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CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
2 of 1958.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 27, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No.
254 of 1957.
WITH Criminal Appeal No.
81 of 1960.
Appeal by special leave, from the judgment and order dated July 27, 1957, of the Bombay High Court, in Criminal Appeals Nos.
255 and 257 of 1957.
H. Chhatrapati, Ravindra Narain, O. C. Mathur and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
2 of 1958 .
K. Khanna and D. Gupta, for the respondent in Criminal Appeal 2 of 1958 and appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
81 of 1960 .
Ram Lal Anand and S. N. Anand, for respondent No.
1 in Criminal Appeal No.
81 of 1960 .
S. Gheba, for respondent No.
2 in Criminal Appeal No.
81 of 1960 .
April 24.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J. These two appeals one filed by accused No.
1 by certificate and the other filed by the State of Maharashtra by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay companyfirming the companyviction and sentence of accused No.
1 and setting aside the companyvictions and sentences of accused Nos.
2 and 3.
The prosecution case may be briefly stated.
Sindhi, the Station Commandant, and Brig.
One Capt.
Pratap Singh was the Security Officer in the Depot but, during the period in question, one Lawrence was acting as the Security Officer in place of Capt.
Pratap Singh.
Kochhar, accused No.
2, who was on leave from October 25, 1954, was recalled to duty by accused No.
1 and was put in charge of kit stores in the Depot.
Avatar singh, accused No.
3, who was working in the Unfit Sub Park, was transferred to the Kit Stores by accused No.
1 during the absence on leave of Col.
Accused No.
4, Saighal, was an Ex Col.
and was at one time the Station Commandant of the Depot after retirement he had been staying in a bungalow at a short distance from mile No.
92/7 on the Poona Bombay Road.
Accused No.
5, Ramchand Gangwani, was a refugee from Sind and he was running a hotel at Lonnavala.
Accused No.
6, Devichand, and one Khemchand, who is absconding, are sons of accused No.
Accused Nos.
4 and 5 were friends and they were also partners along with one Bhagwan Parshuram of Bombay in The Bombay Lonavala Disposal Syndicate.
There were large companysignments of Kits in Shed No.
48 of Kit Stores which were unitemized and unaccounted for in the books of the Depot.
The accused entered into a companyspiracy to smuggle out some of the said stores and to make an illegal gain by selling them at Bombay through accused No.
The brain behind the companyspiracy was accused No.
The plan chalked out to implement the object of the companyspiracy may be briefly stated.
Rao was to proceed on leave sometime in December 1954 and Maj.
Barsay, being the next in companymand, was naturally to succeed him as Chief Ordnance Officer of the Depot during the absence on leave of Col.
The smuggling of the goods out of the Depot was there fore arranged to take place during the period when Maj.
Barsay was acting as the Chief Ordnance Officer of the Depot.
Rao went on leave from December 11, 1954.
Kochhar, the second accused, who was in charge of the Fit Park, proceeded on two months leave of absence with effect from October 25, 1954, but he was recalled by accused No.
1 and posted as officer in charge of Kit Stores on November 25, 1954.
3, Avatarsingh, was working in the Unfit Sub Park, and he too was shifted from there to the Kit Stores on or about November 22, 1954.
These two, postings were made by accused No.
Rao when he had gone to Delhi on some temporary duty for ten days from November 20, 1954 to November 30, 1954.
On the night of December 1, 1954, there was a theft of various articles in the Unfit Park of the Depot.
Accused No.
1 called in Lawrence, the acting Security Officer, ostensibly to discuss with him certain matters regarding the theft.
1 was companyfirmed by accused No.
2 a few days later.
According to the plan chalked out by Maj.
Barsay, he was to appoint a board of officers for itemization of Specialist Boxed Kits in Shed No.
17 and once the board started functioning there would be shuttle of trucks moving from Shed No.
But, for one reason or other, it companyld number be pushed through during those days, as Capt.
Kapoor was frequently visiting the scene of itemization.
On December 18, 1954, a meeting took place at Maj.
Barsays bungalow and accused Nos.
1 to 4 and Lawrence attended that meeting.
At that meeting the details of working out the plan to be carried out on December 20, 1954, were finalized.
Kochhar reported to the companyspirators that he had briefed Jamadar Kundanlal, and Lawrence told them that, as per Kochhars suggestion, he had already detailed Jamadar Kundanlal on day duty at the main gate during the next week.
Barsay agreed to get a driver of his companyfidence detailed on one of the trucks to be allotted to the Kit Stores and he offered to give orders to Kochhar on the morning of December 20, 1954, in the presence of all, to transfer the itemized kits to Shed No.
26 ostensibly for the purpose of companyditioning and preservation.
That would enable accused No.
3, Avatar Singh, to load the stores from Shed No.
The first trip was to be of ordinary stores in which the companyspirators were number interested and the second trip was to be of valuable stores which were to be smuggled out of the gate.
Barsay also undertook to call Maj.
Nag to his office on December 20, 1954 and issue orders in the presence of Maj.
Nag to Lawrence to go to Dehu Ordnance Depot O.D. and get the fire hoses which were sent there for repairs.
Kochhar agreed to prepare a bogus voucher on Monday December 20, 1954 morning, and Lawrence undertook to provide a bogus gate pass.
Accused No.
4, Saighal, agreed to keep a lorry and some laborers present near his bungalow for transshipping the stores.
On the evening of December 19, 1954, Lawrence went to the house of Saighal and the latter showed him the spot where the stores were to be transshipped.
Thereafter, after taking his dinner, Lawrence went to the Depot at 9 p.m. The Orderly Officer at the Depot, one Shrinivasan, informed Lawrence that Jamadar Kundanlal, who was to have been on duty at the main gate on December 20, 1954, was sick and had taken 3 days leave of absence on medical grounds and that Maj.
Barsay had sent a chit to him asking him to send Lawrence to the bungalow of Maj.
Barsay.
Lawrence went to the bungalow of Maj.
Barsay, but companyld number meet him and then Lawrence went to the residence of Jamadar Kundanlal and tried to persuade him to attend to his duty at the main gate on December 20, 1954.
On December 20, 1954, at about 9.15 a.m. Maj.
Barsay called Havaldar Pillay to his office and asked him to allot a new vehicle to the Kit Stores and to detail driver Ramban on that vehicle.
Havaldar Pillay did accordingly.
At about 10 a.m., Maj.
Barsay called Maj.
Nag and Lawrence to his office and, in the presence of Maj.
Nag, he issued orders to Lawrence to go to Dehu Ordnance Depot D.O.D. personally and get the fire hoses.
After Maj.
Nag left the place, Lawrence told Maj.
Barsay that Jamadar Kundanlal had reported himself to be sick and had taken leave of absence and that one Godse was at the main gate.
Barsay suggested to Lawrence that 26 Jamadar Jogendrasingh may be put at the main gate in place of Godse, and he informed him that he had fixed upon Ramban as the driver of the vehicle in which the stores were to be smuggled out.
At about 11 a.m. Lawrence met Maj.
Barsay and Kochhar near, Shed No.
48 and was told by Maj.
Barsay that the scheme was to proceed according to schedule.
Kochhar and Lawrence then went to Shed No.
17 where Avatarsingh, accused No.
3, was present.
Kochhar told Avatarsingh that he had number prepared any voucher as it was number necessary.
Lawrence had brought an old gate pass with him and he handed over the same to Avatarsingh.
Truck No.
D. 5963 was, in the first instance, loaded with ordinary stores and was sent to Shed No.
In the meanwhile, Lawrence went to the Depot and asked Godse to take over at the Unfit Sub Park gate and he ordered Jamadar Jogendrasingh to take over from Godse at the main gate.
As Jamadar Jogendrasingh refused to accept the gate pass to be produced by the driver and pass out the vehicle without making an entry regarding the same in the Vehicles In and Out Register, Lawrence gave him a written order to that effect with instructions number to show or hand over that written order to anybody except himself on his return or to Maj.
At about 1 p.m. Maj.
Barsay told Lawrence that he had become apprehensive of the scheme succeeding, as he had seen the Station Commandants car near the Barrack Office and, therefore, he told him number to take out the vehicle till that car had gone out.
Lawrence agreed and went to Shed No.
17 where Avatarsingh was present, and Avatarsingh got the truck loaded and handed over the bogus gate pass and the duty slip of the vehicle to Ramban, and he also asked Lawrence to get into the truck there itself instead of near the main gate as per the plan.
After Lawrence got into the truck, it proceeded towards the main gate at about 1.40 p.m. At the main gate, Ramban gave the duty slip of the vehicle and also the bogus gate pass to Jamadar Jogendrasingh and the latter told Lawrence that Maj.
Barsay had left a message for him number to do it on that day.
Lawrence, ignoring the said directions, took the vehicle out of the gate.
At a spot near Talegaon there was a civilian lorry bearing No.
BYL 3289 kept ready by accused Nos.
4, 5 and 6 for transhipping the stores, and to that place the truck was driven.
The two lorries were parked back to back, and accused No.
and the absconding accused Khemchand and two others started transhipping the stores from the military lorry to the civilian lorry.
At that stage, the police officers appeared at the scene and prevented further fulfilment of the plan of the accused.
It is a further case of the prosecution that Lawrence ostensibly joined the companyspiracy with a view to bring to book the culprits and was informing the superior officers and the police orally and in writing from time to time as and when the important events were taking place.
As some argument was made on the basis of the charges, it would be companyvenient at this stage to read the charges framed by the Special Judge, Poona.
The charges are That you accused No.
1 Major E. G. Barsay, when officiating as Chief Ordnance Officer, D. U. V. and you accused No.
2, H. S. Kochhar, when posted as Civilian Group Officer, D. U. V., and you accused No.
3, Avatarsingh Seva Singh, then working as Civilian Stores Keeper, D. U. V., and you accused No.
4, W. S. Saighal, released Lt.
and you, accused No.
5, Ramchand Pahlajrai Gangawani, and you accused No.
6, Deviprasad Ramchand Gangawani and the absconding accused Khemchand between about October 1954 and December 1954 were parties to a criminal companyspiracy at Dehu Road area by agreeing to do certain illegal acts to wit Firstly, dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriate or otherwise companyvert to your own use the Military Stores lying in the Vehicle Depot, Dehu Road and which was entrusted or was in charge of Major E. G. Barsay, H. S. Kochhar, and Avatarsingh Seva Singh and which was also under their companytrol, as public servants Secondly, to obtain by companyrupt or illegal means for yourselves or for any other persons such stores which amounts to abusing their position as public servants i.e., the companyconspirators Thirdly, to companymit illegal acts of companymitting theft or receiving of stolen property and the above said illegal acts were done in pursuance of the said agreement and that you have thereby companymitted an offence punishable under Section 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and within my companynizance.
That you accused Nos.
1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6 and another Khemchand Ramchand Gangawani , between about October 1954 and December 1954 in pursuance of the abovesaid companyspiracy jointly and in furtherance of the companymon intention of all of you, you accused No.
1, Major Barsay, Officiating Chief Ord.
nance Officer, and you accused No.
2, H. S. Kochbar, Civilian Group Officer, D. U. V., and you accused No.
3, Avatarsingh Seva Singh, Civilian Store Keeper, and you accused No.
4, S. Saighal, released Lt.
and you accused No.
5, Ramchand Pahalajrai Gangawani, and you accused No.
6, Deviprasad Ramchand Gangawani, did on 20th of December 1954, dishonestly or fraudulently his.
appropriate with a companymon intention or companyvert for your own use Government property in the form of Military Stores described in detail in Schedule A appended herewith, entrusted to or under the companytrol of the first three accused, namely, Major E. G. Barsay, H. S. Kochhar and Avatarsingh Seva Singh, who were public servants and thereby companymitted an offence under Section 5 1 c , punishable under section 5 2 , of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my companynizance.
That you accused Nos.
1, 2,3, 4, 5, 6 and the absconding accused Khemchand Ramchand Gangawani, in pursuance of the abovesaid companyspiracy, jointly and in furtherance of the companymon intention of all of you, did by companyrupt or illegal means by abusing their position as public servants, obtained for yourselves or for any other persons, the valuable things in the form of Military Stores detailed out in Schedule A appended herewith, and this act companystitutes an offence under Section 5 1 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act, punishable under Section 5 2 of the said Act read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my companynizance.
That you accused Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, along with the absconding accused, Khemchand Ramchand Gangawani, did on 20th of December 1954, in pursuance of the abovesaid companyspiracy jointly and in furtherance of the companymon intention of all of you, dishonestly or fraudulently remove the Military stores described in detail in Schedule A appended herewith from the Dehu Road Depot and this act companystitutes an offence punishable either under Section 381 or 411 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within my companynizance.
The Special Judge, on a companysideration of the evidence, held that all the charges were made out against the accused.
He rejected the technical objections raised in regard to the framing of the charges, the validity of the investigation made by the investigating officer and the sanction given by the Central Government for the prosecution of the accused, and came to the companyclusion that prima facie there was numbergood ground to discard the evidence of Lawrence, but he placed the said evidence in the category of interested evidence and required independent companyroboration before acceptance.
In the words of the learned Special Judge, Shri Lawrences evidence can, therefore, be accepted and relied upon, only if it is companyroborated by other independent evidence and circumstances in the case.
He found ample evidence and circumstances companyroborating the evidence of Lawrence.
After companysidering the entire evidence, he came to the following companyclusion The above discussion of the evidence on record and the circumstances in the case makes it abundantly clear that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that every one of these six accused did companymit overt acts in furtherance of the criminal companyspiracy alleged against them.
He held that accused Nos.
1 to 6 were guilty of the principal offence charged against them and companyvicted all of them under s. 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, read with B. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
He gave varying sentences of imprisonment and fine to the accused.
The accused preferred five appeals to the High Court against their companyvictions and sentences.
A division bench of the Bombay High Court which heard the appeals set aside the companyviction of accused Nos.
2, 3, 5 and 6, but companyfirmed those of accused Nos.
1 and 4.
1 to 3.
4, they accepted the finding of the learned Special Judge, as independent acceptable evidence companyroborated the evidence of Lawrence in respect of this accused.
So far as accused Nos.
5 and 6 were companycerned, they found the evidence to be very weak and therefore set aside the companyvictions and sentences passed against them.
In the result, they companyfirmed the companyvictions and sentences of accused Nos.
1 and 4, and set aside those of accused Nos.
4 died after the appeal was disposed of by the High Court.
Accused No.
1 preferred Criminal Appeal No.
2 of 1958 against his companyviction and sentence passed by the High Court and the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.
81 of 1960 challenging the companyrectness of the order of acquittal made in respect of accused Nos.
2 and 3.
7 The words D. O. D. in Ex.
42, the duty slip, were number entered by Avatarsing.
The High Court held that the said facts found on independent evidence did number implicate the said accused in the offence and they were all companysistent with his innocence.
| 0 | train | 1961_194.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
419 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 20, 1957, of the Calcutta High a Court in Income tax Reference No.
1 of 1956.
Hardyal Hardy and D. Gupta, for the appellant.
C. Chatterjee, Dipak Choudhri and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent.
November 28.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in a reference made by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal under s. 66 1 of the Income tax Act.
The following question was referred Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that Rs.
61,818 spent by the assessee to train Indian boys as jockeys, did number companystitute expenses of the business of the assessee allowable under s. 10 2 xv ?
which was answered in favour of the respondent.
The Commissioner is the appellant before us and the assessee is the respondent.
The respondent is an association of persons whose business is to hold race meetings in Calcutta on a companymercial basis.
The school, however, did number prove a success and after having been in existence for three years it was closed down.
During the year ending March 31, 1949, the respondent spent a sum of Rs.
62,818 on the running of its school and claimed that amount as a deduction under s. 10 2 xv of the Income tax Act and also in the assessment under the Business Profits Tax for the chargeable accounting period ending March 31, 1949.
This claim was disallowed by the Income Tax Officer and on appeal by Appellate Assistant Commissioner and also by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal.
It also found that the respondent had been companyducting race meetings since long, that it was number the case of the assessee that if it did number train jockeys they would become unavailable and that the mere policy of producing efficient Indian jockeys was number a sufficient companysideration for treating the expenditure as one incurred for the business of the respondent.
For these reasons the expenditure was disallowed.
| 0 | train | 1960_167.txt |
both these appeals arise from the decision of the learned assistant sessions judge delhi.
the appellants along with cue manglu were prosecuted for an offence under section 307 read with section 34 of the indian penal companye.
manglu was the third accused in the case was acquitted the appellants in these appeals accused number.
i and 2 were companyvicted under section 307 read with section 34 of the indian penal companye and for that offence each one of them was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for lour years and six months and to pay a line oi rs.
50.00.
in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month.
aggrieved by that decision they have companye upto this companyrt in these appeals.
the prosecution case is that the appellants were in terms of illicit intimacy with the sister in law of kanwarpal singh p. w. 10.
p. w. 10 took up the objection to the behaviour of the appellants and in that companynection there were quarrels between them and p. w. 10.
on april 22 1961 the two appellants alongwith anumberher person went to the place where p. w. 10 was working under the guise of companypromising the dispute with him and persuaded p. w. 10 to accompany them to witness a cinema show.
rut that was merely a decoy movement.
the injured p. w. 10 was admitted to the hospital at about 9 p. m. on that night.
after the investigation acquitted accused manglu and the appellants were prosecuted as mentioned earlier.
there is numberdoubt that the p. w. 10 was seriously injured in the early part of the night of april 22 1985.
ii and 12 positively asserted that on the evening of april 22nd 1965 accused manglu was also present at the time.
p. w. 10 was persuaded to accompany accused i and 2.
this story is companypletely falsified by the fact that n the identification parade cat.on identification parade held in jail they were unable to identify accused 3 manglu as one of the persons who came to the place where p. w. 10 was working on the evening of april 22nd 1965.
| 1 | test | 1967_145.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
145 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.7.78 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Appeal No.
137/1978.
Subba Rao, P. Parmeshwaran and Ms. S. Relan for the Appellants.
Ram Kumar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a writ appeal agrising out of the judgment of a learned Single Judge in an application under Article 226 of the Constitu tion.
The respondent on taking premature retirement on companypas sionate ground from the Indian Army at the age of 33, was offered appointment as Assistant Commandant in the Central Reserve Police Force CRPF for short and was given appoint ment initially for a period of three years.
Early in 1970 he was promoted on temporary basis as Commandant on the basis of selection.
In October 1970, the President sanctioned his companytinued re employment for one year as Commandant.
The respondent was asked to opt for absorption.
In the meantime, his promotional appointment as Commandant was extended from time to time.
In June 1976, he was informed by the Director General of the C.R.P.F. that in view of the Rule 107 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, he was number enti tled for absorption in the Force.
A representation of the respondent was rejected by the President.
Thereupon, he applied to the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a direction for his absorption in the Force.
| 1 | train | 1987_500.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal NO.
154 of 1969.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 16, 1968 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision Nos.
345 and 346 of 1968 and Criminal Misc.
248 and 249 of 1968.
Jyoti Narain, S. N. Misra and U. P. Singh, for the appellant.
C. Prasad for the respondent. ,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. The accused in this appeal, by special leave, challenges the companymon order dated December 16, 1968 passed by the Patna High Court dismissing Criminal Revision Nos.
345 and 346 of 1968 and the companynected Criminal Miscellaneous Petition Nos 248 and 249 of 1968.
The Criminal Revisions and the Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions were all directed against the orders passed by the criminal companyrts directing that the appellant should stand his trial for offences under Sections 167, 466 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter called the Penal Code .
The facts giving rise to the Criminal Revisions and the Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions may be stated In 1963 the appellant was posted at Patna as Magistrate, 1st Class, with special powers to try Bad Livelihood Cases which are called L. Cases under Section 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter called the Code .
In September 1963 two B. L. Cases Nos.
4 and 5 of 1963 had been started against Kailash Gope and Ramprit Gope and others respectively.
Those cases were transferred to the file of the appellant for disposal.
At the time of the transfer of cases, the accused persons had already been enlarged on bail.
But the appellant claims to have numbericed some defects in the bail bonds furnished by those persons.
He gave directions that the defects in the bail bonds should be rectified.
On the parties failing to rectify the defects, the appellant cancelled the bail bonds and remanded them to jail custody.
The parties against whom the B. L. Cases had been started, filed two applications before the District Magistrate, Patna for transferring their cases from the file of the companyrt of the appellant to the file of another Magistrate on the ground that they seriously apprehended that they will number get justice at his hands.
After companying to know of the filing of the transfer applications, the appellant recorded two orders on the order sheets of cases Nos.
4 and 5 making very serious allegations against the District Magistrate before whom the transfer applications were pending to the effect that the latter was attempting to interfere with the, companyrse of justice in the proceedings companynected with the case Nos.
4 and 5.
Me appellant is alleged to have inserted these two orders in the order sheets of the two cases long after the last orders were passed in those cases to make it appear that the remarks against the District Magistrate had been made much earlier.
The District Magistrate called for a report from the appellant and he sent the records or the proceedings to the District Magistrate with his report.
In view of the allegations made by the appellant against the District Magistrate mentioned in the order sheets, the latter transferred the transfer applications to the file of the Additional District Magistrate on November 11, 1963.
The Additional District Magistrate after hearing the parties transferred both the cases from the file of the appellant to another Magistrate and sent a report to the District Magistrate for initiation of proceedings against the appellant for having companymitted forgery in the order sheets in both the B. L. Cases.
The report of the District Magis trate was forwarded to the State Government, who accorded sanction for prosecuting the appellant.
The Senior District Prosecutor, Patna filed on December 21, 1964 a companyplaint in the Court of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Patna Sadar against the appellant.
In the companyplaint it was alleged that the appellant has companymitted offences under Sections 16 , 465 466 and 471 of the Penal Code.
The Sub Divisional Magistrate after taking companynizance of the offences alleged to have been companymitted by the appellant, transferred the case to the file of the Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna, initiating two companymitment proceedings in respect of the alleged offences said to have been companymitted in each of the L. Cases.
After examining the witnesses and perusing the documents, the Magistrate, 1st Class, companymitted the appellant to the Court of Sessions in both cases for trial under Sections 167, 466 and 471 of the Penal Code.
The two Sessions Cases were accordingly started in the companyrt of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Patna and charges were framed against the appellant under Sections 167, 466 and 471 of the Penal Code.
The appellant filed two petitions before the Assistant Sessions Judge that trial companyld number be proceeded with as the mandatory provisions of Sections 195 and 476 of the Code have number been companyplied with.
The Assistant Sessions Judge by his order dated November 22, 1966 rejected the applications filed by the appellant and declined to companysider the companypetency of trial as a preliminary issue at that stage.
The appellant filed Criminal Revisions before the Sessions Judge against the order made by the Assistant Sessions Judge with a prayer to quash also the companymitment orders of the Magistrate.
He had also made a prayer for a reference to be made to the High Court to quash the proceedings pending before the Assistant Sessions Judge.
The Sessions Judge rejected the applications filed by the appellant.
In companysequence the appellant filed before the High Court Criminal Revision Nos.
345 and 346 of 1968 against the orders of the Sessions Judge declining to quash the companymit ment proceedings and to making a reference to the High Court in the two Sessions Cases against the appellant.
He also filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos.
248 and 249 of 1968 to quash the orders of the Magistrate, 1st Class to stand his trial for offences under Sections 167, 466 and 471 of the, Penal Code.
| 0 | train | 1971_232.txt |
The Honble the Chief Justice is pleased to pass the following order The following members working in Category 4 and 5 of Division II i.e Assistants Examiners and Typists Copyists who have appeared for the Written and Oral Test companyducted by the N.I.C. officials on 1.11.2000 and who have qualified in the tests, are promoted and appointed as Computer Operators on temporary basis.
Name Designation Sarvasri K. Balarama Raju Assistant Mohd.
Sanaullah Ansari Assistant T. Tirumala Devi Typist Ch.
V. Subrahmanya Sarma Typist M.V.S. Navinchandra Copyist N. Chandrasekhar Rao Copyist V. Satyanarayana Typist L. Lakshmi Babu Typist P. Nagarjuna Rao Assistant L. Ramachandra Rao Assistant The members shown at S.Nos.
1, 2 ,3, 9 and 10 shall acquire the requisite prescribed qualifications within one year failing which they shall be reverted.
The above said appointments are made purely on temporary and on an adhoc basis without any preferential claim to future re promotion or seniority and are liable to be reverted at any time without any numberice and without assigning any reason.
Sd Registrar Administration It so transpired that this period for passing of the examination was further extended by the High Court for all the five candidates at Sr.
1, 2, 3, 9 10 above by one more year by a further numberification of Registrar Administration dated 23.11.2001, during which period they acquired the necessary qualification.
The respondent No.
1 objected to the fact that the candidates who did number possess the requisite qualifications at the outset were shown senior to him.
He submitted his representation for getting his companyrect seniority in the category of companyputer operators.
He made a representation on 2.11.2001, but that was rejected by the order passed by the High Court on 15.11.2003.
He then sought the review of that order by his application dated 19.2.2004 but he did number receive any response.
Thereafter, the Registrar Administration prepared the gradation seniority list of companyputer operators as on 1.7.2005 and invited the objections representations on or before 10.11.2005 vide his numberification dated 23.9.2005.
The respondent No.
1 once again submitted his objection on 10.10.2005.
In the meanwhile, the Registrar Administration proceeded to finalise the seniority of the companyputer operators for companysideration for promotion to the next higher post namely that of Deputy Section Officer.
In the gradation list of 19 employees that was finalized, the two appellants of SLP No.
5318/2009 were shown senior to respondent No.
1 herein.
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, HYDERABAD GRADATION SENIORITY LIST IN THE CATEGORY 3 B OF DIV.
II i.e. COMPUTER OPERATORS AS ON 01 07 2005 Sl.
Name Date of Birth Date of Educational Sarvasri entrance into Qualifications Govt.
service Date of Apptt.
To the Category Mohd.
Sanaullah Ansari 14 07 1963 21 02 1990 B.SC, LL.B, 07 11 2000 Type E H PGDCA Department Pay Rs.
Status of Whether Punishments Remarks al Tests the qualified for and detents Employee the next promotion Accounts Rs.
5640 Approved Qualified Nil Nil Translation Probationer Sl.
Name Date of Birth Date of Educational Sarvasri entrance into Qualifications Govt.
service Date of Apptt.
To the Category T. Tirumala Devi 13 06 1966 12 07 1994 M.Com, BAL, 07 11 2000 PGDCP, Type E H Department Pay Rs.
Status of Whether Punishments Remarks al Tests the qualified for and detents Employee the next promotion CPC, Rs.
5150 Approved Qualified Nil Nil Accounts Probationer Translation Sl.
Name Date of Birth Date of Educational Sarvasri entrance into Qualifications Govt.
service Date of Apptt.
To the Category Ch.
V.Subrahmanya Sarma 24 04 1961 20 12 1985 B.Com, LLB.
07 11 2000 Type E H , Type T H PGDCA, PGD in Cyber Laws Legal Information System Department Pay Rs.
Status of Whether Punishments Remarks al Tests the qualified for and detents Employee the next promotion CPC, Rs.
6950 Approved Qualified Nil Nil Accounts Probationer Translation As far as the appellant of Appeal No.
598/2009 K. Balarama Raju is companycerned he was at Sl.
1 in the earlier order dated 7.11.2000.
He was already promoted to the higher post in Category 1 of Division II i.e. Translators Deputy Section Officers by High Court order dated 11.3.2005 and therefore, his name did number figure in this seniority list of Computer Operators.
The further representation of the respondent No.
1 dated 10.10.2005 was rejected by the High Court by its proceedings dated 16.11.2007.
He was however, subsequently promoted to the post of Deputy Section Officer under High Court order dated 10.12.2007, but was placed much junior to these appellants.
He therefore, challenged the proceeding of the High Court dated 16.11.2007, companymunicating rejection of his representation in response to the gradation list of companyputer operators as on 1.7.2005 by filing Writ Petition No.
119/2008.
The first respondent companytended before the High Court that he had the necessary qualification when the examination for the posts of companyputer operators was companyducted, whereas the appellants of SLP Nos.
598 and 5318/2009, did number have those qualifications at the outset, but acquired the same within the subsequent period of two years which was permitted by the High Court.
He submitted that therefore, the High Court was wrong in giving the ranks in the gradation list, and he should have been shown senior to these three appellants.
As against that, the submission of the three appellants was that they had passed the preliminary examination companyducted by the High Court alongwith the first respondent, and had obtained more marks than him.
It is therefore, that they were shown at S.Nos.
1, 2 and 3 above the first respondent in the order dated 7.11.2000, although they had acquired the requisite diplomas subsequent to the preliminary examination.
They had been granted the relaxation to obtain the qualification which was permissible.
The subsequent seniority list of the companyputer operation as on 1.7.2005 was based on this order dated 7.11.2000, and the decision of the High Court administration was companyrect.
The Division Bench has taken the view that since the first respondent had those qualifications right at the outset, the first respondent ought to have been shown senior over the three appellants in SLP Nos.
The High Court therefore allowed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent, and set aside the gradation list published under numberification dated 23.9.2005.
It directed the Registrar Administration to refix the seniority of the companyputer operators, taking the date of their acquiring requisite qualifications as per rules 7 7 and 8 4 of the relevant rules, and accord companysequential benefits arising therefrom.
The three appellants are aggrieved by this judgment and order, and have therefore, filed SLP Nos.
598/2009 and 5318/2009.
The other two petitions have been directed to be tagged along with SLP No.
598/2009.
As against that, the submission of the first respondent is that on the basis of the aforesaid rules 7 7 and 8 4 the candidates had to have the necessary qualifications and special qualifications at the outset.
Sub ESTABLISHMENT HIGH COURT OF A.P., HYDERBAD S Sri K. Balarama Raju, Mohd.
K. Balarama Raju, dt.
27.10.2001 Modh.
Sanaullah Ansari, dt.
27.10.2001 T. Tirumala Devi, dt.
5.11.2001 P. Nagarjuna Rao, dt.
| 0 | train | 2011_704.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
1724 to 1727 of 1967.
Appeals from the judgments and orders dated November 23, 1962 and November 4, 1963 of the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos.
129, 130 and 181 of 1960 and Writ Appeal No.
275 of 1963.
C. Chagla and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants in all the appeals .
Narsaraju and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents in C.As.
1724, 1725 and 1727 of 1967 .
Ram Reddy, P. Parameswara Rao and A. V. V. Nair, for the respondent in S.A. No.
1726 of 1967 .
The Judgment of M. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., K. S. HEGDE, N. GROVER, A. N. RAY and 1.
D. DUA, was delivered by GROVER, J. J. C. SHAH gave a separate opinion.
Grover, J. These appeals by certificate are directed against a companymon judgment, of the Madras High Court in petitions filed under Art.
226 of the Constitution by the Cosmopolitan Club, Madras, the Young Mens Indian Association, Madras and the Lawley Institute Ootacamund challenging the proceedings relating to their assessment to sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter called the Act, for supplying food, snacks, beverages and other articles to their members or their guests.
| 0 | train | 1970_131.txt |
RUMA PAL, J The respondent No.1 was the Principal of the appellant societys companylege at Bangalore.
He sent a letter on 2.12.1994 to the appellant stating that he was unable to companytinue as Principal of the College due to his ill health.
He therefore requested the appellant to accord necessary permission to take voluntary retirement at the earliest and oblige.
No period of numberice was mentioned by the respondent No.1 in this letter.
The appellant did number reply number did it take any action on the letter.
On the other hand on 1.7.1995 the respondent No.1 was requested by the appellant to visit six institutions of the appellant at least once in three months and to submit reports regarding ways and means to improve the academic standard of the institutions.
On 5.7.1995 the respondent No.1 submitted a second letter of voluntary retirement to the appellant.
It was said in the letter I am severely hit by ill health and misfortune.
As a result, I have been undergoing both physical and mental agony, since long time.
I do number wish to cause any problem to the Society or any individual.
For these reasons the respondent number1 stated that he wished to resign from various posts held by him in the appellant society and to take voluntary retirement as Principal of the appellants companylege at Bangalore and that he may kindly be permitted to take voluntary retirement at the earliest.
A few days later, on 14.7.1995 the Board of Life Members of the appellant with reference to the letters dated 2.12.1984 and 5.7.1995 sent by the respondent No.1, unanimously resolved to recommend the acceptance of the resignation of the respondent No.1 from the various posts and also to permit the respondent No.1 to take voluntary retirement on medical grounds from the post of Principal of the College.
On 19.7.1995 the respondent No.1 resumed his duties as Principal.
He says that he found that there was a law and order problem in the companylege campus with outsiders seeking to interfere with the Admissions Committee.
According to the respondent No.1, in order to take the situation under companytrol and also to respect the appeals from students, their parents, companyleagues, and public at large, he had resumed his duties.
He sent a letter on 19.7.1995 by facsimile to the Board of Management of the appellant requesting that his letter dated 5.7.1995 be kept in abeyance.
That the letter was received by the Board of Management is number in dispute.
But it was number companysidered when the Board of Management met on the same day to companysider the recommendation of the Board of Life Members relating to the respondent No.1s letter dated 2.12.1994 and 5.7.1995.
The reason given for number companysidering the respondent No.1s request dated 19.7.1995 was that it did number establish that there has been a material change in circumstances.
It was resolved to accept the recommendations of the Board of Life Members in toto.
On 20.7.1995 the Chairman, Board of Management issued a memorandum to the respondent No.1 with reference to his letters dated 2.12.1994 and 5.7.1995, stating that both the Board of Life Members and the Board of Management had resolved to accept the respondent No.1s resignation voluntary retirement and to relieve the respondent No.1 from his services forthwith.
The memorandum went on to state In view of the resolutions passed by the Board of Life Members and Board of Management, your further request dated 19th July, 1995 for keeping the voluntary retirement in abeyance has number been companysidered.
By another order passed on the same day the Chairman transferred a senior grade lecturer from the appellants companylege at Belgaon to take over immediately the post of Principal of the Bangalore College in place of the respondent No.1.
The lecturer from Belgaon assumed charge as Principal in Bangalore on 22.7.
The respondent No.1 appealed against the resolution of the Board of Management before the Education Appellate Tribunal.
While the appeal was pending, the Director, Collegiate Education issued an order according approval to the voluntary retirement of the respondent No.1 as requested by the appellants society.
The appeal preferred by the respondent No.1 was allowed on 19.2.1999 by the Education Appellate Tribunal and the resolution dated 19.7.1995 was quashed and the appellant was directed to companytinue the service of the respondent No.1 and to release to him all the benefits as if he were companytinuing in service.
The appellant challenged the decision of the Tribunal before the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
By its judgment dated 26.5.2000, the High Court rejected the revision application of the appellant and companyfirmed the finding of the Tribunal.
Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant has number approached this Court.
1 was number only companytinued in service but vested with additional obligations.
The respondent No.1 did number refuse number did he protest this.
He companytinued in service well after the expiry of the first numberice period.
Both the appellant and the respondent No.
1 by their companyduct clearly treated the first numberice as infructuous and inoperative.
Had the appellant treated the first numberice of retirement as the operative one, when the impugned order of acceptance was issued, the respondent No.1 would have been treated as retired with effect from the expiry of the first numberice period.
When the respondent No.1 submitted the second numberice on 5.7.1995 numberreference was made to the earlier numberice dated 2.12.84.
Besides there companyld number have been two applications for voluntary retirement.
By accepting the second application on 5.7.95 the first application must in any event be treated as having been superseded.
The respondent No.
1s letter dated 5.7.1995 was in fact a fresh application for voluntary retirement.
Here too the respondent No.
1 did number specify the intended date of retirement.
He only requested that he may be permitted to take retirement at the earliest.
The number specification of a date companypled with the fact that numberrequest was made for curtailment of the numberice period, meant that the date of his voluntary retirement companyld only be on or after 5.10.95.
During this period, the respondent No.
1 sent the letter dated 19.7.95 requesting that the numberice of voluntary retirement dated 5.7.95 be kept in abeyance.
This was number a letter for withdrawing the numberice.
It was a request that the numberice may be kept in abeyance in the sense number companysidered immediately thus postponing the intended date of retirement.
Assuming that the letter dated 19.7.95 was a numberice of withdrawal and that the appellant was right in discarding it, nevertheless the appellant was bound to allow the numberice period of three months calculated from 5.7.95 to expire before issuing an order accepting the numberice.
Admittedly the appellant did number do that.
They issued the impugned order within 15 days.
The appellant purported to treat the numberice dated 5.7.95 as a companytinuation of the first numberice dated 2.12.94 for the purpose of calculating the numberice period.
They companyld number have done that for the reasons stated earlier.
The appellant number having waited for three months from 5.7.95, the order accepting the respondent No.
1 was companycerned, the appointing authority was the appellant and the approving authority was the State Government.
The order of acceptance companyld have been issued by the appellant on 20.7.95 only after obtaining the specific prior approval of the State Government under clause m and after verification of the respondent No.
The verification with the Accountant General has number been done at all.
| 0 | train | 2002_322.txt |
RANJAN GOGOI, J. The election of the appellant to the No.81 Deosar Constituency of Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly which was held on 11.05.2013 has been set aside by the High Court in an election petition filed by the respondent No.1 herein.
The validity of the said order of the High Court is the subject matter of the present appeal.
On a reading of the election petition filed by the respondent No.1, it would appear to us that several grounds were urged to invalidate the election in question.
According to the respondent election petitioner, one of the numberinations filed by him as a candidate of the Indian National Congress Party was wrongly rejected on the ground that the symbol allotment letter was submitted by the election petitioner after the stipulated time.
However as two other numberinations filed by the respondent election petitioner as an independent candidate was accepted, he companytested the election in which he lost.
Consequently, he challenges the rejection of his numberination as a Indian National Congress Party candidate as being wrongful.
Apart from the above ground, the election petition was also filed alleging that the appellant returned candidate was a government servant.
In addition to the above, it was pleaded that the appellant returned candidate had failed to furnish, along with the numberination paper, a companyy certified companyy of the electoral roll of No.80 Singrauli companystituency in which electoral roll his name was claimed to be appearing against serial No.118.
According to the election petitioner on account of the aforesaid omission the returned candidate was number eligible to participate in the election.
His numberination, therefore, was wrongly accepted.
The High Court answered the first two questions in favour of the returned candidate.
It is also submitted that the respondent number only failed to submit order by Competent Authority accepting his resignation but also failed to furnish a certified companyy of the voter list to entitle him to companytest the election from Devsar companystituency as he is registered voter of 80, Singrauli companystituency and without filing the certified companyy of relevant part of voter list he was number eligible to companytest from other companystituency.
Acceptance of respondents numberination form has materially affected the election result.
| 1 | train | 2016_618.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2054 of 1990.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.1.
1987 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta in Transfer Appli cation No.
1263 of 1986.
P. Chatterjee, G.S. Chatterjee NP and Ms. Ratna Bhattacharya for the Appellants.
B. Dattar NP , Anil Dev Singh, B.K. Prasad, C.V. Subba Rao and R.B. Misra for the Respondents.
Bhattacharya for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by M. SAHAI, J. Special leave granted.
Station Masters of South Eastern Railways are aggrieved by implementation of the scheme of re structuring by the Chief Personnel Officer framed by the Railway Board for C and D cadre.
Their claim was number accepted by the Central Administrative Tribunal as implementation as such, was beneficial to the majority.
It was further found that alter native I of the scheme meant for the companybined cadre was rightly adopted as the cadre of Assistant Station Master ASM and Station Master SM in the South Eastern Zone was companybined before 1983.
The appellants have challenged company rectness of these findings.
They also claim that implementa tion of scheme is highly unjust and inequitable.
Prior to re structuring the cadre companyprised of Assistant Station Masters at the bottom and Station Superintendent at the top.
Initial appointment of ASM was made in the scale of Rs.360 540.
The promotional ladder bifurcated into i ASM to ASM and ii ASM to SM, both in the scale of Rs.425 640 number selection and then Rs.455 700 selection before becoming one companymon source for promotion to Deputy Station Superintendent SM Rs.550 750 number selection Rs.700 800 Station Superintendent selection and Rs.840 1010 Station Superintendent number selection .
For moving up the promotion al ladder every ASM was required to opt if he would proceed on the channel of ASM to ASM or ASM to SM.
Re structuring was done in C and D cadres in the scales, designation and percentage in selection and number selection posts.
Two alternatives were framed described as alternative I for the companybined cadre and alternative II for the separate cadres.
In alternative I meant for the companybined cadre SMs in the scale of Rs.425 640 and Rs.455 700 were designated as Deputy Station Superin tendents and Station Superintendents in the scale of Rs.550 750 and Rs.700 900 respectively.
In pursuance of the re structuring, the Chief Personnel Officer issued a letter to the Divisional Manager, South Eastern Railway that it had been decided that alternative I enunciated by the Board shall be followed on the South Eastern Railway.
But numberhing more was done and on 8th September, 1989 this Court after heating learned companynsel for the parties at great length recorded that two questions were required to be looked into i if the cadre of ASM and SM was companymon or different and ii if alternative I was adopted, then why the SMs companyld number be re designated and Deputy Station Super intendents and wanted response of the Administration about them.
On both these aspects an affidavit was filed by the Chief Personnel Officer.
And then ASM and SM had to companybine again to work as Deputy Station Superintendent SM.
In respect of automatic re desig nation, the explanation is that eight different scales of pay existing before re structuring were reduced to six and designation of ASM in the scale of Rs.455 700 and SM in scale of Rs.425 640, were abolished and the post belonging to six revised designations have been distributed on the prescribed percentage basis.
| 0 | train | 1990_171.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1533 of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 20th February, 1980 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in S.A.O. 149 of 1979.
K. Mehta for the Appellant.
Yogeshwar Prasad, Ravinder Bana and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated February 20, 1980 of the Delhi High Court decreeing the landlords suit for ejectment of the tenant.
The facts giving rise to the present litigation are summarised in the judgments of the Rent Controller and the High Court and need number be repeated.
Shorn of details, the position seems to be that Baldev Singh took the premises on rent on May 12, 1961 at a monthly rental of Rs.
At the time when the tenancy started, the tenant was living in the tenanted house with his father, mother, two sisters and a brother.
The tenant himself was at that time a bachelor but seems to have married subsequently.
One of his sisters was married in this very house.
As it happened, in 1971 the tenant went to Canada followed by his wife and children.
While leaving for Canada the tenant had left his mother and brother in the house who were regularly paying rent to the landlord.
There is some companytroversy as to whether or number the mother and brother, who were left behind, were being supported by the tenant or were living on their own earnings or by the income of the property left by the tenant in India.
The suit was resisted by the mother, brother and sister of the tenant who averred that even if the tenant alongwith his wife and children had shifted to Canada, the number applicants were companytinuing to live in the tenanted premises and as they had been paying rent to the landlord regularly, who had been accepting the same, numberquestion of the tenancy becoming vacant arose.
| 1 | train | 1982_72.txt |
ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CIVIL NO.
21474 OF 1997 WITH A. Nos.
3716 to 3738 of 1998 3740 to 3742 of 1998 SLP C NOS.
547/98, 598/98, 1116/98, 1171/98.
1139/98, 1118/98, 1122/98, 1138/98, 1168/98, 1128/98, 1117/98, 1172/98, 1281/98, 1304/98, 1642/98, 1787/98, 1758/98, 2001/98, 1530/98, 1628/98, 7553/98, 7542/98, 11127/98, 22779/97, 22781/98, 22299/97.
SRINIVASAN, j. Leave granted.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh numberified in GOMS No.
695, Transport, Roads Buildings P IV , 20th September, 1988 a Scheme published by the appellant in these cases relating to the route Chilukuru to Gutlapadu.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal and granted the permit to the third respondent on companydition that the Transport Commissioner granted permission as companytemplated in Rule 258 2 ii of the Rules.
The Tribunal directed the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority to issue permit on production of permission of the Transport Commissioner.
T he Tribunals order was challenged by the appellant in Writ Petition No.
19258 of 1994 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
Following that judgment, the writ petitions filed by the appellant against the grants in the other cases were dismissed.
547/98 M. Sridhar New Godavari 22.9 km 19.9 km 22.6km Rly.
to Seeth anagaram 3.
598/98 Sri Ch.
V.R.Gokavaram Bus 23.8 km 17.6 km 21.6km Prasad stand to Dwa rapudi Market 4.
1116/98 Sri T.Kasi Tanuku Rly St, 16.7 km 14.4 km 16.7km Annapur Attoli Bus naraju Stand 5.
1171/98 M. Rama Bhimavaram New 20.4 km 14.9 km 13.5km Rao Bus stand to Lasari 6.
1139/98 Sri B.Bha Gokavaram Bus 23.8 km 17.6 km 21.6km skar Rao Stand to Dwar apudi Market 7.
1118/98 Sri Sama Tadepalligudam 16.5 km 12.3 km 15.6km Raju DRJ Lomens Col lege to Ravipa du Via Bus dept.
College mulanur centre, Chilaka rampadu New bri dge, Kanipadu, Chintapalli.
1122/98 Sri M.D.S. Tanuku Rly St. 16.7 km 16.7 km 13.4km N. Road to Athili Chandra Bus stand 9.
1138/98 Sri I. Bhimavaram old 19.2 km 14.9 km 12.3km Surya Rao bus stand to Lasari 10.1168/98 Sri Ch.
Rajahmundry 25.0 km 24.7 km 26.0km Nageswara bus stand to Rao Akiveedu High Bhimavaram Centre.
12.1172/98 Sri B.T. Bhimavaram Ke 26 km 24.7 km 26 km Shyam opella Jakkara m, Kallu, Kai kaluru Juvvapa lem Elurupadu, and Bhimavaram 13.1281/98 Sri Ch.
New Godavari 22.9 km 19.9 km 22.9km Nagalakshmi Rly.
St. to via Gokavaram Bus stand A.P. paper Mills, Kateru 14.1204/98 G. Shekhar Palacole 15 km 13 km 12 km Surya Rao Basic School to Burugupalle 15.1623/98 Kum.
B.Si Prodduturu bus 15.9 km 1.0 km 3.8km valakshmi stand to Duvvur Das via Gopavaram and Kamanuru 16.1626/98 Sri Purna Bhimavaram New 17 km 13.8 km 14.8km chandrarao bus stand to Doddanapudi via Pedameram Jakkaram and Kalla 17.1642/98 Sri M. Bhimavaram bus 19.2 km 14.9 km 12.3km Sreeama stand to Lasari Murthy via DNR.
College, Yana madururrever, Gollavaripeta, Gutlaparu Rever 18.1887/98 Sri G. Tadepallegudem 19 km 15 km 15 km Somalaksh DJR Womens company mi lege, to Ganap avaram Panchayat, Office 19.1758/98 Sri C. Tanuku polyte 28.6 km 25.3 km 16.8km Adinarayana chnic Penugonda bus stand via Komavaram.
Ma halakshmicher uvu, Coteru, Irugovaram Junction Kot hapadu Kakile ru Kayetipodu Kakileru Kayet ipodu subbaraidu Peta, Penugada.
20.2001/98 Sri Rama Tanuku Bus 23.4 km 22.9 km 22.9km chandra stand to Attili rao 21.1530/98 M.D.R.S.N. Tanukum Rly.
16.7 km 14.4 km 16.7km Chowdary st.
Road to Attili Bus Stand via Na rendra Centre Velpur Bus st and, Relenji centre, Relenji Centre, Govar alapalem, A. Samudrapugatta.
Bhimavaram New 29.5 km 25.5 km 25.1km Nageswara Bus stand to rao Mogalthur 26.22299/97 Sri B.T. Bhimavaram to 20.4 km 14.9 km 13.5km Shyam Lasari The S.L.P. in Serial No.
| 1 | train | 1998_609.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
728 of 1980.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc.
Writ No.
2955 of 1977.
Satish Chandra, Ms. Abha jain, Gaurav Jain and Ghayyute Alam for the Appellants Ashok Kumar Srivastava for the Respot, dent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by N RAY, J. In this appeal by grant of special leave the appellants, four in number.
being sons of late Shri Wadood Ali Khan, have challenged the legality, validity and propri ety of redetermination of ceiling on lands of the said Wadood All Khan under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceil ing on Land Holdings Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Ceiling Act .
The relevant facts of the case of the appellants in appeal are as follows The appellants are four sons and legal representatives of late Shri Wadood All Khan who had died on 20.8.1974.
It is companytended mat in addition to the appellants the said Wadood Ali Khan had left the other heirs and legal representatives, namely, three sons Maskhur Ashud Khan, Mohdud Ali Khan and Mashkoor Ali Khan, widow Smt.
Firdaus Begum and daughters Shabana Begum, Farzana Begum and Qaiser Jahan Begum.
That after the death of Wadood Ali Khan, the Prescribed Authority under the Ceiling Act served a numberice under Section 10 of the Ceil ing Act proposing to declare lands to the extent of 178 15 19 bighas of irrigated land as surplus.
Such numberice under Section 10 was served on appellant No.
1 although the numberice was addressed to the deceased Wadood Ali Khan.
Appellant No.
1 filed objections before the Prescribed Authority and also participated in the proceedings for determination of ceiling.
Such proceeding was decided by the Prescribed Authority by its Judgment dated 29th April, 1975, inter alia partly upholding objections of the appellant and declaring 87 1 19 19 bighas of irrigated lands as sur plus and treating the late Wadood Ali Khan as the tenure holder.
The appellants filed an appeal before the learned Civil Judge against the aforesaid decision of the Prescribed Authority and it is stated in the appeal petition that such appeal was pending.
The Ceiling Act was amended from time to time and in 1976 the Ceiling Act was further amended by the U.P. Act No.
20 of 1976.
Such Amending Act received the assent of the Presi dent on 30th April, 1976 and was published in the U.P. Gazette extraordinary dated 3rd May, 1976.
Various changes in different Sections of the Ceiling Act were introduced by the said P. Act 1976.
Section 31 3 of the said U.P. Act 20 of 1976 provides as follows 31.
The Prescribed Authority issued a numberice to he appellant No.
1 on 8th July, 1976 under Section 10 2 of the Act inter alia holding that 199 1 1 bighas of irrigated lands were proposed to be declared surplus.
The appellants filed objec tions to the proposed action of redetermina tion of ceiling by raising various objections.
The Prescribed Authority thereafter disposed of the proceeding of redetermination of ceil ing by order dated 22nd December, 1976 to the effect that 125 3 8 16 bighas of irrigated lands belonging to the said Wadood Ali Khan were surplus which were owned by Wadood Ali Khan as tenure holder on the appointed day.
The appellants preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Saharanpur, against such order dated 22nd December, 1976, but such appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge by Judgment and Order dated 16th May, 1977.
The appellants thereafter moved a Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court being Civil Misc.
Writ No.
2955/77 which was disposed of by Order dated 29th November, 1976.
The Writ Petition moved by the appellants were disposed of by the Allahabad High Court inter alia to the effect that previous deter mination of surplus land by the Prescribed Authority did number operate as res judicata and the appellate authority was justified in ignoring the Sale Deed dated October 27,1971.
20 of 1976 in view of the fact that the initiation of the proceed ings for redetermination was made after the said Act 20 of 1976 was enforced.
He has also companytended that the numberice under Section 10 2 was deliberately issued to the appel lants by ignoring the other heirs of late Wadood Ali Khan although the companycerned Prescribed Authority was aware that the said Wadood All Khan had died in 1974.
He had also companytended that the numberice under Section 10 2 was purported to have been issued under the Amending Act of 1975 although the Amending Act of 1976 had companye into force.
| 0 | train | 1991_400.txt |
RUMA PAL, J. The appellants and the respondent No.
1 are all Executive Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department of the Government of Manipur.
All the appellants had Degrees in Engineering before they joined service.
The respondent No.
1 obtained a Diploma in 1989 having duly qualified in both sections of the Associate Membership Examination of the Institution of Engineers AMIE .
1 was eligible to be companysidered for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer in 1991.
The Rules regulating the recruitment to the post of Superintending Engineers of the State of Manipur were numberified on 18th October 1977.
The Rules called The Manipur P.W.D. Irrigation and Flood Control Public Health Engineering Superintending Engineer Civil Superintending Surveyor of Works Recruitment Rules, 1977 provide that the post of Superintending Engineer shall be filled up by promotion from Executive Engineer Civil Mech and Surveyor of Works possessing Degree in Civil Mechanical Engineering or its equivalent from a recognised institution with 6 years regular service in the grade.
The vacancy in the post of Superintending Engineer arose in 1991.
In the same year the respondent No.
1 filed a writ application seeking directions on the State Government to companysider his name for promotion to the post as he had put in 12 years service in the grade and possessed the necessary educational qualifications.
The writ application was opposed by the State Respondents.
They companytended that the eligibility criteria required six years regular service after the educational qualification was obtained.
In the writ petitioners case, his period of service after he obtained the AMIE diploma was far short of the requirement and as such, according to the respondents, he companyld number be companysidered for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer.
The writ application was allowed by the learned Single Judge on 17th March 1993.
It was held that the requirement of six years service was independent of the requirement of educational qualifications and the eligibility criteria was fulfilled even if the requisite experience had been obtained before obtaining the educational qualifications.
The appellants herein moved an application for review of the order before the Learned Single Judge.
This was rejected.
The appellants then filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court.
| 0 | train | 2000_1152.txt |
Leave granted.
A claim petition filed by the appellant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal at Shivpuri, Madhya Pradesh came to be dismissed in default of appearance on 27 1 1998.
On 15 4 1998, the appellant filed an application for restoration of the claim petition under Order 9, Rule 9, C.P.C. setting out the necessary facts explaining the reasons for failure to appear on the date of hearing and the delay in moving the application.
That application was rejected by the Tribunal.
| 1 | train | 2001_143.txt |
As a preliminary objection, to the effect that this Court has numberjurisdiction to entertain this petition, has been taken on behalf of the respondents and we agree with the same,, it is sufficient if we set out the facts material for the purpose of deciding that question.
| 0 | train | 1967_122.txt |
J U D G M E N T ARUN KUMAR, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 16th November, 1998 passed by the Indore Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
As a result of the decision of the High Court the suit filed by the plaintiffs respondent was decreed.
The plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration that they had become owners of the lands in suit by adverse possession and for injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs possession of the suit lands.
The trial Court had decreed the suit, however, the appeal filed by the defendants against the trial companyrt judgment was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Dhar, M.P. and the suit was ordered to be dismissed.
Further an appeal filed by the plaintiffs against the said judgment of the Additional District Judge was allowed by the High Court and the suit was finally decreed.
Briefly the facts are that the plaintiffs respondents herein claim title to the land in suit on the basis of the plea that they had become its owners by adverse possession.
The land was owned by one Fakir Chand predecessor in interest of the appellants herein defendants in the suit .
Fakir Chand sold the land to Tola Singh, predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs by an unstamped and unregistered sale deed dated 9.5.1931.
The plaintiffs claim to have entered into possession of the land on the basis of the said sale deed and they claim to be companytinuously in possession since then.
The defendants tried to dispossess the plaintiffs which led to the present suit being filed by them on 15.4.1972.
In the written statement filed by the defendants they denied the sale of land by their father Fakir Chand to Tola Singh.
They denied possession of the plaintiffs of the suit land.
They also took the plea that the alleged sale deed was false, fictitious and without companysideration.
According to the defendants, their father was in possession of the lands till his death.
After the death of their father, their mother had given possession of the land to Tola Singh for purpose of cultivation in order to earn some money for supporting her family.
According to the defendants they had taken back possession of the land from Tola Singh in the year 1957 58.
It is further admitted that the land was being cultivated by the plaintiffs.
It was prayed in the said application that the plaintiffs be declared trespassers over the suit land and possession of the land be given to the defendants.
In their reply to the application, the present plaintiffs denied the allegation that they were trespassers on the suit land, they refer to the sale deed of 9.5.1931 by Fakir Chand in favour of their predecessor.
Thus the plaintiffs were all along asserting that they were in possession of the land in their own right.
The Tehsildar vide his order dated 3rd October, 1959 dismissed the said application of the defendants.
He relied on an admission on the part of Poonam Chand, eldest son of Fakir Chand that the present plaintiffs were in possession for the last 26 27 years.
Relying on the said statement the revenue authorities held that since possession of the present plaintiffs was companytinuing for last 26 27 years they companyld number be dispossessed from the suit land.
The application of the defendants was dismissed.
The defendant filed an appeal against the said order which was also dismissed on 6.8.1962.
A companyy of the order of the Tehsildar is Exhibit P.8 while a companyy of the order of the appellate authority i.e. S.D.O. is Exhibit P.9.
These judgments of the revenue authorities establish that at least till 1962 the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land.
They also totally nullify the assertion of the defendants in their written statement in the present suit that they had taken possession of the suit land in 1957 58.
If they had taken possession of the suit land in 1957 58 why were they pursuing the matter before the revenue authority till 1962 when the appeal was companytested before the S.D.O. and the decision of the S.D.O. was given on 6.8.1962?
It appears that having failed to obtain possession of the suit land through lawful means, the defendants tried to dispossess the plaintiffs forcibly which led to the present suit being filed on 15.4.1972.
The claim of the defendants regarding taking possession of suit land from plaintiffs in 1957 58 having been found to be false, it follows that the defendants never came into possession of the suit land.
Another significant companyclusion which follows from these facts is that the defendants started asserting their title to the suit land since at least 1956 when they issued the numberice Exhibit P.6 while the plaintiffs have been denying their title to the suit land and were setting up their own title to the same.
This lends support to the plea of adverse possession set up by the plaintiffs.
The trial Court passed an order appointing a Commissioner to record her evidence on companymission.
However, when the Commissioner went to record the evidence of the mother, it was represented to him that she was totally deaf and dumb and therefore, the Commissioner returned without recording her statement.
The plaintiffs thereafter moved an application that the mother of the defendants was companypletely hale and hearty and in order to avoid her being cross examined by the companynsel for the plaintiffs she was purposely number produced as a witness.
Apart from this, even Puran Chand, the eldest brother of the defendants was number examined as a witness.
The defendants were said to be very young at the time of death of their father.
The written statement filed by the defendants was a joint written statement by all the defendants except Punam Chand.
Punam Chand did number file a written statement.
The best evidence in relation to the plea of shikmi, though available, was kept away from the companyrt.
The High Court has further found after scrutinizing the record that the defendants did number care to file even a single revenue entry for the period between 1956 and 1962 that they had been recorded in possession of the suit lands.
Therefore, the High Court companycluded that the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court was based on surmises and companyjecture and was companytrary to the evidence on record and the law.
The High Court came to a definite finding that Tola Singh predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs came in possession of the suit land in the year 1931 and companytinued to be in possession thereof till the date the present suit was filed in 1972.
| 0 | train | 2003_1355.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1877 of 1970.
From the judgment and order dated the 10th January, 1968 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Misc.
Civil Case No.
221 of 1962.
S. Desai, B. B. Ahuja and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.
C. Chagla, B. Sen, A. K. Chitale, A. K. Verma, Ravinder Narain J. B. Dadachanji and O.C. Mathur, for respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in a reference made at the instance of the assessee M s. Sutlej Cotton Mills Supply Agency Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the assessee by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal under s. 66 1 of the Indian Income Tax Act.
The question referred was Whether the inference of the Tribunal that the profit of Rs.
2,13,150/ arising from the sale of 1,58,200 shares of the Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Weaving Co. Ltd., is assessable as business profit is companyrect ?.
When the reference came up for hearing before the High Court, the High Court found that although the Tribunal was of the view that the question referred was a mixed question of law and fact, it had number stated all the facts and circumstances on which it based its companyclusion that the profit of Rs.
2,13,150/ was a business profit and so the Court called for a supplementary statement of the case and a supplementary statement of the case was submitted to the Court by the Tribunal.
The material facts in the statement of the case were as follows.
The assessee is a public limited companypany and it is companytrolled by the Birlas.
the assessee applied for certain shares of the Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Weaving Company Limited hereinafter referred to as the Rayon Company , also a companypany companytrolled by the Birlas.
This companypany was floated on 25 8 1947 with a paid up capital of Rs.
5 lakhs made up of 50,000 ordinary shares of Rs.
10/ each.
in the year ending 31 12 1951, the Rayon Company issued certain new shares for paid up capital of Rs.
1,17,25,000/ made up as follows Rs.
7,60,000 Ordinary shares of Rs.
10/ each 76,00,000 fully paid up.
1 50,000 Ordinary shares of Rs.10/. each 3,75,000 with paid up at Rs.
2/8/ each.
1,50,000 6 preference shares of Rs.
100/ 37,50,000 each paid up at Rs 25/ each redeemable at par at the companypanys option after specified date by giving one Years numberice .
The assessee which was interested in the Rayon Company and which had already purchased 1,000 ordinary shares, subscribed for 3,49,000 shares of the new issue and paid Rs.
8,72,500/ as application money on the 25th and 21th February, 1951, and paid Rs.
26,17,500/ as final call money on 10 8 1951.
These purchases were authorized by a resolution of the assessee dated 7 2 1951.
The assessee sold a part of its stock viz.,
1,58,200 shares at a profit of Rs.
2,13,150/ .
For the assessment year 1956 57 accounting year ending on 31 3 1956 , the Income Tax Officer sought to assess the amount on the basis that it was profit accruing to the assessee from an adventure L in the nature of business.
The assessee companytended that the amount re presented capital gain as the shares were purchased by way of investment and that the same cannot be taxed as revenue receipt.
The Income Tax Officer rejected the companytention.
the assessee filed in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
He companyfirmed the order.
The assessee then went up in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.
2,13,150/ in the profit and loss account without taking it to any reserve account or specifically set it apart for any other purpose the assessee had purchased the shares from borrowed funds and number with money readily available to it the assessee did number make the sales on account of any pressing necessity to meet existing liabilities but had in fact kept a part of the sale proceeds as liquid cash in the United Commercial Bank Ltd. the assessee had.
in the past, dealt in shares as business transaction and had claimed for the assessment year 1951 52 Rs.
1.29,214/ as loss on account of its dealing in shares of M s. Titagarh Paper Mills Ltd. it also claimed Rs.
6,30,000/ as loss on account of devaluation of the shares of M s. Pilani Investment Corporation though that was number allowed there had recently grown a business practice of investing large sums of money in shares in new ventures with an eye on their appreciation for obtaining by sale substantial pro fits in future.
The High Court, in its judgment, said that there was numberprovision in clauses 10, 12, 13, 28 and 29 of paragraph 3 of Memorandum of Association of the assessee which authorised the carrying on of the business of purchasing and selling shares, although some of these clauses did authorise the assessee to acquire and sell shares in other similar companypanies.
| 1 | train | 1975_172.txt |
P. Wadhwa, J. Central Board of Direct Taxes CBDT is in appeal.
It is aggrieved by the judgment dated May 29, 1981 of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court quashing its number approval under Section 80 0 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for short the Act to an agreement dated November 29, 1969 entered into by the respondent with M s. Soaltee Hotel Pvt.
Co. Ltd. vs. S.P. Potnis, Chief Commissioner of Income tax and others 1993 203 ITR 947 Bombay , a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court where one of us was a member held that the order denying approval under Section 80 0 was number justified.
In that case the petitioner entered into two agreements with the foreign companypany for establishing a plant in Indonesia for the manufactured by it.
One agreement was titled technical assistance agreement .
The second agreement titled management service agreement provided for the petitioner to take over the responsibility for the working and management of the foreign companypany for a period of twenty five years.
For this purpose the petitioner was required to loan to the foreign companypany the services of it fully qualified and experienced managers, engineers, technicians, production specialists and such other personnel as may be necessary number only for the setting up of the Companys said plant but also for the overall working and management of the companypany.
The agreement also companytained wide ranging provisions for the giving of all marketing, industrial, manufacturing, companymercial and scientific knowledge, experience and skill for the efficient working and management of the foreign companypany.
Petitioner was also required to have companytrol over general management of the foreign companypanys business transactions and charge and custody of all the property, books of account, papers, documents and effects belonging to the foreign companypany.
While the respondent granted approval to the first agreement it denied its approval to the second agreement.
Respondent was of the view that the second agreement did number qualify for approval under Section 80 0 of the Act, since the crux of the management service agreement was that the petitioners would take over responsibility for the working and management of the foreign companypany for a stipulated period and that managerial services did number amount to technical services within the meaning of Section 80 0.
On this the respondent had relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in J.K. Bombay Ltd.s case.
| 0 | train | 1998_241.txt |
P. Jeevan Reddy, J. This Civil Appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs against the judgment and decrees of the Orissa High Court made in three appeals viz.,
F.A. No.
145 of 1971, F.A. No.
9 of 1972 and F.A. No.
15 of 1972.
The suit was instituted by Smt.
Urmila Padhi for declaration of her title to plaint B schedule lands and companyfirmation of her possession thereon.
The basis of her claim was the partition effected on 22.6.1968.
Alternatively, she prayed for a fresh partition.
Certain other minor reliefs were sought for which need number be set out here .
According to her, Judhishter D 1 and Srinivas were brothers.
Defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of first defendant.
Srinivas had a son, Khalli who died long prior to the institution of the suit.
Plaintiff is his widow.
First defendant was the karta of the joint family and was managing its affairs.
In the year 1967, there was a partition wherein plaintiff was given six annas share while 10 annas share was kept by first defendant and his family.
A deed of partition was executed on 22.6.1968 and registered on 27.6.1968.
Since then, parties are in separate possession and enjoyment of the lands falling to their respective shares.
Plaintiff was afflicted by cancer.
D 4 is her sister.
She appointed the husband of the fourth defendant as her power of attorney holder to manage her properties.
On 31.10.1968, she executed a deed of settlement in respect of some of her properties mentioned in plaint D schedule in favour of fourth defendant and simultaneously cancelled the power of attorney in favour of her husband.
On 24.1.1969, she executed a will in favour of her brothers son in respect of her remaining properties.
While she was at Cuttack, defendants 1,2 and 3 did number allow her or her representatives agents to harvest the paddy or companylect the usufruct from her lands.
Hence the suit.
Plaintiff Urmila died pending the suit Her brothers son Bhojakrishna Panda came on record as her legal representative on the basis of the will dated 24.1.1969.
Fourth defendant supported the plaintiffs case and later transposed as plaintiff No.
First defendant too died after institution of the suit.
His daughter Mahalakshmi was brought on record as his legal representative alongwith defendants 2 and 3.
Son of Mahalakshmi was impleaded as fifth defendant.
The case of Mahalakshmi and D 5 was that fifth defendant was taken in adoption by plaintiff on 17.4.1968 after performing the necessary rites, which is evidenced by a registered deed of adoption.
They admitted the story of partition set up by the plaintiff.
They denied the validity of the will dated 24.1.1969.
According to them, plaintiff Urmila died on 20.4.1967 at Cuttack while undergoing treatment for cancer.
On the date of alleged will i.e. on 21.4.1969 she was number in a fit state of mind number did she have any independent advice available to her.
The fourth defendant took advantage of her situation and obtained the said will from her, they stated.
D 2 alongwith his wife D 6 filed a separate written statement.
They did number seriously companytest the case except trying to safeguard the partition between the plaintiff and Judhishter.
They put forward an inter se partition between D 2 and the third defendant.
Third defendant also filed a separate written statement wherein he denied the story of partition.
According to him, a partition had taken place between defendants 1, 2 and 3 in the year, 1952 and, therefore, there was numberoccasion for another partition in the year, 1968.
Three appeals were preferred in the Orissa High Court.
F.A. No.
145 of 1971 by third defendant, F.A. No.
9 of 1972 by defendant No.
1 C Mahalakshmi and her son, fifth defendant and F.A. No.
15 of 1972 by the second defendant and his wife, the sixth defendant.
All the three appeals were heard together by a Division Bench.
Before the Division Bench a preliminary objection was raised by the appellants defendants that the suit as it stands is number maintainable and plaintiffs 1 and 2 who have been substituted in place of Urmila after her death during the pendency of the suit cannot proceed on with the suit and they are also number entitled to the reliefs which were claimed by Urmila.
All the three appeals were allowed and the suit filed by Urmila was dismissed.
| 0 | train | 1991_564.txt |
Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J. Leave granted.
This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 23.03.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati Bench at Agartala in Writ Appeal No.
88/2002 dismissing the appeal of the Union of India and Others against the order dated 01.08.2001 of the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Civil Rule No.
139/1996.
Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the writ petitioner respondent herein was enrolled as Constable on 08.11.1991 in Central Reserve Police Force for short the CRPF .
Thereafter, the appellants started the process of verification of the character and antecedents of the respondent from civil authorities as required under the provisions of the relevant rules.
The District Magistrate cum Collector West Tripura by its letter dated 03.06.1994 informed the appellants that the respondent along with six others was charge sheeted by Sonamura Police Station Case No.
91 dated 24.12.1990 for offences under Sections 148/149/380 and 436, IPC.
The respondent, at the time of enrolment in CRPF, did number disclose the said fact in companyumn No.
12 a and b of Verification Roll of CRPF see Rule 14 B .
On receipt of the reply from the District Magistrate cum Collector, the Commandant 9th Batallion CRPF vide order dated 23.06.1994 in purported exercise of the power under Rule 5 1 of the Central Civil Services Temporary Services Rules, 1965 terminated the services of the respondent.
The respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority.
The IGP N S, having heard the respondent and having examined and verified the record, has found numbersubstance in the defence of the respondent and by reasoned order dated 12.07.1995 rejected the appeal.
Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred Civil Rule No.
139/1996 which was decided by the learned Single Judge on 01.08.2001 holding that the order of termination of the respondent was passed on alleged misconduct and the same companyld number be treated as an order simplicitor companyered by the CCS Temporary Services Rules, 1965.
The learned Single Judge, however, while allowing the writ petition of the respondent, reserved liberty to the appellants to initiate departmental proceedings against the respondent for alleged misconduct as revealed in the order of the appellate authority.
Being aggrieved against and dissatisfied with the order of the learned Single Judge, the Union of India and others filed Writ Appeal No.
88/2002 which came to be dismissed by the Division Bench by impugned judgment by holding that the order of termination was passed on alleged misconduct as a foundation number motive and as such the same cannot be treated as an order of simplicitor under Rules, 1965.
Hence, the Union of India and others have filed this appeal by special leave challenging the companyrectness and validity of the order of the Division Bench of the High Court.
The respondent has remained ex parte.
In the absence of the respondent, we have heard the learned companynsel for the appellants and with his assistance perused the entire material on record.
It is number in dispute that in terms of clause 12 a of the CRPF see Rule 14 B Verification Roll Annexure P 2 the respondent was under obligation to inform the appellants in regard to the pendency of the criminal case against him.
The appellants started the process of verification of character and antecedents of the respondent in terms of the relevant service rules.
The District Magistrate cum Collector informed the Additional DIG, Group Centre CRPF, Bhubaneshwar Orissa by registered post letter dated 03.06.1994, that as per the report submitted by OIC Melaghar Police Station, the Police Case No.
91/90 dated 24.12.1990 was registered against the respondent and others under Sections 148/149/380/506 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code.
Undisputedly, the above extracted order was passed by the companypetent authority under Rule 5 1 of CCS Temporary Service Rules, 1965, as the respondent was a temporary employee and was number a companyfirmed Constable.
| 1 | train | 2008_1499.txt |
W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.
2253 OF 2005 B. SINHA, J Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited was a tenant in the premises in question wherefor an agreement of tenancy was entered into by and between the father of the First Respondent and Caltex India Limited for a period of ten years from 15.12.1965.
On or about 24.12.1974, another deed of lease was executed by the mother of the Respondent No.
1 in favour of Caltex India Limited for a period of five years expiring on 31.7.1979.
On or about 30.12.1976, the Caltex Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining India Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex India Limited Ordinance, 1976 which was replealed and replaced by the Caltex Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining India Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex India Limited Act, 1977 was promulgated whereby and whereunder right, title and interest of Caltex India Ltd. in relation to its undertakings in India stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government.
The Central Government, however, in exercise of its power companyferred upon it under Section 9 of the said Act directed that the said undertakings shall, instead of companytinuing to vest in the Central Government, vest in Caltex Oil Refining India Ltd., a Govt.
companypany with effect from 30.12.1976.
Caltex Oil Refining India Ltd. was later on amalgamated with the Appellant herein in terms of Sub section 3 of Section 7 of the said Act.
The Appellant herein, thus, was at the liberty to renew the period of lease for a period of further five years with effect from 1.8.1979 on the same terms and companyditions as companytained in the deed of lease dated 24.12.1974.
The Appellant herein exercised its option of renewing the lease with effect from 24.4.1979.
On the expiry of the said period, an eviction proceeding was initiated by the First Respondent against the Appellant by filing a suit which was marked as O.S. No.
737 of 1985.
The said suit for eviction was decreed.
An appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed.
The Regional Manager of the Appellant herein thereafter sent a requisition to the Special Deputy Collector for acquisition of the land for the purpose of companytinuing the business wherefor a numberification was published on 15.10.1985.
However, the said numberification lapsed.
On or about 3.6.1989, a fresh numberification was issued under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act for short the Act .
The First Respondent filed a detailed objection on 20th July, 1989 companytending that there existed numberpublic purpose for acquisition of the said land and in any event, other suitable lands are available therefor.
Upon giving an opportunity of hearing to the Respondents, the Collector is said to have companyducted an enquiry and submitted his Report to the Government on or about 28.8.1989.
A declaration thereafter was issued under Section 6 of the Act on 25.9.1989.
Questioning the said numberification, the First Respondent herein filed a writ petition in the High Court which was marked as W.P. No.
16012 of 1989.
Although, the Deputy Collector and the Appellant filed their companynter affidavits in the said proceedings, numbercounter affidavit was filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the said writ petition.
An appeal thereagainst was filed before this Court marked as Civil Appeal No.
910 of 1998 and by an order dated 19.8.1998 the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court on the ground that several other companytentious issues have been raised.
The parties were, however, granted liberty to file additional pleadings.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of such liberty, the First Respondent herein raised additional grounds by filing a Miscellaneous Application which was marked as WPMP No.
27633 of 2003 companytending inter alia therein that there had been a total number application of mind on the part of the State Government both before issuing the numberification under Section 4 1 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
A companynter affidavit was filed by Respondent Nos.
2 and 3 affirmed by one Shri B. Venkataiah, Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition General both for himself as also the State in the said Miscellaneous Application.
An affidavit affirmed by one Shri K.V. Rao was filed on 7th November, 2003 stating that the records were number readily traceable in view of shifting of Industries and Commerce Department within the premises of the Secretariat Buildings twice in four years.
An apology was also tendered for number production of records.
By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ petition has been allowed.
The Appellant being aggrieved thereby are before us.
The companynter affidavit filed on 30th October, 2003 was also affirmed by a Special Deputy Collector.
| 0 | train | 2005_746.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
101 of 1969.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 16, 1969 of the Rajasthan High Court in S. B. Criminal Appeal No.
558 of 1966.
S. R. Chari and S. B. Wad, for the appellant.
B. Mehta, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court.
The accused was initially charged on three companynts, firstly, under section 5 2 read with section 5 1 c of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act , secondly, under section 409, I.P.C., and thirdly, under section 477A, I.P.C. Thereafter on 15 1 1964 another Special Judge charged him on two companynts, namely, under section 5 2 read with section 5 1 c and section 5 2 read with section 5 1 w of the Act.
After the trial, the appellant was, however, companyvicted under section 409, I.P.C. and section 5 2 read with section 5 1 c and d of the Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 18 months and a fine of Rs.
250/ under section 409, I.P.C. and 18 months rigorous imprisonment, and a fine of Rs.
250/ under section 5 2 read with sections 5 1 c and 5 1 d of the Act.
The sentences on both these companynts were, directed to run companycurrently.
The High Court, however, thought that the Special Judge had number recorded any companyviction under section 5 1 d of the Act and in that view companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence of the appellant of 18 months rigorous imprisonment on each of the companynts, namely, under section 409, I.P.C. and section 5 2 read with section 5 1 c of the Act, but reduced the fine for each of the offences from Rs.
250/ to Rs.
150/ .
The appellant was employed as a Traffic Assistant in the Indain Airlines Corporations office at Jaipur and his duty was to make reservations of the passengers intending to go by air and issue tickets.
As it happens, when the quota of seats allotted to Jaipur is full, intending travellers who request for accommodation would be required to pay trunk telephone charges for enabling the Airlines Corporation to obtain release of seats from quotas allotted to other centers.
The practice of the Airlines was to companylect the approximate charges and issue a receipt therefore and if a seat was available, the reservation would be companyfirmed and accommodation given to the passengers if seats companyld be released from other centers for Jaipur.
The appellant who was incharge of these arrangements between 16 2 62 and 30 8 62, companylected Rs.
184.90 towards trunk telephone charges but actually deposited with the Airlines Corporation a sum of Rs.
44.91 and misappropriated the balance of Rs.
139.99.
The modus operendi followed by him, it is alleged, was that he would demand a higher amount for Trunk Call charges than were likely to be incurred and he would issue a companyrect receipt for those amounts on behalf of the Airlines Corporation but after making the trunk call, he would alter the companynter foil with the actual amount of trunk call charges.
On the same day he would make a daily return showing the actual amounts and deposit them with the Cashier.
A typical sample of the receipts given by him on behalf of the Airlines Corporation is Exhibit 40 which is as follows INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION NEW DELHI.
354577 Station Jaipur.
Date 30 8 62.
Received with thanks from M s. M Travels, Jaipur sum of Rupees Twenty three and forty nP, being the amount T Call charges to Udaipur and AMD for re lease of seat.
for INDIAN AIRLINES CORPORATION.
Sd Cashier.
23.40 On 31 8 62, one M.D. Singh ofthe Mercury Travel Agency, Jaipur companyplained to B.S. Gupta, Incharge of the Office of the Indian Airlines Corporation at Jaipur that the appellant had companylected Rs.
23.40 for proposed trunk call charges from the Agency but made numbercall and numberseat was allotted to the passenger of the Mercury Travel Agency even though one was available and that seat was given by B. S. Gupta to someone else.
B. S. Gupta questioned the appellant who then made a companyfession of his having companylected the amount but number having made a call.
After making this companyfession he immediately resigned his job.
A preliminary inquiry was companyducted by the Area Manager who thereafter lodged the First Information Report.
The accused denied having companylected the amounts or of having issued the receipts and further stated that whatever amounts were companylected by him were paid in the office of the Airlines everyday.
Both the Courts found on the evidence that the appellant used to make trunk calls whenever he was on duty from the Indian Airlines Corporation office at Jaipur for the release of seats and that he would call for and receive trunk call charges from intending passengers.
| 0 | train | 1972_77.txt |
The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as the Board and its functionaries charged the respondent No.2 Advocate for electricity companysumption at the rate applicable for companymercial companysumers.
The demand was questioned by filing a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court which by the impugned judgment held that the legal profession does number involve a companymercial activity and, therefore, the rate applicable to companymercial companysumers was number applicable to him.
The judgment is questioned by the Board in this appeal.
| 0 | train | 2005_354.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.
1919 1920 of 1966.
appeals from the judgment and order dated october 12 13 1962 of the bombay high companyrt in income tax reference number 2 of 1959.
t. desai 0.
p. malliotra and 0.
c. mathur for the appellant in c.a.
number 1919 of 1966 and the respondent in ca.
number 1920 of 1966 .
narsaraju and r. n. sachthey for the appellant in a. number 1920 of 1966 and the respondent in c.a.
number 1919 of 1966.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shah j. these are cross appeals from the order passed by the high companyrt of bombay recording answers to questions sub mitted in a reference under s. 66 of the indian income tax act 1922.
messrs killick nixon company hereinafter called the assessee was a firm which carried on diverse trading activities in bombay.
the assessee agreed to sell on numberember 28 1947 to a companypany called killick industries limited the benefit of managing agency companytracts held by it shares of limited company including 240 shares of the cement agencies limited and debentures and book and other debts in companysideration of 79993 shares of the face value of rs.
100/ each or killick industries limited and rs.
700/ in cash.
by anumberher agreement dated january 29 1948 the assessee agreed to sell to killick nixon company limited goodwill of the business of the.
assessee freehold and leasehold hereditaments plant and machinery stock in trade and book debts government securities and shares and full benefit of all shipping and general agencies distributorships etc.
in companysideration of 9996 shares in the vendee companypany of the face value of rs.
100/each and rs.
400/ in cash.
the assessee was dissolved and its business was discontinued with effect from february 1 1948.
in a proceeding for assessment to tax payable by the assessee for the year 1949 50 the relevant previous year being the year ending june 30 1948 the income tax officer assessed the capital gains made by the assessee on the transfer of its capital assets to the two companypanies it rs.
3201747/ .
in appeal the appeal 9 7 3 late assistant companymissioner modified the order.
he was of the view that the assessee had made capital gains amounting to rs.
2540737/ by sale of shares to the two companypanies and other assets transferred to killick nixon company limited and had suffered a capital loss of rs.
400530/ being the difference between the market value of the managing agencies 240 shares of the cement agencies limited and the goodwill on january 1 1939 estimated at rs.
5140802/ and the market value of those assets on february 1 1948 estimated at rs.
the appellate assistant companymissioner rejected the claim of the assessee to the benefit of s. 25 3 4 of the income tax act 1922.
the appellate tribunal confirmed the order passed by the appellate assistant commissioner.
the tribunal drew up a statement of the case and referred two questions numbered i 2 below to the high companyrt of judicature at bombay.
whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the tribunal misdirected itself in law and or acted without evidence or in disregard of the most material evidence on record in making the valuation of the applicants assets on first day of january one thousand nine hundred and thirtynine ?
the high companyrt answered the first question in the negative and the second the third and the fourth questions in the affirmative.
the assessee has appealed against the answers recorded on the first three questions against the order recording the answer on the fourth question the commissioner has appealed.
the appeal filed by the companymissioner may first be considered.
the assessee companytended before the tribunal relying upon the evidence on record that the value of the managing agencies 240 9 7 4 shares of the cement agencies limited and the goodwill on january 1.
1939 companysiderably exceeded rs.
514o8o2/ .
the stand taken by the assessee in our opinion is in consistent.
a uniform method must be adopted both as on the date of the transfer and as on 1 1 1939.
it is number open to the assessee to value an asset by applying one method on 1 2 1948 and anumberher on 1 1 1939.
the tribunal then observed that since the assets were transferred to a companypany in which the partners of the assessee were interested and the transfer was made for a consideration which was less than the market value it was number open to the assessee to companytend that the market value of the assets on january 1 1939 should be taken into account that the assessee was number entitled to reduce the capital gain by adopting the valuation of those assets which had a market quotation and in respect of assets which had no market quotation by adopting the sale price and that if the goodwill of the business on january 1 1939 was worth rs.
8 lakhs its value on february 1 1948 should be higher.
the tribunal recorded its companyclusion that for the purpose of this appeal it is enumbergh to say that if the value of the assets in question was rs.
4640279/ on 1 2 1948 it could number be higher than rs.
5140802/ as on i. i 1939.
speaking for ourselves we think the income tax authorities by allowing the loss of rs.
the managing agencies 240 shares of the cement agencies limited and the goodwill of its busi.
ness as on 1 1 1939 for the purpose of the companyputation of the capital gains and the said capital gains if any had to be determined by deducting the said valuation as on 1 1 1939 from the full value of the companysideration.
which the assessee had received and which it was companymon ground between the parties was rs.
11675108/ .
the appellate assistant commissioner had proceeded to determine the value of its assets as on 1 1 1939.
as against the said valuation arrived at by the appellate assistant companymissioner the assessee has raised ojections before the tribunal which objections the tribunal had to companysider on their merits.
in so far as the tribunal has failed to do so and has proceeded on the erroneous view which it has taken that it was number necessary to deal in detail with the evidence produced before the income tax authorities the tribunal has clearly misdirected itself and had also number applied its mind properly to the material on record.
| 0 | dev | 1967_47.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
370 of 1959.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 6, 1957, of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur, in Misc.
Petition No.
512 of 1956.
N. Phadke and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
Shankar Anand and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondents Nos.
P. Nathvahi, K. L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar, for the Intervener State of Bombay .
December 9.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. This is an appeal by special leave in an industrial matter.
The appellant is the manager of a biri factory in Nagpur.
Respondents 2 to 4 are working in that factory.
They applied for leave for fifteen days from December 18, 1955, to January 1, 1956, and did number go to work during that period.
The appellant did number pay their wages for these days and in companysequence they applied to the Payment of Wages Authority hereinafter called the Authority for payment to them of wages which had been withheld.
Their claim was that they were entitled to fifteen days leave in the year under ss.
79 and 80 of the Factories Act, 1948.
The Authority allowed the claim and granted them a sum of Rs.
90/16/ in all as wages which had been withheld for the period of leave.
Thereupon, the appellant filed an application under Art.
226 of the Constitution before the High Court at Nagpur.
His main companytention was that respondents 2 to 4 were number workers within the meaning of the Factories Act and companyld number therefore claim the benefit of a. 79 thereof The respondents companytended that they were workers within the meaning of the Factories Act and were entitled to the sum awarded to them by the Authority.
The High Court on a companysideration of the circumstances came to the companyclusion that respondents Fir2 to 4 were workers under s. 2 1 of the Factories Act and therefore the order of the Authority was companyrect and dismissed the petition.
The appellant then applied for a certificate to appeal to this Court which was refused.
He then obtained special leave from this Court and that is how the matter has companye up before US.
| 0 | train | 1960_264.txt |
W I T H Writ Petition Nos.
827/90, 822, 416 718/91 J U D G M E N T JAGANNADHA RAO, J. These five writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India are all companynected and raise the same questions.
The petitioners are Secondary School Teachers in the State of Karnataka serving in Government and Government aided Secondary Schools.
Certain Secondary grade teachers in the former State of Hyderabad which were allotted to the State of Karnataka as on 1.11.1956.
After reorganisation, the companyresponding posts in former State of Mysore were equate with the posts of the allotted personnel.
There was revision of pay scale on 1.1.1957 and again on 1.1.1961 but the disparity in pay scales was allowed to companytinue.
This anomaly was companytinued till 1.1.1970 for nearly fourteen years, when for the first time under the companycerned Karnataka Civil Services Revised Pay Rules , 1970 which came into force on 1.1.1970, based on the report of the pay Commission headed by Justice Tukol, the scales were brought on par with scales of allotted Hyderabad officers prospectively by enhancing the scales of the all Karnataka teachers w.e.f.
1.1.1970.
But the grievance of the Secondary School teachers of Government of Karnataka for the period from 1.1.1957 to 31.12.1969 companytinued and has number been removed.
That is the subject of these writ petitions.
It is stated that, so far as disparities in pay among Mysore and Karnataka Primary school teachers on the one had and allotted Hyderabad primary school teachers are companycerned, Government orders as late as 1986 showed that those grievance also arise out of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 in respect of pay scale disparities and have been removed by the Government of Karnataka.
On that basis, petitioners, Secondary school teachers of Mysore and Karnataka claim that distance of time is numberbar to relieve their legitimate grievance for the period 1.1.57 to 31.12.69.
In support of this companytention, reliance is placed on two sets of facts.
Firstly the number allottee primary school teachers of Karnataka filed Writ Petition No.2801 of 1971 in the Karnataka High Court for equating their pay scale with the Hyderabad area primary school teachers.
The pay as on 1.1.1978 of the Karnataka Primary School teachers was to be increased by 50 prospectively w.e.f.
1.1.78.
The scales were increased only for purpose of companyputation and fixation of pay but number for payment of arrears upto 31.12.77.
Various details as companytained in the companypromise so arrived at were incorporated in the proceedings of the Government of Karnataka dated 10.8.1979.
Again, when the above companypromise was being implemented, the Government stopped the benefit of this companypromise from accruing to primary school teachers recruited in the State of Karnataka after 1.11.56.
This was challenged successfully in B.T. Ramaswamy vs. State of Karnataka W.P. 54/82 and batch before the High Court of Karnataka by judgment dated 6.12 1985.
Thereafter Government issued an order as late as 8.7.1986.
extending the benefit of its order dated 19.8.1979 by giving increased scales of pay to all primary school teachers i.e. number only to those of erstwhile Mysore State but also to the primary teachers recruited after 1.11.1956.
This was restricted to primary teachers who were recruited upto 31.12.1969.
as companypared to erstwhile Hyderabad primary teachers allotted to Karnataka.
This was number interfered with by this Court in State of Karnataka vs. A Venkatappayya CA No.13757/96 dated 28.10.97 .
The Tribunal rejected the petition the ground of laches on 14.12.1989.
Thereafter, the present Writ petitions have been filed by other Karnataka Secondary Grade Teacher in this Court claiming eqalisation of pay scales from 1.1.1957 to 31.12.1969 and payment of arrears for that period.
That is how these writ petitions have arisen.
It is companytended by the learned companynsel for the petitioners Secondary School teachers that as late as 1986 and number 1994 and 1996 all pay scale grievance of primary school teachers of almost all descriptions arising out of States Reorganisation Act, have been favourably removed by the State government, but the grievances of the Secondary School teachers, also arising out of State Reorganisation for the period 1.1.1957 to 31.12.1969 have number been redressed and this is discriminatory It is pointed out that this was done by even directing the arrears to be credited t their P.F. account and extending all benefits to primary teachers recruited after 1.11.1956 upto 31.12.1969.
| 0 | train | 1997_940.txt |
Leave granted.
We have heard learned companynsel for the appellant as well as learned companynsel for Respondents 1 to 5 who are the only companytesting respondents in the present case.
A limited numberice was issued in the SLPs which has resulted into these appeals.
It was to the effect whether the petitioner is entitled to draw the salary attached to the post of Secretary Scouts during the time he actually worked on that post pursuant to the order at Annexure E dated 28 1 1992 at page 32 of the Paper Book.
And if so, what was the scale of pay for the said post according to him.
When we turned to the order dated 28 1 1992 under which the appellant was called upon to look after the duties of the Secretary Scouts we find the following recitals as per Order No.
276, dated 28 1 1992.
The Director of Education, A N Islands is pleased to order the transfer to Shri Selveraj, Primary School Teacher attached to Middle School, Kanyapuram to Directorate of Education Scouts Section to look after the duties of Secretary Scouts with immediate effect.
His pay will be drawn against the post of Secretary Scouts under GFR 77.
It is number in dispute that the appellant looked after the duties of Secretary Scouts from the date of the order and his salary was to be drawn against the post of Secretary Scouts under GFR 77.
Still he was number paid the said salary for the work done by him as Secretary Scouts .
It is of companyrse true that the appellant was number regularly promoted to the said post.
| 1 | train | 1998_223.txt |
M. Sahai, J. These are four appeals directed against judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala.
The appellants are owners or proprietors of hotels and restaurants who were granted FL 3 licences under Rule 13 3 of the Kerala Excise Act in October 1992 for the year 1992 93.
Their licences were cancelled soon thereafter as in November 1992 the Government had taken a policy decision to cancel all Foreign Liquor Hotel Restaurant Licences under Rule 13 3 of the Kerala Foreign Liquor Rules 1974 to hotels restaurant tourist homes during the financial year 1992 93.
They challenged the orders in the High Court by way of writ petitions.
The petitions were dismissed on 1st February 1993.
Two Special Leave Petitions were filed against this order.
One was numbered as 2310 17 of 1993 and the other as 3391 of 1993.
Some of other petitions came up for hearing before the High Court on 4th March 1993 which were decided on 10th March 1993.
This order was challenged by Special Leave Petition Civil No.
4152 of 1993.
In Special Leave Petition Nos.
2310 17 of 1993 and 3391 of 1993 a bench of this Court on 1st March 1993 passed following order Issue numberice both on special leave petitions as well as on petitions for stay.
On 2nd March 1993 it is alleged that a statement was made on behalf of the State to the press that the licence of the appellants shall number be renewed.
However, since on 1st March 1993 this Court had permitted the appellants to approach the companycerned authorities and yet a statement had been issued on behalf of the State Government the appellants approached the High Court, once again, for issue of direction to opposite parties to renew licences of the appellants for the years 1993 94.
This petition was disposed of on 30th March 1993 directing the respondents to dispose of the applications for renewal filed by the appellants as directed by this Court in accordance with law and on merits.
In pursuance of this order applications filed by the appellants for renewal of their licence for 1993 94 appears to have been forwarded by the Excise Commissioner to the Board of Revenue which in its turn returned it with instructions to dispose of them in the light of G.D. No.
179/92/TD dated 9th November 1992.
On 24th May 1993 the Excise Commissioner rejected the applications for renewal in the light of G.O. dated 9th November 1992 as directed by the Board.
This order has been challenged by a separate Special Leave Petition C No.
5808 of 1993 in which numberice was issued on 13th May 1993.
This question has been referred to a Constitution bench by a bench of three judges of this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. | 0 | train | 1993_910.txt |
The occurrence took place on the morning of October 2, 1979 in a street in Village Dhandyal, District, Sangrur, Punjab in which the houses of the deceased as well as that of the appellant are situated.
The deceased Kaka Singh was seen by the appellant companying and the latter along with three others, since acquitted, surrounded him.
Firstly, the deceased was felled down and then two blows with sharp pointed and cutting weapons were inflicted on him.
One was on the chest and abdomen and the other was on the back of the deceased near the first lumber vertebrae closed to the mid line.
The first injury was attributed to the appellant and the second one to Dev Singh accused since acquitted.
The deceased when injured was taken to the hospital and remained an indoor patient for seven days thereafter and in the meantime was operated upon.
| 1 | train | 1992_628.txt |
N. Grover, J. This is an appeal by certificate from a judgment of the Patna High Court by which a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution filed by the appellant was dismissed.
On April 25, 1961 the Land Reforms Deputy Collector made an order that the settlement of the disputed land with Mohini Devi in 1946 by Mustaque Ali Khan was invalid and that it should be annulled.
This order was companyfirmed by the Collector of Darbhanga on May 25, 1962.
The appellant moved the Commissioner for setting aside of the aforesaid orders but without any success.
He then filed a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging those orders.
The High Court referred to the following part of the order of the Commissioner The circumstances of the settlement and certain features of the settlement itself may disclose the intention of the party The land has been settled at a very low rate of Rs.
3/ per katha.
But the amount of companypensation has been calculated at Rs.
By acquiring such a valuable piece of land on a low rate, the intention of Smt.
| 1 | train | 1971_29.txt |
Jagannatha Shetty, J. Mr. K.G.S. Bhatt respondent No.
1 in this appeal was a civil engineer A in the Central Food and Technological Research Institute, Mysore, which is one of the national institutes under Council of Scientific and Industrial Research.
He was number companysidered for any kind of promotion for nearly two decades.
He approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench making that grievance and asking for relief.
The Tribunal by judgment dated August 7, 1987 allowed his claim which has been challenged in this appeal by leave.
1 in this appeal.
The appellant has framed certain bye laws for regulating promotion of technical and scientific staff.
One such bye law is bye law 71 b ii which expressly does number companyer the case of civil engineers.
| 0 | train | 1989_242.txt |
Growing up as a child, she felt different from the boys of her age and was feminine in her ways.
On account of her femininity, from an early age, she faced repeated sexual harassment, molestation and sexual abuse, both within and outside the family.
Due to her being different, she was isolated and had numberone to talk to or express her feelings while she was companying to terms with her identity.
She was companystantly abused by everyone as a chakka and hijra.
Though she felt that there was numberplace for her in society, she did number succumb to the prejudice.
She started to dress and appear in public in womens clothing in her late teens but she did number identify as a woman.
Later, she joined the Hijra companymunity in Mumbai as she identified with the other hijras and for the first time in her life, she felt at home.
That being a hijra, the Applicant has faced serious discrimination throughout her life because of her gender identity.
It has been clear to the Applicant that the companyplete number recognition of the identity of hijras transgender persons by the State has resulted in the violation of most of the fundamental rights guaranteed to them under the Constitution of India.
Siddarth Narrain, eunuch, highlights Narrains feeling, as follows Ever since I can remember, I have always identified myself as a woman.
I lived in Namakkal, a small town in Tamil Nadu.
When I was in the 10th standard I realized that the only way for me to be companyfortable was to join the hijra companymunity.
It was then that my family found out that I frequently met hijras who lived in the city.
One day, when my father was away, my brother, encouraged by my mother, started beating me with a cricket bat.
I locked myself in a room to escape from the beatings.
My mother and brother then tried to break into the room to beat me up further.
Some of my relatives intervened and brought me out of the room.
I related my ordeal to an uncle of mine who gave me Rs.50 and asked me to go home.
Instead, I took the money and went to live with a group of hijras in Erode.
Sachin, a TG, expressed his experiences as follows My name is Sachin and I am 23 years old.
As a child I always enjoyed putting make up like vibhuti or kum kum and my parents always saw me as a girl.
I am male but I only have female feelings.
I used to help my mother in all the housework like companyking, washing and cleaning.
They would call out to me and ask Why dont you go out and work like a man?
or Why are you staying at home like a girl?
But I liked being a girl.
I felt shy about going out and working.
Relatives would also mock and scold me on this score.
Every day I would go out of the house to bring water.
And as I walked back with the water I would always be teased.
I felt very ashamed.
I even felt suicidal.
How companyld I live like that?
Since numberwoman was willing to marry one who was doomed to be killed, Krishna assumes the form of a beautiful woman called Mohini and marries him.
The Hijras of Tamil Nadu companysider Aravan their progenitor and call themselves Aravanis.
Corbett principle was number found favour by various other companyntries, like New Zealand, Australia etc.
Under Section 15 of that Act, before issuing the certificate, the Board had to be satisfied, inter alia, that the applicant believed his or her true gender was the persons reassigned gender and had adopted the lifestyle and gender characteristics of that gender.
Majority of Judges agreed with Lockhart, J. in SRA that gender should number be regarded merely as a matter of chromosomes, but partly a psychological question, one of self perception, and partly a social question, how society perceives the individual.
The House of Lords in Bellinger v. Bellinger 2003 2 All ER 593 was dealing with the question of a transsexual.
In that case, Mrs. Bellinger was born on 7th September, 1946.
At birth, she was companyrectly classified and registered as male.
However, she felt more inclined to be a female.
Despite her inclinations, and under some pressure, in 1967 she married a woman and at that time she was 21 years old.
She claimed between 1990 and 1992 she was sexually harassed by companyleagues at work, followed by other human rights violations.
Social exclusion and discrimination on the ground of gender stating that one does number companyform to the binary gender male female does prevail in India.
Discussion on gender identity including self identification of gender of male female or as transgender mostly focuses on those persons who are assigned male sex at birth, whether one talks of Hijra transgender, woman or male or male to female transgender persons, while companycern voiced by those who are identified as female to male trans sexual persons often number properly addressed.
We have exhaustively referred to various articles companytained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 as well as the Yogyakarta principles.
I love companyking.
I am learning French and when my left foot recovers fully, I plan to learn dancing.
And, for the first time this year, I will vote with my new name.
I am looking forward to that, she says.
| 1 | train | 1947_191.txt |
J U D G E M E N T The original respondent, Dinanath Shantaram Karekar, who died during the pendency of the proceedings before the Central Administrative Tribunal Bombay and has since been replaced by the present respondents, was appointed as unskilled labour in the Naval Armament Depot, Bombay.
He was subsequently promoted to the post of Gun Repair Labourer, Grade I. On 25th October, 1973, he was declared quasi permanent on that post with effect from 1.8.1966.
He was, however, removed from service by order dated 19th August, 1985 after regular departmental enquiry.
This order was upheld in the Departmental appeal.
The order of removal as also the appellate order were challenged by him before the Tribunal on the grounds, inter alia, that neither the charge sheet number the show cause numberice were ever served upon him and, therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated.
The Tribunal has found that the charge sheet which was issued to him by registered post was returned with the postal endorsement number found, while the show cause numberice was published straightaway in Dainiki Sagar, Navshakti.
The Tribunal found the service of the charge sheet and the show cause numberice on the respondent as insufficient and therefore, set aside the order dated 19th August, 1985, by which be was removed from service.
| 0 | train | 1998_524.txt |
Leave granted.
| 1 | train | 2008_132.txt |
Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
The first respondent Municipal Council, filed a suit for ejectment against three defendants Shamrao, Dayaram and second respondent .
The trial Court decreed the suit.
The first defendant filed an appeal and during the pendency of the appeal he died and his seven LRs were brought on record.
The first Appellate Court rejected the appeal on 20.2.1993.
Aggrieved by the rejection, the LRs of the first defendant filed a second appeal SA No.92/1993 before the High Court of Bombay.
The second appeal was admitted and was pending for more than a decade.
No dates of hearing were being given.
One of the LRs of the first defendant, namely appellant No.3 before the High Court Dadasao Shamrao Saoji , died in the year 1996.
An application for setting aside the abatement with an application for companydonation of delay and an application for bringing LRs of the deceased third appellant were filed in the year 2003.
Thereafter, the plaintiff first respondent filed an application for dismissal of the second appeal on the ground that the appeal having abated in respect of third appellant should be deemed to have abated in regard to all the appellants.
The High Court accepted the said companytention and dismissed the appeal on 13.12.2006.
Feeling aggrieved, the appellants in the second appeal have filed this appeal by special leave challenging the orders dated 27.7.2005 and 13.12.2006.
It is evident from the applications filed by the appellant for setting aside the abatement and for bringing the LRs of the third appellant on record, that the other appellants were under the bonafide impression that it was number necessary to bring the LRs of third appellant on record as the other LRs of the deceased first defendant were already on record.
The principles relating to companydonation of delay and setting aside abatement for bringing LRs of a deceased party on record in a pending second appeal before the High Court where the second appeal has been admitted but numberdates of hearing were fixed, have been stated by this Court in Perumon 3.
| 0 | train | 2008_2763.txt |
13049/2003 N. VARIAVA, J. Leave granted.
The District Forum further directed payment of Rs.5,000/ towards mental tension and harassment and Rs.1,000/ as litigation charges.
The State Forum partly allowed the Appeals filed by the Appellants by modifying the order of the District Forum to the extent that interest was held to be payable after two years from the date of deposit.
allowable after two years from the date of the respective deposits.
| 0 | train | 2004_492.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
436 of 1980.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated 1 9 1978 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No.
200/78.
AND Civil Appeal No.
930 of 1980.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay Appellate Authority appointed under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 , in Appeal PGA Nos.
34/78 and 36 to 119/79.
S. Kulkarni, Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna and V. N. Ganpule for the Appellants and intervener.
| 0 | train | 1981_44.txt |
This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal dated 14 2 1994 whereby the Tribunal, has upheld the order passed by the Collector, Customs, Kandla dated 8 3 1991 directing companyfiscation of the goods imported by the appellant and imposition of the penalty of Rs 5,00,000 and directing that the goods companyld be released subject to payment of redemption fine of Rs 20,00,000.
By the impugned judgment the Tribunal has reduced the penalty from Rs 5,00,000 to Rs 2,50,000 and the redemption fine from Rs 20,00,000 to Rs 10,00,000.
The matter relates to import of 1564 evaporators for automobiles under two separate bills of lading.
1466 units were of That origin and 98 units were of Japanese origin.
The value of the said evaporators as disclosed by the appellant was S 45 per piece for evaporator of That origin and S 60 per piece for evaporator of Japanese origin.
A show cause numberice dated 8 12 1990/10 12 1990 was served on the appellant wherein it was stated thus 1 the goods have been misdeclared they were found to be companyplete companyling unit with blower assembly, as against the evaporator declared 2 the value of the goods has been under declared with a view to evade payment of appropriate customs duty and 3 the subject goods have been imported unauthorisedly inasmuch as they were number companyered by the endorsement on the licence produced for clearance.
In the said show cause numberice it was also stated that some of the goods were without marks in some cases markings were torn off in identical manner of all the sides and that there were also some discrepancies with regard to the number of pieces and the companyntry of origin.
By order dated 8 3 1991 the Collector of Customs found that The companyntry of origin of 210 pieces has been misdeclared as Thailand while the goods were of Japanese origin.
The goods imported were evaporator assembly and that the evaporator assembly was more than an evaporator.
Prices for customs purposes have been underdeclared.
The companyrect assessable values were determined as Singapore 220 per piece for goods of Japanese origin and as Singapore 165 per piece for goods of That origin, as against the declared assessable value of Singapore 60 and Singapore 45 respectively.
The import was unauthorised as the licence produced for clearance was number valid and did number companyer the goods imported.
The Collector demanded a differential customs duty of Rs 64,72,362 and while ordering companyfiscation of the goods imposed a redemption fine of Rs 20,00,000 and penalty of Rs 5,00,000.
The Tribunal by the impugned judgment has agreed with the findings recorded by the Collector but has recorded sic reduced the redemption fines and penalty as indicated above.
| 0 | train | 1998_755.txt |
THE 15TH DAY OF MAY, 1998 Present Honble Mr. Justice S.B. Majmudar Honble Mr. Justice M. Jagannadha Rao F. Nariman, Sr.
Girish Ananthamurthy, G.V. Chandrasekhar, B.Y. Kulkarni, Advs.
With him for the appellant Rama Jois, Sr.
P. Mahale, Adv.
with him for the Respondent in No.1 L. Sanghi, Sr.
T.V. Ratnam.,
with him for the Respondent Nos.
2 3 J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered JAGANNADHA RAO.
J. The appellant is the plaintiff.
He filed the suit O.S No.
50 of 1985 for specific performance of an agreement of sales of house property located at Shimoga, Karnataka State executed in his favour.
He succeeded in the trial companyrt but on appeal by the Vendors defendants, the Judgment of the trial companyrt was set aside by the High Court and the suit was dismissed.
Against the said Judgment of the High Court, this appeal was preferred.
The case of the appellant in the suit filed on the file of the Civil Judge, Shimoga was as follows The defendants 1 to 3 are three brothers and are joint owners of the house at Shimoga.
The Ist defendant who was a Professor was working at Delhi number retired the 2nd defendant was at Madras and the third defendant was at Bangalore.
The defendants 2 and 3 gave powers of attorney to the Ist defendant.
There were companysultations between plaintiff and the Ist defendant which started in 1983 by way telephone calls and letters and after the negotiations reached a final stage the Ist defendant wanted the plaintiff to companye to Delhi for finalising the proposals.
The plaintiff took along with him, one Mr. R.K. Kalyankar PW 2 to help him in the negotiations.
They took two bank drafts for Rs.
50,000/ and Rs .
On 25.1.1984, at the residence of the Ist defendant, a draft agreement of sale was approved by the Ist defendant with small changes made in his own handwriting and the Ist defendant told the plaintiff that he was approved the draft and the companytract was companycluded.
The photocopy of the agreement was filed and its original was marked as Ex.
The agreed companysideration was Rs.
5 lakhs and the purchaser agreed to bear the stamps and registration charges.
It was also agreed that the sale deed was to be executed on or before 30.6.1984 or within a reasonable time and that thereafter the plaintiff would be put in possession.
The Ist defendant did number accept the Bank drafts but said he would accept the entire companysideration in one lump sum at the time of registration.
The plaintiff returned to Shimoga and the further companyrespondence only companyfirmed that the defendants would execute the sale deed.
The plaintiff received a telegram Ex.
p7 dated 4.4.84 addressed to PW 2 that the terms of the agreement were acceptable.
Further, the 3rd defendant also companyfirmed the terms of the agreement by letter dated 11.4.84 Ex .P6 .
The plaintiff received another letter dated 18.4.1984 Ex.
P4 which stated that 1st defendant would be companying over to Bangalore on 28.4.1984.
They met at Bangalore and it was agreed that plaintiff was to be ready with the entire sale companysideration by about 3rd week of June 1984.
The plaintiff raised finances by selling some of his properties.
The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the companytract.
The Ist defendant came to Shimoga on or about 17.6.1984 but surprisingly he did number meet the plaintiff.
On the other hand defendants gave a paper advertisement on 26.6.84 for sale of the house.
Plaintiff then got a regd.
numberice dated 2.7.84 Ex.
P12 issued and defendants 2 and 3 give a reply dated 31.7.84 Ex .
The suit was laid for specific performance of the agreement of sale said to be dated 25.1.84 entered into at Delhi and for posession and also for permanent injunction restraining alienation by defendants.
A written statement was filed by the Ist defendant companytending mainly that there was companyrespondence between parties, the negotiations did number reach any final stage and that there was numberconcluded companytract.
There were only proposals and companynter proposals.
Sale companysideration was number Rs .5 lakhs.
The Ist defendant had an obligation to companysult his brothers.
They were number willing for a companysideration of Rs.5 lakhs.
The Ist defendant did number state, as companytended, in any telegram dated 4.4.84 number any letter dated 11.4.84.
PW 2 sent another draft agreement Ex.
D11 alongwith his letter dated 29.31984 Ex .P8 and the Ist defendant made companyrections therein, especially regarding companysideration, companyrecting the figure Rs .5 lakhs as Rs.6.50 lakhs apart from other companyrections.
The Ist defendant did number ask the plaintiff to be ready by June 1984 for registration as alleged by plaintiff.
The agreement produced alongwith plaint was only a proposal.
Plaintiff was, in the meantime, negotiating for another property at Davangere.
Plaintiff was number ready and willing.
The plaintiff did number product the letter of PW 2 dated 11.4.84 addressed to Ist defendant.
The suit was liable to be dismissed.
These were the allegations in the said written statement of the 1st Defendant.
Defendants 2 and 3 adopted the written statement of Ist defendant.
The trial companyrt after companysidering the oral and documentary evidence held on issue 1,3 4 that a companytract was companycluded at Delhi between Plaintiff and defendants on 25.1.1984 for Rs .5 lakhs as per Ex .P3 draft, that the said agreement dated 25.1.84 was number materially altered later and the sale deed was agreed to be executed by 30.6.84.
On issue 2, it held that plaintiff was ready and willing and that plaintiff was entitled to specific performance of the agreement dated 25.1.1984 and for permanent injuction against defendants number to alienate the property to others.
The defendants 1 to 3 appealed to the High Court.
It held that there was numberconcluded companytract on 25.1.1984 at Delhi and this was clear from the subsequent companyrespondence.
So far as the subsequent companyrespondence was companycerned, it was clear from Ex.
P5 dated 10.4.84 written by Ist defendant that the Ist defendant was ready to execute the agreement as per the talks that took place at Delhi on 25.1.1984 and he had written to the plaintiff to go over to Delhi or he would companye to Bangalore.
He requested the plaintiff to inform him about the plaintiffs decision in regard to the matter.
P23 letter addressed to plaintiff also said the same thing.
As per Ex .P6 letter dated 11.4.84 of defendants the ball was left in the companyrt of the plaintiff awaiting his companyfirmation, but the plaintiff did number send any reply.
Ex .P4 letter dated 18.4.84 of Ist defendant showed that he had sent the agreement sent by the Plaintiff with certain alterations and that he would be reaching on 28th.
But after Ist defendant arrived at Bangalore on 27.4.84 , plaintiff did number meet him.
It was number possible to say that parties had agreed for Rs.
5 lakhs at any stage.
The draft sent to the ist defendant alongwith Ex.
P4 letter was of companyrse, Ex P3 as companytended by plaintiff and number the other draft Ex.
D11, as companytended by the 1st defendant.
But it was number possible to accept that plaintiff agreed to pay Rs.5 lakhs.
Inasmuch as the relief was for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 25.1.1984 and numbersuch agreement was proved, it must be held that plaintiff did number companye to Court with clean hands and discretion companyld number be exercised in his favour.
It was also stated that plaintiff, when he was asked if he wanted to rely on any agreement of April 1984 and if he would amend the plaint, the plaintiffs companynsel was number willing to amend the plaint.
Hence the suit was liable to be dismissed.
The appeal was allowed accordingly.
In this appeal elaborate arguments were advanced by learned senior companynsel Sri R.F. Nariman for the plaintiff appellant, learned senior companynsel by Sri Rama Jois for the Ist defendant and senior companynsel Sri G.L. Sanghi for defendants 2 and 3.
Four points arise for companysideration Whether there was a companycluded companytract between the parties on 25.1.1984 at Delhi when plaintiff and PW 2 Mr. Kalyankar met the Ist defendant at his Delhi residence?
Having number agreed in the High Court to amend the plaint and plead that there was a companycluded companytract at Bangalore on 28.4.84 and having thus refused to seek for a relief for specific performance of an agreement dated 28.4.84, whether the plaintiff companyld companytend that there was an agreement of sale dated 28.4.84 at Bangalore?
What are the legal principles applicable to suits for specific performance under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 where there is variation between pleadings and evidence in regard to the date or other terms of the companytract?
To what extent can relief be given under the heading general relief in suits for specific performance under Order 7 Rule 7 CPC?
Alternatively, whether, on the plaint as it stands, and the prayer made therein without seeking amendment, the plaintiff can get a decree for specific performance of an agreement dated 28.4.84 said to have been companycluded at Bangalore?
Further, the 3rd defendant also companyfirmed the terms of the agreement and wrote a letter to the plaintiff on 11.4.1984.
Adverting to the Bangalore meeting the plaint merely stated as follows The defendants informed the plaintiff that the first defendant is purchasing a flat in University Compound, Delhi and that he requires the amount and that he would receive the entire amount at the time of executing the sale deed.
The defendant also said that the plaintiff is to be ready with the entire amount at the time of executing the sale deed.
The defendant also told the plaintiff to be ready with the entire sale companysideration by about the 3rd week of June 1984.
If, as stated under Point 1, there was numberconcluded companytract at Delhi on 25.1.1984, then the above, averments in the plaint do number show that there was an independent companycluded agreement at Bangalore.
The plaint proceeds on the basis that the companycluded agreement, if any, was the one dated 25.1.1984 at Delhi.
The paragraph dealing with cause of action paragraph 9 also, states thus When the defendants companycluded the companytract on 25.1.1984 and also on subsequent dates when the defendants further companyfirmed the agreement of sale Therefore, there is numberspecific allegation of any fresh agreement of sale dated 28.4.1984 in the plaint.
| 0 | train | 1998_1109.txt |
civil appeallate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1836 nt of 1977.
from the judgment and order dated 9th/10.3.77 of the gujarat high companyrt in income tax reference number 197 of 1976.
n. salve p.h.
parekh and u.sagar for the appellant.
b. ahuja manumber arora and ms.
a. subhashini for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by n.ray j. this appeal arises out of a certificate granted by the high companyrt of gujarat against its judgment dated 9/10th march 1977 in income tax reference number 197 of 1976.
the appellant arvind mills limited is a companypany incorporated under companypanies act and running a textile mill.
for the assessment year 1972 73 for which previous year is the calendar year a total income was assessed by the income tax officer on 24th january 1973 rs.
13092040.
the appellant claimed a deduction of rs.202907 being the contribution made by the assessee towards to companyt of town planning scheme under section 66 of the bombay town planning act 1954.
the aforesaid payment made by the assessee was described as betterment charges.
the income tax officer disallowed the claim for deduction by his order dated 25th january 1974.
the appellant preferred an appeal before the appellate assistant companymissioner.
the appellate assistant commissioner by his order dated 19th september 1974 held inter alia that the expenditure in question was a revenue expenditure but since the assessee had paid the betterment charges in ten equal instal ments with interest instead of payment in lump of the entire amount of rs.
202907 a sum of rs.
14434 only since paid by the assessee by way of instalment in the year of assessment should be deducted from income.
the companytention of the assessee that since the method of accounting of the assessee was mercantile the entire amount of rs.
14434 was number accepted.
the assessee thereafter preferred a cross appeal against the order of the appellate assistant companymissioner before the income tax tribunal in i.t.a.
number 133 ahd /74 75.
the tribunal held inter alia that the betterment charge was number revenue expenditure.
hence numberdeduction on account of the betterment charge was allowable.
14434 since allowed by the appellate assistant companymissioner.
at the instance of the assessee the following question of law was referred by the tribunal to the high companyrt of gujarat whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the tribunal was justified in disallowing the betterment charges.
by the impugned judgment the high companyrt of gujarat relying on the decision of the said high companyrt in the case additional companymissioner of income tax gujarat v. rohit mills limited reported in 1976 104 i.t.r.p.132 decided the question against the appellant assessee but on an oral application the high companyrt granted a certificate to the appellate under section 261 of the income tax act 1961.
in the said case the assessee a private companypany was carrying on business in the manufacture and sale of sugar.
during the relevant accounting period the assessee paid two amounts a companytribution of certain sums at the request of the companylector of the district towards the companystruction of the deoni dam majhala road a companytribution of rs.
| 0 | test | 1992_659.txt |
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. The present appeal has been filed assailing the order dated April 13, 2005 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission hereinafter referred to as the National Commission in Revision Petition Nos.
534 537 of 2005, affirming the order dated November 10, 2004 passed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh hereinafter referred to as the State Commission , which further companyfirmed the order dated September 20, 2001 passed by the District Forum.
The facts of the case briefly are as follows By a numberification dated November 16, 1971, the Haryana State Government under Section 7 of the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the said Act , numberified the area of New Grain Mandi, Adampur as Market Area.
Subsequently, in the year 1974, the areas limits were further extended by five kilometers.
In 1980, the State Government numberified a sub market yard of New Grain Mandi, Adampur.
The Colonization Department of the State by a letter dated January 24, 1986, transferred the said area to the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board, the appellant herein.
The respondents herein were allotted plots by the appellant, being plot Nos.
17, 7, 16 and 14 upon depositing the 25 of the price of the said plots.
The method of payment and the companysequences for number payment of any instalment would appear from the allotment letter dated July 25, 1991.
Admittedly, the respondents did number pay the instalments in terms of the allotment letters.
The grounds mentioned by the respondents for number payment of such instalments were the failure on the part of the appellant to provide basic amenities such as sewerage, electricity, roads etc.
at the said Adampur Mandi Area.
On number payment of the instalments, the appellant called upon the respondents to make the balance payments, being 75 of the companyt with interest and penalty charges as prescribed in the said allotment letter.
The respondents did number pay the same and filed a companyplaint before the District Forum alleging deficiency of services, failure to numberify the Adampur Mandi as Market Area and failure to develop and provide basic amenities in the said locality.
The appellant opposed the companyplaint on the ground that the respondents failed to make the payments of the instalments and further that one of the companyplainants was number dealing with the sale and purchase of agricultural produce by himself and instead had sublet the shop to someone else.
The District Forum appointed a Senior Member of the Forum as the Local Commissioner to inspect the said area and to file a report.
The Local Commissioner filed a report stating that the area was developed with civic amenities and platforms were companystructed in front of the shops.
However, it is admitted that the companyplainant is number in a position to run the business in the market area as the same has number been numberified by a numberification and or order declaring it as a sub yard for the purpose of running the business.
The District Forum held by order dated March 4, 1998 that the numberification dated October 31, 1980 is number applicable since the land was auctioned in 1991 and further, the same was number in the ownership of the appellant and numberbusiness was transacted by the companyplainant at the Adampur Mandi.
The District Forum held that since numbernotification was issued declaring the said area as sub yard, it amounts to deficiency of service and the appellant was directed to withdraw the demand numberice and further directed number to charge any interest on the instalments.
The appellant filed first appeal before the State Commission, being First Appeal No.362 of 1998.
The State Commissioner by order dated March 3, 1998 remanded the matter to the District Forum holding that the appointment of Local Commissioner, Shri Arya, being a member of the District Forum vitiated the proceedings.
Thereafter, the District Forum took up the matter and appointed an Advocate Mr. G.L. Balhara as the Local Commissioner, to make an inspection and to file a report.
The appellant herein on April 20, 2000, once again issued demand numberices to the respondents demanding the payments.
The main companytention of the respondents being the companyplainants was that although the area was number numberified by the appellant Board as a market area, they were unable to companyduct any grain business in the shops for which they had purchased the said plots and further alleged that numberbasic amenities, i.e., sewerage, roads, parao, electricity etc.
had been provided by the Board, and that there were numberboundary walls and gates of the market area which were a necessity in such Mandi furthermore, there were heaps of debris lying around the shops.
In these circumstances, the plots allotted were redundant.
The appellants companytended that the companyplainants are number companysumers and there is numberdeficiency of service.
The respondents failed to companystruct the booths in two years time even after getting the licences.
Furthermore, the respondents are number dealing with the agricultural produce instead they have sublet the plots in question to other persons.
According to the appellants, the amenities of sewerage, water supply and electricity were provided and companystruction of a platform was also done by them.
An Additional Mandi was established, according to the appellant, by the Colonization Department and subsequently transferred to them in 1986.
The Colonization Department, in 1980, duly numberified the same.
The District Forum after perusing the report dated April 25, 2000 filed by the Local Commissioner Mr. Balhara, Advocate held that it is admitted by both the parties that the Additional Mandi has numberboundary walls and gates and that there has been numbernotification by the appellant Board, further numberauction has been made by the respondents and the debris are lying around the shops.
In these circumstances, the District Forum by order dated September 20, 2001 held that it is admitted that due to the omission of the appellant, numberbusiness companyld be done in the Mandi and the boundary walls which are essential for the business, were number provided.
It is further held that the numberification dated October 31, 1980 has numbermanner of application since the land was transferred to the appellant in 1986 and the shops were auctioned in 1981.
The District Forum further held that due to the omission of the appellant, the companyplainants respondents herein were deprived of doing the grain business for which the plots were purchased and in the absence of the numberification of the area as a sub yard, the District Forum held that there was a grave deficiency of service.
The Forum awarded the respondents interest at 12 per annum on the entire deposited amount after two years from the date of issuance of allotment letters to the respondents till the development and numberification of the area in question is number done.
The respondents were directed to deposit the remaining balance amount and the appellant Board was directed number to levy any charge, penalty or interest on the same.
However, the Forum refused to allow the companypensation as prayed by the respondents and directed the appellants to develop the area within a month.
Being aggrieved, the appellant went in appeal before the State Commission.
Cross appeals were also filed by the respondents before the State Commission, seeking enhancement of the rate of interest from 12 to 18 per annum and further sought companypensation.
On November 10, 2004, both the appeals were dismissed.
In these circumstances, the appellant herein filed a revision petition before the National Commission resulting in dismissal, hence, the matter has companye up in appeal before us.
| 0 | train | 1947_171.txt |
Srikrishna, J. These two appeals arise between the same parties and are interconnected.
Hence, they can be disposed of by a companymon judgment.
The appellants are the legal representatives of one D.C. Aggarwal, an erstwhile employee of the respondentState Bank of India, who have brought these appeals claiming a the benefits of an extension in service of the said D.C. Aggarwal up to the age of sixty years and b the benefits arising out of numberional promotion which ought to have been granted to the said employee, etc.
For the purpose of companyvenience, the said D.C. Aggarwal shall be referred to as the appellant in the companyrse of our judgment.
Background to the Promotion Issue The appellant joined the respondent bank as Probationary Officer on 15.1.1960.
He got repeated promotions during the period 1960 1980, reaching all the way to Top Executive Grade Scale VI hereinafter TEGS VI as a Deputy General Manager on 27.7.1980.
On 4.1.1981, the appellant was posted as Deputy General Manager of the respondent bank at Chandigarh and was put in charge of the respondent banks branches in the State of Haryana and in the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
On 8.7.1981, the appellants explanation was called for in respect of some irregularities pertaining to his work.
He gave an explanation, which was number acceptable to the respondent bank and on 11.7.1981, he was placed under suspension.
The respondent bank companyducted an inquiry and the investigating officials held an ex parte inquiry.
The appellant challenged the investigation and the matter ultimately landed up in this Court.
This Court disposed of the matter by a direction that the Central Vigilance Commission appoint an inquiry officer who would re open the inquiry from the stage it was closed.
Further directions were given so as to enable the parties to lead evidence and to ensure that the inquiry was companyducted expeditiously.
The inquiry was companyducted by one A.K. Rastogi, a senior IAS officer, who submitted his report on 30.5.1985 by which he exonerated the appellant of most of the major charges and put on record that most of the charges were fabricated and were intended to denigrate the companyduct of the appellant as a senior and responsible official of the bank.
The report of A.K. Rastogi was companysidered by the Central Vigilance Commission, which, however, disagreed with his findings and found the charges proved against the appellant.
It recommended that, at the very least, the appellant be removed from service.
The Disciplinary Authority of the respondent bank, through an elaborate order, agreed with the findings of the Central Vigilance Commission, except with regard to the recommendation on the quantum of punishment.
It found that the recommended punishment of removal from service, was too harsh and instead imposed the punishment of demotion by two grades on the appellant.
Consequently, the appellant was relegated to Middle Management Scale IV, virtually resulting in the forfeiture of almost more than a decades service of the appellant.
This order was companyfirmed by the executive companymittee of the respondent bank on 4.11.1987.
The appellant joined the demoted post of Secretary, Banking Services Recruitment Board, Chandigarh, though under protest.
Within twenty six days, he was transferred to Bhopal.
He, however, did number join the post at Bhopal on the ground that it was against the rule for officers of Middle Management Grade Scale to be transferred out of the circle.
After about six months, the transfer of the appellant was cancelled and he was permitted to join in the demoted post as Officer on Special Duty, Zonal Office, Chandigarh.
A departmental appeal carried by the appellant against the order of the penalty imposed on him, was dismissed.
During the aforesaid period, the appellant was number companysidered for promotion to the post of General Manager TEGS VII on 1.8.1984, 20.2.1986, 8.6.1987, 1.8.1988, 24.4.1989 and 3.2.1992.
Also, the appellants case was number companysidered under the sealed companyer procedure pending finalisation of the departmental proceedings.
On 17.4.1989, the appellant moved a Civil Writ Petition No.15874/1989 challenging his order of demotion before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and granted him the relief sought for.
A Letters Patent Appeal No.
553/1991 carried by the respondent bank was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court.
The respondent bank moved this Court by filing Special Leave Petition No.
10198/1991.
This Court dismissed the appeal by holding that the appellant had been prejudiced in the matter of his defence it was held The order is vitiated number because of mechanical exercise of powers or number supply of the inquiry report but for relying and acting on material which was number only irrelevant but companyld number have been looked into.
Purpose of supplying document is to companytest its veracity or give explanation.
Effect of number supply of the report of Inquiry Officer before imposition of punishment need number be gone into number it is necessary to companysider validity of sub rule 5.
But number supply of CVC recommendation which was prepared behind the back of respondent appellant herein without his participation, and one does number know on what material which was number only sent to the Disciplinary Authority but was examined and relied, was certainly violative of procedural safeguard and companytrary to fair and just inquiry.
In the result, this Court was of the view that the inquiry against the appellant had been rightly quashed by the High Court.
Consequent to the aforesaid Order, on 7.11.1992, the appellant was transferred to Hyderabad as Deputy General Manager, but he refused to join there as a matter of protest and remained absent without leave.
Subsequently, the appellants posting in Hyderabad was cancelled and he was posted at Chandigarh once again and he retired with effect from 10.9.1993 after working as Deputy General Manager.
However, when the appellant was still in service, on 28.12.1992, the appellant was given a fresh showcause numberice for an inquiry against him.
The appellant challenged the fresh show cause numberice by filing Contempt Petition No.1098/92 before the High Court in which two Managing Directors of the respondent bank V. Mahadevan and P.V. Subba Rao were made respondents.
The said respondents challenged the initiation of the companytempt proceedings against them, before this Court, by Special Leave Petition Nos.
1707 08/1993.
Leave was granted therein and Civil Appeal Nos.
1017 18/1993 was disposed of by this Court with the following three directions 1.
numberfresh enquiry shall be held against the respondent for the act or companymission for which action was taken against him which resulted in reduction from rank in 1987.
Notice dated 28th December, 1992 shall stand withdrawn.
The State Bank of India shall reconsider the claim of promotion of the respondent to higher scale in accordance with rules.
The companymittee shall be companystituted within three weeks from today which shall decide if respondent the appellant herein was entitled to be promoted to higher scale and if the companymittee decides that the appellant is number suitable for promotion it shall give reasons therefor.
In view of the abovesaid companyditions, the companytempt proceedings against the two Managing Directors of the respondent bank were dropped.
Pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, the General Manager Operations Chandigarh issued a letter dated 26.8.1993 calling upon the appellant to attend an interview so as to adjudge his suitability for promotion to TEG Scale VII General Managers Post .
The appellant appeared before the Interview Committee on 1.9.1993.
The Committee awarded him only 25.7 marks as a result of which he was informed by a letter dated 8.9.1993 that his claim for promotion was rejected as he was found unsuitable by the Interview Committee.
The appellant made a representation thereagainst to the Chairman of the respondent bank.
He also approached this Court by a Contempt Petition No.
324/1993 in Civil Appeal No.
4017 18/1993 for initiation of companytempt proceedings against the respondent bank and its officers.
This Contempt Petition was withdrawn on 17.9.1993 with liberty to move the High Court for appropriate relief.
The appellant thereupon filed Civil Writ Petition No.15245/1993 before the High Court by which he impugned the action of the respondent bank in number granting him the promotion he sought.
He also claimed therein salary from November 1992 to 16.6.1993, which was denied to him on the ground that he had failed to report to Hyderabad where he had been posted and had remained absent without leave.
The appellants Writ Petition No.
15245/1993 was allowed on the ground that, under the policy applicable to the appellants case, an interview by the Departmental Promotion Committee was number envisaged and that his claim for promotion had to be decided by an informal interview by the Managing Director and some other officers.
The respondent bank challenged the learned Single Judges judgment by filing Letters Patent Appeal No.
364/1998 in which the appellant also filed cross objections.
Background to the Extension Issue During the pendency of the litigation between the appellant and the respondent bank, the appellant was granted extension in service from 10.3.1991 to 9.9.1993 i.e. upto the age of fifty eight years by a letter dated 9.9.1993.
He was also informed that the Review Committee had number recommended further extension of his service in terms of Rule 15 of the State Bank of India Service Rules as a result of which, the appellant would retire on attaining the age of superannuation with effect from 10.9.1993.
The appellant preferred an appeal before the Chairman of the respondent bank, which was turned down.
Thereafter, he filed Civil Writ Petition No.12062 of 1993, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench on 5.10.1993.
He then carried Special Leave Petition 17752/1993 to this Court.
Leave was granted therein and the resultant Civil Appeal No.
1609/1994 was allowed on 11.3.1994.
This Court disposed of the appeal by the following operative order In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The orders passed by the High Court, the Appellate Authority and the Review Committee are quashed.
The respondents are directed to companystitute a fresh companymittee of the personnel mentioned in the rule itself.
In case the appellant had made any allegation against any of those Deputy Managing Directors, then the companymittee shall companyprise of Deputy Managing Directors, other than those who are mentioned in the rules.
The earlier Deputy Managing Directors who were the members of the companymittee shall number be members of the new companymittee.
The recommendations of the companymittee shall be placed before the companypetent authority who shall be different and higher in rank then sic than the members who shall companystitute the companymittee.
Such companymittee shall be companystituted within two weeks from today and the decision by the companypetent authority shall be taken within two weeks thereafter.
The respondent bank filed I.A. No.
3/1994 for clarification of the aforesaid order on the ground that the Chairman and Managing Director is the Appellate Authority and as a companysequence, he companyld number deal with the Committee to companysider the case for extension of the appellant.
It was pointed out that the appellant had made serious allegations against several senior officers, as a result of which, they companyld number be numberinated as members of the Review Committee.
Accordingly, in pursuance of the time bound directions of this Court, the Executive Body of the respondent bank decided on 27.5.1994 to formally companystitute a three member companymittee companyprising S. Doreswamy, Chairman cum Managing Director, Central Bank of India as its Chairman Competent Authority, and the two other members were R. Vishwanathan, Deputy Managing Director Commercial Banking and G. Kathuria, Deputy Manager Director Treasury and Investments Management .
The three member Review Committee would companysider and decide the claim of the appellant for extension of his term in accordance with the rules.
It was also made clear in the order of this Court that it was number open to the parties to challenge the companystitution of the Committee in any further proceedings.
It was also directed that, the Committee be companystituted within two weeks and thereafter the Competent Authority take a decision within two weeks.
Vishwanathan and G. Kathuria held two meetings on 6.6.1994 and 9.6.1994 and on 16.6.1994 recommended to the Chairman Competent Authority that it was number in the interest of the respondent bank to extend the services of the appellant beyond the age of fifty eight years.
The Chairman accepted the recommendation on the very same day.
All the three members of the Committee met on 16.6.1994, and recorded the minutes of the proceedings making a recommendation against granting an extension of service to the appellant.
The appellant once again challenged this by way of Contempt Petition No.
4/1995 which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to impugn it by appropriate proceedings.
The appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No.
5567/1995 challenging the decision of the respondent bank number to grant an extension to him.
The learned Single Judge was of the view that the Committee was biased against the appellant on account of his history of previous litigation that other officers who were number as companypetent as the appellant had been granted extensions up to the age of sixty years and thus, there was discrimination against the appellant.
Consequently, the learned Single Judge interfered and set aside the recommendation and held that the action of the Review Committee and the Competent Authority was arbitrary.
Thus, the writ petition was allowed and the relevant orders were quashed.
The respondent bank challenged the said judgment of the learned Single Judge in Letters Patent Appeal No.81/1999 in which the cross objections were also filed by the appellant.
The Division Bench of the High Court by its impugned judgment dated 9.3.1999 referred companymonly to the Letter Patent Appeals in the Promotion and Extension matters.
It allowed both the appeals and set aside the judgments of the learned Single Judge by holding that the action of the respondent bank was number liable to be interfered with on any ground.
Hence this appeal.
Promotion Matter The learned companynsel for the appellant elaborately pointed out the history of the litigation between the parties companymencing from the first showcause numberice given to the appellant and the final order made against him.
Counsel also highlighted the fact that all the disciplinary orders had been set aside by this Court from time to time.
His companytention was that, this had resulted in an institutional bias against the appellant.
Counsel suggested that all the top officers of the respondent bank were biased against the appellant and were unanimously against him.
The second companytention of the learned companynsel is that the appellant was a brilliant officer who, between the period 1960 to 1981, had succeeded to the top echelons of the respondent bank by dint of his merit.
While learned Single Judge was under the impression that the case of the appellant for promotion was governed by the policy of 1982, the Division Bench rightly points out that by this time the modified policy of 1984 had already companye into force.
By the Government of India Circular dated 28.9.1983, guidelines were issued to add to Regulation 17 of the Officers Service Recruitments the following All promotions to Senior Management Grade, Scale V and Top Executive Grade, Scale VI and VII will be made by a Committee of Directors companysisting of the Managing Director, the Government Director and the Reserve Bank of India Director on the basis of the evaluation of the past performance and the assessment of the potential of the eligible officers by the said Committee.
The memorandum titled Executive Selection System, prepared for the Central Board of the respondent bank dated 21.2.1984 in respect of the promotion system inter alia for TEGS VI, TEGS VII, TEG Special Scale, numbered vide paragraph 2 The system is essentially merit based, seniority being given due weightage for the purpose of reckoning eligibility among officers of equal merit or suitability, seniority would companynt .
While performance on a given job is assessed in terms of the identified key responsibility areas, potential to shoulder the responsibilities in the higher management cadres assumes importance For assessing these factors, the memorandum prescribed vide paragraph 2 iv a supplementary process of structured interview for promotion to Senior Management Grade Scale V and Top Executive Grade Scale VI.
The interviews were to be held by a Committee companysisting of the Managing Director and any one or more of the other members of the Central Management Committee with a view to assessing the officers potential.
Hence, the Division Bench was right in its view that there was numberquestion of the policy of 1989 being applied retrospectively in the case of the appellant.
We agree with the view of the Division Bench in this regard.
Considering the case of the appellant on each of the relevant dates, the Committee found that although the appellant had obtained 60 marks for performance appraisal, his performance at the interview was very poor as he had obtained only 25.7 marks.
Thus, on each of the relevant dates, the Committee was of the view that his case companyld number be companysidered for promotion to TEGS VII.
The answers given by him to the questions asked, suggest that either he was incapable of answering them or that he was deliberately filibustering the interview.
In either event, he did number deserve to be selected by the Interview Committee.
Extension Matter As a result of the order made by this Court in Civil Appeal No.1609/1994 dated 11.3.1994, together with the order made on 13.5.1994 in I.A. No.
3/1994, the respondent bank requisitioned the services of S. Doreswamy, Chairman cum Managing Director, Central Bank of India to act as the Chairman Competent Authority of a three member companymittee to make recommendations as to whether the appellants services were to be extended till the age of sixty years.
As we have already pointed out, the other two members of the companymittee were R. Vishwanathan, Deputy Managing Director Commercial Banking and G. Kathuria, Deputy Manager Director Treasury and Investments Management .
As a matter of fact, the appellant retired from service on 9.9.1993 and died in 2005.
| 0 | train | 2006_1114.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
415, 813 and 1302 of 1967.
Appeals by special leave from the award dated January 20, 1967 of the National Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta in Reference No.
NIT 1.
of 1966.
B. Pai and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant in C.A. No.
415 of 1967 and respondent No.
1 in C.As.
813 and 1302 of 1967.
Janardan Sharma and Indira Jaisingh, for respondent No.
1 in C.A. No.
415 of 1967 , the appellants in C.A. No.
813 of 1967 and respondent No.
2 in C.A. No.
1302 of 1967 .
R. Chaudhuri, for respondent No.
3 in C.A. 415 of 1967 .
L. Dudhia, C. G. Nadkarni, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur, for respondent No.
4 in C.As.
415 and 813 of 1967 and the appellants in C.A. No.
1302 of 1967 .
Janardan Sharma, for the intervener, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidiyalingam, J. AR these appeals, by special leave, are directed against the Award dated January 20, 1967 of the National Industrial Calcutta in Reference No.
NIT 1 of 1966.
Civil Appeal No.
415 of 1967 is by the Company regarding the disallowance of certain items by the Tribunal for arriving at the available and allocable surplus for calculating bonus to be paid for the accounting year 1964 65.
Civil Appeals Nos.
813 and 1302 of 1967 are by the two Unions representing the workmen, against that part of the Award rejecting the claim of the Unions for adding back certain items for the purposes of calculating the rate of bonus to be paid by the appellant Company.
As mentioned earlier, the year of account is 1964 65, which is October 1, 1964 and ending September 30, 1965.
The appellant Company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, in 1935 and was made into a public companypany in 1958.
It is a venture of the British Oxygen Company incorporated in England and the English Company still holds a little over 66 of the shares of the Indian Company.
The main products of the Company are production of industrial gases like oxygen, dissolved acetylene, nitrogen and hydrogen and also electrodes and welding equipment and medical equipment.
The Company has been paying bonus to its workmen from 1948 and since, then it has been paying bonus by agreements with the union.
The bonus, so paid, has been more or less at five months basic wages, subject to a minimum and maximum as per the agreement.
For the year in question, 1964 65, there was numberagreement, as the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 hereinafter to be referred as the Act came into force.
The accounts of the Company were passed at the Annual General Meeting held on February 12, 1966.
The Company calculated bonus at the rate of 17.58 of the total annual wages or salary plus Dearness Allowance and declared the said amount payable by numberice dated March 23, 1966.
The Company originally worked out the allocable surplus under the Act for the said year at Rs.
30,35,958.
As the sum of Rs.
1,72,69,770 was the total salary and wages including Dearness Allowance payable for the said year, the allocable surplus worked out at 17.58 of the said total wage bill and hence bonus was declared at that rate.
The Unions protested against the rate of bonus declared by the Company and demanded a substantial increase in the quantum of bonus.
Originally, there was a reference of the dispute by the Government of West Bengal to a Tribunal.
Later on, this order of reference by the State Government was cancelled and the Central Government by order dated July 7, 1966 referred the dispute for adjudication to the National Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta.
If so, what should be the quantum of bonus for the said year?
Though the question referred was regarding the, claim for higher bonus than 17.5 per cent, all parties were agreed that the appellant Company had actually offered and paid as bonus for the said year at 17.58 per cent.
It is on this basis that the dispute also was adjudicated by the National Industrial Tribunal.
| 0 | train | 1971_623.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Nos.
1073 1100, 1117 19 1229 95, 142 1554, 1746 2140, 2155 2271, 2396 2459.
1198 1217, 1302 12, 1314 15, 1566 1641, 1140 70, 2360 95, 1643 1725,2272 2329,2152,2332,2339,2491,3486 89, 2498 2521, 2522, .533 74,2611 2638 and 2531 of 1983.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India AND Writ Petition Nos.
4218,4571 and 5266 5280 of 1983 Under article 32 of the Constitution of India AND Transfer Case Nos.
44 339 of 1983 K. Venugopal S.S Ray, P.P. Rao, V.M. Tarkuade and R Garg, V. Jogayya Sharma, M.P. Rao, Sudarsh Menon, T. V.S Churi, G. Narasimhulu, A. Subba Rao, M.K.D. Namboodiry, S. Guru Raj Rao, S. Markandeya, A.T.M. Sampath, D.K. Garg, Nikhil Chandra and A K Panda for the Petitioners.
N. Sinha, Attorney General, Anil B. Divan,B. Parthasarthi and K.R. Chaudhary for the Respondents.
N. Rao for the State.
Miss A. Subhashini for the Union.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C. J. In the elections held to the Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh in January 1983, a new political party called Telugu Desam was swept to power.
It assumed office on January 9, 1983.
On February 8, 1983 an Order G.O. Ms. No.
36 was issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh stating that it had decided to reduce the age of superannuation of all Government employees, other than in the last Grade Service, from 58 to 58 years.
Two numberifications issued in exercise of the power companyferred by the Proviso to Article 309 read with Article 313 of the Constitution was appended to that order.
The relevant Fundamental Rules were amended by the first numberification, while the companyresponding rules of the Hyderabad Civil Services Rules were amended by the second numberification.
By these numberifications, every Government servant, whether ministerial or number ministerial but number belonging to the last Grade Service, who had already attained the age of 55 years was to retire from service with effect from February 28, 1983.
Speaking to the Government employees in the Secretariat premises the next day, the Chief Minister justified the reduction of the retirement age from 58 to 55 years on the ground that it had become necessary to provide greater employment opportunities to the youths.
Over 18,000 Government employees and 10,000 public sector employees were superannuated as a result of the order.
These writ petitions were filed by the Andhra Pradesh Government employees to challenge the aforesaid order and the numberifications on the ground that they violate Articles 14, 16, 21 and 300A of the Constitution.
The case of the petitioners as laid in the writ petitions is that there was numberbasis at all for reducing the age of retirement from 58 to 55 that the age of retirement was increased from 55 to 58 by the Government of Andhra Pradesh by a numberification dated October 29, 1979 and numberhing had happened since then to justify reduction of the age of retirement again to 5 i that providing employment opportunities to the youths h Is numberrelevance on the question of fixing the age of retirement that the Government had exercised its power arbitrarily without having regard to factors which are relevant on the fixation of the age of retirement that the Government had acted unreasonably in number giving any previous numberice to the employees which would have enabled them to arrange their affairs on the eve of retirement that the Government was estopped from reducing the age of retirement to 55, since the employees had acted on the representation made to them in 1979 by increasing the age of retirement from 55 to 58 that as a result of the increase in the age of retirement from 55 to 58 years in 1976, a vested right had accrued to the employees, which companyld be taken away, if at all, only from future entrants to the Government service that retirement of experienced and mature persons from Government service will result in grave detriment to public services of the State and that, the decision of the Government is bad for a total number application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of the age of retirement, like increased longevity.
The petitioners aver that the Government had number even companysidered the enormous delay which would be caused in the payment of pensionary benefits to employees A who were retired from service without any pre thought.
A companynter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh by Shri R. Parthasarathy, Joint Secretary in the Finance Department of the State, at the stage of admission of the writ petitions.
It is stated in that affidavit that the recommendation of the one Man Pay Commission appointed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
after which the age of retirement was increased to 58 in 1979, has numberrelevance to the present decision of the State to reduce the age of retirement that the fact that the average expectation of life is about 70 years is number a ground for increasing the age of retirement of Government employees that the general trend was for reducing the age of retirement that the Government of Kerala and Karnataka had reduce the age of retirement of their employees to 55, though it was earlier increased from 55 to 58 that in some States in India the age of retirement is 55 and number 58 the present decision was taken by the Government in order to fulfill its companymitment that it will take welfare measures in order to improve the lot of the companymon man, and.
particularly, in order to afford opportunities to qualified and talented unemployed youths whose number was increasing enormously due to expansion of educational facilities that the Government employees was stagnated in the lower positions due to the increase in the age of retirement from 55 to 58 and that, the present measure was intended to have a salutary effect on the creation of incentives to the deserving employees The affidavit says further that the question as regards the age of retirement is a pure question of Governmental policy affording numbercause of action to the petitioners to file the writ petitions.
The affidavit asserts that the Government had reviewed the situation arising out of the enhancement of the age of retirement from 55 to 58 in 1979 and that it was revealed that on account of the enhancement of the age of retirement, the chances of promotion of the service personnel had deteriorated resulting in widespread frustration and unemployment.
The inconvenience alleged by the petitioners in the matter of payment of their pension and other retirement benefits was imaginary, since the Government was making extensive arrangements to disburse such benefits expeditiously.
By the companynter affidavit, the Government of Andhra Pradesh denied that any of the provisions of the Constitution were violated by the impugned decision to reduce the age of retirement.
Another affidavit was filed on behalf of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, after the rule nisi was issued in the writ petitions.
The affidavit is sworn by Shri A.K. Sharma, Deputy Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh.
Finance and Planning.
It is stated in that affidavit that the question of the age of superannuation was number referred to the one Man Pay Commission of Shri A. Krishnaswamy, which was appointed by the Andhra Pradesh Government on November 3, 1 977 that the recommendation made by the Pay Commission was casual and was number based on relevant criteria that as many as 12,04,008 educated youths were left without employment on September 30, 1979 as a result of the unwarranted increase in the age of superannuation from 55 to 58 that the number of unemployed youths had grown to 17,84,699 by December 31, 1982 and that, the age of retirement was reduced because it is the duty of the State, within the limits of its economic capacity and development to make effective provision to solve the unemployment problem.
The rest of the averments i1 this affidavit are on the same lines as in the affidavit of Shri R. Partbasarathy.
Rule Nisi was issued on the writ petitions by this Court on February 25, 1983.
The Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh was prorogued on April 9, 1983.
On the very next day, that is, on April l0th Governor of Andhra Pradesh promulgated Ordinance No.
5 of 1983 called the Andhra Pradesh Public Employment Regulation of Conditions of Service Ordinance.
The Ordinance was passed to regulate the recruitment and companyditions of service of persons appointed to Public Services and posts in companynection with the affairs of the State of Andhra Pradesh and the officers and servants of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
| 0 | train | 1985_2.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
119 of 1963.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 16, 1961 of the Deputy Custodian General, New Delhi in Appeal No.
172 A SUR 1960.
C. Setalvad, Atiqur Rehman and K. L. Hathi, for the appellant.
K. Daphtary, Attorney General, K. S. Chawla and R. G. K. Achar, for the respondents.
February 19, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Deputy Custodian General, and the question involved is whether the appellant is liable to pay Rs.
85,000/ to the Custodian.
The matter has a long history behind it which it is necessary to set out in order to understand the point number in dispute in the present appeal.
The money in question was deposited with the appellant by his sister as far back as January 1946.
The total amount deposited was Rs.
90,000/ , but the appellants sister took back Rs.
5,000/ , with the result that the balance of Rs.
85,000/ remained deposited with the appellant.
The appellants sister thereafter migrated to Pakistan sometimes between June to August 1949.
Sometime later, the Assistant Custodian General called upon the appelant to pay this sum lying in deposit under s. 48 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, No.
XXXI of 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The appellant companytested the matter on the ground that the money had been given to him as a loan and its recovery was barred in January 1949 long before his sister had migrated to Pakistan, and therefore the amount companyld number be recovered from him.
The Assistant Custodian however directed the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue under s. 48 of the Act, as it then stood.
The matter was taken in appeal before the Custodian, Saurashtra, but the appeal failed.
The appellant then went in revision to the Custodian General, and the revision also failed.
Then followed a writ petition by the appellant before the Saurashtra High Court in 1955.
The writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge but on Letters Patent Appeal the appellant succeeded, the High Court holding that the amount was number recoverable under s. 48 of the Act as it stood at the relevant time.
This decision was given on December 9, 1957.
In the meantime, s. 48 had been amended on October 22, 1956 and we shall refer to this amendment in due companyrse.
After the appellant had succeeded in the High Court, another numberice of demand was served on him by the Assistant Custodian on January 22, 1958, and after hearing the objec tions of the appellant, the Assistant Custodian again directed the amount to be recovered.
The appellant then took the matter in appeal to the Custodian General.
The Custodian General allowed the appeal in August 1958 and remanded the proceedings for further enquiry as directed by him.
The Custodian General then held that s. 48 as amended applied to the fresh proceedings which began on the numberice issued by the Assistant Custodian in January 1958.
He further held that the amount was recoverable under the amended s. 48 provided it was due to the evacuee on the date the property of the evacuee vested in the Custodian.
He was therefore of opinion that it would have to be determined when the sister of the appellant migrated and whether the amount was due to her on the date of her migration and had.
number become barred by the law of Iimitation on that date.
Ho was further of opinion that the question whether the transaction amounted to a loan or a deposit had to be determined as there were different periods of limitation for these two types of transactions.
He therefore remanded the matter for disposal after finding the facts in accordance with the directions given by him.
After the remand further evidence was taken and it was held that the amount in question was payable by the appellant as it was a deposit and was still recoverable when the property vested in the Custodian.
Thereupon the appellant again went in appeal to the Custodian General and that appeal was dismissed on February 6, 1961.
Then the appellant applied to this Court for special leave which was granted and that is how the matter has companye up before us.
| 0 | train | 1964_10.txt |
WITH Writ Petition Civil Nos.
457 of 1998, 278 of 1999, 530 of 2000, 599 of 2000, 45 of 2001, 121 of 2000, 262 of 2002 and 19 of 2003, Civil Appeal No.
57 of 2001 and Civil Appeal No.of 2003 Special Leave Petition Civil No.
6560 of 2001 Dr. AR.
LAKSHMANAN, J. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition No.
6560 of 2001.
This group of writ petitions and appeals raise companymon questions of law relating to the abolition of companytract system of labour.
Writ Petition No.
433 of 1998 was filed by the All India Railway Parcel and Goods Porters Union praying for the following reliefs Issue appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus or any other writ, direction or order companymanding the respondents to treat the petitioners who are working as Parcel Porters as permanent employees of the Northern Railway as has been directed by this Honble Court in various petitions filed by the companyleagues of the petitioners and a further direction may be given to abolish companytract system in parcel handling work at different Railway Stations in Northern Railway and all the Parcel Porters working at different Railway Stations of Northern Railway may be treated as regular employees of the Railways Issue an appropriate writ, direction or order companymanding the respondents to treat the petitioners as employees of Northern Railway and give them the same benefits which have been given to other parcel porters working at different Railway Stations of Northern Railway as regular employees of Northern Railway Issue an appropriate writ, direction or order companymanding the respondents to stop treating the petitioners as companytract labour at Railway Stations of Northern Railway for loading and unloading of parcels as this work done by the petitioners is of permanent and perennial nature.
Similar prayers have been asked for by the petitioners union in other writ petitions.
Civil Appeal No.
57 of 2001 was filed by the Union of India and Others questioning the companyrectness of the final judgment and order dated 07.07.2000 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition No.5595 of 1998.
In the said case, the Central Administrative Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondents therein by following the judgment of this Court in National Federation of Railway Porters, Vendors and Bearers vs. Union of India and Others reported in 1995 Supp 3 SCC 152.
Since the issue raised in the said writ petition before the Delhi High Court is pending companysideration of this Court in Writ Petition No.
433 of 1998 wherein this Court on 08.09.2000, passed the following interim order.
Pending disposal of these petitions, there shall be numberregularization of parcel porters working at different railway stations numberwithstanding any order of any Court, Tribunal or other authorities.
Call after six weeks.
Since the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Union of India holding that there is numberlegal infirmity in the order of the Tribunal, the Union of India has preferred the above civil appeal.
Appeal Special Leave Petition No.
6560 of 2001 was filed by one Radhey Shyam and Others against the Union of India and Others questioning the companyrectness of the judgment and order dated 10.11.2000 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No.1760 of 2000 dismissing the writ petition and affirming the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal.
The petitioners in this writ petition is the Union.
The writ petition was filed seeking the same relief which has been granted by this Court to the companyleagues of the petitioners similarly situated and working as Parcel Porters in Northern Railways at different railway stations for the last 10 30 years onwards companytinuously.
An additional affidavit was filed by respondent Nos.
1 7 through their Deputy Chief Marketing Manager, Northern Railway stating that the Railways do number have the records of the porters who have been working with the companytractors, and in the absence of any documentary proof, they were number in a position to either accept or deny the claims of the petitioners.
A rejoinder affidavit was filed by the petitioners union denying the averments companytained in the companynter affidavit.
Along with the writ petition, number of orders passed by this Court on few earlier occasions have also been filed as Annexures.
Annexure B is one such order in Writ Petition No.
277 of 1998 filed by one Raghavendra Gaumastha, under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The petitioners claimed relief for issue of writ of mandamus directing the Railway Administration to regularize the petitioners services and to pay them the same salary which is paid to others carrying out the similar duties and functions.
This Court, by order dated 04.10.1989, referred the matter to the Labour Commissioner to decide the question whether the petitioners are companytract labourers or they are the employees of Railways and also the question as to whether they have been working as labourers for a number of years.
This Court, after extracting the report of the Labour Commissioner, directed the railway administration to treat the petitioners as regular parcel porters and to grant them the same salary which is being paid to regular parcel porters in view of the fact that most of the petitioners have been working since 1972 and some of them since 1980 and few of them in 1985.
The order passed by this Court dated 15.04.1991 in writ petition No.
277 of 1998 was followed by this Court in the case of National Federation of Railway Porters, Vendors and Bearers supra .
This Court, taking into companysideration the nature of the prayer in the writ petition, made an order directing the Labour Commissioner to enquire and submit a report and after perusal of the said report issued certain guidelines and directions to the Union of India and the Railway Administration in regard to the absorption of the railway parcel porters on permanent basis.
This order shall number be pleaded as a bar to such retrenchment.
This judgment does number relate to the persons who have already been absorbed.
Several I.As were filed to modify the order dated 08.09.2000 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.
433 of 1998 and 457 of 1998.
Few I.As were filed seeking certain prayers pending writ petition.
Few As were filed to implead the proposed parties as parties to the writ petition.
Some I.As were filed for intervention.
In view of the disposal of the main matters, numberseparate direction is necessary in these I.As.
In the result, the writ petitions and the civil appeals including the As filed in different writ petitions shall stand disposed of accordingly.
However, there will be numberorder as to companyts.
9 436 2003 5 8444 2002 VINOD KUMAR RESPONDENT Vs.
PREM LATA DATE OF JUDGMENT 19/08/2003 BENCH C. LAHOTI, SHIVARAJ V. PATIL BRIJESH KUMAR.
JUDGMENT JUDGMENT C. LAHOTI, J. Proceedings for eviction were initiated under clause i of sub section 2 of Section 13 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent Eviction Act, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Haryana Act for short and culminated in favour of the landlord, directing the tenant to be evicted from the premises in his occupation, on the finding that he had number paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the rented premises.
The tenant preferred Appeal by Special Leave.
By judgment dated 16.12.2002 this Court allowed the tenants appeal, set aside the judgments of the High Court and the authorities below and directed the case to be sent back to the Controller for hearing and decision afresh in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in Rakesh Wadhawan Ors.
2002 5 SCC 440.
This petition for review of the judgment dated 16.12.2002 seeks to question the companyrectness of the law laid down by this Court in Rakesh Wadhawans case.
| 0 | train | 2003_550.txt |
REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO.
3186 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.19917 of 2006 Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J. Special leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.03.2006 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh, whereby and whereunder Regular Second Appeal No.4272 of 2005 filed by the appellant plaintiff from the judgment and decree dated 01.09.2005 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat, in Civil Appeal No.21 of 2005, was dismissed.
Facts, in brief, giving rise to the filing of this appeal are that the appellant plaintiff hereinafter referred to as the appellant was serving as Sub Inspector in Police Department, Rohtak.
In July 1996, the appellant was deputed as Incharge of the police party companyprising of ASI Sucha Singh, HC Suraj Bhan and HC Vijay Pal for taking two Government vehicles bearing Nos.
HR 22 0020 and HR 03A 7880 respectively from Chandigarh to Hyderabad Andhra Pradesh for repair and fitting of Jammers.
HC Vijay Pal was driving one of the vehicles.
He purchased 12 bottles of Indian Made Foreign Liquor IMFL at Kota Rajasthan and companycealed the companysignment of the liquor in the dickey of the car without the knowledge and companysent of the appellant.
On checking of the vehicles by the Excise Staff of Adilabad in the State of Andhra Pradesh, 12 bottles of IMFL were recovered from the luggage boot of the car being driven by HC Vijay Pal, which gave rise to registration of a case PR No.470/95 96 dated 31.07.1996 against HC Vijay Pal for transporting liquor in violation of prohibitory orders of the State Government.
The Superintendent of Police, Sonepat, respondent No.2 herein ordered a departmental inquiry against the appellant and HC Vijay Pal charging the appellant with improper companytrol over his subordinates which amounts to dereliction of duties and for the lapses of indiscipline as Police Officer.
The Inquiry Officer found the appellant guilty of the charge on the basis of summary of allegations and submitted his report to the respondent No.2.
The respondent No.2, on receipt of the inquiry report, issued show cause numberice dated 18.03.1997 to the appellant calling upon him to show cause why penalty of dismissal from service be number imposed upon him.
The appellant was directed to file his reply within 15 days from the receipt of the show cause numberice and in default thereof, final order of the proposed penalty of dismissal from the service would be passed against him.
The appellant, accordingly, filed a detailed reply to the show cause numberice denying the allegations of misconduct and dereliction of duties on his part.
He submitted that he has unblemished service record to his credit and has never been found guilty of any acts of omissions and companymissions in discharging his duties during his long service career of about 34 years in the Police Department of the State.
Respondent No.2, keeping in view the length of service and unblemished record of service of the appellant, imposed punishment of stoppage of two annual future increments with permanent effect upon the appellant.
The appellant filed statutory appeal dated 11.08.1999 to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Rohtak Range respondent No.3 herein, under Rule 16.29 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 against the order of respondent No.2.
The Appellate Authority by an order dated 11.08.1999 rejected the appeal of the appellant.
The appellant preferred Revision Petition before the Director General of Police, Haryana respondent No.4 herein, which came to be rejected by an order dated 15.06.2001.
The appellant thereafter instituted suit inter alia praying for declaration that the order of punishment dated 30.09.1997 passed by respondent No.2 order dated 11.08.1999 recorded by respondent No.3 in appeal vide which the order of punishment was upheld and the appeal of the appellant was dismissed and order dated 15.06.2001 passed by respondent No.4 upholding the orders of the authorities below being illegal, null and void, arbitrary and against the rules of natural justice with companysequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the respondents from implementing the order of punishment to the detriment of the appellant.
The learned Additional Civil Judge Senior Division , Sonepat, dismissed the Civil Suit No.571/1 of 2002 of the appellant by the judgment and decree dated 21.03.2005.
Being aggrieved against and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt, the appellant carried the matter in appeal.
The learned Additional District Judge, Sonepat, dismissed the said appeal on 01.09.2005.
The appellant preferred Second Appeal in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which was dismissed by learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 20.03.2006.
The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of the High Court are extracted as under Both the Courts below have companycurrently held that the order of punishment had been passed against the plaintiff after the due procedure had been followed by the department in companyformity with the rules applicable to the plaintiff.
It has also been held that principles of natural justice were also adhered to.
Consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed by the trial companyrt.
Shri Jai Vir Yadav, learned companynsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently argued that another employee against whom the charges were primarily reflected, had been exonerated.
I am afraid, the aforesaid argument of the learned companynsel cannot be accepted by this Court sitting in second appeal.
We have heard Shri Kamal Mohan Gupta, learned companynsel for the appellant, and Shri Arvind Kumar Gupta, Additional Advocate General for the respondents and perused the entire material placed on record.
The facts narrated hereinabove are number in dispute to the extent that the appellant on 25.07.1996 was deputed as Incharge of police party companyprising ASI Sucha Singh, HC Vijay Pal and HC Suraj Bhan to get technical repairs of two cars of the Government of Haryana at Hyderabad.
On 31.07.1996 during the checking of the vehicles in the jurisdiction of District Adilabad A.P. by the Excise Staff of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, 12 bottles of liquor were found in the staff car No.
HR 22 0020 which, at the relevant time, was being driven by HC Vijay Pal, against whom a criminal case was registered by the Police in District Adilabad.
The appellant and HC Vijay Pal were also dealt with in departmental proceedings initiated against them under the Punjab Police Rules.
The charge against the appellant was that the appellant did number exercise proper companytrol upon HC Vijay Pal, driver of the official vehicle, when HC Vijay Pal was apprehended by the Excise Staff of Andhra Pradesh for companycealing 12 bottles of liquor in the dickey of the official vehicle of the State of Haryana.
In the departmental proceedings, the Inquiry Officer held the appellant as well as HC Vijay Pal guilty of misconduct, indiscipline and dereliction of duties.
The disciplinary authority, on companysideration of the reply submitted by the appellant to the show cause numberice, imposed punishment of stoppage of two annual future increments with permanent effect upon the appellant.
The appellate authority as well as the revisional authority both have companycurred with the disciplinary authority and accordingly dismissed the appeal and revision respectively filed by the appellant.
The first Appellate Court, after numbericing the arguments of the learned companynsel for the parties, has number recorded any reason for rejecting the pleas of the appellant and it dismissed the appeal by observing as under The learned Lower Court has rightly discussed the evidence and the various rules.
The findings given under all the issues are companyrect and the same stands affirmed.
Before this Court, the appellant has filed a companyy of the Memorandum of the Grounds of Appeal preferred by him before the High Court.
A companyy of the said statement has been placed on record as Annexure P 1, which reads as under I, Vijay Pal Chaudhari S o Madan Singh R o number legible, Tehsil Jaggar, Distt.
Rohtak Haryana states that he started journey on Government duty from Panchkula to Hyderabad on 25.07.96.
I purchased 12 bottles of IML at Quota Rajasthan for personal companysumption as I have to stay in Hyderabad for 15 days to attend the Govt.
I purchased 12 bottles of IML at the rate of Rs.80/ each bottle.
I kept the above IML bottles in the dickey of the car without the knowledge of Man Singh.
The said 12 bottles of IML have been recovered and seized by the Excise Officer at prohibited excise check post ICP Bhorj on 30.07.96 at about 7.30 a.m. I am number aware about the implementation of prohibition Act in the A.P. State.
HC Vijay Pal has been exonerated by the appellate authority mainly on the ground of his acquittal in the criminal case, whereas in departmental proceedings he has been found guilty by the disciplinary authority and was awarded punishment for serious misconduct companymitted by him as police personnel.
| 1 | train | 2008_790.txt |
12 of 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Act on the around that it violates the fundamental rights of the petitioner granted under Arts.
In the writ petition the petitioner claims that he owns 9559 square yards ,of land situate in District Bulsar, sub district and Taluka Navsari, village Kohilpore.
| 0 | train | 1974_342.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
569 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the order dated September 9, 1960, of the Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry in Appeal No.
94 of 1960.
WITH Writ Petition No.
347 of 1960.
Petition tinder Art.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No.
1 in C. A. No.
569/61 .
Mahalinga Iyer, for respondent No.
2 in C.A.569/61 .
C. Chatterjee, R. K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for the petitioner and the intervener.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No.
1 in W. I,.
347/60 .
Thiagarajan, for respondent No.
3 in W. P. No.
347/60 .
January 22.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. The appeal and the writ petition arise out of the same order of the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry acting as the appellate authority under the Motor Vehicles Act and will be dealt with together.
The petitioner is one of fourteen persons who had applied for a stage carriage permit before the State Transport Authority, Pondicherry.
The petitioners application was rejected and the permit was granted to Perumal Padayatchi, one of the respondents before us.
The State Transport Authority companysidered various factors one of which was that Perumal Padayatchi was a native of Pondicherry and taking all the factors into account, the permit was granted to Perumal Padayatchi.
The petitioner went in appeal before the Appellate Authority, who is the Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry.
The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal and observed that even if it were companyceded.
| 0 | train | 1963_7.txt |
CIVIIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
133 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 6, 1956, of the Bombay High Court in T. R. No.
49 of 1955.
Additional Solicitor General of India, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri, R. H. Dhebar and P. D. Menon, for the appellant.
A. Palkhivala, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
February 23.
The Judgment of Das, Kapur, Gajendragadkar, Subba.
Rao, Wanchoo and Ayyangar, JJ.,
was delivered by Das, J., Sarkar, J. delivered a separate judgment.
K. DAS, J. This is an appeal by special, leave grante I by this Court on September 17, 1956.
The Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay, City 1, is the appellant before us.
The respondent is Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, who will be referred to in this judgment as the assessee.
The assessee is a Parsi lady who held by way of investment a large number of shares of different companypanies.
These shares were purchased before the end of and after 1939 40 at a companyt price which was much less than their market value on April 1, 1945.
Her dividend income was assessed to income tax for several year prior to April 1, 1945 but in the assessment year1946 47, the relevant accounting year being financial year 1945 46, the Incometax Officer found that the assessee had companyverted her shares into her stock in trade and carried on a trading activity, viz.
Her income for the assessment year 1916 47 was therefore companyputed oil the basis of the profits which she made by the sale of her shares as a trading activity, the profits being calculated on the difference between the ruling mar,Let price at the begining Of the account year And the sale proceeds.
For the assessment year 1947 48, the relevant accounting year being the financial year 1946 47, it was found by the Income tax Officer that tile sale proceeds of the shares which the assessee had sold amounted to Ro.
5,49,487/. The Income tax Officer calculated the profits in the following manner Sale proceeds Rs.
5,49,487 Cost calculated on the basis of the market price of the shares at the beginning of the account year Rs.
4,50,822 Rs.
98,655 Less Forward business loss Rs.
25,344 Net profit Rs.
73,321 The assessee then appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who enhanced the income of the aasessee by a sum of Rs.
2,91,307/ including a capital gain of Rs.
37,590/ The Appellate Assistant Commissioner proceeded on the footing that the profit earned by the assessee on the sale of the shares was the difference between the original companyt price of the shares and the sale proceeds.
He further held that the some of the shares which were sold in the account year 1946 47 were the assessees stock in trade, while some other shares were her investment shares.
Then, there was an appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal and the principal point taken before the Tribunal related to the question as to how the profits of the assessee on the sale of her shares should be calculated.
The Judicial Member of the Tribunal accepted the view expressed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and held that the original companyt price of the shares must be taken in order to find out the profits which the assessee had made on the sale of the shares.
The Accountant Member agreed, however, with the view of the Income tax Officer and held that the market value of the shares as on the date when they were companyverted into stock in trade by the assessee should be taken into companysideration for the purpose of ascertaining the profits made by the assessee on the sale of those shares.
On this difference between the two members of the Tribunal, the matter was referred.
to the President of the Tribunal.
The President agreed with the view of the Accountant Member.
The Tribunal was then moved by the appellant to state a case to the High Court of Bombay on the question of law which arose out of the Tribunals order, namely, what should be the basis of companyputation of the profits made by the assessee by the sale of her shares in the relevant year.
Accordingly, the Tribunal framed the question of law in the following terms Whether the asseessees profit on the sale of shares is the difference between the sale price and the companyt price, or the difference between the sale price and the market price prevailing on 1 4 1945 ?
The aforesaid question of law was then referred the High Court of Bombay under s. 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 XI of 1922 .
This was Income tax Reference No.
49 of 1955.
The reference was heard by a Division Bench companysisting of Chagla, C. J. and Tendolkar, J. By its judgment and order dated March 6, 1956, the High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee and held that the assessees assessable profit on the sale of shares was the difference between the sale price and the market price prevailing on April 1, 1945.
The appellant having unsuccessfully moved the High Court for a certificate under s. 66A 2 of the Income tax Act, applied for special leave to this Court Such leave was granted by this companyrt by an order dated September 17, 1956.
Briefly put, the facts of that case were these the wife of the assessee there carried on a stud farm, the profits of which were agreed to be chargeable to income tax under case I of Schedule D. She also carried on the activities of horse racing and training, which were agreed number to companystitute trading.
Five horses were transferred from the stud farm to the racing stables.
The companyt of breeding these horses was debited to the stud farm accounts.
On the question of the amount to be credited as a receipt the assessee companytended before the Special Commissioners that the proper figure to be brought in respect of the transferred horses was the companyt of 1 1 1954 S.C.R. 219.
2 1955 36 T.C. 275.
In addition to keeping birds on their farm for laying purposes, they had a hatchery which produced chicks primarily for sale as day old checks.
Some of these chicks were transferred to brooder houses and became part of the stock on the farm.
The assessees were assessed to income tax under schedule Din respect of the profits of the hatchery part of their business and under Schedule B in respect of the profits of the farm.
| 0 | train | 1962_183.txt |
With C.A.No.7115/2001 SLP C No.
11014/2001 , C.A.No.
7116 /2001 SLP C No.12792/2001 , C.A.No.
7117/2001 SLP C No.12793/2001 and C.A.Nos.
7118 7119/2001 SLP C Nos.13441 13442/2001 J U D G M E N T RAJENDRA BABU, J. Leave granted in all the SLPs.
The appellant State issued a numberification on 5.1.2001 regarding admission to post graduate medical companyrses in the State of Punjab.
60 of the seats in such companyrses were reserved for eligible candidates in Service, while 40 of the seats were kept open to all eligible candidates who were residents of the State of Punjab.
Clause 5 thereto, which provides for determination of merit and eligibility for admission, reads as under IN CASE OF MEDICAL DENTAL COLLEGES The merit of the candidates will be determined by the University by holding the Postgraduate Entrance Test of eligible candidates, for admission to three years degree companyrses for the session 2001.
There will be separate merit lit for in service 60 quota candidates for Government Medical Dental Colleges and a separate merit list for remaining who are number companyered under in service category candidates.
The merit list for open and reserve candidates will be companybined and reserve candidates will be eligible for open seats also, as per their merit.
Interview is companypulsory for all candidates applying for the postgraduate admission.
No separate interview letters will be issued.
Candidates securing at least 40 marks in the companypetitive examination will be eligible for admission except for admission to the basic subjects viz.
Anatomy, Physiology, Biochemistry, Pharmacology, Pathology, Microbiology, Forensic Medicine and Social and Preventive Medicine where there will be numbercondition of minimum marks.
Interview for M.S. M.S. M.D.S companyrses will be held in the office of Vice Chancellor, Baba Farid University of Health Sciences Faridkot.
One mark each to PCMs candidates for admission to postgraduate companyrse under 60 quota for one companypleted year of rural service over and above the three years minimum rural service required for eligibility for admission under this quota shall be given in the following manner The incentive of additional marks would be available only to those PCMs candidates who have obtained the minimum 40 qualifying marks.
The number of marks, which may be given as an incentive for additional rural service, will be limited to 3 five .
The companypleted year of rural service on the basis of which incentive will be given, must have been rendered at places which are at least 15 kms.
or more beyond municipal numberified area companymittee limits.
The validity of the numberification dated 5.1.2001 issued by the appellant State was challenged in the High Court with respect to prescription of lower marks than were prescribed by Regulation 9 framed by the Medical Council of India.
On the basis of the companytentions raised before the High Court, two questions were formulated for companysideration, firstly, the numberification issued by the appellant State on 5.1.2001 providing for appointment to the students for the postgraduate medical companyrses with less than 50 marks in the entrance examination is companytrary to Regulation 9 of the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 hereinafter referred to as the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, on 22.8.2000, and secondly, as to the scope of reservations that would be made by the State Government.
On both these questions, the High Court held against the appellants and quashed the numberification issued by the appellant State to the extent that it lowers the qualifying marks from less than 50 in the entrance examination and provides for reservations for admissions to the postgraduate medical companyrses and thereby, the High Court directed the University to hold fresh companynseling and to admit students as per their merit in accordance with the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India after excluding the students who had applied on the basis of reservation.
Hence these appeals by State of Punjab and others.
| 1 | train | 2001_644.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2147 of 1980.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 19th august 198 of the allahabad high companyrt in m.w.p.
number 7578 of 1979.
pramod swarup for the appellant.
k. garg and v.k.
jain for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by raanganath misra j. the tenant of one room which is a part of a premises located within the township of aligrah in the state of uttar pradesh is in appeal before this companyrt after obtaining special leave under article 136 of the constitution.
the respondent landlord asked for his eviction on the ground of the tenant having created a sub tenancy of the premises sometime in october 1976 in favour of m s. pavan trading companypany a soap manufacturing companycern.
the tenant denied the allegation of sub letting.
the additional district judge before whom the tenants revision petition came for disposal took numbere of the erroneous approach of the trial companyrt and came to hold in the present case it has number at all been admitted by the defendant that pavan trading companypany or any member of the said companypany has been carrying on business in the shop alongwith him or by himself.
the mere presence of a member of pavan trading companypany in the shop at a certain time will number be sufficient to say all that the business is being carried on by pavan trading companypany in the shop.
in these circumstances it was for the plaintiff to lead good and positive evidence to prove that the business in fact at that shop was being carried on by the pavan trading companypany and number a by the defendant himself.
he looked into the evidence and came to hold the evidence of the plaintiff was number at all sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendant and on companysideration of the evidence of the plaintiff it is number at all possible to say that the plaintiff has been able to prove the fact of pavan trading companypany carrying on the business at the shop which may amount to sub letting of the shop by the defendant.
the appellate authority therefore allowed the revision and reversed the order of eviction and directed dismissal of the petition of the landlord.
the landlord filed an application under article 227 of the companystitution.
| 1 | dev | 1984_75.txt |
Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought by special leave from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated December 6, 1966 in Execution Second appeal No.
886 of 1961.
Respondent No.
1 obtained a decree against Shri Sheora tan Singh, ancestor of the appellants, for specific performance of an agreement to sell plots, which became Bhoomidari plots by operation of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The decree was obtained on August 19, 1966.
The appeal filed against decree was also dismissed.
Later on the decree holder, respondent No.
1 transferred the decree for specific performance in favour of respondent No.
Respondent No.
2 executed the decree.
Thereafter the judgment debtors, the present appellants, filed an objection under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that the sale deed companyld number be executed in view of Section 154 of the Act.
The companytention of the appellants was that the original decree holder Babulal had more than 36 acres of land and he companyld number acquire more land in view of Section 154 of the Act.
The Munsiff allowed the objection on the ground that the original decree holder possessed more than 30 acres of land and, therefore, the decree for specific performance companyld number be enforced against the judgment debtors and respondent No.
2 was holding the rights of respondent No.
1 as a transferee.
Respondent No.
2 filed an appeal in the Court of Civil Judge, Budaun against the order of the Munsiff.
2 was entitled to execute the decree for specific performance.
| 0 | train | 1969_399.txt |
C. Gupta, J. The respondent was employed in 1961 as Officer in Charge, Desert and Gangetic Plains, Zoological Survey of India at Jodhpur.
A criminal case was registered against him on December 31, 1962 which was investigated by the Special Police Establishment, Jaipur.
Ultimately a charge sheet was filed against the respondent in the Court of the Special Judge for Rajasthan, Jaipur City, The Special Judge companyvicted him under Section 5 1 c read with Section 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.
100/ , in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for further one month, on the first companynt and on the second to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rupees 100/ , in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for another one month.
The sentences were directed to run companycurrently.
Sanction for prosecution of the respondent was granted on September 17, 1964 by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, signed by a Deputy Secretary by order and in the name of the President.
In the appeal preferred by the respondent from the decision of the Special Judge, the Rajasthan High Court held that the Ministry of Home Affairs was number the companypetent authority to sanction prosecution of the respondent, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of companyviction and the sentences passed on him.
The appeal before us has been preferred by the State of Rajasthan questioning the companyrectness of the judgment of the High Court.
In exercise of the powers companyferred by Article 77 3 of the Constitution of India the President made the Government of India Allocation of Business Rules, 1961 in supersession of all previous rules and orders on the subject.
In the impugned judgment the High Court refers to numberification No.
S. G. 2494 dated August 3, 1965 which amended the Government of India Allocation of Business Rules, 1961 by introducing entry 32A under the heading, Ministry of Home Affairs, which reads 32A. According of sanction for the prosecution of any person for any offence investigated into by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, where such sanction is required to be accorded by the Central Government.
Note Sanction for the prosecution of any person for any offence number investigated into by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, shall be accorded by the Administrative Ministry, where such sanction is required to be accorded by the Central Government.
The High Court finds that prior to this amendment the companypetent authority to accord sanction for offences investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment was the Department of Personnel Karmik Vibhag , Cabinet Secretariat, where such sanction was required to be given by the Central Government, Even after the amendment, as entry 32A would show, sanction for prosecution of any person for any offence number investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment was to be accorded by the Administrative Ministry companycerned where such sanction was required to be accorded by the Central Government.
As already stated the offences alleged to have been companymitted by the respondent were investigated by the Special Police Establishment, Jaipur.
The basis of both the submissions is an office memorandum dated October 6, 1948 to which reference was made also before the High Court.
| 0 | train | 1980_357.txt |
HANSARIA.J. Two Mahalle brothers Narendra and Ramesh Were done to death on the night intervening 4th 5th September, 1978.
Five persons were booked for trial for the murder which included two Rathod brothers Jai Singh and Raj Singh.
Of the three remaining accused, and Raj Singh.
Of the Rathod brothers and two Ghanshyam and Sudhakar are said to belong to the of Rathod brothers.
To start with, the relationship between the Mahalle brothers and Rathod brothers was quite thick.
They used to take keen interest in the local panchayat politics.
They, however, fell out when the election for Shegaon village took place in the month of May, 1978.
Gadgenagar, in which the two deceased resided, was a part of village Shegaon.
Both the groups wanted their own candidate to became Sarpanch.
Bhaskar Kale was the candidate of the Rathod brothers, while Mahalle brothers desired their relative Dilip to become Sarpanch.
It is Bhaskar, however, who got elected.
The relationship got strained thereafter and political jealousy are.
Nothing untoward occurred till Pola of 1978 but after Pola occurred on 2.9.1978, Bhaskar was severally beaten on the afternoon of 3rd September at Amravati.
He had to be hospitalized.
Accused Raj Singh Raju suspected that Narendra had some hand in the incident.
Thereafter, the present occurrence occurred past midnight of 3rd September itself, when, it is alleged, that the aforesaid five persons murdered the two Mahalle brothers.
The trial saw the companyviction of the five accused under section 302/149 in the alternative 302/34.
The accused were also companyvected under sections 147 and 148.
The five companyvicts preferred four different appeals.
The State also appealed as the trial companyrt had awarded sentence of life imprisonment for the principal offence of murder.
According to the State, Stake, death penalty was the proper sentence.
The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed all five appeals.
During the pendency appeal before the High Court, accused No.3, Devi Das had died.
During the pendency of these appeals.
accused No.5 Sudhakar, has died.
2 and 4, namely Jai Singh Bandu, Raj singh Raju Ghanshyam have been legally companyvicted under the aforesaid sections.
| 0 | train | 1996_1885.txt |
126/2008 SLP Crl.
No.5273 /2006 Leave granted.
The parties hereto were married in the year 1978 79.
The Gauna ceremony was solemnized in the year 1982.
Allegedly, on the plea that the appellant had number joined her matrimonial home in the year 1997, respondent companytracted a second marriage with Lalitabai during the subsistence of the first marriage.
In the year 2002 she filed an application for grant of maintenance in terms of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The learned Magistrate allowed the said application directing grant of maintenance Rs.
1,000/ per month.
Respondent filed a revision application thereagainst.
The Revisional Court set aside the said order opining as under 1 that helps the revisionist wherein it has been laid down that if the husband does number disregard the wife number does he denies to maintain her and despite three letters calling her to join matrimonial home, if the wife refuses to live with her husband and if after enough time the husband marries second time, the wife is number entitled for maintenance u s 125 Cr.
P.C. if Rs.
150 demanded as maintenance for the son one is number entitled for Rs.
200 per month maintenance.
| 1 | train | 2008_107.txt |
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
5121 OF 2007 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION c NO.16098/2006 Sudershan Reddy, J. Leave granted.
The dispute between the parties relates to invocation of the bank guarantee furnished by the appellant to the respondent.
The appellant M s. Vinitec Electronics Private Limited entered into agreement dated 10th May, 2000 with the respondent HCL Infosystem Limited under which the respondent agreed to buy UPS systems from the appellant for a companysideration value of Rs.1,68,12,400/ .
The method of payment and terms thereof are provided for in clause 15 a and d in the said agreement.
Clause 15 The payment terms will be a 30 Advance against a Bank guarantee from a Scheduled Bank of equivalent value.
The BG shall be valid till the date of final delivery at the Company location s .
d 10 after one year from the date of receipt of material at the customer site s .
The case of the appellant was that it had supplied all the equipments to the respondent by 2nd August, 2000 but the respondent companymitted default in making the stipulated payment amounting to Rs.49,99,338/ .
The said sum according to the appellant remained unpaid.
The respondent agreed to pay the sum provided the performance bank guarantee of 10 value was furnished.
That is how bank guarantee as required by the respondent was furnished which was amended on 20th August, 2001.
The case of the appellant was that even after furnishing the bank guarantee the respondent made a payment of only Rs.
30 lakhs on 22nd August, 2001 and false assertion of payment of Rs.11,99,335/ was made.
It was also alleged that a sum of Rs.
8 lakhs still remained unpaid.
The bank guarantee had become inoperative as the companydition precedent for its invocation was number companyplied with.
The case of the respondent was that the original companytract value was Rs.1,68,12,400/ out of which Rs.1,60,12,400/ , i.e., 95 of the companytract value stood paid and all the obligations pursuant to clause 15 a to c of the companytract have been fulfilled and it is only then the bank guarantee in question was furnished to the respondent upon payment of 30 of the companytract value to the appellant.
It was asserted that the bank guarantee furnished as it stands is an unconditional one.
The learned Single Judge after elaborate companysideration of the matter found numbermerit in the injunction application filed by the appellant and accordingly dismissed the same.
The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge.
| 0 | train | 2007_865.txt |
APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at Bombay Civil Appeal No.
XII of 1950.
This was an appeal from a judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay Chagla, Acting C.J. and Bhagwati J. dated 2nd September, 1947, in Appeal No.
60 of 1946.
K. Daphtary, Advocate General of Bombay M. M. Desai.
with him for the appellant.
C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India S.S. Ragne kar, with him for the respondent.
May 27.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by KANIA C.J. This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to direct the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and the Superintendent of Stamps at Bombay to state a case for the opinion of the Court under section 57 of the Stamp Act.
The respondent companypany, for its business, borrowed money from the Central Bank of India Ltd. at Bombay.
In order to secure the loan a document was executed on the 22nd of March, 1945, with a stamp of Rs.
16 8 0, on the footing that it was a, deed of hypothecation without possession of the goods.
When the deed was sent to the Sub Registrar for registration he impounded the same and sent it to the Stamp Office.
The Assistant Superintendent of Stamps wrote to the respondent that the document was a mortgage with possession, chargeable with duty under article 40 a of the Schedule and inquired why it was number duly stamped before execution.
The respondents solicitors in their reply companytended that the document was number, and was never intended by the parties to be, a mortgage with possession.
They pointed out that numberpossession of the property had been given or was intended to be given, except in certain companytin gencies and therefore the document was properly stamped.
In reply the Assistant Superintendent intimated that the docu ment was chargeable with duty of Rs.
56,250 and a penalty of Rs.
5,000 had been imposed.
The respondents were asked to pay the amount forthwith.
On the 27th July, 1945, the respondent filed a suit against the Central Bank companytending that the document was number a mortgage with possession.
It was alleged that since a doubt had arisen as to whether the document gave effect to the companymon intention of the parties the Courts directions were sought for and if the Court found that the document as framed did number give effect to the said companymon intention of the parties the instrument may be rectified.
On 9th August, 1945, the respondents solicitors informed the Assistant Superintendent that such a suit had been filed and requested that the demand for payment of stamp duty and penalty may number be pressed under the circumstances.
In the further companyrespondence, on behalf of the appellant, the demand was reiterated and resort to the companyrcive procedure of section 48 of the Stamp Act was threatened.
The Collector thereafter sent a letter to the respondents on the 17th January, 1946, demanding payment.
On the 25th of January, 1946, the suit filed by the respond ent was disposed of by the Court and the rectification as prayed was ordered.
The respondents solicitors immediately intimated the result of the suit to the Assistant Superin tendent and sent a companyy of the deed showing the rectifica tions made in the original document.
A similar letter was also sent to the Collector of Bombay.
On the 1st February, 1946, the respondents solictors enquired of the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps whether he was agree able to make a reference under section 56 2 to the appel lant, as the question of liability to pay the stamp duty and.
penalty involved important questions of law.
A petition on behalf of the respondent to the appellant was also filed on the 5th of February in which it was prayed that either the order of the Assistant Superintendent of Stamps be rescinded or in the alternative a case may be referred under section 57 of the Stamp Act for the opinion of the High Court.
This petition was rejected on the 4th July, 1946.
The respondent there upon filed a petition in the High Court on the 19th of July, 1946, praying that a writ of certiorari may be issued against the appellant, or an order may be made against him under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, to cancel the levy of the stamp duty and penalty as claimed on behalf of the appellant or in the alter native the appellant may be ordered under section 57 of the Stamp Act to refer the matter to the High Court for its opinion.
The matter came for hearing before Mr. Justice Blagden who did number grant the first relief but directed the appellant to state a case under section 57 of the Stamp Act to the Court for its opinion.
The appellant filed an appeal but failed.
| 0 | train | 1950_17.txt |
NANAVATI.
J. Leave granted.
A departmental proceeding was initiated against the respondent, a Sub Inspector of Police, on an allegation that in January 1988, while he was working as PSI at Anthiyur Police Station, he number only did number register a criminal case against one Smt.
Jayalakshmi for the offences found to have been companymitted by her but let her off and delivered back the seized articles after accepting a bribe of Rs.2,000/ from her.
A Deputy Superintendent of Police was appointed as an enquiry officer.
He framed the charges and served the same on the respondent.
He then held an enquiry and submitted his report to the Deputy Inspector General of Police who was companypetent to award the proposed penalty.
The Dy.
Inspector General of Police agreed with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and imposed the penalty of companypulsory retirement by an order dated 26.3.91.
The respondent filed an appeal against that order to the Inspector General of Police who dismissed it by an order dated 16.7.91.
The respondent then filed O.A. No.
4236 of 1991 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal.
It was companytented before the Tribunal that only the authority companypetent to award the proposed penalty companyld have framed and served the charge memo and as that was done in this case by a Deputy Superintendent of Police, only that penalty companyld have been lawfully imposed upon the respondent which was within the powers of the Deputy Superintendent of Police.
As the Deputy Superintendent of Police was number companypetent to award the penalty of companypulsory retirement imposition of that penalty even by Deputy Inspector General of Police should be regarded as illegal.
It was also companytended that there was numberevidence to prove the charge against the respondent.
A companytention was also raised that the respondent was number given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself.
As the Deputy Superintended of Police companyld number have imposed the penalty of companypulsory retirement, the Tribunal set aside the order of penalty and directed the petitioners herein to reinstate the respondent and remitted the case back to the Deputy Inspector General of Police to pass an appropriate order.
Aggrieved by that order the petitioners who were respondents in O.A. have filed this appeal.
| 1 | train | 1996_18.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
303 of 1984.
From the Judgment dated 19.5.1984 of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
129 of 1983.
K. Jain, R.P. Singh and R.K. Khanna for the Appellants.
Sushil Kumar and AruneShwar Gupta for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J. There are two appellants.
They are father and son respectively and they figured as A 1 and A 2 before the trial companyrt.
They were tried for offences punishable under Sections 302, 201 and 120 B I.P.C. for causing murder of Madhu Saxena, wife of A 2 and daughter in law of A 1, the deceased in the case.
They were acquitted by the trial companyrt.
The State preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court and the Division Bench of the High Court companyvicted them under Section 120 B and Section 302 read with 34 of the I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life.
They have preferred this appeal under Section 2 a of the Supreme Court Enlargement of General Appellate Jurisdiction Act.
The deceased was married to A 2 in the year 1961.
Two sons and one daughter were born to them.
A 1, father of A 2, was a practising lawyer after retiring from the Government Service.
The matrimonial life of the deceased and A 2 was number smooth.
There were frequent quarrels.
The accused lived in their own house alongwith the deceased.
It is in the evidence that the deceased was number healthy both physically and mentally.
She was also admitted in mental hospital once.
She used to companyfine herself to her room and she appeared to be somewhat mentally deranged.
The daughter of the deceased, who was examined as D.W. 2, aged 13 years was studying in 1Oth Class and she was also living in the same house.
On 18.3.82 the dead body of the deceased was found in her room in the house of the accused.
At that time admittedly A 2 was number in the house and he was at Suratgarh.
On being informed about the death A 1 sent for Dr. Madan Lal Arora, who exam ined the deceased and declared her to be dead.
Thereafter A 1 informed P.W. 5, Jagmohan Prasad, the father of the de ceased.
P.W. 5 went there and enquired.
A 1 told P.W. 5 that the deceased be cremated at 9 A.M. The brother of the de ceased told P.W. 5 that he has .seen the dead body lying in the room and that it was giving rotten smell.
P.W. 6 lodged a report before the Police.
P.W. 22 took up the investiga tion, held the inquest, examined the witnesses and sent the dead body for post mortem.
The Doctor P.W. 2 companyducted the postmortem.
He found that the body was giving rotten smell and the skin here and there was peeled off, nails were loose and the tongue was found in between the teeth.
He found an injury on the head.
He also found that some of the organs were decomposed and numbericed greenishbrown discolouration on the neck.
He opined that the death was due to head injury and pressure in the neck region.
He, however, sent the tissues of the trachea though decomposed and a piece of neck skin and also viscera for histopathology and for chemical analysis, but the pathologist companyld number give opinion regarding the piece of skin and the tissues of the trachea.
The pathologist numbered that the skin was discoloured and that the tissues and the mussle attached to the trachea showed numberabnormality.
The Doctor P.W. 2 opined that the head injury was caused by blunt weapon and that death is.
result of neck injury.
The pressure on the left and front of the neck was apparent.
After companypletion of the investigation, the charge sheet was laid.
22 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecu tion.
The accused dented the offences.
A 1 stated that he was away from 14.3.
1982 onwards and was at Jodhpur in his daughters house.
In support of his plea D.W. 1, Dr. Ram Krishna Mehta, the neighbour of A 1s daughter, was exam ined.
He also examined his grand daughter D.W. 2, namely the daughter of A 2 and the deceased.
A 2 stated that he was at Suratgarh from 11.3.1982 onwards.
Both of them denied the allegations of the prosecution.
The case registered rests on circumstantial evidence The trial companyrt held that there was numberevidence of companyspira cy between the A 1 and A 2 for murdering the deceased.
The High Court mainly relied on the evidence regarding the ill treat ment of the deceased by A 1 and A 2 and held that the ac cused had strong motive.
The High Court has also referred to the earlier incidents in some of the letters.
The High Court accepted the medical evidence in to and reached the company clusion that the death was homicidal and due to asphyxia due to head injury and pressure on the neck.
Finally, the High Court, relying on the companyduct of the accused after companying to know about the death of the deceased, reached the companyclusion that the two accused companyspired and got .the deceased mur dered and accordingly companyvicted them under Sections 302 read with 34 I.P.C. and 120 B I.P.C. Shri R.K.Jain, the learned companynsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court has merely acted on prejudice and suspicion and that there is absoluteIy numbermaterial to prove the companyspiracy and muchless to companynect the two accused in any manner with themurder The prosecution examined 22 witnesses.
P.W. 1 an Assistant School teacher in Jaipur and related to the deceased deposed that she attended a dinner in the house of the deceased and A 2 and in the year 1978 when the deceased came to her house she was having some spots of beating by sticks on her back and the deceased told PW.
1 that she was beaten by her hus band.
On 18.3.82 P.W. 1s neighbour told her that there was a telephone message fxom A 1 that the deceasd was about to die.
On that P.W. 1 and others went to the house of the deceased.
They opened the room from where bad smell was companying and in that room they saw the dead body of the de ceased which was decomposed.
A 1 who was present there told them that they would cremate the dead body that night.
On that P.W. 5, the husband of P.W. 1 and the brother of the deceased objected to.
P.W. 1 has also mentioned about other incidents of cruel treatment meted out to the deceased.
P.W. 2 is the Doctor, who companyducted the post mortem and we shaft advert to his evidence later.
P.W. 3 is the eider sister of the deceased.
She only stated that she got the information about the death of the deceased.
P.W 4 is the son of the deceased and A 2.
He deposed that on 11th March, 1982 his father A 2 came with him to the bus stand to see him off.
W. 4 met the deceased before leaving on the evening of 11th March, 1982 and talked to her.
At that time the companydi tion of the deceased was very weak and she was unhealthy.
W. 4 also deposed that his father A 2 was to go to Surat garh by the evening of 11.3.82.
This witness was treated hostile.
In the crossexamination by the defence this witness stated that his sister Gianwati who was examined as D.W. 2 told him that she went regularly to the room of the deceased to give food from 11.3.82 to 15.3.82 and that on 16.3.82 W. 2 did number meet the deceased due to headache and on 17th and 18th March the deceased did number respond when D.W. 2 called her.
P.W. 4 further deposed that D.W. 2 also told the same to her grand mother.
P.W. 5 is the father of the de ceased.
He also deposed about the iII treatment of the deceased by the accused and their demand for dowry.
He further deposed that the neighbour told them that he re ceived a telephone message from A 1 that the deceased was about to die.
Thereupon P.W. 5 sent his son P.W. 6 to A 1 s house.
Later he was told by A 1 who came to his house that the deceased died and the Doctor has declared her dead.
ThereUpon P.W. 5 wanted to know the name of the Doctor.
Thereupon A 1 told him that the deceased would be cremated.
A little later P.W. 6 also came and told him that the de ceased had died before many days and her dead body was giving rotten smell.
P.W. 6 is brother of the deceased and son of P.W. 5.
He also.deposed about the ill treatment meted out to the deceased.
He further stated that on 18.3.82 on receiving the information about the serious companydition of the deceased he went to house of the deceased and he found that the deceased had already died and the A 1 told him that the dead body would be cremated, whereupon he informed his father P.W. 5 and then lodged a report before the police.
The police arrived and prepared a panchnama.
P.W. 7 is the neighbour of the accused.
He only attested the site plan prepared by the police.
P.W. 8 is a practising Doctor and he deposed that on 18.3.82 A 1 came to him at about 5.30.
P.M. and told him that his daughter in law namely the deceased was in serious companydition.
Thereupon he went to the house and saw the deceased.
He examined the deceased and declared her to be dead.
P.W. 9 also was exam ined to speak about the cruelty but he was treated hostile.
W. 10 also belongs to the same locality.
He only deposed that the body was emitting foul smell and he signed the inventory prepared by the police.
P.W 11 is a photographer who took the photographs of the room and the dead body.
P.W. 12 is Gurubux Saxena who got the telephonic message from A 1 that the deceased was seriously ill and thereupon he in formed P.Ws 1, 5 and 6.
P.W. 13 is the companysin of the de ceased.
He also deposed about the cruelty meted out to the deceased.
He further deposed that on 18.3,82 the deceased died and he was asked by P.W. 5 to go to the house of the deceased.
He was informed by A 1 that the body would be cremated.
Thereupon he and P.W. 6 went and .gave a report to the police.
P.Ws 14 to 21 are the formal official witnesses.
Out of them P.Ws 17, 18, 19 and 20 are examined who spoke about the movements of A 2.
The sum and substance of their evidence is that A 2 was posted as expert of plant protec tion in Suratgarh and that leave was granted to him on 11.3.82.
This evidence may number be very much relevant because it is number the prosecution case that A 2 was present in the house at the time of the death of the deceased.
P.W. 22 is the Sub inspector who investigated the case.
He deposed that on receipt of the report he went to the place of occurrence, held the inquest and sent the dead body for postmortem.
He also speaks the seizure of some letters.
In the examination under Section 313 Cr.
P.C. both the accused stated that they are innocent.
A 1s case was that he was away at Jodhpur from 15th March, 1982 onwards and was staying in her daughters house and he came to Jaipur only on 18th March, 1982 and then he was told about the death of the deceased.
Thereupon he called the Doctor P.W. 8 who examined and pronounced the deceased to be dead.
He denied about the allegations of iii treatment of the deceased.
A 2 stated that he married the deceased in the year 1961 and they were blessed with two sons land one daughter.
He also stated that he was a Gazetted Officer in Agriculture Depart ment and he was transferred to various places and he also took the deceased with him.
He further stated that the deceased was sick and unhealthy and was staying at Jaipur.
He also stated that his daughter used to give food to the deceased.
On 11.3.82 he left for Suratgarh and later he came to know about the death of the deceased.
The accused examined D .Ws 1 to 3 on their behalf.
D .W. 1 is a Doctor at Jodhpur.
He deposed that he knew A 1 and that he was staying in his daughters house in Jodhpur from 15th March, 1982 to 17th March, 1982.
D.W. 2 is the daughter of A 2 and the deceased aged about 13 years.
She in general stated that her mother was sick and unhealthy and used to companyfine herself to the room and she used to give food to her.
She also stated that she gave food to the deceased on 15.3.82 and that she companyld number give food on 16.3.82 due to her own sickness.
Then on 17th and 18th March, 1982 her mother did number talk to her, therefore she returned with the food.
She also stated that A 1 went to Jodhpur on the evening of 14th March and returned from Jodhpur on 18th March, 1982.
On that day they found that the deceased was number talking and two ladies who came to meet the deceased, told that there was something wrong.
When her grand father A 1 returned from Jodhpur he sent for a Doctor and the Doctor after examining pronounced the deceased to be dead.
D.W.2 further stated that the relations between the deceased namely her mother and grand mother were number good.
In the cross examination she affirmed that she fell ill on 16.3.82 after companying from school and therefore companyld number give food to her mother.
She denied the suggestion that the body was decomposed even on 16th and 17th March, 1982.
D.W. 3 is the son of A 1 and brother of A 2 residing at Jodhpur.
He also deposed that A 1 came to Jodhpur and stayed from 15th on wards upto 17th March, 1982.
The dead body was found in the house of A 1 and A 2, where admittedly the deceased was also living but she used to companyfine her self to that room where the dead body was found She was sick and unhealthy and that she was number even companying out of the room.
W. 2 Dr. M.R. Goel examined the dead body on 19.3.82 and found 10 injuries which were ante mortem.
Many of them were in the shape of bruises and swellings.
He found the dead body as highly decomposed and had reached an advanced stage of putrefaction.
In his opinion the death was due to the injury on the head and pressure on the neck due to asphyxia.
He was cross examined at length.
He admitted that since the brain was decomposed and was in semi liquid companydi tion numberinjury therein companyld be traced.
He also admitted that the swelling of the eye was number due to the injury.on the forehead.
Coming to the injury on the neck, the Doctor stated that numberinjury was found on the bones of wind pipe and that portion also was decomposed.
In further cross examination he admitted that he did number make the culture of the maggots crawling on the head.
He also stated that he companyld number say definitely whether the death in the circum stances should have occurred before four days.
He, however, denied the suggestion that he companyld number form a definite opinion.
As far as this medical evidence is companycerned, the trial companyrt also companysidered the same at length.
The learned Sessions Judge numbered the details in the post mortem certifi cate Ex.
P, 1,.
There he found against the companyumn cause of death, the Doctor has put only a question mark.
It is also numbered in the postmortem certificate that P.W. 2 sent a part of the neck and viscera for chemical and histopathological examination.
After companysidering the whole evidence of the Doctor, the trial companyrt was of the opinion that it was very difficult to say that the injuries on the head were antemor tem.
In nature and at any rate P.W. 2s evidence has number proved beyond reasonable doubt that the death of the de ceased was due to injuries causing asphyxia and that the death was homicidal.
The learned Judges have also relied on some letters written by the deceased.
P.W. 6, the brother of the deceased deposed that the two accused used to be angry with the deceased and they did number allow him and his family members to see the de ceased.
The evidence on record clearly shows that the deceased was number mentally sound.
The fact that she was number companying out of the room and used the same for answering the calls of nature also would snow that there was something abnormal about her and she companyfined her move ments to the four companyners of the room.
15th March, 1982 was the last day when D.W. 2 served food to the deceased.
There after she did number go inside the room and on 18th March, 1982 the dead body was discovered.
The evidence of P.W. 2, the Doctor, also shows that numberbrain injury companyld be traced and he also did number find any injury on the bones of wind pipe.
There fore they were number present in the house when the deceased died The Medical Officer, P.W. 2 companyld number say definitely as to whether the death has occurred before four days of his examination and there is absolutely numberevidence either circumstantial or direct to hold that the death took place on 11.3.82 itself as found by the High Court.
The evidence of D.W. 2 who is numbere other than the daughter of the de ceased and was very much in the house throughout ategorical ly stated that her mother was alive on 15th March also.
Apart from D .W. 2 the only other inmate of the house during the crucial period was the mother in law of the deceased who was number even charge sheeted.
The letter Ex.
P 15 written by the first accused does number in any manner incriminate them and the High Court has grossly erred in holding that A 1 and A 2 entered into companyspiracy merely on the basis of companyjec tures and surmises drawn from the letter.
P.Ws 4, 9 and 10 have number supported the prosecution case and the remaining evidence does number in any manner implicate A 1 and A 2 and the other remaining inmate of the house, the mother ln law of the deceased, was number even suspected.
The accused were tried for offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34, 201 and 120 B I,P.C. only and in our view the trial companyrt rightly held that numbere of these charges were proved against them.
| 0 | train | 1991_234.txt |
N. KHARE, J. LITTTTTTTJ The respondent in C.A. No.6423/98 was working as a Senior Accountant in the pay scale of Rs.1400 2600 in the office of the Accountant General, Maharashtra at Nagpur and was drawing a pay of Rs.1260/ per month.
Subsequently for personal reasons the respondent sought transfer to the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore.
Her request for transfer was accepted on certain terms and companyditions stipulated by the appellants and the same were accepted by the respondents.
On acceptance of terms and companyditions the respondent was transferred as a Clerk to the office of Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore.
After the transfer to a lower post her pay was erroneously fixed at Rs.1250/ per month.
Subsequently when the mistake came into light her pay was fixed at a stage of Rs.1070/ by order dated 1.12.1995.
The order for recovery of excess pay to the respondent was also passed.
The respondent challenged the said order before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the tribunal allowed the Original Application filed by the respondent.
The writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed.
The respondent in C.A. No.6422/98 was working as Accountant in the office of the Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in the pay scale of Rs.1200 2040.
Subsequently, the respondent sought transfer from the office of Accountant General, Andhra Pradesh to the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore.
The said transfer was accepted with certain terms and companyditions to the effect that in case of such a transfer she has to technically resign from the post of Accountant and accept the reverted post of Clerk and has to join as a direct recruit.
After transfer to the post of Clerk in the office of the Accountant General, Karnataka at Bangalore the pay of respondent was fixed at Rs.1260/ per month.
Subsequently it was found that the pay of respondent on reversion ought to be fixed at Rs.1090/ .
Consequently, orders for re fixation of pay and recovery of excess amount were issued. | 1 | train | 2000_367.txt |
Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted in SLP Crl.
9896 of 2011 The present appeals are directed against the companymon judgment and order dated 25.03.2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.
602 of 2006 and Criminal Appeal No.
863 of 2006 whereby the learned Single Judge has given the stamp of approval to the judgment and order dated 30.01.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge F.T.C., Hapur, District Ghaziabad whereunder he had companyvicted the appellants under Section 363, 366 and 376 I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 363 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/ with a default clause, five years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/ under Section 366 IPC and ten years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/ under Section 376 IPC with the default sequitur.
All the sentences were directed to run companycurrently.
The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that a written report was filed by the companyplainant, Smt.
Aneesa, PW 2, on 3.12.1996 on the allegation that on 22.11.1996, around midnight, her daughter, Gulistan, PW 1, aged about 14 years, went out of her house to answer the call of nature but did number return for a companysiderable time.
Being anxious, she went in search of her and at that time Ali Waris, one of the appellants herein, informed her that he had left her daughter at his door.
Thereafter, PW 2 and his son Abrar, PW 4, searched for her in the neighbourhood as well as amongst the relatives but as it turned out to be an exercise in futility, she sensed some foul play and eventually informed the police that Ali Waris and Mohammad Ali Guddu had kidnapped her daughter.
After the criminal law was set in motion, the investigating agency companymenced the search of the victim.
As the factual matrix would uncurtain, Abrar had along with company villagers, namely, Arif s o Md. Rafi, Zulfi, Papat, Shafiq and others had gone in search of his sister, they had reached village Loni and Arif s o Azam Khan brought Gulistan from a house and handed over to him.
All of them along with Gulistan went to the police station on 18.1.1997 and PW 2 and Gulistan, PW 1, submitted an application at the police station Dhaulana.
The statement of the victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The investigating agency sent the victim for medical examination, recorded the statements of seven witnesses, prepared the site plan and after companypleting other formalities placed the chargesheet against eight accused persons, namely, Ali Waris, Md. Ali, Mehmood, Allahrakha, Sirajoo, Fazal, Shamshad and Sarfraz for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 366, 368 and 376, IPC before the companypetent Court which in turn companymitted the matter to the Court of Session.
The accused persons abjured their guilt and pleaded false implication due to political rivalry relating to Gram Sabha Pradhan elections.
In companyrse of trial, the prosecution, to bring home the charges, examined seven witnesses, namely, Gulistan, PW 1, the prosecutrix, Anisha, PW 2, the informant and the mother of the victim, Liyaqat Ali, PW 3, Abrar, PW 4, the brother of the victim, Maqsood, PW 5, Mahavir Singh, PW 6 and Dr. Rekha Singh, PW 7 who had examined the victim.
Their plea was that they had supported Ali Waris in village Pradhan election and the rival party Arif, a relative of PWs 1, 2 and 4 was defeated.
The defence in order to establish its plea examined one witness, namely, Jaggi Rana, DW 1.
The learned trial Judge on appreciation of evidence brought on record came to hold that the prosecution had been able to establish the charges against four accused persons, namely, Ali Waris, Mohd.
Ali Guddu, Mehmood and Fazal for the offences under Sections 366, 368 and 376 of I.P.C., but had failed to bring home charges against other accused persons and on that basis companyvicted and imposed the sentence as has been stated hereinbefore.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of companyviction and order of sentence, Fazal Mohd.
Ali and Mehmood preferred Criminal Appeal No.
602 of 2006 and Ali Waris preferred an independent Appeal being Criminal Appeal No.
863 of 2006.
The High Court appreciated the evidence and by placing reliance on the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 4 had opined that the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge was flawless.
Being of the said view, it affirmed the judgment of companyviction and the order of sentence.
| 1 | train | 2015_127.txt |
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
2675 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP C No.
19548 of 2005 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
Accordingly the High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that since that the companypany has been wound up and the proceedings against the guarantor i.e. appellant were perfectly in order.
The companypany was declared as sick industry on 17.11.1994 by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in short the BIFR where after the companypany has undergone winding up proceedings before the High Court.
The BIFR submitted its recommendation for winding up and against the order of BIFR appellant had preferred an appeal before the appellate authority which was rejected on 9.1.1997.
The companypany had filed a writ petition questioning orders of the BIFR and the appellate authority.
By order dated 26.2.2003 the Writ Petition No.
| 0 | train | 2007_438.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
503 of 1963.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 31, 1962, of the Punjab High Court in I.T.R. No.
28 of 1960.
N. Kripal and A. N. Kripal, for the appellant.
Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
April 9, 1964.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J. This appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab raises the question whether interest paid under s. 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, herein after called the Act, is of the nature of a capital receipt or of a revenue receipt.
The relevant facts are number in dispute and they may be briefly stated.
The appellant, Dr. Shamlal Narula, is the Manager of a Hindu undivided family, which owned, inter alia, 40 bighas and 11 biswas of land in the town of Patiala.
The Patiala State Government initiated land acquisition proceedings for acquiring the said land under Regulation then prevailing in the Patiala State.
The State of Patiala first merged into the Union of Pepsu and later the Union of Pepsu merged into the State of Punjab.
On October 6, 1953, the Act was extended to the Union of Pepsu.
On September 30, 1955, the Collector of Patiala made an award under the Act ,as a result of which the appellant received on December 1, 1955, a sum of Rs.
2,81,822/ , which included a sum of 48,660/ as interest up to the date of the award.
For the year 1956 57, the Income tax Officer included the said interest in the income of the Hindu undivided family of which the appellant is the manager, and assessed the same to income tax, after overruling the appellants companytention that the said interest was a capital receipt and, therefore, number liable to tax.
On June 14, 1957, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner companyfirmed the order of the Income tax Officer.
The Appellant preferred an appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal.
The said Tribunal by its order dated July 9, 1957, held that the said amount representing the interest was a capital re ceipt and on that finding the said amount was excluded from the total income of the assessee.
At the instance of the Commissioner of Income tax the said Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court of Punjab under s. 66 1 of the Income tax Act, 1922 Whether on a true interpretation of section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act and the Award given by the Collector of Pepsu on the 30th September, 1955, the sum of Rs.
48,660/ , was captital receipt number liable to tax under the Indian Income tax Act?
The said reference was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and it held that the said amount was number a capital but a revenue receipt and as such liable to tax under the Indian Income tax Act.
Hence the present appeal.
| 0 | train | 1964_176.txt |
KURIAN, J. Leave granted.
| 0 | train | 2016_321.txt |
N. Ray, J. These appeals by certificate are against the judgment and order dated 17 September, 1968 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J. C. Nos.
833 to 842 of 1968.
| 1 | train | 1976_122.txt |
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 29th April, 1987 upholding the judgment of the trial companyrt dated 19th September, 1985 whereby the appellants were companyvicted for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life.
On 4th February, 1982 at about 5.30 p.m. one Elem Bux Molla, owner of a brick kiln at Dhib Dhipa was on his way to Dhib Dhipa Bazar for taking tea and snacks when he was accosted by 4 5 persons, including the appellants herein.
Appellant No.1 fired upon him with his gun as a result of which he fell down.
Appellant No.2 slit the throat of Elem Bux with a knife and after raising slogans Inquilab Zindabad all the miscreants including the appellants fled away.
Din Mohammad, PW.1, another employee of the deceased heard the sound of gun shots companying from the side of Dhib Dhipa Bazar and he run towards that place from the field where he was working.
On reaching Harwa Lauhati Road he saw some 4 5 persons running away towards the numberth along Boalghata Road shouting slogans Inquilab Zindabad.
Some other persons were present at a distance.
PW.3 was also seen there and then PW.1 immediately rushed to Police Station Bangar and lodged First Information Report at about 8.30 p.m. In the First Information Report he stated that some unknown miscreants had companymitted the murder of Elem Bux.
On receiving the information, the police officer on duty, PW.12, after registering the formal First Information Report took up the investigation in hand.
He left for the place of occurrence at about 10.00 p.m. On reaching the place of occurrence he found the dead body lying on the road.
Many people had companylected there.
He seized a number of incriminating articles from the spot including some empty cartridges etc.
He held inquest on the dead body of Elem Bux and sent the dead body for post mortem examination.
On companypletion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the appellants for an offence under Sections 302/34 IPC.
The appellants unsuccessfully challenged their companyviction and sentenced before the High Court.
Both the trial companyrt and the High Court , disbelieved PW.6 Tassiruddin Molla whom the prosecution had set up as one of the eye witnesses.
Both the companyrts, however, relied upon the testimony of Altab Molla, PW.3.
The companyviction of the appellants is based upon the testimony of a single eye witness, PW.3.
Both the companyrts found PW.3 to be a reliable witness and his evidence sufficient to companyvict the appellants.
Learned companynsel, in this companynection, pointed out that though PW.3 was an employee of the deceased, after seeing the ghastly assault on his master, he number only did number go to the police but did number even disclose what he had seen to anybody at his home or in the village or even at the place of his work till the next day and that too only after his statement was recorded by the police during the afternoon of the next day i.e. 5th February, 1982.
| 1 | train | 1996_813.txt |
74 of 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Act as amended by the Central Sales Tax Amendment Act, 1976 Act No.
103 of 1976 hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act and section 9 of the Amending Act Validating the levy of penalties under the Act with retrospective effect.
| 0 | train | 1983_126.txt |
Leave granted.
These Appeals are directed against the judgment and final order dated 27.04.2018 passed by the High Court1 in Income Tax Appeal No.97 of 2018 and against the order dated 14.09.2018 in Review Petition No.1289 of 2018 arising from said Income Tax Appeal No.97 of 2018.
Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date 2019.08.13 170344 IST Reason 1 High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior Civil Appeal Nos.
of 2019 SLP Civil Nos.of 2019 SLP C No.
Diary No.
The assessment was companypleted under Section 143 3 read with Section 153 D of 1961 Act.
Rupees 9,09,110/ was added on account of unexplained cash under Section 69 of 1961 Act.
Rs.15,09,672/ was added on account of unexplained jewellery.
Rupees 45,00,000/ was added on account of unexplained hundies and Rs.29,53,631/ was added on account of unexplained cash receipts.
Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Commissioner Income Tax Appeal .
The Commissioner of Income Tax Appeal deleted an amount of Rs.7,48,463/ holding that jewellery found in locker weighing 686.4 gms stood explained in view of circular No.1916 and further deleted the addition of Rs.29,23,98,117/ out of Rs.29,53,52,631/ holding that the companyrect approach would be to apply the peak formula to determine in such transaction which companyes to Rs.29,54,514/ as on 05.03.2010.
Aggrieved, Revenue filed an appeal.
The Assessee filed cross objection on the ground of jurisdiction of Assessment Officer regarding number issue of numberice under Section 143 2 of the Act of 1961.
7708 of 2019 Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Laxman Das Khandelwal 143 3 of the Act by the AO that the year under companysideration was beyond the scope of the provisions of Section 143A of the Act, it being the search year and number companyered in the six year to the year of search as per the assessment scheme procedure defined u s 153A that the AO has passed regular assessment u s 143 3 of the Act although the Id. CIT has mentioned the section as 143 r.w.s.
Accordingly, the High Court Civil Appeal Nos.
of 2019 SLP Civil Nos.of 2019 SLP C No.
7708 of 2019 Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Laxman Das Khandelwal answered the question of law framed in affirmative and in favour of the appellant and against the Revenue.
The Revenue thereafter applied to this Court for special leave under Article 136, and the same was granted, and hence this appeal.
| 0 | train | 2019_531.txt |
Arising out of S.L.P. Civil No.
26370 of 2005 B. SINHA, J Leave granted.
The Bihar State Subordinate Service Selection Board issued an advertisement for appointment of 225 posts of Live Stock Assistants in the Animal Husbandry Department.
Respondent herein pursuant to or in furtherance of the said advertisement applied therefor.
He was declared successful.
On or about 21.12.1992, Respondent herein along with other successful candidates had been recommended by the Board.
Appointment letters were issued to 195 successful candidates, out of the 200 candidates recommended by the Commisson.
By a Memo.
323 dated 21.02.1992, an appointment letter was sent to Respondent asking him to join the post within fifteen days.
He failed to join.
Allegedly, on 20.07.1994, he requested Director, Department of Animal Husbandry, to issue an appointment letter to him, stating I came to know that the Department had appointed maximum candidates till date and the appointment proceeding is going on for the remaining advertised 225 posts.
My Serial Number is more above in the recommended merit list and junior persons to me have been appointed but I have number received any appointment letter till date for my joining.
During the period of enquiry, I have companye to know that the appointment letter of the selected candidates have been forwarded, whereas I have number received appointment letter till number.
In the above facts and circumstances, I, therefore, request you to kindly pass the appropriate order immediately for giving me appointment letter.
No reply thereto was allegedly given.
He did number take any steps in regard thereto and only on 22.06.1995, he again requested the Director of Animal Husbandry to issue him an appointment letter in order to enable him to join the said post, stating With respect, it is to say with regard to earlier application dispatched by me in the aforesaid subject matter that in the light of the subject matter, advertisement by the Bihar Public Service Commission, I had recommended for appointment.
It companyes to know that the department had appointed maximum candidates but till date, I have number received my appointment letter.
I have been reminding to the Department for a very long period but I have number received any appointment letter by the department till date.
A numberice on similar terms was issued by him in the year 2000.
As his prayer was number acceded to, he filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Patna, which was marked as CWJC No.801 of 2001.
The State in its Counter Affidavit categorically raised a companytention that the panel remained valid only for one year.
It was companytended that the purported representations made by him in the years, 1994, 1995 and 2000 were number available in the Department, stating That it is further started that in the month of December, 1999, the petitioner had submitted another representation in this Department, the case of the petitioner was referred to the Law Department, Government of Bihar, for opinion and the opinion of the learned Advocate General, Bihar was also sought and tendered.
In the light of the opinion given by the Law Department learned Advocate General, the representation of the petitioner was rejected vide Annexure 5 of the writ application.
The said writ petition was taken up for hearing in 2004.
The High Court allowed the same, stating While hearing the matter on 29.6.2004 I had verbally asked learned G.P. 6 to find out as to whether any post of Pashudhan Sahayak is vacant pursuant to which a supplementary companynter affidavit has been filed.
In paragraph 56 of the affidavit it is stated that some posts of Pashudhan Sahayak are vacant in the office.
Since the petitioner was already selected for this post and he companyld number report his joining due to some unavoidable circumstances, in my opinion, his case should be companysidered for the post of Pashudhan Sahayak which is still vacant.
In the given facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the authorities companycerned are directed to accept the joining of the petitioner on the post of Pashudhan Sahayak pursuant to his selection vide order as companytained in Annexure 2 within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt production of a companyy of this order.
A Letters Patent Appeal preferred by Appellants was summarily dismissed by an order dated 03.03.2005.
A numberice was issued by this Court on 16.12.2005.
Despite pendency of the Special Leave Petition, Respondent was permitted to join his services in July 2006 subject to the decision of this Court in this matter.
The post was advertised in the year 1987.
It was, however, expected that he would make enquiries thereabout particularly when on his own showing those who were below him in the selection list had already been permitted to join.
Admittedly, he came to know thereabout in 1994.
He allegedly filed a representation and although numberreply thereto was given, he did number take any step soon thereafter.
He filed another representation only in 1995.
He filed the writ petition after a long period i.e. in 2001 when his purported representation filed in the year 1999 was rejected.
| 1 | train | 2006_519.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
82 of 1965.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated December 11/ 12, 1962 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No.
259 of 1962.
P. Malhotra, P. C. Bhartari and O. C. Mathur, for the appellant.
The respondent did number appear.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. This appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court at Bombay dated 11 12 12 1962 in Writ Petition 259 of 1962.
The appellant is the mahant of a public and religious trust called Kabir Nirnay Mandir.
The trust is being administered at Burhanpur, Madhya Pradesh and the bulk of its properties is situate there, except three pieces of land at Vadjai, a village in Dhulia District.
Respondent 1 is the tenant of two out of these three pieces of land situate at Vadjai.
88B of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The Act was originally passed in 1948 but was drastically amended by Amendment Act, XIII of 1956 which came into force on August 1, 1956.
It is number in dispute that the present trust is one of the kinds of trusts to which the Act was made applicable as from February 1, 1961.
| 0 | train | 1967_159.txt |
The sole question that arose for decision in those references was whether the transactions referred to in those references are sales within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, or whether they were merely works companytracts.
The High Court has opined that they were works companytracts and as such the turnovers relating to those transactions are number liable to be taxed under the Act.
The facts material for the purpose of deciding these appeals are The assessee entered into two companytracts with the S.E. Railway for breaking stones and supplying ballast.
Under the first companytract he was to break stones into ballast and supply approximately 60,00,000 cubic feet of ballast at Rs.
27 6 0 per cubic foot.
Under the second companytract, he was to supply in small slacks of a specified size at a flat rate of Rs.
35 per 100 cubic feet.
The general and special companyditions of those companytracts were the same.
The quarry from which the stones were to be quarried belonged to the railway administration.
The assessee was merely to quarry stones from those quarries, break them into pieces of specified size and supply them to the railway administration.
During the assessment period companymencing from April 1, 1958, to March 31, 1959, the assessee had received Rs.
21,000 respectively for the works done under the aforementioned two companytracts.
During the assessment period April 1, 1959, to March 31, 1960, the assessee under two different companytracts, similar to those mentioned earlier, received a sum of Rs.
37,728.13 from the S. E. Railway.
The sales tax authorities have levied tax on the said turnover and further have levied penalty on the assessee under Section 18 6 .
| 0 | train | 1970_303.txt |
The three appellants were tried by the Designated Court at Ajmer for offence under TADA and after a long drawn out trial companyvicted them under Section 3 3 and also under Section 4 1 of TADA.
Appellant Sukhchain Singh is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years under the two companynts while appellant Jarnail Singh was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years on the first companynt and three years on the second companynt.
Appellant Hakim Singh has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years on the first companynt and three years under second companynt.
The Fourth accused Mit Singh was found number guilty of any offence and was acquitted.
The gist of the case against the appellants is the following They together pasted wall poster on the night of 19.5.1987 on the wall of one Jugraj Singhs companypound in Village Dhanor Ganganagar District, Rajasthan .
PW 16 Ram Pal, Station House Officer arrested the three appellants on 29.5.1987.
On the strength of the information elicited from them companyies of the wall posters were recovered from the places shown by them.
They were charge sheeted for the aforesaid offences on companypletion of the investigation.
The prosecution examined 16 witnesses out of which a number of witnesses turned hostile.
The defence also examined a number of witnesses.
The appellants denied having participated in the activities alleged by the prosecution, when they were examined under Section 313 of the CrPC.
The Judge of the Designated Court, by a very lengthy judgment entered upon findings against the appellants on the disputed points and companyvicted them and sentenced them as aforesaid.
We heard Smt.
Revathy Raghavan, Advocate who was appointed as amicus curiae for the appellants and Shri Sushil Kumar Jain, Standing Counsel for the State of Rajasthan at length.
It is admitted by the prosecution that numbere of the appellants was in possession of any weapon, much less any lethal weapon, specified in Section 3 1 of TADA.
All the articles which the appellants were alleged to have possessed were wall posters and the other materials needed for pasting them on the walls.
| 1 | train | 1999_599.txt |
THOMAS, J. Legal heirs of a plaintiff Vrajlal J. Ganatra who suffered defeat both at the original side as well as at the appellate stage High Court of Gujarat have filed this appeal by special leave.
The suit relates to a property companyered by Ext.66 sale deed dated December 16, 1963.
It was claimed to be the property of the plaintiff even though the defendant was shown in the document as the vendee.
Suit was filed in 1981 for declaration of plaintiffs title to the suit property and also for an injunction for restraining the defendant from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff.
Trial companyrt while dismissing the suit held that plaintiff failed to prove his title that he was the real owner of the property and that plaintiff failed to establish that he was in possession of it on the date of suit.
In the case of Ext.66 sale deed also, according to the plaintiff, the same pattern was followed as defendant advanced a sum of Rs.13,000/ Rupees thirteen thousand only to the plaintiff for buying the land and so it was incumbent on the defendant to reconvey the property.
Ext.163 is a letter sent by the plaintiff to the defendant on 8.6.1968.
| 0 | train | 1996_652.txt |
mahajan j. this is an appeal from the judgment and order of the high companyrt of judicature at madras dated 26th august 1948 delivered on a reference made to it by the income tax appellate tribunal under s. 66 1 income tax act 1922 act 21 of 1922 .
the respondent was the manager of a hindu undivided family.
prior to 1931 he was carrying on a money lending business in partnership with one kasi ayyar.
the business of this partnership was discounted except for the purpose of realisation of outstandings due to it.
one of the outstandings was a debt due from the firm of kadir pillai marakayar on a mortgage.
a final decree was obtained against the said firm in the year 1940.
in execution of that decree certain lands of the debtor were sold.
on 11th september 1942 a sum of rs.
16395 14 10 was due under the decree when the two partners decided to close the accounts of the partnership and in pursuance of that decision the outstandings were divided between them.
on 12th september 1942 the respondent entered a sum of rs.
8197 representing half of the said sum due from the debtor under the decree in the books of his own separate money lending business which he was carrying on as manager of the family.
a separate account was opened in these books in the name of the debtor.
there were certain money receipt towards the discharge of the debt during the accounting period.
the total amount realised subsequent to 12th september 1942 came to rs.
4664 and the respondent credited half of this amount i.e. rs.
2332 in his account as his share.
on the 5th october 1943 the respondent wrote off the sum of rs.
5880 which was still due to him from the debtor out of the amounting of rs.
8197 as irrecoverable.
in the assessment year 1944 45 accounting year 1943 44 the respondent claims an allowance of the aforesaid sum of rs.
5880 as a bad debt under section 10 2 xi of the act.
the claim was disallowed by the income tax officer.
on appeal the appellate assistant companymissioner allowed the claim and held that the bad debt had been taken over by the respondent as a part of the money lending business and that the loss was sustained in the separate business carried on by him.
on appeal the income tax appellate tribunal companyfirmed this decision.
on an application made to it the tribunal referred the following two question for the decision of the high companyrt whether there is any material for the tribunals finding that the bad debt of rs.
5880 claimed by the assessee arose in respect of a loan made in the ordinary companyrse of his money lending business within the meaning of section 10 2 xi of the income tax act ?
the reference was answered in the affirmative by the high companyrt.
while granting leave to the petitioner the learned judges said as follows the companystruction to be placed on the above words i.e. loans made in the ordinary companyrse of such business is of great importance in this province having regard to the practice prevalent among nattukottai chettis in particular who companyduct family money lending business that at partition among the companyarceners of the family the debts due to the undivided family firm are allotted between the several companyarceners who after the division set up independent money lending business treating the debts assigned to them as debts of the new business.
| 0 | dev | 1951_84.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
976 and 977 of 1964.
Appeals from the judgment and decree dated March 26, 1964 of the Patna High Court in Election Appeals Nos.
8 and 10 of 1963.
B. Agarwala, Jagdish Panday, Chinta Subbarao, M. Rajagopalan and B.P. Jha, for the appellant, In both the appeals .
P. Varma and D. Goburdhun, for the respondent In both the appeals .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. Both these appeals are brought by certificate against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated March 26, 1964, pronounced in Election Appeals Nos.
8 and 10 of 1963.
The appellant Kedar Pandey and the respondent Narain Bikram Sah hereinafter called Narain Raja were the companytesting candidates in the year 1962 on behalf of the Congress and Swatantra Party respectively for the election to Bihar Legislative Assembly from Ramnagar Constituency in the district of Champaran.
The numberination papers of the appellant and the respondent and two others Parmeshwar Prasad Roy and Suleman Khan were accepted by the Returning Officer without any objection on January 22, 1962.
Later on the two candidates Parmeshwar Prasad Roy and Suleman Khan withdrew their candidatures.
After the poll the respondent, Narain Raja was declared elected as member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly by majority of valid votes.
On April 11, 1962 Kedar Pandey filed an election petition challenging the election of the respondent.
It was alleged by Kedar Pandey that the respondent was number duly qualified under Art.
173 of the Constitution of India to be a candidate for election as he was number a citizen of India.
According to Kedar Pandey the respondent, his parents and grand parents were all born in Nepal and, therefore, on the date of the election, the respondent Narain Raja was number qualified to be chosen to fill the Assembly seat for which he had been declared to have been elected.
According to Kedar Pandey the respondent was related to the royal family of Nepal and the father of the respondent Rama Raja owned about 43 bighas of land and a house at Barewa in Nepal in which the respondent had a share along with his three other brothers.
The election petition was companytested by the respondent who said that he was an Indian citizen and there was numberdisqualification incurred under Art.
The further case of the respondent was that he had lived in India since his birth and that he was a resident of Ramnagar in the district of Champaran and number of Barewa in Nepal.
The respondent claimed that he was born in Banaras and number at Barewa.
Upon these rival companytentions it was held by the Tribunal that the respondent Narain Raja was number a citizen of India and, therefore, was number qualified under Art.
173 of the Constitution for being chosen to fill a seat in the Bihar Legislative Assembly.
The Tribunal, therefore, declared that the election of the respondent was void.
But the Tribunal refused to make a declaration that Kedar Pandey was entitled to be elected to Bihar Legislative Assembly for that Constituency.
Both the appellant and the respondent preferred separate appeals against the judgment of the Election Tribunal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna.
The High Court in appeal set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and upheld the election of the respondent Narain Raja.
The High Court found, on examination of the evidence, that Narain Raja, the respondent before us, was born in Banaras on October 10, 1918 and that the respondent was living in India from 1939 right upto 1949 and even thereafter.
The High Court further found that long before the year 1949 Narain Raja had acquired a domicile of choice, in Indian territory and, therefore, acquired the status of a citizen of India both under Art.
On these findings the High Court took the view that Narain Raja was duly qualified for being elected to the Bihar Legislative Assembly and the election petition filed by the appellant Kedar Pandey should be dismissed.
The main question arising for decision in this case is whether the High Court was right in its companyclusion that the respondent Narain Raja was a citizen of India under Art.
5 of the Constitution of India on the material date.
The history of the family of Narain Raja is closely companynected with the history of Ramnagar estate.
Shri Prahlad Sen after whose death the estate came into the possession of Shri Mohan Vikram Sah, popularly known as Mohan Raja.
After the death of Mohan Raja the estate came into the possession of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi, the vidow of Mohan Raja, and after the death of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi, the estate came into the possession of Rama Raja alias Mohan Bikram Sah, the father of the respondent Narain Raja.
It is in evidence that the daughter of Prahlad Sen was married to Shri Birendra Vikram Sah, the father of Mobart Raja.
Mohan Raja died without any male issue but during his lifetime he had adopted Rama Raja, the father of the respondent and by virtue of a will executed by Mohan Raja in the year 1904 in favour of his wife Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi the Rani became entitled to the Ramnagar estate on the death of Mohan Raja which took place in 1912 , in preference to the adopted son Rama Raja since the properties belonged to Mohan Raja in his absolute right and number as ancestral properties.
After the death of Rani L P D 5SCI 12 Chhatra Kumari Devi in 1937 Rama Raja came into the possession of the Ramnagar estate.
In the year 1923, Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi had filed R.S. No.
4 of 1923 against Rama Raja the Court of Sub Judge, Motihari with regard to a village which Rama Raja held in Ramnagar estate on the basis of a Sadhwa Patwa lease.
Rama Raja in turn filed T.S. No.
34 of 1924 in the Court of Subordinate Judge of Motihari against Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi and others claiming title to Ramnagar estate and for possession of the same on the basis of his adoption by Mohan Raja.
The Title Suit and the Rent Suit were heard together by the Additional Sub Judge, Motihari who, by his judgment dated August 18, 1927 decreed the Title Suit filed by Rama Raja and dismissed the Rent Suit filed by Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi.
There was an appeal to the High Court of Patna which dismissed the appeal.
Against the judgment of the High Court appeals were taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
The appeal was decided in favour of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi and the result was that the Title Suit filed by Rama Raja was dismissed and Rent Suit filed by Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi was decreed.
In the companyrse of judgment the Judicial Committee did number disturb the finding of the trial Court that Rama Raja was an adopted son of Shri Mohan Vikiram Sah alias Mohan Raja and accepted that finding as companyrect but the Judicial Committee held that Ramnagar estate was number the ancestral property of Mohan Raja, but he got that property by inheritance, he being the daughters son of Prahlad Sen, the original proprietor of that estate.
In view of this circumstance, the Judicial Committee held that though Rama Raja was the adopted son of Mohan Raja, Rama Raja was number entitled to the estate in view of the will executed by Mohan Raja in favour of Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi in the year 1904.
It appears that in the year 1927 Rama Raja had taken possession of Ramnagar estate and got his name registered in Register D and remained in possession till the year 1931 when he lost the suit in Privy Council.
After the decision of Privy Council, Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi again came into possession of Ramnagar estate and companytinued to remain in possession till she died in 1937.
There is evidence that Rama Raja died in Bombay and his dead body was cremated in Banaras.
It is also in evidence that during the lifetime of Rama Raja there was a partition suit in the year 1942 No.
40 of 1942 for the partition of the properties of the Ramnagar estate among Rama Raja and his sons including the respondent.
This suit was filed on September 29, 1942 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Motihari.
A preliminary decree Ex.
1 2 was passed on April 16, 1943 on companypromise and the final decree Ex 1 1 in the suit was passed on May 22, 1944.
estate had an extensive area of Bakasht lands.
By the said partition the estate was divided among the company sharers but certain properties including forests in the estate were left joint.
On behalf of the appellant Mr. Aggarwala put forward the argument that the High Court was number justified in holding that Narain Raja was born in Banaras in the year 1918.
According the case of the appellant Narain Raja was born at a place called Barewa in Nepal.
In order to prove his case the appellant examined two witnesses Sheonath Tewari W. 18 and N.D. Pathak P.W. 15 .
The High Court held that their evidence was acceptable.
There was also a plaint Ex.
8 produced on behalf the appellant to show that Narain Raja was born at Barewa.
This plaint was apparently filed in a suit brought by the respondent for the realisation of money advanced by the respondents mother to one Babulal Sah.
The place of birth of the respondent is mentioned in this plaint as Barewa Durbar.
8 that it was number signed by the respondent but by one Subhan Mian Joiaha described as Agent.
On behalf of the respondent R.W. 9 G. S. Prasad was examined to prove that Narain Raja was born at Banaras.
From the year 1938 onwards Narain Raja lived in Ramnagar.
After Rama Rajas death in 1947 Narain Raja companytinued to live in Ramnagar, being in possession of properties obtained by him under companypromise in 1944.
In the companyrse of his statement Narain Raja deposed that his father had built a palace in Ramnagar between 1934 and 1941 and thereafter Narain Raja himself built a house at Ramnagar.
Before he had built his house, Narain Raja lived in his fathers palace.
There is the partition suit between Narain Raja and his brothers in the year 1942.
Exhibits 1 2 and 1 1 are the preliminary and final decrees granted in that suit.
After the partition Narain Raja was looking after the properties which were left joint and was the manager thereof.
The extensive forests of Ramnagar estate were number partitioned and they had been left joint.
Narain Raja used to make settlement of the forests on behalf of the Raj and pattas used to be executed by him.
After partition, he and his wife acquired properties in the district of Champaran, in Patna and in other places.
Narain Raja and his wife and children possessed 500 or 600 acres of land in the district of Champaran.
Narain Raja managed these properties from Ramnagar.
He had also his houses in Bettiah, Chapra, Patna and Benaras.
The forest settlements are supported by Exhibits X series, companymencing from 1943, and by Ex.
W of the year 1947.
Then, there are registered pattas excluded by Narain Raja of the year 1945, which are Exs.
W/3, W/4, and W/5.
There are documents which prove acquisition of properties in the name of Narain Rajas wife F D, F 2 .
F 3 and F 5 .
Exhibit F 4 shows the purchase of 11 bighas and odd land at Patna by Narain Raja.
It is also important to numberice that Narain Raja had obtained Indian Passport dated March 23, 1949 from Lucknow issued by the Governor General of India and he is described in that Passport as Indian by birth and nationality and his address is given as Ramnagar of Champaran district.
In the companyrse of his evidence Narain Raja said that he had been to Barewa for the first time with his father when he was 10 or 12 years old.
He also said that he had number gone to Barewa for ten years before 1963.
The High Court companysidered that for the determination of the question of domicil of a person at a particular time, the companyrse of his companyduct and the facts and circumstances before and after that time are relevant.
Reverting to the history of Narain Rajas life from 1950 onwards, it appears that he had married his wife in 1950.
His wife belonged to Darkoti in Himachal Pradesh near Patiala.
The marriage had taken place at Banaras.
The daughter prosecutes her studies in Dehradun.
In 1950 or 1951 Narain Raja had established a Sanskrit Vidalya in Ramnagar in the name of his mother, called Prem Jananl Sanskrit Vidyalaya.
The story of Narain Rajas political activities is as follows There was a Union Board in Ramnagar before Gram Panchayats had companye into existence, of which Narain Raja was the Chairman or President.
1 1889 40 Oh.
D. 216.
After Gram Panchayats were established, the Union Board was abolished.
Narain Raja was a voter in the Gram Panchayat and he was elected as the Vice President of the Union called D.C.M. Union of Ramnagar.
Thereafter, he became the President of the Bettiah Sub divisional Swatantra Party and then Vice President of Champaran District Swatantra Party.
Taking all the events and circumstances of Narain Rajas life into account we are satisfied that long before the end of 1949 which is the material time under Art.
| 0 | train | 1965_124.txt |
Leave granted.
67/2001 pending on the file of Additional Civil Judge Jr. Division and JMFC Hospet has been ordered by the High Court to be withdrawn from that Court and has been transferred to the Court of Principal Civil Judge Jr. Division and JMFC, Tumkur with a direction to try the case himself or assign to any other additional Court having jurisdiction to try the same.
The transfer order was passed on a petition under Section 407, Cr.
P.C. filed by the accused before the High Court.
| 1 | train | 2003_1238.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
41 of 1952.
Appeal from a Judgment and Decree dated 25th July, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta Sen and Chunder JJ.
exercising Special Jurisdiction Income tax in Income tax Reference No.
31 of 1949, Mitra S. N. Mukherjee, with him for the appellant.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India P. A. Mehta, with him for the respondent.
January 16.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS J. This appeal arises out of six references made by the Calcutta Bench of the Income tax Appellate Tribunal under section 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, two of them relating to the incometax assessment years 1943 44 and 1944 45 and the remaining four relating to excess profits tax for the chargeable accounting periods ending on the 31st December of each of the years 1940, 1941 1942 and 1943 respectively.
Part of the salt so manufactured by the Association is companysigned to Messrs. Turner Morrison Company Ltd. for sale in India.
All shipping operations, ie.,
chartering of steamer, loading, insurance etc.,
are effected in Egypt by the Association who sends the documents to Messrs. Turner Morrison Company Ltd. Messrs. Turner Morrison and Company Ltd. effect sales in India through brokers at the best price obtainable at or above the prices approved by the Association.
is paid.
All handling of the cargoes when they arrive at Calcutta and the necessary disbursements in companynection therewith are carried out and made by Turner Morrison, Company Ltd. The sale proceeds are companylected by Turner Morrison Company Ltd. and credited to the account kept in their own name with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
On these facts the Income tax Officer treated Turner Morrison Company Ltd. as the agents of the Association under section 43 of the Indian Income tax Act and assessed them to income tax for the two assessment years mentioned above under section 4 1 a or, alternatively, under the first part of section 4 1 c .
They were also assessed to excess profits tax for the four chargeable accounting periods herein before mentioned.
Turner Morrison Company Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Agents preferred appeals against the aforesaid assessment orders to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who, however, dismissed the appeals.
The Agents took a further appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal.
the assessment was properly made under section 4 1 a and incidentally the Tribunal also came to the companyclusion that the alternative companytention of the Income tax authorities that the assessment should be made under the first part of section 4 1 c was also well founded and that section 42 had numberapplication to the case The result was that the Tribunal companyfirmed the findings of the Income tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeals.
And if the answer to the first question is in the negative, Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was right in accepting the companytention of the Department that the income accrued or arose or is deemed to accrue or arise in India and is assessable to tax as companytemplated by section 4 1 c ?
The reference came up for disposal before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court Consisting of Sen and Chunder JJ.
The learned Judges gave the following answers to the questions Question 1 .
| 0 | train | 1953_8.txt |
Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
5,000/ .
The companyviction was made by the High Court in reversal of an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.
This appeal is in challenge of the said companyviction and sentence passed on him.
It is unnecessary for us to companysider the sustainability of the companyviction and sentence from any legalistic point of view.
The Employees State Insurance Corporation has introduced a scheme called Amnesty Scheme for withdrawal of Criminal Cases Against the Insured Persons and Employees filed under Sections 84 and 85 of the ESI Act, respectively.
The said scheme was introduced on February 1, 2000 which was applicable to persons against whom prosecution was pending till July 31, 2000.
The difficulty pointed out against the appellant was that the High Court judgment was dated January 27, 2000 by which he was companyvicted and the scheme was introduced only 4 days thereafter.
The interval between the date of judgment and introduction of the scheme is too insignificant for denial of the benefit to the appellant, though special leave petition was filed by the appellant subsequent thereto.
| 0 | train | 2001_251.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Petition No.
262 of 1955.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution for a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
V. S. Mani, the next friend, in person.
C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India G N. Joshi and Porus A. Mehta, with him .
Naunit Lal, for the respondent.
November II.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J. This is a petition under article 32 of the Constitution for a writ of habeas companypus.
The petition was presented by Mr. R.V.S. Mani, an advocate of the Nagpur High Court, on behalf of Shrimati Vidya Verma and was directed against her father Dr. Shiv Narayan Verma of Nagpur.
On 20 12 1954 she said that she did number want to live with her father but wanted to live with her uncle at Waraseoni.
She appeared again the next day and clarified this by saying that she would go to her uncle in the companypany of her father.
She said, that she had numberdiscomfort in living with her father but was number at ease with him and would have more peace of mind with her uncle.
She also said I have numberneed of any companynsel and have numberhing to talk to Shri R. V. S. Mani.
The girl was allowed to go to her uncle.
Mr. Mani then applied for leave to withdraw the petition.
This was allowed on 24 1 1955 and numberorder was made about companyts.
Then came the present petition on 22 8 1955.
| 0 | train | 1955_125.txt |
HARJIT SINGH BEDI,J. Ujjagar Singh, the appellant herein, a resident of village Bangawali, Tehsil Malerkotla, was tried and companyvicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur for the murder of his niece Mukhtiar Kaur and was awarded the death penalty.
In addition, he was companyvicted for an offence punishable under section 376 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to a fine of Rs.5, 000/ and in default of payment to undergo further R.I. for one year and under section 309 of the IPC to a sentence of simple imprisonment for one year.
The aforesaid companyvictions and sentences have been maintained by the High Court and the matter is before us in these proceedings by way of special leave.
The facts of the case are as under At about 2.00 p.m. on 10th November 2002 a boy whose identity is number forthcoming, informed Satnam Singh PW2 that an incident of firing had taken place in the house of Ujjagar Singh situated in the fields on the outskirts of the village.
Satnam Singh companyveyed this information to Sarpanch Jora Singh PW1 who was attending a marriage at that time.
Jora Singh accompanied by Gurdeep Singh PW3 thereupon rushed to Ujjagar Singhs house and found Mukhtiar Kaur lying dead with a gun shot injury and the appellant also with a gun shot injury lying unconscious on the ground in the adjoining room.
Jora Singh and Gurdeep Singh immediately removed Ujjagar Singh to the Civil Hospital, Dhuri in the jeep belonging to Kulwant Singh PW4.
Jora Singh also met Inspector Harjinder Pal Singh PW14 at 4.40 p.m. near the hospital, who recorded his statement at that place and with his endorsement Ex.
P.A. sent it to Police Station, Dhuri where the formal FIR was registered at about 4.45 p.m. with the special report being delivered to the Illaka Magistrate at Dhuri itself at 6.20 p.m. the same evening.
The facts as narrated were that Arjan Singh of village Bangawali had three sons Puran Singh, Ujjagar Singh appellant and Ajmer Singh.
Puran Singh had died about 20 years earlier leaving behind his wife, two sons and a daughter Mukhtiar Kaur.
The two sons and the wife also died long before the incident and Mukhtiar Kaur the sole surviving member of this branch of the family had been married to Balwinder Singh PW9 about 9 or 10 years earlier.
Puran Singh had however transferred 30 or 35 bighas of agricultural land falling to his share after the death of his father in the name of the appellants sons by a companylusive decree in the year 1994 and the suggestion was that this transaction had been objected to by Mukhtiar Kaur who was demanding that the land be returned to her.
It appears that Mukhtiar Kaurs relations with her in laws had got strained and she had left her matrimonial home and companye to live with Ujjagar Singh, her uncle, 7 or 8 months earlier and the suggestion was that Mukhtiar Kaur had been killed by the appellant with his licensed gun and he had thereafter attempted to companymit suicide.
Having recorded the aforesaid facts in the FIR, PW14 Inspector Harjinder Pal Singh reached the place of incident and lifted one spent 12 bore cartridge case Shaktiman make from near Mukhtiar Kaurs dead body and one DBBL gun from the place where Ujjagar Singh appeared to have been shot and another spent cartridge case was recovered from the right barrel of the gun.
After companypletion of the investigation at the spot, Mukhtiar Kaurs dead body was sent for its post mortem examination.
The post mortem examination was also companyducted by PW5 Dr. Ishwar Singh, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital along with Dr. Harwinder Kaur PW17 and it was found that Mukhtiar Kaur had two gunshot injuries on her dead body, a wound of entry on the back of right side of chest 2 cm x 1 cm with margining sic and blackening and a companyresponding exit wound of 5 cm x 3.5 cm to the front of the right side of the chest.
Dr. Harwinder Kaur aforesaid also took swabs from the vagina of the deceased and as per the chemical examiners report dated 2.1.2003 semen was found on the swab taken from the vagina and from the underwear that Mukhtiar Kaur had been wearing at the time of her death.
The weapon and the recovered cartridge cases had also been sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory which in its report dated 4.8.2004 opined that the crime cartridge case CI companyld have been fired by the right barrel of the weapon whereas the crime cartridge case C2 had been fired from the right barrel.
On the companypletion of the investigation, a charge sheet under sections 302, 376 and 309 of the IPC was filed against the accused and as he pleaded number guilty he was brought to trial.
During the trial Jora Singh PW1, Satnam Singh PW2, Gurdeep Singh PW3 and Kulwant Singh PW4 resiled from their statements given to the police and were declared hostile.
Balwinder Singh PW9, however, supported the prosecution case deposing that the land had in fact been got transferred from Gurmail Kaur, mother of Mukhtiar Kaur to Ujjagar Singh by fraud and Mukhtiar Kaur was therefore entitled to its return.
He also deposed that Mukhtiar Kaur had told him some time earlier that the accused had been beating her and had also companymitted sexual intercourse with her and that at about 11 p.m. on 10.11.2002 Karam Singh PW10 had informed him as to what had transpired on which he along with his father Hamir Singh PW12 and several others had rushed to Bangawali.
PW10 Karam Singh aforesaid companyfirmed the story given by Balwinder Singh.
The prosecution also relied on the statements of Dr. Vijay Kumar PW6 of the Civil Hospial, Dhuri who testified that the appellant had been brought to the hospital at about 2.45 p.m. on 10.11.2002 with a serious gun shot injury, Dr. Ripan Miglani PW15 of the Dayanand Medical College Hospital, Ludhiana who deposed that he had been admitted to the department of Neuro surgery with a serious gun shot injury and Dr. Sanjay Uppal PW16, a plastic surgeon who disclosed that the appellant had been under his treatment for almost 5 weeks and the burnt area around the firearm injury had been removed by him.
The prosecution also placed reliance on the statement of ASI Jasbir Singh PW11 who had accompanied Inspector Harjinder Pal Singh PW14 to the place of incident and supported the recoveries made from the spot.
The prosecution case was then put to the accused and his statement recorded under section 313 of the Cr.
P.C. In reply to question 33 he stated as under I am innocent.
I have been implicated falsely in this case.
I was treating Mukhtiar Kaur as my daughter and loved her as my daughter.
False allegations have been levelled against me.
I never harassed Mukhtiar Kaur number ever got her land mutated from her mother by fraud.
I have number killed Mukhtiar Kaur.
Mother of Mukhtiar Kaur got the land mutated by her own free will and Mukhtiar Kaur had numberdispute about it.
Balwinder Singh her husband was addicted to vices and used to beat her due to which she used to remain under depression and sick generally, and used to companye to me as my daughter.
My house kothi is situated on the outer skirts of village Bangawali and door planks had number been fixed so far to rooms.
Some body suddenly came and fired at me.
I fell down on the ground and became unconscious.
Therefore, I companyld number see what had happened to Mukhtiar Kaur as she was in other room.
Later on I came to know that some body had fired at her and she died.
I regained companysciousness in hospital.
The story of rape by me with her has been fabricated by her husband as he is inimical towards me.
Even I do number know who took me to hospital.
I have been implicated in this case falsely.
| 0 | train | 2007_967.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
502 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 16 9 1975 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No.
139 of 1975 .
K. Gupta, for the appellants.
Das, and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J. The appellants who are Railway employ ees, were companyvicted by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi under rules 118 and 119 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 and were sentenced to six months rigorous imprison ment.
This is alleged to be in breach of the order passed by the Government of India under rule 118 1 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971.
The order issued under rule 118 1 b by the Government of India in its Ministry of Labour on November 26, 1973 recites that in the opinion of the Central Government it was necessary and expedient for maintaining supplies and serv ices essential to the life of the companymunity to prevent strikes in the Railway Services and that therefore the Central Government hereby prohibits a strike in companynection with any industrial dispute disputes in the said Railway Services in India for a period of six months w.e.f.
the 26th November, 1973.
In support of its case the prosecution examined three witnesses called S.D. Sharing, Dilbagh Rai and jasbir Singh.
Sharmas evidence is in the nature of hearsay and indeed he admits in so many words that his knowledge regarding the incitement given by the appellants to the Railway workers to go on strike was derived solely from information received by him.
Rule 118 1 a limits the power of the Government to issue an appropriate order, general or special, for prohibiting inter alia a strike in companynection with any industrial dispute.
Since the rule does riot empower the Government to issue an order prohibiting strikes generally, whether they bear any companynection with an industrial dispute or number, there can be numbercontravention of the order unless it is established by evidence that the strike was in companynection with an industrial dispute.
The prosecution did number lead any evidence to prove this impor tant ingredient of the offence and the generalisation made by the witnesses in their evidence is wholly inadequate for accepting that the appellants gave incitement to a strike in companynection with any industrial dispute.
It is urged by the learned companynsel appearing for the Delhi Administration, who are respondents to the appeal, that what is companytemplated by rule 118 1 a itself is a strike in companynection with an industrial dispute and therefore it is number necessary for the prosecution to establish that the strike was in companynec tion with any industrial dispute.
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Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
Ms. Kshama Haresh Mehta, Mr. Prafull Anubhai Shah and Ms. Punita Haresh Mehta, are impleaded as Respondent Nos.3A, 3B and 3C. Vakalatnamas duly signed by the three substituted trustees have been filed in companyrt and are taken on record.
A companypromise petition duly signed by all the parties on 10th October, 2007 was earlier filed in this case. | 0 | train | 2009_1335.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petitions Nos.
6372 80, 9604, 9935 41, 9943 44, 9946 56 and 10001 of 1982, 13 18, 83, 393, 410, 682, 914 25, 928, 1108 11, 2742 52, 2770, 2898, 3330 33, 3362, 3543, 3875 79, 3941, 3946, 3950, 4241, 4242, 4815 16, 4826, 4829, 4834 37, 5183, 5574, 5717, 7891 of 1983, 7016, 8189 8206 9346 of 1982, 4614 20, 5188, 5845, 7489, 8212, 8612, 8875 76, 8886 88, 8268 69, 8348 50, 8382, 8384, 9082 83, 9094, 9129, 9133, 9134, 9145, 9147, 9262, 9562, 9862,9864 and 9876 78 of 1983.
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India Advocates For The Petitioners P. Verma Sanjeev Walia, J.S. Sahpuri and M.P. Jha.
Shrinath Singh and A. Gupta.
K. Goel.
M. Nayyar.
N. Puri, M.K. Dua and Sudarshan Goel.
M. Tarkunde and Anil.
B. Divan, H.K. Puri.
K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua.
P. Bhatt, Ashok Mathur and Parveen Kumar.
R. Ganguli.
K. Bisaria.
K. Sabarwal.
S. Shant, D.K. Garg and M.M. Kashyap, S.K. Bagga.
Advocates for the Petitioners R. Kapur, Sanjiv Madon, S.R. Srivastava, D.D. Sharma, M. Ashri, Shankar Ghose, M s. D.P. Mukharji, G.S. Chatterjee, B.S. Shant, M.M. Kashyap, T.S. Arora, S.K. Ghambir, Shrinath Singh, A.P. Mohanti, Swaraj Kaushal, B. Kanta Rao and P.H. Parekh.
Advocates For The Respondents P. Jagga C. Manchanda, P.R. Mridul, Harbanslal and P.A. Francis.
P. Jagga, Miss Kailash Mehta, Vimal Dave, A. Minocha, Jeetendra Sharma, Janardhan Sharma, P. Gaur, Atul Jain, Prem Malhotra, M.M. Kshatriya, Dr. Meera Agarwal, R.C. Misra, Jitendra Sharma, D.P. Mukharji, Randhir Jain, Ramesh C. Pathak, Satish Vig, E.C. Agarwal, V.K. Panditha, R. Satish, K. Mahajan Ashok Grover, Mohan Pandey, J.K. Jain, R.S. Bindra, J.D. Jain, K.L. Taneja, S. Srinivasan, E.M.S. Anam, K. Dua, N.K. Agarwala, R.P. Jagga, S.K. Bagga, Ms. S. Bagga, C.P. Wig, Miss. Rani Chhabra, Mukul Mudgal, N.S. Das Bhal, Ashuni Kumar, R.N. Poddar, C.V. Subba Rao.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. In these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioners have questioned the companystitutional validity of the Home Department Notification No.
352 LD 73/602 dated January 31, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Notification as modified by the Home Department Notification No.
2294 LD 73/3474 dated September 24, 1973 and the Home Department Notification No.
3205 LD 74/3614 dated September 24, 1974 issued by the Chief Commissioner of the Union Territory of Chandigarh under section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 hereinafter referred to as the Act exempting every building companystructed in the urban area of Chandigarh for a period of five years from the respective date applicable to it from the operation of the Act and issuing certain other directions in that behalf.
Incidentally the petitioners have also questioned the validity of section 3 of the Act.
For a proper appreciation of the rival companytentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer briefly to the history of the relevant provisions of law.
The area number known as the Union Territory of Chandigarh was a part of the State of Punjab as it existed prior to the companying into force of the Punjab Reorganization Act.
1966 Act 31 of 1966 .
With effect from November 1, 1966 i.e. the appointed day under section 4 of the said Act the Union Territory of Chandigarh came into existence and thereupon the said area ceased to from part of the erst while State of Punjab.
Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 companyferred power on the Central Government to extend by numberification with such restrictions or modifications as it thought fit any enactment which was in force in a State at the date of the numberification to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
Whereas section 88 of that Act provided for the territorial extent of laws, section 89 dealt with the power to adapt laws, with the object of providing as far as possible for the companytinuity of laws in force in the several parts of the erstwhile State of Punjab in the successor States namely the States of Punjab and Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh.
The Act i.e. the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, 1949 was a law which had been enacted before the companymencement of the Constitution and companytinued to be in operation even after the companymencement of the Constitution in the erstwhile State of Punjab by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution.
But the Act had number been brought into force in the area companystituting the Union Territory of Chandigarh by the State Government of the erstwhile State of Punjab.
By the Notification No.
13/1/66 CHD dated November 1, 1966 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, the President authorised the Administrator of the Union Territory of Chandigarh i.e. the Chief Commissioner thereof, in relation to the said territory to exercise and discharge with effect from November 1, 1966 the powers and functions of the State Government under any such law.
The validity of the said numberification was challenged before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
The High Court quashed the said numberification by its judgment dated October 9, 1974 holding that the Act had number been effectively brought into force in the Union Territory of Chandigarh by virtue of that numberification vide Dr. Harkishan Singh v. Union of India Ors .
1 It is number necessary to deal with the reasons given by the High Court in support of its judgment since the legal infirmities pointed out by the High Court were set right by the Parliament by the enactment of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act Extension of Chandigarh Act, 1974 Act 54 of 1974 hereinafter referred to as the Extension Act the relevant part of which reads as follows This Act may be called the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act Extension to Chandigarh Act, 1974.
The Act also applied to all the buildings which were companystructed thereafter and before January 31, 1973 on which date the numberification was issued.
| 0 | train | 1983_258.txt |
42 I.T.R. 115, referred to.
Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay v. Indira Balkrishna 39 T.R. 546 and Commissioner of Income tax, Poona v. Buldana Distt.
Main Cloth Importers Group, 42 I.T.R. 172, applied.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
294 and 295 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated November 30, 1965 of the Madras High Court in Tax Case No.
215 of 1962 Reference No.
120 of 1962 .
C. Chagla, K. Srinivasan and T. A. Ramachandran, for the appell it in both the appeals .
Sen, G. C. Sharma and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent in both the appeals .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. These companypanion appeals by certificate under s. 66A 2 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 in short the Act are directed against the decision of the Madras High Court in a tax reference under S. 66 1 of the Act, relating to the assessment years 1958 59 and 1959 60.
Messrs. N. V. Shanmugam and Co., a firm, was carrying on business in the manufacture and sale of snuff under a deed of partnership dated April 20, 1955.
Its partners were S. Ramiah Nadar, Murugavel Nagar and Shanmughavel Nadar.
S. Mohan, a minor had been admitted to the benefits of the partnership, his share in the net profits being 1/6th.
The deed of partnership provided that the partnership companyld number be dissolved before August 3 1, 1955.
But it was open to the partners to companytinue the partnership or enter into a fresh partnership on fresh terms and companyditions.
On September 17, 1956, Ramiah Nadar filed a suit in the city Civil Court, Madras for the dissolution of the partnership 2Sup.
Cl/70 8 with effect from August 31, 1956 and for taking of accounts.
He also applied for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the business.
On September 21, 1956, the Court appointed three receivers two of whom were the partners of the firm namely Ramiah Nadar and Murugavel Nadar and the third was an Advocate by name Ram Mohan.
The business of the firm had been stopped from September 1, 1956 to September 21, 1956.
The Court directed the receivers to reopen and companyduct the snuff business for the purpose of winding up, with powers to realise the outstandings and discharge the dues of the firm subject to the following among other terms.
Clause 4 The receivers can carry on the business of the partnership numbermally.
Clause 6 All parties to have access to the books of the firm and to the business premises.
Clause 7 All parties are entitled to get information relating to the companyduct of the business from the receivers.
Clause 8 The profits if any earned from 1 9 1956 will be treated as an asset of the firm subject to be divided between the parties in the manner set out in paragraph 10 of the deed dated 20 4 1955.
The receiver or receivers shall number be entitled to any share in the pro fits for the management.
Clause 9 The receivers will pay every month Rs.
1,5001 to plaintiff, Rs.
1,5001 to the 1st defendant, Rs.
750/ to 2nd defendant and Rs.
750/ to 3rd defedant by his guardian from November 1, 1956 owners of the dissolved firm .
Sometime later the companyrt appointed a Commissioner for taking the accounts of the firm and for arranging the sale of the business as a going companycern but numbersale took place.
In the assessment year 1958 59, the business yielded a profit of Rs.
93,739/ .
He came to the companyclusion that the business was carried on by an association of persons and as such numberquestion of assessing the individual partners on their share of income at tile rate applicable to them would arise, as companytended by the receivers.
The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the appeal of the assessees and companyfirmed the order of the Incometax Officer but on a further appeal, the Tribunal came to the companyclusion that the profits earned should be assessed to tax in the hands of the individual partners at the rates applicable to, them.
The three receivers jointly represented the real owners.
The circumstance that there were three receivers was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the assessment.
There was numberquestion of assessing the receivers as an association of persons.
In Mohamad Noorullah v. C.I.T. Madras 1 this Court had to companysider whether the assessment in that case was rightly made on an association of persons.
Therein, 0, a Mohamaden who was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of beedies of a particular brand, died intestate on December 17, 1942 leaving as his heirs, N, a son by his predeceased wife, L his widow and his four children by L. The widow L and one D carried on the business after the death of O.N, through his next friend, applied for leave to sue for partition in forma pauperis and pending these proceedings on March 17, 1943, two advocates were appointed as joint receivers of all the properties of 0, by companysent of all the parties.
The companysent on behalf of the minor was given by his next friend.
The widow L filed another suit for partition on May 10, 1943 but applied for the companytinuance of the joint receivers.
N opposed the application on the ground that h. .
wanted different persons to be appointed as receivers.
By an order dated May 25, 1943, the Court ordered the companytinuance of the joint receivers.
The receivers companytinued in charge of the business till November, 1946 when the business was put up for sale by auction and was purchased by N. The Income tax Officer assessed the profits of the business for the calendar years 1943 46 in the, hands of the receivers as the income of an association of persons companysisting of the heirs of O. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Tribunal upheld the finding of the Income tax Officer.
| 0 | train | 1970_38.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2597 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.3.1988 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No.
2462 of 1987.
Soli J. Sorabji, R. Mahapatra, B.P. Singh and L.P. Agarwala for the Appellant.
K. Kapoor, S. Dube, Chatterji and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. Special leave granted.
The appeal is disposed of by the judgment herein.
On or about 7th August, 1963 Jayshree Textiles Industries Ltd. hereinafter called the Jayshree was inducted as a tenant in respect of a godown in Calcutta on groundfloor at a monthly rent of Rs.
151 per month payable according to the English calendar month w.e.
f. 1.8.
1963 exclusive of electric charges.
Such induction was by the predecessor in title of the present appellant.
The said rent of Rs.151 p.m. was later enhanced from time to time and the last rent was Rs.225 p.m. On or about 21st July, 1975, the High Court at Calcutta, in Company Petition No.
161/76 companynected with companypany application No.
70/76 filed by the Jayshree, approved the PG NO 207 scheme of amalgamation whereby the Jayshree merged in the respondent Company.
It is alleged that on or about 4th July, 1985, the appellant for the first time came to know that the said godown was in occupation of Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd and, hence, a numberice to quit was issued.
On or about 11th July, 1985, the respondent by its letter intimated the appellant.
that Jayshree was amalgamated with the respondent in accordance with the scheme sanctioned by the High Court at Calcutta on 21st July, 1976.
On 29th August, 1985, a numberice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, read with Section l3 d of the B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 hereinafter called the Act , to quit, vacate and hand over vacant possession on the last date of the following month,was issued to Jayshree.
Thereafter, on lst December, 1985 the appellant filed a suit for eviction in the City Civil Court at Calcutta against the Jayshree and the respondent herein.
On 25th March, 1986, the respondent filed a Title Suit No.
545/86 under Order 39 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code praying for temporary injunction restraining the appellant from disconnecting electricity in, the said premises.
It is alleged and was also alleged before the High Court that the defendant No.
2 in the suit in the City Civil Court, took 15 adjournments to file written statement between March 1986 to May 1987.
On about 6th July, 1987, the appellant filed an application under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent in the High Court at Calcutta, praying for transfer of the two suits on the ground that the respondent had adopted dilatory tactics and had taken several adjournments and.
furthers that the original records relating to amalgamation are available in the High Court.
Rule nisi was issued by the High Court.
On 10th October, 1987 the High Court passed the following order The Court By companysent of the parties, this application for transfer of the suit under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent is treated as on days list and is disposed of by the following order By companysent of the parties the title suit being Title Suit No.
345 of 1986 between Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. and Abhay Singh Surana pending before the learned Judges bench in the City Civil Court and the ejectment suit being Ejectment Suit No.
1088 of 1985 between Abhay Singh Surana and Jayshree Textiles Industries Ltd. and another pending in the City Civil Court are removed and transferred to this PG NO 208 Court and to be entertained and tried by this Court in its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, the records be transferred to this Court by 16th September 1987.
The Registrar, Original Side, shall companymunicate order to the Registrar, City Civil Court.
If necessary, at the companyt of the petitioner a special messenger is to be deputed for the purpose of transfer of the records from the City Civil Court to this Court.
Let the two suits appear in the for settlement on 17th September, 1987.
On 17th February, 1988, the respondent filed an application before the learned Trial Judge in Calcutta for recalling the order of transfer dated 10.10.1987.
On 17th March, 1987, the companyrt passed the following order The Court It appears that on 10th September, 1987, an order was passed directing transfer of the suit to this Court so that the parties companyld settle the matter in this Court.
In that view of the matter, let the suit be heard by the appropriate Court.
The order dated 10th September, 1987 is hereby recalled.
Let there also be an order in terms of prayer b of the petition.
Since the suit is being re trans ferred to the City Civil Court, this Court cannot pass any order as to the prayers made for deposit of rent.
Liberty is given to the parties to make an appropriate application before the appropriate Court for such a direction.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner had filed a special leave petition and leave was granted herein.
the reasons for so doing being recorded on the proceeding of the said High Court.
The aforesaid clause has been the subJect matter of various adjudications and interpretations by the High Court.
The Letters Patent companytemplates two companytingencies for the High Court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction.
namely.
on agreement of the parties to that effect.
the suits be transferred and, secondly, for the purpose of justice.
It further stipulates that the reasons for so doing to be recorded on the proceedings in the High Court.
| 0 | train | 1988_285.txt |
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court directing acquittal of the respondent.
Two appeals were filed i.e. one by Multan and the other by the present respondent.
The High Court by the impugned judgment directed their acquittal.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Written report Ex.
5 of the incident in question was delivered by Mahendra Singh at Police Station Bhagwanpur on July 4, 1979 at 1.30 P.M. First Information report Ex.
6 was then drawn up and relevant entries were made in the general diary, of which Ex.
Ka.7 is a companyy.
The prosecution case, briefly stated, is that Mahendra Singh was employed as a Munshi with Sardar Prithipal Singh and Company.
On July 3, 1979, Mahendra Singh reached village Comawala to settle accounts with the labourers working at the brick kiln owned by Prithipal Singh and companypany.
He stayed over night at the brick kiln.
Others, who slept at the brick kiln that night, were Sarnam Singh, Ram Rikhshpal, Ram Pal and Mustaque.
A lighted lamp was available at the spot.
At about 1 0 clock in the night, three miscreants, two holding companyntry made pistols and one armed with a knife, appeared at the brick kiln.
The miscreants woke up all those sleeping on the spot and robbed them of their belongings one after the other by brandishing the arms they were carrying.
Mahendra Singh was robbed of his wrist watch of Titus Make and Rs.
40/ in cash, Satnam Singh was deprived of a wrist watch of Titus make and Rs.125/ in cash and Ram Rikshpal was robbed of his wrist watch and Rs.35/ in cash.
The miscreants lifted an axe lying on the spot and beat Mahendra Singh with bottom of the axe.
The miscreants locked the victim of robbery in the office room on the spot and carried away the suitcase and clothes belonging to Ram Rikshapal.
The doors of the office were later pushed by those detained inside.
The victim of robbery then reported the incident to the residents of village Comawala and an unsuccessful search of the miscreants was made around the village.
The companyplainant Mahendra Singh reported the matter to his employers on the morning following the night of occurrence at Kankhel.
The miscreants had been seen and recognised in the light of the lantern on the spot who were unknown persons.
Sub Inspector Kali Charan P.W.9 companyducted the investigation.
He interrogated Mahendra Singh and others at the Police Station on July 4, 1979 and later reached the place of occurrence on the same day.
Ram Rikshapal, Rampal and others were interrogated at the place of occurrence.
A site plan with index Ex.
Ka.8 was then drawn up on the basis of the spot inspection.
On the following day, the Investigating Officer examined the lamp and entrusted the same to the custody of Mahendra Singh.
After companypletion of investigation charge sheet was filed.
It is to be numbered that the respondent was arrested alongwith another person on 4.7.1979 for offence punishable under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 in short the Arms Act .
On interrogation respondent Ilyas companyfessed his involvement in the present incident and disclosed the name of companyaccused.
The Test Identification Parade in short the TI Parade was held where the respondent was identified by the three eye witnesses i.e. PWs 4, 5 and 6.
Mahavir Singh PW 1 had arrested accused Ilyas.
Placing reliance on the evidence of eye witnesses and the TI Parade the accused persons were held guilty.
In appeal the appellants pointed out that in the sketch map the lamp was number companyrectly shown.
The lamp was allegedly kept at the height of 3/4 ft and naturally very little light companyld have reached out of chapper.
| 1 | train | 2008_1662.txt |
Gopala Gowda, J. Leave granted.
The present appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 13th March, 2009 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in A. No.
362 of 2007 whereby the High Court dismissed the writ appeal of the appellant holding that the appellant hospital is number entitled to building tax exemption relying on the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Medical Trust Hospital v. State of Kerala1.
The appellant had filed writ petition No.605 of 2007 before the High Court of Kerala which dismissed the same by order dated 23.01.2007 on the ground that the building of the appellant is number used principally for charitable purposes, pursuant to which the above said writ appeal was filed which was also dismissed.
Hence, this appeal.
The facts of the case in brief are stated hereunder SH Medical Centre is a charitable institution registered under the Travancore Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955.
This institution manages the appellant hospital which is managed by nuns of the Christian religious faith who have renounced their worldly existence to serve humanity to render charitable services like free treatment to patients belonging to the lower strata of the society and charges numberinal amount for treatment from those who can afford such treatment.
The Memorandum of the SH Medical Center states that the object of the institution is purely philanthropic purposes and number profit.
It states that the members of the society are number entitled to any share in the net proceeds of the society and in case the society is wound up the assets of the society shall number go to any of the members and shall go to any other charitable trust, society or institution with similar objects or to the Government.
The appellant started companystructing buildings to house the hospital.
Several buildings were companystructed from 1987 1988 to 2002 2003 for the functioning of the hospital.
On 16.10.1995 the respondent passed an order exempting the appellant from assessment of building tax.
The said exemption was in companynection with the main building of the hospital.
On 16.07.2003, the then Tehsildar, Kottayam called the representatives of the appellant to ascertain as to whether exemption is available to the appellant under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
A person from the office of the Tehsildar, Kottayam visited the appellant hospital and stated that the appellant is liable to pay building tax.
Thereafter, the appellant filed a detailed representation stating that since it is a charitable institution engaged in charitable activities, the appellant has to be exempted from paying building tax.
On 27.02.2004, the appellant received a demand numberice purportedly issued by the Assessing Authority by which the appellant was assessed to building tax under Sections 9 2 and 9 4 of the Act wherein building tax was assessed at an amount of pic24,77,700/ for a plinth area of 14826.63 Sq.
meters to be paid by the appellant.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 27.02.2004, the appellant filed Writ Petition C No.
9968 of 2004 before the High Court of Kerala.
By an order dated 02.04.2004, the learned single Judge of the High Court disposed of the writ petition directing the Tehsildar to reconsider the assessment in the light of the judgments of the High Court but rejected the request of the appellant to refer the issue relating to exemption to the Government under Section 3 2 of the Act.
Against this rejection order the appellant filed a Writ Appeal No.
875 of 2004 before the High Court.
By an order dated 01.11.2006, the Government of Kerala rejected the companytention of the appellant that they are entitled to exemption under the Act as free medical service is given only in the plinth area of 448.40 Sq.
in the third floor of the main building and therefore only the said portion is exempt from paying building tax.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant filed a Writ Petition C No.
605 of 2007 before the High Court praying to quash the orders dated 01.11.2006 and 27.02.2004 and to declare the appellant to be a charitable institution under the Act.
In the petition the appellant had annexed the audited income and expenditure account of the hospital as well as balance sheet for the years 2002 to 2005.
The learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the building of the appellant is number used principally for charitable purposes.
To arrive at the said companyclusion the learned single Judge took into account the gross income of the appellant and companypared the gross income vis a vis the amount spent on free medical aid and social work.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the appellant filed a Writ Appeal No.
362 of 2007 before the Division Bench of the High Court.
By an order dated 13.03.2009, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal by relying on two Division Bench decisions of the High Court in 1 Medical Trust Hospital supra and 2 Thirurangadi Muslim Orphanage Committee v. The Government of Kerala W.P. C No.
4426 of 2009 B and held that as long as the appellant is a hospital run on chargeable basis it is number entitled to exemption.
Both the single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court interpreted the Explanation Clause of Section 3 1 of the Act to hold that the buildings were number used principally for a charitable purpose as the medical services were number rendered free of charge to all patients, but only to those who companyld number afford it.
The rest were charged a numberinal fee for services at the Hospital.
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2 The petitioner was granted recognition in 2011 12 to companyduct the MBBS degree companyrse with an intake of 150 students.
The petitioner has number admitted students during 2014 15 and 2015 16.
The assessment reports were companysidered by the Executive Committee of the Medical Council of India MCI which numbered the existence of as many as 39 deficiencies.
Among the deficiencies numbered were the following Deficiency of faculty is 52.2 as detailed in the report.
Shortage of Residents is 91.7 as detailed in the report.
This decision was companymunicated to the Union government on 22 March 2016.
The companylege was called upon to rectify the deficiencies within two weeks.
The companylege submitted its companypliance on 4 April 2016.
This was verified in an assessment companyducted on 22 April 2016.
3 The team of assessors informed MCI that the petitioner had resisted inspection on the ground that most of the residential and faculty were on leave after the holiday for Mahavir Jayanti.
According to the petitioner, the assessment was in violation of the regulations which prohibit inspection within two days before or after a religious or festival holiday declared by the Central State government.
The Union government by its letter dated 10 June 2016 informed the petitioner number to admit a fresh batch of students for 2016 17.
5 Following the decision companymunicated by the Oversight Committee 1 in a letter dated 13 June 2016, the Union government forwarded the companypliance submitted by the petitioner on 17 June 2016 to MCI.
The Executive Committee of MCI numbered that the letter of the Oversight Committee companyered those obligations falling under Section 10 A of the IMC Act.
Since the case of the petitioner pertained to the grant of recognition under Section 11 2 it was according to the Executive Committee number companyered by the decision of the Oversight Committee.
This was companymunicated to the Union government on 5 July 2016.
6 In the meantime, pursuant to MCIs letter dated 15 May 2016, the petitioner submitted its companypliance on 9 June 2016.
On 6 July 2016 the companylege was directed to resubmit its companypliance after rectifying deficiencies.
After the petitioner submitted a letter of companypliance dated 9 July 2016, it was decided to verify this by a fresh assessment.
7 On 12 August 2016, the Oversight Committee, on the basis of the information furnished by the medical companyleges on their website and without companyducting physical assessment, approved the case of the petitioner for grant of companyditional recognition under Section 11 2 of the IMC Act in respect of the 150 students admitted in the 1 The Oversight Committee was appointed in pursuance of a judgment dated 2 May 2016 of this Court in Modern Dental College and Research Centre Vs.
State of M.P., Civil Appeal 4060 of 2009 decided on 2 May 2016.
2016 7 SCC 353 medical companylege, subject to the companylege submitting, within 15 days from the date of numberification of the approval by the Central government, the following documents An undertaking on affidavit from the Dean Principal and the Chairman of the Trust affirming that the deficiencies pointed out by the assessors of the Council in the companypliance verification assessment stand rectified A Bank Guarantee for a sum of Rs 2 crores in favour of the Council which shall be valid for a period of one year or till such time the first renewal inspection takes place, whichever is later.
It was further directed by the then Oversight Committee that the inspection of the medical companyleges which have been recommended for grant of Conditional Letter of Permission Recognition under Section 11 2 of the IMC Act shall be companyducted after 30 September 2016 and any companylege which is found to have number companyplied with the deficiency as per their undertaking shall be debarred from admitting any students for a period of two years i.e. 2017 18 2018 19.
8 On 8 September 2016 companyditional recognition was granted to the petitioner for academic year 2016 17, in terms of the decision of the Oversight Committee dated 12 August 2016.
The companyditions imposed included the following 2 The OC has also stipulated as follows OC may direct assessment to verify the companypliance submitted by the companylege and companysidered by OC, any time after 30 September, 2016.
In default of companyditions i ii in para 1 above and if the companypliances are found incomplete in the assessment to be companyducted after 30 September, 2016, such companylege will be debarred from fresh intake of students for 2 years companymencing 2017 18 9 The decision of the Executive Committee to recommend to the Union government number to grant recognition under Section 11 2 was companysidered by the General body of MCI on 22 November 2016.
The minutes of the General body of 22 November 2016 were forwarded both to the Union government and the Oversight Committee.
10 A companypliance verification assessment of the infrastructure, faculty, clinical material and other physical facilities was carried out on 21 February 2017.
The companypliance verification assessment numbered a deficiency of 4.54 per cent in teaching faculty a deficiency of 2.35 per cent of residents.
This, according to the petitioner, was well within acceptable parameters.
It has been stated that MCI received a companyplaint dated 14 March 2016 from some students of the companylege stating that the companylege did number have adequate infrastructure, clinical material and teaching faculty residents.
The companyplaint alleged that prior to the MCI assessment, ghost faculty residents and fake patients are portrayed.
Specific examples of deficiencies were furnished in the companyplaint.
On 21 March 2017 the companypliance assessment verification dated 21 February 2017 was companysidered by the Executive Committee of MCI.
Consideration of the matter was deferred inter alia in view of the companyplaint which had been received on 14 March 2017.
It was in this background that an assessment team carried out the second assessment on 22 March 2017.
Both the companypliance assessments of 21 February 2017 and 22 March 2017, together with the previous assessments of March April 2017 were companysidered by the Executive Committee on 28 March 2017.
The following deficiencies were numbered among others Deficiency of faculty is 33.33 as detailed in the report.
Shortage of Residents is 64.28 as detailed in the report.
Attendance registers of faculty and Residents of all departments were number provided by the companylege in the requisite time as per OC guidelines.
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Madras High Court on 8 August 2017.
The petitioner sought to withdraw the writ petition to enable it to move this Court.
Liberty was granted by the High Court following which the petition was disposed of as withdrawn.
14 During the pendency of these proceedings, by an order dated 11 August 2017, the Union government was directed to afford an opportunity of a hearing to the petitioner and to take the assistance of the newly companystituted Oversight Committee and to pass a reasoned order thereafter by the end of August 2017.
| 0 | train | 2017_399.txt |
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted.
This appeal arises from the final judgment and order dated 03.11.2014 passed by the High Court of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date 2018.04.17 Orissa at Cuttack in M.A.T.A. No.113 of 2014 172235 IST Reason whereby the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein in limine at the stage of admission, in companysequence, upheld the order dated 17.09.2014 passed by the Family Court, Bhubaneswar in Civil Proceeding No.24 of 2011.
The facts of the case lie in a narrow companypass and it would be clear from the facts stated hereinbelow.
The appellant is the plaintiff whereas the respondent is the defendant in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
The dispute is between the husband and wife and it relates to award of permanent alimony payable to wife.
The appellant husband filed a petition against the respondent wife under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act before the Judge, Family Court, Bhubaneswar seeking decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of desertion and cruelty.
The respondent filed her written statement and denied the material averments of the appellants claim.
On the basis of the pleadings and the evidence adduced by the parties, the Family Judge, by order dated 17.09.2014, allowed the petition and passed a decree of divorce by dissolving the marriage.
The Family Judge also directed the appellant husband to pay permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/ and litigation expenses of Rs.10,000/ to the respondent wife .
The appellant husband , felt aggrieved by that part of the order of the Family Court by which the appellant was directed to pay permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/ to the respondent wife , filed appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.
By judgment decree dated 03.11.2014, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appellants appeal and affirmed the order of the Family Court.
Against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court, the appellant husband has filed this appeal by way of special leave in this Court.
Heard Mr. Kumar Gaurav, learned companynsel for the appellant and Mr. Radha Shyam Jena, learned companynsel for the respondent.
Having heard the learned companynsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are companystrained to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order as also the order of the Family Court to the extent it fixes the award of permanent alimony and remand the case to the Family Court for deciding the question of grant of permanent alimony payable to wife afresh on merits in accordance with law.
The operative portion of the order of the Family Court reads as under The petition of the petitioner is allowed on companytest in favour of the petitioner.
A decree of divorce is passed and the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is hereby declared dissolved with effect from the date of decree.
The petitioner is directed to pay permanent alimony of Rs.15,00,000/ and litigation expenses of Rs.10,000/ to the respondent.
emphasis supplied The order of the Division Bench of the High Court reads as under After looking into the allegations made and pleadings taken by the parties, as recorded in the impugned judgment, which during the companyrse of argument companyld number be snipped, we do number find any reason to interfere with the amount of Rs.15,00,000/ awarded as permanent alimony to the wife by the learned Judge, Family Court.
| 1 | train | 2018_761.txt |
ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. Customs authorities question companyrectness of the judgment rendered by the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, West Regional Bench at Mumbai hereinafter referred to as the CEGAT setting aside the order passed by the Commissioner of Customs Airport companyfirming demand of duty and penalty.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Show cause numberice was issued to the respondents alleging shortage of gold and diamonds, capital goods and unauthorized usage of capital goods.
It is to be numbered that the show cause numberice was issued on the basis of certain intelligence gathered regarding infraction of various provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 in short the Act and Customs Rules, 1966 in short the Rules , the EXIM policy and violation of companyditions of certain Notifications on the basis of which the respondents had availed benefits.
The purported action was in terms of Sections 111 d , 111 j , 111 l , 111 o , 111 m , 112 a , 112 b , 113 d , 113 i , 114 i and 114 A of the Act.
The premises of the respondents M s. B.V. Jewels and M s B.V. Star were searched.
Both the units were situated at plot No.55 of Santacruz Electronics Export Processing Zone in short SEEPZ , Andheri East, Mumbai.
Officers of Customs visited the unit on 31.1.2000, recorded statements of the Accounts Manager and stock taking was done.
The unaccounted diamonds, and capital goods were seized and show cause numberice was issued granting opportunity to the respondents to have their say in the matter.
The Commissioner companysidered the show cause reply and after companysidering the materials brought on record by departmental authorities and the reply furnished by the respondents, passed the order to the following effect The demand of duty of Rs.2,57,90,900/ under the proviso to Section 28 2 of the Act on M s B.V. Star was companyfirmed.
A similar amount was imposed as penalty under Section 114 A of the Act.
2 8604.5 gms.
of gold and 844.16 cts.
of diamonds valued at Rs.62,86,823/ and capital goods of Rs.58,58,696/ were held to be liable for companyfiscation under Sections 111 d , 111 j , 111 o of the Act.
Penalty of Rs.12,00,000/ was imposed on M s B.V. Star under Section 112 a .
The demand of duty of Rs.12,94,12,122/ under the proviso to Section 28 2 of the Act on M s B.V. Jewels was companyfirmed.
Similar amount was imposed as penalty in terms of Section 114 A of the Act.
It was held that 73730 cts.
of diamonds valued at Rs.26,29,54,490/ and capital goods found missing valued at Rs.58,54,698/ were liable for companyfiscation under Sections 111 d , 111 j and 111 o of the Act.
It was numbericed that these items were number available for companyfiscation.
23 pieces of high value diamonds valued at Rs.39,63,286/ under the aforesaid provisions were directed for companyfiscation.
Broken diamonds valued at Rs.6,91,139/ under Sections 111 o and 119 of the Act was also directed for companyfiscation.
The redemption of seized goods on payment of fine of Rs.70,000/ was allowed.
Confiscation of diamonds and diamond studded in semi finished gold jewellery valued at Rs.4,03,72,667/ along with inseparable gold weighing 6423.32 gms.
valued at Rs.26,81,736/ were directed to be companyfiscated.
Redemption fine of Rs.43,00,000/ was fixed.
Unaccounted diamonds valued at Rs.27,00,76,393/ was held to be liable for companyfiscation but it was observed that these were number available for companyfiscation.
Penalty of Rs.5 crores was imposed on M s B.V. Jewels under Section 112 a and 114 i of the Act.
Penalty of Rs.10,00,000/ was imposed each on Mr. Suresh Mehta and Mr. Suken Mehta.
Penalty of Rs.2,00,000/ was imposed on Mrs. Saroj Mehta, Mrs. Sapna Mehta, Shivani Mehta, Mr. B.V. Shah, Mr. Rajesh B. Shah and Mr. Bharat S. Shah.
Penalty of Rs.1,00,000/ was imposed on Mr. Vijay Shah.
The order of the Commissioner was questioned in appeal before CEGAT which by the impugned judgment set aside the same holding that the accusations were number established.
The shortage or excess as claimed were number substantiated and various departmental numberifications were number properly companystrued by the Commissioner.
The order of the CEGAT is challenged in these appeals.
Learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the show cause numberice elaborately detailed the various infractions.
The Commissioner analysed the materials companylected in the background of the show cause reply furnished by the respondents and came to hold that the accusations were established.
Accordingly, the directions as numbered above were given.
Unfortunately, the CEGAT did number examine the materials in their proper perspective.
By abrupt companyclusions without any material to support them and or without indicating reasons the companyclusions of the Commissioner were nullified.
The judgment which is the result of perfunctory manner of disposal by the CEGAT needs to be set aside and the order of the Commissioner deserves to be restored.
The various infractions for which duty and or penalty were imposed which were highlighted by the Customs Authorities are essentially as follows In respect of M s B.V. Star the allegations and levies were as follows Levy of duty on gold shortage of 8604.5 gms.
valued at Rs.34,66,889/ .
The duty companyponent is Rs.23,65,652/ .
Duty on shortage of 844.16 cts.
of diamonds valued at Rs.26,92,014/ , the duty companyponent on which was Rs.11,84,372/ .
Duty levied on missing capital goods which were imported duty free the value of which was Rs.2,22,48,876/ .
This essentially related to three items i.e. i duty on capital goods valued at Rs.1,06,37,742/ which were imported by M s B.V. Star were found to be in illegal possession and usage of M s B.V. Jewels ii capital goods valued at Rs.58,58,696/ which were number found in the unit and iii un installed motors, hand pieces and brushes valued at Rs.36,70,675/ for violation of the numberification No.196/87.
Penalty of Rs.12 lakhs imposed under Section 112 a of the Act.
So far as issues relating to M s B.V. Jewels are companycerned, they are as follows Duty on shortage of 73730 cts.
of diamonds valued at Rs.
26,29,54,490/ , the duty on which payable was Rs.12,54,80,309/ .
Broken diamonds of 1607.3 carats valued at Rs.6,91,139/ .
Confiscation of high value diamonds valued at Rs.39,63,286/ .
Duty on unaccounted capital goods of Rs.58,54,698/ .
Confiscation of 10631.39 carats of diamonds valued at Rs.4,03,72,667/ that were unaccounted along with 6423.32 gms.
of gold.
Confiscation of unaccounted diamonds exported during 1998 99, 1999 2000 valued at Rs.27,00,76,393/ .
Accordingly, M s B.V. Star operated from the 2nd and 4th floors while M s B.V. Jewels operated from the other two floors.
On 3.2.2000, Suresh Mehta produced 3861.65 carats of diamonds the value of which varied between 40 to 50 per carat.
By letter dated 3.2.2000 the physical stock of gold and diamonds as per the inventory sheet prepared by the departmental authorities was companyfirmed.
It was specifically stated that there was numberseparate stock of gold and diamonds of M s B.V. Star as it was included in the stock of M s B.V. Jewels.
The seized stock of diamond and gold were revalued by an appraiser.
The companyclusions of the Commissioner and the Tribunal need to be numbered.
First the case of M s B.V. Star is dealt with.
The issues and seriatim are as follows Duty on gold shortage of 8604.5 grams valued at Rs.34,66,889 is Rs.23,65,652 Duty on shortage of 844.16 cts.
of diamonds valued at Rs.26,92,014 is Rs.
11,84,372 As regards gold and diamond, Commissioner observed that the units claim that their stock was mixed up with that of M s. B.V. Jewels was number accepted as there is numberprovision available in Custom Notification or EXIM Policy whereby two units can have joint stock of exempted material.
Customs Notification 177/1994 Cus at Para 7 i stipulates the goods imported by a unit in EPZ can be transferred to other unit only with the prior permission of Asstt.
Commissioner of Customs of the Zone, which has number been done.
Hence, Commissioner companyfirmed the custom duty on gold and diamonds, which were found short.
CEGAT set aside the demand based on above companyclusion.
Confiscation of High Value diamonds valued at Rs.
39,63,286/ On 07.02.2000, 27 seven pieces of high value diamonds of which 23 pieces were in blister packing accompanied by certificate issued by European Gemological laboratory and 4 pieces were in loose companydition.
It was claimed by the assessee to have been legally imported stock which were produced by the unit.
Commissioner observed that, in case of three Bills of Entry, the certificate numbers of diamonds do number tally with the numbers mentioned in the import invoices.
In case of seven other diamonds, they were imported with certificate Numbers of Gemological Institute of America, whereas the certificates produced were of European Gemological Laboratory.
Seven diamonds imported vide Bill of Entry No.
7602 dated 12.10.1998 were neither exported number found in stock.
Same was in case of 03 heart shaped diamonds, imported vide Bill of Entry No.
3809 dated 22.01.1999.
Commissioner did number agree with units claim about certain quantity of diamonds against a particular invoice, as the invoice had endorsement of certificate number for seven diamonds whereas for others, numbernumber was mentioned.
Claim that though invoice does number mention invoice number, diamonds were having certificate numbers.
It was observed that, a supplier will number supply some certified diamonds mentioning certificate number only in respect of some diamonds and supply other diamonds in the same companysignment without indicating certificate number.
The Commissioner companyfiscated the 23 high value diamonds valued at 39,63,286/ , as the unit was number able to prove beyond doubt that these diamonds were imported legally.
Import details of diamonds furnished were number found to be in order and certificate numbers of the said diamonds were number found mentioned in the import documents.
As diamonds were found to be in original packing of foreign origin and numberdocumentary proof for legal import were produced, the goods were held liable for companyfiscation.
CEGAT observed that weight and description of the diamonds tallies with that of invoice.
Seizure and companyfiscation was number justified because supplier issued invoice.
Certificates are issued by another agency and supplier in all cases may number indicate the certificate numbers on the invoices and packing list.
58,34,698/ imported by M s. B.V. Jewels was accepted by the unit to have been sold to M s. S.B.T. International Ltd., based on alleged oral permission from the Development Commissioner.
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C. Shah, C.J. In proceedings for assessment of income tax for the years l947 48 and 1948 49, the Income tax Officer, Ranchi, held that Banwari Lal Agarwal, hereinafter called the assessee, had invested Rs.
17,425 in the year of account relating to the assessment year 1947 48, and Rs.
35,500 in the year of account relevant to the assessment year 1948 49, in Indian Woollen and Silk Stores, Ranchi, of which the assessee was a partner.
The Income tax Officer included those sums as the income from undisclosed sources in the assessment of the Hindu undivided family styled M s. Narmal Ramkumar of which the, assessee was a member in the two respective assessment years.
The Hindu undivided family appealed against that order.
The Appellate Tribunal held in respect of the appeal for the assessment year 1947 48 that a sum of Rs.
17,425 represented the income from from undisclosed sources but it companyld number be assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family.
But in respect of the appeal for the year 1948 49, following the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal relating to the assessment year 1947 48, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner directed that the sum of Rs.
The Income tax Officer then companymenced a proceeding for assessment of the income of the assessee for the year 1948 49, under Section 34 1 a after obtaining the sanction of the Commissioner of Income tax.
The Commissioners sanction was specifically given on the direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
In proceedings for assessment before the Income tax Officer it was companytended by the assessee that the proceeding under Section 34 1 a was barred by limitation, as it was initiated more than eight years after the expiry of the assessment year.
The Income tax Officer rejected the companytention and assessed the sum of Rs.
35,500 as the income of the assessee from undisclosed sources.
The appeal filed by the assessee to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did number succeed.
The Appellate Tribunal, following the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Hiralal Amritlal Shah v. K.C. Thomas 1st.
Income tax Officer, M Ward, Bombay .,
held that the proceeding under Section 34 1 a had become barred and was therefore invalid.
At the instance of the Commissioner of Income tax, the Tribunal referred the following question to the High Court of Patna Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellant Tribunal was right in holding that proceedings under Section 34 1 a of the Income tax Act for the assessment year 1948 49 in the case of the assessee was invalid ?
Against that order the Commissioner of Income tax has appealed to this Court.
| 0 | train | 1971_13.txt |
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
1874 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. Civil No.
3335 of 2006 K. JAIN, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal, by the Food Corporation of India for short FCI , is to the final judgment and order dated 14th October, 2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Arbitration Petition No.334 of 2004.
By the impugned order, the award of an amount of Rs.8,23,101/ by the sole arbitrator against claim No.9 has been upheld.
A brief factual background giving rise to the appeal is as follows The FCI undertook companystruction of godowns at Panvel, District Raigad and issued numberice inviting tenders for companystruction of 50000 MT capacity companyventional godowns in 10 units alongwith ancillary work and services.
Pursuant thereto, the respondents hereinafter referred to as the claimants submitted tender, which was accepted by the FCI.
A formal companytract was executed between the FCI and the claimants on 19th September, 1984.
As per the terms of the companytract, the work was to be companypleted within 10 months from 30th day of issue of the orders and the time was deemed to be of the essence of the companytract.
As the claimants companyld number companyplete the work within the stipulated time, which was once extended, the FCI issued a show cause numberice to them seeking to terminate the companytract.
Ultimately the companytract was terminated vide order dated 15th November, 1987.
The claimants invoked the arbitration agreement and requested the FCI to appoint an arbitrator.
Since there was numberresponse from the FCI, the claimants filed a suit in the High Court for appointment of an arbitrator.
An arbitrator was appointed, who gave his award on 27th August, 1998.
As payment in terms of the award was number made, the claimants again moved the High Court.
In fresh proceedings before the Arbitrator, the stand of the claimants, qua Claim No.9 was that the rate quoted by them for filling the plinth under floors including watering, ramming, companysolidation and dressing in terms of item No.1.7 of the Schedule of rates was only for labour and did number companyer providing or supplying sand for the said purpose and yet they were required to supply sand for filling.
As such the claimants were entitled to be paid extra for supply of sand.
The arbitrator gave his award on 31st December, 2003 accepting the said claim.
For reference, the relevant portion of the award is extracted below According to defence under the provision of 1967 CPWD specification Vol.
I II, the nature of the item includes sand also and number merely the labour charges, similarly the rate of sand filling is for companysolidated thickness or loose thickness or voids to any extent and this claim is denied into to.
Being aggrieved, the FCI filed objections against the award under Section 30 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 praying for setting aside of the award on claim number9, but without any success.
The learned Single Judge affirmed the view taken by the Arbitrator that the rate quoted by the claimant did number include the companyt of the material.
The FCI carried the matter in appeal before the Division Bench.
Before the Division Bench, the FCI also attempted to raise the issue of award of interest by the Arbitrator, which was number permitted on the ground that the issue was neither taken up before the Arbitrator number was raised before the learned Single Judge.
As numbered above, the Division Bench has dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the present appeal.
| 1 | train | 2007_1417.txt |
This is a defendants appeal by special leave of this Court from the judgment and decree dated 7 2 1974 of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing the appellants second appeal preferred from the Appellate judgment of the District Judge of Jaipur.
The plaintiffs respondents filed a suit against the appellants for their eviction after termination of their tenancy by service of a numberice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the ground that they required the suit premises bona fide for their personal necessity.
The suit was companytested by the appellants on various grounds.
The learned Munsif who tried the suit in the first instance held in favour of the plaintiffs on some of the issues which arose for determination on the pleadings of the parties.
He, however, dismissed the suit on the finding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they required the suit premises bona fide for their personal necessity.
They went up in appeal before the District Judge of Jaipur who reversed the findings of the Trial Court on the question of personal necessity of the plaintiffs.
accepted their case and decreed the suit The defendants filed a second appeal in the High Court.
This companytention was accepted and the appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 23 l 1973.
Subsequently it was found that the Act aforesaid had been applied to Chomu by a numberification on a date which fell during the pendency of the suit in the Trial Court.
The judgment of dismissal of second appeal was reviewed and the appeal was heard afresh by another Judge of the High Court sitting singly.
The appeal was dismissed again by the judgment dated 7 2 1974.
The defendants presented this appeal by special leave of this Court.
| 0 | train | 1974_374.txt |
candidates must possess at least five years practical experience and for Asstt.
Regional Inspector Tech.
three years practical experience of repairs, overhauling and inspection of Motor Vehicles in a large automobile workshop.
The said practical experience specified in Clause 5 5 of the advertisement is in terms of the provisions of the U.P. Transport Subordinate Technical Service Rules, 1980.
The applicant claimed that he had two and a half years experience 10.5.1994 to 22.11.1996 as Workshop Supervisor in Hindustan Automobiles which was admittedly a State Government approved institution and another two and a half years experience companymencing from 1.1.1997 in a large private workshop known as Zaheer Engineering Works.
Nearly six months after the said advertisement, the Transport Commissioner, Lucknow issued certain guidelines in regard to what should be companysidered as large automobile workshops for the purpose of fulfilling the requirement relating to practical experience mentioned in Clause 5 5 of the advertisement.
As per the said guidelines, only i workshops which were approved by the State Government, ii Department of State Government or Central Government which has its own large automobile workshop, iii a companyporation which has its own large workshop and iv workshops of authorised dealers of heavy light vehicles manufacturers where repairs and overhauling are carried on, companyld be companysidered as large automobile workshops.
The appellant companysidered the application of the respondent with reference to the said guidelines and found that working at Zaheer Engineering Works companyld number be companysidered as practical experience as it as number a large automobile workshop.
As a result UPPSC rejected the application of the respondent on the ground that he did number have the prescribed experience.
Feeling aggrieved the respondent approached the Allahabad High Court by filing Civil Misc.
Writ Petition NO.34884 of 2000.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court by judgment dated 17.08.2000 rejected the writ petition.
Feeling aggrieved the respondent filed Special Appeal No.515 of 2001.
The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court by judgment dated 16.07.2001 accepted the companytention of the respondent and allowed the appeal.
It rejected the companytention of the appellant that a large automobile workshop refers to a automobile workshop approved by the State Government.
That apart the advertisement does number also mention that the large automobile workshop only relates to the workshops approved by the State Government.
As a companysequence the Division Bench directed the UPPSC to companysider the case of the respondent for appointment afresh by taking into account the period of service experience of the respondent herein in large automobile workshops meaning thereby any large automobile workshops approved by the State Government or in the private sector.
The appellant purported to reconsider the case of the respondent in the light of the order of the Division Bench and passed a fresh order dated 24.08.2001 whereby it again rejected the application of the respondent on the ground that there was numbermention in the certificate that Zaheer Engineering Works was a workshop approved by the State Government.
The respondent again approached the Allahabad High Court by initiating a second round of litigation in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No.12615 of 2002.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court by judgment dated 04.10.2002 allowed the writ petition.
He did number go into the question whether Zaheer Engineering Works was a large automobile workshop or number.
He was of the view that having regard to the qualification prescribed by the Central Government in a numberification dated 12.06.1989 issued under Section 213 4 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1989, prescribing the practical experience of one year it was unnecessary for the respondent to establish five years experience.
The learned Single Judge was of the view that the said Central numberification dated 12.6.1989 would prevail over the provisions of the U.P. Transport Subordinate Technical Rules 1980.
The said judgment of the learned Single Judge was upheld by a Division Bench and the appellants appeal Special Civil Appeal No.
99 of 2003 was rejected by order dated 08.07.2004.
The said judgment is challenged by the UPPSC.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
709 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dt.
9 10 74 of the Madras High Court in Referred ease No.
4 of 1968 Ram Reddy, C. Ramakrishna and A. V.V. Nair, for the Appellant.
P. Raman, A.V. Rangam and Miss A Subhashini, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHINGHAL J. This appeal by special leave arises out of the decision of the Madras High Court dated October 9, 1974, on a reference by the Chief Controlling Revenue authority under section 57 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The Board of Revenue, Madras, which was the Chief Controlling Revenue authority, initially stated the case raising the following questions for decision, Whether the decision of the Board of Revenue that the instrument relating to the Deed of Trust and Mortgage would attract the levy of a Stamp Duty as laid down in Article 40 b of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act mad that the debentures would be exempted from the levy of stamp duty is companyrect or number and Whether the claim of the Respondent herein that the stamp duty is payable on the debenture under Article 27 a and on the Deed of Trust and Mortgage under Article 40 c is tenable or number ?
The High Court directed the Board of Revenue to refer three additional questions, but ultimately took the view that the additional questions did number really arise in the case.
It answered the first question in favour of the Revenue and the second question against the Madras Refineries Limited, hereinafter referred to as the Company.
The Company feels aggrieved and has companye up in appeal to this Court.
The Company was incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, as a public limited companypany.
An agreement known as the Loan and Note Purchase Agreement was executed be tween the Company and the First National City Bank and six others on December 20, 1966, by which the Company agreed to authorise the creation and issuance of 14,880,000 U.S. principal amount of its 5 secured numberes Series A, and 7,440,300 U.S. principal amount of its 51/2 secured numberes Series S, and the sale of, or the borrowing to be evidenced by such Notes in accordance with the terms and provisions of the agreement.
The Notes were to be issued under and secured by a Deed of Trust and Mortgage between the Company and the First National City Bank.
It was a1so agreed that the Notes shall be secured and shall have the other terms and provisions provided in the agreement and shall be guaranteed by the President Of India pursuant to the terms of a Guarantee Agreement, in the prescribed form.
The Deed of Trust and Mortgage and the Guarantee Agreement were executed between the President and the First National City Bank as Trustee on June 15, 1967.
In the meantime the Company made an application to the Collector under section 31 of the Act for opinion as to the stamp duty with which the Deed of Trust and Mortgage was.
chargeable, and the Collector referred the matter to the Board of Reve nue.
The Board decided on June 28, 1967 that the duty was chargeable on the Trust and Mortgage Deed under Article 40 b of Schedule I to the Act.
37,66,500/ as stamp duty under protest, stating that it would move the Board for a reference of the companytroversy to the High Court.
The Trust and Mortgage Deed was registered onJane 30, 1967, and the A series debentures were issued the same day.
The Company applied to the Board of Revenue to state the case to the High Court.
B series debentures were issued on June 28, 1968.
The case was stated on March 28, 1969 and was decided by the impugned decision of the High Court dated October 9, 1974.
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NAGESWARA RAO, J. Leave granted.
The judgment of the High Court of Uttarakhand allowing the Writ Petition filed by Respondent No.1 Dr. Samrat Sharma and setting aside the order of termination of the services of Respondent No.1 is in challenge in this Appeal.
The High Court directed the reinstatement of Respondent No.1 with all companysequential benefits.
The Appellant is a private aided companylege, affiliated to Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna Garhwal Central University, Srinagar, Pauri Garhwal for short the HNBG University .
Respondent No.1 was an Assistant Professor Hindi in the Department of Hindi in the said College.
Respondent No.5 Dr. Smt.
Kamlesh Sharma made a companyplaint to the Principal of the College on 04.09.2012 alleging misbehavior by Respondent No.1 on 01.09.2012 during the meeting of the teaching staff of the College.
An explanation was sought from Respondent No.1 which was submitted on 12.10.2012.
Not being satisfied with the explanation given by Respondent No.1, the Managing Committee of the College decided to companystitute a companymittee to enquire into the charges levelled by Respondent No.5 in her letter dated 04.09.2012.
Dr. I.D. Kansal and Mr. K.S. Sharma, Members of the Managing Committee were requested to companyduct an enquiry.
The statement of Respondent No.5 and other witnesses were recorded by the Enquiry Committee.
In spite of the opportunity given to Respondent No.1 to defend himself, he did number appear before the Enquiry Committee.
The Enquiry Committee came to a companyclusion that Respondent No.1 used indecent language and behaved in an aggressive manner in the staff meeting on 01.09.2012.
As Respondent No.1 was found guilty of the charges levelled against him, the Enquiry Committee recommended initiation of action against Respondent No.1.
The Enquiry Committee also recommended criminal prosecution to be launched against Respondent No.1.
On the basis of the recommendations of the Enquiry Committee, three charges were framed against Respondent No.1 which are as follows CHARGE NO.01 PARA 04 OF COMPLAINT LETTER DATED 04.09.2012 On 01.09.2012 at 10.00 Oclock in the morning, the Principal had called a meeting of his entire teaching staff in the Principal room.
At the very same, in your presence, Dr. Samrat Sharma, Assistant Professor, Hindi Department has leveled allegations against me with regard to the time table and he has used very filthy words to me in a very aggressive manner and thus he has behaved me like that without any reason.
The said time table had been prepared according to his companysent.
There is a clear example that his wife Smt.
Jayanti Adjariya alongwith his son has left his house and for which cases are going on between them in the Courts at Roorkee, Jhansi, Nainital and Allahabad.
Charge No.03 Para No.7 of Complaint Letter Dated 04.09.2012 Due to this companytinuous insult and mental harassment, I, who is a senior most teacher who has 38 years of teaching experience, and who has been looking after performing the administrative duties and responsibilities of a Vice President while you go on leave, request you to kindly protect my dignity and seniority.
Respondent No.1 was informed that he should submit his written statement by 14.02.2014.
Respondent No.1 was also given an opportunity to produce witnesses in his defense.
He was also informed that he can cross examine the witnesses during the fact finding enquiry by a companymittee companysisting of Dr. Dushyant Kumar, Vice President of the Managing Committee and Mr. Vikash Sharma, Advocate.
The Fact Finding Committee submitted its report on 14.02.2014 holding Respondent No.1 guilty of all the three charges.
The Committee recommended the termination of the services of Respondent No.1 as he was found guilty of Sub Section 17.04 of Section 49 j of the First Statute of the University of Hemwati Nandan Bahuguna, Garhwal, 1978 for short the First Statutes .
Thereafter, a supplementary charge sheet was issued on 02.07.2014.
The following charges were framed and companymunicated to Respondent No.1 CHARGE NO.1 You are posted in this Non Governmental College on the post of Associate Professor and this College is affiliated to the H.N.B. Garhwal University, Srinagar.
You have acted insubordinately and made false companyplaints against the Chairman Secretary of the Managing Committee and also against the Principal, have written following letters directly to the Director, Higher Education, Uttarakhand, Haldwani First Letter dated 04.01.2014 Second Letter dated 31.01.2014 Third Letter dated 06.02.2014 Fourth Letter dated 28.02.2014 Fifth Letter dated 01.03.2014 Sixth Letter dated 12.04.2014 The aforesaid letters having been sent by you directly without any proper channel and the same is in clear violation of the Point No.05 of the Agreement having been given in Appendix Gha of the Garhwal University Srinagar Regulation.
You have written letter to the Director of Education, Higher Education, Haldwani intentionally, in clear disobedience and in violation of the Degree Arth/8 21 /1671/2011 12 dated 05.05.2011 which companytained your signature also and of which there are adequate proof against you.
The Inquiry Committee, after perusing the entire companyrespondences, has found you guilty for sending letters directly and without any proper channel to the Director, Higher Education, Uttarakhand.
CHARGE NO.02 You after hearing of the Appeal bearing No.
/12074 119 3 /2013 filed before the Honble Information Commission, Uttarakhand, Dehradun, the Honble Commissioner of the Information Commission Shri Vinod Nautiyal in his disposal order dated 16.09.2013 has found you to be guilty for forging in the bills towards the educational equipments having been purchased from the grant amount received from the U.G.C. and has directed the Public Information Officer/ Principal to register a First Information Report against you in the nearest Police Station.
The Public Information Officer Principal in companypliance of the directions of the Honble Information Commissioner, has got registered a First Information Report against you with the Kotwali P.S. Gangnahar Roorkee on 12.10.2013 for the offence under Sections 467, 468, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
On 12.10.2013, the P.S. Kotwali Gangnahar, Roorkee has registered a case against you bearing Crime Case No.269/ 13 at Serial No.276/13 under the aforesaid Sections.
The Investigation Officer in the aforesaid criminal case, after recording the statements of the Principal Dr. Vipin Pratap Gautam, Member of the Purchasing Committee Dr. Surjeet Singh, Dr. Vijay Kumar, Shri Vijendra Singh, Shri Sandeep Poswal, Shri Amit Sharma, Assistant Accountant and after recording your statements also and obtaining signatures of all, has filed charge sheet in the Court on 31.10.2013 which is pending companysideration before the said Honble Court.
You in order to save from the charges leveled against you with regard to forgery after having companyspired, the details of the letters which you have written against the Principal, Chairman Managing Committee and the Secretary of the Managing Committee and against me directly to the Police Administration as also to the Government of Uttarakhand, is given below Charge No.3 As per directions of the Honble Commissioner of Information Shri Vinod Nautiyal, after getting registered an FIR against you before the P.S. Kotwali Gangnahar Roorkee dated 12.10.2013 against you and on the basis of the said FIR, the police registered a Crime Case No.296/13 and after companyducting investigation in respect of the said case, charge sheet has been filed before Court on 31.10.2013.
The case in which you are an accused, against the same sections and with regard to the same charges, you have been given an application on 13.5.2014 before the Court of Additional Civil Judge/ D. J.M. Roorkee for filing a false case against Shri Manohar Lal Sharma, Chairman, Managing Committee, Dr. Vipin Pratap Gautam, Principal.
The Members of the Purchasing Committee namely Dr. Surjeet Singh, Dr. Vijay Kumar, Shri Vijendra Singh, Shri Sandeep Poswal, Shri Amit Sharma Assistant Accountant for making them an accused for the purpose of registering an FIR under section 156 3 of the Cr.
P.C. with P.S. Kotwali Gangnahar, Roorkee.
After receiving the report of the Investigating Officer of the P.S. Gangnahar Kotwali, Roorkee, the learned Judge i.e. Additional Civil Judge S.D.J.M. Roorkee finding the allegations as leveled by you in your application filed before the learned judge, Additional Civil Judge S.D. JH.M. Roorkee, has rejected your application vide order dated 26.05.2014.
The Honble Judge has clearly mentioned written in its judgment and order dated 26.05.2014 that the report is received from the companycerned Police Station.
According to the report received from the companycerned Police Station, in respect of the aforesaid case, Crime Case No.296/2013 under Sections 467/468/469/471 of the Indian Penal Code has been registered in respect of the aforesaid case in which the applicant Samrat Sharma is an accused and the respondents in the aforesaid case are the companyplainant of the case, in which Charge Sheet No.180/2013 dated 31.10.2013 has been sent.
Respondent No.1 was directed to appear before the Enquiry Committee, failing which an ex parte decision will be taken against him.
Responding to the supplementary charge sheet dated 02.07.2014, Respondent No.1 submitted his explanation on 04.07.2014.
Respondent No.1 did number appear before the Enquiry Committee on 12.07.2014.
The Enquiry Committee found that the charges levelled against Respondent No.1 were proved.
The Enquiry Committee recommended stern action against Respondent No.1 for indulging in the acts of insubordination, indiscipline and violation of the First Statutes and the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 for short Universities Act .
The services of Respondent No.1 were terminated by an order dated 13.07.2014.
The approval of the Vice Chancellor, HNBGC University, Srinagar was sought by the BSM PG College, Roorkee Haridwar Appellant herein, which was granted on 16.09.2014.
Respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Uttarakhand challenging the order of termination of his services dated 13.07.2014 and the approval granted by the Vice Chancellor on 16.09.2014.
During the pendency of the departmental enquiry, Respondent No.1 was placed under suspension on 31.01.2014.
The order of suspension was also assailed by Respondent No.1 in the Writ Petition.
The High Court allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the order of termination and directed reinstatement of Respondent No.1 and the Management of the College was directed to pay the salary for the period during which he was placed under suspension.
The High Court was companyvinced that Respondent No.1 did number get sufficient opportunity to defend himself in the departmental enquiry.
Commenting on the merits of the allegations against Respondent No.1, the High Court was of the opinion that sufficient evidence was number available to hold Respondent No.1 guilty of the charges.
In any event, the High Court held that the imposition of penalty of termination of service was number companymensurate with the allegations made against Respondent No.1.
A careful examination of the material on record would disclose that Respondent No.1 was number given sufficient opportunity to defend himself.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALA, J. The question that needs our companysideration and decision in this appeal by special leave is Can a tenant of a residential building who is allotted a residence reasonably sufficient for his requirements and becomes liable for eviction from that residential building on an application made by his landlord under Section 14 3 a iv of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 the 1987 Act resist grant of such application on the ground of having lost the allotted residence by surrender.
Antecedent facts are briefly these.
The appellant was a tenant of a residential building, Shop No.
6, Second Floor, Chhota Shimla Bazar, Shimla under its owners.
When that residential building was sold by its owners to the respondent under a registered sale deed dated 23 9 1982, the appellant became the tenant of the respondent in respect of it by accepting him as his landlord.
However, by then, the appellant was in possession of a residence allotted to him as a government servant of the State of Himachal Pradesh.
Since the provision in Section 14 3 a f of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1971 the 1971 Act entitled a landlord to get possession of a residential building from his tenant when such tenant was allotted a residence which was reasonably sufficient for his requirements, the respondent landlord issued a numberice dated 20 10 1982 to the appellant tenant calling upon him to give possession of the residential building according to the said provision.
But, the appellant did number give possession of the residential building to the respondent as required by the said numberice.
Instead, the appellant chose to lose possession of the allotted residence by surrendering it to the Government.
The respondent who did number get possession of the residential building from the appellant despite numberice issued in that regard, made an application under Section 14 3 a f of the 1971 Act before the Controller seeking eviction of the tenant from the residential building.
However, the appellant resisted grant of that application on two grounds i that the residence which was allotted to him for his residence being number reasonably sufficient for his requirements he companyld number be evicted from the residential building under Section 14 3 a f of the 1971 Act, and ii that the residence allotted to him, when had been lost by surrender, he companyld number be evicted from the residential building under Section 14 3 a f of the 1971 Act.
The grounds on which the application of respondent was resisted did number find favour with the Controller and were rejected by him as unmerited and untenable by his order dated 10 4 1985 with a direction given thereunder to the appellant to put the respondent in possession of the residential building.
That order of the Controller though impugned by the appellant in an appeal filed before the appellate authority under the 1971 Act that appeal was dismissed resulting in affirmation of the order of the Controller.
Thereafter, on 6 5 1986 the appellant filed a revision petition before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, which was the revisional authority under the 1971 Act impugning the order of the Controller, as well as, the appellate authority.
When the said revision petition filed under the 1971 Act was pending disposal by the revisional authority the High Court, the 1987 Act was brought into force with effect from 17 11 1971, the date on which the 1971 Act had companye into force.
The 1987 Act which repealed the 1971 Act, as well, required disposal of every application, appeal, or revision petition, pending decision under any provision of the 1971 Act before the Controller, appellate authority or the revisional authority, in accordance with the companyresponding provision of the 1987 Act as if the companyresponding provision companytained in the latter Act was, at the relevant time, in force.
The appellant has assailed the said order of dismissal of his revision petition by the High Court by filing the present appeal by special leave.
| 0 | train | 1994_1021.txt |
CHANDRAMAULI KR.
PRASAD, J. Kichha Sugar Company Limited aggrieved by the order dated 24th of June, 2008 passed by the Uttarakhand High Court in WPMS No.
3717 of 2001, affirming the award dated 12th of November, 1992 directing payment of Hill Development Allowance after taking into account the amount received as leave encashment and overtime wages, has preferred this special leave petition.
Leave granted.
Facts lie in a narrow companypass The Government of Uttar Pradesh, by its order dated 5th of January, 1981, had directed for payment of Hill Development Allowance to its employees working at specified hill areas at the rate of 15 of the basic wage.
Kichha Sugar Company Limited, the appellant herein hereinafter referred to as the employer , being a unit of a subsidiary of U.P. Government Corporation, adopted the same and started paying Hill Development Allowance at the rate of 15 of the basic wage.
The workmen demanded calculation of 15 of the said allowance by taking into account the amount paid as overtime, leave encashment and all other allowances.
When the employer did number agree to the calculation of the Hill Development Allowance as suggested by the workmen, a dispute was raised.
It was referred to companyciliation and on its failure, the companypetent Government made the following reference.
The Industrial Tribunal gave opportunity to both the employer and the workmen to file their claim and produce material and on companysideration of the same, gave award dated 12th of November, 1992 directing the employer to give Hill Development Allowance to their permanent and regular workers on the amount received regarding leave encashment and overtime wages.
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