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1-05 | 1 | FM 1-05
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
January 2019
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.
This publication supersedes FM 1-05, dated 5 October 2012. |
1-05 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site |
1-05 | 3 | *FM 1-05
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 1-05 Department of the Army
Washington, DC 21 January 2019
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
Contents
Page
PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY ................................................................ 1-1
Religious Support Foundations ................................................................................. 1-1
Mission ....................................................................................................................... 1-1
Organization .............................................................................................................. 1-2
Chaplain Corps Capabilities ...................................................................................... 1-2
Religious Support Core Competencies ..................................................................... 1-4
Religious Support Functions ..................................................................................... 1-4
Religious Support Duties and Responsibilities .......................................................... 1-6
Summary ................................................................................................................... 1-7
Chapter 2 CONTEXT FOR RELIGIOUS SUPPORT ................................................................. 2-1
Army Operational Doctrine and Religious Support ................................................... 2-1
Force Projection and Religious Support Responsiveness ........................................ 2-2
Unified Action and Religious Support ........................................................................ 2-3
Summary ................................................................................................................... 2-4
Chapter 3 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT BY ECHELON .................................................................... 3-1
Echelons of Command .............................................................................................. 3-1
Religious Support in the Theater Army ..................................................................... 3-2
Religious Support in the Corps .................................................................................. 3-2
Religious Support in the Division ............................................................................... 3-3
Religious Support in Brigades ................................................................................... 3-4
Religious Support Enablers ....................................................................................... 3-4
Training ...................................................................................................................... 3-6
Summary ................................................................................................................... 3-6
Chapter 4 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS ................................ 4-1
Operations Process ................................................................................................... 4-1
Planning Religious Support ....................................................................................... 4-2
Preparing Religious Support...................................................................................... 4-4
Executing Religious Support ..................................................................................... 4-5
Assessing Religious Support ..................................................................................... 4-9
Summary ................................................................................................................... 4-9
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 1-05, Dated 5 October 2012 |
1-05 | 4 | Contents
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1 |
1-05 | 5 | Preface
FM 1-05 provides a cohesive understanding of the fundamentals of religious support. It is the Army’s
doctrinal source for religious support planning, training, and execution.
The principal audience for FM 1-05 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of
Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable
joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United
States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure
that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
FM 1-05 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the
definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms.
FM 1-05 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 1-05 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Directorate Capabilities Integration Division, United States Army Chaplain Center and School. Send
comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) to Commandant, United States Army Chaplain Center and School, ATTN: ATSC-DCDID
(FM 1-05), 10100 Lee Road, Fort Jackson, SC 29207-7000; by e-mail
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
1-05 | 7 | Introduction
ADP 1-01 defines Army doctrine as fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures,
and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of
the institutional Army that directly support operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives.
It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. FM 1-05 is a key integrating publication that links
the doctrine for the Chaplain Corps with Army and joint doctrine. FM 1-05 provides operational guidance
for commands and religious support personnel at all echelons and forms the foundation for all United States
Army Chaplain Center and School curricula.
This manual contains four chapters. Chapter 1 describes religious support foundations, including the
historical precedents for the Army Chaplain Corps as well as its roles, missions, and functions. Chapter 2
delineates the current operational environment, including the requirement to provide religious support across
the range of military operations. Chapter 3 details the execution of religious support at the different echelons
of command within our Army. Chapter 4 depicts planning for religious support across the conflict continuum
using the operations process.
The principles of Army religious support doctrine presented in this manual enable chaplains and religious
affairs specialists to apply creative, flexible, and innovative approaches to specific missions and operational
environments. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists serving in a joint force land component command
or a joint task force should refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JG 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations,
and other joint planning publications for further guidance. FM 1-05 is nested with JP 3-0 and JG 1-05.
The Army is the principal land force, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct prompt and sustained
operations on land. The Army is responsible for deploying forces at any time, in any environment, against
any adversary and must be able to operate for extended periods across the range of military operations.
In order to support the free exercise of religion within the Army, chaplain sections and unit ministry teams
must be able to function within operational environments possessing a full range of threats. Chaplain sections
and unit ministry teams sustain Soldiers across the range of military operations; from military engagement,
security cooperation, and deterrence, to crisis response and limited contingency operations, to large-scale
combat operations.
Everything the Army does for our nation is done by Soldiers who are supported by their Family members.
The principles of Army religious support doctrine presented in this field manual enable chaplain sections and
unit ministry teams to apply creative, flexible, and innovative approaches to specific missions and operational
environments as it supports the Soldier and Family. Chaplains have served in the U.S. Army since the first
days of the American Revolution and many have died in combat. These chaplains represented more than 120
separate denominations and faith groups from across America. Seven chaplains have been awarded the Medal
of Honor for heroism above and beyond the call of duty. Many chaplains and religious affairs specialists have
received other medals for valor. The personal needs of Soldiers, the mission at hand, their own faith, and
emerging religious support doctrine, guided these chaplains and religious affairs specialists as they met the
goal to uphold the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.
To meet the historic mission of the Chaplain Corps in the midst of a complex and lethal operational
environment, the Army’s religious support doctrine must evolve. Specifically, several factors necessitate a
new religious support doctrine—
* Large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary increases the complexity, lethality, and
operational tempo demands upon individuals and formations.
* Precision fire capabilities and antiaccess and area denial complicate delivery of the Chaplain
Corps’ core competencies of nurturing the living, caring for the wounded, and honoring the dead. |
1-05 | 8 | * Electronic warfare and cyberattacks necessitate an emphasis on the ability to provide religious
support and advisement to the command utilizing analog skills and delivery methods.
* Antiaccess and area denial necessitates isolated and austere operations with limited reach back or
logistic support. This requires an expeditionary mindset in regards to readiness and logistical
support for religious support.
* Renewed emphasis on potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear casualties,
combined with high casualty rates requires a paradigm shift in terms of honoring the dead.
* Corps’ and divisions’ functional capacity as tactical headquarters employing subordinate forces
requires intentional integration and synchronization of religious support training, planning,
execution, and delineation of area coverage responsibilities.
These principles guide the growth of Army religious support doctrine today. Moreover, they enable this
manual to address the complexities of lethal and uncertain operational environments. |
1-05 | 9 | Chapter 1
Religious Support for the Army
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FOUNDATIONS
1-1. On June 14, 1775, the 2nd Continental Congress established by resolution the American Continental
Army authorizing ten companies of expert riflemen to support the American Revolution. In July of 1775, the
Continental Congress provided for the appointment and pay of chaplains for the Army. That appointment
provided the Army with a dedicated and intentional means to support the religious needs of American
Soldiers fighting for our nation’s freedom and forever linked the chaplaincy with the operational mission of
the United States (U.S.) Army.
1-2. The passing of the Constitution and accompanying Bill of Rights enshrined into public law our nation’s
fundamental liberties. The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the right to free exercise of their
religious beliefs and prohibits the government from establishing a religion. This constitutional principle is
firmly embedded in statutory foundations of the nation.
1-3. The Army Chaplaincy serves to advise and assist commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities
to provide for the free exercise of religion in the context of military Service as guaranteed by the Constitution;
to assist commanders in managing religious affairs and to serve as principal advisors to commands for all
issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations. Chaplains participate in operational planning
and advise the commander and staff on matters as appropriate, consistent with their noncombatant status.
(See DODD 1304.19 for discussion of chaplain appointments.)
1-4. At every echelon of the force, the chaplaincy is the Army’s primary agency for facilitating the right to
free exercise of religion for Service members on behalf of the commander. The chaplains and religious affairs
specialists, from the Chief of Chaplains down to battalion unit ministry teams (UMTs), fulfill this core and
essential responsibility. Based upon the requirements of an operational mission, a Soldier exercises this right
in a number of ways to include, but not limited to—
* Worshipping according to one’s faith.
* Seeking religious counsel and care.
* Keeping holy days and observances.
* Participating in rites, sacraments, and ordinances.
* Practicing dietary laws.
MISSION
1-5. The mission of the Army Chaplain Corps is to provide religious support (RS) to the Army across the
range of military operations (ROMO) by assisting the commander in providing for the free exercise of
religion and providing religious, moral, and ethical advisement and leadership. (DODD 1304.19) Provide is
understood as either (perform) personal delivery or (provide) coordination of required support from other
chaplain sources. (See ADRP 1-03, ART 4.2.4.1 for religious tasks.) Throughout our history, chaplains and
religious affairs specialists have served alongside combat Soldiers, enduring the same hardships, and bearing
the same burdens. They are members of the profession of arms. RS in the Army has no civilian equivalent.
Chaplains execute their distinct RS mission for uniformed military Service members, Family members, and
authorized civilians in a variety of geographical locations, operational situations, and circumstances.
1-6. The Army is the dominant U.S. fighting force in the land domain. Army forces both depend upon and
enable the joint force across multiple domains (air, land, maritime, space, and the information environment
[which includes cyberspace]). This mutual interdependence creates powerful synergies and reflects that all
operations have multi-domain components. Army forces, with unified action partners, conduct land |
1-05 | 10 | Chapter 1
operations to shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in ground combat, and consolidate gains.
(See ADP 3-0 for a discussion of land operations.) Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must be able to
deliver RS across the ROMO while coping with the physical, moral, spiritual, and psychological demands
unified action places on themselves and the Service members they serve.
1-7. The intensity, brutality, and lethality of large-scale combat operations confront our Army with
challenges and opportunities which demand focused training. To accomplish future missions, the Army
requires forces that exhibit a high degree of adaptability. Adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and
respond effectively to a changing operational environment (OE) with appropriate, flexible, and timely
actions. Adaptability impacts the way chaplain sections and UMTs provide RS. The Army requires adaptable
and flexible chaplains and religious affairs specialists with the capacity to successfully function in an OE that
is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, marked by rapid change, and executed under austere and
isolated conditions. The Army requires trained chaplains and religious affairs specialists capable of critically
assessing an operational situation and quickly adapting RS tasks to sustain Service members across the
ROMO. Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is the cornerstone
of combat readiness.
ORGANIZATION
1-8. Chaplain sections and UMTs consist of at least one chaplain and one religious affairs specialist, based
on organizational requirements. Army chaplains and religious affairs specialists form a UMT at brigade and
below, and chaplain section at echelons above brigade. The chaplain section or UMT is identified according
to a modified table of organization and equipment or a table of distribution and allowances in an Army force.
A UMT assigned to a modified table of organization and equipment unit is known as a mission unit UMT.
Chaplain sections and UMTs are embedded into the Army force structure as organic and central to the
organization. The chaplain section or UMT is authorized by the modified table of organization and equipment
for units whose primary mission is warfighting. The chaplain section or UMT deploys with the unit and
provides RS for all units (assigned or attached by task organization) and authorized civilians during each
phase of an operation. RS requires the assignment and deployment of chaplains and religious affairs
specialists at all echelons, beginning at battalion. Each echelon of chaplain sections or UMTs executes
technical supervision and advisement responsibilities for subordinate chaplain sections and UMTs.
CHAPLAIN CORPS CAPABILITIES
1-9. The Army requires the capability to provide RS and the capability to advise commanders on the impact
of religion. These two required capabilities reflect the dual role of the Chaplain Corps: religious leader and
professional military religious advisor:
* As religious leaders, the Army requires the capability to provide RS across austere and isolated
locations, which accommodates Service members’ right to the free exercise of religion and
supports resiliency efforts to sustain Service members in combat. RS tasks sustain the individual
Service member, extending upward throughout the entire command structure and outward to the
broadest command audience authorized. RS is comprehensive because every individual personally
defines what constitutes RS. While not every religious need of every Soldier can be met, chaplains
and religious affairs specialists seek to meet as many needs as possible. (See ADRP 1-03,
ART 4.2.4.1 for religious tasks.)
* As the professional military religious advisor, the chaplain advises the commander and staff on
religion, ethics, morals, and morale, and their impact on all aspects of military operations. (See
ADRP 1-03, ART 4.2.4.3 for religious tasks.)
RELIGIOUS LEADER
1-10. Leadership is defined by the Army as the process of influencing people by providing purpose,
direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). As religious
leaders, chaplains provide RS to the Army and joint force. As a leadership team, chaplain sections or UMTs
support the commander’s responsibility to provide for free exercise of religion for all authorized personnel.
The chaplain provides RS that meets the religious and spiritual requirements of the unique military culture. |
1-05 | 11 | Religious Support for the Army
RS includes providing those aspects of religious education, clergy counsel, pastoral care, authentic worship,
and faith group expression that would otherwise be denied as a practical matter to Soldiers under the varied
circumstances of military contingencies. At higher levels of command, it includes supervising and
synchronizing the RS tasks of multiple subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists across the larger
area of operations (AO).
1-11. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists plan, prepare, execute and assess RS across the full ROMO.
In its planning process, a chaplain section or UMT plans for three categories of RS for the Army—
* Unit support. This covers the unit to which the chaplain and religious affairs specialist are assigned
or attached and is normally the first priority of support.
* Area support. This covers Service members, unified action partners, and authorized civilians who
are not a part of the assigned unit, but who operate within that unit’s AO.
* Denominational or distinctive religious group support. This covers Service members and other
authorized persons of the chaplain’s denomination.
Note: Availability of denomination-specific chaplains or distinctive religious group leaders and
mission requirements may limit the availability and timeliness of this support.
1-12. As credentialed religious leaders, who are themselves guaranteed the free exercise of religion,
chaplains cannot perform RS contrary to their faith tradition, tenets, and beliefs.
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY RELIGIOUS ADVISOR
1-13. As a member of the unit’s staff, the chaplain serves as the professional military religious advisor to the
commander and staff. Chaplains provide religious, moral, and ethical leadership to the Army by advising the
commander on these issues and their impact on Service members, Family members, and unit operations.
Chaplains advise commanders on the moral and ethical nature of command policies, programs, actions, and
the impact of such policies on Service members and Families. They advise the command on such issues as—
* Accommodation of religious needs and practices for Service members, Families, and authorized
civilians to support the free exercise of religious beliefs.
* Religious and ethical issues in the AO and the potential impact on mission accomplishment. (Refer
to ATP 1-05.03 and ATP 1-05.04 for detailed discussion of internal and external advisement.)
* The needs and concerns of Service members, Families, and authorized civilians, to include suicidal
ideation, alcohol or drug abuse, or other at-risk behaviors that impact mission accomplishment.
* Marital and parenting stressors resulting from extended deployments for training or operations.
* Morale throughout all phases of an operation.
1-14. The chaplain advises the commander on the impact of religion within the unit and how religion impacts
the unit’s mission throughout its AO. Internally, the chaplain is responsible for advising the command on the
religious practices of Service members within the command. This can include identifying holy days, specific
worship requirements, dietary requirements, and wearing of religious garments. Externally, the chaplain
advises the command on the specifics of the religious environment within their AO that may impact mission
accomplishment. This can include indigenous religions in the AO, holy days that could impact military
operations, and the significance of local religious leaders and structures. Chaplain sections and UMTs can
work within boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to integrate their respective expertise and
knowledge with the collective expertise of the staff in order to focus on specific problem sets to provide
coherent staff recommendations to the commander.
1-15. As a professional military religious advisor, the chaplain executes RS planning by actively integrating
into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). To effectively deliver RS to Soldiers, the chaplain is
responsible for planning the RS tasks within the command that support the mission and coordinating support
necessary for mission success. RS tasks are continuous, detailed, systematic, relevant, and responsive to the
needs of the authorized population. RS must be more than minimal presence and a hurried service by the
chaplain section or UMT. RS planning is critical to ensuring RS tasks are primarily predictive rather than
reactive. The vision of the chaplaincy is providing the right RS in the right place at the right time. |
1-05 | 12 | Chapter 1
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT CORE COMPETENCIES
1-16. Competencies provide a clear and consistent way of conveying expectations for Army leaders. The
core-leader competencies stem directly from the Army definition of leadership. The core competencies
emphasize the roles, functions, and activities of what leaders do. Competencies are demonstrated through
behaviors that can be readily observed and assessed by a spectrum of leaders and followers: superiors,
subordinates, peers, and mentors. (See ADP 6-22 for a discussion of competencies.) Competencies must be
developed, sustained, and progressively improved through education, training, and experience. Within the
two required capabilities, chaplains fulfill three basic core competencies. These three competencies provide
the fundamental focus and direction as the Chaplain Corps executes its mission of ensuring the right to free
exercise of religion for Soldiers—
* Nurture the living. In preparation for missions that span the ROMO and during the execution of
those missions, chaplains and religious affairs specialists develop and execute a RS plan that seeks
to strengthen and sustain Soldiers and Family Members.
* Care for the wounded. During the execution of decisive action, chaplains and religious affairs
specialists assist in the healing process by bringing hope and strength to those who have been
wounded and traumatized in body, mind, and spirit. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists also
provide RS, pastoral care, comfort, and hope to the dying. Through prayer and presence, the
chaplain section or UMT provides the Soldier with courage and comfort in the face of death.
* Honor the dead. Our nation reveres those who have died in military Service. RS honors the dead.
Memorial ceremonies, services, and funerals reflect the emphasis the American people place on
the worth and value of the individual. Chaplains conduct these services and ceremonies, fulfilling
a vital role in rendering tribute to America’s sons and daughters who paid the ultimate price
serving the nation in the defense of freedom. (See ATP 1-05.02 for a more detailed discussion of
this competency.)
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
1-17. Commanders provide opportunities for free exercise of religion through their chaplains and religious
affairs specialists. The chaplain sections or UMTs provide RS by executing specific tasks in support of their
assigned functions. Function is the broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed,
equipped, and trained (JP 1). These functions align with task lists which chaplain sections and UMTs train
to proficiency. Commanders expect chaplains and religious affairs specialists to understand the tasks
associated with these functions. These operational religious support functions and tasks are found in ADRP
1-03, The Army Universal Task List. ADRP 1-03 provides a common language and reference system for
doctrine, capability, and training developers. Commanders utilize the performance measures in the Army
Universal Task List in evaluating an organization and individual’s abilities to perform these tasks. A partial,
descriptive list of the RS functions a chaplain section or UMT may utilize in an OE includes—
* Advising the command on religion, morals, morale, and ethical issues.
* Leadership of religious worship.
* Administration of religious rites, sacraments, and ordinances.
* Provision of pastoral care and counseling.
* Teaching and management of religious education.
* Family-life ministry (division or expeditionary sustainment command [ESC]).
* Provision of professional support to the commander and staff.
* Management and administration of personnel, facilities, and funds necessary to the RS mission.
* Soldier and leader engagements with local or host-nation religious leaders as directed by the
commander.
* Conduct of RS planning, training, and tasks.
LEADERSHIP OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
1-18. Leadership of religious worship includes leadership of and preaching in unit or consolidated area
religious services. It also includes officiating at military funerals, memorial services, and ceremonies, and |
1-05 | 13 | Religious Support for the Army
providing occasional worship events such as revivals, liturgical or holy day observances, religious festivals,
sacred practices, and spiritual fitness events.
ADMINISTRATION OF REQUIRED RELIGIOUS RITES
1-19. Administration of required religious rites, sacraments, and ordinances includes officiating at events
such as baptisms and presiding at obligatory religious celebrations (such as the Roman Catholic Eucharist,
Protestant Communion, Jewish Passover, or Muslim Eid al-Fitr).
PROVISION OF PASTORAL CARE AND COUNSELING
1-20. Provision of pastoral care and counseling includes crisis intervention (stress management, fear, grief,
or trauma); visitation at hospitals, medical treatment facilities, and confinement facilities; prevention and
intervention of suicidal behavior; and counseling for religious formation and spiritual direction. Such
counseling always upholds the Service member’s right to privileged communication with chaplains and
religious affairs specialists. (See Military Rule of Evidence 503 in the Manual for Courts Martial for more
details on privileged communication.)
TEACHING AND MANAGEMENT OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
1-21. Teaching and management of religious education includes the oversight and teaching of unit religious
education programs, catechetical or confirmation classes, and chapel groups.
FAMILY-LIFE MINISTRY (DIVISION OR ESC)
1-22. Family-life ministry includes providing professional development training, personal counseling for
deployed UMTs and Service members, and resourcing chaplain sections and UMTs for the execution of RS
functions and tasks during deployment.
PROVISION OF PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER AND STAFF
1-23. Provision of professional support to the commander and staff includes forming and maintaining
professional staff relationships that facilitate the RS mission, as well as personal counsel with commanders
and leaders on critical decisions. Integration into staff processes and advisement on religion, ethics, morals,
and morale both fall under the chaplain’s role as a professional military religious advisor.
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND FUNDS
1-24. Management and administration of personnel, facilities, and funds is necessary the RS mission. It
includes overseeing real property (such as chapels), volunteers and distinctive religious group leaders, and,
if applicable, safely receiving, disbursing, and accounting for appropriated and non-appropriated funds
associated with the command master religious plan.
SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENTS WITH LOCAL OR HOST-NATION RELIGIOUS
LEADERS
1-25. Soldier and leader engagements with local or host-nation religious leaders is within the chaplain section
or UMT capability of professional military religious advisor and is executed by specific order from the
commander. Together with the unit staff, more specifically the information operations officer or information
operations working group, the UMT synchronizes the Soldier and leader engagements with the unit mission
in order to build mutual trust, promote human rights, and develop appropriate command relationships within
an operational area. At no time shall chaplains compromise their noncombatant status provided to them by
the Law of War during the accomplishment of this function. (See ATP 1-05.03 for detailed information on
the chaplain section or UMT’s role in Soldier and leader engagements.) |
1-05 | 14 | Chapter 1
CONDUCT OF COMPREHENSIVE RELIGIOUS SUPPORT TRAINING AND OPERATIONS
1-26. Conduct of comprehensive RS training and operations includes continual planning as a part of the
MDMP. It also includes the developing, staffing, execution, and assessment of UMT-specific training plans
as well as synchronizing the RS mission with the unit’s current operations. (See FM 7-0 for a discussion on
training.)
ADVISING THE COMMAND ON RELIGION, MORALS, MORALE, AND ETHICAL ISSUES
1-27. Advising the command on religion, morals, morale, and ethical issues, both within the command and
throughout an AO, often includes functioning as “the commander’s eyes and ears” in the unit through
informal and formal interaction with Service members. It includes advising commanders on Service
members’ morale, and when conducting operations, ensuring the unit is meeting its professional obligations
ethically and morally.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1-28. Commanders, chaplains, and religious affairs specialists have distinct duties and responsibilities in
providing RS to the Army.
COMMANDER
1-29. Commanders provide for the free exercise of religion for Service members, Families, and authorized
civilians. To ensure readiness across the ROMO, commanders enable RS functions as prescribed in Army
regulations. The Army accommodates religious practices when such accommodations do not impede military
readiness or hinder unit cohesion, standards, health, safety or discipline. Accommodating religious practices
is weighed against military necessity and not guaranteed at all times. (See AR 600-20, Army Directive
2016-34, and Army Directive 2018-19 for religious accommodation guidance.)
CHAPLAIN
1-30. The duties of chaplains operating within their dual roles of leader and advisor are prescribed by law,
Department of Defense (DOD) policy, Army regulations, religious requirements, and Army mission. Per
Title 10, United States Code, chaplains provide RS to U.S. military and authorized civilians. Chaplains advise
the commander and staff on religion and its impact on all aspects of military operations. Chaplains remain
accountable to their assigned chain of commands and the chaplain technical staff channels up through the
chief of chaplains. Commanders are expected to collaboratively support this dual accountability. Chaplains
also remain accountable to their endorsing faith groups. Chaplains are noncombatants and do not bear arms.
Chaplains do not exercise command authority.
1-31. To fulfill their function as professional military religious advisors, chaplains require at least a secret
clearance. This allows them access to the unit operations center and ensures the chaplain is involved in the
unit’s operational planning process.
1-32. In addition, chaplains may perform other tasks such as—
* Exercising supervision and technical supervision over subordinate chaplains and religious affairs
specialists.
* Training and supporting subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists.
* Providing religious and moral leadership to the command.
* Coordinating RS with higher and adjacent headquarters chaplains and religious affairs specialists.
* Translating operational plans into RS priorities for development of a concept of RS.
* Conducting informal visits in work areas, training areas, recreation areas, barracks, and quarters
as deemed appropriate. |
1-05 | 15 | Religious Support for the Army
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS SPECIALIST
1-33. The religious affairs specialist is a combatant trained in the delivery of RS in an OE. The religious
affairs specialist requires a secret clearance to coordinate with other staff sections within the unit’s operations
center. The religious affairs specialist integrates the chaplain section or UMT into the unit security mission
and accompanies the chaplain throughout the AO. Under the supervision of a chaplain, the religious affairs
specialist coordinates and synchronizes RS for the unit. As an integral member of the chaplain section or
UMT, the religious affairs specialist assists in providing informed and relevant advisement on religious and
cultural affairs. In the chaplain’s absence, the religious affairs specialist continues the RS mission for the
commander as a staff representative, but does not assume the religious leadership role of a chaplain. If
assigned as a supervisory chaplain section or UMT noncommissioned officer in charge to certain brigades
and above, the religious affairs specialist requires the additional skill identifier of 2S.
1-34. Under the supervision of a chaplain, the religious affairs specialist—
* Assists in RS planning, preparation, execution, and training (movement, sustainment, rehearsals
and survivability).
* Coordinates for and supervises section activities (equipment maintenance, sustainment support,
classified data systems and access).
* Assesses unit morale and advises the chaplain accordingly.
* Assists the chaplain in fulfilling all three core competencies (for example, pre-counseling
interviews and traumatic event management).
* Assists in development of the religious area analysis in order to support advisement on religious
and cultural affairs in the AO and religious accommodation.
* Serves as section liaison to the unit command sergeant major and all other noncommissioned
officers.
SUMMARY
1-35. RS to the Army is founded on historic precedent and constitutional, legal, and regulatory requirements.
Chaplains serve commands to provide for the freedom of religion for every Service member, Family member,
and authorized civilian. The chaplain provides RS on behalf of the commander. Both the chaplain and
religious affairs specialist are fully committed to maintaining the highest moral standards, as well as Army
and Chaplain Corps values at all times in pursuit of the RS mission.
1-36. The Army requires adaptable and flexible chaplains and religious affairs specialists with the capacity
to successfully function in an OE that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, marked by rapid
change, and executed under austere and isolated conditions. The Army requires trained chaplains and
religious affairs specialists capable of critically assessing an operational situation and quickly adapting RS
functions and tasks to sustain Service members across the ROMO. (See ADRP 1-03 for religious tasks.)
1-37. Chaplains deliver RS through two required capabilities: provide and advise. Within the two required
capabilities, chaplains and religious affairs specialists fulfill three basic core competencies: nurture the living,
care for the wounded, and honor the dead. These three competencies provide the fundamental focus and
direction as the chaplaincy executes its mission of facilitating free exercise of religion for Service members,
Families, and authorized civilians. As a branch, the Chaplain Corps remains committed to providing religious
leadership for the entire Army Family in support of the joint force. In training and operations, Army chaplains
represent hundreds of American denominations and faith traditions and fulfill a sacred calling of service
captured in their motto, “Pro Deo et Patria” (for God and country). |
1-05 | 17 | Chapter 2
Context for Religious Support
ARMY OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
2-1. The foundation for Army operations and its contribution to unified action is unified land operations.
Unified land operations are offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to
seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate
gains, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action (ADRP 3-0). Unified land operations achieve
operational and strategic success through integration of six principles; mission command, develop the
situation through action, combined arms, adherence to the law of war, establish and maintain security, and
create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. The tenets of unified land operations are simultaneity, depth,
synchronization, and flexibility. The Army subsequently conducts operations as part of the joint force in four
broad categories; operations to shape, operations to deter, large-scale combat operations, and operations to
consolidate gains. The complexity of operations and an OE requires aggressive, adaptive, flexible, and
responsive RS by chaplain sections and UMTs at all echelons of command.
2-2. All domains are contested which makes all operations multi-domain operations. To achieve success,
commanders at all echelons combine different operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish the
mission. For each mission, they determine the emphasis Army forces place on each offensive, defensive, and
stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks. Each operation is mutually related and can be
interdependent. Often units conduct more than one type of operation simultaneously in an OE. Commanders
weigh the importance of the mission and assign a priority of effort. The staff then allocates resources to
support the commander’s intent. This process includes the planning of RS as a function of sustainment.
Chaplain sections and UMTs determine RS priority of effort to synchronize with the unit’s main effort and
preparation for branches and or sequels. As part of this planning process, the chaplain sections and UMTs
plan reprioritization of RS and RS assets based on operational changes in their AO. Chaplain sections and
UMTs pay particular attention to the possibility of simultaneous actions across two or more areas of
operations and the amount of resources, personal energy, and situational awareness essential to success.
2-3. To meet existing and emerging challenges, the Army trains to confront multiple threats. Threats are a
fundamental part of an OE. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability
and intent to harm U.S. forces. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not
organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Into this foray the Army now
faces renewed concerns regarding peer threats. A peer threat possesses capabilities and capacity to oppose
U.S. forces across multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative
advantage. Peer adversaries increase the challenges and potentiality of casualties to levels not experienced
since the Second World War. This is further exacerbated due to proliferation of technologies including
unmanned aerial systems, inexpensive anti-tank guided missiles, precision fires, and advanced rocket
propelled grenades. This enables adversaries the ability to practice antiaccess and area denial operations
rendering lines of communication (physical and cyberspace) inoperable.
2-4. The mission of providing RS remains the same no matter the threat; the task and standard remain the
same. Chaplain sections and UMTs aggressively, intentionally, creatively, and flexibly plan for RS tasks
across the ROMO. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists adapt RS tasks based on the operational
conditions and the mission of the specific unit they serve. This requires maintaining an expeditionary mindset
focused upon delivery of RS under austere and isolated conditions with limited mobility and communication.
2-5. Conflict in populated areas fundamentally alters the manner in which unified action partners can apply
force to achieve success in a conflict. Enemies increasingly seek populations as a refuge within which to hide
while engaging U.S. forces. War remains a battle of wills—a contest for dominance over people. Future
conflicts will require U.S. security dominance to extend across the population by means of operations to |
1-05 | 18 | Chapter 2
shape. This context emphasizes extensive leadership preparation to include analyzing the role of religion in
an OE and advising on its impact on mission success.
2-6. The Army’s preeminent challenge is to balance expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the
endurance and adaptability needed to complete an operation, no matter what form the operation eventually
assumes. Several factors can reduce the effects of uncertainty, chance, and friction. Determination and high
morale are significantly influenced by well-developed religious beliefs and spiritual character. Chaplain
sections and UMTs seek to develop or strengthen the individual’s spirit in order to enhance the resiliency of
the force as it supports the fast, fluid, and unforeseen demands of decisive action. The free exercise of religion
reduces personal stress and anxiety, and provides continuity in the exercise of individual religious practices,
disciplines, and personal world view. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists assist the commander and
the Service member with the refinement and application of individual religious beliefs and spiritual
constructs. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists work with their commanders and Service members to
build knowledge and respect that fosters individual and collective accountability and religious insight.
Chaplains and religious affairs specialists live out the shared experiences of the Army Family and provide
dedicated skills to resolve conflict, foster faith, and enhance unit readiness and individual Service member
and Family resiliency.
FORCE PROJECTION AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
RESPONSIVENESS
2-7. Force projection is the military component of power projection. To apply national power globally, the
Army executes missions through force projection. Speed is paramount. Force projection encompasses five
processes: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. Each process requires a
RS plan enabling the chaplain and religious affairs specialist to support Service members and the unit
mission.
2-8. As a religious leader, the chaplain’s first priority is the care of Service members, Families, and civilians
working under the stress of rapid force projection. As the professional military religious advisor, the chaplain
can expect to participate in the unit’s planning process that can include task-organization changes, religious-
support coordination requirements, and integration of Army contractors authorized to accompany the force
and unified action partner considerations.
2-9. Deploying units require external RS during the mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and
demobilization phases. This RS is the responsibility of the chaplain sections and UMTs assigned to the home
station and the mobilization site, and theater or Army Service component command (ASCC) RS assets at
intermediate staging bases. Because deploying units deploy with their assigned RS assets, RS of the rear
detachment, including non-deployed unit personnel, Family members, and authorized civilians is the
responsibility of home station RS personnel. This includes RS for deploying and redeploying RS assets who
are themselves going through the process and in need of training and time for family reunion activities. The
home station family life chaplain should consider separate reunion training for RS personnel and their Family
members to increase the effectiveness of such training.
2-10. RS functions span all three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels of war operate
within a whole of government approach as they model the relationship between national objectives and
tactical actions. National leaders formulate strategy for employment of the national elements of power
(diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to achieve national objectives both domestically and
internationally. Leaders at the theater and joint force level utilize operational synchronization to link tactical
employment of forces to strategic objectives. The tactical level utilizes the ordered arrangement of forces in
relation to one another in support of operational objectives. Echelon of command, and capabilities might
occupy a normative relationship to a particular level of war, but the relationship to the levels of war is more
dependent upon the nature of their task, mission, or objective. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of relationships
among echelons.) RS occurs simultaneously and continuously from the force projection platforms to the
forward operational areas. RS tasks require integrating a vision of RS across the levels of war. Planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing RS is a detailed, systematic, and coordinated process that remains
relevant and responsive to the commander’s mission and the Army Family. |
1-05 | 19 | Context for Religious Support
2-11. A natural tension exists between the echelons of command at the levels of war. This stems from
different perspectives, requirements, and constraints associated with command at each level of war. The
horizons for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing RS missions vary greatly from level to level. This
impacts RS planning, preparation, execution, and assessment, and highlights the differences of RS tasks from
battalion through ASCC.
2-12. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. At
this level, operations can be rapid and dynamic in nature. Chaplain sections or UMTs at the tactical level of
war focus primarily on the personal delivery of RS to their units as they maneuver in an AO. The chaplains
and religious affairs specialists operating at the tactical level of war provide the most direct, daily, and
responsive RS. The chaplain section or UMT is a key participant in the MDMP and determines the concept
of support employed to complete the RS mission. The RS plan is produced with the focus on the execution
of comprehensive religious coverage throughout all phases of the operation and identifying RS priorities
throughout each phase of the operation. Supervisory chaplain sections and UMTs operating at this level
provide technical supervision in the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of subordinate RS
missions. When directed by their commanders, chaplains and religious affairs specialists plan and prepare
Soldier and leader engagements support in order to engage local indigenous religious leaders as part of the
unit’s Soldier and leader engagements strategy.
2-13. The operational level of war links employing operating forces to achieving strategic objectives.
Operational level commanders conduct major operations to establish conditions that define the end state. This
entails a high degree of information access and data transfer, multitask management, and keen situational
awareness. These chaplain sections possess the competencies to articulate strategic objectives to tactical units
in a manner that empowers synchronization of RS operations and broad mission accomplishment.
Operational-level RS is an advanced application of skills as a religious leader and professional military
religious advisor. The chaplain section must understand the constraints of delivering RS within the
operational area. They must understand how the regional religious environment affects operations. At the
operational level, the chaplain section places a premium on continual mission analysis, development of
detailed RS plans, and synchronization of actions. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists serving at this
level, focus on the planning, analysis, management, and coordination of RS and religious-support assets
across a larger AO.
2-14. The strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation determines national or multinational
strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these
objectives. RS at the strategic level focuses on resourcing the Army with personnel; ecclesiastical supplies;
responsive industrial-base, rapid-fielding initiatives; and appropriate RS policies and guidance. These
resources further the free exercise of religion and guide national and combatant commanders as appropriate.
Chaplains and religious affairs specialists at the strategic level ensure RS personnel are available at every
subordinate level. They develop capabilities and solutions by analyzing the mission and domains of doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. (For a full
discussion of strategic RS, see both JG 1-05 and the religious affairs tasks from CJCSI 3500.02B). Chaplains
operating at the strategic level enable combatant commanders to engage at senior levels with national
religious figures. When directed by their commanders, chaplains and religious affairs specialists plan and
prepare Soldier and leader engagements support in order to engage local indigenous religious leaders as part
of the Soldier and leader engagements Strategy. This chaplain support to military engagement is highly
contextualized and fully integrated into the theater security cooperation plan.
UNIFIED ACTION AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
2-15. Army operations integrate unified action partner capabilities and RS needs. Additional requirements
may include regional and multinational support and cooperation. Stability and DSCA tasks involve legal,
cultural, religious, demographic, and physical environmental factors. Events of a humanitarian crisis, natural
disaster, and ethnic and religious conflicts offer even more deliberate religious planning considerations and
demand more nuanced responses. When directed, chaplains consider the ramifications of delivering RS with
the cultural and social behaviors in these complex and ambiguous environments.
2-16. Interagency coordination occurs between agencies of the U.S. government, including the DOD, for the
purpose of accomplishing a mission. Interagency relationships and activities are part of any unified action. |
1-05 | 20 | Chapter 2
In such operations, federal government agencies other than the DOD may have the mission lead (such as in
a DSCA task). In fact, the DOD may be only called upon in a supporting capacity in some operations,
particularly those involving foreign humanitarian aid or homeland security. Interagency capabilities
supplement military activities to facilitate solving strategic challenges; however, these agencies may lack RS.
The presence of these agency partners may increase demand on RS resources. A key consideration in the
interagency environment is the communication of expectations and the detailed alignment of capabilities with
resources and authority. RS in interagency operations requires initiative, appropriate authorization, and
sensitivity to the religious needs of non-DOD civilians while remaining fully committed to unit
responsibilities and Service members. Success in interagency RS requires clear command guidance and
constraints, reasonable expectations, and a genuine spirit of teamwork and respect. The greatest of these
challenges will be initial contact, continuous coordination, and visibility. Chaplains and religious affairs
specialists make early contact with appropriate agency leaders and continually coordinate actions with Army
leaders.
2-17. An intergovernmental organization (IGO) is created by a formal agreement (a treaty) between two or
more governments and is formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. They
may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis. Examples of IGOs include the United Nations,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. IGOs have defined structures, roles,
responsibilities, and resources and expertise to participate in unified action. IGO relationships and operations
allow the U.S. forces to operate from a force projection base without extensive forward deployed footprints
to meet regional challenges. Often RS in IGOs encounters challenges of communicating with representatives
from other governments, ameliorating national religious prejudices, not creating the appearance of
sanctioning a particular religion, interoperability, mutual cooperation, and relationship building. All religious
affairs activities that occur in the context of IGOs are directed by and coordinated through the combatant
command or joint force command of the theater.
2-18. Multinational operations describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations working
together to achieve the same mission objective. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one organization
that participates on many levels of multinational operations. Each country approaches the American concepts
of religious toleration and free exercise differently. Again, all religious affairs activities that occur in the
context of multinational operations are directed and coordinated through the combatant command or joint
force command of the theater. RS in multinational operations considers the challenges of multinational
political perceptions regarding—
* Communication and cooperation with chaplains or religious affairs specialists.
* Religious cooperation.
* Understanding cultural and organizational differences.
* Relationship building.
SUMMARY
2-19. RS personnel assigned to formations in an Army tasked with providing joint force commanders
operationally significant and sustained land power must, train, prepare, and assess individual and collective
readiness to provide RS to forces engaged across the ROMO. Providing meaningful RS to Service members,
Families, and authorized civilians can occur under widely differing circumstances with rapid and
unpredictable transitions. The requirements of unified land operations are more demanding now than ever.
But the mission remains the same: providing meaningful RS to Soldiers, Families, and authorized civilians.
Chaplains and religious affairs specialists remain at the heart of Soldier resiliency and Army Family
resiliency. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must remain responsive and adaptable to the challenges
of working in a complex OE where chaplain sections and UMTs must plan, prepare, execute, and integrate
RS across the ROMO. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists continue to sustain programs that nurture
ethical decision making and facilitate religious formation and spiritual development as an inseparable part of
unit readiness. |
1-05 | 21 | Chapter 3
Religious Support by Echelon
ECHELONS OF COMMAND
3-1. The Army provides to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) a mix of headquarters, units, and
capabilities in an echeloned array designed toward specific missions or functions. A force package may
consist of light, medium, and heavy forces; it can blend regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army
Reserve units and Soldiers. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners which
are integrated in a multi-domain approach to achieve unity of effort across the ROMO. Military power cannot,
by itself, restore or guarantee a stable peace or an agreeable political solution. The exercise of military power
sets the conditions that enable other instruments of national power to exert their contributing influence.
3-2. Army forces need versatile and deployable headquarters suited for contingencies and protracted
operations. To provide higher echelon mission command, the Army fields a mix of tactical and operational
headquarters able to function as land force, joint, multinational and Service component command
headquarters. There are five general echelons of commands within a GCC’s area of responsibility.
3-3. The theater army, or ASCC, serves as the senior Army echelon command of a GCC’s area of
responsibility. It includes the Service component commander and all Army forces assigned to a GCC. Its
operational responsibilities include command of forces, direction of operations, and control of assigned AOs.
Its administrative responsibilities encompass Service-specific requirements for equipping, sustaining,
training, unit readiness, discipline, and personnel matters. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of support to other
Services.) Additional forces might be aligned or attached to the theater army in order to custom tailor the
capabilities required to support the GCC. These could include but are not limited to theater level sustainment
command, military intelligence brigade-theater, expeditionary sustainment command, civil affairs brigade,
medical command, air and missile defense command, military police command, psychological operations
brigade, engineering command, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) brigade, and theater
aviation command.
3-4. Large-scale combat operations might require a corps headquarters to function as a tactical land
headquarters under a joint or multinational land component command. As such, the corps commands Army
and multinational forces in campaigns and major operations. Operationally, corps conduct offensive,
defensive, and stability tasks with operational control of two or more divisions and a variety of supporting
brigades, tactical control over various multinational units and U.S. Marine Corps units, and it is supported
by various theater sustainment organizations. Corps operations shape an OE and set the conditions for tactical
actions by divisions and lower echelons. Administratively, a corps provides administrative and logistics
support to all assigned Army forces as specified by the theater army. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of support
from the theater army.)
3-5. A division’s primary role is as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades in decisive action. The
division executes the tasks assigned by its higher headquarters as both a formation and a headquarters during
large-scale combat operations. Operationally, the division conducts shaping operations within the division
AO, task-organizes and employs brigade combat teams (BCTs) and multifunctional and functional brigades,
integrates and synchronizes operations of those same brigades, masses effects at decisive points, allocates
resources and sets priorities, and leverages joint capabilities. When a division receives attachments, that
division assumes administrative control of those units, to include logistics, medical and administration.
3-6. A BCT is the Army’s primary combined arms, close-combat force. BCTs maneuver against, close
with, and destroy the enemy. They are the principle ground maneuver units of a division. There are three
types of BCTs: armored, infantry, and Stryker. Each BCT has scalable organic capabilities across the
warfighting functions. |
1-05 | 22 | Chapter 3
3-7. Multifunctional and functional brigades add capabilities such as attack and reconnaissance aviation,
fires, contracting support, or sustainment. They are normally attached to a corps or division, but might be
aligned under the command of a joint or multinational headquarters.
3-8. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists execute RS tasks within all of these formations, from ASCC
down to battalion. The execution of RS tasks within an AO is integrated throughout all levels of command.
RS tasks focus on the timely delivery and resourcing of RS for the command and advising commanders on
the impact of religion in an OE. While the RS requirement is consistent, how RS is executed for a specific
unit or echelon of command requires detailed mission analysis. Analysis impacts the planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment of RS. The execution phase requires chaplains and religious affairs specialists
capable of aggressively adapting and focusing their operations within the capabilities of their unit. RS tasks
are impacted by terrain, distance, and ability to provide a personal presence. Chaplains and religious affairs
specialists at all levels leverage available technology to support the planning, preparing, execution, and
assessment of their respective RS tasks. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must not only be proficient
tactically and professionally in order to execute their mission, they must understand the unit’s capabilities in
order to deliver effective and responsive RS.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE THEATER ARMY
3-9. The ASCC chaplain is the senior Army component chaplain functioning in a Title 10, United States
Code role and who supervises all Army RS in the theater. The ASCC chaplain is responsible for
recommending RS policy to the ASCC commander.
3-10. The ASCC chaplain coordinates with the other Service component chaplaincies to synchronize
religious coverage concepts, conduct joint RS plans, integrate religious area analysis, liaise with military and
civilian personnel, and advise the commander regarding religious issues. Religious issues at this level of war
are inherently complex and impact strategic and operational outcomes. The assigned world religions chaplain
provides advisement for the ASCC and subordinate units in the AO. The chaplain section integrates RS
functions into the theater commander’s command master religious plan. The ASCC chaplain section
recommends and coordinates RS throughout the AO in support of commander requirements. The chaplain
section coordinates with subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists to synchronize RS execution,
training, policy, ecclesiastical resupply, and funding for RS tasks in the AO. The ASCC chaplain
communicates regularly with the senior chaplains in each joint task force or joint force land component
command.
3-11. Each theater army headquarters normally has organizations providing theater-level capabilities aligned
with it or under its control and each may have Regular Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army
Reserve UMTs operating within these formations. These can include—
* Theater sustainment command.
* Theater network command or brigade.
* Military intelligence brigade-theater.
* Regionally focused civil affairs brigade or planning team.
* Regionally focused medical command.
* Functional commands (engineer, military police, criminal investigation, and aviation).
* Functional brigades (civil affairs, engineer, theater aviation, military police, medical, and CBRN).
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE CORPS
3-12. The chaplain sections at corps supervise the overall RS effort within the corps AO. Corps chaplains
serve as senior advisors to commanders at all levels of command. The chaplain section collects, processes,
analyzes, and disseminates a broad base of RS information. Proper staffing procedures and coordination
through command, staff, and technical channels with commanders, staff, and subordinate chaplain sections
and UMTs support the execution of RS within these large areas of operation. Corps chaplains shape and
guide the tactical and professional proficiency of subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists,
which directly impacts the successful execution of RS. This supervisory role is exercised through integration
into the operations process, frequent personal contact with subordinate chaplains and religious affairs |
1-05 | 23 | Religious Support by Echelon
specialists, memorandums of agreement or understanding between commands, professional relationships,
mission orders, running estimates, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and command policies. The corps
chaplains advise the commander and support corps RS functions by—
* Establishing links with unified action partners and religious leaders of the host nation.
* Synchronizing RS functions with the theater or ASCC chaplain’s office.
* Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing RS for corps operations.
* Facilitating or supervising RS training for RS personnel in all phases of the ROMO with an
emphasis on phase 0.
* Supervising and coordinating resources for religious-support tasks in divisions and directly
attached or assigned brigades.
* Coordinating RS planning with higher, lower, and adjacent commands to ensure balanced
religious group access throughout the deployed force.
* Monitoring and assessing the resilience of subordinate chaplain sections and UMTs.
3-13. A world religions chaplain serves at the corps level. The world religions chaplain executes the
professional military religious advisor and leader capabilities by—
* Serving as the world religions chaplain advisor to the corps commander assessing the influences
of cultural and religious networks for current and future operations.
* Contributing to operational and tactical-level planning by assisting with religious impact analysis
for situational awareness and contributing assessments of religious-cultural influences that shape
the informational and OE.
* Serving as the command chaplain's Soldier and leader engagements officer in charge.
* Reviewing components of the campaign plan to ensure integration of religious considerations.
* Monitoring Soldier and leader engagements from operational to tactical and manages as part of
the Soldier and leader engagements workgroup.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE DIVISION
3-14. The division chaplain section fulfills the two required capabilities of providing RS and advisement to
the command through both direct advisement at the division level and supervision of that same support at the
brigade and battalion levels. These includes but is not limited to the—
* Synchronization of RS plans from division with the corps.
* Communication of priorities of support and RS efforts within the division AO.
* Monitoring of a changing OE and facilitation of coordinated area coverage plans and
communication among subordinate chaplain sections and UMTs.
* Supervision of RS in brigades and directly attached or assigned battalions.
* Supervision and facilitating or conducting RS training for RS personnel during all phases of the
ROMO.
* Cross-leveling of RS assets in support of large-scale combat operations associated casualties.
* Ongoing professional development of subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists across
the continuum of conflict.
* Integration of RS training in the unit training calendar and advisement on subordinate unit RS
training plans.
3-15. A Family-life chaplain serves at the division or ESC level. The division or ESC Family-life chaplain
executes the religious leader and advisor capabilities by─
* Providing deployed Family counseling and pastoral care capability for Soldiers in theater.
* Performing training for deployed chaplains and religious affairs specialists in division or ESC to
develop and maintain uniformly effective pastoral care and counseling skills. |
1-05 | 24 | Chapter 3
* Providing resilience-maintaining activities for forward deployed pastoral and health-care
providers in division or ESC operational area.
* Designing and staffing Soldier and Family-ministry activities to include pre and post deployment
Strong Bonds training, resiliency training, deployment preparedness and recovery, and suicide
intervention.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN BRIGADES
3-16. Serving in a BCT or functional brigade, the brigade UMT establishes a vision for RS within the brigade
AO through its integration in the operations process. Through its professional military religious advisor
capability, the UMT visualizes the end state of RS for the brigade and the required effort and resources
necessary to execute their planned missions. The operations process enables brigade UMTs to understand the
brigade commander’s intent for RS within the brigade AO, synchronize subordinate RS tasks, and coordinate
for the required support necessary to achieve mission success.
3-17. Generally, a brigade has two or more battalions under its operational control. Each battalion has a
UMT, and the brigade UMT supervises these subordinate UMTs. The brigade UMT plans, coordinates,
assesses, and supervises the execution of RS by subordinate UMTs throughout its AO. A brigade can take on
numerous attachments to conduct operations. This gives the organic unit a far different task organization and
capability than what it carried while training at home station. A brigade can deploy and operate with its
organic units. Other brigades only deploy subordinate units to support other operations. In each case, a
brigade UMT plays a critical role in shaping and supporting the RS functions of subordinate UMTs.
3-18. Brigade UMTs closely monitor rapidly changing OEs anticipating support requirements,
communicating priorities by means of the commander’s operations process, coordinating area coverage
plans, and requesting additional support from higher in order to facilitate comprehensive RS across the
ROMO.
3-19. Supervision and training are critical for the success of the brigade religious-support mission. The
brigade UMT must see supervision and training as their part of comprehensive RS within the brigade.
Supervision and training are a function of both the religious leader and professional military religious advisor
capability. For the brigade UMT, the transition from serving as a battalion UMT to a brigade-level UMT is
not simply a movement in location, it requires a transition in focus. A chaplain and religious affairs specialist
at the brigade level shift their main effort away from the direct delivery role of RS. Instead, the main effort
is focused on supervising, synchronizing, and resourcing subordinate UMTs as they provide RS to the
battalions operating within the larger brigade AO. Through effective leadership, supervision, training, and
mentoring, the brigade UMT can impact the effectiveness of battalion level RS tasks. The brigade UMT has
the responsibility to ensure subordinate UMTs are planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the delivery
of RS to Soldiers and meeting the commander’s intent. The religious leader capability guides the brigade
UMT in their role to the brigade headquarters staff. The brigade UMT monitors the religious and emotional
health of subordinate UMTs as they provide RS to Soldiers in close combat and coordinates external RS as
needed for subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT ENABLERS
3-20. Religious support enablers consist of chaplain detachments. These detachments have mission specific
organization. Each has its own support and equipment.
CHAPLAIN DETACHMENTS
3-21. Chaplain detachments (CDs) provide the Army Chaplain Corps a force tailoring capability to respond
to expeditionary requirements usually identified through the global force management process. The
detachments represent a supplemental capability for conducting RS functions and for providing RS across
the ROMO. The CDs are an augmentation capability, not a replacement for organic RS or force structure. A
CD is composed of mobilized Reserve Component chaplains and religious affairs specialists. When
mobilized, these detachments increase the commander’s ability to meet the religious needs of Service
personnel. |
1-05 | 25 | Religious Support by Echelon
ORGANIZATION
3-22. Four CD organizations exist:
* Alpha - 2 chaplains (56A)/3 religious affairs specialists (56M).
* Bravo - 1 chaplain (56A)/1 religious affairs specialist (56M).
* Charlie - 1 chaplain (56A)/1 religious affairs specialist (56M).
* Delta - 1 chaplain (56A)/1 religious affairs specialist (56M).
CD-Alpha
3-23. The primary mission of the CD-Alpha is to provide unit and denominational RS during unified land
operations and is normally assigned to a theater sustainment command or equivalent separate task force
headquarters. The CD-Alpha also provides port opening elements conducting port operations the capability
for RS coverage during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. A CD-Alpha may also be
used in homeland security, foreign humanitarian assistance and DSCA missions at the direction of the chief
of chaplains. The CD-Alpha has the capability to provide technical supervision for five CD-Bravo teams. If
required, the CD-Alpha can divide into two teams to provide expanded area support.
CD-Bravo
3-24. The primary mission of the CD-Bravo is to provide augmentation to an ESC or sustainment brigade
and task-organized elements without organic RS assets. CD-Bravos provide unit and denominational RS
during unified land operations. If directed by the chief of chaplains, CD-Bravos may coordinate or provide
RS to first-responder units, federal agencies, and other IGOs.
CD-Charlie
3-25. The primary mission of the CD-Charlie is to provide augmentation to a corps chaplain section. The
CD-Charlie normally locates with the corps chaplain section and may operate independently to provide
support to overall RS tasks and Soldier and leader engagements functions. CD-Charlies provide unit and
denominational RS during unified land operations and a liaison capability to faith-based non-governmental
organizations. The CD-Charlies provide assets required to enable the corps chaplain section to conduct 24-
hour and split-based RS planning, coordination, and execution.
CD-Delta
3-26. The primary mission of the CD-Delta is to provide augmentation to a division chaplain section. The
CD-Delta normally locates with the division chaplain section. CD-Deltas provide RS planning, coordination,
and execution functions to include unit and denominational RS during decisive action. The CD-Deltas
provide assets required to enable the division chaplain section to conduct 24-hour and split-based RS
planning, coordination, and execution.
SUPPORT
3-27. All CDs rely on the unit to which assigned or attached for all logistics support. This support includes,
but is not limited to: legal, health service support, finance, personnel and administrative services, field
feeding, unit maintenance, and logistical support.
EQUIPMENT
3-28. All CDs require 100% mobility. It must have equipment, supplies, and personnel when mobilized in
order to have 100% operational capability once deployed. CDs are required to communicate digitally and by
voice with higher and lower echelon chaplain sections from anywhere within the AO. |
1-05 | 26 | Chapter 3
TRAINING
3-29. Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is the cornerstone
of combat readiness. (See FM 7-0 for a discussion on training.) Army forces must remain trained and ready
to conduct decisive action in support of unified land operations anywhere along the ROMO. This requires
challenging, realistic, and consistent training under dynamic and complex conditions. RS training must be
synchronized with and integrated into a unit’s training plan recognizing the unique capabilities and
requirements of RS in support of the assigned unit’s mission. This might require leveraging subject matter
experts in RS topics or military subject matter experts on topics outside of RS areas of expertise. The
unexpected and rapid transition from phase 0 operations demands vigilance in terms of planning, execution,
and assessment of training in order to ensure chaplains and religious affairs specialists are ready for large-
scale combat operations regardless of their current unit of assignment or perceived removal from threats
posed by potential adversaries.
3-30. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must understand the unit’s mission and the commander’s
intent. Unit tasks are organized as mission-essential task lists. The mission essential task list is a list of those
functions which a unit must always accomplish to achieve mission success based on its table of organization
and equipment capabilities. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists train to the unit’s mission essential task
list, utilizing the derived RS battle tasks. Chaplain sections and UMTs at all echelons of command have the
responsibility to be tactically and technically proficient in order to execute their specific operational RS
mission. Supervisory chaplains and religious affairs specialists train, mentor, and coordinate resources for
subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists in order to meet the requirement of providing the Army
with adaptive, technically and tactically proficient chaplain sections and UMTs. (See FM 7-0 for details on
planning, executing, and assessing a unit training plan and ADRP 1-03 for universal tasks.)
SUMMARY
3-31. The execution of RS by chaplains and religious affairs specialists is imperative in all operations and at
all echelons of command. The chaplain section and the UMT are the means by which the Army provides RS
to Service members, Families, and civilians. RS provided during a military operation can occur under widely
differing circumstances. At the battalion level, the UMT personally delivers RS to individuals within the
command. At higher levels, the chaplain section and the UMT supervises the execution across the command
to ensure RS requirements are met across the ROMO. This is essential to achieve execution of comprehensive
RS throughout an AO. The method by which we prepare to deliver RS is recurring RS training executed as
part of an integrated and synchronized unit training plan. |
1-05 | 27 | Chapter 4
Religious Support and the Operations Process
OPERATIONS PROCESS
4-1. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to
enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command requires responsive chaplain sections and
UMTs—
* Capable of understanding an OE.
* Able to adapt, anticipating and managing transitions as they support the execution of the overall
unit mission.
* Willing to accept an approved level of risk to create opportunities for RS.
Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must plan within guidance and utilize risk management to operate
within acceptable risk levels and develop courses of action (COAs) to meet the commander’s intent. (See
ATP 5-19 for details on risk management.) Within a framework of adaptability, chaplains and religious affairs
specialists exhibit the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to a changing OE with appropriate,
flexible, and timely actions. (See ATP 1-05.01 for more details on RS and the operations process.)
4-2. The Army’s method for the exercise of mission command is the operations process. This process
consists of the major activities performed by command staffs during operations: planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing. During the operations process, the chaplain section or UMT plans,
prepares, executes, and continually assesses RS tasks in support of the unit mission. These activities may be
sequential or simultaneous. Often, chaplains and religious affairs specialists must plan and prepare for an
upcoming operation while still providing responsive RS to Soldiers. Chaplains and religious affairs
specialists must begin preparation activities (coordination for transportation or supplies) while still in the
planning process. Throughout this process, chaplain sections and UMTs apply Army design methodology;
the critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex and multidimensional
problems and develop approaches to solve them. Design should not be viewed as a process or a simplified
checklist. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion on the staff planning and operations process.)
4-3. Innovation, adaptation, and continuous learning are central to mission success as chaplain sections and
UMTs provide RS in an often uncertain and complex OE. The goals of design are—
* Understanding multidimensional problems. Chaplain sections and UMTs analyze the situation and
the operational variables to gain the critical information necessary to understand and frame these
problems.
* Anticipating change. Rather than responding to events as they occur, chaplain sections and UMTs
anticipate, recognize, and manage transitions.
* Creating opportunities.
4-4. Throughout the operations process, chaplain sections and UMTs face various problems. A problem is
an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. Chaplains and religious
affairs specialists apply critical and creative thinking to solve problems as it executes its RS mission. Critical
thinking enables chaplain sections and UMTs to understand situations, identify problems, find causes, arrive
at conclusions, make quality plans, and assess the progress of operations. To solve a problem, chaplains and
religious affairs specialists—
* Recognize and define the problem.
* Gather information.
* Develop possible solutions to the problem. |
1-05 | 28 | Chapter 4
* Analyze possible solutions.
* Select the best solution.
* Implement the solution, assess results, and provide feedback.
4-5. Chaplain sections and UMTs integrate into the collaborative planning of the MDMP. The MDMP is
an iterative planning methodology. The MDMP helps chaplains and religious affairs specialists understand
the situation and mission, develop COAs, and decide on a COA to accomplish missions. It integrates the
activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other military and civilian partners to
produce a fully synchronized plan or order for execution. Planning for any RS task must take into
consideration the force structure, RS sustainment, an OE, and the AO. (See FM 6-0 and ATP 1-05.01 for
more detailed discussions on the MDMP.)
PLANNING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
4-6. A plan is a design for a future or anticipated operation. Because Army operations are conducted in
complex, ever-changing, and uncertain OEs, a plan is a framework from which to adapt rather than a script
to follow. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan
facilitates effective action during unforeseen events. Good RS plans address contingencies in current and
future operations. Planning is an essential element of mission command and is a continuous activity of the
operations process. The successful execution of RS functions and tasks requires UMTs fully integrated into
the operations process. Planning helps chaplains and religious affairs specialists at all echelons of command
by—
* Identifying problems (potential and actual) that may impede delivery of RS.
* Understanding and developing solutions to problems.
* Anticipating key events and adapting to changing circumstances. It is an understanding of key
events that means the difference between successful and unsuccessful planning.
* Coordinating RS to sustain the task organization (unit and subordinate UMTs) and prioritize
efforts.
* Directing, coordinating, and synchronizing RS functions and tasks.
4-7. RS planning is continuous, time sensitive, detailed, and systematic. It examines all factors relating to
RS in unified land operations. It is integrated into and synchronized with the unit operations process. The
most valuable resource is time. All chaplain sections and UMTs must manage time so that the RS mission
gets accomplished. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must prioritize their efforts and allocate
sufficient time to that effort. The chaplain section and the UMT cannot be everywhere and must determine
where to focus its efforts. They prioritize and synchronize their actions against the unit’s critical time driven
events. The corps, division, and brigade chaplains and religious affairs specialists supervise subordinate
planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities by resourcing them with current and relevant
information and products, low density faith-group resources, and providing relevant and timely guidance.
The chaplain section and the UMT plans for RS by considering the operational and mission variables.
Operational variables consist of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, plus
physical environment and time considerations. Mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. These variables determine how to
provide RS. Operational variables provide the UMT a structured tool to assess the impact of religion on each
of the variables. This action can provide the foundation for operational planning tools such as the running
estimate.
4-8. The planning process builds on already developed SOPs of the unit, the UMT, and higher chaplain
sections. Most SOPs are initially general in nature and then fully developed to support a specific unit mission
within a specified AO. Good SOPs reduce the amount of information needed in the published RS plan. Unit
SOPs, such as a unit’s tactical SOP or a division memorial SOP, delineate roles and responsibilities for unit
or staff personnel. Since a commander signs off on the unit tactical SOP, it becomes an authoritative
document for RS supervision of subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists. A tactical SOP
provides the supervisory chaplain with the enforcement tools necessary for the execution of area-wide RS
functions. An internal staff section RS SOP details, by position, the team member responsible for each |
1-05 | 29 | Religious Support and the Operations Process
recurring duty and responsibility, provided that the team has analyzed and cataloged its tasks. Well-written
SOPs are an effective, combat-oriented set of procedures, and should produce—
* Simplified, brief combat orders.
* An enhanced understanding and teamwork among commanders, staffs, and troops.
* Standard synchronized staff drills.
* Standard abbreviated or accelerated decision-making techniques.
RUNNING ESTIMATE
4-9. Situational awareness is the immediate knowledge of the conditions of an operation, constrained
geographically and in time. It is the chaplain section and UMT knowing what is currently happening around
them based on information and knowledge products, such as the common operating picture and running
estimates. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information
to determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decision making. It enables chaplains
and religious affairs specialists to determine the implications of what is happening and forecast what may
happen. (See ATP 1-05.01 for a sample running estimate.)
4-10. The running estimate is the intentional and continuous assessment of current and future operations to
determine if the current operation is proceeding according to commander’s intent and if planned future
operations are supportable. Building and maintaining running estimates is a primary task of each staff section.
Chaplain sections and UMTs maintain a running estimate to facilitate situational awareness and
understanding and use a running estimate throughout the operations process. A comprehensive running
estimate addresses all aspects of an operation based on the two required capabilities of religious leader and
professional military religious advisor and the three core competencies of nurture, care, and honor. A running
estimate is a tool that enhances a commander’s visualization of religion within an OE. Failure to maintain
running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed RS plans or bad decisions. Key
information recorded in the running estimate is included in orders, particularly in the functional annexes.
4-11. The running estimate analyzes how the factors considered in the mission analysis affect the ability to
accomplish the RS mission and how religion may impact unit operations. The chaplain and religious affairs
specialist consider all elements of the mission which could influence RS. The running estimate ensures
careful and intentional planning and execution by following a logical, continuous, and methodical process.
(See FM 6-0 for more information on running estimates and the operations process [planning, preparation,
execution, and assessment]). During the MDMP, the running estimate acts as an analysis tool enabling the
UMT to see—
* How RS functions and tasks impact the unit mission and other staff section actions.
* How mission variables and other staff section actions impact the execution of current and future
RS functions and tasks.
4-12. As part of the planning process and production of the running estimate, a religious area analysis is one
resource to assist and advise the command in situational awareness and understanding. The chaplain advises
the commander and staff on the beliefs, practices, and customs of religious groups in the AO, and the impact
that local religions may have on the conduct of the mission. Common concerns include religious
organizations and doctrines, practices and customs, and places of worship, shrines, and other holy sites.
Chaplain sections and UMTs must coordinate with other staff sections and agencies (civil affairs, cultural
advisors, intelligence, information operations, and other UMTs) for staff feedback in order to gain a
comprehensive base of knowledge that supports the needs of the commander. Like the running estimate,
chaplains and religious affairs specialists continuously refine the religious area analysis as new information
emerges.
CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS SUPPORT AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT PLAN
4-13. The product of this planning process is a concept of RS and an RS plan. The RS plan informs the
commander and staff of the concept of RS. The RS plan is flexible and informed by the concept of RS to
support the unit’s mission requirements while operating in a complex and uncertain OE. Chaplain sections
and UMTs provide RS on a different scale and at different times based on the unit mission and capabilities. |
1-05 | 30 | Chapter 4
While the requirement to provide RS is the same, the plan for a combined arms battalion differs from a plan
for a theater-level sustainment operation.
4-14. After a commander selects a COA, the chaplain section or UMT completes the details of the RS plan
for inclusion in the operation order. Depending on the level of command, the RS plan communicates the
higher commander’s intent, provides guidance of the supervisory UMT, assigns responsibilities, defines area
support requirements, and authorizes coordination between subordinate UMTs and adjacent commands. The
RS plan, once published as a part of the operation order is a written order signed by the higher headquarters
commander. As a result, supervisory chaplains and religious affairs specialists must exercise their staff
responsibility to participate in the staff planning process and develop a thorough RS plan to assist subordinate
UMTs in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing RS to their units. Subordinate UMTs receive an RS
plan from higher headquarters and incorporate those requirements into their own RS plan.
4-15. The RS plan is for the whole command. For example, a brigade RS plan contains information
applicable to the whole brigade and would impact battalion RS tasks. A battalion RS plan would contain
information for subordinate company commanders on the delivery of RS for their Soldiers. Many units
publish a base order for a deployment and then cut fragmentary orders or warning orders as needed to sustain
mission command. Fragmentary orders enable UMTs to disseminate information on RS activities, coordinate
for support, and publish guidance on changes or additions to the original RS plan. Since chaplains have no
command authority, it is critical they publish the RS plan (initial or updated) through the operations process
and in coordination with the appropriate staff channels. This enables the RS plan to be incorporated as part
of an operation order, fragmentary order, or warning order from a commander to subordinate commanders.
This facilitates the UMT’s ability to coordinate key tasks for its concept of support with commanders, staff,
and higher and subordinate UMTs.
4-16. The amount of time and the priority of effort allocated to support the dual capabilities of religious
leader and professional military religious advisor vary from UMTs and are based on the type of unit, the
mission being executed by that unit, and the level of command. For example, the development of a religious
area analysis may not be applicable to every UMT based on the mission requirements of the unit. A
supervisory UMT can provide resources to the subordinate UMTs by accessing higher headquarters’ products
and developing products specific to that unit’s AO. This gives subordinate UMTs more time to plan, prepare,
and execute their mission. (See FM 6-0 for more detail on operation plans and order formats.)
PREPARING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
4-17. The preparation phase consists of activities performed by chaplain sections or UMTs to improve their
ability to execute an operation. It can include, but is not limited to—
* Refining the RS plan.
* Conducting or participating in key rehearsals.
* Coordinating for support.
* Conducting inspections.
* Executing movement.
4-18. The MDMP drives preparation. Time is a critical factor in all operations. During the planning process,
chaplains and religious affairs specialists must determine the time needed to prepare and execute their
mission. Proper analysis helps determine what actions are required and when those actions must begin to
ensure mission success. The running estimate is used by chaplains and religious affairs specialists at all
echelons of command to identify the current readiness of the chaplain section or UMT or subordinate UMTs
in relationship to the unit and the RS mission. Running estimates are also used to track mission readiness
goals and requirements.
4-19. Preparation moves chaplain sections or UMTs from the planning phase to execution. Planning and
preparation often overlap as chaplains and religious affairs specialists must accomplish required coordination
while still developing a plan. It helps chaplains and religious affairs specialists understand the situation and
their roles in a mission or operation. Team members use this time to update their situational understanding
of both an OE and the religious needs of their Soldiers. During the preparation phase, actions could include— |
1-05 | 31 | Religious Support and the Operations Process
* Attending confirmation briefings and rehearsals to ensure they are current with the operational
plan and can provide relevant RS to Soldiers supporting the mission.
* Conducting inspections of UMT personnel and equipment and rehearsing the plan by phase.
* Coordinating for the support necessary to achieve mission success such as transportation or
additional RS assets.
* Training or rehearsing tasks critical to mission success to include survivability tasks.
* Supervisory chaplains and religious affairs specialists use this time to ensure subordinate UMTs
are focused and preparing to execute RS plans that support the commander’s plan. They ensure
subordinate UMTs are properly positioned, resourced by command to meet the RS requirements,
and have the ability to move and communicate.
EXECUTING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
4-20. The end result of planning and preparing is mission execution. Execution puts the plan into action. For
the chaplain section or UMT, this means that effective RS does not simply happen—it occurs because the
team has planned, prepared, and then executed its mission.
4-21. In operations where lethality and intensity are high, RS becomes increasingly important to Soldiers.
To successfully execute the RS mission, chaplains and religious affairs specialists are guided by several
critical sustainment principles. (See ADP 4-0 for sustainment discussion.) These sustainment principles
impact the operations process chaplains and religious affairs specialists use to plan, prepare, execute, and
assess—
* Integration. Integration is the most critical principle. Integration of RS occurs throughout the
operations process–plan, prepare, execute, and assess. One of the primary functions of the chaplain
section or UMT is to ensure the integration of RS tasks with the unit’s operations plans. Not
properly integrating RS and unit operations could result in mission failure.
* Anticipation. Anticipation of RS facilitates responsive support. Anticipation is the ability to
foresee events and requirements and initiate necessary actions that most appropriately respond to
the need. Anticipating RS tasks means staying abreast of operational plans, continuously assessing
requirements, and tailoring support to meet current operations and the changing OE.
* Responsiveness. Responsiveness is the ability to meet changing requirements on short notice and
to rapidly sustain efforts to meet changing circumstances over time. It includes the ability to see
and forecast operational RS requirements. It is providing the right support in the right place at the
right time.
* Simplicity. Simplicity relates to processes and procedures. Clarity of tasks, standardized and
interoperable procedures, and clearly defined command relationships contribute to simplicity.
Simplicity enables economy and efficiency in the use of resources, while ensure effective support
of forces.
* Economy. Economy means providing sustainment resources in an efficient manner to enable a
commander to employ all assets to generate the greatest effect possible. Economy reflects the
reality of resource shortfalls, while recognizing the inevitable friction and uncertainty of military
operations. Economy enables strategic and operational reach by reducing unnecessary use of
transportation requirements.
* Survivability. Survivability is the ability to protect personnel, information, infrastructure, and
assets from destruction or degradation. UMTs integrate survivability considerations with
operational planning to maximize their ability to function despite multiple threats to their safety.
* Continuity. Continuity is the uninterrupted provision of RS across all levels of war and throughout
all levels of command. UMTs, at all levels, work hand in hand with operational staffs ensuring
synchronization of requirements over the entire course of the operation.
* Improvisation. Improvisation is the ability to adapt sustainment operations to unexpected
situations or circumstances affecting a mission. It may involve changing or creating methods that
adapt to an enemy that quickly evolves. This requires commanders, their staffs, and Soldiers to
improvise other possible means to accomplish an operations. |
1-05 | 32 | Chapter 4
EXECUTING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
4-22. The ROMO is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and
purpose within a backdrop of the conflict continuum. All operations along this range share a common
fundamental purpose—to achieve or contribute to national objectives. Military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence activities build networks and relationships with partners, shape regions, keep
day-to-day tensions between groups below the threshold of armed conflict, and maintain U.S. global
influence. Typically, crisis response and limited contingency operations are focused in scope and scale and
conducted to achieve a specific strategic or operational-level objective in an operational area. Large-scale
combat operations occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy’s armed
forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives.
4-23. The chaplain section or UMT plans and prepares to execute RS for Service members, families, and
authorized civilians across the ROMO. This requires a continuous and precise RS plan that is executed at the
right place, right time, and in the right amount in both routine and emergency situations. This requires the
intentional integration of RS requirements into the operations process. All chaplains and religious affairs
specialists must consider events that impact the execution of their tasks and plan and prepare accordingly.
The chaplain section or UMT establishes RS priorities; considers the threat characteristics, the units
conducting the main and supporting operations; and the severity and number of casualties from previous
missions. They must prioritize elements that have sustained the most casualties or to those that will be
engaged earliest in close combat.
4-24. Staff integration and the ability to understand operation orders, graphic controls and measures, as well
as the priorities of effort is essential to successful delivery of RS. A chaplain section or UMT without proper
training and situational awareness will create hazardous conditions for unified action partners during unified
land operations, become a casualty, or simply fail at delivering timely, relevant, and effective RS and
advisement.
4-25. The chaplain section or UMT always places a priority on first performing and providing RS to Service
members, Family members, and authorized civilians. Depending on the mission of the unit and the type of
unit they serve, chaplains and religious affairs specialists must be prepared to support the commander’s
increased needs for advisement regarding host-nation religion and religious issues including places of
religious worship, religious education, and cultural sites. The commander may leverage the chaplain to
conduct Soldier and leader engagements as a means of supporting tactical or operational objectives.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT DURING OPERATIONS
4-26. The chaplain and religious affairs specialist consider the items discussed in paragraph 4-22 through
4-25 across all aspects of the ROMO. They also consider the specific items for consideration in the defined
operations or tasks discussed in paragraphs 4-27 through 4-39. To fully understand an OE and RS impacts,
RS personnel need to read FM 3-0, ATP 1-05.01, and fully integrate into the unit’s mission command
processes.
Religious Support During Operations to Shape
4-27. Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security cooperation,
deterrence missions, tasks, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capability, and promote
regional stability. The theater army integrates land power within theater engagement plans and security
cooperation activities. Army units at the corps and lower echelons execute shaping tasks and provide forces
for security cooperation.
4-28. RS for operations to shape arise from either habitual security cooperation agreements or unexpected
requirements due to OE changes. Chaplain sections and UMTs need to plan for either scenario. The
environment will be marked by increased unified action partner activities requiring flexibility and the ability
to gain and maintain situational awareness regarding RS capabilities across unified action partners. Short
notice and rapid deployment requires trained and ready chaplain sections and UMTs with established and
rehearsed load plans, detailed battle drills, and SOPs capable of self-sustained operations at echelon for 90 –
120 days. Effective RS logistics requires regularly updated religious demographics analysis of the assigned
unit. The unpredictable nature of operations to shape requires the development of research and advisement |
1-05 | 33 | Religious Support and the Operations Process
tools for advisement to the command on indigenous religious practices and potential impact upon operations.
The potential for small custom tailored force packages requires chaplains and religious affairs specialists
capable of fulfilling the required capabilities of RS and advisement without additional chaplain section or
UMT support and limited technology.
Religious Support During Operations to Prevent
4-29. The purpose of operations to prevent is to deter adversary actions contrary to U.S. interests. They are
typically conducted in response to activities that threaten unified action partners and require deployment or
repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if deterrence fails. The
theater army enables the GCC to employ land forces within the area of responsibility and into specific
operational areas. Corps headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a tactical headquarters with
subordinate divisions and brigades as a show of force.
4-30. RS for operations to deter involve the planning of support for entire formations. Chaplain sections and
UMTs can expect to operate without resupply for the first 60 – 90 days and need to prepare for operations
under austere conditions as the theater likely does not have basic life support activities established. Providing
briefings and counseling to families and Service members can be challenging due to the unpredictable nature
of the deployment and uncertainty regarding follow-on missions and duration of the deployment. Due to the
larger scale of deploying forces, there is a higher likelihood that chaplain sections and UMTs will be co-
located at the forward operating site. The flow of forces and potential failure of deterrence might necessitate
rapid deployment and immediate employment which means chaplain sections and UMTs must remain
prepared for rapid deployment with the capability to conduct RS tasks immediately upon arrival into theater.
RS personnel assigned to sustainment units could find themselves working at a reception, staging, onward
movement, and integration site. This requires a unique capability to counsel personnel from outside the
organization with whom there is not a pre-existing relationship. The local population is likely already
impacted, which necessitates accurate and relevant external advisement for the command. The flow of
personnel into theater also requires deliberate planning on the flow of chaplain section and UMT personnel
within the force package movement plan in order to provide RS at the forward operating site as quickly as
possible and throughout the duration of the operation.
Religious Support During Large-Scale Defensive Operations
4-31. Large-scale combat operations defensive operations provide commanders time to build combat power
and establish conditions for transition to the offense. The strengths of a defense include the defender’s ability
to occupy positions before an attack and use available time to prepare those defenses. The three primary
defense tasks are area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde.
4-32. RS during steady state operations requires the ability to rapidly transition to defense operations. RS
during the defense requires plans focused on immediate transition to the offense during defensive operations.
In the defense, the chaplain section or UMT has more time to synchronize its RS plan and apply maximum
RS assets to critical areas. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must be prepared to adapt to the
changing tactical situation. For example, in a mobile defense, the commander combines offensive, defensive,
and retrograde actions. Proper analysis and planning enhance the synchronization of the delivery of RS during
the different phases and increase the effectiveness of RS tasks. During defense operations, maneuver plans
should consider the potential loss of geographic lines of communication. Higher echelons require situational
awareness regarding the movement of RS assets during both steady state and defense operations. Defense
operations might commence with little warning thereby isolating RS assets within a given AO. This
situational awareness creates viable options for delivery of RS to isolated units without co-located RS assets.
Chaplain sections and UMTs need established SOPs or battle drills addressing the inventory and security of
sacred items and religious literature in the event of rapid retrograde operations.
Religious Support During Large-Scale Offensive Operations
4-33. Offensive operations seek to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and
population centers. Offense is characterized by audacity, concentration, surprise, and tempo. The offense
emphasizes the requirement for a balance of high tempo and synchronization to mitigate current capabilities
gaps (fires, electronic warfare, cyberspace, CBRN, mobility, and sustainment). |
1-05 | 34 | Chapter 4
4-34. RS during offensive operations is usually focused on anticipating or reacting to the lethal nature of
offensive operations. This requires RS personnel who understand the synchronization of tasks and geographic
control measures as they impact freedom of movement, casualty flow routes, and prioritization of RS prior
to, during, and following offensive operations. This phase of operations carries with it the highest likelihood
of casualties for unified action partners. Of note, large-scale combat operations offensive operations
anticipate casualty rates on par with the Second World War. High casualty rates requires an intentional area
and node RS coverage plan synchronized by supervisory chaplain sections and UMTs. In preparation for
offensive operations chaplain sections and UMTs need to focus on both the provision of RS and advisement
on ethics, morals, morale, and religion. The speed of offensive operations will create gaps in communication
rendering continuous advisement ineffective until lines of communication are reestablished. The ability for
RS personnel to synchronize efforts, movement, and communication of reports is critical to successful
delivery of RS, especially in light of the potential for communication primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency plans to falter at various points during large-scale combat operations offensive operations. RS
teams also need to be well trained on analog land navigation skills and the ability to conduct RS under light
and noise discipline conditions with tight time constraints.
Religious Support During Operations to Consolidate Gains
4-35. Consolidation of gains are the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set
the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.
Operations to consolidate gains exploit tactical and operational success by destroying or defeating enemy
means for protracted resistance and denying its operational purpose. Commanders employ defeat
mechanisms and stability mechanisms; compel, control, influence, and support. Consolidation of gains is not
a synonym for stability.
4-36. Consolidation of gains requires an increased emphasis on external advisement to the command in terms
of religion, ethics, morals, and morale as they impact the unit’s formation, ongoing operations, and the local
population. Chaplains work in conjunction with the information operations officer to advise the commander
on second- and third-order effects of operations from a religious perspective in order to avoid unintended
consequences or reinforce intended consequences. Chaplain sections and UMTs should anticipate potential
conflict among troops transitioning from large-scale combat operations to operations to consolidate gains as
interactions with host-nation personnel increases as well as interaction with detained personnel or enemy
prisoners of war. RS assets should prepare for transition in type of operations, change of mission, or
redeployment operations and integrate with the staff for planning and execution of appropriate tasks. There
should also be a focus on internal advisement in regards to family issues, single Soldier issues, and potential
conflict with sustainment unit personnel as the unit transitions to redeployment. Chaplain sections and UMTs
supporting theater movement control assets should anticipate heightened tempo and subsequent stress for
their personnel amid potential for negative perceptions from redeploying personnel and unit.
Religious Support During Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks
4-37. DOD support for domestic emergencies is executed through two distinct but interrelated missions—
homeland defense and DSCA. DSCA tasks involve DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic
emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. DSCA tasks require the chaplain
section or UMT to know the restrictions, limitations, and proper responsibilities of the chaplain and religious
affairs specialist in providing RS under both law and mission authority. (See JG 1-05, JP 3-0, and JP 3-28
for discussions on joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for DSCA tasks.)
4-38. DSCA tasks usually are a Title 32, United States Code (state) mission until or unless the state requests
federal (Title 10, United States Code active military) support or the extent of the mission results in
federalization. DSCA tasks require extensive coordination between multi-jurisdictional entities (municipal,
county, and state agencies) as well as federal agencies and nongovernmental agencies. The United States
Army Reserve and Army National Guard often have habitual relationships with such agencies to respond
quickly and appropriately in support of such tasks. This is particularly so when the joint task forces of each
state Army National Guard respond to provide consequence management to CBRN incidents.
4-39. RS within DSCA tasks depends heavily on jurisdictional coordination. When directed by the
commander, the chaplain section or UMT conducts multicomponent (Regular Army, Reserve, and National |
1-05 | 35 | Religious Support and the Operations Process
Guard), intra-agency, and IGO coordination to effectively provide RS. Coordination must occur at the highest
level possible. The Regular Army, Reserve Component, and joint task force chaplains integrate RS tasks and
execute a religious coverage plan that provides seamless RS. This involves extensive coordination and liaison
among the active and reserve component chaplaincies. UMTs provide direct RS to military units; perform
liaison responsibilities with state and federal agencies, pertaining to religious issues; and when directed by
the commander liaison with civilian-religious leaders. This is particularly critical in responding to
catastrophes, whether man-made (such as CBRN incidents) or naturally-occurring (such as Hurricane
Katrina).
ASSESSING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
4-40. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities
during military operations (JP 3-0). Assessing progress is the responsibility of all staff sections. Chaplain
sections and UMTs continuously assess the operation from their specific area of expertise and integrate and
coordinate their individual assessments in assessment working groups. This feedback process throughout the
operations process enables them to keep on track. Assessment occurs at all levels of war and at all echelons
of command. The situation and echelon dictate the focus and methods chaplains and religious affairs
specialists use to assess. Chaplain sections or UMTs assist the commander by continuously assessing an OE
and the progress of the RS tasks as it supports the overall unit mission.
4-41. The primary tools used to assess progress of the unit’s operation and the RS tasks include the operation
order, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the unit’s assessment
plan.
4-42. Chaplain sections or UMTs assess RS tasks by—
* Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information for updating the running estimate.
The running estimate is used to assess RS functions and tasks. The estimate provides information,
conclusions, and recommendations. At a minimum, the chaplains and religious affairs specialists
track—
Friendly force capabilities (to include chaplains and religious affairs specialists) with respect
to ongoing and planned operations.
Enemy capabilities, as they impact current RS functions and plans for future RS functions.
Civil considerations for current RS functions and plans for future RS functions.
* Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing
tasks. Evaluation helps chaplain sections or UMTs determine what is working or not working and
gain insights into how to better accomplish their mission.
* Recommending or directing action for improvement of RS tasks. While assessment may identify
problems, unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to a chaplain section or UMT or
a commander is limited.
SUMMARY
4-43. The impact of religion continues to grow complex as local events, persons, or issues change. These
factors cumulatively increase the religious, psychological, and interpersonal demands on Service members.
Chaplain sections and UMTs seek to use all available resources effectively to encourage personnel
participation in religious activities. Planning must take into consideration: time, transportation, available
resources, and technology. While RS functions and tasks can incorporate new technologies, nothing can
substitute for personal pastoral presence and protecting and defending the free exercise of religion, personal
delivery of RS remains paramount. |
1-05 | 37 | Glossary
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADP Army doctrine publication
AO area of operations
AR Army regulation
ASCC Army Service component command
ART Army tactical task
ATP Army techniques publication
BCT brigade combat team
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CD chaplain detachment
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
COA course of action
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
ESC expeditionary sustainment command
FM field manual
GCC geographic combatant commander
IGO intergovernmental organization
JG joint guide
JP joint publication
MDMP military decisionmaking process
OE operational environment
ROMO range of military operations
RS religious support
SOP standard operating procedure
U.S. United States
UMT unit ministry team
SECTION II – TERMS
Army doctrine
Fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used
for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of the institutional Army
that directly support operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative
but requires judgment in application. (ADP 1-01). |
1-05 | 38 | Glossary
assessment
A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military
operations. (JP 3-0)
function
The broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained.
(JP 1)
leadership
The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the
mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22)
mission command
(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable
disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0)
unified land operations
Offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win
our Nation’s wars as part of unified action. (ADRP 3-0) |
1-05 | 39 | References
All URLs accessed on 19 December 2018.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. November 2018.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
THE UNITED STATES LEGAL DOCUMENTS
The United States Code can be found online: http://uscode.house.gov.
Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces. 10 August 1956.
Title 32, United States Code, National Guard. 10 August 1956.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most Department of Defense Directives are available online: www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
DODD 1304.19. Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments. 11 June 2004.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/.
CJCSI 3500.02B. Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Program. 15 January 2014.
JG 1-05. Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. 01 February 2018.
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.
JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 29 October 2018.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available online at https://armypubs.army.mil.
ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 02 September 2014.
ADP 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2017.
ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
ADP 6-22. Army Leadership. 01 August 2012.
ADRP 1-03. The Army Universal Task List. 02 October 2015.
ADRP 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2017.
AR 600-20. Army Command Policy. 06 November 2014.
Army Directive 2016-34. Processing Religious Accommodation Requests Requiring a Waiver to Army
Uniform or Grooming Policies. 06 October 2016. |
1-05 | 40 | References
Army Directive 2018-19. Approval, Disapproval, and Elevation of Requests for Religious
Accommodation. 08 November 2018.
ATP 1-05.01. Religious Support and the Operations Process. 31 July 2018.
ATP 1-05.02. Religious Support to Funerals and Memorial Events. 27 November 2018.
ATP 1-05.03. Religious Support and External Advisement. 03 May 2013.
ATP 1-05.04. Religious Support and Internal Advisement. 23 March 2017.
ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014.
FM 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2018.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 May 2014.
FM 7-0. Train to Win in a Complex World. 05 October 2016.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Manual for Courts Martial at
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/MISC_PUB_27-
7_2016_EDITION_3_FINAL.pdf.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
This section contains no entries.
REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website:
https://armypubs.army.mil/.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. |
1-05 | 41 | Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
levels of war, 2-10 theater enablers, 3-11
A–B
operational level, 2-13 religious support categories, 1-11
advisement
strategic level, 2-14
religious support functions, 1-17
ethics, 1-9
tactical level, 2-12
external, 1-13 religious support plans, 4-13
internal, 1-13 M–N–O assessing, 4-40
religion, 1-14 executing, 4-20
mass casualty ministry, 4-34
operations process, 4-1
assessment, defined, 4-40 memorial ceremonies, 1-16
planning, 4-6
C military decision making process, preparing, 4-17
1-15, 4-5 running estimates, 4-9
chaplain,
as religious staff advisor, 1-13 ministry, family life, 1-22 training, 3-30
duties, 1-30 mission, Army chaplaincy, 1-5 S
tasks, 1-32 impact of religion, 1-9, 1-14
Soldier and leader engagements,
chaplain corps, capabilities, 1-9 mission command, defined, 4-1 1-25
core competencies, 1-16
mission-essential tasks, 3-30
mission, 1-5 T
chaplain detachments, 3-21 P–Q types of operations, defense
Alpha, 3-23 pastoral care and counseling, support of civil authorities tasks,
Bravo, 3-24 1-20 4-37
Charlie, 3-25 force projection, 2-7
plans, religious support, 4-13
Delta, 3-26 large-scale defensive
policy, Department of Defense, 1- operations, 4-31
command master religious plan,
1-24 30 large-scale offensive
privileged communication, 1-20 operations, 4-33
D–E multidomain operations, 2-2
distinctive religious group leaders, R multinational operations, 2-18
1-11 range of military operations, 4-22 operations to consolidate
gains, 4-35
religious affairs specialist, duties,
F–G–H operations to prevent, 4-29
1-33
family life chaplains, 1-17, 3-15 tasks, 1-34 operations to shape, 4-27
unified action, 2-15
function, defined, 1-17 religious leader, 1-9
religious staff advisor, 1-9, 1-13 U–V
I–J–K
religious support by echelon, 3-8 unified land operations, defined,
intergovernmental organizations,
brigade level, 3-16 2-1
2-17
corps level, 3-12
W–X–Y–Z
L division level, 3-14
functional brigades, 3-7 world religions chaplains, 3-10
leadership, defined. 1-10
theater army, 3-9 |
1-05 | 43 | FM 1-05
21 January 2018
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
MARK A. MILLEY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
1901606
DISTRIBUTION: |
3-13.4 | 1 | FM 3-13.4
Army Support to Military Deception
FEBRUARY 2019
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
3-13.4 | 2 | This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site
(https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site |
3-13.4 | 3 | FM 3-13.4
Field Manual Headquarters
No. 3-13.4 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 26 February 2019
ARMY SUPPORT TO MILITARY DECEPTION
Contents
Page
PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS ..................................................................................................... 1-1
Overview of Army Military Deception Planning ......................................................... 1-1
Functions of Military Deception ................................................................................. 1-1
Categories of Deception ............................................................................................ 1-1
Key Terms of Military Deception ............................................................................... 1-3
Principles of Deception .............................................................................................. 1-5
Types of Military Deception ....................................................................................... 1-6
Tactics ....................................................................................................................... 1-7
Techniques ................................................................................................................ 1-8
Deception Maxims ..................................................................................................... 1-8
Deception Means ..................................................................................................... 1-11
Information Quality .................................................................................................. 1-13
Roles and Responsibilities ...................................................................................... 1-13
Chapter 2 PLANNING ................................................................................................................ 2-1
Preplanning ............................................................................................................... 2-1
The Army Tactical Deception Planning Process ....................................................... 2-4
Deception Plan Approval ......................................................................................... 2-14
Intelligence Support to Deception Planning ............................................................ 2-14
Legal Considerations ............................................................................................... 2-17
Operations Security and Deception ......................................................................... 2-19
Military Deception as an Information-Related Capability ........................................ 2-20
Integration with Other Information-Related Capabilities .......................................... 2-21
Coordination Requirements ..................................................................................... 2-23
Risk Assessment ..................................................................................................... 2-23
Chapter 3 PREPARATION AND EXECUTION ......................................................................... 3-1
Preparation ................................................................................................................ 3-1
Execution ................................................................................................................... 3-1
Managing the Execution of the Deception Plan ........................................................ 3-3
Terminating Military Deception Operations ............................................................... 3-5
Chapter 4 ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 4-1
Assessment Responsibilities ..................................................................................... 4-1
Assessment Plan ....................................................................................................... 4-2
Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance Development ................ 4-2
Appendix A COUNTERDECEPTION ........................................................................................... A-1
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. |
3-13.4 | 4 | Contents
Appendix B INPUT TO OPERATION PLANS AND ORDERS .................................................... B-1
Appendix C DECEPTION EVALUATION CHECKLIST ............................................................... C-1
SOURCE NOTES ............................................................................... Source Notes-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 2-1. Planning steps ........................................................................................................... 2-12
Figure 3-1. Monitoring activities .................................................................................................... 3-4
Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) ........................... B-1
Tables
Table 1-1. Deception differences ................................................................................................... 1-2
Table 1-2. Sample deception techniques ...................................................................................... 1-8
Table 2-1. The Army tactical deception planning process in the military decisionmaking process 2-4
Table 2-2. Sample terminations ................................................................................................... 2-14 |
3-13.4 | 5 | Preface
This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing,
synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve
over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant.
FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors.
The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and
staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to
applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators
throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,
international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
FM 3-13.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both
the glossary and the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the
definition.
FM 3-13.4 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States,
and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP)
Office. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined
Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028
(Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, United States Army
Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (FM 3-13.4), 300 McPherson Avenue,
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028. |
3-13.4 | 7 | Introduction
When properly resourced and integrated, deception has the potential to deter or induce actions that are
favorable to the force and can increase the success of friendly activity. In the same way that operations
transition from one phase to the next, deception plans integrated into each phase and through each transition
will strengthen the ability of commanders to retain initiative throughout the operation. Successfully planned
deceptions give commanders the ability to act faster than the enemy can make decisions, creating positions
of relative advantage.
Deception, as part of a broader strategy, is present in military case studies. While deception has its roots in
the earliest military strategies, the modern day practical study of deception relies largely on case studies from
World War I to present day. The availability of actual participants for interviews combined with detailed
after action review reporting provides an in-depth understanding of deception tactics and techniques.
Deception can play a pivotal role in achieving the commander’s objectives and significantly reduce risk.
Deception can conceal, protect, reinforce, amplify, minimize, distort, or otherwise misrepresent friendly
technical and operational capabilities, intentions, operations, and associated activities. Deception can be a
critical enabler to achieving operational surprise and maintaining the initiative during large-scale combat
operations in highly contested, lethal environments.
This publication is the proponent for the new Army term, tactical deception. |
3-13.4 | 9 | Chapter 1
Fundamentals
OVERVIEW OF ARMY MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING
1-1. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or
violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or
inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Deception applies
to all levels of warfare, across the range of military operations, and is conducted during all phases of military
operations. When properly integrated with operations security (OPSEC) and other information-related
capabilities (IRCs), deception can be a decisive tool in altering how the enemy views, analyzes, decides, and
acts in response to friendly military operations.
1-2. Deception is a commander-driven activity that seeks to establish conditions favorable for the
commander to achieve objectives. It is both a process and a capability. As a process, deception employs an
analytic method to systematically, deliberately, and cognitively target individual decision makers. The
objective is to elicit specific action (or inaction) from the enemy. As a capability, deception is useful to a
commander when integrated early in the planning process as a component of an operation focused on causing
an enemy to act or react in a desired manner. Deception greatly enhances the element of surprise. Deception
aligns with surprise and the displacement of critical threat capabilities away from the friendly point of action.
Due to the potentially sensitive nature of deception activities and selected means, planners must implement
appropriate security and classification measures to properly safeguard deception tactics, techniques, and
procedures.
FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY DECEPTION
1-3. Planners must have a thorough understanding of the functions and the scope of what deception can and
cannot accomplish. A deception plan serves as a part of the overall mission. Every deception plan must
clearly indicate how it supports the commander’s objectives. The functions of deception include, but are not
limited to—
* Causing delay and surprise through ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding.
* Causing the enemy to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and materiel resources.
* Causing the enemy to reveal strengths, weaknesses, dispositions, and intentions.
* Causing the enemy to waste combat power and resources with inappropriate or delayed actions.
CATEGORIES OF DECEPTION
1-4. Deception activities support objectives detailed in concept plans, operation plans (OPLANs), and
operation orders (OPORDs) associated with approved military operations or activities. Deception applies
during any phase of military operations to establish conditions to accomplish the commander’s intent. The
Army echelon that plans a deception activity often determines its type. The levels of war define and clarify
the relationship between strategic and tactical actions. The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They
correlate to specific authorities, levels of responsibility, and planning. The levels help organize thought and
approaches to a problem. Decisions at one level always affect other levels. Table 1-1 shows the three types
of deception. |
3-13.4 | 10 | Chapter 1
Table 1-1. Deception differences
Deception in support of
Military deception Tactical deception
operations security
Influence the action or Gain a tactical advantage Make friendly force
Focus inaction of enemy over an enemy intentions harder to
decision makers interpret
Level Strategic or operational Tactical Any
Military campaigns and Army commanders All in support of an
Support to major operations approved operations
security plan
Combatant command and Joint task forces, Army All
joint task forces Service component
Headquarters
command, division, and
below
In accordance with Two levels higher (as per Two levels higher (as per
Approval
CJCSI 3211.01 or combatant command combatant command
from
DODI 3604.01 instruction) instruction)
Target Adversary or enemy Enemy Foreign intelligence entity
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
DODI Department of Defense instruction
MILITARY DECEPTION
1-5. Military deception (MILDEC) is planned, trained, and conducted to support military campaigns and
major operations. MILDEC activities are planned and executed to cause adversaries to take actions or
inactions that are favorable to the commander’s objectives. The majority of MILDEC planned for and
executed by the combatant command (CCMD) to create operational-level effects. MILDEC is normally
planned before, and conducted during, combat operations. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and
processes that must be adhered to in their respective commands. MILDEC is a joint activity to which the
Army, as the primary joint land component, contributes. Army forces do not unilaterally conduct MILDEC.
MILDEC must adhere to the regulatory requirements found in Army policy and regulations, CJCSI 3211.01
series, and applicable CCMD instructions.
TACTICAL DECEPTION
1-6. Tactical deception is an activity planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level
commanders to cause enemy decision makers to take actions or inactions prejudicial to themselves and
favorable to the achievement of tactical commanders’ objectives. Commanders conduct tactical deception
(TAC-D) to influence military operations to gain a relative, tactical advantage over the enemy, obscure
vulnerabilities in friendly forces, and enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces. In general, TAC-D
is a related subset of deception that is not subject to the full set of MILDEC program requirements and
authorities. In most circumstances, Army commanders can employ TAC-D unilaterally if certain criteria are
met. In description, TAC-D differs from MILDEC in four key ways:
* MILDEC is centrally planned and controlled through CCMD-derived authorities, but TAC-D is
not. TAC-D can be employed unilaterally by tactical commanders with an approved plan.
* TAC-D actions are tailored to tactical requirements of the local commander and not always linked
or subordinate to a greater MILDEC plan.
* The TAC-D approval process differs from the MILDEC approval process in that it is only required
to be approved at two echelons higher, provided that it adheres to the joint policy for MILDEC
addressed in CJCSI 3211.01. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and processes that must
be adhered to in their respective commands.
* Planning for TAC-D is usually more abbreviated, but still focuses on influencing the action or
inaction of enemy decision makers, to gain a tactical advantage over an enemy. TAC-D gains this
relative advantage using deception activities that affect the enemy’s perceptions of friendly
activities and possibly targeting lower-echelon enemy combatants to affect their operations. |
3-13.4 | 11 | Fundamentals
DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS SECURITY
1-7. Deception in support of operations security (DISO) is a deception activity that conveys or denies
selected information or signatures to a foreign intelligence entity (FIE) and limits the FIE’s overall ability to
collect or accurately analyze critical information about friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment,
and other assets. The intent of DISO is to create multiple false, confusing, or misleading indicators to make
friendly force intentions harder to interpret by FIE. DISO makes it difficult for FIEs to identify or accurately
derive the critical information and indicators protected by OPSEC. Deception and OPSEC are mutually
supporting activities. DISO prevents potential enemies from accurately profiling friendly activities that
would provide an indication of a specific course of action (COA) or operational activity. DISO differs from
joint MILDEC and TAC-D plans in that it only targets FIEs and is not focused on generating a specific enemy
action or inaction. Because a DISO does not target a specific enemy decision maker, the DISO approval
process differs from the MILDEC approval process. A DISO can be approved at two levels higher, provided
that it adheres to the joint policy for MILDEC in CJCSI 3211.01 series and is developed in support of an
approved OPSEC plan. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and processes that must be adhered to
in their respective commands.
KEY TERMS OF MILITARY DECEPTION
1-8. Military deception officers (MDOs) must have a comprehensive understanding of deception terms and
definitions. Deception refers to those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion,
or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. The
following are terms and definitions associated with deception that deception will use throughout the planning
process—
* Deception goal.
* Deception objective.
* Deception target.
* Desired perceptions.
* Conduits.
* Indicator.
* Filter.
* Node.
* Link.
* Deception event.
* Observable.
* Competing observable.
* Patterns.
* Deception story.
1-9. The deception goal is the commander’s statement of the purpose of military deception as it contributes
to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission (JP 3-13.4). It is always written from the
perspective of the friendly force commander. In initial planning guidance, a deception goal may be general
in nature, requiring refinement during the development of the deception estimate. The deception goal is
usually stated as a positive friendly advantage or condition such as: “Deception will create a decisive combat
power advantage for the coalition main effort attack along AXIS MONTANA.” Like any other form of
military operation, the measure of success for deception is its direct contribution to the accomplishment of
the mission. Deception plans often require investments in effort and resources that would otherwise be
applied against the enemy in a more direct fashion. Consequently, it is important for the commander to first
envision the deception goal in terms of its specific contribution to accomplishing the designated mission.
Some additional examples include—
* “I want to use deception to improve the friendly force advantage.”
* “I want to use deception to increase freedom of maneuver.” |
3-13.4 | 12 | Chapter 1
1-10. The deception objective is the desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the
adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location (JP 3-13.4). It is the action or inaction that
directly leads to the advantage or condition stated in the deception goal. For example, “Cause the enemy to
hold its armored reserve in a position or status unable to impact friendly forces along AXIS MONTANA
through H+36 hours.”
1-11. The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will
achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4). The target thus directs the action or inaction of the military
capability described in the deception objective. The deception target or target set is key individuals on whom
planners focus the deception plan. Understanding the target’s process for receiving and processing
information, assessing a situation, and deciding a COA is critical to a successful deception plan. For more
information on deception targets, see chapter 2.
1-12. In military deception, desired perception is what the deception target must believe for it to make the
decision that will achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4). They are personal conclusions, official
estimates, and assumptions that the deception target must believe in order to make the decision that will
achieve the deception objective. These enemy perceptions will form from both objective (observation and
analysis) and subjective (intuition and experience) analysis. They are also heavily impacted by biases,
preconceptions, predispositions, and filters applied in the collection, analysis, delivery, and reception of
information.
1-13. Within military deception, conduits are information or intelligence gateways to the deception target,
such as foreign intelligence entities, intelligence collection platforms, open-source intelligence, and foreign
and domestic news media (JP 3-13.4). They are the pathways to the deception target. Collectively, they define
how the enemy will observe activity in the information environment and how those observations are
transmitted, processed, and ultimately delivered to the decision maker. For more discussion on conduits and
conduit analysis, see discussion beginning in paragraph 2-33.
1-14. In operations security usage, an indicator is data derived from friendly detectable actions and open-
source information that an adversary can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or estimates of
friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities (JP 3-13.3).
1-15. A filter is any node within a conduit that aggregates, synthesizes, or applies bias information on its
path to the deception target. A node is an element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical
thing (JP 3-0). Planners understand that filters make every conduit unique, affecting the way information is
transmitted through them. To create the most effective portrayal of the deception story, planners assess each
conduit and the filters involved, ensure redundancy with other conduits, and appreciate the relative value of
each conduit as perceived by the target.
1-16. A link is a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes (JP 3-0). The key link
between selected indicators and the deception story is the tentative identification of one or more enemy
conduits to which the plan exposes the indicator. Observable activities and the threat conduits combine to
produce indicators that can be seen or perceived to aid in collection and decision-making processes. Unless
exposed to one or more active conduits, an indicator is ineffective in conveying the observable or indicator:
the enemy cannot register or respond to what it cannot see. Executions are the tasks or activities that the
friendly unit conducts to put an observable into action.
1-17. A deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a
deception operation (JP 3-13.4). A deception event aims to portray an observable that contributes to desired
perceptions in the deception target.
1-18. In military deception, an observable is the detectable result of the combination of an indicator within
an adversary’s conduit intended to cause action or inaction by the deception target (JP 3-13.4). Observables
are often made up of executions, which can include events, activities, or elements of information that must
be seen or sensed by the target to form the desired perceptions. Observables may gain credibility through the
use of supporting observables. To enhance the probability that the target will receive or accept one or more
of the required observables.
1-19. MDOs may need to develop supporting observables. Supporting observables enhance the deception
story and help create a believable context for the required observables. Planners identify all the activities |
3-13.4 | 13 | Fundamentals
normally associated with a specific activity or event (the required observable). From those activities, the
planner analyzes which of those associated activities the target would normally collect against and use as a
significant indicator of usual or consistent friendly behavior. The activities must be fully compatible with all
elements of the deception story and carefully sequenced with other observables to have their desired effects.
1-20. Within military deception, a competing observable is any observable that contradicts the deception
story, casts doubt on, or diminishes the impact of one or more required or supporting observables (JP 3-13.4).
To minimize the impact of competing observables on enemy analysis, they must be mitigated as part of the
deception plan. Examples of mitigation for competing observables include protection with OPSEC, including
DISO; neutralization of the enemy conduit to which competing observables are likely to be exposed; or
assumption of risk based on detailed analysis of minimal impact to the operation. The availability of resources
and time are often limiting factors in preparing such supporting measures, but they can be extremely valuable
in raising the credibility and verifiability of the deception story and the probability of deception success.
1-21. Patterns are multiple-repetitive indicators that give the enemy an operational profile. Enemies use their
intelligence collection assets to analyze patterns to identify the unit and predict its mission. Changes in pattern
can affect how an enemy perceives friendly actions.
1-22. The deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the
deception target to adopt the desired perception (JP 3-13.4). It is a succinct statement or narrative of exactly
what the MDO wants the target to believe to be the true situation, then decide and act on that basis. It is
usually made up of the deception observables and the deception desired perceptions in a specific sequence to
create deception events. MDOs write the deception story from the perspective of the enemy so it reads like
the enemy’s intelligence estimate about friendly forces’ actions and intentions.
PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION
1-23. Just as the principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of military operations, the six
principles of deception provide guidance to plan deception. The principles of deception are—
* Focus.
* Objective.
* Centralized planning and control.
* Security.
* Timing.
* Integration.
FOCUS
1-24. The deception plan should focus on the thought process of the threat decision maker who has the
authority and capability of causing the desired actions. The enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance is normally not the target; rather, it is a primary conduit used in the deception plan to convey
selected information to the decision maker. Planners must clearly understand the difference between
intermediate conduits and the intended target. Focused deception must cause an action or inaction of the
enemy force. In order to do this, there must be existing conduits to the deception target or a reasonable
expectation that conduits can establish.
OBJECTIVE
1-25. Deception plans focus actions and resources that motivate an enemy to decide to take (or not to take)
specific desired actions. The plan cannot focus solely on motivating the target to believe certain things; it
must lead to the target making a specific decision to act or not act.
CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND CONTROL
1-26. A centralized approach is necessary to avoid confusion and to ensure various elements portray the
same story and do not conflict with other operational objectives or evolving conditions in an operational
environment. Execution of the deception may, however, be decentralized as long as all participating |
3-13.4 | 14 | Chapter 1
organizations adhere to a single plan. Once the commander approves the deception plan, the designated
operational element monitors the situation and its effects on the target, as well as friendly and partnered
forces. The MDO, working with the deception working group (DWG), ensures synchronization,
deconfliction, and OPSEC.
SECURITY
1-27. Successful deception requires strict security that begins before execution with measures to deny the
enemy knowledge of the friendly force’s intent to deceive. Successful planners apply strict need to know
criteria to each aspect of the deception plan. Maintaining the security of the deception means limiting the
number of informed planners and participants to those needed. The MDO must develop and maintain access
rosters and other security controls to limit exposure of operational deception activities.
TIMING
1-28. The most critical aspects of deception planning are beginning proper synchronization with the
commander’s intent and maintaining synchronization during execution. Timing in deception operations is
crucial. The challenge is to get the deception target to act in accordance with the deception objective within
the timelines required by the friendly operation. Planners must conduct a thorough conduit analysis to
understand the amount of time required for an observable to pass through filters and nodes before reaching
an enemy decision maker. This means that friendly deception executions must be completed in a manner that
accounts for the time consumed by the enemy’s intelligence collection and analysis process, the enemy’s
decision-making process, and the enemy’s activity that is to be exploited by friendly forces. Timing must be
synchronous among friendly deception actions taken, the assimilation and reaction processes of the enemy,
and dependent friendly operations.
INTEGRATION
1-29. Deception is an integral part of an operation that planners must integrate, at all levels, throughout the
planning process. This integration includes developing a concept for deception that supports the overall
mission as part of COA development. Planners must also integrate deception plans with higher headquarters
plans. Deceptions must be consistent with Army doctrinal norms. The MDO assists the staff in integrating
the deception operation throughout all phases of the operation. This begins with planning, continues through
execution, and concludes with the termination of the deception.
TYPES OF MILITARY DECEPTION
1-30. Any deception aims to either increase or decrease the level of uncertainty, or ambiguity, in the mind
of the deception target. This ambiguity has the potential to compel the target to mistakenly perceive friendly
motives, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities thereby altering the target’s assessment. Two generally
recognized types of MILDEC exist:
* Ambiguity-increasing.
* Ambiguity-decreasing.
AMBIGUITY-INCREASING DECEPTION
1-31. Ambiguity-increasing deception provides the enemy with multiple plausible friendly COAs.
Ambiguity-increasing deception is designed to generate confusion and cause mental conflict in the enemy
decision maker. Anticipated effects of ambiguity-increasing deception can include a delay to making a
specific decision, operational paralysis, or the distribution of enemy forces to locations far away from the
intended location of the friendly efforts. Ambiguity-increasing deception is often directed against decision
makers known to be indecisive or risk-adverse.
1-32. These deceptions draw attention from one set of activities to another. They can create the illusion of
strength where weakness exists, or create the illusion of weakness where strength exists. They can also
acclimate the enemy to particular patterns of activity that are exploitable later. For example, ambiguity-
increasing deceptions can cause the target to delay a decision until it is too late to prevent friendly mission |
3-13.4 | 15 | Fundamentals
success. They can place the target in a dilemma for which no acceptable solution exists. They may even
prevent the target from taking any action at all. This type of deception is typically successful with an
indecisive decision maker who is known to avoid risk.
AMBIGUITY-DECREASING DECEPTION
1-33. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions manipulate and exploit an enemy decision maker’s pre-existing
beliefs and bias through the intentional display of observables that reinforce and convince that decision maker
that such pre-held beliefs are true. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions cause the enemy decision maker to be
especially certain and very wrong. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions aim to direct the enemy to be at the
wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong equipment, and with fewer capabilities. Ambiguity-
decreasing deceptions are more challenging to plan because they require comprehensive information on the
enemy’s processes and intelligence systems. Planners often have success using these deceptions with strong-
minded decision makers who are willing to accept a higher level of risk.
TACTICS
1-34. Deception tactics can be characterized as operational-level constructs that encompass a broad range of
deceptive activity and information integrated as a component of the overall plan. Deception plans apply five
basic tactics: diversions, feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays. These tactics are often best employed in
TAC-D to support the commander’s objectives. The selection of tactics and their use depends on planners’
understanding the current situation as well as the desired deception goal and objective.
DIVERSION
1-35. A diversion is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal
operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). The goal of diversion is to induce the
enemy to concentrate resources at a time and place that is advantageous to friendly objectives.
FEINT
1-36. In military deception, a feint is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for
the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action
(JP 3-13.4). A feint is designed to lead the enemy into erroneous conclusions about friendly dispositions and
concentrations. A series of feints can condition the enemy to react ineffectively to a future main attack in the
same area.
DEMONSTRATION
1-37. In military deception, a demonstration is a show of force similar to a feint without actual contact with
the adversary, in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an adversary (JP 3-13.4). A
demonstration’s intent is to cause the enemy to select a COA favorable to friendly goals.
RUSE
1-38. In military deception, a ruse is an action designed to deceive the adversary, usually involving the
deliberate exposure of false information to the adversary’s intelligence collection system (JP 3-13.4). A ruse
deceives the enemy to obtain friendly advantage. A ruse in deception is normally an execution based on guile
or trickery that contributes to the larger deception plan.
DISPLAY
1-39. In military deception, a display is a static portrayal of an activity, force, or equipment intended to
deceive the adversary’s visual observation (JP 3-13.4). Displays include the simulation, disguise, or portrayal
of friendly objects, units, or capabilities in the projection of the deception story. Such objects, units, or
capabilities may not exist but are made to appear that they exist. |
3-13.4 | 16 | Chapter 1
TECHNIQUES
1-40. The application of techniques varies with each operation depending on time, assets, and objectives.
Planners assess which techniques to apply based on feasibility, availability, and effectiveness. Table 1-2
provides sample deception techniques.
Table 1-2. Sample deception techniques
Technique Deception created
Amplifying signatures To make a force appear larger and more capable or to simulate
the deployment of critical capabilities.
Suppressing signatures To make a force appear smaller and less capable or to conceal
the deployment of critical capabilities.
Overloading enemy sensors To confuse or corrupt their collection assets by providing
multiple false indicators and displays.
Repackaging known organizational To generate new or deceptive profiles that increase or decrease
or capability signatures the ambiguity of friendly activity or intent.
Conditioning the enemy To desensitize to particular patterns of friendly behavior and to
induce enemy perceptions that are exploitable at the time of
friendly choosing.
Reinforcing the impression To mislead by portraying one course of action when actually
taking a different course of action.
Conditioning the target by To believe that an apparently standard routine will be pursued,
repetition whilst in fact preparing a quite different course of action.
Leading the enemy by substitution To believe that nothing has changed by covertly substituting the
false for the real, and vice versa.
Leading the enemy by mistake To believe that valuable information has come into their
possession through a breach of security, negligence, or
inefficiency.
DECEPTION MAXIMS
1-41. The military derives deception maxims from game theory, historical evidence, social science, and
decision analysis theory. These maxims are offered to enhance the deception concepts provided in this
publication. They provide additional insight that commanders and their staffs can use to develop their plans.
Note. These deception maxims originated in Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore. See the
Source Notes.
MAGRUDER’S PRINCIPLE
1-42. Magruder’s principle states that it is generally easier to induce the deception target to maintain a pre-
existing belief than to deceive the deception target for the purpose of changing that belief. Magruder’s
principle exploits target biases and the human tendency to confirm exiting beliefs. Magruder’s principle
alludes to two paths. A path of the deceiver changing the belief of a target and a path of maintaining a present
belief. The principle then advises the better of the two paths. Magruder’s principle is named for Major
General John Magruder. During the Civil War, he was tasked with impeding Major General George
McClellan’s advance on Richmond with a numerically superior force. Magruder deceived McClellan by
encouraging McClellan’s belief that he faced a larger enemy than he actually faced. In using Magruder’s
principle, MDOs provide the targeted decision makers with information that reinforces their expectations for
what they believe to be true. This reinforces the target’s pre-existing perceptions. Any bias is potentially
exploitable. Most targets are unaware of how deeply their biases influence their perceptions and decisions.
Most people resist letting go of existing opinions and tend to seek information that reinforces their own bias. |
3-13.4 | 17 | Fundamentals
1-43. An example of this principle occurred with the selection of the invasion site and its cover plan for the
D-Day invasion of France. Using reconnaissance and communications intercepts, the Allies learned that
Hitler and his senior military advisors believed that the most likely place for the Allied invasion would be in
the Pas de Calais region. This was a viable plan as it provided better air cover and a shorter transit time from
England; in fact, it was a reverse of their plan to invade England in 1940. The Allies were able to exploit and
reinforce the enemy’s expectations to the extent that the Germans had a difficult time reacting to the actual
landings in Normandy.
LIMITATIONS TO HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING
1-44. The human brain can only process so much information and only so fast; it is susceptible to inherent
limitations or tricks of the mind. There are two primary exploitable limitations to human information
processing: the law of small numbers and the susceptibility to conditioning. The law of small numbers is the
tendency to generalize from a small sample set. Exploiting this law means that it does not necessarily take
many observables for the target to draw a conclusion. Susceptibility to conditioning is the repeated
presentation of stimuli to elicit a specific response from the target. In deception, it is the frequent inability of
deception targets to detect small changes in friendly force indicators, even if the cumulative change over time
is large.
1-45. An example of this principle was the breakout of the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz
Eugen from Brest on February 12, 1942. The Germans facilitated the breakout by jamming British radars.
Ordinarily this would have been a significant tip-off that something was amiss, but British radar operators
dismissed it as being caused by atmospheric disturbance. This error was the result of a carefully orchestrated
German ruse directed by General Wolfgang Martini, the head of the Luftwaffe Signals Service. The Germans
jammed the British radar sites every day at the same time to build the British radar operators’ belief that the
atmosphere was interrupting the receipt of any signals. The British became so accustomed to the so-called
atmospheric problems that the ships were able to escape.
MULTIPLE FORMS OF SURPRISE
1-46. A strong correlation exists between deception and surprise. The more forms of surprise built into the
deception plan, the more likely it will overwhelm the target. These forms of surprise include size, activity,
location, unit, time, equipment, intent, and style. One effect of surprise is the cry-wolf syndrome in which
repeated false alarms have the potential to desensitize an enemy. A pattern of behavior lulls an opponent into
a sense of normal behavior to allow a friendly action to occur without an immediate counteraction.
1-47. An example occurred when Egypt successfully deceived Israel into a false sense of security in 1973
by mobilizing reservists twenty-three times before actually acting. Many times over one year, the same source
provided information that the war would break out on a specific date. Each time, that day would come and
go without an attack. This happened so often that when the source actually provided the date of the real
attack, no one believed him.
JONES’ DILEMMA
1-48. This principle is named after Reginald Victor Jones, a British professor heavily involved in solving
science and technology intelligence challenges. In this deception, the target receives information through
multiple means and methods, from many angles, throughout an operational environment. Deception generally
becomes more difficult as the number of conduits available to the deception target to confirm the real situation
increases. However, the greater the number of conduits that are deceptively manipulated, the greater the
chance the target will believe the deception. Planners must balance the need to disrupt or deny enemy
capabilities with the need to preserve select deception conduits to the enemy decision maker.
CARE IN THE DESIGN OF PLANNED PLACEMENT OF DECEPTIVE MATERIAL
1-49. Windfalls (unexpected gains) of information or plans are usually second-guessed, and the target or the
target’s intelligence assets usually doubt the authenticity of any windfall if it comes too easily. The target
will likely view deceptive materials or information as credible if it uncovers the information in a seemingly |
3-13.4 | 18 | Chapter 1
natural manner. The harder the target has to work to acquire it, the more likely the target will believe it as
credible.
1-50. Important military information that is too easy to obtain is usually suspect. Information that falls into
the enemy’s hands must appear to be the result of legitimate collection activities. People naturally tend to
believe information earned more than information given. An example of this technique could be feeding
mission information to the enemy through a trusted source instead of making the information general
knowledge.
1-51. A common characteristic of successful deceptions is that they were designed to co-opt skepticism by
requiring the target to participate either by physically obtaining the evidence or analytically by interpreting
it. However, if the deception is too subtle, it risks that the target will fail to perceive the deception story at
all.
1-52. An example of this principle is from early in World War II, when a German aircraft heading for
Cologne became lost and made a forced landing near Malines in Belgium. Belgian authorities soon arrested
the three passengers, two Wehrmacht officers and a Luftwaffe major. They were taken to the police station
and left alone briefly. They attempted to burn some documents they were carrying. They were top secret
documents containing attack plans for Holland and Belgium. However, the documents failed to burn and fell
into the hands of Belgian authorities. The authorities believed that the documents were a part of a deception
plan because the Germans could not be careless enough to allow actual war plans to fall into the hands of the
Allies. This example shows a misclassification error in which a real windfall was dismissed as false because
it was too easy to obtain.
LEVERAGE THE TRUTH
1-53. In this instance, truth means reality based on facts or precedence. As a rule, the deception should not
portray a reality that would come as a surprise to the target. A deception that conforms to proven or
predictable patterns of behavior is more likely to succeed than a deception that violates these norms. Because
the target has access to Army doctrine and probably understands how the Army operates (to include its core
values), the target will see deceptions as false if they fail to align with foundational Army tenets or historical
patterns of behavior. In this instance, the deception will fail. Planners can provide meaning to actual events,
activities, and operations that support the deception plan.
MINIMIZE FALSEHOOD
1-54. The less the deception relies on false information, the greater the chance of success. Although
deception, by its nature, implies the use of false information to shape the target’s perceptions, each portrayal
of falsehood increases the risk of failure by increasing susceptibility to competing observables. This
deception principle resembles the principle of economy of force—use only the amount of false information
needed to produce the desired perceptions. Any falsehoods should be supported by elements of truth. This
way the target discovers that, everywhere it turns, it finds verifiable information that makes any questionable
part of the deception more believable.
HUSBANDING OF DECEPTION ASSETS
1-55. This maxim suggests that it may be wise to withhold the employment of deception capabilities until
the stakes and the benefits are high. Put another way, a planner conserves deception assets and activities until
forces can employ them to achieve the greatest impact at the most opportune time. This principle considers
that employment of an asset will cause it to become valueless after it has been used once.
1-56. An example of holding deception assets in reserve until the right moment involves the use of double
agents by Britain in connection with the Normandy deception in World War II. The British had captured all
known German agents operating in Britain and decided to use them against Germany. While Britain was
certain that it was in control of the German’s espionage system, it waited to use the agents against Germany
until the Normandy invasion. |
3-13.4 | 19 | Fundamentals
SEQUENCING RULE
1-57. Planners must sequence deception activities and maintain them for as long as possible to maximize the
deception story. OPSEC measures can help planners mask unit observables that would otherwise reveal the
unit’s mission and intent until the last possible instant. To be effective, deception and OPSEC activities must
be sequenced and coordinated in both time and space, and in conjunction with adjacent or pre-existing
operations.
IMPORTANCE OF FEEDBACK
1-58. Planners must develop indicators that will determine the success or failure of the deception. An
assessment plan uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to determine if the enemy has adopted, rejected, or
countered the deception plan. Assessing MOEs gives the commander the necessary feedback to continue,
adjust, or terminate a deception plan. When developing the deception plan, planners should build associated
MOEs for key events.
1-59. An example of the importance of feedback happened during World War II. The British developed a
top-secret cryptographic tool called ULTRA that enabled the British to read German codes. The information
that ULTRA provided to the Allies was a critical element to the success of the Allied invasion of Normandy.
The Allies knew through ULTRA that the German troops remained in Norway and concluded through
feedback that the deception was successful.
BEWARE OF POSSIBLE UNWANTED REACTIONS
1-60. Deceptions may produce unintended, often unwanted consequences. Believing that a threat is real, an
enemy can act unpredictably. Proper planning and coordination and knowing the enemy can reduce the
chance that deceptions will result in unfavorable action. Successful planners consider second- and third-order
effects of the deception plan to mitigate unintended consequences. The risk inherent to a deception operation
is measured by the losses that can result from its failure. The possibility of failure stems from the uncertainties
surrounding how the target receives and interprets information intended for the target and, eventually, how
it affects the target’s desired perceptions. If discovered, resources used for the deception may be in jeopardy.
As with any military operation that puts forces at risk, planners decide to use deception after a deliberate
assessment that weighs opportunity against need and cost against benefit. The deception planner must advise
the commander of the risk, benefit, and cost of the deception operation relative to both success and failure.
DECEPTION MEANS
1-61. Deception means are methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the
deception target (JP 3-13.4). There are three basic categories of deception means: physical, technical, and
administrative. An individual deception means may have multiple attributes that allow it to be characterized
in more than one category. Planners normally employ deception means in complementary variety to mislead
multiple types of enemy sensors to increase credibility and the likelihood of creating the desired perception.
Means provide the signatures, associations, and profiles of friendly purported activities to the enemy. For
additional deception means and the authorities to employ them, refer to CCMD instructions and request
guidance from the CCMD.
PHYSICAL MEANS
1-62. Physical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey or deny information or
signatures normally derivable from direct observation or active sensors by the deception target. Most physical
means also have technical signatures visible to sensors that collect scientifically or electronically. Planners
typically evaluate physical means using characteristics such as shape, size, function, quantity, movement
pattern, location, activity, and association with the surroundings. Examples might include—
* Movement of forces.
* Exercises and training activities.
* Decoy equipment and devices.
* Tactical actions. |
3-13.4 | 20 | Chapter 1
* Visible test and evaluation activities.
* Reconnaissance and surveillance activities.
TECHNICAL MEANS
1-63. Technical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey or deny selected information
or signatures to or from the deception target. These means manipulate electromagnetic, acoustic, or other
forms of energy or through olfaction. Technical means often use technical equipment.
1-64. Technical means may be applied with corresponding physical means or alone to replicate something
physical that is absent from direct visual observation. As with any use of friendly military material resources,
any use of technical means to conduct deception must comply with U.S. and international law. Planners
integrate technical means with other technical activities of the operation. Examples of technical means might
include—
* The establishment of communications networks and interactive transmissions that replicate a
specific unit type, size, or activity.
* The emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors associated with a specific capability
or activity.
* Multispectral simulators that replicate or mimic the known electronic profile of a specific
capability or force.
* Selected capabilities that disrupt an enemy sensor or affect data transmission.
1-65. Electromagnetic deception is the deliberate change of electromagnetic energy intended to convey
misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons. The misinformation
results in degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. Types of electromagnetic deception
include manipulative, simulative, and imitative deception. Manipulative deception involves actions to
eliminate revealing—or to convey misleading—electromagnetic telltale indicators that an enemy can use.
Simulative deception involves actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile
forces. Imitative deception introduces electromagnetic energy into enemy systems that imitate enemy
emissions. For more information on electromagnetic deception, see FM 3-12. For more information on
acoustic, other energy, or olfactory means, see ATP 3-53.1.
ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS
1-66. Administrative means are resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny selected written, oral,
pictorial, or other documentary information or signatures to or from the deception target. They normally
portray information and indicators associated with coordination for ongoing or planned military activity to
the deception target. Examples of administrative means normally visible to an enemy at some level might
include—
* Movement, transit, or overflight requests including flight planning, port call, or traffic control
coordination.
* Basing inquiries or construction requests.
* Other preparatory coordination associated with a military operation normally done through
unclassified channels.
CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND DECOYS
1-67. Camouflage and concealment are OPSEC measures and survivability operations tasks used to protect
friendly forces and activities from enemy detection and attribution. Camouflage makes friendly capabilities
or activities blend in with the surroundings. Concealment makes friendly capabilities or activities
unobservable or unrecognizable to the enemy. Concealing the location, movement, and actions of friendly
forces can delay hostile attack and assist commanders in retaining the tactical advantage. Both use physical,
technical, and administrative means to deceive the enemy and protect the deception story. Deception
measures use the same signatures for simulating friendly forces and activities.
1-68. A decoy is an imitation in any sense of a person, object, or phenomenon that is intended to deceive
enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation (JP 3-13.4). Decoys may be used in conjunction |
3-13.4 | 21 | Fundamentals
with other deception activities to mislead enemy intelligence collection and direct the enemy’s attention away
from actual forces. Decoys must appear realistic to the enemy sensors to be effective. See ATP 3-37.34 for
additional information on camouflage, concealment, and decoys.
INFORMATION QUALITY
1-69. Information quality refers to the accuracy, completeness, relevance, and believability of information
available for decision making. Deception should affect the quality of information available for enemy
decisions in the following ways:
* Portray to the enemy true information that supports the deception story.
* Deliberately present misleading information and indicators to enemies to degrade the accuracy of
enemy information.
* Give enemy decision makers a false sense of completeness of their understanding about friendly
forces or intentions.
* Cause enemy forces to misjudge the relevance of available information and misallocate
operational or intelligence resources.
* Cause enemies to doubt the veracity of their own intelligence assessments.
1-70. MDOs protect the quality of information available for friendly decisions and public dissemination by
instituting internal processes to identify and isolate information generated as a by-product of any deception
activity. This protection helps prevent the commander from reaching erroneous conclusions because the staff
unknowingly integrated the content or output of the deception efforts as accurate information. This also
ensures the information made public is not part of any deception plan that would result in a loss of public
trust.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1-71. Army commanders and their staffs have distinct and coordinating roles and responsibilities in
deception. All planners must understand the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved with deception
planning and execution and then tailor each planning team accordingly.
COMMANDERS
1-72. The commander’s role is critical in planning deception. The commander determines the utility of
deception’s contribution to achieving objectives. Commanders decide to develop a deception plan after
evaluating the analysis and recommendations from the MDO. Commanders should guide applicable
deception executions while understanding their potential importance during planning and execution. The
commander has explicit and inherent responsibilities for the deception effort. The commander—
* Assesses higher headquarters’ plans and orders for stated and implied deception tasks.
* Considers the ways deception can support every operation, mindful of deception maxims to gain
maximum impact.
* States the tentative deception objective in the initial planning guidance.
* Approves the deception objective.
* Allocates necessary resources.
* When required, seeks appropriate approval to employ certain deception means.
* Determines when to exploit deception or counterdeception.
G-2
1-73. The G-2 assists the commander by identifying deception objectives to complement operational
objectives. With the commander leading the efforts, the G-2 identifies deception objectives that apply to
operations, intelligence, and counterintelligence resources. The G-2— |
3-13.4 | 22 | Chapter 1
* Analyzes the threat and the enemy’s capability to process, filter, and evaluate intelligence on the
friendly situation.
* Provides assessments on the threat’s vulnerabilities to deception.
* Assesses threat targets, sensors, most dangerous and most likely COAs, acceptance of the
deception story, and MOEs.
* Provides comprehensive assessments and continual feedback to the MDO in support of deception
planning, execution, and deception termination.
* Supports counterdeception operations to protect friendly deception operations and to expose threat
deception attempts.
* Responds to MDOs’ requests for information (RFIs) concerning analysis data for behavioral
influences or human factors for threat military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organizations.
* Helps to prevent reporting of unintentionally collected deception information to the commander
as valid facts.
G-3
1-74. The G-3 recommends the use of resources including those required for deception. For deception, the
G-3—
* Recommends the deception objective, story, and plan to the commander.
* Coordinates the deception effort through the information operations cell.
* With the staff judge advocate, ensures that the deception effort is planned and conducted in
accordance with the U.S. laws, rules of engagement, and the law of war.
* Supervises execution of the deception plan.
* Submits detailed and clear RFIs to the G-2 for information and intelligence that is key to deception
planning, execution, and assessment.
* Provides feedback to the G-2 on intelligence products to include clarification or additional RFIs
if needed.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS OFFICER
1-75. The information operations (IO) officer is the staff officer responsible for the integration and
synchronization of IRCs in support of the deception plan. These responsibilities include coordinating and
deconflicting deception planning and integration into the scheme of IO (a clear, concise statement of where,
when, and how the commander intends to employ and synchronize IRCs). The IO officer monitors the
implementation and execution of the deception portion of IO. Since military deception is an IRC and
fundamentally cognitive in nature, IO officers typically possess deception-related training and experience for
effectively using TAC-D.
MILITARY DECEPTION OFFICER
1-76. The MDO is responsible for coordinating military deception assets and operations. An MDO is
authorized at corps and theater army levels as the command military deception officer (also known as
CMDO). At division and lower echelons, the commander designates an MDO. Generally, the most suitable
staff officer designated as the MDO is the IO officer because of experience and training. In the absence of a
trained or experienced IO officer, the commander typically designates the individual trained in using Army
IRCs to influence an enemy decision maker. MDOs ensure that staff classify plans in accordance with
DODM 5200.01. The security classification guides establish parameters for planning, coordinating, and
executing deception plans at appropriate levels.
1-77. MDO responsibilities include, but are not limited to—
* Providing programmatic oversight and compliance with security requirements.
* Developing Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations).
* Exercising staff supervision over deception activities.
* Maintaining program integrity through maintenance of strict OPSEC measures. |
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