Plaintiff further presumed that the 06/11/12 Letter was in fact the work product of a licensed attorney as it stated “Should you wish to discuss this matter with a view towardss reaching an amicable settlement, please do not hesitate to contact us” (Emphasis in original) and was personally signed by one of MEL HARRIS LLC’s attorneys. 45. As Plaintiff understood the 06/11/12 Letter, as would the least sophisticated consumer, the only way to “amicably settle” the alleged Sears Obligation and avoid a “non- amicable” result such as a lawsuit and civil judgment was to call MEL HARRIS LLC and its attorneys. 46. After receiving the 06/11/12 Letter, Plaintiff reasonably inferred -- as would a “least sophisticated consumer” -- that Citibank/Sears was proceeding more aggressively as it has incurred the expense to hire a law firm, such as MEL HARRIS LLC, whose public reputation was to sue New York consumers and obtain judgments and those attorneys had taken the time to personally write him a letter and sign it. -8- 47. In a further attempt to collect the Sears Obligation, Defendants sent Plaintiff a letter dated July 12, 2012 (“07/12/12 Letter”), which was in addition to the telephone calls and 06/11/12 Letter he had received, and was continuing to receive from Defendants. A true and correct copy of the 07/12/12 Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 48. The 06/11/12 Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 49. Plaintiff presumed that the 07/12/12 Letter was in fact the work product of a licensed attorney as it stated in the First Paragraph that “[o]ur client has asked us to convey to you an exciting way for you to SAVE MONEY and liquidate the above balance which is significantly past due” (Emphasis in original) and was personally signed by HARRIS. 50. As Plaintiff understood the First Paragraph of 07/12/12 Letter, as would the least sophisticated consumer, to be statements and conduct that only a licensed attorney could engage in or make, i.e., discussing what “our client” had asked MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS. 51. In fact, unlike the 06/11/12 Letter, the 07/12/12 Letter contains deliberately omits any admonition whatsoever that the attorney signing this particular letter had “not personally reviewed the particular circumstances of [Plaintiff’s] account” and was personally signed by HARRIS who made the following additional affirmative statements to Plaintiff indicating he had indeed reviewed the particular circumstances of Plaintiff’s account, as only a licensed attorney has the legal authority to make such statements: (a) “Our client has asked us to convey to you....” (b) “Our client has authorized us to accept any reasonable settlement amount in order to satisfy this debt in full.” (Emphasis in original). (c) “One-lump payment settlements will create the largest savings for you.” (d) “We will also accept offers of partial payment settlements.” 52. In the Third Paragraph of the 07/12/12 Letter, MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS -9- affirmatively state that, “[t]he only requirement is that [Plaintiff] call this office within ten (10) days after receipt of this letter to discuss how much money [Plaintiff] will be saving.” (Emphasis in original). Plaintiff perceived, as would the least sophisticated consumer, that the foregoing statement constituted a one-time take it or leave it offer that would result in his being sued if he failed to “call [MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS] within 10 days” as it was personally signed by HARRIS and as Plaintiff was well aware of Defendants’ strong propensity to sue New York consumers in an effort to obtain civil judgments on alleged debts such as the Sears Obligation. 53. The foregoing statement that, “[t]he only requirement is that [Plaintiff] call this office within ten (10) days after receipt of this letter to discuss how much money [Plaintiff] will be saving” is flatly false, deceptive, and misleading, as Defendants will accept a settlement offer from Plaintiff and other consumers at any time. 54. Based on the foregoing facts, when considered in conjunction with the 06/11/12 Letter, Plaintiff believed, as would the least sophisticated consumer, that the 07/12/12 Letter was in fact the work product of a licensed attorney. 55. The only an attorney employed by MEL HARRIS LLC personally signed the 06/11/12 Letter was to scare Plaintiff, and other least sophisticated consumers, into believing that the “price of poker had just gone up” -- namely, that LVNV had now hired attorneys who were prepared to, and regularly do, sue consumers such as Plaintiff if quick arrangements are not made to pay the alleged debt. 56. The only reason HARRIS personally signed the 07/12/12 Letter was to scare Plaintiff, and other least sophisticated consumers, into believing that the “price of poker had just gone up” -- namely, that LVNV had now hired attorneys who were prepared to, and regularly do, sue consumers such as Plaintiff if quick arrangements are not made to pay the alleged debt. -10- 57. The fact the 06/11/12 Letter and 07/12/12 Letter appears to be personally signed by a licensed attorneys, lends significant credence to Plaintiff’s presumption that these letters were in fact authored, and direct to be sent, by a licensed attorney who had reviewed the particular circumstances of his account prior to mailing same. 58. The 07/12/12 Letter falsely represents and implies that a licensed attorney was directly or personally involved in reviewing Plaintiff’s file or account prior to mailing same. 59. After receiving the 06/11/12 Letter and 07/12/12 Letter, Plaintiff reasonably inferred -- as would a “least sophisticated consumer” -- that LVNV was proceeding more aggressively as it has incurred the expense to hire a law firm, whose attorneys were personally involved with the review and collection of his account. 60. MEL HARRIS LLC intended that the 06/11/12 Letter and 07/12/12 Letter imply a heightened severity over dunning letters from non-attorney collection companies and that the least sophisticated consumer react with a commensurate level of alarm and concern thereby giving them an unfair business advantage over those non-attorney debt collection companies. 61. Sometime after receiving the 06/11/12 Letter and 07/12/12 Letter, Plaintiff became informed and now believes, and on that basis alleges, that the 06/11/12 Letter and 07/12/12 Letter are actually computer-generated, mass-produced, letters that are sent to consumers at-large without any meaningful attorney review or involvement. 62. At all times relevant to the collection of the alleged Sears Obligation, there existed a principal-agent relationship between LVNV on the one-hand, and MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS on the other hand. 63. At all times relevant to the collection of the alleged Sears Obligation, MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS were also the agents for LVNV, acting within the course and scope -11- of their employment at the time of the incidents complained of herein, and were under the direct supervision, control, and approval of LVNV. 64. As the principal and a debt collector, LVNV is vicariously liable for the illegal collection activities of other debt collection companies and collectors, such as MEL HARRIS LLC and HARRIS, who are working on its behalf to collect debts from consumers like Plaintiff. 70. This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 71. With respect to the Plaintiff Class, this claim is brought on behalf of a class of (a) all persons in the State of New York (b) to whom Defendants sent a written communication materially similar to the form attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit B; (c) in an attempt to collect a debt that was incurred for personal, family, or household purposes; (d) which was not returned as undelivered by the United States Postal Service or a process server; (e) during the one year immediately preceding the filing of the initial complaint in this action and ending 21 days thereafter. 72. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of MEL HARRIS LLC and LVNV. 73. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 74. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit B, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(3), and 1692e(10). 75. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. -13- 76. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 77. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: (a) Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. (b) Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibits A, violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(3), and 1692e(10). (c) Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendants’ common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. (d) Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel has -14- any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. (e) Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 78. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that a determination that the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the form attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit B, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(3), or 1692e(10) is tantamount to declaratory relief and any monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination. 79. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 80. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). -15- 81. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 82. The Defendants’ written communications in the form attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit B are false, deceptive, and misleading in that these communications were neither drafted by, nor received any meaningful review or involvement from, a licensed attorney prior to the mailing of said letters in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e and 1692e(3). 83. The Defendants’ written communication in the form attached as Exhibit A and Exhibit B constitutes the use of a false representation and/or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e and 1692e(10). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

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16. Defendants regularly serve the needs of restaurants and other business owners by selling bulk supplies and equipment. 49. Pursuant to Rules 23(a), (b)(3) and/or (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a nationwide class (“Class”), initially defined as follows: All persons or entities located in the United States who were customers of Defendants from February 22, 2009 to the present (“Class Period”), from whom Defendants collected PII that was compromised as a result of the data breaches of Defendants’ card processing systems, and who sustain fraudulent charges as a result of the breach and/or made out of pocket expenditures in mitigation of the consequences to them of such data breaches. Excluded from the consumer class are governmental entities, the Defendants, any entity in which the Defendants have a controlling interest, their employees, officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors and wholly or partly owned subsidiaries or affiliated companies, including parent corporations, class counsel and their employees; and the judicial officers and their immediate family members and associated court staff assigned to this case. 57. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendants owed its member customers a duty of care in the handling and safeguarding of their PII that was entrusted to them for the purpose of making purchases at Defendants’ stores. 59. Additionally, Defendants assumed a duty, and had duties imposed upon them by regulations to use reasonable care to keep Class members’ financial data and PII private and secure. 60. Additionally, Defendants had a duty, and had a duty imposed on them by regulations, to report the theft of PII to Plaintiff and the Class in an expedient manner (as to Data Breach One) and an immediate manner (as to Data Breach Two). 61. Defendants also represented to Plaintiff and the Class that their systems were compliant with payment card industry standards, which created a special relationship between Defendants and Plaintiff and the Class, in that Plaintiff and the Class reasonably relied on Defendants to take reasonable steps to safeguard their PII.1 79. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 80. Defendants represented that their systems were compliant with payment card industry standards.2 However, Defendants negligently allowed Plaintiff and Class member information to be taken, in December 2012, even after a similar breach just a year before during September through November of 2011. GROSS NEGLIGENCE (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class, as Against All Defendants) NEGLIGENCE (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class, as Against All Defendants)

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12. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”): • Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt using the same unlawful form letter herein, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. • The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 13. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: • Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection Letter and/or notices from Defendant that fail to adequately advise the consumer of the amount owed in violation of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that is sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy); • There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. • Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. • Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. • Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class. • A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. • A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed to proceed without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. • Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 14. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “13” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 15. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 16. Upon information and belief, within the last year Defendant commenced efforts to collect an alleged consumer “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5), when it mailed a Collection Letter to Plaintiff seeking to collect on an unpaid account allegedly owed to Discover Bank. 17. On or around October 26, 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter. See Exhibit A. 18. The letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 19. The letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 20. The October 26, 2017 letter was an initial communication between Plaintiff and Defendant. 21. As a result of the following Counts Defendant violated the FDCPA. First Count 15 U.S.C. §1692g and §1692e et seq. Failure to Adequately and Honestly Convey the Amount of the Debt 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “21” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide “the amount of the debt.” 25. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must convey the amount of the debt clearly and accurately from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer. 26. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must state whether interest, late fees and/or other fees are accruing. 27. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must allow the least sophisticated consumer to determine the minimum amount he or she owes at the time of the notice. 28. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must allow the least sophisticated consumer to determine what he or she will need to pay to resolve the debt at any given moment in the future. 29. The written notice, to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), must contain an explanation, understandable by the least sophisticated consumer, of any fees or interest that may cause the balance to increase at any time in the future. 30. The failure to include the foregoing information renders an otherwise accurate statement of the “amount of the debt” violative of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 31. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff whether the amount listed is the actual amount of the debt due. 32. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff whether the amount listed already includes “interest.” 33. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff whether the amount listed already includes “other charges.” 34. The Letter failed to advise Plaintiff what portion of the amount listed is principal. 35. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff whether the amount listed will increase. 36. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff what “other charges” might apply. 37. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if “other charges” are applied, when such “other charges” will be applied. 38. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if “other charges” are applied, what the amount of those “other charges” will be. 39. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff of the nature of the “other charges.” 40. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if there is “interest,” what the amount of the accrued interest will be. 41. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if there is “interest,” when such interest will be applied. 42. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if there is “interest,” what the interest rate is. 43. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if there is “interest,” the amount of money the amount listed will increase per day. 44. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if there is “interest,” the amount of money the amount listed will increase per week. 45. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if there is “interest,” the amount of money the amount listed will increase per month. 46. The Letter failed to inform Plaintiff if there is “interest,” the amount of money the amount listed will increase per any measurable period. 47. The Letter, because of the aforementioned failures, would render the least sophisticated consumer unable to determine the amount of his or her debt. 48. The least sophisticated consumer could reasonably believe that the debt could be satisfied by remitting the listed amount as of the date of the letter, at any time after receipt of the letter. 49. The least sophisticated consumer could reasonably believe that the amount listed was accurate only on the date of the Letter. 50. If interest is continuing to accrue, the least sophisticated consumer would not know the amount of the debt because the letter fails to indicate the applicable interest rate. 51. If interest is continuing to accrue, the least sophisticated consumer would not know the amount of the debt because the letter fails to indicate what the amount of the accrued interest will be. 52. If interest is continuing to accrue, the least sophisticated consumer would not know the amount of the debt because the letter fails to indicate when such interest will be applied. 53. If interest is continuing to accrue, the least sophisticated consumer would not know the amount of the debt because the letter fails to indicate the amount of money the amount listed will increase at any measurable period. 54. If “other charges” are continuing to accrue, the least sophisticated consumer would not know the amount of the debt because the letter fails to indicate the nature of the “other charges.”1 55. The letter failed to advise Plaintiff that if Plaintiff pays the amount listed, an adjustment may be necessary after Defendant receives payment. 56. The letter failed to advise Plaintiff that if Plaintiff pays the amount listed, Defendant will inform Plaintiff of the balance difference before depositing payment. 57. The Defendant’s failures are purposeful. 1 Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP, 852 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2017), Balke v. All. One Receivables Mgmt., No. 16-cv- 5624(ADS)(AKT), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94021, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2017) ("[T]he Collection Letter in this case refers with vagueness to "accrued interest or other charges," without providing any information regarding the rate of interest; the nature of the "other charges"; how any such charges would be calculated; and what portion of the balance due, if any, reflects already-accrued interest and other charges. By failing to provide even the most basic level of specificity in this regard, the Court "cannot say whether those amounts are properly part of the amount of the debt," for purposes of section 1692g.Carlin, 852 F.3d at 216. Further, as set forth in Carlin, without any clarifying details, the Collection Letter states only that these unspecified assessments may be added to the balance due, which the Court finds to be insufficient to "accurately inform[ ] the [Plaintiff] that the amount of the debt stated in the letter will increase over time.") consumer knew the true amount due, Defendant does not inform the consumer whether the amount listed will increase. 58. In order to induce payments from consumers that would not otherwise be made if the consumer knew the true amount due, Defendant does not inform the consumer what “other charges” might apply. 59. In order to induce payments from consumers that would not otherwise be made if the consumer knew the true amount due, Defendant does not inform the consumer when such “other charges” will be applied. 60. Defendant failed to clearly and unambiguously state the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 61. The Letter would likely make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 62. The Letter would likely make the least sophisticated consumer confused as to the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 63. Defendant's conduct violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g(a)(1) and 1692e. 64. Plaintiff suffered injury in fact by being subjected to unfair and abusive practices of the Defendant. 65. Plaintiff suffered actual harm by being the target of the Defendant's misleading debt collection communications. 66. Defendant violated the Plaintiff's right not to be the target of misleading debt collection communications. 67. Defendant violated the Plaintiff's right to a truthful and fair debt collection process. 68. Defendant used materially false, deceptive, misleading representations and means in its attempted collection of Plaintiff's alleged debt. 69. Defendant's communications were designed to cause the debtor to suffer a harmful disadvantage in charting a course of action in response to Defendant's collection efforts. 70. The FDCPA ensures that consumers are fully and truthfully apprised of the facts and of their rights, the act enables them to understand, make informed decisions about, and participate fully and meaningfully in the debt collection process. The purpose of the FDCPA is to provide information that helps consumers to choose intelligently. The Defendant's false representations misled the Plaintiff in a manner that deprived him of his right to enjoy these benefits, these materially misleading statements trigger liability under section 1692e of the Act. 71. These deceptive communications additionally violated the FDCPA since they frustrate the consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his or her response. Second Count 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3) Suggesting a Dispute Must be Made in Writing 72. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “71” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 73. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(3) requires the notice to include a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector. 74. There is no requirement that the consumer dispute the debt in writing. 75. It is a violation of FDCPA to require disputes be made in writing. 76. It is a violation of the FDCPA to include language in the Letter that overshadows the required 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(3) statement. 77. It is a violation of the FDCPA to include language in the Letter that contradicts the required 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(3) statement. 78. It is a violation of the FDCPA to include language in the Letter that, when examined from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, overshadows the required § 1692g(a)(3) statement. 79. It is a violation of the FDCPA to include language in the Letter that, when examined from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, contradicts the required § 1692g(a)(3) statement. 80. It is a violation of the FDCPA to include language in the Letter that, when examined from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, leads the least sophisticated consumer to believe that her dispute must be in writing. 81. Defendant’s Letter states “Please send all payments or correspondence to:” and proceeds to provide a mailing address for which to mail same. 82. The least sophisticated consumer, reading the Letter as a whole, would be likely to understand that, because a dispute is a correspondence, all disputes must be communicated in writing, thereby invalidating the right to make a dispute orally. 83. Disputes need not be in writing. Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2013). 84. The language concerning written disputes overshadows the required 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(3) statement. 85. The language concerning written disputes contradicts the required 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(3) statement. 86. The language concerning written disputes, when examined from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, overshadows the required § 1692g(a)(3) statement. 87. The language concerning written disputes, when examined from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, contradicts the required § 1692g(a)(3) statement. 88. The language concerning written disputes, when examined from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, leads the least sophisticated consumer to believe that her dispute must be in writing. 89. Defendant has violated § 1692g as the above-referenced language overshadows the information required to be provided by that Section. See Balke v. All. One Receivables Mgt., Inc., 16-CV- 5624(ADS)(AKT), 2017 WL 2634653, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2017).

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36. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 37. At all material times, Plaintiff and the Collective Members, in their work for Defendants, were employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce that had annual gross sales of at least $500,000. 38. At all material times, Plaintiff and the Class Action Members, in their work for Defendants, were employed by an enterprise engaged in commerce that has annual gross volume of sales made for business in excess of $150,000, exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated. 39. Defendants paid Plaintiff and the Collective Members a sub-minimum wage, ostensibly according to the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA, which allow an employer to pay an hourly wage less than the statutory minimum wage, provided that the employer complies with the requirements of the tip-credit provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 40. Defendants paid their tipped employees–including Plaintiff and the Collective Members–sub-minimum, tip-credit wages without informing them of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 41. Therefore, Defendants did not comply with the requirements of the tip-credit provisions and thus cannot avail itself of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA. 42. Defendants paid their tipped employees–including Plaintiff and the Collective Members–sub-minimum, tip-credit wages but did not allow them to retain all tips they earned, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 8 43. Defendants did not allow Plaintiff and the Collective Members to retain all tips they earned because they subjected Plaintiff and the Collective Members to their “late fees,” which were fines Defendants imposed on its tipped employees who arrived late to work. Specifically, in the event a tipped employee arrived late to work, Defendants would require them to disgorge twenty dollars ($20) from their tips directly to Defendants. Such policy and practice resulted in Defendants retaining tips that their tipped employees earned, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 44. Defendants violated the FLSA by paying certain of its employees sub-minimum, tip-credit wages while making improper deductions from their paychecks which brought their wages below the applicable minimum wage, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 45. Therefore, Defendants did not comply with the requirements of the tip-credit provisions and thus cannot avail itself of the tip-credit provisions of the FLSA. 46. Specifically, Defendants engaged in the regular policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and the Collective Members to reimburse Defendants for breakage, broken dishes, register shortages, and/or customer walkouts. Such policy and practice by Defendants resulted in Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ wages below the applicable minimum wage, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 47. Defendants regularly required Plaintiff and the Collective Members to work off- the-clock. This was commonly, though not exclusively, required to prevent Plaintiff and the Collective Members from being clocked in for more than 40 hours in a given workweek. As a result, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Members both minimum wage and overtime for hours worked. 9 48. Defendants regularly required Plaintiff and the Class Action Members to work off-the-clock. This was commonly, though not exclusively, required to prevent Plaintiff and the Class Action Members from being clocked in for more than 40 hours in a given workweek. As a result, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Action Members both minimum wage and overtime for hours worked. 49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 50. Plaintiff brings the FLSA claims in this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 51. Plaintiff asserts those claims on behalf of herself, and on behalf of all similarly situated tipped employees employed by Defendants, who were not paid all compensation required by the FLSA during the relevant time period as a result of Defendants’ compensation policies and practices. 52. Plaintiff seeks to notify the following employees of their rights under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to join this action by filing in this Court written notice of their consent to join this action: All individuals who worked at any time during the past three years for Defendants who were paid for their work on an hourly basis according to the tip credit provisions of the FLSA, (i.e. an hourly rate less than the applicable minimum wage, excluding tips). 53. The FLSA provides for a three-year statute of limitations for causes of action arising out of a willful violation of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 255. As alleged above, Plaintiff and similarly situated employees’ claims arise out of Defendants’ willful violations of the FLSA. 10 Accordingly, the Court should require appropriate notice of this action be given to all tipped employees employed by Defendants within three years from the filing of this Complaint. 54. Upon information and belief, Defendants have employed more than 50 tipped employees during the period relevant to this action. 55. The identities of these employees, as a group, are known only to Defendants. Because the numerous members of this collective action are unknown to Plaintiff, joinder of each member is not practicable. 56. Because these similarly situated tipped employees are readily identifiable by Defendants and may be located through their records, they may be readily notified of this action and allowed to opt into it pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their FLSA claims. 57. Collective adjudication is appropriate in this case because the tipped employees whom Plaintiff wishes to notify of this action have been employed in positions similar to Plaintiff; have performed work similar to Plaintiff; and have been subject to compensation practices similar to those to which Plaintiff have been subjected, including unlawful payment of sub-minimum wages for non-tipped work and unlawful application of the FLSA’s tip credit provisions. 58. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 59. Plaintiff brings her Ohio wage claims as a Rule 23 class action on behalf of the following Class Action Members: 11 The Class Action Members are all of Defendants’ current and former employees who were paid an hourly rate of less than the Ohio minimum wage on account of their receiving tips, starting three years before this lawsuit was filed up to the present. 60. Numerosity. The number of Class Action Members is believed to be over one hundred. This volume makes bringing the claims of each individual Class Action Member before this Court impracticable. Likewise, joining each individual Class Action Member as a plaintiff in this action is impracticable. Furthermore, the identity of the Class Action Members will be determined from Defendants’ records, as will the compensation paid to each of them. As such, a class action is a reasonable and practical means of resolving these claims. To require individual actions would prejudice the Class Action Members and Defendants. 61. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class Action Members because like the Class Action Members, Plaintiff was subject to Defendants’ uniform policies and practices and was compensated in the same manner as the other Class Action Members. Defendants regularly required Plaintiff and the Class Action Members to work off-the-clock. This was commonly, though not exclusively, required to prevent Plaintiff and the Class Action Members from being clocked in for more than 40 hours in a given workweek. As a result, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Action Members both minimum wage and overtime for hours worked. 62. As a result of such policy and practice by Defendants, Defendants violated the minimum and overtime wage provisions of Ohio Revised Code. § 4111.01. 63. Adequacy. Plaintiff is a representative party who will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class Action Members because it is in her interest to effectively prosecute the claims in this Complaint in order to obtain the unpaid wages and penalties required 12 under Ohio law. Plaintiff has retained attorneys who are competent in both class actions and wage and hour litigation. Plaintiff does not have any interest that may be contrary to or in conflict with the claims of the Class Action Members she seeks to represent. 64. Commonality. Common issues of fact and law predominate over any individual questions in this matter. The common issues of fact include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendants required Plaintiff and the Class Action Members to perform work off-the-clock; b. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Action Members the minimum wage for all hours worked; 65. Common issues of law include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Defendants properly paid all minimum wages due and owing to Plaintiffs and the Class Action Members; b. Whether Defendants were entitled to impose a tip credit on the wages of Plaintiffs and the Class Action Members; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class Action Members are entitled to compensatory damages; d. The proper measure of damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class Action Members; and e. Whether Defendants’ actions were “willful.” 66. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit. Even in the event any of the Class Action Members could afford to pursue individual litigation against companies the size of Defendants, doing so would unduly burden the system. Individual litigation would magnify the delay and expense to all 13 parties and burden the court system with duplicative lawsuits. Prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Action Members would create the risk of inconsistent or varying judicial results and establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 67. A class action, by contrast, presents far fewer management difficulties and affords the benefits of uniform adjudication of the claims, financial economy for the parties, and comprehensive supervision by a single court and Judge. By concentrating this litigation in one forum, judicial economy and parity among the claims of individual Class Members are promoted. Additionally, class treatment in this matter will provide for judicial consistency. The identities of the Class Action Members are readily identifiable from Defendants’ records. 68. This type of case is well-suited for class action treatment because: (1) Defendants’ practices, policies, and/or procedures were uniform; (2) the burden is on each Defendant to prove it properly compensated its employees; (3) the burden is on each Defendant to accurately record hours worked by employees; and (4) the burden is on each Defendant to prove it properly imposed the tip credit upon its employees. 69. Ultimately, a class action is a superior forum to resolve the Ohio state law claims set forth in this Complaint because of the common nucleus of operative facts centered on the continued failure of Defendants to pay Plaintiff and the Class Action Members according to applicable Ohio laws. 70. Nature of Notice to be Proposed. As to the Rule 23 Class Action Members, it is contemplated that notice would be issued giving putative class members an opportunity to opt out of the class if they so desire, i.e. an “opt-out notice.” Notice of the pendency and resolution of the action can be provided to the Class Action Members by mail, electronic mail, print, broadcast, internet, and/or multimedia publication. 14 71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 72. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff and the Collective Members of the provisions of the “tip credit” in 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 73. As a result, Defendants were not entitled to take a tip credit against Plaintiff’s and the Collective Member’s minimum wages. 74. Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Members the full minimum wage according to the provisions of the FLSA for each and every workweek that Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked for Defendants, for the duration of their employment, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 75. As such, full applicable minimum wage for such time Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked is owed to Plaintiff and the Collective Members for the entire time they were employed by Defendants. 76. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – their failure to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Member the full minimum wage over the course of their employment would violate federal law, and Defendants were aware of the FLSA minimum wage requirements during Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 77. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are therefore entitled to compensation for the full minimum wage at an hourly rate, to be proven at trial, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, together with interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs. 15 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Alexandra Bright, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, respectfully request that this Court grant relief in Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ favor, and against Defendants for compensation for unpaid minimum wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements of this action, and any additional relief this Court deems just and proper. 78. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 79. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff and the Collective Members of the provisions of the “tip credit” in 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 80. As a result, Defendants were not entitled to take a tip credit against Plaintiff’s and the Collective Member’s minimum wages. 81. Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Members the full minimum wage according to the provisions of the FLSA for each and every workweek that Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked for Defendants, for the duration of their employment, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 82. As such, full applicable minimum wage for such time Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked is owed to Plaintiff and the Collective Members for the entire time they were employed by Defendants. 83. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – their failure to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Member the full minimum wage over the course of their employment would violate federal law, and Defendants were aware of the FLSA minimum 16 wage requirements during Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 84. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are therefore entitled to compensation for the full minimum wage at an hourly rate, to be proven at trial, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, together with interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Alexandra Bright, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, respectfully request that this Court grant relief in Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ favor, and against Defendants for compensation for unpaid minimum wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements of this action, and any additional relief this Court deems just and proper. 85. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 86. Defendants engaged in the regular policy and practice of requiring Plaintiff and the Collective Members to reimburse Defendants for breakage, broken dishes, register shortages, and/or customer walkouts. 87. Such policy and practice by Defendants resulted in Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ wages below the applicable minimum wage, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 88. Defendants therefore failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Members the full minimum wage according to the provisions of the FLSA for each and every 17 workweek that Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked for Defendants, for the duration of their employment, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 89. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – their failure to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Member the full minimum wage over the course of their employment would violate federal law, and Defendants were aware of the FLSA minimum wage requirements during Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. 90. Plaintiff and the Collective Members are therefore entitled to compensation for the full minimum wage at an hourly rate, to be proven at trial, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, together with interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Alexandra Bright, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, respectfully request that this Court grant relief in Plaintiffs’ and the Collective Members’ favor, and against Defendants for compensation for unpaid minimum and overtime wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements of this action, and any additional relief this Court deems just and proper. 91. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 92. Defendants engaged in the regular practice of requiring Plaintiff and the Collective Members to perform labor each shift while not clocked in (“off-the-clock”). This practice most commonly occurred, though not exclusively, when Plaintiff or the Collective Members were nearing 40 hours worked in any given workweek. In other words, this practice 18 most commonly occurred to avoid paying Plaintiff and the Collective Members overtime. During such time, Defendants did not record the time that Plaintiff and the Collective Members worked, and Defendants did not compensate Plaintiffs and the Collective Members for such time that they worked. As such, Defendants’ records of Plaintiff’s time worked, if in existence, understate the duration of time each workweek that Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff and the Collective Members to work. 93. By requiring Plaintiff and the Collective Members to work off-the-clock, Defendants violated both the minimum wage provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 206 and the overtime provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207. 94. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – requiring Plaintiff and the Collective Members to work off-the-clock, would violate federal law and Defendants were aware of the FLSA minimum wage and overtime requirements during Plaintiff’s and the Collective Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Alexandra Bright, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, respectfully request that this Court grant relief in Plaintiffs’ and the Collective Members’ favor, and against Defendants for compensation for unpaid minimum and overtime wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, prejudgment and post-judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements of this action, and any additional relief this Court deems just and proper. 95. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 19 96. Defendants engaged in the regular practice of requiring Plaintiff and the Class Action Members to perform labor each shift while not clocked in (“off-the-clock”). This practice most commonly occurred, though not exclusively, when Plaintiff or the Class Action Members were nearing 40 hours worked in any given workweek. In other words, this practice most commonly occurred to avoid paying Plaintiff and the Class Action Members overtime. During such time, Defendants did not record the time that Plaintiff and the Class Action Members worked, and Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff and the Class Action Members for such time that they worked. As such, Defendants’ records of Plaintiff’s time worked, if in existence, understate the duration of time each workweek that Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiff and the Class Action Members to work. 97. By requiring Plaintiff and the Class Action Members to work off-the-clock, Defendants violated both the minimum wage and the overtime provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 4111.01. 98. Defendants knew that – or acted with reckless disregard as to whether – requiring Plaintiff and the Class Action Members to work off-the-clock, would violate federal law and Defendants were aware of the FLSA minimum wage and overtime requirements during Plaintiff’s and the Class Action Members’ employment. As such, Defendants’ conduct constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Alexandra Bright, on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons, respectfully request that this Court grant relief in Plaintiff’s and the Class Action Members’ favor, and against Defendants for compensation for unpaid minimum and overtime wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, prejudgment and post- 20 judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements of this action, and any additional relief this Court deems just and proper. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this March 12, 2019. FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF TIP CREDIT TO PLAINTIFF IMPROPER TIP RETENTION IMPROPER DEDUCTIONS FROM PAYCHECKS OFF-CLOCK LABOR & TIME SHAVING OFF-CLOCK LABOR

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23. Defendants develop, manufacture, market, distribute and sell a line of joint supplements under the Osteo Bi-Flex brand name. These Products include: (1) Osteo Bi- Flex One Per Day; (2) Osteo Bi-Flex Triple Strength; (3) Osteo Bi-Flex Double Strength; (4) Osteo Bi-Flex Triple Strength with Vitamin D; (5) Osteo Bi-Flex MSM; (6) Osteo Bi- Flex Energy Formula; (7) Osteo Bi-Flex Regular Strength; and (8) Osteo Bi-Flex Advanced. Defendants began manufacturing, marketing and selling the Osteo Bi-Flex products nationwide in 1996. 25. Since the Products’ launch, Defendants have consistently conveyed the message to consumers throughout California that Osteo Bi-Flex will “promote mobility”, “renew cartilage”, “maintain healthy connective tissue” and “improve[] joint comfort” simply by taking the recommended number of tablets each day. These claims are not substantiated by competent scientific evidence and are factually baseless. 26. The primary active ingredients in all the Osteo Bi-Flex products are glucosamine hydrochloride and chondroitin sulfate. Glucosamine is an amino sugar that the body produces and distributes in cartilage and other connective tissue. Chondroitin sulfate is a complex carbohydrate found in the body’s connective tissues. There is no competent scientific evidence that taking any of these ingredients―let alone through oral administration―results in the body metabolizing it into something that relieves the three symptoms of arthritis. 28. Contrary to the stated representations on all the Products’ labeling and packaging, Defendants do not possess (and have not possessed) competent scientific evidence that any of these ingredients, taken alone or in combination, are effective in treating the three major symptoms of arthritis or any other joint related ailments. 30. Despite the lack of competent scientific evidence, Defendants continue to unequivocally claim that Osteo Bi-Flex provides joint health benefits to all persons. 31. As the manufacturer and distributor of Osteo Bi-Flex, Defendants possess specialized knowledge regarding the content and effects of the ingredients contained in their Products and are in a superior position to learn of the effects—and have learned of the effects—their Products have on consumers. 32. Specifically, Defendants knew or should have known, but failed to disclose that they have no competent scientific evidence that their Osteo Bi-Flex products are effective in treating the three major symptoms of arthritis or other joint related ailments. 34. Plaintiff and Class members have been and will continue to be deceived or misled by Defendants’ deceptive representations touting the effectiveness of the Osteo Bi-Flex products. Plaintiff purchased and used the Osteo Bi-Flex products during the Class period and in doing so, read, considered and based her decisions to buy the Products on the above cited label representations. Because the Products’ sole purpose is to provide joint relief for the three major symptoms of arthritis, Defendants’ representations and omissions were a material factor in influencing Plaintiff’s decision to purchase and use the Osteo Bi-Flex products. There is no other reason for Plaintiff to have purchased the Osteo Bi-Flex products and Plaintiff would not have purchased the Products had she known that Defendants did not possess competent scientific evidence to support the claims that they made about these Products. 35. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged in their purchases of these Products and have been deceived into purchasing Products that they believed, based on Defendants’ representations, were proven to be effective in treating the three major symptoms of arthritis and other joint related ailments when, in fact, they are not. 36. Defendants, by contrast, reaped enormous profits from their false marketing and sale of these Products. 38. Members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the proposed Class contains many thousands of members. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 39. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. The common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following:  Whether Defendants have competent scientific evidence to support each of the claims that they made about their Products;  Whether the claims discussed herein that Defendants made about their Products were or are misleading, or reasonably likely to deceive;  Whether Defendants’ alleged conduct violates public policy;  Whether the alleged conduct constitutes violations of the laws asserted herein;  Whether Defendants engaged in false and misleading advertising;  Whether Plaintiff and Class members have sustained monetary loss and the proper measure of that loss;  Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to restitution, disgorgement of Defendants’ profits, declaratory and/or injunctive relief; and  Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of compensatory damages. 41. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection and class litigation. 42. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation would make it impracticable or impossible for proposed Class members to prosecute their claims individually. It would thus be virtually impossible for the Class, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs done to them. Furthermore, even if Class members could afford such individualized litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts. Individualized litigation would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system from the issues raised by this action. By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties under the circumstances here. 43. In the alternative, the Class also may be certified because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class thereby making appropriate final declaratory and/or injunctive relief with respect to the members of the Class as a whole. 44. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members. 46. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 47. This cause of action is brought under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §1750, et seq. (the “Act”). Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by California Civil Code §1761(d). Defendants’ Osteo Bi-Flex products are goods within the meaning of the Act. 48. Defendants violated and continue to violate the Act by engaging in the following practices proscribed by California Civil Code §1770(a) in transactions with Plaintiff and the Class which were intended to result in, and did result in, the sale of Defendants’ Osteo Bi-Flex products: (5) Representing that [the Osteo Bi-Flex products have] . . . characteristics, . . . uses [or] benefits . . . which [they] do not have. * * * (7) Representing that [the Osteo Bi-Flex products are] of a particular standard, quality or grade, . . . if [they are] of another. * * * (9) Advertising goods . . . with the intent not to sell them as advertised. * * * (16) Representing that [the Osteo Bi-Flex products have] been supplied in accordance with a previous representation when [they have] not. 50. Pursuant to §1782(d) of the Act, Plaintiff and the Class seek a court order enjoining the above-described wrongful acts and practices of Defendants and for restitution and disgorgement. 51. Pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff notified Defendants in writing by certified mail of the particular violations of §1770 of the Act and demanded that Defendants rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers of Defendants’ intent to so act. Copies of the letters are attached hereto as Exhibit B. 52. If Defendants fail to rectify or agree to rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers within 30 days of the date of written notice pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff will amend this complaint to add claims for actual, punitive and statutory damages, as appropriate. 53. Defendants’ conduct is malicious, fraudulent and wanton, and provides misleading information. 54. Pursuant to §1780(d) of the Act, attached hereto as Exhibit C is the affidavit showing that this action has been commenced in the proper forum. 55. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 56. As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendants’ conduct because she purchased the Osteo Bi-Flex products. 58. Plaintiff and the Class reserve the right to allege other violations of law, which constitute other unlawful business acts or practices. Such conduct is ongoing and continues to this date. 59. Defendants’ acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices and non- disclosures as alleged herein also constitute “unfair” business acts and practices within the meaning of Business and Professions Code §17200 et seq., in that their conduct is substantially injurious to consumers, offends public policy, and is immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous as the gravity of the conduct outweighs any alleged benefits attributable to such conduct. 60. As stated in this complaint, Plaintiff alleges violations of consumer protection, unfair competition and truth in advertising laws resulting in harm to consumers. Plaintiff asserts violations of the public policy of engaging in false and misleading advertising, unfair competition and deceptive conduct towards consumers. This conduct constitutes violations of the unfair prong of Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq. 61. There were reasonably available alternatives to further Defendants’ legitimate business interests, other than the conduct described herein. 62. Defendants’ claims, nondisclosures and misleading statements, as more fully set forth above, are also false, misleading and/or likely to deceive the consuming public within the meaning of Business & Professions Code §17200 et seq. 63. Defendants’ labeling and packaging as described herein, also constitute unfair, deceptive, untrue and misleading advertising. 65. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, and all other similarly situated California residents, seeks restitution of all money obtained from Plaintiff and the members of the Class collected as a result of unfair competition, an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing such practices, corrective advertising and all other relief this Court deems appropriate, consistent with Business & Professions Code §17203. 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 67. Plaintiff, and each member of the Class, formed a contract with Defendants at the time Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased the Osteo Bi-Flex products. The terms of that contract include the promises and affirmations of fact made by Defendants on their Osteo Bi-Flex products’ labels and packages, as described above. These representations constitute express warranties, became part of the basis of the bargain, and are part of a standardized contract between Plaintiff and the members of the Class on the one hand, and Defendants on the other. 68. All conditions precedent to Defendants’ liability under this contract have been performed by Plaintiff and the Class. 69. Defendants breached the terms of this contract, including the express warranties, with Plaintiff and the Class by not providing products that could provide the benefits described above which was the only reason Plaintiff and Class members purchased the Osteo Bi-Flex products. 70. As a result of Defendants’ breach of their warranty, Plaintiff and Class members have been damaged in the amount of the purchase price of the Osteo Bi-Flex products they purchased. Breach of Express Warranty The Osteo Bi-Flex Products Violation of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act –Civil Code §1750 et seq.

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102. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in Nassau County, New York. 103. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: i. All consumers where Arrowood sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third party without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 104. This action seeks a finding that Arrowood’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 11 105. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 106. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 107. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Arrowood has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 108. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Arrowood’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. 15. Arrowood alleges Plaintiff owes it $31,858.04 (“the alleged Debt”). 16. Plaintiff did not owe $31,858.04 (“the Claimed Amount”) to Arrowood. 17. Plaintiff did not owe money to Arrowood. 18. Plaintiff was never indebted to Arrowood. 19. Plaintiff did not owe the alleged Debt to Arrowood. 20. Arrowood never offered to extend credit to Plaintiff. 21. Arrowood never extended credit to Plaintiff. 22. Plaintiff was never involved in any transaction with Arrowood. 23. Plaintiff never entered into any contract with Arrowood. 24. Plaintiff never did any business with Arrowood. 25. Plaintiff was never advised by anyone that the alleged Debt was sold to Arrowood. 26. Plaintiff was never advised by anyone that the alleged Debt was assigned to Arrowood. 27. Plaintiff was never advised by anyone that the alleged Debt was transferred Arrowood. 28. Plaintiff was never advised by anyone that the alleged Debt was acquired by Arrowood. 29. Plaintiff was never advised by Arrowood that the alleged Debt was sold to it. 30. Plaintiff was never advised by Arrowood that the alleged Debt was assigned to it. 31. Plaintiff was never advised by Arrowood that the alleged Debt was transferred to it. 4 32. Plaintiff was never advised by Arrowood that the alleged Debt was acquired by it. 33. Arrowood is a stranger to Plaintiff. 34. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess competent proof that any entity assigned to it all of that entity’s interest in the alleged Debt. 35. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess competent proof that any entity assigned to it the right to any proceeds from the alleged Debt. 36. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess competent business records concerning the alleged Debt from any entity that owned the alleged Debt. 37. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess personal knowledge of the facts set forth in any business records concerning the alleged Debt received from any entity that owned the alleged Debt. 38. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess any credit agreement between Plaintiff and any entity that owned the alleged Debt. 39. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess any competent proof that Plaintiff agreed to pay the alleged Debt. 40. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess any competent proof that Plaintiff is obligated to pay the alleged Debt. 41. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess any competent proof that Plaintiff owed the Claimed Amount at the time Arrowood ostensibly acquired the alleged Debt. 42. Upon information and belief, Arrowood does not possess any competent proof that the Claimed Amount was accurate at the time Arrowood ostensibly acquired the alleged Debt. 43. Upon information and belief, Arrowood holds no legal right, title or interest in any debt Plaintiff allegedly owed. 5 44. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 45. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 46. At an exact time known only to Arrowood, Arrowood decided to hire Rubin & Rothman, LLC (“Rubin”) to attempt to collect the alleged Debt on Arrowood’s behalf. 47. As part of its utilization of Rubin, Arrowood conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to Rubin. 48. The information conveyed by Arrowood to Rubin included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, among other things. 49. Arrowood’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to Rubin is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 50. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Rubin for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 51. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Rubin decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. 52. At all times relevant herein, Rubin was acting as a “debt collector” as that term is defined by the FDCPA. 53. That correspondence, dated April 5, 2021, was received, and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that correspondence (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 54. The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 55. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Arrowood concerning the alleged Debt. 6 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 57. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” 58. Rubin does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 59. Plaintiff never consented to Arrowood’s communication with Rubin concerning the alleged Debt. 60. Plaintiff never consented to Arrowood’s communication with Rubin concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 61. Plaintiff never consented to Arrowood’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 62. Upon information and belief, Arrowood has utilized Rubin for these purposes thousands of times. 63. Arrowood utilizes Rubin in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. 64. Arrowood utilizes Rubin without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to Rubin. 65. Arrowood utilizes Rubin with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Arrowood’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. 7 66. Arrowood violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to Rubin. 67. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 68. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. 69. Arrowood disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to Rubin. 70. Arrowood violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to Rubin. 71. For the foregoing reasons, Arrowood violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 72. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 73. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g provides that within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing certain enumerated information. 74. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) requires the written notice provide a statement of the amount of the debt. 75. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1), the statement of the amount of the debt must accurately set forth the actual amount of the debt. 76. A statement of the amount of the debt, when the debt is not owed at all by the consumer, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 8 77. As set forth in paragraphs 15 through 43 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe the Claimed Amount. 78. As such, Arrowood did not accurately set forth the actual amount of the alleged debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 79. In sum, Arrowood’ statement of the amount of the alleged Debt, when Plaintiff did not owe that amount, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1). 80. As also relevant here, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) requires the written notice provide a statement of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. 81. To comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2), the statement of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed must accurately set forth the name of the entity that actually owns the debt. 82. A statement of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed, when the consumer does not owe money to the stated entity, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 83. As set forth in paragraphs 15 through 43 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe money to Arrowood. 84. As such, Arrowood did not accurately set forth the name of the entity that actually owns the debt as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 85. In sum, Arrowood’s statement that Arrowood was the name of the creditor to whom the alleged debt was owed, when Plaintiff did not owe any money to Arrowood, violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 86. For the foregoing reasons, Arrowood violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692g(a)(1) and 1692g(a)(2) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 9 87. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 88. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 89. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 90. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 91. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a debt to a certain entity when the consumer does not owe a debt to that entity is a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). 92. An allegation by a debt collector that a consumer owes a certain amount of money when the consumer does not that amount is a violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10). 93. As set forth in paragraphs 14 through 43 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe the Claimed Amount. 94. As set forth in paragraphs 14 through 43 of this Complaint, Plaintiff did not owe money to Arrowood. 95. As such, Arrowood’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the Claimed Amount is a false, deceptive, and/or misleading representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 10 96. Arrowood’s allegation that Plaintiff owed money to Arrowood is a false, deceptive, and/or misleading representation made in connection with the collection of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 97. Arrowood’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the Claimed Amount is a false representation of the character, amount, and/or legal status of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 98. Arrowood’s allegation that Plaintiff owed money to Arrowood is a false representation of the character, amount, and/or legal status of the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 99. Arrowood’s allegation that Plaintiff owed the Claimed Amount is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 100. Arrowood’s allegation that Plaintiff owed money to Arrowood is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 101. For the foregoing reasons, Arrowood violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and are liable to Plaintiff therefor. Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692g(a)(1), 1692g(a)(2) Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f

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20. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 21. On or around September 20, 2010, Plaintiff’s wife, Lisa Jefferson, financed her vehicle with AmeriCredit. Lisa Jefferson provided neither her cellular telephone number nor Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number to AmeriCredit when she financed her vehicle with AmeriCredit. 22. Plaintiff does not have an AmeriCredit account. Plaintiff’s name is not on the title to the vehicle, and Plaintiff has no legal responsibility for the AmeriCredit loan. On information and belief, AmeriCredit may have obtained Plaintiff’s cell phone number when AmeriCredit classified him as a credit reference from Mrs. Jefferson. At no point did Plaintiff provide prior express consent to AmeriCredit to contact him on his cellular telephone using an automated telephone dialing system in connection with Mrs. Jefferson’s account.11 23. On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff received a telephone call on his cellular telephone from telephone number 705-876-5332. Plaintiff did not pick up the call. The caller left a voicemail message asking for Plaintiff’s wife. 25. On information and belief, given the apparent debt collection purpose of the calls and the many calls received within a short period of time, the calls received by Plaintiff were made using a system that qualifies as an automated dialer under the TCPA and relevant FCC regulations. 26. AmeriCredit is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 27. Pursuant to FCC Rulings and relevant case law, AmeriCredit is directly liable for the TCPA violations of its debt collectors when such third parties make debt collection calls on behalf of AmeriCredit. 28. All telephone contact on behalf of AmeriCredit to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone occurred via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and/or used “an artificial or prerecorded voice” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 29. The telephone number on which Plaintiff was contacted on behalf of AmeriCredit with an “artificial or prerecorded voice” and/or made by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 30. Plaintiff did not provide his “prior express consent” allowing AmeriCredit or its debt collectors to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” within the meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 31. Telephone calls made to Plaintiff’s cellular phone by on behalf of AmeriCredit were not “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 33. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on AmeriCredit to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided it with prior express consent within the meaning of the statute.12 34. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”). 35. Plaintiff proposes the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons within the United States who, on or after May 27, 2014, received a non-emergency telephone call from or on behalf of AmeriCredit to a cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Collectively, these persons will be referred to as “Class members.” Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class. Excluded from the Class are GM Financial and any entities in which AmeriCredit has a controlling interest, AmeriCredit’s agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or emotional distress. 36. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but Plaintiff reasonably believes that Class members number at minimum in the thousands. 37. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of AmeriCredit, because their privacy has been violated, they were subject to annoying and harassing calls that constitute a nuisance, and they were charged for incoming calls. 38. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 40. There are well defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all parties. The questions of law and fact involving the class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether non-emergency calls made to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice; b. Whether such calls were made by or on behalf of AmeriCredit; c. Whether AmeriCredit can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent (i.e., consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated) to make such calls; d. Whether AmeriCredit’s conduct was knowing and/or willful; e. Whether AmeriCredit is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f. Whether AmeriCredit should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 41. As a person who received telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without her prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA and Rules, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 42. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes, including claims under the 45. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 46. The foregoing acts and omissions of AmeriCredit constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 47. AmeriCredit knew or should have known that its actions were in violation of the TCPA as a result, inter alia, of numerous consumer complaints, its prior FCC Citation, and its involvement in the Newman case, which AmeriCredit was in the process of settling during the class period in this case. 49. Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA by Defendants in the future. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 51. The foregoing acts and omissions of AmeriCredit constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 52. As a result of AmeriCredit’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 53. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting AmeriCredit’s violation of the TCPA in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. STATUTORY VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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54. This class action is brought on behalf of all persons who bought or leased a Class Vehicle in the United States. 55. The Class Vehicles at issue in this action include all BMW vehicles equipped with a Navigation System containing the ARRTI feature. The Class Vehicles ’ Navigation System is Defective. 56. The Class Vehicles are equipped with a Navigation System designed, manufactured, and installed in the Class Vehicles by BMW. 58. BMW represents that local real-time traffic information is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in the “NY/NJ/CT-Metro Area”, which, according to BMW’s coverage map, includes the areas of northern New Jersey where Plaintiff McGuire drives his Vehicle. 59. For some Class Vehicles, the Navigation System is an optional feature, offered by BMW for installation in those model Class Vehicles prior to the sale of the Vehicle, and, if selected, paid for by the purchaser or lessee of the Vehicle at an additional cost of $2,800. 60. For other Class Vehicles, BMW includes the Navigation System as a standard feature, and therefore BMW includes the price of the Navigation System in the total price of those Vehicles. 62. Preliminary expert inspection of Plaintiff’s Class Vehicle as well as other Class Vehicles available for sale by BMW confirmed that the Navigation System in those Vehicles failed to display local real-time traffic information for the area where the Vehicle was located, and also failed to re-route the Vehicle around upcoming traffic when using the route guidance feature. BMW Knew of the Navigation System Defect. 63. On information and belief, BMW became aware of the Navigation System Defect at least as early as June 2012, before Plaintiff and Class members purchased or leased their Class Vehicles, and certainly well before Plaintiff and Class members brought their Vehicles to BMW for warranty repair of their Vehicles’ Navigation System failures. 65. Preliminary expert analysis made without the benefit of discovery indicates that, in or around June 2012, BMW changed the design of the navigation system for some of its forthcoming 2013 models, announcing that the navigation systems in certain 2013 3-Series, 5-Series, and 7-Series vehicles would feature ARTTI instead of the traffic feature provided by the navigation systems in prior BMW models. 66. Those 2013 BMW models with the ARTTI-enabled Navigation System, including the Class Vehicles, first became available for purchase or lease by the public in or around July 2012. 68. BMW’s knowledge of the defective BMW Navigation System before and after the Vehicles' release into the market, and the absence of any fix for it, is certain given the close attention it pays to the development, production, and quality of its Vehicles. According to

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24. Plaintiff Murphy visited Defendant’s facilities located at Youngfield Street in Wheat Ridge, Colorado, where he experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk due to excessive slopes in a purportedly accessible parking area. As a result of Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiff Murphy’s ability to access and safely use Defendant’s facilities has been significantly impeded. 25. Despite this difficulty and risk, Plaintiff Murphy plans to return to Defendant’s facilities. The shopping center Defendant owns is close to Plaintiff Murphy’s residence. The center features a grocery store and other stores which Plaintiff Murphy regularly visits due to its proximity to his residence. Furthermore, Plaintiff Murphy intends to return to Defendant’s facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the ADA. 27. Despite this difficulty and risk, Plaintiff Kouri plans to return to Defendant’s facilities. Plaintiff Kouri travels to San Diego frequently for fitness conferences related to his business, and also to visit numerous friends in the area. The shopping center Defendant owns is close to the conference locations and/or Plaintiff’s Kouri’s friends in the area, and he intends to return. Furthermore, Plaintiff Kouri intends to return to Defendant’s facilities to ascertain whether those facilities remain in violation of the ADA. 28. Plaintiffs will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing Defendant’s facilities, however, so long as Defendant’s facilities remain non-compliant, and so long as Defendant continue to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the future will lead, to inaccessibility at Defendant’s facilities. 29. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiffs will continue to be unable to fully and safely access Defendant’s facilities in violation of his rights under the ADA. 30. As individuals living with a mobility disabilities who use wheelchairs, Plaintiffs are directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendant’s facilities, have architectural barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with mobility-related disabilities. 31. In June 2018, counsel for Plaintiffs sent a letter to Defendant describing the ADA violations at issue and requesting a negotiated resolution. Defendant never even responded to Plaintiffs’ letter. II. Defendant Repeatedly Denies Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities. 33. To date, Defendant’s centralized design, construction, alteration, maintenance, and operational policies and practices have systematically and routinely violated the ADA by designing, constructing, and altering facilities so that they are not readily accessible and are usable, by failing to remove architectural barriers, and by failing to maintain and operate facilities so that the accessible features of Defendant’s facilities are maintained. 35. The fact that individuals with mobility-related disabilities are denied full and equal access to numerous of Defendant’s facilities, and the fact that each of these facilities deny access by way of inaccessible parking facilities, is evidence that the inaccessibility Plaintiffs experienced is not isolated, but rather, is caused by Defendant’s systemic disregard for the rights of individuals with disabilities. 36. Defendant’s systemic access violations demonstrate that Defendant either employs policies and practices that fail to design, construct, and alter their facilities so that they are readily accessible and usable and/or that Defendant employs maintenance and operational policies and practices that are unable to maintain accessibility. 37. As evidenced by the widespread inaccessibility of Defendant’s parking facilities, absent a change in Defendant’s corporate policies and practices, access barriers are likely to reoccur in Defendant’s facilities even after they have been remediated. I. Plaintiffs Have Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities.

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(California Penal Code § 496(c)) (Class Action Claim) 188. AdTrader hereby re-incorporates and re-alleges all the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 189. Under California law, a party may bring a private right of action against a defendant that fraudulently obtains that party’s property (including money) by means of deception. AdTrader hereby brings such a claim on behalf of itself and the other members of the Advertiser Class. 190. As previously alleged in greater detail, Google’s actions in inducing AdTrader, and the other members of the Advertiser Class, into spending advertising funds on the DBM and AdWords platforms constitute theft by deception under California law. 191. As previously alleged in greater detail, AdTrader, and the other members of the Advertiser Class, have been damaged as a result of Google’s deception. Accordingly, they are entitled to treble damages and attorney’s fees as a result. 19. Google is the largest online marketing/advertising business in the world. The AdWords Advertising Program (“AdWords”) is Google’s primary advertising program. AdWords advertisements are displayed in a variety of formats such as text and/or images, alongside or above search results, on webpages, in e-mails, on blogs, and/or in videos. Background on DoubleClick Ad Exchange (AdX)

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15. Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”). 16. The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. 17. The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff. 18. The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). 19. At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. 20. At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection, the alleged Debt was in default. 21. In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by written correspondence. 22. Upon information and belief, rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party in Wixom, Michigan, to perform such activities on its behalf. 23. As part of its utilization of the third-party, Defendant conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party. 24. The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party included Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff allegedly owed the debt, among other things. 25. Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 4 26. The third-party then populated some or all this information into a prewritten template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction. 27. That letter, dated August 13, 2020, was received, and read by Plaintiff. (A true and accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”) 28. The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2). 29. The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant concerning the alleged Debt. 30. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector.” 32. The third-party does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). 33. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party concerning the alleged Debt. 34. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 35. Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information. 5 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party for these purposes thousands of times. 37. Defendant utilizes a third-party in this regard for the sole purpose of maximizing its profits. 38. Defendant utilizes a third-party without regard to the propriety and privacy of the information which it discloses to such third-party. 39. Defendant utilizes a third-party with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such private and sensitive information. 40. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party. 41. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. 42. The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable. 43. Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party. 44. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party. 45. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor. 46. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in the State of New York. 47. Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: 6 i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party without obtaining the prior consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action to the present. 48. This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 49. The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons. 50. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 51. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendant has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection laws. Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f

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1. whether Defendant Monica Braverman obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 1. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 821 (9thCir. 2012) cert. denied,13-136, 2013 WL 5878083(U.S. Nov. 4, 2013), a Federal Class Action, decided by the United States Supreme Court, involving similar underlying facts as the present action, about 30 companies, violations of the Video Privacy Protection Act ("VPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2710, et seq.; 2. Cross v. Blank, Adv. No.: 9:15ap00926FMD, (M.D. Fla. 2015), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"),18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 10. Sharon Taylor et. al. v. Safeway Inc. et. al., 2:07-cv-0017, (E.D. Tex. 2007), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, about 50 companies, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 10. whether Defendant BB Direct Inc. obtained the written express consent of Plaintiff and Class Members to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 11. whether Defendant TaCito & Associates obtained the written express consent of Plaintiff and Class Members to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 11. Sharon Taylor et. al. v. Biometric Access Company et. al., 2:07-cv-0018, (E.D. Tex. 2007), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, about 50 companies, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 12. Sharon Taylor et. al. v. Freeman Publishers Inc., 2:07-cv-0410, et. al., (E.D. Tex. 2007), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, about 50 companies, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 12. whether Defendant Don Herring Ltd. obtained the written express consent of Plaintiff and Class Members to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 13. whether Defendant Monica Braverman acted knowingly when it obtained, re- disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 14. whether Defendant BB Direct Inc. acted knowingly when it obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 15. whether Defendant TaCito & Associates acted knowingly when it obtained, re- disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 16. whether Defendant Don Herring Ltd. acted knowingly when it obtained, re- disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 17. whether Defendant Monica Braverman’s conduct described herein violates the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2721; 19. whether Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc.'s conduct described herein violates the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2721; 2. whether Defendant BB Direct Inc. obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 20. whether Defendant Don Herring Ltd.’s conduct described herein violates the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §2721; 21. whether Defendant Monica Braverman, as custodian of the Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records, possessed a duty to use reasonable care to investigate and determine the validity of the claimed DPPA permissible uses by Defendants BB Direct Inc., TaCito & Associates Inc., and Don Herring Ltd., prior to, during, and after, re-disclosing, and/or re-selling Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records to such entities by permitting procurement, re-disclosure, and re-sale of the Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records by such entities, and if so, whether Defendants Monica Braverman intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently failed in his obligation; 22. whether Defendant BB Direct Inc., as recipient of the Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records from Defendants Monica Braverman had a duty to use reasonable care to investigate and determine the validity of the claimed DPPA permissible uses by Defendant Monica Braverman used to obtain, directly or indirectly, the motor vehicle records from the State Department of Motor Vehicles, prior to, during, and after, obtaining Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records; moreover, whether Defendant BB Direct Inc. , by re-disclosing and re-selling the Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records to Defendants had a duty to use reasonable care to investigate and determine the validity of the claimed DPPA permissible uses by Defendants, and if so, whether Defendant BB Direct Inc. intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently failed in his obligation; 23. whether Defendant Tacito & Associates Inc., as recipient of the Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records from Defendant BB Direct Inc., had a duty to use reasonable care to investigate and determine the validity of the claimed DPPA permissible uses by Defendant BB Direct Inc., used to obtain, directly or indirectly, the motor vehicle records from the State Department of Motor Vehicles, prior to, during, and after, obtaining Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records; moreover, whether Defendant Tacito & Associates Inc., by re-disclosing and re-selling the Plaintiff and Class Members' motor vehicle records to Defendants had a duty to use reasonable care to investigate and determine the validity of the claimed DPPA permissible uses by Defendants, and if so, whether Defendant Tacito & Associates Inc., intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently failed in his obligation; 25. whether Defendant Monica Braverman complied with 18 U.S.C. §2721 (c), the obligation to maintain a record of any person and/or company that Defendant Monica Braverman re-disclosed, and /or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments for a period of five (5) years; and if so, whether Defendant Monica Braverman intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently failed in his obligation; 26. whether Defendant BB Direct Inc. complied with 18 U.S.C. §2721 (c), the obligation to maintain a record of any person and/or company that Defendant BB Direct Inc. re-disclosed, and /or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments for a period of five (5) years; and if so, whether Defendant BB Direct Inc., intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently failed in his obligation; 27. whether Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc., complied with 18 U.S.C. §2721 (c), the obligation to maintain a record of any person and/or company that Defendant BB Direct Inc. re-disclosed, and /or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments for a period of five (5) years; and if so, whether Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc., intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently failed in his obligation; 28. whether Defendant Don Herring Ltd. complied with 18 U.S.C. §2721 (c), the obligation to maintain a record of any person and/or company that Defendant BB Direct Inc. re-disclosed, and /or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments for a period of five (5) years; and if so, whether Defendant Don Herring Inc., intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently failed in his obligation; the nature, and extent of Plaintiff and Class Members' damages; 29. the nature, and extent of all statutory penalties, including liquidated damages of $2500.00, and/ or damages for which Defendant Monica Braverman are liable for, and legally obligated to, Plaintiff and Class Members; 3. whether Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc. obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 3. Cook v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc. 663 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2011), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present actions violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 31. the nature, and extent of all statutory penalties, including liquidated damages of $2500.00, and/ or damages for which Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc. is liable for, and legally obligated to, Plaintiff and Class Members; 31. whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to appropriate injunctive relief against Defendant BB Direct Inc.; 32. the nature, and extent of all statutory penalties, including liquidated damages of $2500.00, and/ or damages for which Defendant Don Herring Ltd. is liable for, and legally obligated to, Plaintiff and Class Members; 32. whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to appropriate injunctive relief against Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc.; 33. whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to appropriate injunctive relief against Defendant Don Herring Ltd.; and 33. whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to appropriate injunctive relief against Defendant Monica Braverman; 34. whether punitive damages are appropriate. 148. The questions of law and fact common to Class Members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members; and a class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of his controversy. 4. Doe et. al. v. Compact Information Systems Inc. et al., 3:13cv05013MBH, (N.D. Tex. 2013), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 4. whether Defendant Don Herring Ltd. obtained, re-disclosed, and/or resold Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 5. whether Defendant Monica Braverman had a DPPA permissible use to obtain, re- disclose, and/or resell Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 55. The protections afforded consumers by the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act is premised upon a screening process qualifying access to state motor vehicle records. This obligation is imposed on any and all individuals and entities that obtain, re-disclose, and resell such data, imposing a duty on “Authorized Recipients”, acting as re-sellers to exercise reasonable care in responding to requests to purchase the motor vehicle records. Individuals and entities that obtain, re-disclose, and/or re-sell the motor vehicle records obtained from state motor vehicle departments, must follow screening policies and reasonable verification measures. Defendants intentionally, or in the alternative, negligently re-disclosed and/or re-sold motor vehicle records obtained from the State Department of Motor Vehicles to Defendant National Affiliates, without adequate screening precautions. 57. On information and belief, the most prevalent unauthorized use of Motor Vehicles Records obtained from State Department of Motor Vehicles is by those persons and/or entities involved in the Motor Vehicle Industry, a billion-dollar enterprise. In order to outline the Defendant’s business practices, and the incentive for Defendants to act as a “Supplier” or “Distributor”, an understanding of the “Direct Marketing Vehicle Industry” is necessary, including knowing the participants, the participants’ functions, and entities knowingly funding this enterprise. 59. The Direct Marketing Vehicle Industry employs financial instruments to “vertically integrate” an association of entities requiring a “lead supply chain”. A state’s MVR database provides the most accurate and updated database of all licensed drivers and vehicles, providing a marketing database surpassing all other sources., albeit, the “Holy Grail” of all databases. As such, the Direct Marketing Vehicle Industry is involved with any and all means possible, at any costs, ignoring legal constraints, to procure this database. Once the database is obtained then the marketing and solicitation scheme can be implemented. 60. Defendant Braverman is an individual involved in the Direct Marketing Industry, acting as a Direct Market Provider assisting Direct Marketing entities. On information and belief, Defendant Monica Braverman obtains state motor vehicle records, directly or indirectly, from many state DMVs. 6. Richard Fresco v. R.L. Polk., No. 09-13344 (11th Cir. 2010), (Fresco II"- Intervention), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 6. whether Defendant BB Direct Inc. had a DPPA permissible use to obtain, re- disclose, and/or resell Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 61. Defendant BB Direct is a corporation involved in the Direct Marketing Industry, acting as a Direct Market Provider assisting Direct Marketing persons and entities. Defendant BB Direct Inc. obtains state motor vehicle records, directly or indirectly, from many state DMVs. 62. Defendant TaCito is a corporation involved in the Direct Marketing Industry, acting as a Direct Market Provider assisting Direct Marketing persons and entities. Defendant TaCito obtains state motor vehicle records, directly or indirectly, from many state DMVs. 64. The VSC Industry is the poster child for marketing abuses, illegal telemarketing, and deceptive mailers. It is a complex financial infrastructure, funded by a multitude of financial institutions. The core of this industry is “fueled” by illegally obtaining millions of motor vehicle records from State Motor Vehicle Departments, the “grease” to create and send the Direct Marketing Vehicle Industry marketing letters. C. Defendants’ Business Association & Practices-Admissions Against Interest 66. Defendant Don Herring Ltd., d/b/a Don Herring Mitsubishi, is an automobile dealership located in the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex area, and describes its business as follows: "We have been in business since 1979, and we have never rested on our accomplishments. We have since expanded into three dealerships in Dallas, Irving, and Plano, Texas all serving fine Mitsubishi products" “Mitsubishi dealership in Texas”, last Accessed September 3, 2016), online: http://www.donherring.com/about-don-herring-in-tx 67. After receipt of the Don Herring solicitation letter, Plaintiff Lopez became concerned about whether his Personal Identifying Information, (“Pii”), and motor vehicle information, was being sold to marketing companies, jeopardizing his privacy and security interests, and that of his family, due in part because Plaintiff Lopez did not have a prior commercial relationship with Defendant Don Herring. Within a few days after receipt of the letter Plaintiff Lopez contacted Defendant Don Herring’s Dallas office and spoke to Cary Wilson, a Senior Sales Associate at Don Herring’s office located at 3520 S. Marvin D. Love Freeway, Dallas, Texas. Mr. Wilson informed Plaintiff Lopez that the source of his vehicle information originated from the Texas State Department of Motor Vehicles., (See Exhibit 2,“Lopez Dec”). 69. Mr. Reuben Mosely, General Sales Manager at Don Herring’s office located at 3520 S. Marvin D. Love Freeway, Dallas, Texas responded to the inquiry on behalf of Mr. Wilson and noted, “Yes that is correct. We use a third party company that supplies the information and it is gathered through vehicle registrations, (See Exhibit 4). 7. Sharon Taylor et al. v. Acxiom Corporation et al., 2:07-cv-0001, (E.D. Tex. 2007), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, about 50 companies, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 70. In review of the Defendant Don Herring’s solicitation letter a company was noted in fine print at the bottom of one (1) of the pages. It was TaCito & Associates Marketing, reportedly, “a direct marketing advertising agency that specializes in automotive marketing”, TaCito & Associates Marketing is a subsidiary of Defendant TaCito & Associates, Inc., and owned by Anthony J. TaCito. Defendant Tacito’s involvement was further noted in this letter by its offering of additional benefits if Plaintiff Lopez accessed the following website online: arthurlopez.KEYFORKEYEVENTS.COM, and entered the activation code: TDM 1456. This website is owned by TaCito & Associates Marketing. Reportedly TaCito & Associates Marketing has in excess of 167 similar domains used for direct marketing, including but not limited to, cdjrtestdrive.com, chevyupgradeevents.com, lhmprovoupgradeevents.com, dhmitsugc.com, bobboyteupgradeevents.com, ramgift.com, getsmorevalue.com, dhgiftcard.com, dealergc.com, vipappt.com, and vtgiftcard.com. 72. On May 14, 2016 an inquiry was sent to Mr. Anthony J. TaCito, CEO of Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc., requesting information as to the source of the vehicle information displayed on Plaintiff Lopez’s solicitation letter sent by Defendant Don Herring, sources identified by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mosely as Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc.. Mr. TaCito responded on May 16, 2016 stating the data was supplied by Defendant BB Direct Inc. for the past 13 years, (See Exhibit 5). 73. The document attached to Mr. TaCito’s May 16, 2016 response, referenced as “ArthurlopezRecord (1). Xlsx 9K”, was noted as “a copy of the records provided from the BBDirect data file”. (See Exhibit 6). 74. In review of this “ArthurlopezRecord” document, a column referenced as “Odometer”, noted an odometer reading of “15”. The exact odometer reading is legally required to be provided to State Department of Motor Vehicles when motor vehicles are purchased. A document obtained from the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles when Plaintiff Lopez purchased his motor vehicle reveals the identical odometer reading of “15” as shown in the “ArthurlopezRecord” document possessed by Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc., and Defendant BB Direct Inc., (See Exhibit 7). 76. On May 17, 2016 an inquiry was sent to Mr. Brian Berg, CEO of Defendant BB Direct Inc., requesting information as to the source of the information displayed on Plaintiff Lopez’s solicitation letter sent by Defendant Don Herring, a source identified by Mr. A. J. TaCito of Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc., as originating from Defendant BB Direct Inc. Mr. Berg confirmed that Defendant BB Direct Inc. had been hired by Defendant TaCito & Associates Inc. to handle the account of this dealership, Defendant Don Herring Ltd., and Mr Berg stated the data had been supplied by Defendant Braverman. (See Exhibit 9). 77. Defendant BB Direct Inc. is reportedly a ”provider of direct marketing data and data related services”, marketing automobile mailing lists: “BB Direct Inc. ’s Premium Automobile Mailing List is the most up-to-date and robust auto database of its kind, outperforming other similar lists in terms of accuracy and coverage. In addition to selecting by make, model, and year, BB Direct Inc. ’s automobile database also includes VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) information. Unlike some automobile files, our database has coverage in all 50 states, is Shelby compliant, and is updated every 2 weeks.” “Automobile Mailing List”, last Accessed September 3, 2016), online: http://www.bbdirect.com/auto- dealership-data/automobile-mailing-list 79. On May 17, 2016 an inquiry was sent to Monica Braverman, CEO of Defendant Netunim, d/b/a/ DataShark regarding the statements made by Mr. Berg as to the source of the motor vehicle record data that Defendant BB Direct Inc. obtained, re-disclosed, and re-sold to BlackBook, Defendant TaCito & Associates, and Defendant Don Herring Ltd. for uses that included, but not limited to, sending a solicitation letter to Plaintiff Lopez. Mrs Braverman didn’t respond. 8. whether Defendant Don Herring Ltd. had a DPPA permissible use to obtain, re- disclose, and/or resell Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 8. Sharon Taylor et. al. v. ACS State & Local Solutions, Inc. et. al., 2:07-cv-0013, (E.D. Tex. 2007), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, about 50 companies, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 83. The legislative history of the DPPA makes it clear that it incorporated “the intentions of the 1972 Privacy Act…[And also] include[d] the recommendations of the 1977 Privacy Protection Study Commission [(PPSC”)] report.” The goal was to prohibit disclosure of “records” collected and maintained by a Government agency, expect under permissible circumstances. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b). The PPSC report recommended that third party record holders be held to the “same standard” as the Government in order to ensure compliance with the important statutory protections. Personal Privacy is an Information Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission Ch. 13 (July 1977). 84. His literal reading of the DPPA was designed to promote public safety and to protect individual privacy, construed so as to maximize his deterrent effect – in particular, by shifting burdens to institutional actors who regularly engage in the targeted conduct or are otherwise in a position to minimize future violations. 85. Congress intended the states to be the “gatekeepers” of the motor vehicle records, limiting the number of people with access to the personal information because the greater the number of people with access, the greater the risk that personal information will be disseminated to those who do not have valid uses for the personal information. 87. In each sentence of section 2721(c) Congress linked the term “Authorized Recipient” to the specific section of 2721(b) that had authorized the release of the information to the recipient. Congress intended that the “Authorized Recipients” to be individuals, entities, or his agents, qualified to receive the information by the terms of section 2721(b). Resellers cannot obtain all of the personal information in the database simply by calling himself resellers. Entities requesting motor vehicle records have to justify his receipt of personal information under the 2721(b) exception is applicable. Defendants were not “Authorized Recipients.” 89. To ensure that the privacy of driver records is adequately protected under the DPPA, it was necessary to impose a high standard of duty for resellers when the records they sell are subsequently used for impermissible purposes, due in part because an industry of “resellers” had arisen to facilitate acquisition by end-users of information collected by State Motor Vehicle Bureaus. As the reseller is in the best position to determine whether the subsequent use of the data would be permissible under the Act, it is the reseller that must bear the burden of ensuring that an impermissible use does not occur and must investigate to determine if entities requesting the motor vehicle records have a DPPA permissible purpose. The state agency ceases to be the custodian of the data once it is obtained by the reseller; the reseller must therefore assume the responsibility and the liability for the subsequent use of the data resulting from its intentional resale, especially as it relates to direct marketing. The civil remedies provision would be rendered “toothless” if resellers could insulate himself from liability based solely on conclusory representations of end users, without being required to exercise due care himself. 9. Sharon Taylor et. al. v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company et.al., 2:07-cv-0014, (E.D. Tex. 2007), a Federal Class Action involving similar underlying facts as the present action, about 50 companies, violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2721, et seq.; 9. whether Defendants Monica Braverman obtained the written express consent of Plaintiff and Class Members to obtain, re-disclose, and/or resell Plaintiff and Class Member's personal information contained within motor vehicle records maintained by the State motor vehicle departments; 91. In light of the text, structure, and legislative history of the DPPA, resellers are subject to a duty of reasonable care before disclosing DPPA-protected personal information, 18 U.S.C. §2721(b)-(c). Resellers must exercise reasonable care in responding to requests for personal information drawn from motor vehicle records. Resellers are liable if they do not secure proof that representations made by the recipient of personal information was valid. Defendants failed to exercise such reasonable care when reselling the motor vehicle records. 92. The structure of the DPPA supports the conclusion that resellers owe a duty of reasonable care when reselling motor vehicle records to third parties. The DPPA statute uses the word “knowingly,” revealing that a level of duty of care exists. The DPPA provides an award of “punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(2); In contrast, the court may award “actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500.” 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1). The actual damages provision is silent as to the degree of fault necessary to trigger liability for actual damages. If, however, as the statute suggests, punitive damages are available only for willful and reckless violations of the DPPA, then actual damages must require something less—that is, conduct that is neither willful nor reckless. 94. Section 2721(c) does not suggests that a reseller may re-disclose protected information so long as its customer claims to have a permissible use. Rather, the DPPA authorizes the resale of information only if there is an actual, not just a stated, permitted use. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c); Thus, as a purely textual matter, the DPPA indicates that a reseller who sells protected information to a client without an actual permissible purpose is liable regardless what “certifications” that client has made. 95. Resellers owe the same or similar legal duty that obligates the State Motor Vehicle Department’s when releasing motor vehicle records, that is to investigate fully whether individuals or companies obtaining the motor vehicle records have a DPPA permissible purpose. As the motor vehicle records are resold, in whole or part, the likelihood of misuse grows exponentially. The DPPA provides no distinction as to obligations of the end-user, resellers, nor the State Motor Vehicle Departments, as Custodian of the motor vehicle records, Gordon v. Softech Int'l, Inc., U.S., No. 13- 533, cert. den. 1/13/14; Arcanum Investigations, Inc. v. Gordon, U.S., No. 13-539, cert. den. 1/13/14). 97. To verify the eligibility to invoke the claimed DPPA permissible purpose, an entity must provide information, including but not limited to, proof relating to its business which must correspond to its claimed DPPA uses, current status, activity of the employing entity, and purported business affiliation. It is negligent if the reseller fails to make proper inquiries of the end-user, especially if “red flags” exist, and provide “red flags” requiring additional review prior to the purchase of the Plaintiff and Class Members’ MVRs. 98. Defendants obtained the MVRs for a reason and with a purpose in mind. Federal Law required Defendants, acting as “re-sellers’, to obligate National Affiliates to use the requested MVR information for purposes permitted by the DPPA. Hence, at a minimum, Defendants and National Affiliates disclosures were not permitted by the DPPA permitted uses, and totally incompatible with the purpose for which the information was collected. A. Introduction

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(Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) (Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)) 14. Pivotal Payments is a “leading provider of technology-driven global payment processing solutions for small to large enterprises.” See http://www.pivotalpayments.com/about- us/pivotal-payments (last visited September 14, 2016). 15. Pivotal Payments “deliver[s] the best payment acceptance strategies” to its clients by operating “multiple divisions dedicated to specific industry segments.” Id. 16. One such division is Capital Processing Network or CPN (“CPN”), which Pivotal Payments acquired in 2014. See http://www.pivotalpayments.com/press-release/pivotal- payments-acquires-key-assets-capital-processing-network-llc (last visited September 14, 2016). 91. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 92. The foregoing acts and omissions of Pivotal Payments and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Pivotal Payments’ behalf constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the Class using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice. 93. As a result of Pivotal Payments’ and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Pivotal Payments’ behalf’s violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), Plaintiff and members of the Class presumptively are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 94. Plaintiff and members of the Class are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting Pivotal Payments and/or its affiliates, agents, and/or other persons or entities acting on Pivotal Payments’ behalf from violating the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by making calls, except for emergency purposes, to any cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice in the future. 95. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. A. Factual Allegations Regarding Pivotal Payments

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15. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of themselves and the class (the “Class”) defined as follows: All participants in and beneficiaries of the Franciscan Alliance Pension Security Plan (the “Plan”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any individuals who are subsequently to be determined to be fiduciaries of the Plan. 16. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Upon information and belief, the Class includes thousands of persons. 17. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class because Plaintiffs’ claims, and the claims of all Class members, arise out of the same conduct, policies, and practices of Defendants as alleged herein, and all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 18. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class and these questions predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. Common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to: USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 4 of 22 5 A. Whether the Plan is covered by ERISA; B. Whether the Plan Administrator failed to comply with ERISA’s reporting and disclosure provisions; C. Whether the Defendants failed to fund the Plan and establish a policy to fund the Plan in compliance with ERISA; and D. Whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duties in failing to comply with the provisions of ERISA set forth above. 19. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent the Class and have retained counsel experienced and competent in the prosecution of ERISA class action litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to those of other members of the Class. Plaintiffs are committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action, and anticipate no difficulty in the management of this litigation as a class action. 20. This action may be properly certified under either subsection of Rule 23(b)(1). Class action status in this action is warranted under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) because prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. Class action status is also warranted under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) because prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to this action, or that would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 21. In the alternative, certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is warranted because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 5 of 22 6 making appropriate final injunctive, declaratory, or other appropriate equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 22. In the alternative, certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is also appropriate. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy within the meaning of Rule 23(b) and in consideration of the matters set forth in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D). Because of the amount of the individual Class members’ claims relative to the complexity of the litigation and the financial resources of the Defendants, few, if any, members of the Class would seek legal redress individually for the wrongs complained of herein. The maintenance of separate actions would place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts, and could result in inconsistent adjudications, while a single class action can determine, with judicial economy, the rights of all Class members. Absent a class action, Class members will continue to suffer damages, and Defendants’ misconduct will proceed without remedy. 23. Franciscan Alliance is a not-for-profit healthcare conglomerate serving the needs of communities in Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. See: http://www.franciscanalliance.org/about/pages/default.aspx. See also 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, at 6. 24. The Company includes 13 hospitals, various accountable care organizations, physician hospital managed care networks, a nonprofit foundation, a consolidated information technology services division, a construction company and a captive insurance company. See: http://www.franciscanalliance.org/about/pages/default.aspx. See also 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, at 6. USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 6 of 22 7 25. The Company’s hospitals include:  Franciscan St. Anthony Health – Crown Point, Crown Point, Indiana  Franciscan St. Anthony Health – Michigan City, Michigan City, Indiana  Franciscan St. Elizabeth Health – Lafayette Central, Lafayette, Indiana  Franciscan St. Elizabeth Health – Lafayette East, Lafayette, Indiana  Franciscan St. Elizabeth Health – Crawfordsville, Crawfordsville, Indiana  Franciscan St. Francis Health – Carmel, Carmel, Indiana  Franciscan St. Francis Health – Indianapolis, Indianapolis, Indiana  Franciscan St. Francis Health – Mooresville, Mooresville, Indiana  Franciscan St. James Health – Chicago Heights, Chicago Heights, Illinois  Franciscan St. James Health – Olympia Fields, Olympia Fields, Illinois  Franciscan St. Margaret Health – Dyer, Dyer, Indiana  Franciscan St. Margaret Health – Hammond, Hammond, Indiana  Franciscan Healthcare – Munster, Munster, Indiana See http://www.franciscanalliance.org/hospitals/pages/default.aspx. 26. The Company has more than 18,000 employees in three states to serve its patients. See http://www.franciscanalliance.org/hospitals/crownpoint/about/pages/mission-and- ministry.aspx. 27. The Company is not, and does not claim to be a church. In fact, in the 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, the Company notes that it is, “dedicated to providing comprehensive health care services, including emergency, medical, surgical, behavioral, rehabilitative, and other health services in inpatient and outpatient settings; home health care services; and primary and specialty physician services to communities within four geographic USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 7 of 22 8 regions in Indiana and Illinois.” See 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, at 6 (emphasis added). 28. Prior to 2010, Franciscan Alliance was known as St. Francis Health Services but, the Company adopted a new name when they, “recognized the evolving changes in the health care landscape and the need to reinforce the shared capabilities across our hospitals and other health care facilities.” See http://www.franciscanalliance.org/about/pages/history.aspx. 29. That Franciscan Alliance is primarily focused on healthcare is perhaps best summarized by the Company’s own statement regarding its name change to Franciscan Alliance, “We adopted a new name – Franciscan Alliance – to strengthen our presence as a large, comprehensive health care system.” Id. (emphasis added). 30. As a result of its business – to provide health care and related services – the Company recorded $2.425 billion in net patient service revenue for the year ended December 31, 2014, an increase from the $2.321 billion recorded the previous year. See 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, at 3. 31. The vast majority of that revenue was received from Medicare, Medicaid, and “commercial insurance carriers, health maintenance organizations, and preferred provider organizations,” sources which only pay for the provision of health care services. See id. at 18. 32. Moreover, the 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements include warnings that the Company’s net patient service revenue was subject to the “[l]aws and regulations governing the Medicare and Medicaid programs” and, “[a]s a result, there is at least a reasonable possibility that recorded estimates may change in the near term.” Id. at 19. 33. In order to fund its healthcare business, the Company has issued over $1 billion in bonds through the Indiana Financial Authority, including $552.545 million in Tax Exempt USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 8 of 22 9 Hospital and Health System Revenue and Refunding Bonds. See id. at 25. These are sources of revenue unavailable to churches. 34. Despite its status as an ERISA plan, the Company has invoked Church Plan status to evade ERISA’s protections to which its employees are entitled. The Company’s failure to treat the Plan as an ERISA plan puts the Plan’s participants at risk of receiving pension payouts drastically lower than those proposed, and deprives Plan participants of material information as alleged below. 35. Moreover, by avoiding ERISA’s requirements, the Company obtains a competitive advantage over the other healthcare entities that comply with ERISA. B. The Plan (1) Franciscan Alliance Pension Security Plan Overview 36. The Plan was established and is maintained by the Company to provide retirement income to employees. Thus, the Plan was not established and is not maintained by a church or convention or association of churches. 37. As noted in the 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, “[p]rior to 2014, [Franciscan Alliance] had various retirement programs due to acquisitions over the years,” but that effective January 1, 2014, all employees “will be covered by one comprehensive retirement program.” See 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, at 28. 38. The Company’s 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements note that “[Franciscan Alliance, Inc. and Affiliates] has a qualified noncontributory defined benefit pension plan [the Plan] covering all eligible employees of certain of the Corporation’s entities.” 2014 Consolidated Financial Statements, at 28. “The plan provides defined benefits based on years of service and final average salary.” Id. USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 9 of 22 10 39. Similarly, the Company’s website states: Employees are eligible to participate in the Franciscan Alliance Pension Plan (defined benefit plan) after one year of service with a minimum of 1,000 hours and attainment of age 21. Employees are fully vested after five years. This plan is paid totally by Franciscan Alliance, with no employee contributions required. See http://www.franciscanalliance.org/careers/why-work-for-us/pages/benefits.aspx. 40. The Plan is an “employee pension benefit plan” within the meaning of ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(A). 41. The Plan is a defined benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA § 3(35), 29 65. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference all prior allegations in this Complaint. 66. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), authorizes a participant or beneficiary to bring a civil action to: “(A) enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan.” 67. Pursuant to this provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief that the Plan is not a “church plan” within the USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 13 of 22 14 meaning of ERISA § 3(33), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33), and is thus subject to the provisions of Title I and Title IV of ERISA. 68. Plaintiffs further seek orders directing all Defendants to bring the Plan into compliance with ERISA, including the reporting and funding requirements of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1023, 1082, 1102, and 1104, and by remedying the additional violations set forth below. 69. Additionally, Plaintiffs seek an order that Franciscan Alliance make all contributions to the Plan as necessary to remedy the Plan’s funding shortfall. 70. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference all prior allegations in this Complaint. 71. § 502(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(A), permits a plan participant to bring a suit for penalties when a defendant violates the recordkeeping obligations set forth in ERISA. 72. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), permits a plan participant to bring a suit to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the provisions of Title I of ERISA or to enforce the terms of a plan. A. Annual Reports 73. Under ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023, employee benefit plans are required to file an annual report with the Secretary of Labor. This report, submitted via Form 5500, must include certain specified information about the plan’s finances, participants, and administration. 74. Defendants failed to file an annual report concerning the Plan with the Secretary of Labor in compliance with ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023, or a Form 5500 and associated USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 14 of 22 15 schedules and attachments which the Secretary has approved as an alternative method of compliance with ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023. 75. Defendants have violated ERISA § 104(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a), by failing to file annual reports with respect to the Plan with the Secretary of Labor in compliance with ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023, or file a Form 5500 and associated schedules and attachments. B. Notification of Failure to Meet Minimum Funding Standards 76. Under ERISA § 101(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(d)(1), employers maintaining employee benefit plans are required to issue a notice to beneficiaries and participants whenever the plan fails to make a required installment or other payment required to meet the minimum funding standards under ERISA. 77. Franciscan Alliance has failed to furnish the Plaintiffs or any member of the Class with a Notice with respect to the Plan pursuant to ERISA § 101(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(d)(1), informing them that Franciscan Alliance failed to make payments required to comply with 81. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate herein by reference all prior allegations in this Complaint. 82. ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082, establishes minimum funding standards for defined benefit plans that require employers to make minimum contributions to their plans so that each plan will have assets available to fund plan benefits if the employer maintaining the plan is unable to pay benefits out of its general assets. 83. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), permits a plan participant to bring a suit to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the provisions of Title I of ERISA or to enforce the terms of a plan. 84. As the employer maintaining the plan, Franciscan Alliance was responsible for making the contributions that should have been made pursuant to ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082, at a level commensurate with ERISA’s requirements. 85. Franciscan Alliance has failed to make contributions in satisfaction of the minimum funding standards of ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082. 86. By failing to make the required contributions to the Plan, Franciscan Alliance has violated ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082. USDC IN/ND case 3:16-cv-00290-RLM-MGG document 1 filed 05/12/16 page 16 of 22 17 87. As a result of the failure of Franciscan Alliance to fund the Plan in accordance with ERISA’s minimum funding standards, Plaintiffs face substantial risk of the pension being lost or severely reduced. A. Defendant Franciscan Alliance’s Business Declaratory and Equitable Relief (Declaratory Judgement Act and ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)) Failure to Provide Minimum Funding (ERISA §§ 302 and 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082, 1132(a)(3)) Violation of Reporting and Disclosure Provisions (ERISA §§ 101-104, 502(a)(1)(A), (a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1024, 1132(a)(1)(A), (a)(3))

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10. Plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of the following class of Nurses (the “Class”): All persons employed by Northern Manor as nurses from April 4, 2011 through the date a judgment is entered in this action. 4 11. Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. Plaintiff estimates that there are over 100 members of the Class. 12. Questions of law and fact are common to all the members of the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including: a. Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class for all hours worked up to 40 per workweek; b. Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class at overtime rates for all hours worked over 40 per workweek; c. Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the NYLL; d. The amount by which Plaintiff and the Class were damaged; and e. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to liquidated damages and/or interest. 13. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiffs. 14. Plaintiffs will protect the interests of the Class fairly and adequately, and Plaintiffs have retained attorneys experienced in class action litigation. 15. A class action is superior to all other available methods for this controversy because: a. The prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; 5 b. The prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for defendant; c. Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class; and questions of law and fact common to members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. d. Nurses who are currently employed by Northern Manor are likely to fear retaliation and/or the loss of their employment, and thus will likely not commence their own actions. 16. Plaintiffs and the Nurses are non-exempt employees currently and formerly employed by Northern Manor to care for its residents. 17. Plaintiffs and the Nurses are scheduled to work five days each week, with an 8- hour shift and a half hour lunch break. 18. Plaintiffs and the Nurses have a very demanding workload, and their work usually cannot be completed within the time allotted for their regular shift. In addition to caring for residents, the Nurses are required to perform work in connection with the change in shift in order to update the next Nurse who is taking over, and the Nurses are also required to fill out extensive paperwork after many shifts. 19. The Nurses care for multiple residents on each shift. Plaintiff Julia Alderson, for example, cared for between 13 and 24 residents per shift during her employment. 6 20. As a result of their heavy work load, the Nurses must stay at work later than the end of their scheduled shift. Plaintiffs have frequently stayed one to two hours past the end of their scheduled shifts. In addition to staying past the end of their shifts, many Nurses do not receive the full, uninterrupted and work free 30-minute break to which they are entitled. That 30 minute time period is deducted from their pay regardless of whether a Nurse is actually given a proper meal break, and as a result, deprives the Nurses of overtime pay. 21. As a result of staying past the end of her shift, Plaintiffs have often worked over 40 hours per week, sometimes works as many as 50 hours per week. 22. Despite working as many as 50 hours per week, Plaintiff Julia Alderson has only been paid for her scheduled 37.5 hour work week; Plaintiff Saraceno’s experience has been similar. Plaintiffs and all of the Nurses punch in and out using a time clock, maintained by Defendants, which notifies Defendants that Plaintiffs and the Nurses are working more than 37.5 hours per week, and Defendants intentionally fail to pay Plaintiffs and the Nurses for the time spent working after their shifts should end. On information and belief, Northern Manor either fails to pay Plaintiffs and the Nurses for the hours shown by their time cards, or alters their time cards to artificially lower the number of hours they are shown to have worked. 23. Plaintiff Julia Alderson, and multiple other Nurses, have complained to their union and to Northern Manor’s management about the failure to pay the Nurses for overtime hours worked, and these complaints have not been acted on and/or have been ignored. 7 24. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were fully set forth herein. 25. During the FLSA Class Period, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(e) and (g). 26. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an “employer” engaged in interstate “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203. 27. At all relevant times, Defendant’s business has had annual gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 28. Plaintiffs consent in writing to be a party to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Plaintiffs’ written consent is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference. 29. Defendant was required to properly pay Plaintiffs and others similarly situated all wages due including applicable overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 30. During the FLSA Class Period, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Nurses all wages due including overtime wages of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek to which they were entitled under the FSLA, 29 U.S.C. §207. 31. Defendant’s violation of the overtime requirements of the FLSA was part of its regular business practice and constituted a pattern, practice, and/or policy. 8 32. As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with the FLSA in amounts to be determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages in an amount equal to their unpaid wages, prejudgment and post judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 33. Defendant’s unlawful conduct, as described above, was willful and intentional and/or was not in good faith. Defendant knew or should have known that the practices complained of herein were unlawful. Defendant knew that Plaintiffs and others similarly situated routinely worked in excess of forty hours per week and that Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were not paid for all hours worked. 34. Defendant has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FSLA with respect to the compensation of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 35. Because Defendant’s violations of the FSLA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §255(a). 36. Plaintiff sand the Nurses seek to enjoin Defendant from its continuing violations of 29 U.S.C. §207. 37. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were fully set forth herein. 38. Plaintiffs and the Nurses were employees of Defendant within the meaning of the NYLL, Article 6, §190(2), and supporting New York regulations. 9 39. Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of NYLL Article 6, §190(3), and any supporting regulations. 40. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Nurses for all hours worked up to 40 in a workweek, and overtime wages of not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 41. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Nurses for all hours worked, and for overtime wages was willful and/or not in good faith within the meaning of NYLL, Article 19, §663. Defendant was aware of the requirements of the NYLL and continued to deprive Plaintiffs and the Nurses of all wages owed. 42. Due to Defendant’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Nurses are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 8. Plaintiffs bring the First Count as a collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b) on behalf of herself and other similarly situated people (the “Collective” or the “Nurses”), which shall include: All persons employed by Northern Manor as nurses from April 4, 2014 through the date the Court orders notice to be sent in accordance with Section 216(b) of the FLSA (the “FLSA Class Period”). 9. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Collective. There are likely one hundred or more similarly situated current and former employees of Defendant who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s records that Defendant is required to create and maintain under applicable federal and state law. Notice should be sent to the Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201, et seq.: Failure to Pay Overtime (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and the Collective) New York Labor Law, Article 19: Failure to Pay Straight Time and Overtime (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and the NYLL Class)

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20. Regardless of their specific job title, certification, or licensure, Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees were hourly or non-exempt employees, and as such, were required to be paid overtime at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay. 21. Defendant has numerous pay policies that result in Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated healthcare employees not being paid for all hours worked, including overtime. A. Pre-Shift Job Duties 22. Defendant requires Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees to engage in work duties that are integral and indispensable to their job duties prior to clocking in. 23. Named Plaintiff and similarly situated nurses regularly arrive 15-30 minutes or more before the start of their regularly scheduled shift in order to turn on their own computer, boot up the necessary software, and clock in by the start of their scheduled shift. Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees were required to clock in at their own computer, so it was necessary they arrive before the start of their scheduled shift to engage in this process. 24. Further, Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees used their computers to perform primary job duties, so turning on and booting up the computers were integral and indispensable to their principal job activities. 26. Although they begin working upon their arrival well before the scheduled start of their shifts, Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees were not permitted to clock in to work more than four (4) minutes prior to the start of their scheduled shift.2 Thus, all of their pre-shift job duties described above were conducted off-the-clock and Defendant did not pay them for this time worked. B. Meal Deduction 27. Defendant has a companywide policy of requiring healthcare employees to clock out of work for a daily 60 minute meal break, even if healthcare employees were unable to take a meal break, meal breaks were only partially taken, or meal breaks were interrupted with job duties. 28. Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees regularly do not take a full, uninterrupted 60-minute meal break. 30. Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees were expected to answer the phone during their meal break if a provider called, and they were reprimanded by their manager for not answering a provider’s call while they were on their meal break. 31. Further, in order to avoid paying overtime, Defendant at times instructed Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees to take an extended meal break off the clock. However, Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees still assisted co-workers and answered managers’ and co-workers’ questions. Defendant also still conducted “lunch meetings” with Named Plaintiff and similarly situated healthcare employees even though Defendant instructed them to take an extended meal break off the clock to avoid overtime. C. Defendant’s Pay Policies and/or Practices Resulted in Unpaid Overtime 32. As a result of Defendant’s companywide pay policies and/or practices described herein, Defendant knew or had reason to know it was not compensating Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated healthcare employees for all hours worked. 33. Named Plaintiff and other similarly situated healthcare employees regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but they were not compensated for all overtime pay because of Defendant’s policies or practices described herein. 35. During relevant times, Defendant suffered or permitted Named Plaintiff and those similarly situated healthcare employees to work more than forty (40) hours per workweek, while not compensating them for all such hours worked over forty (40) at a rate of at least one and one- half times their regular rate of pay as a result of Defendant’s company-wide policies or practices described above that affect Named Plaintiff and all other similarly situated healthcare employees. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant, at all times relevant hereto, was fully aware of the fact that it was legally required to comply with federal and state wage and hour laws. 37. During relevant times, Defendant had knowledge of and acted willfully regarding its conduct described herein. 38. Defendant is in possession and control of necessary documents and information from which Named Plaintiff would be able to calculate damages and/or it otherwise failed to keep such records. IV. 39. Named Plaintiff brings her FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) as a representative action on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated healthcare employees of the opt-in class. The FLSA collective consists of the following: All current and former hourly, non-exempt healthcare employees of Defendant who were scheduled to work 40 or more hours in any workweek during the three years preceding the date of the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the final disposition of this case (“FLSA Collective” or “FLSA Collective Members”). 41. During some or all of the last three years, Defendant did not compensate Named Plaintiff and the putative FLSA Collective Members for time spent performing substantial duties for Defendant’s benefit. V. 42. Named Plaintiff brings her Ohio Wage Act claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 as a class action on behalf of herself and all other members of the following class: All current and former hourly, non-exempt healthcare employees of Defendant who were scheduled to work 40 or more hours in any workweek during the two years preceding the date of the filing of this Complaint and continuing through the final disposition of this case (“Ohio Rule 23 Class” or “Ohio Rule 23 Class Members”). 43. The Ohio Rule 23 Class includes all current or former hourly, non-exempt healthcare employees employed by Defendant throughout the State of Ohio as defined above. 44. The Ohio Rule 23 Class, as defined above, is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 45. Named Plaintiff is a member of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and her claim for unpaid wages is typical of the claims of other members of the Rule 23 Class. 46. Named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Rule 23 Class and the interests of all members of the Rule 23 Class. 47. Named Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with those interests of the Rule 23 Class that he has undertaken to represent. 48. Named Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced class action counsel who can ably represent the interests of the entire Ohio Rule 23 Class. 50. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) because individual actions would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant with respect to its non-exempt employees. 51. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) as Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Ohio Rule 23 Class, making appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class as a whole. 52. Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) as the questions of law and facts common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class predominate over questions affecting individual members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 53. Questions of law and fact that are common to the Ohio Rule 23 Class include, but are not limited to: (a) whether Defendant violated the Ohio Wage Act by failing to pay the Ohio Rule 23 Class for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week because of the pay policies and practices described herein; (b) whether Defendant kept accurate records of the amount of time the Ohio Rule 23 Class was working each day; (c) whether Defendant’s violations of the Ohio Wage Act were knowing and willful; (d) what amount of unpaid and/or withheld compensation, including overtime compensation, is due to Named Plaintiff and other members of the Ohio Rule 23 Class on account of Defendant’s violations of the Ohio Acts; and (e) what amount of prejudgment interest is due to Ohio Rule 23 Class members on the overtime or other compensation which was withheld or not paid to them. 55. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 56. This claim is brought as part of a collective action by Named Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective. 57. The FLSA requires that employees receive overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 58. During the three years preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendant employed the Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members. 59. Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members were paid on an hourly basis and worked in non-exempt positions. 60. Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members regularly worked in excess of 40 hours in workweeks. 62. Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members were not exempt from receiving FLSA overtime benefits. 63. Defendant knew or should have known of the overtime payment requirements of the FLSA. Despite such knowledge, Defendant willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members are entitled. 64. The exact total amount of compensation, including overtime compensation, that Defendant has failed to pay Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members is unknown at this time, as many of the records necessary to make such precise calculations are in the possession of Defendant or were not kept by Defendant. 65. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Named Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages. Named Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of herself and the FLSA Collective Members. 66. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 67. This claim is brought under Ohio Law. 69. The Ohio Wage Act requires that employees receive overtime compensation “not less than one and one-half times” (1.5) the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in one workweek, “in the manner and methods provided in and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937.” See O.R.C. § 4111.03(A); see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 70. Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members worked in excess of the maximum weekly hours permitted under O.R.C. § 4111.03, but were not paid overtime wages for all of such time spent working. 71. Defendant’s companywide policies and/or practices described herein impermissibly reduced Named Plaintiff’s and Rule 23 Class Members' compensable hours worked and resulted in unpaid overtime. 72. Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were not exempt from the wage protections of the Ohio Wage Act. 73. Defendant’s repeated and knowing failures to pay overtime wages to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class members were violations of R.C. §4111.03, and as such, Defendant willfully withheld and failed to pay the overtime compensation to which Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were entitled. 74. For Defendant’s violations of R.C. §4111.03, by which Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have suffered and continue to suffer damages, Named Plaintiff seeks unpaid overtime and other compensation, liquidated damages, interest and attorneys’ fees, and all other remedies available, on behalf of herself and the Rule 23 Class Members. 76. Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were employed by Defendant. 77. During all relevant times, Defendant was an entity covered by the OPPA and Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members have been employed by Defendant within the meaning of the OPPA. 78. The OPPA requires Defendant to timely pay Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members all wages, including unpaid overtime, in accordance with O.R.C. § 4113.15(A). 79. During relevant times, Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were not paid all wages, including overtime wages at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay within thirty (30) days of performing the work. See O.R.C. § 4113.15(B). 80. Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members unpaid wages remain unpaid for more than thirty (30) days beyond their regularly scheduled payday. 81. In violating the OPPA, Defendant acted willfully, without a good faith basis, and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio law. 82. All of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully rewritten herein. 83. The Ohio Wage Act requires employers to maintain and preserve payroll or other records containing, among other things, the hours worked each workday, and the total hours worked each workweek. See O.R.C. § 4111.08. See also, 29 C.F.R. §§ 516.2 et seq. 85. Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members were covered employees entitled to the protection of the Ohio Wage Act. 86. During times material to this complaint, Defendant violated the Ohio Wage Act with respect to Named Plaintiff and the Ohio Rule 23 Class Members by failing to properly maintain accurate records of all hours Named Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class Members worked each workday and within each workweek. 87. In violating the Ohio Wage Act, Defendant acted willfully and with reckless disregard of clearly applicable Ohio Wage Act provisions. FLSA – COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME R.C. 4111.03 — RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR UNPAID OVERTIME R.C. 4113.15 — RULE 23 CLASS ACTION FOR OPPA VIOLATION RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS OF THE OHIO WAGE ACT

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22. Only licensed real estate brokers and salespersons can assist buyers and sellers with the purchase, sale, lease or exchange of real property. 23. To become licensed, an applicant generally must satisfactorily complete the agent curriculum in real estate education and pass a written examination. 24. A real estate broker negotiates agreements to sell, exchange, purchase, rent or lease interests in real property for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration for another person. 25. A salesperson must be affiliated with a broker, either as an employee or as an independent contractor, and work under the supervision of the broker. A salesperson cannot operate his own real estate business. 27. The standard practice in the residential real estate industry is to compensate brokers and agents with commissions that are calculated as a percentage of a home’s sale price. Commissions are paid by the seller when the home sells. 28. Brokers or their individual salespersons may act as the agent for either the buyer or the seller, and in some cases both, in connection with home sales. 29. The broker’s compensation is specified in the listing agreement between the seller of the property and his or her broker (i.e., the seller-broker or listing broker). In addition to setting the commission, the listing agreement also typically includes terms granting the broker the exclusive right to market and sell; setting the length of time the broker is given to sell the real property; setting the listing price; and other listing terms. 30. When the buyer is represented by a broker, the seller or the seller-broker pays the buyer-broker a commission out of the total commission paid by the seller. Accordingly, the buyer-brokers — who are agents of the buyer and adversarial to the sellers — receive their compensation from sellers, not from buyers they represent. 31. The listing agreement typically states that a portion of the commission paid by the seller will be paid to the broker representing a buyer if the buyer has a broker. 32. The online Pinergy listing states the amount of commission the seller will pay the buyer’s broker. It is typically expressed as a percentage of the sales price such as, for example, 3 percent. 34. According to NAR, there are 25,515 Realtors in Massachusetts, 5,227 in Rhode Island, and 6,472 in New Hampshire. B. Multiple Listing Services and “Pinergy” 35. State and local Realtor associations own and operate in their markets a centralized database of properties listed for sale in the region known as a Multiple Listing Service or “MLS.” The MLS that is the subject of this action is Pinergy, which is owned and administered by MLS PIN. 36. Pinergy is a joint venture among the competing Broker Defendants to facilitate the publishing and sharing of information about homes for sale in Pinergy ‘s geographic area. The membership in Pinergy is generally comprised of nearly all residential real estate brokers and their affiliated agents in Pinergy’s service area. Listing a property for sale on Pinergy is essential to marketing a property effectively to prospective buyers. 38. By virtue of nearly industry-wide participation and control over important data, brokers and broker-controlled entities offering Pinergy possess and exercise market power in the markets for the provision of real estate brokerage services to home buyers and sellers within Pinergy’s service area. 39. According to t360.com, as of December 5, 2020, Pinergy was the seventh largest MLS in the country with 41,537 members. 40. As alleged herein, the use of Pinergy is governed by rules and regulations. Defendants enforce Pinergy’s rules, policies and practices. 41. The website for MLS PIN has a page on which complaints can be filed. The webpage instructs that the form can be used “to report a listing that does not appear in MLS or an existing listing that you believe violates MLS PIN Rules.” 42. The website also touts the MLS PIN’s enforcement efforts to enforce its rules and regulations. According to the “Audits, Warnings & Fines” webpage, in September 2020 alone, there were 14 audits, 18 fines, and 54 warnings. C. The Buyer-Broker Commission Rule in MLS PIN’s Rules and Regulations 43. MLS PIN promulgates its Rules and Regulations governing the use of Pinergy (“MLS PIN Rules”). 45. Additionally, Note 1 to Section 5 of the MLS PIN Rules further states, in relevant part: In Filing a Listing with the Service, a Participant is deemed to be making blanket unilateral offers of compensation to the other Participants in the Service. The Participant therefore shall specify on each Listing Filed with the Service the compensation being offered to the other Participants. (Emphasis added.) 46. Section 5 warns that the seller broker may not change the offered commission as the result of any negotiation or cooperation with a buyer broker. Section 5 states, in relevant part, that the Listing Broker may only offer a Participant compensation different from the compensation indicated on any Listing if: (1) the Listing Broker informs the Participant in writing of such proposed change in compensation in advance of the Participant’s producing an offer to purchase or, in the case of an Auction Listing, in advance of the Participant’s registering a prospective bidder for participation in the Auction, and (2) the change in the listed compensation is not the result of any agreement or other cooperative activity between the Listing Broker and any one or more of the other Participants or Subscribers. (Emphasis added.) 47. The rules described in Section 5 of the MLS PIN Rules shall be referred to herein as the “Buyer-Broker Commission Rule.” 48. A “Listing Broker” means “the Individual Participant or Participant Firm who or which Files a Listing with the Service.” 49. A “Participant” means, in relevant part, “any individual or sole proprietorship and any partnership, corporation, limited liability company or other legal entity which Participates in the Service . . . .” “Participation” is available only to real estate brokers licensed by the one or more of the Subscription States that “abide[] fully by these Rules and Regulations and the policies of the Service.” 51. All participants of MLS PIN agree to be bound by the MLS PIN Rules. The MLS PIN Participant Agreement/Application states, in relevant part: PARTICIPANT’S AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND: -- Participant agrees that Participant and all members of Participant’s firm who utilize the multiple listing service (the “Service”) of MLS Property Information Network, Inc. (the “Company”) in any manner will comply with the Rules and Regulations and the policies of the Company and the Service as established or as amended from time to time, copies of which have been made available to Participant and are available at all times to Participant on the company’s website (www.mlspin.com). (Emphasis added.) 52. Participants also agree to pay all compensation offered to cooperating brokers. The MLS PIN Participant Agreement/Application states, in relevant part: PAYMENT OF FEES TO COOPERATING BROKERS: -- Participant hereby agrees, on Participant’s own behalf and on behalf of Participant’s firm, to pay, or cause to be paid, in a complete and timely manner, as provided in the Company’s Rules and Regulations, any and all compensation offered to cooperating brokers in connection with a listing made with the Service by Participant or by any agent or member of Participant’s firm or any of Participant’s offices. If full payment to a cooperating broker is not made in a timely manner, the Company may impose sanctions on Participant and/or on the listing agent or member of Participant’s firm or any of Participant’s offices. The sanctions may include suspension of access to the Service. (Emphasis added.) 53. The MLS PIN Rules are enforced by the local Realtors and Realtor associations that own and manage MLS PIN. 54. Given the commercial necessity of having access to an MLS, real estate brokers and individual realtors must comply with MLS PIN Rules. 56. Seller-brokers list their client’s property on Pinergy as required by the MLS PIN Rules and to ensure that buyer-brokers and prospective buyers are aware of the property. If a seller-broker does not list a client’s property on Pinergy, buyer-brokers will not show that property to prospective buyers. Pinergy also acts as the main source of listings for online websites, such as Zillow, through which many prospective homebuyers find homes. A home that is not listed on an MLS is very hard to find for prospective homebuyers. 57. The Buyer-Broker Commission Rule obligates a seller-broker, on behalf of the seller, to make blanket, unilateral offers of compensation to buyer-brokers when listing a home on Pinergy. If a buyer represented by a broker purchases the home, the buyer-broker receives the offered compensation. 58. The following example illustrates how this process typically works: (a) a homeowner enters into a contract with a seller-broker, in which the seller agrees to pay the seller-broker six percent in total commissions in exchange for marketing and facilitating the sale of the home; (b) the seller-broker then makes a blanket, unilateral offer of a three percent commission to every buyer-broker when it lists the home on Pinergy; (c) a buyer-broker shows the property to a buyer client, who buys the home for $500,000; (d) the seller-broker receives six percent of the sales price ($30,000) from the seller; and (e) the seller-broker then pays three percent of the sales price ($15,000) to the buyer-broker. D. A. The Real Estate Industry Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C § 1 175. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each of the foregoing allegations of this Complaint. 176. Defendants have engaged in a continuing contract, combination, or conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15

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(against all Defendants) Unjust Enrichment (against all Defendants) , Injunctive Relief (against all Defendants) Money Had and Received 22. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure I .220(bX I ) and I .220(b)(2) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as members of the following class: All persons in the United States who purchased an appliance made from Samsung adve¡'tised as "stainless steel" (the "Class"). 23. Subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and discovery, the foregoing definition of the Class may be expanded or narrowed by amendment or amended complaint. Specifically excluded from the proposed Class are the Defendants, its officers, directors, agents, trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, principals, servants, partners, joint venturers, or entities controlled by the Defendants, and its heirs, successors, assigns, or other persons or entities related to or affiliated with the Defendants and/or its officers and/or directors, or any of them; the Judge assigned to this action, and any member of the Judge's immediate family. 24. Numerosily. The members of the Class are so numerous that their individual joinder is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis allege, that the proposed Class contains many thousands of members. The precis. nutb.r of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. The true number of Class members are known by the Samsung, however, and thus, may be notified of the pendency of this action by first class mail, electronic mail, and by published notice, electronic and otherwise. 26. Typícality. Plaintiff s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class in that the Defendants sold a product(s) to Plaintiff advertising that they were composed of a specific metal, when it fact it was a baser metal with a laminate/painted surface. All the Class members' claims would therefore be typical. 27 . Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel highly experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiffhas no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Class. 29. In the alternative, the Class may be also certified because: (Ð the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a fisk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants; (g) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and/or E For example, Plaintiff would be hard pressed to find a law firm willing to engage in a multi-year scorched-earth litigation with Samsung, a well-capitalized foreign corporation with revenues of $305 billion (æ of 2014), to litigate her claim on an individual basis, no matter how meritorious. .Seø https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samsung (læt accessed April 13, 2018). Pursuing a lawsuit pro se would similæly get Plaintiff nowhere. ,Sea https://www.nytimes.coml20l7l09ll l/us/politics/judge-richæd- posner-retirement.html (where noted jurist Judge Richæd A. Posner, formerly of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, said that "most judges regæd [pro se litigants] æ kind of trash not worth the time of a federal judge"). I 33. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs I through 32, as though fully set forth herein. 34, During the class period, Plaintiff and Class members conferred a benefit upon Defendants without knowledge of the substandard products, benefits that were non-gratuitous. 35. Defendants acceþted or retained the non-gratuitous benefits conferred by Plaintiff and the Class members despite Defendants' knowledge of the substandard products. 38. Accordingly, Plaintiffand members of the Class seek full restitution of Defendants' enrichment, benefits and ill-gotten gains acquired because of the unlawful and/or wrongful conduct alleged herein. 39. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. 40. Plaintiffseeks to obtain a pecuniary benefit for the Class in the form of all reimbursement, restitution and disgorgement from Defendants. Plaintiff s counsel are entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses as a result of the conference of a pecuniary benefit on behalf of the Class and will seek an award of such fees and expenses at the appropriate time. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and allothers similarly situated, pray for relief and judgment against Defendants as follows: A. For an order certifying the Class under the appropriate provisions of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure L220, as well as any appropriate subclasses, and appointing Plaintiff and her legal counsel to represent the Class; B. Awarding reimbursement, restitution and disgorgement from Defendants of the benefits conferred by Plaintiff and the Class; C. For pre- and post-judgment interest to the Class, as allowed by law; D. For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to counsel for the Class if and when pecuniary benefits are obtained on behalf of the Class; and 10 41. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs I through 32, as though fully set forth herein. 42. This cause of action is pled in the alternative of all contract-based causes of action. 43. As a result of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have improperly received monies from Plaintiff and the Class it was not legally entitled to receive. 44. Plaintiff and members of the Class have a claim for improperly paid monies to Defendants resulting from Defendants' improper marketing and selling of the Products. 45. Equity and good conscience require that Defendants pay over such additional monies, described above, to Plaintiff and the Class. 46. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' misconduct, Plaintiff and members of the Class have suffered injury and are entitled to reimbursement, rest¡tut¡on and disgorgement in the âmount necessary to restore them to the position they would have been in if Defendants have not sold them the fraudulent Products. 47. Plaintiff seeks to obtain a pecuniary benefit for the Class in the form of reimbursement, restitution and disgorgement from Defendants. Plaintiff s counselare entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses as a result of the conferment of a pecuniary benefit on behalf of the Class, and will seek an award of such fees and expenses at the appropriate time. 11 48. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs I through 32 as though fully set forth herein. 49. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for future unlawfulconduct by Defendants in connection with their manufacture, marketing and sale of appliances fraudulently being sold as "stainless steel" kitchen appliances. 50. Defendants continue to manufacture, market and sell kitchen appliances as "stainless steel" appliances when they are not "stainless steel." 51. The continuing nature of Defendants' acts would necessitate a separate action by Plaintiffand each Class member for damages for each act and would subject Plaintiff, each Class 72 CIVIL DIVISION CASE NO. CLASS REPRESENTATION vs. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) .ú \I\\tfft \\ Defendants. Case No.:_ Judge: RQBYN FERRIS Plaintiff VS, SAMST.JNG ELECTRONTCS CO.. LTp.. SAMSUNC FLECTRONICS AMEzuCA. INC. Defendant II. ROBYN FERRIS, AN INDIVIDUAL, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

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19.   Plaintiff alleges that Equifax is familiar with credit reporting industry standards and subscribes thereto. 20.   Plaintiff alleges that Equifax understands that deviation from credit reporting industry standards can and often does result in denial of credit, higher interest rates, and prompts those making credit decisions to draw a more negative inference from the reported data than if Equifax reported in accordance with the recognized industry standard. 21.   Plaintiff alleges that all actions alleged herein by Equifax was done knowingly, intentionally, and in reckless disregard for credit reporting industry standards in an attempt to purposefully undermine Plaintiff’s ability to reorganize and repair Plaintiff’s FICO Score. 22.   In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that Equifax’s actions were the result of reckless policies and procedures that inevitably led to inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete credit reporting. a.   FICO 23.   FICO Inc. (“FICO”) is a leading analytics software company with its principal headquarters located in San Jose California. FICO has over 130 patents related to their analytics and decision management technology, and regularly uses mathematical algorithms to predict consumer behavior including credit risk. 24.   The FICO Score has become the standard measure of consumer credit risk in the United States and is used in ninety percent of lending decisions. 25.   A FICO score consists of a three-digit number summarizing a consumer’s credit risk or likelihood to repay a loan. FICO periodically updates its scoring models resulting in multiple FICO Score versions. 94.   At all times relevant to this matter, Plaintiff was an individual residing within the State of California. 95.   Furthermore, Equifax conducted business within the State of California at all times relevant. 96.   On or about April 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed for a no asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California in Fresno. Plaintiff’s case was assigned Case Number 13-bk-25655 (the “Bankruptcy”).5 97.   The obligations (“Debt”) to Wells Fargo for a consumer credit card were scheduled in the Bankruptcy. 98.   Wells Fargo did not have their Debt ordered to be “non dischargeable” pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523 et seq.

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19. Since 2001, Costco has distributed, marketed, and sold the Kirkland Signature™ line of dietary supplements. These products include: (1) Kirkland - 7 - Signature™ Extra Strength Glucosamine/Chondroitin Sulfate; and (2) Kirkland Signature™ Extra Strength Glucosamine HCL and MSM. 20. The Kirkland Glucosamine products are sold online and in Costco stores nationwide. The following are screen shots of the Kirkland Glucosamine products: 21. Since the Products’ launch, Costco has consistently conveyed the message to consumers throughout Illinois that the Kirkland Glucosamine products, with their “extra strength” formulas are clinically proven to deliver “optimum mobility” and will protect and build cartilage. Defendant’s renewal and rejuvenation representations are false, misleading and deceptive. 22. Defendant represents that the claimed health benefits are achieved through the combination of ingredients in the Products. The primary active ingredient in both Kirkland Glucosamine products is glucosamine hydrochloride. Glucosamine is an amino sugar that the body produces and distributes in cartilage and other connective tissue. The Products’ labeling and packaging states the benefits associated with taking glucosamine hydrochloride: “Glucosamine is a basic building block for cartilage, synovial fluid and other connective tissues, which are needed for healthy structure and function of joints.” There is no competent and reliable scientific evidence that taking glucosamine―let alone through oral administration―results in the body metabolizing it - 8 - into something that builds cartilage or improves joint structure or function. In fact, clinical cause and effect studies have found no causative link between glucosamine hydrochloride supplementation and joint renewal or rejuvenation or the relief of the two major symptoms of arthritis. 23. The chondroitin sulfate in Kirkland Glucosamine Chondroitin, is a complex carbohydrate found in the body’s connective tissues. On the Product’s labeling and packaging, Defendant represents that chondroitin sulfate “protects existing cartilage and serves as a building block for healthy new cartilage.” There is no competent and reliable scientific evidence that taking chondroitin―let alone through oral administration―results in the body metabolizing it into something that assists in building joint cartilage. Clinical cause and effect studies have found no causative link between chondroitin supplementation and joint renewal or rejuvenation or the relief of the two major symptoms of arthritis. 24. The Methylsulfonylmethane (“MSM”) found in Kirkland Glucosamine and MSM products is an organic sulfur compound found in fruits, corn, tomatoes, tea, coffee, and milk. On the Product’s labeling and packaging, Defendant claims that MSM “is a necessary component that works in conjunction with Glucosamine to provide the building blocks of collagen, an important component of healthy joints and connective tissue. Clinical research shows MSM increases glucosamine’s effectiveness.” There is no competent and reliable scientific evidence that taking MSM―let alone through oral administration―results in the body metabolizing it into something that builds cartilage or improves joint structure or function, or makes glucosamine work more effectively. Clinical cause and effect studies have found no causative link between MSM supplementation and joint renewal or rejuvenation or the relief of the two major symptoms of arthritis. 25. In fact, numerous clinical cause and effect studies have found no causative link between any of the primary active ingredients in the Kirkland Glucosamine products - 9 - alone, or in combination, and joint renewal and rejuvenation. Nevertheless, Defendant without any scientifically valid confirmation that Kirkland Glucosamine is an effective joint treatmentt—let alone an effective treatment for all joints in the human body, for adults of all ages—prominently claims on the Products’ packaging and labeling that Kirkland Glucosamine, with its “extra strength” formula, will “deliver” “optimum joint mobility”, rebuild cartilage and improve joint function. Front and side shots of the two Kirkland Glucosamine product labels appear as follows 34. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Class members pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class: Multi-State Class Action All persons who, within the applicable statute of limitations under their respective state’s consumer fraud act,5 purchased Kirkland Signature™ Extra Strength Glucosamine Chondroitin Sulfate and/or Kirkland Signature™ Extra Strength Glucosamine with MSM. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and those who purchased the Kirkland Glucosamine products for the purpose of resale. 35. In the alternative, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated Illinois residents pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the 5 See footnote 3 for the preliminary listing of said states. - 13 - Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and seeks certification of the following Class: Illinois Class Action All Illinois residents who, within the applicable statute of limitations, purchased Kirkland Signature™ Extra Strength Glucosamine Chondroitin Sulfate and/or Kirkland Signature™ Extra Strength Glucosamine with MSM. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers and directors, and those who purchased the Kirkland Glucosamine products for the purpose of resale. 36. Members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the proposed Class contains many thousands of members. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 37. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. The common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to, the following: • Whether the representations discussed herein that Defendant made about its Products were or are misleading, or reasonably likely to deceive; • Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were deceived in some manner by Defendant’s representations; • Whether the alleged conduct constitutes violations of the laws asserted herein; • Whether Plaintiff and Class members have been injured and the proper measure of their losses as a result of those injuries; and • Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of compensatory/actual damages. 38. The claims asserted by Plaintiff in this action are typical of the claims of - 14 - the members of the Class, as the claims arise from the same course of conduct by Defendant and the relief sought is common. Plaintiff and Class members suffered injury and damages caused by their purchase of the Kirkland Glucosamine products marketed, distributed and sold by Defendant. 39. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in both consumer protection and class litigation. 40. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The expense and burden of individual litigation would make it impracticable or impossible for proposed Class members to prosecute their claims individually. It would thus be virtually impossible for the members of the Class, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs done to them. Furthermore, even if Class members could afford such individualized litigation, the court system could not. Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory judgments arising from the same set of facts. Individualized litigation would also increase the delay and expense to all parties and the court system from the issues raised by this action. By contrast, the class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual management difficulties under the circumstances here. 41. In the alternative, the Class also may be certified because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class thereby making appropriate final declaratory and/or injunctive relief with respect to the members of the Class as a whole. 42. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin and prevent Defendant from engaging in the acts described, and requiring - 15 - Defendant to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members. Unless a Class is certified, Defendant will retain monies received as a result of their conduct that were taken from Plaintiff and Class members. Unless a Class-wide injunction is issued, Defendant will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Class and the general public will continue to be misled. 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein. 44. In Illinois, the “Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act” 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 502/1, et seq. (“the Act”), like the consumer fraud acts of numerous other states across the nation, prohibits deceptive acts and practices in the sale of such products as Defendant’s Kirkland Glucosamine products. 45. Plaintiff and the Class were injured by Defendant’s deceptive misrepresentations, concealments and omissions and these misrepresentations, concealments and omissions were material and deceived Plaintiff and the Class. 49 Defendant does business in Illinois, sells and distributes its Kirkland Glucosamine products in Illinois, and engaged in deceptive acts and practices in connection with the sale of its Kirkland Glucosamine products in Illinois and elsewhere in the United States. 50. Defendant’s Products purchased by Plaintiff and the Class were “consumer items” as that term is defined under the Act. 51. Defendant misrepresented and deceptively concealed, suppressed and/or omitted the material information known to Defendant as set forth above concerning its Kirkland Glucosamine products which has caused damage and injury to Plaintiff and the Class. - 16 - 52. Defendant’s deceptive acts occurred in a course of conduct involving trade and commerce in Illinois and throughout the United States. 53. Defendant’s deceptive acts proximately caused actual injury and damage to Plaintiff and the Class. 54. Defendant intended Plaintiff and all Class members to rely on their deceptive acts. 55. The conduct of the Defendant constituted a consumer fraud under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act and similar laws in other states. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class pray as follows: a. That the Court enter an order certifying this action as a class action―either as a multi-state class or, in the alternative, as an Illinois class; b. That the Court enter an Order against Defendant awarding to Plaintiff and the Class compensatory/actual damages; c. Awarding declaratory and injunctive relief as permitted by law or equity, including enjoining Defendant from continuing the unlawful practices as set forth herein; d. Attorneys’ fees, expert fees and costs; and e. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. DATED: October 28, 2011 By: s/Stewart Weltman The Kirkland Glucosamine Products Violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act

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11. At all times material to this action, defendants were an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined by Section 203(s)(1) of the FLSA, and had annual gross volume of sales which exceeded $500,000. 12. Plaintiff has been employed by defendants within the last three years before the filing of this lawsuit. 13. Plaintiff is employed by defendants at the MSM facility located at 1055 Ridgecrest Dr., Goodlettsville, TN 37072. 14. At all times material, Plaintiff has been employed as a customer care specialist and treated as an exempt employee. 15. Plaintiff’s primary duties included answering calls from customers and receiving relevant information which was passed on to the proper department for processing. 16. At all times material, Plaintiff did not supervise any other employees. 17. At all times material, Plaintiff’s primary duty did not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment. 18. While Plaintiff has been employed by MSM, MSM is an “employer” of Plaintiff as defined by Section 203(d) of the FLSA. 19. While Plaintiff has been employed by MSM, Plaintiff is an “employee” of MSM as defined by Section 203(e)(1) of the FLSA, and has worked for MSM within the territory of the United States within three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit. 20. While Plaintiff has been employed by MSM, Plaintiff is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined in Section 203(r) and 203 (s). 21. The overtime provisions of the FLSA set forth in Section 207 applies to MSM. 22. While Plaintiff has been employed by EEC, EEC is an “employer” of Plaintiff as defined by Section 203(d) of the FLSA. 23. While Plaintiff has been employed by EEC, Plaintiff is an “employee” of EEC as defined by Section 203(e)(1) of the FLSA, and has worked for EEC within the territory of the United States within three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit. 24. While Plaintiff has been employed by EEC, Plaintiff is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined in Section 203(r) and 203 (s). 25. The overtime provisions of the FLSA set forth in Section 207 applies to EEC. 26. While Plaintiff has been employed by REMCO, REMCO is an “employer” of Plaintiff as defined by Section 203(d) of the FLSA. 27. While Plaintiff has been employed by REMCO, Plaintiff is an “employee” of REMCO as defined by Section 203(e)(1) of the FLSA, and has worked for REMCO within the territory of the United States within three years preceding the filing of this lawsuit. 28. While Plaintiff has been employed by REMCO, Plaintiff is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined in Section 203(r) and 203 (s). 29. The overtime provisions of the FLSA set forth in Section 207 applies to REMCO. 30. Plaintiff regularly works five days per week. 31. Plaintiff regularly begins working at 6:45 am and continues working until after 5 pm without an uninterrupted lunch break. 32. During some workweeks, Plaintiff was required to answer phone calls after work and on weekends. 33. At all times material, Defendants regularly fail to pay Plaintiff the overtime rate of one and on-half times her regular rate for all hours worked over 40 in some workweeks. 34. At all times material, William Emory was and is the manager of EEC. 35. At all times material, William Emory made and makes decisions with respect to day-to-day operations, hiring, firing work schedules, pay policies, and compensation. Mr. Emory was and is an employer of Plaintiff at all relevant times. 36. At all times material, Gary Garrett has supervisory control over Plaintiff and has knowledge of the duties performed by Plaintiff, the hours worked by Plaintiff, and knowledge that Plaintiff was not paid the overtime premium for all hours worked over 40 in some workweeks. Mr. Garrett was and is an employer of Plaintiff at all relevant times. Count I Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act Overtime Wage Violation 37. As a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with Section 207 of the FLSA, Defendants are jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff for overtime back pay. 38. In addition to the amount of unpaid overtime wages owed to Plaintiff, Plaintiff is also entitled to recover an equal amount of liquidated damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 216(b). 39. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Collective Action Allegations 40. Plaintiff is aware of other similarly situated individuals who have worked for the Defendants within the last three years and who have been improperly compensated in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the lawsuit by filing a consent with the Court pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA. Specifically, Plaintiff is aware of other current and former employees of Defendants Specifically, Plaintiff is aware of other current and former hourly employees of Defendants whose primary duties were non-exempt and who were not paid one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 41. Pursuant to Section 216(b), attached hereto and filed with this Complaint as Exhibit A is a Consent to Become Party Plaintiff. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA, prays for the following relief: a. Designation of this cause as a collective action on behalf of the class and prompt issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), apprising putative members of the pendency of this action, permitting other members of the class to assert timely FLSA claims in this action by filing individual Consents 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); b. An award of compensation for unpaid overtime compensation owed to Plaintiff and other members of the class at the applicable FLSA overtime rate of pay; c. An award of liquidated damages to Plaintiff and other members of the class pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); d. An award of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the applicable legal rate to Plaintiff and other members of the class pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); e. A ruling that the three-year statutory period for willful violations under the FLSA shall apply; f. An award of reasonable attorney’s fees; g. An award of the costs and expenses of this action; and h. Such other, further general legal and equitable relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled.

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15. Originally founded in Hartford, Connecticut in 1853, Aetna is an American managed health care company that sells traditional, consumer directed health care and life insurance plans. Through its network of affiliates and subsidiaries throughout the United States, Aetna offers a range of insurance products including medical, pharmaceutical, dental, behavioral health, long-term care and disability plans. Aetna is a Fortune 100 company with over $60 billion in reported annual revenue. 16. Aetna’s health insurance plans cover an estimated 23 million Americans, including the proposed class in this lawsuit. Aetna states that as a “health care leader, we believe that our corporate responsibility starts with helping people live healthier lives.” Aetna’s Chairman, CEO and President Mark Bertolini claims that Aetna’s “values carry through our thoughts and actions every day, inspire innovation in our products and services, and drive our commitment to excellence in all we do.” Aetna claims that its core value of “Caring” mandates that “[w]e listen and respect our customers and each other so we can act with insight, understanding and compassion.” B. Aetna Improper Procedures 17. Former Medical Director for Aetna, Dr. Jay Ken Iinuma, admitted under oath that “he never looked at patients’ records when deciding whether to approve or deny care.” He further admitted to “following Aetna’s training, in which nurses reviewed records and made recommendations to him.” 23. Plaintiffs brings this action on their own behalf and pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (c)(4), Plaintiffs seeks certification of a Nationwide class and a California class. The nationwide class is initially defined as follows: All persons residing in the United States who are insured with Aetna (the “Nationwide Class”). The California class is initially defined as follows: All persons residing in California who are insured with Aetna (the “California Class”). 32. Plaintiffs incorporate the substantive allegations contained in each and every paragraph of this Complaint. 33. Aetna marketed and solicited and invited Plaintiffs and the members of the Class to have insurance with their company. Plaintiffs and Class Members accepted Aetna’s offers and insured with Aetna. 34. When Plaintiffs and Class Members insured through Aetna, they paid monies so that they could receive the best medical insurance. In so doing, Plaintiffs and Class Members entered into implied contracts with Aetna to which Aetna agreed to properly review their medical records and give coverage when appropriate after a careful review by a medical physician. 35. Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have purchased Aetna’s insurance in the absence of the implied contract between them and Aetna. 36. Plaintiffs and Class Members fully performed their obligations under the implied contracts with Aetna. 37. Aetna breached the implied contracts it made with Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to properly review medical records to ascertain proper coverage of Plaintiffs and Class Members. 38. As a direct and proximate result of Aetna’s breaches of the implied contracts between Aetna and Plaintiffs and Class Members, Plaintiffs and Class Members sustained actual losses and damages as described in detail above. 42. Plaintiffs repeats and fully incorporates the allegations contained in each and every paragraph of this Complaint. 43. In exchange for Plaintiff and class members payments of premiums, Aetna issued a health care policy, the material terms of which include, without limitation, that Plaintiff and class members were to have timely access to and coverage for medically necessary treatment. 44. Notwithstanding Aetna's legal and contractual obligations, Aetna repeatedly and consistently refused to provide benefits for Plaintiff and class members, as outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. 45. Therefore, by refusing to provide Gillen with timely benefits, defendants not only breached the contract, but also acted unreasonably and subjected themselves to bad faith liability. 53. Plaintiffs repeats and fully incorporates the allegations contained in each and every allegation of this Complaint. A. Aetna Provides Healthcare Related Services Nationwide Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide and California Classes) Breach of Implied Contract (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide and California Classes) Breach of Contract (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide and California Classes) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 Unlawful Business Practices and Unfair Competition (On Behalf of the California Class) Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 Fraudulent/Deceptive Business Practices (On Behalf of the California Class)

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(Failure to compensate for minimum wage) (Failure to compensate for work performed “off the clock”) (Unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA) 17. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES, files this case as an “opt in” collective action, as it is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 18. The class that Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES, seeks to represent may be described as follows: All current and former employees of Defendant that worked at any apartment or rental facility location owned or operated by Defendant in Texas during the class period, and claims that he or she either failed to receive all of his or her minimum wage pay in violation of 29 U.S.C.201 et. seq . and seeks payment for such lawfully earned minimum wage pay, or (b) failed to receive all of his or her overtime compensation, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 201 et. seq. 20. Those persons who choose to opt in, referred to as the “Plaintiff’s class”, will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of their written consents to sue will be filed with the Court. 21. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES contends that this action is appropriate for collective action status because Defendant herein has acted in the same manner with regard to all members of the Plaintiff’s class. 22. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant has been subject to the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. 201 et.seq. 23. For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is defined as such period commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing thereafter. 24. Defendant employed Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES, from June 1, 2012 until April 5, 2013 at Defendant’s apartment complex located at 6233 Gulfton Street, Houston, Texas 77081 and known commonly as the “Westward Square” apartments. 25. During the period of his employment that Plaintiff has worked for Defendant, Plaintiff has worked as a porter. 26. During his employment and in the routine performance of his day-to-day job duties., Plaintiff has performed non-exempt work, during a significant period of most days, as classified by the Act, because the performance of Plaintiff’s job required it and because Defendant’s management required the performance of those non-exempted job duties, as a condition of Plaintiff’s continued employment. 28. During the beginning of Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff was paid a regular hourly rate of $5.00 per hour. Defendant violated the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff and others like him, at least $7.25 per hour. 29. During Plaintiff’s employment, while working for Defendant, Plaintiff was required to work overtime hours in excess of 40 hours worked during many seven-day workweeks. 30. Further, during these hours worked, Plaintiff has performed the function of his job, which included the performance duties typically performed by “hourly” paid non-exempt employees because the job required it and the Defendant’s management required it, as a condition of Plaintiff’s continued employment. 31. Plaintiff often worked in excess of 40 hours per week during his employment with the Defendant. Plaintiff’s regular schedule was Monday through Friday from 7:00 o’clock A.M. until 4:00 o’clock P.M., and on Saturday’s from 7:00 o’clock A.M. until 12:00 o’clock P.M. 32. Plaintiff and others like him, were routinely required to work in excess of their weekly schedule, depending upon the necessity of the day’s work. Sometimes Plaintiff would work until 7 or 8 o’clock in the evening during the week. Defendant demanded that Plaintiff and others like him perform the extra work as a condition of their employment. 33. On certain weeks, Plaintiff was required to be “on call” and would have to report to repair apartment rental units that had an emergency. 34. During Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff was never paid for more than $200.00 per week, despite the fact that he worked more than 40 hours per week. 36. Defendant failed to pay statutory overtime as required by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. 37. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully written herein. 38. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES, and all others similarly situated are considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to interpret the Act. 39. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES, and all others similarly situated are entitled to receive overtime pay for all hours they have worked in excess of 40 during each seven-day workweek. 40. Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours they worked in excess of 40 per week. 41. Defendant has violated 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees “overtime” pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 42. Defendant has failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the FLSA, and has willfully and deliberately sought to evade the requirements of the federal statute. 44. Defendant has failed to keep or record time records reflecting what hour’s employees, such as the Plaintiff and those similarly situated actually worked. 45. The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 46. No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, overtime pay for hours worked over forty per week. 47. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding overtime compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated. 48. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid overtime compensation from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. 49. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law. 50. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraph is re-alleged as if fully written herein. 51. Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendants that is in violation of the FLSA. 52. Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendant has been imposed on other workers. 53. Other, similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages. 55. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES’ experience is typical of the experience of the member’s class as it pertains to compensation. 56. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do not prevent collective treatment. 57. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied overtime compensation for hour worked in excess of 40 per week, or denied minimum wage are similarly situated. 58. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 59. All current and former employees of Defendant’s apartment complexes who at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment who were denied overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any given workweek are properly included as members of the class. 60. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully written herein. 61. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES, and all others similarly situated are considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to interpret the Act. 63. The Defendants’ conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 64. No lawful exemption excused Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated for the statutorily required minimum wage. 65. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding minimum wage compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated. 66. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid, from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. 67. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law. 68. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraph is re-alleged as if fully written herein. 69. Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendants that is in violation of the FLSA. 70. Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendant has been imposed on other workers. 71. Other, similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages. 73. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES’s, experience is typical of the experience of the member’s class as it pertains to compensation. 74. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do not prevent collective treatment. 75. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied minimum wage are similarly situated. 76. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 77. All current and former employees of Defendant’s apartment complexes who at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment who were denied minimum wage compensation in any given workweek are properly included as members of the class. X. 78. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES, and all others similarly situated is considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to interpret the Act. 79. Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their entitled pay for all hours they worked in a workweek. 81. Defendant failed to maintain a complete, accurate, and contemporaneous record of the number of hours worked per workweek by Plaintiff and by all other similarly situated employees, as required by law. 82. Defendant engaged in wage theft by not compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated for work they were required to perform at Defendant’s bar as part of their regular job duties by forcing Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees to clock out after the bar closed, but continue to perform work, oftentimes over an hour after Plaintiff had clocked out. 83. Defendant demanded this wage theft as a condition of Plaintiff and all those similarly situated, continued employment. 84. The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 85. No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and all others similarly situated for hours worked, but not recorded or paid in a workweek 86. Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated for hours worked, but not recorded or paid. 87. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to the unpaid compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid, from the date they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial. 88. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law. XI. 90. Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy of the Defendant that is in violation of the FLSA. 91. Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices and policies of Defendant has been imposed on other workers. 92. Other, similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages. 93. Accordingly, Defendant’s pattern and practice of failing to compensate employees for work performed, but not recorded or paid, as required by the FLSA results from the Defendant’s general application of policies and practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the members class. 94. Plaintiff GUILLERMO MONTES’ experience is typical of the experience of the member’s class as it pertains to compensation. 95. The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do not prevent collective treatment. 96. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are denied compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid, are similarly situated. 97. All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who were the victims of the wage theft scheme engaged in by the Defendant, are similarly situated 98. Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts.

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10. Within four years prior to the filing of this action, Defendants—whether directly, through affiliate marketers, or otherwise—used equipment to dial the residential and cellular telephone numbers of potential customers, including Kenzik. On information and belief, the dialing equipment used had the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention. 11. Many if not all of these calls also utilized artificial and/or prerecorded voice messages to market Kiley & Kiley’s services to lower interest rates on credit card debt and more favorable payment terms. 12. Unfortunately, many of the people whose residential and cell phones were called as a result of Defendants’ telemarketing practices never actually consented to receive such calls, and many numbers were also called despite direct requests to stop and/or registration with the National Do Not Call Registry. 13. These are unsolicited “cold calls” made for the purpose of generating leads for sales of Defendants’ products and/or services. On information and belief, many of the individuals targeted by Kiley & Kiley and its lead generators were called more than once. 14. Kenzik received multiple prerecorded message calls from Kiley & Kiley and Kiley & Kiley failed to honor the National Do Not Call Registry or even direct requests that the calls stop. 27. Starting on or about June 3, 2014, and likely even earlier, Kenzik received calls to her residential telephone line—sometimes multiple times a day—using prerecorded voice messages to advertising its free credit card processing services. 29. Upon information and belief, this statement is true: The calls were made by Kiley & Kiley in order to promote its goods and services. Alternatively, the calls were made on behalf of Kiley & Kiley. 30. As evidenced by, among other things, the large volume of calls and their use of prerecorded voice messages, many if not all of these calls from or on behalf of Defendants were made using an automatic telephone dialing system, equipment having the capacity to dial Kenzik’s number without human intervention. On information and belief, no human being pressed the digits of Kenzik’s residential telephone number into a phone to make any call to Kenzik. On further information and belief, at least some of Kiley & Kiley’s lead generation telemarketing calls were made using an automatic telephone dialing system service. 31. Kenzik received calls on at least the following dates: June 3, 2014 June 4, 2014, June 18, 2014, June 23, 2014, June 25, 2014, June 26, 2014, June 30, 2014, July 1, 2014, July 14, 2014, July 16, 2014, July 17, 2014, July 22, 2014, July 29, 2014, Aug 1, 2014, Aug 4, 2014, Aug 5, 2014, Aug 6, 2014, Aug 8, 2014, Aug 9, 2014, Aug 11, 2014, Aug 12, 2014, Aug 13, 2014, Aug 14, 2014, Aug 15, 2014, and Aug 18, 2014. Discovery from Defendants or third parties that work with Defendants to promote their goods and services will almost certainly show that there were more calls. 32. Kenzik has never given Defendants permission to contact her residential telephone line, whether through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system, prerecorded or artificial voice, or otherwise. At all relevant times Kenzik’s number was registered with the National Do-Not-Call Registry. 34. At all times relevant, Kenzik’s residential phone line was also called after being registered with the National Do Not Call Registry. 35. Kenzik was damaged by Defendants’ calls. Her privacy was wrongfully invaded, and Kenzik has become understandably aggravated with having to deal with the frustration of repeated, unwanted phone calls forcing her to divert attention away from her work and other activities, especially given Defendants’ complete disregard of her requests to cease and the registration of her number with the National Do Not Call Registry. 36. Kenzik realleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. Kenzik brings this Count I on behalf of herself and the Class defined below, only. 37. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 38. “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (quoting In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991: Request of ACA Int’l for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 23 FCC Rcd 559, 566 (2007). 40. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendants had first obtained the express consent of the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendants did not have prior express permission or invitation to call the residential phone line of Plaintiff and the residential or cellular phone lines of other members of the putative Class when their calls were made. 41. As such, Defendants’ call were willful or, at a minimum, negligent. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(f)(1). 42. Defendants have, therefore, violated Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice to make non- emergency telephone calls to the residential phone line of Kenzik and the residential or cellular phone lines of the other members of the putative Class without their prior express permission or invitation. 43. As a result of Defendants’ conduct and pursuant to Section 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Kenzik and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Kenzik and the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 45. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a class (the “Section 227(b) Class”) defined as follows: All persons in the United States who, within four years prior to the filing of this action, Defendants or some person on Defendants’ behalf called on their residential or cell phone line, using an artificial or prerecorded voice or device with the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, where Defendants’ did not have prior express permission or invitation from the recipient to make such call. 46. Upon information and belief, Defendants called more than 100 phone numbers in the four years prior to the filing of this action utilizing a device with the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention or a message that had been recorded ahead of time, where Defendants did not have prior express permission for such call. 48. Kenzik’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the putative Class. The factual and legal bases of Defendants’ liability to Kenzik and the other members of the putative Class are the same: Defendants violated the TCPA by causing the residential and cellular telephone number of each member of the putative Class, including Kenzik, to be called using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice without prior express permission or invitation. 49. Kenzik will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Kenzik has no interests that might conflict with the interests of the Class. Kenzik is interested in pursuing her claims vigorously, and she has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex litigation, including with regards to the claims alleged herein. 50. Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual action would entail. There are, on information and belief, thousands of members of the putative Class, such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 52. Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Kenzik and the other members of the putative Class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the putative Class, should they even realize that their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. 53. The identity of the putative Class is, on information and belief, readily identifiable from the records of Defendants and/or any affiliated marketers. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, LINDA KENZIK, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, demands judgment in her favor and against Defendants, KILEY & KILEY, L.L.C. and JOHN DOES 1-10, jointly and severally, as follows: A. That the Court adjudge and decree that the present case may be properly maintained as a class action, appoint Kenzik as the representative of the class, and appoint Kenzik’s counsel as counsel for the class; B. That the Court Award actual monetary loss from such violations or the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) for each violation, whichever is greater; C. That the Court enjoin the Defendants from additional violations; and D. That the Court award pre-judgment interest, costs and such further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 54. Kenzik realleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. This Count II is brought on behalf of Kenzik and the Defendant-Specific DNC Class defined below, only. 55. It is a violation of the TCPA to make a telephone solicitation to any person that has asked not to receive such calls. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3). 56. Telemarketers like Kiley & Kiley must honor a do-not-call request immediately. In its July 3, 2003, Final Order implementing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3), the FCC explained: We note that the Commission’s rules require that entities must record company- specific do-not-call requests and place the subscriber’s telephone number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is made. Therefore, telemarketers with the capability to honor such company- specific do- not-call requests in less than thirty days must do so. We believe this determination adequately balances the privacy interests of those consumers that have requested not to be called with the interests of the telemarketing industry. Consumers expect their requests not to be called to be honored in a timely manner, and thirty days should be the maximum administrative time necessary for telemarketers to process that request. In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd 14014, 14069-14070 (2003). 57. Kiley & Kiley claims to be a technologically savvy company. Upon information and belief, that claim is true: Kiley & Kiley had the capacity to cease calling immediately upon demand, but instead made at least two additional calls to Plaintiff and each of the Defendant- Specific DNC Class members in spite of this. 59. A private right of action is available for consumers who have received more than one call within a twelve-month period, in violation of FCC regulations like 47 C.F.R. § 60. As a result of Defendants’ conduct and pursuant to Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA, Kenzik and the other members of the putative Defendant-Specific DNC Class were harmed and are each entitled to up to $500.00 in damages for each violation, which amount may be trebled if the violations are proven to have been willful or knowing. Kenzik and the Defendant-Specific DNC Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). Class Allegations 61. Kenzik brings this Count on behalf of a class (the “Defendant-Specific DNC Class”) defined as follows: All persons in the United States who, within four years prior to the filing of this action, ongoing, Defendants or some person on Defendants’ behalf called at least twice in any twelve month period in order to promote Kiley & Kiley goods and/or services, where both calls were made outside a reasonable time after a request that calls to the phone number stop. 62. Upon information and belief, Defendants called more than 40 phone numbers at least twice each in the four years prior to the filing of this action, where the recipient of such call had previously demanded that further calls promoting Defendants’ goods and/or services cease. 64. Kenzik’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the putative Company-Specific DNC Class. The factual and legal bases of Defendants’ liability to Kenzik and the other members of the putative Defendant-Specific DNC Class are the same: Defendants violated the TCPA by causing telemarketing calls to be made to persons after they had requested not to be called. 64.1200(d)(3). 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 65. Kenzik will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Defendant-Specific DNC Class. Plaintiff has no interest that might conflict with the interests of the Defendant- Specific DNC Class. Kenzik is interested in pursuing these claims vigorously, and she has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex litigation, including with regards to the claims alleged herein. 67. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 68. Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Kenzik and the other members of the Defendant-Specific DNC Class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the Defendant-Specific DNC Class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the putative Defendant-Specific DNC Class, should they even realize that their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Defendant-Specific DNC Class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. 70. Kenzik realleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. This Count III is brought against Defendants on behalf of Kenzik and the National DNC Registry Class defined below. 71. The TCPA provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to … [a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200©(2);47 U.S.C. § 227 (c). 72. Defendants or some party on their behalf initiated more than one telephone solicitation in a 12-month period to each of the telephone numbers of Kenzik and the other members of the National DNC Registry Class, despite the fact that Kenzik and the other members of the National DNC Registry Class had all registered their numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations. 73. Defendants have, therefore, violated Section 227 (c) of the TCPA. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2). 75. On information and belief, because Kenzik has received multiple calls from or on behalf of Defendants despite having registered with the National Do Not Call Registry, Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA, such that treble damages are warranted. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). Class Action Allegations 76. Kenzik brings this Count on behalf of a class (the “National DNC Registry Class”) defined as follows: All person in the United States to whose telephone number Defendants or some person on Defendants’ behalf initiated more than one call in any 12- month period within the four years prior to the filing of this action, where (1) the telephone number was registered on the National Do Not Call Registry, (2) the calls were made for the purpose of promoting Defendants’ goods and/or services, and (3) Defendants’ records do not contain a signed, written agreement with the person stating that the person agrees to be contacted at such number. 77. Upon information and belief, Defendants caused more than 100 telephone numbers to each be called more than once within any 12-month period in the four years prior to the filing of this action for the purpose of promoting Defendants’ goods and/or services, despite such numbers being registered on the National Do Not Call Registry and the lack of express, written permission for such calls. 79. Kenzik s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the putative Class. The factual and legal bases of Defendants’ liability to Kenzik and the other members of the National DNC Registry Class are the same: Defendants violated the TCPA by initiating calls to the telephone numbers of each member of the putative Class, including Kenzik, despite the fact that such persons had registered their numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations. 80. Kenzik will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the putative Class. Kenzik has no interests that might conflict with the interests of the Class. Kenzik is interested in pursuing her claims vigorously, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex litigation, including with regards to the claims alleged herein. 82. No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 83. Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Kenzik and the other members of the Class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class, should they even realize that their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct. 9. Defendant, Kiley & Kiley, is a credit card processing company that provides and markets services to lower interest rates on credit card debt and more favorable payment terms. Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the National DNC Registry Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Section 227 (b) Class)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 22. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and are heavily integrated with Defendant’s bakeries. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s bakeries and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 27. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical bakery locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical bakeries on its Website, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to purchase items, order in advance and to view the items. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's bakeries in the near future if she could access their website. 28. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 31. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 32. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 34. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s bakeries and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services available via the Website and make reservations. 36. Defendants have, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and have generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 37. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 38. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 42. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 44. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 46. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 47. Defendant’s bakeries are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s bakeries. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 48. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 50. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 51. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 53. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 54. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 55. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 56. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 58. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 59. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 63. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub- Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 69. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 70. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 71. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 73. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 74. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 76. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 77. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 79. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 80. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 82. Defendant’s locations are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with its establishments and is a gateway thereto. 84. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 85. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 86. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 88. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 89. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense and punitive damages pursuant to sec. 8-502(a). 91. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 92. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 93. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

win

(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 109. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 110. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Public Facility contains access barriers denying metabolically-disabled customers full and equal access to the goods, services, and facilities of the Public Facility, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the metabolically- disabled. 111. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. 27 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq.—Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York Subclass) 25. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide Class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally metabolically-disabled individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered in the Public Facility during the relevant statutory period.” 26. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York Subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all metabolically-disabled individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Public Facility and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant during the relevant statutory period.” 27. Millions of people have a physical disability that is partly treatable by diet in the United States, including in New York. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 28. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible Public Facility, denying metabolically-disabled persons access to the events, goods, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of imposing access barriers, metabolically-disabled persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to the Public Facility. 29. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether the Public Facility is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; i. Whether the Public Facility is a “place or provider of 10 public accommodation” under the laws of the New York; ii. Whether Defendant through the Public Facility denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with metabolic disabilities in violation of the ADA; and iii. Whether Defendant through the Public Facility denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with metabolic disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 30. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to Plaintiff, have metabolic disorders that render them metabolically-disabled, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by imposing access barriers on the Public Facility, such that it is not accessible to the Class of people who are legally disabled due to eating constraints. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to 11 the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 32. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 33. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with metabolic disabilities throughout the United States. 34. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 35. Defendant operates the Public Facility located at 3052 West 21 Street, Brooklyn, NY 11224 . 36. The Public Facility is a service and benefit offered by Defendant in New York. The Public Facility is owned, controlled, and/or operated by Defendant. Defendant sells tickets to events at the Public Facility and on their Website, including in New York State. 37. The Public Facility, which is marketed to consumers located in New York State, is a commercial Public Facility that hosts events and sells goods and services. 38. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the metabolically-disabled access to the Public Facility, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Public Facility. Due to Defendant’s imposition of access barriers to the Public Facility, metabolically-disabled individuals have been and are being denied equal access to 12 the Public Facility, as well as to the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Public Facility. 39. Defendant denies the metabolically-disabled access to goods, services, and information made available through the Public Facility by preventing them from freely entering the Public Facility with the food they need to treat their disability. 40. Allowing disabled people to bring medical supplies into the Public Facility presents no significant obstacles or difficulties for Defendant. Other public facilities allow diabetic individuals to bring insulin supplies onto their premises. However, simply bringing insulin supplies is insufficient because: 1) diabetic individuals need readily available food in case their blood sugar drops, 2) many diabetic individuals (including Plaintiff) need to bring pre-measured food to match their insulin to the quantity of food consumed, and 3) Defendant’s policy ignores metabolically-disabled individuals with other disabilities that are treated by food. 41. The Public Facility states clearly on the Website that it does not allow outside food, which constitutes an access barrier that prevents free and full use by Plaintiff and metabolically- disabled persons. See Exhibit A. 42. The Public Facility thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Public Facility and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Defendant. 43. Plaintiff attempted to purchase tickets for One Africa show at the Public Facility, most recently in August 2018. However, Plaintiff did not purchase tickets because he would have been unable to ultimately access the Public Facility because of the access barrier imposed by Defendant’s no outside food policy, as seen on the Website and attached hereto as Exhibit A. 13 These access barriers have caused the Public Facility to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, metabolically-disabled individuals. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s Public Facility contains access barriers causing the Public Facility to be inaccessible to—and not independently usable by—metabolically-disabled individuals. 45. These barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of the Public Facility and Defendant. Plaintiff did not attempt to attend an event at the Public Facility because he understood Defendant’s discriminatory policy and knew that such an attempt would be futile. The ADA explicitly does not require “a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization . . . does not intend to comply [with Title III of the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). This is particularly true for Plaintiff, for whom going out in public without available snacks would be a health risk. Disabled Ams. for Equal Access, Inc. v. Ferries del Caribe, Inc., 405 F.3d 60, 65 n.7 (1st Cir. 2005). 46. Plaintiff was injured by his loss of opportunity to enjoy the Public Facility. The ADA “expressly contemplates loss of opportunity as an actionable injury.” Betancourt v. Federated Dep’t Stores, 732 F. Supp. 2d 693, 707 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), (b)). Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a Public Facility that is inaccessible to metabolically-disabled class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a Public Facility that is sufficiently intuitively 14 and/or obviously inaccessible to metabolically-disabled Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to metabolically-disabled Class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Plaintiff and the Class are disabled for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102 reads in pertinent part: (1) Disability. The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual— ▪ (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; . . . . (2) Major life activities. ▪ (A) In general. For purposes of paragraph (1), major life activities include, but are not limited to . . . eating . . . . 49. Accordingly, courts have interpreted diseases such as food disorders and diabetes as disabilities because those diseases interfere with eating. 50. Even before the ADA was amended in 2008 to explicitly include “eating” as a “major life activity,” courts interpreting the ADA considered eating to be a major life activity. Recent decisions also hold that diabetes is a disability covered by the ADA. 42 U.S.C.S. § 12102 codifies this law because diabetes limits the major life activity of eating. See, e.g., Kells v. Sinclair Buick--GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 830–831 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that diabetes is a “recognized ADA impairment[]”); Lee v. District of Columbia, 920 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 (D.D.C. 2013) (“A reasonable jury could therefore find that Mr. Lee was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act.”); Girten v. Town of Schererville, 819 F. Supp. 2d 786, 798 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (“Without question, Girten’s diabetes is quite serious and a jury could reasonably 15 find that Girten’s condition substantially limits the major life activity of eating.”); Nawrot v. CPC Intern., 277 F.3d 896, 904–905 (7th Cir. 2002) (diabetes affected ability to think and perform tasks); Bugg-Barber v. Randstad US, L.P., 271 F. Supp. 2d 120, 128 (D.D.C. 2003) (similar); Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 924–926 (7th Cir. 2001) (diabetes substantially limited eating); Downs v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-1117, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4848, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2006) (similar); U.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety, 309 F. Supp. 2d 837, 840 (S.D. Miss. 2004) (similar); Gonsalves v. J.F. Fredericks Tool Co., Inc., 964 F. Supp. 616, 621 (D. Conn. 1997) (diabetes affected eating and sleeping); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813–814 (N.D. Tex.1994) (similar); Erjavac v. Holy Family Health Plus, 13 F. Supp. 2d 737, 746–748 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (eating and waste elimination); Shirley v. Westgate Fabrics, Civil Action No. 3:95-CV-2550-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16545, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 1997) (similar). 51. Even episodic disabilities less severe than Plaintiff’s disease would qualify for protection under Title III. Service v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (“Plaintiff need not be in a constant state of distress or suffer an asthmatic attack to qualify as disabled under the ADA.”). Plaintiff’s disease is severe enough to decisively limit his major life activity of eating. 52. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 53. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), 16 provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 54. The Public Facility, located in New York, is a public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) because it is “a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.” (emphasis added). 55. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates the Public Facility. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 57. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 58. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, 17 unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 59. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 60. Many public facilities allow outside food into their venues (as required under the ADA). The policy of allowing outside food does not unduly burden those venues. Plaintiff and the Class merely seek to bring into the Public Facility the food they need for medical reasons. This would not disrupt the Public Facility’s operations. 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Defendant who are metabolically-disabled have been denied full and equal access to the Public Facility, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 62. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 63. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 18 accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 64. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 67. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 69. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 70. The Public Facility, located in New York State, is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). The Public Facility is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, 19 the Public Facility. 71. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 72. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 73. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 74. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food would not alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to 20 Defendant. 76. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a Public Facility that is inaccessible to metabolically-disabled Subclass members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or i. constructed and maintained a Public Facility that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to metabolically-disabled Subclass members; and/or ii. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to metabolically-disabled Subclass members. 77. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 78. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human 21 Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 81. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 82. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . .” 86. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in 22 section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 87. Plaintiff and Class are within the Jurisdiction of New York. Plaintiff is a resident of New York State and accessed the Website in New York State. Class members are residents of New York State and have accessed the Website in New York State. Plaintiff and Class members are covered by the New York Civil Rights Laws. The Public Facility and the Website, targeting New York citizens in New York State, are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). The Public Facility and the Website are services, privileges, and/or advantages of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. Events at the Public Facility are integrated with ticket sales and information on the Website. 88. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 89. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food to would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 91. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall 23 violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 92. Specifically, under NY Civ Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . .” 93. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 94. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Subclass on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 95. Plaintiff and Subclass members are entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 96. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 97. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful 24 discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 98. The Public Facility and the Website, targeting New York citizens in New York State, are sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). The Public Facility and the Website are services, privileges, and/or advantages of Defendant. Food at the Public Facility is sold by, and integrated with, the Public Facility. Events at the Public Facility are integrated with ticket sales and information on the Public Facility website. 99. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Public Facility. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 100. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in imposing access barriers to the Public Facility, causing the Public Facility and the services integrated with the Public Facility to be completely inaccessible to the metabolically-disabled. This inaccessibility denies metabolically-disabled patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 101. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the 25 Subclass on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 8-107(4)(a) and 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a Public Facility that is inaccessible to metabolically-disabled Subclass members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a Public Facility for which it is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to metabolically-disabled Subclass members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to metabolically-disabled Subclass members. 102. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 103. To make the Public Facility accessible to the metabolically-disabled, Defendant need only cease its existing policy. Making the Public Facility accessible by allowing people to bring in food to would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 104. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Public Facility and Defendant under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer 26 irreparable harm. 105. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 106. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 8-120(8) and 8-126(a) for each offense. 107. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 108. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§ 8-120 and 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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15. At all times relevant, Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). 16. Defendant sought to collect a debt that arose from a transaction incurred allegedly for personal, family or household purposes. 17. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff’s fiancé, Aileen Luciano (“Luciano”), had a Target-branded credit card issued by Defendant. 18. At the time Luciano applied for the credit card from TNB, Luciano did not provide Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number to Defendant. 19. Plaintiff was not obligated to Defendant on Luciano’s Target credit card account. Plaintiff and Luciano are not married, and Plaintiff was not a co-obligor or cosigner on Luciano’s Target credit card account. Plaintiff has no contractual relationship whatsoever with Defendant relating to Luciano’s Target credit card account. 20. Plaintiff never provided his cellular telephone number to TD Bank or TNB. 21. Upon information and belief, TD Bank obtained Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number through skip-tracing. 22. Plaintiff never provided TD Bank or TNB with express consent to receive prerecorded or automated calls on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. 23. Plaintiff did not provide his cellular telephone number to TD Bank “during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed.” 25. TD Bank and/or TNB called Plaintiff’s cellular phone approximately once per day, seven days a week, between April 2014 and late August 2014. The exact number of calls can be determined from Plaintiff’s cellular phone bills and from Defendant’s records. 26. Defendant’s calls were made from numbers with Minnesota and California area codes, as well as 1-800 prefixes. 27. Each time Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone and Plaintiff answered the call, there was silence on the line until Plaintiff spoke or made a sound into the phone. The initial silence indicates that a computer-controlled, automated telephone dialing system was initiating the calls and routing them to a live operator or automated message only after the system identified a voice or other sound on the line. 28. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39) (“The term ‘person’ includes an individual, partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, or corporation.”) 29. All telephone contact by Defendant to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone occurred via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), and/or used “an artificial or prerecorded voice” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 30. The telephone number that Defendant used to contact Plaintiff, with an “artificial or prerecorded voice” and/or made by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” was assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 32. Defendant’s telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone were not “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 33. Defendant’s telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone utilizing an “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system” for non-emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiff’s prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 33. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes, including claims under the 34. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is on Defendant to demonstrate that Plaintiff provided his prior express consent within the meaning of the statute. 35. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully stated herein. 36. The foregoing acts and omissions of TD Bank constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 37. As a result of TD Bank’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each member of the Class are entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 40. The foregoing acts and omissions of TD Bank constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 41. As a result of TD Bank’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 42. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief prohibiting TD Bank’s violation of the TCPA in the future. 43. Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 44. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. 46. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but Plaintiff reasonably believes that Class members number at minimum in the hundreds. 47. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of TD Bank. 48. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 49. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. The disposition of the claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the Court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. The Class can be identified easily through records maintained by TD Bank and/or its agents. 51. Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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37. Plaintiffs bring this action on their behalf and as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) & (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased any “investment” offered by Defendants from May 6, 2006 until the present day (the “Class Period”) and who suffered damages as a result (the “Class”). 38. Excluded from the Class are: a. Defendants; b. members of the immediate family of each of the Defendants that are not corporate entities; c. any person who was an executive officer, employee and/or director of any Defendant during the Class Period; d. any person, firm, trust, corporation, officer, director or any other individual or entity in which any Defendant has a controlling interest or which is affiliated with any of the Defendants; e. any independent contractor of any Defendants who participated in the sales of the investment vehicles outlined herein; and f. the legal representatives, agents, affiliates, heirs, successors-in-interest or assigns of any such excluded party. 40. Plaintiffs‟ claims are typical of the claims of members of the Class. Plaintiffs and all members of the Class sustained damages as a result of the Defendants‟ unlawful course of conduct including racketeering, money laundering, fraud, negligence, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud and other malfeasance as specified herein. 41. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the members of the Class that Plaintiffs seek to represent. 42. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, some as little as $5,000; therefore the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the Class members individually to seek redress for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. 44. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 45. The names and addresses of the Defendants‟ customers and investors who purchased “investments” during the Class Period are obtainable from information in the possession of the Defendants and/or their agents. Notice can be provided to such owners via first class mail or email using techniques and a form of notice similar to those customarily used in class actions. 46. TAYLOR has always claimed to come from humble beginnings and bragged that he started working at 12 and became a millionaire at the ripe old age of 16. Then he “retired” with his “vast fortune” but became “bored” and came back to work in 2000. 47. Beginning in 2000,TAYLOR started touting himself to the public as a “self-made millionaire at 16” by claiming that in 1998 he launched a company with a high school partner called GoFerretGo.com that became a multi-million dollar company. 49. TAYLOR repeatedly claimed in books, newspapers, television interviews, emails, radio ads and You Tube videos that GoFerretGo.com had a value of $3.5 million at some point during its less than 3 year history. However, GoFerretGo.com mysteriously dissolved in 2001. 50. TAYLOR tirelessly told the GoFerretGo.com story to potential investors, news and TV reporters, church members, politicians, community leaders, etc. over many years in order to garner their trust and gain access to other potential investors, who would be introduced to TAYLOR through trusted members of their community, i.e., church leaders and pastors, politicians, philanthropic leaders, etc. 51. In 2004, Defendant TAYLOR formed Christian Capital Group, LLC (“Christian Capital”), a Missouri limited liability company. Defendant TAYLOR was the “executive trustee” of Christian Capital. Throughout his meteoric rise to fame, TAYLOR always went back to his roots, scamming mainly African-American and minority persons of faith with his investment schemes. 52. TAYLOR targeted minority and African American persons of faith because he knew that there was an unwritten (and sometimes written) tenet imposed upon church members, particularly in African-American and Christian churches, which can best be described as “what happens in church stays in church.” The tenets of many Christian religions require disputes among church members to be handled by the church through its Elders, Deacons and Minister (assuming the Minister is not involved). 54. TAYLOR was a master at using verbal constructions to describe the investment “opportunities” he was hawking so that they sounded extremely impressive but actually were meaningless. TAYLOR used his confidence trick to take advantage of his targets‟ lack of investment knowledge. TAYLOR served as a “hub” for the victims recruiting and interacting with them directly in order to perpetuate the scheme. 55. The Ponzi schemes orchestrated by the CITY CAPITAL CONSPIRATORS were particularly well planned because the “investments” of the Plaintiffs and other Class members were set up to automatically renew or “rollover” each year such that the investors could not liquidate their investments automatically at the end of the investment period and, in fact, were not even notified at the end of any investment period that they could withdraw their investment funds or” choose” to reinvest; the interest that purportedly was being earned on the investment “appeared” in the investors/victims‟ self-directed IRA accounts at EQUITY TRUST automatically and regardless of whether the accrued interest had actually been placed in the account. (It had not for the majority of investors/victims). 56. The CITY CAPITAL CONSPIRATORS kept sending out investment account statements and providing information to investors/victims showing the CITY CAPITAL investors/victims the extraordinary investment returns they were earning by keeping their money in their EQUITY TRUST self-directed IRA account thus maintaining the deception that the schemes of the CITY CAPITAL CONSPIRATORS were providing high returns. 58. Investors conned by the CITY CAPITAL CONSPIRATORS would reinvest their money in these schemes because they appeared to pay a much better return than any alternative investment opportunity. At least the returns appeared much better according to their EQUITY TRUST account statements. 59. According to a press release issued by a Missouri entity called ”Christian Capital” and TAYLOR, Christian Capital was a non-profit ministry “that employs biblical principles to help individuals increase their financial resources through low-risk investment opportunities.” (Ex. A). TAYLOR frequently reminded his targets that these were “once in a lifetime” opportunities and that the potential investor needed to move fast or lose their place in line for this investment “opportunity.” 60. TAYLOR in 2004 made investment presentations for the “Prosperity Fund” a/k/a Prosperity Ministries run by Christian Capital at minority and African-American churches in Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. (Ex. A). 61. Taylor at times referred to himself as a “Minister” and an “ordained Minister.” 62. Upon information and belief, TAYLOR never had any formal seminary training nor had he ever been the minister or leader of a church. 64. Defendant TAYLOR advertised that participation through investment in the Prosperity Fund would help participants, many of whom were church-goers who heard TAYLOR speak at their church, learn about how to: “eliminate consumer debt without consolidation or refinancing; retire in 10 years or less; and be a part of a low-risk investment with high performances” which were also “beneficial to the financial success of the church and community.” (Ex. B). 65. TAYLOR told the potential Prosperity Fund investors that God had helped him find the perfect investment opportunity for the church and its members. This investment scam by TAYLOR was a prelude to the Socially Conscious Investment Ponzi Scam of which Plaintiffs and other Class members are victims, as discussed below. 66. In September of 2004, TAYLOR was sued for fraud in the case of Williford et al v. Ephren Taylor, Jr. (“Williford Complaint”) in Missouri both personally and as trustee of the Prosperity Ministries trust. Also named as defendants in the suit were his wife, Meshelle Taylor, his father, (also named Ephren Taylor) and his father‟s church, Johnson County Church of Christ (“Johnson County Church”). (Ex. C). 67. After this set back, rather than give up on his scams, TAYLOR decided to go bigger. 69. TAYLOR started holding himself out to the public in books, newspapers, television, emails, radio ads and videos as a successful businessman overseeing $250 million dollars in assets of two publicly traded companies. 70. An essential part of TAYLOR‟S scam, as with other Ponzi schemes, was and is to make investors want to invest in him via his wildly successful “companies.” While some of TAYLOR‟S investment success “stories” and personal financial dealings may have been real, the majority of them were purely fabricated. 71. Upon information and belief, Defendants BRANTLEY, WEB3 and MCCARTHY were instrumental in helping TAYLOR create the fictional character that TAYLOR assumed and which permitted him to bilk millions of dollars from hundreds or thousands of investors. 72. Through numerous press releases and hundreds of speaking engagements, books, blogs, You Tube videos, radio and television commercials and interviews and public appearances, TAYLOR convinced the world that he was a “Minister,” financial guru, investment wizard, multi- million dollar business manager and philanthropic rock star. 73. A Ponzi scheme or fraudulent enterprise cannot be successful or even operate without the help of a number of individuals both inside and outside the company perpetuating the scheme. The facts will show that TAYLOR was part of a carefully orchestrated con-not a solo act. A. THE CREATION OF EPHREN TAYLOR'S IMAGE CONSPIRACY (against all Defendants) 502. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein paragraphs 1-503 above as if fully set forth herein. 503. At all relevant times, all Defendants joined in a common effort to commit the tortuous conduct and violations of state and federal law alleged in this complaint. 504. Defendants made their fraudulent misstatements and committed fraud as alleged above in part in order to induce Plaintiffs and the other Class members to invest in CITY MONEY LAUNDERING (Against all Defendants) 451. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein paragraphs 1-450 above as if fully set forth herein. 452. Further, as part of Defendants‟ operation of the Socially Conscious Investment Ponzi Scam and the Sweeps Machine Investment Ponzi Scam, they engaged in, and otherwise caused, numerous financial transactions and transfers through financial institutions in the United States, which transactions violated 18 U.S.C. Sections 1956 and 1957. 453. Defendants committed acts of money laundering, namely financial transactions, to promote their unlawful misappropriation of investor funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956 (a) (1) (A) and to conceal their unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1956 (a) (1) VIOLATION OF NORTH CAROLINA SECURITIES ACT Chapter 78A-10 (Against all Defendants) 542. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and reallege herein paragraphs 1-541 above as if fully set forth herein. 543. The acts and practices of the Defendants alleged herein violated Chapter 78A-10 of the North Carolina Securities Act, in that Defendants made, or caused to be made, representations or statements which were false, where (i) they knew the truth, or (ii) with reasonable efforts could have known the truth, or (iii) made no reasonable effort to ascertain the truth, or (iv) did not have knowledge concerning the representations or statements made, where said representations or statements were engaged in to induce or promote the issuance, distribution, exchange, sale, negotiation, or purchase within or from this state of securities. VIOLATION OF NORTH CAROLINA SECURITIES ACT Chapter 78A-11 (Against all Defendants) 546. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege paragraphs 1 through 545 above as if fully incorporated herein. 547. The acts and practices of the Defendants alleged herein violated Chapter 78A-11 of the North Carolina Securities Act, in that they involved the use or employment of a fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, or false pretense, where said uses or employments were engaged in to induce or promote the issuance, distribution, exchange, sale, negotiation, or purchase within or from this state of securities by the use of unlawful telephone rooms in violation of Chapter 78A-11.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a motorcycle parts and accessories company that owns and operates www.rolandsands.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in January of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.rolandsands.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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1. there is no explanation of the increase or note that the balance is increasing or will continue to increase; or 11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 12. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant Simm sent a. initial letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. where the current balance is listed as more than the charge-off balance; e. in two sub-classes where: 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communication to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f, and 1692g. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 2. where additional amounts that could be added or subtracted from the balance since charge off are all listed as zero; and f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 20. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 21. Some time prior to October 15, 2020, Plaintiff allegedly incurred an obligation to non-party Elan. 22. The obligation arose out of transactions incurred primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, specifically a personal credit card. 23. The alleged Elan obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 24. Elan is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (4). 25. Upon information and belief, Elan contracted with Defendant Simm to collect the alleged debt. 26. Defendant Simm collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – October 15, 2020 Collection Letter 27. On or about October 15, 2020, Defendant Simm sent Plaintiff an initial collection letter regarding the alleged debt. See Letter attached as Exhibit A. 28. The Letter states “BALANCE: $5,510.77” and then states: 63. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 64. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 65. Defendant violated said section by: a. Failing to state that the balance may increase despite that it could, and in fact, did; or alternatively, implying that it will continue to increase when in fact it would not, in violation of §1692e (10); and b. Stating zero amounts for additions to the charge-off amount despite that the balance had increased, in violation of §1692e (10); and c. Falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e (2). 66. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 67. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 68. In the alternative, Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 69. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt. 71. By reason thereof, Defendant are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 72. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth here. 73. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 75. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g by failing to include a clear statement about the amount of the debt and whether it is static or dynamic despite implications in the letter both ways. 76. By reason thereof, Defendant are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. § 1692g et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.ALLEY.COM, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical location. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to: find information about the physical locations, the ability to view and purchase day passes, details about membership and benefits online and in Defendant’s locations, information about the events taking place at their various venues, access to their career postings and opening details, participate in other social interactive experiences, and to learn about other important information. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March, 2019, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical locations in New York by being unable to learn more information about the Defendant’s rental space locations, the ability to view and purchase day passes, details about membership and benefits online and in Defendant’s locations, information about the events taking place at their various venues, access to their career postings and opening details, participate in other social interactive experiences, and to learn about other important information. 27. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 28. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting or returning to Defendant’s physical locations and Website, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical locations on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting or returning to the locations and Website to purchase items and to view the items. 29. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 30. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 32. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 33. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . their title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 35. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s rental space locations, purchase day passes and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. 36. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 39. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 40. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 44. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 48. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 49. Defendant’s rental spaces are a place of public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s rental spaces. The Website is a service that is integrated with this location. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 52. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 54. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 56. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 57. Defendant’s physical location is located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 59. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 60. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 65. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub- Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 70. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 72. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 74. Defendant’s New York State physical location is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it advertises, owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 77. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 85. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it advertises, owns and operates its physical location and its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 86. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical location to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 87. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 89. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 90. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 91. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 92. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 95. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 96. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical location, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 97. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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(Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants) 17. On March 31, 2014, after the market closed, the Company filed a Form 40 F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013 (the “2013 40-F”) with the SEC, which provided the Company’s year-end financial results and position and stated that the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures were effective as of December 31, 2013. The 2013 40-F was signed by Defendant Jeannes. The 2013 40-F also contained signed certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by Defendants Jeannes and Hall attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company’s internal controls over financial reporting, and the disclosure of all fraud. 19. Goldcorp’s Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the year ended December 31, 2013, attached as Exhibit 99.2 to the 2013 40-F, provided updates on the water wells near the Peñasquito Mine, stating in pertinent part: Peñasquito continued to incrementally increase its fresh water production in 2013 from 69,500 to 77,000 cubic metres per day with the addition of eight new wells in the Torres-Vergel area and four new wells in the mine area. These new wells not only supplied water to replace the declining production in the existing well field, but allowed water production to increase above 2012 year end levels. This increase in water production combined with rigorous control of tailings management and improved efficiencies in the primary crusher and augmented feed circuit, allowed an increase in plant throughput from 99,945 tonnes per day in 2012 to 106,200 tonnes per day in 2013. * * * Failure to comply strictly with applicable laws, regulations and local practices relating to mineral right applications and tenure, could result in loss, reduction or expropriation of entitlements, or the imposition of additional local or foreign parties as joint venture partners with carried or other interests. The occurrence of these various factors and uncertainties cannot be accurately predicted and could have a material adverse effect on the Company’s operations or profitability. 23. On March 30, 2016, the Company filed a Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2015 (the “2015 40-F”) with the SEC, which provided the Company’s year-end financial results and position and stated that the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and disclosure controls and procedures were effective as of December 31, 2015. The 2015 40-F was signed by Defendant Garofalo. The 2015 40-F also contained signed SOX certifications by Defendants Garofalo and Ball attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material to the Company’s internal controls over financial reporting, and the disclosure of all fraud. 27. 30. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or otherwise acquired Goldcorp securities during the Class Period (the “Class”); and were damaged upon the revelation of the alleged corrective disclosures. Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 33. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 34. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:  whether the federal securities laws were violated by Defendants’ acts as alleged herein;  whether statements made by Defendants to the investing public during the Class Period misrepresented material facts about the financial condition, business, operations, and management of Goldcorp;  whether Defendants’ public statements to the investing public during the Class Period omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;  whether the Individual Defendants caused Goldcorp to issue false and misleading SEC filings and public statements during the Class Period;  whether Defendants acted knowingly or recklessly in issuing false and misleading SEC filings and public statements during the Class Period;  whether the prices of Goldcorp common shares during the Class Period were artificially inflated because of the Defendants’ conduct complained of herein; and  whether the members of the Class have sustained damages and, if so, what is the proper measure of damages. 36. Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the fraud- on-the-market doctrine in that:  Defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts during the Class Period;  the omissions and misrepresentations were material;  Goldcorp securities are traded in an efficient market;  the Company’s shares were liquid and traded with moderate to heavy volume during the Class Period;  the Company traded on the NYSE and was covered by multiple analysts;  the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce a reasonable investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities; and  Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased, acquired and/or sold Goldcorp securities between the time the Defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented facts. 37. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 40. This Count is asserted against Goldcorp and the Individual Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 41. During the Class Period, Goldcorp and the Individual Defendants, individually and in concert, directly or indirectly, disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 42. Goldcorp and the Individual Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they:  employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud;  made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or  engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Goldcorp common shares during the Class Period. 44. Individual Defendants, who are the senior officers and/or directors of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the material statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to ascertain and disclose the true facts in the statements made by them or other Goldcorp personnel to members of the investing public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 45. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of Goldcorp common shares was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the falsity of Goldcorp’s and the Individual Defendants’ statements, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied on the statements described above and/or the integrity of the market price of Goldcorp common shares during the Class Period in purchasing Goldcorp common shares at prices that were artificially inflated as a result of Goldcorp’s and the Individual Defendants’ false and misleading statements. 47. As a result of the wrongful conduct alleged herein, Plaintiff and other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be established at trial. 48. By reason of the foregoing, Goldcorp and the Individual Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and are liable to the plaintiff and the other members of the Class for substantial damages which they suffered in connection with their purchase of Goldcorp common shares during the Class Period. 49. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of Goldcorp, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of Goldcorp’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information regarding Goldcorp’s business practices. 51. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Goldcorp’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by Goldcorp which had become materially false or misleading. 53. Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of Goldcorp. By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of Goldcorp, each of the Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, Goldcorp to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Each of the Individual Defendants exercised control over the general operations of Goldcorp and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complain. 54. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by Goldcorp. Background Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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14. In the four year period preceding the filing of this action, WELLS FARGO, its predecessors in interest and/or vendors have made numerous telephone calls to Plaintiff's cellular telephone number, (404) 693-0147, in an attempt to collect a secured debt on a home equity line of credit. 15. The telephone calls were made using a predictive dialer. 17. In other telephone calls, WELLS FARGO left messages from "live" collection agents which had a pause at the beginning of the message before the WELLS FARGO representative began speaking. 18. A pause at the beginning of a message or call is characteristic of predictive dialer technology where the dialer connects a call to a consumer and then connects an agent to the call. 19. WELLS FARGO has historically used and has registered with various regulatory agencies a dialing system manufactured by Sun Microsystems. 20. WELLS FARGO also uses software on its dialing system(s) which has the capacity to predictively dial in its telephone calls to telephone number (404) 693-0147. 21. WELLS FARGO's call center(s) and dialing infrastructure have the capacity to store a database of telephone numbers. 22. WELLS FARGO's call center(s) and dialing infrastructure have the capacity to dial telephone numbers from a stored list either at random or in some sequence. 24. WELLS FARGO's dialing system(s) has the capacity to dial from a list of telephone numbers without human intervention. 25. The telephone calls to Plaintiff were initiated by Defendant WELLS FARGO using an automatic telephone dialing system. 26. Plaintiff did not initiate the loan with WELLS FARGO, but rather initiated it with Wachovia Bank, N.A. and never provided express permission or consent for either Wachovia Bank, N.A. or WELLS FARGO to make the telephone calls to his cellular telephone number. 27. Plaintiff was specifically requested to authorize "Automated Dialing System Calls" by a Wells Fargo employee, to which he unequivocally declined to give such authorization. 28. Plaintiff has orally advised more than one WELLS FARGO employee that he did not want WELLS FARGO to contact him on his cellular telephone number after expressly declining to consent to autodialed calls. 29. WELLS FARGO employees specifically advised that they would not honor a verbal request to cease calling Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number and that they would continue to call his cellular telephone number. 31. Upon information and belief, WELLS FARGO’s practice was to make computerized notations regarding oral requests to cease and desist, including but not limited to (a) hand-typed notes and (b) placement of a brief (e.g. three-day) “hold” on calls, for alleged purposes of allowing the consumer to request that calls cease and desist in writing. However, if Wells Fargo did not receive a written cease and desist, then it would automatically load the cellular telephone number back into its autodialer. There were likely other computerized methodologies for keeping track of do not call requests as well. 32. WELLS FARGO continued calling Plaintiff after one or more clear requests not to call his cellular telephone number by leaving unattended and pre- recorded messages. 33. WELLS FARGO continued calling Plaintiff after one or more clear requests not to call his cellular telephone number by leaving live messages that utilized automated and predictive dialing technology. 35. WELLS FARGO was a defendant in the case of Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 755 F. 3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014) in which the Eleventh Circuit cited Osorio v. State Farm Bank, FSB, 746 F. 3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2014). 36. By virtue of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Breslow, WELLS FARGO was made aware of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Osorio that it must honor verbal requests to cease calling using automated dialers and prerecorded voice messages. 37. WELLS FARGO has continued calling Plaintiff and other consumers’ cellular telephone numbers using a predictive dialer and leaving unattended and prerecorded messages after requests to cease calling despite its knowledge of the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Osorio. 38. WELLS FARGO had previously settled multiple TCPA class actions involving millions of class members who received TCPA violative calls to their cell phones in regard to collection calls on primary home mortgages in the case of Alberto Malta, et al. v. The Federal Loan Mortgage Corporation A/K/A Freddie Mac; and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., Case No. 3:10- cv-01290-BEN-NLS, USDC SDCA. 40. The telephone calls were not initiated by accident or mistake. 41. Plaintiff is a member of and seeks to bring this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals (hereinafter the "Class" as well as "Subclass One"). 43. Plaintiff also seeks to represent, and is a member of, Subclass One, consisting of all persons within the Class, who Wells Fargo called after it had received notification that it did not have permission to call. 44. Excluded from the class are claims related to any calls released as part of prior settlements, including but not limited to Malta v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 3:10-cv-1290-BEN-NLS (S.D.Cal.), or Franklin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 14-cv-2349-MMA (BGS) (S.D.Cal.). Defendant is in exclusive possession, custody and control of the list of persons who were class members in those, and any other, cases. And while there are other cases pending against Wells Fargo, for example, McLean v. CBV Collection Services, LTD et al, 1:14-cv-7789 (N.D.Ill.) and Luster v. Wells Fargo Dealer Services, Inc., 1:15-cv-01058-MHC (N.D. Ga.), counsel does not believe the proposed class members’ claims in this matter overlaps with those cases. It is not Counsel’s intent to have overlapping classes, and any overlap will be ameliorated through amendment if facts show that they do overlap. 46. The class and subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 47. The allegation of the previous paragraph is likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. This allegation is based upon the following information: 1) Plaintiff himself received such calls to his cellular telephone from multiple collection agents of WELLS FARGO indicating Defendant did not scrub to remove cellular telephone numbers; 2) the very purpose of automated dialers is to call numerous persons in a short amount of time; and 3) the sheer size and national scope of WELLS FARGO. 49. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. 50. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. He has retained counsel experienced in handling TCPA robocall actions and class actions. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 51. Certification of the class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate in that the Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. 53. Plaintiff requests certification of a hybrid class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (3) for monetary damages and injunctive relief. 54. The acts of Defendants constitute violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 56. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to an award of actual damages or $500.00, whichever is greater, for each such violation and an injunction prohibiting future conduct in violation of the TCPA. 57. Defendants’ violations were committed willfully and knowingly. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the class, requests the court treble damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).

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11. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 12. Some time prior to May 4, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to CF MEDICAL 33. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3): 34. The Class consists of (a) all individuals in the State of Texas (b) whose information was shared by Defendant to its mail house (c) in connection with a debt purportedly whose original creditor was CF MEDICAL LLC, (d) during the one-year period preceding the filing of the Complaint in this action. 36. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 37. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s practice, of sharing debtor’s personal and protected information with its mail house, violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c and 1692e. 38. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 39. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 42. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 43. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. 45. Pursuant to Section 15 U.S.C. §1692c of the FDCPA: “Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a post judgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.” (emphasis added). 46. The Defendant violated said provision by conveying Plaintiff’s information to its mail house in connection with the collection of Plaintiff’s debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692c. 47. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692c et seq. of the FDCPA, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 49. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 50. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f by using unfair means in connection with the collection a debt, to wit, knowingly disclosing sensitive information about Plaintiff’s debt to third parties not expressly authorized under the FDCPA. 51. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692c et seq.

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23. Defendant operates, manages, and markets its restaurants, sells store gift cards to the public, and uses them as a form of communication. One or more of its restaurants is located in New York City. Defendant’s restaurants constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s restaurants provide important goods and services to the public. 25. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s store gift cards, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public at its restaurants. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from purchasing, accessing, and utilizing the store gift cards and, as a result, Defendant’s restaurants. 26. These access barriers on Defendant’s store gift cards have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to purchase a Braille store gift card related to Defendant’s physical restaurant locations, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations. Plaintiff intends to immediately purchase a store gift card issued by the Defendant as soon as they become available in Braille. 27. If the store gift cards were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently purchase the store gift cards and complete a desired transaction utilizing gift cards as sighted individuals do. 28. Through her knowledge about the lack of Braille store gift cards, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 30. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 31. Title III of the ADA requires that public accommodations provide “appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 32. Defendant discriminates on the basis of disability because they fail to afford individuals who are visually impaired with the same ability to independently access the goods and services provided to others, thus failing to ensure effective communication with its visually impaired customers during transactions for its goods and services. 33. The regulation sets forth numerous examples of “auxiliary aids and services”, including, without limitation, “Brailled materials and displays..." 28 C.F.R. § 34. In addition to this general nondiscrimination mandate, Title III prohibits public accommodations from engaging in specific types of discrimination, including the failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, services, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(a). 35. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, (emphasis added) . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) Nothing in this section shall require a person with disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization … does not intend to comply with its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) 36.303 (b)(2). “[I]n order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability. 28 CFR 36.303 (c)(ii).6 37. If the store gift cards were accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently utilize them. 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding its store gift cards, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in marketing and selling its store gift cards and has generated significant revenue from the store gift cards. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its store gift cards equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the store gift cards, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who would like independent access to Defendant’s store gift cards and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards are a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s store gift cards deny the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Defendant’s restaurants are places of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s restaurants. The store gift cards are a service that is integrated with these locations. 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the store gift cards, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in the State of New York and constitute restaurants and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s store gift cards are a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s store gift cards are a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and sells its store gift cards. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 61. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 64. Readily available manufacturing and/or printing capabilities exist for making store gift cards accessible to the blind and visually impaired. The addition to store gift cards of Braille on the gift card and packaging thereof and other related marketing materials would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s store gift cards and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 74. Defendant’s locations are restaurants and places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its store gift cards are a service that is integrated with its establishments. 75. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its store gift cards, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 76. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its store gift cards, causing its store gift cards and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 78. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant is: a. developing, marketing and selling store gift cards that are inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failing to sell store gift cards that are sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious and that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 79. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 80. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its store gift cards and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 81. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 84. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 86. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, Defendant’s store gift cards contain access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its store gift cards and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, and fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 87. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers On Its Store Gift Cards VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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1. Plaintiff Richard Wade Architects, P.C., brings this action to secure redress for the actions of defendant Total Merchant Services, Inc., in sending or causing the sending of unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §227 (“TCPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/2 (“ICFA”), and the common law. 10. On or about September 5, 2011, plaintiff Richard Wade Architects, P.C., received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine. 11. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 12. Defendant Total Merchant Services, Inc., is responsible for sending or 3 causing the sending of the faxes. 13. Defendant Total Merchant Services, Inc., as the entity whose products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes. 14. Defendant Total Merchant Services, Inc., either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of plaintiff and other recipients in sending the faxes. 15. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to plaintiff. 16. On information and belief, the faxes attached hereto were sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 17. On information and belief, defendants have transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Illinois. 18. There is no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’ unsolicited advertising faxes to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 19. Furthermore, the “opt out notice” required by the TCPA even when faxes are sent with consent or pursuant to an established business relationship was not provided in the faxes at issue. 2. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited fax advertising. Unsolicited fax advertising damages the recipients. The recipient is deprived of its paper and ink or toner and the use of its fax machine. The recipient also wastes valuable time it would have spent on something else. Unsolicited faxes prevent fax machines from receiving and sending authorized faxes, cause wear and tear on fax machines, and require labor to attempt to identify the source and purpose of the unsolicited faxes. 20. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-19. 21. The TCPA makes unlawful the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ...” 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). 22. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations 4 prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 23. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 24. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 25. Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent. 26. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 35. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-19. 36. Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA § 2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by sending unsolicited fax advertising to plaintiff and others. 37. Unsolicited fax advertising is contrary to the TCPA and also Illinois law. 720 ILCS 5/26-3(b) makes it a petty offense to transmit unsolicited fax advertisements to Illinois residents. 38. Defendants engaged in an unfair practice by engaging in conduct that is contrary to public policy, unscrupulous, and caused injury to recipients of their advertising. 39. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. 40. Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce. 41. Defendants’ conduct caused recipients of their advertising to bear the cost thereof. This gave defendants an unfair competitive advantage over businesses that advertise lawfully, such as by direct mail. For example, an advertising campaign targeting one million 7 recipients would cost $500,000 if sent by U.S. mail but only $20,000 if done by fax broadcasting. The reason is that instead of spending $480,000 on printing and mailing his ad, the fax broadcaster misappropriates the recipients’ paper and ink. “Receiving a junk fax is like getting junk mail with the postage due”. Remarks of Cong. Edward Markey, 135 Cong Rec E 2549, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 42. Defendants’ shifting of advertising costs to plaintiff and the class members in this manner makes such practice unfair. In addition, defendants’ conduct was contrary to public policy, as established by the TCPA and Illinois statutory and common law. 43. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 51. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-19. 52. By sending plaintiff and the class members unsolicited faxes, defendants converted to their own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members. 9 53. Immediately prior to the sending of the unsolicited faxes, plaintiff and the class members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes. 54. By sending the unsolicited faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them unusable. Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 55. Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization. 56. Plaintiff and the class members were deprived of the paper and ink or toner, which could no longer be used for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each class member thereby suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes. 57. Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 58. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons and entities with Illinois fax numbers (b) who, on or after a date five years prior to the filing of this action, or such shorter period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of defendant Total Merchant Services, Inc., and on or before a date 20 days following the filing of this action, (c) were sent faxes by or on behalf of defendant Total Merchant Services, Inc., promoting its goods or services for sale (d) and who were not provided an “opt out” notice as described in 47 U.S.C. §227. 59. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 60. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: 10 a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. Whether defendants thereby violated the TCPA; c. Whether defendants thereby committed the tort of conversion; d. Whether defendants thereby engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of the ICFA. e. Whether defendants thereby converted the property of plaintiff. 61. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 62. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 63. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendants is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 64. Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: a. Appropriate damages; b. An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; c. Costs of suit; d. Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 11 s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs James O. Latturner Heather A. Kolbus INTRODUCTION

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11. Numerous courts around the country have adopted the Miller safe harbor language to prevent this violation from continuing to occur, but the Defendant did not provide this safe harbor language within any of its letters. See Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols, & Clark, L.L.C., 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000). 12. In addition, while the dunning letter did indicate that the communication was from a debt collector for the purpose of collecting a debt, it failed to inform Plaintiff of her right to dispute the validity of the debt within 30 days. 13. Accordingly, Defendant’s letter is false, deceptive, and misleading in violation of the FDCPA. 14. Plaintiff brings this as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated who have received similar debt collection notices and/or communications from Defendant which, as alleged herein, are in violation of the 33. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the above paragraphs and incorporates them as if specifically set forth at length herein. 34. Defendant’s collection letter failed to properly state the current balance of the debt and failed to adequately inform Plaintiff about interest accruing and how payment of the current balance would not satisfy the debt. Accordingly, Defendant’s collection letter violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 e, e(2), e(10), and g(a)(1). 6. On a date better known by Defendant, Plaintiff incurred an obligation for rent on her living quarters. 7. Rent is considered a “debt” as that term is used and defined under the FDCPA. 8. In attempt to collect said debt, Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial dunning letter on December 20, 2016 seeking to collect said debt. Exhibit A. 9. At one location in the letter, Defendant indicated they were seeking a balance of $3,166.14. Further in the letter, Defendant indicated it was seeking a “judgment balance” in the amount of $3,166.14 plus accruing interest. Stating the balance as one amount and later stating a different (higher) amount is contradictory and confusing to the consumer as to what amount is properly owing. The Class VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.

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29. During the class period, Defendant furnished an employment-purposed consumer report concerning Plaintiff to a third party, Pinkerton Consulting & Investigations, which in turn sold the report to Ms. Doe’s employer, Trinity. 30. Among other things, the FCRA regulates the collection, maintenance, and disclosure of consumer credit report information by consumer reporting agencies (CRAs), including public record information. 31. Additionally, the FCRA mandates conditions, procedures, and limitations on the use of consumer reports for employment purposes by prospective employers and other individuals. 32. The FCRA mandates that a report user, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in part on a consumer report, must provide to the consumer a copy of the applicant’s report and a summary of the applicant’s rights under the FCRA. 33. Innovative and Pinkerton are parties to an agreement whereby Innovative furnishes customized, employment-purposed consumer reports about consumers, including but not limited a report known as the “NATCRIM.” 34. Under the FCRA, Pinkerton must certify that each consumer report it requests is for a permissible purpose. 36. Innovative has an independent obligation to comply with the FCRA. 37. Innovative’s violations of the FCRA have been willful, wanton, and reckless in that it knew, or should have known, that it was failing to comply with the requirements of the FCRA. 38. Innovative willfully disregards its duties under the FCRA, which it exacts serious consequences on job applicants and interstate commerce. The natural result of Innovative’s failures to abide by the conditions, procedures and limitations of the FCRA prejudices consumers’ ability to challenge information contained in consumer reports it sells to third parties. 39. Innovative does not provide notification to consumers that it furnished an employment-purposed consumer report containing a criminal record likely to adversely affect employment at the time it provides the report to third parties. 40. Innovative expressly disclaims that it is providing consumer reports for employment purposes, yet it knowingly supplies such reports to third parties that it knows uses the reports for employment purposes. 75. Plaintiff brings this action on a class basis, with initial class definitions that follow. 76. The § 1681k(a)(1) Notice Class, on or after August 25, 2015. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681k, Plaintiff brings this action for themselves and on behalf of the following “Notice Class,” of which she is a member, initially defined as: All natural persons residing in the United States (including all territories and other political subdivisions of the United States) (a) who were the subject of a consumer report issued after August 25, 2015, (b) that was furnished by Innovative to a third party, (c) that contained at least one public record of a criminal conviction or arrest, and (d) to whom Innovative did not place in the United States mail postage pre- paid, on the day it furnished the report, a written notice that it was furnishing the subject report and containing the name of the person that was to receive the report. 78. Numerosity. Upon information and belief, the putative Classes exceed 50 members each. Information concerning the exact size of the putative Class is within the exclusive possession of Defendant or its agents. 79. The Class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 80. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other Class members as all Class members were similarly affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct in violation of the 87. Plaintiff incorporates by reference those paragraphs set out above as though fully set forth herein. 88. The consumer report of the Named Plaintiff and of each member of the “Notice Class” was furnished for an employment purpose and contained one or more public records of the type that may adversely affect an employer’s hiring decision. 90. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Innovative obtains public records including criminal records from a third-party consumer reporting agency and does not attempt to obtain this information through its own courthouse searches. 91. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that as to the “Notice Class,” Innovative did not send such class members a notice pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(1). 92. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that as to the “Notice Class,” Innovative did not itself or by its own court researchers or vendors attempt to verify the completeness or current status of the public records pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2), within 30 days before it furnishes and sells these records in one of its reports. 93. Innovative’s failure to timely provide the required FCRA notices to the Plaintiff and other members of the “Notice Class” violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(1). 94. The conduct, action, and inaction of Defendant was willful, rendering it liable for statutory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 95. Plaintiff and other members of the putative “Notice Class” are entitled to recover costs and attorneys’ fees as well as appropriate equitable relief from Innovative in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 96. Plaintiff reiterates each of the allegations in the preceding paragraphs as if set forth herein at length. 98. Innovative also included obsolete information – for instance, records of arrests antedating the report by more than seven years – in the consumer reports it sold to third parties about the putative class members. 99. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) by reporting arrest information that was not only expunged, it obviously antedated the report by more than seven years. 100. Defendant knew that it was forbidden by the FCRA to publish criminal arrest information in a consumer report that is older than seven years, but despite this knowledge published the obsolete information anyway. 101. As to the Named Plaintiff and the “Obsolete Information Class,” Innovative regularly violates the prohibition on publishing obsolete information in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2). 102. As a result of the publication of obsolete information, the Named Plaintiff and the “Obsolete Information Class” were subjected to the publication of information that was deemed obsolete by Congress and specially excluded from information permitted in consumer reports. 103. The conduct, action, and inaction of Innovative was willful, rendering it liable for statutory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. 104. Plaintiff and other members of the putative “Obsolete Information Class” are entitled to recover costs and attorneys’ fees as well as appropriate equitable relief from Innovative in an amount to be determined by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. Failure To Provide “At The Time” Notice – 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(1) Obsolete Information – 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) Plaintiffs’ Proposed Classes

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27. Defendant offers the commercial website, https://www.twigny.com/#/, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services offered by the Defendant and which Defendant ensures delivery of such goods throughout the United States including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to, the following, which allow consumers to: purchase dinnerware items such as plates, bowls, chargers, mugs, pitchers, bowls, platters, cups and other products available online for purchase, and to ascertain information relating to pricing, shipping, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 28. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered thereby. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 30. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in August, 2021, in an attempt to purchase a product from the Defendant, the Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted person and full and equal access to the goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the goods, and services of the Website by being unable to purchase dinnerware items such as plates, bowls, chargers, mugs, pitchers, bowls, platters, cups and other products available online for purchase, and to ascertain information relating to pricing, shipping, ordering merchandise and return and privacy policies. 31. The Plaintiff intends to immediately revisit the Website to purchase a product from the Defendant as soon as the access barriers are removed from the Website. 33. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually-impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 35. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 36. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s Website and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to use and enjoy the Website in the same manner as sighted individuals do, preventing Plaintiff from using the Website to purchase items and to view the items. 37. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 38. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired persons. 40. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 41. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 43. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by visually-impaired persons. 44. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired persons could independently shop for and otherwise research the Defendant’s products via the Website. 46. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually-impaired consumers. 47. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State Sub-Class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered by Defendant’s Website, during the relevant statutory period. 51. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class and Sub-Classes, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually-impaired persons, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to visually-impaired persons, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 52. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class and Sub-Classes. The Class, and Sub-Classes, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind persons, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class and/or the Sub-Classes. 54. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions are common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 55. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by visually-impaired persons throughout the United States. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s online retail store is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s online retail store 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 60. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 61. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 63. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 64. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 65. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 67. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and/or operates its Website in the State of New York. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 68. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 69. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 72. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 73. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 75. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 77. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 78. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 79. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 80. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 82. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and/or operates its Website in the City of New York, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 83. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated therewith to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind consumers full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 84. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 86. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 87. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate, against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and Sub-Class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Sub-Class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 88. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 90. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 91. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 93. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods and services of its Website, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 94. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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(Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder) (Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act) 22. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself and the other public shareholders of KMG (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 24. KMG is a chemical company that formulates, manufactures, and distributes specialty chemicals to industries such as electronics, industrial wood preservation, and industrial lubrication. 25. On August 15, 2018, the Company and Cabot issued a press release announcing the Proposed Merger, which states in pertinent part: 53. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 54. Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any S-4 or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 78l of this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1). 56. The failure to reconcile the numerous non-GAAP financial measures included in the S-4 violates Regulation G and constitutes a violation of Section 14(a). 57. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 58. SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes in S-4 communications that contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading[.]” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 59. Regulation G similarly prohibits the solicitation of shareholder votes by “mak[ing] public a non-GAAP financial measure that, taken together with the information accompanying that measure . . . contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the presentation of the non-GAAP financial measure . . . not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 244.100(b) (emphasis added). 61. In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their roles as directors, were aware of the omitted information but failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). The Individual Defendants were therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were misstated or omitted from the S-4, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information to shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort. 62. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the S-4 is materially misleading and omits material facts that are necessary to render it not misleading. The Individual Defendants undoubtedly reviewed and relied upon the omitted information identified above in connection with their decision to approve and recommend the Proposed Merger. 63. The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material information identified above has been omitted from the S-4, rendering the sections of the S-4 identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading. 65. KMG is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’ negligence in preparing and reviewing the S-4. 66. The misrepresentations and omissions in the S-4 are material to Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of their right to cast an informed vote if such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Merger. 67. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict. 68. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein. 69. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of KMG within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as officers and/or directors of KMG, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in the S-4 filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and misleading. 71. In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act violations alleged herein, and exercised the same. The S-4 at issue contains the unanimous recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Merger. They were thus directly involved in preparing the S-4. 72. In addition, as described herein and set forth at length in the S-4, the Individual Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement. The S-4 purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants reviewed and considered. The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their input on the content of those descriptions. 73. By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 74. As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by their acts and omissions as alleged herein. By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed.

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10. Western Dental utilizes TalkSoft in order to send automated appointment reminders, and requests to schedule new appointments. 11. TalkSoft’s parent company RevSpring explains how it automates the process of patient outreach, which is used to bring former patients back into the dental clinics: 2 15. Until 2016, Plaintiff Bulette was a patient of Western Dental. 37. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on behalf of Defendant) text messaged, (2) on the person’s cellular telephone number, (3) using a text messaging platform substantially similar to the text messaging platform Defendant used to text message Plaintiff, (4) after that person opted-out of Defendant’s text messages and did not resubscribe. 38. The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definition following appropriate discovery. 39. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 44. Defendant and/or its agents sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an autodialer after Plaintiff and members of the Class opted-out of receiving additional text messages. 45. These solicitation text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation text messages. 46. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 47. In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Arising From Texts Sent by Western Dental Agents Plaintiff Received Autodialed Text Messages to Her Cell Phone Despite Telling Defendant to Stop Texting Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Western Dental Violates the TCPA By Sending Autodialed Text Messages to Consumers’ Cellular Phone Numbers Without Consent, After Consumers Opt-Out

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1. Through its Amazon Photos service, Amazon unlawfully collects, stores, and uses the biometric identifiers and information of Amazon Prime members residing in Illinois. ................................................................................................. 13 1. The rise of facial recognition through “deep learning.” ...........................8 1. The rise of facial recognition through “deep learning.” 18. In general, “facial recognition” refers to the scanning of a person’s face and matching it against a library of facial images. Facial recognition is a type of “image recognition”—a term that refers more broadly to computer technologies that can recognize people, animals, objects, or other targeted subjects using algorithms and machine learning. 19. Many of the recent advances in image-recognition technologies rely “on deep learning technology, an advanced type of machine learning and artificial intelligence.”17 Deep learning “works by building deep neural networks that simulate the mechanism of the human brain and then interpreting and analyzing data, such as image, video and text.”18 2. Amazon unlawfully collects, stores, and uses the biometric information of Illinois residents who are not Prime members but are given free Amazon Photos accounts through the Family Vault feature. ......................................................... 17 2. Tech behemoths race to perfect image-recognition technology via deep learning. .................................................................9 20. Unlike other machine-learning algorithms, “[d]eep learning networks do not require human intervention because the nested algorithms run the data through different concepts which eventually learn from their own mistakes.”19 Thus, “[d]eep learning is suitable for instances where there are boatloads of data to analyze or complex problems to solve.”20 3. Amazon unlawfully collects, stores, and uses the biometric identifiers and information of Illinois residents who have never used Amazon Photos, most of whom are unaware that Amazon has their biometric data. ................................................... 18 C. Amazon Rekognition has raised civil-liberty and privacy concerns among civil-rights groups, members of Congress, and Amazon’s own employees and shareholders. .................................................................... 21 D. Amazon unlawfully collected, stored, and used Plaintiff’s biometric identifiers and information through Amazon Photos. ........................ 23 V. 3. Amazon makes facial-recognition technology available to consumers through Amazon Photos and to businesses and governmental entities through Rekognition. .......................................... 10 B. Amazon Photos ................................................................................................ 13 A. Deep learning, big tech, and the road to Rekognition. A. Deep learning, big tech, and the road to Rekognition..........................................8 ANGELA HOGAN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v.

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 18. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard of hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 21. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard of hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard of hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 23. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 24. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 25. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 26. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. Defendant operates the Website, an online, independent tour guiding and activity service providing internet and mobile booking of domestic and global destinations, and various activities. It provides travel support, tips, reviews, and serves thousands of customers across the United States and abroad. 29. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 30. The Website allows the user to browse packaged international adventure trips, blogs, travel videos, destination photos combined with intuitive search and booking tools. It covers a variety of options such as biking tours, walking and hiking trips, family trips, and multi- sport trips. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 31. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard of hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching sports, etc., for deaf and hard of hearing persons. 34. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard of hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard of hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard of hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the video on the Website. 35. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard of hearing persons. 36. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard of hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard of hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends and family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard of hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the service provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 38. Plaintiff attempted to watch the video “California Wine Country Culinary Walking Tour” on the Website in February 2018, but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 39. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard of hearing individuals. 40. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Defendant and the Website. 41. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard of hearing class members. 42. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 43. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 44. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 45. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 46. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 47. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 48. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard of hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 49. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 62. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 63. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 64. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 65. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 66. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard of hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 68. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 69. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard of hearing class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard of hearing class members. 70. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 72. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 74. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 77. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of … disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision” 80. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard of hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 84. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside …” 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 87. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 88. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 90. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 91. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(1). 92. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard of hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities … any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to … enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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60. Upon infonnation and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective Class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 61. Typicality: Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 62. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the Class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendants' facilities and/or services due to Defendants' failure to make its facilities fully accessible and independently usable as above described. 64. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and have no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. 65. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Rule 23(b )(2) because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 66. The allegations contained in the previous paragraphs are incorporated by reference. 67. Defendants' facilities were required to be altered, designed, or constructed so that they are readily accessible and usable by disabled individuals, including individuals who use wheelchairs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(l). 68. The architectural barriers described above demonstrate that Defendants' facilities were not altered, designed, or constructed in a manner that causes them to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals who use wheelchairs, including Plaintiff and the class she seeks to represent. 69. The architectural barriers described above demonstrate that Defendants have failed to remove barriers, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 70. Defendants' facilities are required to comply with the DOJ's 2010 Standards or, in some cases, the 1991 Standards. 72. Defendants have discriminated against Plaintiff and the Class in that it has failed to make its facilities fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals who use wheelchairs in violation of the ADA, as described above. 73. Defendants' conduct is ongoing, and, given that Defendants have not complied with the ADA' s requirements that public accommodations be fully accessible to, and independently usable by, individuals with disabilities, Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as costs and attorneys' fees. 74. Without the requested injunctive relief, specifically including the request that the Court retain jurisdiction of this matter for a period to be determined after the Defendants certify that it is fully in compliance with the mandatory requirements of the ADA that are discussed above, Defendants' non-compliance with the ADA's requirements that its facilities be accessible to, and independently usable, by individuals with disabilities is likely to recur. VIOLATION OF THE ADA

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18. On or about June 17, 2015, Defendant sent a written communication to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the Debt. A true and correct copy of the June 17, 2015 communication to Plaintiff is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 19. The June 17, 2015 communication was the first communication Plaintiff received from Defendant. 20. Plaintiff did not receive any additional communications from Defendant within five days of the June 17, 2015 communication. 21. The June 17, 2015 communication to Plaintiff stated that Plaintiff’s “above referenced account(s) have been turned over to our law firm by COMENITY BANK for collection.” See Ex. A. 22. Defendant’s June 17, 2015 communication continued, “This communication is from a debt collector. This is an attempt to collect a debt, and any information obtained will be used for that purpose.” See Ex. A. 27. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of: (a) All persons with a New Mexico address, (b) to whom Thomason Law Firm, LLC mailed an initial debt collection communication that stated: “Unless this account is paid in full within 30 days of the date you receive this letter, a lawsuit may be filed against you to collect the amount owed,” (c) in the one year preceding the date of this complaint, (d) in connection with the collection of a consumer debt. Excluded from the class is Defendant, its officers and directors, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendant has or had controlling interests. 28. The proposed class satisfies Rule 23(a)(1) because, upon information and belief, it is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery. The proposed class is ascertainable in that, upon information and belief, the names and addresses of all members of the proposed class can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 30. Plaintiff satisfies Rule 23(a)(4) because she will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the class and has retained counsel experienced and competent in class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with the members of the class that she seeks to represent. 31. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. 32. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 34. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 33. 36. The manner in which Defendant conveyed the validation notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g was ineffective and overshadowed and contradicted the statutory notice. 37. Specifically, the June 17, 2015 communication stated: “Unless this account is paid in full within 30 days of the date you receive this letter, a lawsuit may be filed against you to collect the amount owed.” This statement conveyed to the least-sophisticated consumer that the only way to avoid a lawsuit was to make full payment within 30 days, when, in reality, the consumer could dispute all or a portion of the debt during that 30-day validation window. 38. The effect of the June 17, 2015 communication was to cause the least- sophisticated consumer to waive, or believe the consumer did not have, the rights afforded under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 39. In addition, Defendant’s June 17, 2015 communication overshadowed and rendered ineffective the disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 40. The language that Defendant included in its June 17, 2015 communication to Plaintiff contradicts statutorily-mandated disclosures that Defendant was required to provide to Plaintiff. 41. In the alternative, Defendant, through its communication, failed to explain an apparent, though not actual contradiction that its letter creates regarding statutorily-mandated disclosures that Defendant was required to provide to Plaintiff. 42. Defendant designed its June 17, 2015 letter to Plaintiff to evade the spirit of the FDCPA, and to lead Plaintiff to disregard her statutory rights under the FDCPA. PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)

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11. More than six years ago, Ms. Prince fell behind on paying her bills, including a debt she allegedly owed for a Credit One Bank credit card. On July 24, 2018, Defendant Global sent Ms. Prince an initial collection letter demanding payment of this debt. This collection letter stated that the “Original Creditor” was “Credit One Bank, N.A.”, then stated that the “Current Creditor” was “LVNV Funding, LLC”. The letter then went on to state “Your delinquent Credit One Bank, N.A. account has been 4 4 placed with our company for collections”, and later warned that the “current account owner” was going to credit report the debt, A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit B 12. Moreover, Defendants’ collection letter included a second page entitled “PRIVACY NOTICE”, which in addition to LVNV, listed another ten entities as somehow involved with the debt. An example of this Privacy Notice is attached Exhibit C. 13. Defendants’ letter failed to explain what, if any, the difference was between the “current” and “original” creditor, the account ”owner” or what the role was of the other ten entities. Plaintiff is informed through counsel that Defendant LVNV likely bought the debt at issue after default, and that Defendant Global was representing only 23. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-22. 24. Section 1692g of the FDCPA requires that, within 5 days of Defendants’ first communication to a consumer, they had to provide Ms. Prince with an effective validation notice, containing, among other disclosures, “(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;” see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 25. Defendants’ form collection letter -- by identifying Credit One Bank, N.A. as the “original creditor” and LVNV as the “current creditor”, then referring to the debt as a “Credit One Bank, N.A. account”, referring to an unidentified “account owner” and listing ten other entities as somehow involved with the debt -- failed to identify effectively the current creditor to whom the debt was owed, in violation of § 1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA, see, Janetos, 825 F.3rd at 321-23; see also, Taylor v. Alltran Financial, 2018 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 159862 at [*6]-[*10](S.D.Ind. 2018); Long v. Fenton & McGarvey Law Firm, 223 F. Supp. 3d 773, 778-79 (S.D. Ind. 2016); Pardo v. Allied Interstate, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125526 at [*7]-[*9](S.D. Ind. 2015); Deschaine v. National Enterprise Systems, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31349 at [*3](N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2013); Walls v. United Collection Bureau, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68079 at [*4]-[*6](N.D. Ill. 2012); and Braatz v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123118 at [*3]-[*4](N.D. Ill. 2011). 26. Defendants’ violation of § 1692g of the FDCPA renders them liable for 7 7 statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 27. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-22. 28. Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any false and/or any deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of a debt, including, but not limited to, the false representation of the character, amount or legal status of any debt, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). Moreover, debt collectors are barred from threatening to take any action that the collector cannot legally take, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). 29. Attempts by debt collectors to collect time-barred debts via deceptive and misleading collection letters violate § 1692e of the FDCPA, see, Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 852 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S.Ct 736 (U.S. 2018); and McMahon v. LVNV Funding, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014); see also, Holzman v. Malcolm S. Gerald, 920 F.3d 1264, 1270-1273 (11th Cir. 2019); Tatis v. Allied Interstate, 882 F.3d 422, 428-430 (3rd Cir. 2018); Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, 836 F.3d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 2016); and Buchanan v. Northland Group, 776 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2015). 30. Although Defendants attempted to provide a disclaimer that the debt was time-barred, that disclaimer was ineffective because: a) they failed to foreclose the possibility that Global or one of the other entities would not sue on the debt; b) they did not foreclose the possibility that Global or one of the other entities would not credit report the debt; c) they failed to foreclose that LVNV could not legally sue or credit 8 8 report the debt, rather than that LVNV had simply chosen not to do so; and, d) failed to warn that a payment could restart the statute of limitations. 31. Defendants’ violation of § 1692e of the FDCPA renders them liable for actual and statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 32. Plaintiff adopts and realleges ¶¶ 1-22. 33. Section 1692f of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect a debt, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. 34. Although Defendants attempted to provide a disclaimer that the debt was time-barred, that disclaimer was ineffective because: a) they failed to foreclose the possibility that Global or one of the other entities would not sue on the debt; b) they did not foreclose the possibility that Global or one of the other entities could credit report the debt; c) they failed to foreclose that LVNV could not legally sue or credit report the debt, rather than that LVNV had simply chosen not to do so; and, d) failed to warn that a payment could restart the statute of limitations. 35. Defendants’ violation of § 1692f of the FDCPA renders them liable for actual and statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, see, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. 36. Plaintiff, Robin Prince, brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of Alabama from whom 9 9 Defendants attempted to collect a defaulted consumer debt allegedly owed for a Credit One credit card account, via the same form collection letter (Exhibits B and C), that Defendants sent to Plaintiff, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. This action seeks a finding that Defendants’ form letter violates the FDCPA and asks that the Court award damages as authorized by § 1692k(a)(2) of the FDCPA. 37. Defendants regularly engage in debt collection, using the same form collection letter they sent Plaintiff Prince, in their attempts to collect defaulted consumer debts from other consumers. 38. The Class consists of more than 35 persons from whom Defendants attempted to collect defaulted consumer debts by sending other consumers the same form collection letter they sent Plaintiff Prince. 39. Plaintiff Prince’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law or fact raised by this class action complaint affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual issues. Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. This class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 40. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Defendants have acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted. 10 10 41. Plaintiff Prince will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. The management of the class action proposed is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised by this class action complaint will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendants’ conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof. Moreover, Plaintiff Prince has retained counsel experienced in class action litigation, including class actions brought under the FDCPA. Violation Of § 1692g(a)(2) Failure To Identify Effectively The Current Creditor Violation Of § 1692f Of The FDCPA -- Unfair Or Unconscionable Collection Actions Violation Of § 1692e Of The FDCPA – False, Deceptive Or Misleading Collection Actions

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20. Defendants are and/or operate a private club that provides entertainment to its patrons in the form of music, alcoholic beverages, and live dancers. 21. Plaintiff and others similarly situated dance in the club without very many clothes on. 22. Taylor was employed by Defendant as a dancer in August of 2010 and she is still so employed, and she has always been classified as an independent contractor. During this time period, Defendant did not pay Taylor any wages or other compensation. Taylor typically worked eight-hour shifts, three days a week. 23. During the relevant time period, Defendant intentionally misclassified all women who worked as dancers, including Plaintiff, as independent contractors as opposed to employees. As a result of this intentional misclassification, Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class were not paid the minimum wages required under the FLSA. 25. Plaintiff and the members of the proposed class are tipped employees under the FLSA as they are engaged in occupation in which they customarily and regularly receive more than $30.00 each month in tips. Throughout the relevant time period Plaintiff and each class member have averaged more than $7.25 per hour in tips. Nevertheless, as employees of Defendants, Plaintiff and the proposed class members remain entitled to: (i) receive minimum wages under the FLSA, and (ii) retain all tips given to them by customers when they performed dances. 26. Defendants' misclassification of Plaintiff and other proposed class members as independent contractors was designed to deny class members their fundamental rights as employees to receive minimum wages, to retain all tips given to them by customers and was done to enhance Defendants' profits. 28. The touchstone for determining whether an individual is an "employee" under the FLSA is the "economic reality" test. Under the test, employee status turns on whether the individual is, as a matter of economic reality, in business for herself. Here, as a matter of economic reality, Plaintiff, and other members of the proposed class, were not in business for themselves and truly independent, but rather were "economically dependent" on Defendant. 29. Courts utilize six factors to determine economic dependence. They are (i) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer, (ii) the relative investments of the alleged employer and employee, (iii) the degree to which the employee's opportunity for profit and loss is determined by the employer, (iv) the skill and initiative required in performing the job, (v) the permanency of the relationship, and (vi) the degree to which the alleged employee's tasks are integral to the employer's business. 31. Plaintiffs are not in business for themselves, but are dependent upon finding employment with others, namely Defendants. A. Degree of Control - Plaintiff and the Proposed Class Exercise No Control Over Their "Own" Or Their Employers' Business. 32. Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class do not exert meaningful control over Defendants' business and do not stand as separate economic entities from Defendants. 33. Defendants exercise control over all aspects of the working relationship with Plaintiff and other proposed class members. 34. The economic status of Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class is inextricably linked to those conditions over which Defendants have complete control. They are completely dependent on the club for their , earnings. 35. Defendants control all of the advertising and promotion without which the dancers could not survive economically. 36. Plaintiff and other member of the proposed class are restricted from working at other exotic dance clubs while in a working arrangement with Defendants. 38. Dancers are required to account to Defendants for all dances they perform in the club. Defendants require that the dancers pay a fee from their tips to the disc jockey, bouncer, and to Defendants as "house fees." 39. In addition, dancers are required to pay a separate portion of their tips to Defendants each time they perform private dances. Private dances are available to club patrons at an additional minimum cost set by Defendants. 40. Defendants alone establishes the fee split which each dancer is required to pay it and the disc jockey for each type of dance for which they receive tips during the work shift (i.e., how much per private dance, and how much of the tips received for other types of dances such as stage dances.) 41. Defendants increased the "house fees" the dancers must pay to Defendant if they are late for their scheduled shift. 42. Ultimately, Defendants set the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's and all proposed class members' work. This is the hallmark of economic dependence. B. Skill and Initiative Required in Performing the Job. 43. Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class do not exercise the skill and initiative of a person in business for themselves. 45. The dance skills utilized are commensurate with those exercised by ordinary people who choose to dance at a disco or at a wedding. 46. Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class do not have the opportunity to exercise the business skills and initiative necessary to elevate their status to that of independent contractors. 47. Plaintiff owns no enterprise. 48. She exercises no business management skills. 49. She maintains no separate business structures or facilities. 50. She does not exercise control over customer volume or the atmosphere at the private club. 51. Plaintiff does not actively participate in any effort to increase the club's client base, enhance goodwill, or establish contracting possibilities. 52. The scope of Plaintiff's initiative is restricted to decisions involving what clothes to wear (within Defendants' guidelines) or how provocatively to dance which is consistent with the status of an employee, not an independent contractor. 54. Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class have made miniscule investments into their employment, particularly when compared to the investment made by Defendants. 55. Plaintiff and other members of the proposed class make no capital investment in the facilities, advertising, maintenance, sound system and lights, food, beverage and other inventory, or staffing of the club. 56. Plaintiff and the proposed class members' investment is limited to expenditures on costumes and make-up which they may choose to wear while working, and their own labor. But for Defendants' provision of the club the dancers work in, Plaintiff and the proposed class members would earn nothing. D. Opportunity for Profit and Loss. 57. Defendants, not Plaintiff and other members of the proposed class, manage all aspects of the business operation. Defendants establish the hours of operation, set the atmosphere, coordinate advertising, hire and control the staff (managers, waitresses, bartenders, bouncers/doormen, etc.). Defendants, not Plaintiff and other members of the proposed class, take the true business risks for the club. 59. Defendants alone establish the minimum tip amounts that should be collected from patrons for private dances. E. Permanency of the Relationship. 60. Defendants do not permit Plaintiff and other members of the proposed class to dance professionally at any other venue while employed by Defendants. 61. Plaintiff and proposed class members have a long-term relationship with Defendants and dance at their location multiple times. F. Integral Part of the Employer's Business. 62. Plaintiff and the other members of the proposed class are dancers that are essential to the success of Defendants' business. In fact, the primary reason the private club exists is to showcase the dancers' physical attributes for customers. 63. Defendants also serve alcoholic beverages at the club. Defendants are able to charge a much higher price for their drinks than establishments without exotic dancers because the dancers are the main attraction of the club. As a result, Plaintiff and the other proposed class members are an integral part of Defendants' business. 65. Plaintiff and the proposed class members were misclassi'fied as independent contractors and should have been paid minimum wages through the relevant time period and otherwise afforded the rights of employees. v. 72. Plaintiff brings her claim for relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons who were, are, or will be employed by Defendants as similarly situated dancers improperly classified as independent contractors at any time within the applicable statute of limitations period, who are entitled to payment of minimum wage and applicable overtime premiums for all hours worked for Defendants. 73. The relevant time period dates back three years from the date in which this Complaint was filed and continues forward through the date of judgment pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 74. Plaintiff is unable to state the exact number of the class but believe that the class exceeds 50 persons but is less than 200 persons. 76. The email addresses o"f many of the FLSA collective action plaintiffs are available from Defendants, and notice should be provided to the FLSA collective action plaintiffs via email to their last known email address as soon as possible. 77. The claimed damages exceed $100,000.00. 78. Plaintiff asserts that other current and former dancers are similarly situated in that they are and/or were subject to Defendants' same policy and practice of misclassifying dancers as independent contractors, as opposed to employees, and were not paid the minimum wage required under the FSLA. 80. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 81. Plaintiff asserts this claim for damages and declaratory relief pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 82. At all relevant times Defendants have been, and continue to be, an "employer" engaged in interstate "commerce" and/or in the production of "goods" for "commerce," within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 83. At all relevant times Defendants have employed and/or continue to employ "employee[s]," including Plaintiff and each of the prospective FLSA Collective Action Plaintiffs, who have been and/or continue to be engaged in interstate "commerce" and/or in the production of "goods" for "commerce," within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendants have had annual gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000.00. 85. 29 U.S.C. §207(a) provides in pertinent part: ... no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged n commerce or in the production of goods for commerce for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 86. Defendants failed to pay class members the minimum wages set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207, or any wages whatsoever. 87. In fact, Defendants required that Plaintiff and other similarly situated actually pay them in order to work. 88. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and all other members of the proposed class minimum wages throughout the relevant time period because they misciassified them as independent contractors. 89. The amounts paid to Plaintiff and the proposed class members by customers in relations to dances performed were tips not wages and cannot be used to offset Defendants' obligation to pay class members minimum wages. 91. Neither of these conditions were satisfied by Defendants in this case. 92. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff or other members of the proposed class of the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 93. Plaintiff and other class members did not retain all the tips received except those tips included in a tipping pool among employees who customarily receive tips. 94. Defendants never notified Plaintiff and other class members that their tips were being used to reduce the minimum wages otherwise due under FLSA's tip-credit provisions and that thy were still due the reduced minimum wage for tipped employees. Rather, Defendants have always maintained that Plaintiff and members of the proposed class were never due any minimum wages due to their intentional misclassification as independent contractors; and in turn, Defendants paid them no wages. 96. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff and all members of the proposed class are entitled to the full statutory minimum and overtime wages set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207 for all periods in which they worked for Defendants. 97. Defendants' conduct in misclassifying Plaintiff and other class members as independent contractors was willful and done to avoid paying them minimum and overtime wages and the other benefits they were legally entitled to. 98. The FLSA provides that a private civil action may be brought for the payment of federal minimum and overtime wages and for an equal amount in liquidated damages in any court of competent jurisdiction by an employee on behalf of him/herself and other employees similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.") VIOLATION OF THE FLSA (Failure to Pay Statutory Minimum Wages)

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(Violation of the Retail Installment Sales Act, R.C. 1317.16(B)) (Notice of Sale Stated An Incorrect Date of Sale) 12. On or arottnd September 6, 2014, Ms. Scott purchase& a 2011 Kia Optima, VIN# KNAGM4A78B5066126, from Ganley Chevrolet in Brook Park, Ohio. See Ex. 1, Buyer's Order. 1200 Ontacio Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 5 Court of Common Pleas New Case Electronically Filed: , July 13, 2018 09:54 By: RONALD I. FREDERICK 0063609 Confirmation Nbr. 1437457 13. Subsequently, Ganley assigned the loan financing the vehicle to Capital One. ~ 14. On or about July 1\7, 2017, Capital One repossessed the vehicle. 15. On July 19, 2017, Capital One sent Ms. Scott, a"Notice of Sale," as required by R.C. 1317.16. 16. The Notice of Sale stated that Ms. Scott's car would be sold at a"public sale" on August 22, 2017. See Ex. 2, Notice of Sale. 17. However, the vehicle was sold at a much later date, on or around October 7, 2017, at an unknown location. 18. 'I'he failure to provide the correct date of sale is a violation of both RISA and the 49. Ms. Scott hereby incorporates by reference all facts, statements and allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs as though expressly re-stated and re-written herein. 50. On July 19, 2017, Capital One sent Ms. Scott, a"Notice of Sale," as required by R.C. ALMOND SCOTT 15300 MAPLE PARK DR. Apt #3 � CASE NO. : CLEVELAND, OHIO 44113 CASE NO. � SUMMONS NO.

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(42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex Parte Young—Equal Protection) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex Parte Young—Due Process) 79. Rivas Sports brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2), and (b)(3) on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated. The proposed class is defined as follows: All retailers at Del Amo Fashion Center that do not have an exterior entrance and are not “Essential Businesses” as defined in the County of Los Angeles Health Officer’s Order, titled “Reopening Safer at Work and in the Community for Control of COVID-19,” and last revised on September 4, 2020, and that thus must remain closed to the public for in-person shopping under the terms of that Order. 80. The proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. According to Simon’s records, Del Amo has over 150 interior retailers that are not Essential Businesses. Many of them are small businesses that have experienced severe financial hardship due to prolonged closures amid the COVID- 19 pandemic, and are unable to institute suit on their own behalf. In addition, the County Order was just issued, and immediate relief from it is necessary. There is insufficient time to join all members of the proposed class. 89. All of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 90. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids Defendants from “deny[ing] any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” The basic principle animating this command is that the government must treat similarly situated persons similarly; “[w]hen those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational reason for the difference.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008). 91. Under the County Order, many businesses—including big-box retailers like Walmart and Target, large department stores located in malls that have exterior entrances, and small businesses like barbershops with exterior entrances—are allowed to open to the public. Yet similarly situated non-essential businesses located in indoor malls and shopping centers cannot open to the public for in-store shopping at all—just because of their interior locations. And even the operations of essential businesses located in indoor malls and shopping centers are restricted by comparison with like businesses not located in indoor malls or shopping centers. County Order ¶ 9(d); see Appendix E. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; DR. MUNTU DAVIS, individually and in his official capacity as County of Los Angeles Health Officer; DR. BARBARA FERRER, in her official capacity as Director, County of Los Angeles Department of Public Health; and ALEX VILLANUEVA, in his official capacity as Sheriff, County of Los Angeles, Defendants. CASE NO. 2:20-cv-08312 Plaintiffs Have Safely Operated Retail Stores Inside Shopping Malls During The COVID-19 Pandemic

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12. Defendants operate a restaurant in New York, New York with the name Roxy’s Diner. 13. Mr. Panton became an employee of Defendant Ben Moha and Defendant 694 Enterprises Inc. d/b/a Roxy Diner in or about early September 2013 and continued working for Defendants until Aug. 23, 2015. 14. At all relevant times, Mr. Panton worked as a cook and as a food prep worker for Defendants. 15. Throughout his employment with Defendants, Mr. Panton worked 7 days per week and approximately 72-80 hours each week. 17. On Mondays through Thursday, Mr. Panton worked from in or about 4:00 p.m. to close at 1:00 a.m. or later. 18. Defendants did not maintain any electronic time-keeping system and they did not have Plaintiff clock in or out. 19. Upon information and belief, Defendants noted Plaintiff’s arrival and departure in a notebook. 20. Defendants paid Mr. Panton on an hourly basis. 21. Mr. Panton routinely worked more than forty (40) hours in a work week throughout his employment. 22. Defendants did not pay any overtime premium pay to Mr. Panton at all for his hours over 40. 23. Upon information and belief, defendants did not pay any of their non-exempt employees overtime premium pay when such employees worked more than 40 hours in a work week. 24. Defendants failed to pay Mr. Panton the required spread of hours pay for the days when he worked a spread of hours longer than 10 in a single work day. 25. Upon information and belief, none of the defendants’ workers were paid any spread of hours pay when required. 27. Defendants failed to pay Mr. Panton overtime compensation at rates of at least one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, in willful violation of the FLSA. 28. Mr. Panton has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 29. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in paragraphs 1 through 28 of this Complaint. 30. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff overtime compensation at rates of one and one- half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, in violation of the NYLL. 31. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff at the applicable overtime hourly rate was willful within the meaning of NYLL §198. 32. Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 33. Mr. Panton repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in paragraphs 1 through 32 of this Complaint. 34. Defendants failed to pay an additional hour of wages at the minimum wage rate on days where Mr. Panton worked a spread of hours longer than ten. Failure to Pay Spread of Hours Pay (12 NYCRR §142-2.4) Violation of the Overtime Provisions of the New York State Labor Law Violation of the Overtime Provisions of the FLSA

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(New York State General Business Law § 349) (Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) 48. The plaintiff, Russell Klippel, brings this action on behalf not only of himself, but also on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23. 50. All members of the Class are also members of one or both of the two subclasses. 51. Excluded from the Class and subclasses are: a. anyone employed by counsel for Plaintiff in this action; and b. any Judge to whom this case is assigned, as well as his or her immediate family and staff. Numerosity: 52. The summons and complaint at issue in this case is a boilerplate document whose language does not materially vary from one action to the next, and which, upon information and belief, was sent by Defendants to thousands of consumers. 53. The Class and subclasses include hundreds, if not thousands of members and are sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 54. Although the exact number of Class members and their addresses are unknown to Plaintiffs, they are readily ascertainable from Plaintiffs’ records. Existence And Predominance Of Common Questions: 55. Common questions of law and fact exist as to Plaintiffs and all members of the Class and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members. 58. Thus, plaintiff's claims – based on the same boilerplate misstatements of law as the claims of all other class members -- are typical of the claims of the class. 59. Put differently, all of the claims are based on the same factual and legal theories and the plaintiff, together with each class member, have been subjected the same false and deceptive communications and acts by Defendants. Adequacy: 60. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class members. Her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the Class he seeks to represent. 61. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions and in consumer protection matters. There is no reason why this plaintiff and his counsel will not vigorously pursue this matter. Superiority: 62. The class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims at issue herein. 64. Further, it would be virtually impossible for the members of the Class effectively to individually redress the wrongs done to them. Even if the members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court system could not. 65. Individualized litigation presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of the case. 66. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 68. Plaintiff hereby restates, realleges, and incorporates by reference all foregoing paragraphs. 69. Defendants’ attempt to collect the alleged debt by falsely stating plaintiff was subject to a particular city court’s jurisdiction when they knew or had reason to know he was not, violates 15 USC §§ 1692e, 1692e(5); 1692e(10), 1692f and 1692f(1). 70. Defendants’ actions to collect the alleged debt by suing plaintiff in a judicial district ( i.e., the Johnstown City Court in the case of Mr. Klippel) where he does not live nor where the Defendant had any basis to believe the alleged credit card contract sued upon was signed violates 15 USC §§ 1692i, §1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10); 1692f and 1692f(1). 71. Defendants’ actions to collect the alleged debt by suing plaintiff in a forum barred by UCCA ¶213 violates 15 USC §§ 1692i, §1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10); 1692f and 1692f(1). 72. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of the preceding paragraphs as fully as set forth herein. 74. Each of these actions was consumer oriented and involves misleading conduct that is recurring and has a broad impact upon the public. 75. Specifically, and without limitation, the following acts are false and deceptive: filing actions in venues it knew or should have known to be improper pursuant to state and federal law in order to lower its own filing fees; and falsely and willfully stating a basis of venue that Defendants knew or should have known to be untrue. 76. This false and deceptive conduct impairs the rights of consumers, forcing them to defend suits in improper fora. 77. Plaintiff and all others similarly situated have been damaged thereby. 78. As a result of Defendant’s violations of § 349, Plaintiff and each other member of the NYGBL§ 349 subclass are entitled to declaratory judgment; an injunction against the offending conduct, damages of $50 each, costs and attorneys' fees.

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(Breach of Express Warranty) (Fraud) (Unjust Enrichment) (Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act) (Violations of California’s False Advertising Law) (Violation California’s Unfair Competition Law) (Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301, et seq.) 16. Ms. Rosillo seeks to represent a class defined as all persons in the United States who purchased California Baby Natural Bug Blend Bug Repellent (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are persons who made such purchase for purpose of resale. 17. Ms. Rosillo also seeks to represent a subclass defined as all Class members who purchased California Baby Natural Bug Blend Bug Repellent in California (the “California Subclass”). 23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 24. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and members of the California Subclass. 25. This cause of action is brought pursuant to California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ I750-I785 (the “CLRA”). 26. Plaintiff and the other members of the California Subclass are “consumers,” as the term is defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d), because they bought the Product for personal, family, or household purposes. 27. Plaintiff, the other members of the California Subclass, and Defendant have engaged in “transactions,” as that term is defined by California Civil Code § 1761(e). 28. The conduct alleged in this Complaint constitutes unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts and practices for the purpose of the CLRA, and the conduct was undertaken by Defendant in transactions intended to result in, and which did result in, the sale of goods to consumers. 29. As alleged more fully above, Defendant has violated the CLRA by falsely representing to Plaintiff and the other members of the California Subclass that the Product is a “bug repellent” that “repels mosquitoes” when the product in fact does not. 32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 33. Plaintiff brings this cause of action on behalf of herself and members of the California Subclass. 34. As alleged more fully above, Defendant has falsely advertised the Product by falsely claiming that the Product is a “bug repellent” that “repels mosquitoes” when the Product in fact does not. 35. Plaintiff and the other members of the California Subclass have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s violations of California’s False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. 36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 58. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 63. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 64. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class and California Subclass against Defendant. 65. Plaintiff and Class members conferred benefits on Defendant by purchasing the Product. 66. Defendant has knowledge of such benefits. 67. Defendant has been unjustly enriched in retaining the revenues derived from Plaintiff’s and Class members’ purchases of the Product. Retention of those moneys under these circumstances is unjust and inequitable because Defendant misrepresented that the Product is a “bug repellent” that “repels mosquitoes.” 69. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges herein all paragraphs alleged above. 70. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class and California Subclass against Defendant. 71. As discussed above, Defendant misrepresented on the Product’s labeling that it is a “bug repellent” that “repels mosquitoes.” 72. The false and misleading representations and omissions were made with knowledge of their falsehood. Defendant manufacturers all of its own products5 and is undoubtedly aware of the Consumer Report study finding that the Product does not work. Nonetheless, Defendant continues to sell its ineffective and worthless Product to unsuspecting consumers. 73. The false and misleading representations were made by Defendant, upon which Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and California Subclass reasonably and justifiably relied, and were intended to induce and actually induced Plaintiff and members of the Class and California Subclass to purchase the Product. 74. The fraudulent actions of Defendant caused damage to Plaintiff and members of the Class and California Subclass, who are entitled to damages and other legal and equitable relief as a result.

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(Violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq.) (Violation of California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.) (Violation of California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq.) 59. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above, and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 60. The California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Civil Code section 1750, et seq., was designed and enacted to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices. To this end, the CLRA sets forth a list of unfair and deceptive acts and practices in Civil Code section 1770. 61. The CLRA applies to Defendant's actions and conduct described herein because it extends to the sale of goods or services for personal, family, or household use. 62. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and members of the Class were "consumers" as that term is defined in Civil Code section 1761(d). 69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above, and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 70. Each of the above misleading advertising practices of Chipotle set forth above constitutes untrue or misleading advertising under the California False Advertising Law (“FAL”), California Business & Professions Code section 17500, et seq. 75. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above, and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 76. Defendant has engaged in unfair competition within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq., because Defendant’s conduct is unlawful, misleading and/or unfair as herein alleged. 77. Chipotle’s business practices are unlawful because they violate the CLRA, FDCA, and FAL. I. Genetically Modified Organisms

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70. Plaintiffs bring Counts 1-4 and 6 of this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons. This class includes: All Iranian refugees who (1) applied for refugee admission to the United States under the Lautenberg Amendment, whether as a principal applicant or derivative relatives; (2) traveled to Vienna, Austria, for processing; and (3) received denials from the United States government in or after February 2018 with the sole explanation that their application was denied “as a matter of discretion,” and their U.S.-based Close Family Members who served as their U.S. ties. 71. “Close Family Member” as used in the class definition is defined as parents, parents-in-law, spouses, fiancés, children, adult sons or daughters, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, siblings (whole or half), and step-relationships, grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins. 72. Separate subclasses may be appropriate for the proposed class defined above. 73. Joinder is impracticable not only because the proposed class is so numerous, but also because many members of the proposed class are currently in Vienna, Austria and are both physically and financially unable to access the U.S. court system to pursue an action on their own. 74. The members of the proposed class share common issues of fact and law, including but not limited to: (1) whether the Notices of Ineligibility denying refugee status “as a matter of discretion” violate the Lautenberg and Specter Amendments, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Accardi doctrine; (2) whether relief is available under those provisions and the Mandamus Act; and (3) whether the undisclosed program change violated the Administrative Procedure Act. 75. The claims or defenses of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims or defenses of members of the proposed class. 78. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 77 above. 79. An actual controversy exists between the parties, because the Defendants seek to rely upon the Notices of Ineligibility issued to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs seek a determination that those Notices of Ineligibility are invalid and unlawful. 80. For the reasons stated herein and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201-02, Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare that the Notices of Ineligibility issued to them were unlawful. 81. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 80 above. 82. Each of the Notices of Ineligibility issued to Plaintiffs is a final agency action that violates the Lautenberg Amendment. 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (note). 83. The Notices should therefore be set aside as unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 702 and 5 85. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference herein each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 84 above. 86. Each of the Notices of Ineligibility issued to Plaintiffs is a final agency action that violate agency procedures, including those at 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16). 87. The Notices should therefore be set aside under the principle articulated in United States ex. rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 88. The Notices should also be set aside as unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 702 and 5 A. Congress Passed the Lautenberg and Specter Amendments to Facilitate Refugee Admissions Of Persecuted Religious Minorities ACCARDI DOCTRINE & ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (On Behalf of All Plaintiffs, Including the Class, Against DHS Defendants) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT (On Behalf of All Plaintiffs, Including the Class, Against All Defendants) LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT & ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (On Behalf of All Plaintiffs, including the Class, Against DHS Defendants)

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(Breach of Express Warranty) (Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability) (Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose) (Negligence) 19. Defendant Orscheln is in the business of selling and advertising for sale certain merchandise or retail products in trade or commerce at retail stores throughout the state of Iowa. 20. Defendant Citgo is in the business of manufacturing certain merchandise or retail products which are to be sold in trade or commerce at retail stores throughout the state of Iowa. 21. During some or all of the time period from 2014 to the present, Defendant Orscheln sold, labeled, and advertised the 303 THF Products in yellow buckets called Premium 303 Tractor Hydraulic & Transmission Fluid and Mile Master 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid. 22.140, Packaging and Labeling Requirements. On April 21, 2017, the Division of Weights, Measures and Consumer Protection purchased and tested a sample of Mile Master 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid. This product claims to meet John Deer 303 specifications. John Deere 303 was discontinued and was subsequently replaced with the current JDM-J20C or D. Testing indicates your product does not meet Brookfield viscosity at -20C and -35C for John Deere J20C or pour point for J20D. This product is misbranded because the product did not meet the specification limits. Additionally, the reported performance additive content is lower than a typical J20C. 22. During some or all of the time period from 2014 to the present, Defendant Citgo manufactured, labeled, and advertised the Premium 303 Tractor Hydraulic & Transmission Fluid (“Premium 303”) and Mile Master 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid (“MileMaster 303”) sold by Orscheln, Family Center, and other retailers. Defendants’ Deceptive Labeling, Marketing and Advertising 24. Defendants falsely and deceptively labeled, marketed and offered for sale the Premium 303 and the Mile Master 303 (1) as universal lubricants for farm logging and construction equipment; (2) as meeting specifications and being acceptable for use as hydraulic fluid, transmission fluid, and gear oil in older and newer tractors and other equipment; (3) as substitutes for and satisfying John Deere’s JD-303 specifications; (4) as fluids specifically formulated with base oils and additives designed to help protect against wear, rust, corrosion and foaming; and (5) as fluids meeting certain John Deere and other OEM specifications and/or that may be used as a replacement fluid in equipment made by Allis-Chalmers, Massey, Ferguson, White, Allison, Case, International Harvester, Kubota, John Deere, New Holland, Ford and Caterpillar. 25. Defendants’ labeling, marketing, advertising and sale of the 303 THF Products has been widespread, continuous and contained on various signs, labels and advertisements throughout the state of Iowa for years. Representative examples of Defendants’ labeling, marketing and advertising materials are set forth below. 28. These representations were also contained in Defendants’ advertising circulars and/or on Defendants’ websites. 29. By naming, labeling, marketing, advertising and selling the 303 THF Products in the foregoing manner, and by describing the products using words such as “303,” “general purpose” and “universal,” Defendants sought to create, and did create, an image of the 303 THF Products in the minds of Plaintiffs and other consumers that would lead a reasonable consumer to conclude that Defendants’ 303 THF Products were completely safe and effective for use in consumers’ equipment and all equipment made by the listed manufacturers. 30. Defendants’ product name, labeling, advertising and marketing of their 303 THF Products was material to the reasonable consumer. 31. At the time of Defendants’ labeling, advertisements, marketing and other representations, and as Defendants already knew or should have known, the representations regarding the 303 THF Products were false, deceptive and misleading to consumers seeking to purchase tractor hydraulic fluid. 33. As Defendants knew, or should have known, the 303 THF Products manufactured and sold in the yellow buckets by Defendants lacked some or all of the additives required to provide the advertised “qualities” and benefits. 34. As Defendants knew, or should have known, the 303 THF Products manufactured and sold in the yellow buckets by Defendants did not meet all current specifications (and failed to meet certain obsolete specifications) for any manufacturers of farm, logging and construction equipment. Alternatively, Defendants knew, or should have known, they had no basis on which to sell the 303 THF Products as tractor hydraulic fluids that met the specifications of all manufacturers listed on the label. 36. Instead, the 303 THF Products were deceptively offered for sale as fluids containing quality base oils, sufficient additives, and meeting the obsolete and now unavailable “303” specification. The State of Missouri’s Testing of 303 THF 37. Because of the poor, uncertain quality of 303 tractor hydraulic fluids and the deceptive way in which they are manufactured and sold, several private and governmental entities have been concerned about the sale of the fluids, the misleading nature of the labeling, and the damage the fluids can do to tractors and other equipment. The Missouri Department of Agriculture (MDA) is one such entity. 38. In the summer of 2017, the Missouri Department of Agriculture sampled fourteen (14) different 303 THF products, many of which claimed to work in almost every tractor. Defendants’ 303 THF Products were purchased in Missouri by the MDA in 2017 and were two of the products tested. 40. As a result of the testing, the MDA concluded that all fourteen (14) of these 303 THF products failed to meet any current specifications and were found to be underperforming to the point that damage was likely to result from use. 41. Defendants’ Premium 303 and Mile Master 303 were two of the fluids that failed to meet current specifications. 42. Defendants’ THF Products were also found to have additive levels of calcium, phosphorous and zinc that were well below the additive levels found in fluids meeting the J20C specification. 43. After its testing and research of the tractor hydraulic fluids, the MDA notified the retailers, including Defendant Orscheln, that the products were misbranded and violated Missouri’s law prohibiting deceptive business practices (§ 413.115, RSMo.) because they failed to meet current tractor manufacturer’s specifications. The MDA’s October 5, 2017 letter to Citgo with regard to the Mile Master 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid stated: The Missouri Department of Agriculture is responsible for insuring that all consumer commodities including motor oil, antifreeze, automatic transmission fluid, or other automotive products sold or offered for sale in the state of Missouri meet the requirements of Missouri Revised Statute, Chapter 413 Weights and Measures and/or Missouri Code of State Regulation 2 CSR 90- 45. In an October 12, 2017 letter to Orscheln with regard to Mile Master 303, the MDA noted that “[t]ests indicate this is a misbranded product and does not comply with Missouri law RSMO Chapter 413.” The MDA further wrote that Defendant Orscheln was “hereby ordered to remove this product from sale until changes are made to correct the labeling or the product itself.” 46. In an October 12, 2017 letter to Orscheln with regard to Premium 303, the MDA noted as follows: The Missouri Department of Agriculture is responsible for insuring that all consumer commodities including motor oil, antifreeze, automatic transmission fluid, or other automotive products sold or offered for sale in the state of Missouri meet the requirements of Missouri Revised Statute, Chapter 413 Weights and Measures and/or Missouri Code of State Regulation 2 CSR 90-22.140, Packaging and Labeling Requirements. On April 21, 2017, the Division of Weights, Measures and Consumer Protection purchased and tested a sample of Orscheln Premium 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid. This product claims to meet John Deer 303 specifications. John Deere 303 was discontinued and was subsequently replaced with the current JDM-J20C or D. Testing indicates your product does not meet Brookfield viscosity at -20C and -35C for John Deere J20C or pour point for J20D. This product is misbranded because the product did not meet the specification limits. Additionally, the reported performance additive content is lower than a typical J20C. 47. Thus, Premium 303 and Mile Master 303 were among the 303 THF products the Missouri Department of Agriculture tested and that failed to meet any current specifications and were likely to cause damage to equipment. 49. In the five-year period prior to the original filing of this Class Action, Plaintiff purchased Defendants’ 303 THF Products on numerous occasions. 50. As with all Members of the Class, in the five-year period prior to the original filing of this Class Action, Plaintiff purchased Defendants’ 303 THF Products containing the label representations set forth above. 51. Plaintiff Wayne Rupe purchased Orscheln Premium 303 and Milemaster 303 at the Orscheln’s store located in Ottumwa, Iowa. 52. These 303 THF Products were used by Plaintiff Rupe in his ____ and in other equipment. 54. Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendants’ representation that each fluid was a “303” fluid and on Defendants’ own labeling, statements and advertisements concerning the particular qualities and benefits of the 303 THF Products. 55. All reasonable consumers would consider Defendants’ 303 THF Products to be suitable for use in tractors and other equipment and would not have any understanding or way to know that Defendants’ 303 THF Products were of uncertain quality, lacked adequate viscosity and additives, had a value much less than the price offered for sale, and/or that use of Defendants’ 303 THF Products would cause all equipment to suffer increased wear and damage. 56. A reasonable consumer would consider Defendants’ labeling, statements and advertisements when looking to purchase a tractor hydraulic fluid. As a result of using Defendants’ 303 THF Products, Plaintiff and Class Members: (a) paid a sum of money for a product that was not as represented; (b) received a lesser product than labeled, advertised and marketed; (c) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the 303 THF Product was different than what Defendants represented; (d) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the 303 THF Product had less value than what was represented; (e) did not receive a product that measured up to their expectations as created by Defendants; and (f) suffered damage to their equipment, including but not limited to excessive wear, leakage in the seals, exposure to spiral gear damage, improper and poor shifting, wear and damage to wet brakes, high pump leakage, and damage from deposits, sludging and thickening. 58. Plaintiff used the 303 THF Products in the manner in which Defendants advised it could and should be used. 59. As a result of Defendants’ 303 THF Products not meeting specifications as labeled, advertised, marketed, warranted, and promised, Defendants violated the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, breached express and implied warranties, fraudulently or negligently induced Plaintiff and Class Members to purchase their products through material misrepresentations, acted in a negligent manner, and were unjustly enriched. 62. This action is brought by Plaintiff against Defendants to recover all money paid by Plaintiff and Class Members to Defendants for purchase of their 303 THF Products which were labeled, marketed, advertised, and sold in the dishonest, misleading, and deceptive manners noted herein, for recovery of the damage caused to equipment owned by Plaintiff and the Class Members, for punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and for all other remedies available to those aggrieved by Defendants’ conduct. 63. Plaintiff brings this Class Action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and the following Class of similarly situated persons: All persons and other entities who purchased Orscheln Premium 303 Tractor Hydraulic & Transmission Fluid and/or MileMaster 303 Tractor Hydraulic Fluid in Iowa at any point in time from June 6, 2014 to present, excluding those who purchased for resale. 64. Also excluded from the Class are Defendants, including any parent, subsidiary, affiliate or controlled person of Defendants; Defendants’ officers, directors, agents, employees and their immediate family members, as well as the judicial officers assigned to this litigation and members of their staffs and immediate families. 65. The 303 THF Products at issue were sold across Iowa through retailers. The Class Members may be identified through use of sales receipts, affidavits, or through sales records. 68. The representative Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those in the putative Class because he purchased Defendants’ 303 THF Products and was similarly treated. 69. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of other Members of the Class. The interests of the other Class Members will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and counsel, who have extensive experience prosecuting complex litigation and class actions. 70. A Class Action is the appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. It would be impracticable, cost prohibitive, and undesirable for each Member of the Class to bring a separate action. In addition, the presentation of separate actions by individual Class Members creates the risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications, establishes incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, and/or substantially impairs or impedes the ability of Class Members to protect their interests. A single Class Action can determine, with judicial economy, the rights of the Members of the Class. 72. Class certification is also appropriate because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class. The Class Action is based on Defendants’ acts and omissions with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to the representative Plaintiff. All Class Members who purchased Defendants’ products were treated similarly. Thus, all Class Members have the same legal right to an interest in relief for damages associated with the violations enumerated herein. 73. Class certification is also appropriate for class-wide injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2). 74. Plaintiff asserts in Counts I through VIII, below, the following claims on behalf of themselves and the Class:  Count I – Negligence  Count II – Breach of Express Warranty  Count III – Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability  Count IV – Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose  Count V – Unjust Enrichment  Count VI – Fraud/Misrepresentation  Count VII – Negligent Misrepresentation 75. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 76. Defendants owed a duty of at least reasonable care to the purchasers of their 303 82. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff and Class Members purchased Defendants’ 303 THF Products. 84. As set forth above, Defendants made common statements of facts regarding quality and use in the name and on the label of the 303 THF Products. 85. The common statements Defendants made in the name and on the label of the 303 THF Products were made to induce Plaintiff and Class Members to purchase the 303 THF Products and/or were a material factor in inducing Plaintiff and Class Members to purchase the 303 THF Products, and therefore became part of the basis of the benefit of the bargain and an express warranty. 87. Defendants have received from Plaintiff timely notification of the defects in their THF 303 Products. 88. The failure of the THF 303 Products to conform to the statements of Defendants has caused injury and damage to Plaintiff and Class Members. 89. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 90. Defendants directly or indirectly sold the 303 THF Products to Plaintiff and Class Members for use as described above. 91. As set forth above, at the time Defendants sold the 303 THF Products, the products were not fit for their ordinary use and the use described by Defendants. 92. Plaintiff and Class Members used the 303 THF Products for their ordinary purpose and the use described by Defendants. 93. Defendants have received from Plaintiff timely notification of the defect in their 303 THF Products. 94. The failure of the 303 THF Products to be fit for their ordinary purpose has cause injury and damage to Plaintiff and Class Members. 96. Defendants directly or indirectly sold the 303 THF Products to Plaintiff and Class Members for use as described above. 97. As set forth above, at the time Defendants sold the 303 THF Products, the products were not fit for their particular purpose for use as universal hydraulic fluid for tractors and/or other equipment. 98. Defendants knew or should have known of the uses for which the 303

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17. DRS placed approximately fifteen calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number between December 2018 and October 2019. 18. In each of these telephone calls, DRS delivered an artificial or pre-recorded message seeking to speak to a “Wilma Williams” regarding an alleged debt. 19. In at least one of these artificial or pre-recorded messages, DRS requested that the called party call (678) 940-1318 or visit the website www.directrecoveryservices.com to submit a payment. 20. In early Spring 2019, after receiving several telephone calls from DRS, Plaintiff called DRS and left a voice message instructing DRS that it was calling a wrong number. 21. Shortly after leaving that voice message, Plaintiff placed a call to DRS and spoke to a live representative of DRS. 22. In that conversation, Plaintiff again instructed DRS that it was calling a wrong number, and instructed DRS to stop calling his telephone number. 23. Despite acknowledging that instruction, DRS continued to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number. 24. After Plaintiff received yet another telephone call from DRS, Plaintiff responded to that call by following an IVR prompt to speak to an agent, and again spoke to a live representative of 49. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of himself and the classes of similarly situated individuals as defined below: TCPA class: All persons and entities throughout the United States (1) to whom Direct Recovery Services, LLC, placed, or caused to be placed, calls (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, (3) by using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (4) within the four years preceding the date of this complaint, (5) absent prior express consent—in that the called party was not the intended recipient. FDCPA class: All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Direct Recovery Services, LLC, placed, or caused to be placed, calls, (2) within the one year preceding the date of this complaint, (3) and in connection with the collection of a consumer debt, (4) where the person called Direct Recovery Services, LLC was not the person alleged to owe the debt. 51. Upon information and belief, the members of the classes are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. 52. The exact number of the members of the classes is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery. 53. The members of the classes are ascertainable because the classes are defined by reference to objective criteria. 54. In addition, the classes are ascertainable because, upon information and belief, cellular telephone numbers, names, and addresses of the members of the classes can be identified in business records maintained by Defendants and by third parties. 55. There exists a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact that affect the members of the classes. 56. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the classes. 57. As it did for all members of the classes, DRS used an automatic telephone dialing system, or an artificial or prerecorded voice, to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, without prior express consent, and in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 58. And, as was the case for all members of the classes, Gusman directed and authorized DRS to use an automatic telephone dialing system, or an artificial or prerecorded voice, to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, without prior express consent, and in violation of 47 79. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1-78. 81. DRS violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number without prior consent. 82. DRS additionally and separately violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice when it delivered messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number without prior consent. 83. Gusman is vicariously liable for DRS’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) because, on information and belief, she authorized DRS’s conduct of using an automatic telephone dialing system to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number without prior consent. 84. As a result of Defendants’ violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), Plaintiff, and the members of the classes, are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 85. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1-78. 86. Defendants caused Plaintiff’s cellular telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously, with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass him, even after he informed Defendants that they were calling the wrong number. 88. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every factual allegation contained in paragraphs 1-78.

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(For Violation of Section 20A of the 1934 Act) (For Violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants) (For Violation of §20(a) of the 1934 Act Against the Individual Defendants) 37. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons or entities that purchased or otherwise acquired Vertex common stock between May 7, 2012 and June 28, 2012 (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, officers and directors of the Company as well as their families, and the families of the Defendants. Class members are so numerous that joinder of them is impracticable. 39. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class. Prosecution of individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 44. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants, in pursuit of their scheme and continuous course of conduct to inflate the market price of Vertex common stock, knowingly or recklessly made materially false or misleading statements or failed to disclose material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 45. During the Class Period, Defendants, and each of them, carried out a plan, scheme, and course of conduct using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the mails, which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period did: (a) artificially inflate and maintain the market price of Vertex common stock; (b) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (c) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Vertex common stock at inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan, and course of conduct, Defendants took the actions set forth herein in violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5. All Defendants are sued either as primary participants in the wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein or as controlling persons as alleged below. 47. Defendants had actual knowledge of the misrepresentations and omissions of material facts set forth herein or acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed to ascertain and disclose such facts, even though such facts were available to them. 48. As a result of the dissemination of the materially false and misleading information and failure to disclose material facts as set forth above, the market price of Vertex common stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the fact that the market price of Vertex common stock was artificially inflated, and relying directly or indirectly on the false and misleading statements made knowingly or with deliberate recklessness by Defendants, or upon the integrity of the market in which the shares traded, Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased Vertex stock during the Class Period at artificially high prices and were damaged thereby. 49. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class and the marketplace known of the true facts, which were not disclosed by Defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would not have purchased or otherwise acquired their Vertex shares during the Class Period, or if they had acquired such shares during the Class Period, they would not have done so at the artificially inflated prices which they paid. 51. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 52. The Individual Defendants acted as control persons of Vertex within the meaning of §20(a) of the 1934 Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their executive positions, board membership, and stock ownership, as alleged above, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did, directly or indirectly, influence and control the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff contends were false and misleading. The Individual Defendants were provided with, or had unlimited access to, the Company’s internal reports, press releases, public filings, and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to or shortly after these statements were issued, and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. 53. In particular, the Individual Defendants had direct involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, are presumed to have had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein and exercised the same. 54. The Individual Defendants controlled Vertex. 56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 57. While Vertex securities traded at artificially inflated prices, Defendants Boger, Mueller, Silva, Ullian, and Wysenski personally profited by selling millions of combined dollars of Vertex shares between the May 7, 2012 false disclosure of fabricated test results and the May 28, 2012 first corrections of those results. The below chart demonstrates the egregious stock sales by these Defendants: Defendant Date of Sale Amount of Shares Profit Boger May 9, 2012 3,314 $201,228.00 Boger May 16, 2012 4,000 $252,943.00 Boger May 23, 2012 4,000 $251,302.00 Mueller May 7, 2012 79,500 $4,216,085.00 Mueller May 15, 2012 6,500 $417,824.00 Silva May 9, 2012 56,295 $3,425,781.00 Ullian May 9, 2012 20,000 $1,211,600.00 Wysenski May 7, 2012 147,695 $8,049,377.50 Wysenski May 8, 2012 38,009 $2,360,406.65 Wysenski May 14, 2012 180,000 $11,568,872.00

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 27. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.BLUEMARLINBOATS.NET , to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the products and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The products and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, and the Defendant’s website allows consumers to find information about: showroom location and hours, products and/or services offered for sale, technical specifications of its products, prices, warranties, awards and other vital information needed by prospective consumers in order to make informed decisions about the Defendant’s products and/or services. 29. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 30. Plaintiff, BRAULIO THORNE, attended the boat fair at Javits during its sales exhibition January 23-27, 2019 in order to obtain information from the personal boat, watercraft and related accessories and/or services sellers presenting and marketing at the fair, including the Defendant. 31. Soon after attending the Javits fair, the Plaintiff attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s products and services but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 34. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant intentionally violated federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 35. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 36. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: showroom location and hours, products and/or services offered for sale, technical specifications of its products, prices, warranties, awards and other vital information needed by prospective consumers in order to make informed decisions about the Defendant’s products and services. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's physical showrooms in the near future if he could access their website. 38. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 39. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination or with deliberate indifference, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 40. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 42. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. The Website must be accessible for individuals with disabilities who use computers, laptops, tablets and smart phones. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 44. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 45. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 46. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 47. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of products and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of products and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 50. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. 52. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 53. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 54. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 55. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendant’s showrooms and sales exhibits at Javits are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s physical sales locations. The Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these locations and is a gateway thereto. 58. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 59. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 61. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 62. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 66. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 67. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 68. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 70. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is not sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that it is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 74. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 81. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical sales locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 82. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical sales locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 85. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 86. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed City Sub-Class on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the City Sub-Class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 87. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 88. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502(a). 89. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 90. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 91. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 93. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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28. Plaintiffs Laila Ibrahim and Gehad Elsayed are both Muslim women who wear religious head coverings called hijabs—headscarves covering the ears, hair, and neck of the woman, but not the face—as an expression of their sincerely held religious beliefs. 29. Their beliefs are grounded in the Quran, Sunnah, and the Hadith. 31. To a Muslim woman, the veil becomes inextricably a part of herself: a form of her person and her being. To remove the veil from a women outside of her family is to debase her— violating not just her religion but her dignity. 32. The veil is worn at all times outside the presence of a Muslim woman’s family including, but not limited to, for photographs seen on government-issued IDs such as driver’s licenses and passport photos. The NYPD Photographic Unit Standard Operating Procedures 33. NYPD Photographic Unit Photography Standard Operating Procedures version 1.1 (“Photo Unit SOP”) governs the format for all post-arrest-processing photography at both the precincts and central booking. 34. Section 8 of the Photo Unit SOP provides direction for taking the front facing photograph. The photographer is directed to instruct the arrestee that the head must be straight. The prisoner should be facing and looking into the camera. Both eyes must be opened in a normal manner without squinting. The mouth should be closed unless injury or deformity prevents the mouth from closing. Long hair must be brushed or pushed away from the eyes and front of the face, which should be expressionless. 36. Nowhere does the Photo Unit SOP require the removal of religious head coverings. Instead, that policy emphasizes the importance of an unobstructed view of the face and ears for photographs taken at a precinct or central booking. 37. Upon information and belief, these photographs are then saved in the NYPD Photo Manager database and are shared with other law enforcement databases, making the photograph of arrestees without their religious head coverings visible to anyone with access to the databases— indefinitely. Searches at Police Facilities 38. After arrival at the precinct and central booking, all arrestees are subjected to a custodial search. 39. Though all women are to be searched by a female officer, upon information and belief, because all non-strip searches are conducted in the same processing space, male police officers and/or male detainees are often present during the searches of Muslim women. 40. For example, in Patrol Guide Procedure No. 208-05, the NYPD provides “[u]pon arrival at precinct of arrest or other Department facility, the arresting officer (if he/she is of the same sex as prisoner) or another designated member of the same sex as the prisoner, shall conduct a thorough search of the subject’s person and clothing to ensure the safety of all persons within the facility and to remove weapons, contraband, and evidence not recovered by the frisk.” 41. Thereafter, the arrestee is taken back to the arrest processing section to continue the process with male officers. 43. The NYPD’s written policy, (hereinafter jointly referred to as the “NYPD’s Religious Head Covering Arrest Policy”), has two distinct stages with respect to photographing arrestees: at the precinct while processing the initial arrest (the “Identification Photograph”); and a second time while at central booking (the “Booking Photograph”). 44. For years prior to 2015, the NYPD’s Religious Head Covering Arrest Policy provided a discretionary policy for the removal of religious head coverings for photographs taken during post-arrest-processing at both the precinct and at central booking. 45. At both locations, the arresting officer would search them, enter the arrestee’s pedigree information, take their photograph, and place them in a holding cell with other arrestees. 46. In 2015, the NYPD issued Interim Order 29 (hereinafter referred to as “IO 29”), which revised the NYPD’s policy as it related to the Booking Photograph, targeted arrestees who refused to remove their religious head coverings, providing them the option to take the Booking Photograph at the Mass Arrest Processing Center (MAPC) located at One Police Plaza in Manhattan regardless of the borough of their initial arrest. 47. After the 2015 change, arrestees still must remove their religious head coverings for photographs taken at central booking, without same gender photographers or private rooms, or be transported to the MAPC. 49. IO 29 left undisturbed the policy and practice of requiring all persons to remove their religious head covering for the “booking photo.” At all central booking facilities throughout the City of New York, all individuals who wear religious head coverings are required to remove their head covering for a photograph even after a search. 50. IO 29 acknowledges that arrestees requesting a religious accommodation afforded thereunder will experience “delay due to operation requirements incumbent in using MAPC,” that is, an arrestee’s post arrest processing and arraignment could be delayed if MAPC is closed at the time of their processing. 51. IO 29, and the subsequent revised Patrol Guide Sections P.G. 208-03 and P.G. 208- 07, theoretically eliminated all photographing of objecting arrestees in the Court Sections and only “accommodates” objecting arrestees at MAPC. 52. Transporting an arrestee to MAPC can substantially increase the processing time of an arrestee, adding hours and, in some instances, days to their arrest processing. The NYPD’s Practice is Inconsistently Applied and Discretionary 53. The NYPD continues an ad-hoc practice of requiring the removal of religious head coverings for post-arrest processing photographs at both the precincts and at central booking. 54. The NYPD’s alleged policy allows officers at the Identification Photograph to use individual discretion as to whether or not they would allow a Muslim woman to keep her hijab on during an Identification Photograph. 56. For example, Plaintiff Elsayed, on only one occasion, was permitted to keep her hijab on during the Identification Photograph. Both Plaintiffs were not provided the MAPC accommodation for their Booking Photograph, and were both forced to unveil. 57. Upon information and belief, NYPD officers have complete discretion when deciding whether or not the religious head covering must be removed. Prior Experiences of Plaintiff Gehad Elsayed 58. Ms. Elsayed is an observant Muslim woman who wears the hijab, covering her hair and neck as part of her religious obligations. Pursuant to her religious beliefs, Ms. Elsayed does not show her hair to men who are not part of her immediate family. 59. At all times relevant to the Complaint, including the present, Ms. Elsayed is employed at a car dealership. 60. Her position requires her to deal with customers and she is frequently in communication with the NYPD when certain incidents with customers escalate. 61. Ms. Elsayed has been arrested on three prior occasions, in 2012, 2014, and 2017. 62. In June of 2012, Ms. Elsayed was required to remove her hijab while being photographed at the 62nd Precinct and at Central Booking. 63. At the Precinct, Ms. Elsayed requested that a female officer take her fingerprints, as physical contact with men who are not in her immediate family is against her religious beliefs. This request was denied and a male officer moved her hands during the fingerprinting process. 64. Ms. Elsayed was photographed by a female officer in a private room. 66. While at Central Booking Ms. Elsayed endured the laughs of male officers and sexual comments by male detainees who referred specifically to the fact that her hair was exposed. 67. In April of 2014, Ms. Elsayed was permitted to wear her hijab for the Identification Photograph, but was again forced to remove her hijab during the Booking Photograph. 68. Ms. Elsayed endured the extreme shame of being seen by men outside of her family without her hijab. As a result of her multiple experiences, she fears further interactions with the police, believing that they will once again force her to remove her hijab in violation of her religious beliefs Experience of Plaintiff Gehad Elsayed on March 14, 2018 69. On March 14, 2018 at approximately 9:50 a.m., Ms. Elsayed was arrested for allegedly driving with a suspended license. 70. Ms. Elsayed was taken to the 72nd Precinct in Brooklyn for post arrest processing, which included fingerprinting and photographing. Plaintiff was permitted to keep her hijab for the Identification Photograph. 71. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Ms. Elsayed was transported to Brooklyn Court Section for further post arrest processing. 72. While waiting in a holding cell with other female arrestees, Ms. Elsayed was called by NYPD Officer JD1 to stand in front of a camera that was stationed in the center of the holding area. 73. This took place in the presence of seven male officers, a male photographer, and approximately twelve to fifteen male detainees who could all see her from where they were in the room. 75. Ms. Elsayed told Officer JD1, as she had told prior officers and photographers during her prior arrests, that it was against her religious convictions to remove her hijab in the presence of men who were not members of her immediate family. 76. Officer JD1 insisted Ms. Elsayed remove her hijab and preceded to mock her request with three other male officers, all watching Ms. Elsayed struggle to maintain control of a central religious belief. 77. At no point did Officer JD1 inform Ms. Elsayed that she could be taken to MAPC for a booking photograph taken in a private room. 78. The male officers ridiculed Ms. Elsayed for wanting to keep on her hijab and one officer mocked her saying “this is not the place to ask for any favors.” 79. Humiliated, panicked, and overwhelmed, Ms. Elsayed continued to plead with the photographer and the officer to keep her hijab on. 80. As the orders to remove her hijab continued, another officer approached Ms. Elsayed and told her to “cut out the crying and take that thing off.” 81. With all eyes on her, Ms. Elsayed reluctantly and slowly slid her hijab to her shoulders. 82. The photographer began to take the photograph and Officer JD1 ordered that Ms. Elsayed remove her hijab completely. 83. Ms. Elsayed complied, and her photograph was taken as she held her hijab in her hands. 85. Ms. Elsayed asked Officer JD1 to hide her photograph so it would not be visible to everyone. However, these photographs are available indefinitely to anyone with access to the Photo Manager database within the NYPD, as well as all persons involved in post-arrest processing and prosecution. Experience of Plaintiff Laila Ibrahim 86. Ms. Ibrahim is a stay-at-home mother of three and has been wearing the hijab for twenty years. She was born in Egypt and became a U.S. citizen in 2016. She has been married for 14 years. 87. On or about May 5, 2018, at approximately 1:00 A.M., New York Police Department (“NYPD”) Officer Brodie (Shield No. 28113) and Officer John Doe 2 (“JD2”) entered Plaintiff Laila Ibrahim’s apartment while she was asleep. 88. The officers were responding to a call placed by Ms. Ibrahim’s husband over a dispute. 89. Ms. Ibrahim, who speaks limited English, was awoken by her son and told that police officers wanted to talk to her. 90. Officers Brodie and JD2 asked Ms. Ibrahim if she had ripped up her husband’s shirts during the dispute. 91. Ms. Ibrahim showed the officers the old, ripped up clothing and explained that the shirts were old and stained, and that she intended to throw them out prior to the dispute. 93. Mr. Ibrahim did not intend to press charges, but the officers insisted that they still had to arrest Ms. Ibrahim, against Mr. Ibrahim’s wishes and without his request. 94. Officer Brodie and JD2 called for another unit and two more officers, John Doe 3 (“JD3”) and John Doe 4 (“JD4”), arrived to the scene. 95. The four officers took Ms. Ibrahim into custody and brought her down three flights of stairs, holding her by her upper arms while her wrists were in tightly fastened handcuffs. 96. Officers JD3 and JD4 placed Ms. Ibrahim in a patrol car and took her to 114th precinct located at 34-16 Astoria Blvd. South, Astoria, NY 11103. 97. Ms. Ibrahim was placed in a holding cell. 98. Ms. Ibrahim requested a translator several times, but Officer Brodie demanded that she shut up and stop crying, and that no translator would be provided.

win

14. Defendant offers food delivery services and online nutritional coaching. The meals are prepared fresh and then delivered by mail. The meals accommodate several diets including the Paleo Diet and the Keto Diet. Through the Website, customers can sign up for a meal plan that delivers between four (4) and eighteen (18) meals per week. Defendant also offers a free twenty (20) minute nutritional consultation and customers can also purchase coaching packages for one (1) or three (3) months. 15. Defendant’s Website is heavily integrated with its food delivery services and nutritional coaching services. Through the Website, customers can create an account, select the meals to be delivered, book a nutritional consultation, and manage an account. Customers can also purchase gift cards through the Website that are delivered electronically to the recipient. 16. The Website is a commercial marketplace. The website is Defendant’s main point of sale. 17. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff Fischler and other blind or visually-impaired users access to its Website, thereby denying the facilities and services that are offered and integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling. Due to its failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its Website, Plaintiff Fischler and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling and the -7- numerous facilities, goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through its Website. 18. Plaintiff Fischler cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen- reading software. He is, however, a proficient screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. He has visited the Website on separate occasions using screen-reading software. 19. During his visits to the Website, the last occurring on or about November 19, 2019, Plaintiff Fischler encountered multiple access barriers that denied him the enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the goods and services of Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling services. Because of these barriers he was unable to, substantially equal to sighted individuals: a. Know what is on the Website. This is due in part to the non-text images, which are not accompanied by the requisite alternative text. Many, if not all, are labeled with nondescript file names such as 02-fastfood.jif” or “03-ingredients.png.” On the page for how it works, the images are all unlabeled. Some graphics are also not detected by the screen reader. Plaintiff Fischler was unable to learn about the meal options equal to a sighted user because the graphics for “keto” or “spicy” or “paleo” are not detected. Plaintiff Fischler was also unable to learn about menu items equal to a sighted user because when he clicks on the item, no new information is provided. When a sighted user clicks on the item, a pop up window opens with additional text, ingredient lists and nutritional information. Plaintiff Fischler could not access the nutrition and ingredient information. b. Navigate the Website. Plaintiff Fischler had difficulty navigating this Website using his screen reader. Heading navigation is poor. On some pages, such as -8- the page for subscription plans, almost every line is a heading, therefore there is no way to skip ahead. Other pages have no heading navigation at all. The plan page is also difficult to navigate using a screen reader because there are multiple links labeled “select” however, each link is to sign up for a different plan. Navigating the nutritional consultation form is also difficult with a screen reader. It is difficult to select a date and time. There is no way to skip ahead to a following day. A screen reader must arrow through all of the time options for the current day to reach the next day and so on. This is extremely time consuming. The form to book an appointment is also not properly labeled. Meal selection is also very difficult using a screen reader. As mentioned above, a screen reader user does not have access to information on nutrition, ingredients, or whether a meal conforms to a specific diet. Also, when trying to select meals, Plaintiff Fischler encountered issues with screen reader focus, where focus would be hijacked and thrown to the top of the page. When he believed he had selected all of his meals, Plaintiff Fischler tried to find the link to checkout but when he entered on it, nothing happened. Therefore, he was ultimately unable to complete a purchase. 20. Plaintiff Fischler was denied full and equal access to the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website because he encountered multiple accessibility barriers that visually-impaired people often encounter with non-compliant Website: a. Images are not properly labeled. They are labeled only with files names like “03-ingredients.png”. b. Documents do not have a title. c. Frames do not have a title. -9- d. Button elements are empty and have no programmatically determined name. e. Forms have fields without label elements or title attributes. f. Webpages have no headings and headings are not nested correctly. Defendant Must Remove Barriers to Its Website 21. Due to the inaccessibility of its Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff Fischler, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The Website’s access barriers that Plaintiff Fischler encountered have caused a denial of his full and equal access in the past, and now deter him on a regular basis from accessing the Website. These access barriers have likewise deterred him from visiting Defendant’s Website and taking advantage of its meal delivery and nutritional counseling and enjoying it equal to sighted individuals. 22. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff Fischler could independently navigate it, learn about delivery options and pricing, learn about the meals offered, sign up for a nutritional consultation and complete a purchase, as sighted users can. 23. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff Fischler has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 24. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff Fischler and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the -10- Website, Plaintiff Fischler alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; b. Failing to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff Fischler; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff Fischler, as a member of a protected class. 25. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 26. Title III of the ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff Fischler seeks under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 27. Because its Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff Fischler seeks a permanent injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff Fischler to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for its Website: a. Remediating the Website to be WCAG 2.0 compliant; -11- b. Training Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly checking the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; d. Regularly testing user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies with the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, e. Developing an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 28. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies on maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually impaired consumers. 29. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff Fischler and other visually impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating its rights. 30. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making its Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 31. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. -12- 32. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling during the relevant statutory period (“Class Members”). 33. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a State of New York subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling during the relevant statutory period (“New York Subclass Members”). 34. Plaintiff Fischler seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied equal access to Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling during the relevant statutory period (“New York City Subclass Members”). 35. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: a. Whether Defendant’s website is a place of “public accommodation”; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace; c. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” or a service or good “of a place of public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA; -13- d. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” or an “accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; e. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating Title III of the ADA; and f. Whether the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of their goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 36. Plaintiff Fischler’s claims are typical of the Class Members, New York Subclass Members and New York City Subclass Members: they are all severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the visually impaired individuals. 37. Plaintiff Fischler will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class and Subclasses’ interests because he has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because he has no interests antagonistic to the Class or Subclasses. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and Subclasses, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff, the Class and Subclasses. 38. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class and Subclass Members -14- predominate over questions affecting only individuals, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 39. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 40. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 41. Title III of the ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 42. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and a public accommodation under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Its Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling. The Website is a service that is integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling. 43. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). -15- 44. Under Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 45. Under Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 46. These acts violate Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff Fischler, who is a member of a protected class of persons under Title III of the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, he has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. 47. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff Fischler requests the relief as set forth below. -16- 48. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf of the New York Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant’s meal delivery and nutritional counseling. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these meal delivery and nutritional counseling. 50. Defendant is subject to NYSHRL because it owns and operates its New York meal delivery and nutritional counseling and the Website. Defendant is a “person” under N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 51. Defendant is violating the NYSHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a), 296(2)(c)(i), 296(2)(c)(ii). 52. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components -17- to make its website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of its business nor result in an undue burden to them. 53. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class because of a disability, violating the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2), in that Defendant has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to Class Members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 54. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and New York Subclass Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York Subclass Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 55. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYSHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for every offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. -18- 56. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the New York City Subclass Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. Defendant’s Website is a commercial marketplace and constitutes a sales establishment and public accommodation under the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with those establishments. 58. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website and its meal delivery and nutritional counseling, making it a person under N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 59. Defendant is violating the NYCHRL in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its meal delivery and nutritional counseling to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(4)(a), 8-107(15)(a). 60. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Subclass because of a disability, violating the NYCHRL, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a,) in that it has: a. Constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. Constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or -19- c. Failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 61. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff Fischler and the New York City Subclass Members because of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the New York City Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 62. As Defendant’s actions violate the NYCHRL, Plaintiff Fischler seeks injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination, compensatory damages, civil penalties and fines for each offense, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-120(8), 8-126(a). 63. Plaintiff Fischler, individually and on behalf the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 64. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff Fischler contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its meal delivery and nutritional counseling, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities -20- Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 65. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate now in order that each of the parties may know its respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant, Its Website And Its Website’s Barriers VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

lose

10. John Doe Corporations 1-10 initiated prerecorded telemarketing calls to the residential landline telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the Class to promote Ohio G&E in violation of the TCPA. Ohio G&E, or one of Ohio G&E’s vendors, hired John Doe Corporations 1-10 to originate new customers, making Ohio G&E liable for their illegal telemarketing conduct. 2 Ohio G&E has a corporate affiliate, U.S. Gas & Electric, Inc. (“US G&E”), that also does business as Ohio Gas & Electric. US G&E is the entity that provides natural gas service in Ohio under the “Ohio Gas & Electric” name, while Defendant Energy Services Providers, Inc. provides electric services under the “Ohio Gas & Electric” name. 4 11. The TCPA prohibits companies, such as Ohio G&E, from placing calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice (“prerecorded calls”) when making calls to residential landline telephones without first obtaining consent. 12. Ohio G&E has violated, and continues to violate, the TCPA and its implementing regulations by placing, or having placed on its behalf, prerecorded calls to residential landline telephone subscribers (a) who have not expressly consented to receiving such calls and/or (b) who have expressly requested not to receive such calls. 13. As Congress recognized: Many customers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers…. Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.3 14. Senator Larry Pressler, one of the original drafters of the TCPA, explained the need for the TCPA by observing that “[u]nlike other communications media, the telephone commands our instan[t] attention. Junk mail can be thrown away. Television commercials can be turned off. The telephone demands to be answered.” 137 Cong. Rec. S18785 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Pressler). 15. As explained by the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)4, the TCPA requires “prior express written consent for all autodialed or prerecorded telemarketing calls to wireless numbers and residential lines.” In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the 3 Pub. L. No. 102-243 § 2(6, 12) (1991), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227. 4 The FCC is the federal agency given the administrative authority to interpret and enforce the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). 5 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG No. 02-278, FCC 12-21, 27 FCC Rcd. 1830 ¶ 2 (Feb. 15, 2012). 16. Yet, in violation of this rule, Defendants fail to obtain any prior express written consent to place prerecorded calls to consumers’ residential landline telephone numbers. 17. In response to the liability risk associated with the TCPA, numerous commercially available services exist to help companies that call others using prerecorded voices, such as Defendants, to identify telephone numbers that are on the Nation Do Not Call Registry or are cellular subscribers and otherwise ensure that calls are only made to consenting consumers. For instance, companies such as Infutor, Nextmark List, and Contact Center Compliance advertise their ability to instantly identify and flag disconnected telephone numbers from cellular telephone number data lists on a recurring basis (such as weekly or monthly). This type of service can identify disconnected numbers before they are recycled, thereby alerting mobile marketers that any consent associated with those telephone numbers has been terminated. 18. Despite the FCC’s ruling, the industry guidelines, and the commercial availability of programs that help callers filter out non-consenting numbers, Defendants fail to take the necessary steps to ensure that their prerecorded calls are placed only to consenting recipients. 19. Rather, in an effort to increase revenue and skirt additional costs, Defendants simply ignore the law when contacting individuals via prerecorded calls to their residential landline telephones. 20. Defendants know, or should know, that their prerecorded calls are placed to non- consenting residential landline telephone subscribers. Ultimately, Defendants are responsible for verifying telephone number ownership and obtaining consent before placing prerecorded calls to residential landline telephone subscribers. 6 21. Defendants were, and are, aware that their unsolicited prerecorded calls were, and are, unauthorized as they fail to obtain prior express written consent before placing those calls to consumers. Ultimately, consumers are forced to bear the costs of receiving these unsolicited prerecorded calls. 22. By placing the unsolicited prerecorded calls at issue in this Complaint, Defendants caused Plaintiff and the other members of the Class actual harm and cognizable legal injury. This includes the aggravation, nuisance, and invasions of privacy that result from the sending and receipt of such prerecorded calls, a loss of value realized for the monies consumers paid to their carriers for the receipt of such prerecorded calls, and a loss of the use and enjoyment of their phones, including wear and tear to the related data, memory, software, hardware, and battery components, among other harms. 23. In response to Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff filed this action seeking (a) an injunction requiring Defendants to cease all unsolicited prerecorded calling activities and, (b) an award of actual or statutory damages to the members of the Class under the TCPA, together with costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 24. Plaintiff Lindenbaum is the registered account owner and regular user of a residential landline telephone number 216-xxx-5581. 25. The 5581 telephone number has been registered on the National Do Not Call Registry since August 31, 2003. 26. On February 16, 2021 at 7:10 pm, Plaintiff received an unsolicited, pre-recorded phone call on her residential landline telephone from, or on behalf, of Defendants. 7 27. The February 16, 2021 call used a pre-recorded voice and stated that the call was being made to alert Plaintiff that she had been overcharged by her energy supplier. 28. Plaintiff pressed “1” to speak with a live person and was connected with one of John Doe Corporation 1’s telephone representatives. 29. John Doe Corporation 1’s phone representative asked Plaintiff for her billing account number and asked if Plaintiff received any government assistance with her utility bill and confirmed that Defendant Ohio G&E would be the energy supplier. 30. Solely to determine who was behind this unwarranted robocall, Plaintiff continued the call, answering questions from John Doe Corporation 1’s phone representative, and proceeded all the way to the point of third-party verification of her intent to contract with Ohio G&E for electric services.5 She ultimately declined to switch her electric service to Ohio 58. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated and seeks certification of the following Class: Robocall Residential Landline Telephone No Consent Class: All persons in the United States who from a date four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint to the present: (1) Defendants (or a third person acting on behalf of Defendants) called; (2) on the person’s residential landline telephone number using an artificial or prerecorded voice; and (3) for whom Defendants lacked prior express consent to call that residential landline telephone number at the time the call was made. 59. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest, and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 60. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the definition of the Class following class discovery, including discovery revealing the manner by which Defendants claim they obtained prior express consent to place autodialed and/or pre-recorded calls to the Plaintiff. 61. Numerosity: The exact number of members within the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have placed unsolicited calls to hundreds or thousands of 13 consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 62. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct, namely their unauthorized telemarketing calls. Plaintiff is a member of the Class defined herein, and if Plaintiff is able to recover for the claims set forth in this Complaint, then the other members of the Class will have a right to recover as well. 63. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class actions, including class actions under the TCPA and related statutes. Plaintiff has no conflicts with, or interests antagonistic to, those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiff. 64. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: a) Whether John Doe Corporation 1 made calls with a prerecorded message; b) Whether Defendants’ conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA; c) Whether Ohio G&E is liable for the conduct of their third-party vendors; d) Whether members of the Robocall Residential Landline No Consent Class are entitled to statutory and treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct; e) Whether Defendants obtained prior express consent to contact any class members; f) Whether Defendants’ calls constitute telemarketing or were dual purpose messages; and 14 g) To the extent Defendants’ conduct does not constitute telemarketing, whether Defendants obtained prior express oral consent to contact any class members. 65. Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all parties is impracticable, and the damages suffered by the individual members of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendants’ actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendants’ misconduct. Even if members of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action. Individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions ensured. 66. Adequate notice can be given to the members of the Class directly using information maintained in Defendants’ records or through notice by publication. 67. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 15 68. Defendants and/or their agents placed unsolicited calls to residential landline telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall Residential Landline No Consent Class. 69. These calls were made without the prior express written consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall Residential Landline No Consent Class to receive such calls. 70. These calls, including those to Plaintiff, utilized an artificial or prerecorded voice. 71. To the extent prior written express consent was required, Defendants failed to obtain prior written express consent that disclosed to the consumer that agreeing to receive pre- recorded calls was not a condition of purchase or use of any goods or service. Neither was oral consent provided. 72. To the extent Ohio G&E’s agent, John Doe Corporations 1-10, placed the calls at issue, Ohio G&E’s agent acted with actual or apparent authority and/or in accordance with a contract between Ohio G&E and its agent, John Doe Corporations 1-10. Ohio G&E’s agent acted under Ohio G&E’s control and for Ohio G&E’s benefit and/or with Ohio G&E’s knowledge and approval. Ohio G&E controlled its agent and knew about, and received the benefits of, the agent’s calling activities. Ohio G&E ratified the agent’s conduct with respect to the placing of such calls. 73. Defendants have, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall Residential Landline No Consent Class are each entitled to, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation of such act. 74. In the event that the Court determines that Defendants’ conduct was willfull and knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages 16 recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the Robocall Residential Landline No Consent Class. 8. Ohio G&E is a certified supplier in the Ohio Energy Choice program, offering electricity and natural gas to consumers in Ohio.2 9. In recent years, energy suppliers such as Ohio G&E have turned to unsolicited telemarketing as a way to increase their customer base. Widespread telemarketing is a primary method by which Ohio G&E solicits new customers. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Robocall Residential Landline No Consent Class)

lose

21.Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, on behalf of a Nationwide Class defined as: All persons who, between October 7, 2009 and the present, purchased one or more containers of “Great Value Pork & Beans in Tomato Sauce” at a Walmart store located in the United States. 22.Plaintiff Tye also brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, on behalf of a California Sub-Class defined as: All persons who, between October 7, 2009 and the present, purchased one or more containers of “Great Value Pork & Beans in Tomato Sauce” at a Walmart store located in California. 23.Plaintiff Schmoll also brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, on behalf of a New Jersey Sub-Class defined as: All persons who, between October 7, 2009 and the present, purchased one or more containers of “Great Value Pork & Beans in Tomato Sauce” at a Walmart store located in New Jersey. 25.The members of the class and sub-classes for whose benefit this action is brought are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 26.Upon information and belief, the proposed Nationwide Class is composed of over 100,000 persons and each proposed State Sub-Class is composed of at least 5,000 persons. 27.No violations alleged in this complaint are a result of any oral communications or individualized interaction of any kind between class members and Defendants. 28.Rather, all claims in this matter arise from the identical, false, written affirmative statements on the Product label as outlined in detail herein. 30.In addition, there are common questions of law and fact affecting the rights of all California Sub-Class members, including, inter alia, the following: a. Whether Defendants’ actions, as outlined herein, violated the California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; b. Whether Defendants’ actions, as outlined herein, violated the California Business & Professions Code § 17500 et seq.; c. Whether Defendants’ action in placing the word “PORK” under the word “INGREDIENTS” on the Product label constituted an express warranty under California law; and d. Whether, by the facts alleged herein, Defendants have breached an express warranty under California common law. 33.Plaintiffs are each members of the class and sub-class he seeks to represent. 34.The claims of Plaintiffs are not only typical of all class and sub-class members, they are identical. 36.All claims of Plaintiffs and the class and sub-classes are based on the same legal theories. 37.Plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the class or sub-classes. 38.Plaintiffs will thoroughly and adequately protect the interests of the class and sub-classes, having retained qualified and competent legal counsel to represent themselves and the class and sub-classes. 39.Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class and sub-classes, thereby making appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief for the class as a whole. 40.The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. 41.A class action is the only practical, available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy since, inter alia, the damages suffered by each class member were less than $2 per container of the Product purchased and, as such, individual actions are not economically feasible. 43. Defendants are in the business of manufacturing, distributing, marketing, and selling, inter alia, “Great Value Pork & Beans in Tomato Sauce.” 44. “Great Value Pork & Beans in Tomato Sauce” is a an exclusive Walmart “store brand” food product, sold at Walmart stores throughout the United States, including 200 Walmart stores in California, 60 Walmart stores in New Jersey and 136 Walmart stores in Pennsylvania. 46.Since the initial offering of the Product, each and every label on this Product has borne a uniformly-worded label which includes, inter alia, the word “PORK” under the word “INGREDIENTS,” as depicted in Figure 2, below. Figure 2 47.In actuality, rigorous scientific testing, including microscopic and chemical analysis, has revealed that the Product contains no pork whatsoever. 49.It is equally clear that Defendants have been fully aware for some time that in order to label a product as “Pork & Beans,” the product must contain at least some pork. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration CPG Sec. 567.200, entitled “Pork and Beans and Similar Bean Products,” which makes clear that the product must be made “with pork.” 50.Indeed, over fifteen years ago, the United States Department of Agriculture promulgated a written “Commercial Item Description” which specifies that any product described as “‘Pork and Beans in Tomato Sauce’ … shall contain a minimum of 12 percent ham, bacon or pork based on the weight of the smoked or fresh meat at the time of formulation.” 51.Despite this, Defendants opted to name the Product “Great Value Pork & Beans in Tomato Sauce,” knowing that it contains no pork whatsoever. 52.Defendants also choose to list the word “PORK” on the Product label, under the word “INGREDIENTS,” knowing that the Product actually contained no pork whatsoever. 54.While no one reasonably expects any product called “pork & beans” to contain a majority of pork, or even a large quantity of pork, it is clear that labeling a product which contains no pork whatsoever as “pork & beans” is misleading and deceptive. 55.Defendants sold the Product in their regular course of business. 56.Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class purchased the Product. 57.The written, uniformly-worded label on the Product (as depicted herein) constituted an express warranty provided to all purchasers of the Product under the law of each state in the United States in which the Product was sold. 58.Defendants’ written affirmations of fact, promises, and/or descriptions on the Product label were part of that express warranty under the laws of each state in the United States in which the Product was sold. 60.The false information provided on the label was undiscoverable to Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class at the time of purchase of the Product. 61.All conditions precedent to seeking liability under this claim for breach of warranty have been performed by or on behalf of Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class in terms of paying for the goods at issue. 62.Defendants had actual and/or constructive notice of the false labeling information and to date have taken no action to remedy their breaches of warranty. 63.Defendants were on notice of their breaches of warranty and have refused to remedy such breaches. 64.By placing the Product into the stream of commerce, by operation of law in each state in the United States, Defendants also impliedly warranted to Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class that the Product was accurately labeled in conformance with the law. 66.As a result of the breach of these warranties, Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to legal and equitable relief including damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, rescission, and/or other relief as deemed appropriate, for an amount to compensate them for not receiving the benefit of their bargain. 67.Plaintiffs incorporate all preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth fully herein. 68.Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class have conferred substantial benefits on Defendants by purchasing the Product, and Defendants have knowingly and willingly accepted and enjoyed these benefits. 70.Under the common law of unjust enrichment in every state in the United States where the Product was sold, it would be inequitable for Defendants to retain the benefit of the payments under these circumstances and such retention constitutes unjust enrichment. 71.Under the law of every state in the United States where the Product was sold, both law and equity demand disgorgement of Defendants’ ill-gotten gains. 72.As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct and unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to restitution from Defendants and institution of a constructive trust disgorging all profits, benefits, and other compensation obtained by Defendants. 73.Plaintiff Tye incorporates all preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth fully herein. 75.Defendants sold the Product in California during the class period applicable to Plaintiff Tye and the members of the California Sub-Class. 76.Defendants are each a “person” within the meaning of the Sherman Food Drug & Cosmetic Law, California Health & Safety Code section 109875, et seq. (the “Sherman Law”). 77.As a result of Defendants’ illegal business practices, Plaintiff Tye and the members of the California Sub-Class, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17203, are entitled to an order enjoining such future conduct and such other orders and judgments which may be necessary to disgorge Defendants’ ill-gotten gains and to restore to Plaintiff Tye and members of the California Sub-Class any money paid for the Product. 77.Defendants’ business practices, as described herein, are unlawful under section 17200, et seq. by virtue of Defendants’ violations of the advertising provisions of Article 3 of the Sherman Law and the misbranded food provisions of Article 6 of the Sherman Law. 78.Defendants’ business practices are unlawful under section 17200 et seq. by virtue of Defendants’ violations of section 17500 et seq., which forbids untrue and misleading advertising. 78.Defendants’ unlawful business acts present a threat and a reasonable continued likelihood of injury to Plaintiff Tye and members of the California Sub-Class. 79.Defendants’ business practices are unlawful under section 17200 et seq. by virtue of Defendants’ violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code section 1750, et seq. 80.Plaintiff Tye incorporates all preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth fully herein. 81.Defendants’ conduct as set forth herein constitutes unfair business acts and practices within the meaning of the California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq. 82.Defendants sold the Product in California during the class period applicable to Plaintiff Tye and the members of the California Sub-Class. 83.Plaintiff Tye and the members of the California Sub-Class suffered a substantial injury by virtue of buying the Product which they would not have suffered absent Defendants’ illegal conduct. 84.Defendants’ deceptive marketing, advertising, packaging and labeling of the Product and their sale of unsalable misbranded products that were illegal to possess was of no benefit to consumers, and the harm to consumers and competition is substantial. 86.Plaintiff and the members of the California Sub-Class had no way of reasonably knowing that the Product was misbranded and was not properly marketed, advertised, packaged and labeled, and thus they could not have reasonably avoided the injury each of them suffered. 87.The consequences of Defendants’ conduct as set forth herein outweigh any justification, motive or reason therefor. Defendants’ conduct is and continues to be immoral, unethical, unscrupulous, contrary to public policy, and is substantially injurious to Plaintiff Tye and the California Sub-Class. 88.Pursuant to Business and Professions Code § 17203, and as a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff Tye and the California Sub-Class are entitled to an order enjoining such future conduct by Defendants, and such other orders and judgments which may be necessary to disgorge Defendants’ ill-gotten gains and restore any money paid by Plaintiff Tye and the members of California Sub-Class to purchase the Product from Defendants in California. 90.Defendants’ conduct as set forth herein constitutes fraudulent business practices under California Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. 91.Defendants’ conduct in mislabeling and misbranding its food products originated from and was approved at Defendants’ headquarters. 92.Defendants sold the Product in California during the class period. 93.Defendants’ misleading marketing, advertising, packaging, and labeling of the Product and their misrepresentations that the Product was salable, capable of legal possession and not misbranded were likely to deceive reasonable consumers, and in fact, Plaintiff Tye and the members of the California Sub-Class were deceived. By the acts set forth herein, Defendants have engaged in fraudulent business acts and practices. 94.Defendants’ fraud and deception caused Plaintiff Tye and members of the California Sub-Class to purchase the Product from Defendants which they would have not otherwise purchased had they known the true nature of the Product. 96.As a result of Defendants’ conduct as set forth herein, Plaintiff Tye and members of the California Sub-Class, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 17203, are entitled to an order enjoining such future conduct by Defendants, and such other orders and judgments which may be necessary to disgorge Defendants’ ill-gotten gains and restore any money paid for the Product by Plaintiff Tye and members of the California Sub-Class. 97.Plaintiff Tye incorporates all preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if set forth fully herein. 98.Plaintiff Tye asserts this cause of action for violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17500, et seq. for misleading and deceptive advertising against Defendants on behalf of the California Sub- Class. BREACH OF WARRANTY On Behalf of the Nationwide Class CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17500 et seq. Misleading and Deceptive Advertising On Behalf of the California Sub-Class Only CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 et seq. Fraudulent Business Acts and Practices On Behalf of the California Sub-Class Only CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 et seq. Unfair Business Acts and Practices On Behalf of the California Sub-Class Only CALIFORNIA BUSINESS & PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200 et seq. Unlawful Business Acts and Practices On Behalf of the California Sub-Class Only NEW JERSEY TRUTH IN CONSUMER CONTRACT, WARRANTY AND NOTICE ACT N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 et seq. On Behalf of the New Jersey Sub-Class Only 162. Plaintiff Schmoll incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth at length herein. 163. Plaintiff Schmoll and the members of the New Jersey Sub-Class are “consumers” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 and 16. 164. Defendants are “sellers” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 and 16. 165. The Product label on “Great Value Pork & Beans in Tomato Sauce” is both a consumer “notice” and “warranty” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 and 16. 166. By the acts alleged herein, Defendants have violated N.J.S.A. 56:12-16 because, in the course of Defendants’ business, Defendants have offered written consumer notices and warranties to Plaintiff Schmoll and the New Jersey Sub-Class which contained provisions which violated their clearly established legal rights under New Jersey state law, within the meaning of UNJUST ENRICHMENT On Behalf of the Nationwide Class

win

(Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.) (Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.) (Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., on behalf of the Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) 10. To address these harms, the TCP A makes it illegal to send autodialed, artificial, or prerecorded messages without prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. §227 et seq. 11 . The TCPA prohibits the use of an automatic telephone dialing system ("ATDS") to call any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service, absent an emergency purpose or absent Defendant obtaining the prior express consent of the called party. 12. SunPro may not make unsolicited telemarketing calls to cell phone numbers without the user's prior express written consent. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). 13. The FCC has defined telemarketing as "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12). 14. The FCC has stated that telemarketing occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or services. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12); 18 FCC Red. 14014,14098 ,Tl 41 (FCC 2003). 15. The TCPA established the National Do-Not-Call List ("DNC") and prohibits a company from calling individuals who have registered their residential telephone number on the DNC list. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) more than once during a 12 month period. Any company, or someone on the company's behalf, that calls a person with a number registered to the DNC has TCPA liability. 16. SunPro sells solar panels. 18. Defendant's automated promotional calls include the use of an artificial or pre- recorded voice. 19. Upon information or belief, those calls did and do not require human intervention to dial the phone number or communicate the message. 20. Plaintiff and the putative Class members did not consent to receive SunPro's calls. 21. SunPro's calls present the precise harm and infringe the same privacy interests Congress sought to protect in enacting the TCP A. 22. SunPro's calls invaded Plaintiffs privacy, and that of the class members. 23. When Plaintiff and members of the putative class received a call from Defendant, they are alerted to call by a ring, vibration, or other indication on their telephone. 24. If Defendant's promotional telephone call goes unanswered, Defendant leaves a promotional message with a pre-recorded or artificial voice. 25. Cell phone plans have limited voicemail capacity. This means that each unwanted pre-recorded voice message from SunPro consumes voicemail capacity, creating the risk that these voicemails will exclude messages from or prevent delivery of messages to a consumer's voicemail box that the consumer wants and needs. 26. Plaintiff and the putative class members' paid for the voicemail capacity consumed by SunPro's pre-recorded voice messages through their cell phone plans. 27. SunPro subjected Plaintiff and the putative class members to the aggravation, nuisance, and loss of time involved with receiving SunPro's calls. 28. SunPro, through its calls, has violated Plaintiffs and putative class members' statutory and privacy rights. 30. Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease making all improper calls, and an award of statutory damages to himself and class members for all calls that violated their statutory rights, as well as costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 46. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 47. Defendant and its agents have made, and continue to make, unsolicited calls to cell phone numbers, including to Plaintiffs and the other members of the class, using an automatic telephone dialing system and prerecorded or artificial voice messages. 48. SunPro made these calls without obtaining prior express consent from Plaintiff or the class members. 50. Each of the proposed classes numbers over forty (40) persons and are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and it is further impracticable to bring all such persons before this Court. 51 . The injuries and damages to these class members present questions of law and fact that are common to each class member, and that are common to the entire class as a whole. Those common questions include, and are not limited to: a. Whether the subject calls used prerecorded or artificial voices; b. Whether the subject calls are covered by the TCP A; c. Whether the subject calls violate the TCP A; and d. Whether the class members are entitled to relief under the TCP A. 52. Defendant has engaged in the same conduct regarding the other members of the class asserted in this suit. 53. The claims, defenses, and injuries of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims, defenses and injuries of the entire class, and the claims, defenses and injuries of each class member are typical of those of the entire class. 54. Representative Plaintiff will fully and adequately protect and represent the entire class, and all its putative members. 55. The identity of all members of this class cannot be determined at this time, but will be determined upon obtaining discovery from Defendant and others. 57. The prosecution of separate actions would also create a substantial risk of adjudication with respect to individual class members which, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interest of other members not parties to the adjudication, thereby substantially impairing and impeding their ability to protect these interests. Further, the maintenance of this suit as a class action is the superior means of disposing of the common questions which predominate herein. 58. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 59. Plaintiff did not expressly consent to receive calls from Defendant. 6. The TCP A exists to prevent communications like those described within this complaint. "Voluminous consumer complaints about abuses of telephone technology - for example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes -prompted Congress to pass the TCP A." Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012). 60. Defendant used an artificial or pre-recorded voice to call Plaintiffs cell phone. 61. After receiving the call from Defendant, Plaintiff listened to the pre-recorded voice that was recorded by his voicemail. 62. SunPro violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(l)(A)(iii) with its call to Plaintiffs cell phone. 63. Defendant has acted in the same way toward all class members by placing unsolicited telephone calls to their cell phones or their residential land lines. 64. Defendant's conduct caused Plaintiff and the class members the exact harm Congress sought to prevent in enacting the TCP A. 65. Plaintiff and the class members were harmed and incurred damages as identified above. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 68. Upon information and belief, Defendant placed the unlawful calls to Plaintiff and the class members in knowing violation of the TCP A, thereby willfully violating federal law. 69. Defendant has acted in the same way toward all members of the class. 7. Congress also found that "the evidence presented to the Congress indicates that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance ... " Id. at §§12-13. 70. As a result of these calls, Plaintiff and the class are entitled to relief, recovery, and treble damages for a willful violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). 71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein all previous paragraphs of this Complaint. 72. 4 7 C.F .R. §64.1200( c) - a regulation that implements the TCP A - states that "[ n ]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation" to "[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government." 73. Under 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(e), subsection (c) is "applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers[.]" 75. 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5), provides that any "person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may" bring a private cause of action for a violation of the regulations that were promulgated to protect consumers pursuant to the TCP A. 76. SunPro violated 47 U.S.C. §227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the DNC Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of SunPro in violation of 47 C.F.R. §64.1200(c). 77. As a result of these calls, Plaintiff and the DNC Class are entitled to relief, recovery, and damages for a violation of the TCP A. 8. "When Congress enacted the TCP A, it did so in part to protect consumers from the 'nuisance, invasion of privacy, cost, and inconvenience that autodialed and prerecorded calls generate." Meredith v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 2018 WL 1782854, at *3 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (quoting Caudill v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 2016 WL 3820195 (E.D. Ky. 2016)).

lose

(AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS) 1. Deceptive Sales Practices of Home Improvement Contractor a. General 1. The jurisdiction of this court is established pursuant to Federal Truth in Finding Act, 15 U.S.C. §1640 (“TILA”) and for state law claims pursuant to the pendent jurisdiction of the Court. 10. Several days later, on or about July 28, 2016, an employee and/or agent of Fluid Air who identified herself as “Michelle” arrived at the Locicero Residence for the purpose of “inspecting” the air conditioner unit and discussing the so-called “FPL Program.” 11. After “inspecting” the air conditioner unit at the Locicero Residence, “Michelle” falsely represented to Ms. Locicero that the “FPL Program” provided financial assistance to homeowners such as Ms. Locicero to change out old air conditioner units for energy efficiency when no such “FPL Program” existed. 12. “Michelle” falsely represented to Ms. Locicero that the “FPL Program” would allow Ms. Locicero to change-out the air conditioner replacement at the Locicero Residence without Ms. Locicero paying any money out of pocket when in fact it was the intent of Fluid Air to create a loan in the name of Ms. Locicero to finance the purchase of the air conditioner replacement without her permission or consent. 13. In the belief that an “FPL Program” existed which would assist Ms. Locicero in changing out her air conditioner unit, Ms. Locicero signed a document entitled “Agreement for Change Out in Service” (“A/C Change Out Agreement”). 14. A true and correct copy of the A/C Change Out Agreement is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit “A.” 16. As more particularly described above, the sale of the A/C Unit constituted a “home solicitation sale” as said term is defined under Florida Statute §501.021(1). 17. Pursuant to Florida Statute §501.031(2), every home solicitation sale should be evidenced by a writing which contains a statement (“Right to Cancel”) under a conspicuous caption, “BUYER’S RIGHT TO CANCEL”: “This is a home solicitation sale, and if you do not want the goods or services, you may cancel this agreement by providing written notice to the seller in person, by telegram, or by mail. This notice must indicate that you do not want the goods or services and must be delivered or postmarked before midnight of the third business day after you sign this agreement. If you cancel this agreement, the seller may not keep all or part of any cash down payment.” 18. The A/Change Out Agreement did not have the statutorily mandated disclosures with respect to both form and content of the Right to Cancel in contravention of Florida Statute §501.031. ii. As to the Federal Cooling-Off Rule 19. As more particularly described above, the sale of the A/C Unit was a “door-to- door sale” as said term is defined under 16 C.F.R. §429.0(a). 20. As more particularly described above, the A/C Unit constituted a “consumer good” as said term is defined under 16 C.F.R. §429.0(b). 3. At all times material hereto, Defendant, INTRUST Bank (“INTRUST”), is a banking corporation organized in the State of Kansas. 4. At all times material hereto, INTRUST was in the business of extending credit to consumers for personal and household purposes. 5. At all times material hereto, GreenSky, LLC (“GreenSky”) was a Georgia limited liability company doing business in the State of Florida. 54. Ms. Locicero brings this action on her own behalf and as representative of all those similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with respect to equitable relief sought herein, and Rule 23(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with respect to the damages sought herein. 56. Although the precise number of class members is presently unknown and can only be determined by discovery, the proposed class size satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as, upon information and belief, INTRUST has extended credit to more than one hundred (100) customers who executed all similar finance agreements. 57. The members of the class referred to above who are similarly situated with Ms. Locicero, or readily ascertainable are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved, affecting the parties to be represented in that each party has been injured by, or has an interest in litigating the legality of the practice of the Defendant alleged herein. Proof of a common or single state of fact or set of facts will establish the right of each member of the class to recover. 58. Plaintiff is a member of the class because Plaintiff entered into the Locicero Loan Agreement that was obtained by GreenSky for which INTRUST failed to provide adequate disclosures under TILA and Regulation Z in the same manner as all other members of the class. 6. At all times material hereto, Ms. Locicero was the legal title owner of a single- family home located at 1050 N.W. 53rd Street, Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 (“Locicero Residence”), where Ms. Locicero maintained her place of residence. 60. Common questions of law or fact include whether Defendants provided an extension of credit in the form of the Locicero Loan Agreement in violation of TILA and Regulation Z which extension of credit was arranged by GreenSky in violation of the CSOA. 61. The requirement of Rule 23(a)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is met because the claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of class members. Plaintiff and class members executed a finance agreement in the same or substantially similar form as the Locicero Loan Agreement which credit was obtained by GreenSky during the relevant class period and are entitled to statutory and actual damages as a result of the failure to disclose and provide the required material information under TILA and the CSOA. 62. The requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is met because Plaintiff will fairly and accurately protect the interests of the class. No antagonism exists between the interest of the Plaintiff and the interest of other class members. Counsel for Plaintiff is experienced in class action litigation and is well qualified to conduct this litigation. 63. This action is appropriate for class treatment pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because Defendant has acted or has refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire class, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive or corresponding to declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 65. This is an action for violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (“TILA”), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, seeking damages, interest, costs and attorney’s fees. 66. Ms. Locicero realleges and reaffirms the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 64 above as if set forth hereat in full. 68. By reason of the aforesaid violations of the TILA and Regulation Z, INTRUST is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the class for statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1640(a). 69. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1640, Plaintiff and the members of the class are entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees to be determined by the Court. 7. On or about July 24, 2016, Ms. Locicero received an unsolicited telephone call on her cell phone from whom Ms. Locicero believes was a salesperson at “Fluid Air Concepts” (“Fluid Air” or “A/C Contractor”) concerning a “sales program” to help low income persons save on energy costs. 70. Plaintiff has retained the undersigned law firm to represent his interest herein and is obligated to pay said law office a reasonable fee for its services. 71. This claim for declaratory relief is brought under the Florida Declaratory Judgment Act, Fla. Stat. §86.021, to settle and obtain relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to the rights, status and legal relations of Ms. Locicero and members of the class and the consumer protections embodied in the CSOA. 72. Ms. Locicero realleges and reaffirms the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 64 above as if set forth hereat in full. 74. Based on information and belief, there is an actual, judicable controversy between the parties relating to the construction of the credit services contract of Ms. Locicero and members of the Class and the application of Florida’s Credit Service Organization Act to those contracts. 75. The public interest is best served by granting the requested injunctions, as the public has a compelling interest in preventing GreenSky from violating the statutory and common law of the State of Florida. 76. Ms. Locicero and other members of the Class are likely to succeed on the merits of this action, as the CSOA explicitly requires that GreenSky provide specific disclosures to consumers for whom it provided services for. 77. Ms. Lociero realleges and reaffirms the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 64 above as if set forth hereat in full. 78. By paying or agreeing to pay money for credit services, Ms. Locicero and members of the Class conferred a benefit of illegally collected charges upon GreenSky and 8. In the ensuing telephone call, the salesperson informed Ms. Locicero that Ms. Locicero could save a substantial amount of money by upgrading the air conditioning system at the Locicero Residence using a Florida Power and Light (“FPL”) Program “that would pay for itself.” 82. This is an action for violation of the Florida Credit Service Organizations Act, Florida Statute §817.7001, et seq. (“Florida CSOA”), brought herein pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 83. Ms. Locicero realleges and reaffirms the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 64 above as if set forth hereat in full. 84. At all times material hereto, Ms. Locicero was a “buyer” as said term is defined under Florida Statute §817.7001(1). 85. At all times material hereto, GreenSky was a “credit service organization” as said term is defined under Florida Statute §817.7001(2)(a). 86. At all times material hereto, the monies owed to INTRUST under the Locicero Loan Agreement constituted an “extension of credit” as said term is defined under Florida Statute §817.7001(3). 88. Pursuant to Florida Statute §817.706, Ms. Locicero and the members of the Class are entitled to recover actual damages, but in no case less than the amount paid by Ms. Locicero and the Class Members to GreenSky, plus reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and punitive damages. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Francisca D. Locicero, an individual, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, prays: A. For an order certifying the instant matter as a class action; B. For equitable relief establishing that GreenSky may not continue operating as a credit service business without complying with the requirements of Florida law and that all extensions of credit arranged by GreenSky are void by operation of law; C. For statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees against INTRUST pursuant to 15 A. Details of In-home Solicitation CREDIT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS ACT (“CSOA”) (AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS) I. JURISDICTION TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C. §1601, ET SEQUI (AS TO INTRUST) UNDER FLORIDA STATUTES CHAPTER 86 (AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS)

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15. Plaintiff was employed as an exotic dancer by Shangri La West for the period of about 2017 through about 2019. 16. During the period of Plaintiff’s employment, the number of shifts Plaintiff worked varied from week to week. 17. During the period of Plaintiff’s employment, the exact number of hours Plaintiff worked varied from week to week. 18. On information and belief, Defendant has possession of time and/or sign in “house fee” payment records for Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers employed by Defendant during the relevant period. 19. At all times, Defendant had actual knowledge of all hours Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers worked each shift through sign in or tip-in sheets, DJ records, and shift-managers monitoring and supervising Plaintiff’s work duties and the work duties of other exotic dancers at Shangri La West. 20. At no time during Plaintiff’s period of employment did Defendant ever pay Plaintiff or any other exotic dancers any wages for hours that Plaintiff and other exotic dancers worked each week. USDC IN/ND case 1:20-cv-00006-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 01/03/20 page 3 of 12 4 21. At all times relevant, Defendant totally failed to pay wages or any kind of compensation to Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers for work duties performed. 22. At all times relevant, Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers at Shangri La West as independent contractors when these individuals should have been classified under the FLSA and IMWL as employees. 23. At all times, Defendant controlled all aspects of the job duties Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers performed inside Shangri La West through employment rules and workplace policies. 24. At all times, Defendant controlled the method by which Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers could earn money at Shangri La West by establishing dance orders, setting customer prices on private and semi-private exotic dances, and setting private and semi-private dance specials and promotions for customers. 25. At all times, Defendant required Plaintiff and other exotic dancers to perform private and semi-private dances under the pricing guidelines, policies, procedures, and promotions set exclusively by Defendant. 26. Defendant hired Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers and had the ability to discipline them, fine them, fire them, and adjust their work schedules. 27. Defendant, through supervisors and managers, supervised the duties of Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers to make sure their job performance was of sufficient quality. 28. Defendant conducted initial interviews and vetting procedures for Plaintiff and other exotic dancers and, at Shangri La West’s sole discretion, Defendant’s management and/or ownership could deny any Plaintiff or any other dancer access or ability to dance and/or work at Shangri La West. USDC IN/ND case 1:20-cv-00006-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 01/03/20 page 4 of 12 5 29. At all times, Defendant had the right to suspend or send Plaintiff or other exotic dancers home and away from Shangri La West if Plaintiff or other dancers violated rules or policies or if Defendant’s ownership or management, at its discretion, did not want Plaintiff or any other dancer at Shangri La West. 30. As a condition of employment with Defendant, Plaintiff and other dancers were not required to have or possess any requisite certification, education, or specialized training. 31. At all times relevant, Defendant was in the business of operating a night club featuring exotic dancers and at all times it was the job duty of Plaintiff and each other exotic dancer to perform as exotic dancers for Defendant’s customers. 32. In addition to failing to pay Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers any wages for hours worked, Defendant required Plaintiff and all other exotic dancers to pay Shangri La West or its ownership or management a house fee or kickback of $25.00-$50.00 or more for each shift Plaintiff and the other exotic dancers worked. 33. At all times during the relevant period, without legal excuse or justification, Defendant regularly and customarily kept and/or assigned to management tips and gratuities Plaintiff and other exotic dancers received from customers. 34. For at least the past twenty (20) years, gentlemen’s clubs like Shangri La West have been publically sued for misclassifying exotic dancers as independent contractors and failing to pay minimum wage compensation to exotic dancers as required by the FLSA and state wage and hour laws. 35. On information and belief, Defendant and its management had actual or constructive knowledge that for at least the past twenty (20) years, there have been ongoing or past litigation by exotic dancers against gentlemen’s clubs like Shangri La West in which the exotic dancers USDC IN/ND case 1:20-cv-00006-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 01/03/20 page 5 of 12 6 challenged the so-called independent contractor classification and otherwise sought to recover unpaid wages and damages under the FLSA state wage and hour laws. 36. On information and belief, Defendant and its management had actual or constructive knowledge that Plaintiff and other exotic dancers at Shangri La West were employees and not independent contractors and were owed minimum wage compensation under the FLSA and the 38. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 39. The Rule 23 Class is defined in this matter as all individuals, who at any time during the relevant time period, worked as an exotic dancer for Defendant, but were designated as an independent contractor and therefore, were not paid minimum wage compensation as required by the IMWL (hereinafter, “the Class”). 40. On information and belief, the Class are believed to exceed fifty (50) current and former exotic dancers at Shangri La West and is therefore so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 41. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members, including, but not limited to: USDC IN/ND case 1:20-cv-00006-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 01/03/20 page 6 of 12 7 i. Whether Defendant violated the IMWL by classifying all exotic dancers at Shangri La West as "independent contractors," as opposed to employees, and not paying them any minimum wages; ii. Whether Defendant unlawfully required class members to split their tips with Defendant and and/or Defendant’s managers; iii. Whether the monies given to dancers by patrons when they perform private and semi-private dances are gratuities or "service fees.” iv. Whether Defendant violated the IMWL; and v. The amount of damages and other relief (including statutory liquidated damages) to which Plaintiff and the Class are entitled. 42. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class. 43. Plaintiff, like other members of the Class, was misclassified as an independent contractor and denied her rights to wages and gratuities by Defendant under the IMWL. 44. Defendant’s misclassification of Plaintiff was done pursuant to a common business practice which affected all Class members in a similar way. 45. The named Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel are adequate representatives of the Class. 46. Given Plaintiff’s loss, Plaintiff has the incentive and is committed to the prosecution of this action for the benefit of the Class. 47. Plaintiff has no interests that are antagonistic to those of the Class or that would cause them to act adversely to the best interests of the Class. 48. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class and collective actions and, in particular, litigation of wage and hour disputes. USDC IN/ND case 1:20-cv-00006-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 01/03/20 page 7 of 12 8 49. This action is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ .P. 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(c)(4) because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 50. This action is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class and because a class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this action. 51. Plaintiff is pursuing this lawsuit as collective action under FLSA Section 216(b) on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated individuals who at any time during the relevant time period worked for Defendant as an exotic dancer and was designated as an independent contractor and was not paid minimum wage compensation as required by the FLSA (hereinafter, “the Collective”). 52. Plaintiff and the members of the Collective are similarly situated because each were (1) improperly classified as independent contractors; (2) were not paid any wages by Defendant for hours worked; (3) were victims of tip theft whereby Defendant kept and/or assigned to management their tips and gratuities received from customers; (4) were required to pay per-shift house fee or kickback to Defendant for each shift worked; and (5) were not paid wages at or above the Federal Minimum Wage of $7.25 for each hour worked. 53. Plaintiff’s damages are substantially similar to other members of the Collective because, under the FLSA, each are owed (1) a return of all house fee kickback payments made to Defendant for each shift worked; (2) reimbursement of all tips and gratuities taken and/or USDC IN/ND case 1:20-cv-00006-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 01/03/20 page 8 of 12 9 assigned by Defendant and/or Defendant’s management; (3) payment for all hours worked in an amount equal to the Federal Minimum Wage of $7.25 per hour; plus (4) statutory liquidated damages as provided by Federal law for Defendant’s failure to pay minimum wage compensation as required by the FLSA. 54. On information and belief, Defendant has employed at least fifty (50) current and former exotic dancers at Shangri La West in the past three (3) years. 55. On information and belief, Defendant is in custody, possession, and control of identifying records relating to all current and former exotic dancers employed by Defendant at Shangri La West in the past three (3) years. 56. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 57. The FLSA required Defendant to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers at an hourly rate at least equal to the Federal Minimum Wage. 58. The FLSA required that Defendant allow Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers to keep all tips and gratuities received from customers. 59. As set forth above, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers at hourly rates in compliance with the FLSA Federal Minimum Wage requirements. 60. Without legal excuse or justification, Defendant kept and/or assigned to management tips and gratuities received by Plaintiff and other exotic dancers and belonging to Plaintiff and other exotic dancers. USDC IN/ND case 1:20-cv-00006-HAB-SLC document 1 filed 01/03/20 page 9 of 12 10 61. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers as required by the FLSA was willful and intentional and was not in good faith. 62. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs by reference as if fully set forth herein. 63. The IMWL required Defendant to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers at an hourly rate at least equal to the Indiana Minimum Wage. 64. The IMWL required that Defendant allow Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers to keep all tips and gratuities received from customers. 65. As set forth above, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers at hourly rates in compliance with the IMWL Indiana Minimum Wage requirements. 66. Without legal excuse or justification, Defendant kept and/or assigned to management tips and gratuities received by Plaintiff and other exotic dancers and belonging to Plaintiff and other exotic dancers. 67. Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated exotic dancers as required by the IMWL was willful and intentional and was not in good faith. VIOLATION OF THE FLSA (Failure to Pay Statutory Minimum Wages) VIOLATION OF INDIANA MINIMUM WAGE LAW (Failure to Pay Statutory Minimum Wage)

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17. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Rules 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 18. Plaintiffs seek to represent a class defined as: All consumers in the United States who were sent a letter that is identical to or is substantially the same form as the Letter by or on behalf of Defendant, which seeks to collect an alleged consumer debt, within one year prior to the filing of this action and which was not returned as undeliverable. D. Numerosity 19. The Letters are mass-mailed form letters that Defendant sends out to thousands of consumers in nationwide. Therefore, the members of the class are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. 20. Upon information and belief, Defendant sent or caused to be sent thousands of similar deceptive Letters to consumers. 21. The exact numbers and identities of class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records. 37. Each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 of this Complaint is repeated, realleged and incorporated herein by reference. A. The Account The Class VIOLATIONS OF FDCPA SECTION 15 U.S.C. § 1692G(B)

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11. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/ or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to June 11, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to creditor Anesthesiology of Greenwood. 23. The alleged Anesthesiology of Greenwood obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. Anesthesiology of Greenwood is a "creditor" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4). 25. Defendant ICS contracted with Anesthesiology of Greenwood to collect the alleged debt. Violation – June 11, 2020 Collection Letter 26. On or about June 11, 2020, Defendant ICS sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. See a true and correct copy of the Letter attached at Exhibit A. 27. The letter states: “Anesthesiology of Greenwood has provided the attached information, verifying your responsibility for payment of the debt referenced in the Account Summary. If you still question that obligation, contact our office, otherwise your remittance of $3,992.55 is required. Anesthesiology of Greenwood is both the original and current creditor to whom this debt is owed. We forward information about the debts we handle to the national credit reporting agencies in your creditor’s name. Your dispute regarding the claimed amount will also be reported. You have the right to inspect your credit rating in accordance with federal law.” 28. The letter states that the account information is scheduled to be reported in “your creditor’s name,” which according to the Letter is Anesthesiology of Greenwood. 30. In the alternative, if both Defendant ICS and the original creditor are both reporting to the national reporting agencies, it would constitute deceptive double-reporting. 31. It is deceptive for two companies will report to the credit reporting agencies on the same debt. 32. As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 33. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 34. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 35. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 36. Defendant violated § 1692e: a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which is inaccurate. b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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19. Plaintiff brings the First Claim for Relief for violation of the FLSA as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of himself and all persons who were, are or will be employed by Chase and/or CBRE as facility managers nationwide at any time within the three years prior to filing this Complaint through the date of final disposition of this action (hereafter, the “the Nationwide FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”). 20. The Nationwide FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are subdivided into the following subclasses: a. All Nationwide FLSA Collective Plaintiffs employed by Chase as facility managers and/or with similar job titles and duties within the United States at any time within the three years prior to filing this Complaint through the date of final disposition of this action, who file(d) consents to join this collective action as party plaintiffs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). b. All Nationwide FLSA Collective Plaintiffs employed by CBRE as facility managers and/or with similar job titles and duties within the United States at any time within the three years prior to filing this Complaint through the date of final disposition of this action, who file(d) consents to join this collective action as party plaintiffs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 21. Plaintiff and the Nationwide FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are similarly situated in that they have substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions within each FLSA subclass, and are or were subject to each Defendant’s common practice, policy, or plan of unlawfully characterizing them as exempt employees and failing to pay them overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked in violation of the FLSA. 24. Plaintiff brings the Second through Eighth Claims for Relief on behalf of the following classes and subclasses, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3): a. CBRE Facility Manager Class, which is defined as all current and former CBRE facility managers who worked for CBRE in California within four years of this complaint’s filing date. Within this CBRE Facility Manager Class is the Former CBRE Facility Manager Subclass, which is limited to CBRE Facility Manager Class members who have separated from employment with CBRE. b. Chase Facility Manager Class, which is defined as all individuals who worked for Chase as facility managers in California within four years of this complaint’s filing date. 25. Plaintiff reserves the right to refine the definition of the proposed Classes (including the applicable time frame) based on further investigation and discovery. 26. Plaintiff’s claims should be resolved on a class-wide basis, and there is a well-defined community of interest with respect to the litigation. 35. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 of this Complaint as if fully set forth here. 36. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, enterprises engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce with the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203. 37. Attached to this complaint as Exhibit A is the consent to sue signed by Plaintiff pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b) and 256. 38. The FLSA requires employers to pay employees overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a week. 41. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 40 of this Complaint as if fully set forth here. 42. Under California law, an employer must pay an employee overtime based upon their regular rate of pay for time worked in excess of 8 hours in a day. See California Labor Code sections 510, 1194. 43. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the Classes worked more than eight hours a day and more than forty hours a week. 44. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and the Classes overtime for time spent working more than 8 hours in a day and/or 40 hours in a week. 45. Plaintiff and the Classes were harmed as a result. They did not receive all the wages to which they were entitled. 46. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 45 of this Complaint as if fully set forth here. 47. Under California law, an employer must pay an employee all accrued wages upon termination. See Labor Code sections 201 and 202. 48. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff, the CBRE Former Facility Manager Subclass or the Chase Facility Manager Class all owed overtime, premium pay for missed meal and rest periods, and other owed wages upon termination. 50. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 49 of this Complaint as if fully set forth here. 51. Under California law, an employer must pay an employee all wages due upon termination or resignation. The willful failure to do so results in waiting time penalties equal to 30 days of an employee’s wage. See Labor Code section 203. 52. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff, the CBRE Former Facility Manager Subclass or the Chase Facility Manager Class all wages due and owing upon their separation from employ. Defendants did not pay owed overtime wages. Defendants did not pay premium pay for missed meal and rest periods. 53. This conduct by Defendants was willful. They knew or should have known of the overtime wages incurred by Plaintiff, the CBRE Former Facility Manager Subclass and the Chase Facility Manager Class. They knew or should have known that they were not paying Plaintiff, the CBRE Former Facility Manager Subclass or the Chase Facility Manager Class premium pay for missed meal and rest periods. 54. As a result, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff, the CBRE Former Facility Manager Subclass and the Chase Facility Manager Class for waiting time penalties. 62. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint as if fully set forth here. 66. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 65 of this Complaint as if fully set forth here. 67. California law prohibits any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice. See California Business and Professions Code section 17200. 69. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 68 of this Complaint as if fully set forth here. 7. Chase operates retail banks and other business across the United States. Chase employed Plaintiff to manage a portfolio of its facilities in Southern California. Chase classified Plaintiff and its other facility managers as exempt. Chase compensated Plaintiff with a salary that had an hourly equivalent of between $40.86 and $42.10. Chase’s other facility managers at the time, performed job duties that were substantially similar to his. 70. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 72 of this Complaint as if set forth here with the following exception. Plaintiff does not bring this PAGA cause of action as a class action. 71. Plaintiff is an aggrieved employee under PAGA because he was employed by CBRE during the applicable statutory period and suffered one or more of the Labor Code violations set forth in this Complaint. Plaintiff seeks to recover on his behalf, on behalf of the State, and on behalf of all current and former aggrieved employees of CBRE, the civil penalties provided by PAGA, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs in this representative action. 72. Plaintiff seeks penalties pursuant to PAGA for violation of the following Labor Code sections: a. Failure to provide prompt payment of wages upon termination and resignation in violation of Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203; b. Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code §§ 226 and 226.3; c. Failure to pay overtime wages in violation of applicable wage orders and Labor Code §§ 204, 510, 558, 1194 and 1198; d. failure to provide meal periods and rest periods in violation of applicable wage orders and Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512, and 558; e. Failure to keep required payroll records in violation of the applicable wage orders and Labor Code §§ 1174 and 1174.5. Failure To Provide Accurate Wage Statements Failure To Pay Wages Upon Termination (Limited to CBRE Former Facility Manager Subclass and Chase Facility Manager Class) Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) (Alleged only against CBRE) Unfair Business Practices Unpaid Overtime Pursuant to the FLSA Unpaid Premium Pay For Missed Meal And Rest Periods Unpaid Overtime Pursuant to California Law Waiting Time Penalties (Limited to CBRE Former Facility Manager Subclass and Chase Facility Manager Class)

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(Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) (Per se Violations of Washington’s Consumer Protection Act, RCW § 19.86 et seq.) (Violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, RCW § 19.86 et seq. Non-Per Se Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices) 10.1 Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. Case 2:14-cv-00235-RMP Document 1 Filed 07/18/14 6.1 Defendants have generally treated Plaintiffs the same way they treat all check writers from whom they attempt to collect money. Case 2:14-cv-00235-RMP Document 1 Filed 07/18/14 7.1 This action is brought as a class action, as follows: UMBRELLA CLASS: All persons to whom Bounceback sent a collection demand beginning four years preceding the filing of this Complaint and continuing, in connection with a returned check, purporting to be a letter from a Washington county prosecuting attorney. Sub-Class 1 (FDCPA): All members of the umbrella class to whom Bounceback sent a collection demand seeking to collect a check written for personal, family or household use beginning one year preceding the filing of this Complaint and continuing; Sub-Class 2 (CPA): All members of the umbrella class to whom Bounceback sent a collection demand seeking to collect a check beginning four years preceding the filing of this Complaint and continuing; 7.2 As set forth below, the proposed Class and Sub-Classes satisfy the requirements for a class action. 7.3 The definitions of the Class and Sub-Classes are clear, and members of the Class and Sub-Classes are easily identifiable on the basis of objective information, as Bounceback maintains information regarding all persons to whom it sends a collection demand in connection with a returned check, including their last known addresses. 7.4 Class and Sub-Class members can be identified using information kept by Defendants in the usual course of business and/or in the control of Defendants. Class and Sub-Class members can be notified of the pendency of the class action through direct mailing and emailing to physical addresses and email Case 2:14-cv-00235-RMP Document 1 Filed 07/18/14 8.1 Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 8.2 The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using false, deceptive or misleading communications to collect a debt, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(10), or from using unfair or unconscionable means to collect. 15 U.S.C. §1692f. Defendants’ Check Enforcement Program is grounded in deception and unfairness, in violation of these general prohibitions. Additionally, defendants violate specific FDCPA provisions by disguising who they are, how much a check writer owes, and what will happen if a check writer does not pay, as follows: a. FALSE IDENTITY: Bounceback’s standard practice is to send collection letters on official prosecutor letterhead to convey the false impression that the letters were sent by a law enforcement agency, rather than by Bounceback, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(9) and (14). Bouncebacks’s standard form letters include the false representation that Bounceback is a law office, i.e., the office of the county prosecuting attorney, in violation of 15 U.S.C.§ 1692e(3). Additionally, Defendants violate 15 U.S.C. 1692d(6) by Case 2:14-cv-00235-RMP Document 1 Filed 07/18/14 9.1 Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs. 9.2 Defendants have engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices by engaging in the following courses of conduct: (i) soliciting claims for collection in Washington while not licensed as a collection agency in Washington; (ii) collecting or attempting to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another person while not licensed as a collection agency; (iii) using a fictitious name or any name other than its own which would indicate to the debtor that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such alleged debts; (iv) making false threats and collecting fees not permitted by law; (vi) collecting Case 2:14-cv-00235-RMP Document 1 Filed 07/18/14

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19. Ring holds itself out to the public as a leader in home security which manufactures home security products that incorporate indoor and outdoor motion-detecting cameras, including Ring video doorbells and security cameras. 20. The Ring video doorbell is the company’s flagship product. The first version of the Ring video doorbell (hereinafter, the “Ring Video Doorbell 1”) was introduced in 2013. The Ring video doorbell products are marketed as a smart doorbell that contains a high- definition video camera, a motion sensor, and a microphone and speaker for two-way communication. 21. The Ring video doorbell integrates with an associated smartphone “app,” which allows users to view real-time and recorded video from the camera, receive notifications when the doorbell is rung, communicate with visitors at the door, and share the recorded video and snapshots with friends and family. 22. In 2015, Ring came out with its first video security camera, called the “Ring Indoor Cam Plug-In Security Camera,” which is a camera with “live-feed” viewability and video recording and playback features. The Ring Indoor Cam Plug-In Security Camera was updated in 2018 with motion detection and two-way audio. 88. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of a class defined as: All United States citizens who, during the applicable limitations period, (a) purchased a Ring video doorbell or security camera at a brick and mortar store in the United States where the outside box did not contain any language indicating that the video recording, playback or snapshot features of the product could only be accessed if the consumer also purchased a Protect Plan subscription for an additional monthly or annual fee, and (b) signed up for the Protect Plan. 89. Plaintiff also brings this action as a class action on behalf of a subclass defined as: All United States citizens who, during the applicable limitations period, purchased a “Ring Video Doorbell 2” at a brick and mortar store in the United States and signed up for the Ring Protect Plan. 90. Specifically excluded from the class and subclass are Defendant, any entity in which a Defendant has a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest in Defendant, Defendant’s agents and employees and attorneys, the bench officers to whom this civil action is assigned, and the members of each bench officer’s staff and immediate family. 91. Numerosity. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of class members, but is informed and believe that the classes easily comprise tens of thousands of individuals. As such, class members are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 92. No violations alleged in this complaint are a result of any oral communications or individualized interaction of any kind between class members and Defendant, or of any subject belief of Plaintiff or an individual class member.

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23. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered "1" through"22" herein with the same force and effectas if the same were set forth at length herein. 24. On or about October 1,2015, one or both Defendants began communlcating with Plaintiff by means of telephone calls to Plaintiffs mobile telephone number 732 232 1473. 25. By October 19, 2015, Plaintiff had received numerous calls. 26. When Plaintiff answered his telephone, he heard silence on the other end, convincing him that said calls were made by an automatic dialing system. 27. Defendants' calls originated from number 877 838 4347. 29. On October 19,2A15, placed a telephone callto the aforementioned number and was connected to a recorded greeting which stated: "Thank you for calling Cardmember $ervice." 30. Plaintiff was presentlyconnected to a representativewho identified himself as "Dominic" of Cardmember Service. 31. Plaintiff requested of "DominiC' that calls from Defendant to his telephone number of 7322321073 implemented from an from automated dialing system cease and desist. 32. Despite Plaintiffs request, Defendant's auto-dialed calls continued. 33. Plaintiff thereafter placed a second call to Defendants at number 877 838 4347 and was connected to a representative who identified herself as "Katrina' from Cardmember Service. 34. Plaintiff notified uKatrina" that he was receiving calls which had nobody atthe other end when he answered and wished to know if they were autodialed calls. 35. "Katrina' confirmed that Defendants' calls were autodialed. 36. When Defendants calls persisted, Plaintiff contacted the undersigned legal representative. 37. Defendantthereafter placed a third callto Defendants and was connected to a representative of Defendant who identified himself as "Cecil" from Cardmember Services. 38. Plaintiff requested that 'Cecil" provide Plaintiff with address and contact information so that his attorney could communicate with Defendants. 40. "Cecil" then proceeded to read a prepared recitation in a rapid manner, racing through the speech, running words and sentences together, stating: "By providing us with a telephone number for a cellular number or wireless device including a number that you later convert to a cellular number you essentially consent to receive a communication including but not limited to pre-recorded orartificially [unintelligiblelca]ls, text message and calls made by an automatic dialing system from ue and our affiliates, this [unintelligible]to telephone number you provide to us now and in the future..." 41. Plaintiff then interrupted "Cecil" to say that he wanted to switch numbers because he didn't want any calls from an automatic dialer. 42. When Defendant's calls to Plaintiffs telephone persisted, Plaintiff noticed that some calls were identified by caller identification as originating from "JIMBOREE" and some from "US BANK" and the same number was calling, 43- Plaintiff then requested that a business associate, Sion Abadi, place a telephone callto Defendants to determine who was calling him despite his request to no longer receive calls. 44. On Februa ry 23, 2816 , Sion Abadi placed a telephone call to Defendants and was connected to a representative who identified himself as "Mark from Cardmember Service." 45. Mr. Abadi conferenced Plaintiff into the telephone call and Plaintiff confirmed that Mr. Abadi could communicate with "Ma*" on his behalf. 46. Mr. Abadi thereafter attempted to discover if Defendant CARDMEMBER SERVICE was a separate entihT from Defendant US BANK, asking: "ls this US BANK?"

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28. On January 22, 2019, Defendant initiated an unsolicited call to Plaintiff’s Phone Number using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). Defendant contacted Plaintiff from phone number (402) 836-3870 (“Defendant’s ATDS Phone Number”). See Exhibit A.2 29. Plaintiff had not, prior to this initial call from Defendant, expressly consented in any manner to allow Defendant to contact him. 30. On January 22, 2019, Plaintiff attempted to contact Defendant at Defendant’s ATDS Phone Number for the purpose of demanding Defendant cease its attempts to contact and solicit Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s Phone Number, but was unable to speak with a human being. 32. Defendant’s unsolicited call to Plaintiff sought to encourage him to provide or update contact information related to his chiropractic business so Defendant could include it within one or more database(s) Defendant may sell to its subscribers, and so its subscribers could advertise and tele-market to Plaintiff to sell Plaintiff their goods and services. Expressupdate, www.expressupdate.com (“Make Sure Your Customers Can Find You” … “Build Your Profile” and “Grow Your Business”) (last visited May 12, 2019). 33. Defendant uses its autodialed calls to Plaintiff and class members in order to encourage and induce the use of its “Express Update” services. Defendant advertises “Express Update makes it easier for customers to find and reach your business on the internet – and it’s all FREE! It’s simple: Search Express Update for your business listing and make sure the information is correct. Then we will automatically send your correct information to our partners….” Why Use Express Update?, Expressupdate, https://www.expressupdate.com/why_express_update (last visited May 12, 2019). 35. Defendant’s autodialed calls were a pretext to obtain recipients’ participation in Defendant’s proprietary database, access to which Defendant makes available to consumers and other businesses. Embedded within the https://www.expressupdate.com/why_express_update website is the weblink: https://www.infousa.com/lists/mailing-lists/, which states: “Find and reach new customers using our targeted mailing lists. Need mailing lists for your next marketing campaign? InfoUSA makes finding new customers a snap. Plus, once you’ve identified your target audience, we have everything you need in order to design, print, and deliver your customized mailer.” InfoUSA, https://www.infousa.com/lists/mailing-lists/ (last visited May 12, 2019). 36. Defendant’s website declares: “Infogroup proudly . . . Contacts over 100,000 businesses every day to verify our quality information and augment our data sets further . . . [and] leverages our proprietary platforms and technology to manage over 25 billion records in support of thousands of marketing campaigns.” About Infogroup, Infogroup, https://www.infogroup.com/about-infogroup (last visited May 12, 2019). 38. Defendant’s autodialed calls promote Defendant’s commercially available proprietary databases by offering its services and supposed benefits to called parties while Defendant is collecting valuable data to provide to their paying customers. In other words, there was a clear profit motive behind Defendant’s autodialed calls. B. Defendant’s multiple contacts with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to end the harassment. 39. On January 29, 2019, January 31, 2019, February 14, 2019, and February 21, 2019, Defendant further attempted to contact Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s Phone Number. During each attempt Defendant contacted Plaintiff using the exact same ATDS number Defendant had used previously. See Exhibit A. 41. On February 21, 2019, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter demanding Defendant cease its continued attempts to contact Plaintiff. In this letter Plaintiff also informed Defendant that its calls to Plaintiff violated the TCPA. See Exhibit C. 42. Despite Plaintiff’s written demands, Defendant again attempted to contact Plaintiff on February 26, 2019, and again on March 1, 2019. See Exhibit A. During each attempt, Defendant contacted Plaintiff using the exact same ATDS number Defendant had used previously. See id. 43. After Defendant’s March 1, 2019, phone call, Plaintiff contacted Infogroup via e- mail at the e-mail address “[email protected]” for the purposes of further demanding Defendant cease its attempts to contact and solicit Plaintiff. See Exhibit D. 44. On March 1, 2019, Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s e-mail communication from e-mail address “[email protected]” with the following response: We do apologize, but this was in our business database, and the violations you are indicating only apply to consumer data. We have removed your business from our business database and you will receive no additional calls. See Exhibit D. 45. The TCPA has no “business exception” for calls to cellular phones. See 47 U.S.C. § 227. 46. On March 5, 2019, four days after promising that it had removed Plaintiff’s Phone Number from its database, Defendant attempted to contact Plaintiff a seventh time. See Exhibit A. During this attempt Defendant again contacted Plaintiff from Defendant’s ATDS Phone Number. See id. 48. Each of Defendant’s unsolicited phone calls to Plaintiff’s Phone Number were made via an ATDS. 49. Each of Defendant’s seven unsolicited phone calls to Plaintiff’s Phone Number violated the TCPA. C. Defendant’s conduct was knowing or willful; Defendant has previously been sued for violating the TCPA. 50. As a self-described “big data, analytics and marketing services provider” Defendant knew the TCPA regulated its conduct and that the TCPA does not provide a business-to-business exception. Notwithstanding this fact, Defendant systematically contacted Plaintiff even after it promised to stop. 51. Additionally, this is not the first time Defendant has been sued for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. See Complaint, Alves v. Infogroup Inc., No. 2:16-cv-09328 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2016), attached hereto as Exhibit E. For example, on December 16, 2016, Terri Alves, a resident of California, filed a proposed Class Action suit against Defendant in United States District Court for the Central District of California alleging Defendant violated the TCPA. See id. Approximately 11 days after the Complaint was filed, the Complaint was voluntarily dismissed by the named plaintiff, as to prejudice against the named Plaintiff only, and without prejudice as to the rest of the class. 52. At minimum, Defendant became aware that its practices violated the TCPA on or around December 16, 2016. 54. At the very least Plaintiff’s letters to Defendant on January 22, 2019, and February 21, 2019, land his e-mail communication to Defendant on March 1, 2019, complaining of Defendant’s unconsented autodialed calls put Defendant on notice that its calls violated the TCPA. 55. As such, Defendant knowingly or willfully violated the TCPA no less than seven times with respect to Plaintiff. 56. Upon information and belief, Defendant has attempted to contact hundreds or thousands of additional individuals in knowing or willful violation of the TCPA. 57. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated on behalf of the following Class: All persons in the United States (1) to whom one or more telemarking or advertising calls were initiated, (2) to their cellular telephone number, (3) placed by or on behalf of Infogroup (4) using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (5) on or after May 22, 2015; and (6) without their prior express written consent. 58. Not included in the Class is Defendant or any of its members, affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, officers, directors, employees, successors, or assigns; or the Judge assigned to this case, including his or her immediate family, or his or her staff. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or amend the Class definition during the course of this litigation. 59. This action has been brought, and may be properly maintained, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The proposed Class and Class Representative satisfy the criteria of Rule 23 as outlined below. 61. Numerosity—Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). Defendant used automated technology that is capable of contacting thousands of people per day, so the potential class members number in the hundreds or thousands, at least. Individual joinder of all members in the case would be impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a Class will benefit the parties and the Court. The proposed class members should be identifiable from a review of Defendant’s marketing documents, phone records, contact lists, and other internal documents. 62. Commonality and Predominance—Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and 23(b)(3). This action involves common questions of law and fact which predominate over any questions which may affect individual Class members, including, but not limited to: a. Whether Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system to call the cellular phones of Plaintiff and others; b. Whether Defendant initiated telemarketing calls to cellular phones without the prior express written consent of the called parties; c. Whether Defendant’s alleged conduct violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act; d. Whether Defendant’s actions were knowing or willful and, if so, whether the Court should treble the statutory damages awarded to Plaintiff and other members of the class; e. Whether Class members are entitled to statutory damages, equitable relief, exemplary damages, and/or other relief; and f. The amount and nature of relief to be awarded to Plaintiff and Class members. 64. Adequacy of Representation—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). The above-named Plaintiff is an adequate Class representative because Plaintiff’s interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class he seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are well-versed and experienced in complex litigation and class action litigation, and Plaintiff and counsel intend to vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class. Plaintiff and his attorneys will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 65. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). Injunctive and declaratory relief are appropriate because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds which are generally applicable to Plaintiff and Class members. Thus, final injunctive and declaratory relief, as described below, are appropriate with respect to the Class. 66. Superiority—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). A class action is superior to any other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this action; no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management and litigation of this class action. When compared to the burden and expense required to litigate each Class member’s claims, each individual Class member’s claims are relatively small; thus, it would be impracticable for individual Class members to seek redress for Defendant’s wrongful conduct. Even if individual Class members could afford individual suits, the court system could not. Adjudication of this matter by means of a class action ensures the most efficient and time- and cost-effective resolution by providing economy of scale, presents fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefit of a comprehensive supervision and a final adjudication by a single court. 68. Class Action Maintainable Under Rule 23(b)(2). By continuing to contact individuals and businesses in violation of the TCPA, Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making declaratory relief an appropriate remedy for Plaintiff and the Class. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein, and brings Count I on behalf of himself and the entire Class. 70. Defendant’s acts and omissions alleged herein constitute numerous and multiple violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227, as Defendant called the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and the other Class members using an ATDS. 71. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an award of $500 in damages for each and every call Defendant made to their cellular telephone numbers using an ATDS or artificial or prerecorded voice in violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 73. Defendant’s violations were knowing or willful. 74. If the Court determines that Defendant’s actions were knowing or willful, then Plaintiff requests that the Court increase the statutory damages up to three times the amount. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, for himself and all class members, requests the following relief: A. Certification of the proposed class; B. Appointment of Plaintiff as representative of the class; C. Appointment of Plaintiff’s counsel as counsel for the class; D. An order awarding statutory damages of $500 per phone call at issue pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B); E. An order increasing those statutory damages up to three times ($1,500 per call at issue) pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C); F. An order enjoining Defendant from engaging in the same or similar unlawful practices alleged herein; G. An order awarding costs of suit; H. Leave to amend this Complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial; and Orders granting any other relief this Honorable Court deems equitable, proper, and just. Respectfully submitted, CLARK & McCREA By: /s/ Collen A. Clark A. Defendant routinely initiates autodialed calls as part of its ongoing advertising and telemarketing campaigns. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.

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13. One of AWG’s distribution centers is located in Pearl River, Louisiana. 14. The Pearl River facility is extremely busy and employs regularly over 300 employees at a time. The work is fast paced and the vast majority of the workers work well over 40 hours per workweek. 15. Piazza worked for AWG as a laborer until his improper termination. 16. Piazza’s job duties included unloading product from delivery trucks and placing the products in the warehouse, repackaging product pallets to prepare for shipment, and loading delivery trucks with products. 17. Piazza was compensated at an hourly rate, and he worked regularly worked significant hours in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 18. Piazza was regularly scheduled to work exactly 8 hours a day and 40 hours every work week, and he was required to take paid time off if he was not going to work his scheduled hours. 19. During his tenure with Defendant, Piazza regularly and routinely arrived at work and began working before his scheduled shift time, worked through his scheduled lunch break, and worked after his scheduled shift end time and on weekends. 20. Piazza regularly worked 60 to 70 hours per workweek. 21. Due to Defendant’s record-keeping and compensation policies, Piazza did not report this time on a time sheet, and consequently, he was not compensated for this time. 22. Piazza’s time sheet was controlled and manipulated by his supervisors and managers. 24. AWG deducted the time from Piazza’s time sheet even if Piazza did not take a lunch break. 25. Piazza rarely took a lunch break of more than a few minutes because his performance was based on production numbers that incentivized him to work through lunch. 26. Piazza frequently worked 12 to 14-hour days and 65 to 80 hours per workweek. 27. Piazza’s co-workers worked similar work hours and also worked through lunch or took a short lunch break of less than 20 minutes. 28. Even though Defendant used a timekeeping system that could accurately record their employee’s work hours, Defendant instructed their employees not to clock out for lunch so that AWG could automatically deduct 30 minutes per workday. 29. On several occasions, Plaintiff determined that he worked substantially more hours than were recorded on his paycheck. Plaintiff complained about the discrepancy, and Defendant promised to correct the issue. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant routinely edited Plaintiff's time records by reducing his reported work hours and thus not compensating him for all hours he actually worked. 31. Defendant also implemented a policy and procedure in which it gave Plaintiff cash or gift cards as incentive to work extra hours, extraordinary overtime or at unpopular times. This extra compensation was not included in Plaintiff's regular rate of pay or overtime rate of pay calculations. 32. Defendant’s record-keeping and compensation policies and practices mandated that employees not accurately record their actual work hours. 34. No manager for Defendant ever ordered Plaintiff to cease working hours outside of and in excess of his scheduled work hours; rather, Defendant knowingly allowed Plaintiff to suffer or permitted him to work hours outside of and in excess of his scheduled work time. 35. No supervisor or manager for Defendant ever investigated or ensured that Plaintiff was being compensated for all hours worked, including the hours worked outside and in excess of his scheduled work time. 36. Defendant developed and implemented the time-keeping policy to avoid incurring any overtime compensation obligations. 37. Plaintiff witnessed other misclassified employees arrive at work and begin working before their scheduled shift times, work through their scheduled lunch breaks, and work after their scheduled shift end times. 38. Upon information and belief, Defendant’s record-keeping and compensation policies were dictated and issued by Defendant’s senior management and issued to all of Defendant’ departments. 39. Defendant’s record-keeping policy promoted the falsification of employee time sheets by prohibited employees from reporting their work hours properly. 40. Consequently, all hourly employees who were subject to AWG’s policy that did not allow employees to accurately record start times, end times and lunch breaks, and who had time deducted from their time sheet even if they did not take a break are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 41. Defendant has gross annual sales equal to or greater than $500,000. 43. Plaintiff, as an employee of Defendant, engaged in interstate commerce including but not limited to allowing its employees to handle, sell, produce, or otherwise work on goods or materials that came from a state other than Louisiana. 44. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was compensated at an hourly rate. 45. Defendant failed to keep accurate payroll records showing the total hours worked each day and week by its employees. 46. Defendant refused to pay employees for lunch breaks even if the employee did not take a break of more than 20 minutes in a day. 47. Plaintiff regularly worked time that he was not permitted to record properly and for which he was not compensated properly or at all. 48. Plaintiff regularly worked time in excess 40 hours in a workweek for which he was not compensated. 49. Defendant did not compensate Plaintiff properly for all hours worked. 50. Defendant did not compensate Plaintiff at a rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’ regular rate of pay for all hours Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. 51. Defendant violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 & 207 by failing to compensate Plaintiff properly. 52. Defendant knew that Plaintiff worked hours for which Plaintiff was not compensated properly. 53. Defendant failed to act in good faith when they promoted falsification of payroll records and refused to pay employees properly for time worked. 55. Defendant’ actions constitute knowing, intentional and willful violations of the FLSA. 56. Plaintiff was damaged as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s actions, policies and practices and failure to compensate them properly. 57. Defendant has many other misclassified employees who worked at the same location operated by Defendant and were subjected to the same improper record-keeping and compensation policies as Plaintiff. These employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff because they were prohibited from recording their work hours properly and worked hours for which they were not compensated properly. 58. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff maintains this collective action on behalf of Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. 59. Defendant maintains records identifying the names, addresses and other contact information of putative collective class members who are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 60. To the extent required by law, notice will be provided to putative collective class members who are similarly situated to Plaintiff. 61. Plaintiff and other similarly situated individuals are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and judicial interest.

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15. Definition of Class. N.R. proposes the following class: All individuals who: (a) have been, are, or will be participants or beneficiaries under the Raytheon Health Benefit Plan in effect or renewed on or after January 24, 2014; and (b) who have received, require, or are expected to require services for the treatment of a qualified mental health condition that are excluded by the Plan pursuant to the “non- restorative speech therapy,” “non-restorative ABA speech therapy,” and “habilitative services” exclusions. Definition: The term “qualified mental health condition” shall mean a condition listed in the most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published by the American Psychiatric Association to which Defendants applied and/or currently apply the Plan’s “non-restorative speech therapy,” “non-restorative ABA speech therapy,” and “habilitative services” exclusions. 24. N.R. is a five-year old child who was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder in 2017 by Sarah Barnett, M.D. 25. Dr. Barnett recommends that N.R. receive speech therapy services to treat his ASD. See Appendix 10. 26. N.R.’s speech therapy is provided by Ann Kulichik, MS, CCC-SLP/I, BRS- S. Ms. Kulichik is a licensed Speech Language Pathologist. 61. N.R. re-alleges all paragraphs above. 62. Defendant Raytheon Company is a fiduciary under ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), because it is the “Plan Sponsor” and is a named Plan fiduciary. Defendant Raytheon Company exercises discretionary authority or discretionary control with respect to the denial and appeal of denied claims under the Plan. 63. Defendant William Bull is a fiduciary under ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), because he is the Plan Administrator and a named Plan fiduciary. Defendant Bull exercises discretionary authority or discretionary control with respect to the denial and appeal of denied claims under the Plan. 64. ERISA imposes strict fiduciary duties upon plan fiduciaries. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C), states, in relevant part, that a plan fiduciary must discharge its duties with respect to a plan “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and … in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this title and Title IV.” 70. N.R. re-alleges all the paragraphs above. 73. N.R. re-alleges all the paragraphs above. 74. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), provides that a participant or beneficiary may “enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” N.R. and the class seek to enjoin Defendants from continuing to apply exclusions and limitations on all coverage of speech therapy to treat qualified mental health conditions. N.R. and the class also seek corrective notice and reformation of the relevant Plan documents. A. N.R.’s Administrative Appeal BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES ERISA §§ 404(a)(1), 502(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1132 (a)(2) CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF BENEFITS, CLARIFICATION OF RIGHTS UNDER TERMS OF THE PLANS AND CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT TO FUTURE BENEFITS UNDER THE PLAN ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) CLAIM TO ENJOIN ACTS AND PRACTICES IN VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE PLANS, TO OBTAIN OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF AND TO ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE PLANS ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)

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12. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following consumer class (the “Class”): • Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all persons similarly situated in the State of New York from whom Defendant attempted to collect a consumer debt using the same unlawful form letter herein, from one year before the date of this Complaint to the present. • The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: 13. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: • Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that is sent to hundreds of persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy); • There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; 4 c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief. • Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. • Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. • Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class. • A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. • A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed to proceed without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. 5 • Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 14. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “13” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 15. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and Internet. 16. Upon information and belief, within the last year Defendant commenced efforts to collect an alleged consumer “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5), when it mailed a Collection Letter to Plaintiff seeking to collect an unpaid balance allegedly originating with Cellco Partnership. 17. On or around December 4, 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”). See Exhibit A. 18. The Letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). 19. The Letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2). 20. The Letter states in pertinent part: “Amount of the debt as of the date of this letter: $2,210.22.” 21. As a result of the following Counts Defendant violated the FDCPA. First Count 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. False or Misleading Representations as to Status of Debt 22. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “21” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length 6 herein. 23. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 24. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector is prohibited from using false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of a debt. 25. While § 1692e specifically prohibits certain practices, the list is non-exhaustive, and does not preclude a claim of falsity or deception based on non-enumerated practice. 26. Collection notices are deceptive if they can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate. 27. The question of whether a collection letter is deceptive is determined from the perspective of the “least sophisticated consumer.” 28. Defendant’s conduct constitutes a false, deceptive and misleading means and representation in connection with the collection of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 29. The Letter can reasonably be read by the least sophisticated consumer to have two or more meanings concerning the actual balance due, one of which must be inaccurate, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 30. By stating a “Amount of the debt as of the date of this letter: $2,210.22” Defendant falsely suggested that immediate payment of the balance would benefit Plaintiff by implying that the Balance would be subject to change, and could be subject to additional interest.1 31. Plaintiff’s account was not subject to the accrual of interest. 32. In the alternative, Plaintiff’s account was subject to the accrual of interest, but Defendant’s 1 Islam, v. American Recovery Service Incorporated, 17-CV-4228 (BMC), 2017 WL 4990570, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017). Holding that Avila compels the conclusion that any ambiguity as to post-dated accruals in a collection notice gives rise to a claim under the general prohibition of § 1692e – even if the ambiguity does no harm or even inures to the benefit of the debtor. 7 communication failed to adequately disclose same. 33. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to § 1692(e). 34. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.

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76. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth at length herein. 77. As alleged above, Zumper negligently and willfully failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the information it reported about Plaintiff and members of the Reasonable Procedures Class when it prepared Zumper Screen reports about them. 78. Pursuant to FCRA sections 1681n and 1681o, Zumper is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the Reasonable Procedures Class for the relief sought herein. 79. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth at length herein. 82. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth at length herein. 83. As alleged above, Zumper negligently and willfully failed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine whether items of information disputed by Plaintiff and members of the Failure to Reinvestigate Class was inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed information, or delete the disputed item, before the end of the 30-day period beginning on the date on which Zumper received notice of the dispute. 84. Pursuant to FCRA sections 1681n and 1681o, Zumper is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the Failure to Reinvestigate Class for the relief sought herein. 85. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth at length herein. 86. As alleged above, Zumper negligently and willfully failed to reinvestigate and record the current status of items of information disputed by Plaintiff and members of the Failure to Reinvestigate, Injunctive Relief Class or to add, correct, or delete that information from those consumers’ files before the end of the 30-business-day period beginning on the date Zumper received notice of the dispute. 88. Plaintiff incorporates the above paragraphs as though set forth at length herein. 89. As alleged above, Zumper negligently and willfully violated FCRA section 1681j(f) when it charged Plaintiff and members of the Overcharging Class more than the maximum allowable disclosure charge set forth in applicable federal regulations to disclose all the information in those consumer’s Zumper file. 90. Pursuant to FCRA sections 1681n and 1681o, Zumper is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the Overcharging Class for the relief sought herein. 91. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though the same were set forth at length herein. 92. As alleged above, Zumper negligently and willfully violated FCRA section 1681g(a)(2) when it failed to disclose to Plaintiff and members of the Public Records Source Disclosure Class the source(s), including its third-party public records data vendor, to those consumers who requested all the information in their Zumper file. 93. Pursuant to FCRA sections 1681n and 1681o, Zumper is liable to Plaintiff and the members of the Public Records Source Disclosure Class for the relief sought herein. A. Zumper’s Business Practices Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.16(a) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Failure to Reinvestigate, Injunctive Relief Class Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.18(a) On behalf of Plaintiff and the Public Records Source Disclosure Class Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Public Records Source Disclosure Class Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Failure to Reinvestigate Class Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Reasonable Procedures Class Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(f) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Overcharging Class Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.14(b) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Reasonable Procedures Class

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10. Defendant contacted or attempted to contact Plaintiff from telephone 20 numbers belonging to Defendant, including without limitation (561) 220-9418. 21 11 Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 12 47 U.S.C. §227(c) 13 •As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 US. C. 14 §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation Class 15 members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for 16 each and every violation, pursuant to 47 US. C.. 227(c)(5). 17 •Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. 18 11. Defendant's calls constituted calls that were not for emergency 22 purposes as defined by 47 US.C. § 227(b)(J)(A). 23 12. Defendant's calls were placed to a telephone number assigned to a 24 cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls 25 pursuant to 47 US.C. § 227(b)(J). 26 13 13. During all relevant times, Defendant did not possess Plaintiffs "prior 27 express consent" to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an 28 artificial or prerecorded voice on its cellular telephones pursuant to 47 US. C. § 19 Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection 20 Act 21 47 U.S.C. §227(c) 22 •As a result of Defendant's willful and/or knowing violations of 47 23 US.C. §227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the DNC Class and DNC Revocation 24 Class members are entitled to and request treble damages, as provided 25 by statute, up to $1,500, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 26 US.C. §227(c)(5). 27 •Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. 28 20 Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 21 47 u.s.c. §227(b) 22 •As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 US. C. 23 §227(b)(J), Plaintiff and the ATDS Class and ATDS Revocation 24 Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, 25 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 US.C. 227(b)(3)(B). 26 •Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper. 27 21. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all others 26 similarly situated, as a member the four proposed classes (hereafter, jointly, "The 27 Classes"). The class concerning the A TDS claim for no prior express consent 28 (hereafter "The ATDS Class") is defined as follows: 25 8. Beginning on or about June 13, 2017 and continuing through on or 14 about July 20, 2017, Defendant contacted Plaintiff on Plaintiffs cellular telephone 15 number ending in -7558 in an attempt to solicit Plaintiff to purchase Defendant's 16 services or products. 17 9. Defendant used an "automatic telephone dialing system" as defined 18 by 47 US.C. § 227(a)(J) to place its calls to Plaintiff seeking to solicit its services. 19

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29. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 30. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of, the Class, defined as follows: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing telephone calls and/or text messages from Defendants to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 31. Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiffs do not know the number of members in the Class but believe the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 47 U.S.C. §227(b) • As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1), Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to and request $500 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). • Any and all other relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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23. On or about November 14, 2019 and November 25, 2019, Defendant caused the following automated text messages to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone ending in 1501 (“1501 Number”): 24. The 1501 Number has been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry since May 2, 2014. 25. At the time Plaintiff received these calls and messages she was the subscriber and/or sole user of the 1501 Number. 26. The 1501 Number is Plaintiff’s personal cell phone number and not a business phone number. 27. Defendant’s text messages and calls constitute telemarketing/advertising because they promote Defendant’s business, goods, and services. Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 6 of 16 PAGEID #: 6 7 28. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS. 29. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. The messages include no personal identifiers and are formatted in a generic manner. 30. The number used by Defendant (614-662-1814) is known as a “long code,” a standard 10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 31. Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks’ SMS centers, which are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code. 32. Additionally, when Plaintiff replied back with the response “Stop!!”, she received the following automated message in response from the ATDS Defendant used: This automated response was sent by the ATDS automatically as an acknowledgment of Plaintiff’s stop request. Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 7 of 16 PAGEID #: 7 8 33. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 34. To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human involvement. 35. Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff additional harm, including invasion of privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s call also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 36. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 37. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the Classes defined as follows: NO CONSENT CLASS: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message using the same type of equipment used to send text messages to Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number for the purpose of promoting and/or advertising Defendant’s goods and/or services. DO NOT CALL CLASS: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this Complaint: (1) were sent a text message or phone call by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of advertising and/or promoting Defendant’s products and services. 38. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the Class definitions as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 39. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes but believes the Class Members number in the several thousands, if not more. Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 8 of 16 PAGEID #: 8 9 42. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to Members of the Classes which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Members of the Classes. Among the questions of law and fact common to the members of the Classes are: a) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; b) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; c) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; d) Whether Defendant initiated telemarketing calls to telephone numbers listed on the National Do Not Call Registry; e) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 43. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class Members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 9 of 16 PAGEID #: 9 10 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 52. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 53. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”) as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. at § 227(a)(1). 54. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used an ATDS to make non- emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above. 55. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 11 of 16 PAGEID #: 11 12 56. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an ATDS to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 57. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 58. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the Members of the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 60. It is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any telephone call…using an automatic telephone dialing system…To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii). 61. Additionally, it is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “[i]nitiate, or cause to be initiated, any telephone call that includes or introduces an advertisement or constitutes telemarketing, using an automatic telephone dialing system…other than a call made with the prior express written consent of the called party or the prior express consent of the called party when the call is made …” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2). 62. Defendant transmitted calls using an automatic telephone dialing system to the telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent. Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 12 of 16 PAGEID #: 12 13 63. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express written consent to call the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 64. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 64.1200(a) by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 65. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these calls and knew or should have known that it was using an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 66. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 67. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its messages to their telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other Members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 68. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 69. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 13 of 16 PAGEID #: 13 14 70. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.” 71. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 72. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 73. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 74. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 75. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. Case: 2:20-cv-06564-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 1 Filed: 12/28/20 Page: 14 of 16 PAGEID #: 14 15 PROPOSED CLASSES Violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class) Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class)

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35. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them by this reference as though fully stated herein. 36. Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of the TCPA, including each of the aforementioned provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. 38. Plaintiff re-alleges all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates them by this reference as though fully stated herein. 39. Defendant’s acts as detailed herein constitute numerous knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, in that the calls placed by Defendant were made without prior express consent of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 40. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages in an amount up to $1,500.00 for each and every knowing and/or willful violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 6. Within the last four years, Cavalry placed telephone calls to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.

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59. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through fifty eight (58) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 60. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of two classes. 61. Class A consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as -10- the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about December 15, 2015; and (a) the collection letter was to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA for the use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt and for misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed by the Plaintiff. 62. Class B consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about December 15, 2015; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter failed to correctly identify the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2). 63. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that a form collection letter is at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. -11- C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 64. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 65. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 66. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” -12- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 67. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

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18. Defendant maintains a program for Defendant’s customers who purchase a variety of items from Defendant, thereby giving customers awards and incentives to purchase from Defendant, which Defendant refers to as the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program.” 22. Specifically, in describing the purpose of this program to customers, the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program Terms and Conditions” state: “1. Membership: Participation in the Bloomingdale's Loyallist program ("Program") and the benefits of the Program are offered at the sole discretion of Bloomingdale's ("Bloomingdale's," "us," or "our"). Eligible customers (as described below) may enroll. Bloomingdale's Store and Bloomingdale's American Express® cardholders are automatically enrolled. All other eligible customers must enroll with a store associate. You do not need a Bloomingdale's Store or Bloomingdale's American Express card to enroll in the Program. Upon enrolling, you will be assigned a Bloomingdale's Loyallist account ("Rewards Account"), a Bloomingdale's Loyallist Account number ("Rewards Number"), and certain customers will also receive a Membership card (the "Membership card"). As you shop, you accumulate points in your Rewards Account, as described below, that may be issued as a Loyallist Reward Card ("Reward Card") from time to time, which you may then use to shop at Bloomingdale's, bloomingdales.com, and Bloomingdale's The Outlet Store.” 23. Defendant does not advise participants or potential participants in any fashion that Defendant will send texts to participants on participants’ cellular telephones. 24. In joining the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program,” participants do not sign or otherwise give their express consent to receive any texts from Defendant which advertise or relate to any other of Defendant’s products or services. 25. Nor does Defendant ask any participants in the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program” to give their consent in any manner to receive texts from Defendant. Indeed, in joining the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program” participants are not asked to sign any type of consent form. 26. Despite this, as a matter of uniform policy, Defendant sends uniformly-worded text messages to all participants in the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program” which ask consumers if they would like to receive promotional offers from Defendant via text message on their cellular telephones. 28. On or about April 13, 2015, Defendant began using Plaintiff’s cellular telephone for the purpose of sending Plaintiff spam advertisements and/or promotional offers, via text message, including a text message sent to and received by Plaintiff on or about April 13, 2015, at 11:30 a.m. 29. Plaintiff received the aforementioned text message from Defendant, which was sent to his cellular phone ending in 2768. The message was sent with a message code 256-66 and indicated as follows: Bloomingdale’s Promo Alerts: Reply Y now to confirm you want texts! Reply HELP for help. 1 msg/wk. MSG&Data Rates May Apply. Q’s 800- 777-0000 30. As outlined herein, Plaintiff and the class never gave express consent to receive text messages at any time for any reason containing spam or advertisements from Defendant, as required by the plain language of the TCPA, on their cellular telephones. 31. By signing up for the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program,” and entering Plaintiff’s contact information, Plaintiff did not, as a matter of law and fact, give consent to receive promotional or advertising text messages from Defendant via their cellular telephones. 36. The text message sent to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone described herein was sent via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1) and as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A). 37. The telephone number to which Defendant, or its agent, sent its unsolicited text message was assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1). 38. The unsolicited text message to Plaintiff was made for general marketing purposes. 39. The general marketing commercial text which was sent to Plaintiff and The Class was not sent for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i). 40. The unsolicited commercial texts violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 41. Plaintiff brings this action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf of a proposed class defined as: All persons within the United States who received any solicitation/telemarketing text messages from Defendant to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice and such person had not previously consented to receiving such calls within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint 42. The Class for whose benefit this action is brought are each so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 43. The exact number and identities of the persons who fit within the proposed class are each ascertainable in that Defendant maintains written and electronically stored data showing the name and address of each participant in “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program.” Records showing all texts sent to such persons by Defendant and all other data needed to identify The Class. 44. The proposed Class is composed of over 10,000 persons. 46. There are common questions of law and fact affecting the rights of the class members, including, inter alia, the following: a. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant made any telemarketing/solicitation text message (other than a text message made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to a Class member using any automatic telephone dialing system to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; b. Whether Plaintiff and The Class were damages thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and c. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 47. Plaintiff is a member of The Class he seeks to represent in that he was a participant in the “Bloomingdale’s Loyallist Program,” who, between April 13, 2015, and the present, received one or more text messages from Defendant, without Plaintiff’s explicit consent to do so via an “automated telephone dialing system.” 48. The claims of Plaintiff are not only typical of The Class members, they are identical in that they arise from Defendant’s uniform policies and form documents, and are based on the same legal theories of all class members. 49. Plaintiff has no interest antagonistic to, or in conflict with, The Class. 50. Plaintiff will thoroughly and adequately protect the interests of The Class, having retained qualified and competent legal counsel to represent himself and The Class. 51. Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief for the class as a whole. 53. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy since, inter alia, the damages suffered by each class member were less than $1500 per person and individual actions to recoup such an amount are not economically feasible. 54. Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual manageability issues. 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 56. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 57. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 58. Plaintiff and The Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 60. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 61. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 62. Plaintiff and The Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. /// /// KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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12. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas; b. to whom Merchants’ Credit Guide Co. sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt; c. regarding collection of a debt; d. that failed to properly identify and name the current creditor to whom the debt was allegedly owed; e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action. 14. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 15. Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 16. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f and 1692g. 17. The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well-defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 § l692e and §1692f and § 1692g. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiffs have also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 19. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 20. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 21. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 22. Some time prior to January 9, 2017, an obligation was allegedly incurred by the Plaintiff. 23. The alleged obligation is a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5). 24. Illinois Emergency Medical Specialists contracted the Defendant to collect the alleged debt as referenced on the collection leter as “Our Client.” See January 9, 2017 Collection Letter – Attached hereto as Exhibit A. 25. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation I – January 9, 2017 Collection Letter 26. On or about January 9, 2017, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”). See January 9, 2017 Collection Letter – Attached hereto as Exhibit A. 27. This letter did not contain all the requirements of the ‘‘G Notice'' as required by 15 U.S.C. §1692g. Specifically, this letter deceptively fails to identify who the original or current creditor is to whom the alleged debt is owed. 28. The letter lists Illinois Emergency Medical Specialists as “Our Client” but nowhere does the letter clearly identify who the current creditor is as is required by the FDCPA. 29. It is deceptive to not clearly state who the creditor is in any collection letter sent to a consumer. 30. Mere illusions are not enough, but the letter must specifically and clearly state who the creditor is. 31. Defendant has failed to provide the consumer with a proper initial communication letter by failing to clearly identify the original and current creditors of the debt. 32. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 33. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 34. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 35. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 36. Defendant violated said section by: a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 37. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 43. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 45. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692g, a debt collector must notify the consumer of the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. §1692g(a)(2). 46. This notice must be clearly conveyed so that the consumer is clearly advised as to whom the alleged debt is owed. 47. Defendant violated this section by unfairly failing to advise Plaintiff as to the identity of the current creditor who was attempting to collect a debt from her. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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(Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (the “CLRA”), California Civil Code § 1750, et seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class 24. Consumers also understand that real carrot cake desserts do not need to contain as much added sugar as typical desserts. This is true because carrots are naturally sweet. In fact, according to food historians, carrot cake “originated during the Middle Ages when sugar and sweeteners were expensive for most individuals and often hard to find, so many people used carrots as a substitute for sugar.” (See https://www.thefooddictator.com/the-hirshon-ultimate- carrot-cake (last accessed August 24, 2020).) 25. Accordingly, consumers reasonably understand that a “carrot cake” dessert product is more healthful than a typical dessert product that does not contain any vegetables at all. 27. The exception is Nabisco’s Carrot Cake Oreos. Like the Hostess Product, the “Carrot Cake” Oreos do not contain any carrot, or at least not enough to list it in the ingredients. But, unlike Hostess, Nabisco clearly discloses on the front of the package that its product is merely “CARROT CAKE FLAVORED”: 28. Like Nabisco, General Mills also makes a truthful front-of-the-package disclosure regarding fake carrot. Although its Betty Crocker cake mix does contain real carrot—the ingredients include “carrot powder”—General Mills discloses to consumers on the front of the package that the “carrot” pieces inside the box are “IMITATION CARROT FLAVORED 73. Plaintiff brings this action against Hostess, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, as a class action pursuant to section 1781 of the California Civil Code. Plaintiff seeks to represent the following groups of similarly situated persons, defined as follows: All natural persons who reside in California and, between August 25, 2016 and the present, purchased Hostess Carrot Cake Donettes (“the Class”). 74. This action has been brought and may properly be maintained as a class action against Hostess because there is a well-defined community of interest in the litigation and the proposed class is easily ascertainable. 75. Numerosity: Plaintiff does not know the exact size the Class, but she estimates that it is composed of more than 100 persons. The persons in the Class are so numerous that the joinder of all such persons is impracticable and the disposition of their claims in a class action rather than in individual actions will benefit the parties and the courts. 78. Adequacy: Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all class members because it is in their best interests to prosecute the claims alleged herein to obtain full compensation due to them for the unfair and illegal conduct of which they complain. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino also has no interests that are in conflict with, or antagonistic to, the interests of class members. She has retained highly competent and experienced class action attorneys to represent her interests and those of the Class. By prevailing on her own claims, Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino will establish Hostess’s liability to all class members. Ms. Lauchung- Nacarino and her counsel have the necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and she and counsel are aware of their fiduciary responsibilities to the class members and are determined to diligently discharge those duties by vigorously seeking the maximum possible recovery for class members. 79. Superiority: There is no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy other than by maintenance of this class action. The prosecution of individual remedies by members of the Class will tend to establish inconsistent standards of conduct for Hostess and result in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by each individual member of the Class may be relatively small, the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the class to redress the wrongs done to them, while an important public interest will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. 81. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino realleges and incorporates the paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if set forth herein. 82. Hostess’s actions, representations and conduct have violated, and continue to violate the CLRA, because they extend to transactions that are intended to result, or which have resulted, in the sale or lease of goods or services to consumers. 83. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino and other class members are “consumers” as that term is defined by the CLRA in California Civil Code § 1761(d). 84. The Product that Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino (and other similarly situated class members) purchased from Hostess constitutes “goods” within the meaning of California Civil Code § 1761(a). 86. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino requests that this Court enjoin Hostess from continuing to employ the unlawful methods, acts and practices alleged herein pursuant to California Civil Code § 1780(a)(2). If Hostess is not restrained from engaging in these types of practices in the future, Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino and the other members of the Class will continue to suffer harm. 87. CIVIL CODE § 1782 NOTICE. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino notices and demands that within thirty (30) days from that date of the filing of this Complaint, Hostess correct, repair, replace or otherwise rectify the unlawful, unfair, false and or deceptive practices complained of herein. 88. Should the violations herein alleged not be corrected or rectified as required by Civil Code § 1782 within 30 days with respect to all Class Members, Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino will seek to amend this Class Action Complaint to seek, on behalf of each Class Member, actual damages of at least $1,000, punitive damages, an award of $5,000 for each Class Member who is a disabled person or senior citizen, and restitution of any ill-gotten gains due to Hostess’s acts and practices. 89. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino also requests that this Court award her costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to California Civil Code § 1780(d). 90. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino realleges and incorporates by reference the paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if set forth herein. 91. Beginning at an exact date unknown to Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino, but within three (3) years preceding the filing of the Class Action Complaint, Hostess made untrue, false, deceptive and/or misleading statements in connection with the advertising and marketing of the Product. 92. Hostess made representations and statements (by omission and commission) that led reasonable customers to believe that the Product that they were purchasing contained carrot cake, and that it contained a substantial amount of carrot. 93. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino and those similarly situated relied to their detriment on Hostess’s false, misleading and deceptive advertising and marketing practices, including each of the misrepresentations and omissions set forth in paragraphs 30-38 and 45 above. Had Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino and those similarly situated been adequately informed and not intentionally deceived by Hostess, they would have acted differently by, without limitation, refraining from purchasing the Product, or paying less for it. 94. Hostess’s acts and omissions are likely to deceive the general public. 95. Hostess engaged in these false, misleading and deceptive advertising and marketing practices to increase its profits. Accordingly, Hostess has engaged in false advertising, as defined and prohibited by section 17500, et seq. of the California Business and Professions Code. 96. The aforementioned practices, which Hostess used, and continue to use, to their significant financial gain, also constitutes unlawful competition and provides an unlawful advantage over Hostess’s competitors as well as injury to the general public. 98. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino seeks, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, full restitution of monies, as necessary and according to proof, to restore any and all monies acquired by Hostess from her, the general public, or those similarly situated by means of the false, misleading and deceptive advertising and marketing practices complained of herein, plus interest thereon. 99. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino seeks, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, a declaration that the above-described practices constitute false, misleading and deceptive advertising. 100. Ms. Lauchung-Nacarino seeks, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, an injunction to prohibit Hostess from continuing to engage in the false, misleading and deceptive advertising and marketing practices complained of herein. Such misconduct by Hostess, unless and until enjoined and restrained by order of this Court, will continue to cause injury in fact to the general public and the loss of money and property in that Hostess will continue to violate the laws of California, unless specifically ordered to comply with the same. This expectation of future violations will require current and future consumers to repeatedly and continuously seek legal redress in order to recover monies paid to Hostess to which it is not entitled. Ms. Lauchung- Nacarino, those similarly situated and/or other consumers nationwide have no other adequate remedy at law to ensure future compliance with the California Business and Professions Code alleged to have been violated herein. A. It is Well-Understood by Consumers and Manufacturers in the Food Industry that “Carrot Cake” Products Must Contain a Substantial Amount of Carrot.

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10, AND EACH OF THEM, Defendant (s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 10. In the letter, Defendant attempted to induce Plaintiff to make payments on a debt allegedly owed to Cach, LLC, originally from JP Morgan Chase/Washington Mutual/Providian Bank, and in the amount of $17,779.31. 11. Defendant stated in the letter: “THE LAW LIMITS HOW LONG 39. Plaintiff repeats and reincorporates by reference into this cause of action allegations set forth above at paragraphs 1-38. 40. To the extent that Defendant’s actions, counted above, violated the FDCPA, those actions were done knowingly and willfully. 41. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k, Plaintiff seeks up to $1,000 for himself and each Member of the Class for each violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 42. Plaintiff repeats and reincorporates by reference into this cause of action allegations set forth above at paragraphs 1-38. 43. To the extent that Defendant’s actions, counted above, violated the RFDCPA, those actions were done knowingly and willfully. 44. Pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §1788.30, Plaintiff seeks $1,000 in statutory damages for himself and each Member of the Sub-Class for each violation of the RFDCPA. 9. On or around May 26, 2016, Defendant sent Plaintiff a debt collection letter in an effort to collect an alleged debt owed from Plaintiff. Attached as Exhibit A is a redacted true and correct copy of this letter (“the Letter”). CACH, LLC WILL NOT SUE YOU FOR IT, AND CACH, LLC WILL NOT REPORT IT TO ANY CREDIT REPORTING AGENCY. WE ARE NOT A LAW FIRM AND WE CANNOT GIVE YOU LEGAL ADVICE. SHOULD YOU Violations of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (Plaintiff and the Class) Violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. (Plaintiff and the Sub-Class)

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12. Shortly after the creation of the National Do Not Call Registry in 2003, Mr. Chinitz placed his landline number (831-420-####) on the Registry. In or around 2015, Mr. Chinitz placed a VOIP line (408-501-####) on the National Do Not Call Registry. In or around June 2017, Mr. Chinitz re-registered both numbers, under the mistaken impression that his original registration had expired. 13. On or around May 17, 2017, Mr. Chinitz, though his real estate agent, Katy Cowley, listed his home in Santa Cruz, California, for sale. 14. Ms. Cowley placed the listing on an online real estate listing portal, Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”). 15. The MLS listing for Mr. Chinitz’s home expired on November 1, 2017. 16. The listing included a private instruction to real estate agents that read, “OWNERS 39. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and a class of all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all above paragraphs as though fully repeated herein. 52. The TCPA provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 53. Under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 54. A caller is not liable for violating the TCPA if it can demonstrate that its violation “is the result of error and that as part of its routine business practice, it meets the following standards: (A) Written procedures. It has established and implemented written procedures to comply with the national do-not-call rules; (B) Training of personnel. It has trained its personnel, and any entity assisting in its compliance, in procedures established pursuant to the national do-not-call rules; (C) Recording. It has maintained and recorded a list of telephone numbers that the seller may not contact; (D) Accessing the national do-not-call database. It uses a process to prevent telephone solicitations to any telephone number on any list established pursuant to the do-not- call rules, employing a version of the national do-not-call registry obtained from the administrator of the registry no more than 31 days prior to the date any call is made, and maintains records documenting this process.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(i). 65. Plaintiff incorporate by reference all above paragraphs as though fully repeated herein. 66. The TCPA provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 67. Under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d), “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity. The procedures instituted must meet certain minimum standards, including: “(3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or entity making a call for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such a call is made) receives a request from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person or entity must record the request and place the subscriber’s name, if provided, and telephone number on the do-not call list at the time the request is made. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such calls are made) must honor a residential subscriber’s do-not-call request within a reasonable time from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed thirty days from the date of such request . . . . (6) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A person or entity making calls for telemarketing purposes must maintain a record of a consumer’s request not to receive further telemarketing calls. A do-not-call request must be honored for 5 years from the time the request is made.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3), (6) (emphasis added). 68. Plaintiff and Class B members made requests to Defendants not to receive calls from Defendants. 76. Plaintiff incorporate by reference all above paragraphs as though fully repeated herein. 77. The TCPA prohibits a caller from initiating any telephone call to a residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the contacted party unless the call was initiated for emergency purposes, is made solely to collect a debt owed or guaranteed by the United States or is exempted by a FCC rule or order. 78. Defendants initiated multiple telephone calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to residential telephone lines to Plaintiff and other members of Class C. 85. Plaintiff incorporate by reference all above paragraphs as though fully repeated herein. 86. Defendants’ practices of initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers like Plaintiff and Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, failing to honor do not call requests, and using an artificial or prerecorded message to initiate calls violate 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., and the regulations promulgated under it. Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (On behalf of Plaintiff and All Classes) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2) (On behalf of Plaintiff and Class B – National Internal Do Not Call Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (On behalf of Plaintiff and Class C - National Artificial or Prerecorded Message Class) Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2) (On behalf of Plaintiff and Class A - National Do Not Call Registry Class)

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