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FM 1-05 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT January 2019 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. This publication supersedes FM 1-05, dated 5 October 2012.

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This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site

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*FM 1-05 Field Manual Headquarters No. 1-05 Department of the Army Washington, DC 21 January 2019 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT Contents Page PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v Chapter 1 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY ................................................................ 1-1 Religious Support Foundations ................................................................................. 1-1 Mission ....................................................................................................................... 1-1 Organization .............................................................................................................. 1-2 Chaplain Corps Capabilities ...................................................................................... 1-2 Religious Support Core Competencies ..................................................................... 1-4 Religious Support Functions ..................................................................................... 1-4 Religious Support Duties and Responsibilities .......................................................... 1-6 Summary ................................................................................................................... 1-7 Chapter 2 CONTEXT FOR RELIGIOUS SUPPORT ................................................................. 2-1 Army Operational Doctrine and Religious Support ................................................... 2-1 Force Projection and Religious Support Responsiveness ........................................ 2-2 Unified Action and Religious Support ........................................................................ 2-3 Summary ................................................................................................................... 2-4 Chapter 3 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT BY ECHELON .................................................................... 3-1 Echelons of Command .............................................................................................. 3-1 Religious Support in the Theater Army ..................................................................... 3-2 Religious Support in the Corps .................................................................................. 3-2 Religious Support in the Division ............................................................................... 3-3 Religious Support in Brigades ................................................................................... 3-4 Religious Support Enablers ....................................................................................... 3-4 Training ...................................................................................................................... 3-6 Summary ................................................................................................................... 3-6 Chapter 4 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS ................................ 4-1 Operations Process ................................................................................................... 4-1 Planning Religious Support ....................................................................................... 4-2 Preparing Religious Support...................................................................................... 4-4 Executing Religious Support ..................................................................................... 4-5 Assessing Religious Support ..................................................................................... 4-9 Summary ................................................................................................................... 4-9 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. *This publication supersedes FM 1-05, Dated 5 October 2012

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Contents GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1 INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1

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Preface FM 1-05 provides a cohesive understanding of the fundamentals of religious support. It is the Army’s doctrinal source for religious support planning, training, and execution. The principal audience for FM 1-05 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.) FM 1-05 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. This publication is not the proponent for any Army terms. FM 1-05 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent of FM 1-05 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the Directorate Capabilities Integration Division, United States Army Chaplain Center and School. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commandant, United States Army Chaplain Center and School, ATTN: ATSC-DCDID (FM 1-05), 10100 Lee Road, Fort Jackson, SC 29207-7000; by e-mail [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction ADP 1-01 defines Army doctrine as fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of the institutional Army that directly support operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. FM 1-05 is a key integrating publication that links the doctrine for the Chaplain Corps with Army and joint doctrine. FM 1-05 provides operational guidance for commands and religious support personnel at all echelons and forms the foundation for all United States Army Chaplain Center and School curricula. This manual contains four chapters. Chapter 1 describes religious support foundations, including the historical precedents for the Army Chaplain Corps as well as its roles, missions, and functions. Chapter 2 delineates the current operational environment, including the requirement to provide religious support across the range of military operations. Chapter 3 details the execution of religious support at the different echelons of command within our Army. Chapter 4 depicts planning for religious support across the conflict continuum using the operations process. The principles of Army religious support doctrine presented in this manual enable chaplains and religious affairs specialists to apply creative, flexible, and innovative approaches to specific missions and operational environments. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists serving in a joint force land component command or a joint task force should refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, JG 1-05, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, and other joint planning publications for further guidance. FM 1-05 is nested with JP 3-0 and JG 1-05. The Army is the principal land force, organized, trained, and equipped to conduct prompt and sustained operations on land. The Army is responsible for deploying forces at any time, in any environment, against any adversary and must be able to operate for extended periods across the range of military operations. In order to support the free exercise of religion within the Army, chaplain sections and unit ministry teams must be able to function within operational environments possessing a full range of threats. Chaplain sections and unit ministry teams sustain Soldiers across the range of military operations; from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence, to crisis response and limited contingency operations, to large-scale combat operations. Everything the Army does for our nation is done by Soldiers who are supported by their Family members. The principles of Army religious support doctrine presented in this field manual enable chaplain sections and unit ministry teams to apply creative, flexible, and innovative approaches to specific missions and operational environments as it supports the Soldier and Family. Chaplains have served in the U.S. Army since the first days of the American Revolution and many have died in combat. These chaplains represented more than 120 separate denominations and faith groups from across America. Seven chaplains have been awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism above and beyond the call of duty. Many chaplains and religious affairs specialists have received other medals for valor. The personal needs of Soldiers, the mission at hand, their own faith, and emerging religious support doctrine, guided these chaplains and religious affairs specialists as they met the goal to uphold the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. To meet the historic mission of the Chaplain Corps in the midst of a complex and lethal operational environment, the Army’s religious support doctrine must evolve. Specifically, several factors necessitate a new religious support doctrine— * Large-scale combat operations against a peer adversary increases the complexity, lethality, and operational tempo demands upon individuals and formations. * Precision fire capabilities and antiaccess and area denial complicate delivery of the Chaplain Corps’ core competencies of nurturing the living, caring for the wounded, and honoring the dead.

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* Electronic warfare and cyberattacks necessitate an emphasis on the ability to provide religious support and advisement to the command utilizing analog skills and delivery methods. * Antiaccess and area denial necessitates isolated and austere operations with limited reach back or logistic support. This requires an expeditionary mindset in regards to readiness and logistical support for religious support. * Renewed emphasis on potential chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear casualties, combined with high casualty rates requires a paradigm shift in terms of honoring the dead. * Corps’ and divisions’ functional capacity as tactical headquarters employing subordinate forces requires intentional integration and synchronization of religious support training, planning, execution, and delineation of area coverage responsibilities. These principles guide the growth of Army religious support doctrine today. Moreover, they enable this manual to address the complexities of lethal and uncertain operational environments.

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Chapter 1 Religious Support for the Army RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FOUNDATIONS 1-1. On June 14, 1775, the 2nd Continental Congress established by resolution the American Continental Army authorizing ten companies of expert riflemen to support the American Revolution. In July of 1775, the Continental Congress provided for the appointment and pay of chaplains for the Army. That appointment provided the Army with a dedicated and intentional means to support the religious needs of American Soldiers fighting for our nation’s freedom and forever linked the chaplaincy with the operational mission of the United States (U.S.) Army. 1-2. The passing of the Constitution and accompanying Bill of Rights enshrined into public law our nation’s fundamental liberties. The First Amendment guarantees all Americans the right to free exercise of their religious beliefs and prohibits the government from establishing a religion. This constitutional principle is firmly embedded in statutory foundations of the nation. 1-3. The Army Chaplaincy serves to advise and assist commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities to provide for the free exercise of religion in the context of military Service as guaranteed by the Constitution; to assist commanders in managing religious affairs and to serve as principal advisors to commands for all issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations. Chaplains participate in operational planning and advise the commander and staff on matters as appropriate, consistent with their noncombatant status. (See DODD 1304.19 for discussion of chaplain appointments.) 1-4. At every echelon of the force, the chaplaincy is the Army’s primary agency for facilitating the right to free exercise of religion for Service members on behalf of the commander. The chaplains and religious affairs specialists, from the Chief of Chaplains down to battalion unit ministry teams (UMTs), fulfill this core and essential responsibility. Based upon the requirements of an operational mission, a Soldier exercises this right in a number of ways to include, but not limited to— * Worshipping according to one’s faith. * Seeking religious counsel and care. * Keeping holy days and observances. * Participating in rites, sacraments, and ordinances. * Practicing dietary laws. MISSION 1-5. The mission of the Army Chaplain Corps is to provide religious support (RS) to the Army across the range of military operations (ROMO) by assisting the commander in providing for the free exercise of religion and providing religious, moral, and ethical advisement and leadership. (DODD 1304.19) Provide is understood as either (perform) personal delivery or (provide) coordination of required support from other chaplain sources. (See ADRP 1-03, ART 4.2.4.1 for religious tasks.) Throughout our history, chaplains and religious affairs specialists have served alongside combat Soldiers, enduring the same hardships, and bearing the same burdens. They are members of the profession of arms. RS in the Army has no civilian equivalent. Chaplains execute their distinct RS mission for uniformed military Service members, Family members, and authorized civilians in a variety of geographical locations, operational situations, and circumstances. 1-6. The Army is the dominant U.S. fighting force in the land domain. Army forces both depend upon and enable the joint force across multiple domains (air, land, maritime, space, and the information environment [which includes cyberspace]). This mutual interdependence creates powerful synergies and reflects that all operations have multi-domain components. Army forces, with unified action partners, conduct land

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Chapter 1 operations to shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in ground combat, and consolidate gains. (See ADP 3-0 for a discussion of land operations.) Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must be able to deliver RS across the ROMO while coping with the physical, moral, spiritual, and psychological demands unified action places on themselves and the Service members they serve. 1-7. The intensity, brutality, and lethality of large-scale combat operations confront our Army with challenges and opportunities which demand focused training. To accomplish future missions, the Army requires forces that exhibit a high degree of adaptability. Adaptability is the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to a changing operational environment (OE) with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. Adaptability impacts the way chaplain sections and UMTs provide RS. The Army requires adaptable and flexible chaplains and religious affairs specialists with the capacity to successfully function in an OE that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, marked by rapid change, and executed under austere and isolated conditions. The Army requires trained chaplains and religious affairs specialists capable of critically assessing an operational situation and quickly adapting RS tasks to sustain Service members across the ROMO. Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is the cornerstone of combat readiness. ORGANIZATION 1-8. Chaplain sections and UMTs consist of at least one chaplain and one religious affairs specialist, based on organizational requirements. Army chaplains and religious affairs specialists form a UMT at brigade and below, and chaplain section at echelons above brigade. The chaplain section or UMT is identified according to a modified table of organization and equipment or a table of distribution and allowances in an Army force. A UMT assigned to a modified table of organization and equipment unit is known as a mission unit UMT. Chaplain sections and UMTs are embedded into the Army force structure as organic and central to the organization. The chaplain section or UMT is authorized by the modified table of organization and equipment for units whose primary mission is warfighting. The chaplain section or UMT deploys with the unit and provides RS for all units (assigned or attached by task organization) and authorized civilians during each phase of an operation. RS requires the assignment and deployment of chaplains and religious affairs specialists at all echelons, beginning at battalion. Each echelon of chaplain sections or UMTs executes technical supervision and advisement responsibilities for subordinate chaplain sections and UMTs. CHAPLAIN CORPS CAPABILITIES 1-9. The Army requires the capability to provide RS and the capability to advise commanders on the impact of religion. These two required capabilities reflect the dual role of the Chaplain Corps: religious leader and professional military religious advisor: * As religious leaders, the Army requires the capability to provide RS across austere and isolated locations, which accommodates Service members’ right to the free exercise of religion and supports resiliency efforts to sustain Service members in combat. RS tasks sustain the individual Service member, extending upward throughout the entire command structure and outward to the broadest command audience authorized. RS is comprehensive because every individual personally defines what constitutes RS. While not every religious need of every Soldier can be met, chaplains and religious affairs specialists seek to meet as many needs as possible. (See ADRP 1-03, ART 4.2.4.1 for religious tasks.) * As the professional military religious advisor, the chaplain advises the commander and staff on religion, ethics, morals, and morale, and their impact on all aspects of military operations. (See ADRP 1-03, ART 4.2.4.3 for religious tasks.) RELIGIOUS LEADER 1-10. Leadership is defined by the Army as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). As religious leaders, chaplains provide RS to the Army and joint force. As a leadership team, chaplain sections or UMTs support the commander’s responsibility to provide for free exercise of religion for all authorized personnel. The chaplain provides RS that meets the religious and spiritual requirements of the unique military culture.

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Religious Support for the Army RS includes providing those aspects of religious education, clergy counsel, pastoral care, authentic worship, and faith group expression that would otherwise be denied as a practical matter to Soldiers under the varied circumstances of military contingencies. At higher levels of command, it includes supervising and synchronizing the RS tasks of multiple subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists across the larger area of operations (AO). 1-11. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists plan, prepare, execute and assess RS across the full ROMO. In its planning process, a chaplain section or UMT plans for three categories of RS for the Army— * Unit support. This covers the unit to which the chaplain and religious affairs specialist are assigned or attached and is normally the first priority of support. * Area support. This covers Service members, unified action partners, and authorized civilians who are not a part of the assigned unit, but who operate within that unit’s AO. * Denominational or distinctive religious group support. This covers Service members and other authorized persons of the chaplain’s denomination. Note: Availability of denomination-specific chaplains or distinctive religious group leaders and mission requirements may limit the availability and timeliness of this support. 1-12. As credentialed religious leaders, who are themselves guaranteed the free exercise of religion, chaplains cannot perform RS contrary to their faith tradition, tenets, and beliefs. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY RELIGIOUS ADVISOR 1-13. As a member of the unit’s staff, the chaplain serves as the professional military religious advisor to the commander and staff. Chaplains provide religious, moral, and ethical leadership to the Army by advising the commander on these issues and their impact on Service members, Family members, and unit operations. Chaplains advise commanders on the moral and ethical nature of command policies, programs, actions, and the impact of such policies on Service members and Families. They advise the command on such issues as— * Accommodation of religious needs and practices for Service members, Families, and authorized civilians to support the free exercise of religious beliefs. * Religious and ethical issues in the AO and the potential impact on mission accomplishment. (Refer to ATP 1-05.03 and ATP 1-05.04 for detailed discussion of internal and external advisement.) * The needs and concerns of Service members, Families, and authorized civilians, to include suicidal ideation, alcohol or drug abuse, or other at-risk behaviors that impact mission accomplishment. * Marital and parenting stressors resulting from extended deployments for training or operations. * Morale throughout all phases of an operation. 1-14. The chaplain advises the commander on the impact of religion within the unit and how religion impacts the unit’s mission throughout its AO. Internally, the chaplain is responsible for advising the command on the religious practices of Service members within the command. This can include identifying holy days, specific worship requirements, dietary requirements, and wearing of religious garments. Externally, the chaplain advises the command on the specifics of the religious environment within their AO that may impact mission accomplishment. This can include indigenous religions in the AO, holy days that could impact military operations, and the significance of local religious leaders and structures. Chaplain sections and UMTs can work within boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to integrate their respective expertise and knowledge with the collective expertise of the staff in order to focus on specific problem sets to provide coherent staff recommendations to the commander. 1-15. As a professional military religious advisor, the chaplain executes RS planning by actively integrating into the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). To effectively deliver RS to Soldiers, the chaplain is responsible for planning the RS tasks within the command that support the mission and coordinating support necessary for mission success. RS tasks are continuous, detailed, systematic, relevant, and responsive to the needs of the authorized population. RS must be more than minimal presence and a hurried service by the chaplain section or UMT. RS planning is critical to ensuring RS tasks are primarily predictive rather than reactive. The vision of the chaplaincy is providing the right RS in the right place at the right time.

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Chapter 1 RELIGIOUS SUPPORT CORE COMPETENCIES 1-16. Competencies provide a clear and consistent way of conveying expectations for Army leaders. The core-leader competencies stem directly from the Army definition of leadership. The core competencies emphasize the roles, functions, and activities of what leaders do. Competencies are demonstrated through behaviors that can be readily observed and assessed by a spectrum of leaders and followers: superiors, subordinates, peers, and mentors. (See ADP 6-22 for a discussion of competencies.) Competencies must be developed, sustained, and progressively improved through education, training, and experience. Within the two required capabilities, chaplains fulfill three basic core competencies. These three competencies provide the fundamental focus and direction as the Chaplain Corps executes its mission of ensuring the right to free exercise of religion for Soldiers— * Nurture the living. In preparation for missions that span the ROMO and during the execution of those missions, chaplains and religious affairs specialists develop and execute a RS plan that seeks to strengthen and sustain Soldiers and Family Members. * Care for the wounded. During the execution of decisive action, chaplains and religious affairs specialists assist in the healing process by bringing hope and strength to those who have been wounded and traumatized in body, mind, and spirit. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists also provide RS, pastoral care, comfort, and hope to the dying. Through prayer and presence, the chaplain section or UMT provides the Soldier with courage and comfort in the face of death. * Honor the dead. Our nation reveres those who have died in military Service. RS honors the dead. Memorial ceremonies, services, and funerals reflect the emphasis the American people place on the worth and value of the individual. Chaplains conduct these services and ceremonies, fulfilling a vital role in rendering tribute to America’s sons and daughters who paid the ultimate price serving the nation in the defense of freedom. (See ATP 1-05.02 for a more detailed discussion of this competency.) RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FUNCTIONS 1-17. Commanders provide opportunities for free exercise of religion through their chaplains and religious affairs specialists. The chaplain sections or UMTs provide RS by executing specific tasks in support of their assigned functions. Function is the broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained (JP 1). These functions align with task lists which chaplain sections and UMTs train to proficiency. Commanders expect chaplains and religious affairs specialists to understand the tasks associated with these functions. These operational religious support functions and tasks are found in ADRP 1-03, The Army Universal Task List. ADRP 1-03 provides a common language and reference system for doctrine, capability, and training developers. Commanders utilize the performance measures in the Army Universal Task List in evaluating an organization and individual’s abilities to perform these tasks. A partial, descriptive list of the RS functions a chaplain section or UMT may utilize in an OE includes— * Advising the command on religion, morals, morale, and ethical issues. * Leadership of religious worship. * Administration of religious rites, sacraments, and ordinances. * Provision of pastoral care and counseling. * Teaching and management of religious education. * Family-life ministry (division or expeditionary sustainment command [ESC]). * Provision of professional support to the commander and staff. * Management and administration of personnel, facilities, and funds necessary to the RS mission. * Soldier and leader engagements with local or host-nation religious leaders as directed by the commander. * Conduct of RS planning, training, and tasks. LEADERSHIP OF RELIGIOUS WORSHIP 1-18. Leadership of religious worship includes leadership of and preaching in unit or consolidated area religious services. It also includes officiating at military funerals, memorial services, and ceremonies, and

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Religious Support for the Army providing occasional worship events such as revivals, liturgical or holy day observances, religious festivals, sacred practices, and spiritual fitness events. ADMINISTRATION OF REQUIRED RELIGIOUS RITES 1-19. Administration of required religious rites, sacraments, and ordinances includes officiating at events such as baptisms and presiding at obligatory religious celebrations (such as the Roman Catholic Eucharist, Protestant Communion, Jewish Passover, or Muslim Eid al-Fitr). PROVISION OF PASTORAL CARE AND COUNSELING 1-20. Provision of pastoral care and counseling includes crisis intervention (stress management, fear, grief, or trauma); visitation at hospitals, medical treatment facilities, and confinement facilities; prevention and intervention of suicidal behavior; and counseling for religious formation and spiritual direction. Such counseling always upholds the Service member’s right to privileged communication with chaplains and religious affairs specialists. (See Military Rule of Evidence 503 in the Manual for Courts Martial for more details on privileged communication.) TEACHING AND MANAGEMENT OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 1-21. Teaching and management of religious education includes the oversight and teaching of unit religious education programs, catechetical or confirmation classes, and chapel groups. FAMILY-LIFE MINISTRY (DIVISION OR ESC) 1-22. Family-life ministry includes providing professional development training, personal counseling for deployed UMTs and Service members, and resourcing chaplain sections and UMTs for the execution of RS functions and tasks during deployment. PROVISION OF PROFESSIONAL SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDER AND STAFF 1-23. Provision of professional support to the commander and staff includes forming and maintaining professional staff relationships that facilitate the RS mission, as well as personal counsel with commanders and leaders on critical decisions. Integration into staff processes and advisement on religion, ethics, morals, and morale both fall under the chaplain’s role as a professional military religious advisor. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONNEL, FACILITIES, AND FUNDS 1-24. Management and administration of personnel, facilities, and funds is necessary the RS mission. It includes overseeing real property (such as chapels), volunteers and distinctive religious group leaders, and, if applicable, safely receiving, disbursing, and accounting for appropriated and non-appropriated funds associated with the command master religious plan. SOLDIER AND LEADER ENGAGEMENTS WITH LOCAL OR HOST-NATION RELIGIOUS LEADERS 1-25. Soldier and leader engagements with local or host-nation religious leaders is within the chaplain section or UMT capability of professional military religious advisor and is executed by specific order from the commander. Together with the unit staff, more specifically the information operations officer or information operations working group, the UMT synchronizes the Soldier and leader engagements with the unit mission in order to build mutual trust, promote human rights, and develop appropriate command relationships within an operational area. At no time shall chaplains compromise their noncombatant status provided to them by the Law of War during the accomplishment of this function. (See ATP 1-05.03 for detailed information on the chaplain section or UMT’s role in Soldier and leader engagements.)

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Chapter 1 CONDUCT OF COMPREHENSIVE RELIGIOUS SUPPORT TRAINING AND OPERATIONS 1-26. Conduct of comprehensive RS training and operations includes continual planning as a part of the MDMP. It also includes the developing, staffing, execution, and assessment of UMT-specific training plans as well as synchronizing the RS mission with the unit’s current operations. (See FM 7-0 for a discussion on training.) ADVISING THE COMMAND ON RELIGION, MORALS, MORALE, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 1-27. Advising the command on religion, morals, morale, and ethical issues, both within the command and throughout an AO, often includes functioning as “the commander’s eyes and ears” in the unit through informal and formal interaction with Service members. It includes advising commanders on Service members’ morale, and when conducting operations, ensuring the unit is meeting its professional obligations ethically and morally. RELIGIOUS SUPPORT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1-28. Commanders, chaplains, and religious affairs specialists have distinct duties and responsibilities in providing RS to the Army. COMMANDER 1-29. Commanders provide for the free exercise of religion for Service members, Families, and authorized civilians. To ensure readiness across the ROMO, commanders enable RS functions as prescribed in Army regulations. The Army accommodates religious practices when such accommodations do not impede military readiness or hinder unit cohesion, standards, health, safety or discipline. Accommodating religious practices is weighed against military necessity and not guaranteed at all times. (See AR 600-20, Army Directive 2016-34, and Army Directive 2018-19 for religious accommodation guidance.) CHAPLAIN 1-30. The duties of chaplains operating within their dual roles of leader and advisor are prescribed by law, Department of Defense (DOD) policy, Army regulations, religious requirements, and Army mission. Per Title 10, United States Code, chaplains provide RS to U.S. military and authorized civilians. Chaplains advise the commander and staff on religion and its impact on all aspects of military operations. Chaplains remain accountable to their assigned chain of commands and the chaplain technical staff channels up through the chief of chaplains. Commanders are expected to collaboratively support this dual accountability. Chaplains also remain accountable to their endorsing faith groups. Chaplains are noncombatants and do not bear arms. Chaplains do not exercise command authority. 1-31. To fulfill their function as professional military religious advisors, chaplains require at least a secret clearance. This allows them access to the unit operations center and ensures the chaplain is involved in the unit’s operational planning process. 1-32. In addition, chaplains may perform other tasks such as— * Exercising supervision and technical supervision over subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists. * Training and supporting subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists. * Providing religious and moral leadership to the command. * Coordinating RS with higher and adjacent headquarters chaplains and religious affairs specialists. * Translating operational plans into RS priorities for development of a concept of RS. * Conducting informal visits in work areas, training areas, recreation areas, barracks, and quarters as deemed appropriate.

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Religious Support for the Army RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS SPECIALIST 1-33. The religious affairs specialist is a combatant trained in the delivery of RS in an OE. The religious affairs specialist requires a secret clearance to coordinate with other staff sections within the unit’s operations center. The religious affairs specialist integrates the chaplain section or UMT into the unit security mission and accompanies the chaplain throughout the AO. Under the supervision of a chaplain, the religious affairs specialist coordinates and synchronizes RS for the unit. As an integral member of the chaplain section or UMT, the religious affairs specialist assists in providing informed and relevant advisement on religious and cultural affairs. In the chaplain’s absence, the religious affairs specialist continues the RS mission for the commander as a staff representative, but does not assume the religious leadership role of a chaplain. If assigned as a supervisory chaplain section or UMT noncommissioned officer in charge to certain brigades and above, the religious affairs specialist requires the additional skill identifier of 2S. 1-34. Under the supervision of a chaplain, the religious affairs specialist— * Assists in RS planning, preparation, execution, and training (movement, sustainment, rehearsals and survivability). * Coordinates for and supervises section activities (equipment maintenance, sustainment support, classified data systems and access). * Assesses unit morale and advises the chaplain accordingly. * Assists the chaplain in fulfilling all three core competencies (for example, pre-counseling interviews and traumatic event management). * Assists in development of the religious area analysis in order to support advisement on religious and cultural affairs in the AO and religious accommodation. * Serves as section liaison to the unit command sergeant major and all other noncommissioned officers. SUMMARY 1-35. RS to the Army is founded on historic precedent and constitutional, legal, and regulatory requirements. Chaplains serve commands to provide for the freedom of religion for every Service member, Family member, and authorized civilian. The chaplain provides RS on behalf of the commander. Both the chaplain and religious affairs specialist are fully committed to maintaining the highest moral standards, as well as Army and Chaplain Corps values at all times in pursuit of the RS mission. 1-36. The Army requires adaptable and flexible chaplains and religious affairs specialists with the capacity to successfully function in an OE that is volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, marked by rapid change, and executed under austere and isolated conditions. The Army requires trained chaplains and religious affairs specialists capable of critically assessing an operational situation and quickly adapting RS functions and tasks to sustain Service members across the ROMO. (See ADRP 1-03 for religious tasks.) 1-37. Chaplains deliver RS through two required capabilities: provide and advise. Within the two required capabilities, chaplains and religious affairs specialists fulfill three basic core competencies: nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the dead. These three competencies provide the fundamental focus and direction as the chaplaincy executes its mission of facilitating free exercise of religion for Service members, Families, and authorized civilians. As a branch, the Chaplain Corps remains committed to providing religious leadership for the entire Army Family in support of the joint force. In training and operations, Army chaplains represent hundreds of American denominations and faith traditions and fulfill a sacred calling of service captured in their motto, “Pro Deo et Patria” (for God and country).

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Chapter 2 Context for Religious Support ARMY OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT 2-1. The foundation for Army operations and its contribution to unified action is unified land operations. Unified land operations are offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action (ADRP 3-0). Unified land operations achieve operational and strategic success through integration of six principles; mission command, develop the situation through action, combined arms, adherence to the law of war, establish and maintain security, and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy. The tenets of unified land operations are simultaneity, depth, synchronization, and flexibility. The Army subsequently conducts operations as part of the joint force in four broad categories; operations to shape, operations to deter, large-scale combat operations, and operations to consolidate gains. The complexity of operations and an OE requires aggressive, adaptive, flexible, and responsive RS by chaplain sections and UMTs at all echelons of command. 2-2. All domains are contested which makes all operations multi-domain operations. To achieve success, commanders at all echelons combine different operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish the mission. For each mission, they determine the emphasis Army forces place on each offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks. Each operation is mutually related and can be interdependent. Often units conduct more than one type of operation simultaneously in an OE. Commanders weigh the importance of the mission and assign a priority of effort. The staff then allocates resources to support the commander’s intent. This process includes the planning of RS as a function of sustainment. Chaplain sections and UMTs determine RS priority of effort to synchronize with the unit’s main effort and preparation for branches and or sequels. As part of this planning process, the chaplain sections and UMTs plan reprioritization of RS and RS assets based on operational changes in their AO. Chaplain sections and UMTs pay particular attention to the possibility of simultaneous actions across two or more areas of operations and the amount of resources, personal energy, and situational awareness essential to success. 2-3. To meet existing and emerging challenges, the Army trains to confront multiple threats. Threats are a fundamental part of an OE. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm U.S. forces. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Into this foray the Army now faces renewed concerns regarding peer threats. A peer threat possesses capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer adversaries increase the challenges and potentiality of casualties to levels not experienced since the Second World War. This is further exacerbated due to proliferation of technologies including unmanned aerial systems, inexpensive anti-tank guided missiles, precision fires, and advanced rocket propelled grenades. This enables adversaries the ability to practice antiaccess and area denial operations rendering lines of communication (physical and cyberspace) inoperable. 2-4. The mission of providing RS remains the same no matter the threat; the task and standard remain the same. Chaplain sections and UMTs aggressively, intentionally, creatively, and flexibly plan for RS tasks across the ROMO. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists adapt RS tasks based on the operational conditions and the mission of the specific unit they serve. This requires maintaining an expeditionary mindset focused upon delivery of RS under austere and isolated conditions with limited mobility and communication. 2-5. Conflict in populated areas fundamentally alters the manner in which unified action partners can apply force to achieve success in a conflict. Enemies increasingly seek populations as a refuge within which to hide while engaging U.S. forces. War remains a battle of wills—a contest for dominance over people. Future conflicts will require U.S. security dominance to extend across the population by means of operations to

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Chapter 2 shape. This context emphasizes extensive leadership preparation to include analyzing the role of religion in an OE and advising on its impact on mission success. 2-6. The Army’s preeminent challenge is to balance expeditionary agility and responsiveness with the endurance and adaptability needed to complete an operation, no matter what form the operation eventually assumes. Several factors can reduce the effects of uncertainty, chance, and friction. Determination and high morale are significantly influenced by well-developed religious beliefs and spiritual character. Chaplain sections and UMTs seek to develop or strengthen the individual’s spirit in order to enhance the resiliency of the force as it supports the fast, fluid, and unforeseen demands of decisive action. The free exercise of religion reduces personal stress and anxiety, and provides continuity in the exercise of individual religious practices, disciplines, and personal world view. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists assist the commander and the Service member with the refinement and application of individual religious beliefs and spiritual constructs. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists work with their commanders and Service members to build knowledge and respect that fosters individual and collective accountability and religious insight. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists live out the shared experiences of the Army Family and provide dedicated skills to resolve conflict, foster faith, and enhance unit readiness and individual Service member and Family resiliency. FORCE PROJECTION AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT RESPONSIVENESS 2-7. Force projection is the military component of power projection. To apply national power globally, the Army executes missions through force projection. Speed is paramount. Force projection encompasses five processes: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. Each process requires a RS plan enabling the chaplain and religious affairs specialist to support Service members and the unit mission. 2-8. As a religious leader, the chaplain’s first priority is the care of Service members, Families, and civilians working under the stress of rapid force projection. As the professional military religious advisor, the chaplain can expect to participate in the unit’s planning process that can include task-organization changes, religious- support coordination requirements, and integration of Army contractors authorized to accompany the force and unified action partner considerations. 2-9. Deploying units require external RS during the mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization phases. This RS is the responsibility of the chaplain sections and UMTs assigned to the home station and the mobilization site, and theater or Army Service component command (ASCC) RS assets at intermediate staging bases. Because deploying units deploy with their assigned RS assets, RS of the rear detachment, including non-deployed unit personnel, Family members, and authorized civilians is the responsibility of home station RS personnel. This includes RS for deploying and redeploying RS assets who are themselves going through the process and in need of training and time for family reunion activities. The home station family life chaplain should consider separate reunion training for RS personnel and their Family members to increase the effectiveness of such training. 2-10. RS functions span all three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels of war operate within a whole of government approach as they model the relationship between national objectives and tactical actions. National leaders formulate strategy for employment of the national elements of power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to achieve national objectives both domestically and internationally. Leaders at the theater and joint force level utilize operational synchronization to link tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The tactical level utilizes the ordered arrangement of forces in relation to one another in support of operational objectives. Echelon of command, and capabilities might occupy a normative relationship to a particular level of war, but the relationship to the levels of war is more dependent upon the nature of their task, mission, or objective. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of relationships among echelons.) RS occurs simultaneously and continuously from the force projection platforms to the forward operational areas. RS tasks require integrating a vision of RS across the levels of war. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing RS is a detailed, systematic, and coordinated process that remains relevant and responsive to the commander’s mission and the Army Family.

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Context for Religious Support 2-11. A natural tension exists between the echelons of command at the levels of war. This stems from different perspectives, requirements, and constraints associated with command at each level of war. The horizons for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing RS missions vary greatly from level to level. This impacts RS planning, preparation, execution, and assessment, and highlights the differences of RS tasks from battalion through ASCC. 2-12. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. At this level, operations can be rapid and dynamic in nature. Chaplain sections or UMTs at the tactical level of war focus primarily on the personal delivery of RS to their units as they maneuver in an AO. The chaplains and religious affairs specialists operating at the tactical level of war provide the most direct, daily, and responsive RS. The chaplain section or UMT is a key participant in the MDMP and determines the concept of support employed to complete the RS mission. The RS plan is produced with the focus on the execution of comprehensive religious coverage throughout all phases of the operation and identifying RS priorities throughout each phase of the operation. Supervisory chaplain sections and UMTs operating at this level provide technical supervision in the planning, preparation, execution and assessment of subordinate RS missions. When directed by their commanders, chaplains and religious affairs specialists plan and prepare Soldier and leader engagements support in order to engage local indigenous religious leaders as part of the unit’s Soldier and leader engagements strategy. 2-13. The operational level of war links employing operating forces to achieving strategic objectives. Operational level commanders conduct major operations to establish conditions that define the end state. This entails a high degree of information access and data transfer, multitask management, and keen situational awareness. These chaplain sections possess the competencies to articulate strategic objectives to tactical units in a manner that empowers synchronization of RS operations and broad mission accomplishment. Operational-level RS is an advanced application of skills as a religious leader and professional military religious advisor. The chaplain section must understand the constraints of delivering RS within the operational area. They must understand how the regional religious environment affects operations. At the operational level, the chaplain section places a premium on continual mission analysis, development of detailed RS plans, and synchronization of actions. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists serving at this level, focus on the planning, analysis, management, and coordination of RS and religious-support assets across a larger AO. 2-14. The strategic level of war is the level of war at which a nation determines national or multinational strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. RS at the strategic level focuses on resourcing the Army with personnel; ecclesiastical supplies; responsive industrial-base, rapid-fielding initiatives; and appropriate RS policies and guidance. These resources further the free exercise of religion and guide national and combatant commanders as appropriate. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists at the strategic level ensure RS personnel are available at every subordinate level. They develop capabilities and solutions by analyzing the mission and domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. (For a full discussion of strategic RS, see both JG 1-05 and the religious affairs tasks from CJCSI 3500.02B). Chaplains operating at the strategic level enable combatant commanders to engage at senior levels with national religious figures. When directed by their commanders, chaplains and religious affairs specialists plan and prepare Soldier and leader engagements support in order to engage local indigenous religious leaders as part of the Soldier and leader engagements Strategy. This chaplain support to military engagement is highly contextualized and fully integrated into the theater security cooperation plan. UNIFIED ACTION AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT 2-15. Army operations integrate unified action partner capabilities and RS needs. Additional requirements may include regional and multinational support and cooperation. Stability and DSCA tasks involve legal, cultural, religious, demographic, and physical environmental factors. Events of a humanitarian crisis, natural disaster, and ethnic and religious conflicts offer even more deliberate religious planning considerations and demand more nuanced responses. When directed, chaplains consider the ramifications of delivering RS with the cultural and social behaviors in these complex and ambiguous environments. 2-16. Interagency coordination occurs between agencies of the U.S. government, including the DOD, for the purpose of accomplishing a mission. Interagency relationships and activities are part of any unified action.

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Chapter 2 In such operations, federal government agencies other than the DOD may have the mission lead (such as in a DSCA task). In fact, the DOD may be only called upon in a supporting capacity in some operations, particularly those involving foreign humanitarian aid or homeland security. Interagency capabilities supplement military activities to facilitate solving strategic challenges; however, these agencies may lack RS. The presence of these agency partners may increase demand on RS resources. A key consideration in the interagency environment is the communication of expectations and the detailed alignment of capabilities with resources and authority. RS in interagency operations requires initiative, appropriate authorization, and sensitivity to the religious needs of non-DOD civilians while remaining fully committed to unit responsibilities and Service members. Success in interagency RS requires clear command guidance and constraints, reasonable expectations, and a genuine spirit of teamwork and respect. The greatest of these challenges will be initial contact, continuous coordination, and visibility. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists make early contact with appropriate agency leaders and continually coordinate actions with Army leaders. 2-17. An intergovernmental organization (IGO) is created by a formal agreement (a treaty) between two or more governments and is formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. They may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis. Examples of IGOs include the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. IGOs have defined structures, roles, responsibilities, and resources and expertise to participate in unified action. IGO relationships and operations allow the U.S. forces to operate from a force projection base without extensive forward deployed footprints to meet regional challenges. Often RS in IGOs encounters challenges of communicating with representatives from other governments, ameliorating national religious prejudices, not creating the appearance of sanctioning a particular religion, interoperability, mutual cooperation, and relationship building. All religious affairs activities that occur in the context of IGOs are directed by and coordinated through the combatant command or joint force command of the theater. 2-18. Multinational operations describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations working together to achieve the same mission objective. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one organization that participates on many levels of multinational operations. Each country approaches the American concepts of religious toleration and free exercise differently. Again, all religious affairs activities that occur in the context of multinational operations are directed and coordinated through the combatant command or joint force command of the theater. RS in multinational operations considers the challenges of multinational political perceptions regarding— * Communication and cooperation with chaplains or religious affairs specialists. * Religious cooperation. * Understanding cultural and organizational differences. * Relationship building. SUMMARY 2-19. RS personnel assigned to formations in an Army tasked with providing joint force commanders operationally significant and sustained land power must, train, prepare, and assess individual and collective readiness to provide RS to forces engaged across the ROMO. Providing meaningful RS to Service members, Families, and authorized civilians can occur under widely differing circumstances with rapid and unpredictable transitions. The requirements of unified land operations are more demanding now than ever. But the mission remains the same: providing meaningful RS to Soldiers, Families, and authorized civilians. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists remain at the heart of Soldier resiliency and Army Family resiliency. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must remain responsive and adaptable to the challenges of working in a complex OE where chaplain sections and UMTs must plan, prepare, execute, and integrate RS across the ROMO. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists continue to sustain programs that nurture ethical decision making and facilitate religious formation and spiritual development as an inseparable part of unit readiness.

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Chapter 3 Religious Support by Echelon ECHELONS OF COMMAND 3-1. The Army provides to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) a mix of headquarters, units, and capabilities in an echeloned array designed toward specific missions or functions. A force package may consist of light, medium, and heavy forces; it can blend regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve units and Soldiers. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners which are integrated in a multi-domain approach to achieve unity of effort across the ROMO. Military power cannot, by itself, restore or guarantee a stable peace or an agreeable political solution. The exercise of military power sets the conditions that enable other instruments of national power to exert their contributing influence. 3-2. Army forces need versatile and deployable headquarters suited for contingencies and protracted operations. To provide higher echelon mission command, the Army fields a mix of tactical and operational headquarters able to function as land force, joint, multinational and Service component command headquarters. There are five general echelons of commands within a GCC’s area of responsibility. 3-3. The theater army, or ASCC, serves as the senior Army echelon command of a GCC’s area of responsibility. It includes the Service component commander and all Army forces assigned to a GCC. Its operational responsibilities include command of forces, direction of operations, and control of assigned AOs. Its administrative responsibilities encompass Service-specific requirements for equipping, sustaining, training, unit readiness, discipline, and personnel matters. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of support to other Services.) Additional forces might be aligned or attached to the theater army in order to custom tailor the capabilities required to support the GCC. These could include but are not limited to theater level sustainment command, military intelligence brigade-theater, expeditionary sustainment command, civil affairs brigade, medical command, air and missile defense command, military police command, psychological operations brigade, engineering command, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) brigade, and theater aviation command. 3-4. Large-scale combat operations might require a corps headquarters to function as a tactical land headquarters under a joint or multinational land component command. As such, the corps commands Army and multinational forces in campaigns and major operations. Operationally, corps conduct offensive, defensive, and stability tasks with operational control of two or more divisions and a variety of supporting brigades, tactical control over various multinational units and U.S. Marine Corps units, and it is supported by various theater sustainment organizations. Corps operations shape an OE and set the conditions for tactical actions by divisions and lower echelons. Administratively, a corps provides administrative and logistics support to all assigned Army forces as specified by the theater army. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of support from the theater army.) 3-5. A division’s primary role is as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades in decisive action. The division executes the tasks assigned by its higher headquarters as both a formation and a headquarters during large-scale combat operations. Operationally, the division conducts shaping operations within the division AO, task-organizes and employs brigade combat teams (BCTs) and multifunctional and functional brigades, integrates and synchronizes operations of those same brigades, masses effects at decisive points, allocates resources and sets priorities, and leverages joint capabilities. When a division receives attachments, that division assumes administrative control of those units, to include logistics, medical and administration. 3-6. A BCT is the Army’s primary combined arms, close-combat force. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy the enemy. They are the principle ground maneuver units of a division. There are three types of BCTs: armored, infantry, and Stryker. Each BCT has scalable organic capabilities across the warfighting functions.

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Chapter 3 3-7. Multifunctional and functional brigades add capabilities such as attack and reconnaissance aviation, fires, contracting support, or sustainment. They are normally attached to a corps or division, but might be aligned under the command of a joint or multinational headquarters. 3-8. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists execute RS tasks within all of these formations, from ASCC down to battalion. The execution of RS tasks within an AO is integrated throughout all levels of command. RS tasks focus on the timely delivery and resourcing of RS for the command and advising commanders on the impact of religion in an OE. While the RS requirement is consistent, how RS is executed for a specific unit or echelon of command requires detailed mission analysis. Analysis impacts the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of RS. The execution phase requires chaplains and religious affairs specialists capable of aggressively adapting and focusing their operations within the capabilities of their unit. RS tasks are impacted by terrain, distance, and ability to provide a personal presence. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists at all levels leverage available technology to support the planning, preparing, execution, and assessment of their respective RS tasks. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must not only be proficient tactically and professionally in order to execute their mission, they must understand the unit’s capabilities in order to deliver effective and responsive RS. RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE THEATER ARMY 3-9. The ASCC chaplain is the senior Army component chaplain functioning in a Title 10, United States Code role and who supervises all Army RS in the theater. The ASCC chaplain is responsible for recommending RS policy to the ASCC commander. 3-10. The ASCC chaplain coordinates with the other Service component chaplaincies to synchronize religious coverage concepts, conduct joint RS plans, integrate religious area analysis, liaise with military and civilian personnel, and advise the commander regarding religious issues. Religious issues at this level of war are inherently complex and impact strategic and operational outcomes. The assigned world religions chaplain provides advisement for the ASCC and subordinate units in the AO. The chaplain section integrates RS functions into the theater commander’s command master religious plan. The ASCC chaplain section recommends and coordinates RS throughout the AO in support of commander requirements. The chaplain section coordinates with subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists to synchronize RS execution, training, policy, ecclesiastical resupply, and funding for RS tasks in the AO. The ASCC chaplain communicates regularly with the senior chaplains in each joint task force or joint force land component command. 3-11. Each theater army headquarters normally has organizations providing theater-level capabilities aligned with it or under its control and each may have Regular Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve UMTs operating within these formations. These can include— * Theater sustainment command. * Theater network command or brigade. * Military intelligence brigade-theater. * Regionally focused civil affairs brigade or planning team. * Regionally focused medical command. * Functional commands (engineer, military police, criminal investigation, and aviation). * Functional brigades (civil affairs, engineer, theater aviation, military police, medical, and CBRN). RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE CORPS 3-12. The chaplain sections at corps supervise the overall RS effort within the corps AO. Corps chaplains serve as senior advisors to commanders at all levels of command. The chaplain section collects, processes, analyzes, and disseminates a broad base of RS information. Proper staffing procedures and coordination through command, staff, and technical channels with commanders, staff, and subordinate chaplain sections and UMTs support the execution of RS within these large areas of operation. Corps chaplains shape and guide the tactical and professional proficiency of subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists, which directly impacts the successful execution of RS. This supervisory role is exercised through integration into the operations process, frequent personal contact with subordinate chaplains and religious affairs

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Religious Support by Echelon specialists, memorandums of agreement or understanding between commands, professional relationships, mission orders, running estimates, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and command policies. The corps chaplains advise the commander and support corps RS functions by— * Establishing links with unified action partners and religious leaders of the host nation. * Synchronizing RS functions with the theater or ASCC chaplain’s office. * Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing RS for corps operations. * Facilitating or supervising RS training for RS personnel in all phases of the ROMO with an emphasis on phase 0. * Supervising and coordinating resources for religious-support tasks in divisions and directly attached or assigned brigades. * Coordinating RS planning with higher, lower, and adjacent commands to ensure balanced religious group access throughout the deployed force. * Monitoring and assessing the resilience of subordinate chaplain sections and UMTs. 3-13. A world religions chaplain serves at the corps level. The world religions chaplain executes the professional military religious advisor and leader capabilities by— * Serving as the world religions chaplain advisor to the corps commander assessing the influences of cultural and religious networks for current and future operations. * Contributing to operational and tactical-level planning by assisting with religious impact analysis for situational awareness and contributing assessments of religious-cultural influences that shape the informational and OE. * Serving as the command chaplain's Soldier and leader engagements officer in charge. * Reviewing components of the campaign plan to ensure integration of religious considerations. * Monitoring Soldier and leader engagements from operational to tactical and manages as part of the Soldier and leader engagements workgroup. RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN THE DIVISION 3-14. The division chaplain section fulfills the two required capabilities of providing RS and advisement to the command through both direct advisement at the division level and supervision of that same support at the brigade and battalion levels. These includes but is not limited to the— * Synchronization of RS plans from division with the corps. * Communication of priorities of support and RS efforts within the division AO. * Monitoring of a changing OE and facilitation of coordinated area coverage plans and communication among subordinate chaplain sections and UMTs. * Supervision of RS in brigades and directly attached or assigned battalions. * Supervision and facilitating or conducting RS training for RS personnel during all phases of the ROMO. * Cross-leveling of RS assets in support of large-scale combat operations associated casualties. * Ongoing professional development of subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists across the continuum of conflict. * Integration of RS training in the unit training calendar and advisement on subordinate unit RS training plans. 3-15. A Family-life chaplain serves at the division or ESC level. The division or ESC Family-life chaplain executes the religious leader and advisor capabilities by─ * Providing deployed Family counseling and pastoral care capability for Soldiers in theater. * Performing training for deployed chaplains and religious affairs specialists in division or ESC to develop and maintain uniformly effective pastoral care and counseling skills.

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Chapter 3 * Providing resilience-maintaining activities for forward deployed pastoral and health-care providers in division or ESC operational area. * Designing and staffing Soldier and Family-ministry activities to include pre and post deployment Strong Bonds training, resiliency training, deployment preparedness and recovery, and suicide intervention. RELIGIOUS SUPPORT IN BRIGADES 3-16. Serving in a BCT or functional brigade, the brigade UMT establishes a vision for RS within the brigade AO through its integration in the operations process. Through its professional military religious advisor capability, the UMT visualizes the end state of RS for the brigade and the required effort and resources necessary to execute their planned missions. The operations process enables brigade UMTs to understand the brigade commander’s intent for RS within the brigade AO, synchronize subordinate RS tasks, and coordinate for the required support necessary to achieve mission success. 3-17. Generally, a brigade has two or more battalions under its operational control. Each battalion has a UMT, and the brigade UMT supervises these subordinate UMTs. The brigade UMT plans, coordinates, assesses, and supervises the execution of RS by subordinate UMTs throughout its AO. A brigade can take on numerous attachments to conduct operations. This gives the organic unit a far different task organization and capability than what it carried while training at home station. A brigade can deploy and operate with its organic units. Other brigades only deploy subordinate units to support other operations. In each case, a brigade UMT plays a critical role in shaping and supporting the RS functions of subordinate UMTs. 3-18. Brigade UMTs closely monitor rapidly changing OEs anticipating support requirements, communicating priorities by means of the commander’s operations process, coordinating area coverage plans, and requesting additional support from higher in order to facilitate comprehensive RS across the ROMO. 3-19. Supervision and training are critical for the success of the brigade religious-support mission. The brigade UMT must see supervision and training as their part of comprehensive RS within the brigade. Supervision and training are a function of both the religious leader and professional military religious advisor capability. For the brigade UMT, the transition from serving as a battalion UMT to a brigade-level UMT is not simply a movement in location, it requires a transition in focus. A chaplain and religious affairs specialist at the brigade level shift their main effort away from the direct delivery role of RS. Instead, the main effort is focused on supervising, synchronizing, and resourcing subordinate UMTs as they provide RS to the battalions operating within the larger brigade AO. Through effective leadership, supervision, training, and mentoring, the brigade UMT can impact the effectiveness of battalion level RS tasks. The brigade UMT has the responsibility to ensure subordinate UMTs are planning, preparing, executing, and assessing the delivery of RS to Soldiers and meeting the commander’s intent. The religious leader capability guides the brigade UMT in their role to the brigade headquarters staff. The brigade UMT monitors the religious and emotional health of subordinate UMTs as they provide RS to Soldiers in close combat and coordinates external RS as needed for subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists. RELIGIOUS SUPPORT ENABLERS 3-20. Religious support enablers consist of chaplain detachments. These detachments have mission specific organization. Each has its own support and equipment. CHAPLAIN DETACHMENTS 3-21. Chaplain detachments (CDs) provide the Army Chaplain Corps a force tailoring capability to respond to expeditionary requirements usually identified through the global force management process. The detachments represent a supplemental capability for conducting RS functions and for providing RS across the ROMO. The CDs are an augmentation capability, not a replacement for organic RS or force structure. A CD is composed of mobilized Reserve Component chaplains and religious affairs specialists. When mobilized, these detachments increase the commander’s ability to meet the religious needs of Service personnel.

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Religious Support by Echelon ORGANIZATION 3-22. Four CD organizations exist: * Alpha - 2 chaplains (56A)/3 religious affairs specialists (56M). * Bravo - 1 chaplain (56A)/1 religious affairs specialist (56M). * Charlie - 1 chaplain (56A)/1 religious affairs specialist (56M). * Delta - 1 chaplain (56A)/1 religious affairs specialist (56M). CD-Alpha 3-23. The primary mission of the CD-Alpha is to provide unit and denominational RS during unified land operations and is normally assigned to a theater sustainment command or equivalent separate task force headquarters. The CD-Alpha also provides port opening elements conducting port operations the capability for RS coverage during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration. A CD-Alpha may also be used in homeland security, foreign humanitarian assistance and DSCA missions at the direction of the chief of chaplains. The CD-Alpha has the capability to provide technical supervision for five CD-Bravo teams. If required, the CD-Alpha can divide into two teams to provide expanded area support. CD-Bravo 3-24. The primary mission of the CD-Bravo is to provide augmentation to an ESC or sustainment brigade and task-organized elements without organic RS assets. CD-Bravos provide unit and denominational RS during unified land operations. If directed by the chief of chaplains, CD-Bravos may coordinate or provide RS to first-responder units, federal agencies, and other IGOs. CD-Charlie 3-25. The primary mission of the CD-Charlie is to provide augmentation to a corps chaplain section. The CD-Charlie normally locates with the corps chaplain section and may operate independently to provide support to overall RS tasks and Soldier and leader engagements functions. CD-Charlies provide unit and denominational RS during unified land operations and a liaison capability to faith-based non-governmental organizations. The CD-Charlies provide assets required to enable the corps chaplain section to conduct 24- hour and split-based RS planning, coordination, and execution. CD-Delta 3-26. The primary mission of the CD-Delta is to provide augmentation to a division chaplain section. The CD-Delta normally locates with the division chaplain section. CD-Deltas provide RS planning, coordination, and execution functions to include unit and denominational RS during decisive action. The CD-Deltas provide assets required to enable the division chaplain section to conduct 24-hour and split-based RS planning, coordination, and execution. SUPPORT 3-27. All CDs rely on the unit to which assigned or attached for all logistics support. This support includes, but is not limited to: legal, health service support, finance, personnel and administrative services, field feeding, unit maintenance, and logistical support. EQUIPMENT 3-28. All CDs require 100% mobility. It must have equipment, supplies, and personnel when mobilized in order to have 100% operational capability once deployed. CDs are required to communicate digitally and by voice with higher and lower echelon chaplain sections from anywhere within the AO.

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Chapter 3 TRAINING 3-29. Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is the cornerstone of combat readiness. (See FM 7-0 for a discussion on training.) Army forces must remain trained and ready to conduct decisive action in support of unified land operations anywhere along the ROMO. This requires challenging, realistic, and consistent training under dynamic and complex conditions. RS training must be synchronized with and integrated into a unit’s training plan recognizing the unique capabilities and requirements of RS in support of the assigned unit’s mission. This might require leveraging subject matter experts in RS topics or military subject matter experts on topics outside of RS areas of expertise. The unexpected and rapid transition from phase 0 operations demands vigilance in terms of planning, execution, and assessment of training in order to ensure chaplains and religious affairs specialists are ready for large- scale combat operations regardless of their current unit of assignment or perceived removal from threats posed by potential adversaries. 3-30. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must understand the unit’s mission and the commander’s intent. Unit tasks are organized as mission-essential task lists. The mission essential task list is a list of those functions which a unit must always accomplish to achieve mission success based on its table of organization and equipment capabilities. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists train to the unit’s mission essential task list, utilizing the derived RS battle tasks. Chaplain sections and UMTs at all echelons of command have the responsibility to be tactically and technically proficient in order to execute their specific operational RS mission. Supervisory chaplains and religious affairs specialists train, mentor, and coordinate resources for subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists in order to meet the requirement of providing the Army with adaptive, technically and tactically proficient chaplain sections and UMTs. (See FM 7-0 for details on planning, executing, and assessing a unit training plan and ADRP 1-03 for universal tasks.) SUMMARY 3-31. The execution of RS by chaplains and religious affairs specialists is imperative in all operations and at all echelons of command. The chaplain section and the UMT are the means by which the Army provides RS to Service members, Families, and civilians. RS provided during a military operation can occur under widely differing circumstances. At the battalion level, the UMT personally delivers RS to individuals within the command. At higher levels, the chaplain section and the UMT supervises the execution across the command to ensure RS requirements are met across the ROMO. This is essential to achieve execution of comprehensive RS throughout an AO. The method by which we prepare to deliver RS is recurring RS training executed as part of an integrated and synchronized unit training plan.

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Chapter 4 Religious Support and the Operations Process OPERATIONS PROCESS 4-1. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (ADP 6-0). Mission command requires responsive chaplain sections and UMTs— * Capable of understanding an OE. * Able to adapt, anticipating and managing transitions as they support the execution of the overall unit mission. * Willing to accept an approved level of risk to create opportunities for RS. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must plan within guidance and utilize risk management to operate within acceptable risk levels and develop courses of action (COAs) to meet the commander’s intent. (See ATP 5-19 for details on risk management.) Within a framework of adaptability, chaplains and religious affairs specialists exhibit the ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to a changing OE with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions. (See ATP 1-05.01 for more details on RS and the operations process.) 4-2. The Army’s method for the exercise of mission command is the operations process. This process consists of the major activities performed by command staffs during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing. During the operations process, the chaplain section or UMT plans, prepares, executes, and continually assesses RS tasks in support of the unit mission. These activities may be sequential or simultaneous. Often, chaplains and religious affairs specialists must plan and prepare for an upcoming operation while still providing responsive RS to Soldiers. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must begin preparation activities (coordination for transportation or supplies) while still in the planning process. Throughout this process, chaplain sections and UMTs apply Army design methodology; the critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex and multidimensional problems and develop approaches to solve them. Design should not be viewed as a process or a simplified checklist. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion on the staff planning and operations process.) 4-3. Innovation, adaptation, and continuous learning are central to mission success as chaplain sections and UMTs provide RS in an often uncertain and complex OE. The goals of design are— * Understanding multidimensional problems. Chaplain sections and UMTs analyze the situation and the operational variables to gain the critical information necessary to understand and frame these problems. * Anticipating change. Rather than responding to events as they occur, chaplain sections and UMTs anticipate, recognize, and manage transitions. * Creating opportunities. 4-4. Throughout the operations process, chaplain sections and UMTs face various problems. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists apply critical and creative thinking to solve problems as it executes its RS mission. Critical thinking enables chaplain sections and UMTs to understand situations, identify problems, find causes, arrive at conclusions, make quality plans, and assess the progress of operations. To solve a problem, chaplains and religious affairs specialists— * Recognize and define the problem. * Gather information. * Develop possible solutions to the problem.

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Chapter 4 * Analyze possible solutions. * Select the best solution. * Implement the solution, assess results, and provide feedback. 4-5. Chaplain sections and UMTs integrate into the collaborative planning of the MDMP. The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology. The MDMP helps chaplains and religious affairs specialists understand the situation and mission, develop COAs, and decide on a COA to accomplish missions. It integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other military and civilian partners to produce a fully synchronized plan or order for execution. Planning for any RS task must take into consideration the force structure, RS sustainment, an OE, and the AO. (See FM 6-0 and ATP 1-05.01 for more detailed discussions on the MDMP.) PLANNING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT 4-6. A plan is a design for a future or anticipated operation. Because Army operations are conducted in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain OEs, a plan is a framework from which to adapt rather than a script to follow. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action during unforeseen events. Good RS plans address contingencies in current and future operations. Planning is an essential element of mission command and is a continuous activity of the operations process. The successful execution of RS functions and tasks requires UMTs fully integrated into the operations process. Planning helps chaplains and religious affairs specialists at all echelons of command by— * Identifying problems (potential and actual) that may impede delivery of RS. * Understanding and developing solutions to problems. * Anticipating key events and adapting to changing circumstances. It is an understanding of key events that means the difference between successful and unsuccessful planning. * Coordinating RS to sustain the task organization (unit and subordinate UMTs) and prioritize efforts. * Directing, coordinating, and synchronizing RS functions and tasks. 4-7. RS planning is continuous, time sensitive, detailed, and systematic. It examines all factors relating to RS in unified land operations. It is integrated into and synchronized with the unit operations process. The most valuable resource is time. All chaplain sections and UMTs must manage time so that the RS mission gets accomplished. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must prioritize their efforts and allocate sufficient time to that effort. The chaplain section and the UMT cannot be everywhere and must determine where to focus its efforts. They prioritize and synchronize their actions against the unit’s critical time driven events. The corps, division, and brigade chaplains and religious affairs specialists supervise subordinate planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities by resourcing them with current and relevant information and products, low density faith-group resources, and providing relevant and timely guidance. The chaplain section and the UMT plans for RS by considering the operational and mission variables. Operational variables consist of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, plus physical environment and time considerations. Mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. These variables determine how to provide RS. Operational variables provide the UMT a structured tool to assess the impact of religion on each of the variables. This action can provide the foundation for operational planning tools such as the running estimate. 4-8. The planning process builds on already developed SOPs of the unit, the UMT, and higher chaplain sections. Most SOPs are initially general in nature and then fully developed to support a specific unit mission within a specified AO. Good SOPs reduce the amount of information needed in the published RS plan. Unit SOPs, such as a unit’s tactical SOP or a division memorial SOP, delineate roles and responsibilities for unit or staff personnel. Since a commander signs off on the unit tactical SOP, it becomes an authoritative document for RS supervision of subordinate chaplains and religious affairs specialists. A tactical SOP provides the supervisory chaplain with the enforcement tools necessary for the execution of area-wide RS functions. An internal staff section RS SOP details, by position, the team member responsible for each

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Religious Support and the Operations Process recurring duty and responsibility, provided that the team has analyzed and cataloged its tasks. Well-written SOPs are an effective, combat-oriented set of procedures, and should produce— * Simplified, brief combat orders. * An enhanced understanding and teamwork among commanders, staffs, and troops. * Standard synchronized staff drills. * Standard abbreviated or accelerated decision-making techniques. RUNNING ESTIMATE 4-9. Situational awareness is the immediate knowledge of the conditions of an operation, constrained geographically and in time. It is the chaplain section and UMT knowing what is currently happening around them based on information and knowledge products, such as the common operating picture and running estimates. Situational understanding is the product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the mission variables to facilitate decision making. It enables chaplains and religious affairs specialists to determine the implications of what is happening and forecast what may happen. (See ATP 1-05.01 for a sample running estimate.) 4-10. The running estimate is the intentional and continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable. Building and maintaining running estimates is a primary task of each staff section. Chaplain sections and UMTs maintain a running estimate to facilitate situational awareness and understanding and use a running estimate throughout the operations process. A comprehensive running estimate addresses all aspects of an operation based on the two required capabilities of religious leader and professional military religious advisor and the three core competencies of nurture, care, and honor. A running estimate is a tool that enhances a commander’s visualization of religion within an OE. Failure to maintain running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed RS plans or bad decisions. Key information recorded in the running estimate is included in orders, particularly in the functional annexes. 4-11. The running estimate analyzes how the factors considered in the mission analysis affect the ability to accomplish the RS mission and how religion may impact unit operations. The chaplain and religious affairs specialist consider all elements of the mission which could influence RS. The running estimate ensures careful and intentional planning and execution by following a logical, continuous, and methodical process. (See FM 6-0 for more information on running estimates and the operations process [planning, preparation, execution, and assessment]). During the MDMP, the running estimate acts as an analysis tool enabling the UMT to see— * How RS functions and tasks impact the unit mission and other staff section actions. * How mission variables and other staff section actions impact the execution of current and future RS functions and tasks. 4-12. As part of the planning process and production of the running estimate, a religious area analysis is one resource to assist and advise the command in situational awareness and understanding. The chaplain advises the commander and staff on the beliefs, practices, and customs of religious groups in the AO, and the impact that local religions may have on the conduct of the mission. Common concerns include religious organizations and doctrines, practices and customs, and places of worship, shrines, and other holy sites. Chaplain sections and UMTs must coordinate with other staff sections and agencies (civil affairs, cultural advisors, intelligence, information operations, and other UMTs) for staff feedback in order to gain a comprehensive base of knowledge that supports the needs of the commander. Like the running estimate, chaplains and religious affairs specialists continuously refine the religious area analysis as new information emerges. CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS SUPPORT AND RELIGIOUS SUPPORT PLAN 4-13. The product of this planning process is a concept of RS and an RS plan. The RS plan informs the commander and staff of the concept of RS. The RS plan is flexible and informed by the concept of RS to support the unit’s mission requirements while operating in a complex and uncertain OE. Chaplain sections and UMTs provide RS on a different scale and at different times based on the unit mission and capabilities.

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Chapter 4 While the requirement to provide RS is the same, the plan for a combined arms battalion differs from a plan for a theater-level sustainment operation. 4-14. After a commander selects a COA, the chaplain section or UMT completes the details of the RS plan for inclusion in the operation order. Depending on the level of command, the RS plan communicates the higher commander’s intent, provides guidance of the supervisory UMT, assigns responsibilities, defines area support requirements, and authorizes coordination between subordinate UMTs and adjacent commands. The RS plan, once published as a part of the operation order is a written order signed by the higher headquarters commander. As a result, supervisory chaplains and religious affairs specialists must exercise their staff responsibility to participate in the staff planning process and develop a thorough RS plan to assist subordinate UMTs in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing RS to their units. Subordinate UMTs receive an RS plan from higher headquarters and incorporate those requirements into their own RS plan. 4-15. The RS plan is for the whole command. For example, a brigade RS plan contains information applicable to the whole brigade and would impact battalion RS tasks. A battalion RS plan would contain information for subordinate company commanders on the delivery of RS for their Soldiers. Many units publish a base order for a deployment and then cut fragmentary orders or warning orders as needed to sustain mission command. Fragmentary orders enable UMTs to disseminate information on RS activities, coordinate for support, and publish guidance on changes or additions to the original RS plan. Since chaplains have no command authority, it is critical they publish the RS plan (initial or updated) through the operations process and in coordination with the appropriate staff channels. This enables the RS plan to be incorporated as part of an operation order, fragmentary order, or warning order from a commander to subordinate commanders. This facilitates the UMT’s ability to coordinate key tasks for its concept of support with commanders, staff, and higher and subordinate UMTs. 4-16. The amount of time and the priority of effort allocated to support the dual capabilities of religious leader and professional military religious advisor vary from UMTs and are based on the type of unit, the mission being executed by that unit, and the level of command. For example, the development of a religious area analysis may not be applicable to every UMT based on the mission requirements of the unit. A supervisory UMT can provide resources to the subordinate UMTs by accessing higher headquarters’ products and developing products specific to that unit’s AO. This gives subordinate UMTs more time to plan, prepare, and execute their mission. (See FM 6-0 for more detail on operation plans and order formats.) PREPARING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT 4-17. The preparation phase consists of activities performed by chaplain sections or UMTs to improve their ability to execute an operation. It can include, but is not limited to— * Refining the RS plan. * Conducting or participating in key rehearsals. * Coordinating for support. * Conducting inspections. * Executing movement. 4-18. The MDMP drives preparation. Time is a critical factor in all operations. During the planning process, chaplains and religious affairs specialists must determine the time needed to prepare and execute their mission. Proper analysis helps determine what actions are required and when those actions must begin to ensure mission success. The running estimate is used by chaplains and religious affairs specialists at all echelons of command to identify the current readiness of the chaplain section or UMT or subordinate UMTs in relationship to the unit and the RS mission. Running estimates are also used to track mission readiness goals and requirements. 4-19. Preparation moves chaplain sections or UMTs from the planning phase to execution. Planning and preparation often overlap as chaplains and religious affairs specialists must accomplish required coordination while still developing a plan. It helps chaplains and religious affairs specialists understand the situation and their roles in a mission or operation. Team members use this time to update their situational understanding of both an OE and the religious needs of their Soldiers. During the preparation phase, actions could include—

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Religious Support and the Operations Process * Attending confirmation briefings and rehearsals to ensure they are current with the operational plan and can provide relevant RS to Soldiers supporting the mission. * Conducting inspections of UMT personnel and equipment and rehearsing the plan by phase. * Coordinating for the support necessary to achieve mission success such as transportation or additional RS assets. * Training or rehearsing tasks critical to mission success to include survivability tasks. * Supervisory chaplains and religious affairs specialists use this time to ensure subordinate UMTs are focused and preparing to execute RS plans that support the commander’s plan. They ensure subordinate UMTs are properly positioned, resourced by command to meet the RS requirements, and have the ability to move and communicate. EXECUTING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT 4-20. The end result of planning and preparing is mission execution. Execution puts the plan into action. For the chaplain section or UMT, this means that effective RS does not simply happen—it occurs because the team has planned, prepared, and then executed its mission. 4-21. In operations where lethality and intensity are high, RS becomes increasingly important to Soldiers. To successfully execute the RS mission, chaplains and religious affairs specialists are guided by several critical sustainment principles. (See ADP 4-0 for sustainment discussion.) These sustainment principles impact the operations process chaplains and religious affairs specialists use to plan, prepare, execute, and assess— * Integration. Integration is the most critical principle. Integration of RS occurs throughout the operations process–plan, prepare, execute, and assess. One of the primary functions of the chaplain section or UMT is to ensure the integration of RS tasks with the unit’s operations plans. Not properly integrating RS and unit operations could result in mission failure. * Anticipation. Anticipation of RS facilitates responsive support. Anticipation is the ability to foresee events and requirements and initiate necessary actions that most appropriately respond to the need. Anticipating RS tasks means staying abreast of operational plans, continuously assessing requirements, and tailoring support to meet current operations and the changing OE. * Responsiveness. Responsiveness is the ability to meet changing requirements on short notice and to rapidly sustain efforts to meet changing circumstances over time. It includes the ability to see and forecast operational RS requirements. It is providing the right support in the right place at the right time. * Simplicity. Simplicity relates to processes and procedures. Clarity of tasks, standardized and interoperable procedures, and clearly defined command relationships contribute to simplicity. Simplicity enables economy and efficiency in the use of resources, while ensure effective support of forces. * Economy. Economy means providing sustainment resources in an efficient manner to enable a commander to employ all assets to generate the greatest effect possible. Economy reflects the reality of resource shortfalls, while recognizing the inevitable friction and uncertainty of military operations. Economy enables strategic and operational reach by reducing unnecessary use of transportation requirements. * Survivability. Survivability is the ability to protect personnel, information, infrastructure, and assets from destruction or degradation. UMTs integrate survivability considerations with operational planning to maximize their ability to function despite multiple threats to their safety. * Continuity. Continuity is the uninterrupted provision of RS across all levels of war and throughout all levels of command. UMTs, at all levels, work hand in hand with operational staffs ensuring synchronization of requirements over the entire course of the operation. * Improvisation. Improvisation is the ability to adapt sustainment operations to unexpected situations or circumstances affecting a mission. It may involve changing or creating methods that adapt to an enemy that quickly evolves. This requires commanders, their staffs, and Soldiers to improvise other possible means to accomplish an operations.

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Chapter 4 EXECUTING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 4-22. The ROMO is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the conflict continuum. All operations along this range share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve or contribute to national objectives. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities build networks and relationships with partners, shape regions, keep day-to-day tensions between groups below the threshold of armed conflict, and maintain U.S. global influence. Typically, crisis response and limited contingency operations are focused in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a specific strategic or operational-level objective in an operational area. Large-scale combat operations occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy’s armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives. 4-23. The chaplain section or UMT plans and prepares to execute RS for Service members, families, and authorized civilians across the ROMO. This requires a continuous and precise RS plan that is executed at the right place, right time, and in the right amount in both routine and emergency situations. This requires the intentional integration of RS requirements into the operations process. All chaplains and religious affairs specialists must consider events that impact the execution of their tasks and plan and prepare accordingly. The chaplain section or UMT establishes RS priorities; considers the threat characteristics, the units conducting the main and supporting operations; and the severity and number of casualties from previous missions. They must prioritize elements that have sustained the most casualties or to those that will be engaged earliest in close combat. 4-24. Staff integration and the ability to understand operation orders, graphic controls and measures, as well as the priorities of effort is essential to successful delivery of RS. A chaplain section or UMT without proper training and situational awareness will create hazardous conditions for unified action partners during unified land operations, become a casualty, or simply fail at delivering timely, relevant, and effective RS and advisement. 4-25. The chaplain section or UMT always places a priority on first performing and providing RS to Service members, Family members, and authorized civilians. Depending on the mission of the unit and the type of unit they serve, chaplains and religious affairs specialists must be prepared to support the commander’s increased needs for advisement regarding host-nation religion and religious issues including places of religious worship, religious education, and cultural sites. The commander may leverage the chaplain to conduct Soldier and leader engagements as a means of supporting tactical or operational objectives. RELIGIOUS SUPPORT DURING OPERATIONS 4-26. The chaplain and religious affairs specialist consider the items discussed in paragraph 4-22 through 4-25 across all aspects of the ROMO. They also consider the specific items for consideration in the defined operations or tasks discussed in paragraphs 4-27 through 4-39. To fully understand an OE and RS impacts, RS personnel need to read FM 3-0, ATP 1-05.01, and fully integrate into the unit’s mission command processes. Religious Support During Operations to Shape 4-27. Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security cooperation, deterrence missions, tasks, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capability, and promote regional stability. The theater army integrates land power within theater engagement plans and security cooperation activities. Army units at the corps and lower echelons execute shaping tasks and provide forces for security cooperation. 4-28. RS for operations to shape arise from either habitual security cooperation agreements or unexpected requirements due to OE changes. Chaplain sections and UMTs need to plan for either scenario. The environment will be marked by increased unified action partner activities requiring flexibility and the ability to gain and maintain situational awareness regarding RS capabilities across unified action partners. Short notice and rapid deployment requires trained and ready chaplain sections and UMTs with established and rehearsed load plans, detailed battle drills, and SOPs capable of self-sustained operations at echelon for 90 – 120 days. Effective RS logistics requires regularly updated religious demographics analysis of the assigned unit. The unpredictable nature of operations to shape requires the development of research and advisement

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Religious Support and the Operations Process tools for advisement to the command on indigenous religious practices and potential impact upon operations. The potential for small custom tailored force packages requires chaplains and religious affairs specialists capable of fulfilling the required capabilities of RS and advisement without additional chaplain section or UMT support and limited technology. Religious Support During Operations to Prevent 4-29. The purpose of operations to prevent is to deter adversary actions contrary to U.S. interests. They are typically conducted in response to activities that threaten unified action partners and require deployment or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if deterrence fails. The theater army enables the GCC to employ land forces within the area of responsibility and into specific operational areas. Corps headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a tactical headquarters with subordinate divisions and brigades as a show of force. 4-30. RS for operations to deter involve the planning of support for entire formations. Chaplain sections and UMTs can expect to operate without resupply for the first 60 – 90 days and need to prepare for operations under austere conditions as the theater likely does not have basic life support activities established. Providing briefings and counseling to families and Service members can be challenging due to the unpredictable nature of the deployment and uncertainty regarding follow-on missions and duration of the deployment. Due to the larger scale of deploying forces, there is a higher likelihood that chaplain sections and UMTs will be co- located at the forward operating site. The flow of forces and potential failure of deterrence might necessitate rapid deployment and immediate employment which means chaplain sections and UMTs must remain prepared for rapid deployment with the capability to conduct RS tasks immediately upon arrival into theater. RS personnel assigned to sustainment units could find themselves working at a reception, staging, onward movement, and integration site. This requires a unique capability to counsel personnel from outside the organization with whom there is not a pre-existing relationship. The local population is likely already impacted, which necessitates accurate and relevant external advisement for the command. The flow of personnel into theater also requires deliberate planning on the flow of chaplain section and UMT personnel within the force package movement plan in order to provide RS at the forward operating site as quickly as possible and throughout the duration of the operation. Religious Support During Large-Scale Defensive Operations 4-31. Large-scale combat operations defensive operations provide commanders time to build combat power and establish conditions for transition to the offense. The strengths of a defense include the defender’s ability to occupy positions before an attack and use available time to prepare those defenses. The three primary defense tasks are area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. 4-32. RS during steady state operations requires the ability to rapidly transition to defense operations. RS during the defense requires plans focused on immediate transition to the offense during defensive operations. In the defense, the chaplain section or UMT has more time to synchronize its RS plan and apply maximum RS assets to critical areas. Chaplains and religious affairs specialists must be prepared to adapt to the changing tactical situation. For example, in a mobile defense, the commander combines offensive, defensive, and retrograde actions. Proper analysis and planning enhance the synchronization of the delivery of RS during the different phases and increase the effectiveness of RS tasks. During defense operations, maneuver plans should consider the potential loss of geographic lines of communication. Higher echelons require situational awareness regarding the movement of RS assets during both steady state and defense operations. Defense operations might commence with little warning thereby isolating RS assets within a given AO. This situational awareness creates viable options for delivery of RS to isolated units without co-located RS assets. Chaplain sections and UMTs need established SOPs or battle drills addressing the inventory and security of sacred items and religious literature in the event of rapid retrograde operations. Religious Support During Large-Scale Offensive Operations 4-33. Offensive operations seek to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offense is characterized by audacity, concentration, surprise, and tempo. The offense emphasizes the requirement for a balance of high tempo and synchronization to mitigate current capabilities gaps (fires, electronic warfare, cyberspace, CBRN, mobility, and sustainment).

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Chapter 4 4-34. RS during offensive operations is usually focused on anticipating or reacting to the lethal nature of offensive operations. This requires RS personnel who understand the synchronization of tasks and geographic control measures as they impact freedom of movement, casualty flow routes, and prioritization of RS prior to, during, and following offensive operations. This phase of operations carries with it the highest likelihood of casualties for unified action partners. Of note, large-scale combat operations offensive operations anticipate casualty rates on par with the Second World War. High casualty rates requires an intentional area and node RS coverage plan synchronized by supervisory chaplain sections and UMTs. In preparation for offensive operations chaplain sections and UMTs need to focus on both the provision of RS and advisement on ethics, morals, morale, and religion. The speed of offensive operations will create gaps in communication rendering continuous advisement ineffective until lines of communication are reestablished. The ability for RS personnel to synchronize efforts, movement, and communication of reports is critical to successful delivery of RS, especially in light of the potential for communication primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans to falter at various points during large-scale combat operations offensive operations. RS teams also need to be well trained on analog land navigation skills and the ability to conduct RS under light and noise discipline conditions with tight time constraints. Religious Support During Operations to Consolidate Gains 4-35. Consolidation of gains are the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. Operations to consolidate gains exploit tactical and operational success by destroying or defeating enemy means for protracted resistance and denying its operational purpose. Commanders employ defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms; compel, control, influence, and support. Consolidation of gains is not a synonym for stability. 4-36. Consolidation of gains requires an increased emphasis on external advisement to the command in terms of religion, ethics, morals, and morale as they impact the unit’s formation, ongoing operations, and the local population. Chaplains work in conjunction with the information operations officer to advise the commander on second- and third-order effects of operations from a religious perspective in order to avoid unintended consequences or reinforce intended consequences. Chaplain sections and UMTs should anticipate potential conflict among troops transitioning from large-scale combat operations to operations to consolidate gains as interactions with host-nation personnel increases as well as interaction with detained personnel or enemy prisoners of war. RS assets should prepare for transition in type of operations, change of mission, or redeployment operations and integrate with the staff for planning and execution of appropriate tasks. There should also be a focus on internal advisement in regards to family issues, single Soldier issues, and potential conflict with sustainment unit personnel as the unit transitions to redeployment. Chaplain sections and UMTs supporting theater movement control assets should anticipate heightened tempo and subsequent stress for their personnel amid potential for negative perceptions from redeploying personnel and unit. Religious Support During Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks 4-37. DOD support for domestic emergencies is executed through two distinct but interrelated missions— homeland defense and DSCA. DSCA tasks involve DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. DSCA tasks require the chaplain section or UMT to know the restrictions, limitations, and proper responsibilities of the chaplain and religious affairs specialist in providing RS under both law and mission authority. (See JG 1-05, JP 3-0, and JP 3-28 for discussions on joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for DSCA tasks.) 4-38. DSCA tasks usually are a Title 32, United States Code (state) mission until or unless the state requests federal (Title 10, United States Code active military) support or the extent of the mission results in federalization. DSCA tasks require extensive coordination between multi-jurisdictional entities (municipal, county, and state agencies) as well as federal agencies and nongovernmental agencies. The United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard often have habitual relationships with such agencies to respond quickly and appropriately in support of such tasks. This is particularly so when the joint task forces of each state Army National Guard respond to provide consequence management to CBRN incidents. 4-39. RS within DSCA tasks depends heavily on jurisdictional coordination. When directed by the commander, the chaplain section or UMT conducts multicomponent (Regular Army, Reserve, and National

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Religious Support and the Operations Process Guard), intra-agency, and IGO coordination to effectively provide RS. Coordination must occur at the highest level possible. The Regular Army, Reserve Component, and joint task force chaplains integrate RS tasks and execute a religious coverage plan that provides seamless RS. This involves extensive coordination and liaison among the active and reserve component chaplaincies. UMTs provide direct RS to military units; perform liaison responsibilities with state and federal agencies, pertaining to religious issues; and when directed by the commander liaison with civilian-religious leaders. This is particularly critical in responding to catastrophes, whether man-made (such as CBRN incidents) or naturally-occurring (such as Hurricane Katrina). ASSESSING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT 4-40. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations (JP 3-0). Assessing progress is the responsibility of all staff sections. Chaplain sections and UMTs continuously assess the operation from their specific area of expertise and integrate and coordinate their individual assessments in assessment working groups. This feedback process throughout the operations process enables them to keep on track. Assessment occurs at all levels of war and at all echelons of command. The situation and echelon dictate the focus and methods chaplains and religious affairs specialists use to assess. Chaplain sections or UMTs assist the commander by continuously assessing an OE and the progress of the RS tasks as it supports the overall unit mission. 4-41. The primary tools used to assess progress of the unit’s operation and the RS tasks include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the unit’s assessment plan. 4-42. Chaplain sections or UMTs assess RS tasks by— * Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information for updating the running estimate. The running estimate is used to assess RS functions and tasks. The estimate provides information, conclusions, and recommendations. At a minimum, the chaplains and religious affairs specialists track—  Friendly force capabilities (to include chaplains and religious affairs specialists) with respect to ongoing and planned operations.  Enemy capabilities, as they impact current RS functions and plans for future RS functions.  Civil considerations for current RS functions and plans for future RS functions. * Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. Evaluation helps chaplain sections or UMTs determine what is working or not working and gain insights into how to better accomplish their mission. * Recommending or directing action for improvement of RS tasks. While assessment may identify problems, unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to a chaplain section or UMT or a commander is limited. SUMMARY 4-43. The impact of religion continues to grow complex as local events, persons, or issues change. These factors cumulatively increase the religious, psychological, and interpersonal demands on Service members. Chaplain sections and UMTs seek to use all available resources effectively to encourage personnel participation in religious activities. Planning must take into consideration: time, transportation, available resources, and technology. While RS functions and tasks can incorporate new technologies, nothing can substitute for personal pastoral presence and protecting and defending the free exercise of religion, personal delivery of RS remains paramount.

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Glossary SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADP Army doctrine publication AO area of operations AR Army regulation ASCC Army Service component command ART Army tactical task ATP Army techniques publication BCT brigade combat team CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CD chaplain detachment CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction COA course of action DA Department of the Army DOD Department of Defense DODD Department of Defense directive DSCA defense support of civil authorities ESC expeditionary sustainment command FM field manual GCC geographic combatant commander IGO intergovernmental organization JG joint guide JP joint publication MDMP military decisionmaking process OE operational environment ROMO range of military operations RS religious support SOP standard operating procedure U.S. United States UMT unit ministry team SECTION II – TERMS Army doctrine Fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and symbols, used for the conduct of operations and which the operating force, and elements of the institutional Army that directly support operations, guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (ADP 1-01).

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Glossary assessment A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. (JP 3-0) function The broad, general, and enduring role for which an organization is designed, equipped, and trained. (JP 1) leadership The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. (ADP 6-22) mission command (Army) The exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0) unified land operations Offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape the operational environment, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action. (ADRP 3-0)

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References All URLs accessed on 19 December 2018. REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS These documents must be available to intended users of this publication. ADP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 14 August 2018. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. November 2018. RELATED PUBLICATIONS These documents contain relevant supplemental information. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL DOCUMENTS The United States Code can be found online: http://uscode.house.gov. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces. 10 August 1956. Title 32, United States Code, National Guard. 10 August 1956. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS Most Department of Defense Directives are available online: www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. DODD 1304.19. Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments. 11 June 2004. JOINT PUBLICATIONS Most joint publications are available online: http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/. CJCSI 3500.02B. Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Program. 15 January 2014. JG 1-05. Religious Affairs in Joint Operations. 01 February 2018. JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013. JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017. JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 29 October 2018. ARMY PUBLICATIONS Army doctrinal publications and regulations are available online at https://armypubs.army.mil. ADP 1-01. Doctrine Primer. 02 September 2014. ADP 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2017. ADP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012. ADP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012. ADP 6-22. Army Leadership. 01 August 2012. ADRP 1-03. The Army Universal Task List. 02 October 2015. ADRP 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2017. AR 600-20. Army Command Policy. 06 November 2014. Army Directive 2016-34. Processing Religious Accommodation Requests Requiring a Waiver to Army Uniform or Grooming Policies. 06 October 2016.

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References Army Directive 2018-19. Approval, Disapproval, and Elevation of Requests for Religious Accommodation. 08 November 2018. ATP 1-05.01. Religious Support and the Operations Process. 31 July 2018. ATP 1-05.02. Religious Support to Funerals and Memorial Events. 27 November 2018. ATP 1-05.03. Religious Support and External Advisement. 03 May 2013. ATP 1-05.04. Religious Support and Internal Advisement. 23 March 2017. ATP 5-19. Risk Management. 14 April 2014. FM 3-0. Operations. 06 October 2018. FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 May 2014. FM 7-0. Train to Win in a Complex World. 05 October 2016. FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956. OTHER PUBLICATIONS Manual for Courts Martial at https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/MISC_PUB_27- 7_2016_EDITION_3_FINAL.pdf. PRESCRIBED FORMS This section contains no entries. REFERENCED FORMS Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate website: https://armypubs.army.mil/. DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

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Index Entries are by paragraph number. levels of war, 2-10 theater enablers, 3-11 A–B operational level, 2-13 religious support categories, 1-11 advisement strategic level, 2-14 religious support functions, 1-17 ethics, 1-9 tactical level, 2-12 external, 1-13 religious support plans, 4-13 internal, 1-13 M–N–O assessing, 4-40 religion, 1-14 executing, 4-20 mass casualty ministry, 4-34 operations process, 4-1 assessment, defined, 4-40 memorial ceremonies, 1-16 planning, 4-6 C military decision making process, preparing, 4-17 1-15, 4-5 running estimates, 4-9 chaplain, as religious staff advisor, 1-13 ministry, family life, 1-22 training, 3-30 duties, 1-30 mission, Army chaplaincy, 1-5 S tasks, 1-32 impact of religion, 1-9, 1-14 Soldier and leader engagements, chaplain corps, capabilities, 1-9 mission command, defined, 4-1 1-25 core competencies, 1-16 mission-essential tasks, 3-30 mission, 1-5 T chaplain detachments, 3-21 P–Q types of operations, defense Alpha, 3-23 pastoral care and counseling, support of civil authorities tasks, Bravo, 3-24 1-20 4-37 Charlie, 3-25 force projection, 2-7 plans, religious support, 4-13 Delta, 3-26 large-scale defensive policy, Department of Defense, 1- operations, 4-31 command master religious plan, 1-24 30 large-scale offensive privileged communication, 1-20 operations, 4-33 D–E multidomain operations, 2-2 distinctive religious group leaders, R multinational operations, 2-18 1-11 range of military operations, 4-22 operations to consolidate gains, 4-35 religious affairs specialist, duties, F–G–H operations to prevent, 4-29 1-33 family life chaplains, 1-17, 3-15 tasks, 1-34 operations to shape, 4-27 unified action, 2-15 function, defined, 1-17 religious leader, 1-9 religious staff advisor, 1-9, 1-13 U–V I–J–K religious support by echelon, 3-8 unified land operations, defined, intergovernmental organizations, brigade level, 3-16 2-1 2-17 corps level, 3-12 W–X–Y–Z L division level, 3-14 functional brigades, 3-7 world religions chaplains, 3-10 leadership, defined. 1-10 theater army, 3-9

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FM 1-05 21 January 2018 By Order of the Secretary of the Army: MARK A. MILLEY General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: KATHLEEN S. MILLER Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1901606 DISTRIBUTION:

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FM 3-13.4 Army Support to Military Deception FEBRUARY 2019 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is available at the Army Publishing Directorate site (https://armypubs.army.mil/) and the Central Army Registry site

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FM 3-13.4 Field Manual Headquarters No. 3-13.4 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 26 February 2019 ARMY SUPPORT TO MILITARY DECEPTION Contents Page PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS ..................................................................................................... 1-1 Overview of Army Military Deception Planning ......................................................... 1-1 Functions of Military Deception ................................................................................. 1-1 Categories of Deception ............................................................................................ 1-1 Key Terms of Military Deception ............................................................................... 1-3 Principles of Deception .............................................................................................. 1-5 Types of Military Deception ....................................................................................... 1-6 Tactics ....................................................................................................................... 1-7 Techniques ................................................................................................................ 1-8 Deception Maxims ..................................................................................................... 1-8 Deception Means ..................................................................................................... 1-11 Information Quality .................................................................................................. 1-13 Roles and Responsibilities ...................................................................................... 1-13 Chapter 2 PLANNING ................................................................................................................ 2-1 Preplanning ............................................................................................................... 2-1 The Army Tactical Deception Planning Process ....................................................... 2-4 Deception Plan Approval ......................................................................................... 2-14 Intelligence Support to Deception Planning ............................................................ 2-14 Legal Considerations ............................................................................................... 2-17 Operations Security and Deception ......................................................................... 2-19 Military Deception as an Information-Related Capability ........................................ 2-20 Integration with Other Information-Related Capabilities .......................................... 2-21 Coordination Requirements ..................................................................................... 2-23 Risk Assessment ..................................................................................................... 2-23 Chapter 3 PREPARATION AND EXECUTION ......................................................................... 3-1 Preparation ................................................................................................................ 3-1 Execution ................................................................................................................... 3-1 Managing the Execution of the Deception Plan ........................................................ 3-3 Terminating Military Deception Operations ............................................................... 3-5 Chapter 4 ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 4-1 Assessment Responsibilities ..................................................................................... 4-1 Assessment Plan ....................................................................................................... 4-2 Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance Development ................ 4-2 Appendix A COUNTERDECEPTION ........................................................................................... A-1 DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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Contents Appendix B INPUT TO OPERATION PLANS AND ORDERS .................................................... B-1 Appendix C DECEPTION EVALUATION CHECKLIST ............................................................... C-1 SOURCE NOTES ............................................................................... Source Notes-1 GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1 REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1 INDEX ............................................................................................................... Index-1 Figures Figure 2-1. Planning steps ........................................................................................................... 2-12 Figure 3-1. Monitoring activities .................................................................................................... 3-4 Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) ........................... B-1 Tables Table 1-1. Deception differences ................................................................................................... 1-2 Table 1-2. Sample deception techniques ...................................................................................... 1-8 Table 2-1. The Army tactical deception planning process in the military decisionmaking process 2-4 Table 2-2. Sample terminations ................................................................................................... 2-14

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Preface This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.) FM 3-13.4 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text, the term is italicized, and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. FM 3-13.4 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The proponent for this publication is the United States Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP) Office. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on a Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (FM 3-13.4), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by email to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org- [email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Introduction When properly resourced and integrated, deception has the potential to deter or induce actions that are favorable to the force and can increase the success of friendly activity. In the same way that operations transition from one phase to the next, deception plans integrated into each phase and through each transition will strengthen the ability of commanders to retain initiative throughout the operation. Successfully planned deceptions give commanders the ability to act faster than the enemy can make decisions, creating positions of relative advantage. Deception, as part of a broader strategy, is present in military case studies. While deception has its roots in the earliest military strategies, the modern day practical study of deception relies largely on case studies from World War I to present day. The availability of actual participants for interviews combined with detailed after action review reporting provides an in-depth understanding of deception tactics and techniques. Deception can play a pivotal role in achieving the commander’s objectives and significantly reduce risk. Deception can conceal, protect, reinforce, amplify, minimize, distort, or otherwise misrepresent friendly technical and operational capabilities, intentions, operations, and associated activities. Deception can be a critical enabler to achieving operational surprise and maintaining the initiative during large-scale combat operations in highly contested, lethal environments. This publication is the proponent for the new Army term, tactical deception.

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Chapter 1 Fundamentals OVERVIEW OF ARMY MILITARY DECEPTION PLANNING 1-1. Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). Deception applies to all levels of warfare, across the range of military operations, and is conducted during all phases of military operations. When properly integrated with operations security (OPSEC) and other information-related capabilities (IRCs), deception can be a decisive tool in altering how the enemy views, analyzes, decides, and acts in response to friendly military operations. 1-2. Deception is a commander-driven activity that seeks to establish conditions favorable for the commander to achieve objectives. It is both a process and a capability. As a process, deception employs an analytic method to systematically, deliberately, and cognitively target individual decision makers. The objective is to elicit specific action (or inaction) from the enemy. As a capability, deception is useful to a commander when integrated early in the planning process as a component of an operation focused on causing an enemy to act or react in a desired manner. Deception greatly enhances the element of surprise. Deception aligns with surprise and the displacement of critical threat capabilities away from the friendly point of action. Due to the potentially sensitive nature of deception activities and selected means, planners must implement appropriate security and classification measures to properly safeguard deception tactics, techniques, and procedures. FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY DECEPTION 1-3. Planners must have a thorough understanding of the functions and the scope of what deception can and cannot accomplish. A deception plan serves as a part of the overall mission. Every deception plan must clearly indicate how it supports the commander’s objectives. The functions of deception include, but are not limited to— * Causing delay and surprise through ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding. * Causing the enemy to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and materiel resources. * Causing the enemy to reveal strengths, weaknesses, dispositions, and intentions. * Causing the enemy to waste combat power and resources with inappropriate or delayed actions. CATEGORIES OF DECEPTION 1-4. Deception activities support objectives detailed in concept plans, operation plans (OPLANs), and operation orders (OPORDs) associated with approved military operations or activities. Deception applies during any phase of military operations to establish conditions to accomplish the commander’s intent. The Army echelon that plans a deception activity often determines its type. The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategic and tactical actions. The levels have no finite limits or boundaries. They correlate to specific authorities, levels of responsibility, and planning. The levels help organize thought and approaches to a problem. Decisions at one level always affect other levels. Table 1-1 shows the three types of deception.

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Chapter 1 Table 1-1. Deception differences Deception in support of Military deception Tactical deception operations security Influence the action or Gain a tactical advantage Make friendly force Focus inaction of enemy over an enemy intentions harder to decision makers interpret Level Strategic or operational Tactical Any Military campaigns and Army commanders All in support of an Support to major operations approved operations security plan Combatant command and Joint task forces, Army All joint task forces Service component Headquarters command, division, and below In accordance with Two levels higher (as per Two levels higher (as per Approval CJCSI 3211.01 or combatant command combatant command from DODI 3604.01 instruction) instruction) Target Adversary or enemy Enemy Foreign intelligence entity CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction DODI Department of Defense instruction MILITARY DECEPTION 1-5. Military deception (MILDEC) is planned, trained, and conducted to support military campaigns and major operations. MILDEC activities are planned and executed to cause adversaries to take actions or inactions that are favorable to the commander’s objectives. The majority of MILDEC planned for and executed by the combatant command (CCMD) to create operational-level effects. MILDEC is normally planned before, and conducted during, combat operations. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and processes that must be adhered to in their respective commands. MILDEC is a joint activity to which the Army, as the primary joint land component, contributes. Army forces do not unilaterally conduct MILDEC. MILDEC must adhere to the regulatory requirements found in Army policy and regulations, CJCSI 3211.01 series, and applicable CCMD instructions. TACTICAL DECEPTION 1-6. Tactical deception is an activity planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level commanders to cause enemy decision makers to take actions or inactions prejudicial to themselves and favorable to the achievement of tactical commanders’ objectives. Commanders conduct tactical deception (TAC-D) to influence military operations to gain a relative, tactical advantage over the enemy, obscure vulnerabilities in friendly forces, and enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces. In general, TAC-D is a related subset of deception that is not subject to the full set of MILDEC program requirements and authorities. In most circumstances, Army commanders can employ TAC-D unilaterally if certain criteria are met. In description, TAC-D differs from MILDEC in four key ways: * MILDEC is centrally planned and controlled through CCMD-derived authorities, but TAC-D is not. TAC-D can be employed unilaterally by tactical commanders with an approved plan. * TAC-D actions are tailored to tactical requirements of the local commander and not always linked or subordinate to a greater MILDEC plan. * The TAC-D approval process differs from the MILDEC approval process in that it is only required to be approved at two echelons higher, provided that it adheres to the joint policy for MILDEC addressed in CJCSI 3211.01. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and processes that must be adhered to in their respective commands. * Planning for TAC-D is usually more abbreviated, but still focuses on influencing the action or inaction of enemy decision makers, to gain a tactical advantage over an enemy. TAC-D gains this relative advantage using deception activities that affect the enemy’s perceptions of friendly activities and possibly targeting lower-echelon enemy combatants to affect their operations.

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Fundamentals DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS SECURITY 1-7. Deception in support of operations security (DISO) is a deception activity that conveys or denies selected information or signatures to a foreign intelligence entity (FIE) and limits the FIE’s overall ability to collect or accurately analyze critical information about friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment, and other assets. The intent of DISO is to create multiple false, confusing, or misleading indicators to make friendly force intentions harder to interpret by FIE. DISO makes it difficult for FIEs to identify or accurately derive the critical information and indicators protected by OPSEC. Deception and OPSEC are mutually supporting activities. DISO prevents potential enemies from accurately profiling friendly activities that would provide an indication of a specific course of action (COA) or operational activity. DISO differs from joint MILDEC and TAC-D plans in that it only targets FIEs and is not focused on generating a specific enemy action or inaction. Because a DISO does not target a specific enemy decision maker, the DISO approval process differs from the MILDEC approval process. A DISO can be approved at two levels higher, provided that it adheres to the joint policy for MILDEC in CJCSI 3211.01 series and is developed in support of an approved OPSEC plan. CCMD instructions add guidelines, policies, and processes that must be adhered to in their respective commands. KEY TERMS OF MILITARY DECEPTION 1-8. Military deception officers (MDOs) must have a comprehensive understanding of deception terms and definitions. Deception refers to those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. The following are terms and definitions associated with deception that deception will use throughout the planning process— * Deception goal. * Deception objective. * Deception target. * Desired perceptions. * Conduits. * Indicator. * Filter. * Node. * Link. * Deception event. * Observable. * Competing observable. * Patterns. * Deception story. 1-9. The deception goal is the commander’s statement of the purpose of military deception as it contributes to the successful accomplishment of the assigned mission (JP 3-13.4). It is always written from the perspective of the friendly force commander. In initial planning guidance, a deception goal may be general in nature, requiring refinement during the development of the deception estimate. The deception goal is usually stated as a positive friendly advantage or condition such as: “Deception will create a decisive combat power advantage for the coalition main effort attack along AXIS MONTANA.” Like any other form of military operation, the measure of success for deception is its direct contribution to the accomplishment of the mission. Deception plans often require investments in effort and resources that would otherwise be applied against the enemy in a more direct fashion. Consequently, it is important for the commander to first envision the deception goal in terms of its specific contribution to accomplishing the designated mission. Some additional examples include— * “I want to use deception to improve the friendly force advantage.” * “I want to use deception to increase freedom of maneuver.”

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Chapter 1 1-10. The deception objective is the desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location (JP 3-13.4). It is the action or inaction that directly leads to the advantage or condition stated in the deception goal. For example, “Cause the enemy to hold its armored reserve in a position or status unable to impact friendly forces along AXIS MONTANA through H+36 hours.” 1-11. The deception target is the adversary decision maker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4). The target thus directs the action or inaction of the military capability described in the deception objective. The deception target or target set is key individuals on whom planners focus the deception plan. Understanding the target’s process for receiving and processing information, assessing a situation, and deciding a COA is critical to a successful deception plan. For more information on deception targets, see chapter 2. 1-12. In military deception, desired perception is what the deception target must believe for it to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective (JP 3-13.4). They are personal conclusions, official estimates, and assumptions that the deception target must believe in order to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. These enemy perceptions will form from both objective (observation and analysis) and subjective (intuition and experience) analysis. They are also heavily impacted by biases, preconceptions, predispositions, and filters applied in the collection, analysis, delivery, and reception of information. 1-13. Within military deception, conduits are information or intelligence gateways to the deception target, such as foreign intelligence entities, intelligence collection platforms, open-source intelligence, and foreign and domestic news media (JP 3-13.4). They are the pathways to the deception target. Collectively, they define how the enemy will observe activity in the information environment and how those observations are transmitted, processed, and ultimately delivered to the decision maker. For more discussion on conduits and conduit analysis, see discussion beginning in paragraph 2-33. 1-14. In operations security usage, an indicator is data derived from friendly detectable actions and open- source information that an adversary can interpret and piece together to reach conclusions or estimates of friendly intentions, capabilities, or activities (JP 3-13.3). 1-15. A filter is any node within a conduit that aggregates, synthesizes, or applies bias information on its path to the deception target. A node is an element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing (JP 3-0). Planners understand that filters make every conduit unique, affecting the way information is transmitted through them. To create the most effective portrayal of the deception story, planners assess each conduit and the filters involved, ensure redundancy with other conduits, and appreciate the relative value of each conduit as perceived by the target. 1-16. A link is a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes (JP 3-0). The key link between selected indicators and the deception story is the tentative identification of one or more enemy conduits to which the plan exposes the indicator. Observable activities and the threat conduits combine to produce indicators that can be seen or perceived to aid in collection and decision-making processes. Unless exposed to one or more active conduits, an indicator is ineffective in conveying the observable or indicator: the enemy cannot register or respond to what it cannot see. Executions are the tasks or activities that the friendly unit conducts to put an observable into action. 1-17. A deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation (JP 3-13.4). A deception event aims to portray an observable that contributes to desired perceptions in the deception target. 1-18. In military deception, an observable is the detectable result of the combination of an indicator within an adversary’s conduit intended to cause action or inaction by the deception target (JP 3-13.4). Observables are often made up of executions, which can include events, activities, or elements of information that must be seen or sensed by the target to form the desired perceptions. Observables may gain credibility through the use of supporting observables. To enhance the probability that the target will receive or accept one or more of the required observables. 1-19. MDOs may need to develop supporting observables. Supporting observables enhance the deception story and help create a believable context for the required observables. Planners identify all the activities

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Fundamentals normally associated with a specific activity or event (the required observable). From those activities, the planner analyzes which of those associated activities the target would normally collect against and use as a significant indicator of usual or consistent friendly behavior. The activities must be fully compatible with all elements of the deception story and carefully sequenced with other observables to have their desired effects. 1-20. Within military deception, a competing observable is any observable that contradicts the deception story, casts doubt on, or diminishes the impact of one or more required or supporting observables (JP 3-13.4). To minimize the impact of competing observables on enemy analysis, they must be mitigated as part of the deception plan. Examples of mitigation for competing observables include protection with OPSEC, including DISO; neutralization of the enemy conduit to which competing observables are likely to be exposed; or assumption of risk based on detailed analysis of minimal impact to the operation. The availability of resources and time are often limiting factors in preparing such supporting measures, but they can be extremely valuable in raising the credibility and verifiability of the deception story and the probability of deception success. 1-21. Patterns are multiple-repetitive indicators that give the enemy an operational profile. Enemies use their intelligence collection assets to analyze patterns to identify the unit and predict its mission. Changes in pattern can affect how an enemy perceives friendly actions. 1-22. The deception story is a scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception (JP 3-13.4). It is a succinct statement or narrative of exactly what the MDO wants the target to believe to be the true situation, then decide and act on that basis. It is usually made up of the deception observables and the deception desired perceptions in a specific sequence to create deception events. MDOs write the deception story from the perspective of the enemy so it reads like the enemy’s intelligence estimate about friendly forces’ actions and intentions. PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION 1-23. Just as the principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of military operations, the six principles of deception provide guidance to plan deception. The principles of deception are— * Focus. * Objective. * Centralized planning and control. * Security. * Timing. * Integration. FOCUS 1-24. The deception plan should focus on the thought process of the threat decision maker who has the authority and capability of causing the desired actions. The enemy’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance is normally not the target; rather, it is a primary conduit used in the deception plan to convey selected information to the decision maker. Planners must clearly understand the difference between intermediate conduits and the intended target. Focused deception must cause an action or inaction of the enemy force. In order to do this, there must be existing conduits to the deception target or a reasonable expectation that conduits can establish. OBJECTIVE 1-25. Deception plans focus actions and resources that motivate an enemy to decide to take (or not to take) specific desired actions. The plan cannot focus solely on motivating the target to believe certain things; it must lead to the target making a specific decision to act or not act. CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND CONTROL 1-26. A centralized approach is necessary to avoid confusion and to ensure various elements portray the same story and do not conflict with other operational objectives or evolving conditions in an operational environment. Execution of the deception may, however, be decentralized as long as all participating

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Chapter 1 organizations adhere to a single plan. Once the commander approves the deception plan, the designated operational element monitors the situation and its effects on the target, as well as friendly and partnered forces. The MDO, working with the deception working group (DWG), ensures synchronization, deconfliction, and OPSEC. SECURITY 1-27. Successful deception requires strict security that begins before execution with measures to deny the enemy knowledge of the friendly force’s intent to deceive. Successful planners apply strict need to know criteria to each aspect of the deception plan. Maintaining the security of the deception means limiting the number of informed planners and participants to those needed. The MDO must develop and maintain access rosters and other security controls to limit exposure of operational deception activities. TIMING 1-28. The most critical aspects of deception planning are beginning proper synchronization with the commander’s intent and maintaining synchronization during execution. Timing in deception operations is crucial. The challenge is to get the deception target to act in accordance with the deception objective within the timelines required by the friendly operation. Planners must conduct a thorough conduit analysis to understand the amount of time required for an observable to pass through filters and nodes before reaching an enemy decision maker. This means that friendly deception executions must be completed in a manner that accounts for the time consumed by the enemy’s intelligence collection and analysis process, the enemy’s decision-making process, and the enemy’s activity that is to be exploited by friendly forces. Timing must be synchronous among friendly deception actions taken, the assimilation and reaction processes of the enemy, and dependent friendly operations. INTEGRATION 1-29. Deception is an integral part of an operation that planners must integrate, at all levels, throughout the planning process. This integration includes developing a concept for deception that supports the overall mission as part of COA development. Planners must also integrate deception plans with higher headquarters plans. Deceptions must be consistent with Army doctrinal norms. The MDO assists the staff in integrating the deception operation throughout all phases of the operation. This begins with planning, continues through execution, and concludes with the termination of the deception. TYPES OF MILITARY DECEPTION 1-30. Any deception aims to either increase or decrease the level of uncertainty, or ambiguity, in the mind of the deception target. This ambiguity has the potential to compel the target to mistakenly perceive friendly motives, intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities thereby altering the target’s assessment. Two generally recognized types of MILDEC exist: * Ambiguity-increasing. * Ambiguity-decreasing. AMBIGUITY-INCREASING DECEPTION 1-31. Ambiguity-increasing deception provides the enemy with multiple plausible friendly COAs. Ambiguity-increasing deception is designed to generate confusion and cause mental conflict in the enemy decision maker. Anticipated effects of ambiguity-increasing deception can include a delay to making a specific decision, operational paralysis, or the distribution of enemy forces to locations far away from the intended location of the friendly efforts. Ambiguity-increasing deception is often directed against decision makers known to be indecisive or risk-adverse. 1-32. These deceptions draw attention from one set of activities to another. They can create the illusion of strength where weakness exists, or create the illusion of weakness where strength exists. They can also acclimate the enemy to particular patterns of activity that are exploitable later. For example, ambiguity- increasing deceptions can cause the target to delay a decision until it is too late to prevent friendly mission

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Fundamentals success. They can place the target in a dilemma for which no acceptable solution exists. They may even prevent the target from taking any action at all. This type of deception is typically successful with an indecisive decision maker who is known to avoid risk. AMBIGUITY-DECREASING DECEPTION 1-33. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions manipulate and exploit an enemy decision maker’s pre-existing beliefs and bias through the intentional display of observables that reinforce and convince that decision maker that such pre-held beliefs are true. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions cause the enemy decision maker to be especially certain and very wrong. Ambiguity-decreasing deceptions aim to direct the enemy to be at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong equipment, and with fewer capabilities. Ambiguity- decreasing deceptions are more challenging to plan because they require comprehensive information on the enemy’s processes and intelligence systems. Planners often have success using these deceptions with strong- minded decision makers who are willing to accept a higher level of risk. TACTICS 1-34. Deception tactics can be characterized as operational-level constructs that encompass a broad range of deceptive activity and information integrated as a component of the overall plan. Deception plans apply five basic tactics: diversions, feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays. These tactics are often best employed in TAC-D to support the commander’s objectives. The selection of tactics and their use depends on planners’ understanding the current situation as well as the desired deception goal and objective. DIVERSION 1-35. A diversion is the act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, alarm, or feint that diverts attention (JP 3-03). The goal of diversion is to induce the enemy to concentrate resources at a time and place that is advantageous to friendly objectives. FEINT 1-36. In military deception, a feint is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive action (JP 3-13.4). A feint is designed to lead the enemy into erroneous conclusions about friendly dispositions and concentrations. A series of feints can condition the enemy to react ineffectively to a future main attack in the same area. DEMONSTRATION 1-37. In military deception, a demonstration is a show of force similar to a feint without actual contact with the adversary, in an area where a decision is not sought that is made to deceive an adversary (JP 3-13.4). A demonstration’s intent is to cause the enemy to select a COA favorable to friendly goals. RUSE 1-38. In military deception, a ruse is an action designed to deceive the adversary, usually involving the deliberate exposure of false information to the adversary’s intelligence collection system (JP 3-13.4). A ruse deceives the enemy to obtain friendly advantage. A ruse in deception is normally an execution based on guile or trickery that contributes to the larger deception plan. DISPLAY 1-39. In military deception, a display is a static portrayal of an activity, force, or equipment intended to deceive the adversary’s visual observation (JP 3-13.4). Displays include the simulation, disguise, or portrayal of friendly objects, units, or capabilities in the projection of the deception story. Such objects, units, or capabilities may not exist but are made to appear that they exist.

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Chapter 1 TECHNIQUES 1-40. The application of techniques varies with each operation depending on time, assets, and objectives. Planners assess which techniques to apply based on feasibility, availability, and effectiveness. Table 1-2 provides sample deception techniques. Table 1-2. Sample deception techniques Technique Deception created Amplifying signatures To make a force appear larger and more capable or to simulate the deployment of critical capabilities. Suppressing signatures To make a force appear smaller and less capable or to conceal the deployment of critical capabilities. Overloading enemy sensors To confuse or corrupt their collection assets by providing multiple false indicators and displays. Repackaging known organizational To generate new or deceptive profiles that increase or decrease or capability signatures the ambiguity of friendly activity or intent. Conditioning the enemy To desensitize to particular patterns of friendly behavior and to induce enemy perceptions that are exploitable at the time of friendly choosing. Reinforcing the impression To mislead by portraying one course of action when actually taking a different course of action. Conditioning the target by To believe that an apparently standard routine will be pursued, repetition whilst in fact preparing a quite different course of action. Leading the enemy by substitution To believe that nothing has changed by covertly substituting the false for the real, and vice versa. Leading the enemy by mistake To believe that valuable information has come into their possession through a breach of security, negligence, or inefficiency. DECEPTION MAXIMS 1-41. The military derives deception maxims from game theory, historical evidence, social science, and decision analysis theory. These maxims are offered to enhance the deception concepts provided in this publication. They provide additional insight that commanders and their staffs can use to develop their plans. Note. These deception maxims originated in Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore. See the Source Notes. MAGRUDER’S PRINCIPLE 1-42. Magruder’s principle states that it is generally easier to induce the deception target to maintain a pre- existing belief than to deceive the deception target for the purpose of changing that belief. Magruder’s principle exploits target biases and the human tendency to confirm exiting beliefs. Magruder’s principle alludes to two paths. A path of the deceiver changing the belief of a target and a path of maintaining a present belief. The principle then advises the better of the two paths. Magruder’s principle is named for Major General John Magruder. During the Civil War, he was tasked with impeding Major General George McClellan’s advance on Richmond with a numerically superior force. Magruder deceived McClellan by encouraging McClellan’s belief that he faced a larger enemy than he actually faced. In using Magruder’s principle, MDOs provide the targeted decision makers with information that reinforces their expectations for what they believe to be true. This reinforces the target’s pre-existing perceptions. Any bias is potentially exploitable. Most targets are unaware of how deeply their biases influence their perceptions and decisions. Most people resist letting go of existing opinions and tend to seek information that reinforces their own bias.

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Fundamentals 1-43. An example of this principle occurred with the selection of the invasion site and its cover plan for the D-Day invasion of France. Using reconnaissance and communications intercepts, the Allies learned that Hitler and his senior military advisors believed that the most likely place for the Allied invasion would be in the Pas de Calais region. This was a viable plan as it provided better air cover and a shorter transit time from England; in fact, it was a reverse of their plan to invade England in 1940. The Allies were able to exploit and reinforce the enemy’s expectations to the extent that the Germans had a difficult time reacting to the actual landings in Normandy. LIMITATIONS TO HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING 1-44. The human brain can only process so much information and only so fast; it is susceptible to inherent limitations or tricks of the mind. There are two primary exploitable limitations to human information processing: the law of small numbers and the susceptibility to conditioning. The law of small numbers is the tendency to generalize from a small sample set. Exploiting this law means that it does not necessarily take many observables for the target to draw a conclusion. Susceptibility to conditioning is the repeated presentation of stimuli to elicit a specific response from the target. In deception, it is the frequent inability of deception targets to detect small changes in friendly force indicators, even if the cumulative change over time is large. 1-45. An example of this principle was the breakout of the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen from Brest on February 12, 1942. The Germans facilitated the breakout by jamming British radars. Ordinarily this would have been a significant tip-off that something was amiss, but British radar operators dismissed it as being caused by atmospheric disturbance. This error was the result of a carefully orchestrated German ruse directed by General Wolfgang Martini, the head of the Luftwaffe Signals Service. The Germans jammed the British radar sites every day at the same time to build the British radar operators’ belief that the atmosphere was interrupting the receipt of any signals. The British became so accustomed to the so-called atmospheric problems that the ships were able to escape. MULTIPLE FORMS OF SURPRISE 1-46. A strong correlation exists between deception and surprise. The more forms of surprise built into the deception plan, the more likely it will overwhelm the target. These forms of surprise include size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment, intent, and style. One effect of surprise is the cry-wolf syndrome in which repeated false alarms have the potential to desensitize an enemy. A pattern of behavior lulls an opponent into a sense of normal behavior to allow a friendly action to occur without an immediate counteraction. 1-47. An example occurred when Egypt successfully deceived Israel into a false sense of security in 1973 by mobilizing reservists twenty-three times before actually acting. Many times over one year, the same source provided information that the war would break out on a specific date. Each time, that day would come and go without an attack. This happened so often that when the source actually provided the date of the real attack, no one believed him. JONES’ DILEMMA 1-48. This principle is named after Reginald Victor Jones, a British professor heavily involved in solving science and technology intelligence challenges. In this deception, the target receives information through multiple means and methods, from many angles, throughout an operational environment. Deception generally becomes more difficult as the number of conduits available to the deception target to confirm the real situation increases. However, the greater the number of conduits that are deceptively manipulated, the greater the chance the target will believe the deception. Planners must balance the need to disrupt or deny enemy capabilities with the need to preserve select deception conduits to the enemy decision maker. CARE IN THE DESIGN OF PLANNED PLACEMENT OF DECEPTIVE MATERIAL 1-49. Windfalls (unexpected gains) of information or plans are usually second-guessed, and the target or the target’s intelligence assets usually doubt the authenticity of any windfall if it comes too easily. The target will likely view deceptive materials or information as credible if it uncovers the information in a seemingly

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Chapter 1 natural manner. The harder the target has to work to acquire it, the more likely the target will believe it as credible. 1-50. Important military information that is too easy to obtain is usually suspect. Information that falls into the enemy’s hands must appear to be the result of legitimate collection activities. People naturally tend to believe information earned more than information given. An example of this technique could be feeding mission information to the enemy through a trusted source instead of making the information general knowledge. 1-51. A common characteristic of successful deceptions is that they were designed to co-opt skepticism by requiring the target to participate either by physically obtaining the evidence or analytically by interpreting it. However, if the deception is too subtle, it risks that the target will fail to perceive the deception story at all. 1-52. An example of this principle is from early in World War II, when a German aircraft heading for Cologne became lost and made a forced landing near Malines in Belgium. Belgian authorities soon arrested the three passengers, two Wehrmacht officers and a Luftwaffe major. They were taken to the police station and left alone briefly. They attempted to burn some documents they were carrying. They were top secret documents containing attack plans for Holland and Belgium. However, the documents failed to burn and fell into the hands of Belgian authorities. The authorities believed that the documents were a part of a deception plan because the Germans could not be careless enough to allow actual war plans to fall into the hands of the Allies. This example shows a misclassification error in which a real windfall was dismissed as false because it was too easy to obtain. LEVERAGE THE TRUTH 1-53. In this instance, truth means reality based on facts or precedence. As a rule, the deception should not portray a reality that would come as a surprise to the target. A deception that conforms to proven or predictable patterns of behavior is more likely to succeed than a deception that violates these norms. Because the target has access to Army doctrine and probably understands how the Army operates (to include its core values), the target will see deceptions as false if they fail to align with foundational Army tenets or historical patterns of behavior. In this instance, the deception will fail. Planners can provide meaning to actual events, activities, and operations that support the deception plan. MINIMIZE FALSEHOOD 1-54. The less the deception relies on false information, the greater the chance of success. Although deception, by its nature, implies the use of false information to shape the target’s perceptions, each portrayal of falsehood increases the risk of failure by increasing susceptibility to competing observables. This deception principle resembles the principle of economy of force—use only the amount of false information needed to produce the desired perceptions. Any falsehoods should be supported by elements of truth. This way the target discovers that, everywhere it turns, it finds verifiable information that makes any questionable part of the deception more believable. HUSBANDING OF DECEPTION ASSETS 1-55. This maxim suggests that it may be wise to withhold the employment of deception capabilities until the stakes and the benefits are high. Put another way, a planner conserves deception assets and activities until forces can employ them to achieve the greatest impact at the most opportune time. This principle considers that employment of an asset will cause it to become valueless after it has been used once. 1-56. An example of holding deception assets in reserve until the right moment involves the use of double agents by Britain in connection with the Normandy deception in World War II. The British had captured all known German agents operating in Britain and decided to use them against Germany. While Britain was certain that it was in control of the German’s espionage system, it waited to use the agents against Germany until the Normandy invasion.

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Fundamentals SEQUENCING RULE 1-57. Planners must sequence deception activities and maintain them for as long as possible to maximize the deception story. OPSEC measures can help planners mask unit observables that would otherwise reveal the unit’s mission and intent until the last possible instant. To be effective, deception and OPSEC activities must be sequenced and coordinated in both time and space, and in conjunction with adjacent or pre-existing operations. IMPORTANCE OF FEEDBACK 1-58. Planners must develop indicators that will determine the success or failure of the deception. An assessment plan uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to determine if the enemy has adopted, rejected, or countered the deception plan. Assessing MOEs gives the commander the necessary feedback to continue, adjust, or terminate a deception plan. When developing the deception plan, planners should build associated MOEs for key events. 1-59. An example of the importance of feedback happened during World War II. The British developed a top-secret cryptographic tool called ULTRA that enabled the British to read German codes. The information that ULTRA provided to the Allies was a critical element to the success of the Allied invasion of Normandy. The Allies knew through ULTRA that the German troops remained in Norway and concluded through feedback that the deception was successful. BEWARE OF POSSIBLE UNWANTED REACTIONS 1-60. Deceptions may produce unintended, often unwanted consequences. Believing that a threat is real, an enemy can act unpredictably. Proper planning and coordination and knowing the enemy can reduce the chance that deceptions will result in unfavorable action. Successful planners consider second- and third-order effects of the deception plan to mitigate unintended consequences. The risk inherent to a deception operation is measured by the losses that can result from its failure. The possibility of failure stems from the uncertainties surrounding how the target receives and interprets information intended for the target and, eventually, how it affects the target’s desired perceptions. If discovered, resources used for the deception may be in jeopardy. As with any military operation that puts forces at risk, planners decide to use deception after a deliberate assessment that weighs opportunity against need and cost against benefit. The deception planner must advise the commander of the risk, benefit, and cost of the deception operation relative to both success and failure. DECEPTION MEANS 1-61. Deception means are methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target (JP 3-13.4). There are three basic categories of deception means: physical, technical, and administrative. An individual deception means may have multiple attributes that allow it to be characterized in more than one category. Planners normally employ deception means in complementary variety to mislead multiple types of enemy sensors to increase credibility and the likelihood of creating the desired perception. Means provide the signatures, associations, and profiles of friendly purported activities to the enemy. For additional deception means and the authorities to employ them, refer to CCMD instructions and request guidance from the CCMD. PHYSICAL MEANS 1-62. Physical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey or deny information or signatures normally derivable from direct observation or active sensors by the deception target. Most physical means also have technical signatures visible to sensors that collect scientifically or electronically. Planners typically evaluate physical means using characteristics such as shape, size, function, quantity, movement pattern, location, activity, and association with the surroundings. Examples might include— * Movement of forces. * Exercises and training activities. * Decoy equipment and devices. * Tactical actions.

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Chapter 1 * Visible test and evaluation activities. * Reconnaissance and surveillance activities. TECHNICAL MEANS 1-63. Technical means are resources, methods, and techniques used to convey or deny selected information or signatures to or from the deception target. These means manipulate electromagnetic, acoustic, or other forms of energy or through olfaction. Technical means often use technical equipment. 1-64. Technical means may be applied with corresponding physical means or alone to replicate something physical that is absent from direct visual observation. As with any use of friendly military material resources, any use of technical means to conduct deception must comply with U.S. and international law. Planners integrate technical means with other technical activities of the operation. Examples of technical means might include— * The establishment of communications networks and interactive transmissions that replicate a specific unit type, size, or activity. * The emission or suppression of chemical or biological odors associated with a specific capability or activity. * Multispectral simulators that replicate or mimic the known electronic profile of a specific capability or force. * Selected capabilities that disrupt an enemy sensor or affect data transmission. 1-65. Electromagnetic deception is the deliberate change of electromagnetic energy intended to convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons. The misinformation results in degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. Types of electromagnetic deception include manipulative, simulative, and imitative deception. Manipulative deception involves actions to eliminate revealing—or to convey misleading—electromagnetic telltale indicators that an enemy can use. Simulative deception involves actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces. Imitative deception introduces electromagnetic energy into enemy systems that imitate enemy emissions. For more information on electromagnetic deception, see FM 3-12. For more information on acoustic, other energy, or olfactory means, see ATP 3-53.1. ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS 1-66. Administrative means are resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny selected written, oral, pictorial, or other documentary information or signatures to or from the deception target. They normally portray information and indicators associated with coordination for ongoing or planned military activity to the deception target. Examples of administrative means normally visible to an enemy at some level might include— * Movement, transit, or overflight requests including flight planning, port call, or traffic control coordination. * Basing inquiries or construction requests. * Other preparatory coordination associated with a military operation normally done through unclassified channels. CAMOUFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND DECOYS 1-67. Camouflage and concealment are OPSEC measures and survivability operations tasks used to protect friendly forces and activities from enemy detection and attribution. Camouflage makes friendly capabilities or activities blend in with the surroundings. Concealment makes friendly capabilities or activities unobservable or unrecognizable to the enemy. Concealing the location, movement, and actions of friendly forces can delay hostile attack and assist commanders in retaining the tactical advantage. Both use physical, technical, and administrative means to deceive the enemy and protect the deception story. Deception measures use the same signatures for simulating friendly forces and activities. 1-68. A decoy is an imitation in any sense of a person, object, or phenomenon that is intended to deceive enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation (JP 3-13.4). Decoys may be used in conjunction

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Fundamentals with other deception activities to mislead enemy intelligence collection and direct the enemy’s attention away from actual forces. Decoys must appear realistic to the enemy sensors to be effective. See ATP 3-37.34 for additional information on camouflage, concealment, and decoys. INFORMATION QUALITY 1-69. Information quality refers to the accuracy, completeness, relevance, and believability of information available for decision making. Deception should affect the quality of information available for enemy decisions in the following ways: * Portray to the enemy true information that supports the deception story. * Deliberately present misleading information and indicators to enemies to degrade the accuracy of enemy information. * Give enemy decision makers a false sense of completeness of their understanding about friendly forces or intentions. * Cause enemy forces to misjudge the relevance of available information and misallocate operational or intelligence resources. * Cause enemies to doubt the veracity of their own intelligence assessments. 1-70. MDOs protect the quality of information available for friendly decisions and public dissemination by instituting internal processes to identify and isolate information generated as a by-product of any deception activity. This protection helps prevent the commander from reaching erroneous conclusions because the staff unknowingly integrated the content or output of the deception efforts as accurate information. This also ensures the information made public is not part of any deception plan that would result in a loss of public trust. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1-71. Army commanders and their staffs have distinct and coordinating roles and responsibilities in deception. All planners must understand the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved with deception planning and execution and then tailor each planning team accordingly. COMMANDERS 1-72. The commander’s role is critical in planning deception. The commander determines the utility of deception’s contribution to achieving objectives. Commanders decide to develop a deception plan after evaluating the analysis and recommendations from the MDO. Commanders should guide applicable deception executions while understanding their potential importance during planning and execution. The commander has explicit and inherent responsibilities for the deception effort. The commander— * Assesses higher headquarters’ plans and orders for stated and implied deception tasks. * Considers the ways deception can support every operation, mindful of deception maxims to gain maximum impact. * States the tentative deception objective in the initial planning guidance. * Approves the deception objective. * Allocates necessary resources. * When required, seeks appropriate approval to employ certain deception means. * Determines when to exploit deception or counterdeception. G-2 1-73. The G-2 assists the commander by identifying deception objectives to complement operational objectives. With the commander leading the efforts, the G-2 identifies deception objectives that apply to operations, intelligence, and counterintelligence resources. The G-2—

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Chapter 1 * Analyzes the threat and the enemy’s capability to process, filter, and evaluate intelligence on the friendly situation. * Provides assessments on the threat’s vulnerabilities to deception. * Assesses threat targets, sensors, most dangerous and most likely COAs, acceptance of the deception story, and MOEs. * Provides comprehensive assessments and continual feedback to the MDO in support of deception planning, execution, and deception termination. * Supports counterdeception operations to protect friendly deception operations and to expose threat deception attempts. * Responds to MDOs’ requests for information (RFIs) concerning analysis data for behavioral influences or human factors for threat military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organizations. * Helps to prevent reporting of unintentionally collected deception information to the commander as valid facts. G-3 1-74. The G-3 recommends the use of resources including those required for deception. For deception, the G-3— * Recommends the deception objective, story, and plan to the commander. * Coordinates the deception effort through the information operations cell. * With the staff judge advocate, ensures that the deception effort is planned and conducted in accordance with the U.S. laws, rules of engagement, and the law of war. * Supervises execution of the deception plan. * Submits detailed and clear RFIs to the G-2 for information and intelligence that is key to deception planning, execution, and assessment. * Provides feedback to the G-2 on intelligence products to include clarification or additional RFIs if needed. INFORMATION OPERATIONS OFFICER 1-75. The information operations (IO) officer is the staff officer responsible for the integration and synchronization of IRCs in support of the deception plan. These responsibilities include coordinating and deconflicting deception planning and integration into the scheme of IO (a clear, concise statement of where, when, and how the commander intends to employ and synchronize IRCs). The IO officer monitors the implementation and execution of the deception portion of IO. Since military deception is an IRC and fundamentally cognitive in nature, IO officers typically possess deception-related training and experience for effectively using TAC-D. MILITARY DECEPTION OFFICER 1-76. The MDO is responsible for coordinating military deception assets and operations. An MDO is authorized at corps and theater army levels as the command military deception officer (also known as CMDO). At division and lower echelons, the commander designates an MDO. Generally, the most suitable staff officer designated as the MDO is the IO officer because of experience and training. In the absence of a trained or experienced IO officer, the commander typically designates the individual trained in using Army IRCs to influence an enemy decision maker. MDOs ensure that staff classify plans in accordance with DODM 5200.01. The security classification guides establish parameters for planning, coordinating, and executing deception plans at appropriate levels. 1-77. MDO responsibilities include, but are not limited to— * Providing programmatic oversight and compliance with security requirements. * Developing Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations). * Exercising staff supervision over deception activities. * Maintaining program integrity through maintenance of strict OPSEC measures.

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Fundamentals * Providing expertise in deception planning. * Managing information required to develop deception plans and cultural analysis to determine the effects of ambiguity. * Determining requirements or opportunities for deception operations (with the G-2) by red teaming the enemies’ most probable COAs. * Coordinating with other staff sections for support to the deception targets, deception objectives, and deception story. * Ensuring themes, messages, and actions conveyed to the enemy decision maker enable the deception plan. * Producing, distributing, briefing, and coordinating the deception plan on a need to know basis. * Assessing the execution and effects of deception plans. * Coordinating with unit operations planners to review and analyze plans for deception requirements. * Understanding deception authorities and coordinating with designated officials at higher echelons to gain concept of operations approval. CYBERSPACE ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES SECTION 1-78. The cyberspace electromagnetic activities (known as CEMA) section coordinates and synchronizes cyberspace and electronic warfare operations across staff elements from brigade to corps. The cyberspace electromagnetic activities section is key to the collaboration of cyberspace and electronic warfare operations to include the planning of electromagnetic deception. G-5 1-79. The G-5 has staff planning and supervisory responsibility for— * Maintaining contingency plans and initiating crisis action planning efforts. * Coordinating to ensure deception planning is included in OPLANs, concept plans, and campaign plans. * Incorporating deception planning at the beginning of the planning process. DECEPTION WORKING GROUP 1-80. The MDO oversees all deception planning and execution. For successful deception integration, a deception planning team, appointed by the command, is formed. In most circumstances, the team then forms a DWG to facilitate the planning, coordination, integration, and assessment of deception. At a minimum, a DWG includes representatives from the G-2, G-3, the G-3 IO cell, G-5, and the OPSEC planner. The DWG often includes representatives from IRCs that are pertinent or relevant to the deception concept of operations being developed. The DWG plans, directs, monitors, and assesses deception plans. It may also provide planning, execution, and termination support for deception operations undertaken by higher command echelons in their operational area. Members of the DWG typically writes Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) for the OPORD. Other responsibilities include— * Interfacing and working closely with operational planners to review and analyze deception plan requirements. * Responding to higher headquarters’ deception tasking. * Coordinating with higher headquarters on proposed deception efforts to solve potential conflicts. * Providing resource requirements to higher headquarters for deception program development and sustainment. * Looking for opportunities to implement deception in support of military objectives.

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Chapter 2 Planning PREPLANNING 2-1. The complexity and sensitivity of deception requires detailed planning that begins with preplanning. MDOs have three preplanning considerations: capability development, planning guidance, and mission analysis. A successful deception plan incorporates preplanning considerations as well as flexibility to lessen the risk of failure. When preplanning, MDOs create a baseline analysis, prepare deception planning guidance, and complete mission analysis. BASELINE ANALYSIS 2-2. Baseline analysis is preplanning that ensures the organization has the requisite staff, methods, and tools to plan deception. Baseline analysis entails acquiring basic information on available deception means. This includes information on friendly doctrine and tactics as well as technical characteristics of employed combat systems. It also includes basic data on friendly intelligence and counterintelligence resources and operations. DECEPTION PLANNING GUIDANCE 2-3. When preplanning, MDOs consider how to develop deception activities within the framework of the commander’s intent and planned operations. They consider the commander’s initial deception guidance that often arrives as a separate written or verbal deception-planning directive. Deception planning efforts must be synchronized and integrated with traditional unit planning efforts at all times. The importance of the relationship between the MDO and the G-5 cannot be overstated. Early in mission analysis, MDOs begin to determine a potential deception goal. Commanders verbalize the deception goal as specific contributions to mission accomplishment (see paragraph 1-9). 2-4. During mission analysis, planners identify potential deception objectives that enable forces to reach the deception goal. The deception objective is a concise statement of how the commander plans the enemy to act or not act (see paragraph 1-10). This objective provides the MDO with a clear aim. The objective is usually stated in a positive result, such as “deception will cause the enemy to delay commitment of reserve forces in the rear.” Having decided the deception objective, the planners formulate a detailed plan. 2-5. Sometimes the commander’s initial guidance contains no specific guidance for deception planning to occur. In that case, the MDO uses the commander’s intent informed by the results of mission analysis to evaluate whether deception can or should play a role in the overall operation. That role, when identified, is then stated as a proposed deception goal and its associated deception objectives. Sometimes multiple deception goals exist based on such considerations as operational phasing, duration, or complexity. 2-6. Deception is never conducted as an end in itself; it must support real plans, operations, and objectives. Correspondingly, the success of an operation cannot be contingent on the success of a deception. Policy prohibits deception from deliberately targeting anyone outside the enemy military decision-making process without further legal review (see paragraph 2-89 for more on legal considerations). MISSION ANALYSIS 2-7. All military planning includes mission analysis. Mission analysis involves gathering, analyzing, and synthesizing information to get oriented on current conditions of an operational environment. MDOs in conjunction with staff planning efforts conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem and to identify what deception the unit can accomplish, when and where it should be done, and why

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Chapter 2 to do it—the purpose of the deception operation. Deception mission analysis begins before the Army tactical deception planning process and is always properly informed by current operations and planning efforts. 2-8. The deception goal and its associated deception objectives are key outputs of deception mission analysis, and the foundation for subsequent deception planning. They provide the commander and MDOs with a solid understanding of how the deception supports the overall operation and establishes the conceptual framework for the deception plan. An effective deception does not have to be elaborate or complex. Simplicity is often preferred. 2-9. MDOs need to participate in and have their efforts informed by conventional planning efforts. Conventional and deception planning horizons occur simultaneously in parallel. During mission analysis, the MDO begins with analyzing and assessing an operational environment and information environment. Deception may be a feasible option, if appropriate to the mission, and if there is a possibility of success. Issues that planners consider when determining if deception is a viable COA include— * Availability of assets. * Understanding any potential deception targets. * Suitability. * Time. * Risk. Availability of Assets 2-10. MDOs consider the availability of assets to determine if sufficient assets exist to support both the operation and the deception. There are few assets specifically designed and designated for deception. This means plans may require shifting assets from supporting the operation to the deception plan. Commanders consider the risks to ascertain that shifting assets to support deception does not adversely affect the operation or prevent mission success. Resource development includes collecting potential target data sources, identifying potential conduit systems, and cataloging potential deception means. Resource development also includes the collection of essential foreign and friendly situation and background information needed to initially to organize operations and assess general capabilities. Understanding the Deception Target 2-11. MDOs consider the potential deception target to determine if sufficient information exists on how the target acquires information and makes decisions, what knowledge the target has of the situation, and how the target views the friendly force. Planners also determine if sufficient information exists to reveal the biases, beliefs, and predispositions of the deception target. If necessary, the staff can make assumptions about the deception target, but it must avoid mirror imaging, which is the tendency to assume a person sees the world and makes decisions in a manner similar to oneself. It is for this reason that MDOs rely heavily on human factors analysis (see paragraph 2-37). Suitability 2-12. MDOs consider suitability. Some missions are better suited to deception than others are. When a unit has the initiative and has some control over the area of operations, then deception is more suitable. In some situations, specific personnel or organizations are better suited to execute deception operations than others are. Deception planners determine if conditions are appropriate to conduct deception and make a recommendation to commander. The decision ultimately resides with the commander. Conditions in which deception are appropriate include the following: * The enemy has an advantage that cannot be overcome without using deception, for example, advantageous force strength, capability, agility, or situational awareness. * The enemy has known preconceptions that can be exploited. * The enemy has known flaws in its decision-making process. * The enemy is under pressure to act. * The enemy is susceptible to suggestion.

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Planning * Deception will enhance OPSEC. * Deception will enhance the effectiveness and likelihood of success of a conventional plan. Time 2-13. MDOs consider time available. Time is a key element to consider when developing the deception story. MDOs determine how much time they have to present the deception story and to estimate how much time the deception target will use make a decision and direct the desired action. The available time may determine the scope and depth of the story. MDOs carefully time deception events to synchronize them with the approved plan. Risk 2-14. An important planning consideration is the mitigation of identified risk. Risk is a key factor that must be reexamined during all phases of deception planning and execution (see paragraph 2-126). The MDO must evaluate any substantial risk which may include— * Risk of deception failure. * Risk of compromise. * Risks associated with a successful deception. * Exposure of means or feedback channels. Information Environment Analysis 2-15. An information environment analysis is an extension of mission analysis. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The information environment is a subset of an operational environment. The MDO, working with IO planners, must identify the key aspects of the information environment relevant to the deception target and decision making. To influence the behavior of the deception target, the planner must understand how the target views the environment, processes information, and makes decisions. This understanding includes an analysis of the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure variables of the target’s environment. Deception Running Estimate 2-16. Once created, a mission analysis provides information that helps produce a deception running estimate. The deception running estimate is a specialized product derived from the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and from responses to situation-specific RFIs submitted by MDOs. Most information in the estimate originates from mission analysis, but much of the detail required is unique to deception. MDOs collaborate with intelligence analysts to build the running estimate. MDOs work with the G-2 to obtain information critical to effective deception planning. This information forms the basis of the deception running estimate that feeds the development of a viable deception concept. 2-17. The deception running estimate identifies deception opportunities, detects information and capability requirements, and recommends a feasible deception goal and its objectives. The MDO presents this estimate during the mission analysis briefing. The estimate considers current capabilities based on enemy susceptibilities, preconceptions, and biases; available time; and available deception means. A key outcome of the running estimate is the determination of whether or not there is a viable deception opportunity. 2-18. Preparing the deception estimate involves developing alternative approaches to reaching the deception goal. It first determines the objective of the deception and then the desired perceptions that likely lead to that objective. Developing the estimate is a critical process to prepare for a deception operation. Depending on the nature of the commander’s guidance, the deception estimate may be integrated in the operation’s running estimate, may stand alone, or may not be appropriate at that time. In the latter case, the role of deception is limited to OPSEC activities or simply to supporting one or another component of the operation. 2-19. The deception running estimate is a living product. Planners refine it as additional information and intelligence become available, or as conditions evolve and change within an operational environment and information environment. During the initial planning, MDOs and intelligence analysts often make

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Chapter 2 assumptions that later require validation to continue with planning. Planners track these assumptions, align them with an open RFI, and consider them during risk analysis. During the unit’s COA analysis (war gaming), planners help refine the estimate and may add support to key planning assumptions about probable enemy responses to planned friendly activity. The greater the number of assumptions underpinning a deception plan, the higher the risk that one or more assumptions will prove false and threaten the plan’s success. 2-20. The deception running estimate identifies key enemy decision makers and develops individual or group profiles. The analysis of the enemy military decision-making structure includes identifying key decision makers who exercise some level of direct control over the enemy capabilities. These individuals or groups are potential deception targets. As such, the MDO works with the G-2 to collect as much available information relating to their backgrounds, psychological profiles, personal relationships, key influencers, known biases, predispositions or vulnerabilities, current perceptions, and previous behavior in similar circumstances. With that information, the planner identifies the enemy’s most probable and most dangerous COAs related to the deception goal. 2-21. The MDO briefs the initial running estimate to the commander in private during mission analysis to seek approval of the deception goal and its objectives, receive refined commander’s planning guidance for deception, and ensure nesting within the supported plan. The commander may provide additional guidance concerning specific deception COAs the staff should address when preparing estimates. Once approved, the deception goal and its objectives become the focus for all subsequent deception planning. THE ARMY TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS 2-22. The Army tactical deception planning process nests in the steps of the Army’s military decisionmaking process (known as MDMP). The deception plan supports the OPLAN. Planners nest and integrate the deception plan with the OPLAN to achieve the deception’s desired effect. A successful deception plan unfolds logically and realistically. Deception planning is an iterative process that requires continual reexamination of its goals, objectives, targets, and means. The early integration of deception in the planning cycle ensures optimum application of resources and maximizes the potential for overall success. Table 2-1 shows the Army tactical deception planning process nesting in the military decisionmaking process. Table 2-1. The Army tactical deception planning process in the military decisionmaking process Army tactical deception planning process Military decisionmaking process Deception preplanning. → Step 1: Receipt of mission Step 1: Determine the deception goal and the deception → Step 2: Mission analysis objective. Step 2: Identify and analyze the deception target. Step 3: Course of action Step 3: Identify desired perceptions of the deception target. development Step 4: Develop deception observables and means. Step 5: Develop the deception story. → Step 4: Course of action analysis Step 6: Develop the deception event schedule. and war gaming Step 7: Develop OPSEC and other protection measures. Step 8: Develop feedback criteria. Step 5: Course of action comparison Step 9: Develop a termination plan. Step 6: Course of action approval Step 10: Produce Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to → Step 7: Orders production, Annex C (Operations) dissemination, and transition OPSEC operations security 2-23. Because of its inherent sensitivity, MDOs usually need to protect access to deception planning. As a result, deception planning occurs in an access-controlled area rather than through open discussion in the plans shop. Key staff members and leadership who are part of the deception planning effort plan discretely to integrate and deconflict deception planning outputs into the overall planning effort. Planners balance the need

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Planning to conduct adequate coordination with a parallel planning process during deception planning against the need to maintain the secrecy required for effective deception operations. MDOs establish and use strict need to know criteria to determine which specific staff members will participate in deception planning. The criteria may specify separate levels of access to facilitate coordination, thus allowing more individuals access to the less sensitive aspects of the deception plan. DECEPTION PLANNING METHODOLOGY 2-24. MDOs use the see-think-do planning methodology to guide deception planning, execution, and assessment. Successful deception operations are those that do more than make the target believe or think the deception is true. The deception target must make a decision to act or not act in a way that favors friendly operations. Enemy Cognitive or Action Process (See-Think-Do) 2-25. Deception focuses on the decision making of an enemy. Deception must end in a decision to act or not act in a way that supports an operation. MDOs emulate the cognitive process by identifying what they want the enemy to do, determining what the enemy must think in order to act as desired, and then establishing what the deception target must see to encourage thinking that way. The enemy cognitive or action process occurs in the see-think-do order: * See: What significant indicators of something does the enemy see, sense, or detect? * Think: Do these indicators lead the enemy to believe what it sees, senses, or detects? * Do: Has the enemy decided on an action or inaction based on what it believes? Deception Planning Process (Do-Think-See) 2-26. The deception planning process follows the reverse of the enemy cognitive process. This reverse planning uses do-think-see: * Do: What action or inaction do friendly forces want the enemy to take? * Think: What must the deception target believe to take the desired action or inaction? * See: What deception must friendly forces show to or hide from the deception target that will cause the target to develop the desired perception? STEPS OF THE ARMY TACTICAL DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS 2-27. Planning for deception follows the reverse planning sequence of activities; it determines how to cause sequential events that lead to success but in the reverse order of their occurrence. The goal and its objectives of the deception operation start this process by specifying the operational effects of the deception and the decision of the target that provide the desired operational effect. 2-28. Deception planning comes together during COA development, analysis, war gaming, and comparison. Planners produce a deception plan to support each COA as they develop each COA. The level of analysis and detail for a deception plan needs to suffice for an MDO to effectively portray a viable concept to the commander. The planner must present a high level of confidence that friendly forces can successfully execute the deception plan with available assets, continued planning, and detailed coordination. As with the overall COA, the doctrinal evaluation criteria is that a COA must be adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. Planners brief each deception plan as a subset of the overall COA. 2-29. Each COA briefing contains the following information: * Previously developed deception goal and objectives. * Identification of deception target (position, relation to enemy capabilities to affect, goals, decision process, potential vulnerabilities to deception, and accessibility). * Desired perceptions. * Narrative statement describing concept or deception story (may include deception type, techniques, and tactics). * Identification of tentative means or capabilities, conduits, and feedback.

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Chapter 2 * Identification of execution shortfalls concerning intelligence, means, capability, or authority). * A concept sketch. 2-30. The MDO ensures that each deception plan is properly constructed. Using the approved COA or concept as a base, the MDO integrates any revised commander’s guidance, updated intelligence analysis, and revisions to the primary COA to refine and complete the deception plan. The initial step in this process is to review all previous planning products and adjust them as required. From this point, the planner begins the ten-step Army tactical deception planning process: * Step 1—Determine the deception goal and the deception objective. * Step 2—Identify and analyze the deception target. * Step 3—Identify desired perceptions of the deception target. * Step 4—Develop deception observables and means. * Step 5—Develop the deception story. * Step 6—Develop the deception event schedule. * Step 7—Develop OPSEC and other protection measures. * Step 8—Develop feedback criteria. * Step 9—Develop a termination plan. * Step 10—Produce Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations). Step 1—Determine the Deception Goal and the Deception Objective 2-31. The deception goal is the desired contribution of the DWG to friendly mission success. The deception goal is usually recommended in the running estimate and confirmed by the commander’s planning guidance at the conclusion of mission analysis. The commander is responsible for providing the deception goal. The MDO or DWG often develops a deception objective based on that goal. 2-32. The deception objective is the purpose of the deception expressed as the enemy’s actions or inactions at a critical time and location. Like the deception goal, the running estimate contains the deception objective. The commander confirms the deception objective in the commander’s planning guidance at the conclusion of mission analysis. Step 2—Identify and Analyze the Deception Target 2-33. The deception target is the enemy decision maker who has authority to make the decision to achieve the deception objective. During mission analysis, MDOs identify potential deception targets. The target directs the action or inaction of the enemy force or capabilities. Friendly forces need existing conduits to the deception target or a reasonable expectation to establish conduits. 2-34. To fully analyze a target for deception, planners— * Characterize enemy decision making. * Analyze the human factors affecting a deception. * Conduct conduit analysis of the deception target. * Understand the enemy’s intelligence and counterintelligence organizations and capabilities. * Analyze the enemy’s potential vulnerability to deception. * Understand enemy deception and counterdeception doctrine and resources. Characterize Enemy Decision Making 2-35. To affect enemy decision making, planners must first understand and characterize its functional components by analyzing and describing the enemy’s decision-making structure and style. Decision-making structure refers to how the enemy organizes relevant information to collect, transmit, analyze, and deliver to support decision making. Decision-making structure provides the basis for conduit analysis. Planners select a model that is conducive to rapid understanding. This type of model enables intelligence analysts and MDOs to better understand the overall enemy decision-making structure and subsequently communicate the reason for a certain operational approach or series of deception events.

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Planning 2-36. Decision-making style refers to the deliberative process that a selected decision maker uses to reach a conclusion. The selection and use of a common framework allows intelligence analysts and planners to focus their analysis and discussions to best support achievement of objectives. Many formal and informal decision- making styles exist. Once an enemy selects a framework, intelligence analysts and planners work to identify what conditions might cause adjustments to that base style. Analyze the Human Factors Affecting a Military Deception 2-37. Enemy goals and operational objectives provide the “why” behind enemy decision making and subsequent actions or inaction. Understanding and predicting enemy behavior is the first step planners take. Human factors are the physical, cultural, psychological, and behavioral attributes of an individual or group that influence perceptions, understanding, and interactions (JP 2-0). Human factors affect decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any level in any state or organization. MDOs analyze the human factors that influence decision making that also include feelings and emotions that influence cognitive functions. MDOs also use a cognitive approach to understand the thought processes and functions of the enemy, such as attention, perception, memory, reasoning, problem solving, and decision making. Cognitive functions combine to help individuals make sense of their environments. 2-38. Planners analyze factors that affect enemy decision making by conducting emulative analysis. This analytical process reproduces what or how the enemy thinks, to include the socio-cultural lenses through which the enemy’s thinking occurs. Emulative analysis provides the basis for the friendly assessment of what the target must see or not see. It anticipates the enemy’s response to changes in the environment created by friendly forces. It also studies the enemy’s predispositions, biases, patterns of receiving information, and priorities, among other factors. Emulative analysis is crucial to deciding what must be shown; where, when, and by whom it must be shown; how it must be packaged; and how it must be transmitted to create the desired reaction within the target’s control system. Systematically applying emulative analysis comes before evaluating the target’s range of possible reactions to observables and the alternative conclusions the target could draw from them. 2-39. Cognitive biases and preconceptions might subjectively influence enemy decision making. This is important to any attempt to predict future behaviors. The study of psychology and decision making recognizes numerous potential types of bias. For purposes of illustration, a commonly recognized summary of bias types includes— * Cultural biases caused by the interpretation of information through one’s own cultural knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, habits, and cognitive styles acquired as a member of a specific social environment or group. * Organizational biases stemming from a potential outcome of the goals, norms, policies, and traditions that characterize the specific organizations in which individuals affiliate. * Personal biases that come from personality traits, education, and firsthand experiences that affect a person’s worldview over the course of a lifetime. 2-40. Preconceptions are conceptions or assumptions formed beforehand. In addition to being highly influenced by bias, people form preconceptions by sustained observation and perceived recognition of patterns. This is particularly relevant to deception planning because known biases and preconceptions can be exploited. 2-41. MDOs have other considerations when analyzing a target. They consider answers to the following questions: * Is all information equally important to the target? * Does the target rely more on certain sources? * Does the target receive influential analysis or advice from someone within or supported by the same information conduit? * Does the presence of an intermediate-level decision maker in the conduit affect the deception story or the observable? * What enemy vulnerabilities can be exploited?

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Chapter 2 Conduct Conduit Analysis of the Deception Target 2-42. Conduit analysis is the detailed mapping of individual conduits or information pathways to the potential deception targets. The MDO chooses and deconflicts access to specific conduits to deliver a synchronized portrayal of selected information and indicators. In general terms, an individual conduit consists of a sensor that registers a signature, a transmission means from the sensor to an intermediate node or nodes that might act on the information in a variety of ways, and a delivery to the deception target. 2-43. Conduit analysis usually depicts the conduit and the method of transmitting information between two nodes. Conduit analysis begins with the initiation of planning and continues to be refined through the COA development, COA selection, and finalization of the deception plan. MDOs normally identify potential conduits using one of two methods: working outward from the deception target and their inner circle of information sources or working inward by visualizing the presentation of a potential indicator to known enemy collection capabilities up through the process flow to the deception target. 2-44. Some key terms associated with conducting conduit analysis include the following: * Conduit: An information or intelligence gateway to the deception target. Conduits can include a FIE, an intelligence collection platform, an open-source intelligence, and foreign and domestic news media. * Observable: The detectable result of the combination of an indicator within an enemy’s conduit intended to cause action or inaction by the deception target. Observables are events, activities, or elements of information that must be seen or sensed by the target to form the desired perceptions. * Transmission time: The average time for an observable transmission to move from sensor to deception target. Estimating and anticipating transmission time for conduits is critical to synchronizing a deception plan execution. 2-45. Planners consider information on any risks incurred by using a conduit. Risks might include exposure of friendly means, forces, or sensitive capabilities. Risks can also include potential awareness by the enemy that a selected means might be part of a friendly deception, causing the conduit to lose credibility. The selection of appropriate conduits is a critical part of developing a successful plan. When selecting conduits, the MDO considers— * How the information enters the conduit. * The information that can be conveyed through the conduit. * The time the conduit is available to transmit information. * The amount of time the information needs to reach the target. * The degree of control the relevant nodes have over the conduit. * The credibility of the conduit to the decision maker. * The filters likely to affect information as it moves through the conduit. 2-46. Whatever method (or combination of methods) the MDO uses, the more conduits that the planner and supporting G-2 intelligence analysts can identify and map, the greater the chance of synchronizing friendly deception operations to feed multiple conduits simultaneously, and the increased potential success of the deception. Additionally, when the MDO classifies conduits as simple or complex, then the planning team can share the context more effectively. A simple conduit transmits data to the intended decision maker without applying an intermediate filter. A complex conduit includes one or more filters that might substantially alter the content, add context to the observable, or alter the timeframe for delivery. 2-47. Ideally, the MDO selects multiple conduits to deliver information to the deception target and sequences the delivery in a manner that builds and confirms the deception story. Such delivery can cause information about the same observable to be delivered at multiple differing times and from many sources. This technique can reinforce the desired ambiguity-increasing or ambiguity-decreasing effect. To enhance the believability of the deception story, the MDO works with OPSEC and other IRCs to manage competing observables (any indicator that might contradict the deception story) and to limit the function of conduits that might register and report them. 2-48. While the initial discussion of a given conduit might address the relevant information flow in simple terms, planners cannot actually fully exploit that conduit until they analyze it in detail. Intelligence analysts

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Planning and MDOs must understand and subsequently collaborate to diagram key elements and complete a worksheet or other planning template that corresponds to each conduit for use in future planning. Understand the Enemy’s Intelligence and Counterintelligence Organizations and Capabilities 2-49. Enemy decision making stems from its intelligence and counterintelligence organizations and capabilities that support them (to include external intelligence sources). To manipulate or augment the information available to a deception target, the MDO needs detailed knowledge of the enemy’s ability to see and interpret all relevant friendly activities and indicators. Traditionally, the G-2 analyzes enemy intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, organizations, and functions. By leveraging the full scope of resources, the G-2 provides the enemy’s perception of friendly goals and objectives, the enemy’s perception of friendly technical estimates, and the enemy’s intelligence process. 2-50. The G-2 provides the enemy’s perceptions of friendly capabilities. This analysis includes an enemy perspective analysis of friendly probable goals and objectives, friendly most probable and dangerous COAs, a blue center of gravity analysis, and any other fundamental assumptions or perceptions the enemy has developed about friendly activities, capabilities, or intent. 2-51. The G-2 provides detailed technical estimates of the enemy’s collection capabilities, intelligence networks, and reporting channels. Ideally, this analysis includes the capabilities of FIEs that share intelligence with the enemy. The G-2 can capture this information within the deception running estimate by organizing threat capabilities under the intelligence disciplines: geospatial intelligence, human intelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, technical intelligence, and counterintelligence. Deception planners need the scope of this analysis to identify a particular threat’s collection capabilities anywhere that they provide potential knowledge of friendly plans. 2-52. The G-2 also provides knowledge of the enemy’s intelligence process: planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and integration. The MDO needs to understand every sensor, link, node, and potential filter in the conduit through which that event’s execution was transmitted. This knowledge enables planners to inject deceptive information into the enemy’s intelligence system as a deception event, track its delivery to the decision maker, and evaluate whether the execution produced the desired perception or effect. Knowledge of the enemy’s intelligence process requires sufficient fidelity of intelligence in the deception running estimate to conduct a reasonably accurate enemy conduit analysis with minimal assumptions later in the planning process. Analyze the Enemy’s Potential Vulnerability to Deception 2-53. To fully analyze a target for deception, planners analyze the enemy’s vulnerability to deception and conditions that might favor the enemy in protecting against deception. MDOs use the framework of physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment. Sample vulnerabilities in the physical dimension include shortfalls in collecting or processing capability and vulnerabilities in force structure or capability. Examples of vulnerabilities in the informational dimension might include such things as poor information management or data processing capability and overdependence on vulnerable or non- redundant communications networks. Cognitive vulnerabilities to deception can include such things as predisposition or bias, an overly burdensome decision-process model, poor decision quality (group think, single point of failure, or lack of subordinate autonomy), or poor decision timeliness (a leader who cannot come to a decision quickly). Enemy strengths in the areas mentioned above are normally inverse statements to examples provided. Analyze Enemy Deception and Counterdeception Doctrine and Resources 2-54. Planners fully analyze a target for deception by exploring an enemy’s deception and counterdeception doctrine and capability. Knowing an enemy’s deception doctrine and capability is critical to deception planning. It can enable analysts and MDOs to understand the emphasis the enemy places on deception and thus vigilance in its detection. This knowledge also provides the necessary awareness to help friendly forces identify when the enemy might use deception to influence friendly decision making.

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Chapter 2 Step 3—Identify Desired Perceptions of the Deception Target 2-55. After the MDO has determined how the enemy thinks, the planner identifies what the enemy wants friendly forces to think. The deception target perceptions are what the deception target must believe in order to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective. This perception of friendly force actions is based on the deception objective and exploits the deception target’s information processing cycle. This includes the supporting information and network-enabled systems, decision-making processes, beliefs, biases, and preconceptions regarding friendly forces and the situation. Once the desired perceptions are determined, the MDO begins to sequence them. These perceptions become the required perceptions for a successful deception. Required perceptions are those that are essential, pre-eminent above others in the enemy’s analysis. Referring to them as required conveys the criticality of focus, resourcing, and feedback to a perception’s formation by the deception target. Step 4—Develop Deception Observables and Means 2-56. The MDO takes the initial sequence of required perceptions and starts to determine how to portray the deception using observables and means. Deception observables resemble the pieces of a puzzle presented to the target over time. The target—usually aided by supporting information and intelligence systems— assembles the pieces of the puzzle, gradually reconstructing the picture of a constructed military situation. Observables that must be “seen” and accepted as true by the enemy to form the desired perceptions sometimes called required observables. As with perceptions, required observables may be given greater credibility using supporting observables. Observables are portrayed to the target (and target information and intelligence systems) through executions, often referred to as deception events. 2-57. The deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques used to create required observables (things the deception target needs to see in order to deduce the desired perceptions) and act out the deception story. The nature of the desired perception—with the indicators needed to convey the perception to the deception target—determines the deception means employed. Physical means are observable physical activities of forces, systems, and individuals that present visual indicators. Technical means could include cyber-based messaging and information-sharing venues, smart phone and mobile wireless communications, radio broadcasts, radar emissions, and electromagnetic deception. Administrative means convey oral, pictorial, documentary, or other material evidence to a deception target. While many available means may exist, the means employed must be consistent. Step 5—Develop the Deception Story 2-58. The deception story outlines friendly actions portrayed to cause a deception target to take action (or inaction) as designed in a deception objective. The deception story should be a summarized statement of our deception portrayal stated as a logical enemy conclusion derived from all available observables. The core elements of the story are the desired perceptions that we wish to create within the enemy decision maker. The deception story consists of observables and desired perceptions. It also addresses competing observables. The MDO uses the intelligence estimate and writes the deception story as a narrative from the perspective of the enemy. 2-59. A well-developed deception story presents an overview of the entire deception as seen from the target’s point of view. As such, it serves as a valuable means of checking the logic and consistency of the internal elements of the deception and identifying areas that need refinement or may call for the addition of supporting observables. An exact understanding of the perceptions and observables required for the deception provides a concrete basis for creating the deception story. The deception story weaves these elements together into a coherent whole that describes the picture of the situation that the target will reconstruct from the information the deception provides. An effective deception story must be verifiable, executable, believable, and consistent. Verifiable 2-60. A target can verify an effective deception story through multiple channels and by using all intelligence sources. When making sure that the deception story is verifiable, deception planners avoid single-source inputs that would provide the whole story. Multiple conduits provide pieces of a puzzle that combine to create

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Planning the deception story. Employing various conduits in a timely and believable manner is of the utmost importance. This dynamic clearly underscores the value and importance of the IO officer in the deception process. Executable 2-61. A supported commander has the resources and authority to execute a deception story and the time available. Time, and echelon when it is employed, may limit the scope and depth of the deception story, which is why planners continually assess the synchronization and deception event schedule. Believable 2-62. A believable deception story corresponds to the deception target’s perceptions of the friendly force’s mission, intentions, and capabilities. An enemy will likely discount notional plans or forces that grossly distort actual friendly capabilities. An enemy often meets unverifiable deception with suspicion and doubt. Additionally, enemies will not believe stories that closely copy past and already exposed deception operations. The deception story must be believable both in its parts and as a whole. If one or more of the parts do not fit into the complete picture, they may create enough suspicion to reveal the deception. Consistent 2-63. An effective deception story matches the target’s understanding of actual friendly doctrine, historical force employment, campaign strategy, tactics, current operational situation, and conditioned patterns of friendly activity. The deception element must have as complete a picture as possible of the deception target’s level of knowledge and belief in these areas. Step 6—Develop the Deception Event Schedule 2-64. A deception event is a deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation (JP 3-13.4). The deception event schedule is the tool used to sequence deception events for a logical progression of the deception story and to synchronize the deception with the broader plan. This schedule requires identifying when the MDO employs specific deception events. The schedule aims to influence the deception target’s perceptions in time and space so the target completes the desired action (the deception objective) at the most operationally advantageous moment. The deception event schedule captures what will occur, when it will take place, where it will occur, and who will control the execution. Each planned deception event has a unique number to facilitate coordination and execution tracking. It is imperative that MDOs synchronize and deconflict the deception event schedule with the unit’s operations synch matrix. Figure 2-1 on page 2-12 depicts the steps leading up developing the event schedule. 2-65. Deception events are activities conducted through deception means at a specific time and location to convey the deception story to the target. Deception events build observables that create desired perceptions. The observables and desired perceptions are two key elements of the deception story. To convey the story, the enemy needs to sense and observe the events. If the enemy’s intelligence system can see, sense, or detect the deception event, then it can collect the information it needs to piece together the deception story. The systematic, yet seemingly random, projection of deception story elements by multiple means at varied times also makes the deception more believable. The MDO carefully ensures that information appears as legitimately collected. The enemy usually suspects important military information that is too easy to obtain. 2-66. Based on the commander’s final decision as to how to portray the story, the MDO develops the deception event schedule in a time-ordered sequence. This schedule captures all friendly actions (deception events), executing elements, and execution reporting and coordination requirements involved in the deception operation. It also directly supports the tasking of friendly resources, coordination with other staff elements, and identification of administrative and logistics requirements. MDOs consider the following factors when building the deception event schedule: * The overall plan. * The timing of actual friendly activities in the operations synch matrix. * The time required for friendly forces to conduct the deception activity.

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Chapter 2 * The location a particular activity fits in the normal sequence of events for the type of operation being portrayed. * The time required for the enemy intelligence collection assets to collect, analyze, and report on the activity. * The time required for the deception target to process, decide, and execute the desired action. * The time required to execute the desired action or inaction. * The impact of filters on the timeliness of observables. Figure 2-1. Planning steps Step 7—Develop Operations Security and Other Protection Measures 2-67. OPSEC and other protection measures are employed with deception to ensure that only the desired deception events reach the enemy and that actions in support of operations are concealed. Without OPSEC, the enemy may observe preparations for the supported operation. Deception activities may not convince the enemy to believe the deception story if the enemy observes preparations. Equally important is risk assessment. All deception involves risk and cost. Commanders base the decision to conduct a deception on a deliberate assessment that weighs costs (including risk) against benefits. MDOs can mitigate risk by ensuring the success of the supported operation does not hinge upon the success of the deception, anticipating conditions that could compromise the deception, and developing responses in the event of unintended effects.

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Planning Step 8—Develop Feedback Criteria 2-68. Identifying (or in some cases, establishing) channels for feedback is a continuous and integral part of deception planning. Feedback is information that reveals how the target or information systems respond to the deception. The essence of feedback planning is expressed in three steps. The MDO first envisions the target’s response to each desired perception or observable. Then the MDO analyzes the target’s actions associated with the response (response indicators) that friendly resources can detect. Lastly, the MDO coordinates with or tasks appropriate friendly resources for reports on those indicators within a given period. 2-69. Although a high level of feedback is a desirable planning goal, staffs do not need dedicated feedback mechanisms for every perception or observable. Carefully designed feedback at key times during the deception can often provide information on the enemy’s reaction to multiple observables. Additionally, friendly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts often collects response indicators related to enemy operations as a part of unit intelligence collection. Where feedback relies on such information, early coordination with the intelligence officer’s collection plan can help eliminate redundant feedback mechanisms and reduce unnecessary tasking. 2-70. Feedback demonstrates that the deception story is being assembled by the targeted decision maker in the desired manner. An effective MDO plans and incorporates these feedback mechanisms into the deception event schedule to gather necessary information at critical times in the deception story’s development. Feedback enables the commander to determine whether to continue the deception story, adjust the deception events, or terminate the deception. These determinations depend on the target’s reaction to the deception events conducted by friendly forces. Feedback-related tasks and activities are also noted in the deception event schedule. Chapter 4 discusses feedback in detail. Step 9—Develop a Termination Plan 2-71. Deception does not just simply end. A commander-approved termination plan guides a coherent, structured, and implementable exit strategy. This is important because the commander terminates a deception after it meets its termination criteria, which may include success, failure, compromise, or a combination of the three. Like the deception story, the deception target must also believe the exit strategy and friendly operational profiles. Additionally, the termination plan keeps the target unaware of the deception means, techniques, and events. Otherwise, the next deception operation may not have the desired effect if the enemy gained insights into friendly tactics, techniques, and procedures. Various circumstances might create a requirement to terminate the deception completely or in part. 2-72. Termination planning ensures the controlled, orderly cessation of planned deception events, protects means and resources, and sets the parameters for any release of information relating to the deception. Planning the termination of a deception operation requires the same care and attention to details that went into planning the deception’s execution. Ideally, termination planning includes contingencies for unforeseen events such as the deception’s premature compromise. In the event of compromise, termination planning for deception includes a notification to rapidly inform forces that may be affected. The termination concept provides initial planning considerations to implement and should include the following: * A brief description of each termination scenario circumstance included in the plan. * Steps for initiating termination operations in each scenario circumstance included in the plan. * The identification of the first commander who has termination authority. 2-73. The MDO anticipates that, as the plan proceeds in execution, circumstances of termination will change. A termination concept entirely suited to the initial set of conditions often differs from what is required as the deception matures. The termination concept identifies the timing to release information about the deception. It may provide a cover story should questions arise about the role of deception in a particular operation. Controlling the exposure of the existence of a deception operation or of elements of a deception may be difficult because of the nature of the operation. A termination concept should also include classification and dissemination instructions for deception-related information. 2-74. Potential termination scenarios are illustrated in table 2-2 on page 2-14.

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Chapter 2 Table 2-2. Sample terminations Scenario Criteria and Events Successful deception The deception has run its natural course, achieved its objectives, and operation termination will not expose or affect the deception. The overall operational situation has changed and circumstances that prompted Change of mission the deception no longer pertain. Prudent risk: a Some elements of the deception estimate have changed, increasing the risk and decreased probability costs to friendly forces and prompting the commander to end the deception of success component of the course of action.  The deception is proceeding and may succeed but is no longer synchronized with other aspects of the operation or campaign.  The deception is proceeding and may succeed but it becomes evident that Synchronization the window of opportunity for exploiting certain conduits or the target itself issues has closed.  Deception events cannot be synchronized or executed at the required times or locations for any number of reasons. It becomes apparent that if forces modify some elements of the deception (choice of conduits, objectives, or targets), then the probability of success will New opportunity increase, risks will be reduced, or the impact of the deception will be greater. In this case, the commander may want to terminate some deception events and activities while reorienting other elements of the deception. The commander has cause to believe that all or some elements of the deception Compromise have become known to the enemy. Step 10—Produce Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) 2-75. Following completion of the deception event schedule and the termination plan, the MDO has everything required to complete Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) of the OPLAN or OPORD. Exhibits, worksheets, and templates used to develop the deception plan can add clarity and detail to a plan so personnel who were not part of the original planning process can rapidly grasp its contents. In most cases, the Appendix 14 to Annex C is classified at or above the classification of the supported plan. Care must be taken in the classification of the deception appendix (to include in training and exercise environments). DECEPTION PLAN APPROVAL 2-76. After completing, coordinating, and reviewing the deception plan for consistency, the MDO presents it to the commander for tentative approval. To ensure its synchronization at all levels, approval authority for deception resides two echelons above the originating command. After the approving authority has approved the deception plan, it becomes a part of the OPLAN or OPORD. It is important that deception plans are not widely distributed. To ensure every opportunity to succeed and to protect the deception from compromise, planners strictly limit access to the deception operation to those with a need to know. Deception staffing and approval must adhere to the regulatory requirements found in CJCSI 3211.01 and applicable CCMD instructions. The need to know criteria is essential, and only a limited number of personnel participate in the deception plan review and approval process. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO DECEPTION PLANNING 2-77. Intelligence support is critical to a successful deception plan. Deception requires the timely collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all relevant information and intelligence that is immediately, or potentially, significant to the deception. A lack of accurate information and intelligence database and an inadequate time to rectify a situation can limit the range of viable deception options available to the commander. These deficiencies can also increase the associated risk and significantly reduce the probability of success. Adequate emphasis on timely and in-depth development of information resources

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Planning during the capability development phase of the deception plan can go a long way toward alleviating deficiencies. For information on development of data collection plans, see chapter 4. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 2-78. MDOs frequently make informed assumptions on various topics to continue planning. In addition to RFIs associated with completing the deception event schedule, MDOs often require a high level of detail and predictive analysis. Information on potential deception conduits comes from many sources and must be collected and available so a commander can execute a deception plan with confidence. Once combat operations have begun and U.S. forces have disrupted or neutralized enemy pre-conflict military decision- making structure and flow, access to sensors, and decision-making support networks, the conduits should be reassessed. Rapid enemy adaptation to new conditions in an operational environment requires equally agile friendly intelligence support. Unless deception RFIs are aligned with the priority intelligence requirements, or the deception plan is supported with dedicated intelligence analysis and resources, the deception plan is at risk of becoming desynchronized or ineffective. 2-79. Focused intelligence support is essential to the successful planning, execution, and assessment of any deception. A well-constructed deception plan requires substantive intelligence support. Intelligence supports the execution of effective deception in five ways: * Identifies enemy decision makers and the information conduits associated with them. * Helps complete the deception estimate. Begun during mission analysis, the deception estimate is the foundation for effective deception planning as well as subsequent execution and assessment. * Supports the conduit analysis step of the deception planning process. * Ensures the collection plan supports the development, collection, and analysis of planned deception measures of performance (MOPs), MOEs, and indicators. * Identifies and confirms instances of enemy deception and supporting counterdeception exploitation. 2-80. Deception plans employed at any level of conflict (tactical, operational, and strategic) impose special requirements for information collection and intelligence production. Examples of such specialized intelligence production include— * Studies of the enemy’s decision-making responsibilities, logic, processes, and procedures. * Technical and operational assessments of the enemy’s intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination systems (strategic, operational, and tactical). * Emulative assessments of how the enemy sees an operational environment and perceives U.S. forces, including expectations about intentions and capabilities. 2-81. MDOs thoroughly analyze and anticipate intelligence support requirements, making information needs and commander’s critical intelligence requirements known to supporting intelligence collection and production organizations. 2-82. The planning and execution of deception operations demands a highly responsive system for managing relevant information collection and intelligence support. Because of the often highly specialized nature of the information and intelligence required, the sensitivity of the operation, and its special security requirements, the MDO must develop internal information and intelligence synch matrixes. Although the specific content and subject matter of these matrixes may fundamentally differ from the types of information required of more traditional military operations, the basic objective is the same in all cases: to ensure the timely, sufficient, and reliable flow of information and intelligence throughout all phases of the planning and execution of the operation. Each deception operation requires a deception matrix. The matrix is a detailed catalog of the specific information required to accomplish every element of the deception. The deception matrix identifies when that information is required and establishes the criticality of the information to deception planning and execution. 2-83. A deception plan is important to the overall success of the operation. MDOs prepare it in a comprehensive and systematic manner and follow a format that facilitates the coordination and integration of all supporting information sources and agencies. The plan is a dynamic tool that is continuously refined and adapted as the operation proceeds.

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Chapter 2 INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 2-84. After performing functional analysis and developing threat models, the intelligence staff assists the MDO in refining selected intelligence requirements into information categories that prioritize and ensure their collection. These categories typically include deception target information, conduit information, military decision-making information, and military capabilities information. Several intelligence entities can compile this type of information, but an MDO will typically coordinate requests through the theater S-2, G-2, or J-2 elements. Deception Target Information 2-85. MDOs collect and develop the following on key target decision makers in areas of interest: * General biographic data and career summary. * Level of target’s decision-making authority. * Personal decision-making style. * Biases, predispositions, and range of knowledge. * Primary or favored sources of information. * Relationships with and degree of influence with political authorities, key advisors, and known personalities. * Experience in and attitudes toward friendly and enemy use of deception. * Historical patterns of decisions. Conduit Information 2-86. MDOs collect and develop the following information on the potential means of conveying information to key target decision makers in areas of interest: * Intelligence system and capabilities such as—  Signals intelligence capabilities that include systems and processes for collection, processing, and dissemination.  Human intelligence capabilities that include systems and processes for collection, processing, and dissemination.  Measurement and signature intelligence capabilities that include systems and processes for collection, processing, and dissemination. * Operational staff structure, staff process, and information filters. * Communications and automated information systems structure and process. * Other information sources (open source, commercial satellite, third-country intelligence, or personal contacts) and the process for integrating them into the military information system. Military Decision-Making Process Information 2-87. MDOs have a unique requirement to understand how targeted decision makers actually make decisions, what logical processes that they employ, and how their staff supports this process by analyzing and presenting information to them. Automated, heuristic, prescriptive norms, and simple quantitative methods might be employed in various combinations. There are many ways decisions can be made, and these methods can change within each level of headquarters depending on the mission, time available, and other circumstances. This type of required information includes— * Command and staff process for military situation assessment (by echelon), including—  Required elements of information for situation assessment.  Assessment factors and biases.  The analytical process, to include human reasoning and automated system support.

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Planning * Command and staff process for analyzing and determining COAs (by echelon), including—  Required elements of information for COA analysis.  Assessment factors and biases.  The analytical process, to include human reasoning and automated decision aids. * Command and staff process for developing OPLANs and issuing orders (by echelon). Military Capabilities Information 2-88. Friendly intelligence routinely collects information on the military capabilities of potential threats. Access to all information regarding military capabilities is crucial to effective planning and execution of deception. The more MDOs know about actual capabilities of the threat, the more accurately they can assess the ability of a designated target to achieve a specific deception objective in time for the actions (or inaction) of its forces to be exploited by friendly forces. Typical classes of information about threat capabilities that may prove useful to the MDO include— * Doctrinal “ways of war” data. * Force structure, systems, and capabilities. * Military mobilization systems. * Force training priorities and proficiencies. * Force mobility and maneuver capabilities. * Force deployments and reserves. * Force reconnaissance, intelligence and target acquisition systems, and capabilities. * Technical and operational characteristics of key weapons systems. * Logistic support systems, techniques, and capabilities. * Command and control procedures, systems, and capabilities. * Standard operating procedures and practices. * Strategic, theater, and tactical communications systems, procedures, and capabilities. * Information warfare and command and control warfare doctrine, systems, and capabilities. * Military space systems, operations, and capabilities. * Nuclear forces and weapons. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 2-89. A number of U.S. and international legal and policy restrictions governs the conduct of deception operations in wartime and contingency operations. MDOs ensure that they are knowledgeable on such matters and able to reliably advise the commander. This means coordinating with the higher command echelon deception staff element to determine applicable guidelines. MDOs also work with the command’s legal officer to ensure that the commander’s legal responsibilities are properly reflected in deception planning and execution. 2-90. Supporting IRCs such as public affairs activities, civil affairs operations, cyberspace operations, and military information support operations (MISO) are controlled and regulated by their respective policies and practices. A compliant MDO knows these policies and practices while ensuring that no aspect of the deception plan or its execution conflicts with the governing policies of other agencies or activities. Coordination and planning ensure an adherence to all policies and their integration in a synchronous manner. While deception operations may leverage the resources, activities, and operations of such parallel activities and operations, they cannot do so in a way that violates governing policy and legal responsibilities. This is why sufficient training and experience are critical attributes of an MDO. MDOs must possess discreet capabilities in a legally sufficient manner that insulates risk to the commander. UNLAWFUL DECEPTIONS 2-91. Certain deception activities or techniques are prohibited because they violate the law of war, including killing or wounding the enemy by resorting to perfidy. Acts of perfidy are acts that, by design, invite the

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Chapter 2 confidence of an enemy to lead it to believe that the enemy is entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under the law of war, with intent to betray that confidence. Moreover, the law of war prohibits misusing certain protected signs such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent, fighting in the enemy’s uniform, and feigning non-hostile relations in order to seek a military advantage. These actions are prohibited because they undermine the protections afforded by the law of war to civilians, persons who are hors de combat, or other protected classes of persons and objects; impair non-hostile relations between opposing belligerents; and may damage the basis for the restoration of peace. A deception plan must follow the commander’s limitations and agreements, and planners must consider legal implications. Staffs should always consult with the judge advocate when developing a deception plan. 2-92. Deception operations are constrained, but not forbidden, by international agreements. Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered permissible. Ruses of war are legitimate so long as they do not involve treachery or perfidy on the part of the belligerent resorting to them. They are, however, forbidden if they contravene any generally accepted rule. The line of demarcation between legitimate and illegitimate ruses sometimes blurs, but the following examples indicate the correct principles. Improper practice to secure an advantage over the enemy includes deliberate lying or misleading conduct that involves a breach of faith or a moral obligation to speak the truth. For example, it is improper to feign surrender so as to secure an advantage over the opposing belligerent. 2-93. The Department of Defense Law of War Manual states deception operations will not intentionally target or mislead the U.S. public, the U.S. Congress, U.S. news media, or any open-source (unclassified or generally available to the public) publications. Traditionally, all Department of Defense (DOD) missions and activities have either been determined by federal statue or, in the absence of statutory authority, through the broad constitutional powers of the President. The President, under constitutional and statutory authority, may issue documents that provide direction to the executive branch that apply to this field. Specific regulatory guidance pertaining to the conduct of deception operations is promulgated by DOD and the Services. Misinforming the media about military capabilities and intentions in ways that influence U.S. decision makers and public opinion is contrary to DOD policy. Deceptions will comply with U.S. law, applicable international treaties and agreements to which the U.S. is a party, DOD and Service regulations and policies, and established rules of engagement for U.S. forces. See the Department of Defense Law of War Manual and DODD 2311.01E. 2-94. It is expressly forbidden to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention. Flags of truce must not be used surreptitiously to obtain military information or merely to obtain time to affect a retreat or secure reinforcements, or to feign a surrender in order to surprise an enemy. In practice, it has been authorized to make use of national flags, insignia, and uniforms as a ruse. Hague Regulation (Article 23) does not prohibit such employment but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to employ them during combat, but their use at other times is not forbidden. 2-95. Legitimate ruses can include the following examples: * Surprises, ambushes, feigning attacks, retreats, or flights. * Simulated quiet and inactivity. * The use of small forces to simulate a large unit. * The transmission of false or misleading radio or telephone messages:  False orders purporting to have been issued by the enemy commander.  The use of the enemy’s signals and passwords.  Fake communication with troops or reinforcement that do not exist. * Deceptive supply movements. * Deliberate planting of false information. * The use of spies and secret agents. * The movement of landmarks. * Assembled dummy guns and vehicles or laid dummy mines. * Erected dummy installations and airfields.

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Planning * Removal of unit identifications from uniforms. * The use of signal deceptive measures. * The use of MISO messages and actions for psychological effects. LEGAL SUPPORT TO MILITARY DECEPTION 2-96. MDOs include legal support personnel in coordination efforts to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. and international laws, treaties, and agreements to which the United States is a party; Presidential and DOD policy and regulations; rules of engagement; and applicable component policy. Legal personnel assist in planning the operation to achieve the objective while complying with legal requirements. They also provide training to MDOs on law and policy applicable to deception operations. OPERATIONS SECURITY AND DECEPTION 2-97. OPSEC is the process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to— * Identify those actions that can be observed by enemy intelligence systems. * Determine indicators that enemy intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to enemies. * Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to enemy exploitation. 2-98. The purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. and multinational forces from successful enemy exploitation of critical information. Deception is typically active, while OPSEC is more passive in nature. OPSEC is a concealment aspect for all deceptions, affecting both the plan and its execution. (See JP 3-13.3 for a detailed discussion of OPSEC.) 2-99. Deception and OPSEC are mutually supporting activities and complementary IRCs. Planners fully integrate them at all levels to maximize effective support to operations. They contribute to the elements of surprise, security, and freedom of maneuver. Deception and OPSEC planners cooperate to manage visible indicators to influence how the enemy perceives friendly capabilities, actions, or intent, so to affect enemy subsequent action or inaction in a manner conducive to the operation. 2-100. OPSEC incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an enemy exploiting vulnerabilities. OPSEC is not an administrative security program but an activity to conceal and protect the operationally significant information from the enemy’s collection assets. Limiting the number of personnel who know the actual operation is often key to maintaining OPSEC. 2-101. Deception plans can benefit from normally occurring activity provided the normal activity fits the deception story. Conversely, actual operations have the potential to create OPSEC indicators that pose a threat to the effectiveness of deception plans. These real indicators may conflict with the deception story. Deception and OPSEC planners have to coordinate with organizations that create these indicators to limit potential adverse effects or to maximize their deception potential. Critical information is the specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities needed by enemies to plan and act effectively against friendly mission accomplishment. Operations security vulnerability is a condition in which friendly actions provide operations security indicators that may be obtained and accurately evaluated by an adversary in time to provide a basis for effective adversary decision making (JP 3-13.3). 2-102. In addition to the primary planning goal of unifying what is visible to the enemy military decision makers into a holistic and managed denial and deception effort, deception and OPSEC planning intersect at multiple points in the planning process. In execution, deception activities themselves frequently require OPSEC measures and countermeasures to protect sensitive means and resources, and ultimately enhance their believability to the enemy. 2-103. As trained OPSEC practitioners analyze friendly information and planned activities, they understand what information or observable activity rises to the level of critical information and indicators. If the enemies can collect that critical information or those indicators, they can potentially derive an accurate operational

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Chapter 2 picture of key friendly aspects. Those aspects can include presence, capability, strength, intent, readiness, location of future operations or activity, timing, and method of operations. 2-104. MDOs consciously and continuously analyze and manage friendly operational profiles so what the enemy can see is no more or less than what the MDOs deliberately plan. OPSEC focuses primarily on identifying and protecting critical information and indicators associated with the planned COA. Deception leverages the visible aspects of friendly operations and combines them with a deceptive activity to create plausible alternative facts and conditions in an operational environment to which targeted decision makers feel they must respond. 2-105. OPSEC planners, with the intelligence community, use OPSEC to— * Identify critical information and indicators by phase, type of operation, or mission. * Determine how the enemy collects (sees). * Determine how the enemy perceives potentially visible friendly critical information and indicators. * Measure the enemy’s ability to collect, analyze, and respond to the critical information and indicators to a level that generates an unacceptable risk (time and operational ability to respond). * Develop and apply OPSEC measures and countermeasures to protect and deny critical information and indicators that enable the enemy to accurately determine and subsequently interdict planned operations. 2-106. To achieve the desired level of control over enemy perceptions, OPSEC planners and MDOs coordinate activities across a spectrum of influence that includes— * Truth: factual information and actions visible to all. * Denial: critical information and indicators protected by OPSEC. * Misdirection: DISO and other activities designed to confuse enemy analysts and decision makers. * Deceit: deceptive activity and information delivered as part of the approved deception plan. 2-107. While OPSEC identifies and protects critical information and indicators about the actual COA, deception actively generates what appears to be critical information and indicators supporting the deception story. Deception deliberately leads the enemy decision makers to the wrong conclusion, thus usurping their decision making and subsequent action. 2-108. Deception and OPSEC planners can save significant time and resources by collaborating during the military decisionmaking process. Enemy threat assessment in the OPSEC planning process to determine technical aspects of how an enemy sees and perceives friendly activity correlates directly with the MDO’s identification of conduits necessary to deliver deceptive information to military decision makers. Both OPSEC and deception require a detailed knowledge of enemy decision making to project the impact of planned activities. In concept development, the OPSEC planner and MDO both require detailed knowledge of friendly indicators (signature, association, profile, contrast, and exposure). They use OPSEC to identify and protect critical information and indicators and use deception to replicate desired indicators that effectively portray the deception story. 2-109. OPSEC also supports deception directly during planning, preparation, and execution. The existence of a deception plan in and of itself is critical information, and indicators require protection. Planners need an OPSEC analysis of the planned deception to protect against an inadvertent or unintentional disclosure of deception existence, techniques, or particular means being used. Failure to maintain good OPSEC can enable the enemy to identify the operation as a deception effort with resulting second- and third-order effects such as the refocusing of enemy intelligence collection and combat power against actual friendly force dispositions and intent. MILITARY DECEPTION AS AN INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITY 2-110. An information-related capability is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 3-13). A properly planned and executed deception is one of the most effective IRCs available to the

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Planning commander. It can directly influence, corrupt, disrupt, and usurp the enemy’s decision-making process and the subsequent direction of its forces. INTEGRATION WITH OTHER INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES 2-111. IRCs play a coordinated and interrelated role in the overall deception effort. In many cases, IRCs provide the sole means for accomplishing a deception task. Just as MDOs integrate deception with the overall plan, they also coordinate and deconflict it with IRC plans to eliminate potentially counterproductive activities. This is normally accomplished through the integrating and synchronizing function of IO. Not all planners know the existence or extent of deception activity since access to the plan remains strictly on a need to know basis. MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS 2-112. Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives (JP 3-13.2). Deception targets differ from MISO target audiences; however, a deception target might also be included as part of a broader MISO target audience. MDOs deconflict deception observables used to deceive deception targets with MISO themes and messages to maintain believability and credibility. 2-113. MISO actions and messages are generally truth based. This practice is not based upon legal or policy restrictions but a requirement to maintain credibility with target audiences in order to execute future MISO. Informed MDOs know the MISO themes and messages that the intended deception target may receive. MISO actions and messages contain both objective and subjective truth, and must be generally “verifiable” by the target audience. Deception events and deceptive information inserted into enemy conduits may contain falsehoods and need only be believable to the target. The two can be mutually beneficial, but they may also run counter to each other; therefore, planners carefully coordinate MISO and deception. 2-114. Commanders can use MISO actions and messages directed at specific enemy target audiences with deception techniques such as feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays to add credibility to the deception story or event. MISO messages warning of impending multinational force arrival, providing surrender instructions, or attacking the morale of enemy military or paramilitary forces are examples of this type of cooperation. However, because of the requirement for MISO to retain credibility with its broader target audiences, MDOs carefully evaluate any use of MISO in this manner (and proposed themes) for potential costs, benefits, and second- and third-order effects of its use. ELECTRONIC WARFARE 2-115. Electronic warfare is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying enemy operations within the electromagnetic spectrum throughout an operational environment. The term electronic warfare refers to military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1). Deception, in conjunction with OPSEC, supports electronic warfare operations by protecting the development, acquisition, and deployment of sensitive electronic warfare capabilities. 2-116. Electronic warfare can support feints, ruses, demonstrations, and displays. Positioning electronic warfare systems in a particular location, and the electromagnetic signatures the systems present, can create an indicator of the command’s intended main effort. By disrupting enemy communications, and other enemy systems using the electromagnetic spectrum, electronic warfare can introduce or increase ambiguity, confuse enemy operations, or affect the enemy’s ability to obtain and pass information about certain activities. Close coordination is required between friendly electronic warfare, deception, communications, cyberspace and space support elements, frequency management, and intelligence planners to ensure electronic warfare does not disrupt enemy communications systems that are used as deception conduits or that are providing intelligence feedback.

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Chapter 2 2-117. Electromagnetic deception is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, suppression, absorption, denial, enhancement, or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to convey misleading information to an enemy or to enemy electromagnetic-dependent weapons, thereby degrading or neutralizing the enemy’s combat capability. Using electromagnetic deception is not exclusive to deception but can provide potent effects for aspects of deception operations related to the electromagnetic. Among the types of electromagnetic deception are the following: * Manipulative involves actions to eliminate revealing, or convey misleading, electromagnetic telltale indicators that may be used by hostile forces. * Simulative involves actions to simulate friendly, notional, or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces. * Imitative involves actions to imitate enemy emissions to mislead hostile forces. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 2-118. Deception and cyberspace operations can be mutually supportive in many ways. Since an enemy can reside in cyberspace and leverage the same systems and processes, cyberspace operations serve as an effective conduit for placing or delivering deceptive material to affect enemy military decision making and subsequent action or inaction. MDOs can help protect friendly use of information systems by applying deceptive activities similar to those used in the physical dimension for maneuver forces. Such an operation may include constructing false servers, communications nodes, and other hardware associated with a tactical computer network to include the replication of traffic and false data storage. 2-119. Enemy intelligence and targeting systems, which make a priority of attacking or subverting a friendly information system, can be dissuaded from doing so via a successful deception plan. MDOs can redirect enemy collection assets toward deceptive events (such as the presentation of a false “weakness” in friendly information systems) and then target those assets for destruction or exploitation by friendly forces. Any deception plan must consider the abilities and limitations of friendly and enemy cyberspace operations. Careful and detailed planning ensures deception executions using cyberspace operations assets are tracked, recorded, and deconflicted with other nondeceptive cyberspace operations. Planners properly classify and avoid exposing the deception plan to unprotected computer networks or sending it via unsecured email. Any exposure can lead to plan failure. SPACE OPERATIONS 2-120. Space operations capabilities offer many options to influence deception activities to include satellite- based imagery and signals intelligence collection systems against friendly forces. These collection satellites generally operate in predetermined orbits, and thus the time they are in position to collect intelligence on friendly forces is predictable. MDOs can use this information to portray to the enemy a desired observable or use it to camouflage or take appropriate OPSEC measures to avoid providing indicators to enemy intelligence operations. Additionally, the posturing of friendly force satellites capabilities may also assist in deception efforts. For instance, the use of a friendly force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or the positioning of a communications satellite both illustrate methods that may help mislead the enemy regarding friendly force intentions. PUBLIC AFFAIRS 2-121. Deception activities, including planning efforts, are prohibited from explicitly or implicitly targeting, misleading, or attempting to influence the U.S. Government, U.S. Congress, the U.S. public, or the U.S. news media. Legal staff review all deception activities to eliminate, minimize, or mitigate the possibility that such influence might occur. Planners coordinate deception plans that have activities potentially visible to the media or the public with appropriate public affairs officers to identify any potential problems. Coordination reduces the chance that public affairs officers inadvertently reveal information that could undermine an ongoing or planned deception.

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Planning CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS 2-122. Civil-military operations are the activities of a commander performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions. These operations support national objectives for host-nation and regional stability. Civil-military operations may include military forces conducting activities and functions normally done by the local, regional, or national government. Conducted to gain maximum support for U.S. forces from the civilian population, civil-military operations contribute to the success of military operations and project a favorable U.S. image throughout the operational area. MDOs coordinate deception with civil-military operations and with MISO efforts that support civil-military operations to ensure deception plans do not inadvertently undermine the relationships with the civilian population or with host-nation military authorities. Failure to consider civil-military operations could compromise deception plans or have other unintended consequences. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS 2-123. MDOs coordinate both deception and its supporting actions with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and supporting staffs. Within a staff, coordination is required between MDOs and other planners and analysts on the staff. Coordination with U.S. Government department and agency personnel prevents destabilizing civil- military relationships and an unintentional compromise of deception plans. This coordination has increased importance in situations in which the media or general public view deception. 2-124. It is important to restrict knowledge of information relating to planned and ongoing MILDEC operations to only those personnel who need to know. The commander provides guidance concerning the dissemination of deception-related information. During multinational operations, the staff informs the commander of information requirements and concerns of the non-U.S. partners. During planning, MDOs develop need to know criteria that permit necessary coordination while limiting the number of individuals with knowledge of the deception. Only a few individuals require access to the entire deception plan. Others require only knowledge of limited portions of the plan. The need to know criteria should address these different levels of required access. 2-125. When deception plans incorporate or involve multinational partners, the command’s foreign disclosure officer helps determine appropriate access to deception information and operations. For further information on multinational personnel access to deception plans, refer to CJCSI 3211.01. RISK ASSESSMENT 2-126. The evaluation of the risks associated with conducting a deception does not end with the commander’s decision to adopt a particular COA. In planning, commanders use risk assessment to determine the potential consequences of deception failure or compromise and the consequences of unintended effects of the deception. 2-127. As planning progresses, the MDO refines the risk assessment as each element of the plan is detailed and aligned with the current situation. For example, the execution of a required observable by an electronic ruse instead of by a demonstration conducted by a combat unit may reduce the risk to command resources. Throughout the course of the deception planning process, MDOs must note significant changes in risk to the commander and staff so their impacts can be assessed and accounted for in operational planning. The staff records results of risk analysis during planning. The MDO then develops risk mitigation measures to ensure risk remains within acceptable levels to the commander. 2-128. The MDO develops a risk assessment for the finalized deception plan under conditions prevailing at that time. That risk assessment must be clearly presented during the approval process so the commander can make a well-informed decision on whether to approve and execute the deception operation or not. If the deception plan is not immediately implemented, the MDO continues to monitor risk to account for implications of changes in the situation.

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Chapter 3 Preparation and Execution PREPARATION 3-1. During preparation, planners take every opportunity to refine the deception plan based on updated intelligence and friendly information. Deception plans are not static and are continually adjusted. As assumptions prove valid or invalid, staffs confirm enemy perceptions, or the status of friendly units change, the MDO adjusts the deception for the commander or recommends aborting it if the deception can no longer significantly influence the situation and achieve the deception goal. As part of the plan, OPSEC activities also continue during preparation for the deception. OPSEC is a dynamic effort that anticipates and reacts to enemy collection efforts. 3-2. MDOs coordinate the deception plan with every other aspect of the OPLAN. This coordination still occurs with those only who have a need to know. The complexity of deception, its secrecy, and its many witting and unwitting links within the staff and across operational forces requires careful coordination of the deception plan with overall planning. Coordination also occurs with specific staff entities. Close coordination with operations and intelligence planners is driven by the essential nature of their contribution to the deception planning process, but most other elements of the staff have a less direct relationship. 3-3. During deception planning, OPSEC is a necessary condition and a critical planning requirement. The planning process itself must be secure, with no inadvertent disclosures due to carelessness in staff work or coordination. At the same time, planning must ensure that security is built into and maintained throughout the deception operation. This security reduces the risk of compromise and protects activities and units involved in the deception, particularly unwitting participants. EXECUTION 3-4. The deception plan forms the basis for execution, but execution may occur in conditions more dynamic than anticipated. Consequently, the deception plan is subject to continual reassessment and refinement. By its nature, little flexibility exists in the concept of operations for deception. Successful monitoring involves knowing precisely when to take the next step in conveying the deception story. MDOs often identify specific operational feedback events identified in the plan to provide these cues. IO officers are critical in assessing and deciding the timing, frequency, and means through which an observable is transmitted to achieve the desired cognitive effect on the deception target. DECEPTION EXECUTION 3-5. Deception execution includes the following activities: * Adjust the deception plan as necessary for changed conditions. * Sustain deception synchronization with an approved COA and OPSEC plan. * Sustain internal deception synchronization between the planning team and commander. * Sustain intelligence collection during deception execution. * Monitor, assess, and mitigate risk. * Keep the commander informed. * Maintain strict security and access controls throughout.

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Chapter 3 Adjust the Deception Plan as Necessary for Changed Conditions 3-6. The cycle begins with a review of the plan. In this step, the MDO analyzes the situation and operational environment, and reviews anticipated conditions and planning assumptions against which the plan was developed. Existing RFIs are reemphasized, and new RFIs are developed to address shortfalls in necessary intelligence. 3-7. During this step, the MDO reviews and identifies any changes to the enemy situation. Changes can include— * Adjustments to the enemy decision-making process or key military decision makers. * Changes in enemy force structure, capabilities, disposition, and intelligence collection efforts (conduits or information pathways) to best facilitate the effective delivery of the deception story. * Changes in third-party intelligence support. * Potential new sources of open-source intelligence based on rapidly evolving social media or other networks. 3-8. The MDO also reviews and identifies changes to the friendly plan. Changes can include— * Revised strategic or commander’s guidance. * Changes to allocated forces. * Changes to relationships with multinational partners. * Changes to basing or adjustments to operational phasing or timing. The MDO coordinates with the G-3 on initial deception and operations execution timing to ensure a synchronous, supporting relationship exists that will aid the deception, the operation, or both. 3-9. Once the MDO has updated knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations, all key elements of the plan—from the deception goal and objectives through the final deception event schedule—are validated or adjusted as required. While this is the first step in deception execution, this process of analysis and adjustment continues as conditions evolve and change over the course of mission execution. Sustain Deception Synchronization with the OPSEC Plan 3-10. The MDO continuously coordinates vertically and horizontally with commanders and staffs to synchronize real-world operations and deception operations. This coordination helps portray a credible, believable, and realistic deception. Changes to any operational aspect—such as presence, capability, strength, intent, readiness, future location, timing, or method of planned friendly operations—require accountability in the scheduled execution of deception activities. Such accountability requires the MDO to maintain situational awareness, participate in meetings that address targeting and assessments, and provide routine updates and operational analysis to the commander. The MDO works with the OPSEC planner to monitor critical information and indicators throughout the operations as well as recommend changes to DISO plans. 3-11. MDOs have a special responsibility to keep deception and OPSEC closely synchronized. Both deception and OPSEC work closely together in the holistic portrayal of friendly activities. Deception activities often receive support from focused OPSEC measures and countermeasures that protect their existence. This support includes close cooperation in the targeting or exploitation of enemy conduits so they are either neutralized or available as required to create the desired OPSEC and deception effects. Sustain Internal Deception Synchronization Between the Planning Team and Commander 3-12. Deception executions, while planned in detail, do not remain static activities on an access-controlled deception event schedule or operational-level synch matrix. The MDO maintains constant communication with internal components, capability owners, and other resource providers tasked to execute or support each event so the portrayal of the deception story proceeds as planned. This includes operational-level tasks— such as synchronizing different deception lines of effort and balancing or shifting lines of effort as appropriate—to sustain the desired story progression. Based on feedback, the MDO may adjust, repeat, postpone, or cancel some planned executions or event series.

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Preparation and Execution Sustain Intelligence Collection during Deception Execution 3-13. Working with the G-2 collection manager enables internal synchronization of the deception plan. This helps ensure information collection assets are in position to collect MOPs and monitor MOEs and indicators as outlined in the plan. This synchronization also informs the commander on its status, current levels of success, and revised risk. During combat operations in particular, the MDO actively monitors intelligence collection. Monitor and Assess for Compromise and Counterdeception 3-14. Using the target feedback provided by MOEs collection, in conjunction with the assessment process, the MDO determines the current progression and success of the deception plan. Specially trained intelligence analysts, supported by MDOs, remain alert for indicators of compromised components of a deception story. Compromise includes the identification of any possible enemy counterdeception efforts. Deception compromise, when detected, may lead to one or more termination or exploitation scenarios. Keep the Commander Informed 3-15. The status of the deception operation is part of the commander’s routine battlefield update and assessment processes. As the principal authority for the execution of the plan, the commander has responsibility for any decision to alter, terminate, or change the deception or primary COA to exploit changing conditions. Deception also factors largely in the overall computation of operational risk. Increased risk might generate a requirement for adjustment to the plan in other areas. Maintain Strict Security and Access Controls Throughout 3-16. Effective forces practice tight security throughout execution to protect the deception plan and its execution. While commanders make many decisions in the planning process on a need to know basis, situations can arise that require external expertise or input, such as legal and policy interpretations. The commander decides who has a need to know and applies appropriate controls to limit the compromise of any deception. To decide, the commander, informed by the MDO, balances mission against prudent risk to determine security limits and parameters. In the intense and fluid activity of managing complex military operations, it becomes even more critical for all involved personnel to apply appropriate classification, handling, and access controls on a daily basis. Staffs should immediately report any OPSEC or other security violations of the deception plan at any level (strategic, operational, or tactical) to the MDO and OPSEC planner. They will evaluate the violation for potential impact. MANAGING THE EXECUTION OF THE DECEPTION PLAN 3-17. Once the commander orders the execution of the deception, staffs begin implementing the plan in a dynamic environment. The implementing order can require immediate execution, or it may provide an effective start date in coordination with other operations or events. 3-18. The MDO is the controlling planner for its execution. Continuity of key personnel as the deception moves from a plan to an actual operation ensures that the people executing the deception understand all its conceptual nuances, the inherent risks, and the underlying intentions and techniques behind each planned deception event. The controlling planner oversees the implementation of the specific deception events in accordance with the deception event schedule and continuously monitors the deception operation as part of the developing situation, evaluating the deception at each stage. The planner responds to developments with recommendations as to how the operation should proceed. As a result of the recommendations on the actual situation, the commander can add, delete, or modify scheduled deception events. 3-19. Because of the extreme sensitivity of deception plans, if the plan requires more than minor adjustments, the original approving authority must approve the revised plan before execution begins. Changes that impact the deception goal, the deception objective, or the commander’s guidance should not be considered as minor. Before initiating the plan, planners refer any requirements for plan changes that affect earlier assessments of the probability of deception success or alter the degree of risk initially associated with the operation to the commander. However, planners can consider minor changes that involve the timing or sequence of individual

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Chapter 3 deception events based on actual operational conditions so long as they do not significantly alter the basic operational flow of the deception. 3-20. Once planners review and validate the deception event schedule and supporting worksheets, the controlling planner synchronizes the implementation of the plan. During implementation, participating units and resources normally receive tasks through traditional command operational and intelligence tasking channels. Occasionally, the controlling planner may directly engage participants outside the normal tasking channels when special communications channels are required to protect sensitive means and sources that reside outside normal command channels. 3-21. The controlling planner monitors feedback indicators at each stage and regulates the scheduling and intensity of deception operations. At times, the controlling planner may need to delay or accelerate planned deception events or, if the situation requires, add measures to achieve desired enemy perceptions in the time indicated by the commander’s overall plan. The controlling planner informs the commander and the chief of operations of the status of all synchronization requirements associated with the execution of the deception. An inability to execute the deception with timing needs of other operations may prompt termination of a deception operation. Monitoring the Deception Operation 3-22. As with most plans, the quality of a deception plan directly relates to the validity of assumptions concerning the situation at the start of the operation. Validating such assumptions with current information is essential to any monitoring activity. Before starting the operation, staffs continually monitor the general situation and submit RFIs to confirm or deny assumptions concerning the conditions under which forces initiate the deception operation. Such pre-operational monitoring may prompt the start time for execution. 3-23. Four types of monitoring activities occurs for a deception operation (see figure 3-1). Monitoring the developing situation to ensure that the deception concept continues to correspond to actual conditions is the first activity. A second type of monitoring involves observing the effects of the deception operation at each stage of execution. This monitoring consists of obtaining the necessary feedback to trace the progress of the deception in line with the deception event and execution schedule. The third type of monitoring provides the means for assessing the need to terminate the deception operation for reasons other than mission accomplishment. The fourth type of monitoring activity detects and traces unintended consequences of the deception operation. Such consequences can be positive or negative and may involve either the deception itself or other operations. MDOs may use data on unintentional effects to adjust the deception or take advantage of new opportunities.  Monitor developing situation  Observe the effects  Provide assessment means  Detect and trace consequences Figure 3-1. Monitoring activities 3-24. To achieve the level of synchronized activity that the deception operation demands, the controlling planner monitors the general military situation together with the systematic execution of the deception. The controlling planner also understands and evaluates the status of the deception operation in the full context of the overall operation as well as how deception activities are proceeding. At the same time, MDOs keep higher command echelons that direct and coordinate theater-wide and strategic deception operations informed regarding the execution of the command’s deception. Controlling the Deception Operation 3-25. Although monitoring requirements are extensive, control remains the central issue of execution. Control involves making decisions to conduct each activity as specified by the plan or to change the plan to

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Preparation and Execution align it to changes in the situation or the target’s responses. Terminating the deception is the final control action in the execution of the operation. 3-26. Control consists of the series of implementing decisions and actions undertaken during the course of a deception operation. MDOs project many of these activities during the planning stage as a part of the natural progression of events envisioned in the deception event and execution schedule. Other decisions are dictated by the course of events revealed during monitoring. Centralized control over deception activities is imperative to ensure synchronous operations and the integration of deception in a manner that does not conflict with other operations. This principle requires close coordination among deception support elements operating at various levels of command. Authority to implement changes to various aspects of the deception operation must be specified in the deception plan. 3-27. Throughout the execution of the deception plan, the controlling planner remains prepared to support the commander with sound recommendations when operations reach decision points. If the deception plan has a progression of specific phases, with each new phase contingent on the success of the preceding phase, and the commander’s approval is required for the execution of each phase, then the commander will need to know the specific status of the deception operation at each approval phase. If it becomes apparent that the deception story is not being successfully transmitted, the deception story is not eliciting the desired action from the target, or the deception is not synched with larger operational requirements, then the controlling planner may recommend to the commander to adjust the operation to fit alternative opportunities or to terminate it. If the assessed operational risk increases during the execution, the controlling planner addresses this change with the commander and provides a recommendation as to how the operation should proceed. TERMINATING MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONS 3-28. The termination of a deception is concerned with ending the deception in a way that protects both the short- and long-term interests of the command. Planners rarely know in advance the exact circumstances that will require termination of a deception plan. Consequently, termination preparations are a continuous process that span the planning and execution of the deception. When the commander decides to terminate, the termination concept that planners developed and refined during previous phases becomes the basis for a deliberate series of termination actions. These actions are designed to advantageously end the operation while protecting employed means and techniques. 3-29. The actions involved in termination include— * The organized cessation of deception activities. * The protected withdrawal of deception means. * After action assessments and reports. All three actions of termination occur whether or not the operation achieves its objective and whether or not the deception plan remains concealed. In developing the deception plan, planners determine conditions and provisions for the termination of the operation. The termination concept outlines alternative reasons and methods for terminating the operation, such as indications that the deception objective will not be reached or operational situations indicating that the goal is no longer valid. Termination planning anticipates the commander’s need to avoid the compromise of deception means and methods, and it anticipates the levels of risk acceptable to sources and means before recommending termination. 3-30. When the commander orders termination, the selected termination concept becomes the basis for final termination actions. These actions conclude the operation in line with the deception events that have been executed, the assessed state of awareness of the target, and the commander’s specific termination objectives at the time. Termination of a deception also encompasses evaluation and reporting. After action assessment should be conducted by the MDO. This assessment provides the commander with an objective basis for determining the degree of mission success and for improving future deception plans. Because important information on various elements of the deception may continue to become available over a long time, a series of interim after action reports may be required before making a final assessment. The after action report provides a comprehensive overview of the deception as it was planned to work and actually conducted.

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Chapter 4 Assessment ASSESSMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 4-1. One primary responsibility of the MDO involves assessing the effectiveness of deception and DISO in achieving supported command objectives. Assessment is the continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation, and execution—and evaluation of the current situation to measure the overall effectiveness of the operation. An essential and resource-intensive aspect of any successful deception, MDOs consider assessment from the initiation of planning. Planners avoid developing deception objectives that cannot be associated with a progressive and observable enemy response into a more detailed deception concept or subsequent execution. Deception is assessed in the same manner as other operations: using MOPs to determine if a deception event was executed according to plan and using MOEs to determine if the event created the desired impact or effect. In deception, MOPs involve everything up to and including delivery of the observable (filtered or unfiltered) to the deception target. 4-2. Accurately assessing MOEs for deception is complicated by the fact that MDOs need to measure desired changes in perception, as well as the action or inaction manifested by their success. MDOs develop MOEs that measure effectiveness, efficiency, and adaptability using the following guide: * Appropriate: MOEs should correlate to the target’s objectives. * Mission-related: MOEs must correlate to the mission. * Measurable: Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than qualitative MOEs, and hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use. * Useful: MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond at decision points identified in the deception plan. 4-3. Because of this complexity, a detailed assessment plan accompanies each planned deception event. A detailed assessment plan includes MOPs, MOEs, and coordination with the G-2 for information collection assets to collect and report indicators in real time. Every assessment plan begins with a baseline—the point from which assessments are measured. Planners can generate a baseline from an initial survey, poll, or estimate or establish a baseline from a specific time or event. 4-4. The MDO also has responsibility for continually reassessing the deception objective, target, story, and events to ensure they are still important to the achievement of the mission objectives. Monitoring activities include, but are not limited to— * Monitoring and evaluating the deception to ensure it continues to support operations. * Evaluating how the target is acting or not acting in response to the deception story. * Monitoring for unintended consequences resulting from the deception. * Determining when termination criteria are met. 4-5. Planners consider how to assess a deception plan at the start of the planning process. A plan to assess a deception informs the commander if the operation is being executed as planned and achieving the desired results. As part of the evidence-based approach to decision making, assessment is integral to the planning process, and it must be designed as part of the initial planning process once the commander’s intent has been articulated. By integrating assessment into the planning cycle, staff can identify potential second- and third- order effects and unintended consequences.

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Chapter 4 ASSESSMENT PLAN 4-6. An MDO develops an assessment plan using the following steps: * Design an assessment plan. * Develop a data collection plan and an analysis plan. * Collect and treat data. * Analyze, interpret, and make recommendations. DESIGN AN ASSESSMENT PLAN 4-7. An MDO designs an assessment plan at the initial planning phase of the operation. This should be integral to the planning process. Assessment design typically uses two types of feedback: * Target feedback: information, analytical determinations, and evidence (MOEs) that the target is acting or preparing to act on the deception. * Conduit feedback: information and evidence (MOEs) that the conduits receive, process, and transmit to elements of the deception. This feedback is also referred to as operational feedback. An effective design includes indicators of whether the target is receiving the deception story as planned. It also includes indicators of whether the target is acting in accordance with the deception objective. DEVELOP A DATA COLLECTION PLAN AND AN ANALYSIS PLAN 4-8. An MDO designs a collection plan during the planning phase of the operation. This not only articulates the procedure by which indicators should be collected, but also the time-sensitive monitoring of indicators as they relate to the measurable outcome. Alongside the collection plan, MDOs design an analysis plan at the initial stage of deception planning. This analysis plan identifies the analytical techniques used to analyze the collected evidence. COLLECT AND TREAT DATA 4-9. The DWG continuously collects and treats data during the execution phase of the operation. First, the group establishes a baseline prior to the execution phase beginning and continuously monitors the collection plan. All assessments require a baseline. A pre-operation baseline is used to gauge progress during the operation against eventual outcomes post-operation. If the deception plan does not establish a baseline, the staff cannot determine what has changed as part of the deception plan or understand eventual success or failure. ANALYZE, INTERPRET, AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS 4-10. The DWG continuously analyzes, interprets, and makes recommendations during the execution phase of the operation, but a final assessment after the operation is required. If the MDO designed the deception plan correctly—with a robust analysis plan based on a mixed methods approach to collect and monitor the necessary evidence—then the final assessment should be robust. This is important as the final assessment informs the realization of the effect being sought as part of the overall OPLAN. The deception assessment contributes to the overall evidence that informs the commander’s decision-making process. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE DEVELOPMENT 4-11. The development of deception MOEs and MOPs differs slightly from similar processes for other capabilities. One way to easily conceptualize MOEs and MOPs for deception involves using the see-think- do methodology. MOEs are associated with think and do: what perceptions and conclusions did the enemy draw from a particular observable (alone or in the context of other observations)? Are those perceptions leading toward the desired action or inaction captured in a deception objective? MOPs are most closely associated with see: did friendly forces portray the planned indicator? Did the enemy see the execution and transmit the desired message to the deception target creating an observable?

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Assessment 4-12. MOE development and collection for deception focuses on the current cognitive state of the deception target. The enemy’s cognitive state can be measured in one of two ways. First, it uses the evaluation of known comments or public statements by the decision maker. Second, it identifies and monitors the flow of enemy (particularly the target’s) activity to determine patterns of behavior that indicate the deception target’s susceptibility to being moved toward the desired perception and subsequent action or inaction. The baseline provides the first indication that friendly forces can affect the target in the manner that meets the desired effect. However, the knowledge of this activity occurring or not occurring may not be easily available or discernible. Sometimes, it will manifest itself at the very moment a particular effect in the deception plan is required; thus, the controlling planner remains vigilant to indicators that suggest the current cognitive state of the target has in some manner changed. 4-13. MOP collection for deception involves two conceptual steps: * Determining that the tasked friendly unit or capability employed the desired means to create an indicator at the appropriate time and location. * Verifying that the intended enemy conduits cued on the friendly signature, transmitted the collected data, and delivered the information to the deception target in a discernable context. These two steps define the difference between a deception MOP and a traditional MOP (one that asks if friendly forces performed the directed action). Part of every successful deception execution involves action by the enemy. The conduit that the deception seeks to exploit must function. 4-14. MDOs determine a deception event schedule from reporting channels. The MDO coordinates this reporting with the element controlling a particular execution as a part of finalizing the plan for appropriate access and security controls. Verifying that the enemy conduit functioned as planned and that the desired information reached the deception target requires focused and coordinated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. Using their previous conduit analysis work, MDOs, supporting intelligence analysts, and the intelligence collection manager collaborate. They identify points at which the information transmission might fall susceptible to enemy monitoring and analysis. The presence of filters in the conduit pathway makes this verification process difficult because predicting the level of data aggregation or synthesis with other friendly observables is subjective at best. In some cases, the appearance of an anticipated MOE might be the only validation that a persuasive observable was accurately received and perceived. 4-15. To provide the commander with the information to adjust plans as needed based on timely MOEs, the G-2 and MDO coordinate. For example, if one deception objective is for the enemy to hold the armored reserve away from the decisive point of ground action, then MDOs develop MOEs related to achieving that objective. MOE examples related to the action or inaction of the reserve might include such things as— * An increase or decrease in preparation of defensive positions (implying a period of static activity). * An increase or decrease in enemy intelligence collection in the vicinity of a friendly main axis of advance at the expense of other sectors (is the enemy “telegraphing” an interest?). * An increase or decrease in route reconnaissance toward the friendly sector by armored reserve units or leadership (is this pending or an active branch plan?). * An increase or decrease in battle drill or movement rehearsal by the enemy reserve. 4-16. Without the close support of the G-2 and a deliberate focus on the development of viable MOEs and MOPs as part of the deception plan, the success or failure of the deception might not be known until the moment that a planned enemy action or inaction is turned against friendly forces. This could result in a loss of initiative or increased friendly loss of life.

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Appendix A Counterdeception COUNTERDECEPTION PLANNING A-1. Enemies can use deception to mislead friendly analysts and decision makers about their activities, capabilities, or intent to offset a friendly superiority or gain some other operational advantage. Counterdeception is efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation (JP 3-13.4). Successful friendly decision makers know of enemy deception activities to formulate informed and coordinated responses and, more importantly, avoid placing friendly forces at an operational disadvantage. Counterdeception contributes to situational awareness by protecting friendly systems and decision makers from responding to deceptive manipulation or faulty analysis of an operational environment. Counterdeception applies across the range of military operations in which enemies might use deception in an attempt to alter friendly activities or even achieve operational surprise during hostilities. A-2. Knowledge of an enemy’s deception plan enables a commander to act appropriately against the deception. It provides friendly forces an opportunity to gain valuable insight into the means used to portray the deception. It also provides friendly forces a chance to analyze enemy deception targets and objectives as indicators of the broader context in which the enemy views friendly forces and operations. Counterdeception becomes a tool for influencing those perceptions and could subsequently be turned effectively against the enemy. DETECTING ENEMY DECEPTION A-3. The intelligence warfighting function plays a central role in identifying enemy deception operations. MDOs can assist in this effort. Trained deception personnel should be postured and have access to information, intelligence data, analytical support, and intelligence products during the deployment and execution of friendly operations. To identify enemy deception, trained deception personnel must first understand the enemy’s deception doctrine, techniques, capabilities, and limitations. Knowing previous methods the enemy has used deception is also important. The MDO collaborates with the G-2 to collect and provide this information as part of the deception running estimate. Understanding the enemy’s operational objectives; normal operational profiles; posture; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and intent are also crucial to identifying tactical or operational indicators of possible deception. The MDO can use the friendly OPSEC doctrinal construct of signature, association, profile, contrast, and exposure to assess enemy activity for its congruency with known patterns or expectations based on the evolving operational situation. Indicators of potential deception can range from a dedicated analyst’s intuitive sense that “something is amiss” to the outright compromise of deceptive means, methods, or activity by friendly intelligence collection assets. Properly balancing tactical and operational indicators with strategic assumptions is also important. Planners can reduce potential surprise if their estimates weigh tactical indicators more heavily than strategic assumptions in some phases of the operation. Dismissing tactical indicators or other minor contrasts because they conflict with friendly biases and preconceptions may allow a hostile deception to succeed. CONFIRMING ENEMY DECEPTION A-4. If intelligence reveals or suggests an enemy deception activity, the staff must fully analyze the situation and ensure that this intelligence and its potential impact on the friendly operation are presented to the commander. One method to analyze the situation involves forming a working group to analyze, review, and determine the deceptive activity. This working group could include the MDOs, G-2 analysts, red team members, G-3 planners, and others with knowledge of suspected enemy deception means or methods. If it has not already been done, the working group analyzes vulnerability to enemy deception using the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions. The group then uses information and intelligence available through

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Appendix A the intelligence enterprise to determine the enemy deception plan. Using the deception planning methodology of see-think-do, the working group might use an abbreviated war-gaming process to construct enemy deception goals and objectives, targets, desired perceptions and deception story narrative, probable events and means, conduits, and anticipated MOEs. Deception planners then use outputs of this technique to focus friendly intelligence collection assets that confirm or deny the existence and scope of an actual enemy deception plan and related executions. COUNTERING OR EXPLOITING ENEMY DECEPTION A-5. After confirming an enemy’s deception operation, the working group has two primary functions. It first examines past information collection, intelligence production, and intelligence analysis to determine the impact the deception may have had on friendly planning, decision making, or current operational activities. The outputs of the working group inform future COAs or counterdeception planning. Second, the working group develops and presents proposed counterdeception COAs to the commander. Each COA involves a different level of risk or opportunity that must be weighed in the overall context of the operation and commander’s desired end state. Based on risks, commanders can ignore, expose, exploit, or defeat enemy deception efforts. A-6. Commanders ignore the deception if acknowledging the deception compromises friendly deception identification capabilities. Such a compromise of friendly capabilities might lead to future improvements in enemy deception capabilities. This scenario requires a working group to continue to identify deceptive indicators and base the friendly force operational decision making and subsequent activity on actual enemy capability, activity, or intent. A-7. Commanders might choose to publicly expose the deception to embarrass the enemy or increase risk within an enemy’s operational cost and benefit analysis. Through exposure, the enemy might be persuaded that its deception operations are futile, too costly, or too risky to continue. Exposure of a deception prior to combat operations might also serve to weaken the enemy’s political or military position with allies or domestic audiences. A-8. An exploitation of enemy deception focuses on forcing an enemy to expend resources and continue deception operations by reinforcing the perception that friendly forces are unaware of the deception. In this scenario, friendly forces provide positive MOEs that the deception is having the desired effect until the culminating point of the enemy’s deception (their desired “do or not do” for one friendly operational capability) and then reacting in an unexpected manner that turns the enemy’s anticipated advantage against itself. A-9. Defeating the enemy deception effort could involve destroying or degrading the enemy’s deception capabilities and resources so it cannot sustain its portrayal of the deception story. Like the other potential COAs, this outcome ideally includes a war-gaming step to identify possible second- and third-order effects and associated risk.

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Appendix B Input to Operation Plans and Orders APPENDIX 14 (MILITARY DECEPTION) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS) DIRECTIONS B-1. Appendixes are information management tools. They simplify orders by providing a structure for organizing information. FM 6-0 discusses the organizational structure for appendixes to Army to OPLANs and OPORDs. Staffs list appendixes under an appropriate heading at the end of the document they expand. For example, Appendix 14 (Military Deception) is to Annex C (Operations). This appendix describes how deception supports operations described in the base plan or order. Some additional considerations for writing the Appendix 14 include the following: * Access to Appendix 14 is typically on a need to know basis, which means limiting access to those individuals who are involved in planning, approving, or executing deceptions and must have knowledge of the military deception to perform their duties. * The deception appendix will normally be developed, published, distributed, and maintained separately. * Staffs do not use normal administrative procedures to distribute or staff the deception appendix. Only positive control means, such as hand-to-hand delivery, will be used to distribute deception related material. APPENDIX TEMPLATE B-2. Commanders and staffs use Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) to OPLANs and OPORDs to describe how deception will support operations described in the base plan or order. See figure B-1 for a sample format instructions. The italicized font in figure B-1 explains the information that commanders and staffs complete. MILITARY DECEPTION References: List documents essential to this tab. a.Maps and charts b.Other relevant documents Task Organization: (If applicable) Information and intelligence provided here must be focused and plan-specific. Do not reiterate information available in the base plan. 1.Situation. Summarize situational information relevant to the execution of the deception. a. General. Identify the overall purpose of the deception plan. In one paragraph briefly identify the commander’s intent in employing deception—what the deception plan is designed to accomplish. Specifically identify the friendly operation it will support. Identify any phasing for the conduct of operations. Briefly state the expected results if the plan is successful. b.Enemy. Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations)

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Appendix B (1)Enemy Intent. Identify the assessed enemy goal or condition (favorable or unfavorable, as perceived through the opponent’s perspective) that this deception plan is designed to counter or exploit. (2) General Capabilities. Identify significant enemy military capabilities that can affect the overall operations in general and the deception plan in particular. (a) Enemy Intelligence Organizations. Identify intelligence organizations, missions, and capabilities for covert and clandestine operations. Include collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. Specifically note those organizations most likely to provide intelligence to the targeted decision maker and those tasked with exposing deception. (b) Enemy Counterintelligence Organizations. Identify enemy missions, capabilities, and operations. (c) Enemy Intelligence Sharing with Other Countries. Identify other intelligence organizations available to the enemy, the nature of intelligence exchange, and the potential for using that relationship for the deception. (d) Other Sources and Related Matters. Identify scientific, technical, diplomatic, or academic contacts that might act as information conduits. (e) Enemy Deception and Denial Activities. Provide an analysis of the enemy’s use of deception and denial supporting its political and military goals. Identify the enemy’s deception and denial methods as well as current deception and denial activities. (3)Deception Targets. Describe the decision maker targeted by the deception plan. Include personality, strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and people or factors known to influence decisions. (4)Target Biases and Predispositions. Briefly describe those biases and predispositions of the target that the deception plan is targeting for exploitation. (5)Probable Enemy Course of Action. Refer to Annex B. (6)Enemy Ability to Respond. Discuss the ability of the target to respond to the deception. Discuss how the enemy has previously responded to similar events, conditions, and circumstances. (7) Probable Enemy Courses of Action without the Deception. Discuss probable enemy courses of action and their possible results if deception is not used. c.Friendly. Summarize the friendly situation, critical limitation, and concept of operations. (1) Provide information on activities by unwitting friendly forces having an impact on the deception. Compare the time necessary to collect, process, report, and analyze intelligence (in support of deception) with the plan’s operational timeline. Assess the impact here. (2)Identify required capabilities and capacities for collection and identify shortfalls. Consider current collectors’ actual capacities in relation to the projected volume of information requirements. d. Assumptions. State the assumptions concerning friendly, enemy, or third-party capabilities, limitations, or courses of action. State conditions that the commander believes will exist during execution. e.Information Requirements. Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

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Input to Operation Plans and Orders (1) Identify requirements, including those of subordinate commanders, for pre-execution and execution phases of the planned operation. (2)List questions and answers required for further planning and as a basis for decision on execution. (3) List the additional priority intelligence requirements and other intelligence requirements that become relevant upon execution. (Use additional paragraphs if necessary to reflect differing requirements during planned phases of the operation.) 2.Mission. Identify the task and purpose for the deception. a.Operational Mission. Briefly state the operational mission that the deception operation supports. b. Deception Mission. Briefly identify the general purpose of the deception mission, including the desired actions that the deception target is expected to take. Identify how friendly capabilities, situations, conditions, or operations will be improved or protected if the target commits the desired actions. (1) Deception Goal. Precisely state the commander’s purpose of the deception operation as it contributes to the command’s mission objectives. (2) Deception Objectives. Precisely state the intended effect of the deception on the target in terms of the specific action or inaction the deception operation is expected to elicit from the target. State, exactly, what friendly forces want the target to do or not to do with its forces, capabilities, and operations. (3)Enemy Perceptions. Precisely identify the key conclusions, estimates, or assumptions that the target will have to accept as being true in order for it to act in accordance with the deception objective. (4) Deception Story. Briefly outline the friendly actions to portray to cause the deception target to acquire the desired perceptions. The deception story is presented in a style that replicates what the target would expect to read in his own intelligence estimates of the “enemy” situation (typically no more than a short paragraph). 3.Execution. a.Concept of Operations. Identify how the deception operation supports the commander’s overall concept of operations. Describe how the deception is integrated into the supporting plan. If applicable, list how the deception operation will be phased. (1) General. Generally describe the framework for the operation. Include a brief description of the phases of the deception. (2)Other Capabilities or Activities. Discuss the use of other capabilities and activities in support of the deception plan. Discuss all other capabilities and activities plans and operations pertinent to the deception. Include coordination required to deconflict if necessary. (3)Feedback and Monitoring. Provide a general statement of the type of feedback expected, if any, and how it will be collected (monitored). Identify the effect of no feedback. Identify the friendly capability to identify and collect plan-specific feedback information. (a) Operational Feedback. Identify specific intelligence operations and indicators that will be monitored to determine if deception events are being sensed by enemy intelligence collection, analytical, or dissemination systems. Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

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Appendix B (b)Analytical Feedback. Identify specific expected actions or inactions. (4) Executions to be Conducted and Means. Briefly outline the general framework for the deception operation and the means to employ. Identify and provide a general description of the types of executions and means used to portray them for each operational phase. If applicable, include the timelines for major phase executions. Use the deception event schedule to describe specific executions and events in order. (5)Risks. Give a brief risk analysis in the categories given below. Rate risk as low, medium, or high in each category. (a)Deception is successful. Include likely enemy response. Describe impact on friendly forces from enemy intelligence sharing. (b)Deception fails. Describe the impact if the target ignores the deception or fails in some way to take the actions intended. (c)Deception is compromised to allies or enemies. Describe impact on friendly forces from enemy intelligence compromise. (6)Termination. Provide detailed instructions on conditions for termination, actions to be taken (must be reflected in Exhibit 2 (Execution Schedule)), or emergency if there is unintended disclosure or compromise. Focus on the termination “story” to be used if the deception succeeds, is compromised, or is ended by the friendly commander. b.Tasks. Specify execution and feedback tasks to organizations participating in the deception operation. Identify how collection managers will support planners and analysts. c.Coordinating Instructions. Identify any tasks or instructions pertaining to two or more of the units listed in the preceding subparagraphs. List the tentative D-day and H-hour, if applicable, and any other information required to ensure coordinated action between two or more elements of the command. 4.Administration and Logistics. State instructions regarding administrative and logistics support procedures used in developing, coordinating, and implementing the deception plan. Do not include those administrative, logistics, and medical actions or ploys that are an actual part of the deception operation. a.Administration. (1) General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities. (2)Specific. Detail any special administrative measures required for executing the deception plan. b. Logistics. Detail logistics requirements required for executing such as the transportation of special material or provision of printing equipment and materials. Do not include executions conducted by logistics elements as part of the portrayal of observables. c.Costs. Note if applicable. 5.Command and Control. a.Command Relationships. Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

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Input to Operation Plans and Orders (2) Authority. Designate supported and supporting commanders as well as supporting agencies as applicable. (3) Oversight. Detail oversight responsibilities particularly for executions by nonorganic units or organizations outside the chain of command. (4) Coordination. Identify coordination responsibilities and requirements related to deception events and execution feedback. Address in-theater and out of theater requirements. b. Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems. Detail communications means and procedures to be used by control personnel and participants in the deception plan. Include all reporting requirements. 6.Security. a.General. Outline general procedures to be employed during planning, coordination, and implementation of deception activities. b. Specific. State access restrictions, handling instructions, and authority to grant access to the deception appendix or plan. Describe use of cover stories if applicable, code words, nicknames, and procedures for planning and execution documents. If required, place access rosters and other detailed security considerations in a separate document. As a general policy, any material related to planned, ongoing, or completed deception is accorded controlled access. Address essential elements of friendly information, indicators to be managed, and protective measures. Figure B-1. Sample Appendix 14 (Military Deception) to Annex C (Operations) (continued)

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Appendix C Deception Evaluation Checklist G-3 EVALUATION CHECKLIST C-1. The G-3 completes an evaluation after a deception. The evaluation checklist can include the following questions: * What integration of deception operations into tactical maneuvers occurred? * Did the OPSEC annex support the deception annex? * Was the deception annex to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations? * Were individuals at all echelons identified and aware of their responsibilities in relation to deception activities? * What were the required unit tasks? * How was the deception annex coordinated? Was it complementary? * Did it address a common list of indicators that required either display or concealment? * Did other supporting annexes contain option choices addressed in the deception annex without alluding to deceptive intent? * Does the deception annex address main and alternate COAs in the basic operational concept? * Were surveys conducted of both concealed sensitive indicators (OPSEC) and displayed deceptive indicators to access visibility? * What was the deception objective?  Did the deception objective closely support the objective of the tactical operation?  Did the deception objective support corresponding OPSEC objectives?  Were phase-out actions planned to disguise that deception was used?  Was an implementing schedule prepared?  Did the implementing schedule identify the start and finish times of event, location, unit involved, and means to be used? * What was the deception story?  Was it employed as planned?  Did the deception story provide adequate information to deter the enemy from taking undesirable actions?  Was the story flexible enough to allow changes during its execution to take advantage of unexpected enemy actions? * Did compromise of intent of deception or OPSEC activity occur?  If yes, what was the compromise?  If yes, did the compromise degrade the overall success of the operation? * What were the essential elements of friendly information and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen? * What deception technique was employed?  Were communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures or command, control, and communications protection measures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?  Were non-communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures planned for and used? What was the desired effect?

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Appendix C  If non-electronics deception techniques (reconnaissance, engineer activities, and so forth) were used, what was the desired effect of the techniques? * What resources (personnel, equipment, and time) were tasked to conduct operations with deceptive intent? * Were sufficient resources available? * What was the experience level of deception element personnel? * What specific deception items (dummies, decoys, and so forth) were constructed, used, and how? How many were used? * What other resources or services were required? Were they available? * What real missions could not be accomplished because these resources were being used for deception? * Do the benefits of deception justify any loss of operational resources? * Were dedicated, secured communications lines and other means of transmission of the plan available? Were they adequate? * Was sufficient time available to formulate, write, and execute the deception and OPSEC plans? * What were the results of deception activities? * Did the deception assist in the successful execution of the overall operation? G-2 EVALUATION CHECKLIST C-2. The G-2 completes an evaluation after a deception. The evaluation checklist can include the following questions: * Were deception and OPSEC annexes to the OPLAN written to support tactical operations? * Does intelligence have an established enemy database and an understanding of enemy doctrine? * Was there awareness of enemy intelligence capabilities and collection schedules? * What were the priority intelligence requirements and information requirements for the deception and OPSEC plans? * What intelligence activities were targeted at discovering deceptions in progress against friendly forces? * What intelligence activities were targeted to determine enemy reaction to friendly deceptions? * What enemy activities were identified as being deception related? Why? * What was the deception story?  At what level of the enemy organization was it focused?  Did the deception story cause the enemy decision maker to make the desired decision?  Was the story consistent with the friendly unit’s tactical doctrine, established patterns, and normal operational sequences?  Was the story consistent with the target’s perception of the friendly unit’s real capabilities?  Did the story permit verification by various enemy collection systems? * What countersurveillance techniques were used to deny the enemy knowledge of true intentions and evaluate indicator visibility? * What were the essential elements of friendly information and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen? * What deception steps were employed?  If communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures or command, control, and communications protection measures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?  If non-communications-electronics deception and electronic counter-countermeasures were planned for and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?  If non-electronics deception techniques (reconnaissance, engineer activities, and so forth) were used, what was the desired effect of the techniques?