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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03) 15. Defendant is a home health care business. 16. Plaintiff Chantelle McCann was employed by Defendant between 2015 and 2017. 4 17. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a home health aide. 18. Other similarly-situated employees were employed by Defendant as home health aides. 19. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were employed by Defendant as non-exempt employees under the FLSA. 20. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were paid an hourly wage. (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) 21. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides worked more than 40 hours per week, but Defendant failed to pay them overtime compensation for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. 22. Rather than paying overtime compensation, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were only paid straight time for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. (Failure to Keep Accurate Records) 23. Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve accurate records of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides. (Defendant Willfully Violated the FLSA) 24. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. 25. Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be 5 adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 26. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a member, is composed of and defined as follows: All current and former home health aides employed by Alpha Home Health Agency, LLC at any time between April 18, 2015 and the present. 27. The amount of overtime hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated home health aides worked are reflected on their time sheets and pay stubs. 28. Plaintiff estimates, that on average she worked between five (5) and ten (10) overtime hours per week. 29. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, by upon information and belief, avers that is consists of at least 100 persons. 30. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her own in bringing this action. 31. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records. These individuals may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 6 32. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as: All current and former home health aides employed by Alpha Home Health Agency, LLC at any time between April 18, 2015 and the present. 33. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 100 persons. 34. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: (a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to its home health aides for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and (b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff Chantelle McCann and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10. 35. The claims of the named Plaintiff Chantelle McCann are typical of the claims of other members of the Ohio Class. Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio Class members. 36. Named Plaintiff Chantelle McCann will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of 7 the Ohio Class in this case. 37. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 38. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 40. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29 43. Plaintiff in corporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 44. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the OMFWSA,

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31. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all legally blind individuals who have attempted, or will attempt, to make a debit purchase with Defendant’s POS Devices at its stores throughout the United States. 32. The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court. 33. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 34. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they have all been and/or are being denied full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make its POS Devices fully accessible and independently usable as above described. 36. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole.

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(Declaratory Relief) 111. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 110 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 25 112. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that Lovelyskin.com contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of Lovelyskin.com, which Lovely Skin owns, operates and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 113. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.)) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. – Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.)) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) 25. Defendant, Lovely Skin, Inc., controls and operates Lovelyskin.com. in New York State and throughout the United States and the world. 26. Lovelyskin.com is a commercial website that offers products and services for online sale. The online store allows the user to browse skincare and beauty products, make purchases, and perform a variety of other functions. 27. Among the features offered by Lovelyskin.com are the following: (a) Consumers may use the website to connect with Lovely Skin on social media, using such sites as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Pinterest; (b) an online store, allowing customers to purchase skincare and beauty products, and other related products and accessories; and (c) learning about the Lovely Skin skincare and beauty products and their benefits, reading about success stories, learning about shipping and return policies, see answers to common questions, and learning about career opportunities. 28. This case arises out of Lovely skin’s policy and practice of denying the blind access to the goods and services offered by Lovelyskin.com. Due to Lovely skin’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to Lovelyskin.com, blind individuals have been and are being denied equal access to Lovely Skin, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through Lovelyskin.com. 29. Lovely Skin denies the blind access to goods, services and information made available through Lovelyskin.com by preventing them from freely navigating Lovelyskin.com. 30. Lovelyskin.com contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and blind persons using keyboards and screen-reading software. These barriers are pervasive and include, but are not limited to: lack of alt-text on graphics, inaccessible drop-down menus, the lack of navigation links, the lack of adequate prompting and labeling, the denial of 9 keyboard access, empty links that contain no text, redundant links where adjacent links go to the same URL address, and the requirement that transactions be performed solely with a mouse. 31. Alternative text (“Alt-text”) is invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that a screen-reader can speak the alternative text while sighted users see the picture. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation except that it appears as a text pop-up when the mouse moves over the picture. There are many important pictures on Lovelyskin.com that lack a text equivalent. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics (screen-readers detect and vocalize alt-text to provide a description of the image to a blind computer user). As a result, Plaintiff and blind Lovelyskin.com customers are unable to determine what is on the website, browse the website or investigate and/or make purchases. 32. Lovelyskin.com also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Lovelyskin.com, these forms include search fields to locate skincare and beauty products and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s merchandise, nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. 33. Similarly, when using a screen-reader on Lovelyskin.com, the screen-reader does not read the pop-up window which allows the user to take advantage of discounts by entering their email address. Thus, blind visitors to the website are not able to get the same price advantage as sighted persons. Furthermore, while a user of screen-readers can get to the products page, they are unable to continue once adding an item to cart. When Plaintiff added a lipstick to the cart, a pop-up window appeared. A sighted person using a mouse can see that the 10 pop-up window contains information about the item added and provides the option to “view cart / checkout” or “continue shopping. However, screen-readers cannot recognize the pop-up window and a blind person cannot continue any further with the transaction. Therefore, blind customers are essentially prevented from purchasing any items on Lovelyskin.com. 34. Furthermore, Lovelyskin.com lacks accessible image maps. An image map is a function that combines multiple words and links into one single image. Visual details on this single image highlight different “hot spots” which, when clicked on, allow the user to jump to many different destinations within the website. For an image map to be accessible, it must contain alt-text for the various “hot spots.” The image maps on Lovelyskin.com’s menu page do not contain adequate alt-text and are therefore inaccessible to Plaintiff and the other blind individuals attempting to make a purchase. When Plaintiff tried to access the menu link in order to make a purchase, she was unable to access it completely. 35. Moreover, the lack of navigation links on Defendant’s website makes attempting to navigate through Lovelyskin.com even more time consuming and confusing for Plaintiff and blind consumers. 36. Lovelyskin.com requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Lovelyskin.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases on Lovelyskin.com. 11 37. Due to Lovelyskin.com’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the stores or require assistance in navigating the stores. By contrast, if Lovelyskin.com was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and make purchases via the Internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Lovelyskin.com’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Lovelyskin.com. 38. Lovelyskin.com thus contains access barriers which deny the full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use Lovelyskin.com and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of Lovelyskin.com in New York State and throughout the United States. 39. Plaintiff, Aretha Crosson, has made numerous attempts to complete a purchase on Lovelyskin.com, most recently in June 2019, but was unable to do so independently because of the many access barriers on Defendant’s website. These access barriers have caused Lovelyskin.com to be inaccessible to, and not independently usable by, blind and visually- impaired persons. Amongst other access barriers experienced, Plaintiff was unable to purchase skincare products and lipstick. 12 40. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that Defendant’s website, Lovelyskin.com, contains access barriers causing the website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, blind and visually-impaired persons. 41. These barriers to access have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Lovelyskin.com. 42. Defendant engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 43. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 44. Because of Defendant’s denial of full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits and services of Lovelyskin.com, Plaintiff and the class have suffered an injury-in-fact which is concrete and particularized and actual and is a direct result of defendant’s conduct. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted 13 to access Lovelyskin.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Lovelyskin.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 46. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally blind individuals in New York State who have attempted to access Lovelyskin.com and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by Lovelyskin.com, during the relevant statutory period.” 47. There are hundreds of thousands of visually-impaired persons in New York State. There are approximately 8.1 million people in the United States who are visually- impaired. Id. Thus, the persons in the class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 48. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying blind persons access to the goods and services of Lovelyskin.com. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, blind persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse, select and shop on Lovelyskin.com. 49. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: (a) Whether Lovelyskin.com is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; (b) Whether Lovelyskin.com is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; 14 (c) Whether Defendant, through its website, Lovelyskin.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the ADA; and (d) Whether Defendant, through its website, Lovelyskin.com, denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities in violation of the law of New York. 50. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the class. The class, similar to the Plaintiff, is severely visually-impaired or otherwise blind, and claims Lovely Skin has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on their website, Lovelyskin.com, so it can be independently accessible to the class of people who are legally blind. 51. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 52. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 53. Judicial economy will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial 15 system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 54. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the class, unless otherwise indicated. 55. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 54 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 56. Title III of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 57. Lovelyskin.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7). 58. Defendant is subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns and operates Lovelyskin.com. 59. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 60. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful 16 discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 61. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 62. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things, “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 63. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their websites accessible, including but not limited to ensuring adequate prompting and accessible alt-text. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 17 64. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Patrons of Lovely Skin who are blind have been denied full and equal access to Lovelyskin.com, have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 66. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Lovelyskin.com in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 67. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA, and therefore Plaintiff invokes his statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 18 72. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.”. 73. Lovelyskin.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 74. Defendant is subject to the New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates Lovelyskin.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law. § 292(1). 75. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Lovelyskin.com, causing Lovelyskin.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons the full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 76. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 77. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would 19 fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 78. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 79. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 8 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Lovelyskin.com under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) et seq. 20 and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 82. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 86. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 85 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 87. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 88. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 21 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 90. Lovelyskin.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 91. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates Lovelyskin.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40- c(2). 92. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Lovelyskin.com, causing Lovelyskin.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 93. There are readily available, well-established guidelines on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually-impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other business entities in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed by using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make their website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 94. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each 22 and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 95. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . .” 96. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class on the basis of disability are being directly indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 98. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 99. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 98 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein. 100. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of 23 . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 101. Lovelyskin.com is a sales establishment and public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 102. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates Lovelyskin.com. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 102(1). 103. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Lovelyskin.com, causing Lovelyskin.com to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(15)(a). 104. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or 24 (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 105. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 106. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Lovelyskin.com under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 107. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 108. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 109. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 110. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

lose

12. Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following nationwide consumer class (the “Class”): • All New York consumers from whom Defendant improperly required a valid reason for the dispute in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq. • The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action. 13. The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class action: • Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of persons whom Defendant has improperly denied the right to dispute a debt in violation of specific provisions of the FDCPA. • There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation: a. Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s conduct; c. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and d. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or 4 injunctive relief. • Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same operative facts and are based on the same legal theories. • Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other members of the Class. • Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class. • A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. • A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. Absent a Class Action, class members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed proceed to without remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten gains. • Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 5 14. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “13” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant, on behalf of a third-party, began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from Plaintiff. 16. Defendant was attempting to collect on Plaintiff’s purportedly overdue account with North Shore University Hospital. 17. On June 5, 2017, in an effort to begin collecting on this debt, Defendant send Plaintiff a Collection Letter. See Exhibit A. 18. Thereafter, on or around July 14, 2017, Plaintiff called Defendant to inquire about the alleged debt. 19. A representative of Defendant answered the phone and identified himself as “Marshanda.” 20. During that phone call, Plaintiff authorized her representative (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), to discuss the status of the debt with Defendant. 21. After discussing Plaintiff’s debt at length, and only after Plaintiff’s representative stated that Plaintiff disagreed with the balance and asked to dispute the debt, Defendant stated that Plaintiff needed to contact Defendant directly. 22. Plaintiff iterated that she had already been authorized to discuss the debt and asked whether she can merely dispute the debt over the phone, to which Defendant responded: “It can be verbal, but she just needs to give us a reason why” (emphasis added). 23. As set forth in the following Counts Defendant violated the FDCPA. 6 First Count 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq. False and Misleading Representations 24. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered “1” through “23” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 25. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to § 1692(e) by using false, deceptive, and misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt. 26. Defendant violated said section by requiring a reason for the dispute. 27. The FDCPA does not require the consumer to provide any reason at all in order to dispute a debt.1 28. As the Second Circuit opined, “a debt collector cannot require a consumer to have a valid reason or to submit particular types of documentation in order to dispute a debt.” DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). 29. Upon information and belief, Defendant and its employees, as a matter of procedural practice and pattern never intend to follow through with the validation rights they purportedly provide in the initial communication. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant and its employees, when receiving written disputes as a matter of procedural practice and pattern do not provide verification of debts since they maintain all disputes must be submitted with a valid reason. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant and its employees, intentionally denied Plaintiff his 1 Sambor v. Omnia Credit Servs., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Haw. 2002), Mendez v. M.R.S. Assoc., 2004 WL 1745779 *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2004). (A consumer is entitled to dispute the validity of a debt for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all), Whitten v. ARS National Servs. Inc., 2002 WL 1050320 *4 (N.D. 111 May 23, 2002). (Imposing a requirement that a consumer have a `valid' reason to dispute the debt is inconsistent with FDCPA), Castro v. ARS National Servs., Inc., 2000 WL 264310 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000), Frey v. Satter, Beyer & Spires., 1999 WL 301650 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 1999), DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 f.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2001), Mejia v. Marauder Corporation., 2007 WL 806486 (N.D. Cal. 2007). (Unlawful to suggest that proof of payment required for dispute). 7 dispute rights afforded to him under the FDCPA. 32. Upon information and belief, Defendant and its employees, wrongfully implied to Plaintiff that a dispute needs to be deemed valid in order for it to be considered a dispute. 33. Upon information and belief, Defendant and its employee, by intentionally denying Plaintiff and any other debtor to dispute the debt without a valid reason unfairly intimidate and force debtors in to paying disputed debts. 34. Defendant’s employee who spoke with Plaintiff intended to speak said words to Plaintiff. 35. The acts and omissions of Defendant and its employees done in connection with efforts to collect a debt from Plaintiff were done intentionally and willfully. 36. Upon information and belief, Defendant and its employees intentionally and willfully violated the FDCPA and do so as a matter of pattern and practice by maintaining that the debtors have a valid reason to dispute any debt contrary to the FDCPA and the rights given by Defendant purportedly in the validation notice. 37. As an actual and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant and its employees, Plaintiff has suffered actual damages and injury, including but not limited to, fear, stress, mental anguish, emotional stress, acute embarrassment and suffering for which she should be compensated in an amount to be established by a jury at trial.

win

1. A declaration that Defendants practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; 10. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; and 11. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. 2. An injunction requiring Defendants not to call any third parties or numbers that were skip traced to insure that Plaintiff is not called now or when Plaintiff obtains additional telephone numbers in the future; 20. On or about January 28, 2016, Plaintiff began receiving telephone calls to his cellphone from Medicredit regarding debts allegedly owed to Wentworth and Portsmouth Regional by someone other than himself. At no time leading up to these calls had Plaintiff provided either Defendant with his cellphone number or otherwise given either Defendant his consent to call it. 21. Upon answering the calls, Plaintiff was met with the various pauses, clicks, automated prompts, and so-called "dead air" that form the hallmarks of automatic telephone dialer use.. 22. On several other occasions, Medicredit left the following pre-recorded voice message on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone: 6 “Hello, we are calling from Medicredit on behalf of Portsmouth Regional Hospital. This is a call from a debt collector. Please return our call at 800-823-2318, Monday through Friday during normal business hours. Thank You.” 23. On several other occasions, Medicredit’s automated prompts would play into Plaintiff’s cell phone voice mail, indicating that even if Plaintiff were to answer the calls he would be greeted by an automated and pre-recorded voice system: “Para recibir este mensaje en Español, oprima el 2. If you are “Shannon Dian” press the number 1 on your telephone to receive the message. If that person is home, and you can request for them to come to the phone, press 2. If they are not home and unavailable to receive this message, press 3. If I have the wrong number, press 4. To repeat these choices, press the Star key. Please have “Shannon Dian” come to phone and press 1 to receive an important message regarding personal business. I will wait up to 45 seconds.” 24. On several occasions, upon answering Medicredit’s telephone calls, Plaintiff waited on hold until a live agent of Medicredit picked up, at which time he would inform the agent to stop calling him. Despite Plaintiff’s requests, Medicredit continued to call him. 25. Upon information and belief, Medicredit obtained Plaintiff’s number from Wentworth or Portsmouth Regional, or through a third-party electronic database during a skip- tracing process. 26. By effectuating these unlawful phone calls, Medicredit has caused Plaintiff the very harm that Congress sought to prevent - a "nuisance and invasion of privacy." 7 27. Defendant’s aggravating and annoying phone calls trespassed upon and interfered with Plaintiff’s rights and interests in his cellular telephone and cellular telephone line, by intruding upon Plaintiff’s seclusion. 28. Defendant’s phone calls harmed Plaintiff by wasting his time. 29. Moreover, "wireless customers [like Plaintiff] are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used." In re Rules Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd 559, 562 (2007). Defendant’s phone calls harmed Plaintiff by depleting the battery life on his cellular telephone, and by using minutes allocated to Plaintiff by his cellular telephone service provider. 3. An injunction requiring Defendants to file quarterly reports of third party audits with the Court on its system and procedures not to call any third parties or numbers that were skip traced to insure that Plaintiff is not called in the future; 30. Medicredit’s unlawful acts, as described above, were committed knowingly and willfully in light of the fact that Medicredit has been sued on numerous prior occasions for the very same conduct. 31. In addition, both Portsmouth Regional and Wentworth knew or should have known Medicredit’s history as a serial TCPA violator. In fact, Medicredit has been sued previously for violations of the TCPA and recently settled a class action. See Prater v. Medicredit, Inc. et al., No. 4:14-cv-00159-ERW (E.D. Mo. Filed Jan. 28, 2014) and Doc 89 (Final Approval Granted 12/07/15). 32. Despite this knowledge, Portsmouth Regional and Wentworth continue to use Medicredit’s services and, in doing so, continues to accept and retain the pecuniary benefits derived from Medicredit’s unlawful activities. 33. In addition to being strictly liable for Medicredit’s violations of the TCPA pursuant to the FCC 2008 Order, Portsmouth Regional’s and Wentworth’s ratification of 8 Medicredit’s continued and habitual TCPA violations subject both Portsmouth Regional and Wentworth to vicarious liability under common law agency principles. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01(1) (2006) ("Ratification is the affirmance of a prior act done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual authority."). 34. Plaintiff also brings this action on behalf of several classes of other similarly situated individuals, seeking damages and any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Medicredit in negligently, knowingly, or willfully contacting them on their cellular telephones in violation of the TCPA. 35. Accordingly, the proposed class is defined as follows: All persons within the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Medicredit placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) between July 14, 2015 and the date of certification, (5) through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice (6) where such person’s number was obtained from a source other than the person himself. 36. The proposed Revocation is defined as follows: All persons within the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Medicredit placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) between July 14, 2015 and the date of certification, (5) through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice (6) after such person informed Medicredit to stop calling. 37. The proposed Wentworth sub-class is defined as follows: All persons within the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Medicredit placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) between July 14, 2015 and the date of certification, (5) through the use of any automatic telephone 9 dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice (6) in an attempt to collect a debt owed or allegedly owed to Wentworth (7) where such person’s number was obtained from a source other than the person himself or after such person informed Medicredit to stop calling. 38. The proposed Portland Regional class is defined as follows: All persons within the United States (2) to whose cellular telephone number (3) Medicredit placed a non-emergency telephone call (4) between July 14, 2015 and the date of certification, (5) through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice (6) in an attempt to collect a debt owed or allegedly owed to Portsmouth Regional (7) where such person’s phone number was obtained from a source other than the person himself or after such person informed Medicredit to stop calling. 39. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the Classes, having himself been called by Medicredit on his cellular telephone through the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or artificial or prerecorded voice without his prior express consent. 4. An injunction requiring Defendants not to call any third parties or numbers that were skip traced to insure that class members are not called if they obtain additional telephone numbers in the future; 40. Defendants and their employees and agents are excluded from the Classes. 41. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the Class members number in the thousands. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class Action to assist in the expeditious litigation of the matter. 42. The Classes is so numerous that the individual joinder of all its members is impractical. While the exact number and identities of the Class members are known only to Defendant at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Classes include thousands of members. Plaintiff alleges that the Class members may only be ascertained through the records maintained by Defendants. 10 43. Common questions of fact and law exist as to all members of the Classes which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Classes. These common legal and factual questions, which do not vary between Class members, and which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any Class members, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether, within the class period , Medicredit made any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to a Class member using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; b. Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; c. Whether Portsmouth Regional and/or Wentworth is vicariously liable for the class placed on its behalf; and d. Whether Medicredit should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 44. As a person who received calls from Medicredit using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without their prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Classes. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained attorneys experienced in the prosecution of class actions. 11 46. A class action is superior to other available methods of fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, since individual litigation of the claims of all Class members is impracticable. Even if every Class member could afford individual litigation, it would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous issues would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same complex factual issues. By contrast, the conduct of this action as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system, and protects the rights of each Class member. 47. The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the this Class members not parties to such adjudications or that would substantially impair or impede the ability of such non-party Class members to protect their interests. 48. Defendants have acted or refused to act in respects generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final and injunctive relief with regard to the members of the Classes as a whole. 49. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 12 5. An injunction requiring Defendants to file quarterly reports of third party audits with the Court on its system and procedures not to call any third parties or numbers that were skip traced to insure that class members are not called in the future; 50. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 51. Medicredit caused equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to be used to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above. 52. Medicredit’s calls also utilized an artificial and/or prerecorded voice. 53. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendants had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls or after any consent was revoked. 54. As such, the calls at issue were willful or, at a minimum, negligent. 55. Defendants have, therefore, violated Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by causing an automatic telephone dialing system and/or artificial or prerecorded voice to be used to make non-emergency telephone calls to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their prior express consent. 56. Wentworth is strictly liable for Medicredit’s violations for the calls placed on Wentworth’s behalf. 57. Portsmouth Regional is strictly liable for Medicredit’s violations for the calls placed on Portsmouth Regional’s behalf. 58. As a result of Defendants’ conduct and pursuant to Section 227(b)(3)(B) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class are each entitled to a minimum of 13 $500.00 in damages for each violation and if willfulness is proven up to $1,500 for each violation. 59. Plaintiff and the Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Jason Martin, on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class, respectfully request the following relief against Defendant: 6. An award of actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 14 7. An award of statutory damages for Plaintiff and each Class member in the amount of $500.00 for each and every call that violated the TCPA; 8. An award of treble damages, as provided by statute, of up to $1,500.00 for Plaintiff and each Class member for each and every call that violated the TCPA; 9. An order certifying this action to be a proper class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, establishing the appropriate Classes and any Sub- classes the Court deems appropriate, finding that Plaintiff is a proper representative of the Classes, and appointing the lawyers and law firms representing Plaintiff as counsel for the Classes; Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227

win

21. Defendant is a CBD products manufacturing company that owns and operates the website, www.mjcbdd.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant ensures the delivery of throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers its products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website using a screen-reader. 25. For example, many features on the Website lacks alt. text, which is the invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to differentiate what products were on the screen due to the failure of the Website to adequately describe its content. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to contain a proper label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff was unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This was a problem for Plaintiff because in certain instances the screen reader failed to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 30. These access barriers effectively denied Plaintiff the ability to use and enjoy Defendant’s website the same way sighted individuals do. 31. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 34. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.1 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 36. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 39. Web-based technologies have features and content that are modified on a daily, and in some instances, an hourly, basis, and a one time “fix” to an inaccessible website will not cause the website to remain accessible without a corresponding change in corporate policies related to those web-based technologies. To evaluate whether an inaccessible website has been rendered accessible, and whether corporate policies related to web-based technologies have been changed in a meaningful manner that will cause the website to remain accessible, the website must be reviewed on a periodic basis using both automated accessibility screening tools and end user testing by disabled individuals. 40. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 41. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 42. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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40. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class consists of all persons who owned shares of Yahoo common stock at any time since January 27, 2013 and who continued to own such shares through and including January 6, 2016, and were damaged (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant. 41. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 42. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to the Company’s public filings, as of October 30, 2015, there were over 944 million shares of Yahoo common stock outstanding, held by thousands, if not tens of thousands, of individuals and entities. 43. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class, including, inter alia, whether: (i) Yahoo is an unregistered investment company; (ii) Yahoo was obligated to register under the ICA; (iii) the Individual Defendants violated the ICA by failing to cause Yahoo to comply with the ICA and by causing Yahoo to enter into contracts and transactions in violation of the ICA; and (iv) Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class have and will continue to sustain damages arising out of Defendants’ violations of the ICA. Plaintiff does not have any interests that are adverse or antagonistic to those of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff is committed to the vigorous prosecution of this action and has retained counsel competent and experienced in this type of litigation. 47. Yahoo was founded in 1995. While Yahoo describes itself as an Internet company providing search and display advertising services on Yahoo properties and affiliate sites worldwide, the most significant and valuable aspects of its business are its publicly traded investments. 48. Yahoo represents that it offers many Internet related products including, for example: Yahoo Search, which serves as a starting point to navigate the Internet and discover information; Yahoo Answers, which enables users to seek, discover, and share knowledge and opinions across mobile phones, tablets, and desktops; Yahoo Mail that connects users to the people and things; Yahoo Messenger, an instant messaging service; and Yahoo Groups, which allows users to join groups based on shared interests and involvements. Background of the Company Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against the Individual Defendants (Asserted Derivatively on Behalf of Yahoo) 145. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 146. The Individual Defendants are fiduciaries of Yahoo and all of its stockholders and owe them the duty to conduct the affairs of the Company loyally, carefully, faithfully, diligently, and prudently. This cause of action is asserted based upon the Individual Defendants’ acts in violation of Delaware state law, which acts constitute breach of fiduciary duty. 147. Each of the Individual Defendants, acting individually and in concert, engaged in the conduct alleged herein in reckless disregard and/or intentional breach of his or her fiduciary duties to the Company and its stockholders. 148. Defendants further breached their fiduciary duties by, inter alia, putting their interests ahead of the interests of the Company and its stockholders. 149. The Company will be irreparably injured as a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts and the Company has no adequate remedy at law.

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10. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well. 12. Defendant Park Surgical Co., Inc., as the entity whose products or services were advertised in the fax, derived economic benefit from the sending of the fax. 13. Defendant Park Surgical Co., Inc., either negligently or wilfully violated the rights of Plaintiff and other recipients in sending the fax. 14. Each fax refers to a website registered to Defendant Park Surgical Co., Inc. 15. The fax has a “remove” number at the bottom that is associated with the mass broadcasting of advertising faxes. 16. Plaintiff had no prior relationship with Defendant and had not authorized the sending of fax advertisements to Plaintiff. 17. The fax does not contain an “opt out” notice in the form required by 47 U.S.C. § 227. 18. On information and belief, the fax attached hereto was sent as part of a mass broadcasting of faxes. 19. On information and belief, Defendant has transmitted similar unsolicited fax advertisements to at least 40 other persons in Michigan. 20. There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff or other recipients of Defendant’s unsolicited advertising fax to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines must be left on and ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners. 21. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶ 1-20. 23. The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), provides: Private right of action. A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph. 24. Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded. 25. Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages. 26. Defendant violated the TCPA even if its actions were only negligent. 27. Defendant should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. 29. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class. 30. There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The predominant common questions include: a. Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending unsolicited fax advertisements; b. The manner in which Defendant compiled or obtained its list of fax numbers; c. Whether Defendant thereby violated the TCPA. 31. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices. Neither Plaintiff nor Plaintiff's counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 33. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions. 9. Some time in 2011, prior to filing this complaint Plaintiff Michigan Urgent Care & Primary Care Physicians, P.C. received the unsolicited fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine.

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2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 25. Defendant owns and operates a hotel in the City of New York as well as in the rest of the United States. Many of these locations also offer dining and entertainment options, including on-site restaurants, room service and lobby lounges. 27. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, using Defendant’s Website access to information through their reservation system relating to the availability of ADA compliant rooms and handicap accessible features of the hotel, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s hotels. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to add information through their reservation system relating to its accessibility for visually-impaired persons on their Website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s hotels and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public at Defendant’s hotels. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 3. Whether the hotels provide a braille and/or large print menu for restaurants and/or room service and, in the alternative, if they have trained staff to read the menu to blind or vision-impaired guests. 30. Due to the lack of information relating to the accessibility features of Defendant’s hotels through the reservation system on the Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public in their hotels. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis using the services that the hotels offer to the public because of the lack of information on accessibility through the reservation system on the Website. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant’s hotels or book rooms in Defendant’s hotels in the future if the Plaintiff was able to learn about the accessibility of Defendant’s hotels and guest rooms for blind and vision-impaired persons through the reservation system on their website and those accessibility features meet the needs of the Plaintiff. 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website reservation system have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information on the Website reservation system relating to the accessibility of the hotels and guest rooms for blind and visually-impaired people and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from reserving a room at the hotels, staying at the hotel and using the facilities of the hotel including restaurants and attending events. 33. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the provisions of the ADA relating to providing information about accessibility features of the hotels and the guest rooms on its Website reservation system would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the services and facilities at Defendant’s hotels, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including, but not limited to, the failure to provide information on its Website reservation system sufficient to advise that the hotels are fully ADA compliant, and for each accessible guest room, to specify the room type, the type of accessible facility in the room, and the communications features in the room. 35. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. If the ADA-required information is included on the Website reservation system, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently determine through use of the Website if Defendant’s hotels and guest rooms are ADA compliant and if the facilities described relating the facilities and communications equipment in guest rooms are acceptable to the Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website and the inclusion of information on the Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system to make such information fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 4. Whether or not emergency exit signs are compliant with ADAAG1 requirements and emergency evacuation plans and information are provided in braille and large print. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website reservation system to obtain information relating to ADA accessibility of the hotels and their guest rooms, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required accessibility information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant have violated the ADA, NYSHRL or NYCHRL by failing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system so individuals with disabilities can independently assess if Defendant’s hotels or guest rooms meet the accessibility needs of the Plaintiff and the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 52. Defendant’s hotels are places of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotels. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotels and is a gateway thereto. 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, and, as a result, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 60. Defendant’s physical hotels are located in the State of New York and constitute places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, causing the Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for including the ADA-required information on websites making such websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. Incorporating the basic components to make the Website reservation system include the ADA-required information would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and their physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 7. Whether or not the hotels have removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 75. Defendant’s hotels are places of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with their establishments. 76. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates physical locations in the City of New York and the Website, making the Defendant a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update the Website and remove access barriers to its hotels by failing to include the ADA- required information on its reservation system, causing the services integrated with their physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non- disabled public. 78. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 8. Whether or not the guest rooms contain tactile and large print thermostat controls and talking/large print clocks. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website and their establishments under § 8- 107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 82. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension their physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 88. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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12. At all times relevant to the complaint herein, Defendant engaged in telecommunications by means of telephone facsimile machines as defined by the TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3). 13. Upon information and belief, Defendant regularly advertises its goods and services to recipients by transmitting fax advertisements. 14. Upon information and belief, the faxes were sent by means of a telephone facsimile machine that has the capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or onto paper, and send thousands of faxes per day to facsimile numbers that were preselected by Defendant. 15. Upon information and belief, Defendant has no procedure or means for recipients who do not consent to receiving the faxes to stop receiving them. 16. In this instant case, Defendant had no prior established business relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff had never in the past used Defendant’s services, nor given Defendant consent to receive unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant. 17. Within four (4) years prior to the commencement of this action, Defendant, or a third party agent acting on behalf of Defendant, willfully and knowingly transmitted facsimiles to Plaintiff that advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services. 19. Defendant’s facsimile advertisement further failed to properly advise Plaintiff of the right, method or process of how to opt-out of receiving further such facsimile advertisements from Defendant in the future. See Exhibit A. 20. Plaintiff did not give Defendant, or any third party acting on behalf of Defendant, prior express invitation or permission to transmit the aforementioned facsimiles, thereby rendering them unsolicited. 21. Plaintiff did not agree to make available its facsimile number for advertisement in a directory. 22. Defendant transmitted at least one (1) unsolicited advertisement to Plaintiff. Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes. 24. Defendant failed to provide the proper notice to Plaintiff and the putative class members of the method and/or process of how to opt-out of receiving such future facsimile advertisements with the all of the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 26. Defendant, whose products or services were advertised, or whose clients’ and/or agents’ products or services were advertised in the faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of these faxes. 27. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of and all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 28. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Classes, consisting of: a. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agents(s) and/or employee(s) within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. b. All persons in the United States who received any unsolicited fax advertisement on their telephone facsimile machines from Defendant or its agent(s) and/or employee(s) where said advertisements failed to properly notify the recipient of their ability to opt-out of receiving such fax advertisements from Defendant in the future. 29. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believe the Class members number in the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 31. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 32. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agents’ records. 34. As a recipient of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant and of fax advertisements which failed to properly advise of Plaintiff’s ability to opt-out, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Classes. 35. Plaintiff and the members of the Classes have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Classes will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 36. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 37. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and state laws. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 38. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 40. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 41. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 42. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). 43. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), enjoining Defendant from transmitting any advertisements in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully set forth herein at length. 45. At all times herein, Plaintiff was and is entitled to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. 46. The transmission of facsimiles to Plaintiff as set forth above, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D). 47. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to statutory damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3)(B) and 227(b)(3)(C). Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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15. Addison Health Systems sent material to PHI via its office facsimile machine that promoted the commercial activity availability or quality of Addison Health Systems’ goods or services on March 4, 2014. 16. Addison Health Systems did not seek or obtain permission from PHI to send an ad to PHI’s facsimile machine prior to doing so. Case: 1:17-cv-00466-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/11/17 Page: 3 of 7 PAGEID #: 3 4 17. The 3/4 Fax Ad did not contain an opt-out notice that complied with the requirements of the JFPA. 18. Based on information, belief, and the appearance of the 3/4 Fax Ad, Addison Health Systems sent the 3/4 Fax Ad to more than forty persons via facsimile. 19. In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, PHI brings this action on behalf of the following persons: “All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action (2) were sent the 3/4 Fax Ad or similar material (3) via facsimile (4) by or on behalf of Addison Health Systems.” This class of persons constitutes the putative class members. PHI may amend the class definition after discovery identifies potential class members, additional facsimile advertisements, and/or the contours of the class. 20. Numerosity: Based on information, belief, and the appearance of the 3/4 Fax Ad, the number of putative class members exceeds forty. 3/4 Fax Ads are typically sent to hundreds if not thousands of persons. The joinder of such a large group of persons in a single lawsuit would be impracticable. 21. Commonality: Common questions of law and fact apply to the claims of the putative class members. These include the following: (a) Whether the 3/4 Fax Ad constitutes an “unsolicited advertisement” within the meaning of the JFPA; (b) How Addison Health Systems compiled or obtained the list of fax numbers to which the 3/4 Fax Ad was sent; (c) Whether Addison Health Systems obtained “express invitation or permission” within the meaning of the JFPA from the intended targets prior to sending them the 3/4 Fax Ad; Case: 1:17-cv-00466-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/11/17 Page: 4 of 7 PAGEID #: 4 5 (d) Whether the 3/4 Fax Ad contained an opt-out notice that complied with the requirements of the JFPA; (e) Whether Addison Health Systems violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder with regard to the 3/4 Fax Ad; and (f) Whether Addison Health Systems sent the 3/4 Fax Ad intentionally, knowingly, or willfully. 22. Typicality: PHI’s claims are typical of the claims of the putative class members. PHI is asserting the same claim under the same federal statute as the other members of the putative class. PHI is also seeking the same relief for itself and the other members of the putative class. 23. Adequacy: PHI will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the putative class members. PHI has no interests in conflict with the putative class members, has the resources and inclination to prosecute this action to completion, and has retained experienced counsel to assist it in doing so. 24. Predominance: The questions of law and fact common to the putative class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members because: (a) PHI’s claim depends on the same factual and legal issues as that of the putative class members; (b) the evidence supporting Addison Health Systems’ likely defenses will come solely from Addison Health Systems’ own records and will not require any information or inquiries from individual class members; (c) the damages for all putative class members are set by statute and will, therefore, be the same for each and every member of the putative class; and (d) the identity of the putative class members can be readily ascertained from Addison Health Systems’ or its agents’ computer records, phone records, or other business records. Case: 1:17-cv-00466-TSB Doc #: 1 Filed: 07/11/17 Page: 5 of 7 PAGEID #: 5 6 25. Superiority: A class action would be superior to individual actions by the putative class members for the following reasons: (a) the damages suffered by any one class member are too low to justify a stand-alone lawsuit; (b) the JFPA contains no provision for awarding attorney fees. As such, individual claimants would, as a practical matter, have to proceed pro se against a large, sophisticated defendant; (c) many of the putative class members are legal entities that would not be permitted to proceed in court pro se; and (d) the evidence concerning each of putative class member’s claims is so similar that the adjudication of each on an individual basis would be repetitive, inefficient, and wasteful.

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13. When selling automobiles, Fred Beans holds itself out in retail installment sales contracts with consumers as a creditor-seller to whom consumers are obligated to pay the amount financed, prior to immediately transferring financing to a third-party financier/creditor. 15. On March 20, 2017, Mr. Brogan entered into a Retail Installment Sales Contract with Fred Beans ("RISC #1") and purchased a 2016 Subaru Impreza (the "Vehicle"). RISCS #1 is attached as Exhibit 1. 16. RISC #1 included, among other things, a Federal Truth-In-Lending disclosure regarding the financing terms offered by Fred Beans for the sale of the Vehicle: 49. Plaintiff asserts his claim in Count One and Count Two on behalf of the "False Finance Charge Class" defined as follows: False Finance Charge Class: All consumers who purchased vehicles from Fred Beans in the United States that: (1) where the retail installment sales contract falsely stated the Finance Charge; (2) were Pennsylvania residents at the time of the purchase; (3) within the three years prior to the filing of the Complaint until the date of final judgment in the action. 50. Plaintiff asserts his claim in Counts One and Two on behalf of the "Multiple RISC Class" (illusory financing class) defined as follows: Multiple RISC Class: All consumers who purchased vehicles from Fred Beans in the United States that: (1) entered into a retail sales installment contract with Fred Beans; (2) who were presented with more than one retail sales installment contract without a written cancellation of the prior retail installment sales contract; (3) were Pennsylvania residents at the time of the purchase; (4) within the five years prior to the filing of the Complaint until the date of final judgment in the action. 52. Plaintiff asserts his claim in Count Three on behalf of the "Unauthorized Inquiry Class" defined as follows: Unauthorized Inquiry Class: All consumers who entered into retail sales installment contracts with Fred Beans in the United States: (1) where Fred Beans continued to conduct hard credit inquiries following the execution of the retail sales installment contract; (2) within five years prior to the filing of the Complaint until the date of final judgment in the action.· 53. Numerosity. The Putative Classes are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Fred Beans regularly improperly issues retail sales installment contracts with false finance charges; regularly issues multiple retail sales installment contracts without any written cancellation of the prior retail sales installment contracts with consumers with changed finance terms; regularly charges document fee/dealer fees as part of its retail sales installment contracts that it regularly issues, that bears no rational relationship to the preparation and completion of documents; and continues to conduct hard credit inquiries by obtaining credit reports without any permissible purpose in violation ofTILA, the FCRA and PAUFA. 55. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Putative Classes. As a person who was issued retail sales installment contracts with false finance charges; issued multiple retail sales installment contracts without any written cancellation of the prior retail sales installment contracts with consumers with changed finance terms; was charged document fee/dealer fee as part of Fred Beans retail sales installment contracts that it regularly issues, that bears no rational relationship to the preparation and completion of documents; and was subject to hard credit inquiries by Fred Beans without a permissible purpose all in violation of TILA, the FCRA and PA UFA, Plaintiffs interests are aligned with, and are not antagonistic to the interests of the members of the Putative Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation. 57. This case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(l) because prosecution of actions by or against individual members of the Putative Classes would result in inconsistent or varying adjudications and create the risk of incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Further, adjudication of each individual Class member's claim as a separate action would potentially be dispositive of the interest of other individuals not a party to such action, impeding their ability to protect their interests. 58. This case is maintainable as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Fred Beans has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Putative Class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the Classes as a whole. 60. Plaintiff intends to provide notice to all members of the Putative Classes to the extent required by Rule 23. The name and addresses of the Putative Class members are available from Defendant's records. 61. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other allegations and paragraphs of the Complaint as if set forth herein at length. 62. The transaction described herein was a consumer credit transaction with the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. 63. Fred Beans is a "Creditor" pursuant to TILA U.S.C. § 1602(£). 64. As a creditor, Fred Beans regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or payable in more than four installments and is the person to whom the transaction which is the subject of this action is initially payable, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) and Reg. Z § 226.2(a)(l 7). Defendant is also identified as the seller-creditor on the retail sales installment contracts at issue. 66. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1638, the creditor must disclose material terms such as the true finance charge, amount financed and APR. 67. The Federal Truth in Lending Disclosures in the retail sales installment contracts were false and misleading as, among other reasons, the dealership repeatedly miscalculated the financing terms in its favor in order to generate further revenue from automobile sales. 68. Moreover, Defendant had no intention to honor the financing terms contained in its retail sales installment contracts, which would always be subject to Defendant's unilateral determination. 69. Plaintiff and the Putative classes are entitled to damages in the amount that the court may allow, along with attorneys' fees and expenses pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) and 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(3). 70. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other allegations and paragraphs of the Complaint as if set forth herein at length. 71. The PAUFA, 73 P.S. §201-1 provides a private right of action for any consumer who "suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property" as a result of an unlawful method, act or practice. 73 P.S. § 201-9.2(a). 72. P AUF A makes it unlawful for a person to engage in unlawful business practices, including, but not limited to any "fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding." 73 P.S. §201-2(4)(xvii). 74. Defendant further violated PAUF A by, among other reasons, charging consumers in its retail sales installment agreements dealer fees that were purportedly for services rendered in preparing documentation for automobile sales. The dealer fees, however, bear no relationship to costs associated with document preparation, but are actually a hidden expense to consumers so the Defendant can generate further revenue from automobile sales. 7 5. Defendant further violates PA UFA by, among other reasons, presenting consumers with numerous retail sales installment contracts for Defendants own benefit, even though the contracts are final binding agreements, for Defendant's own benefit so that consumers are bound by the agreement while the Defendant is not. 76. Plaintiff and the Putative Class are entitled to three times statutory damages, including attorneys' fees and costs. 77. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all other allegations and paragraphs of the Complaint as if set forth herein at length. 78. Plaintiff is a "consumer" as defined by the FCRA. 79. Fred Beans is a "person" as defined by the FCRA. 80. Fred Beans used a "consumer report," as defined by the FCRA. 81. Defendant violated Sections 168ln and 16810 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act by willfully and negligently causing unauthorized and excessive credit inquiries to be made of Plaintiff and the Class. 83. The conduct of Defendant was a direct and proximate cause, as well as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to the Plaintiff and Class that are outlined more fully above and, as a result, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the Class for the full amount of statutory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs of litigation, as well as such further relief, as may be permitted by law. 84. The foregoing violations were willful. Fred Beans knew that it was required to obtain Plaintiffs consent prior to submitting subsequent credit inquiries after it agreed to provide financing. Fred Beans acted in deliberate or reckless disregard of its obligations and the rights of Plaintiff and other Class members under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i). 85. Plaintiff and the Putative Class are entitled to statutory damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each and every one of these violations, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(l)(A). 86. Plaintiff and the Putative Class are also entitled to punitive damages for these violations, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 168ln(a)(2). 87. Plaintiff and the Putative Class are further entitled to recover their costs and attorneys' fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(3). VIOLATIONS OF TRUTH IN LENDING ACT VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT VIOLATIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW

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10. In the year prior to the filing of this Complaint, on or about June 20, 2016, Defendant called Plaintiffs and used a pre-recorded message which stated: If the individual that has answered this phone call is (blank) our law office needs to speak with you with regards to a rather concerning legal matter. Please press one to be connected to a staff member for assistance. Thank you. 11. Plaintiff John Waldrop had answered the phone call and pressed one as directed in the message. 13. Plaintiff John Waldrop declined to accept the deal immediately but said he needed to speak with his wife, Plaintiff Shannon Waldrop, about the account before agreeing to any repayment. 14. The call described above was the first communication between Defendant and Plaintiff John Waldrop. 15. The call described above ended without Defendant ever informing Plaintiff John Waldrop that Defendant was a debt collector or that the call was an attempt to collect a debt or that any information obtained from Plaintiff John Waldrop would be used for the purpose of debt collection. 16. Plaintiff John Waldrop called back to Defendant later in the day on June 20, 2016. 17. In the second June 20, 2016 call, Defendant offered to email Plaintiffs a letter regarding the account. 18. In the second June 20, 2016 call, Defendant again failed to inform Plaintiff John Waldrop that Defendant was a debt collector or that the call was an attempt to collect a debt or that any information obtained from Plaintiff John Waldrop would be used for the purpose of debt collection. 19. Shortly after the second June 20, 2016 call, Defendant provided Plaintiffs with the letter discussed in the second call. This letter was an effort to collect from Plaintiffs an alleged obligation asserted to be owed or due a creditor other than Defendant. 20. A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit 1 to this Complaint. 22. The June 20, 2016 letter falsely referred to the account as a “judgment” twice in the first paragraph, although Plaintiff Shannon Waldrop’s account had not been reduced to a judgment. 23. The June 20, 2016 letter memorialized the previous oral offer to settle the account if payment was received “no later than 6/30/2016.” 24. Defendant communicated with both Plaintiffs on the phone over the remainder of the day and over the next couple of days. There were four or more communications total 25. Defendant failed to inform Plaintiffs that Defendant was a debt collector in all of its communications with Plaintiffs. 27. By offering to setting a deadline to settle the account less than 30 days from the first communication with Plaintiff, Defendant overshadowed Plaintiffs’ right to dispute the debt as described in paragraph 26 above. 28. Upon information and belief, Defendant attempts to collect defaulted debts from many consumers residing in Arizona and, as a matter of pattern and practice, does not provide the disclosures described in paragraph 23 above in any communication with any consumer residing in Arizona. 29. Upon information and belief, Defendant attempts to collect defaulted debts from many consumers residing in Arizona and, as a matter of pattern and practice, overshadows one or more of the consumers’ rights outlined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g by creating deadlines for the consumers to settle the accounts for less than the full amount owed on the accounts within the time allowed for Plaintiff’s to exercise their 1692g rights. 30. Upon information and belief, Defendant attempts to collect defaulted debts from many consumers residing in Arizona and, as a matter of pattern and practice, does not inform them in the first communication that the communication is from a debt collector, that the communication is an attempt to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for the purpose of debt collection. 31. Upon information and belief, Defendant attempts to collect defaulted debts from many consumers residing in Arizona and, as a matter of pattern and practice, does not inform them in communications subsequent to the first communication that it is a debt collector. 34. Excluded from the Class are Defendant, the officers and directors of the Defendant, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which Defendant has or had a controlling interest. 35. The proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiffs at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery. The proposed Class is ascertainable in that the names address of all members of the Class can be identified in business records maintained by Defendant. 37. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced and competent in class action litigation. 38. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the Class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for the members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 39. Issues of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over any questions that may affect only individual members, in that Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class. Among the issues of law and fact common to the Class are: a. Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA as alleged herein; b. Defendant’s conduct particular to the matters at issue was identical; c. The availability of statutory penalties; and d. The availability of attorneys’ fees and costs. 40. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained above. 42. In its initial communication with Plaintiffs, Defendant failed to inform Plaintiffs that Defendant was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. 43. In other communications with Plaintiffs subsequent to the first communication, Defendant failed to disclose that the communication was from a debt collector. 44. As such, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11). 45. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained above. 47. Defendant communicated with Plaintiffs multiple times, by phone and by letter, yet never provided the notices required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g as described above. 48. Further, on June 20, 2016, Defendant communicated with Plaintiffs for the first time and communicated to Plaintiffs a deadline of June 30, 2016 to settle the account for less that the full balance of the account, thereby overshadowing Plaintiffs’ 15 U.S.C. § 1692g rights. 50. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained above. 51. 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2) provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: *** (2) The false representation of— (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; 52. Defendant’s June 20, 2016 letter communicated to Plaintiff multiple times that the Account had been reduced to a “judgment.” This was a false statement and amounts to a false representation of the legal status of the debt. 53. As such, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. 1692e. VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. 1692g VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(11) VIOLATION OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. 1692g

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11. ELDOR Process Engineers are not compensated for any work performed beyond their scheduled 40-hour work week, including any work performed as a result of off-hours service calls, which can occur at any time during a 24-hour period. 12. Upon information and belief, ELDOR knowingly and in bad faith has improperly classified Process Engineers as either “professional” or “administrative” employees who are exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA. The actual job duties of the Process Engineers do not support either of these exemptions. 13. As it relates to the improper “professional” exemption, Process Engineers are not required to have knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instructions. Indeed, in practice, Process Engineers are not required to possess engineering or equivalent degrees or experience. 14. As it relates to the improper “administrative” exemption, the primary duties of Process Engineers do not include the performance of “office” work related to the management or general business operations of the employer, nor do the Process Engineers exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 15. Specifically, although ELDOR Process Engineers maintain an “engineer” title, Process Engineers working for ELDOR do not hold engineering degrees, nor do they perform specific engineering work. 17. Rather, the day-to-day job responsibilities of an ELDOR Process Engineer are effectively interchangeable with the job responsibilities of an ELDOR “Technician”, a position ELDOR has classified as non-exempt, and, thus eligible for overtime compensation. 18. However, ELDOR Technicians are not required to be “on call”. 19. Upon information and belief, ELDOR requires its similarly situated Process Engineers, who are misclassified as exempt from FLSA overtime pay requirements, to perform unpaid overtime work in a concerted effort to avoid paying its employees earned overtime compensation. 20. Of note, the Representative Plaintiff, on two separate occasions, discussed his concerns about unpaid overtime work and ELDOR’s misclassification of its Process Engineers to ELDOR’s former Human Resources Director Bridget Farmer and Plant Manager Fabio Pisconi, but his concerns were never meaningfully addressed by ELDOR. 22. The Representative Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 23. Upon information and belief, ELDOR knowingly and in bad faith has improperly classified Process Engineers as either “professional” or “administrative” employees who are exempt from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA. 24. The actual job duties and qualifications of ELDOR Process Engineers do not support either of these exemptions. 25. Accordingly, the Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members are not classified properly as exempt employees. 26. At all times relevant to the Complaint, ELDOR was fully aware of the exemption requirements of the FLSA and knew or should have known that the Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members did not qualify for any exemption from these requirements. 27. ELDOR willfully and unlawfully ignored the exemption requirements of the FLSA. 28. ELDOR cannot show that its violations of the FLSA were in good faith and that it has reasonable grounds for believing that its ongoing acts or omissions were not violations of the FLSA. 29. As used herein, “willful” is meant in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), and “good faith” and “reasonable grounds” is meant in accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 260. 31. The Representative Plaintiff incorporates by reference herein the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 32. At all times relevant to the Complaint, the Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were not compensated for any work performed beyond their scheduled 40-hour work week, including, but not limited to, any work performed as a result of extra shifts and/or off-hours service calls. 33. The Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members regularly work more than 40 hours per week for ELDOR. 34. The Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were not exempt from the overtime compensation requirements of the FLSA. 35. Under the FLSA, ELDOR was required to compensate the Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members at the appropriate rate of overtime pay for each hour over forty (40) they worked in a week for all job-related services provided to 9. At all times relevant to the Complaint, ELDOR violated the FLSA in two ways: A) ELDOR knowingly and improperly misclassified the Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members as exempt “professional” or “administrative” employees pursuant to the FLSA; and B) The Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members were entitled to overtime wages, but due to their improper misclassification, ELDOR failed to appropriately compensate the Representative Plaintiff and Collective Action Members. Failure to Pay Overtime Misclassification

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(DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, ARIZ.REV. STAT. § 12-1831, ET SEQ.) (RESTITUTION/UNJUST ENRICHMENT) (VIOLATION OF FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 ET SEQ. – MINIMUM WAGE) (VIOLATIONS OF ARIZONA WAGE LAWS, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-351 ET SEQ.) (VIOLATION OF FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 ET SEQ. – OVERTIME) 1. The employer is required or empowered to do so by state or federal law. 11. In Arizona, OnTrac utilizes more than two hundred delivery drivers, like Plaintiff, to deliver packages from OnTrac’s distribution center, located at 4400 E. Elwood Street in Phoenix, Arizona, to residential and business customers throughout Arizona. 12. OnTrac subcontracts with Regional Service Providers (RSPs), who contract with the drivers to provide delivery services to or on behalf of OnTrac’s customers. RSPs obtain an exclusive right from OnTrac to operate within a specific area by purchasing that right from OnTrac. These service areas are established by OnTrac using zip codes. An RSP that purchases a service area from OnTrac is responsible for delivering all of the packages to OnTrac’s customers within the zip code that corresponds to the service area. Upon information and belief, most RSPs are responsible for thirty or more service areas. Upon information and belief, the RSPs lack their own, physical offices and, instead, operate entirely out of OnTrac’s distribution center. 13. RSPs enter into agreements with drivers, like Plaintiff, for the drivers to deliver the packages from the OnTrac distribution center to the OnTrac customers in a particular RSP service area. Although the agreements between drivers and the RSPs state that the drivers are hired by the RSPs as independent contractors, the economic reality of the arrangement is that the drivers are actually employees of OnTrac. Upon information and belief, OnTrac mandates as a condition of its agreements with RSPs, that RSPs contract with drivers as independent contractors, as opposed to employees. 14. RSPs are used as intermediaries but OnTrac controls and supervises the delivery process. As alleged in more detail below, OnTrac exercises near-total control over the manner in which drivers perform package delivery services. 16. Drivers are compensated on a per address basis, meaning they receive a flat rate for every address to which they deliver one or more packages. Drivers only receive payment for a delivery if OnTrac deems that the delivery has been completed. 17. OnTrac has the power to terminate any driver for any reason by instructing an RSP to end its relationship with a driver. If OnTrac terminates a driver, OnTrac prohibits the driver from being rehired by a different RSP. Additionally, OnTrac can, for any reason, prevent an RSP from hiring a driver in the first place. 18. Though the drivers’ contracts with RSPs state that drivers are permitted to work simultaneously for multiple RSPs and/or for delivery companies other than OnTrac, in practice, OnTrac forbids drivers from working simultaneously for more than one RSP or for another delivery company. OnTrac enforces this policy by terminating or suspending or threatening to terminate or suspend drivers who work simultaneously for more than one RSP or for another delivery company. 19. Additionally, though drivers’ contracts with RSPs permit the drivers to hire others to share or cover their routes, in practice, OnTrac forbids drivers from subcontracting with other additional drivers to deliver packages for them or assist in the delivery process. OnTrac enforces this policy by terminating or suspending or threatening to terminate or suspend drivers who attempt to subcontract with additional drivers to share or cover their routes. 2. The employer has prior written authorization from the employee. An employer shall not withhold wages under a written authorization from the employee past the date specified by the employee in a written revocation of the authorization, unless the withholding is to resolve a debt or obligation to the employer or a court orders otherwise. 21. Drivers are not expressly required by their contracts with RSPs to wear an OnTrac uniform. Instead, they are provided with a choice between (a) purchasing and wearing an OnTrac shirt and hat in exchange for OnTrac paying the driver a nominal clothing fee (approximately $5.00 per day) or (b) not wearing OnTrac clothing. In practice, however, OnTrac terminates or suspends and has terminated and suspended drivers for failing to comply with verbal uniform requirements, which consists of requiring drivers to wear an OnTrac shirt and hat, black shoes, and beige pants. 22. OnTrac specifies the type of vehicle that the drivers are permitted to use. Drivers cannot use any other type of vehicle to deliver packages. OnTrac has the discretion to terminate or suspend and, on information and belief, has terminated and suspended drivers for using an unapproved vehicle to deliver packages. Drivers who provide their own vehicles must pay for gas, maintenance, and all other expenses necessary to operate the vehicles. 23. As a condition of becoming a driver, OnTrac requires that all drivers maintain certain levels of commercial insurance coverage and that drivers name OnTrac as an additional insured on the policy. 24. All drivers must have a special scanner in order to perform deliveries for OnTrac. Upon information and belief, RSPs lease the scanners from OnTrac. Upon information and belief, OnTrac deducts from each drivers’ bi-weekly paycheck an amount of money labeled as a “courier fee.” Upon information and belief, this courier fee includes, among other things, a charge to the drivers for use of the OnTrac scanners. Upon information and belief, the “courier fee” ranges from approximately $45 to $75 every two weeks, depending on how much money a driver earns during the same pay period. 26. Sometimes, when drivers arrive at the OnTrac distribution center at the time specified by OnTrac, they are informed by OnTrac that there are no packages for them to deliver. OnTrac and its processing of packages is solely responsible for these delays in the readiness of packages for delivery. When these delays occur, OnTrac requires that the drivers wait at the distribution center until the packages are ready to be delivered. Sometimes, drivers must wait many hours before they are assigned a route. OnTrac has the discretion to terminate or suspend and, on information and belief, has terminated and suspended drivers for refusing to wait at the distribution center until they are assigned a delivery route or packages for delivery. 27. After they are assigned a route, the drivers are required by OnTrac to load their vehicles with the packages for delivery. The packages for each route are pre-sorted by OnTrac on palettes. Once drivers finish loading their vehicle, they proceed to the OnTrac office (located within the distribution center), where OnTrac staff provide the drivers with a delivery manifest prepared by OnTrac. The delivery manifest sets forth the drivers’ name and OnTrac ID number, all deliveries for which the driver is responsible that day, and the time frame within which each package must be delivered. 29. In addition, OnTrac adds and cancels deliveries from a driver’s manifest after the driver has left the distribution center. When deliveries are added to the manifest, the drivers have no choice but to accept and complete these additional deliveries, which require the driver to return to the distribution center or some other location to pick up the package. OnTrac has the discretion to terminate or suspend and, on information and belief, has terminated and suspended drivers for failing to deliver packages added to the drivers’ manifest after departing the distribution center to begin their deliveries. When deliveries are cancelled, the drivers do not receive any compensation for those packages they are transporting. 3. There is a reasonable good faith dispute as to the amount of wages due, including the amount of any counterclaim or any claim of debt, reimbursement, recoupment or set-off asserted by the employer against the employee. 30. OnTrac also instructs drivers to pick up packages for delivery from customers within the drivers’ delivery areas. OnTrac has the discretion to terminate or suspend and, on information and belief, has terminated and suspended drivers for failing to pick up packages as instructed by the OnTrac dispatchers. 32. OnTrac has the discretion to terminate or suspend and, on information and belief, has terminated and suspended drivers for failing to deliver packages within the time window set forth in the delivery manifests prepared and provided by OnTrac to drivers. 33. OnTrac requires that all drivers “clear” their route before they are free to stop working for the day. A route is not considered “cleared” unless (a) all packages on the drivers’ manifest have been deemed delivered or undeliverable and, if applicable, (b) any undeliverable packages have been returned to the OnTrac distribution center and unloaded by the driver and (c) any packages picked up during the day have been delivered to the OnTrac distribution center and unloaded by the driver. 34. OnTrac, not the RSPs, determines whether the drivers’ route has been cleared. If OnTrac determines that the route has not been cleared, OnTrac requires drivers to remedy whatever issue is preventing the route from being cleared. OnTrac has the discretion to terminate or suspend and, on information and belief, has terminated and suspended drivers for failing to clear their routes or failing to remedy issues that have prevented the route from being cleared. 35. By way of example, on a number of occasions, Plaintiff Ziglar called OnTrac to clear his route after delivering all of the packages that he had loaded into his van. He was informed by OnTrac that he still had one or more packages to deliver and that his route was not clear. Even though the packages had not been included on Plaintiff Ziglar’s palette in the morning (and therefore had not been loaded into his truck), OnTrac required Plaintiff Ziglar to return to the distribution center, locate and load the packages, and return to the field to deliver them. 37. Though the length of each driver’s day can vary, drivers typically work more than 8 hours per day from the time they arrive at the OnTrac distribution center until OnTrac confirms their route is clear. Upon information and belief, drivers often work 12 or more hours from the time they arrive at the OnTrac distribution center until OnTrac confirms their route is clear. 38. Drivers, including Plaintiff, typically work more than 40 hours per week while providing services for OnTrac. However, drivers are never provided with time and one-half their regular rate of pay for hours worked greater than 40 hours in a work week. Plaintiff Ziglar frequently worked 6 or 7 days in a week for 8 or more hours per day. Consequently, he worked more than 40 hours in one week delivering packages for OnTrac. However, he only was paid his ordinary per delivery rate and was never paid any overtime pay. 39. Drivers, including Plaintiff, frequently are not paid for all hours worked at an hourly rate at or in excess of the minimum wage rates established by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, and its implementing regulations, and the Arizona Minimum Wage Statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-363, and its implementing regulations. In many weeks, the payment that the drivers, including Plaintiff, receive for performing delivery services, divided by the number of hours the drivers had performed those services has resulted and will continue to result in an hourly rate of pay below the relevant federal and Arizona minimum wages. 41. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of all drivers who delivered packages for Defendant in Arizona and have been designated as “independent contractors” during or at any time following the 12-month period preceding the filing of this complaint. 42. Plaintiff and other class members have uniformly been misclassified as independent contractors. 43. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 45. The named Plaintiff is a member of the class, who suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s conduct and actions alleged herein. 46. The named Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class, and the named Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the class. 47. The named Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. The named Plaintiff has retained able counsel experienced in class action litigation. The interests of the named Plaintiff are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, the interests of the other class members. 48. The questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including legal and factual issues relating to liability and damages. 49. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all class members is impractical. Moreover, since the damages suffered by individual members of the class may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it practically impossible for members of the class individually to redress the wrongs done to them. The class is readily definable and prosecution of this action as a class action will eliminate the possibility of repetitive litigation. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 51. Plaintiff is similarly situated to all other drivers who delivered packages for OnTrac, and there is a group of similarly situated employees who were subject to OnTrac’s common policies and who are entitled to notice of this action under 29 U.S.C § 216(b). 52. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) provides in relevant part: no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. 54. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to be paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a regular workweek. 55. By the acts and omissions complained of above, including, inter alia, by failing to pay overtime wages for work in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendant has violated the FLSA. 56. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA were willful and accordingly, a three- year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 58. Defendant has intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA. 59. Plaintiff and Class Members have been harmed and suffered damages by being denied overtime pay in accordance with the FLSA, plus incurred costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 60. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful and willful acts and violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are entitled to recovery of overtime wages, liquidated damages in an amount equal to the wages they are owed as unpaid overtime, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation, declaratory and injunctive relief. 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206 provides in relevant part: Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages at the following rates: (1) except as otherwise provided in this section, not less than-- (A) $5.85 an hour, beginning on the 60th day after May 25, 2007; (B) $6.55 an hour, beginning 12 months after that 60th day; and (C) $7.25 an hour, beginning 24 months after that 60th day; 63. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to be paid in an amount at least equal to the applicable minimum wage. 64. By the acts and omissions complained of above, including, inter alia, by failing to pay minimum wages, Defendant has violated the FLSA. 66. Each improperly paid Plaintiff and Class Member, who performed or continues to perform services for Defendant for any time during the three years preceding this lawsuit, is entitled to notification of the pendency of this action and of his/her right to consent to becoming a party to this action. Notice should be sent to all Class Members, as defined above, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 67. Defendant has intentionally, willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the FLSA. 68. Plaintiff and Class Members have been harmed and suffered damages by being denied minimum wages in accordance with the FLSA, plus incurred costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 69. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful acts and violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and Class Members have been damaged and pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) are entitled to recovery of minimum wages, liquidated damages in an amount equal to the minimum wages they are owed, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other compensation, declaratory and injunctive relief. 70. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-352 provides in relevant part: No employer may withhold or divert any portion of an employee's wages unless one of the following applies: 73. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-363 provides, in relevant part: A. Employers shall pay employees no less than the minimum wage, which shall be six dollars and seventy-five cents ($6.75) an hour beginning January 1, 2007. B. The minimum wage shall be increased shall be increased on January 1, 2008 and on January 1 of successive years by the increase in the cost of living. … 74. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-355(A) provides in relevant part: if an employer, in violation of this chapter, fails to pay wages due any employee, the employee may recover in a civil action against an employer or former employer an amount that is treble the amount of the unpaid wages. 75. The Arizona minimum hourly wage in 2015 was $8.05 per hour and currently remains at $8.05 per hour for 2016. 76. By virtue of the acts and omissions alleged herein, including failing to pay all wages due to Plaintiff and Class Members, including minimum wages and overtime wages and by improperly deducting portions of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ wages without authorization, Defendant has violated Arizona’s Wage Laws. 78. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. Defendant has been unjustly enriched by the work performed by Plaintiff and Class Members without payment of the lawfully earned compensation for the work they have performed. 80. Defendant has been unjustly enriched by the charge-backs and deductions made from the Plaintiff and Class Members pay. 81. Plaintiff is entitled to restitution and/or damages in quantum meruit for the value of Defendant’s unconscionable contracts conferred upon Defendant together with any profit thereon and prejudgment interest. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to restitution for all of Defendant’s costs or fees that have been levied upon Plaintiff and Class Members, including charge-backs, weekly deductions, fuel expenses, vehicle maintenance, check processing fees, insurance fees, courier fees, and electronic device fees together with any profit thereon and prejudgment interest. 83. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §12-1831 provides: Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 86. By virtue of the acts and omissions alleged herein and their status as employees, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to a determination of the rights and benefits of their employment including, but not limited to, payment by the Defendant of the employer portion of federal and state taxes and mandatory coverages including workers’ compensation coverage, rights to protections and benefits under all federal and state laws applicable to employees and to all benefits and coverages under all benefit plans and coverages made available to OnTrac employees together with all other appropriate equitable, injunctive and make whole relief.

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(Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 19. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 20. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 21. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 23. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 24. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 26. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 27. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 28. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 29. Defendant operates the Website, which provides information, education, classes, and services relating to exercise, Pilates, and back problems. It delivers information and sells to tens of millions of people across the United States. 30. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 32. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 33. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 34. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 35. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 37. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 38. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 39. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 41. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 42. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 43. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 44. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 47. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (“place of exhibition and entertainment,” “place of recreation,” and “service establishments”). 48. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 49. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services, or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 50. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 51. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disability. 65. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation … because of the … disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 66. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 67. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 68. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 69. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 71. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 72. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 74. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 75. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 76. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 77. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 78. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 81. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 82. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 83. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 84. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 85. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . .” 87. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 88. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 89. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 90. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 91. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 92. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102(9). 94. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 95. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard- of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 97. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 98. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 99. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 100. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 101. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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29:USC§203 et.seq., VIOLATION OF FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 04/12/2017 Print Save As... Reset JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 08/16) Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity): Brief description of cause: VII. REQUESTED IN

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1.5 times their regular rate of pay for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week, in violation of the New York Minimum Wage Act and its implementing regulations. N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 650 et seq.; 12 NYCRR § 142-2.2. Relief Demanded 10. Upon information and belief, and at all relevant times herein, Defendant was in the plumbing and repair business. 11. At all times relevant herein, Defendant employed over 75 employees during the class period. 12. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was an hourly employee of Defendant and his last regular hourly rate of pay was about $16 an hour. 13. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed from on or about October 22, 2018 to on or about November 7, 2019. 14. At all times relevant herein, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for each and all hours worked in a week; 1) Plaintiff was required to clock in to work abut 1 hour earlier than his scheduled time, for about 5 days a week and was not paid for this additional hour worked daily; and 2) Defendant had a policy and practice of deducting wages for 30 minutes daily for “lunch” breaks. However, due to the demands of his job, Plaintiff was required to work through his lunch breaks on most or all days during his employment with Defendant and did not receive a bona fide meal break within the meaning of the FLSA and NYLL. Due to these violations, Plaintiff is owed wages for about 7.5 hours a week, for most or all weeks during his employment with Defendant. 15. At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff worked about 50 hours or more each week for Defendants and sometimes more; 5 days a week. 16. A more precise statement of the hours and wages may be made when Plaintiff Lim-Tom obtains the wage and time records Defendants were required to keep under the FLSA and NYLL. Accurate copies of Plaintiff’s wage and time records that Defendants were required to keep pursuant to 29 USC 211, 29 CFR 516 and NYLL 195, 12 NYCRR 142.2-6 are incorporated herein by reference. 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the putative class members at a rate of 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all overtime hours worked (hours over 40 in a week). 19. The violations complained of by Plaintiff were also suffered by putative class members. 20. At all times relevant herein, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and the putative class members with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1). 21. At all times relevant herein, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff and the putative class members with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – the wage statements provided to Plaintiff did not contain all hours worked by Plaintiff nor all wages earned, among other deficiencies. 22. Upon information and belief and at all times relevant herein, Defendant had annual revenues and/or expenditures in excess of $500, 000. Plaintiff references and incorporates herein, accurate copies of records of Defendant’s business volume and revenues as well as business operations and commerce that Defendant was required to keep and maintain under the FLSA including under 29 CFR 516. 23. Upon information and belief and at all times relevant herein, Defendant conducted business with companies outside the State of New York. 24. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Defendant and Plaintiff conducted business with insurance companies outside the State of New York. 25. At all times applicable herein and upon information and belief, Defendant utilized the goods, materials, and services through interstate commerce such as plumbing equipment and other essential materials. 27. Defendant as a regular part of its business, makes payment of taxes and other monies to agencies and entities outside the State of New York. 28. Defendant as a regular part of its business, engaged in credit card transactions involving banks and other institutions outside the State of New York. 29. At all times applicable herein and upon information and belief, Defendant utilized the instrumentalities of interstate commerce such as the United States mail, electronic mail, the internet and telephone systems. 30. Upon information and belief, and at all relevant times herein, Defendant failed to display federal and state minimum wage/overtime posters. 31. Upon information and belief, and at all relevant times herein, Defendant failed to notify Plaintiff of her federal and state minimum wage and overtime rights and failed to inform Plaintiff that she could seek enforcement of such rights through the government enforcement agencies. 32. The “present” or the “present time” as used in this complaint refers to the date this complaint was signed. 33. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated who opt into this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 32 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 35. The FLSA cause of action is brought as a collective action on behalf of the named Plaintiff and all others who are/were similarly situated and who file consents to opt-in to the action. 36. The class of similarly situated individuals as to the FLSA cause of action is defined as current and former hourly employees of Defendant, and who 1) worked more than forty hours in a week, within at least the three-year period, preceding the filing of this complaint; and 2) were not paid at an overtime rate of at least 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week as also explained above. 37. The class includes but is not limited to delivery persons and employees in similar positions. 38. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendant, upon information and belief, there are over 75 members of the class during the class period. 39. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 40. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated, were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the FLSA – 29 U.S.C 201 et Seq. 41. Upon information and belief, and at all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly similarly-situated, were engaged in commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce and/or Defendant constituted an enterprise(s) engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a). 42. Upon information and belief and at all times relevant herein, Defendant transacted commerce and business in excess of $500,000.00 annually or had revenues and/or expenditures in excess of $500,000.00 annually. 44. Due to Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff, and all those similarly-situated, are entitled to recover from Defendant, their unpaid overtime wage compensation, plus maximum liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of the action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 45. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as class members, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 46. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 47. The class of similarly-situated individuals as to the overtime cause of action under the NYLL is defined as current and former hourly employees of Defendant, and who: 1) were employed by Defendant within the State of New York; 2) worked more than forty hours in a week, within at least the six-year period, preceding the filing of this complaint; and 3) were not paid at an overtime rate of at least 1.5 times their regular rate for each and all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a week as also explained above. 48. The class includes but not limited to plumbers and employees in similar positions. 49. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 50. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendant, upon information and belief, there are over 75 members of the class during the class period. 52. Upon information and belief, there are questions of law or fact common to the class – (a) whether the putative class was paid at least 1.5 times the applicable regular rate for all hours in excess of forty in a week. 53. Upon information and belief, the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims of the class. 54. The representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 55. The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 56. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy - particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate Defendants and in light of the large number of putative class members. 57. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated as class members, were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the New York Labor Law, §§ 2 and 651 and the regulations thereunder including 12 NYCRR § 142. 58. At all times relevant herein, Defendant failed to pay and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated as class members, overtime compensation at rates not less than 60. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated as class members, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 59 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 76. Plaintiff alleges on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as class members, and incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 75 above as if set forth fully and at length herein. 77. Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rule 23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 78. The class of similarly-situated individuals as to the cause of action for NYLL 195(1) and NYLL 195(3) violations is defined as current and former employees of Defendant who: 1) were not provided with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1), or 2) were not provided with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3). 79. The class includes but is not limited to employees who did not receive wage statements, employees who received wage statements but whose wage statements did not reflect all hours worked or all wages earned, and employees who did not receive the required wage notices setting forth the regular and overtime rate of pay among other information. 80. The class definition will be refined as is necessary, including after discovery if necessary. 81. Although the precise number of putative class members is unknown, and facts on which the calculation of that number is based are presently within the sole control of Defendant, upon information and belief, there are over 75 members of the class during the class period. 83. Upon information and belief, there are questions of law or fact common to the class – (a) whether Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1), and (b) whether Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and the putative class with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3). 84. Upon information and belief, the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims of the class. 85. The representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 86. The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. 87. There are questions of law and fact common to the class which predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the class, including: (b) whether Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1), and whether Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and the putative class with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3). 88. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy - particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate Defendant and in light of the large number of putative class members. 89. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and all those similarly-situated as class members, were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the New York Labor law, §§ 190 et seq., including §§ 191, 193, 195 and 198. 91. At all times relevant herein, Defendant failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff and the class members with the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – Plaintiff and the class are therefore entitled to and seeks to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-d), as well as an injunction directing Defendant to comply with NYLL 195(1). Relief Demanded 92. Due to Defendant’s New York Labor Law Article 6 violations including violation of sections 191, 193 and 198, Plaintiff and all those similarly situated are entitled to recover from Defendant, maximum recovery for violations of NYLL 195(1) and NYLL 195(3), prejudgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of the action, pursuant to N.Y. Labor Law § 190 et seq. including § 198. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - 29 U.S.C 201 et Seq. (Overtime wages) NYLL § 190, 191, 193, 195 and 198 NYLL § 190, 191, 193, 195 and 198 NYLL 650 et Seq. (Unpaid Overtime)

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29. Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of the following class of persons, hereafter, the “Class”: All persons in the United States who on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (1) were sent by or on behalf of Defendants a telephone facsimile message of material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services, (2) with respect to whom Defendants cannot provide evidence of prior express invitation or permission for the sending of such fax or (3) with whom Defendants did not have an established business relationship, and (4) the fax identified in subpart (1) of this definition (a) did not display a clear and conspicuous opt-out notice on the first page stating that the recipient may make a request to the sender of the advertisement not to send any future advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or machines and that failure to comply, within 30 days, with such a request meeting the requirements under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(v) is unlawful, (b) lacked a telephone number for sending the opt-out request, or (c) lacked a facsimile number for sending the opt-out request. 30. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their employees, agents, and members of the judiciary.

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17. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs 1-16. 18. Samsung manufactured televisions for the purposes of their eventual sale to retail buyers. Samsung also appended to the goods express warranties. 19. On or about March 2011, Samsung manufactured a television that Plaintiff would eventually purchase. On or about April 2011, at San Rafael California, a retailer, Best Buy, sold the Samsung television to Plaintiff at retail for roughly two thousand, four hundred ($2,400.00) dollars. 20. In connection with the sale, Plaintiff received Samsung's express warranty, which accompanied the television. Plaintiff examined the sample of the television model used as a demonstrator at the seller's premises. Plaintiff paid for an additional four year warranty at the time of the sale. 21. On or about March 2016, Plaintiff discovered that the television exhibited a failure in utility or performance and failed to conform to the sample in that it began to cycle on and off frequently. 26. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs 1-25. 27. Samsung has violated Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code §17200 et seq. by engaging in unlawful business acts and practices that constitute acts of “unfair competition” as defined in Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §17200 with respect to the services provided to the California Class. 28. Samsung engaged in unlawful acts and practices in violation of the Song- Beverly Act as alleged above and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act as alleged below. 29. As a direct and proximate result of Samsung’s unlawful acts, Plaintiff and the class members were injured and lost money or property, including but not limited to the purchase price they paid to Samsung for their televisions. 31. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs 1-30. 32. Samsung engaged in unfair acts and practices by the acts alleged above. These unfair acts and practices were immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, unconscionable, and/or substantially injurious to Plaintiff and class members. They were likely to deceive the public. The harm these practices caused to Plaintiff and the class members outweighed their utility, if any. 33. As a direct and proximate result of Samsung’s unfair practices and acts, Plaintiff and the class members were injured and lost money or property, including but not limited to the purchase price they paid to Samsung for their televisions. 34. Defendant has engaged in, and continues to engage in, business practices that violate the UCL by continuing to make false and misleading representations on their labeling of the Product. 35. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs 1-34. 36. Samsung’s conduct alleged above was fraudulent and deceptive. Samsung’s omission to disclose that it would not provide repair parts for seven years was likely to deceive Members of the public, including Plaintiff and the class members. Plaintiff and the class members relied on this omission in purchasing their Samsung televisions. 37. As a direct and proximate result of Samsung’s deceptive practices and acts, Plaintiff and the class members were injured and lost money or property, including but not limited to the price received by Samsung for their televisions. 39. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs 1-38. 40. Plaintiff and Members of the proposed Class were consumers within the meaning of Civil Code § 1761(d). 41. Samsung's conduct violates Civil Code § 1770(a)(5), which prohibits: "[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have..." 42. Samsung's conduct violates Civil Code § 1770(a)(7), which prohibits "[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another." 43. Samsung's conduct violates Civil Code § 1770(a)(9), which prohibits "[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised." 44. Defendant is a “Person” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(c). 45. The transaction(s) involved here are “Transaction(s)” as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(e). 46. Plaintiff and the Members of the Class have standing to pursue this cause of action because they have suffered injury-in-fact and have lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth here. 47. Plaintiff and the Members of the Class purchased their Samsung televisions in reliance on Defendant’s labeling and marketing and omission to disclose that it would not provide repair parts for seven years as required by law. 48. Defendant has used deceptive representations with respect to the Product in violation of Cal. Civ. Code §1770(a)(4). Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 – Unlawful Business Practices Violation of Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code § 1750 et seq.) Violation of Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1792 et seq. Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 – Unfair Business Practices Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200 – Fraudulent/Deceptive Business Practices

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10. The exact number of persons affected by the data breach is currently unknown but potentially effects millions of account holders and customers. The data breach affected potentially millions of credit and debit cards maintained by 37. PLAINTIFF brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 49. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 50. DEFENDANT'S failure to disclose information concerning the data breach directly and promptly to affected customers, constitutes a fraudulent act or practice in violation of California Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. 51. DEFENDANT’S acts, practices, and omissions detailed above constitute fraudulent practices in that they are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer in that PLAINTIFF and Class members were induced to shop at Neiman Marcus stores and pay for merchandise using credit cards based on the understanding, whether explicit or implied, that DEFENDANT had implemented appropriate security protocols and that, in the event of a loss or breach, DEFENDANT would promptly notify affected customers. 52. DEFENDANT’S acts, practices, and omissions detailed above, constitute unlawful practices and/or acts as they constitute violations of numerous provisions of California law, including but not limited to Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80 et seq. 55. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 56. DEFENDANT came into possession of the INFORMATION of PLAINTIFF and other Class members and thus had a duty to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting such INFORMATION from being compromised, lost, stolen, misused, and/or disclosed to unauthorized parties. 58. DEFENDANT had a duty to have procedures in place to detect and prevent the loss or unauthorized dissemination of said INFORMATION. 59. DEFENDANT, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to PLAINTIFF and Class members by failing to exercise reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding said INFORMATION within its possession. 60. DEFENDANT, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to PLAINTIFF and Class members to exercise reasonable care by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and prevent dissemination of PLAINTIFF’S and other Class members’ INFORMATION. 61. DEFENDANT, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to timely disclose to PLAINTIFF and the Class members the fact that their INFORMATION had been compromised. 62. DEFENDANT'S negligent and wrongful breach of its duties owed to PLAINTIFF and the Class proximately caused PLAINTIFF and Class members' INFORMATION to be compromised. 63. As a direct and proximate cause of DEFENDANT’S failure to exercise reasonable care and use commercially reasonable security measures its databases were accessed without authorization and customers’ INFORMATION was compromised and exposed to unauthorized access. 66. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 67. As herein, DEFENDANT violated various statutes, including California Civil Code §§ 1798.80 et seq., which requires a business that licenses, owns, or maintains INFORMATION to give prompt notification to persons potentially affected by a security breach. 68. This statute was intended to protect customers’ information from unauthorized disclosure and to ensure prompt notification of any such unauthorized, unlawful disclosure. 70. By engaging in the negligent conduct as alleged above, DEFENDANT was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, in that DEFENDANT acted or failed to act with a willful and conscious disregard of PLAINTIFF’S and Class members’ rights. PLAINTIFF therefore seeks an award of damages, including punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, on behalf of herself and the Class. 71. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 72. Plaintiff and Class members were the owners and possessors of their INFORMATION. As the result of DEFENDANT'S wrongful conduct, DEFENDANT has interfered with the PLAINTIFF’S and Class members' rights to possess and control such property, to which they had a superior right of possession and control at the time of conversion. 73. As a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT'S conduct, PLAINTIFF and the Class members suffered injury, damage, loss or harm and therefore seek compensatory damages. 74. Plaintiff and the Class members did not consent to DEFENDANT'S mishandling and loss of their INFORMATION. 76. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 77. The INFORMATION of PLAINTIFF and other consumers of DEFENDANT was and continues to be private information. PLAINTIFF and each member of the Class had a legally protected informational privacy interest in the confidential and sensitive information that DEFENDANT obtained and unlawfully disseminated. 78. PLAINTIFF and other members of the Class had a legally protected autonomy privacy interest regarding their INFORMATION without unwanted observation, intrusion, or interference. 79. PLAINTIFF and members of the Class reasonably expected that their confidential and sensitive information would be kept private. 8. DEFENDANT is a nationwide retailer ranked 504th on the Fortune 1,000 list. PLAINTIFF is a regular shopper at Neiman Marcus stores, and uses her Neiman Marcus credit card regularly at a Neiman Marcus store in this Judicial District. Plaintiff has made numerous purchases at Neiman Marcus between July 2013 and October 2013 and as recently December 26, 2013. 80. DEFENDANT’S failure to secure and protect PLAINTIFF’S and other customers’ INFORMATION resulted in the public disclosure and publication of such private information to third parties, including but not limited to hackers. 81. Dissemination of PLAINTIFF’S and other consumers’ INFORMATION is not of a legitimate public concern; publicity of their INFORMATION would be, is, and will continue to be offensive to PLAINTIFF, putative Class members, and other reasonable people. 82. DEFENDANT’S wrongful actions and/or inaction as described above constituted and continue to constitute a serious invasion of the privacy of PLAINTIFF and other consumers by publicly disclosing private facts (i.e., their INFORMATION). 84. In violating the privacy of PLAINTIFF and Class members as alleged above, DEFENDANT was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, in that DEFENDANT acted or failed to act with a willful and conscious disregard of PLAINTIFF’S and Class members’ rights. PLAINTIFF therefore seeks an award of damages, including punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, on behalf of herself and the Class. 85. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 86. DEFENDANT owns and/or licenses computerized data that includes PLAINTIFF’S and Class members’ INFORMATION and/or maintains computerized data that includes INFORMATION that it does not own. As such, DEFENDANT owed PLAINTIFF and Class members a duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure, and to promptly notify and disclose any breach of security and/or unauthorized access of such information to persons affected thereby. 96. PLAINTIFF and the Class members delivered and entrusted their INFORMATION to DEFENDANT for the sole purpose of receiving services from DEFENDANT. 97. During the time of bailment, DEFENDANT owed PLAINTIFF and the Class members a duty to safeguard this information properly and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to protect such information. DEFENDANT breached this duty. 98. As a result of these breaches of duty, PLAINTIFF and the Class members have suffered harm, as alleged above. 99. PLAINTIFF seeks actual damages on behalf of the Class. 100. Moreover, DEFENDANT, by and through the conduct alleged above, was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, in that DEFENDANT acted or failed to act with a willful and conscious disregard of PLAINTIFF’S and Class members’ rights. PLAINTIFF therefore seeks an award of damages, including punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, on behalf of herself and the Class. BAILMENT CONVERSION INVASION OF PRIVACY NEGLIGENCE NEGLIGENCE PER SE UNLAWFUL, UNFAIR, AND FRAUDULENT BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER CALIFORNIA BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200, ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA DATA BREACH ACT, CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.80, ET SEQ.

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14. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California. Plaintiff are, and at all times mentioned herein were, “persons” as defined by 52. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 53. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from either Defendant, or their agents, calling on behalf of either Defendant, between the date of filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for marketing purposes, to non-customers of Defendants, at the time of the calls. 55. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in at least the following ways: Defendants illegally contacted Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendants or their agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby. 56. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and discovery. 57. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendants' records and/or Defendants’ agent’s records. 59. As a person who received calls from Defendants in which Defendants used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class. 60. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendants' unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct. The size of Class member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein. 61. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 63. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 64. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 65. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 66. As a result of Defendants' negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) 68. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 70. As a result of Defendants' knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 71. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 73. As a result of Defendants' negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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(pled in the alternative) 13. Sealy manufactures and distributes for sale mattresses under various brand names, including the Sealy brand, Sealy Posturepedic, Optimum, and Stearns & Foster. 15. Sealy provides an express written warranty to every consumer who purchases one of its mattress products, by which warranty Sealy suggests that it wants purchasers to be completely satisfied with its mattresses. 16. Sealy manufactures and distributes for sale mattresses throughout the United States and provides an express limited warranty (“express warranty”) to the original purchaser of the mattress and foundation set. The express warranty covers manufacturing defects in a mattress or foundation when the set is subject to proper handling and normal use in conjunction with a bed frame that provides Continuous Support. 17. The express warranty provides for the repair or replacement, at Sealy’s discretion, of a mattress that exhibit excessive sagging, while excluding indentations caused by misuse, abuse, factors other than a product defect, and normal body indentations as indicated by Sealy’s provided measurements. 18. The express warranty was drafted entirely by Sealy and neither Plaintiff nor any Class member had any input or ability to negotiate any portion of the warranty. 19. A consumer who wants to make a warranty claim must first, contact the retail store where he/she purchased their sleep set, and if he/she cannot reach the store, write directly to Sealy’s the Consumer Services Department. 20. In or about January 2012, Plaintiff purchased a Sealy brand Stearns & Foster mattress (the “Mattress”) from a Mattress Firm store in Overland Park, Kansas. The mattress has a 10-year limited warranty. 22. After much difficulty, this Original Mattress was eventually replaced with another mattress on or about January 12, 2016, at additional cost to Plaintiff. 23. The Replacement Mattress has a similar defective condition resulting in excessive sagging, so Plaintiff again contacted the Mattress Firm store and submitted a warranty claim. 24. As Sealy’s instructions provide, claims pursuant to Sealy’s warranty must be made through the retail store where the consumer purchased the concerned Sealy mattress. The retail store has its authorized inspector determine the validity of consumers’ claims made pursuant to Sealy’s warranty. Thus, the retail store is an independent co-warrantor of the Sealy mattresses. 25. Mattress Firm and Sealy denied Plaintiff’s warranty claim, refusing to repair or replace Plaintiff’s mattress, refusing to provide an adequate explanation, and ultimately refusing to respond to Plaintiff’s inquiries. 26. On information and belief, valid warranty claims by consumers are routinely ignored or denied by the Defendants without justification. 27. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and other Class members are damaged and have suffered economic loss, in terms of, inter alia, being left with a defective product after their valid warranty claims are denied, and being out-of-pocket for the time and associated costs of making their claims. 28. Plaintiff brings this suit as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated persons. 30. The Rule 23(b)(2) Injunctive Relief Class, with respect to Sealy, initially may be defined as follows: All original purchasers of a mattress manufactured by Sealy, who purchased a Sealy mattress in the United States on or after January 12, 2016, and have maintained original ownership of said mattress. Excluded from the Class are the current and former directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives of Sealy, and members of their immediate families, and the Court and Court personnel. 31. A Rule 23(b)(2) Injunctive Relief Subclass with respect to Mattress Firm, initially may be defined as follows: All original purchasers of a mattress manufactured by Sealy, who purchased from Mattress Firm a Sealy mattress in the United States on or after January 12, 2016, and have maintained original ownership of said mattress. Excluded from the Class are the current and former directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives of Sealy, and members of their immediate families, and the Court and Court personnel. 32. The Rule (b)(3) Class initially may be defined as follows: All original purchasers of a mattress manufactured by Sealy, who purchased a Sealy mattress in the United States on or after January 12, 2016, and made a warranty claim that was denied, or about which Sealy refused to respond, without justification. Excluded from the Class are the current and former directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives of Sealy, and members of their immediate families, and the Court and Court personnel. 34. A Rule (b)(3) Kansas Subclass with respect to Sealy, initially may be defined as follows: All original purchasers of a mattress manufactured by Sealy, who purchased a Sealy mattress in Kansas on or after January 12, 2016, and made a warranty claim that was denied, or about which Sealy refused to respond, without justification. Excluded from the Class are the current and former directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives of Sealy, and members of their immediate families, and the Court and Court personnel. 35. A Rule 23(b)(3) Kansas Subclass with respect to Mattress Firm, initially may be defined as follows: All original purchasers of a mattress manufactured by Sealy, who purchased from Mattress Firm a Sealy mattress in the United States on or after January 12, 2016, and made a warranty claim that was denied, or about which Sealy refused to respond, without justification. Excluded from the Class are the current and former directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives of Sealy Corporation, and members of their immediate families, and the Court and Court personnel. 36. Numerosity. The proposed Classes are sufficiently numerous such that joinder is impractical. Upon information and belief, the Rule 23(b)(2) Injunctive Relief Class consists of tens of thousands of members. Upon information and belief, the Rule 23(b)(3) Class consists of at least hundreds of members. 38. Typicality. Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other Class members, and his claims are typical of other Class members. 40. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because the joinder of all members of each Class is impracticable. Furthermore, the adjudication of this controversy through a class action will avoid the possibility of an inconsistent and potentially-conflicting adjudication of the claims asserted herein. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 41. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all Class members, thereby making appropriate final and declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) Injunctive Relief Classes. 42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 41 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 43. Sealy and Mattress Firm provide a limited written warranty (“express warranty”) to original purchasers of Sealy mattresses. 44. The express warranty was a part of the basis of the bargain for Plaintiff and the other Class members in purchasing Sealy mattress products. 45. The express warranty extends to original purchasers and, thus, Plaintiff and the other Class members are in privity with Sealy. 47. Defendants have been put on reasonable notice of their breach of express warranty by virtue of Plaintiff’s warranty claim and subsequent communications between Plaintiff and Defendants, including calls and emails between Plaintiff and the Defendants’ customer service departments prior to the filing of this Complaint. 48. Upon visiting the Mattress Firm store to discuss the ongoing issue, an employee and agent of Mattress Firm admitted to Plaintiff that the model of the Mattress in question has pervasive defects affecting a large percentage of said model. 49. As a direct result of the failure of Sealy’s mattress products to perform as expressly warranted and Defendants’ unjustified denial of warranty claims, Plaintiff and the other members of the Rule 23(b)(3) Class and Subclass have been damaged and have suffered economic loss, in terms of, inter alia, being left with a defective product after their valid warranty claims are denied, and being out-of-pocket for their time and costs incurred. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that a Rule 23(b)(3) Class and Subclass (as defined above) be certified with Plaintiff appointed as the Representative of both Classes, that judgment be granted against Defendants in an amount that is fair and reasonable, together with prejudgment interest as provided by law, and that Plaintiff receives such other relief as the Court deems proper and just under the circumstances, including payment of costs and expenses in filing this suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 51. The Uniform Commercial code § 2-313 provides that an affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer that relates to the goods or becomes part of the basis of the bargain, creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the promise. 52. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides for a civil action by consumers for the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor, to comply with a written warranty arising under state law. 53. As demonstrated above, Defendants have failed to comply with the terms of the express warranty with regard to the defective Sealy mattresses. 54. Sealy’s mattress products are consumer products as defined in § 2301(a) of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 55. Defendants are warrantors. 56. Defendants breached express warranties because, as alleged herein, they failed to offer repairs or replacement products to Plaintiff and the other members of the Rule 23(b)(3) Class and Subclass, pursuant to the terms of the express warranty. 58. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 59. The Kansas Consumer Protection Act (“KCPA”), K.S.A. §§ 50-623, et seq., prohibits the use of deceptive an unconscionable acts and practices before, during, or after a consumer transaction in the state of Kansas. 60. Plaintiffs are each a “consumer” for purposes of the KCPA. 61. Defendants are each a “supplier” for purposes of the KCPA. 62. The mattress purchases described herein were “consumer transactions” for purposes of the KCPA. 63. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein, Plaintiffs have been damaged and are “aggrieved.” 64. The KCPA should be liberally construed to promote its policies of protecting consumers against suppliers that commit deceptive and unconscionable acts and practices. K.S.A. § 50-623, et seq; Williamson v. Amrani, 283 Kan. 227, 234 (2007). 65. Violations of the KCPA can occur before, during, or after the consumer transaction. 67. Defendants’ violations of K.S.A. § 50-627, Unconscionable Acts and Practices, include, but are not limited to, the following: a. The consumer was unable to receive a material benefit from the subject of the transaction, in violation of K.S.A. § 50-627(b)(3); b. The transaction the supplier induced the consumer to enter into was excessively onesided in favor of the supplier, in violation of K.S.A. § 50-627(b)(5); c. The supplier made misleading statements of opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to the consumer's detriment, in violation of K.S.A. § 50- 627(b)(6); and d. The supplier excluded, modified or otherwise attempted to limit either the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or any remedy provided by law for a breach of those warranties, in violation of K.S.A. § 50-627(b)(7). 68. Plaintiffs are authorized to recover their actual damages and/or statutory damages in the amount of $10,000.00 per violation. K.S.A. §§ 50-634 and 50-636. 69. In this case, Plaintiffs’ actual damages include, but are not limited to, their emotional distress. 71. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 70 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 72. Defendants have been unjustly enriched by retaining moneys from the sales of Sealy mattresses that are defective in quality and workmanship. 73. Plaintiff and the other Class members have conferred benefits upon Defendants by purchasing Sealy mattress products. 74. Defendants have knowingly and willingly accepted these benefits from Plaintiff and the other Class members. 75. Under the circumstances, it is inequitable for Defendants to retain these benefits at the expense of Plaintiff and the other Class members. 76. Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense and detriment of Plaintiff and the other Class members by wrongfully collecting and retaining money to which Defendants, in equity, are not entitled. 77. Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants all amounts wrongfully collected and improperly retained by Defendants, plus interest thereon. 79. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 78 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein. 80. There is an actual controversy between Defendants, on the one hand, and Plaintiff and the other Class members, on the other hand, concerning the validity of Defendants’ asserted defenses whenever a stain is on a Sealy mattress, to otherwise valid warranty claims. 81. Pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2201, the Court may “declare the rights and legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 82. Defendants have wrongfully denied warranty claims based solely upon unjustifiable reasons, despite the root cause of the sagging or indentation being due to a defect in quality and workmanship of the mattress products. 84. Plaintiff further requests that this court declare: (a) That the warranty against failures in quality or workmanship is not voided by spills, burns, bent or broken border/grid wires, mattress or foundation damage due to abuse or abnormal use, damage due to use with inappropriate foundation, and damage due to bed frames that do not provide Continuous Support, unless such condition directly caused the covered warranty defect in quality or workmanship complained of by the consumer. 85. Plaintiff asks the Court to declare that a valid warranty claim for defects in quality or workmanship is not defeated simply because a separate condition exists in the mattress for which a warranty claim is not being made. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that a Rule 23(b)(2) Injunctive Relief Class and Subclass (as the classes are defined above) be certified with Plaintiff appointed as the Representative of both Classes, that the Court issue an injunction requiring Defendants to abide by the terms of the written warranty in the manner set forth above, that Defendants be financially responsible for notifying all Class members that their warranty is not void as against failures in quality or workmanship regardless of the condition of their mattress otherwise, that judgment be granted against Defendants in an amount that is fair and reasonable, together with prejudgment interest as provided by law, and that Plaintiff receives such other relief as the Court deems proper and just under the circumstances, including payment of costs and expenses in filing this suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

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34. Defendants are a service provider of refrigeration and HVAC systems for various customers throughout Southern California. � 5 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 56. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that the FLSA Class Members have also been denied overtime pay for hours worked over forty (40) per workweek. Plaintiff worked with other hourly-paid employees of Defendants, and as such, has personal knowledge of their existence, status as Defendants’ employees, hourly pay compensation scheme, and the overtime violations. 57. Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff worked for Defendants in a similar capacity and were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half their regular rate when those hours exceeded forty (40) hours per workweek. 58. Defendants have employed more than 50 such employees who worked in California during the last three years who were paid an hourly rate. 59. Such workers worked more than 40 hours per week during at least one week in the last three years. 60. Such workers were at times not compensated at all for work in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 61. Although Defendants permitted and/or required the FLSA Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendants have denied them any compensation for their hours worked over forty (40). 62. FLSA Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as Plaintiff. 63. FLSA Class Members regularly work or have worked in excess of forty (40) hours during a workweek. 64. All such service technicians are hourly-paid and are classified by Defendants as non-exempt. Moreover, all such service technicians are subject to the same payroll policies of failing to use the weighted average of all regular hourly rates applied to determine each service technician’s overtime rate. � 8 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 74. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 75. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the “California Class,” which is comprised of: All current and former non-exempt hourly paid service technicians who worked for Defendants in California at any time starting four years prior to the filing of this Complaint through the present. � 76. Numerosity. The number of members in the California Class is believed to exceed 50. This volume makes bringing the claims of each individual member of the class before this Court impracticable. Likewise, joining each individual member of the California Class as a plaintiff in this action is impracticable. Furthermore, the identity of the members of the California Class will be determined from Defendants’ records, as will the compensation paid to each of them. As such, a class action is a reasonable and practical means of resolving these claims. To require individual actions would prejudice the California Class and Defendants. 77. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the California Class because like the members of the California Class, Plaintiff was subject to Defendants’ uniform policies and practices and was compensated in the same manner as others in the California Class. Defendants failed to pay non-exempt employees overtime compensation for all of their hours worked, including overtime hours. All members of the California Class worked substantially more than eight (8) hours in a day and forty (40) hours in a week. Plaintiff and the California Class were paid at hourly rates below the correctly calculated overtime rate for hours worked over forty (40) in a workweek and over eight (8) in a work day. Plaintiff and the California Class have been uncompensated and/or under-compensated as a result of Defendants’ common policies and practices which failed to comply with California law. 78. Adequacy. Plaintiff is a representative party who will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the California Class because it is in his interest to effectively prosecute the claims herein alleged in order to obtain the unpaid wages and penalties required under California � 10 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 85. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 86. At all relevant times, Defendants has been, and continues to be, an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce, within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. At all relevant times, Defendants has employed and continues to employ, employees, including Plaintiff and the FLSA Class. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have had gross operating revenues in excess of $500,000. 87. The FLSA requires each covered employer such as Defendants to compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 88. Plaintiff and the FLSA Class were entitled to be paid overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked at the rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay. 89. At all relevant times, Defendants required Plaintiff and the FLSA Class to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. Despite the hours worked by them, Defendants willfully, in bad faith, and in knowing violation of the FLSA, failed and refused to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class the appropriate overtime wages for all compensable time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. By failing to compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Class at a rate of not less than one-and-a-half times the regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek, Defendants have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., � 13 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 96. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 97. At all relevant times, Defendants were required to compensate their non-exempt � 14 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Failure to Pay All Wages Upon Termination (California Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203, and 256) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class 112. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 113. California Labor Code § 201 provides that any discharged employee is entitled to all wages due at the time of discharge. � 17 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Failure to Pay Overtime (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA CLASS Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods (California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512 et. seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class 108. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 109. California Labor Code requires employers to provide a 30-minute net meal period if the employee works more than five hours per day. See Cal. Lab. Code § 512. The California Labor Code also requires employers to provide a 10-minute net rest period for each four-hour period worked, or major fraction thereof. 110. Defendants violated the meal and rest period laws by forcing Plaintiff and the members of the California Class to work through long hours without the required meal and rest periods. Specifically, Defendants refused to permit Plaintiff and the California Class to enjoy an uninterrupted 30 meal period when they worked more than 5 hours in a day. Defendants’ policy was to forbid Plaintiff and the California Class to eat on the job, instead any meals were required to be taken driving between jobs. That is, Plaintiffs were not fully relieved of all work-related duties for their required meal periods. 111. Plaintiff and the members of the California Class sue for all damages allowed under the law including payment of one additional hour of pay at the employees’ regular rate of pay for each such violation. See Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7. Failure to Pay Minimum Wage (California Labr Code §§ 1182.12, 1194, 1197, 1194.2, and 1198) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class 101. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. � 15 ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– Failure to Pay Overtime (California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class Unlawful and/or Unfair Competition Law Violations (California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et. seq.) On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class 117. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 118. California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. prohibits unfair competition in the form of any unlawful, unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business practices. 119. Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and as a representative of all others subject to Defendants’ unlawful acts and practices. 120. During all relevant times, Defendants committed unlawful, unfair, deceptive, and/ or fraudulent acts as defined by California Business & Professions Code § 17200. Defendants’ unlawful, unfair, deceptive, and/or fraudulent business practices include, without limitation, failing to pay overtime wages, failing to pay minimum wages, failing to provide and authorize � 18 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

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21. Plaintiff Jennifer Stephens does not have any credit cards associated with Defendant and has never provided Defendant with her cellular phone number. 22. However, despite having no account with Defendant, beginning in or around January 2017, Plaintiff Jennifer Stephens began receiving unsolicited phone calls from Defendant to her wireless phone, for which Plaintiff Jennifer Stephens provide no consent to call, attempting to collect on an alleged Victoria Secret debt owed by her adult daughter. 23. Among other unsolicited calls from Defendant, Plaintiff Jennifer Stephens has received calls on January 20, 2017 from the number 303-255-5000, January 26, 2017 from the number 208-635-7403, February 7, 2017 from an unknown number, February 10, 2017 from the number 855-334-4197 and on February 16, 2017 from the number 855-334-4197. These numbers are owned by Defendant. 24. When answered, during each of these calls there was prolonged silence and delays prior to being connected to a live representative. 25. Plaintiff requested that Defendant stop calling her on her cellular phone and that Defendant had the wrong number, however the calls continued. 26. Like Plaintiff Jennifer Stephens, Plaintiff Christopher Gulley does not have any credit cards associated with Defendant and has never provided Defendant with his cellular phone number. 37. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 38. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of the Class, consisting of all persons within the United States who: (1) received a telephone call from Defendant or its agents; (2) on his or her cellular telephone number; (3) through the use of any automatic telephone dialing systems or artificial or prerecorded voice system as set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(3); and (4) where Defendant has no record of prior express consent for such individual to make such call, within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint through the date of final approval. 39. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. 40. Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of members in the Class, but believe the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 41. Plaintiffs and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted Plaintiffs and the Class members via their cellular telephones by using unsolicited telephone calls, thereby causing Plaintiffs and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiffs and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiffs and the Class members. Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. 50. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 51. Each such telephone call described herein was made using equipment that, upon information and belief, had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator, and to dial such numbers. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to in effect make hundreds or thousands of phone calls simultaneously to lists of thousands of consumers’ wireless phone numbers without human intervention. 52. The foregoing acts and omissions by Defendant and its agents constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 53. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 54. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 60. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for herself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). 61. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 63. As a result of Defendant’s, and Defendant’s agents’, willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for themselves and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 64. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 65. Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ. VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 ET SEQ.

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14. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the foregoing paragraphs with the same force and effect as if fully set out in specific detail herein. 15. In May 2012, Hewlett-Packard [“HP”] launched what it termed a multi- year restructuring plan to “fuel innovation and enable investment”. As part of this strategy, HP announced that it expected “approximately 27,000 employees” to exit the company by fiscal year 2014. 16. The company proposed accomplishing this goal through the offering of “early retirement” packages. The “early retirement” program for U.S. employees would be based on whether the impacted individual's combined “age and years of service” exceeded certain levels. Attached to this pleading is a copy of the HP Workforce Reduction plan provided to Plaintiff Jackson. 19. In an SEC filing for dated May 22, 2014, Hewlett-Packard revised its previous job elimination estimate of 34,000, stating that the number would increase by 11,000 to 16,000. 20. In October 2014, Hewlett-Packard announced its intention to split into two public companies, Hewlett Packard Enterprise ("HPE") and HP, Inc. ("HPI"). 22. On October 31, 2015 and November 1, 2015, HP, Inc. and Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company formerly came into existence. 23. On November 1, 2015, Meg Whitman became Charmian of HP, Inc. and CEO of Hewlett Packard Enterprise. During a November 2, 2015, interview with CNBC's David Faber Ms. Whitman expressed the following when questioned about job cuts: Faber: Still with a quarter of a million people work the company, you did announce significant job cuts about a month or so ago, when you gave - - or maybe a bit more, six weeks—when you gave us more details. Is that going to be it for HPE? *** Whitman: That should be it. I mean, that will allow us to right size our enterprise services business to get the right onshore/offshore mix, to make sure that we have a labor pyramid with lots of young people coming in right out of college and graduate school and early in their careers. That's an important part of the future of the company. So, it should be the last that we see. And you know, this will take another couple of years and then we should be done. Plaintiff Enoh I. Enoh (Race and Age Claims) 25. After HP split into HPE and HPI in November 2015, Mr. Enoh's became an employee of HPE and his job title changed to that of Field Services Engineer. Despite receiving satisfactory evaluations for most of his career, Mr. Enoh was terminated by HPE on May 26, 2017. 26. Before his termination, Mr. Enoh was part of a 14-member team of Field Services Engineers. Of those 14 team members, three were African-American, and Mr. Enoh was the senior team member in terms years as an HP/HPE employee and chronological age. 27. At the time of his termination Mr. Enoh's performance ratings were the same or better than most members of his team, however they were retained. Mr. Enoh was informed that his separation was due to "restructuring," however to his knowledge he was the only individual on his team let go even though his performance was better or at least equal to his Caucasian and/or younger counterparts. 28. Furthermore, shortly before terminating Mr. Enoh, HPE hired 5 or 6 Caucasian and/or younger employees. Mr. Enoh was required to train and mentor some of these individuals. 30. The Defendants also discriminated against Mr. Enoh because of his age in that until the time of his termination he had been a model employee and should not have been subject to the workforce restructuring plan. 31. Mr. Enoh was subjected to a reduction in force of one as the majority of the employees retained were younger than him. Plaintiff Christopher Jackson's (Race and Age Claims) 32. Plaintiff Christopher Jackson ("Jackson") is a 52 year old African-American male. Mr. Jackson worked for Hewlett Packard from July 15, 1996 to July 18, 2016, with his last position being District Manager. 33. Up until 2015, Mr. Jackson had always received satisfactory performance evaluations and his career with HP had been exemplary. In 2014, Mr. Jackson became aware of the promotion of two Caucasian male employees, Mark Valan and Thomas Medforth. 35. In 2015, HP allowed Medforth to use an antiquated evaluative tool to measure the performance of District Managers. This evaluative tool was introduced mid-year and disproportionately graded as low the performance of African-American managers. 36. Based on this evaluative tool, Mr. Jackson was rated as “Partially Achieved” which means that he did not meet his performance goals for the rating period. In November 2015, Medforth was elevated as Manager for all District Managers. Mr. Jackson did not get a chance to compete for this position as his low rating of that same year precluded him from applying. Also, at this time, Mr. Jackson became an employee of HPI. 38. This caused the African-American managers to miss their production goals. On June 29, 2016, Mr. Jackson complained to HPI that he was being discriminated against because of his race. 39. On July 18, 2016, Mr. Jackson was informed that he was being terminated. Mr. Jackson was informed that his separation was due to “restructuring”, however, he was the only individual in his department let go even though his performance was better or at least equal to that of his Caucasian and/or younger counterparts. 40. Mr. Jackson personally observed that HP, HPE, and HPI has or had very few African-Americans in positions above the District Manager level. Plaintiff Derek L. Mobley's (Race Claims) 42. In November 2016, Mr. Mobley was part of a training class for Advanced Solutions Engineers. Mr. Mobley was the only member of his training class with a Server + Certification which was directly applicable to the job. This training class was made up of contract workers who were trying to gain permanent employment with HPE. 43. Upon entering this training program, Mr. Mobley and the other members of the training class were informed by HPE’s representatives that if their performance was satisfactory they would transition to full-time employment within 4 to 6 months. 44. Mr. Mobley's class was made up of approximately seventeen individuals, 14 African-Americans, two Caucasians, and one Turkish-American. Around April of 2017, HPE announced that they were instituting a hiring freeze. 45. Later in April 2017, Mr. Mobley learned that the only remaining Caucasian contract worker in the training class was hired as a full-time employee despite the alleged hiring freeze. 46. The other Caucasian contract worker had resigned. Mr. Mobley later inquired as to whether there were any other positions that had become "unfrozen" and was instructed to visit HPE’s website. 48. HPE in contravention of its own allegedly non-discriminatory hiring practices did not post all jobs and instead relied on a "tap on the shoulder" procedure whereby it awarded positions of higher pay and prestige to Caucasian employees. Plaintiff William Murrell’s (Race Claims) 49. Plaintiff Willaim Murrell is an African-American male. In 2000 or 2001, Mr. Murrell began working for HP as a contract employee. For the next 5 or 6 years, Mr. Murrell attempted to become a regular full-time employee of HP but was not successful until 2007. 50. Caucasian contract workers did not have wait this long before they became full-time employees with HP. Mr. Murrell is a resident of Atlanta, Georgia. Upon hiring on full-time with HP, Mr. Murrell's job title was Field Service Support Representative. 52. As Field Service Support Representative II, Mr. Murrell performed satisfactorily and received favorable performance reviews. He also served as a Senior Team Lead and in that role he was responsible for monitoring the day to day work of less senior team members. 53. Around January or February 2016, Mr. Murrell was informed by his manager, Christopher Jackson [African-American] that he was being considered for a merit promotion to the position of Customer Engineer III. [Doc.#30: ¶76]. 54. At that time, Mr. Murrell had been a Field Services Support Representative for approximately 9 years. Caucasian employees who started their careers at the same time as Mr. Murrell and that were in his peer group, have advanced much faster through the company to where they are now District Managers or in other positions of higher authority, prestige and pay. 55. On January 26, 2017, Thomas Medford [Caucasian male] announced the promotion of 17 individuals. Mr. Murrell was not selected for promotion and instead two Caucasian junior Team Leads [Bill Howell & Robert Brown] were. 77. Representative Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all applicable paragraphs above as part of this Count of the Complaint. 78. Defendants have discriminated against the Representative Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent with regards to selection procedures and other terms and conditions of employment because of their race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 79. Defendants’ conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful and conducted with disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class. 81. Representative Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all applicable paragraphs above as part of this Count of the Complaint. 82. The criteria utilized by Defendants in making selection decisions-to include promotions and lay-offs-discriminate on the basis of race in violation of §703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k). 83. Defendants allowed an overwhelmingly Caucasian group of selectors to use a company wide “Performance Evaluation” policy that allowed them to manipulate the selection process to the detriment of their African-American employees. 84. These processes disparately impacted African-American employees because they allow subjectivity and favoritism to influence employment decisions. Because of this, the decision-makers are free to exercise their discretion in an unguided, subjective manner that provides a ready mechanism for Caucasians to vent discriminatory feelings upon African-American employees. 86. As a direct result of Defendants’ discriminatory policies and/or practices as described above, Plaintiffs and the class they seek to represent have suffered damages including, but not limited to, lost past and future income, compensation, and benefits. 87. Representative Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all applicable paragraphs above as part of this Count of the Complaint. 88. This Claim is brought by the Representative Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the collective they seek to represent. Defendants engaged in an intentional, company-wide, and systematic policy, pattern, and/or practice of discrimination against employees ages 40 and older. 90. These company-wide policies are intended to and do have the effect of denying Plaintiffs and the collective of employment opportunities because of their age. The discriminatory acts that constitute Defendants’ pattern and/or practice of discrimination have occurred both within and outside the liability period in this case. 91. As a direct result of Defendants’ discriminatory policies and/or practices as described above, Plaintiffs and the collective have suffered damages including, but not limited to, lost past and future income, compensation, and benefits. 92. The foregoing conduct constitutes illegal, intentional discrimination and unjustified disparate treatment prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 93. Representative Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all applicable paragraphs above as part of this Count of the Complaint. 95. Specifically Defendants’ promotions and facially neutral lay-off policies have had a disparate impact on individuals over the age of 40. 96. Defendants have maintained these discriminatory policies, patterns, and/or practices both within and outside the liability period in this case. 97. As a direct result of the Defendants’ discriminatory policies and/or practices as described above, Plaintiffs and the collective they seek to represent have suffered damages including, but not limited to, lost past and future income, compensation, and benefits. COUNT ONE Intentional Discrimination on the Basis of Race in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Disparate Impact Discrimination on the Basis of Race In Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Disparate Impact Discrimination Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Intentional Discrimination Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

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25. On or about June 2015, Plaintiff was hired as a Co-Manager by Express to work for Defendant’s retail store in the Newport Centre Mall located at 30 Mall Dr W, Jersey City, NJ 07310 (“Newport Store”). 6 26. Plaintiff worked at the Newport Store from on or around June 2015 until on or around September 2016. 27. As a Co-Manager, Plaintiff was required to work five (5) days per week and generally worked around forty-two hours (42) per week. During the holiday season3 Plaintiff would work longer hours and the number of hours she worked each week would increase to around forty-five (45) hours. 28. Specifically, each work day Plaintiff would be assigned to work any of the following three shifts: (the opening shift) from 8:00 am until 6:00 pm, (the middle shift) from 11: 00 am to 8:00 pm, the (closing shift) from 2:00 pm to 12 am or 1:00 am. The specific five days of any given week Plaintiff would work varied, the weekly arrangement was subject to the store’s advance scheduling notice. Plaintiff had a thirty-minute break each day and thus worked at least forty-two and a half hours (42.50) each week. 29. Although hired as a Co-Manager, Plaintiff’s primary duties were largely unrelated to the management of the store and were not meaningfully different from the hourly associates. On a daily basis, Plaintiff primarily performed tasks including but not limited to: stocking and running merchandise, cleaning the store and the bathrooms, ringing the register, marking down the merchandise, store recovery, trash disposal, and folding clothes, taking care of customer services, take returns and exchange and other duties typically expected of hourly associates. 3 The holiday season generally runs a month long and starts from the time around Thanksgiving to the time around Christmas. 7 30. As a Co-Manager, Defendants assigned Plaintiff to open or close the store depending on her schedule. However, this responsibility was not exclusive to Co-Managers and Defendants sometimes also assigned opening and closing the store to hourly associates. 31. As a Co-Manager, Plaintiff did not have discretion about any decisions that were critical to the management and operation of Express. She lacked authority to change work shifts, alter store hours, change the layout of the store, set pay rates or prices, to maintain sales records. Each of these types of tasks were within the discretion of the Store Manager. Any decision she ever made had to make required Store Manager approval. 32. Plaintiff did not have the authority to hire, discipline or fire the hourly associates or make recommendations which were given particular weight by management in regard to those decisions. 33. Plaintiff was given detailed specific instruction each day by the Store Manager and did not have the discretion to deviate from these instructions in the performance of her duties. The performance of the duties she was assigned was controlled and dictated by Defendant’s policies and procedures. 34. At the time of her hire, District Manager Brian4 (“Brian”) told Plaintiff that she would receive an annual salary of $50,000 5 as a Co- Manager but she would also receive “Supplemental”6 if she ever had to work overtime. After their meeting, Brain sent Plaintiff a web link via e-mail for her to go to Express’s website to complete the necessary steps after hiring. Upon clicking the link, Plaintiff was directed to webpages on Express’s 4 Plaintiff does not recall his last name. 5 Plaintiff was also promised a one-time $5,000 “bonus” on the condition that she would stay with Express for at least a year. 6 Brain did not explain exactly what does “Supplemental” mean or how it would be calculated. 8 website that further informed her about work and pay. Specifically, one webpage contains details of her regular hourly pay rate and explicitly stated that, for hours she worked over forty, she would be compensated at 0.5 times her regular hourly rate. Plaintiff e-signed this webpage. 35. Despite of being classified as exempt salaried employee, Plaintiff was required to track the number of hours she worked and was paid the “Supplemental” for the hours she worked over 40 at a rate of 0.5 times her regular hourly rate. New York Employment Period 36. From on or about May 1999 to on or around May 2013, Plaintiff worked at different Express Stores in Manhattan, New York7 (the “New York Stores”). Plaintiff first worked as sales associate and then was promoted to be a Co-Manager in 2010. 37. In 2010, Plaintiff was notified via telephone by her Department Manager Richard Kim that the Reginal Manager Robin Summas and he agreed that Plaintiff would be promoted to be a Co-Manager. Upon the promotion, Plaintiff met with her store manager Latanya Spellman, who informed her that she will be salaried. Ms. Spellman gave Plaintiff two documents to sign, one telling her what her annual salary is, the other stating that she was promoted to be a Co-Manager and that she would be paid a salary plus the “Supplemental” for the hours she worked over 40 a week. The document did not specify what the term “Supplemental” meant, what it consists of, or how it would be calculated. Ms. Spellman told her verbally that she would be paid 0.5 times her hourly rate basing on her annual salary for hours she work over 40. 7 See Footnote 1. 9 38. Throughout her time as a Co-Manager at the New York stores, Plaintiff regularly worked five (5) days per week and generally worked sometime between forty –three (43) to forty- five (45) hours per week. During the holiday season8 Plaintiff would work longer hours and the number of hours she worked each week would increase to sometime between forty- five (45) to forty-nine (49) hours. 39. Plaintiff did not have a set work schedule when she worked as a Co-Manager at the New York Stores, she would receive the store’s scheduling notice one week in advance. 40. Similar to what she later experienced in the Newport Store, Plaintiff’s work at the New York stores were non-managerial in nature. Although hired as a Co-Manager, Plaintiff’s primary duties were largely unrelated to the management of the store and were not meaningfully different from the hourly associates. On a daily basis, Plaintiff primarily performed tasks including but not limited to: stocking and running merchandise, cleaning the store and the bathrooms, ringing the register, marking down the merchandise, store recovery, trash disposal, folding clothes, taking care of customer services, taking returns and exchanges, and other duties typically expected of hourly associates. Her job duties therefore did not differ greatly from her duties as sales associate. 41. Throughout her time worked at the New York Stores, Plaintiff received an annual salary at about $65,000 a year with performance-based bonus that tied to the sales of the store. 42. Despite of being misclassified as exempt salaried employee, Plaintiff was required to track the number of hours she worked and was paid, as the “Supplemental” for the hours she worked in excess of 40 at 0.5 times her regular hourly rate derived from her annual salary. 8 The holiday season generally runs a month long and starts from the time around Thanksgiving to the time around Christmas. 10 43. Defendant knowingly and willfully operated its business with a policy of not paying overtime premiums equal to one and a half times Plaintiff’s regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 44. Defendant knowingly and willfully operated its business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), the New Jersey overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the FLSA, NYLL and New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law and the supporting federal and state regulations. 45. Plaintiff brings FLSA claims on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated persons who have been or were classified as exempt from FLSA’s overtime pay provision and employed by Express as salaried Co-Manager who have worked in excess of 40 hours per week during any work week for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”), and whom failed to receive overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at time and one- half their regular hourly rate (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 46. During the relevant time, Plaintiff has been similarly situated to all Co-Managers of Defendant and has been subjected to illegal terms and conditions of employment, including failure and refusal to properly compensate Plaintiff and all similarly situated Co-Managers for overtime hours worked during their employment with Defendant. 47. Plaintiff’s claims under the FLSA herein are essentially the same as those of all Co- Managers in Defendant’s employment in that it is Defendant’s policy and practice to 11 schedule Co-Managers to work in excess of forty hours per week, without proper compensation of overtime pay. 48. Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than forty (40) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendant during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 50. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 51. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members 12 may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 52. Questions of law and fact common to members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the questions of fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendant employed Collective Action members within the meaning of the 56. Plaintiff brings NYLL and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law Claims, as set forth below, as a class action pursuant to FRCP Rule 23 on behalf of herself as well as on behalf of all Co- Managers who classified as exempt by Defendant in the State of New York and New Jersey. 57. Specifically, Plaintiff intends to represent individuals who have been or were misclassified as exempt from overtime pay provision under the NYLL and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and employed by Express as salaried Co-Manager who have worked in excess of 40 hours per week during any work week, and whom failed to receive proper overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at time and one- half their regular hourly rate (the “State Class Plaintiffs”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, in contravention to the NYLL and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law. 58. All questions relating to Defendant’s violation of the NYLL and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law share the questions of law and fact common to the State Class Plaintiffs which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendant employed Plaintiff and the Class within the meaning of the NYLL and New Jersey Wage and Hour law; 14 b. Whether Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and Class members as exempt from the NYLL and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law provisions; c. Whether Plaintiff and Class members properly paid at a rate of one-and-one-half times their regular rate for all hours they worked in excess of 40; e. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendant required to pay the Class members for their work. 59. A class action is superior to all other methods and is necessary in order to fairly and completely litigate the violations of the NYLL and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law that have occurred. 60. The list of putative class members included in Plaintiff’s NYLL and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law claims is readily discernible and ascertainable from Defendant. Notice of this class action can be offered by any means permissible under the FRCP Rule 23 requirements. 61. The case being brought as a class action has the public benefit of saving the Court time and effort by reducing a multitude of claims to a single litigation. Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members creates a risk for varying results based on identical fact patterns as well as disposition of the classes’ interests without their knowledge or contribution. 62. Because of the nature of wage and hour claims brought during the course of employment, class members are often fearful of filing claims against their employers and would benefit from Plaintiff’s willingness to proceed against Defendant. The anonymity inherent in a class action suit further provides safety against retaliation and/or undue stress and fear for the class members’ jobs and continued employment. 15 63. Class certification is appropriate because common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the class, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 64. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 65. At all times relevant to this action, the Defendant was Plaintiff and Collective Class Members’ employers within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203 (d). 66. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §206 (a) and 207 (a). 67. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were misclassified as exempt from overtime pay and failed to receive overtime compensation at the overtime premium for their overtime hours worked. 68. Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty per week at a wage rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay under 29 U.S.C. §206 (a), in the violation of 29 U.S.C. §207(a)(1). 69. Defendant’s violations of the FLSA as described in this Complaint have been willful and intentional. Defendant has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its compensation of Plaintiff. 16 70. Due to Defendant’s FLSA violations, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid overtime wages and an equal amount in the form of liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action, pursuant to the FLSA, specifically 29 U.S.C. §216(b), all in an amount to be determined at trial. 71. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 72. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and Class members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-56a1(h). 73. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was employers within the meaning of New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-56a1(g). 74. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were misclassified as exempt from overtime pay and failed to receive overtime compensation at the overtime premium for their overtime hours worked. 75. Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and Class members’ overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty per week at a wage rate of 1.5 times their regular rate of pay or, at a minimum, the minimum wage to which Plaintiff and Class members were entitled under New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-56a4 and 12:56. 76. Due to Defendants’ violations of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid minimum wages as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, pursuant to the New Jersey Wage and 17 Hour law, specifically New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-56a25, all in an amount to be determined at Trial. 77. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 78. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and Class members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-4.1. 79. At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was employer within the meaning of New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-4.1 80. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were misclassified as exempt from overtime pay and failed to receive overtime compensation at the overtime premium for their overtime hours worked. 81. Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and Class members’ wages that Plaintiff and Class members were entitled under New Jersey Wage Payment Law, in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-4.2 and 34:11-4.3. 82. Due to Defendant’s violations of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their full amount of wages due plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, as well as as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, pursuant to the New Jersey Wage Payment Law, specifically New Jersey Statutes Annotated 34:11-56.8, all in an amount to be determined at Trial. 18 83. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 84. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were employed by the Defendant within the meaning of the New York Labor Law, §§2 and 651. 85. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and Class members were misclassified as exempt from overtime pay and failed to receive overtime compensation at the overtime premium for their overtime hours worked. 86. Defendant willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights and the rights of the members of the Class by failing to pay them overtime compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek in violation of the New York Labor Law and its regulations. 87. The Defendant’s New York Labor Law violations have caused Plaintiff and the members of the Class irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. 88. Due to the Defendant’s New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid unpaid overtime compensation, damages for unreasonably delayed payment of wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of the action, pursuant to New York Labor Law § 663(1) et al. Prayer For Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated employees and the Class Plaintiffs respectfully requests that this court enter a judgment providing the following relief: a) A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under 19 the FLSA and the New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law; b) An injunction against Defendants and their officers, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them as provided by law, from engaging in each of unlawful practices and policies set forth herein; c) An award of unpaid overtime compensation due under FLSA and New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law; d) An award of liquidated and/or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ knowing and willful failure to pay overtime compensation pursuant to New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law; e) Back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, counsel fees, pre- judgment and post-judgment interest, Court costs and fees and such other relief as the Court may deem just and appropriate under the circumstances for violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination against H.C. International Inc. and Andrew Cai. f) An award of prejudgment and post-judgment fees; g) An award of costs and expenses of this action together with reasonable attorney’s and expert fees; h) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just, and proper. New Jersey Employment [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Claim Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New Jersey Wage Payment Law—Claim for Unpaid Overtime Wages] Plaintiff and On behalf of the New Jersey Class Members [Violation of New Jersey Wage and Hour Law—Claim for Overtime Wages] On behalf of the Plaintiff and the New Jersey Class Members [Violation of New York State Labor Law- Claim for Unpaid Overtime Wages] Plaintiff and on Behalf of All New York State Plaintiffs

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(BREACH OF CONTRACT) 17. In 2007, then President of the Republic of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, implemented the PEC program, which provided a non-income-based tuition subsidy to expatriate high school students enrolled in French government-approved French high schools outside of France. The PEC tuition grants were designed to promote the French educational system abroad and to encourage French expatriate students to attend French government-approved high schools when they resided outside of France. The PEC program fulfilled President Sarkozy’s campaign pledges to foster “free” French education for French citizens abroad, though eventually, in December 2009, tuition payments were capped at 2007/2008 levels. 18. The PEC program provided PEC tuition grants for approximately 8,000 French high school students each year, including Plaintiff’s daughter, Belle. Belle was a student at the French-American School of New York. 19. Plaintiff applied for a PEC tuition grant to pay for her daughter Belle’s tuition at the French-American School of New York for the academic year 2012/2013. On or about April 20, 2012, the French Consul General, Phillipe Lalliot, sent Plaintiff Martine Violet a letter advising her that her daughter Belle had been approved by the Local Commission for Financial Aid for a PEC award for the 2012/2013 academic year in the amount of $25,820. 20. The letter, written in French, states the following: 28. Plaintiff seeks to be appointed as the class representative of a Class composed of and defined as follows: All persons who, on or about April 20, 2012, were notified that they had been awarded PEC tuition grants by the French government for the 2012/2013 academic year to pay for tuition of their children at French government- approved French-American high schools in the United States and subsequently had those PEC tuition grants cancelled prior to the 2012/2013 academic year. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any Judge presiding over this matter and the members of his or her immediate family. Also excluded from this Class are the legal representatives, heirs, successors, and attorneys of any excluded person or entity, and any person acting on behalf of any excluded person or entity. 29. As to the above Class, this action is appropriately suited for class action treatment. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges, that the Class is sufficiently numerous – consisting of several thousand individuals -- such that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because joinder of all Class members is impractical. 31. The questions of law and fact common to the Class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including legal and factual issues relating to liability and available remedies. 32. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of Class members, and Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff was awarded a PEC tuition grant to pay for her daughter’s high school tuition by Defendants on or about April 20, 2012, and that grant was unilaterally cancelled by Defendants on or about July 5, 2012. Plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact as a result of Defendants’ conduct, as did all Class members who were similarly awarded PEC tuition grants by Defendants on or about April 20, 2012 and had those grants unilaterally cancelled by Defendants on or about July 5, 2012. 33. Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with and not antagonistic to those of the other Class members. Plaintiff is represented by counsel who is competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation. 35. On behalf of herself and the Class members, as defined in Paragraph 28 above, Plaintiff hereby realleges, and incorporates by reference as though set forth fully herein, the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 34 above. 37. Defendants’ actions described herein constitute breaches of their contracts between Defendants and Plaintiff and the other Class members. 38. Defendants’ breaches of contract, as set forth above, have caused Plaintiff and the other Class members to incur substantial monetary damages for which they seek recovery herein.

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20. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges, and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through nineteen (19) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 21. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class. 22. The class consists of all persons whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about March 5, 2014; and (a) the collection letter was sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt purportedly owed to Xchange Telecom; and (b) the collection letter was not returned by the postal service as undelivered; (c) and the Plaintiff asserts that the letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692f and 1692f(8) for using unfair and unconscionable means to collect on an alleged debt, and for sending collection letters to consumers, which reveal information, other than the Defendant’s name and/or address. 23. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. Based on the fact that a form collection letter is at the heart of this litigation, the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who received such collection letters (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. -5- D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 24. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 25. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 27. The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. -6- Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant. -4-

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[Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] 18. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 19. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of minimum wages, overtime pay, spread of hours pay, and failure to provide the required wage notice at the time of hiring would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 20. From November 10, 2015 until May 1, 2016 Plaintiff was hired by Defendants to work as a waitress for Defendants’ restaurant located at 1170 Wantagh Avenue, Wantagh, NY 11793. 21. Plaintiff worked five days per week with two days off on Wednesdays and Thursdays. Plaintiff worked from 11:00 a.m. until 10:30 p.m., or 11:00 p.m. if needed, on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Fridays. Plaintiff worked from 12:20 p.m. until 11:00 p.m. or 11:30 p.m., if needed, on Saturday. Sundays, Plaintiff worked from 12:20 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. or 10:30 p.m., if needed. Plaintiff received a break of one hour and a half each day except for Sundays. She was not allowed to take any break on Sundays. Plaintiff worked approximately fifty and a half (50.5) hours per week. 22. At all relevant periods of time, Plaintiff was paid a fixed month salary of $430 per month. 23. Plaintiff was a tipped employee and received approximately $120 per day in tips. 24. However, during all the relevant periods, Defendants have a policy and practice of unlawful deduction of tips and distributing tips to untipped workers. Specifically, Defendants 6 deducted a percentage of Plaintiff’s tips for to share with the staff in the Hibachi and Kitchen area. Plaintiff was a waitress in both of these sections. 25. Plaintiff was not required to utilize any means of recording or verifying the hours she worked (e.g. punch clock, sign-in sheet, fingerprint or ID scanner). 26. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for minimum wages or overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 27. Plaintiff was not compensated for New York’s “spread of hours” premium for shifts that lasted longer than ten (10) hours. 28. The applicable minimum wage for the period of December 31, 2014 to December 30, 2015 was $8.75 per hour. 29. The applicable minimum wage for the period of December 31, 2015 to the present is $9.00 per hour. 30. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice at the time of her hiring. 31. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 32. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of minimum wages, overtime and the “spread of hours” premium would economically injure Plaintiff and the Class Members by their violation of federal and state laws. 33. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiff was not exempt under federal and state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. 34. Plaintiff and the New York Class Members’ workdays frequently lasted longer than 10 hours. 7 35. Defendants did not pay Plaintiff and other Class members’ New York’s “spread of hours” premium for every day in which they worked over 10 hours. 36. Defendants did not post the required New York State Department of Labor posters regarding minimum wage pay rates, overtime pay and pay day. 37. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff and other Class members with written notices about the terms and conditions of their employment upon hire in relation to their rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime pay. These notices were similarly not provided upon Plaintiff’s and other Class members’ pay increase(s). 38. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective Plaintiff, and the Class. 39. On or about April 29, 2016, Defendant Tom Cheng witnessed Plaintiff vomiting. He became aware that this was due to Plaintiff’s pregnancy. 40. On May 1, 2016, Tom Cheng fired Plaintiff. 41. This termination was unlawful and discriminatory, as it was based on Plaintiff’s pregnancy. 42. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying either the FLSA minimum wage or the New York State minimum wage to Plaintiff or other similarly situated employees. 43. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the 8 FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 44. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying the New York State “spread of hours” premium to Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees. 45. Plaintiff brings this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants at their restaurant location for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and whom failed to receive minimum wages, spread-of-hours pay, and overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 46. Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than thirty (30) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and have retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of 9 employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 48. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 49. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 50. Questions of law and fact common to members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the questions of fact common to Plaintiff and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendants employed Collective Action members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members the minimum wage in violation of the FLSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder; 10 c. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members overtime wages for all hours worked above forty (40) each workweek in violation of the FLSA and the regulation promulgated thereunder; d. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members spread of hours payment for each day an employee worked over 10 hours; e. Whether the Defendants failed to provide the Collective Action Members with a wage notice at the time of hiring as required by the NYLL; f. Whether the Defendants’ violations of the FLSA are willful as that terms is used within the context of the FLSA; and, g. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 51. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 52. Plaintiff and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 53. Plaintiff brings their NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants at each of their three restaurant locations doing business as Mt. Fuji Sushi Hibachi on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 54. All said persons, including Plaintiff, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are 11 determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class Member is also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P 23. 55. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than thirty (30) members of the class. 56. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay minimum wage and overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 57. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in representing plaintiffs in both class action and wage and hour employment litigation cases. 12 58. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenses that numerous individual actions engender. The losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, thus the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Further, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 59. Upon information and belief, defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure 13 employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 60. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and Class members the New York minimum wage for all hours worked; c. Whether Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; d. Whether Defendants maintained a policy, pattern and/or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay as required by the NYLL; e. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiff and class members as required by the NYLL; f. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work 61. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 14 62. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce,” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(a) and §§207(a). Further, Plaintiff is covered within the meaning of FLSA, U.S.C. §§206(a) and 207(a). 63. At all relevant times, Defendants employed “employees” including Plaintiff, within the meaning of FLSA. 64. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 65. The FLSA provides that any employer engaged in commerce shall pay employees the applicable minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 66. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff, and the collective action members, for some or all of the hours they worked. 67. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §206 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 68. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by failing to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Class Members at the statutory minimum wage when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 69. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 70. At all relevant times, plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§2 and 651. 71. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay the minimum wage shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 72. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 73. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 74. The FLSA provides that no employer engaged in commerce shall employ a covered employee for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one- half times the regular rate at which he or she is employed, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, whichever is greater. 29 USC §207(a). 75. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 USC §216(b). 76. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 16 77. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and a half to Plaintiff and Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 78. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 79. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiff and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiff’s and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 80. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and Collective Class Members the statutory overtime rate of time and one half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiff and Collective Action members. 81. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 17 82. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 83. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 84. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class was not in good faith. 85. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 86. Plaintiff brings this Cause of Action pursuant to 29 U.S.C § 216(b) on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated persons, if any, who consent in writing to join this action. 87. The FLSA prohibits any arrangement between the employer and a tipped employee whereby any part of the tip received becomes the property of the employer. A tip is the sole property of the tipped employee. 88. Upon information and belief, Defendants did not allow Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to retain all the tips they earned. Rather, upon information and belief, Defendants unlawfully retained portions of the tips earned by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 89. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255. Defendants were aware or should have been aware that 18 the practices described in this Collective Action Complaint were unlawful. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to the compensation of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. 90. Because Defendants' violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255. 91. Due to Defendants' FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective, are entitled to recover from Defendants the tips that were unlawfully retained by the Defendants, an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages for Defendants' willful violations of the FLSA, together with interest, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and disbursements in connection with this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 91. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 92. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide written notice of the rate or rates of pay and the basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; allowances, if any, claimed as a part of minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular pay day designated by the employer; the name of the employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of 20 employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer. NYLL §195-1(a). 92. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 93. At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff were employed by some or all of the Defendants within the meaning of NYLL §§ 2 and 651. 93. Defendants intentionally failed to provide notice to employees in violation of New York Labor Law § 195, which requires all employers to provide written notice in the employee’s primary language about the terms and conditions of employment related to rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime on his or her first day of employment. 94. Defendants not only did not provide notice to each employee at Time of Hire, but failed to provide notice to each Plaintiff even after the fact. 94. NYLL § 196-d bars an employer from retaining “any part of a gratuity or of any charge purported to be gratuity [.]” 95. Defendants retained part of Plaintiff’s gratuities for unauthorized purpose in violation of NYLL § 196-d. 95. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, $50 for each workday that the violation occurred or continued to occur, up to $5,000, together with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law. N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-b). 96. Defendants retained part of Plaintiff’s gratuities and distributed them to tip- ineligible employees in violation of NYLL § 196-d. 96. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 97. Defendants’ retention of Plaintiff’s gratuities was willful. 19 97. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide detailed paystub information to employees every payday. NYLL §195-1(d). 98. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, damages in the amount of unlawfully retained gratuities and an amount equal to one quarter of their unlawfully retained gratuities in the form of liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, including pre-and post-judgment interest, pursuant to NYLL § 198. 98. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the New York Labor Law with respect to compensation of Plaintiff, and did not provide the paystub on or after Plaintiff’s payday. 99. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, $250 for each workday of the violation, up to 21 $5,000 for each Plaintiff together with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-d). 99. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 100. The NYLL requires employers to pay an extra hour’s pay for every day that an employee works an interval in excess of ten hours pursuant to NYLL §§190, et seq., and §§650, et seq., and New York State Department of Labor regulations §146-1.6. 101. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay was not in good faith. [Violation of New York Labor Law Unlawful —Retention Gratuities Under NYLL] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Time of Hire Wage Notice Requirement] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Minimum Wage] 15 [Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act — Improper Retention of Tips Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective] [Violation of Title VII for Discrimination Based on Pregnancy] 104. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 105. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to the individual’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s sex. 106. The PDA amended Title VII to include discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 107. Defendants violated Title VII by wrongfully terminating Plaintiff because of her pregnancy. 108. Plaintiff was still able to perform her job at the time of her termination. 109. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendant’s pregnancy discrimination, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer substantial monetary damages, including, but not limited to, loss of income, including past and future salary and non-monetary damages, including, but not limited to, emotional distress and suffering, all in amounts to be determined at trial. 110. Defendant’s discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff was willful and/or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s protected rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendant. [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of New York Labor Law—New York Pay Stub Requirement] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Spread of Time Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class] [Violation of NYCHRL for Unlawful Termination Based on Pregnancy] 22 111. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 112. The NYCHRL prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to the individual’s terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s sex. 113. Defendants violated NYCHRL by terminating Ms. Lin’s employment because of her pregnancy. 114. As a direct and proximate consequence of Defendants’ pregnancy discrimination, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer substantial monetary damages, including, but not limited to, loss of income, including past and future salary and non-monetary damages, including, but not limited to, emotional distress and suffering, all in amounts to be determined at trial. 115. Defendants’ discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff was willful and/or in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s protected rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive damages against defendant. Prayer For Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, and the FLSA collective plaintiffs and rule 23 class, respectfully requests that this court enter a judgment providing the following relief: a) Authorizing plaintiff at the earliest possible time to give notice of this collective action, or that the court issue such notice, to all persons who are presently, or have been employed by defendants as non-exempt tipped or non-tipped employees. Such notice 23 shall inform them that the civil notice has been filed, of the nature of the action, of their right to join this lawsuit if they believe they were denied proper hourly compensation and premium overtime wages; b) Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; c) Designation of Plaintiff as representatives of the Rule 23 Class, and counsel of record as Class counsel; d) Certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to FLSA; e) Issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the FLSA opt-in class, apprising them of the pendency of this action, and permitting them to assert timely FLSA claims and state claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and appointing Plaintiff and his counsel to represent the Collective Action Members; f) A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under FLSA and New York Labor Law; g) An injunction against Mt. Fuji Sushi Hibachi, its officers, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them as provided by law, from engaging in each of unlawful practices and policies set forth herein; h) An award of unpaid wages and minimum wages due Plaintiff and the Collective Action members under the FLSA and New York Labor Law, plus compensatory and liquidated damages in the amount of twenty five percent under NYLL §§190 et seq., §§650 et seq., and one hundred percent after April 9, 2011 under NY Wage Theft 24 Prevention Act, and interest; i) An award of unpaid overtime wages due under FLSA and New York Labor Law; j) An award of unpaid “spread of hours” premium due under the New York Labor Law; k) An award of unlawfully retained gratuities; l) An award of “spread of hours” premium due under the New York Labor Law; m) An award of damages for Defendants’ failure to provide wage notice at the time of hiring as required under the New York Labor Law. n) An award of liquidated and/or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ knowing and willful failure to pay overtime compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216; o) An award of liquidated and/ or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ willful failure to pay overtime compensation and “spread of hours” premium pursuant to New York Labor Law; p) An award of costs and expenses of this action together with reasonable attorneys’ and expert fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) and NYLL §§198 and 663; q) The cost and disbursements of this action; r) An award of prejudgment and post-judgment fees; s) Providing that if any amounts remain unpaid upon the expiration of ninety days following the issuance of judgment, or ninety days after expiration of the time to appeal and no appeal is then pending, whichever is later, the total amount of judgment shall automatically increase by fifteen percent, as required by NYLL §198(4); and t) Such other and further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just, and proper. 25

win

24. Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 25. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff a security program. 26. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s Application “Securitymaster,” which Defendant sends to promote its business. 27. Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 29. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 5971 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 5971 Number. 30. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016)(“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)). 31. The text messages originated from telephone number 273-67, a number which upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant. 32. The number used by Defendant (273-67) is known as a “short code,” a standard 5-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by an individual. 34. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. 35. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. 36. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. 37. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, advertising Defendant’s services, without the recipients’ prior express written consent. 38. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 41. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 42. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 47. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 49. “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)). 50. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below. 51. These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 52. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent. 53. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 54. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 56. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 57. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA. 58. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 59. As a result of Defendant’s violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 60. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 46 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 61. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 63. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 64. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 65. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 66. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

lose

40. This is a class action on behalf of all purchasers of Avon common stock during the Class Period (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families, and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which defendants have or had a controlling interest. 41. Common questions of law and fact predominate and include: (a) whether defendants violated the Exchange Act; (b) whether defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts; (c) whether defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that their statements were false; (d) whether defendants manipulated the market price of Avon common stock; (e) whether the price of Avon common stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period; and (f) the extent of and appropriate measure of damages. 43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 44. During the Class Period, defendants carried out a plan that was intended to, and did: (a) deceive the investing public, including plaintiff and the Class; and (b) artificially manipulate the price of Avon common stock. 45. Defendants: (a) employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading; and (c) engaged in acts, practices and a course of conduct that operated as a fraud and deceit upon purchasers of Avon common stock in violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Defendants are sued as primary participants in the wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein. 46. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal the adverse material information as specified herein. 47. Defendants’ liability arises from the fact that they developed and engaged in a scheme to manipulate the price of Avon common stock and were aware of the dissemination of information to the investing public that they knew or recklessly disregarded was materially false and misleading. 49. By virtue of the foregoing, defendants have violated §10(b) of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 50. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, plaintiff and members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and sales of Avon common stock during the Class Period. 51. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 52. The Individual Defendants had control over Avon and made the materially false and misleading statements and omissions on behalf of Avon within the meaning of §20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their executive positions, and their culpable participation, as alleged above, the Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did, directly or indirectly, influence and control the decision making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements that plaintiff contends were false and misleading. The Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to the Company’s internal reports, press releases, public filings and other statements alleged by plaintiff to be misleading prior to or shortly after these statements were issued, and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause them to be corrected. 54. By reason of such wrongful conduct, defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the Exchange Act. As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, plaintiff and the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company’s common stock during the Class Period. For Violation of §20(a) of the Exchange Act Against All Defendants For Violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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(Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17533.7 Against All Defendants) (Violation of Business & Prof. Code Section 17200 Et Seq. Against All Defendants) (Violation of California Consumers Legal Remedies Act Against All Defendants) 13. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the allegations contained in Paragaphs1 through 12, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 14. Defendants manufacture, market, and/or sell AGAG apparel products that have printed on the product itself and the product packaging that the products are “Made in U.S.A.” 15. Contrary to the representation, the AGAG apparel products are substantially and/or partially made, manufactured or produced with component parts that are manufactured outside of the United States. Based upon information and belief, the foreign component parts included in THE PROTÉGÉ jeans (and presumably all other offending AGAG apparel products) are the fabric, thread, buttons, rivets, and/or certain subcomponents of the zipper assembly. For other models of jeans, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the fabric, thread, buttons, rivets, and/or certain subcomponents of the zipper assembly are made outside of the United States as well. 4 25. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the allegations contained in Paragaphs1 through 24, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 26. Plaintiff brings this action, as set forth below, against Defendants, pursuant to Rules 23(a), 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”), individually and on behalf of a class consisting of all persons in the United States who purchased one or more of Defendants’ AGAG apparel products during the relevant four-year statutory time period that bore a “Made in U.S.A.” country of origin designation but that contained foreign-made component parts (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are the Court and its employees; Defendants; any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of Defendants; and all employees and directors who are or have been employed by Defendants during the relevant time period. Definition of the Subclass 27. Subclass members are all of Defendants’ California customers who purchased AGAG apparel products that were labeled as “MADE IN U.S.A. OF IMPORTED FABRIC” that contained foreign-made component parts beyond the 7 36. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the allegations contained in Paragaphs1 through 35, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 37. California Civil Code Section 1750 et seq. (entitled the Consumers Legal Remedies Act) provides a list of “unfair or deceptive” practices in a “transaction” relating to the sale of “goods” or “services” to a “consumer.” The Legislature’s intent in promulgating the Consumers Legal Remedies Act is expressed in Civil Code Section 1760, which provides, inter alia, that its terms are to be: [C]onstrued liberally and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection. 38. Defendant’s AGAG apparel products constituted “goods” as defined in Civil Code Section 1761(a). 10 47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the allegations contained in Paragaphs1 through 46, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 48. Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. provides that unfair competition means and includes “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading marketing.” 49. By and through their conduct, including the conduct detailed above, Defendants engaged in activities which constitute unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices prohibited by Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. Beginning at an exact date unknown as yet and continuing up through the present, Defendants committed acts of unfair competition, including those described above, by engaging in a pattern of “unlawful” business practices, within the meaning of Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq., by manufacturing, distributing, marketing AGAG apparel products with a false country of origin designation and violating Section 17533.7 by falsely claiming that the products referenced herein are “Made in U.S.A.” when they actually contain component parts manufactured outside of the United States. 50. Beginning at an exact date unknown as yet and continuing up through the present, Defendants committed acts of unfair competition that are prohibited 12 61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the allegations contained in Paragaphs1 through 60, inclusive, of this complaint as though fully set forth herein. 62. Business & Professions Code Section 17533.7 provides: It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association to sell or offer for sale in this State any merchandise on which merchandise or on its container there appears the words "Made in U.S.A." "Made in America," "U.S.A.," or similar words when the merchandise or any article, unit, or part thereof, has been entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced outside of the United States. (emphasis added). 63. Defendants (both AGAG and Nordstrom) Business & Professions Code Section 17533.7 by selling and offering to sell merchandise in the State of California with the “Made in U.S.A.” country of origin designation as fully set forth herein. The merchandise at issue in this case actually contains component parts that are manufactured outside of the United States in violation of California and federal law. 64. It is alleged on information and belief that Defendants’ violations of Business & Professions Code Section 17533.7 were done with awareness of the fact that the conduct alleged was wrongful and were motivated solely for increased profit. It is also alleged on information and belief that Defendants did 15

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a Resort and Casino that operates MONTICELLO GAMING Resort and Casino as well as the MONTICELLO GAMING website, offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. 22. Defendant operates MONTICELLO GAMING (its “Casino”) in New York, at 204 NY-17B, Monticello, NY 12701. 23. Its Casinos constitute places of public accommodation. Defendant’s Casinos provide to the public important goods and services. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services including Casino locations and hours, access to its Player Login online portal, information pertaining to its hotel, spa and casino, including information on the various slot machines and gaming platforms it offers at its physical locations, and related goods and services. 25. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Casinos. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Casinos and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 26. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 30. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Casinos on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting the locations to take advantage of the goods and services that it provides to the public. 32. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 34. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. Because Defendant’s Website have never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that this permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 49. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 51. Defendant’s Casinos are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Casinos. The Website is a service that is integrated with these locations. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 56. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 57. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 59. Defendant’s physical locations are located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 60. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 66. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 68. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 71. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 72. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 78. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 83. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 84. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 93. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 99. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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11. On or about January 4, 2019, ARS mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an alleged debt owed to “VELOCITY INVESTMENT LLC,” with an “Original Creditor” listed as “PROSPER FUNDING LLC.” A copy of the letter is attached to this complaint as Exhibit A. 12. Upon information and belief, the alleged debt referenced by Exhibit A was the result of a short-term, unsecured consumer loan, the proceeds of which were used only for personal, family, and household purposes. 13. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer, and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer. 15. Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is the first written communication ARS mailed to Plaintiff regarding the alleged debt referenced in Exhibit A. 16. Exhibit A includes the following representation which largely reflects the statutory validation notice that the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, requires the debt collector mail the alleged debtor along with, or within five days of, the initial communication: 17. Exhibit A also includes the following statements: 18. On the face of Exhibit A, the unsophisticated consumer would understand such language to be a threat that litigation would be commenced immediately if ARS and/or velocity did not receive payment as demanded by the letter. 19. Exhibit A repeatedly emphasizes the immediacy of the threat of litigation by stating that the creditor of Plaintiff’s alleged debt is actively preparing to refer his account to an attorney “[a]t this time,” and that the “establish[ment] of a satisfactory resolution” of his account is the only means by which to avoid the referral of his account to a law firm “at this time.” 20. Exhibit A further conveys the immanency of legal action by referencing a specific law firm, “GURSTEL STALOCH & CHARGO P.A.” 22. Upon information and belief, ARS and/or the creditor of Plaintiff’s alleged debt had no definite intentions to refer Plaintiffs account to “GURSTEL STALOCH & CHARGO P.A.” or any other attorney at any point as of the date of Exhibit A. 23. As of December 27, 2019, no legal action has been brought against Plaintiff with respect to his alleged debt owed to “VELOCITY INVESTMENT LLC.” 24. Upon information and belief, the sole purpose of including the above referenced language in Exhibit A is to impart upon the unsophisticated consumer a sense of urgency based on false pretenses and to discourage the consumer for exercising their rights to dispute and request verification of their alleged debts. 25. Although Exhibit A includes the validation notice required under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, the letter does not explain how Plaintiff’s rights to dispute and request verification of the alleged debt “fit together” with the letter’s threat to refer the debt to “GURSTEL, STALOCH & CHARGO, or an associated law firm in your state.” See, e.g., Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997). 26. Exhibit A overshadows the validation notice. 27. Plaintiff was confused and misled by Exhibit A. 28. The unsophisticated consumer would be confused and misled by Exhibit A. The FDCPA 30. Moreover, Congress has explicitly described the FDCPA as regulating “abusive practices” in debt collection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a) – 1692(e). Any person who receives a debt collection letter containing a violation of the FDCPA is a victim of abusive practices. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”). 32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) specifically prohibits the “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.” 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 37. The Wisconsin Consumer Act (“WCA”) was enacted to protect consumers against unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable business practices and to encourage development of fair and economically sound practices in consumer transactions. Wis. Stat. § 421.102(2). 39. To further these goals, the Act’s protections must be “liberally construed and applied.” Wis. Stat. § 421.102(1); see also § 425.301. 40. “The basic purpose of the remedies set forth in Chapter 425, Stats., is to induce compliance with the WCA and thereby promote its underlying objectives.” First Wisconsin Nat’l Bank v. Nicolaou, 113 Wis. 2d 524, 533, 335 N.W.2d 390 (1983). Thus, private actions under the WCA are designed to both benefit consumers whose rights have been violated and also competitors of the violators, whose competitive advantage should not be diminished because of their compliance with the law. 41. To carry out this intent, the WCA provides Wisconsin consumers with an array of protections and legal remedies. The Act contains significant and sweeping restrictions on the activities of those attempting to collect debts. See Wis. Stats. § 427.104. 42. The Act limits the amounts and types of additional fees that may be charged to consumers in conjunction with transactions. Wis. Stats. § 422.202(1). The Act also provides injured consumers with causes of action for class-wide statutory and actual damages and injunctive remedies against defendants on behalf of all customers who suffer similar injuries. See Wis. Stats. §§ 426.110(1); § 426.110(4)(e). Finally, “a customer may not waive or agree to forego rights or benefits under [the Act].” Wis. Stat. § 421.106(1). 44. Further, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that WCA claims relating to debt collection are to be analyzed under the “unsophisticated consumer” standard. Brunton v. Nuvell Credit Corp., 785 N.W.2d 302, 314-15. In Brunton, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly adopted and followed the “unsophisticated consumer” standard, citing and discussing Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994). Id. 45. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(g) states that a debt collector may not: "Communicate with the customer or a person related to the customer with such frequency of at such unusual hours or in such a manner as can reasonably be expected to threaten or harass the customer." 46. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(h) states that a debt collector may not: "Engage in other conduct . . . in such a manner as can reasonably be expected to threaten or harass the customer.” 47. The Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions, which is tasked with regulating licensed collection agencies, has found that "conduct which violates the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act" can reasonably be expected to threaten or harass the customer. See Wis. Admin. Code DFI-Bkg 74.16(9) ("Oppressive and deceptive practices prohibited."). 48. Wis. Stat. § 427.104(1)(L) states that a debt collector may not: “Threaten action against the customer unless like action is taken in regular course or is intended with respect to the particular debt.” 49. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 51. ARS and/or the creditor of Plaintiff’s alleged debt had no definite intentions to refer Plaintiffs account to “GURSTEL STALOCH & CHARGO P.A.” or any other attorney at any point as of the date of Exhibit A. 52. By stating: “If you contact our office and establish a satisfactory resolution your creditor will not refer your account to GURSTEL STALOCH & CHARGO P.A., or an associated law firm in your state, for review at this time,” Exhibit A overshadows the validation notice. 53. Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(5), 1692e(10), and 1692g(b). 54. Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 55. By stating: “If you contact our office and establish a satisfactory resolution your creditor will not refer your account to GURSTE STALOCH & CHARGO P.A., or an associated law firm in your state, for review at this time,” Exhibit A threatens action against Plaintiff which ARS and/or the creditor of Plaintiff’s alleged debt do not intend to take with respect to Plaintiff’s alleged debt. 56. Exhibit A violates the FDCPA. 57. ARS is licensed as a “Collection Agency” pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 218.04 and Wis. Admin. Code Ch. DFI-Bkg 74. 58. Defendant violated Wis. Stat. §§ 427.104(g), 427.104(h), and 427.104(L). 60. The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class. 61. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members. The predominant common question is whether the Defendants complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 1692e(10), and 1692g. 62. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members. All are based on the same factual and legal theories. 63. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in consumer credit and debt collection abuse cases. 64. A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute. Individual cases are not economically feasible.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is an online marketplace, and operates www.overstock.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant’s Website provides consumers with access to an array of goods and services, including the ability to browse products for delivery, including available products such as clothing and shoes, find information on promotions, as well as related goods and services available online. 24. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 25. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 26. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in December 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website, by being unable to learn more information, the ability to browse available products such as clothing and shoes available for delivery, find information on promotions, and related goods and services available online. 28. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 29. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those available products such as clothing and shoes available for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 30. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 31. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 33. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 34. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 36. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 37. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 38. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 39. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 54. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 58. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 59. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 63. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 64. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 65. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 67. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 68. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 69. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 70. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 71. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 72. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 74. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 75. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 76. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 77. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 79. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 81. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 82. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 83. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 85. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 86. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 92. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 93. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 94. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 96. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 97. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the products, services and facilities of its Website, which Defendant owns, operations and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 98. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW

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12. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the class defined as follows: all past and current employees of defendant FCA who were dues paying members of the UAW impacted by the illegal, improper, and collusive conduct of FCA and the UAW in violation of the LMRA. 13. The members of the class are so numerous that joinder is impractical, if not impossible. 14. The members of the class can be identified easily through a review of the business records of FCA and the UAW. 15. There are common questions of fact and law affecting all class members that arise as a result of the allegations in this complaint. 17. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed class as they are injured employees of FCA and injured members of the UAW. 18. A class action is a superior method of resolution to the other available methods for a fair, efficient, and just resolution of this controversy. 19. The expense and burden of individual litigation are impediments to class members’ seeking relief for the wrongful conduct alleged. 20. This action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because common questions of fact and law predominate over questions affecting only individual class members (individual questions focus almost exclusively on the amount of damages owed in the form of dues paid by the class members, and other compensation, including compensatory damages, punitive damages, and interest). 21. The amount in controversy with respect to each individual member of the class is relatively modest when compared to the costly prosecution of separate actions. 66. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. 67. FCA unlawfully paid bribes to executives of the UAW to take FCA- friendly positions during collecting bargaining negotiations, including those in 2011 and 2015. 69. FCA, through the acts of its designated agents, who included officers, directors, senior managers, and executives, knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. 70. Members of the conspiracy made prohibited payments with the intention of impermissibly influencing the collective bargaining process. 71. The prohibited payments did impermissibly influence the collective bargaining process by allowing FCA to obtain company-friendly concessions from the UAW during the collective bargaining process. 72. The prohibited payments caused at least one designated agent of the UAW, a co-conspirator with FCA, to direct and/or impermissibly influence the decision of the UAW Executive Board to expend billions of dollars in the non- arm’s length purchase of an equity interest in FCA. 73. As a result of FCA’s violation of the LMRA, plaintiffs and other class members have been harmed in that potentially hundreds of millions of dollars of their dues paid to the UAW for the purposes of good-faith negotiations have instead been spent on tainted and/or illegal collective bargaining negotiations. 75. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference. 76. The UAW engaged in willfully requesting, receiving, accepting, and agreeing to receive and accept, money and things of value from persons acting in the interest of FCA. 77. The UAW gave authority to its designated agents, including Holiefield and King, among others, to represent its members who were employees of FCA. 78. The UAW had an obligation to serve the interests of all members without favoritism to the company, and/or without favoritism or hostility to any members, to exercise its representational discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. 79. The UAW breached its duty to its membership, by acting based upon the improper motivation of FCA’s bribery, and the UAW’s requesting and receiving prohibited payments and things of value. 80. The UAW’s representation of its membership was arbitrary, perfunctory, or inexcusably neglectful. 82. By its involvement in the FCA/UAW conspiracy, the UAW, through its designated agents, lacked a rational basis for decision-making when it chose to expend millions of dollars of its members’ dues in the tainted bargaining process. 83. By its involvement in the conspiracy, the UAW, through its designated agents, lacked a rational basis for decision making and acted egregiously neglectful when it expended billions of dollars of its membership’s dues on a non-arm’s length purchase of an equity interest in FCA. 84. By the multiple UAW actors in the FCA conspiracy, the UAW failed in its duty to investigate the actions of its designated agents, to the detriment of its members’ rights, and to the expense of its membership through hundreds of millions of dollars of dues having been wasted on tainted bargaining. BREACH OF THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION UNDER THE LMRA VIOLATION OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

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(Failure to Furnish Accurate Wage Statements in Violation of NYLL §195) (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage in Violation of 29 U.S.C. §206) (Failure to Pay Overtime in Violation of 29 U.S.C. §207) (Failure to Pay NYLL “Call-in Pay” 12 NYCRR §142-2.3) (Failure to Pay Overtime in Violation of NYLL §650 et seq. and 12 NYCRR §142-2.2) (Failure to Pay Minimum Wage in Violation of NYLL §650 et seq.) (Failure to Pay Wages for All Hours Worked in Violation of NYLL §191) 12. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class have worked for Defendants as Ad-Hoc Interviewers. 13. The primary job duty of an Ad-Hoc Interviewer is to make telephone calls to members of the general public in order to conduct surveys and gather consumer information on behalf of third party clients. 14. As a condition of employment, Defendants require all Ad-Hoc Interviewers to participate in approximately 18 hours of training before they are able to begin working for Defendants. However, Ad-Hoc Interviewers are not compensated at all for any of this time spent training. 15. After undergoing these 18 hours worth of uncompensated training, Ad-Hoc Interviewers are paid on an hourly basis, and generally base paid at the minimum wage rate. 16. Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class have routinely worked more than 40 hours a week, and up to 50 hours a week. 17. Defendants determine the amount of hours to compensate Plaintiffs, the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class based on the amount of hours that they are logged into their work computers. 5  18. However, Defendants routinely fail to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class for all of their hours worked. For examples, Defendants fail to compensate Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class for time spent while they must wait for a seat assignment, which often takes as much as 45 minutes, or while waiting to log into their computers if the computers are malfunctioning and/or are disabled from logging in to them, which routinely takes more than 15 minutes. 19. As a result, Ad-Hoc Interviewers, who are ready and waiting to work, are not compensated for time spent waiting for seat assignments or waiting to log into their computers while malfunctions are resolved, nor is this time accounted for when determining whether Ad- Hoc Interviewers have worked in excess of 40 hours per week, or when determining their overtime wages. 20. In addition, Defendants dock the wages of Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class members for taking breaks of less than twenty (20) minutes. 21. Furthermore, Defendants disproportionately “round up” the amount of time that Ad-Hoc Interviewer take for breaks. For example, if an Ad-Hoc Interviewer arrives one (1) minute late following a ten (10) minute break, Defendants dock fifteen (15) minutes of compensable time from their pay, and when an Ad-Hoc Interviewer arrives more than five (5) minutes late following a ten (10) minute break, Defendants dock thirty (30) minutes of compensable time from their pay. 22. Thus, on a daily basis, Defendants have and continue to unlawfully dock compensable time from Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class members for a slew of reasons, and have failed to include this compensable time when determining whether Plaintiffs worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 6  23. In addition to receiving a base hourly wage, Ad-Hoc Interviewers are also paid a non-discretionary bonus for certain client projects labeled as “production jobs” when they achieve a pre-determined production level. 24. Defendants, however, do not include these non-discretionary bonuses when determining the regular rate of pay of Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class for the purpose of calculating their overtime pay, and as result, Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective and NYLL Class their lawfully entitled overtime wages. 25. Furthermore, Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiffs and members of the NYLL Class their proper “call-in” pay as required under New York law. 26. Specifically, Defendants were required to pay Plaintiffs and members of the NYLL Class who, by request or permission of Defendants, reported for duty on any day, whether or not assigned to work, at the applicable wage rate for at least four hours for one shift, or the number of hours in the regularly scheduled shift, whichever is less at the basic minimum hourly wage. 27. However, Defendants regularly caused Plaintiffs and members of the NYLL Class to report to work only to find themselves told to return home without “call-in” pay, in violation of the New York Minimum Wage Order for Miscellaneous Industries and Occupations §142-2.3 and the NYLL. 28. Further, as a result of the foregoing conduct, Defendants have failed to provide accurate wage statements to Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class, in violation of NYLL §195. 29. Plaintiffs bring their FLSA claims as a collective action pursuant to the FLSA on 7  behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly-situated persons who were/are employed by Defendants as Ad-Hoc Interviewers and/or in a similar position who were/are not paid the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime at a rate of one and one- half time their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week during the FLSA Collective Period. 30. The basic job duties of the FLSA Collective were/are the same as or substantially similar to those of Plaintiffs, and the FLSA Collective were/are paid in the same manner and under the same common policies, plans and practices as Plaintiffs. 31. The FLSA Collective, like Plaintiffs, have all been subject to the same unlawful policies, plans and practices of Defendants, including failing to pay the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 32. During the FLSA Collective Period, Defendants were fully aware of the duties performed by Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective, and that those duties were not exempt from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA. 33. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein, Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. §206 by not paying the FLSA Collective and Plaintiffs the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked. 34. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein, Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. §207 by not paying the FLSA Collective and Plaintiffs overtime at a rate of one and one- half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 8  35. Defendants’ violations of the aforementioned statutes were willful, repeated, knowing, intentional and without a good faith basis, and significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 36. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective for the full amount of their unpaid minimum and overtime wages, plus additional equal amounts as liquidated damages, plus the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective. 37. While the exact number of the FLSA Collective is unknown to Plaintiffs at the present time, upon information and belief, there are at least 1,000 other similarly-situated persons who were/are employed by Defendants as Ad-Hoc Interviewers and/or in a similar position during the FLSA Collective Period. 38. Plaintiffs are currently unaware of the identities of the FLSA Collective. Accordingly, Defendants should be required to provide Plaintiffs with a list of all persons employed by Defendants as Ad-Hoc Interviewers and/or in a similar position during the FLSA Collective Period, along with their last known addresses, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses so Plaintiffs can give the FLSA Collective notice of this action and an opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to participate in it. 39. Plaintiffs bring their NYLL claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all other similarly-situated persons who were/are employed by Defendants as Ad-Hoc Interviewers and/or in a similar position who were/are not paid the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked, overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, 9  straight-time wages for all hours worked, “call-in” pay and those who were not provided with accurate wage statement by Defendants. 40. The basic job duties of the NYLL Class were/are the same as or substantially similar to those of Plaintiffs, and the NYLL Class were/are paid in the same manner and under the same common policies, plans and practices as Plaintiffs. 41. The NYLL Class, like Plaintiffs, all have been subject to the same unlawful policies, plans and practices of Defendants, including not paying the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked, overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, straight-time wages for all hours worked, “call-in” pay and not being provided accurate wage statements by Defendants. 42. During the NYLL Class Period, Defendants were fully aware of the duties performed by Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class, and that those duties were not exempt from the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the NYLL and/or its regulations. 43. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein, Defendants violated the NYLL and/or its regulations by not paying the NYLL Class and Plaintiffs the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked, overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, straight-time wages for all hours worked, “call-in” pay and by not providing them with accurate wage statements. 44. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and/or its regulations were willful, repeated, knowing, intentional and without a good faith basis, and significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class. 10  45. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class for the full amount of their unpaid minimum, overtime and straight-time wages, “call-in” pay, statutory penalties for failing to provide accurate wage statements, plus an additional amount as liquidated damages, plus the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class. 46. Certification of the NYLL Class’s claims as a class action is the most efficient and economical means of resolving the questions of law and fact common to Plaintiffs’ claims and the claims of the NYLL Class. Plaintiffs have standing to seek such relief because of the adverse effect that Defendants’ unlawful compensation policies and practices have had on them individually and on members of the NYLL Class. Without class certification, the same evidence and issues would be subject to re-litigation in a multitude of individual lawsuits with an attendant risk of inconsistent adjudications and conflicting obligations. Certification of the NYLL Class is the most efficient and judicious means of presenting the evidence and argument necessary to resolve such questions for Plaintiffs, the NYLL Class and Defendants. 47. Plaintiffs’ claims raise questions of law and fact common to the NYLL Class. Among these questions are: (a) Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked during the NYLL Class Period; (b) Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week during the NYLL Class Period; (c) Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class straight-time wages for all hours worked during the NYLL Class Period; (d) Whether Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class with accurate wage statemnts during the NYLL Class Period; 11  (e) Whether Defendants’ failure to pay the prevailing minimum wage to Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class constitutes a violation of NYLL §650 et seq.; (f) Whether Defendants’ failure to pay overtime to Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class constitutes a violation of NYLL §650 et seq. and 12 NYCRR §142.2-2; (g) Whether Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class straight-time wages constitutes a violation of NYLL §191; (h) Whether Defendants paid Plaintiff and the NYLL Class members “call-in” pay; (i) Whether Defendants’ failure to provide Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class with accurate wage statements constitutes a violation of NYLL §195; and (j) Whether Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and/or its regulations were willful. 52. These common questions of law and fact arise from the same course of events and each class member will make similar legal and factual arguments to prove Defendants’ liability. 53. Plaintiffs are members of the NYLL Class that they seek to represent. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the NYLL Class. The relief Plaintiffs seek for the unlawful policies and practices complained of herein are also typical of the relief which is sought on behalf of the NYLL Class. 54. Plaintiffs’ interests are co-extensive with those of the NYLL Class that they seek to represent in this case. Plaintiffs are willing and able to represent the NYLL Class fairly and to vigorously pursue their similar individual claims in this action. Plaintiffs have retained counsel who are qualified and experienced in employment class action litigation, and who are able to meet the time and fiscal demands necessary to litigate a class action of this size and complexity. The combined interests, experience and resources of Plaintiffs and their counsel to litigate the individual and NYLL Class claims at issue in this case satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 12  55. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the NYLL Class, making final injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the NYLL Class as a whole. 56. Injunctive and declaratory relief are the predominant relief sought in this case because they are the culmination of the proof of Defendants’ individual and class-wide liability and the essential predicate for Plaintiffs’ and the NYLL Class’ entitlement to monetary and non- monetary remedies to be determined at a later stages of the proceedings. 57. The common issues of fact and law affecting Plaintiffs’ claims and those of the NYLL Class members, including the common issues identified above, predominate over any issues affecting only individual claims. 58. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims and the claims of the NYLL Class. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 59. The cost of proving Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor regulations makes it impracticable for Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class to pursue their claims individually. Maintenance of a class action promotes judicial economy by consolidating a large class of plaintiffs litigating identical claims. The claims of the NYLL Class interrelate such that the interests of the members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Additionally, the questions of law and fact common to the NYLL Class arise from the same course of events and each class member makes similar legal and factual arguments to prove the Defendants’ liability. 13  60. The NYLL Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number of the NYLL Class is unknown to Plaintiffs at the present time, upon information and belief, there are at least 1,000 other similarly-situated persons who were/are employed by Defendants as Ad-Hoc Interviewers and/or in a similar position and during the NYLL Class Period. 61. Plaintiffs are currently unaware of the identities of the members of the NYLL Class. Accordingly, Defendants should be required to provide Plaintiffs with a list of all persons employed by Defendants as Ad-Hoc Interviewers and/or in similar positions during the NYLL Class Period, along with their last known addresses, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses so Plaintiffs can give the NYLL Class notice of this action and an opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to participate in it. 62. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective, reallege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 63. The FLSA requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to pay all non- exempt employees the prevailing minimum wage for all hours worked. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them the prevailing minimum wage under the FLSA. 64. During the FLSA Collective Period, Defendants however, did not always pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective at the prevailing minimum wage rate for all hours worked because they, inter alia, failed to compensate them for time spent training, and failed to count all of the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective, causing Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to perform a substantial amount of off-the-clock work. 14  65. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective the prevailing minimum wage rate for all hours worked, Defendants violated the FLSA. 66. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the FLSA. 67. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA has significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and entitles them to recover the total amount of their unpaid minimum wages, an additional equal amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the FLSA Collective, reallege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 69. The FLSA requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to pay all non- exempt employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them overtime under the FLSA. 70. During the FLSA Collective Period, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective worked more than 40 hours in a workweek. However, Defendants did not always pay them overtime for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours per week because they, inter alia, did not count all of the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective, causing Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to perform a substantial amount of off-the-clock work, and thus failing to compensate them for all overtime hours worked. 71. Furthermore, when Defendants did pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants did not pay them one and one-half times their regular rate of pay because they, inter alia, did not include the non-discretionary bonuses they earned when determining their regular rate of pay. 15  72. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective overtime at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants violated the FLSA. 73. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the FLSA. 74. Defendants’ violations of the FLSA has significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective and entitles them to recover the total amount of their unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 75. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the NYLL Class, reallege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 76. The NYLL requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to pay all non- exempt employees the prevailing minimum wage rate for all hours worked. Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them the prevailing minimum wage under the NYLL. 77. During the NYLL Class Period, however, Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class the prevailing minimum wage rate for all hours worked because they, inter alia, did not compensate them for time spent training, and failed to count all of the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class, causing Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to perform substantial off-the-clock work. 78. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class the prevailing minimum wage rate for all hours, Defendants violated the NYLL. 79. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the NYLL. 16  80. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL have significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class and entitles them to recover the total amount of their unpaid minimum wages, an additional amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the NYLL Class, reallege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 82. The NYLL and 12 NYCRR §142-2.2 require a covered employer, such as Defendants, to pay employees overtime at a rate of one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay in the manner and methods provided in the FLSA. Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them overtime under the NYLL and/or its regulations. 83. During the NYLL Class Period, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class worked above 40 hours in a workweek. However, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class overtime wages for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours per week because they, inter alia, failed to count all of the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class, causing Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to perform a substantial amount of off-the-clock work, and thus failing to compensate them for all overtime hours worked. 84. Furthermore, when Defendants did pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants did not pay them one and one-half times their regular rate of pay because, inter alia, they failed to include the amount of non- discretionary bonuses they earned when determining their regular rate of pay. 17  85. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class overtime wages at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, Defendants violated the NYLL and 12 NYCRR §142-2.2. 86. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the NYLL and/or its regulations. 87. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL and/or its regulations have significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class and entitles them to recover the total amount of their unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 88. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the NYLL Class, reallege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 89. The NYLL requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to pay employees for all hours worked. Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class were not exempt from the requirement that Defendants pay them for all hours worked under the NYLL. 90. During the NYLL Class Period, however, Defendants did not always pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class their straight-time wages for all hours worked because they, inter alia, did not compensate them for time spent training, and failed to count all of the hours worked by Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class, causing Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective to perform a substantial amount of off-the-clock work. 91. As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class their straight-time wages for all hours worked, Defendants violated the NYLL. 92. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitutes willful violations of the NYLL. 18  93. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL has significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class and entitles them to recover the total amount of their unpaid straight-time wages, an additional amount in liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees and costs. 94. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the NYLL Class, reallege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 95. During the NYLL Period, Defendants were required to pay Plaintiff and the NYLL Class members “call-in” pay, in violation of the NYLL, including, but not limited to, New York Minimum Wage Order for Miscellaneous Industries and Occupations §142-2.3. 96. As a result of Defendants’ NYLL violation, Plaintiff and the NYLL Class members are entitled to recover from Defendants their “call-in” pay owed, and an equal amount in liquidated damages, as well as attorneys’ fees, costs and interests. 97. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the NYLL Class, reallege and incorporate by reference all proceeding paragraphs as if they were set forth again herein. 98. The NYLL requires covered employers, such as Defendants, to furnish wage statements to its employees with every payment of wages and to provide wage notices. Plaintiff and the NYLL Class were not exempt from this requirement. 99. During the NYLL Class Period, Defendants failed to furnish accurate wage statements and wage notices to Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class, in violation of NYLL §195 by, inter alia, providing wage statements that inaccurately recorded hours worked and/or wages earned. As a result, the wage statements furnished by Defendants to Plaintiffs and the members 19  of the NYLL Class contained inacurrate information with respect to wages purportedly paid and hours worked. 100. The foregoing conduct of Defendants constitute willful violations of the NYLL and/or its regulations. 101. Defendants’ violations of the NYLL have significantly damaged Plaintiffs and the NYLL Class and entitles them to recover statutory damages, together with attorneys’ fees and costs.

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a clothing, shoe, and accessories company that owns and operates www.heronpreston.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in May of 2020, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.heronpreston.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Website, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems and require that any third party vendors who participate on its Website to be fully accessible to the disabled by conforming with WCAG 2.0 criteria. 28. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.BENNINGTON.EDU, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. 30. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 31. Plaintiff, Jason Camacho, attended the NACAC college fair at Javits on Nov. 5, 2018 in order to obtain information from the college exhibitors presenting and marketing at the fair including the Defendant’s school. 32. Soon after attending the Javits fair, Mr. Camacho attempted to access the Defendant’s website in order to obtain additional information about the Defendant’s school but was thwarted in his efforts to do so due to the inaccessibility of the Defendant’s website as set forth herein. 35. The stated principles of NACAC members include “They strive to eliminate bias within the educational system based on …disability.”1 36. By its failure to provide a website that is accessible to the blind or vision impaired, Defendant, that is a member of NACAC, intentionally violated NACAC’s basic principles to eliminate bias toward the disabled as well as federal, state and city statutes and regulations designed to protect those members of society who are in need of protection by those various laws. 37. NACAC maintains a business relationship with the New York Daily News newspaper which publishes full page advertisements for the NACAC college fairs at Javits and an onsite guide to the exhibitors which is distributed free of charge to attendees at the college fairs. Exhibitors, such as the Defendant, may participate in the New York Daily News advertisements and/or advertise in the onsite guide. 39. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 40. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s school and enjoying the services offered by the Defendant equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information about: school location and hours, curriculum and programs of instruction, academic calendars, course and admission prerequisites, cost of tuition, available financial aid, career services, accreditation, faculty, campus security, transfer credits, textbooks, and other vital information needed by prospective students in order to make an informed decision about the Defendant’s school. Plaintiff intends to visit Defendant's school in the near future if he could access their website. 41. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 42. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 44. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 45. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 47. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s school, shop for and otherwise research related services available via the Website such as curriculum, financial aids, campus tours and other vital information. 49. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining its Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 50. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 51. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of services offered in Defendant’s physical locations and on its website, during the relevant statutory period. 54. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA and the RA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL. 55. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, RA, NYSHRL and NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so it can be independently accessible to the Class. 57. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 58. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 59. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 60. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 62. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 63. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 64. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 66. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant’s physical exhibit locations are located in the State of New York and constitutes a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these physical locations and is a gateway thereto. 71. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 73. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 75. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the State Sub-class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 76. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 77. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the State Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 80. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 81. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 83. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 86. Defendant’s New York physical locations are public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is heavily integrated with these establishments and is a gateway thereto. 87. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 88. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 89. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 91. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 92. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 93. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 94. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 95. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States … shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance….” 97. Defendant receives Federal financial assistance. 98. Defendant’s operations, including its website, is a program or activity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 794. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT of 1973, §504 VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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13. On April 6, 2017, Plaintiff received an unsolicited 2-page fax advertisement. A copy of the subject fax advertisement is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The fax advertisement attached as Exhibit A was sent, or caused to be sent, by Defendant. It advertises Defendant’s urgent care medical provider services. 14. The subject fax advertises Defendant’s goods, products or services. Exhibit A is an advertisement sent by fax to advertise Defendant’s urgent care medical provider services. Exhibit A states that Defendant provides “Emergency Medical Condition Exams,” offering “Rapid Reports,” “Professional Evaluation,” “Cost Effective” services, and “X-Rays, Medications, and Injections.” 15. Though the facsimile says “Miami Medical Center” (hereafter, “MMC”), the telephone provided on the fax is that for Defendant. The address on the fax leads to a building with a large sign identifying the business as “RITECARE Urgent Medical Center.” Upon information and belief, MMC is nothing but an alter-ego of Defendant. 16. Defendant sent, or caused these unsolicited fax advertisements to be sent, to Plaintiff and a class of similarly-situated persons. 18. Exhibit A does not contains an opt-out notice as required by the TCPA. 19. On information and belief, Defendant sent the same and similar facsimiles advertising its services to Plaintiff and other recipients without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation. This allegation is based, in part, on the fact that Plaintiff never gave permission to anyone to send the subject fax advertisement to it, that Plaintiff never conducted business with Defendant, and that sending advertisements by fax is a very cheap way to reach a wide audience. 20. There are no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other putative Class member) to avoid receiving illegal faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications their owners desire to receive. 21. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated as members of the Class initially defined as follows: All persons and entities who were sent one or more telephone facsimile messages on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, that advertised the commercial availability or quality of property, goods, or services offered by defendant, and that did not contain an opt-out notice on its first page. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, any officer or director of Defendant, the legal representative, heir, successor, or assign of Defendant, and any Judge assigned to this action, along with the members of his or her immediate family. 23. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements under Rule 23 (a). Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims separately from the putative Class’s claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 24. Numerosity/Impracticality of Joinder: On information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise number of Class members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff, but can be obtained from Defendant’s records or the records of third parties. 26. Typicality of claims: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the entire Class because Plaintiff and all Class members were injured by the same conduct. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class each received one or more unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant that also did not contain the opt-out notice required by the TCPA. Under the facts of this case, because the focus is upon Defendant’s conduct, if Plaintiff prevails on its claims, then the putative Class members must necessarily prevail as well. 28. Prosecution of Separate Claims Would Yield Inconsistent Results: Even though the questions of fact and law in this action are predominately common to Plaintiff and the putative Class members, separate adjudication of each Class member’s claims would yield inconsistent and varying results. Such inconsistent rulings would create incompatible standards for Defendant to operate under if/when Class members bring additional lawsuits concerning the same unsolicited fax advertisements or if Defendant advertises by fax again in the future. 29. This Class Action is the Superior Method to Adjudicate the Common Questions of Law and Fact that Predominate: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all Class members is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every Class member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. Relief concerning Plaintiff’s rights under the laws herein alleged and with respect to the Class would be proper. Plaintiff envisions no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (3). 30. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 32. The TCPA prohibits the “use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine….” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1). 33. The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement,” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s express invitation or permission.” 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (4). 34. The TCPA provides: 35. In relevant part, the TCPA states, “[t]he Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection . . . in implementing the requirements of this subsection, the Commission shall provide that a notice contained in an unsolicited advertisement complies with the requirements under this subparagraph only if . . . (i) the notice is clear and conspicuous. . . .” 47. U.S.C. § 227 (b) (2) (D) (i). 49. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 50. Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated persons. 51. By sending unsolicited faxes to Plaintiff and the other Class members, Defendant improperly and unlawfully converted their telephone lines, fax machines, toner, and paper to Defendant’s own use. Defendant also converted the Class members’ time to its own use. 52. Immediately prior to their receipt of the unsolicited faxes, Plaintiff and the other Class members each owned an unqualified and immediate right to possession of its fax machine, paper, toner, and employee time. 53. By sending the unsolicited faxes, Defendant permanently misappropriated the Class members’ fax machines, toner, paper, and employee time to its own use. Such misappropriation was wrongful and without authorization. 55. The unsolicited faxes deprived Plaintiff and the other Class members of the use of their fax machines, paper, toner, and employee time for any other purpose. Plaintiff and each Class member thereby suffered damages as a result of their receipt of unsolicited fax advertisements from Defendant. 56. Each of Defendant’s unsolicited faxes effectively stole Plaintiff’s employees’ time because persons employed by Plaintiff were involved in receiving, routing, and reviewing Defendant’s illegal faxes. Defendant knew or should have known employees’ time is valuable to Plaintiff. 57. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 57. Defendant is a “person” or “entity” as used in FDUTPA. 58. Plaintiff and the Members of the Sub-Class are “consumers” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(7). 58. Pursuant to FDUTPA, unfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful. 60. Within four years prior to the filing of this complaint and continuing to the present, Defendant violated FDUTPA by engaging in unfair practices against Plaintiff and the Sub-Class. 61. Defendant was engaging in “trade or commerce” within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.203(8). 62. The practices described herein also offend established public policy regarding the protection of the consuming public and legitimate business enterprises against companies, like Defendant, who engage in unfair methods of competition. 63. Defendant’s conduct, which caused substantial injury to Plaintiff and the Sub- Class could have been avoided, and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to any consumers or competition. 64. Defendant’s business acts and practices are also unfair because they have caused harm and injury-in-fact to Plaintiff and Sub-Class Members. 65. In addition to actual damages, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. CONVERSION FLORIDA DECEPTIVE AND UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT, FLA. STAT. § 501.201 TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227

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32. The market for Applied Optoelectronics’ securities was open, well-developed and efficient at all relevant times. As a result of these materially false and/or misleading statements, and/or failures to disclose, Applied Optoelectronics’ securities traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. Plaintiff and other members of the Class purchased or otherwise acquired Applied Optoelectronics’ securities relying upon the integrity of the market price of the Company’s securities and market information relating to Applied Optoelectronics, and have been damaged thereby. 33. During the Class Period, Defendants materially misled the investing public, thereby inflating the price of Applied Optoelectronics’ securities, by publicly issuing false and/or misleading statements and/or omitting to disclose material facts necessary to make Defendants’ statements, as set forth herein, not false and/or misleading. The statements and omissions were materially false and/or misleading because they failed to disclose material adverse information and/or misrepresented the truth about Applied Optoelectronics’ business, operations, and prospects as alleged herein. 37. As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter since Defendants knew that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company were materially false and/or misleading; knew that such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding Applied Optoelectronics, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of Applied Optoelectronics’ allegedly materially misleading misstatements and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential proprietary information concerning Applied Optoelectronics, participated in the fraudulent scheme alleged herein. 44. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 45. During the Class Period, Defendants carried out a plan, scheme and course of conduct which was intended to and, throughout the Class Period, did: (i) deceive the investing public, including Plaintiff and other Class members, as alleged herein; and (ii) cause Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Applied Optoelectronics’ securities at artificially inflated prices. In furtherance of this unlawful scheme, plan and course of conduct, Defendants, and each defendant, took the actions set forth herein. 46. Defendants (i) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (ii) made untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements not misleading; and (iii) engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business which operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers of the Company’s securities in an effort to maintain artificially high market prices for Applied Optoelectronics’ securities in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. All Defendants are sued either as primary participants in the wrongful and illegal conduct charged herein or as controlling persons as alleged below. 47. Defendants, individually and in concert, directly and indirectly, by the use, means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce and/or of the mails, engaged and participated in a continuous course of conduct to conceal adverse material information about Applied Optoelectronics’ financial well-being and prospects, as specified herein. 55. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully set forth herein. 56. Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Applied Optoelectronics within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein. By virtue of their high- level positions and their ownership and contractual rights, participation in, and/or awareness of the Company’s operations and intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by the Company with the SEC and disseminated to the investing public, Individual Defendants had the power to influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision- making of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff contends are false and misleading. Individual Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of the Company’s reports, press releases, public filings, and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the statements or cause the statements to be corrected. 57. In particular, Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company and, therefore, had the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the securities violations as alleged herein, and exercised the same. Background Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder Against All Defendants

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21. As explained above, the videos we watch on television are merely a series of still photographs displayed in such rapid succession that we perceive movement. Refresh rate refers to the number of unique images we see, as expressed in Hertz, or cycles per second. At this time video is not recorded at any more than 60 images per second, with movies typically being filmed at 24 images per second. This is because our electricity runs at the same rate.3 22. If too few images are displayed per second, viewers can see what is referred to as motion blur. Motion blur refers to the apparent streaking of rapidly moving objects. Motion blur can be evident in fast moving sports such as basketball or football. 36. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf, and on behalf of the following Classes pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3). Specifically, the Classes consist of each of the following: National Class: All persons or entities in the United States who purchased one or more Televisions from November 1, 2010 until the present. Or, in the alternative, Maine Class: All persons or entities in Maine who purchased one or more Televisions from November 1, 2010 until the present. 45. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 46. California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq. prohibits acts of “unfair competition”, which is defined by Business & Professions Code § 17200 as including any “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . .” 47. Defendant has engaged in unfair competition and unfair, unlawful or fraudulent business practices by the conduct, statements, and omissions described above, and by concealing and misleading Plaintiff and Class members concerning the actual refresh rates of the Televisions. 48. These acts and practices have also deceived Plaintiff and are likely to deceive persons targeted by such statements and omissions. In failing to disclose material facts concerning the refresh rates of the Televisions, Defendant breached its duties to disclose these facts, violated the UCL, and caused injuries to Plaintiff and Class members. The omissions and acts of concealment by Defendant pertained to information material to Plaintiff and Class members in that statements concerning the refresh rates would have been likely to deceive them based on a reasonable consumers’ expectations and assumptions. 51. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 52. In violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq., Defendant has disseminated or caused to be disseminated deceptive advertising misrepresentations, omissions and practices as described herein. These statements are actionable violations of § 17500 in that Defendant expressly states that the Televisions have attributes which they do not possess. 53. Defendant’s advertising misrepresentations, omissions, and practices made in connection with the sale of the Televisions are unfair, deceptive and/or misleading within the meaning of California Business & Professions Code § 17500, et seq. These representations are likely to, and did, deceive reasonable consumers such as Plaintiff Larsen. 54. In making and disseminating the statements alleged herein, Defendant knew or should have known that the statements were and are misleading or likely to mislead for the reasons set forth above. 58. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 59. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Civil Code section 1750 et seq. Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and on behalf of the Class members, all of whom are similarly situated consumers within the meaning of CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1781. 67. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 68. Plaintiff asserts this cause of action on behalf of himself and the other members of the Class. 69. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 205 et seq. 70. The Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act declares unlawful all “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce…” 71. Under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, Defendant’s misleading representations regarding their refresh rates are unfair, deceptive and unconscionable. 72. In the course of misrepresenting the refresh rates of the Televisions to consumers and inflating prices to reflect these misrepresentations, Defendant has engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in trade or commerce in violation of ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 207. 73. Defendant violated the § 207 by inflating the prices of the Televisions under the guise of higher quality refresh rate televisions. 74. Defendant violated the § 207 by failing to disclose to consumers the true refresh rates of the Televisions. 75. Defendant violated § 207 by failing to charge consumers the fair market value for the Televisions because of the inflated prices justified by misrepresentations of the refresh rates. 80. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 81. Defendant has a duty of good faith and fair dealing with respect to their dealings with consumers, including Plaintiff and the Class members. 82. There is an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in every contract, and Defendant had an implied duty to ensure that their marketing materials and other representations regarding the quality of its refresh rates were not false and misleading. 89. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as though set forth fully herein. 90. Defendant made material misstatements of fact to Plaintiff and Class members regarding the refresh rates of the Televisions. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class were fraudulently induced to purchase the Televisions with false and inflated refresh rates. BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (On Behalf of the National Class) COMMON LAW FRAUD (On Behalf of the National Class) NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (On Behalf of the National Class) VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17200, et seq. (On Behalf of the National Class) VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA FALSE ADVERTISING LAW, BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 17500, et seq. (On Behalf of the National Class) VIOLATION OF THE CONSUMERS LEGAL REMEDIES ACT CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 1750 et seq. (On Behalf of the National Class) VIOLATION OF THE MAINE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT (On Behalf of the Maine Class)

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15. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of itself and a Class of similarly situated individuals or business, defined as follows: All persons in the United States who received a facsimile, soliciting their participation in a paid research study/project, from or on behalf of Defendant and who had no ongoing business relationship with Defendant and had not given consent to receive facsimiles from Defendant, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint until the class is certified. 16. Numerosity: The exact number of class members is unknown and is not available to Plaintiff at this time, but individual joinder in this case is impracticable. The Class likely consists of thousands of individuals and businesses, given the extensive nature of Defendant’s business and the need to contact hundreds if not thousands of the individuals to participate in its surveys. Nonetheless, class members can be easily identified through Defendant’s or its agents’ records. 4 17. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and members of the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include but are not limited to the following: a) Whether Defendant sent the attached fax or had it sent on its behalf; b) Whether Defendant had or attempted to obtain consent; c) How Defendant compiles its list of individuals/companies to send facsimiles; d) Whether Defendant has processes in place to prevent unsolicited facsimiles; e) Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful; f) Whether Defendant’s facsimiles were advertisements; and g) Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA. 18. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other Class members and it sustained the same damages as other members of the Class as a result of Defendant’s actions. 19. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex litigation and class actions including TCPA cases. Furthermore, Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of members of the Class, and they have the financial resources to do so. 20. Superiority: This case is appropriate for certification because class proceedings are the best method available for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy in light of the common issues across the class. 5 21. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 22. The TCPA expressly prohibits unsolicited facsimile advertising, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C). 23. The TCPA defines an “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(1). 24. The Sixth Circuit also looks to dictionary definitions of the word “advertising” to further clarify its meaning to “the action of calling something” of a “commercial nature” to the attention of the public.” Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., 788 F.3d 218, 221-222 (6th Cir. 2015).” 25. As such, a facsimile intending to draw the attention of the public to the desire of a defendant to enlist survey takers for a commercial purpose is an “advertisement” under the TCPA. See Lyngaas, D.D.S. v. J. Reckner Associates, Inc, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D.Mich., 2:17-CV- 12867 (Order filed 07/31/18, ECF No. 29). Defendant violated this provision by sending an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff. 26. Federal Courts have found that facsimile solicitations to participate in marketing surveys in exchange for payment are advertisements within the purview of the TCPA. See Fischbein v. Olson Research Group, Inc., 959 F.3d 559 (3rd Cir. 2020). 27. Accordingly, Defendant’s facsimile is regulated by the TCPA, and Defendant’s transmission of it without prior consent or a business relationship is unlawful. 6 28. As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered actual damages as set forth above. 29. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), Plaintiff and members of the Class are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in statutory damages for each violation. 30. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and members of the Class to $1,500 for each violation. 7. On or about November 4, 2019, Defendant sent an unsolicited facsimile to Plaintiff (attached hereto as Exhibit 1). 8. Plaintiff and Defendant had no prior or existing business relationship, and Plaintiff did not give Defendant its fax number or consent to be sent a facsimile. 9. The facsimile was one page long and stated it was a “PAID TELEPHONE Violation of 47 U.S.C § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations) (Ohio Wage Act Violations) 13. Defendant is in the business of providing security monitoring and other related services to customers throughout the United States. 14. Defendant operates customer service / dispatch call centers in Ohio, among other places. 3 15. At all times material to this Complaint, Plaintiff worked as a Customer Service Representative and/or Dispatcher in Defendant’s Uniontown, Ohio call center. 16. Other similarly situated employees were employed by Defendant as Customer Service Representatives, Customer Care Representatives and Dispatchers. 17. Plaintiff and other similarly situated Customer Service Representatives, Customer Care Representatives and Dispatchers were classified by Defendant as non-exempt employees. 18. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees routinely worked forty (40) or more hours per workweek. 19. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were paid on an hourly basis. 20. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees answered inbound telephone calls from customers and responded to customer emails regarding customers’ alarms and other customer service issues. (Failure to Pay For Time Spent Starting and Log In and Out of Defendant’s Computer Systems and Applications) 21. Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were expressly directed not to clock in prior to the start of their scheduled start times. Defendant required, however, that Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees be ready to take their first call promptly at their scheduled start times. 22. Thus, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were required by Defendant to perform unpaid work before clocking in each day, including, but not limited to, starting, booting up, and logging into Defendant’s computer systems and software applications. 23. Similarly, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were required to clock out precisely at the end of their scheduled shifts. Defendant required, however, that Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees log out of and shut down Defendant’s computer systems and 4 software applications at the end of their scheduled end times. 24. Thus, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were required by Defendant to perform unpaid work after clocking out each day, including, but not limited to, logging out of and shutting down Defendant’s computer systems and software applications. 25. By common policy and practice, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were required to have their computers booted up and have several applications running before the start of their shifts so that they could take their first call at their scheduled start times. 26. By common policy and practice, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were required to log out of and shut down their computers after the end of their shifts. 27. Defendant arbitrarily failed to count this pre-shift and post-shift work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees as “hours worked.” 28. Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees performed this unpaid work every workday, and it constituted a part of their fixed and regular working time. 29. Plaintiff estimates that she spent approximately 10-15 minutes performing the above-described pre-shift and post-shift work each day. 30. This unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees was practically ascertainable to Defendant. 31. There was no practical administrative difficulty of recording this unpaid work of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees. It could have been precisely recorded for payroll purposes simply by allowing them to clock in before they began booting up Defendant’s computer systems and applications and clock out after the logged out of and shut down Defendant’s computer systems and applications. 32. This unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees 5 constituted a part of their principal activities, was required by Defendant, and was performed for Defendant’s benefit. 33. Moreover, this unpaid work was an integral and indispensable part of other principle activities performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees. Specifically, they cannot perform their work without booting up and starting Defendant’s computer systems and applications. And, they are required to log out and shut down Defendant’s computer systems and applications at the end of their workday. 34. Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly- situated employees for booting up and logging into Defendant’s computer systems and applications during which they performed work that managers and/or other agents and/or representatives / dispatchers observed. 35. Defendant knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other similarly- situated employees for logging out of and shutting down Defendant’s computer systems and applications during which they performed work that managers and/or other agents and/or representatives observed. (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation) 36. As a result of Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees not being paid for all hours worked, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were not paid overtime compensation for all of the hours they worked over 40 each workweek. 37. Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of the FLSA. (Failure to Keep Accurate Records) 38. Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve records of the unpaid work performed 6 by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees before clocking in each day. 39. The amount of time Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees spent on their required and unpaid work before clocking in and after clocking out amounted to approximately 10- 15 minutes when Defendant’s computer systems were working properly, or longer when Defendant’s computer systems were slow or not working. 40. Plaintiff brings Count One of the action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct. 41. The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff herself is a member, is composed of and defined as: All former and current Customer Service Representatives, Customer Care Representatives and Dispatchers employed by Defendant between April 3, 2015 and the present. 42. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, but upon information and belief aver that it consists of more than three hundred people. 43. This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as to claims for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages. Plaintiff is representative of those other employees and are acting on behalf of their interests, as well as their own, in bringing this action. 44. These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s business and payroll records. These individuals may readily be 7 notified of this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid wages, overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 45. Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (the “Ohio Class”) defined as: All former and current Customer Service Representatives, Customer Care Representatives and Dispatchers employed by Defendant between April 3, 2016 and the present. 46. The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon information and belief, aver that it consists of at least several hundred persons. 47. There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not limited to the following: a) whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to its Customer Service Representatives, Customer Care Representatives and Dispatchers for hours worked in excess of 40 each workweek; and b) what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff and other members of the class for Defendant’s violation of the Ohio Wage Act. 48. Named Plaintiff Bender will adequately protect the interests of the Ohio Class. Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of the other Ohio Class members. The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio Class in this case. 49. The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over 8 any questions affecting only individual members. The primary questions that will determine Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. 50. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs, attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources. Many Ohio Class members’ claims are sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of pursuing their claims individually. Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation. 51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 52. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for work performed before clocking in and after clocking out each day violated the 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten herein. 58. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees for work performed before clocking in and after clocking out each day violated the Ohio Wage Act. 59. Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees overtime compensation at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all of the hours they worked over 40 in a workweek violated the Ohio Wage Act. 60. Defendant’s failure to keep records of all of the hours worked each workday and the total hours worked each workweek by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees violated the Ohio Wage Act. 61. As a result of Defendant’s practices and policies, Plaintiff and other similarly- situated employees have been damaged in that they have not received wages due to them pursuant to the Ohio Wage Act.

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14. Defendant Arms buys and sells real estate. 15. Defendant Concentra, Inc. provides occupational therapy services at clinics nationwide. 16. To increase their marketing efforts, Defendants texted hundreds or possibly thousands of phones at once. 17. Unfortunately, Defendants failed to obtain consent from Plaintiff and the Class before sending the text messages. 18. On May 13, 2019 at 7:55 a.m., Plaintiff received a text from Defendant Concentra and/or their agents from the phone number 650-201-7381. 19. The text message that Plaintiff received said “Are you looking for a new career? Concentra is inviting physical therapists to interview for o/p ortho positions across CA and offering up to $10k in incentives for select locations. Grow your skills with opps for leadership, manual therapy cert. and student teaching. Let’s talk today! Text STOP to end.” 21. The text message that Plaintiff received said “11.6 CAP, Cheap Cashflow w/ Easy Fix – Brick/Frame – 3bd/1ba, 1020sqft, Call Jason for details + pics. 901-350-5059.” 22. Plaintiff never consented to receive text messages from Defendants. 23. Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) on behalf of Plaintiff and a class defined as follows: No Consent Class. All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to present (2) received at least one text message; (3) on his or her cellular telephone; (4) that was texted using an automatic telephone dialing system; (5) for the purpose of promoting Defendants’ services; (6) where Defendants did not have any record of prior express written consent to place such call at the time it was made. 24. The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’ counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 25. Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 27. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on behalf of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the proposed Class and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel to prosecute the case on behalf of Plaintiff and the proposed Class. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. 28. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. 29. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: i. Whether Defendants’ conduct violated the TCPA; ii. Whether Defendants’ conduct violated the TCPA willingly and/or knowingly; iii. Whether Defendants texted thousands of cell phones; iv. Whether Defendants obtained prior written consent prior to texting any members of the Class; v. Whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the knowingness or willfulness of Defendants’ conduct. 31. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 32. Defendants and/or their agents sent text messages to Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent to do so. 33. Defendants used an automatic telephone dialing system as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A) 34. Defendants’ calls were made for a commercial purpose. 35. As a result of its unlawful conduct, Defendants repeatedly invaded Plaintiff’s and the Class’s personal privacy, causing them to suffer damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), entitling them to recover $500 in civil fines for each violation and an injunction requiring Defendants to stop their illegal calling campaign. 36. Defendants and/or its agent made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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3. Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state: (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss fi·om such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater. or (C) Both such actions. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) 45. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 31 above as if set forth herein at length. 46. The TCPA makes unlawful the "use of any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(C). 4 7. The TCPA defines "unsolicited advertisement" as "any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person's express invitation or permission." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 48. The TCPA provides: 49. The TCP A is a strict liability statute, so Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent. 51. Defendants violated the TCPA by transmitting Exhibit A, or an unsolicited advertisement substantially similar thereto, to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without obtaining their prior pennission or invitation. 52. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 - 31 above as if set forth herein at length. 53. The acts, practices and conduct engaged in by the Defendants and complained of herein constitute "deceptive acts and practices" within the meaning of Article 22A of the General Business Law of the State ofNew York, NY GBL § 349. 54. Defendants willfully and knowingly engaged in conduct constituting deceptive acts and practices in violation ofNY GBL § 349.

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(OHIO PROMPT PAYMENT: FAILURE TO PROMPTLY PAY OVERTIME) (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Members of the Prompt Payment Act Class) (OHIO MINIMUM FAIR WAGE STANDARDS ACT: UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES) (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Members of the OMFWSA Class) (PENNSYLVANIA MINIMUM WAGE ACT: UNPAID OVERTIME WAGES) (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Members of the PMWA Class) 15. Defendant employed Plaintiff and the Collective and Class Action Members as Hourly Employees. 16. Defendant operated in and around Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia during the relevant time period. 17. Defendant maintains control, oversight, and discretion over the operations of worksites, including employment practices with respect to Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members. 18. Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members’ work as Hourly Employees was integrated into and performed in the normal course of Defendant’s business. 20. During the relevant period, Hourly Employees were governed by common overtime pay policies. 21. During the relevant period, Seven Points Energy Services, Inc. paid its Hourly Employees on an hourly basis in addition to Safety Surge bonuses which were paid on an hourly basis. Mr. Crigler was paid an additional $1.25 per hour worked for a Safety Surge bonus, and other Hourly Employees were similarly paid a Safety Surge bonus by the hour. 22. The Safety Surge bonuses were not discretionary. 23. During the relevant period, Seven Points Energy Services, Inc. paid time and a half overtime but did not include the Safety Surge bonus into the regular rate in calculating the overtime rate. 24. Consistent with Defendant’s policy, pattern, and/or practice, Plaintiff and the Hourly Employees regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without being paid wages for all hours worked and without being paid overtime wages, in violation of the FLSA, Ohio law, and Pennsylvania law. 25. During the entire time that Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, Plaintiff was not paid properly for his driving time as detailed herein. 26. Defendant cannot dispute that it owed Plaintiff and Collective Action Members overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40. 27. Plaintiff complained about Defendant’s pay practices to his superiors, but they did not remedy their failure to pay him for all hours worked. 29. Plaintiff and all members of the Class and Collective Action were paid in the same manner. 30. Defendant is aware of the totality of work that Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members performed. 31. This work did not require managerial responsibilities or the exercise of meaningful decision-making on matters of significance that impacted the business and no interaction with the management of the home office. 32. Throughout the Class and Collective Action periods, the primary job duties of Plaintiff and the Class and Collective Action Members did not include: hiring, firing, disciplining, or directing the work of other employees, nor exercising meaningful, independent judgment and discretion. 33. Defendant’s failure to comply with the FLSA and Ohio and Pennsylvania state laws has caused Plaintiffs and the Collective Members to suffer lost wages and interest therein. 34. Defendant is liable under the FLSA and both the Ohio and Pennsylvania wage-and- hour statutes for, inter alia, failing to properly pay overtime wage to Plaintiff and similar employees. 35. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective action on behalf of the Collective Action Members as defined above. 36. Plaintiff desires to pursue his FLSA claim on behalf of any individuals who opt into this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 38. Resolution of this action requires inquiry into common facts, including, inter alia, Defendant’s common compensation, timekeeping, and payroll practices. 39. Specifically, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members the legally required amount of overtime compensation per workweek after including the Safety Surge bonuses in determining the rate in violation of the FLSA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1), 215(a), 29 C.F.R. § 778.104, and 29 C.F.R. § 778.211(c). 40. These similarly situated individuals are known to the Defendant, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s payroll records which Defendant was required to maintain pursuant to the FLSA, Ohio law, and Pennsylvania law, see 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. § 215.2; Ohio Const. art. II, § 34a; 43 P.S. 333.101, et seq. 41. Conditional certification of this case as a collective matter pursuant to U.S.C. § 216(b) is proper and necessary so that these employees may be readily notified of this action through direct U.S. mail and/or other means including email and allowed to opt in for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for overtime compensation, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest), and attorneys’ fees and costs under the FLSA. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all Pennsylvania Class and Collective Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 44. Plaintiff and all Members of the Pennsylvania Class assert factually related claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). 45. Defendant violated the Pennsylvania wage and hour laws because it failed to pay Plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Class at a rate of 1.5 times their regular hourly rate and Safety Surge bonuses for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, pursuant to 43 P.S. 333.101, et seq. 46. Although the precise number of the Pennsylvania Class is unknown, Members are readily identifiable and can be located through Defendant’s records. 48. Plaintiff is an adequate class representative, is committed to pursuing this action, and has retained competent counsel experienced in wage and hour law and class action litigation. 49. Class certification of Plaintiff’s Pennsylvania wage and hour law claim is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. The Members of the Pennsylvania Class are entitled to injunctive relief to end Defendant’s common and uniform policy and practice of denying the Pennsylvania Class the wages to which they are entitled. 50. Class certification of Plaintiff’s Pennsylvania wage and hour law claim is also appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and facts common to the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual Members of the Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Ohio Class Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 53. Plaintiff and all members of the Ohio Class assert factually related claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). 54. Defendant violated the Ohio wage and hour laws because it failed to pay Plaintiff and the Ohio Class at a rate of 1.5 times its regular hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4111.03. 54. 55. Although the precise number of the Ohio Class is unknown, Members are readily identifiable and can be located through Defendant’s records. 57. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Members of the Ohio Class. 58. Plaintiff is an adequate class representative, is committed to pursuing this action, and has retained competent counsel experienced in wage and hour law and class action litigation. 59. Class certification of Plaintiff’s Ohio wage and hour law claim is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Class as a whole. The Members of the Ohio Class are entitled to injunctive relief to end Defendant’s common and uniform policy and practice of denying the Ohio Class the wages to which they are entitled. 60. Class certification of Plaintiff’s Ohio wage and hour law claim is also appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and facts common to the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual Members of the Class and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 62. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Collective Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 63. At all relevant times, Defendant has been and continues to be, an employer engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). 64. At all relevant times, Defendant employed, and/or continues to employ, Plaintiff and each of the Collective Action Members within the meaning of the FLSA. 65. At all relevant times, Defendant had a policy and practice of willfully refusing to pay its Hourly Employees and all Collective Action Members time and a half of the regular rate and Safety Surge bonuses. 66. As a result of Defendant’s willful failure to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members for all wages earned and for wages earned at a rate not less than 1.5 times the regular rate of pay plus Safety Surge bonuses for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant has violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(a)(1), 215(a), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 778.104. 67. Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all PMWA Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 70. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and PMWA Class Members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the PMWA, and Defendant was an employer within the meaning of PMWA. 71. The overtime wage provisions of the PMWA and its supporting regulations apply to Defendant. 72. Defendant willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights and the rights of the PMWA Class by failing to pay the overtime rate legally required of not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of regular pay plus Safety Surge bonuses for all hours worked by them in excess of 40 in a workweek in violation of the PMWA and its regulations. 73. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the PMWA, Plaintiff and the PMWA Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages and pre-judgment and post- judgment interest, including the employer’s share of FICA, FUTA, state unemployment insurance, and any other required employment taxes, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to the PMWA. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Collective Action Members, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 76. At all relevant times, Plaintiff and OMFWSA Class Members were employed by Defendant within the meaning of the OMFWSA, and Defendant was an employer within the meaning of OMFWSA. 77. The overtime wage provisions of the OMFWSA and its supporting regulations apply to Defendant. 78. Defendant willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights and the rights of the Ohio Class by failing to pay them the legally required amount of overtime compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked by them in excess of 40 in a workweek in violation of the OMFWSA and its regulations. 79. As a result of Defendant’s willful violations of the OMFWSA, Plaintiff and the OMFWSA Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendant their unpaid overtime wages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages and pre-judgment and post- judgment interest, including the employer’s share of FICA, FUTA, state unemployment insurance, and any other required employment taxes, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to the OMFWSA. 81. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all the Prompt Payment Act Class Members, realleges and incorporates by reference the preceding paragraphs. 82. Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of Ohio Revised Code 4113.15, on behalf of himself and all members of the Ohio Prompt Pay Class for which certification is sought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 83. At all times relevant, Defendant was Plaintiff’s and the Ohio Prompt Pay Class’ employer for purposes of overtime compensation owed. 84. Defendant violated Ohio Revised Code 4113.15, by failing to pay overtime compensation to its Hourly Employees including Plaintiff and the Ohio Prompt Pay Class within thirty days of their regularly scheduled payday. 85. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4113.15 provides that Defendant, having violated § 4113.15, “is liable to the employee in an amount equal to six per cent of the amount of the claim still unpaid and not in contest or disputed or two hundred dollars, whichever is greater.” FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiff and All Putative Collective Action Members)

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29. Plaintiff is a subscriber of a cellular telephone associated with telephone number (570) XXX-1283. 30. Indra is an energy company that sells electricity and natural gas to consumers. 31. According to Indra’s website, Indra markets itself to “millions of residential and commercial utility customers across 9 states and more than 64 utility markets.” 32. Over the past year, Plaintiff has received several unsolicited telemarketing telephone calls from representatives of Indra advertising its services and goods. 33. In particular, Plaintiff received various telemarketing calls to his cellular telephone from representatives of Indra that were placed for the purpose of marketing or selling Indra’s electricity and natural gas. 34. Indra called Plaintiff from the following telephone number: (888) 269-7397. 3 See, e.g., Osorio v. State Farm Bank F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2014); Soppet, 679 F.3d at 638-39. 7 35. This telephone number is associated with Indra. 36. For example, when a call is placed to the aforementioned number, one of Defendant’s representatives answers the telephone stating: “Thank you for calling Indra.” 37. An example of one such call occurred as recently as January 8, 2019. 38. At or around 2:15 PM EST, Plaintiff received a telemarketing call from Indra that was placed from the following telephone number: (888) 269-7397. 39. When Plaintiff answered the call, he was connected with a representative from Indra named Susan Dean who then solicited Plaintiff to purchase natural gas and electricity from Indra. 40. After a brief conversation, Plaintiff informed the Indra representative that he was not interested, requested that he be taken off Indra’s marketing list, and terminated the telephone call. 41. Plaintiff estimates that he has received approximately five telemarketing calls to his cellular telephone from Defendant—all placed for the purpose of soliciting his business. 42. On information and belief, other calls occurred on the following dates: January 2, 2019; January 4, 2019; and January 5, 2019. 43. Plaintiff believes he spoke with an Indra representative on at least two different occasions and both times requested to be taken off of Indra’s marketing list. 44. Despite this fact, Indra representatives continued to bombard his cellular telephone with telemarketing calls. 45. Plaintiff never provided his cellular telephone number to Defendant. 46. Plaintiff was never one of Defendant’s customers. 47. Plaintiff never requested information about Defendant’s services. 8 48. On information and belief, when contacting consumers, Indra uses an outbound calling system that automatically dials a list of telephone numbers stored by Defendant. 49. Defendant’s outbound dialing system uses algorithms to predict when Defendant’s representatives will be available to take a call, and then automatically dials the numbers stored on Defendant’s outbound dialing system. 50. Upon information and good faith belief, and in light of the frequency, number, nature, and character of the calls at issue, telephone contact made by Defendant to Plaintiff on his cellular telephone occurred via an ATDS as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 51. To be sure, when Plaintiff answered the calls from Defendant, there was a long pause and then a clicking noise before one of Defendant’s representatives came on the line. 52. Upon information and good faith belief, and in light of the frequency, number, nature, and character of the calls at issue, Defendant placed its calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number by using (i) an automated dialing system that uses a complex set of algorithms to automatically dial consumers’ telephone numbers in a manner that “predicts” the time when a consumer will answer the phone and a person will be available to take the call, or (ii) equipment that dials numbers and, when certain computer software is attached, also assists persons in predicting when a sales agent will be available to take calls, or (iii) hardware, that when paired with certain software, has the capacity to store or produce numbers and dial those numbers at random, in sequential order, or from a database of numbers, or (iv) hardware, software, or equipment that the FCC characterizes as a predictive dialer through the following, and any related, reports and orders, and declaratory rulings: In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 17 FCC Rcd 17459, 17474 (September 18, 2002); In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 9 1991, 18 FCC Rcd 14014, 14092-93 (July 3, 2003); In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd 559, 566 (Jan. 4, 2008). 53. At no point did Indra obtain Plaintiff’s prior express written consent to place telemarketing calls to his cellular telephone. 54. Indeed, all of the telemarketing calls alleged herein that Defendant placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were made without Plaintiff’s prior express written consent to receive such calls. 55. The calls were annoying and harassing to Plaintiff, and an invasion of his privacy. 56. The calls violated the TCPA because they were made without Plaintiff’s prior express consent—written or oral. 57. Not surprisingly, Indra’s unlawful telemarketing practices have led to significant backlash from consumers. 58. The internet is bereft with online reviews warning consumers about Defendant’s unlawful practices4: 4 Reviews available at: https://800notes.com/Phone.aspx/1-888-269-7397, last accessed March 13, 2019. 10 59. By making the unauthorized telephone calls alleged herein, Indra has caused consumers (including Plaintiff) actual harm and cognizable legal injury. 60. This includes the aggravation and nuisance and invasions of privacy that resulted from the receipt of such telephone calls, in addition to a loss of value realized for the monies consumers paid to their telephone carriers for the receipt of such calls. 61. Furthermore, the telephone calls interfered with class members’ use and enjoyment of their cellular telephones, including the related data, software, and hardware components. 62. Indra also caused substantial injury to their cellphones by causing wear and tear on their property, consuming battery life, and in some cases appropriating cellular data or minutes. 11 63. In order to redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals, bring suit under the TCPA for statutory damages of $500 to $1,500 per telephone call. 64. On behalf of the class, Plaintiff also seeks an injunction requiring Defendant to cease placing telemarketing calls to consumers until such time as it receives prior express written consent from all such persons. 65. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”). Plaintiff proposes the following Class definition, subject to amendment as appropriate: All persons and entities throughout the United States (1) to whom Palmco Administration LLC placed one or more calls, (2) for the purpose of advertising its goods or services. (3) directed to a number assigned to a cellular telephone service, (4) by using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (5) absent prior express written consent, (6) within four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class certification. 66. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class. 67. Excluded from the Class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s agents and employees, any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family. 68. Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but on information and belief, the number of Class members at minimum is in the thousands. 69. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of Defendant, including, but not limited to, the invasion of their privacy, annoyance, waste of time, depletion of their cellular telephone battery, and the intrusion on their cellular telephone that occupied it from receiving legitimate communications. 12 70. This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages. 71. The joinder of all Class members is impracticable due to the size and relatively modest value of each individual claim. 72. The disposition of claims in a class action will provide substantial benefit to the parties and the judicial economy of the court in avoiding a multiplicity of identical suits. 73. The Class can be identified easily through records maintained by Defendant and third parties. 74. There are well-defined, nearly identical, questions of law and fact affecting all Class members. 75. The questions of law and fact involving the Class claims predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members. 76. Those common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Whether non-emergency calls made to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones used an artificial or prerecorded voice or an automatic telephone dialing system; b. Whether such calls were made by Defendant; c. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express consent (i.e., consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated) to make such calls; d. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing or willful; e. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and f. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 13 77. As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an automatic telephone dialing system, without his prior express consent within the meaning of the TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member. 78. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and has no interests which are antagonistic to any member of the Class. 79. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes, including claims under the TCPA. 80. A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 81. Class-wide relief is essential to compel Defendant to comply with the TCPA. 82. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for the violation of the TCPA are relatively small. 83. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the calls at issue are all automated and the Class members did not provide prior express consent, as required under the statute, to authorize such calls to their cellular telephones. 84. Defendant has acted on grounds applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 85. Moreover, on information and belief, the TCPA violations complained of herein are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered. 14 86. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the factual allegations contained in paragraphs 1-85 as if fully stated herein. 87. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system to place calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number without his express consent. 88. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 89. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the factual allegations contained in paragraphs 1-60 as if fully set forth herein. 90. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) by utilizing at automatic telephone dialing system to place telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number without his prior express written consent. 91. As result of Defendant’s violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, et seq. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)

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14. Plaintiffs bring the First Cause of Action as a collective action pursuant to §216(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b) on behalf of himself and other similarly situated people (the “Collective”), which shall include: All persons who work or worked for Defendants as Retention Specialists from April 27, 2012 through the date the Court orders notice to be sent in accordance with §216(b) of the FLSA (the “FLSA Class Period”). 15. Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs and the Collective and for making unlawful deductions from the pay of Plaintiffs and the Collective. There are likely hundreds or thousands of similarly situated current and former employees of Defendants who have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable, and can be located through Defendants’ records that Defendants are required to create and maintain under applicable federal and state law. Notice should be sent to the Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 7 16. Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of the following class of Retention Specialists (the “Class”): All persons in the State of New York who work or worked for Defendant as Retention Specialists from April 27, 2009 through the date a judgment is entered in this action. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, and any corporations, partnerships or other entities affiliated with Defendants. 17. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. Plaintiff estimates that there are dozens of members of the Class. 18. Questions of law and fact are common to all the members of the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, including: a. Whether Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class for all hours worked and/or at overtime rates for hours worked over 40 per workweek; b. Whether Defendants made unlawful deductions from the pay of Plaintiffs and the Class; c. Whether Plaintiffs’ pay stubs from Defendants complied with the requirements of the NYLL; d. Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the NYLL; e. Whether Defendants’ conduct was willful and/or not in good faith; f. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to liquidated damages; and g. The amount by which Plaintiffs and the Class were damaged. 19. The claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiffs have no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to Plaintiffs. 8 20. Plaintiffs will protect the interests of the Class fairly and adequately, and Plaintiffs have retained attorneys experienced in class action litigation. 21. A class action is superior to all other available methods for this controversy because: a. The prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; b. The prosecution of separate actions by the members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; c. Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class; and questions of law and fact common to members of the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. d. Retention Specialists who are currently employed by Defendants are likely to fear retaliation and/or the loss of their employment, and thus will likely not commence their own actions or assert FLSA claims as part of the Collective. 22. Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants within the last three years, as stated above. Plaintiffs and similarly situated Retention Specialists were employed by Defendants to attempt to collect on past due invoices from customers, and, if unsuccessful, to disconnect and retrieve the broadband and/or TV equipment from customers’ homes. 9 23. Throughout their employment, in most or all weeks, Plaintiffs worked more than 40 hours per week. Plaintiffs worked as many as 70 hours per week. 24. Throughout their employment, Plaintiffs were not paid for all hours worked, including hours worked over 40 in most or all work weeks. Rather, Defendants required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated employees to punch out when they had worked approximately 40 hours, and continue to work off the clock for the remainder of their hours. Defendants also required Plaintiffs to perform administrative work off the clock, regardless of whether they had worked 40 hours for the week. 25. Defendants required Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees to pay for various expenses of Defendants’ businesses, including the cost of “personal” vehicles that were used during work hours to perform work for Defendants. Among other things these vehicles were used to travel to customers’ homes to disconnect the equipment of customers who were delinquent with payments and whose accounts could not be collected upon. Defendants did not reimburse Plaintiffs and similarly situated Retention Specialists for the cost of gasoline, insurance, tolls, and maintenance. Defendants required Plaintiffs and similarly situated Retention Specialists to own a vehicle; several of the Plaintiffs herein were required to purchase a vehicle in order to work for Defendants. Plaintiffs and similarly situated retention specialists were not reimbursed for any of the costs associated with their vehicles, despite the fact that these vehicles were used and/or purchased to conduct Defendants’ business. 26. Defendants failed to provide to Plaintiffs proper pay statements as required by NYLL §195(3). The pay statements do not list the name and address of RCH Cable, who is the Retention Specialists’ employer, do not accurately state the rate of pay and whether the Retention Specialists are paid by the hour or piece, the telephone number of the employer, the 10 physical address of the employer’s office or principal place of business, the overtime rates of pay, the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked. 27. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were fully set forth herein. 28. During the FLSA Class Period, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated were “employees” of Defendants within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203(e) and (g). 29. At all relevant times, Defendants have been an “employer” engaged in interstate “commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §203. 30. At all relevant times, Defendants’ business has had annual gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 31. Plaintiffs consent in writing to be parties to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). Plaintiffs’ written consents are attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference. 32. Defendants were required to properly pay Plaintiffs and others similarly situated all wages due including applicable overtime wages for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 33. During the FLSA Class Period, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Collective all wages due including overtime wages of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek to which they were entitled under the FSLA, 29 U.S.C. §207. 11 34. Defendants’ violation of the overtime requirements of the FLSA was part of their regular business practice and constituted a pattern, practice, and/or policy. 35. Defendants also required Plaintiffs and the Collective to purchase vehicles and pay the related expenses, including but not limited to gasoline, insurance, tolls, and maintenance, to perform their work for Defendants. Defendants did not reimburse Plaintiffs and the Collective for any of these expenses, thus causing the wages of Plaintiffs and the Collective to amount to less than the minimum wage, in violation of the FLSA. 36. As a result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with the FLSA in amounts to be determined at trial, and by the deductions from their wages, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages in an amount equal to their unpaid wages, prejudgment and post judgment interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and punitive damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 37. Defendants’ unlawful conduct, as described above, was willful and intentional and/or was not in good faith. Defendants knew or should have known that the practices complained of herein were unlawful. Defendants knew that Plaintiffs and others similarly situated routinely worked in excess of forty hours per week and/or paid for the costs associated with Defendants’ business, and that Plaintiff and others similarly situated were not paid for all hours worked and/or reimbursed for their expenditures. 38. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FSLA with respect to the compensation of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated. 39. Because Defendants’ violations of the FSLA have been willful, a three-year statute of limitations applies, pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §255(a). 12 40. Plaintiffs and the Collective seek to enjoin Defendants from their continuing violations of 29 U.S.C. §207. 41. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were fully set forth herein. 42. Plaintiffs and the Class were employees of Defendants within the meaning of NYLL, Article 6, §190(2), and supporting New York regulations. 43. Defendants were an “employer” within the meaning of NYLL Article 6, §190(3), and any supporting regulations. 44. Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and the Class overtime wages of not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 45. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and the Class overtime wages was willful and/or not in good faith within the meaning of NYLL, Article 19, §663. Defendants were aware of the requirements of the NYLL and continued to deprive Plaintiffs and the Class of all wages owed. 46. Due to Defendants’ violations of the NYLL, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid wages, liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 13 47. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were fully set forth herein. 48. The NYLL expressly prohibits employers from making unauthorized deductions from employees’ wages. 49. NYLL §193 prohibits deductions from employees’ wages unless the deductions are (1) expressly authorized by and “for the benefit of the employee” and (2) are limited to the enumerated categories of permissible deductions listed in NYLL §193. 50. Plaintiffs and the Class never authorized Defendants to withhold their wages for the purpose of financing travel to perform work for Defendants and/or for other costs relating to the operation of Defendants’ business. 51. Deduction of overhead expenses provides a direct benefit to the employer, and not to the employee. The failure to reimburse Plaintiffs and the Class for their full expenses associated with purchasing and/or using their personal vehicles during work hours, and for other costs relating to Defendants’ business, to perform work for Defendants, constitutes an unlawful deduction because the “purpose” of NYLL §193 was “[t]o prohibit wage deductions by indirect means where direct deductions would violated the statute.” 52. Thus, Defendants’ failure to reimburse Plaintiffs and the Class for their expenses violates NYLL §193 because it is neither for the benefit of Plaintiffs and the Class nor of a type allowable under NYLL §193. 14 53. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful deductions from their compensation, Plaintiffs and the Class were damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 54. Plaintiffs incorporate and re-allege all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were fully set forth herein. 55. NYLL §195(3) requires that an employer furnish a wage statement, with each payment, to an employee that provides basic information including but not limited to identifying information of the employer and the employee’s hours worked and rate of pay for straight-time and overtime hours. 56. Defendants failed to provide to Plaintiffs proper pay statements as required by NYLL §195(3). The pay statements do not list the name and address of RCH Cable, who is the Retention Specialists’ employer, do not accurately state the rate of pay and whether the Retention Specialists are paid by the hour or piece, the telephone number of the employer, the physical address of the employer’s office or principal place of business, the overtime rates of pay, the number of regular hours worked, and the number of overtime hours worked. 57. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class have been damaged in an amount of statutory damages to be proven at trial. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201, et seq.: Failure to Pay Overtime and Unlawful Deductions (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Collective) New York Labor Law §193: Unlawful Deductions (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) New York Labor Law §195(3): Inadequate Wage Statements (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) New York Labor Law, Article 19: Failure to Pay Overtime (Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)

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18. On July 26, 2016, the Company filed a Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2016 (the “2Q 2016 10-Q”) with the SEC, which provided the Company’s second quarter 2016 financial results and position. The 2Q 2016 10-Q stated that the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures were effective as of June 30, 2016, and that “[t]here have been no changes in PMI’s internal control over financial reporting during the most recent fiscal quarter that have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, PMI’s internal control over financial reporting.” The 2Q 2016 10-Q was signed by Defendant Olczak. The 2Q 2016 10-Q contained signed certifications pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) by Defendants Calantzopoulos and Olczak attesting to the accuracy of financial reporting, the disclosure of any material changes to the Company’s internal controls over financial reporting, and the disclosure of all fraud. 22. The statements referenced in ¶¶18-21 above were materially false and/or misleading because they misrepresented and failed to disclose the following adverse facts pertaining to the Company’s business, operational and financial results, which were known to Defendants or recklessly disregarded by them. Specifically, Defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) there were irregularities in the clinical experiments that underpin Philip Morris’ application to the FDA for approval of its iQOS smoking device; and (2) as a result, Defendants’ statements about the Company’s business, operations and prospects were materially false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable bases at all relevant times. The Truth Emerges 23. On December 20, 2017, Reuters published a report stating that “[f]ormer employees and contractors [of Phillip Morris] have detailed irregularities in the clinical experiments that underpin Philip Morris International’s application to the FDA for approval of its iQOS smoking device,” stating in pertinent part: 30. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Throughout the Class Period, the Company’s securities were actively traded on the NYSE. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed Class. Record owners and other members of the Class may be identified from records maintained by the Company or its transfer agent and may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in securities class actions. 31. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of federal law that is complained of herein. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class. 34. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually redress the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. 36. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market. 37. Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2430 (1972), as Defendants omitted material information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information, as detailed above. 39. This Count is asserted against the Company and the Individual Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC. 40. During the Class Period, the Company and the Individual Defendants, individually and in concert, directly or indirectly, disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 41. The Company and the Individual Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 in that they: employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of the Company’s securities during the Class Period. 43. Individual Defendants, who are the senior officers and/or directors of the Company, had actual knowledge of the material omissions and/or the falsity of the material statements set forth above, and intended to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, acted with reckless disregard for the truth when they failed to ascertain and disclose the true facts in the statements made by them or other personnel of the Company to members of the investing public, including Plaintiff and the Class. 44. As a result of the foregoing, the market price of the Company’s securities were artificially inflated during the Class Period. In ignorance of the falsity of the Company’s and the Individual Defendants’ statements, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied on the statements described above and/or the integrity of the market price of the Company’s securities during the Class Period in purchasing the Company’s securities at prices that were artificially inflated as a result of the Company’s and the Individual Defendants’ false and misleading statements. 45. Had Plaintiff and the other members of the Class been aware that the market price of the Company’s securities had been artificially and falsely inflated by the Company’s and the Individual Defendants’ misleading statements and by the material adverse information which the Company and the Individual Defendants did not disclose, they would not have purchased the Company’s securities at the artificially inflated prices that they did, or at all. 47. By reason of the foregoing, the Company and the Individual Defendants have violated Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder and are liable to the Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for substantial damages which they suffered in connection with their purchases of the Company’s securities during the Class Period. 48. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 49. During the Class Period, the Individual Defendants participated in the operation and management of the Company, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the Company’s business affairs. Because of their senior positions, they knew the adverse non-public information regarding the Company’s business practices. 50. As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to the Company’s financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements issued by the Company which had become materially false or misleading. 52. Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of the Company. By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of the Company, each of the Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause, the Company to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein. Each of the Individual Defendants exercised control over the general operations of the Company and possessed the power to control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and the other members of the Class complaint. 53. By reason of the above conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for the violations committed by the Company. Violation of Section 10(b) of The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants Violation of Section 20(a) of The Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants

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17. As part of its business practices, Defendant would uniformly send text messages to hundreds, if not thousands, of consumers. Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent at least ten thousand illegal text messages over the last four years preceding this lawsuit. 18. Plaintiff herself was sent at least two text messages without his express consent. 19. Below is a depiction of actual text messages received by Plaintiff from Defendant: 21. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be contacted. 22. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the ***-***-9685 phone number. 23. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages, and the use of a short- code, demonstrates that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it “plausible” that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132- IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an 26. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 27. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, received text message made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, not for emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express consent. 28. Defendant and their employees or agents, Plaintiff’s attorneys and their employees, the Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 31. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS; (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior express consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant are liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 32. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiffs and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 37. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-36 as if fully set forth herein. 38. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system . . . to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 40. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant– used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above. 41. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express consent to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members when the subject calls were made. 42. Defendant therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members without their prior express consent. 43. All possible Defendants are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such violation of the TCPA. 44. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. 45. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-36 as if fully set forth herein. 47. Defendant knew that they did not have prior express consent to send these text messages. 48. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones, the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 49. All possible Defendants are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such violation of the TCPA. 50. As a result of Defendant violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, AMY BETIT, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, prays for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. A declaration that Defendant violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing; c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called party; d. An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and e. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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1. The amount of the debt; 10. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 11. The Class consists of: a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York; b. to whom Defendant sent an initial collection letter; c. attempting to collect a consumer debt; d. on behalf of another; e. including a statement that a settlement amount must be paid by a date within 30 days of the collection letter; and f. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action. 12. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 13. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 14. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692g et seq. 15. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 16. This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community interest in the litigation: a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical. b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692g et seq. c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common uniform course of conduct complained of herein. d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are averse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit. e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender. 17. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 18. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 19. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. 2. The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 20. Prior to March 19, 2021, Plaintiff allegedly incurred an obligation to the Original Creditor, MidHudson Emergency Physician Services, PLLC (hereinafter “MidHudson”), who is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (4). 21. The obligation arose out of medical services which were incurred solely for personal purposes. The subject obligation is therefore a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 22. Upon information and belief, MidHudson contracted the Defendant for the purpose of debt collection. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (6). 23. Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States Postal Services, telephone and internet. Violation – March 19, 2021 Collection Letter 24. On or about March 19, 2021, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter regarding the subject debt owed to MidHudson. (See Letter Attached as Exhibit A.) 25. The letter ostensibly provides the notices as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g regarding disputing the debt. 26. However, Defendant included additional language beyond the g-notice: “Our client MidHudson Emergency Physician Services, PLLC has authorized us to offer you a settlement on your accounts that have been placed for collection with Bay Area Credit Service (BACS). If you take advantage of this offer, we will settle your accounts with SEE SUMMARY on reverse side for the amount of $267.75. This is a savings to you of $114.75. This settlement amount must be paid in one payment and this offer is valid until 04-08-21. We are not obligated to renew this offer.” 27. Defendants violated §§ 1692(e) and (g) by including a settlement offer that overshadowed Plaintiff’s debt validation rights under 1692(g) because it coerced Plaintiff to pay off the debt rather than enforce her rights to have the debt validated, and in the event that it could not be validated, extinguished altogether. 28. This plainly encourages Plaintiff to overlook her statutory debt validation rights because it induces Plaintiff to take advantage of the reduced settlement offer prior to the expiration of the 30-day debt validation window. 29. Plaintiff would be coerced into believing that she had one of two choices – either accept the settlement offer and forgo her right to challenge the debt, or challenge the debt and give up the settlement offer altogether. 3. A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt- collector; 30. The least sophisticated consumer would be tempted to just “take the offer and run” instead of exercising her rights to have the debt validated. 31. In this way, Plaintiff is induced to overlook her statutory debt validation rights, and the collection letter is clearly designed to do exactly that. 32. The least sophisticated consumer is especially vulnerable to this kind of ploy. In many instances, consumers who are behind on their payments face insurmountable odds, e.g., loss of employment, divorce, etc., and dealing with a scarcity of resources, will often choose the path of least resistance. 33. In this case, that means accepting an offer to pay a reduced settlement rather than challenging the debt, therefore inducing the consumer to overlook her debt validation rights. 34. Absent from the Letter is an explanation that the consumer would still have the ability to challenge the debt if she accepted the offer to settle, or that accepting the settlement offer would not foreclose the ability to request debt validation. 35. Therefore, Defendant is essentially “demanding payment” within the 30-day debt validation period because Plaintiff is being offered a settlement that would expire prior to the deadline for validating the debt under 1692g. 36. Plaintiff would have been able to make an educated decision whether to dispute the debt or pay if she were provided an appropriate g-notice. 37. Plaintiff was unable to properly evaluate her options of how to handle this collection letter and the underlying debt. 38. These violations by Defendant were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional, and Defendant did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations. 39. Defendant’s collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff effectively stripped Plaintiff of her right to dispute the validity of the debt and caused Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with the legally protected right to dispute the validity of the debt. 4. A statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 40. Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and unfair representations with respect to their collection efforts were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability to intelligently respond to Defendant’s collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately determine how to dispute the debt without risking a law suit. 41. Defendant’s actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to properly respond to or handle Defendant’s debt collection. 42. Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment. 43. Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for Defendant’s violations. 44. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 45. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. 46. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 47. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 48. Defendant violated said section by misrepresenting the status of the debt, in violation of § 1692e (2)(A). 49. Additionally, Defendants violated said section by deceptively and/or misleadingly providing additional language beyond the g-notice language which served to strip Plaintiff of her right to dispute the validity of the debt, in violation of § 1692e (10). 5. A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. b. Disputed Debts If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor. 50. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 51. Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein. 52. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 53. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g: a. Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing – 54. Defendant violated this section by providing language in the Letter that overshadowed and/or was inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt, thereby violating §1692g (b). 55. In addition, Defendant violated § 1692(a) by effectively failing to provide the requisite g-notice. 56. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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18. Defendants manufacture, distribute, market, and sell over-the-counter biotin products under their Nature’s Bounty brand. This lawsuit concerns five of those products — Biotin 5000 mcg, SUPER POTENCY Biotin 5000 mcg, QUICK DISSOLVE Biotin 5000 mcg, Biotin 10,000 mcg rapid release softgels, and Biotin 10,000 mcg HEALTH & BEAUTY rapid release liquid softgels (collectively, “Biotin Products”). The Biotin Products are marketed as supplements with the purpose of providing certain health benefits. The Biotin Products are sold in virtually every major food, drug, and mass retail outlet in the country including, but not limited to: CVS, Kroger, Target, Walgreens, and Wal-Mart. A single container of the Biotin Products retails for approximately $10.00–$25.00. The Uniform Health Benefits Message 19. Throughout the relevant time period, Defendants have consistently conveyed the health benefits message to consumers throughout California and the United States. Consumer Exposure to the Health Benefits Message 21. Plaintiff and Class members have been and will continue to be deceived or misled by Defendants’ deceptive health benefit representations. Plaintiff and the Class members have been damaged in their purchases of the Biotin Products and have been deceived into purchasing the Biotin Products that they believed, based on Defendants’ representations, would provide them health benefits, when, in fact, they do not. 23. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks certification of the following Class: California-Only Class Action All California consumers who within the applicable statute of limitations period until the date notice is disseminated, purchased Biotin Products. Excluded from this Class are Defendants and their officers, directors and employees, and those who purchased Biotin Products for the purpose of resale. 24. Numerosity. The members of the Classes are so numerous that joinder of all members of the Classes is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes that the proposed Classes contain thousands of purchasers of Biotin Products who have been damaged by Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein. The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff. 26. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes because, inter alia, all Class members were injured through the uniform misconduct described above and were subject to Defendants’ deceptive health benefit representations on the front of each and every Biotin Product container. Plaintiff is also advancing the same claims and legal theories on behalf of herself and all members of the Classes. 27. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Classes. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff has no adverse or antagonistic interests to those of the Classes. 29. Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on behalf of the entire Classes, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Classes, to enjoin and prevent Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members. 30. Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies received as a result of their conduct that were taken from Plaintiff and Class members. 31. Unless an injunction is issued, Defendants will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the members of the Classes and the general public will continue to be deceived. 32. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 33. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Classes. 34. As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendants’ conduct because she purchased Defendants’ Biotin Products in reliance on Defendants’ claim that the Biotin Products would provide her with health benefits, but did not receive Biotin Products that provide those benefits. 35. Plaintiff suffered that injury at the time of her purchase, when she bought products that do not deliver the benefits Defendants promise. 37. In the course of conducting business, Defendants committed “fraudulent business act[s] or practices” and false, deceptive or misleading advertising by, inter alia, making the health benefit representations (which also constitutes advertising within the meaning of §17200) regarding the Biotin Products on the Biotin Products’ labeling, as set forth more fully herein. 38. Defendants’ actions, claims and misleading statements, as more fully set forth above, are false, misleading and/or likely to deceive the consuming public within the meaning of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. 39. Plaintiff and other members of the Classes have in fact been deceived as a result of their reliance on Defendants’ material health benefit representations. Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered injury in fact and lost money as a result of their purchase(s) of Defendants’ Biotin Products that do not provide health benefits. 40. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendants will continue to engage in the above-described conduct. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate. 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself, all others similarly situated, and the general public, seeks restitution of all money obtained from Plaintiff and the members of the Classes collected as a result of unfair competition, an injunction prohibiting Defendants from continuing such practices, corrective advertising and all other relief this Court deems appropriate, consistent with Business & Professions Code §17203. 42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in the paragraphs above, as if fully set forth herein. 44. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code §1750, et seq. (the “Act”). 45. Plaintiff is a consumer as defined by California Civil Code §1761(d). The Biotin Products are “goods” within the meaning of the Act. 46. Defendants violated and continue to violate the Act by engaging in the following practices proscribed by California Civil Code §1770(a) in transactions with Plaintiff and the California-Only Class which were intended to result in, and did result in, the sale of the Biotin Products: (5) Representing that [the Biotin Products have] . . . characteristics, . . . uses [and] benefits . . . which [they do] not have . . . . * * * 47. Pursuant to California Civil Code §1782(d), Plaintiff and the California- Only Class seek a Court order enjoining the above-described wrongful acts and practices of Defendants and for restitution and disgorgement. 48. Pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff notified Defendants in writing by certified mail of the particular violations of §1770 of the Act and demanded that Defendants rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers of Defendants’ intent to so act. A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 49. If Defendants fail to rectify or agree to rectify the problems associated with the actions detailed above and give notice to all affected consumers within 30 days of the date of written notice pursuant to §1782 of the Act, Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to add claims for actual, punitive and statutory damages, as appropriate. 50. Defendants’ conduct is fraudulent, wanton and malicious. The Biotin Products Violation of Business & Professions Code §17200, et seq. Fraudulent Business Acts and Practices (On Behalf of the Multi-State or California-Only Class) Violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act – Civil Code §1750 et seq. (On Behalf of the California-Only Class)

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56. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein. 58. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 59. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a deceptive representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 60. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a misleading representation made in connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt. 62. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the character of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 63. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the amount of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 64. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the legal status of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 66. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 67. An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a deceptive means used in an attempt to collect the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 68. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, that Plaintiff owed $343 when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 69. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, that Plaintiff owed $343 when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a deceptive representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 70. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, that Plaintiff owed $343 when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a misleading representation made by Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 72. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation of the amount of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 73. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation of the legal status of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). 74. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). 75. Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a deceptive means used in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10)

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1. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint, Defendant made any call/s (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) to Class members using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service; 11. Sometime prior to January 7th, 2015, Plaintiffs were assigned, and became the owners of, a cellular telephone number from her wireless provider. 12. Beginning on or about January 7, 2015, Plaintiffs received numerous telephone calls on their cellular telephone from Defendant where Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), which is prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). This conduct continued daily for several days. 13. The ATDS used by Defendant has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator. 14. The calls to the Plaintiffs from Defendant came from phone numbers including but not limited to 856-202-7301. 16. Plaintiffs did not provide “prior express consent” to receive telephone calls from Defendant using an artificial or prerecorded voice utilizing an ATDS, as required by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 17. These telephone calls by Defendant or its agents were therefore in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 18. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the Class”). 19. Plaintiffs represent, and are members of, the Class, consisting of: All persons within the United States who received any telephone call/s from Defendant or their agent/s and/or employee/s to said person’s cellular telephone made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing system or with an artificial or prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 2. Whether Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation; and 20. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiffs do not know the number of members in the Class, but believe the Class members number in the tens of thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter. 21. Plaintiffs and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at least the following ways: Defendant illegally contacted Plaintiffs and the Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiffs and the Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for which Plaintiffs and the Class members previously paid, by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendant during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiffs and the Class members. Plaintiffs and the Class members were damaged thereby. 23. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the Court. The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records or Defendant’s agent’s records. 24. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the following: 25. As persons who received numerous calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiffs’ prior express consent, Plaintiffs are asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiffs have no interest antagonistic to any member of the Class. 27. Plaintiffs have retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the TCPA. 28. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and California law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims. 29. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 3. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future. 30. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 31. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 33. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. 34. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein. 35. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. 36. As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C). 37. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.

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11. Defendant CARFAX is one of the best-known providers of vehicle history reports to car dealerships and consumers nationwide. 12. In an effort to promote its services, Defendant CARFAX hired Defendant Vimenture to send fax solicitations on its behalf. Specifically, Defendant Vimenture sent fax advertisements to businesses and consumers nationwide promoting CARFAX’s Service Network, which is a service that provides “auto shops and aftermarket service facilities” access to CARFAX’s database of consumer vehicle history reports.3 13. Defendants sent (or had sent on their behalf) thousands of unsolicited fax advertisements to Plaintiff’s and the members of the Class’s fax machines without consent for the express purpose of obtaining new customers for its Service Network. The fax messages were unsolicited advertisements promoting Defendant CARFAX’s services. 15. Plaintiff and Class members did not give their prior express consent to receive fax messages from Defendants, or phone calls of any kind, nor did they desire to receive such fax advertisements. 16. Plaintiff Athol Motorcar is an automotive mechanic located in the State of New York. 18. The caller ID on Plaintiff’s fax machine stated “NETPROCO.” 19. Plaintiff did not provide its express consent to receive faxes from Defendants, nor did it have any other contact with Defendants. 20. Plaintiff did not have any type of an established business relationship with Defendant CARFAX or Defendant Vimenture. 21. Defendants were and are aware that the unsolicited fax advertisements at issue were (and are continuing to be) sent, and that the faxes were being transmitted to consumers and entities that had not consented to receive them. 23. Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants have sent unsolicited fax advertisements to thousands of consumers and entities that fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records. 24. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common and predominant questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: (a) whether Defendants’ conduct violated the TCPA; (b) whether Defendants’ fax messages constitute unsolicited advertisements; (c) whether Defendants systematically sent fax advertisements to members of the Class for whom Defendants did not have a current record of express consent to transmit such faxes to; and (d) whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the willfulness of Defendants’ conduct. 25. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and transmission of unsolicited fax advertisements. 27. Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ policies challenged herein apply and affect members of the Class uniformly and Plaintiff’s challenge of these policies hinges on Defendants’ conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff. Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of conduct toward members of the Class. The factual and legal bases of Defendants’ liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class are the same, resulting in injury to the Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct. 29. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 30. Defendants sent, or directed to be sent, unsolicited fax message advertisements to fax machines belonging to Plaintiff and other members of the Class without their prior express consent to receive such messages. 31. Defendants’ fax messages are unsolicited advertisements because they advertise and otherwise solicit consumers and businesses to purchase Defendant CARFAX’s goods and services and Plaintiff and the members of the Class did not consent to receive such messages. Specifically, the fax message included information about the availability of Defendant CARFAX’s services and provided a phone number and website where a fax recipient could sign up and pay for the same. 32. Plaintiff and members of the Class did not provide their express consent to receive fax messages from Defendants and did not have any form of a business relationship with Defendants. 34. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the Class suffered actual damages in the form of monies paid to receive the unsolicited fax messages and to maintain their fax machines, and under section 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such violation of the TCPA. 35. Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the Court may, pursuant to section 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the Class. Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

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10. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) excluded from bankruptcy discharge government loans that became due more than five years prior to the bankruptcy petition, repayment of which would not cause “undue hardship” on the debtor. 11. Subsequent amendments, which lengthened and eventually eliminated the five-year non-dischargeability time frame for loans by the federal government, have made it has become increasingly difficult for debtors to ever attain discharges of those student loan debts. 13. That changed in 2005 following extensive lobbying by private education lenders and debt collectors. The Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (2005) (hereinafter “BAPCPA”) expanded the definition of non-dischargeable student debt to include “any other educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.” 11 U.S.C. §523(a) (8) (B). 14. Section 221 (d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S. C. §221(d)(1)) defines a qualified educational loan as one that is used to pay for “qualified higher education expenses.” In turn, a “qualified higher education expense” is one that is used to pay for the cost of attendance at a qualified educational institution by an eligible student. 26 U.S.C. §221(d)(2). 15. Thus, BAPCPA made some private student loans dischargeable, but only loans that were made for qualified higher education expenses at a qualified educational institution for eligible students (“Qualified Education Loans”). 17. To remove those burdens and expand their lending pool, lenders initiated new programs that bypassed the qualified schools completely and instead lent money directly to student borrowers. By circumventing the schools private lenders significantly increased the total amount of loans that they originated by lending money that exceeded the scope of 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)(B). 18. However, the increased ease of lending and total scope of originated loans came at a price. While the loans were much easier to originate (because they were not required to meet the certification requirements imposed by 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8)(B)) and were potentially larger, they were no longer within the scope of non-dischargeability under that statue. Instead, these loans (“Consumer Education Loans”) were simply unsecured consumer debts (like student credit card debt) and thus were discharged automatically upon entry of a discharge injunction. Application Of 523(a)(8) Relies On Creditor Good Faith 19. Prior to the 2005 amendment, section 523(a)(8) was easy to apply because essentially all student loans were made by the federal government under the guidelines for non-dischargeability. Thus, if a student loan was issued or guaranteed by the federal government, it was non-dischargeable absent a showing of “undue hardship.” This fueled the belief that all student loans are non-dischargeable. 21. This situation created an opportunity for unscrupulous creditors to exploit the application of section 523(a)(8) and to deceive debtors into thinking that all private student loans, like their federal cousins, were excepted from discharge when some were not. 22. When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the debtor includes all unsecured debts on a Schedule F form, listing only the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor, and the consideration received. After demonstrating compliance with the Bankruptcy Code, a court then issues an order discharging all pre-petition debts listed on the bankruptcy petition except for those listed in section 523(a). Importantly, the discharge order does not specifically state which loans, if any, are presumptively excepted from discharge. Rather, it states only that the order does not discharge some debts, including “debts for most student loans.” Lenders Used The Presumption Of Non-Dischargeability To Mislead Student Borrowers 23. Not content with the protections won from Congress in 2005, commercial lenders devised a scheme to manipulate the widespread belief of non-dischargeability and deceive debtors and the bankruptcy courts into thinking that all private student loans, both qualified and non-qualified, both accredited and unaccredited, were excepted from discharge. 25. Thus, a law that was originally designed to prevent students from taking advantage of the bankruptcy system by borrowing and then discharging debt that was incurred in attending an accredited school, instead enabled unscrupulous creditors to defraud vulnerable and unsophisticated student borrowers. 27. Thus, lenders were aware of the confusion that could exist even for sophisticated parties with regard to the dischargeability of private student loans and made affirmative disclosures in that area, but made no such disclosures to debtors who were being pursued in an attempt to collect discharged debt. Plaintiff DiDonato’s Loans Were Unsecured Loans That Were Discharged In Bankruptcy 28. From 2001-2008, DiDonato was a medical student at Temple University. 29. DiDonato received scholarships and federal loans to cover his full “Cost of Attendance” at Temple University. 30. In addition, DiDonato borrowed several Tuition Answer Loans from Sallie Mae totaling more than $50,000 during the 2006-2007 academic year (“the Debts” or “Plaintiff’s Consumer Education Loans”). 31. These Tuition Answer Loans were not made solely for the “cost of attendance” and accordingly were not “qualified education loans” as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B). 32. In December 2018, DiDonato sought relief under Title 11 in this Court. 34. In April 2019, this Court ordered discharge of all Plaintiff’s properly scheduled pre-petition debt. 35. Navient was duly notified of the discharge of all of Plaintiff’s pre-petition debts. 36. However, instead of treating the Debts as discharged Navient thereafter engaged the services of Defendants to attempt to collect on these discharged Debts in violation of federal law 37. On June 13, 2019 Defendant GS Services Limited Partnership sought to collect on the discharged debts by sending a dunning letter offering to settle the outstanding balance of $197,514 for $13,718. 38. On January 6, 2020, Defendant Financial Asset Management Systems. Inc. sought to collect on the discharge debts by sending a dunning letter offering to settle the outstanding balance of $197,514 for $12,804. 39. These letters were in violation of the FDCPA because they were a misrepresentation of the legal status and character of the debt and were attempts to collect debts that were legally prohibited from being collected. 40. These letters were false and misleading in that they stated that the debt was due and owing when in fact it was discharged in bankruptcy. All Class Members Share A Similar Narrative. 41. All Class Members share a similar factual narrative. 43. All Class Members filed for bankruptcy protection in various district courts of the United States. 44. At the conclusion of these bankruptcy cases, all Class Members were issued discharge orders. 45. These Discharge Orders extinguished all education-related debt that was not excepted from discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 46. Notwithstanding the discharge of these debts, Defendants employed processes, practices and acts designed to mislead Class Members into believing that their debts were not discharged and inducing them to make payments on the extinguished debts. 47. Defendants have misled Class Members and sought to collect on discharged debts through various means, including but not restricted to, the use of dunning letters, emails and phone calls demanding repayment. V. 48. Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, as a representative of the following class: 50. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the definition of the class and/or add subclasses to include or exclude members. 51. As described below, this action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, superiority, predominance, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A. Numerosity 52. The persons in the class of plaintiffs are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. In the interest of judicial economy, this dispute should be resolved through class action. 54. Upon information and belief, the individual members of the class of plaintiffs, or at least a large portion thereof, lack the means to pursue these claims individually and severally. B. Commonality 55. There are common questions of law/fact affecting the entirety of the class. Specifically, predominant common questions include without limitation: (i) whether the Class Members’ loans were discharged at the conclusion of their bankruptcy cases; and (ii) whether Defendants violated the FDCPA by seeking to collect on discharged private education debt. 56. Answers to these common questions will drive the resolution of the injuries shared by each member of the class. C. Typicality 57. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are representative of those of all Class Members. Specifically, DiDonato’s Loans are identical in nature to the Class Members’ discharged loans on which Defendants attempted collection. D. Predominance and Superiority 59. This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications for individual members which would establish conflicting standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Class. Such identical actions would also, as well as a practical matter, be dispositive of interests of other members not parties to the adjudications and would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 60. Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunction relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 61. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Management of the Class claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many individual claims. The identities of the Class members may be obtained from Defendants’ records. E. Adequacy of Representation 9. In 1978, Congress enacted section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code to prohibit the discharge of federal student loans during the first five years of repayment (unless payment would constitute an undue hardship) to address a growing concern that students were taking advantage of the Bankruptcy Code by incurring extensive student loan debt and then declaring bankruptcy soon after graduation. Section 523(a)(8) Of The Bankruptcy Code.

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14. Defendant owns, manages and/or operates many hotels throughout the United States. 15. As part of these operations, Defendant provides its customers transportation services, including, but not limited to, complimentary shuttle services. 16. Within the applicable limitations period, Plaintiff called the Crowne Plaza located in King of Prussia, PA, and was told by an agent of Defendant that Crowne Plaza provides a complimentary shuttle service for guests. 17. Plaintiff was told that the complimentary shuttle service was not wheelchair accessible and was told that Defendant would not provide an alternative transportation service. 18. An investigation performed on Plaintiffs behalf confirmed the allegations made by Plaintiff above. 21. Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b )(2) of the federal rules of civil procedure and on behalf of herself and the following class: "All individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at hotels owned and/or operated by Defendant because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services at those hotels." 23. Typicality: Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct. 24. Common Questions of Fact and Law: There is a well-defined community of interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment of, Defendant's goods, services and facilities due to the policies and practices described above. 25. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class. Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of class litigation under the ADA. 26. Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the class as a whole. 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every allegation herein. 28. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the class. 29. Plaintiff is the guardian of Joy Barbara Levin, an individual with a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 31. Title Ill of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 32. Defendant operates fixed route systems and demand responsive systems within the meaning of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(3) and (4). 33. For fixed route systems, Defendant must meet the following requirements: a) for all purchases or leases after August 25, 1990, vehicles with a seating capacity over 16 passengers must be wheelchair-accessible; and b) for all purchases or leases after August 25, i990, vehicles with a seating capacity of under 16 passengers must either be either wheelchair-accessible or equivalent service must be provided. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(B). 34. For demand responsive systems, Defendant must provide wheelchair-accessible vehicles or ensure that equivalent service is provided. 42 U .S.C. § l 2 l 82(C) 35. Defendant has engaged in illegal disability discrimination by, without limitation, failing to ensure that transportation vehicles in use at the hotels it manages and/or operates are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, by failing to ensure that its hotels provide equivalent accessible transportation services to such individuals, and/or by failing to ensure that personnel are trained to proficiency with respect to the provision of accessible transportation services. Violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.

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22. Defendant offers the https://www.eddiebauer.com/ website, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with its physical locations. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to: find information about store locations, clearance items, rewards, offers, shipping and returns; access to an assortment of men and women’s ready to wear apparel and outerwear including parkas, jackets, pants, jeans, tights, capris, shorts, skirts, t-shirts, tank tops, sweaters, sweatshirts, hoodies, dresses; accessories including belts, gloves, hats, scarves, sunglasses, socks; footwear including boots, sneakers, hiking, casual slip-ons, sandals, slippers; recreation and travel gear including backpacks, duffels, luggage, laptop bags, tents, sleeping bags, lighting, canteens, flasks, bottles, tote bags; houseware including down comforters, throws, sheets, pillows, mattress pads, duvet covers, shams and other products and services that are available for purchase online and in store locations. 23. Based on information and belief, it is Defendant's policy and practice to deny Plaintiff and Class Members, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s stores. Due to Defendant's failure and refusal to remove access barriers on its website, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal and full access to Defendant’s stores and the variety of footwear, apparel and accessories offered to the public through Defendant’s Website. Defendant’s Barriers on Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code, § 51(f) Deny Plaintiff and Class Members’ Access 41. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) (b)(3), the Nationwide class is initially defined as follows: all legally blind individuals who have attempted to access Defendant’s website by the use of a screen reading software during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. 54. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 53, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 55. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 60. Plaintiff alleges and incorporates herein by reference each and every allegation contained in paragraphs 1 through 53, inclusive, of this Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 61. Defendant’s locations are “business establishments” within the meaning of the California Civil Code § 51 et seq. Defendant generates millions of dollars in revenue from the sale of its services in California through its store’s locations and related services and https://www.eddiebauer.com/ is a service provided by Defendant that is inaccessible to customers who are visually-impaired like Plaintiff and Class Members. This inaccessibility denies visually-impaired customers full and equal access to Defendant’s facilities and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Defendant is violating the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq., in that Defendant is denying visually- impaired customers the services provided by https://www.eddiebauer.com/. These violations are ongoing. 62. Defendant’s actions constitute intentional discrimination against Plaintiff and Class Members on the basis of a disability in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civil Code § 51 et seq. in that: Defendant has constructed a website that is inaccessible to Plaintiff and Class Members; maintains the website in this inaccessible form; and has failed to take adequate actions to correct these barriers even after being notified of the discrimination that such barriers cause. Violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the California Class) Violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (On Behalf of Plaintiff, the Nationwide Class and the California Class)

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(Declaratory Relief) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 105. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 106. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website contains access barriers denying deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals the full and equal access to the goods and services of the Website, which Defendant owns, operates, and/or controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the deaf and hard of hearing. 107. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. (Violation of New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102, et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq. — Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) (Violation of New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 15 (Executive Law § 292 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) (Violation of New York State Civil Rights Law, NY CLS Civ R, Article 4 (CLS Civ R § 40 et seq.) (on behalf of Plaintiff and New York subclass) 81. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 21. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certification of the following nationwide class pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the United States who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website during the relevant statutory period.” 22. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following New York subclass pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 23(b)(2), and, alternatively, 23(b)(3): “all legally deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State who have attempted to access the Website and as a result have been denied access to the enjoyment of goods and services offered by the Website, during the relevant statutory period.” 23. There are hundreds of thousands of deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals in New York State. There are approximately 36 million people in the United States who are deaf or hard of hearing. Thus, the persons in the Class are so numerous that joinder of all such persons is impractical and the disposition of their claims in a class action is a benefit to the parties and to the Court. 24. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of maintaining an inaccessible website denying deaf and hard-of-hearing persons access to the goods and services of the Website. Due to Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to remove access barriers, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons have been and are being denied full and equal access to independently browse and watch videos on the Website. 25. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class, including without limitation, the following: a. Whether the Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether the Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the laws of New York; c. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant through the Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with hearing disabilities in violation of the laws of New York. 26. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of those of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are deaf or hard of hearing, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, and/or the laws of New York by failing to update or remove access barriers on the Website, so it can be independently accessible to the Class of people who are legally deaf or hard of hearing. 27. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the members of the Class. Class certification of the claims is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 28. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because questions of law and fact common to Class members clearly predominate over questions affecting only individual Class members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 29. Judicial efficiency will be served by maintenance of this lawsuit as a class action in that it will avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with hearing disabilities throughout the United States. 30. References to Plaintiff shall be deemed to include the named Plaintiff and each member of the Class, unless otherwise indicated. 31. Defendant operates the Website, which is an online media and sales website covering financial news and financial literacy. The Website features notable commentators including Jim Cramer. It delivers information and services for purchase to millions of people across the United States. Visitors to the Website can purchase memberships and subscriptions to investment ideas as well as purchase personal finance and investing online courses. 32. The Website is a service and benefit offered by Defendant throughout the United States, including New York State. The Website is owned, controlled and/or operated by Defendant. 33. The Website allows users to browse and read stories, view photographs, and watch videos about today’s financial news and financial literacy. Defendant’s videos are available with the click of a mouse and are played through the Internet on computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices. 34. This case arises out of Defendant’s policy and practice of denying the deaf and hard of hearing full and equal access to the Website, including the goods and services offered by Defendant through the Website. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to the Website, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals have been and are being denied equal access to the Website, as well as to the numerous goods, services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 35. Defendant denies the deaf and hard of hearing access to goods, services, and information made available through the Website by preventing them from freely enjoying, interpreting, and understanding the content on the Website. 36. The Internet has become a significant source of information for conducting business and for doing everyday activities such as reading news, watching videos, etc., for deaf and hard-of-hearing persons. 37. The deaf and hard of hearing access videos through closed captioning, which is a transcription or translation of the audio portion of a video as it occurs, sometimes including description of non-speech elements. Except for a deaf or hard-of-hearing person whose residual hearing is still sufficient to apprehend the audio portion of the video, closed captioning provides the only method by which a deaf or hard-of-hearing person can independently access the video. Unless websites are designed to allow for use in this manner, deaf and hard-of-hearing persons are unable to fully access the service provided through the videos on the Website. 38. There are well-established guidelines for making websites accessible to disabled people. These guidelines have been in place for several years and have been followed successfully by other large business entities in making their websites accessible. The Web Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”), a project of the World Wide Web Consortium which is the leading standards organization of the Web, has developed guidelines for website accessibility, called the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”). The federal government has also promulgated website accessibility standards under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act. These guidelines are readily available via the Internet, so that a business designing a website can easily access them. These guidelines recommend several basic components for making websites accessible, including but not limited to adding closed captioning to video content. 39. The Website contains access barriers that prevent free and full use by Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, including but not limited to the lack of closed captioning. This barrier is in violation of WCAG 2.1 Guideline 1.2.2, which mandates that video content contain captioning. 40. The Website contains multiple videos that lack captioning. The videos, including Jim Cramer’s “Are we Heading Into a Recession” and the current events’ videos including “Nordstrom Shuts Doors Amid Covid-19 Pandemic” and “St. Patrick’s Day Festivities Canceled,” are amongst the many videos on the Website that do not contain closed captioning. The lack of captioning prevents Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing people from understanding the content of those videos, thus preventing them from learning about Defendant’s opportunities. 41. Due to the Website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and other deaf or hard-of-hearing individuals must in turn spend time, energy, and/or money to apprehend the audio portion of the videos offered by Defendant. Some deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals may require an interpreter to apprehend the audio portion of the video or require assistance from their friends or family. By contrast, if the Website was accessible, a deaf or hard-of-hearing person could independently watch the videos and enjoy the services provided by Defendant as hearing individuals can and do. 42. The Website thus contains access barriers which deny full and equal access to Plaintiff, who would otherwise use the Website and who would otherwise be able to fully and equally enjoy the benefits and services of the Website in New York State. 43. Plaintiff attempted to watch the videos about financial news and the economy including Jim Cramer’s “Are we Heading Into a Recession” and the current events’ videos including “Nordstrom Shuts Doors Amid Covid-19 Pandemic” and “St. Patrick’s Day Festivities Canceled,” amongst many other videos on the Website, most recently on March 17, 2020, but was unable to do so independently because of the lack of closed captioning on the Website, causing it to be inaccessible and not independently usable by deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 44. As described above, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the fact that the Website contains access barriers causing the Website to be inaccessible, and not independently usable by, deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. 45. These access barriers have denied Plaintiff full and equal access to, and enjoyment of, the goods, benefits, and services of Defendant and the Website. 46. Defendant engages in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: (a) constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructing and maintaining a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obviously inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failing to take actions to correct access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 47. Defendant utilizes standards, criteria, and methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others. 48. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 49. Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), provides that “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Title III also prohibits an entity from “[u]tilizing standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(D)(I). 50. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by Title III of ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), a “place of education,” a “place of exhibition or beauty,” a “place of recreation,” and “service establishments.” 51. Defendant has failed to make its videos accessible to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing by failing to provide closed captioning for videos displayed on the Website. 52. Discrimination under Title III includes the denial of an opportunity for the person who is deaf or hard of hearing to participate in programs or services or providing a service that is not as effective as what is provided to others. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I-III). 53. Discrimination specifically includes the failure to provide “effective communication” to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals through auxiliary aids and services, such as captioning, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(III); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(C). 54. Discrimination also includes the failure to maintain accessible features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. §36.211. 55. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(I), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 56. Under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(II), it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities or a class of individuals with disabilities and the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 57. Specifically, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(II), unlawful discrimination includes, among other things, “a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 58. In addition, under Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(III), unlawful discrimination also includes “a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 59. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Individuals who are deaf and hard of hearing have been denied full and equal access to the Website have not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and/or have been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled patrons. 60. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 61. Modifying its policies, practices, and services by providing closed captions to make its videos accessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals would not fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business, nor would it pose an undue burden to this flourishing company. 62. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 63. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 64. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of the ADA and therefore Plaintiff invokes her statutory right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 65. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 66. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 67. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as though fully set forth herein. 68. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 69. Defendant operates a place of public accommodation as defined by N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). 70. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 71. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the videos displayed on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 72. Specifically, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(I), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations.” 73. In addition, under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(II), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 74. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exc. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 75. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 76. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of the Website under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 77. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 78. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Exc. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 79. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 80. Pursuant to N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 82. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 83. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . . . ” 84. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 85. The Website is a public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2). 86. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 87. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing videos on the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf and hard of hearing. This inaccessibility denies deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons full and equal access to the goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 88. In addition, N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty-two . . . shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . . . ” 89. Specifically, under N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside . . . . ” 90. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 91. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 92. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines pursuant to N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 93. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if set forth fully herein. 94. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person who is the owner, franchisor, franchisee, lessor, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation . . . [b]ecause of any person’s . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly . . . [t]o refuse, withhold from or deny to such person the full and equal enjoyment, on equal terms and conditions, of any of the accommodations, advantages, services, facilities or privileges of the place or provider of public accommodation.” 95. The Website is a public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102. 96. Defendant is subject to City Law because it owns and operates the Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-102. 97. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to the Website, causing the Website and the services integrated with the Website to be completely inaccessible to the deaf. This inaccessibility denies deaf patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. Specifically, Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(15)(a). 98. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: (a) constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or (b) constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members; and/or (c) failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to deaf and hard-of-hearing Class members. 99. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 100. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class and Subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, and/or opportunities of the Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the Subclass will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 101. The actions of Defendant were and are in violation of City Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 102. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense. 103. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 104. Pursuant to N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.

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(Breach of Contract) (Violation of Md. Com. Law Code § 13-301, et seq.) (Violation of Md. Com. Law Code § 12-109) 14. BofA is the second largest bank in the United States as well as one of largest mortgage lenders in the United States. 15. As part of its business, BofA lends money to borrowers for the purchase of residential property. 16. In order to initiate such transactions, borrowers enter into a mortgage agreement with BofA that involves the use of a residential home as collateral. 17. BofA utilizes form mortgage agreements that generally require the borrower to maintain an escrow account with BofA. 18. In accordance with the mortgage agreements, borrowers prepay property-related expenses, such as property taxes and insurance premiums, by transferring funds to BofA for placement into the escrow account. 19. BofA utilizes the funds in escrow accounts to generate “float” income for itself. 21. The laws of Maryland explicitly require that lenders pay interest on funds in escrow accounts. 22. Md. Com. Law Code § 12-109(b)(1) provides: A lending institution which lends money secured by a first mortgage or first deed of trust on any interest in residential real property and creates or is the assignee of an escrow account in connection with that loan shall pay interest to the borrower on the funds in the escrow account at an annual rate not less than the weekly average yield on United States Treasury securities adjusted to a constant maturity of 1 year, as published by the Federal Reserve in "Selected Interest Rates (Daily) -- H.15", as of the first business day of the calendar year. 23. Further, Md. Com. Law Code § 12-109(b)(2) provides: Interest on these funds shall be: (i) Adjusted, if applicable, as of the first day of each calendar year to reflect the rate to be paid during that year, as determined under paragraph (1) of this subsection; (ii) Computed on the average monthly balance in the escrow account; and (iii) Paid annually to the borrower by crediting the escrow account with the amount of interest due. 24. Through the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) Congress has mandated that “[i]f prescribed by applicable State or Federal law, each creditor shall pay interest to the consumer on the amount held in any impound, trust, or escrow account that is subject to this section in the manner as prescribed by that applicable State or Federal law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3). 25. BofA is well-aware of its legal obligations pertaining to escrow accounts. 27. Ms. Clark purchased a house in Westminster, Maryland in or about August 1995, and financed the purchase with a loan from BofA’s predecessor-in-interest, Washington Mortgage Company. 28. On or about February 13, 2013, Ms. Clark entered into a mortgage agreement in the form of a deed of trust (the “Deed of Trust”), pursuant to which BofA took a security interest in Ms. Clark’s home. 29. Nothing in the Deed of Trust permits BofA to withhold interest accrued on escrow funds. This agreement also states that BofA will pay interest on escrowed funds if “Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds.” 30. The Deed of Trust specifically defines “Applicable Law” as “all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, ordinances, and administrative rules and orders (that have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final non-appealable judicial opinions.” 31. Since 2013, Ms. Clark has continuously made monthly mortgage payments to BofA, a portion of which have been placed in the escrow account. 32. BofA failed to pay interest on the funds Ms. Clark placed in escrow in violation of federal and Maryland state laws. 33. Upon information and belief, BofA profited off the funds held in escrow by generating float income, which BofA retained for itself. 35. Specifically excluded from the Class is any entity in which BofA has a controlling interest or which has a controlling interest in BofA, BofA’s legal representatives, assigns, and successors, and any Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of such Judge’s staff and immediate family. 36. Class-wide adjudication of Ms. Clark’s claims is appropriate because Ms. Clark can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions asserting the same claims. 37. Numerosity: The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of individual members is impracticable. 38. The members of the Class can be readily identified through BofA’s records. 40. Typicality: Ms. Clark’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Ms. Clark and members of the Class have been adversely affected and damaged by BofA’s failure to pay interest. 41. Adequacy of Representation: Ms. Clark will fairly and adequately represent the Class. Ms. Clark has the best interests of the members of the Class in mind. Ms. Clark is also represented by qualified counsel with extensive experience representing classes, including experience prosecuting class actions against large financial institutions. 42. Superiority: A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of these claims because individual joinder of the claims of all members of the Class is impracticable. Many members of the Class are without the financial resources necessary to pursue this matter. Even if some could afford to litigate claims separately, such a result would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which the individualized cases would proceed. Individual litigation increases the time and expense of resolving a common dispute concerning BofA’s actions toward an entire group of individuals. Class action procedures allow for far fewer management difficulties in matters of this type and provide the unique benefits of unitary adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision over the entire controversy by a single judge in a single court. 43. The Class may be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because BofA has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the claims raised by the Class. 45. Ms. Clark repeats and re-alleges all the foregoing allegations as if they were fully set forth herein. 46. Ms. Clark and the Class members entered into binding agreements with BofA. 47. Members of the Class entered into substantially similar agreements with BofA. 48. Federal law and Maryland law require BofA to pay interest on funds held in escrow for Ms. Clark and the Class members. 49. BofA did not pay interest on the funds held in escrow for Ms. Clark and Class members in violation of state and federal laws. 50. BofA therefore breached its agreements with Ms. Clark and the Class members by failing to comply with federal and Maryland state law requiring interest to be paid. 51. By reason of the foregoing, Ms. Clark and the Class members are entitled to judgment in the amount to be determined at trial, together with interest thereon; reasonable attorney’s fees and costs; and injunctive relief barring future breaches of BofA’s agreements 52. Ms. Clark repeats and re-alleges all the foregoing allegations as if they were fully set forth herein. 54. Ms. Clark and BofA executed an agreement in connection with a mortgage of a residential property located within Maryland. 55. BofA maintains an escrow account pursuant to this agreement. 56. Ms. Clark has paid money into the escrow account. 57. BofA did not pay or credit Ms. Clark with interest on the funds in the escrow account. 58. By failing to pay interest on escrowed funds to Ms. Clark and Class members, BofA has violated Maryland law. 59. As a result of BofA’s unlawful conduct, Ms. Clark and the members of the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 60. BofA’s violations of Maryland law are ongoing. 61. By reason of the foregoing, Ms. Clark and the members of the Class are entitled to all monetary damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, interest on damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, reasonable attorney’s fees and cost, and any other form of relief permitted under Maryland law. 62. Ms. Clark repeats and re-alleges all the foregoing allegations as if they were fully set forth herein. 63. BofA has engaged in unfair, abusive, or deceptive trade practices the conduct of a business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of a service in Maryland. 65. BofA is a “merchant” within the meaning of Md. Com. Law Code § 13-101(g). 66. BofA made false or misleading statements and representations of a, kind which has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers. 67. BofA’s conduct was intentional, willful, and knowing. 68. BofA engaged in deceptive acts or practices by failing to pay interest on funds held in escrow accounts to Ms. Clark and members of the Class. 69. When presented with a mortgage agreement stating that BofA will comply with all requirements of state and federal law, a reasonable consumer would conclude that BofA would comply with applicable state and federal laws concerning interest on mortgage escrow accounts. 70. Yet, at the time BofA issued its mortgage agreements stating that it would comply with all requirements of state and federal law, BofA was aware of the applicable law, and knew it would not pay interest on Ms. Clark’s and Class members’ funds held in escrow. 71. BofA’s periodic statements to Ms. Clark and members of the Class do not accurately reflect amounts owed to and by borrowers because they do not include interest that BofA is required to pay on funds held in escrow. 72. A reasonable consumer who receives a monthly or periodic mortgage statement or escrow summary report would assume that the information and figures listed therein would be accurate and in accordance with state law and federal law. 74. Further, as part of its scheme, BofA knowingly and intentionally sends or otherwise makes available monthly and other periodic statements to borrowers that are false or misleading because they do not accurately reflect off-setting amounts of escrow interest owed by BofA to borrowers under the terms of mortgage agreements and under federal and state law. 75. Ms. Clark and the members of the Class were injured through their consumer banking relationship with BofA. 76. As a result of BofA’s deceptive conduct, Ms. Clark and the members of the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 77. BofA’s violations of Maryland Consumer Protection Act are ongoing. 78. By reason of the foregoing, Ms. Clark and the members of the Class are entitled to all monetary damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, interest on damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, reasonable attorney’s fees and cost, and any other form of relief permitted under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act and other applicable laws.

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(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer Protection Act) (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 11. During Autumn of 2017, Plaintiff Scarleth Samara provided her cellullar telephone number ending in -8762 in connection with the purchase of an IDT calling product. 12. Samara then received numerous text message advertisements at the same number from Defendant’s 5-digit short message service (“SMS”) code, including the following advertisement received October 27, 2017: IDT Promo: El 27 y 28 de Oct, Claro Nicaragua ofrece 5x en recargas de $7 o mas. Recarga hoy con tarjetas IDT o en Boss Revolution 13. The text messages were not addressed to Plaintiff by name and were written in an impersonal manner. 14. Defendant sent the same (or substantially the same) generic telemarketing and/or advertising text messages at random through an automatic telephone dialing system to Plaintiff and Class. 15. Prior to sending these text messages, Defendant never informed Plaintiff and Class clearly, conspicuously, and in writing that they would receive recurring automated telemarketing and/or advertising text messages on their cellular phone. 17. The text message calls alleged herein were exclusively made by Defendant or on their behalf. 18. Through their conduct, Defendant caused Class Members actual harm by sending the unauthorized text message calls at issue. Plaintiff and members of the Class were not only subjected to the aggravation that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unauthorized text messages, but also costs paid to their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such unauthorized text messages. 19. Moreover, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered injuries in the form of invasion of privacy and violations of their statutory rights. 20. Defendant was and is aware that the above-described text messages were being sent on a widespread basis, and that the text messages were being sent to consumers who had not provided prior express written consent to receive them. 22. Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown and not available to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, Defendant sent telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Class members can be identified through Defendant’s records. 23. Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the putative Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to the following: (a) Whether Defendant’s conduct violated the TCPA; (b) Whether Defendant sent text messages to Class Members using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), as contemplated by the 28. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 29. In an effort to solicit consumers, Defendant sent unauthorized and unwanted telemarketing and/or advertising text message calls to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephones without their prior express written consent. 30. Defendant sent the telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephone numbers using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers en masse. 31. Defendant utilized equipment that sent the telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class simultaneously and without human intervention. 32. Defendant took steps to physically place such text message calls and/or was so involved in placing the calls as to be deemed to have initiated them. 33. By sending telemarketing and/or advertising text messages to Plaintiff and members of the Class's cellular telephones without prior express written consent, as defined pursuant 47 U.S.C. § 64.1200(f)(8), and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii). 35. Because Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class. 36. Additionally, as a result of Defendant unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future.

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11. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 12. Some time prior to March 18, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred to THE 29. Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). The class consists of (a) all individuals with addresses in the State of Massachusetts (b) to whom Defendant (c) sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt owed to THE VERIDIAN (d) containing the following language “Unless you, within thirty days after receipt of this notice, notify us that you dispute any portion of this debt, the debt will be assumed to be valid.” (e) which letter was sent on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this action and on or before a date 21 days after the filing of this action. 30. The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect debts. 31. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors, and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of their immediate families. 33. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. 34. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 36. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 37. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 39. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5) and 1692e(10). 40. Pursuant to Section 15 U.S.C. §1692e of the FDCPA, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 41. The Defendant violated said provision by using false, deceptive and misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). 42. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. 43. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 44. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. 45. The Defendant violated said section by: • Failing to provide an accurate validation notice in violation of § 1692g(a)(3). VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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12. Homeland Vinyl is a business that manufactures, fabricates, and markets vinyl fencing, rail, and deck products. Homeland Vinyl sells its products throughout the United States, including in New Jersey. 13. Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective provide support for Homeland Vinyl’s manufacturing operations. Among other tasks, Plaintiff and Class and Collective members are responsible for setting up and operating machine equipment, monitoring machine operations, loading raw materials, and checking the quality of finished products. 14. Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective are classified as non-exempt, and compensated with hourly wages. Plaintiff earns approximately $14.25 per hour. Plaintiff also earns a fifty cent shift differential pay when his shifts are scheduled outside normal business hours. 15. Based on information and belief, none of Defendant’s hourly employees, including Class and Collective members, are part of a union, and the terms of their employment are not governed by a collective bargaining agreement. 16. Plaintiff and Class and Collective members are typically scheduled to work twelve- hour shifts. Homeland Vinyl creates bi-weekly schedules in which Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective work three days one week, and four days the next week. Thus, Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective work alternating weekly schedules of at least 36 hours, and 48 hours, respectively. 5 17. For compensation purposes, Homeland Vinyl averages Plaintiff and Class and Collective members’ weekly hours on a bi-weekly basis, and calculates their total pay at a rate of 42 hours per week. Thus, Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective receive four hours of overtime pay every two weeks. But because Plaintiff and Class and Collective members work alternating weeks of 36 and 48 hours, respectively, this bi-weekly averaging policy deprives Plaintiff and Class and Collective members of four hours of overtime every two weeks. 18. When computing Plaintiff and Class and Collective members’ regular rate of pay for overtime purposes, Homeland Vinyl does not account for shift differential pay, as required by the FLSA and New Jersey Wage Law. Consequently, hourly employees of Homeland Vinyl who receive overtime compensation are not compensated at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour of overtime worked. 19. Compensation provided to Plaintiff and Class and Collective members is not paid finally, unconditionally, free and clear of deductions and/or kickbacks. Plaintiff and Class and Collective members are required to pay for and provide their own mechanics tools in performing their routine duties for Homeland Vinyl. Such tool-related expenses incurred by Plaintiff and the Class and Collective include but are not limited to tool cabinets, socket sets (standard and metric, as well as different sizes), breaker bars of different sizes, ratchets of different sizes, wrench sets (metric and standard, large and regular sized), nut drivers (standard and metric), adjustable wrench sets, screwdriver sets, Hex key sets (standard and metric as well as different sizes), Allen keys (standard and metric, as well as different sizes), torque wrenches in different sizes, spray bottles, hammers, sledge hammers, crow and pry bars, rubber mallets, and tap and dye sets. 20. Plaintiff, specifically, spent approximately $500 - $700 for tools used in performing his various job duties. Some of these costs were incurred during weeks in which Plaintiff worked 6 in excess of 40 hours. Because Plaintiff and Class and Collective members routinely work in excess of 40 hours in a week, and because Homeland Vinyl does not compensate Plaintiff and Class and Collective members for these necessarily incurred business expenses – expenses incurred solely for Homeland Vinyl’s benefit – these costs cut into the overtime wages required to be paid to Plaintiff and Class and Collective members. 21. Homeland Vinyl requires Plaintiff and Class and Collective members to perform substantial work off-the-clock and without compensation. Homeland Vinyl instructs hourly employees to arrive for their work shifts fifteen minutes early to relieve outgoing hourly employees and receive work briefing by managers. Homeland Vinyl instructs hourly employees to clock in only after these briefings are completed, which often takes more than fifteen minutes. Homeland Vinyl does not permit hourly employees to clock in before their scheduled work shift begins. Whenever Plaintiff and Class and Collective members attempt to correctly clock in or out to account for this additional work time, Homeland Vinyl unilaterally alters these time entries to excise these pre and post shift activities. In total, Plaintiff and Class and Collective members typically work one and one-half to two hours off-the-clock per week. 22. Furthermore, Homeland Vinyl instructs hourly employees to complete all tasks on the manufacturing floor, regardless of when their scheduled work shift ends. In order to perform these tasks as required, Plaintiff and Class and Collective members often stay more than fifteen minutes after the conclusion of their scheduled work shift in order to complete their work. However, Homeland Vinyl regularly edits hourly employees’ timesheets to reflect that they clocked out at the end of their scheduled shift. Thus, work performed by hourly employees during these periods goes uncompensated. 23. As a result of Homeland Vinyl’s timekeeping policies, Plaintiff and the Class and 7 Collective members are not paid for all hours worked, and are paid at their regular rate or at the applicable overtime rates. 24. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that Homeland Vinyl’s policies and practices as alleged herein have at all relevant times been similar for non-exempt, hourly employees, regardless of the location within the United States, including in New Jersey. 25. Homeland Vinyl’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent throughout its work locations in the United States, including in New Jersey. Homeland Vinyl knew or should have known that its policies and practices have been unlawful and unfair. 26. Homeland Vinyl’s conduct is willful, carried out in bad faith, and causes significant damages to non-exempt, hourly employees in an amount to be determined at trial. Homeland Vinyl had no reasonable basis to believe that it was complying with the FLSA and New Jersey laws. Rather, Homeland Vinyl either knew or acted with reckless disregard of clearly applicable FLSA and New Jersey regulations regarding the computation of overtime, demonstrated by, inter alia: a. At all relevant times, Homeland Vinyl maintained payroll records reflecting the fact that Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective regularly worked alternating weeks of 36 and 48 hours, respectively; b. At all relevant times, Homeland Vinyl maintained payroll records reflecting the fact that Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective were consistently compensated for 42 hours per week, all at the regular rate; c. At all relevant times, New Jersey wage and hour laws, as well as the FLSA, expressly prohibited Homeland Vinyl’s bi-weekly overtime averaging. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.104 (“The Act takes a single workweek as its standard and does not permit averaging of hours over 2 or more weeks. Thus, if an employee 8 works 30 hours one week and 50 hours the next, he must receive overtime compensation for the overtime hours worked beyond the applicable maximum in the second week, even though the average number of hours worked in the 2 weeks is 40”); N.J.A.C. 12:56-6.2(a) (“Overtime and minimum wage pay shall be computed on the basis of each workweek standing alone”) and N.J.A.C. 12:56-6.2(b) (“Hours shall not be averaged over two or more workweeks”); d. Homeland Vinyl required Plaintiff and members of the Class and Collective to furnish their own tools to carry out Homeland Vinyl’s daily operations, and Homeland Vinyl had no reasonable basis to believe this job requirement was anything other than an unlawful deduction and/or kickback under the FLSA. 27. Plaintiff brings the First Count (the FLSA claim) as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of the proposed collective of similarly situated individuals defined as: All current and former non-exempt, hourly employees of Homeland Vinyl who worked at one of Homeland Vinyl’s production facilities in the United States, at any time beginning three years before the filing of this Complaint until the resolution of this action. 28. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated persons defined above, seek relief on a collective basis challenging Defendant’s policies and practices of failing to properly pay Plaintiff for all hours worked, including overtime compensation, as well as Defendant’s failure to record all hours worked. The number and identity of other similarly situated persons yet to opt-in and consent to be party-plaintiffs may be determined from the records of Defendant, and potential opt-ins may be easily and quickly notified of the pendency of this action. 9 29. Plaintiff’s claims for violations of the FLSA may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to Section 216(b) of the FLSA because Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are similar to the claims of the Collective members. 30. The Collective members are similarly situated, as they have substantially similar job duties and requirements and are subject to a common policy, practice and/or plan that unlawfully minimizes overtime and minimum wage compensation due through, inter alia, bi- weekly hour-averaging and requirements to perform off-the-clock work without compensation. 31. Plaintiff is representative of the Collective members and is acting on behalf of their interests, as well as Plaintiff’s own interests, in bringing this action. 32. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of Collective members. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in employment class action and collective action litigation. 33. The similarly situated Collective members are known to Homeland Vinyl, are readily identifiable, and may be located through Homeland Vinyl’s records. These similarly situated employees may readily be notified of this action, and allowed to “opt-in” to this case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for the purpose of collectively adjudicating their claims for unpaid wages, liquidated damages (or, alternatively, interest), and attorney’s fees and costs under the 34. Plaintiff brings the Second and Third Counts (the New Jersey state law claims) as an “opt-out” class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The New Jersey Class is defined as: All current and former non-exempt, hourly employees of Homeland Vinyl who worked at one of Homeland Vinyl’s production facilities in New Jersey, during the 10 time period two years prior to the filing of this Complaint until the resolution of this action. 35. Numerosity: The potential members of the Class as defined are so numerous that joinder of all the members of the Class is impracticable. On information and belief, Plaintiff estimates the class exceeds several hundred class members. 36. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions: There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and the Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These common questions of law and fact include, but are not limited to: a. Whether Homeland Vinyl failed to compensate Class members for all hours worked in violation of the NJSWHL; b. Whether Homeland Vinyl failed to compensate Class members with at least minimum wage for all compensable work time in violation of the NJSWHL; c. Whether Homeland Vinyl failed to properly compensate Class members with wages at a rate of not less than one and one-half the employee’s regularly hourly wage for each hour or working time in excess of 40 hours in any week in violation of the NJSWHL; d. The proper formula for calculating restitution, damages and penalties owed to Plaintiff and the Class as alleged herein. 37. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Homeland Vinyl’s common course of conduct in violation of law as alleged herein has caused Plaintiff and Class members to sustain the same or similar injuries and damages. Plaintiff’s claims are thereby representative of and co-extensive with the claims of the Class. 38. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is a member of the Class, does not have any conflicts of interest with other Class members, and will prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the Class. Counsel representing Plaintiff is competent and experienced in litigating large employment class actions, including wage and hour classes. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class members. 11 39. Superiority of Class Action: A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Individual joinder of all Class members is not practicable, and questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. The injury suffered by each Class member, while meaningful on an individual basis, is not of such magnitude as to make the prosecution of individual actions against Defendant economically feasible. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all Parties and the Court. By contrast, class action treatment will allow these similarly situated persons to litigate their claims in a manner that is most efficient and economical for the parties and the judicial system. 40. In the alternative, the Class may be certified because the prosecution of separate actions by the individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of the Class and, in turn, would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. 41. Class treatment will allow those similarly situated persons to litigate their claims in the manner most efficient and economical for the Parties and the judicial system. 42. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that would be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 43. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 44. The FLSA requires that covered employees receive compensation for all hours worked and overtime compensation not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 12 45. At all times material herein, Plaintiff and the Collective are covered employees entitled to the rights, protections, and benefits provided under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a). 46. Homeland Vinyl is a covered employer required to comply with the FLSA’s mandates. 47. Homeland Vinyl has violated the FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and the Collective, by, inter alia, failing to compensate Plaintiff and the Collective for all hours worked, failing to pay the legally mandated overtime premium for such work and/or minimum wage, and failing to provide compensation that is unconditional, free, and clear of deductions and/or kickbacks as, described hereinabove. 48. Homeland Vinyl has also violated the FLSA by failing to keep required, accurate records of all hours worked by Plaintiff and the Collective. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). 49. Plaintiff and the Collective are victims of a uniform and company-wide compensation policy. This uniform policy, in violation of the FLSA, has been applied to current and former non-exempt, hourly employees of Homeland Vinyl, working throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff and the Collective are entitled to damages equal to the mandated pay, including straight time and overtime premium pay within the three years preceding the filing of the complaint, because Homeland Vinyl has acted willfully and knew or showed reckless disregard for whether the alleged conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. 51. Homeland Vinyl has acted neither in good faith nor with reasonable grounds to believe that its actions and omissions were not a violation of the FLSA, and as a result thereof, Plaintiff and the Collective are entitled to recover an award of liquidated damages in an amount 13 equal to the amount of unpaid overtime pay and/or prejudgment interest at the applicable rate. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 52. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to all of the unpaid wages, plus an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, court costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses they expend in successfully bringing this action to recover their unpaid wages, and any other relief deemed appropriate by the Court. 53. Wherefore, Plaintiff and the Collective request relief as hereinafter provided. 54. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 55. Homeland Vinyl does not compensate Plaintiff and Class members with a rate of not less than one and one-half the employee’s regularly hourly wage for each hour or working time in excess of 40 hours in any week. Homeland Vinyl aggregates hours worked by hourly employees worked over a two week period to minimize overtime pay. This is a per se violation of New Jersey law. See N.J.A.C. 12:56-6.2(a) (“Overtime and minimum wage pay shall be computed on the basis of each workweek standing alone”) and N.J.A.C. 12:56-6.2(b) (“Hours shall not be averaged over two or more workweeks.”) 56. Homeland Vinyl does not account for shift differential pay when determining what the overtime rate should be for Plaintiff and Class members. 57. NJSWHL § 34:11-56a(4) provides that work performed in excess of 40 hours in a given week must be compensated at a rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for an employee. 58. New Jersey Administrative Code 12:56-6.1 provides as follows: 14 For each hour of working time in excess of 40 hours in any week … every employer shall pay to each of his or her employees, wages at a rate of not less than 1 1/2 times such employee's regular hourly wage. 59. For the purposes of calculating overtime premiums, New Jersey Administrative Code 12:56-6.5(b) provides that an employee’s hourly rate should be determined as follows: The regular hourly wage of an employee is determined by dividing his or her total remuneration for employment, exclusive of overtime premium pay, in any workweek, by the total number of hours worked in that workweek for which such compensation was paid. 60. Wages are defined in NJSWHL § 34:11-56a(1) as: any moneys due an employee from an employer for services rendered or made available by the employee to the employer as a result of their employment relationship including commissions, bonus and piecework compensation and including any gratuities received by an employee for services rendered for an employer or a customer of an employer and the fair value of any food or lodgings supplied by an employer to an employee. All such wages are subject to New Jersey’s overtime requirements, including those set forth above. 61. Homeland Vinyl regularly requires Plaintiff and Class members to work in excess of forty hours per week, but does not compensate them at an overtime rate for this work. Furthermore, Homeland Vinyl regularly does not account for differential pay when calculating the overtime rate of hourly employees. 62. Plaintiff and Class members have worked overtime hours for Homeland Vinyl without being paid overtime premiums in violation of the NJSWHL, and other applicable law. 63. Homeland Vinyl has knowingly and willfully refused to perform its obligation to compensate Plaintiff and the Class members for all premium wages for overtime work. As a proximate result of the aforementioned violations, Homeland Vinyl has damaged Plaintiff and the Class members in amounts to be determined according to proof at time of trial. 15 64. Homeland Vinyl is liable to Plaintiff and the Class alleged herein for the unpaid overtime and civil penalties, with interest thereon. Furthermore, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NJSWHL § 34:11-56a25, and New Jersey Administrative Code 12:56-1.5 and 12:56-5.3(a). 65. Wherefore, Plaintiff and the Class request relief as hereinafter provided. 66. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 67. The New Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.3, provides that when an employee is discharged or terminates employment for any reason, the employer must pay the employee all wages due not later than the regular payday for the pay period during which the employee's termination, suspension or cessation of employment took place. 68. Members of the New Jersey Class have terminated their employment with the defendant and the defendant has not tendered payment and/or restitution of wages owed or in the manner required by New Jersey law to them and have thereby caused such members of the New Jersey Class to suffer damages. 69. Therefore, Plaintiff and class members demand appropriate penalties for defendant's failure to timely pay wages on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated persons within six years of the filing of this Complaint until date of entry of judgment. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages (N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a et seq.) (Against Defendant – on Behalf of the Class) Penalties for Violation of N.J.S.A. 34: 11-4.3 (Against Defendant – on Behalf of the Class) Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.) (Against Defendant – on Behalf of the Collective)

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12. Nationstar funded over $19 billion in mortgage loans in the year that ended on December 31, 2017, making it the twentieth-largest mortgage loan originator in the United States. Occasionally Nationstar sells its underlying mortgage loans on the secondary market, but in such cases generally retains the post-sale servicing rights on the sold loans. 18. In August 2014, Plaintiff received a loan from Velocity secured by real residential property in Los Angeles, California, pursuant to a “Note” and “Loan Agreement” that Plaintiff had entered into with Velocity (collectively, the “Loan Documents”). The loan Plaintiff received from Velocity in August 2014 is referred to herein as the “Loan.”5 60. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of four classes of persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 61. To redress and put a stop to Nationstar’s practices of billing borrowers for a single monthly interest charge multiple times, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and the following class (hereinafter, the “Double-Billed Class”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: All individuals in the United States who, at any time between February 7, 2015 and the present, (i) entered into a mortgage loan; (ii) in connection with that mortgage loan made monthly payments to Nationstar in the amount demanded by Nationstar; (iii) in connection with that mortgage loan paid to Nationstar a monthly interest charge; (iv) after timely paying in full that monthly interest charge received from Nationstar a successive demand for payment of the same, previously-paid monthly interest charge (i.e., pertaining to the same month of the same year of the same loan); and (v) paid the full amount demanded by Nationstar for that previously-paid monthly interest charge, without reimbursement. 77. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 78. Plaintiff contracted for mortgage lending services on the terms set forth in the Loan Documents (i.e., the “Note” and “Loan Agreement” governing the Loan) that Plaintiff and Velocity entered into on August 11, 2014, the rights and obligations of which were subsequently assigned to Nationstar on October 21, 2016, via Seneca and/or other intermediary entities. 79. Like Plaintiff, each member of the Double-Billed Class contracted for mortgage lending services with Nationstar directly or with another entity that subsequently assigned the pertinent mortgage loan to Nationstar (or to another predecessor entity which in turn assigned the pertinent mortgage loan to Nationstar), on the same or substantially the same terms as set forth in the Loan Documents that Plaintiff and Velocity entered into on August 11, 2014. 80. In plain, clear, and simple language, in the Loan Documents and other governing loan-related documentation in effect between February 7, 2015 and the present between Nationstar and Plaintiff (and others similarly situated), Nationstar promised Plaintiff and all other Double-Billed Class members that it would refund any overpayments made by the borrower in the course of paying off his or her loan in full. 87. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1-76 set forth above as though fully set forth herein. 88. Plaintiff contracted for mortgage lending services on the terms set forth in the Loan Documents (i.e., the “Note” and “Loan Agreement” governing the Loan) that Plaintiff and Velocity entered into on August 11, 2014, the rights and obligations of which were subsequently assigned to Nationstar on October 21, 2016, via Seneca and/or other intermediary entities. 89. Like Plaintiff, each member of the Post-Payoff Interest Class contracted for mortgage lending services with Nationstar directly or with another entity that subsequently assigned the pertinent mortgage loan to Nationstar (or to another predecessor entity which in turn assigned the pertinent mortgage loan to Nationstar), on the same or substantially the same terms as set forth in the Loan Documents that Plaintiff and Velocity entered into on August 11, 2014. Breach of Contract (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Double-Billed Class) Breach of Contract (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Post-Payoff Interest Payment Class) Breach of Contract (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Late-Fee Class)

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22. Plaintiff brings the First and Second Causes of Action, NYLL claims, under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and a class of persons consisting of: All persons who work or have worked as Manual Workers for Enterprise Holdings, Inc. in New York between October 30, 2014 and the date of final judgment in this matter (the “New York Class”). 23. The members of the New York Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parties and the Court. 24. There are more than one hundred members of the New York Class. 25. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those claims that could be alleged by any member of the New York Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief which would be sought by each member of the New York Class in separate actions. 5 26. Plaintiff and the New York Class have all been injured in that they have been compensated in an untimely manner due to Defendant’s common policies, practices, and patterns of conduct. Defendant’s corporate-wide policies and practices affected everyone in the New York Class similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of unfair and/or wrongful acts as to each member of the New York Class. 27. Plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the New York Class and has no interests antagonistic to the New York Class. 28. Plaintiff is represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class action litigation and employment litigation and have previously represented many plaintiff and classes in wage and hour cases. 29. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy – particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit against corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similar persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expense that numerous individual actions engender. 30. Common questions of law and fact exist as to the New York Class that predominate over any questions only affecting Plaintiff and/or each member of the New York Class individually and include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) whether Defendant compensated Plaintiff and the New York Class on a timely basis; and (b) whether Defendant failed to furnish Plaintiff and the New York Class with an accurate statement of wages, as required by the 31. Consistent with their policies and patterns or practices as described herein, Defendant harmed Plaintiff, individually, as follows: Donald Clemons 32. Clemons was employed by Enterprise as part-time driver from in or around 2001 through March 2020. 33. During his employment, Clemons was based out of Defendant’s location at JFK but transported cars for Defendant throughout the tri-state area. 34. During his employment, over twenty-five percent of Clemons’ duties were physical tasks, including but not limited to: (1) transporting vehicles; and (2) cleaning vehicles. 35. Despite regularly spending more than twenty-five percent of his shift performing these physical tasks, Clemons has been compensated by Defendant on a bi-weekly basis. 36. In this regard, Defendant failed to pay Clemons his wages earned timely as required by NYLL § 191(1)(a). 37. Throughout his employment, Defendant failed to provide Clemons with accurate wage statements as required by the NYLL. 38. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 39. The timely payment of wages provisions NYLL § 191 and its supporting regulations apply to Defendant and protect Plaintiff and the New York Class. 40. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the New York Class on a timely basis as 7 required by NYLL § 191(1)(a). 41. Due to Defendant’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the New York Class are entitled to recover from Defendant the amount of their untimely paid wages as liquidated damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided for by NYLL § 198. 42. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 43. Defendant failed to supply Plaintiff and the New York Class with an accurate statement of wages with every payment of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), listing: dates of work covered by that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked per week, including overtime hours worked if applicable; deductions; and net wages. 44. Due to Defendant’s violations of NYLL § 195(3), Plaintiff and the New York Class are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each workday that Defendant failed to provide them with accurate wage statements, or a total of five thousand dollars each, as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198. New York Labor Law – Failure to Pay Timely Wages (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Class) New York Labor Law – Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Class)

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48. Plaintiff re-states, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference, paragraphs one (1) through one forty-seven (47) as if set forth fully in this cause of action. 49. This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of three classes. 50. Class A consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in the State of New York who observed an account that appeared on their credit report(s); (a) wherein the Defendant had furnishing the national credit bureaus with a statement, that the account had been assigned to an attorney; and (b) the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(3), 1692e(5), 1692e(8), and 1692e(10) of the FDCPA for the false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of the debt. 51. Class B consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in the State of New York who communicated with Defendant within one year prior to the date of the within complaint up to the date of the filing of the complaint; (a) the Defendant denied the Plaintiff the right to dispute the debt by maintaining that the Plaintiff provide a reason for her dispute; and (b) the Defendant made false statements in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(8) and 1692e(10). -8- 52. Class C consists of all persons whom Defendant’s records reflect resided in the State of New York who observed an account that appeared on their credit report(s); (a) wherein the Defendant had furnishing the national credit bureaus with a statement, that the account had been assigned to an attorney; and (b) the Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) for collecting on a debt which was not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law. 53. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is appropriate and preferable in this case because: A. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, though the precise number of class members may be known only to the Defendant. Plaintiff estimates that each class has thousands of members B. There are questions of law and fact common to the class and these questions predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members. The principal question presented by this claim is whether the Defendant violated the FDCPA. C. The only individual issue is the identification of the consumers who observed such language in their credit reports, furnished by the Defendant to the credit bureaus (i.e. the class members), a matter capable of ministerial determination from the records of Defendant. D. The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of those of the class members. All are based on the same facts and legal theories. E. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members’ interests. The Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and -9- collection-abuse claims. The Plaintiff's interests are consistent with those of the members of the class. 54. A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class members’ claims. Congress specifically envisions class actions as a principal means of enforcing the FDCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k). The members of the class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying standards for the parties and would not be in the interest of judicial economy. 55. If the facts are discovered to be appropriate, the Plaintiff will seek to certify a class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 56. Collection attempts, such as those made by the Defendant are to be evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.” Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 57. The Defendant’s actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.

win

11. On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff responded with the words “STOP ZS61” in an attempt to opt-out of any further text message communications with Defendant. 12. Despite Plaintiff’s use of Defendant’s preferred opt-out language, Defendant ignored Plaintiff’s opt-out demand and continued to send Plaintiff further text messages from multiple numbers. 14. Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff cannabis products. 15. The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s various discounts and promotions, which Defendant sends to promote its business. 16. Defendant sent the subject texts from within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 17. Defendant’s texts were not made for an emergency purpose or to collect on a debt pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B). 18. Upon information and belief, Defendant does not have a written policy for maintaining an internal do not call list pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 64.1200(d)(1). 19. Upon information and belief, Defendant does not inform and train its personnel engaged in telemarking in the existence and the use of any internal do not call list pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 64.1200(d)(2). 20. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted. 21. To the extent that Defendant had express consent to contact Plaintiff using an ATDS, that consent was expressly revoked when Plaintiff responded “STOP”. 22. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2627 Number, and is financially responsible for phone service to the 2627 Number. 24. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 25. The text messages originated from telephone numbers 833-282-1735, 970- 795-3114, 970-438-0664, and 970-446-3561, all numbers which upon information and belief are owned and operated by Defendant or on behalf of Defendant. 26. Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life. 27. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 29. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 33. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 38. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 37 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 39. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 40. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 42. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12- month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 43. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 44. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 45. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. 47. The TCPA provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 48. Under 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d), “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity. The procedures instituted must meet certain minimum standards, including: (3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or entity making a call for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such a call is made) receives a request from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person or entity must record the request and place the subscriber’s name, if provided, and telephone number on the do-not call list at the time the request is made. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such calls are made) must honor a residential subscriber’s do-not-call request within a reasonable time from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed thirty days from the date of such request . . . . (6) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A person or entity making calls for telemarketing purposes must maintain a record of a consumer’s request not to receive further telemarketing calls. A do-not-call request must be honored for 5 years from the time the request is made. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3), (6). 50. Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members made requests to Defendant not to receive calls from Defendant. 51. Defendant failed to honor Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members’ requests. 52. Upon information and belief, Defendant has not instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of their behalf, pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d). 53. Because Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members received more than one text message in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d), as described above, Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 54. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every negligent violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 55. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members are entitled to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every knowing and/or willful violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). 56. Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members also suffered damages in the form of invasion of privacy. 57. Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class members are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant’s illegal conduct in the future, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). PROPOSED CLASS Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2) (On Behalf of the Plaintiff and the Internal Do Not Call Class)

win

1. Whether Defendant’s employees and agents such as managers, bell staff, doormen, concierges, transportation providers, security personnel, front desk and other staff are trained to assist blind and vision-impaired guests with basic needs such as: completing the hotel registration; learning about and completing service requests like laundry, dry cleaning, valet, shipping, room service, etc.; reviewing the hotel bill and charges; counting and identifying currency; using a signature guide or template in conjunction with their credit card; using a passcard-type of key; luggage rooms, business center, gym or health club, lounge facilities, rest rooms; orienting guests to hotel and guest room layouts; location of fire alarms, emergency exits and equipment; heating and air conditioning controls; TV remote controls; message retrieval system; automated wake- up systems; and safe deposit box. 2. Whether Defendant accepts guide dogs and, if so, if there are any charges associated with the guide dogs, their policies with respect to guide dogs and if there are any rest areas for guide dogs. 25. Defendant owns and operates a hotel in the City of New York. This location also offers dining and entertainment options, including on-site restaurants, room service and lobby lounges. 26. Defendant’s Website offers features to the public that should allow all consumers to access the facilities and services that it offers about their hotel. The Website is heavily integrated with their hotel, serving as their gateway. 28. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Defendant’s Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 29. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in March, 2019, Plaintiff was not able to determine from the reservation system on the Website what ADA compliant features, if any, the hotel offers and whether the guest rooms have handicap accessible facilities or communications equipment in the guest rooms suitable to blind or visually-impaired persons. As a result, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York City and New York State by being unable to learn any information about the accessibility features of the hotel or its guest rooms. Defendant Must Include Information Relating to ADA Compliant Rooms and Handicap Accessibility Features Through Its Website Reservation System 3. Whether the hotel provides a braille and/or large print menu for restaurants and/or room service and, in the alternative, if they have trained staff to read the menu to blind or vision-impaired guests. 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website reservation system have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find information on the Website reservation system relating to the accessibility of the hotel and guest rooms for blind and visually-impaired people and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from reserving a room at the hotel, staying at the hotel and using the facilities of the hotel including restaurants and attending events. 32. If the hotel and the Website reservation system were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through visiting the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the lack of information on accessibility features available on the reservation system on the Website that result in making the services and facilities of the hotel inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore use standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website and the inclusion of information on the Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system to make such information fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining the Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of including the information required under the ADA regulations on the Website reservation system in order to make its facilities and guest rooms equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website reservation system to obtain information relating to ADA accessibility of the hotel and their guest rooms, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA-required accessibility information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website to obtain the ADA- required information and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website reservation system contains the information on accessibility required under the ADA regulations; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 5. Whether or not all accessible signage complies with the requirements of the ADAAG. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 52. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s hotel. The Website is a service that is integrated with the Defendant’s hotel and is a gateway thereto. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, and, as a result, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant have failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 6. Whether or not the stairs, escalators and elevators comply with ADAAG standards, such as braille for floor numbers in the elevator and a verbal annunciator for each floor. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. The Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to include the ADA-required information on the Website reservation system, causing the Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden." 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 66. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA- required information on its reservation system making their hotel inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and their physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub-Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 7. Whether or not the hotel has removed or protected protruding objects which protrude more than 4” into walkways and hallways such as drinking fountains, fire extinguishers, and planters and if they provide cane detectable warnings for the underside of stairways. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 75. Defendant’s hotel is a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and the Website is a service that is integrated with their establishments. 76. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates physical locations in the City of New York and the Website, making the Defendant a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 78. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 79. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that does not contain the ADA- required information on its reservation system making their hotels inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. failed to take actions to correct the lack of the ADA-required information in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 8. Whether or not the guest rooms contain tactile and large print thermostat controls and talking/large print clocks. 80. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 82. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 83. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 84. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 85. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 86. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York State and City Sub- Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 87. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that the Website does not contain the ADA-required information on its reservation system denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of the Website and by extension their physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 9. Whether or not signage in the hotel can be easily located by blind and vision-impaired persons with 2” minimum height raised letters and braille characters centered at 60” above the finished floor to indicate floor numbers, rest rooms, lobby, vending and ice machines and all other hotel facilities and amenities. b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website and its reservation system under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website and the reservation system complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and d. Regularly check the hotel and the guest rooms to ensure that the accessibility features that they describe on its website reservation system are in fact available and properly maintained. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Website and Compliance with Requirement to Describe Accessibility Features VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

win

1. the Muscle Milk RTD Products: C)'!osport Whey Isolate Protein Drink; Monster Milk: Protein Power ShaKe; GenuIne Muscle Milk: Protein Nutrition Shake; and Muscle MilK Pro Series 40: Mega Protein Shake; 1. the Muscle Milk RTD Products: CY1osport Whey Isolate Protein Drink; Monster Milk: Protein Power Shake; GenuIne Muscle Milk: Protein Nutrition Shake; and Muscle MilK Pro Series 40: Mega Protein Shake; 15. It is axiomatic that the amount of reported protein contained within Defendant's Muscle Milk RID Products is material to any consumer seeking to purchase a protein supplement. Accordingly, Defendant fortifies each Muscle Milk RTD Product with Milk Protein Isolate as its primarily, and most important, ingredient. Milk Protein Isolate differs from raw milk because it is processed to include a higher concentration of protein and removes much of the fats and carbohydrates traditionally found in milk and other naturally occurring beverages. Thus, the type of concentrated protein within the Muscle Milk RID Product is particularly prized. 16. Defendant labels and advertises all of its protein supplements, especially its Muscle Milk RTD Products, in a manner that highlights the amount of added protein contained within. Each Muscle Milk RTD Product lists its respective protein content on each Product's front label, directly below the title ofthe Product, as well as on the back nutritional label. Such representations constitute an express warranty regarding the Muscle Milk R TD Products' protein content. 17. For example, the Cytosport Whey Isolate Protein Drink's product label states plainly that it fortified with 32 grams ofprotein on the front ofthe packaging and also indicates that there are 32 grams ofprotein per bottle (15 grams per serving) in the Nutrition Facts section I: 1 All product images contained within this complaint were taken from Defendant's website. 6 2. the Muscle Milk Powder Products: Muscle Milk: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Light: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Naturals: Nature's Ultimate Lean Muscle Proteini Muscle Milk Gainer: High Protein Gainer Powder Drink Mix; ana Muscle Milk Pro Series 50: Lean Muscle Mega Protein Powder; and 2. the Muscle Milk Powder Products: Muscle Milk: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Light: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Naturals: Nature's Ultimate Lean Muscle Proteini Muscle Milk Gainer: High Protein Gainer Powder Drink Mix; ana Muscle Milk Pro Series )'0: Lean Muscle Mega Protein Powder; and 3. the Lean Muscle Milk Products: Defendant's Muscle Milk: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Light: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Naturals: Nature's Ultimate Lean Muscle Protein; Muscle Milk Pro Series 50: Lean Muscle Mega Protein Powder; and Monster Milk: Lean Muscle Protein Supplement. California Sub-Class: All persons residing in California who, within four (4) years of the filing ofthis Complaint, purchased: 3. the Lean Muscle Milk Products: Defendant's Muscle Milk: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Light: Lean Muscle Protein Powder; Muscle Milk Naturals: Nature's Ultimate Lean Muscle 19 52. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for the following Class ofpersons: Nationwide Class: All persons in the United States who, within four (4) years ofthe fIlIng of this Complaint, purchased: 60. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the 23 69. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 70. Defendant's Muscle Milk and Cytosport products are a "good" as defined by California Civil Code §1761(a). 25 82. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 83. The Sherman Law, HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 109875 et seq., broadly prohibits the misbranding ofany food products. The Sherman Law provides that food is misbranded "if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular." HEALTH & SAF. 91. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs ofthis Complaint. 92. Plaintiffs and other members of the Class and the and the California Sub­ Class who purchased Defendant's Muscle Milk and Cytosport products suffered a substantial injury by virtue of buying a product that misrepresented and/or omitted the true contents and benefits of its protein, L-glutamine, and fat contents. Had Plaintiffs and members ofthe Class and the and the California Sub-Class known that Defendant's materials, advertisement and other inducements misrepresented and/or omitted the true contents and benefits of its Muscle Milk and Cytosport products, they would not have purchased said products. 93. Defendant's actions alleged herein violate the laws and public policies of California and the federal government, as set out preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 94. There is no benefit to consumers or competition by allowing Defendant to deceptively market, advertise, package and label its Muscle Milk and Cytosport products. 95. Plaintiffs and Class and the and the California Sub-Class members who purchased Defendant's Muscle Milk and Cytosport products had no way of reasonably knowing that these products were deceptively marketed, advertised, packaged and labeled. Thus, Class and the California Sub-Class members could not have reasonably avoided the injury they suffered. 29 99. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the 30 A. Misrepresentations Regarding Defendant's RTD Products' Protein Content Breach of Express Warranty (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class) 129. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs ofthis Complaint. 130. Plaintiffs and each member ofthe Class formed a contract with Defendant at the time Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased one or more of the Muscle Milk RTD Products and/or Muscle Milk Powder Products. The terms of that contract include the promises and affirmations of fact made by Defendant on the packaging ofthe Muscle Milk Powder Products regarding the Products' "Protein Blend" and on the packaging ofthe Muscle Milk RID Products regarding the Products' protein content. 131. The Muscle Milk and Cytosport products' packaging constitute express warranties, became part of the basis of the bargain, and are part of a standardized contract between Plaintiffs and the members of the Nationwide Class on the one hand, and Defendant on the other. 132. All conditions precedent to Defendant's liability under this contract have been performed by Plaintiffs and the Class. 133. Defendant breached the terms of this contract, including the express warranties, with Plaintiffs and the Class by not providing the products that could provide the benefits promised, i.e. that the Products contains a "Protein Blend" which included L-glutamine and providing Products that include the warranted amount of protein, as alleged above. 134. As a result of Defendant's breach of its contract, Plaintiffs and the Class have been damaged in the amount of the different purchase price of any and all ofthe Muscle Milk RID Products and Muscle Milk Powder Products they purchased and the price ofa product which provides the benefits and contents as warranted. III 36 Violation of FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201, et seq. ­ Deceptive and Unfair"Trade Practices (On Behalf of the Florida Sub-Class) 104. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs ofthis Complaint. 105. Plaintiff Reichert is a consumer as defined by FLORIDA STATUTE § 501.203. 106. Defendant's Muscle Milk and Cytosport products are goods within the meaning of FLORIDA STATUTE §§ 501.201, et seq. 107. Defendant engaged in trade or commerce, as defined by FLA. STAT. § 501.203, by advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, or distributing its Muscle Milk and Cytosport products with the State of Florida. 108. FLORIDA STATUTE § 500.11(l)(a) deem food (including nutritional supplements) misbranded when the labels contains a statement that is "false or misleading in any particular" and adopts the federal labeling requirements as Florida law. 109. Federal/state statutes and regulations prohibit misleads consumers by including an ingredient in each Muscle Milk and Cytosport product's nutritional labels which is not actually included in the products themselves or overstating the amount of certain nutritional ingredients. 110. Additionally, the word "lean" to may not be used to describe a food product or dietary supplement unless it complies with definitional requirements of 21 C.F .R. § 101.62(e). If a food product is described as lean, and does not comply with 21 C.F.R. § 101.62(e), the food is considered misbranded. 21 C.F.R. § 101.62(f). Ill. Plaintiff Reichert and other members of the Florida Sub-Class who purchased Defendant's Muscle Milk and Cytosport products suffered substantial injury by virtue of buying a product that misrepresented and/or omitted the true nature of its protein, L-glutamine, and fat content. Had Plaintiff Reichert and other reasonable consumers known that Defendant's materials, advertisements and other inducements misrepresented and/or omitted the true contents and benefits of its Muscle Milk and 32 Violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, et seq. ­ Unlawful Business Acts and Practices (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class and the California Sub-Class) Violation of M.C.L. §§ 445.901, et seq. ­ Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices (On Behalf of the Michigan Sub-Class) 118. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs ofthis Complaint. 119. Plaintiff Ehrlichman and Defendant are persons as defined by M.C.L. § 445.902(d). 120. Defendant engaged in trade or commerce, as defined by M.C.L. § 445.902(g), by advertising, soliciting, providing, offering, or distributing its Muscle Milk and Cytosport products with the State of Michigan. 121. MICHIGAN FOOD LAW ACT 92 of 2000 deem food (including nutritional supplements) misbranded when the labels contains a statement that is "false or misleading in any particular" and adopts the federal labeling requirements as Michigan law. 122. Federal/state statutes and regulations prohibit misleading consumers by including an ingredient in each Muscle Milk and Cytosport product's nutritional labels that is not actually included in the products themselves or overstating the amount of certain nutritional ingredients. 123. Additionally, the word "lean" may not be used to describe a food product or dietary supplement unless it complies with definitional requirements of 21 C.F .R. § 101.62(e). Ifa food product is described as lean, and does not comply with 21 C.F.R. § 101.62(e), the food is considered misbranded. 21 C.F.R. § 101.62(f). 34 Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq. ­ Breach of Written Warranty (On Behalf of the Nationwide C1ass) 135. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs ofthis Complaint. 136. This claim is brought by Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the nationwide Class solely for breach of federal law. This claim is not based on any violation of state law. 137. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 et seq., creates a private federal cause ofaction for breach of a "written warranty" as defined by the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) and § 2310(d)(1). 138. The Muscle Milk Powder Products and Muscle Milk RTD Products are "consumer products" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1), as they constitute tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family or household purposes. 139. Plaintiffs and members of the Class are "consumers" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3), since they are buyers of Muscle Milk Powder Products and Muscle Milk RTD Products for purposes other than resale. 140. Defendant is an entity engaged in the business of making and selling dietary supplements available, either directly or indirectly, to consumers such as Plaintiffs and the Class. As such, Defendant is a "supplier" as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4). 141. Through its labeling, Defendant gave and offered a written warranty to consumers relating to the nature and quantity ofL-glutamine contains within the Muscle Milk Powder Products and the protein contents ofthe Muscle Milk RID Products. As a result, Defendant is a "warrantor" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 2301(5). 142. Defendant provided a "written warranty" within the meaning of 15 U.s.C. 2301(6) for the Muscle Milk Powder Products by labeling its products as containing L­ 37 Violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, et seq.­ Untrue, Misleading and Deceptive Advertising (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class and the California Sub-class) Violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE SS 17200, et seq. ­ Fraudulent Business Acts and Yractices (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class and the California Sub-class) Violation of CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 1750, et seq.­ Misrepresentation of a Product's standard, guality, sponsorship approval, and/or certificatIOn (On Behajf ofthe California Subclass) Violation of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, et seq. ­ Unfair Business Acts and Practices (On Behalf of the Nationwide Class and the California Suh-class)

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11. Plaintiff alleges that it was Defendants’ policy not to pay overtime until you worked 60 hours in a workweek. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that neither she nor the members of the putative class were paid overtime for any hours worked over 40 in a workweek. 12. Based upon information and belief, Defendant Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. is a less-than-truckload, company. It offers regional, inter-regional and national Less than Truckload shipping (“LTL”) service. In addition to its core LTL services, the company offers logistics services including ground and air expedited transportation, supply chain consulting, transportation management, truckload brokerage, container delivery and warehousing, as well as household moving services. It contracts with freight forwarding services throughout the world. It is headquartered in Thomasville, North Carolina. 14. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every allegation contained above and re- alleges said allegations as if fully set forth herein. 15. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants never paid her or the other members of the putative class overtime wages when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a week. 16. Plaintiffs brings this suit as a Collective Action under the Fair Labor and Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (“FLSA”) on behalf of the “FLSA Class” defined as: FLSA Class: All persons who were, are, or will be employed by Defendants as a non-exempt employee in the United States within the applicable limitations period, which is three years preceding the filing of the original Complaint herein plus such additional time as may be provided pursuant to equitable tolling. 17. Plaintiffs allege that during the FLSA Class Period, they are and were: (A.) individuals who resided in the United States of America; (B.) were employed as “non-exempt” employees for Defendants in the United States within the three years preceding the filing of the complaint herein; (C.) worked more than 40 hours in any given week; (D.) did not receive all overtime compensation for all hours worked over 40 hours in any given week; (E.) did not receive reimbursement for expenses that were paid for the primary benefit of the named Defendants. (F.) worked regular hours for which they received no pay whatsoever; (G.) are members of the FLSA Collective Class as defined in the preceding paragraph in this Complaint; and, (H.) have signed a consent to sue that shall have been filed in this court. 19. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 20. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23. The classes which Plaintiff seeks to represent are composed of, and defined as follows: Georgia Sub-Class: All employees who were or are employed by Defendants during the Class Period in Georgia as “non-exempt employees” between January 25, 2015 and the date of judgment in this action. As used in this class definition, the term "non-exempt employee" refers to those who Defendants have classified as non-exempt. (Collectively “Putative Class” or “Class Members”) 21. The class is so numerous that the individual joinder of all members is impracticable. While the exact number and identification of class members are unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery directed to Defendants, Plaintiff is informed and believes that the class includes potentially hundreds of members. 23. The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the members of the putative class. Plaintiff and other class members sustained losses, injuries and damages arising from Defendants’ common policies, practices, procedures, protocols, routines, and rules which were applied to other class members as well as Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks recovery for the same type of losses, injuries, and damages as were suffered by other members of the proposed class. 24. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the proposed classes because she is a member of the class, and her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members she seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel, experienced in the prosecution of complex class actions, and together Plaintiff and her counsel intend to prosecute this action vigorously for the benefit of the classes. The interests of the Class Members will fairly and adequately be protected by Plaintiff and her attorneys. 25. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation since individual litigation of the claims of all Class Members is impracticable. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts if these matters were to proceed on an individual basis, because this would potentially result in hundreds of individuals, repetitive lawsuits. Further, individual litigation presents the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and the prospect of a “race to the courthouse,” and an inequitable allocation of recovery among those with equally meritorious claims. By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefit of a single adjudication, economics of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court. 27. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 28. The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201, et. seq., states that an employee must be compensated for all hours worked, including straight time compensation and overtime compensation. (29 C.F.R. §778.223 and 29 C.F.R. §778.315.) This Court has concurrent jurisdiction over claims involving the Fair Labor Standards Act pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216. 29. Plaintiff also brings this lawsuit as a collective action under the Fair Standards Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. §201, et. seq. (the “FLSA”), on behalf of all persons who were, are, or will be employed by Defendants in a non-exempt hourly position during the period commencing three years prior to the filing of this Complaint to and through a date of judgment, who performed work in excess of forty (40) hours in one week and did not receive all compensation as required by the FLSA for the hours worked. To the extent equitable, tolling operates to toll claims by and against the collective employees against the Defendants, the collective statute of limitations should be adjusted accordingly. 31. Questions of law and fact common to collective employees as a whole include, but are not limited to the following: a. Whether Defendants’ policies and practices failed to accurately record all hours worked by Plaintiff and other collective employees; b. Whether Defendants failed to adequately compensate collective employees for expenses incurred for the direct benefit of Defendants as required by the 7. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 8. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a “Dock Worker” for approximately two and a half (2 ½) years with her employment ending on August 1, 2017. She started off part-time and became a full-time employee with Defendants on March 6, 2015. Plaintiff worked 10 to 12- hour shifts averaging between 45 to 55 hours a workweek. She was paid $24.60 an hour. 9. Plaintiff’s “Job Summary” as a “Dock Worker” included “successfully loads and unloads freight throughout the shift using a forklift or manually in a safe, efficient manner.” FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES AND OVERTIME COMPENSATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Against Defendants on behalf of Plaintiff And Proposed Members of the Plaintiff Class)

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30. WeWork is a real estate and workspace sharing company. Founded in 2010 by defendant Neumann, his wife Rebekah Neumann, and Miguel McKelvey, the Company opened its first facility in New York City, offering shared workspace and services to entrepreneurs, freelancers, startups, and small businesses. The Company distinguished itself by its focus on developing perk-filled shared workspaces intended to foster a sense of collaboration and community. 31. Defendant Neumann became the public face of the Company. He led with striking personal charisma, engendering admiration both within and outside the Company for his apparent entrepreneurial vision. He was prone to opining on grand ideas like ending world hunger or figuring out ways to “solve the problem of children without parents.” He led lavish “summer camps” in which thousands of WeWork employees gathered in an annual music-festival-like atmosphere and engaged in activities meant to foster mindfulness, camaraderie and progressive ideals while being entertained by popular musicians like Bastille and Alesso. As defendant Neumann boldly proclaimed, “We are here in order to change the world. Nothing less than that interests me.” 32. WeWork grew quickly. By 2012, the Company had four locations in New York City as well as facilities in Los Angeles and San Francisco. In 2014, WeWork opened two co- working facilities in Washington, D.C. and another in Seattle and its first international location in London. By the end of 2015, WeWork had 54 coworking facilities in New York City, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., Miami, Chicago, Austin, Berkeley, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle. The Company’s international locations also expanded to Tel Aviv and Herzliya in Israel. For Violation of Cal. Corp. Code §§25401 and 25501 Against Defendant WeWork and the Individual Defendants 129. Plaintiff incorporates ¶¶1-122. 130. This claim is brought on behalf of those Class members who purchased WeWork securities from WeWork and/or the Individual Defendants. 131. Defendant WeWork and the Individual Defendants offered to sell and/or sold securities to plaintiff and members of the Class in and from this state by means of written and oral communications that included untrue statements of material fact and omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which the statements were made, not misleading. 132. The defendants named herein failed to exercise reasonable care to ensure the truth and accuracy of such statements, and plaintiff had no knowledge of the falsity of such statements. 133. As a direct and proximate result of WeWork’s and the Individual Defendants’ violations of law described herein, plaintiff and members of the Class have been damaged. The Rise of WeWork

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22. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully rewritten herein. 24. The Named Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are similarly situated in that they had, and have, substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions during the statutory period, and were, and are, subjected to Defendant Versacom’s common practices as more fully described herein, of unlawfully refusing, through various practices and policies, to pay them all straight time and overtime pay to which they were and are entitled, in violation of 27. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully rewritten herein. 28. Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf, as well as on behalf of each and all other persons similarly situated, and thus, seek class certification under FRCP 23. 30. The class that Plaintiffs seek to represent may be described as follows: Class 1 –All current and former non-exempt employees of Versacom who worked as a “Field Wireless Technician” or similar position however titled and whom Versacom failed to properly compensate for all hours worked and/or failed to compensate for overtime work performed in excess of forty-hours (40) per work week. 31. Plaintiffs seek to represent only those members of the above described group “Class 1” who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt-in to this action, have provided consent in writing to be represented by Plaintiff’s counsel as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 32. Those persons who choose to opt-in (hereinafter referred to as “Class Members”) will be listed on subsequent pleadings. Copies of their written consents to sue and opt-in will be filed with the Court. 34. Plaintiffs incorporate all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 35. Defendants' practice of failing to pay Plaintiffs time-and-a-half rate for hours in excess of forty (40) per workweek violates the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 207. 36. Specifically, Defendants violated overtime rules by entering into agreements with Plaintiffs and other Field Wireless Technicians to pay an “all inclusive” flat daily rate and then forbidding these employees to record and/or request overtime payment. Consequently, the Plaintiffs are entitled to time and a half for all hours worked over forty in the past three years. 37. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully rewritten herein. 37. None of the exemptions provided by the FLSA regulating the duty of employers to pay overtime at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which its employees are employed are applicable to the Defendants or the Plaintiffs. VI. 39. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants have been subject to the requirements of the FLSA. 40. Defendant Versacom employed Plaintiff Tommy Nguyen from 2007 to 2013. 41. Defendant Versacom employed Plaintiff Paulus Niekdam in 2012. 42. Defendant Versacom employed Plaintiff Loc Tran from on or about 2007 to 2013. 43. Plaintiffs worked for Defendant Versacom as a Field Wireless Technician and received a weekly salary based on an “all inclusive” daily or site wage intended to cover a sixty (60) – seventy-two (72) hour, six-day (6) workweek. 44. As Field Wireless Technicians, Plaintiffs performed, during a significant period of most days, what was or is otherwise work performed by “hourly” or non-exempt employees due to the requirements of the position and the demands of Defendant Versacom’s management. 45. Throughout the course of their employment, Plaintiffs have been required to work overtime hours in excess of forty (40) hours per each seven-day (7) workweek. 46. Defendants operate a privately held information technology and services company which offers industry certified technicians who provide onsite support for new technology initiatives, telecom network testing, and network repair & maintenance to customers throughout the United States. 48. Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if fully rewritten herein. 49. Defendants' practice of failing to pay Plaintiffs at the required minimum wage rate violates the FLSA. See, 29 U.S.C. § 206. 50. Specifically, because the Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other Field Wireless Technicians for work performed in certain workweeks, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs and other Field Wireless Technicians the federally mandated minimum wage in those weeks. Consequently, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover the federally mandated minimum wage rate for all hours worked and not paid in the past three years.

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15. Easton is one of the largest manufacturers of sporting goods equipment in the country. 16. Some of Easton’s most common and popular sports products are youth baseball bats. Easton manufactures, sells, and distributes a number of different types of baseball bats under various Easton brands. 17. Easton’s bats are some of the most high-end, premium youth baseball bats on the market, with the more expensive models retailing for over three hundred and fifty dollars each ($350.00). Among baseball players, “Easton” baseball bats are widely known as an upscale baseball bat that sells for a premium price. 18. Many of Easton’s customers who buy its baseball bats are parents of school age children in middle school and high school who play competitively for various local and national youth baseball leagues. 48. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the foregoing allegations by reference as though fully set forth herein. 49. Section 17500 of the California Business and Professions Code generally prohibits untrue or misleading advertising. 57. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 58. California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) defines unfair competition to include any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” act or practice, as well as any “unfair, untrue or misleading” advertising. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 59. Section 17200 of the UCL applies to all Class members’ claims, because Defendants’ poor quality control measures and decisions as to the bats’ marketing and labeling occurred within and emanated from the State of California. 60. Defendants have engaged in “unlawful” conduct in violation of the UCL, because Defendants’ bats are falsely and misleadingly advertised as being substantially lighter than they actually are in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 as described above. 64. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the foregoing allegations by reference as though fully set forth herein. 65. Through product labeling and advertising, Defendants created written express warranties and expressly warranted to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class as to the specific weight of the bats. 66. Specifically, Defendants stamped each affected bat with a label expressly warranting that the bat weighed a certain amount in ounces. As such, Defendants uniformly made an express warranty to Plaintiff and the other Class members, warranting that Easton bats weighed a specific amount in ounces. 67. Prior to making their respective purchases, Plaintiff and the other Class members sought out and relied on Defendants’ express warranty that Easton bats weighed a specific amount, appropriate for the person who would be using the bat. Thus, the weight representations made by Defendants formed a part of the basis of the bargain. 71. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the foregoing allegations by reference as though fully set forth herein. 72. The implied warranty of merchantability requires that goods be fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that type are used; have adequate labeling; and conform to any promises or affirmations made on any product label. 73. Defendants, as the marketers and distributors of the Easton baseball bats purchased by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, are merchants. 74. Plaintiff and the other Class members purchased Defendants’ baseball bats in a consumer transaction. 75. The overweight baseball bats that Defendants sold were not fit for the ordinary purposes for which they were sold, and they did not conform to the expectations of consumers. Individuals who purchased Defendants’ overweight bats cannot use them for training, practice, or in games, because the additional weight interferes with performance and increases the risk of sports injuries. 79. Plaintiff hereby incorporates the allegations in paragraphs 1 – 63 by reference as though fully set forth herein. 80. Plaintiff and the other Class members conferred a benefit on Defendants by purchasing the non-conforming baseball bats. This benefit is measurable using the price of Defendants’ bats and the premium built into the cost of Defendants’ bats to consumers. Defendants appreciate or have knowledge of such benefit. 81. Defendants’ retention of this benefit violates principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. 82. It would be inequitable and unjust for Defendants to retain the benefit of revenues obtained from purchases of non-conforming baseball bats by Plaintiff and the other Class members, because Defendants materially misrepresented the weights of the baseball bats such that the baseball bats were no longer age and strength appropriate. Background Breach of Implied Warranty (on behalf of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class) Breach of Express Warranty (on behalf of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class) Unjust Enrichment (in the alternative and on behalf of Plaintiff and the other Class members) Violation of the California Business and Professions Code: Unfair Business Practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.) on behalf of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class Violation of the California Business and Professions Code: False Advertising (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500) on behalf of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class

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NEW JERSEY CONSUMER FRAUD ACT (against LG Korea and LG USA) 1. Refund of the purchase price of all of the Affected Products purchased by the Class Members; 1. Rescission of the purchase and return of the purchase price; 1. Restitution and disgorgement of profits; 2. Treble Damages; 2. Prejudgment and Post judgment Interest; 2. Consequential Damages; 22. On information and belief, LG Korea has been engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, marketing, advertising, selling, warranting, and servicing LG brand appliances in the United States since 2001. LG USA operates as LG Korea’s exclusive seller of LG products in the United States. LG AL operates as LG Korea’s exclusive after-market servicer 11 of LG products sold in the United States. 23. LG Korea is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of air conditioners and other appliances. LG has designed, manufactured, marketed, advertised, sold, and warranted air conditioner product lines, including the Affected Products. 24. LG claims that it “places the utmost priority on consumer safety.” LG claims that “[F]rom the design stage to a product’s usage and disposal, [it] continuously looks for ways in which to improve product safety to prevent any risk to a consumer’s health or property caused by a faulty product.” LG claims that “it is continuing to improve process management and quality so that customers can feel more safety with product made by LG Electronics.” LG also claims it maintains “Customer Satisfaction” by “always keeping up with which service items customers want most, as it continues to provide the best service possible.”1 According to LG, “Life’s Good” when you purchase its products. For purchasers of the Affected Products, life with LG products has been far from good. The Defects 25. The Affected Products fail to perform as advertised because they fail to adequately heat and cool as designed. The Affected Products prematurely fail and produce various fault code errors that require repair, and, in certain environments, the Affected Products are not adequately designed to properly handle humidity. They also produce excessive condensation and moisture. 26. The defects leave the Affected Products unusable because they fail to function as designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold. 27. After discovering problems with the units, consumers repeatedly have attempted to have the units repaired by LG, LG distributors, and third-party installers to no avail. 1 (http://www.lg.com/tn_en/about-lg/sustainability/stakeholder-engagement/ customer.jsp) (last visited September 4, 2012). 12 28. LG failed to adequately design, manufacture, and/or test the Affected Products to ensure that they were free from defects at the time of sale. LG further failed to adequately inform customers of the defects once they were known to LG. 29. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs have used their LG air conditioners in a foreseeable manner and in the manner in which LG intended them to be used. 3. Prejudgment and Post judgment Interest; and 3. Such other just and equitable relief as the Court deems proper. 3. Reasonable attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of suit; 30. The defects manifested during the expected useful life of the Affected Products (both within and outside the applicable warranty periods), are substantially likely to prevent the Affected Products from performing their essential function, and make it impossible for Plaintiffs to use the Affected Products as intended. 31. The customer would not have purchased the Affected Products had the defects been known to them. 32. The defects rendered the Affected Products unfit for the ordinary purpose for which air conditioners are sold at the time LG sold them to Plaintiffs and the Class Members. 33. The defects required, and will continue to require, replacement parts and costly repairs to the Affected Products to the extent they can even be made operational. Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ Reasonable Expectations 34. In purchasing the Affected Products, Plaintiffs reasonably and legitimately expected the air conditioners to operate according to their intended purpose. 35. LG has represented, and Consumers therefore reasonably believed, that the expected useful life of its HVAC products (like the Affected Products) is eighty-four (84) months/seven (7) years. Consumers do not expect that the air conditioners will be manufactured with inherent and latent defects that results in failure well before their expected lifetime requiring out-of-pocket expenditures to maintain and repair the units. 13 36. Customers reasonably expected the Affected Products to effectively heat and cool their properties during the air conditioners’ expected useful lives as marketed and represented by LG. 37. Plaintiffs and the Class Members reasonably expected LG to disclose the existence of any defects that were known to LG at the time of sale, and after the time of sale, that prevented the Affected Products from functioning properly, and to repair or replace the Affected Products with suitable goods. 38. As a result of the defects alleged herein, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have experienced failure of their air conditioners, did not get what they paid for, and have incurred actual damages for attempting to repair or replace the defective Affected Products. LG was Aware of the Defects 39. Before it sold the Affected Products, LG knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the models contained defects that would cause the Affected Products to malfunction and render them incapable of performing their intended functions. 4. Such other just and equitable relief as the Court deems proper. 4. Prejudgment and Post judgment Interest; and 40. LG did not implement a plan to address the defects. Instead, LG manufactured and sold later models that contained the same defects. 41. For some air conditioners that failed within the applicable warranty period, LG suggested repairs to consumers knowing that such repairs would not address the underlying defects and do nothing to prevent later failures. For other air conditioners, LG routinely and strategically blamed others (e.g., defective installation, poor maintenance, etc.) for problems it knew, or was reckless in not knowing, directly resulted from the design and manufacturing of the Affected Products and refused to make any effort to remedy the problem. This was part of a common plan and scheme to avoid disclosing or actually remedying the defects in hopes that the 14 warranty period would expire on purchasers of the Affected Products and leave them with no remedy or recourse. 42. For the Affected Products that LG made an apparent effort to repair, LG was aware that its repairs would not cure the defects but would instead merely delay inevitable product failures. In doing so, LG intended to postpone the failures of the air conditioners until after the expiration of the applicable warranties. For example, LG provided replacement thermistors for Inverter units while knowing that defective boards (a more costly replacement part) were the root cause of the thermistor failures. For example, for PTAC products, LG knew or should have known in 2007 that the units contained defective boards and later that the units contained fan motors that were undersized and would ultimately burn out. 43. When Affected Products failed outside the warranty period, LG left the Plaintiffs to incur out-of-pocket expenses to repair or replace components or the Affected Products as a whole. At times, LG also sold or provided Plaintiffs and the Class Members with defective replacement parts. Thus, Plaintiffs and the Class Members also incurred additional costs and expenses to replace defective replacement parts supplied by LG that also failed. 44. Despite knowing that the repairs it recommended would not cure the defects, LG nonetheless convinced its customers to incur the related expenses in a concerted effort to conceal the defects and avoid paying for labor, expensive replacement parts, and other warranted claims in an effort to force its customers to simply give up. LG’s Omissions and Misrepresentations 45. LG failed to properly and adequately design, manufacture, and/or test the Affected Products to ensure that they were free from defects. LG knew or was reckless in not knowing of the defects when it uniformly warranted, advertised, marketed, and sold the Affected Products to 15 Plaintiffs. 46. LG did not disclose to its customers the fact that the defects existed at the time of sale and that the defects would render the Affected Products unable to perform their essential function before the end of their expected useful lives. LG likewise did not disclose that its recommended repairs would do nothing to cure the defects and would only, at best, briefly delay the impact of the defects, thereby postponing failure in the Affected Products. 47. Instead, in its uniform marketing and advertising, LG falsely represented that the Affected Products were free from defects and that they would perform their essential function. 48. LG knew that consumers were unaware of the defects and that they reasonably expected the air conditioners to effectively perform their intended function. LG also knew that customers expected LG to disclose any defects that would prevent the air conditioners from performing that function long before the end of their expected useful lives, and that such disclosure would impact consumers’ decisions as to whether to purchase the Affected Products. LG knew and intended for consumers to rely on its material misrepresentations and omissions with regard to the defects when purchasing the Affected Products and in attempting repair efforts. 49. As a result of LG’s uniform misrepresentations and omissions in its marketing and advertising, Plaintiffs were led to believe that the Affected Products would operate without defects, and Plaintiffs purchased LG air conditioners in reliance on that belief. 5. Such other just and equitable relief as the Court deems proper. 50. Unfortunately for consumers, LG’s continued representations that the Affected Products were free from defects and would adequately perform as designed and built were not true. LG knew when it sold the Affected Products that the air conditioners would be adversely affected by the existing defects long before the end of the air conditioners’ expected useful lives rendering the air conditioners unable to work properly. 16 51. LG had the capacity to, and did, systematically deceive consumers into believing that they were purchasing air conditioners that were free from defects and could be used safely and practically to heat and cool their properties. 52. LG actively concealed from and/or failed to disclose to Plaintiffs, the Class Members, and everyone, the true defective nature of the Affected Products, and failed to remove the Affected Products from the marketplace or take adequate remedial action. LG dispatched its representatives and repeatedly represented that the Affected Products were free of defects even though it knew when it sold the air conditioners that they contained a defect that would render the air conditioners unable to perform their intended function. Furthermore, LG sold and serviced the Affected Products even though it knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that the Affected Products were defective and that Plaintiffs and the Class Members would be unable to use the air conditioners for their intended purpose. 53. To this day, LG continues to misrepresent and/or conceal material information from Plaintiffs, the Class Members, and the public about the defects in the Affected Products. When customers complain, report problems, or file warranty claims, LG has failed to disclose the cause of the problems and has claimed that the problems were caused by a myriad of other problems unrelated to their defects. LG’s active concealment is part of its common plan and scheme to continue to mislead its customers and to avoid remedying the defects in its products. Fraudulent Concealment Allegations 54. Plaintiffs’ claims arise in part from LG’s fraudulent concealment of the true defects. To the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims arise from LG’s fraudulent concealment, there is no one document, communication, or interaction, upon which Plaintiffs base their claims. They allege that at all relevant times, including specifically at the time they purchased their air 17 conditioners: (1) LG knew, or was reckless in not knowing, of the defects; (2) LG was under a duty to disclose the defects based upon its exclusive knowledge of the defects, its representations about its products, and its concealment of the defects; and (3) LG never disclosed the defects to the Plaintiffs or anyone at any time or place or in any manner, even when directly asked whether the Affected Products contained defects. 55. Plaintiffs make the following specific fraud allegations with as much specificity as possible absent access to the information necessarily available only to LG: (a) Who: LG concealed the defects from Plaintiffs, the Class Members, and everyone in the chain of distribution. Plaintiffs are unaware of, and therefore unable to identify, the true names and identities of those individuals at LG responsible for such decisions. Upon information and belief, these individuals include, but are not limited to, employees within LG’s “CAC” division/department (e.g., engineers, salesman, technical support, etc.). (b) What: LG knew at the time it sold the Affected Products, or was reckless in not knowing, that the existing defects in the air conditioners would cause the air conditioners to prematurely fail or otherwise not perform as intended, thereby rendering the Affected Products unable to perform their essential purpose of heating and cooling their properties long before the end of their expected useful lives (within and without outside of the applicable warranty periods). (c) When, Where, and How: Beginning no later than 2007, LG concealed this material information at all times with respect to the Affected Products, including through the time of sale, on an ongoing basis, and continuing to this day. LG concealed this material information in every communication it had with Plaintiffs, the Class Members, 18 and everyone in the chain of distribution and after-market service. Plaintiffs are aware of no document, communication, or other place or thing, in which LG disclosed this material information to anyone outside of LG or LG’s distribution chain. Such information does not appear in any sales documents, displays, advertisements, warranties, owner’s manual, or on LG’s website that can be accessed by the general public. When customers complain, report problems, or file warranty claims, LG has failed to disclose the cause of the problems and has misrepresented that the problems were caused by a myriad of other problems unrelated to the air conditioner’s defects. LG’s active concealment is part of its common plan and scheme to continue to mislead its customers and to avoid remedying the defects in its products. (i) Regarding the inverter units, in December, 2010, LG directed its distributors to “quarantine” units that had not yet been sold to customers such as Plaintiffs, but specifically instructed them not to do anything to the units already in the field. In December, 2010, LG issued a service bulletin regarding problems with its Inverter products; however, LG did not disclose this bulletin to the general public, and it was not mailed or otherwise directly provided to LG’s customers. It also did not disclose the full extent and nature of the defects with the products. This bulletin was a further effort to mislead its customers and suppress the true nature of the defects. This is but one example. (ii) Regarding the PTAC products, LG issued a series of service bulletins (dated December, 2007, June, 2009, and April, 2011) admitting that its PTAC units contained defective boards, fan motors, coils, and/or compressors. However, LG hid these bulletins from the general public and did not mail or 19 otherwise directly provide them to LG’s customers. Although LG agreed to extend its warranty on the PTAC products for some of these defects, LG refused to pay expenses for past labor and materials incurred by its customers in an effort to remedy the defects. LG has further failed to abide by its promise to remedy the problems and has instead continued to stall and delay repairs. Again, these are merely examples. (d) Why: LG concealed this material information for the purpose of inducing Plaintiffs and the Class Members to purchase the Affected Products at full price rather than purchasing competitors’ air conditioners or paying LG less for the Affected Products. Had LG disclosed the truth, neither Plaintiffs nor the Class Members would have bought the Affected Products, or, at a minimum, would have paid less for them. Further, Plaintiffs would not have engaged in futile efforts to attempt to repair the defective air conditioners, including paying for labor and parts that would not remedy the defects that were known or should have been known to LG before they were sold and incurring other consequential damages. 64. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 65. The Class that Plaintiffs seek to represent is defined as follows: All persons or entities who are citizens of and/or are legally residing in the United States who have purchased or own or have owned any LG air conditioner since 2007 including, but not limited to, Inverter products (e.g., Inverter CST_ FST, Inverter Split, Flex Multi, Multi V, DFS systems), PTAC products, and other LG air conditioner models. Excluded from the Class are (a) LG and any entity in which LG has a controlling interest, and its legal representatives, officers, directors, employees, assigns, and successors, (b) the United States government and any agency or instrumentality thereof; (c) the judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the judge’s immediate family; (d) claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress; (e) any person or entity who is currently in bankruptcy; (f) any person currently in litigation with LG including, but not limited to, Cottage Builders, Inc. and any affiliated entity or person who owns an interest in Cottage Builders, Inc. 66. Numerosity/Impracticability of Joinder: The Class Members are so numerous 23 that joinder of all Class Members would be impracticable. The Class includes tens of thousands of Class Members. The Class is composed of an easily ascertainable, self-identifying set of individuals and entities that purchased or owned Affected Products. The precise number of Class Members can be ascertained by reviewing documents in LG’s sole possession, custody, and control. 67. Commonality and Predominance: There are common questions of law and fact that predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members. These common legal and factual questions, include, but are not limited to, the following: (a) Whether the Affected Products contain common design and/or manufacturing defects; (b) Whether the Affected Products are substantially certain to prematurely fail; (c) Whether the Affected Products are not of merchantable quality; (d) Whether the existence of the defects in the Affected Products is a material fact reasonable purchasers would have considered in deciding whether to purchase an air conditioner; (e) Whether LG knew and/or was reckless in not knowing of the defects in the Affected Products; (f) Whether LG engaged in a pattern of fraudulent, deceptive, and misleading conduct involving the marketing and sale of the Affected Products; (g) Whether LG consciously concealed or failed to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs and other Class Members with respect to the defects in the Affected Products; (h) Whether LG knew that consumers were unaware of the defects and that they expected the air conditioners to be free from defects at the time of sale; 24 (i) Whether LG knew that consumers would expect their air conditioners to effectively heat and cool Plaintiffs’ Class Members’ properties; (j) Whether LG knew that customers would expect it to disclose the existence of known defects that would prevent the air conditioners from properly functioning, and that such disclosure would impact consumers’ decision as to whether to purchase the Affected Products; (k) Whether LG intended that Plaintiffs and the other Class Members rely on its acts of concealment and omissions when purchasing the Affected Products; (l) Whether as a result of the foregoing acts, omissions, and practices, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have suffered an ascertainable loss by purchasing defective air conditioners that are unable to perform their essential function, require additional expenditures in order to reach their expected useful life, if ever, and that present a risk to the safety of Plaintiffs and Class Members in the form of risk of fire and/or mold. (m) Whether LG’s false and misleading statements of facts and concealment of material facts regarding the defect in the Affected Products were likely to deceive the public; (n) Whether LG’s acts and omissions violated the New Jersey CFA; (o) Whether LG fraudulently concealed from and/or failed to disclose to Plaintiffs and the Class Members the defects in the Affected Products; (p) Whether LG’s conduct breached implied and expressed warranties; (q) Whether LG’s warranties failed of their essential purpose; (r) Whether LG has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiffs and Class Members; 25 (s) Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of the false promise or misrepresentation, or concealment, suppression or omission of material fact; (t) Whether LG should be declared financially responsible for notifying all Class Members of the defective Affected Products and for the costs and expenses of repair and replacement of all such defective components therein; (u) Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to recover compensatory and consequential damages, including refunds, punitive damages, treble damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of suit in connection with LG’s unlawful conduct as alleged herein; (v) Whether, as a result of LG’s misconduct, Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to equitable relief and other relief and, if so, the nature of such relief; (w) Whether New Jersey law can be applied to the claims of Plaintiffs and the Class Members; and (x) Whether the actions of LG were willful and malicious, or manifested knowing and reckless indifference and disregard toward the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class Members. 68. Typicality: Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class Members. Plaintiffs and all Class Members have each been injured by the same wrongful practices by LG. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of the Class Members and are based on the same legal and remedial theories. 69. Adequacy: Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiffs’ interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the 26 Class Members. Plaintiffs retained counsel with experience in the prosecution of matters relating to the conduct at issue, in addition to substantial experience in handling complex litigation, class actions and product liability litigation. Neither Plaintiffs nor their attorneys have any interests that are contrary to or conflicting with the Class Members. 70. Superiority: Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, and without duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would entail. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Class Members are in the millions of dollars, and are no less than five million dollars upon information and belief, the individual damages incurred by each Class Member resulting from LG’s wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual suits. The likelihood of individual Class Members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every Class Member could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Individual Class Members do not have a significant interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions, and individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments and would magnify the delay and expense to all of the parties and to the court system because of multiple trials of the same factual and legal issues. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. In addition, LG has acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Class Members and, as such, final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with regard to the Class Members as a whole is appropriate. 71. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, thereby 27 making final relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. As discussed in more detail below, Defendants have collectively acted in a manner that impacted all of the Class Members in an identical manner. Prosecution of separate actions by individual Class Members would create the risk of inconsistent and varying adjudications with respect to individual Class Members, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants. 72. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 73. Plaintiffs and other Class Members are “consumers” within the meaning of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. § 56:8-2 et seq. (the “CFA”). 74. The Affected Products are “goods” within the meaning of the CFA. 75. At all relevant times material hereto, LG conducted trade and commerce in New Jersey and elsewhere within the meaning of the CFA. 76. The CFA is, by its terms, a cumulative remedy, such that remedies under its provisions can be awarded in addition to those provided under other remedies. 77. LG has engaged in deceptive, unconscionable, unfair, fraudulent, and misleading commercial practices in the marketing and sale of air conditioners it knew or should have known were defective. 78. LG had exclusive knowledge of the defects at the time of sale. The defects are latent and not something that Plaintiffs or Class Members could, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered independently prior to purchase. 28 79. LG represented that its goods, merchandise, or services had characteristics, uses, benefits, or qualities that they did not have, and that its goods, merchandise, and services were of a particular standard, quality, or grade that they were not. 80. In its marketing and sale of the Affected Products, LG undertook active and ongoing steps to conceal the defects and has consciously withheld material facts from Plaintiffs and the Class Members with respect to the defects in the Affected Products. Plaintiffs are aware of nothing in LG’s advertising, publicity, or marketing materials that discloses the truth about the defects, despite LG’s awareness of the problem. 81. LG’s conduct was objectively deceptive and had the capacity to deceive reasonable consumers under the circumstances. The fact that defects in the Affected Products would prevent the air conditioners from functioning as designed and render the air conditioners unable to perform their essential purpose of heating and cooling was a material fact that a reasonable and/or unsophisticated consumer would attach importance to at the time of purchase and that would influence reasonable consumers’ choice of action during the purchase of their air conditioners. 82. LG intended that Plaintiffs and the Class Members rely on its acts of concealment and omissions, so that Plaintiffs and other Class Members would purchase the Affected Products at full price rather than paying less for them or purchasing competitors’ air conditioners. 83. Plaintiffs and the Class Members purchased the Affected Products in the wake of LG’s knowing concealment and omissions. 84. Had LG disclosed all material information regarding the defect to Plaintiffs and the Class Members, they may not have purchased the Affected Products, or, at a minimum, they would have paid less for the Affected Products. 85. LG’s general course of conduct had an impact on the public interest because the 29 acts were part of a generalized course of deceptive conduct affecting numerous consumers. 86. As a result of the foregoing acts, omissions, and practices, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have suffered an ascertainable loss by purchasing defective air conditioners that are unable to perform their essential function of heating and cooling their properties for the expected useful life and that present a risk to the safety of Plaintiffs and the Class Members in the form of risk of fire hazards and/or mold and mildew. Plaintiffs and the Class Members may have also incurred additional costs to replace and/or repair the Affected Products. Plaintiffs and the Class Members are entitled to recover such damages, together with appropriate penalties, including compensatory damages, consequential damages, punitive damages, treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit. 87. Application of the CFA to all Class Members, regardless of their state of residence, is appropriate as described herein and because, inter alia: (a) LG USA controlled and directed its nationwide sales operations and support operations from LG USA’s headquarters in New Jersey; (b) LG USA’s marketing and customer support operations and decisions were made in New Jersey, LG USA’s headquarters; (c) LG USA’s principal place of business is located in New Jersey; (d) A significant percentage of LG USA’s key employees are based in New Jersey; and (e) The facts and circumstances of this case reflect numerous contacts with the State of New Jersey so as to create a state interest in applying the CFA to the Defendants, thereby making application of New Jersey law to the entire Class appropriate. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek the following 30 relief under Count One of the Complaint: 88. Plaintiffs incorporate the above allegations by reference as if fully set forth herein. 89. At all times relevant herein, LG Korea and LG USA were and are in the business of manufacturing and selling air conditioners. 90. LG Korea and LG USA have brought themselves into privity with Plaintiffs and the Class Members by selling and/or warranting the Affected Products to them directly and/or through the agency doctrine. 91. At all times relevant herein, LG impliedly warranted in a uniform manner to Plaintiffs and the proposed Class Members that the Affected Products were of the same or greater quality as generally accepted for air conditioners and were safe and fit for their intended use as air conditioners. 92. Contrary to LG’s implied warranties, the Affected Products were not of merchantable quality at the time of sale, as they were not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used and/or do not conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made in the promotional literature. The Affected Products contained inherent, latent defects at the time of sale 31 that were substantially certain to result in malfunction during the useful life of the product such that the air conditioners would not perform their essential function. 93. LG was aware of these defects, but sold the Affected Products without disclosing the defects to Plaintiffs and the Class Members. 94. When LG marketed and sold the Affected Products for use by Plaintiffs and the Class Members, LG had actual or constructive knowledge of the particular purposes for which the Affected Products would be used. 95. When LG marketed and sold the Affected Products for use by Plaintiff and the Class Members, LG had actual or constructive knowledge that Plaintiffs and the Class Members would and did rely upon the skill and judgment of LG to select and furnish air conditioners that were suitable for residential and non-residential use. 96. Contrary to LG’s implied warranty, the Affected Products were not fit for their intended and known use by Plaintiff and the Class Members. The Affected Products contain inherent defects which are substantially certain to result in malfunction during their useful life. 97. LG was aware of the defects in the Affected Products and did not act on that knowledge. LG continued to actively conceal from customers that the air conditioners they purchased were defective at the time of sale. 98. Had the defects that existed at the time of sale been known, the Affected Products could not have been sold or could not have been sold at the same price. 99. Had Plaintiffs or the Class Members been aware of the defects that existed at the time of sale, they would not have purchased the Affected Products (or would have paid less for them). 100. LG has received timely notice of the breach of implied warranties alleged herein. 32 LG has been put on notice by the Class Members as a whole by reason of its knowledge of the defects, and by warranty claims and other complaints made by Plaintiffs, the Class Members, distributors, sales representatives, and contractors. 101. Any express limitation or negation of LG’s implied warranties that the Affected Products were fit to perform their essential purpose, when such was not the case, would be unreasonable, unconscionable, and fraudulent. Accordingly, any such limitation is unenforceable. Further, any express limitation of negation of LG’s implied warranties is unenforceable because such warranties failed on their essential purpose when LG did not timely remedy the defects in the Affected Products. 102. As a direct and legal result of the breach of implied warranties by LG, Plaintiffs and the Class Members sustained actual and consequential damages in an amount to be determined according to proof at time of trial. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek the following relief under Count Two of the Complaint: BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES (against LG Korea and LG USA) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (against LG Korea and LG USA) 103. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 104. LG has been unjustly enriched by the sale of the Affected Products to Plaintiffs and 33 the Class Members. 105. Plaintiffs seek to recover for LG’s unjust enrichment under New Jersey State law. 106. Plaintiffs and the Class Members conferred a benefit on LG, but LG failed to disclose its knowledge that Plaintiffs did not receive what they paid for and misled Plaintiffs and the Class Members regarding the qualities of the Affected Products while profiting from this deception. 107. The circumstances are such that it would be inequitable, unconscionable, and unjust to permit LG to retain the benefit of these profits that it unfairly has obtained from Plaintiffs and the Class Members. 108. Plaintiffs and the Class Members, having been injured by LG’s conduct, are entitled to restitution or disgorgement of profits as a result of the unjust enrichment of LG to their detriment. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiffs and the Class Members seek the following relief under Count One of the Complaint:

lose

25. On or about October 29, 2018, Defendant caused a call with a prerecorded message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 6868 (the “6868 Number”). 26. Because Plaintiff did not answer her telephone after it rang, a voicemail containing a prerecorded message was left on Plaintiff’s phone. 27. The following is a transcript of the October 29, 2018, voicemail that was left in Plaintiff’s voicemail box: Hello, this is a courtesy call from MedXM, a Quest Diagnostics company regarding your annual wellness visit. This is a preventative benefit that you are entitled to at no copay. Please call 888-306-0615 at your earliest convenience to schedule your appointment. That number again is 888-306-0615. Please view our website at MedXM1.com. Thank you and have a great day. 28. On or about November 1, 2018, Defendant caused another call with a prerecorded message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular 6868 Number. 29. Again, because Plaintiff did not answer her telephone after it rang, a voicemail containing a prerecorded message was left on Plaintiff’s phone. 30. The following is a transcript of the November 1, 2018, voicemail that was left in Plaintiff’s voicemail box: Hello, this is a courtesy call from MedXM, a Quest Diagnostics company, on behalf of your health insurance regarding your annual wellness visit. This is a preventative benefit that you are entitled to at no copay. Please call 888-246-7722 to schedule an appointment. Thank you and have a great day. 31. Additionally, Defendant caused multiple voicemails with the exact or substantially identical message to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular phone throughout the 2018 calendar year. 32. The prerecorded calls at issue, which were left as a voicemail, were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action. 33. When Plaintiff listened to the voicemails, she was easily able to determine that it was a prerecorded message. Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear-cut fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”). 34. Defendant’s prerecorded calls constitute telemarketing because they encourage the future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., requesting that Plaintiff contact Defendant to schedule a visit so Defendant could sell Plaintiff medical diagnostic services. 35. The prerecorded calls Plaintiff received originated from telephone numbers 330- 294-5664 and 216-588-9068, telephone numbers owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant. 36. Plaintiff received the subject calls with a prerecorded voice within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district. 37. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be contacted with a prerecorded call. 38. Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 6868 Number and is financially responsible for phone service to the 6868 Number. 39. Plaintiff has been registered with the national do-not-call registry since April 18, 2008. 40. Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded calls caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16- 2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”). 41. Defendant’s unsolicited voice messages caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted fifteen minutes reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted messages. Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was doing to either retrieve her phone and/or look down at the phone to review the message. 42. Furthermore, Defendant’s voice messages took up memory on Plaintiff’s cellular phone. The cumulative effect of unsolicited voice messages like Defendant’s poses a real risk of ultimately rendering the phone unusable for voice messaging purposes as a result of the phone’s memory being taken up. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message-spam#text (finding that text message solicitations, much like the voice messages sent by Defendant present a “triple threat” of identity theft, unwanted cell phone charges, and slower cell phone performance). 43. Defendant’s voice messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone memory space). 44. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated. 45. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows: No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a call using an artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent. Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior to the filing of this action (1) were sent a call by or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any 12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (4) for the purpose of selling Defendant’s products and services; and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) it did not obtain prior express written consent, or (b) it obtained prior express written consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it supposedly obtained prior express written consent to call the Plaintiff. 46. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more. 49. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are: (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones; (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express written consent to make such calls; (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful; (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future. 50. The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case. 56. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 57. It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 58. Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class. 59. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class when its calls were made. 60. Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent. 61. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The violations were therefore willful or knowing. 62. As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls. Id. 63. Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its prerecorded calls to their cellular telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA. 64. Plaintiff re-allege and incorporates paragraphs 1-55 as if fully set forth herein. 65. At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as alleged herein violated the TCPA. 66. Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or prerecorded voice calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the 69. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference herein. 70. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 71. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”1 72. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.” 73. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 74. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government. 75. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12-month period made by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 1 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003) Available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03- 153A1.pdf U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. 76. To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Debora Less, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief: a. A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227; b. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an artificial or prerecorded voice to contact telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express permission of the called party; c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just. Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class) PROPOSED CLASS Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)

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(Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750 et seq.) (Breach of Express Warranty) (on Behalf of the Class and New York Sub-Class) (Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability) (On Behalf of the Class and New York Sub-Class) (Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose) (On Behalf of the Class and New York Sub-Class) (Unjust Enrichment) (on behalf of the New York Sub-Class) (Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.) (Violation of New York General Business Law § 349) (on behalf of the New York Sub-Class) (Violation of the California False Advertising Law, California Business and Professions Code § 17500 et seq.) 17. Computer games and video games are big business in the U.S. Two-thirds of U.S. households have members who play video games, and in 2009, for example, the computer and video game industry generated $10.5 billion in revenue. See http://www.esrb.org/about/video- game-industry-statistics.jsp. 18. According to EA’s publicly available financial report for fiscal year 2012: “Electronic Arts (NASDAQ:EA) is a global leader in digital interactive entertainment. The Company’s game franchises are offered as both packaged goods products and online services delivered through Internet-connected consoles, personal computers, mobile phones and tablets. EA has more than 100 million registered players and operates in 75 countries. In fiscal year 2012, EA posted GAAP net revenue of $4.1 billion. Headquartered in Redwood City, California, EA is recognized for critically acclaimed, high-quality blockbuster franchises such as The Sims™, Madden NFL, FIFA Soccer, Need for Speed™, Battlefield™, and Mass Effect™. More information about EA is available at http://info.ea.com.” Press Release, EA, Electronic Arts Reports Q4 FY12 and FY12 Financial Results (May 7, 2012), http://files.shareholder.com/ downloads/ERTS/2321231381x0x567078/a6291b84-5360-42ee-861d- f3ef67afcfc6/EA_News_2012_5_7_General.pdf 6. 19. Despite knowing that it did not intend to allocate resources for online play for the Products indefinitely or for a reasonable time from the release date, EA engaged in a widespread marketing and advertising campaign to portray the Products as being enabled for indefinite online play or, at a minimum, a reasonable time from the release date. - 6 - 20. Defendant engaged in this misleading and deceptive campaign to charge a premium for the Products and take away market share from other similar products. 21. Defendant sold the Products to consumers nationwide, placing the representation “Xbox LIVE”; “nintendo Wi-Fi connection”; and “PlayStation® Network” on the packaging for the Products. 22. As stated herein, such representations and the widespread marketing campaign portraying the Products as being enabled for online play indefinitely — or, at a minimum, a reasonable time from the release date — are misleading and deceptive to consumers because EA only provided online support for the Products for a limited time. 23. Consumers frequently rely on labels in making purchase decisions. Here, Plaintiff and the other Class members reasonably relied to their detriment on Defendant’s misleading representations and omissions. Defendant’s misleading affirmative statements about the capability of online play for the Products obscured the material fact that Defendant failed to disclose about the limited nature of its online support for the Products. 24. Plaintiff and the other Class members were among the intended recipients of Defendant’s deceptive representations and omissions. Defendant made the deceptive representations and omissions on the Products with the intent to induce Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ purchase of the Products. Defendant’s deceptive representations and omissions are material in that a reasonable person would attach importance to such information and would be induced to act upon such information in making purchase decisions. Thus, Plaintiff’s and the other Class members’ reliance upon Defendant’s misleading and deceptive representations and omissions may be presumed. 25. The materiality of those representations and omissions also establishes causation between Defendant’s conduct and the injuries sustained by Plaintiff and the Class. 26. Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive misrepresentations and omissions are likely to continue to deceive and mislead reasonable consumers and the general public, as they have already deceived and misled Plaintiff and the other Class members. - 7 - 27. In making the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant knew and intended that consumers would choose and pay a premium for online- enabled software over comparable products that were not online-enabled, furthering Defendant’s private interest of increasing sales for its Products and decreasing the sales of products that are truthfully labeled by Defendant’s competitors. 28. As an immediate, direct, and proximate result of Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Defendant injured Plaintiff and the other Class members in that Plaintiff and the other Class members: a. paid a sum of money for Products that were not as represented; b. paid a premium price for Products that were not as represented; c. were deprived the benefit of the bargain because the Products they purchased were different than what Defendant warranted; d. were deprived the benefit of the bargain because the Products they purchased had less value than what was represented by Defendant; e. did not receive Products that measured up to their expectations as created by Defendant; f. were denied the benefit of truthful software labels; and g. were denied the benefit of online play as promised. 29. Plaintiff and the other Class members all paid money for the Products. However, Plaintiff and the other Class members did not obtain the full value of the advertised Products due to Defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions. Plaintiff and the other Class members purchased, purchased more of, or paid more for, the Products than they would have had they known the truth about the limited nature of online play for the Products. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct. - 8 - 30. Had Defendant not made the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Plaintiff and the other Class members would not have been injured. Among other things, they would not have been denied the benefit of the bargain. They would not have suffered the other injuries listed above. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the other Class members have suffered injury in fact as a result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct. 31. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of the following nationwide class (the “Class”): all persons in the United States who purchased Defendant’s Products (as defined herein) from March 1, 2007, to the date of certification of the Class (the “Class Period”); excluded from the Class are officers and directors of Defendant; members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant; Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns; and any entity in which they have or have had a controlling interest. 32. Additionally, Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a sub-class of: all New York residents who purchased Defendant’s Products (as defined herein) in New York during the Class Period (the “New York Sub-Class”). 33. At this time, Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members of the Class or New York Sub-Class; however, given the nature of the claims and the number of retail stores selling Defendant’s Products, Plaintiff believes that members are so numerous that joinder of all of them is impracticable. 34. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved in this case. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that predominate over questions that may affect individual members include: a. Whether Defendant labeled, marketed, advertised, and/or sold the Products to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using false, misleading, and/or deceptive statements or representations, including statements or representations concerning the nature and/or quality of the Products; - 9 - b. Whether Defendant omitted and/or misrepresented material facts in connection with the sales of the Products; c. Whether Defendant participated in and pursued the common course of conduct complained of herein; and d. Whether Defendant’s labeling, marketing, advertising, and/or selling of the Products as online-enabled constitutes an unfair or deceptive consumer sales practice. 35. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff, like all members of the Class, purchased Defendant’s Products bearing the online-enabled representations in a typical consumer setting at a premium price and sustained damages from Defendant’s wrongful conduct. 36. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel that is experienced in litigating complex class actions. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those of the Class. 37. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 38. The prerequisites to maintaining a class action for injunctive or equitable relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) are met, as Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or equitable relief with respect to the Class as a whole. 39. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another might not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class or the New York Sub-Class, even though certain members of the Class or the New York Sub-Class are not parties to such actions. 40. Defendant’s conduct is generally applicable to the Class as a whole and Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, equitable remedies with respect to the Class as a whole. As such, Defendant’s - 10 - systematic policies and practices make declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. 41. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 42. This cause of action is brought pursuant to the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750 et seq. (the “CLRA”), on Plaintiff’s behalf and on behalf of the Class. 43. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are “consumers,” as the term is defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d), because they bought the Products for personal, family, or household purposes. 44. Plaintiff, the other members of the Class, and Defendant has engaged in “transactions,” as that term is defined by California Civil Code § 1761(e). 45. The conduct alleged in this Complaint constitutes unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts and practices for the purposes of the CLRA, and the conduct was undertaken by Defendant in transactions intended to result in, and which did result in, the sale of goods to consumers. 46. As alleged more fully above, Defendant has violated the CLRA by falsely representing to Plaintiff and the other Class members that the Products were enabled for online play for an indefinite period or, at a minimum, a reasonable time from the release date when, in fact, Defendant intended to stop supporting online play after a definite time period. 47. As a result of engaging in such conduct, Defendant has violated California Civil Code § 1770(a)(5), (a)(7), and (a)(9). - 11 - 48. Pursuant to California Civil Code § 1780(a)(2) and (a)(5), Plaintiff seeks an order of this Court that includes, but is not limited to, an order enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practices or any other act prohibited by law – for example, by requiring that Defendant provide support for online play for the Products. 49. Plaintiff also seeks monetary damages as allowed under the CLRA. 50. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class may be irreparably harmed and/or denied an effective and complete remedy if such an order is not granted. 51. The unfair and deceptive acts and practices of Defendant, as described above, present a serious threat to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 52. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 53. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 54. This cause of action is brought pursuant to California’s False Advertising Law, California Business and Professions Code § 17500 et seq. (the “FAL”), on Plaintiff’s behalf and on behalf of the California Class. 55. Such acts of Defendant, as described above, and each of them constitute unlawful business acts and practices. 56. At all material times, Defendant engaged in a scheme of offering the Products for sale to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class by way of, inter alia, commercial marketing and advertising, the World Wide Web (Internet), Product packaging and labeling, and other promotional materials. As described more fully herein, Defendant’s portrayal of the Products as enabled for online play was misleading and deceptive because Defendant did not intend to provide online support for the Products indefinitely or, at a minimum, a reasonable time from the release date. Said advertisements and inducements were made within the State of California and - 12 - nationwide and come within the definition of advertising contained in the FAL in that such promotional materials were intended as inducements to purchase Defendant’s Products and are statements disseminated by Defendant to Plaintiff and the other Class members that were intended to reach Plaintiff and the other Class members. Defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that these representations were misleading and deceptive. 57. In furtherance of said plan and scheme, Defendant has prepared and distributed within the State of California and nationwide – via commercial marketing and advertising, the World Wide Web (Internet), Product packaging and labeling, and other promotional materials – statements that misleadingly and deceptively represent the Products as being enabled for online play. Consumers, including Plaintiff and the other Class members, necessarily and reasonably relied on these materials concerning Defendant’s Products. Consumers, including Plaintiff and the other Class members, were among the intended targets of such representations. 58. The above acts of Defendant, in disseminating said misleading and deceptive statements throughout the State of California to consumers, including Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, were and are likely to deceive reasonable consumers, including Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, by obfuscating the nature and/or quality of the Products, in violation of the “misleading” prong of the FAL. 59. The business practices alleged above are unlawful under the CLRA, which forbids misleading and deceptive advertising. 60. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s violations of the FAL. 61. As a result, Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the Class, pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17535, are entitled to an order of this Court enjoining such future conduct on the part of Defendant, and such other orders and judgments which may be necessary to disgorge Defendant’s ill-gotten gains and restore to any person in interest any money paid for its Products as a result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant. - 13 - 62. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 63. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 64. This cause of action is brought pursuant to California’s Unfair Competition Law, California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq. (the “UCL”). 65. By committing the acts and practices alleged herein, Defendant has engaged in deceptive, unfair, and unlawful business practices in violation of the UCL. 66. Defendant has violated the UCL’s proscription against engaging in unlawful conduct as a result of its violations of (i) the CLRA, as alleged above, and (ii) the FAL, as alleged above. 67. As more fully described herein, Defendant’s misleading marketing, advertising, packaging, and labeling of the Products is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer. Indeed, Plaintiff and the other Class members were unquestionably deceived regarding the characteristics of Defendant’s Products, as Defendant’s marketing, advertising, packaging, and labeling of the Products misrepresented and/or omitted the true nature and/or quality of the Products. Defendant’s portrayal of the Products as enabled for online play was misleading and deceptive because Defendant did not intend to provide support for online play for the Products indefinitely or, at a minimum, a reasonable time from the release date. 68. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class who purchased the Products suffered a substantial injury by virtue of buying a product they would not have purchased and/or paying a premium that they would not have absent Defendant’s unlawful, fraudulent, and unfair marketing, advertising, packaging, and labeling. 69. There is no benefit to consumers or competition from deceptively marketing and labeling products as being enabled for online play indefinitely or, at a minimum, a reasonable - 14 - time from the release date when that is not, in fact, true. Indeed, the harm to consumers and competition is substantial. 70. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class who purchased the Products had no way of reasonably knowing that the Products they purchased were not as marketed, advertised, packaged, and labeled. Thus, they could not have reasonably avoided the injury each of them suffered. 71. The gravity of the consequences of Defendant’s conduct as described above outweighs any justification, motive, or reason therefor, particularly considering the available legal alternatives which exist in the marketplace, and such conduct is immoral, unethical, unscrupulous, offends established public policy, or is substantially injurious to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 72. Defendant’s violations of the UCL continue to this day. 73. Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17203, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class seek an order of this Court that includes, but is not limited to, an order enjoining such future conduct on the part of Defendant and such other orders and judgments which may be necessary to disgorge Defendant’s ill-gotten gains and to restore to any person in interest any money paid for Defendant’s Products as a result of the wrongful conduct of Defendant. 74. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 76. Defendant provided Plaintiff and other members of the Class with written express warranties including, but not limited to, warranties that its Products were enabled for online play, as set forth above. - 15 - 77. Defendant breached these warranties. This breach resulted in damages to Plaintiff and other members of the Class, who bought Products but did not receive the goods as warranted, in that Defendant did not intend to, and has not, provided support for online play for the Products indefinitely or for a reasonable time from the release date. 78. As a proximate result of the breach of warranties by Defendant, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial in that, among other things, they purchased and paid for Products that did not conform to what was promised as promoted, marketed, advertised, packaged, and labeled by Defendant, and they were deprived of the benefit of their bargain and spent money on Products that did not have any value or had less value than warranted, or Products that they would not have purchased and used had they known the true facts about them. 79. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 80. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 81. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased Defendant’s Products, which were promoted, marketed, advertised, packaged, and labeled as being enabled for online play, as set forth above. Pursuant to these sales, Defendant impliedly warranted that its Products would be merchantable and fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used and would conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made in the Products’ promotions, marketing, advertising, packaging, and labels. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class relied on Defendant’s representations that the Products had particular characteristics, as set forth above, and, at or about that time, Defendant sold the Products to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class. By its representations regarding the reputable nature of the company and related entities, and by its promotion, marketing, advertising, packaging and labeling of the Products, - 16 - Defendant warranted that the Products were enabled for online play, as set forth herein. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class bought the Products relying on Defendant’s representations that the Products were enabled for online play, when, in fact, Defendant did not intend to, and has not, provided online support for the Products indefinitely or for a reasonable time from the release date. 82. Defendant breached the warranty implied at the time of sale in that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class did not receive goods that were as represented and, thus, the goods were not merchantable as fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used or as promoted, marketed, advertised, packaged, labeled, or sold. 83. As a proximate result of this breach of warranty by Defendant, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial in that, among other things, they purchased and paid for Products that did not conform to what was promised as promoted, marketed, advertised, packaged, and labeled by Defendant, and they were deprived of the benefit of their bargain and spent money on Products that did not have any value or had less value than warranted or Products that they would not have purchased and used had they known the true facts about them. 84. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 85. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 86. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased Defendant’s Products, which were promoted, marketed, advertised, packaged, and labeled as being enabled for online play. Pursuant to these sales and by its promotion, marketing, advertising, packaging, and labeling, Defendant impliedly warranted that it would support online play for the Products indefinitely or, at a minimum, a reasonable time from the release date as set forth above. - 17 - Plaintiff and the other members of the Class bought the Products from Defendant relying on Defendant’s skill and judgment in furnishing suitable goods as well as its representation that the Products were enabled for online play, as set forth above. However, Defendant did not intend to provide, and has not provided, online support for the Products indefinitely or for a reasonable time from the release date. 87. Defendant breached the warranty implied at the time of sale in that Plaintiff and the other members of the Class did not receive Products that were as represented, and thus the goods were not fit for the purpose as promoted, marketed, advertised, packaged, labeled, or sold. 88. As a result of this breach of warranty by Defendant, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial in that, among other things, they purchased and paid for Products that did not conform to what was promised as promoted, marketed, advertised, packaged, and labeled by Defendant, and they were deprived of the benefit of their bargain and spent money on Products that did not have any value or had less value than warranted or Products they would not have purchased and used had they known the true facts about them. 89. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 90. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the above paragraphs of this Class Action Complaint as if set forth herein. 91. Defendant engaged in false and misleading marketing concerning its Products. 92. As fully alleged above, by advertising, marketing, distribution, and/or selling the Products to Plaintiff and other members of the New York Sub-Class, Defendant engaged in and continues to engage in deceptive acts and practices. 93. Plaintiff and the other members of the New York Sub-Class further seek to enjoin such unlawful deceptive acts and practices as described above. Each of the New York Sub-Class - 18 - members will be irreparably harmed unless the unlawful actions of the Defendant are enjoined in that Defendant will continue to falsely and misleadingly advertise the healthy nature of its Products. Towards that end, Plaintiff and the New York Sub-Class request an order granting them injunctive relief as follows: an order requiring Defendant to provide support for games it marketing as available for online play so that consumers, can, in fact, play these games online with one another. 94. In this regard, Defendant has violated, and continues to violate, section 349 of the New York General Business Law (GBL), which makes deceptive acts and practices unlawful. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of GBL § 349 as described above, Plaintiff and the other members of the New York Sub-Class have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 95. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below. 96. Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and incorporates such allegations by reference herein. 97. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, fraudulent, and misleading labeling, advertising, marketing, and sales of the Products, Defendant was enriched at the expense of Plaintiff and the other members of the New York Sub-Class through the payment of the purchase price for Defendant’s Products. 98. Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience to permit Defendant to retain the ill-gotten benefits that it received from Plaintiff and the other members of the New York Sub-Class, in light of the fact that the Products purchased by Plaintiff and the other members of the Class were not what Defendant purported them to be. Thus, it would be unjust or inequitable for Defendant to retain the benefit without restitution to Plaintiff - 19 - and the other members of the New York Sub-Class for the monies paid to Defendant for such Products. 99. THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.

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12. Probiotics are live microorganisms that, when administrated in adequate amounts, confer a health benefit on the host. The term probiotics excludes metabolic by-products of microorganisms, dead microorganisms, or other microbial-based, non-viable products. 13. In 2001, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (“FAO”) and the World Health Organization (“WHO”) convened to establish guidelines regarding probiotics. The organizations defined “probiotics” as “Live organisms which when administered in adequate amounts confer a health benefit on the host.”2 14. In 2013, the International Association for Probiotics and Prebiotics (“ISAPP”) also defined probiotics as “Live microorganisms that, when administered in adequate amounts, confer a health benefit on the host.” They also noted that this definition is “the widely accepted scientific definition around the world.”3 15. Preservatives are bioactive ingredients or substances that have the ability to prevent or decrease microbial growth in a cosmetic product. Antimicrobial preservatives protect cosmetics from contamination of microorganisms, like bacteria, yeast and mold, and can prolong the shelf-life of cosmetic products. Preservatives are a key component in making a cosmetic inhospitable to microorganisms. Inclusion of a preservative into a cosmetic that contains probiotics would render a cosmetic inhospitable to live microorganisms such as probiotics. 17. Clinique sells, manufactures, and markets its Redness Solutions line of cosmetics, which is sold as a “daily redness regimen” intended to “get redness under control.” On the front of the Clinique Packaging, the products are touted as containing “probiotic” or “microbiome technology:” 18. However, the Clinique Cosmetics contain preservatives that render any added probiotics inert, and are therefore ineffective: Product Preservative Redness Solutions Soothing Cleanser Butylated HydroToluene and Phenoxyethanol Redness Solutions Daily Relief Cream Potassium sorbate and Phenoxyethanol Redness Solutions Makeup Broad Spectrum SPF 15 Phenoxyethanol Redness Solutions Instant Relief Mineral Pressed Powder Chlorphenesin and Sodium Dehydroacetate 20. Defendant knew or should have known that the Clinique Cosmetics express Probiotic Claims were false, deceptive, and misleading, and that Plaintiff, the Class, and Subclass Members would not be able to tell that the Clinique Cosmetics did not contain probiotics absent Defendant’s express disclosure. 21. Defendant employs professional cosmetic chemists and microbiologists to create the chemical formulas for the Clinique Cosmetics. Therefore, Defendant through its employees knew or should have known that the Clinique Cosmetics did not contained probiotics and that it was deceiving consumers by labeling the Products as containing “probiotic” or “microbiome technology.” 23. Had Defendant not made the false, misleading, and deceptive representations and/or omissions alleged herein, Plaintiff and Class Members would not have purchased the Clinique Cosmetics or would not have paid as much as they did for such products. Thus, Plaintiff and Class Members suffered an injury in fact and lost money or property as result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct. 24. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-alleges herein the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 25. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class defined as all people who purchased any Clinique Cosmetics product that falsely advertised that the product purportedly contained “probiotic technology” during the applicable statute of limitations (the “Class”). Specifically excluded from the Class are Defendant, Defendant’s officers, directors, agents, trustees, parents, children, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, principals, servants, partners, joint ventures, or entities controlled by Defendant, and its heirs, successors, assigns, or other persons or entities related to or affiliated with Defendant and/or Defendant’s officers and/or directors, the judge assigned to this action, and any member of the judge’s immediate family. 26. Plaintiff Dalit Cohen also seeks to represent a subclass consisting of Class Members who reside in New York (the “New York Subclass”). 28. Numerosity. The Class and Subclass Members are geographically dispersed throughout the United States and are so numerous that individual joinder is impracticable. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff reasonably estimates that there are hundreds of thousands of Members in the Class and in the Subclass. Although the precise number of Class and Subclass Members is unknown to Plaintiff, it is known by Defendant and may be determined through discovery. 30. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other Members of the Class and Subclass in that, among other things, all Class and Subclass Members were deceived (or reasonably likely to be deceived) in the same way by Defendant’s false and misleading advertising claims about the probiotic technology of Clinique Cosmetics. All Class and Subclass Members were comparably injured by Defendant’s wrongful conduct as set forth herein. Further, there are no defenses available to Defendant that are unique to Plaintiff. 31. Adequacy of Representation. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Members of the Class and Subclass. Plaintiff has retained counsel that is highly experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Class and Subclass. Furthermore, Plaintiff have no interests that are antagonistic to those of the Class or Subclass. 33. In the alternative, the Class and Subclass may also be certified because: (a) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class and Subclass Members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class or Subclass Members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant; (b) the prosecution of separate actions by individual Class and Subclass Members would create a risk of adjudications with respect to them that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of other Class and Subclass Members not parties to the adjudications, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and/or (c) Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and to the Subclass as a whole, thereby making appropriate final declaratory and/or injunctive relief with respect to the Members of the Class and to the Members of the Subclass as a whole. 34. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-allege herein the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 35. Plaintiff Dalit Cohen brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Members of the proposed New York Subclass against Defendant. 36. Defendant committed deceptive acts and practices by employing false, misleading, and deceptive representations and/or omissions about the probiotic technology of its Clinique Cosmetics to mislead consumers into believing the Clinique Cosmetics contain probiotics. 37. Plaintiff Cohen has standing to pursue this claim because she has suffered an injury-in-fact and has lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s deceptive acts and practices. Specifically, Plaintiff Cohen purchased Clinique Cosmetics for her own personal use. In doing so, Plaintiff Cohen relied upon Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive representations that Clinique Cosmetics contained probiotic technology. Plaintiff Cohen spent money in the transaction that she otherwise would not have spent had she known the truth about Defendant’s advertising claims. 38. Defendant’s deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. 40. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive representations and/or omissions, Plaintiff Cohen and other Members of the New York Subclass were injured in that they: (1) paid money for Clinique Cosmetics that were not what Defendant represented; (2) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the Clinique Cosmetics they purchased were different than Defendant advertised; and (3) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the Clinique Cosmetics they purchased had less value than if Defendant’s representations about probiotics were truthful. 41. On behalf of herself and Members of the New York Subclass, Plaintiff Cohen seeks to enjoin Defendant’s unlawful acts and practices and recover her actual damages or fifty (50) dollars, whichever is greater, three times actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 42. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-allege herein the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 43. Plaintiff Dalit Cohen brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Members of the proposed New York Subclass against Defendant. 45. Plaintiff Cohen has standing to pursue this claim because she has suffered an injury-in-fact and has lost money or property as a result of Defendant’s deceptive acts and practices. Specifically, Plaintiff Cohen purchased Clinique Cosmetics for her own personal use. In doing so, Plaintiff Cohen relied upon Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive representations that Clinique Cosmetics would contain probiotics when they do not. Plaintiff Cohen spent money in the transaction that she otherwise would not have spent had she known the truth about Defendant’s advertising claims. 46. Defendant’s deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers. 47. Defendant’s deceptive acts and practices are misleading in a material way because, as alleged above and herein, they violate consumers’ reasonable expectations. If Defendant had advertised its Clinique Cosmetics truthfully and in a non-misleading fashion, Plaintiff and other New York Subclass Members would not have purchased the Clinique Cosmetics or would not have paid as much as they did for them. 48. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s false, misleading, and deceptive representations and omissions, Plaintiff Cohen and other Members of the New York Subclass were injured in that they: (1) paid money for Clinique Cosmetics that were not what Defendant represented; (2) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the Clinique Cosmetics they purchased were different than Defendant advertised; and (3) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the Clinique Cosmetics they purchased had less value than if Defendant’s representations about probiotics were truthful. 50. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-allege herein the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 51. Plaintiff Dalit Cohen brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Members of the proposed Class and Subclass against Defendant. 52. As the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller of Clinique Cosmetics, Defendant issued an express warranty by representing to consumers at the point of purchase that Clinique Cosmetics contained probiotic technology. Defendant’s representations were part of the description of the goods and the bargain upon which the goods were offered for sale and purchased by Plaintiff and Members of the Class and Subclass. 53. In fact, the Clinique Cosmetics do not conform to Defendant’s representations about probiotic technology because Clinique Cosmetics do not, in fact, contain active probiotics. By falsely representing the Clinique Cosmetics in this way, Defendant breached express warranties. 55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff and Members of the Class and Subclass were injured because they: (1) paid money for Clinique Cosmetics that were not what Defendant represented; (2) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the Clinique Cosmetics they purchased were different than Defendant advertised; and (3) were deprived of the benefit of the bargain because the Clinique Cosmetics they purchased had less value than if Defendant’s representations about probiotics were truthful. Had Defendant not breached the express warranty by making the false representations alleged herein, Plaintiff and Class and Subclass Members would not have purchased the Clinique Cosmetics or would not have paid as much as they did for them. 56. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference and re-allege herein the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs of this complaint. 57. Plaintiff Dalit Cohen brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Members of the proposed Class and Subclass against Defendant. 58. Defendant routinely engages in the manufacture, distribution, and/or sale of Clinique Cosmetics and is a merchant that deals in such goods or otherwise holds itself out as having knowledge or skill particular to the practices and goods involved. 59. Plaintiff and Members of the Class and Subclass were consumers who purchased Defendant’s Clinique Cosmetics for the ordinary purpose of such products. 61. However, the Clinique Cosmetics were not of the same average grade, quality, and value as similar goods sold under similar circumstances. Thus, they were not merchantable and, as such, would not pass without objection in the trade or industry under the contract description. 62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff and Members of the Class and Subclass were injured because they paid money for Clinique Cosmetics that would not pass without objection in the trade or industry under the contract description. Breach Of Express Warranty (On Behalf Of The Class And The New York Subclass) Breach of Implied Warranty (On Behalf Of The Class And The New York Subclass) Violation Of New York’s Gen. Bus. Law § 350 (On Behalf Of The New York Subclass)

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12. Defendant Skyrocket Media, either directly, or through its affiliates directs telemarketers to send unsolicited text messages on its behalf and financially benefits from the marketing. 14. In addition to the above statement from the FCC, Skyrocket Media knowingly benefits from all of the marketing that is done on its behalf and has ratified any telemarketing. Plaintiff Received Unsolicited Autodialed Text Messages to Her Cell Phone Despite Being on the DNC List 15. On March 25, 2017, Plaintiff Schultz registered her cellular phone number on the DNC Registry to avoid receiving unwanted phone and text solicitations. 16. Her cellular phone number is not associated with a business and is for personal use. 17. On February 21, 2019 at 3:30 PM, Schultz received an unsolicited autodialed text message from, or on behalf of, Defendant on her cellular phone from 402-922-9644: 19. At the newhome.esa-us.com domain, the consumer is provided with a short survey regarding rent-to-own properties. When the survey is completed, the consumer is routed directly to ViewForeclosureHomes.com, a website owned by Defendant Skyrocket Media.2 20. On March 24, 2019 at 10:00 AM, Schultz received a second autodialed text message on her cellular phone from, or on behalf of, Skyrocket Media, this time supposedly from the phone number 833-869-4183: 21. Clicking on furnished4clsdhomes.pw routes directly to https://eaze- listings.com/img/?aff_id=10&source=ED-CVSeeps-1-4-5: 3 23. Plaintiff has never had a relationship with Skyrocket Media and has never provided Skyrocket Media express written consent to contact her. 24. Plaintiff Schultz was not looking for a rental property or rent-to-own opportunity at the time she was called. 25. The unauthorized text messages sent by Skyrocket Media, as alleged herein, have harmed Plaintiff in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasions of privacy. They have also disturbed Schultz’s use and enjoyment of her cellular phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phones’ hardware (including the phones’ battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone. Text messages ring or vibrate alerting the phone user of their receipt. These messages interfere with and interrupt a user’s experience, resulting in further annoyance and invasions of privacy. 26. In addition, Defendant violated the DNC rules by sending 2 solicitation text messages within a 1-year period to Plaintiff’s phone number, which had been registered on the Do Not Call registry for at least 30 days. 27. Seeking redress for these injuries, Schultz, on behalf of herself and two Classes of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the TCPA which prohibits unsolicited autodialed text messages to cellular telephones, including solicitation text messages to a phone number protected by the DNC. 29. The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definition following appropriate discovery. 30. Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds if not thousands of members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable. 32. Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Classes and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes. 34. Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 33 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 35. Defendant and/or its agents sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class using an autodialer. 36. These solicitation text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation text messages. 38. Defendant failed to obtain prior express consent of any kind. There was no oral consent, and Defendant failed to obtain any written consent required under the TCPA or otherwise. 39. Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are each entitled to between $500 and $1,500 for each and every text message. 40. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Complaint and incorporates them by reference. 41. The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.” 42. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) and (d) “are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”4 44. Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c). 45. Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated, telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government, for at least 30 days. 46. Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class received more than one phone call/text message in a 12-month period by or on behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages and are entitled to between $500 an $1,500 per violation. Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Defendant Sends Text Messages Directly and/or Hires Affiliates to Send Text Messages Directing Consumers to Defendant’s Websites Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class) Telephone Consumer Protection Act (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et. seq.) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodial No Consent Class)

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11. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3). 13. The identities of all class members and sub-class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts. 14. Excluded from the Plaintiff Class and sub-class are the Defendant and all officers, members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families. 15. There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class and sub-class, which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. § l692e. 16. The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members and sub-class members, as all are based upon the same facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class and sub-class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action. 18. Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class and sub-class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 19. Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 20. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein. 21. Some time prior to January 8, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to a creditor, Discover Bank. 22. Upon information and belief, Discover Bank received a judgment related to the underlying debt. 23. Upon information and belief, Discover Bank retained Defendant PFW, a Law Firm, to act as their agent in collecting the subject debt from the Plaintiff. 24. The subject debt arose out of a credit card debt. The subject debt was incurred by Plaintiff solely for personal, household or family purposes. 26. The subject obligation is consumer-related, and therefore a "debt" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (5). 27. Defendant was contracted for the purpose of collecting the subject debt on behalf of Discover Bank. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a (6). Violations – January 8, 2021 Collection Letter 28. On or about January 8, 2021, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Discover Bank. (See Letter at Exhibit A.) 29. The letter states a balance of $11,636.66 30. Defendant further makes settlement offers relating to the Judgment connected with the referenced balance. 31. However, Defendant failed to advise the Plaintiff that since this debt has become a judgment, the total amount due will continually increase by the accrual of interest, which began from the date of the entry of judgment and will continue until the judgment is paid. 32. As a result, the Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as Defendant misstated the balance due by failing to include the fact that interest would continue to accrue from the date of the entry of judgment. 33. As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices, Plaintiff has been damaged. 35. Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. 36. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 37. Defendant violated §1692e: a. As the letter falsely represents the true amount of the debt in violation of §1692e (2); and b. As the letter falsely represents the character and legal status of the debt in violation of §1692e(2)(A); and c. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10). 38. By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.

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16. RTS is the owner of numerous patents and patent applications (the “Patents”) around the world. The Patents must be periodically renewed in each country in order to maintain and protect RTS’s intellectual property rights. 17. Such renewals require the payment of certain fees to, and may require the filing of documents with, patent offices in each country in which Plaintiff has registered Patents. Timely renewal of patents in each country is vital because patents are lost or abandoned if not properly renewed. 18. CPA is in the business of managing foreign registration payments for U.S. patents. In order to manage its payments, RTS entered into the Renewal Service Agreement (“Agreement”) with CPA on March 18, 2016. The Agreement set forth the terms on which CPA would renew RTS’s patents. Section 5.1 of the Agreement states that: Our basic fees in relation to Services that comprise the provision of renewal of intellectual property rights registrations are set out in Clause 4 of the Operating Procedures. 40. RTS brings this action as a class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b) on behalf of a class (the “Class”) defined as: All persons or entities who entered into a Renewal Service Agreement using Defendants’ standard agreements. RTS also seeks to represent a subclass of all Class members who reside in California (the California Subclass”). 41. Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendants and its employees, principals, affiliated entities, legal representatives, successors, and assigns; (ii) any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, and Defendants’ legal representatives; (iii) the judges to whom this action is assigned and any members of their immediate families; and (iv) any member of the Class who timely elects exclusion. 42. RTS reserves the right to amend or modify the definition of the Class or Subclass with greater specificity or further division into subclasses as discovery and the orders of this Court warrant. 53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 54. Defendants entered into written contracts with Plaintiff and the Class for renewal of patents. The contracts included that Defendants would charge “Official Fee(s)” and “Country Charge(s)” to Plaintiff and the Class. 59. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. 60. Defendants have received a benefit, the retention of which would unjustly enrich Defendants, by its conduct in overcharging Plaintiff and the Class. 61. Defendants should be required to return that benefit, disgorge their unlawful gains and provide restitution to Plaintiffs and the Class. 62. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference each preceding paragraph as though set forth at length herein. Breach of Contract (Brought on behalf of the Class) Unjust Enrichment – Restitution (Brought on behalf of the Class) Violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (Brought on behalf of the California Subclass)

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 25. Defendant offers the commercial website, WWW.WOLFFER.COM, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services which Defendant offers in connection with their physical locations. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following, which allow consumers to: find information about Vineyard locations and hours of operation, view and purchase wine bottles and other items, details about a variety of products online and available for purchase in Defendant’s Vineyard, instructions to join the wine club, book or make reservations, access event details and -9- purchase tickets, information about the Vineyard’s history, search for local retailers and to learn about other important information. 26. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered and integrated with Defendant’s Vineyard. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Vineyard and the numerous goods, services, and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 27. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 28. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in September, 2018, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of the Website, as well as to the facilities, goods, and services of Defendant’s physical location in New York by being unable to learn more information about the Defendant’s Vineyard location and hours, view and purchase wine bottles and other items, details about a variety of products online and available for purchase in Defendant’s Vineyard, instructions to join the wine club, book or make reservations, access event details and -10- purchase tickets, information about the Vineyard’s history, search for local retailers and to learn about other important information. 29. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: a. Lack of Alternative Text (“alt-text”), or a text equivalent. Alt-text is an invisible code embedded beneath a graphical image on a website. Web accessibility requires that alt-text be coded with each picture so that screen-reading software can speak the alt-text where a sighted user sees pictures, which includes captcha prompts. Alt-text does not change the visual presentation, but instead a text box shows when the mouse moves over the picture. The lack of alt-text on these graphics prevents screen readers from accurately vocalizing a description of the graphics. As a result, visually-impaired customers of the Vineyard are unable to determine what is on the website, browse, look for Vineyard locations and hours of operation, check out Defendant’s programs and specials, or make any purchases; b. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. They can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen-reader users; c. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and d. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen -11- reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. e. Defendant’s website also lacks prompting information and accommodations necessary to allow blind shoppers who use screen-readers to locate and accurately fill-out online forms. On a shopping site such as Defendant’s website, these forms include search fields to locate bottles of wine, fields that specify the number of items desired, and fields used to fill-out personal information, including address and credit card information. Due to lack of adequate labeling, Plaintiff and blind customers cannot make purchases or inquiries as to Defendant’s wine items nor can they enter their personal identification and financial information with confidence and security. f. Defendant’s website requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction. Yet, it is a fundamental tenet of web accessibility that for a web page to be accessible to Plaintiff and blind people, it must be possible for the user to interact with the page using only the keyboard. Indeed, Plaintiff and blind users cannot use a mouse because manipulating the mouse is a visual activity of moving the mouse pointer from one visual spot on the page to another. Thus, Defendant’s website’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently navigate and/or make purchases. g. Due to the Defendant’s website’s inaccessibility, Plaintiff and blind customers must in turn spend extra time, energy, and/or money to make their purchases at Defendant’s Vineyard. Some blind customers may require a driver to get to the Vineyard or require assistance in navigating the Vineyard. By contrast, if Defendant’s website was accessible, a blind person could independently investigate products and -12- programs and make purchases and reservations via the internet as sighted individuals can and do. According to WCAG 2.1 Guideline 2.4.1, a mechanism is necessary to bypass blocks of content that are repeated on multiple webpages because requiring users to extensively tab before reaching the main content is an unacceptable barrier to accessing the website. Plaintiff must tab through every navigation bar option and footer on Defendant’s website in an attempt to reach the desired service. Thus, Defendant’s website’s inaccessible design, which requires the use of a mouse to complete a transaction, denies Plaintiff and blind customers the ability to independently make purchases on Defendant’s website Defendant Must Remove Barriers To Its Website 30. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually- impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, goods, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from accessing the Website. 31. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from visiting Defendant’s physical Vineyard locations, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to find the location and hours of operation of Defendant’s physical Vineyard on its Website and other important information, preventing Plaintiff from visiting or returning the location and Website to purchase items and to view the items. -13- 32. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 34. Because simple compliance with the WCAG 2.0 Guidelines would provide Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers with equal access to the Website, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in acts of intentional discrimination, including but not limited to the following policies or practices: a. Constructing and maintaining a website that is inaccessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; b. Failure to construct and maintain a website that is sufficiently intuitive so as to be equally accessible to visually-impaired individuals, including Plaintiff; and, c. Failing to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind and visually-impaired consumers, such as Plaintiff, as a member of a protected class. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . their title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals -14- with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 37. Because Defendant’s Website has never been equally accessible, and because Defendant lacks a corporate policy that is reasonably calculated to cause its Website to become and remain accessible, Plaintiff invokes 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2) and seeks a permanent injunction requiring Defendant to retain a qualified consultant acceptable to Plaintiff (“Agreed Upon Consultant”) to assist Defendant to comply with WCAG 2.0 guidelines for Defendant’s Website. Plaintiff seeks that their permanent injunction requires Defendant to cooperate with the Agreed Upon Consultant to: a. Train Defendant’s employees and agents who develop the Website on accessibility compliance under the WCAG 2.0 guidelines; b. Regularly check the accessibility of the Website under the WCAG 38. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually-impaired people could independently view service items, locate Defendant’s Vineyard locations and hours of operation, shop for and otherwise research related products and services via the Website. -15- 39. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 40. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 41. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. -16- 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered in Defendant’s physical locations, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYSHRL or NYCHRL. 46. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 47. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has -17- no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 48. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of their litigation. 49. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining their lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 50. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 51. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). -18- 52. Defendant’s Vineyard is a place of public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege, or advantage of Defendant’s Vineyard. The Website is a service that is integrated with this location. 53. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 54. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 55. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). -19- 56. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 57. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 58. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 59. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) provides that it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation . . . because of the . . . disability of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 60. Defendant’s physical location is located in State of New York and throughout the United States and constitute a sales establishment and place of public -20- accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. Defendant’s Website is a service that is by and integrated with these physical locations. 61. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its physical locations and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 62. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 63. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 64. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(ii), unlawful discriminatory practice also includes, “a refusal to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded or denied services because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless such person can demonstrate that taking such steps -21- would fundamentally alter the nature of the facility, privilege, advantage or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 65. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 66. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 67. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 68. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, -22- accommodations and/or opportunities of Defendant’s Website and its physical locations under § 296(2) et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and the Sub- Class Members will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 69. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 70. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 71. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 72. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 73. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 74. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 75. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40 provides that “all persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any places of public accommodations, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and -23- applicable alike to all persons. No persons, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent, or employee of any such place shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof . . .” 76. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in her or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 77. Defendant’s New York State physical locations is a sales establishment and place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40- c(2). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website is a service that is by and integrated with these establishments. 78. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it advertises, owns and operates its physical location and Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 79. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with Defendant’s physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. Their inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 80. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41 states that “any corporation which shall violate any of the provisions of sections forty, forty-a, forty-b or forty two . . . shall for -24- each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby . . .” 81. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 82. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 83. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 84. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 85. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. -25- 86. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 87. Defendant’s location is a sales establishment and a place of public accommodation within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9), and its Website is a service that is integrated with its establishment. 88. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it advertises, owns and operates its physical locations in the City of New York and its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 89. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with its physical locations to be completely inaccessible to the blind. The inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 90. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). -26- 91. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub-Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 92. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 93. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website and its establishments under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 94. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 95. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. -27- 96. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 97. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 98. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York State and City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 99. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties in that Plaintiff contends, and is informed and believes that Defendant denies, that its Website contains access barriers denying blind customers the full and equal access to the goods, services and facilities of its Website and by extension its physical locations, which Defendant owns, operates and controls, fails to comply with applicable laws including, but not limited to, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, et seq., N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq., and N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107, et seq. prohibiting discrimination against the blind. 100. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is an apartment listings company that owns and operates www.apartmentlist.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions, inquire about pricing, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in May of 2021, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.apartmentlist.com, to make a purchase. Despite her efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to her original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through her attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes her right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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104. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 105. Defendant received money from its customers and their agents for the work performed by the Plaintiff and Class Members during the pre- and post-shift periods, while Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for such work. 106. Defendant holds money that in equity and good conscience belongs to Plaintiff and Class Members due to its failure to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for all hours worked. 107. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 108. Defendant has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Plaintiff and Class Members by failing to pay for work performed by Plaintiff and Class Members during the pre- and post-shift periods. 18 109. Defendant knowingly and/or intentionally accepted the benefit of the work performed by Plaintiff and the Class Members, despite its policy and practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for such work. In particular, Defendant received the benefit of the labor and services provided to Defendant’s customers by the Plaintiff and Class Members. 110. Such wrongful conduct demonstrates bad faith and undue advantage on the part of Defendant. 111. It would be unjust and inequitable for Defendant to retain the benefit of the unpaid work performed by Plaintiff and Class Members. 23. Defendant operates a restaurant in Livingston, Texas known as The Catfish King. 24. Plaintiff Key has worked for Defendant as a server from approximately June of 2011 as a waitress. 25. Defendant pays Plaintiff and its other waitstaff a tip credit reduced minimum wage of $2.13 an hour. That is, Defendant pays its waitstaff a cash wage of $2.13 an hour and then claims a tip credit of $5.12 an hour to make up the difference between the $2.13 an hour cash wage and the federally mandated minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. 26. However, Defendant did not pay its waitstaff for all the hours they really work. 27. Instead, Defendant requires its waitstaff to perform a significant amount of work off the clock before and after the restaurant opens. This work includes cleaning, setting up or taking down the salad bar, and performing other restaurant side work. Defendant schedules its waitstaff to perform this work before and after the restaurant closes. However, Defendant did not pay its waitstaff any compensation for this work, at either the federal minimum wage or the tip credit reduced minimum wage, despite the fact that this work is integral to the restaurant’s operations. 28. In approximately October of 2020, Defendant began paying its waitstaff the minimum wage for the pre and post shift work but has made no effort to pay its employees the wages it denied them prior to this date. 6 29. FLSA/Rule 23 Class Members were employed by Defendant and performed work similar to Plaintiff. 30. Plaintiff and Class Members performed their jobs under Defendant’s supervision, and using materials and technology approved and supplied by Defendants. 31. Plaintiff and FLSA/Rule 23 Class Members were required to follow and abide by common work, time, pay, and overtime policies and procedures in the performance of their jobs. 32. At the end of each pay period, Plaintiff and Class Members received wages from Defendant that were determined by common systems and methods that Defendant selected and controlled. 33. Defendant paid Plaintiff an hourly rate. 34. Defendant paid FLSA and Rule 23 Class Members an hourly rate. 35. Plaintiff worked more than forty hours in at least one workweek during the three years before this Complaint was filed. 36. Each Class Member worked more than forty hours in at least one workweek during the three years before this Complaint was filed. 37. When Plaintiff and Class Members worked more than forty hours in a workweek, Defendant did not pay them one and one-half times their regular hourly rate because Defendant did not pay them for all the hours they actually worked due to Defendant’s policy of treating pre and post shift work as non-compensable time. 38. When Plaintiff and Class Members worked fewer than forty hours in a workweek, Defendant did not pay them their agreed hourly rate for the pre and post shift periods during which Plaintiff and Class Members performed work duties. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant expected and required Plaintiff and Class Members to be available to work before and after their shifts. This time constitute compensable time under the state law because (1) Defendant breached 7 an agreement with Plaintiff and Rule 23 Class Members by not paying them the agreed hourly rate for all hours worked, or (2) Defendant received and accepted the value of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unpaid work with reasonable notice that Plaintiff and Class Members expected to be paid for all hours worked, or (3) Defendant has been unjustly enriched by receiving the benefit of Plaintiff’s unpaid work. 39. Defendant has employed at least 40 people meeting the definition of FLSA and Rule 23 Class Members in this Complaint during the three year period before this lawsuit was filed. 40. Defendant classified Plaintiff as non-exempt from overtime pay. 41. Defendant classifies all FLSA and Rule 23 Class Members as defined in this Complaint as non-exempt from overtime pay. 42. Defendant’s method of paying Plaintiff and Class Members was willful, and was not based on a good faith and reasonable belief that its conduct complied with the FLSA. 43. Plaintiff brings this complaint as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of himself and all persons who were, are, or will be employed by Defendant as non- exempt, hourly waitstaff, or in substantially similar positions, within three (3) years from the commencement of this action. Defendant has not compensated these employees for all their compensable time as described above. 44. Per 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this action may be brought as an “opt-in” collective action for the claims asserted by Plaintiff because their claims are similar to the claims possessed by Class Members. 45. Plaintiff has actual knowledge that Class Members have been denied compensation for time worked. In addition, Plaintiff has actual knowledge that Class Members have also been 8 denied overtime pay for this work and would therefore likely join this collective action if provided a notice of their rights to do so together with a clear statement that doing so would not result in termination or other forms of retaliation by Defendant. 46. Plaintiff is similarly situated to Class Members. Like Plaintiff, Defendant subjected Class Members to its common practice, policy, or plan of refusing to pay overtime for all work performed, in clear violation of the FLSA. 47. Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff work, or have worked, for Defendant but were not paid the minimum wage for all the hours they worked. 48. Other employees similarly situated to Plaintiff work, or have worked, for Defendant but were not paid overtime at the rate of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate when those hours exceeded forty per workweek because Defendant did not pay them for all the hours they worked. 49. Although Defendant permitted and/or required Class Members to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, Defendant has denied them full compensation for their hours worked over forty (40). 50. Class Members perform or have performed the same or similar work as Plaintiff. 51. Defendant’s failure to pay the minimum wage or overtime compensation required by the FLSA results from generally applicable policies or practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of Class Members. 52. Although Plaintiff and Class Members may have different job titles, this action may be properly maintained as a collective action on behalf of the defined class because, throughout the relevant period: a. Defendant maintained common scheduling systems and policies with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members, controlled the scheduling systems and policies 9 implemented throughout their facilities and retained authority to review and revise or approve the schedules assigned to Plaintiff and Class Members; b. Defendant maintained common timekeeping systems and policies with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members; c. Defendant maintained common payroll systems and policies with respect to Plaintiff and Class Members, controlled the payroll systems and policies applied to Plaintiff and Class Members and set the pay rate assigned to Plaintiff and Class Members; and d. Defendant controlled the scheduling policies and practices at issue in the litigation and had the ability to deprive Plaintiff and Class Members of wages owed for work they performed. 53. The specific job titles or precise job responsibilities of each Class Member do not prevent collective treatment. 54. Class Members, irrespective of their particular job requirements, are entitled to the minimum wage for all hours worked and overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of forty during a workweek. 55. Although the exact amount of damages may vary among Class Members, the damages for Class Members can be easily calculated, summed, and allocated based on a simple formula. 56. Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ claims arise from a common nucleus of operative facts; namely, the continued and willful failure of Defendant to comply with its obligation to legally compensate its employees. Liability is based on a systematic course of wrongful conduct by Defendant that caused harm to all Class Members. Defendant had a plan, policy or practice of not paying Plaintiff and Class Members for all the hours they worked. 57. As such, the class of similarly situated Plaintiff is properly defined as follows: 10 Waitstaff employed by Defendant at any time during the three- year period prior to filing this complaint to the present. 58. Plaintiff estimates that the Class, including both current and former employees over the relevant period, will include more than 50 people. The precise number of Class Members should be readily available from Defendant’s personnel, scheduling, time and payroll records, and from input received from Class Members as part of the notice and “opt-in” process provided by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The names and addresses of the Class Members of the collective action are discoverable from Defendant. Given the composition and size of the Class, notice will be provided to these individuals via First Class Mail, text messages, e-mail, and other modes of notice similar to those customarily used in representative actions. 59. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 60. Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant’s employees, are similarly situated individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 61. The FLSA requires each covered employer to compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. 62. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant expected and required Plaintiff and Class Members to be available to work before and after their shifts. In certain weeks, this extra time resulted in the non-payment of overtime because Defendant did not treat this time as compensable time. 11 63. Plaintiff and Class Members have been harmed as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct because they have been deprived of wages owed for work they performed and from which Defendant derived a direct and substantial benefit. 64. Defendant’s failure to pay overtime to Plaintiff and Class Members, in violation of the FLSA, was willful and not based on a good faith belief that its conduct did not violate the FLSA. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 65. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 66. Plaintiff and Class Members, Defendant’s employees, are similarly situated individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 67. The FLSA requires each covered employer to compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than $7.25 per hour for every hour worked. 68. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant expected and required Plaintiff and Class Members to be available to work before and after their shifts. Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and the Class Members for this time resulting in them receiving less than the minimum wage. 69. Plaintiff and Class Members have been harmed as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct because they have been deprived of wages owed for work they performed and from which Defendant derived a direct and substantial benefit. 70. Defendant’s failure to pay the minimum wage to Plaintiff and Class Members, in violation of the FLSA, was willful and not based on a good faith belief that its conduct did not violate the FLSA. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). 12 71. Plaintiff incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 72. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated employees, pursue state-law claims for breach of contract, quantum meruit, money had and received, and unjust enrichment against Defendant. 73. Plaintiff seeks certification of the following class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Waitstaff employed by Defendant at any time during the four years before this Complaint was filed to the present, who that worked an opening or closing shift in weeks where the total time worked was forty hours or less. 74. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated employees, seeks relief on a class basis challenging Defendant’s practice of failing to pay for pre and post shift work, thereby requiring unpaid work and failing to pay Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees their agreed rate of pay or the reasonable value of the services they rendered for all hours worked in non-overtime workweeks (weeks where the total number of hours worked was 40 hours or less). By definition this period excludes weeks where FLSA applies due to more than 40 hours total being worked. 75. Throughout the relevant period, whether through an agreement, handbook, and/or policy, Defendant promised to provide Plaintiff and Class Members for the entirety of the time they worked. 76. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant routinely knowingly allowed Plaintiff and Class Members to perform work before and after their shifts. 77. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant knew that Plaintiff and Class Members regularly performed work because Defendant’s agents regularly encouraged, instructed, suffered 13 and permitted Plaintiff and Class Members to perform this work and observed this work being performed on a regular basis. 78. Throughout the relevant period, Defendant knew that Plaintiff and Class Members regularly performed pre- and post-shift work because Plaintiff and Class Members routinely engaged in this work on Defendant’s premises, in plain sight, and at their managers’ request. 79. As a result, throughout the relevant period, Defendant knew that Plaintiff and Class Members were not being properly compensated for all of their work. 80. Regardless, during the relevant period, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for the valuable services provided during their workdays or prohibit Plaintiff and the Class Members from performing unpaid work. On the contrary, Defendant specifically authorized work to be done during these pre- and post-shift periods and received the benefit of such work. 81. Defendant maintained common work, time, pay, and scheduling policies and procedures at issue during the relevant period. As a result, Plaintiff and Class Members are similarly situated regardless of their job title and have been regularly deprived of pay owed for work they performed in workweeks where Plaintiff and the Class Members worked forty hours or less. 82. As a result of its improper conduct, Defendant has retained money that it should have paid to Plaintiff and Class Members for their compensable work. By retaining this money, Defendant has received an inequitable windfall through, inter alia, reduced labor and operations costs and enhanced profit margins. 83. Plaintiff’s state-law claims against Defendant for breach of contract, quantum meruit, money had and received, and unjust enrichment against Defendant all satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, and superiority requirements of a class action. 14 84. Numerosity. The class satisfies the numerosity standard as it is believed to number over 50 class members. Consequently, joinder of all class members in a single action is impracticable. The data required to calculate the size of the class is within the sole control of Defendant. 85. Commonality. There are common questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting individual members. The questions of law and fact common to the class arising from Defendant’s actions include, without limitation, the following: a. Whether Defendant had a policy and practice of requiring pre- and post-shift work; b. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members performed work during unpaid pre- and post-shift periods; c. Whether Defendant directed, required, requested, and/or permitted Plaintiff and Class Members to work during their pre- and post-shift periods; d. Whether Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members were not compensated for work performed during their pre- and post- shift periods e. Whether agreements existed between Plaintiff and Class Members concerning payment for work performed pre- and post-shift periods, and whether Defendant breached such agreements; f. Whether valuable services were rendered to Defendant by the Plaintiff and Class Members during unpaid pre- and post-shift times, and whether Defendant accepted the benefit of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unpaid services; g. Whether Defendant was unjustly enriched by Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ unpaid work; 15 h. The proper measure of damages, including whether the reasonable value of such services can be based on the agreed hourly rate of pay. 86. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the class because Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same course of conduct and legal theories as the claims of the prospective class members. Like the Class Members, the Plaintiff worked as a driver for Defendant during the relevant time period. Like the Class Members, the Plaintiff was subject to the identical company- wide policy related to the automatic deduction in pay. The other facts outlined above likewise apply equally to both the Plaintiff and the Class Members. 87. Adequacy. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class because his interests do not conflict with the interests of the class members he seeks to represent. The interests of the members of the class will be fairly and adequately protected by the Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel, who has experience in employment and class action lawsuits. 88. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this lawsuit. Even if the event any member of the Class could afford to pursue individual litigation against a company the size of Defendant, doing so would unduly burden the court system. Individual litigation of 50 or more claims would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and flood the court system with duplicative lawsuits. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create risk of inconsistent and varying judicial results and establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. A single class action can determine the rights of all class members in conformity with the interest of efficiency and judicial economy. 89. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. 16 90. A valid and enforceable agreement existed between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Class Members and Defendant, the terms and conditions of which include, but are not limited to, an agreement by Plaintiff and Class Members to perform services for Defendant, and for Defendant to pay Plaintiff and Class Members at an agreed hourly rate for all time in which they performed compensable work. 91. Plaintiff and Class Members duly performed under the agreement at Defendant’s direction and for its benefit. 92. Defendant failed and refused to perform its obligations under the agreement by failing to pay for pre- and post-shift periods when Plaintiff and Class Members performed work during such periods, thereby failing to compensate Plaintiff and Class Members for all time worked on behalf of Defendant. 93. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to recover damages from these breaches for the last four years. 94. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to attorney’s fees for such breach of contract. 95. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs. This claim is plead in the alternative to the breach of contract claim. 96. Plaintiff and Class Members performed valuable services for Defendant during their pre- and post-shift periods. 97. These services had a reasonable value no less than the agreed hourly rate. 98. Defendant accepted and retained the benefit of Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ performance of these valuable services. 17 99. No contract exists between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Class Members and Defendant, regarding the provision of services during unpaid pre- and post-shift periods. 100. Defendant had reasonable notice and/or knowledge that Plaintiff and Class Members expected to be compensated for services rendered for the Defendant. 101. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members the reasonable value of the services performed during unpaid pre- and post-shift periods. 102. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to recover damages under this claim for the last four years. 103. Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under this claim. FAILURE TO PAY THE MINIMUM WAGE (COLLECTIVE ACTION) FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME COMPENSATION (COLLECTIVE ACTION)

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(Class Action Alleging Violations of the South Carolina Act) A. SOUTH CAROLINA ACT COVERAGE (Class Action Alleging Violations of Texas Common Law) A. VIOLATIONS OF TEXAS COMMON LAW (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations) A. FLSA COVERAGE 102. Plaintiff Bunton brings her Texas Common-Law Claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Logisticare to work in Texas since April 1, 2015. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004. 103. Class action treatment of the Texas Common Law Class Members is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 104. The number of Texas Common-Law Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 105. Plaintiff Bunton is a member of the Texas Common-Law Class, her claims are typical of the claims of the other Texas Common Law Class Members, and she has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the other Texas Common Law Class Members. 106. Plaintiff Bunton and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the Texas Common Law Class Members and their interests. 107. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 108. Accordingly, the Texas Common Law Class should be certified as defined in Paragraph 24. Logisticare employs non-exempt workers in its call centers to provide assistance to Logisticare’s clients. Logisticare is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, and has additional call centers in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.3 25. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ job duties consisted of receiving telephone calls from Logisticare’s clients and scheduling transportation for those clients. 26. Plaintiff Adams was employed by Logisticare in Greenville, South Carolina from approximately November 2015 until March 2016. 27. Plaintiff Bunton. Was employed by Logisticare in Austin, Texas from approximately August 2017 until July 2018. 28. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members are non-exempt call-center employees who were (and are) paid by the hour. 30. In addition to their forty (40) “on-the-clock” hours, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members often worked up to six hours “off-the-clock” per week and have not been compensated for that time. 31. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members have not been compensated for all the hours they worked for Logisticare as a result of Logisticare’s uniform corporate policy and practice of paying its employees only during regularly scheduled shift time, and only when their computers were fully booted up and operational. 32. Specifically, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members are required to start up and log in to their computers before their shift officially starts, and then log in to each Logisticare program, and ensure that each Logisticare program is running correctly—all of which can take up to twenty minutes—before they are able to take their first phone call, which comes in as soon as their computers are fully operational. 33. In addition, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were required to arrive at work early, well in advance in of their scheduled shifts, in order to perform work for Logisticare. 34. Further, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members’ computers crashed multiple times each week and required Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members to reset them, which took twenty minutes or more each time. 35. Logisticare also enforced a uniform company-wide policy wherein it automatically clocked out its non-exempt hourly call-center employees—Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members—when their breaks exceeded fifteen (15) minutes. 29 C.F.R. § 785.18; see also Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 873 F.3d at 425. 37. Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were also not compensated for the time they worked for Logisticare rebooting Logisticare’s computers after they crashed. 38. Nor were Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members compensated for any break time that exceeded fifteen (15) minutes. 39. As a result of Logisticare’s corporate policies and practices of requiring Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members to perform compensable work for Logisticare, including their start-up and rebooting tasks, and breaks that exceeded fifteen (15) minutes, while off-the-clock, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members were not compensated for all hours worked, including all worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek at the rates required by the FLSA. 40. Logisticare has employed other individuals who perform(ed) the same or similar job duties under the same pay provisions as Plaintiffs. 41. Logisticare is aware of its obligation to pay overtime for all hours worked and the proper amount of overtime for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) each week to Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members, but has failed to do so. 42. Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members time and a half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, Logisticare’s pay policies and practices violate the FLSA. 43. Because Logisticare did not pay Plaintiffs and the Putative Class Members for all hours they worked, Logisticare’s pay policies and practices also violate South Carolina state law. 45. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 46. The FLSA Collective is defined as: 62. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 63. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this is a collective action filed on behalf of all of Logisticare’s employees throughout the United States who have been similarly situated to Plaintiffs with regard to the work they performed and the manner in which they were paid. 64. Other similarly situated employees of Logisticare have been victimized by Logisticare’s patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA. 65. The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 46. 67. Thus, Plaintiffs’ experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective Members. 68. The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective Members do not prevent collective treatment. 69. All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be paid for all hours worked and at the proper overtime rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek. 70. Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. 71. Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Logisticare will retain the proceeds of its violations. 72. Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency. 73. Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as defined as in Paragraph 46 and notice should be promptly sent. 74. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 75. The South Carolina Act Class is defined as: 87. Plaintiff Adams brings her South Carolina Act claims as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all similarly situated individuals employed by Logisticare to work in South Carolina since April 1, 2016. 88. Class action treatment of Plaintiff Adams’s South Carolina Act claim is appropriate because, as alleged below, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action requisites are satisfied. 89. The number of South Carolina Class Members is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable. 90. Plaintiff Adams is a member of the South Carolina Class, her claims are typical of the claims of other South Carolina Class Members, and she has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of other South Carolina Class Members. 91. Plaintiff Adams and her counsel will fairly and adequately represent the South Carolina Class Members and their interests. 92. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) because common questions of law and fact predominate over questions affecting only individual class members and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 94. All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein. 95. Plaintiff Bunton further brings this action pursuant to the equitable theory of quantum meruit. See Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher’s Choice, Inc. No. CIV. A. 3:98-0282, 1999 WL 608853, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 1999) (citing Schuchart & Assocs. V. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 WL 1147, at *23 (W.D. Tex. June 29, 1983)). 96. VI. 96. The Texas Common-Law Class is defined as:

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27. Until recently, electricity and natural gas were supplied and distributed by local utility companies. Over the last several years, however, a number of states have begun to change the regulations in the energy industry to enhance competition between energy providers. 28. In theory, the deregulation of energy is supposed to allow consumers to shop around for the best energy rates. However, Crius Energy Trust, through the other Defendants, exploits deregulated markets, by engaging in a misleading and deceptive bait-and-switch sales scheme with potential customers. 29. Defendants engage and engaged in a multi-level-marketing scheme enticing IVAs to earn money by encouraging family and friends to switch energy providers and by encouraging these new Viridian customers to find additional customers themselves. Defendants’ ability to expand in this manner is based in large part on their use of IVAs to spread its fraudulent claims to potential customers. 31. Defendants exploit ambiguities in their representations by creating, through standardized marketing materials and scripts, the expectation of competitive pricing and savings when, in fact, the promise of savings in their energy bills is illusory. 32. Defendants’ standardized representations regarding rates and energy savings are materially misleading to consumers. 33. Defendants’ misrepresentations and omissions caused injury to Plaintiffs and the Class members, who reasonably believed that they would receive energy cost savings on their electric and natural gas bills, when, in actuality, they were actually charged substantially more for their energy supplies when they switched to Viridian. Had Plaintiffs and the Class members known that they would be charged substantially more for their energy supplies by switching to Viridian, they would not have enrolled with Viridian or purchased energy from it. 34. Plaintiffs and the Class members have sustained economic injury and damages as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 37. These complaints reflect the false and misleading course of conduct that Defendants are or were engaged in, resulting in damages to consumers across the nation. 39. Government action has already been taken against Viridian in connection with the wrongful conduct described herein. On June 7, 2012, the Maryland Public Service Commission imposed a civil penalty of $60,000 against Viridian related to its false advertising and marketing practices. Under Order 84959, the Commission found that Viridian violated Public Utilities Article § 7-507 and Code of Maryland Regulation 20.53.07.07 and 20.53.07.08 by engaging in false, misleading, and deceptive advertising and solicitations related to the savings the consumer would realize, as well as their relationship with utility companies.13 Upon information and belief, substantially similar investigations are underway in New Jersey and in several other states. Notwithstanding such investigations and litigation by customers, Viridian keeps expanding its operations. 41. Defendants actively promoted sales on a national basis despite the fact that Viridian conducted business in many states. Regional differences in Viridian’s marketing were relatively few and immaterial. For example, “teams” of super-salesmen such as Viridian’s Team V, composed of IVAs Jim Kenny, Ed Kenny, Brenden Kenny and Michael FitzPatrick, operated in multiple states.14 They and each other group and IVA in Viridian’s pyramid marketing structure used direct selling materials to assure standardized and essentially uniform sales presentations were and are made to prospective customers. 42. Such uniformity was and is brought about through the so-called “Viridian University,” through which the Company supplies literature to IVAs, such as the brochure “An Opportunity With Purpose,” and shows IVAs videos to stimulate them to recruit other IVAs and assure uniformity of retail sales presentations. Viridian creates websites for IVAs and provides them with ongoing selling “tips.” In addition, the Company holds retreats and other sessions to motivate its IVAs to sell energy at retail, to recruit other IVAs, and to assure uniformity of marketing of energy sold by Viridian. 44. The exact number of Class members is unknown as such information is in the exclusive control of Viridian. Plaintiffs, however, believe that the Class and Sub-Class each encompass thousands of individuals dispersed throughout Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware, and the nation. Therefore, the number of persons who are members of the Class described above are so numerous that joinder of all members in one action is impracticable. 45. Questions of law and fact that are common to the entire Class predominate over individual questions because the actions of Defendants complained of herein were generally applicable to the entire Class. 47. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of other Class members because Plaintiffs and all Class members were injured by the same wrongful practices of Defendants as described in this Complaint. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same practices and course of conduct that give rise to the claims of all Class members, and are based on the same legal theories. 49. Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class they seek to represent. 50. Viridian has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to all members of the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with regard to Class members as a whole and certification of the Class under Rule 23(b)(2) proper. 51. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth fully herein. 52. Viridian is the sole Defendant to this Count. 53. Plaintiffs and all members of the Class entered into contracts with Viridian, pursuant to which it was to charge them for energy supplied. Implicit in such contracts was Viridian’s duty to act in good faith vis-à-vis its customers and treat them fairly. 54. At all times relevant, Viridian had total control of the energy bills that were provided to its customers and determined unilaterally the prices for energy that would be charged to consumers. 56. Furthermore, while Viridian agreed to set its rates to “market conditions,” it, in fact, set its rates based solely on what the market could bear, as is evidenced by Viridian’s rates dramatically increasing even as public utility rates decreased. 57. Viridian breached its contractual obligations by failing to set rates in response to “market conditions.” 58. In so doing, Viridian acted recklessly, maliciously, in bad faith, unfairly and without good cause, thereby preventing Plaintiffs and the Class members from receiving their reasonably expected benefits under the terms that were promised to them. 59. As a direct and proximate result of Viridian’s deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair practices as referred to herein, Plaintiffs and Class members have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 60. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, demand judgment against Viridian for damages and declaratory relief. 61. Plaintiff Hembling re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth fully herein. 63. At the time Defendants made or caused to be made these misrepresentations and concealed material facts integral to Viridian’s “bait and switch” scheme, Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members were unaware of the falsity of these representations, and reasonably believed them to be true and had no knowledge of the material facts that Defendants did not disclose. 64. In making these representations or causing them to be made or failing to disclose material facts, Defendants knew they were false and intended that Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members would rely upon such misrepresentations and failures to disclose material facts. 65. Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members did, in fact, rely upon such misrepresentations and/or Defendants failure to disclose all material facts and, as a consequence, became customers of the Company. Such reliance was reasonable, as Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members had no reason to believe that Defendants would not act honestly and in good faith. 66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair practices, Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 68. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth fully herein. 69. Under the circumstances alleged herein, Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiffs and the Class to provide them with accurate information regarding, inter alia, the true nature of Viridian’s energy rates and lack of energy cost savings. 70. Defendants, directly or through IVAs, represented to Plaintiffs and Class members that by switching energy suppliers to Viridian, they would enjoy savings with competitive market rates. 71. Defendants’ representations were false, negligent and material. 72. Defendants negligently made these false misrepresentations with the understanding that Plaintiffs and Class members would rely upon them. 73. Plaintiffs and Class members did, in fact, reasonably rely upon these misrepresentations and concealments of material facts by Defendants. 74. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ negligent actions, Plaintiffs and Class members have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 76. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth fully herein. 77. Plaintiffs and the Class have unintentionally conferred substantial benefits on Defendants by switching to Viridian as their energy suppliers, and Defendants have consciously and willingly accepted and enjoyed these benefits and invested them. 78. Defendants knew or should have known that the payments to Viridian were given and received with the expectation that Plaintiffs and the Class would be saving money on their energy bills, as represented by Defendants. 79. Because of the wrongful activities described above, Defendants have been unjustly enriched by their wrongful receipt of Plaintiffs and Class members’ monies through corporate revenues, salaries and other financial benefits. 80. Defendants, having retained the monies which unjustly enriched them, should be required by the Court to account to Plaintiffs and the Class for their unjust enrichment and the profits earned thereafter from investing such monies. 81. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct and unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs and Class members have suffered damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 83. Plaintiff Hembling re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs as though set forth fully herein. 84. Plaintiff Hembling asserts this cause of action on behalf of herself and the other Maryland Sub-Class members. 85. This cause of action is brought pursuant to Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code, Com. Law § 13-101, et seq. (“the MCPA”). 86. The MCPA declares unlawful deceptive and unfair trade practices, such as: making false or misleading statements and other representations that have the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading consumers; failing to state material facts where the failure deceives or tends to deceive consumers; and engaging in deception, misrepresentation, or knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of material facts with the intent that consumers rely on the same in connection with the promotion and sale of consumer goods or services. 87. Under the MCPA, Defendants’ misleading representations regarding energy cost savings and competitive market rates are unfair, deceptive and unconscionable. 88. In the course of soliciting and promoting Viridian’s purported energy cost savings and competitive market rates to consumers and in entering into agreements with consumers to provide such purported services, Defendants have engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in trade or commerce, in violation of Md. Code, Com. Law § 13-101. 90. Defendants violated the MCPA and other similarly situated laws by falsely representing to consumers that if a consumer was removed from a fixed rate term, their variable rate would still be lower than their local utility’s rate. 91. Defendants violated the MCPA and other similarly situated laws by falsely representing that consumers would save money on their energy bills by switching from regulated providers to Viridian. 92. Defendants violated the MCPA by failing to disclose that, on a consistent basis, Viridian’s regular rates are substantially higher than its competitors and not competitive in the market and by failing to disclose to consumers that after the initial promotional period, energy rates were almost guaranteed to increase substantially. 93. Defendants violated the MCPA by failing to adequately inform consumers that Viridian’s energy rates generally increase and will rarely ever be lower than the competitive market price and by representing to consumers that the Company could save consumers money on their energy bills, when, in fact, consumers are more likely to obtain better rates and energy savings with their local regulated public utility companies. 95. Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members relied on Defendants’ misrepresentations delivered through IVAs. Had Defendants disclosed to the Class members, in Viridian’s marketing and sales promotional materials or otherwise, that their energy bills would increase with Viridian, Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members would not have switched from their regulated energy providers to Viridian for their energy supplies. 96. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ deceptive, fraudulent, and unfair practices, Plaintiff Hembling and the Maryland Sub-Class members have suffered injury in fact and/or actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 97. Plaintiff Hembling, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, demands judgment against Defendant for damages and declaratory relief. BREACH OF CONTRACT/COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING (On behalf of the Class) COMMON LAW FRAUD, INCLUDING FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, AND FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (On behalf of the Maryland Sub-Class) NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (On behalf of the Class) UNJUST ENRICHMENT (On behalf of the Class) VIOLATION OF THE MARYLAND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (On behalf of the Maryland Sub-Class)

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2.1 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 21. Defendant is a supplements manufacturing company that owns and operates www.arthurandrew.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 22. Defendant’s Website offers products and services for online sale and general delivery to the public. The Website offers features which ought to allow users to browse for items, access navigation bar descriptions and prices, and avail consumers of the ability to peruse the numerous items offered for sale. 23. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient NVDA screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using a screen-reader. 24. On multiple occasions, the last occurring in February of 2021, Plaintiff visited Defendant’s website, www.arthurandrew.com, to make a purchase. Despite his efforts, however, Plaintiff was denied a shopping experience similar to that of a sighted individual due to the website’s lack of a variety of features and accommodations, which effectively barred Plaintiff from being able to determine what specific products were offered for sale. 26. Many features on the Website also fail to Add a label element or title attribute for each field. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to communicate the purpose of the page element. It also leads to the user not being able to understand what he or she is expected to insert into the subject field. As a result, Plaintiff and similarly situated visually impaired users of Defendant’s Website are unable to enjoy the privileges and benefits of the Website equally to sighted users. 27. Many pages on the Website also contain the same title elements. This is a problem for the visually impaired because the screen reader fails to distinguish one page from another. In order to fix this problem, Defendant must change the title elements for each page. 28. The Website also contained a host of broken links, which is a hyperlink to a non- existent or empty webpage. For the visually impaired this is especially paralyzing due to the inability to navigate or otherwise determine where one is on the website once a broken link is encountered. For example, upon coming across a link of interest, Plaintiff was redirected to an error page. However, the screen-reader failed to communicate that the link was broken. As a result, Plaintiff could not get back to his original search. 30. It is, upon information and belief, Defendant’s policy and practice to deny Plaintiff, along with other blind or visually-impaired users, access to Defendant’s website, and to therefore specifically deny the goods and services that are offered to the general public. Due to Defendant’s failure and refusal to remove access barriers to its website, Plaintiff and visually-impaired persons have been and are still being denied equal access to Defendant’s Website, and the numerous goods and services and benefits offered to the public through the Website. 31. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from equal access to the Website. 32. If the Website were equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 33. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 35. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 36. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 38. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 39. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 40. Without injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other visually-impaired consumers will continue to be unable to independently use the Website, violating their rights. 42. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 43. Common questions of law and fact exist amongst the Class, including: a. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “public accommodation” under the ADA; b. Whether Defendant’s Website is a “place or provider of public accommodation” under the NYCHRL; c. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the ADA; and d. Whether Defendant’s Website denies the full and equal enjoyment of its products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to people with visual disabilities, violating the NYCHRL. 45. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 46. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 47. Judicial economy will be served by maintaining this lawsuit as a class action in that it is likely to avoid the burden that would be otherwise placed upon the judicial system by the filing of numerous similar suits by people with visual disabilities throughout the United States. 48. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 50. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 51. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 52. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 53. Under Section 302(b)(2) of Title III of the ADA, unlawful discrimination also includes, among other things: [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations; and a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii). 55. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 56. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 57. N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) provides that “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place or provider of public accommodation, because of . . . disability . . . directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” 58. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 60. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 61. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 62. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the Sub- Class on the basis of a disability in violation of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) and § 8-107(15)(a) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 64. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 65. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 66. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 67. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 68. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 69. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class and New York City Sub-Classes Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 71. A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly. DECLARATORY RELIEF VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL

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2.0 guidelines; c. Regularly test user accessibility by blind or vision-impaired persons to ensure that Defendant’s Website complies under the WCAG 2.1 guidelines; and, d. Develop an accessibility policy that is clearly disclosed on Defendant’s Websites, with contact information for users to report accessibility-related problems. 20. Defendant is a virtual reality headset manufacturing company, and owns and operates the website, www.oculus.com (its “Website”), offering features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services and which Defendant ensures the delivery of such goods throughout the United States, including New York State. 21. Defendant operates and distributes its products throughout the United States, including New York. 22. Defendant offers the commercial website, www.oculus.com, to the public. The website offers features which should allow all consumers to access the goods and services whereby Defendant allows for the delivery of those ordered goods to consumers throughout the United States, including New York State. The goods and services offered by Defendant include, but are not limited to the following: the ability to browse virtual reality headsets for purchase and delivery, view titles, obtain defendant’s contact information, and related goods and services available online. 24. Plaintiff is a visually-impaired and legally blind person, who cannot use a computer without the assistance of screen-reading software. Plaintiff is, however, a proficient JAWS screen-reader user and uses it to access the Internet. Plaintiff has visited the Website on separate occasions using the JAWS screen-reader. 25. During Plaintiff’s visits to the Website, the last occurring in November 2020, Plaintiff encountered multiple access barriers that denied Plaintiff full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services offered to the public and made available to the public; and that denied Plaintiff the full enjoyment of the facilities, goods and services of the Website. 26. While attempting to navigate the Website, Plaintiff encountered multiple accessibility barriers for blind or visually-impaired people that include, but are not limited to, the following: 28. Empty Links That Contain No Text causing the function or purpose of the link to not be presented to the user. This can introduce confusion for keyboard and screen- reader users; 29. Redundant Links where adjacent links go to the same URL address which results in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users; and 30. Linked Images Missing Alt-text, which causes problems if an image within a link contains no text and that image does not provide alt-text. A screen reader then has no content to present the user as to the function of the link, including information contained in PDFs. 32. Due to the inaccessibility of Defendant’s Website, blind and visually-impaired customers such as Plaintiff, who need screen-readers, cannot fully and equally use or enjoy the facilities, products, and services Defendant offers to the public on its Website. The access barriers Plaintiff encountered have caused a denial of Plaintiff’s full and equal access in the past, and now deter Plaintiff on a regular basis from visiting the Website, presently and in the future. 33. These access barriers on Defendant’s Website have deterred Plaintiff from learning about those various virtual reality headsets for purchase and delivery, and enjoying them equal to sighted individuals because: Plaintiff was unable to determine and or purchase items from its Website, among other things. 34. If the Website was equally accessible to all, Plaintiff could independently navigate the Website and complete a desired transaction as sighted individuals do. 35. Through his attempts to use the Website, Plaintiff has actual knowledge of the access barriers that make these services inaccessible and independently unusable by blind and visually-impaired people. 37. Defendant therefore uses standards, criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating or perpetuating the discrimination of others, as alleged herein. 38. The ADA expressly contemplates the injunctive relief that Plaintiff seeks in this action. In relevant part, the ADA requires: In the case of violations of . . . this title, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities . . . Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the . . . modification of a policy . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). 40. If the Website was accessible, Plaintiff and similarly situated blind and visually- impaired people could independently view service items, shop for and otherwise research related goods and services available via the Website. 41. Although Defendant may currently have centralized policies regarding maintaining and operating its Website, Defendant lacks a plan and policy reasonably calculated to make them fully and equally accessible to, and independently usable by, blind and other visually-impaired consumers. 42. Defendant has, upon information and belief, invested substantial sums in developing and maintaining their Website and has generated significant revenue from the Website. These amounts are far greater than the associated cost of making their Website equally accessible to visually impaired customers. 44. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks to certify a nationwide class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the United States who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services, during the relevant statutory period. 45. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York State subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the State of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of those services, during the relevant statutory period. 46. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, seeks certify a New York City subclass under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2): all legally blind individuals in the City of New York who have attempted to access Defendant’s Website and as a result have been denied access to the equal enjoyment of goods and services offered, during the relevant statutory period. 48. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class. The Class, similarly to the Plaintiff, are severely visually impaired or otherwise blind, and claim that Defendant has violated the ADA, NYSYRHL or NYCHRL by failing to update or remove access barriers on its Website so either can be independently accessible to the Class. 49. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class Members because Plaintiff has retained and is represented by counsel competent and experienced in complex class action litigation, and because Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the Class Members. Class certification of the claims is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the Class as a whole. 50. Alternatively, class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) because fact and legal questions common to Class Members predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members, and because a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this litigation. 52. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 53. Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., provides: No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 54. Defendant’s Website is a public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). The Website is a service that is offered to the general public, and as such, must be equally accessible to all potential consumers. 55. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). 56. Under Section 302(b)(1) of Title III of the ADA, it is unlawful discrimination to deny individuals with disabilities an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation, which is equal to the opportunities afforded to other individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). 58. The acts alleged herein constitute violations of Title III of the ADA, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff, who is a member of a protected class of persons under the ADA, has a physical disability that substantially limits the major life activity of sight within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A)-(2)(A). Furthermore, Plaintiff has been denied full and equal access to the Website, has not been provided services that are provided to other patrons who are not disabled, and has been provided services that are inferior to the services provided to non-disabled persons. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 59. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12188 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein, Plaintiff, requests relief as set forth below. 60. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 62. Defendant’s Website and its’ sale of goods to the general public, constitute sales establishments and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(9). Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant. 63. Defendant is subject to New York Human Rights Law because it owns and operates its Website. Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(1). 64. Defendant is violating N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 65. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2)(c)(i), unlawful discriminatory practice includes, among other things, “a refusal to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless such person can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden". 67. Readily available, well-established guidelines exist on the Internet for making websites accessible to the blind and visually impaired. These guidelines have been followed by other large business entities and government agencies in making their website accessible, including but not limited to: adding alt-text to graphics and ensuring that all functions can be performed using a keyboard. Incorporating the basic components to make its Website accessible would neither fundamentally alter the nature of Defendant’s business nor result in an undue burden to Defendant. 68. Defendant’s actions constitute willful intentional discrimination against the class on the basis of a disability in violation of the NYSHRL, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(2) in that Defendant has: a. constructed and maintained a website that is inaccessible to blind class members with knowledge of the discrimination; and/or b. constructed and maintained a website that is sufficiently intuitive and/or obvious that is inaccessible to blind class members; and/or c. failed to take actions to correct these access barriers in the face of substantial harm and discrimination to blind class members. 69. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 71. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of New York State Human Rights Law and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 72. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(4)(c) et seq. for each and every offense. 73. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 74. Under N.Y. Exec. Law § 297 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. 75. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York State Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 76. Plaintiff served notice thereof upon the attorney general as required by N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 41. 78. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) provides that “no person because of . . . disability, as such term is defined in section two hundred ninety-two of executive law, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights, or to any harassment, as defined in section 240.25 of the penal law, in the exercise thereof, by any other person or by any firm, corporation or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision.” 79. Defendant’s Website is a service, privilege or advantage of Defendant and its Website which offers such goods and services to the general public is required to be equally accessible to all. 80. Defendant is subject to New York Civil Rights Law because it owns and operates their Website, and Defendant is a person within the meaning of N.Y. Civil Law § 40-c(2). 81. Defendant is violating N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 40-c(2) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to its Website, causing its Website and the goods and services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, goods and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 83. Under NY Civil Rights Law § 40-d, “any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section, or subdivision three of section 240.30 or section 240.31 of the penal law, or who shall aid or incite the violation of any of said provisions shall for each and every violation thereof be liable to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, to be recovered by the person aggrieved thereby in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the defendant shall reside ...” 84. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy its discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 85. Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and New York State Sub-Class Members on the basis of disability are being directly or indirectly refused, withheld from, or denied the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof in § 40 et seq. and/or its implementing regulations. 86. Plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages of five hundred dollars per instance, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y. Civil Law § 40 et seq. for each and every offense. 87. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the New York City Sub-Class Members, repeats and realleges every allegation of the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 89. Defendant’s Website is a sales establishment and public accommodations within the definition of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9). 90. Defendant is subject to NYCHRL because it owns and operates its Website, making it a person within the meaning of N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(1). 91. Defendant is violating N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-107(4)(a) in refusing to update or remove access barriers to Website, causing its Website and the services integrated with such Website to be completely inaccessible to the blind. This inaccessibility denies blind patrons full and equal access to the facilities, products, and services that Defendant makes available to the non-disabled public. 92. Defendant is required to “make reasonable accommodation to the needs of persons with disabilities . . . any person prohibited by the provisions of [§ 8-107 et seq.] from discriminating on the basis of disability shall make reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a). 94. Defendant has failed to take any prompt and equitable steps to remedy their discriminatory conduct. These violations are ongoing. 95. As such, Defendant discriminates, and will continue in the future to discriminate against Plaintiff and members of the proposed class and subclass on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the products, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations and/or opportunities of its Website under § 8-107(4)(a) and/or its implementing regulations. Unless the Court enjoins Defendant from continuing to engage in these unlawful practices, Plaintiff and members of the class will continue to suffer irreparable harm. 96. Defendant’s actions were and are in violation of the NYCHRL and therefore Plaintiff invokes his right to injunctive relief to remedy the discrimination. 97. Plaintiff is also entitled to compensatory damages, as well as civil penalties and fines under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120(8) and § 8-126(a) for each offense as well as punitive damages pursuant to § 8-502. 98. Plaintiff is also entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 99. Under N.Y.C. Administrative Code § 8-120 and § 8-126 and the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth and incorporated therein Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below. Defendant’s Barriers on Its Website VIOLATIONS OF THE ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK STATE CIVIL RIGHTS LAW VIOLATIONS OF THE NYCHRL VIOLATIONS OF THE NYSHRL

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13. Defendant manufactures, markets, and sells Crisco EVOO as Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 14. Plaintiff purchased and consumed the Crisco EVOO product multiple times during 2017 and 2018 in reliance on Defendant’s advertising and labeling of the “Crisco EVOO” product as Extra Virgin Olive Oil. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Class purchased the “Crisco “EVOO” product for the dual purpose of consuming it and determining its authenticity as Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 15. As noted above, extensive clinical testing conducted by a leading laboratory – measuring the key variables of (1) Insoluble Impurities; (2) Free Fatty Acid, (3) Peroxide Value (Acetic Acid-Isooctane Method), (4) Specific Extinction, Ultraviolet Absorption, (5) Sensory analysis, (6) Copper (ICP-AES), and (7) Moisture & Volatile Content – conclusively establishes that Crisco EVOO is not Extra Virgin Olive Oil. Accordingly, Defendant’s statements that the “Crisco EVOO” product is Extra Virgin Olive Oil are false and misleading. 19. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of herself and the following class (collectively, the “Class” or “Classes”), defined as: All California residents who made retail purchases of Defendant’s Crisco EVOO product during the applicable limitations period up to and including final judgment in this action. 20. The proposed Class excludes current and former officers and directors of Defendant, Members of the immediate families of the officers and directors of Defendant, Defendant’s legal representatives, heirs, successors, assigns, and any entity in which it has or has had a controlling interest, and the judicial officer to whom this lawsuit is assigned. 21. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the Class definition based on facts learned in the course of litigating this matter. 22. The Crisco EVOO products sold by Defendant suffer from illegal product labeling and advertising. 33. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 34. Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the Class for Defendant’s violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code 1761(d). 35. Plaintiff and the Class Members are consumers who purchased the Crisco EVOO product for personal, family or household purposes. Plaintiff and the Class Members are “consumers” as that term is defined by the CLRA in Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d). 45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 46. Plaintiff has standing to pursue this cause of action because Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and has lost money as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. Specifically, Plaintiff purchased the Crisco EVOO product in reliance on Defendant’s marketing claims. Plaintiff later learned, on the basis of the testing described herein, that the Crisco EVOO product was not in fact Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 47. Defendant has engaged in false advertising as it has disseminated false and/or misleading representations about the Crisco EVOO product. 48. Defendant knew or should have known by exercising reasonable care that its representations were false and/or misleading. During the Class Period, Defendant engaged in false advertising in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq., by misrepresenting in its advertising and marketing of the Crisco EVOO product to Plaintiff, Class members, and the consuming public that the Crisco EVOO product is Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 49. Each of the aforementioned representations alleged in this Complaint was false and misleading because the Crisco EVOO product is not of the standard, quality or grade advertised, and is in reality, not Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 55. Plaintiff has standing to pursue this cause of action because Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and has lost money as a result of Defendant’s actions as set forth herein. Specifically, Plaintiff purchased the Crisco EVOO product in reliance on Defendant’s marketing claims. The product was not of the standard, quality and grade advertised; specifically, it was not Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 65. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations contained in all preceding paragraphs, and further alleges as follows: 66. During the Class Period, Defendant misrepresented to consumers through the advertising, marketing, and sale of the Crisco EVOO product that the Crisco EVOO product was Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 67. Defendant’s misrepresentations were false because the Crisco EVOO product is not Extra Virgin Olive Oil. 68. Defendant’s misrepresentations were material because a reasonable consumer would attach importance to them in determining whether to purchase and consume the Crisco EVOO product. 69. Defendant’s material misrepresentations regarding the characteristics of the Crisco EVOO product are false and made without reasonable grounds for believing them to be true. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (By Plaintiff and on Behalf of the Class Against Defendant) UNLAWFUL, FRAUDULENT & UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, ET SEQ.) (By Plaintiff and on Behalf of the Class Against Defendant) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSUMER LEGAL REMEDIES ACT, (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1750, ET SEQ.) (By Plaintiff and on Behalf of the Class Against Defendant) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA’S FALSE ADVERTISING LAW (CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, ET SEQ.) (By Plaintiff and on Behalf of the Class Against Defendant)

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Massachusetts Wage Law – Overtime Wages (Brought on behalf of the MA Plaintiff and the MA Rule 23 Class) 259. The MA Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the MA Rule 23 Class, realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 260. Defendants failed to pay the MA Plaintiff and the MA Rule 23 Class the proper overtime wages to which they are entitled under the MA Wage Laws and the supporting Massachusetts State Department of Labor Regulations. 261. Through their knowing or intentional failure to pay the MA Plaintiff and the MA Rule 23 Class overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, Defendants have violated the MA Wage Laws and the supporting Massachusetts State Department of Labor Regulations. 262. Due to Defendants’ violations of the MA Wage Laws, the MA Plaintiff and the MA Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid minimum wages, treble damages as provided for by the MA Wage Laws, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action. New York Labor Law –Tip Misappropriation (Brought on behalf of the NY Plaintiffs and the NY Rule 23 Class) 239. The NY Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the NY Rule 23 Class, reallege and incorporate by reference all allegations in all preceding paragraphs. 240. Defendants required the NY Plaintiffs and the NY Rule 23 Class Members to share a portion of the gratuities and/or service charges they received with employees other than servers, bussers, runners, bartenders, or similar employees, in violation of NYLL, Article 6 § 196-d, and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 241. By Defendants’ knowing or intentional demand for, acceptance of, and/or retention of a portion of the gratuities and/or service charges received by the NY Plaintiffs and the NY Rule 23 Class Members, Defendants have willfully violated the NYLL, Article 6, § 196- d, and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 242. Due to Defendants’ willful violations of the NYLL, the NY Plaintiffs and the NY Rule 23 Class Members are entitled to recover from Defendants their unpaid gratuities and/or service charges, liquidated damages as provided for by the NYLL, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

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15. Plaintiff and similarly situated employees work or worked for Defendant as maids and/or housekeeper during the applicable statutory period. 16. Plaintiff and similarly situated employees perform room cleaning services at the hotel operated by Defendants. 17. Defendant compensated Plaintiff and similarly situated employees for their work on an hourly basis. 18. Defendant suffered and permitted Plaintiff and similarly situated employees to work more than forty (40) hours per workweek. 20. In calculating Plaintiff and similarly situated employees’ wages, Defendant only paid them their regular rate (i.e., straight time rate), rather than the legally required one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for hours in excess of forty (40) per workweek. 21. Defendant willfully operated under a common scheme to deprive Plaintiff and similarly situated employees of overtime compensation by paying them less than what is required under federal law. 22. As a large nationwide corporation, Defendant was or should have been aware that Plaintiff and similarly situated employees performed work that required proper payment of overtime compensation. 23. Defendant knew that Plaintiff and similarly situated employees worked overtime hours without receiving proper overtime pay because Defendant maintained and recorded the hours worked by Plaintiff and similarly situated employees. 24. Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, of its unlawful payment practices and recklessly chose to disregard the consequences of its actions. 25. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals. The proposed collective class (“Class Members”) is identified as follows: All maids and/or housekeepers who worked for LQ Management, LLC at the La Quinta Inn in Metairie, Louisiana within the last three years. 27. As the case proceeds, it is likely that other individuals will file consent forms and join as “opt-in” plaintiffs. 28. Members of the proposed Class Members are known to Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records. 29. Plaintiff and the Class Members are all victims of Defendant’s widespread, repeated, systematic, and consistent illegal policies that have resulted in willful violations of their rights under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and that have cause significant damage to Plaintiff and the Class Members. 30. The Class Members would benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and an opportunity to join by filing their written consent. 31. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 32. Defendant is an “enterprise” as defined by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1), and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(b), (s)(1). 33. The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires covered employers like Defendant to pay non-exempt employees like Plaintiff and the Class Members no less than one and one-half (1.5) times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek. 34. Plaintiff and the Class Members sometimes worked more than forty (40) hours per week for Defendant, but Defendant did not properly compensate them for all of their overtime hours as required by the FLSA. 36. Defendant knew Plaintiff and the Class Members worked overtime without proper compensation, and it willfully failed and refused to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members wages at the required overtime rate pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 225. 37. Defendant’s willful failure and refusal to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime wages for time worked violates the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207.

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(Fair Labor Standards Act-Minimum Wage Claim) (Individual and Collective Claim) (Fair Labor Standards Act–Failure to Pay Overtime Wages) (Individual and Collective Action 11.� At all times, relevant herein, Defendants employed Plaintiff and numerous other employees to work on their behalf in providing labor for their financial benefit. 12.� Plaintiff Knecht has been employed by Defendants as a server from approximately October of 2012 until the present. 13.� Plaintiff has an employment agreement with Defendants, whereby Plaintiff is paid an hourly rate plus tips for all hours worked. 14.� Defendants paid Mr. Knecht, as well as other similarly situated servers, an hourly wage less than the statutory minimum wage by taking the “Tip Credit” under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 15.� Defendants paid Plaintiff $2.75 per hour. 16.� Defendants violated the tip credit notice requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), because they did not inform Plaintiff, as well as other similarly situated servers, that they intend to treat tips as satisfying part of their minimum wage obligation. 17.� Defendants also did not notify Plaintiff, as well as other similarly situated servers, regarding the provisions of their tip policy and the amount of the tip credit that it was taking. 18.� Defendants failed to inform the Plaintiff, as well as other similarly situated servers, regarding the amount of tip pool contributions they would be required to make either before or after they were hired. 20.� The Defendants’ mandatory tip pool consists of front severs, back servers, server assistants, hostesses, bartenders and food runners. 21.� The front severs primary duties are to ensure that Charleston Grill’s product and service standards are consistent with Leading Quality Assurance. (LQA). The Leading Hotels of the World, Ltd. through LQA, sets standards for the world's most prestigious hospitality organizations. 22.� The front-severs, initially greet the customers, obtain their drink order, described the menu, and makes wine suggestions. 23.� The back-server acts as a liaison between the Front Server and the guest. They are responsible for resetting the table, putting the appropriate silverware on the table for each course. The back-server is also responsible for the dessert presentation as well serving the dessert and after dinner drinks. 24.� Plaintiffs works primarily as a front server because he is experienced, and knowledgeable in LQA standards. Occasionally, Plaintiff also works as back server. 25.� The server assistants’ primary responsibility is to fill water glasses, clear dirty plates, and bring food to the table. 26.� Server assistants are paid less than minimum wage and sometimes work shifts without being paid any hourly wage. 28.� The food runner position at the Charleston Grill varies from the typical food runner position in other restaurants. In most restaurants, food runners, as the name suggests, assist servers in running food from the kitchen to customers seated at the tables. 29.� However, at Charleston Grill, the food runners do not have any direct interaction with the guests. 30.� In fact, the food runners are specifically instructed not to bring plates to the table or approach customers because they do not have the proper training. 31.� The food runners work primarily in the kitchen expediting food according to the cook’s instructions. 32.� Food runners require no training before they are scheduled to work. However, front severs, back servers, server assistants, hostesses, and bartenders are required to complete training. In addition to training, they are required to pass a written or verbal exam given by the General Manager or Dining Room Manager. 33.� As a result of the Defendants’ mandatory tip pool of requiring Plaintiff to share their tips with the food runners, the Defendants are violating the rights of the Plaintiff and numerous similarly situated employees by failing to pay them the federally mandated minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. 34.� The food runners are not employees who “customarily and regularly” receive tips. They take plates to and from food stations and are rarely visible to the guests. 36.� The Defendants regularly hire food runners from a staffing agency. The food runners hired through a staffing agency, are paid on or above the Federal Minimum wage of $7.25 an hour and are not included in the tip pool. 37.� The Plaintiff, as well as, similarly situated employees, do not redistribute their tips to food runners when they are hired by a staffing agency. 38.� However, food runners hired directly by the Defendants, and not through the staffing agency; were paid below the Federal Minimum wage of $7.25 an hour and were included in the tool pool. 39.� Food runners are only included in the mandatory tip pool when they are hired by the Defendants and not from a staffing agency. 40.� In addition to maintaining a policy that invalidates the tip credit scheme, Defendants also miscalculate the overtime rate for all servers who worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 41.� By law, when tipped employees paid pursuant to a tip credit scheme work overtime, the employer is to calculate the employees’ overtime rate at one-and-a-half (1.5) times minimum wage not the lower direct wage payment of the tip credit scheme. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 42.� Plaintiff and similarly situated employees occasionally worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek without receiving proper overtime compensation. 43.� Plaintiff is paid $4.12 and hour when he works over forty hours. 44.� At all times relevant to this complaint, Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees are non-exempt employees for purposes of the overtime compensation provisions of the 46.� Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as if repeated here verbatim. 47.� At all times, pertinent to this Complaint, Defendants engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) and 203(s). 48.� At all times, relevant to this Complaint, Defendants’ annual gross volume of sales made or business done was not less than Five Hundred Thousand and 00/100 dollars ($500,000.00). 49.� Alternatively, Plaintiff works in interstate commerce so as to fall within the protection of the FLSA. The business of Defendants was and is an enterprise engaged in commerce as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1) and, as such, Defendants are subject to, and covered by, the FLSA. 50.� The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires employers to pay its nonexempt employees a minimum wage of Seven and 25/100 dollars ($7.25) an hour. 51.� The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m), provides an exception allowing certain employers to take a “Tip Credit” and pay less than the statutory minimum wage to tipped employees, on the condition that any pooling, or sharing, of tips is shared only with other employees who customarily and regularly receive tips. 52.� Plaintiff was required by Defendants to pool, or share, his tips with employees, who are not employees who customarily and regularly receive tips, therefore, the tip pool is invalidated. 53.� When the tip pool is invalidated, the employer can no longer enjoy the benefits of the Tip Credit provision, 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 55.� Plaintiff realleges each and every allegation contained in the above paragraphs as if repeated here verbatim. 56.� Pursuant to the terms of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, an employer must pay a nonexempt employee time and a half for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek. 57.� By law, when tipped employees paid pursuant to a tip credit scheme work overtime, the employer is to calculate the employees’ overtime rate at one-and-a-half (1.5) times minimum wage not the lower direct wage payment of the tip credit scheme. 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 58.� Plaintiff and similarly situated employees occasionally worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek without receiving proper overtime compensation. 59.� Defendants have violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, in reckless disregard of the rights of Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff seeks to recover from Defendants the following damages: actual damages; liquidated damages of an equal amount; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and the costs and disbursements of this action. 9.� At all times, relevant herein, Defendants own and operate the Charleston Grill by Belmond, (Charleston Grill) an up-scale restaurant serving “award winning Southern Cuisine” located within the Belmond Charleston Place Hotel at 224 King Street, Charleston, South Carolina 29401. Belmond consist of “a global collection of 49 iconic hotels, trains and river cruises in 24 countries.” https://www.belmond.com/about.

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28. WPZ is a large-cap master limited partnership providing infrastructure for North American natural gas and natural gas products. Williams Partners GP is the general partner of 82. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of WPZ during the Class Period (“the Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their officer, directors, and family members, as applicable. 83. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. As of February 13, 2015, there were 586,694,683 WPZ common units outstanding, owned by hundreds or thousands of investors. 85. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct. 86. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests which conflict with those of the Class. 87. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 94. Defendants made the material omissions and misrepresentations complained of herein with scienter in that they knew and/or recklessly disregarded that the above-mentioned announcement of the WPZ/WMB merger agreement, and the statements made in connection with that announced merger, that were issued or disseminated by the Control Person Defendants or by the Entity Defendants, were materially false and misleading when made by omitting material information necessary to make their statements fully accurate and comprehendible. The Defendants knew that their failure to reveal this material information would likely mislead investors, such as Plaintiff and the Class. 95. The fraud alleged in this Complaint did not involve or arise from the actions of lower level employees, nor was it otherwise hidden from the Control Person Defendants. To the contrary, WMB’s discussions with ETE concerning ETE’s dogged pursuit of WMB were conducted by Defendants Armstrong and Defendant Chappel, with the advance approval of WMB’s Board. In addition, Defendant Armstrong and Defendant Chappel are senior officers and, in the case of Defendant Armstrong, a director of both Williams Partners GP and WMB, which control WPZ. Thus, the knowledge possessed by Defendant Armstrong and Defendant Chappel can be attributed to both Williams Partners GP and WMB, and consequently to WPZ. 96. Prior to WMB’s Board approving the WPZ/WMB merger, Defendant Armstrong had no fewer than four conversations with senior representatives of ETE concerning a potential transactions between WMB and ETE. One of these conversations was during a dinner meeting with Defendant Chappel and senior ETE representatives that was held less than a week prior to the approval of the WPZ/WMB merger. 98. These facts, as well as others stated above, establish the strong inference that the Control Person Defendants acted with scienter and, consequently, that the Entity Defendants they controlled did so as well. A. WPZ and WMB Violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 (Against All Defendants)

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1. In 2013, Mercer Canyons was an agricultural employer pursuant to the statutory definition of 29 U.S.C. §1802(2). 2. In 2013, Plaintiff Ruiz was a seasonal agricultural worker pursuant to the statutory definition of 29 U.S.C. §1802(10)(a). 29. Plaintiffs Bacilio Ruiz and Jose Amador (“Representative Plaintiffs”) bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), consisting of all migrant and seasonal farm workers who: 1) were employed by Mercer Canyons in 2012; 2) sought employment at Mercer Canyons in 2013 before fifty percent of the Clearance Order period elapsed; or, 3) were hired at Mercer Canyons in 2013 prior to fifty percent of the Clearance Order period and were not referred by WorkSource. 3. In 2013, at the time Plaintiff Amador applied for work at Mercer Canyons he met the statutory definition of seasonal agricultural worker pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1802(10)(a). Mercer Canyon’s H-2A Application 30. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The exact size of the class is not known; however on information and belief the class consists of over 100 persons. 31. Representative Plaintiffs are represented by experienced counsel who will vigorously prosecute the litigation on behalf of the class. 32. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class 4. In 2013, Mercer Canyons, by and through its agent Washington Farm Labor Association, applied to the federal Department of Labor to employ H-2A workers. 5. On January 16, 2013, Ryan Ayers, CFO of Mercer Canyons, signed the H-2A application on behalf of Mercer Canyons. 6. The application submitted by Mercer Canyons sought forty-four (44) H-2A workers from March 24, 2013 through September 1, 2013, as set forth in the Clearance Order (ETA 790 Form) attached to the application. A. PLAINTIFF CLASS – DECEIVED WORKERS AWPA Coverage

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[Violation of New York Labor Law—New York Pay Stub Requirement] 108. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 109. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide detailed paystub information to employees every payday. NYLL §195-1(d). 110. Defendants have failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the New York Labor Law with respect to compensation of each Plaintiff, and did not provide the pay stub on or after each Plaintiff’s payday. 19. Defendants committed the following alleged acts knowingly, intentionally and willfully. 20. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees for each hour worked. 5 21. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees at least the applicable New York minimum wage rate for each hour worked. 22. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees their lawful overtime of one and one-half times (1.5x) their regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) in a given workweek. 23. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees their lawful spread of hours for workdays that began and ended ten (10) hours apart. 24. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of minimum wage, overtime pay, failure to provide paystubs and failure to provide the required wage notice at the time of hiring would financially injure Plaintiff and similarly situated employees and violate state and federal laws. 25. Upon information and belief, Defendants failed to keep full and accurate records in order to mitigate liability for wage violations. 26. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to provide Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees with Time of Hire Notices in their primary languages reflecting rates of pay and payday as well as paystubs that listed the employee’s name, the employer’s name, the employer’s address and telephone number, the employee’s rate or rates of pay, any deductions made from employees’ wages, any allowances claimed as part of the minimum wage, and the employee’s gross and net wages for each pay day. 27. At all relevant times, Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to provide Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees with statements every payday that accurately listed all of the following: the dates of work covered by that payment of wages; the employee’s name; the 6 name of the employer; the address and phone number of the employer; the employee’s rate or rates of pay and basis thereof; the employee’s gross wages; the employee’s deductions; allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage; net wages; the employee’s regular hourly rate or rates of pay; the employee’s overtime rate or rates of pay; the employee’s number of regular hours worked, and the employee’s number of overtime hours worked. 28. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 29. Defendants knew that the nonpayment of minimum wage, overtime wages, failure to provide paystubs and failure to provide the required wage notice would economically injure Plaintiffs and the Class Members by their violation of federal and state laws. 30. At all relevant times, Defendants failed to post the required New York State Department Labor posters regarding minimum wage pay rates, overtime pay, and pay day. 31. Defendants knowingly and willfully failed to provide Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees with notices of their exact date of termination and of the cancellation of employee benefits connected with termination within five (5) working days after their dates of termination, in violation of NYLL §195(6). 32. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiffs were not exempt under federal and state laws requiring employers to pay employees overtime. Plaintiff Wenlei Li 33. From on or about August 1, 2017 to April 2, 2018, Plaintiff Li was employed by Defendants and was hired as a warehouse helper and loader for SLR Food Distribution, Inc. located at 100 Nassau Terminal Rd., New Hyde Park, NY 11040. 34. Between on or about August 2017 and April 2, 2018, Plaintiff Li’s regular work 7 schedule ran from 8:20 am – 5:30 pm, with one forty-five (45) minute lunch break for six (6) days from Monday to Saturday; therefore, Plaintiff Li worked eight (8) hours and twenty-five (25) minutes per day. 35. During this period, Plaintiff Li worked around fifty and one half (50.5) hours each week. 36. During this period, Plaintiff Li’s primary job was as a warehouse helper which duties included packing, loading and organizing the warehouse’s inventory and products. 37. During this period, Plaintiff Li’s pay was two thousand two hundred and sixty ($2,260) dollars per month. 38. During this period, Plaintiff Li was paid by check monthly. 39. During this period, Plaintiff Li was not compensated at one-and-one-half of the minimum wage or his calculated regular rate, whichever is greater, for all hours worked above forty (40) in each workweek. 40. Plaintiff Li was not required to record his work hours such as punch time cards and was not paid for all hours worked per week. 41. Nor to Plaintiff Li's knowledge, that Defendants utilizes any time tracking device such as punch cards or sign-in sheets. 42. Plaintiff was not given wage statements for each of his pay period as required by the law. 43. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 44. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notices at the time of his hiring. 8 45. The warehouse manager, known as "Angela" to Plaintiff Li, interviewed Plaintiff Li. 46. Angela handled payrolls to Defendants' employees, including Plaintiff Li. Plaintiff Yingjie Yin 47. From on or about July 15, 2017, to November 30, 2017, Plaintiff Yin was employed by Defendants and was hired as a warehouse helper and loader for SLR Food Distribution, Inc. located at 100 Nassau Terminal Rd., New Hyde Park, NY 11040. 48. Between on or about July 2017 and November 2017, Plaintiff Yin’s regular work schedule ran from 8:20 am – 5:30 pm, with one forty-five (45) minute lunch break for six (6) days from Monday to Saturday, therefore Plaintiff Yin worked eight (8) hours and twenty-five (25) minutes per day. 49. During this period, Plaintiff Yin worked around fifty and one half (50.5) hours each week. 50. During this period, Plaintiff Yin’s primary job was as a warehouse helper which duties included packing, loading and organizing the warehouse’s inventory and products. 51. During this period, Plaintiff Yin’s pay was two thousand two hundred and sixty ($2,260) dollars per month. 52. During this period, Plaintiff Yin was not compensated at the rate of the minimum wage or his calculated hourly wage, whichever is greater, for all hours worked within forty (40) hours in each workweek. 53. During this period, Plaintiff Yin was not compensated at one-and-one-half of the minimum wage or his calculated regular rate, whichever is greater, for all hours worked above forty (40) in each workweek. 9 54. Plaintiff Yin was not required to record his work hours such as punch time cards and was not paid for all hours worked per week. 55. Plaintiff Yin was not required to record his work hours such as punch time cards and was not paid for all hours worked per week. 56. Nor to Plaintiff Yin's knowledge, that Defendants utilizes any time tracking device such as punch cards or sign-in sheets. 57. Plaintiff Yin was not given a correct wage statement for each of his pay period as required by the law. 58. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for overtime compensation according to state and federal laws. 59. Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notices at the time of his hiring. 60. Defendants committed the foregoing acts against the Plaintiffs, the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, and the Class. 61. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiffs either the FLSA minimum wage or the New York State minimum wage to Plaintiffs or other similarly situated employees. 62. Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not paying Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees either the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half), or the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half), in violation of the FLSA and New York Labor Law and the supporting federal and New York State Department of Labor Regulations. 10 63. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and on behalf of all other and former non- exempt employees who have been or were employed by the Defendants at each their previous and current business locations for up to the last three (3) years, through entry of judgment in this case (the “Collective Action Period”) and whom failed to receive minimum wages, overtime compensation (the “Collective Action Members”), and have been subject to the same common decision, policy, and plan to not provide required wage notices at the time of hiring, in contravention to federal and state labor laws. 64. Upon information and belief, the Collection Action Members are so numerous the joinder of all members is impracticable. The identity and precise number of such persons are unknown, and the facts upon which the calculations of that number may be ascertained are presently within the sole control of the Defendants. Upon information and belief, there are more than thirty (30) Collective Action members, who have worked for or have continued to work for the Defendants during the Collective Action Period, most of whom would not likely file individual suits because they fear retaliation, lack adequate financial resources, access to attorneys, or knowledge of their claims. Therefore, Plaintiff submits that this case should be certified as a collection action under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b). 65. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Collective Action Members, and has retained counsel that is experienced and competent in the field of employment law and class action litigation. Plaintiffs have no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those members of this collective action. 66. This action should be certified as collective action because the prosecution of separate action by individual members of the collective action would risk creating either inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of this class that would as 11 a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other members not party to the adjudication, or subsequently impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. 67. A collective action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable. Furthermore, inasmuch as the damages suffered by individual Collective Action Members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation makes it virtually impossible for the members of the collective action to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as collective action. 68. Questions of law and fact common to members of the collective action predominate over questions that may affect only individual members because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to all members. Among the questions of fact common to Plaintiffs and other Collective Action Members are: a. Whether the Defendants employed Collective Action members within the meaning of the FLSA; b. Whether the Defendants failed to pay the Collective Action Members overtime wages for all hours worked above forty (40) each workweek in violation of the FLSA and the regulation promulgated thereunder; c. Whether the Defendants failed to provide the Collective Action Members with a wage notice at the time of hiring as required by the NYLL; d. Whether the Defendants’ violations of the FLSA are willful as that terms is used within the context of the FLSA; and, 12 e. Whether the Defendants are liable for all damages claimed hereunder, including but not limited to compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages, interest, costs and disbursements and attorneys’ fees. 69. Plaintiffs know of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a collective action. 70. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated have been substantially damaged by Defendants’ unlawful conduct. 71. Plaintiffs brings their NYLL claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“F. R. C. P.”) Rule 23, on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants at SLR Food Distribution, Inc. on or after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein (the “Class Period”). 72. All said persons, including Plaintiffs, are referred to herein as the “Class.” The Class members are readily ascertainable. The number and identity of the Class members are determinable from the records of Defendants. The hours assigned and worked, the positions held, and the rate of pay for each Class Member is also determinable from Defendants’ records. For purpose of notice and other purposes related to this action, their names and addresses are readily available from Defendants. Notice can be provided by means permissible under said F.R.C.P 23. 73. The proposed Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, and the disposition of their claims as a class will benefit the parities and the Court. Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the facts on which the calculation of the number is presently within the sole control of the Defendants, upon information and belief, there are more than five (5) members of the class. 13 74. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those claims which could be alleged by any member of the Class, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that would be sought by each member of the Class in separate actions. All the Class members were subject to the same corporate practices of Defendants, as alleged herein, of failing to pay overtime compensation. Defendants’ corporation wide policies and practices, including but not limited to their failure to provide a wage notice at the time of hiring, affected all Class members similarly, and Defendants benefited from the same type of unfair and/ or wrongful acts as to each Class member. Plaintiff and other Class members sustained similar losses, injuries and damages arising from the same unlawful policies, practices and procedures. 75. Plaintiffs are able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has no interests antagonistic to the Class. Plaintiffs are represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in representing plaintiffs in both class action and wage and hour employment litigation cases. 76. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage and hour litigation where individual Class members lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute corporate defendants. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of efforts and expenses that numerous individual actions engender. The losses, injuries, and damages suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to a class action analysis, thus the expenses and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or impossible for the individual Class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Further, important public interests will be served by addressing the matter 14 as a class action. The adjudication of individual litigation claims would result in a great expenditure of Court and public resources; however, treating the claims as a class action would result in a significant saving of these costs. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent and/or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the Class, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and resulting in the impairment of class members’ rights and the disposition of their interests through actions to which they were not parties. The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, class-wide proof. In addition, if appropriate, the Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this action as a class action. 77. Upon information and belief, defendants and other employers throughout the state violate the New York Labor Law. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing claims because doing so can harm their employment, future employment, and future efforts to secure employment. Class actions provide class members who are not named in the complaint a degree of anonymity which allows for the vindication of their rights while eliminating or reducing these risks. 78. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members, including: a. Whether Defendants employed Plaintiffs and the Class within the meaning of the New York law; b. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to overtime under the New York Labor Law; c. Whether Defendants maintained a policy, pattern and/or practice of failing to pay 15 Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class spread-of-hours pay as required by the NYLL; d. Whether the Defendants provided wage notices at the time of hiring to Plaintiffs and class members as required by the NYLL; e. At what common rate, or rates subject to common method of calculation were and are the Defendants required to pay the Class members for their work. 79. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 80. At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” engaged in interstate “commerce” and/or in the production of “goods” for “commerce,” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§206(a) and §§207(a). Further, Plaintiffs are covered within the meaning of FLSA, U.S.C. §§206(a) and 207(a). 81. At all relevant times, Defendants employed “employees” including Plaintiffs, within the meaning of FLSA. 82. Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Defendants have had gross revenues in excess of $500,000. 83. The FLSA provides that any employer engaged in commerce shall pay employees the applicable minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 16 84. At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the statutory minimum wage to Plaintiffs, and the collective action members, for some or all of the hours they worked. 85. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §206 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 86. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and Collective Class Members at the statutory minimum wage when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiffs and Collective Action members. 87. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 88. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants within the meaning of New York Labor Law §§2 and 651. 89. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay the minimum wage shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 90. Defendants knowingly and willfully violated Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ rights by failing to pay them minimum wages in the lawful amount for hours worked. 91. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 91. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, Plaintiffs are entitled to 20 recover from Defendants, jointly and severally, $250 for each workday of the violation, up to $5,000 for Plaintiff to get her with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-d). Prayer For Relief WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves, and the FLSA collective plaintiffs and rule 23 class, respectfully request that this court enter a judgment providing the following relief: a) Authorizing plaintiffs at the earliest possible time to give notice of this collective action, or that the court issue such notice, to all persons who are presently, or have been employed by defendants as non-exempt tipped or non-tipped employees. Such notice shall inform them that the civil notice has been filed, of the nature of the action, of their right to join this lawsuit if they believe they were denied proper hourly compensation and premium overtime wages; b) Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; c) Designation of Plaintiffs as representatives of the Rule 23 Class, and counsel of record as Class counsel; d) Certification of this case as a collective action pursuant to FLSA; e) Issuance of notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) to all similarly situated members of the FLSA opt-in class, apprising them of the pendency of this action, and permitting them to assert timely FLSA claims and state claims in this action by filing individual Consent to Sue forms pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and appointing Plaintiffs and his counsel to represent the Collective Action Members; 21 f) A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under FLSA and New York Labor Law; g)An injunction against SLR Food Distribution, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, employees, representatives and any and all persons acting in concert with them as provided by law, from engaging in each of unlawful practices and policies set forth herein; h) An award of unpaid wages and minimum wages due Plaintiffs and the Collective Action members under the FLSA and New York Labor Law, plus compensatory and liquidated damages in the amount of twenty five percent under NYLL §§190 et seq., §§650 et seq., and one hundred percent after April 9, 2011 under NY Wage Theft Prevention Act, and interest; i) An award of unpaid overtime wages due under FLSA and New York Labor Law; j) An award of damages for Defendants’ failure to provide wage notice at the time of hiring as required under the New York Labor Law. k) An award of liquidated and/or punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ knowing and willful failure to pay wages, minimum wages, overtime compensation pursuant to 29 92. The FLSA provides that no employer engaged in commerce shall employ a covered employee for a work week longer than forty (40) hours unless such employee receives compensation for employment in excess of forty (40) hours at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he or she is employed, or one and one-half times the minimum wage, whichever is greater. 29 USC §207(a). 93. The FLSA provides that any employer who violates the provisions of 29 U.S.C. §207 shall be liable to the employees affected in the amount of their unpaid overtime compensation, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. 29 USC §216(b). 94. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective their overtime pay violated the FLSA. 95. At all relevant times, Defendants had, and continue to have, a policy of practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and a half to Plaintiffs and Collective Action Members for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek, which violated and continues to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§201, et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§207(a)(1) and 215(a). 96. The FLSA and supporting regulations required employers to notify employees of employment law requires employers to notify employment law requirements. 29 C.F.R. §516.4. 97. Defendants willfully failed to notify Plaintiffs and FLSA Collective of the requirements of the employment laws in order to facilitate their exploitation of Plaintiffs’ and FLSA Collectives’ labor. 18 98. Defendants knowingly and willfully disregarded the provisions of the FLSA as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiffs and Collective Class Members the statutory overtime rate of time and one half for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week when they knew or should have known such was due and that failing to do so would financially injure Plaintiffs and Collective Action members. 99. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 100. Pursuant to the New York Wage Theft Prevention Act, an employer who fails to pay proper overtime compensation shall be liable, in addition to the amount of any underpayments, for liquidated damages equal to the total of such under-payments found to be due the employee. 101. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class their overtime pay violated the NYLL. 102. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class was not in good faith. [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Minimum Wage Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class] [Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act—Overtime Wage 17 Brought on behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective] [Violation of New York Labor Law—Time of Hire Wage Notice Requirement] 103. Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 104. The NYLL and supporting regulations require employers to provide written notice of the rate or rates of pay and the basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other allowances, if any, claimed as a part of minimum wage, including tip, meal, or lodging allowances; the regular payday designated by the employer; the name of the 19 employer; any “doing business as” names used by the employer; the physical address of employer’s main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the employer. NYLL §195-1(a). 105. Defendants intentionally failed to provide notice to employees in violation of New York Labor Law§195, which requires all employers to provide written notice in the employee’s primary language about the terms and conditions of employment related to rate of pay, regular pay cycle and rate of overtime on his or her first day of employment. 106. Defendants not only did not provide notice to each employee at Time of Hire, but failed to provide notice to Plaintiffs even after the fact. 107. Due to Defendants’ violations of New York Labor Law, the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendants, jointly and severally,$50 for each workday that the violation occurred or continued to occur ,up to $5,000, together with costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law. N.Y. Lab. Law §198(1-b). [Violation of New York Labor Law—Overtime Pay Brought on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class]

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24. Plaintiffs bring this case on behalf of themselves as well as on behalf of a proposed class consisting of all Idaho Medicaid participants currently receiving Residential Habilitation Services in a Supported Living Environment. 25. Plaintiffs believe that the proposed class consists of at least hundreds, and likely thousands of individuals. Such a group is too numerous for joinder of all members to be practicable. 26. This case presents common questions of law and fact including whether the reimbursement rate cuts will cause service reductions, whether such service reductions will impact quality of quantity of care, whether proper notice was provided, whether an opportunity to appeal the decision was provided, whether such notice and opportunity was required as a matter of law, whether rate cuts will lead directly or indirectly to institutionalization of some members of the class, and whether requiring maintenance of existing rates constitutes a fundamental change in Idaho’s Medicaid program. 27. The named Plaintiffs are typical of the members of the proposed class in that their claims arise from the same facts and course of conduct by Defendants, and thus are typical of the claims of the putative class. 28. The named Plaintiffs have no conflicts of interest with other members of the class, have retained counsel adequate to bring this action, and because of their shared interests will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 31. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 32. By operating the state Medicaid program in a way that it forces some members of the putative class into institutions, Defendants are violating the integration mandate of the ADA as set out in implementing regulations. 32. Because Plaintiffs and the putative class have a property interest in continued receipt of Medicaid benefits, they are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to cessation or reduction of those benefits, pursuant to the XIVth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 33. In addition to their Constitutional rights to due process of law, Plaintiffs and the putative class have a right based in federal statutes and regulations to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to reductions in their benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(3). 34. Defendants were obligated to but have not provided notice and an opportunity to be heard, despite that, while acting under color of state law, they are reducing the benefits and services that Plaintiffs and the putative class will receive on and after February 1, 2016. 36. Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 37. Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class, by definition, qualify for institutional care in Idaho’s Medicaid program. Medicaid participants may only qualify to receive ResHab services if they face institutionalization “in the near future” in the absence of intensive community supports. 38. By precipitously reducing ResHab service rates, causing the termination of services for some, and the necessary reduction of services for most or all ResHab recipients, the Defendants will force some participants into institutional care. This will occur either because participants and their guardians will seek institutional care in the absence of available community supports, or because participants will be involuntarily placed into hospitals or jails as a direct and proximate result of the reduction or loss of community services. Denial of Due Process of Law 42 U.S.C. §1983; 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(3) VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILTIES ACT; 42 USC §12132

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19. Molina is a Long Beach, California-based managed care company that derives premium revenues from thirteen state health plans and a health plan in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Molina has three reportable segments: Health Plans, including Molina’s various HMOs; Molina Medicaid Solutions (“MMS”), which provides business processing, information technology (“IT”) development, and administrative services solutions to state Medicaid agencies; and Other, which consists primarily of Molina’s behavioral health and social services subsidiary, Pathways. Molina’s Health Plans segment accounted for 96.07, 96.87, and 98.40 percent of Molina’s 2015, 2016, and 2017 revenues, respectively. 20. As early as 2012, Molina indicated that the Company would soon double its revenue. Molina also said that much of that growth would stream from ACA Health Exchanges. To prepare for that growth, Molina invested large amounts of capital expenditures (“CapEx”) into its administrative infrastructure, including personnel, processes, and technology. 62. During the Class Period, as alleged herein, the Individual Defendants acted with scienter in that the Individual Defendants knew or were reckless as to whether the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the Company during the Class Period were materially false and misleading; knew or were reckless as to whether such statements or documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. 63. The Individual Defendants permitted Molina to release these false and misleading statements and failed to file the necessary corrective disclosures, which artificially inflated the value of the Company’s common stock. 78. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 79. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or approved the false statements specified above, which they knew or recklessly disregarded were misleading in that they contained misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 80. Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b- 5 in that they: (a) Employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (b) Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) Engaged in acts, practices, and a course of business that operated as a fraud or deceit upon Plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchases of Molina common stock during the Class Period. 83. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 84. The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Molina within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. By virtue of their positions and their power to control public statements about Molina, the Individual Defendants had the power and ability to control the actions of Molina and its employees. By reason of such conduct, Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. Background For Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act Against the Individual Defendants For Violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 Against All Defendants

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25. Repsol is “a global, integrated company at the forefront of the energy industry”1 operating in over 40 countries and throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania. To complete their business objectives, Repsol employed independent contractors. 26. Many of the individuals who worked for Repsol were paid on a day-rate basis, misclassified as independent contractors, and these make up the proposed Putative Class. While the exact job titles and job duties may differ, the Putative Class Members are and were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work. These so-called independent contractors were paid a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) without any overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek. 28. The work Brady performed was an essential and integral part of Repsol’s core business. 29. While he was classified as an independent contractor, Repsol exercised control over all aspects of his job. 30. Repsol did not require any substantial investment by Brady or the Putative Class Members for them to perform the work that was required. 31. Repsol determined Brady and the Putative Class Members opportunity for profit and loss. Brady and the Putative Class Members were not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other employees in their respective position) to perform their job duties. 32. Repsol controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Brady and the Putative Class Members. 33. Repsol determined the hours and locations Brady and the Putative Class Members worked, tools used, and rates of pay received. 34. Even though Brady and the Putative Class Members often worked away from Repsol’s offices without the presence of a direct supervisor employed by Repsol, Repsol still controlled all aspects of Brady and the Putative Class Members job activities by enforcing mandatory compliance with Repsol and its client’s policies and procedures. 35. No real investment was required of Brady and the Putative Class Members to perform their job. 37. Repsol made the large capital investments in buildings, machines, equipment, tools, and supplied in the business in which Brady and the Putative Class Members worked. 38. Brady and the Putative Class Members did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance. 39. Brady and the Putative Class Members were economically dependent on Repsol during their employment. 40. Repsol set Brady and the Putative Class Members rates of pay, their work schedules, and prohibited them from working other jobs for other companies while they were working on jobs for Repsol. 41. Repsol directly determined Brady and the Putative Class Members opportunity for profit and loss. Brady and the Putative Class Members earning opportunities were based on the number of days Repsol scheduled them to work. 42. Moreover, the job functions of Brady and the Putative Class Members were primarily manual labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other advanced degree. 43. Brady and the Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management duties. 44. Brady and the Putative Class Members were not employed by Repsol on a project-by- project basis. In fact, while Brady and the Putative Class Members were classified as independent contractors, they were regularly on call for Repsol and/or its clients and were expected to drop everything and work whenever needed. 46. Brady and the Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice. 47. Repsol’s policy of failing to pay their independent contractors, including Brady and the Putative Class Members, overtime violates the FLSA and PMWA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties. 48. Because Brady (and Repsol’s other independent contractors) were misclassified as independent contractors by Repsol, they should receive overtime for all hours that they worked in excess of 40 hours in each workweek. VI. 60. Brady incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices Repsol imposed on Brady were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members. 61. Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in willful violation of the FLSA and PMWA. 63. Based on his experiences and tenure with Repsol, Brady is aware that Repsol’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members. 64. The Putative Class Members were all improperly classified as independent contractors and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week. 65. Repsol’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members. 66. Brady’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class Members. 67. The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not prevent class or collective treatment. 68. Brady has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members. Like each Putative Class Member, Brady has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages owed to them under state and/or federal law. 69. A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit. 70. Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their injuries and Repsol will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor laws. 71. Furthermore, even if some of the Putative Class Members could afford individual litigation against Repsol, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system. 73. The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and fact are: a. Whether Repsol employed the Putative Class Members within the meaning of the applicable state and federal statutes, including the FLSA and PMWA; b. Whether the Putative Class Members were improperly misclassified as independent contractors; c. Whether Repsol’s decision to classify the Putative Class Members as independent contractors was made in good faith; d. Whether Repsol’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the Putative Class Members was made in good faith; e. Whether Repsol’s violation of the FLSA and PMWA was willful; and f. Whether Repsol’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the nation to all Putative Class Members. 74. Brady’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Brady and the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Repsol’s illegal and uniform employment policy. 75. Brady knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective or class action. 76. Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude collective and class action treatment. IX.

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1.1 million customers and non-customers who had purchased insurance products from Nationwide or sought insurance quotations. 1.1 million geographically dispersed people, making joinder impracticable. Disposition of this matter as a class action will provide substantial benefits and efficiencies to the Parties and the Court. 13. Nationwide collects PII from consumers and other sources in order to provide quotes and sales to consumers for its insurance products and services. See http://www. nationwide.com/notice-faq.jsp (last visited on Feb. 8, 2013). Plaintiff purchased a Nationwide insurance policy. Nationwide has wrongfully retained and failed to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII. 14. On October 3, 2012, a portion of Nationwide’s computer network, which is used by Nationwide and its insurance agents and Allied Insurance Company (“Allied”) and its insurance agents, was intruded upon by an unauthorized person(s), resulting in the theft and wrongful dissemination of Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII (i.e., the Data Breach). Nationwide reported that the Data Breach affected an estimated 15. As a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s failure to properly safeguard and protect the PII of its customers and non-customers, Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII was stolen, wrongfully disseminated without authorization and compromised. 16. More than six weeks after the Data Breach occurred, Plaintiff received a November 16, 2012 letter from Nationwide informing him of the Data Breach and the fact that his PII had been wrongfully disseminated without authorization and compromised. On information and belief, Nationwide sent the uniform letter to all other Class Members. 17. Nationwide’s letter encouraged Plaintiff to take certain steps to protect his PII against misuse, advised him to be vigilant and suggested that he closely monitor his bank statements, credit reports and other financial information for unusual activity. Id. Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 6 of 27 PAGEID #: 6 7 Nationwide offered Plaintiff only one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection through Equifax, which provides under certain conditions up to $1 million identity fraud expense coverage and access to his credit report. Nationwide also provided directions to Plaintiff and the other Class Members for placing a fraud alert. 18. Nationwide also suggested and directed that Plaintiff and the other Class members could place a security freeze on their credit reports, which Nationwide states is “intended to prevent credit, loans and services from being approved in [an individual’s] name without [that individual’s] consent; however, using a security freeze may delay your ability to obtain credit.” See http://www.nationwide.com/notice-resources.jsp (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). Nationwide, however, did not offer to pay this expense. Further, according to Nationwide, as stated on the referenced webpage, a credit bureau “may charge a fee of up to $5.00 (and in some cases, up to $20.00) to place a freeze or lift or remove a freeze.” Id. 19. As a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction and the resulting Data Breach, the criminal(s) and/or their customers now have Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ compromised PII. There is a robust international market for the purloined PII. Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction and the resulting Data Breach have also placed Plaintiff and the other Class Members at an imminent, immediate and continuing increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud1 and medical fraud. 1According to the United States Government Accounting Office (GAO), the terms “identity theft” or “identity fraud” are broad terms encompassing various types of criminal activities. Identity theft occurs when PII is used to commit fraud or other crimes. These crimes include, inter alia, credit card fraud, phone or utilities fraud, bank fraud and government fraud (theft of government services). Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 7 of 27 PAGEID #: 7 8 20. Identity theft occurs when someone uses an individual’s PII, such as the person’s name, Social Security number, or credit card number, without the individual’s permission, to commit fraud or other crimes. See http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0014-identity-theft.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). 21. The Federal Trade Commission correctly sets forth that “Identity theft is a serious crime. It can disrupt your finances, credit history, and reputation, and take time, money, and patience to resolve.” Id. 22. Identity theft crimes often involve more than just crimes of financial loss, such as various types of government fraud (such as obtaining a driver’s license or official identification card in the victim’s name but with their picture), using a victim’s name and Social Security number to obtain government benefits and/or filing a fraudulent tax return using a victim’s information. Identity thieves also obtain jobs using stolen Social Security numbers, rent houses and apartments and/or obtain medical services in a victim’s name. Identity thieves also have been known to give a victim’s PII to police during an arrest, resulting in the issuance of an arrest warrant in the victim’s name and an unwarranted criminal record. 23. According to the FTC, “the range of privacy-related harms is more expansive than economic or physical harm or unwarranted intrusions and that any privacy framework should recognize additional harms that might arise from unanticipated uses of data.”2 Furthermore, “there is significant evidence demonstrating that technological advances and the ability to combine disparate pieces of data can lead 2Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change 39. Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this class action as a national class action on behalf of himself and the following Class of similarly situated individuals: Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 14 of 27 PAGEID #: 14 15 All persons who sought an insurance quote from Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company or Allied Insurance Company, and whose names, and some combination of their Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, dates of birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations, and their employers’ names and addresses, were compromised by the October 3, 2012 data breach of the computer network used by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Allied Insurance Company agents. The Class specifically excludes Defendant, any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest, Defendant’s officers, directors, agents and/or employees, the Court and Court personnel. 40. On information and belief, the putative Class is comprised of approximately 41. The rights of Plaintiff and each other Class Member were violated in a virtually identical manner as a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s willful, reckless and/or negligent actions and/or inaction and the resulting Data Breach. 42. Questions of law and fact common to all Class Members exist and predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members including, inter alia: a) Whether Defendant violated FCRA by failing to properly obtain, maintain, secure or protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII; b) Whether Defendant willfully, recklessly and/or negligently failed to maintain and/or execute reasonable procedures designed to prevent unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII; c) Whether Defendant was negligent in failing to properly safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII; Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 15 of 27 PAGEID #: 15 16 d) Whether Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and the other Class Members to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting their PII; e) Whether Defendant breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in failing to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII; f) Whether Defendant was negligent in failing to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII; g) Whether, by publicly disclosing Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII without authorization, Defendant invaded their privacy; and h) Whether Plaintiff and the other Class Members sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s failure to safeguard and protect their PII. 43. Plaintiff and his counsel will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the other Class Members. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the other Class Members’ interests. Plaintiff’s lawyers are highly experienced in the prosecution of consumer class action and data breach cases. 44. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the other Class Members’ claims in that Plaintiff’s claims and the other Class Members’ claims all arise from Defendant’s failure to properly safeguard and protect their PII. 45. A class action is superior to all other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ claims. Plaintiff and the other Class Members have been harmed as a result of Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction and the resulting Data Breach. Litigating this case as a class action will reduce the possibility of repetitious litigation relating to Defendant’s conduct. 46. Class certification, therefore, is appropriate pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) because the above common questions of law or fact predominate over any Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 16 of 27 PAGEID #: 16 17 questions affecting individual Class Members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 47. Class certification also is appropriate pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate as to the Class as a whole. 48. The expense and burden of litigation would substantially impair the ability of Class Members to pursue individual lawsuits in order to vindicate their rights. Absent a class action, Defendant will retain the benefits of its wrongdoing despite its serious violations of the law. 49. The preceding factual statements and allegations are incorporated herein by reference. 50. FCRA requires consumer reporting agencies to adopt and maintain procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance and other information in a manner fair and equitable to consumers while maintaining the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy and proper utilization of such information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). 51. FCRA defines a “consumer reporting agency” as: Any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 17 of 27 PAGEID #: 17 18 interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). 52. FCRA defines a “consumer report” as: [A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of establishing the consumer’s eligibility for credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; employment purposes, or any other purpose authorized under [15 U.S.C. §] 1681(b). 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). 53. Defendant is a Consumer Reporting Agency as defined under FCRA because on a cooperative nonprofit basis and/or for monetary fees, Defendant regularly engages, in whole or in part, in the practice of assembling Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII for the purpose of furnishing Consumer Reports to third parties in connection with providing insurance quotes and/or uses interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing and/or furnishing Consumer Reports in connection with providing insurance quotes. 54. Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII constitute Consumer Reports because they bear on, inter alia, their credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, physical/medical conditions, and mode of living, which is used or collected, in whole or in part, for the purpose of establishing Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ eligibility for insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 18 of 27 PAGEID #: 18 19 55. As a Consumer Reporting Agency, Defendant was (and continues to be) required to adopt and maintain procedures designed to protect and limit the dissemination of consumer credit, personnel, insurance and other information in a manner fair and equitable to consumers while maintaining the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information. Defendant, however, violated FCRA by failing to adopt and maintain such protective procedures which, in turn, directly and/or proximately resulted in the theft and wrongful dissemination of Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII into the public domain. 56. Defendant’s violation of FCRA, as set forth above, was willful or, at the very least, reckless, constituting willfulness. 57. As a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s willful and/or reckless violations of FCRA, as described above, Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII was stolen, made accessible to unauthorized third parties in the public domain and compromised. 58. As a further direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s willful and/or reckless violations of FCRA, as described above, Plaintiff and the other Class Members were (and continue to be) injured and have suffered (and will continue to suffer) the damages described in detail above. Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction violated FCRA. 59. Plaintiff and the other Class Members, therefore, are entitled to compensation for their actual damages including, inter alia, expenses for adequate credit monitoring and identity theft insurance, out-of-pocket expenses, such as costs for placing a credit freeze or removing a credit freeze, loss of privacy, deprivation of the value of their PII, and other economic and non-economic harm (as detailed above), or Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 19 of 27 PAGEID #: 19 20 statutory damages of not less than $100, and not more than $1,000, each, as well as attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). 60. The preceding factual statements and allegations are incorporated herein by reference. 61. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and the other Class Members to safeguard and protect their PII. In the alternative, and as described above, Defendant negligently violated FCRA by failing to adopt and maintain procedures designed to protect and limit the dissemination of Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII for the permissible purposes outlined by FCRA which, in turn, directly and/or proximately resulted in the theft and wrongful dissemination of Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII into the public domain. 62. It was reasonably foreseeable that Defendant’s failure to maintain procedures to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII would result in an unauthorized third party gaining access to their PII for no permissible purpose under FCRA. 63. As a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s negligent violations of FCRA, as described above, Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII was stolen, made accessible to unauthorized third parties in the public domain and compromised. 64. As a further direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s willful and/or reckless violations of FCRA, as described above, Plaintiff and the other Class Members Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 20 of 27 PAGEID #: 20 21 were (and continue to be) injured and have suffered (and will continue to suffer) the damages described in detail above. Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction violated FCRA. 65. Plaintiff and the other Class Members, therefore, are entitled to compensation for their actual damages, including, inter alia, expenses for adequate credit monitoring and identity theft insurance, out-of-pocket expenses, such as costs for placing a credit freeze or removing a credit freeze, loss of privacy, deprivation of the value of their PII, and other economic and non-economic harm (as detailed above), as well as attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681o(a). 66. The preceding factual statements and allegations are incorporated herein by reference. 67. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff and the other Class Members to safeguard and protect their PII. 68. Defendant breached its duty by failing to exercise reasonable care and failing to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII. 69. It was reasonably foreseeable that Defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding and protecting Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII would result in an unauthorized third party gaining access to such information for no lawful purpose. 70. Plaintiff and the other Class Members were (and continue to be) damaged as a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s failure to secure and protect their PII in the form of, inter alia, expenses for adequate credit monitoring and identity theft Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 21 of 27 PAGEID #: 21 22 insurance, out-of-pocket expenses, such as costs for placing a credit freeze or removing a credit freeze, loss of privacy, deprivation of the value of their PII, and other economic and non-economic harm (as detailed above), for which they are entitled to compensation. 71. Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction and the resulting Data Breach (as described above) constituted (and continue to constitute) negligence at common law. 72. The preceding factual statements and allegations are incorporated herein by reference. 73. Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII was (and continues to be) sensitive and personal private information. 74. By virtue of Defendant’s failure to safeguard and protect Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII and the resulting Data Breach, Defendant wrongfully disseminated Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII to unauthorized persons. 75. Dissemination of Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII is not of a legitimate public concern; publicity of their PII was, is and will continue to be offensive to Plaintiff, the other Class Members and all reasonable people. The unlawful disclosure of same violates public mores. 76. Plaintiff and the other Class Members were (and continue to be) damaged as a direct and/or proximate result of Defendant’s invasion of their privacy by publicly Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 22 of 27 PAGEID #: 22 23 disclosing their private facts (i.e., their PII) in the form of, inter alia, expenses for adequate credit monitoring and identity theft insurance, out-of-pocket expenses, such as costs for placing a credit freeze or removing a credit freeze, loss of privacy, deprivation of the value of their PII, and other economic and non-economic harm (as detailed above), for which they are entitled to compensation. At the very least, Plaintiff and the other Class Members are entitled to nominal damages. 77. Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction and the resulting Data Breach (as described above) constituted (and continue to constitute) an invasion of Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ privacy by publicly and wrongfully disclosing their private facts (i.e., their PII) without their authorization or consent. 78. The preceding factual statements and allegations are incorporated herein by reference. 79. Plaintiff and the other Class Members entrusted their PII to Defendant and/or its affiliate, Allied, for the purpose of obtaining insurance quotes for insurance products and services offered by Nationwide and/or Allied, or to others for similar purposes. Plaintiff and the other Class Members were entitled to trust that their PII in Nationwide’s or Allied’s possession would likewise be properly protected from unlawful access whether or not they originally entrusted it to Nationwide. 80. Plaintiff’s and the other Class Members’ PII is their personal property. Defendant’s wrongful actions and/or inaction and the resulting Data Breach deprived them of the value of their PII, for which there is a well-established national and Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 23 of 27 PAGEID #: 23 24 international market, because the PII is now in the hands of unauthorized person(s) and compromised. 81. Further, Defendant wrongfully retained and failed to safeguard and protect the PII of Plaintiff and the other Class Members. 82. During the time of bailment, Defendant owed Plaintiff and the other Class Members the duty to safeguard and protect their PII by maintaining reasonable and effective data security practices, procedures and protocols to protect their PII. As alleged herein, Defendant breached its duty to Plaintiff and the other Class Members by failing to safeguard and protect their PII which, in turn, directly and/or proximately caused the Data Breach and the wrongful dissemination of their PII to unauthorized persons. 83. Defendant’s breach of this duty directly and/or proximately caused Plaintiff and the other Class Members to suffer (and continue to suffer) the injuries and damages alleged herein. BAILMENT Case: 2:13-cv-00118-MHW-MRA Doc #: 1 Filed: 02/08/13 Page: 5 of 27 PAGEID #: 5 6 INVASION OF PRIVACY BY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT NEGLIGENCE WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

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