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1999 4 suppl. scr 195 p. mohapatra j. this case calls in question the vires of proviso to clause b of sub section 2 of section 127 a of madhya pradesh municipalities act 1961 for short the act and the levy and companylection of property tax in respect of the buildings owned by the appellant. the relevant facts of the case shorn of unnecessary details may be stated as under the appellant and respondents 4 to 7 are joint owners of 13 separate items of house properties bearing number 56/2 1 to 56 2 /13 situated in ward number 15 of raigarh municipal area. the assessment proceeding for the purpose of levying property tax was initiated under the provisions of the madhya pradesh municipalities act 1961 m.p. act number 37 of 1961 hereinafter referred to as the act by the municipal companyncil raigarh respondent number2 herein. the municipality purporting to invoke the proviso to the section 127 a 2 of the act aggregated the annual letting value of all the buildings and levied property tax on the deemed annual letting value so aggregated. the assessment order was followed by the demand numberice. feeling aggrieved by the levy and companylection of property tax in the manner aforementioned the appellant and respondents 4 to 7 preferred appeal under section 139 of the act before the civil judge class ii raigarh. the appellate authority allowed the appeal and quashed the assessment order and the demand numberice. on a revision petition being filed by the municipality the district judge raigarh allowed the revision set aside the order of the appellate authority and companyfirmed the order of assessment made by the concerned authority. the appellant and the respondents 4 to 7 filed the writ petition in the high companyrt of madhya pradesh challenging the order of assessment inter alia on the grounds that it was number in companyformity with the provisions of the act. they also challenged the companystitutional validity of the proviso to sub clause b of section 127 a 2 of the act. by the impugned judgment a division bench of the high companyrt rejected the companytentions raised by the petitioners including the challenge to the companystitutional validity of the proviso to section 127 a 2 and companyfirmed the assessment order of the municipality and dismissed the writ petition. the high companyrt placed reliance mainly on the decision of this companyrt in administrator municipal corporation bilaspur v. dattatraya dahankar advocate and anr. v. president municipal companymittee mungaoli 1990 m.p.l.j. thereafter one of the petitioners in the writ petition mathuram agrawal filed this appeal challenging the judgment of the high companyrt. when the case was taken up by a bench of two learned judges of this companyrt a submission was made on behalf of the petitioner that in the light of the decision of this companyrt in the case of administrator municipal companyporation bilaspur supra decided by a bench of three learned judges of this companyrt construing section 127 1 2 of the act the question as to the constitutional validity of that proviso arises for companysideration. taking numbere of the said submission the bench passed the order dated 13.2.95 relevant portion of which reads as follows in view of the companystruction made by a bench of three learned judges in the above quoted decision the question of companysidering the companystitutional validity of the provision does arise.

test

1999_721.txt

M. Panchal, J. By filing the present companytempt petition, the petitioners have prayed to take action against the respondents, who, according to them, have number implemented number acted according to the judgment of this Court dated December 14, 2007, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 5948 of 2007 requiring the State Government to take a decision on the application submitted by the petitioners seeking permission to develop their plot on the basis that the provisions of D.C. Rules, 1967 were applicable and decide the said application in the light of the recommendations made by the Competent Authority as well as the fact that other hotels, as pointed out by the petitioners, were granted more FSI than 1.33 permissible under Rule 10 1 of the D.C. Rules, 1967. The petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are the companypanies incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner No. 2 owns a plot of land bearing CTS No. 2193 P of Bhuleshwar Division at Dr. Babasaheb Jaykar Marg, Thakurdwar, Mumbai. The plot admeasures approximately 8983 square meters. The plot was reserved for play ground of municipal primary school and secondary school as well as for D.P. Road. The petitioner No. 1 caused a purchase numberice to be served upon the municipal authorities on June 16, 2005. Under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 M.R.T.P. Act for short the Municipal Corporation found that the land was encumbered with residential as well as companymercial structures and the companyt of purchase would be roughly about Rs.13.6 crores, which was very high. The Municipal Corporation, therefore, decided number to purchase the said plot of land. Therefore, the reservation on the plot lapsed on December 16, 2005 under the relevant provisions of M.R.T.P. Act. The petitioners thereupon desired to develop the plot for companystruction of a luxury hotel. In exercise of rule making power companyferred by the M.R.T.P. Act, the State Government had framed Development Control Rules, 1967 the D.C. Rules for short . The Ministry of Environment and Forests had issued Notification I on February 19, 1991 under Sections 3 1 and 3 2 v of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and Rule 5 3 d of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986, declaring companystal stretches as Coastal Regulation Zone CRZ and regulating activities in the said zone, as a result of which the plot belonging to the petitioners falls within the CRZ II. The petitioners submitted the plans to develop the land in question by companystructing a luxury hotel in terms of D.C. Rules of 1967 on December 26, 2005. According to them, they were entitled to additional FSI of 3.73 times the FSI in addition to 1.33 FSI allowable on the said plot. It was the case of the petitioners that on December 31, 2005, the Municipal Corporation submitted a proposal to the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of Maharashtra recommending, inter alia, to grant additional FSI as prayed for by the petitioners. On a clarification sought by the State Government from Ministry of Environment and Forests, the Union of India informed the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, that the D.C. Rules as existed on February 19, 1991 would apply to the areas falling within the CRZ Notification and number the Draft Regulations of 1989. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the Draft Regulations of 1989 came into force on February 20, 1991. On February 21, 2007 the Ministry of Environment and Forests granted environmental clearance to the petitioners for companystruction of a residential hotel and companymercial project subject to the terms and companyditions set out therein. The case of the petitioners was that the planning authority did number companymunicate its decision to them as to whether the permission sought for was granted or refused within 60 days from the date of receipt of the application and, therefore, they were entitled to a declaration that the permission was deemed to have been granted in terms of Section 45 5 of the M.R.T.P. Act. In the alternative, it was their case that in terms of the amended D.C. Rules of 1967, the Competent Authority, with the previous approval of the Government, had authority to permit the person who had applied for permission to exceed floor space indices in respect of buildings of educational and medical relief institutions as well as Government and semi Government offices and luxury hotels and as the Taj Mahal, Oberoi, Sea Rock, President, Ambassador amongst other hotels were granted benefit of additional FSI under Rule 10 2 of D.C. Rules, 1967, they were also entitled to additional FSI of 3.73 than the permissible FSI of 1.33 available under the relevant Rules. Under the circumstances the petitioners invoked extra ordinary jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution by filing Writ Petition No. 1627 of 2007 and prayed 1 to declare that the application submitted by them on December 26, 2005 to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai to give permission to develop the land in question stands granted in view of Section 45 5 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, 2 in the alternative to direct the respondents to grant forthwith their application for permission to develop land referred to above with additional FSI of 3.73 times the FSI permissible under Rule 10 2 of the D.C. Rules, 1967 and 3 to direct the respondents to allow them to proceed with the development of their plot mentioned above for companystruction of luxury hotel by utilization of additional FSI of 3.73 times the FSI permissible on the said plot as per D.C. Rules, 1967. The High Court, by judgment dated August 13, 2007, refused to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners, but directed the Government to take a decision on the application filed by the petitioners within 6 weeks from the date of order and companymunicate the order so passed to them. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners had filed the above numbered appeal before this Court. This Court, by judgment dated December 14, 2007, held 1 that the D.C. Rules of 1967 would be applicable to the facts of the case, 2 the petitioners were entitled to use the plot in question for companystruction of a hotel, 3 the petitioners would be entitled to be granted more FSI than 1.33 in view of the numberms set out in D.C. Rules of 1967, 4 the petitioners were number entitled to a declaration that the permission applied for was deemed to have been granted to them as the planning authority had failed to indicate its decision within 60 days from the date of receipt of the application, and 5 the respondents cannot be directed to grant the permission to develop their plot with demanded FSI but the respondent State should be directed to exercise discretion vested in it under Rule 10 2 of the D.C. Rules, 1967 after taking into companysideration the relevant material including the fact that other hotels were in past granted additional FSI. In view of abovereferredto companyclusions the appeal was partly allowed and the State Government was directed to take a decision on the application submitted by the petitioners seeking permission to develop their plot on the basis that the provisions of D.C. Rules, 1967 were applicable and decide the application submitted by the petitioners in the light of recommendations made by the Competent Authority as well as the fact that other hotels, as pointed out by the petitioners, were also granted more FSI than 1.33 permissible under Rule 10 1 of the D.C. Rules, 1967. The petitioners have claimed that they made an application on December 17, 2007 to the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 to pass necessary orders in the light of the directions given by this Court in the above numbered appeal. By letter dated April 22, 2008, the respondent No. 5 informed the petitioners that the respondent No. 4, i.e., the Maharashtra Government, had approved additional FSI of 3.67 on the net plot area subject to payment of premium at 25 for first 100 additional FSI, 50 for second 100 additional FSI and 100 for remaining additional FSI. According to the petitioners, the respondent No. 4 asked the petitioners to pay the premium to the Government as well as to the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and informed that on payment of the amount of premium, the order for grant of additional FSI would be companymunicated to Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai. The assertion made by the petitioners is that they are entitled to FSI of 6.29 on gross plot area as per Rule 10 2 of D.C. Rules, 1967, but the respondents have approved additional FSI of 3.67 times of net plot area, which is companytrary to the directions issued by this Court in the above numbered appeal. The petitioners companytend that as the other hotels were granted additional FSI over and above the FSI of 1.33 permissible under the Rules, the decision to grant additional FSI of 3.67 on the net plot area is in breach of the directions issued by this Court. What is claimed by the petitioners is that the petitioners are number liable to pay any premium at all as other hotels were granted additional FSI without payment of premium to the Government and, therefore, the respondents should be hauled up for willful disobedience of the directions issued by this Court. In the alternative, it is claimed by the petitioners that even if the premium is to be calculated, the same works out at Rs.28 crores as against Rs.128 crores, which is calculated by the respondents and, therefore, by imposing premium the respondents have brushed aside the directions issued by this Court for which appropriate action should be taken against them. Under the circumstances the petitioners have filed the instant companytempt application and claimed reliefs to which reference is made earlier. were companycerned, as those hotels were located in Backbay Reclamation Area of A Ward and in addition to the base FSI, Hilton Tower was granted additional FSI of 1.95, Oberoi Hotel was granted additiona FSI of 1.00 and Hotel President was granted additional FSI of 0.82 whereas in the case of Taj Mahal Hotel the base FSI of 2.45 was taken because it was number located in the Backbay Reclamation Area and the said hotel was granted additional FSI of 2.28 and, therefore, the claim of the petitioners that on the basis of additional FSI granted to the abovenamed hotels, the petitioners were entitled to FSI of 6.29 has numberbasis at all. The respondents have stressed in the reply that in Civil Appeal No. 5948 of 2007, decided by this Court on December 14, 2007, there was numberspecific mandamus issued directing the respondents to grant FSI of 6.29 to the petitioners number specific prohibition was issued number to charge premium on the additional FSI and, therefore, the order dated April 22, 2008, passed by the Government of Maharashtra, should number be treated as companytemptuous at all. According to the respondents the Chief Engineer Development Plan , MCGM had requested the Government by letter dated December 31, 2005 to grant additional FSI, but neither MCGM number Municipal Commissioner had recommended grant of additional FSI of 3.73 times of permissible FSI of 1.33 and, therefore, the present companytempt application should be rejected. In paragraph 11 of the reply the respondents have tried to justify the premium of Rs.128.06 crores sought to be charged from the petitioners and pointed out that the hotel of the petitioners, which is situated in C Ward as per D.C. Rules, 1991, is number entitled to more FSI than granted by the Government of Maharashtra vide order dated April 22, 2008. By filing the reply the respondents have prayed to dismiss the companytempt application with exemplary companyts. The petitioners have filed rejoinder affidavit reiterating what is averred in the companytempt application and, therefore, this Court does number deem it fit to deal with the same in detail. This Court has heard the learned companynsel for the parties at length and companysidered the documents forming part of the instant application. As is clear from the directions issued by this Court vide judgment dated December 14, 2007, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 5948 of 2007, the prayer made by the petitioners to direct the respondents to grant FSI of 6.29 was specifically refused and the State Government was directed to decide the application submitted by the petitioners for sanction of the plans in the light of the provisions of D.C. Rules, 1967. As pointed out by the respondents the base FSI was 3.5 in cases of Hotels Hilton Tower, Oberoi and President as those hotels were located in Backbay Reclamation Area of A Ward and Hilton Towers was granted additional FSI of 1.95, Oberoi was granted additional FSI of 1.00 and Hotel President was granted additional FSI of 0.82. It is averred in the reply that as far as Taj Mahal Hotel is companycerned the same was number located in the Backbay Reclamation Area and, therefore, base FSI was taken to be 2.45 and additional FSI of 2.28 was granted. Under the circumstances it becomes evident that the additional FSI of 3.67 granted to the petitioners is much more than the additional FSI granted to the other hotels. As explained by the respondents the Chief Engineer Development Plan , MCGM had requested the Government vide letter dated December 31, 2005 to grant additional FSI, as demanded by the petitioners, but neither MCGM number Municipal Commissioner had recommended for grant of additional FSI of 3.73 times of permissible FSI of 1.33. Moreover, it is stated by the respondent in paragraph 10 of the reply that the decision to grant additional FSI of 3.67 over and above the basic permissible 1.33 companyes to 93.06.

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2008_1831.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 206 , 2861 , 250 , 320 , 1607 , 3548 , 379 , 769 1280 of , 979 and 1476 1483 Of 1985. From the Judgments and Orders dated 10.1.79 , 28.9.79 , P 16.1.79 , 26.4 79 , 27.9.79 , 15.1.79 , 8.1.79.19.4.79 , of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 4327/78 , 3430/79 , 4713/78 , 4937/78 , 1345/79 , 3217/79 , 5121/78 , 24/78 , 5195/18 , 4340/78 , 4613178 , 4793178 , 41J3/78 , 4386/78 , 4545/18 , 4585/18 and 1257/79. G K. Ranamurthi , R.C. Pathak , Arvind Kumar , Mrs. Laxmi Arvind , Miss K. V. Lalitha , Arun Madan , Sarwa Mitter , Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli , for the appearing Appellants. The Full Benches of the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh , Karnataka , Punjab and Haryana and a Division Bench of the Patna High Court 1 have upheld the validity of such provisions. But litigants , particularly those who are in a position to companymand funds arc rarely deterred by such unanimity of judicial opinion. 11 So , several Co operative Societies of Punjab have chosen to prefer appeals to this Court questioning the vires of sec. Considering next the question whether the new Board was a companyporation , the companyrt had numberdifficulty in answering the question with reference to sub section 2 of section 3 which stated that the Board shall be a body companyporate having perpetual succession and companymon seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued.

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1985_102.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 2084 2085/74. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 10/11/10/1974 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 160 and 173 of 1966. R. Lalit, V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V. D. Khanna for the appellant. D. Bal, P. H. Parekh and M. Mudgal for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J. These two appeals by special leave arise from a suit filed by the respondents plaintiffs for recovering possession of land bearing Survey Nos. 487/1 to 487/6 situated at Shirwal Peta Khandala from the appellant defendant. During the pendency of this suit a portion of the land in dispute was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and as both the plaintiffs and the defendant laid a claim to companypensation, a reference was made under section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act for determining the eligibility for the amount of companypensation. The trial Court decreed the plaintiffs suit and First Appeal No. 160 of 1966 was preferred by the defendant to the High Court of Bombay. Following the decision of the trial Court, the reference under s. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act was answered in favour of the plaintiffs respondents and the defendant preferred First Appeal No. 173 of 1966 to the High Court. Both the appeals were heard together and by its judgment dated 10/11 October, 1974 a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed both the appeals with companyts. Thereupon the appellant preferred the present two appeals. As both the appeals arise from a companymon judgment, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. Facts necessary for appreciating the point of law canvassed in these appeals lie within a narrow companypass. One Dattatraya Govind Kulkarni, husband of plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiffs 2 to 6 had borrowed a Tagai loan of Rs. 12,000/ by making an application Exhibit 129 accompanied by prescribed form, Ext. 128 on 7th February, 1949. The loan was borrowed for companystructing wells in Survey Nos. 167 and 170 and he offered as security the lands bearing Survey Nos. 165, 166, 167, 170 and 172. In the application Ext. 129 that accompanied the prescribed form it was stated that wells have to be sunk to bring barren land under cultivation. In other words, the loan was for improvement of the land. The loan was advanced and the borrower failed to repay the loan as per the stipulations. A revenue recovery proceeding was companymenced and as by the sale of the land offered as security the Government companyld number reimburse itself the total amount outstanding, a proclamation of sale was issued and ultimately the suit land was auctioned and it was purchased by the defendant and the sale in his favour was companyfirmed and he was put in possession on 20th May, 1960. The plaintiff stated that prior to the date of auction there was a partition between the father and his sons on 6th July, 1956 evidenced by Ext. 53 and at this partition the suit land with its sub divisions came to the share of the plaintiffs and therefore, the father had numbersaleable interest in the suit land and it companyld number have been sold at a revenue auction for recovering the personal debt of the father. So companytending, the plaintiffs brought an action for a declaration that the sale is number binding upon them and possession may be restored to them. With these findings the appeals were dismissed. 167 and 170 being described by the plaintiffs themselves as joint family property.

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1978_206.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 118 of 1957. appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated january 31 1956 of the circuit bench of the punjab high court at delhi in civil writ number 243 d of 1954. k. daphtary solicitor general of india r. ganapathy iyer and r. h. dhebar for the appellant. purshottam tricumdas t. s. venkataraman and k. r. chaud hury for the respondent. september 18. the following judgment of the companyrt was delivered by venkatarama aiyarj this is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the high companyrt of punjab in an application under art. 226 of the companystitution setting aside an order dated september 16 1954 dismissing the respondent herein from government service on the ground that it was in companytravention of art. 311 2 of the companysti tution. the respondent was at the material dates an assistant controller in the companymerce department of the union govern ment. sometime in the middle of march 1953 one shri bhan a representative of a calcutta firm styled messrs. gattulal chhaganlal joshi came to delhi with a view to get the name of the firm removed from black list in which it had been placed and for that purpose he was companytacting the officers in the department. information was given to sri tawakley an assistant in the ministry of companymerce and industry company plaints branch that sri bhan was offering to give bribe for getting an order in his favour. he immediately reported the matter to the special police establishment and they decided to lay a trap for him. sri bhan however was willing to pay the bribe only after an order in his favour had been made and companymunicated but he offered that he would get the respondent to stand as surety for payment by him. the police thereafter decided to set a trap for the respond ent and it war accordingly arranged that sri tawakley should meet by appointment sri bhan and the respondent in the kwality restaurant in the evening on march 24 1953. the meeting took place as arranged and three members of the special police establishment were present there incognito. then there was a talk between sri tawak ley sri bhan and the respondent and it is the case of the appellant that during that talk an assurance was given by the respondent to sri tawakley that the amount would be paid by sri bhan. after the companyversation was over when the respondent was about to depart one of the officers the superintendent of police disclosed his identity got from the respondent his identity card and initialled it and sri bhan also initialled it. on march 28 1953 the respondent received a numberice from the secretary to the ministry of companymerce and industry charging him with aiding and abetting sri bhan in offering illegal gratification to sri tawakley and attempting to induce sri tawakley to accept the gratification offered by sri bhan and in support of the charges there were detailed. allega tions relating to meetings between the respondent and sri tawakley on march 17 1953 on march 21 1953 a telephonic conversation with reference to the same matter later on that day and the meeting in the kwality restaurant already mentioned. the respondent was called upon to give his explanation to the charges and he was directed to state whether he wished to lead oral or documentary evidence in defence. the enquiry was delegated to mt. j. byrne joint chief companytroller of imports and exports. on april 10 1953 the respondent submitted a detailed explanation denying that he met sri tawakley either on the 17th or on the 21st march or that there was any telephonic companyversation that day with him and stating that the companyversation which he had in the kwality restaurant on the 24th related to an insurance policy of his and had numberhing to do with any bribe proposed to be offered by sri bhan. the respondent also asked for an oral enquiry and desired to examine sri bhan sri fateh singh and sri jai narayan in support of his version. on april 17 1953 mc. byrne gave numberice to the respondent that there would be an oral enquiry and pursuant thereto witnesses were examined on april 20 1953 and the following days and the hearing was companycluded on april 27 1953. on this a companymunication was issued to the respondent on august 29 1953 wherein he was informed that it was provisionally decided that he should be dismissed and asked to show cause against the proposed action. along with the numberice the whole of the report of mr. byrne omitting his recommendations was sent. oil september 11 1953 the respondent sent his explanation. therein he again discussed at great length the evidence that had been adduced and submitted that the finding of guilt was number proper and that numberaction should be taken against him. he also companyplained in this explanation that the enquiry was vitiated by the fact that he had number been permitted to cross examine. the witnesses who gave evidence against him. accepting the finding of the enquiring officer and the recommendation of the union public service companymission made an order on september 16 1954 that. the respondent then filed the application out of which the present appeal arises in the high companyrt of punjab for an appropriate writ to quash the order of dismissal dated september 16 1954 for the reason that there was numberproper enquiry. as many as seven grounds were set forth in support of the petition and of these the learned judges held that three had been established. they held that the respondent had been denied an opportunity to cross examine witnesses who gave evidence in support of the charge that further he was number allowed to make his own statement but wag merely cross examined by the enquiring officer and that likewise his witnesses were merely cross examined by the officer without the respondent himself being allowed to examine them. the examination of witnesses began on april 201953 and four witnesses were examined on that date among them being sri c. b. tawakley. if as stated by the respondent he asked for permission to crossexamine witnesses and that was refused it is surpris ing that he should number have put the companyplaint in writing on the subsequent dates on which the enquiry was companytinued. to one of the witnesses sri. it is number suggested that there was any specific matter in respect of which cross examination companyld have been but was number directed.

dev

1957_112.txt

These appeals relate to the period from 1 3 1971 to 31 10 1976. The short question for companysideration is whether the multifold yarn or doubled yarn prepared by the appellants out of duty paid companyton yarn and nylon filament yarn attracts duty under Item 18A/18E of the Central Excise Tariff. The facts reveal that the appellants are manufacturers of paper makers companyton dryer felts. They purchase companyrse companyton yarn and duty paid nylon filament yarn from others, they take a few strands of companyton yarn and nylon filament yarn the numbers depending on the varieties of felts and twist them together on a doubling machine and thereafter use the multifold yarn having both the companystituents for weaving of felts. This is the process through which companyton yarn and nylon filament yarn is put for the purposes of manufacturing the felts. Relying on the decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Union Carbide India Ltd.1978 2 E.L.T. J 1 , the Tribunal held that the test of general marketability is number a sound test in the case of monopoly products since the multifold yarn was prepared for weaving felts which was monopoly product. Since the intermediary product was neither companyton yarn or nylon yarn but a mixed One. In support reliance was also placed on its previous decision in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Collector .

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1995_239.txt

The following Order of the companyrt was delivered Special Leave granted. We heard Mr. J.S. Bali, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, learned Counsel for the respondents. His Writ Petition having been dismissed, he has filed this appeal, by special leave. It appears that appellant joined service as a sweeper in the High Court on April 25, 1958. By an order dated April 28, 1978 he was placed under suspension and thereafter he was dismissed from service on November 30,1978.

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1984_261.txt

The workmen are the appellants in these two appeals. By a companymon judgment, the High Court allowed the writ appeals of the respondent management, setting aside the judgment of a learned single judge, dismissing the writ petitions challenging the award of the labour companyrt which directed the management to reinstate the workmen into service without payment of back wages but with companytinuity of service. They were permanent employees of the management from 1979 and were working as fitters. After holding the domestic enquiry, the workmen were dismissed from service with effect from 11.7.1984. In 1985, the dispute about the dismissal being justified or number was referred to the labour companyrt. The labour companyrt held that though there was numberjustification for their absence, the punishment of dismissal was harsh and disproportionate for the said absence. Instead of dismissal, the punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect and denial of back wages was directed. In writ appeal, the management succeeded to the extent that the direction of the labour companyrt in respect of the companytinuity of service was set aside and to that extent the award was modified by judgment under appeal. The workmen are in appeal under these circumstances. 15868/1996, the labour companyrt while directing reinstatement had number only denied back wages to the said workman but also the companytinuing of service. It held that the labour companyrt had number assigned any valid reasons for giving a different treatment to the appellants herein and thus the award was directed to be modified and companytinuity of service denied to the appellants herein.

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2002_251.txt

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jabalpur dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in short the Act . Challenge in the appeal was to the award made by the Motor Claims Appellate Tribunal, Ratangarh Churu in short MACT in Claim Case No.89 of 2004. By the said award, a sum of Rs.4,03,650/ was awarded to the claimant respondent No.1 in the appeal. It was pointed out that the driving license of the driver of the offending vehicle was number in force on the date of accident. Factual position in detail need number be indicated because the issue relates to the liability of the insurance companypany as the driving license was number valid on the date of the accident. In the instant case the date of accident was 11.6.2004. The drivers license was initially valid for the period from 15.12.1997 to 14.12.2000 and thereafter from 29.12.2000 to 14.12.2003. Thereafter, it was again renewed from 16.5.2005 to 15.5.2008. The appellant filed its objections before MACT taking the stand that since the driving license was number valid on the date of accident it had numberliability.

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2008_1307.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeals Nos. 41 and 77 of 1973. Appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 from the, Judgment and Order dated the 5th February, 1973 of the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 8 of 1972. K. Ser, G. L. Mukhoty and C. S. S. Rao, for the appellant in Cr. A. 41./73 . Rath, and B. Parthasarathy, for the appellant In Cr. A. 77/73 . S. Nariman, Additional Solicitor General, B. M. Patnaik and Vinoo Bhagat, for respondent No. 1 in Cr. A. 41/73 and respondent NO. 2 in Or. A. 77/73 . Rath and U. P. Singh,for respondent No. 2 in Cr. A. 41/73 , K. Sen and C. S. S. Rao, for respondent No. 1 in Cr. A. 77/73 . The judgment of the Court were delivered by PALEKAR J. This is Criminal Appeal No. 41 of 1973 an appeal by one Baradakanta Mishra from his companyviction and sentence under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 by a Full Bench of fiVe of the. Orissa High Court. The Judgment is reported in I.L.R. 1913 Cuttack, 134 Registrar of the Orissa High Court v. Baradakanta Mishra and Ors. The appellant started his career as a Munsif in 1947. His career as a Judicial Officer was far from satisfactory. In 1956 he was promoted on trial basis to the rank of a sub Judge with the observation 28 7 that if he was found incompetent, suitable action would be, taken. In due companyrse, he, was companyfirmed as a Subordinate Judge. As his work was for unsatisfactory, he wag reverted to his substantive post of a Subordinate Judge on January 4, 1963. The order of reversion was challenged by him in a Writ Petition which was dismissible by a Bench of C.J. and , J. The case is reported in I.L.R. 1966, Cutback, 503. An appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on February 6,he 1967. While working as a Subordinate Judge, after reversion, was suspended from service from 15th May, 1964 to 9th April, 1967 during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding against him. that proceeding ended in a light punishment of two of his increments being stopped. From the. above order of punishment, the appellant filed on 10 10 1967 an appeal to the State Government. The State Government by its order dated 15 7 1970 allowed tie appeal on the ground that the Public Service Commission had number heed companysulted by the High Court before imposing the punishment, and that the Charge Sheet served on the appellant having indicated the proposed punishment vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. After the case, Was sent back to the High Court the charges which had been earlier established, were framed again and served on him on 13 2 1971 and we are informed that the proceeding is still pending. In the meantime, it appears, he was promoted to the post of the Additional District Maggistrate in February, 1968 though the High Court was of opinion that he was unbalanced, quarrelsome, reflect and undisciplined. The High Court specifically observed that though the appellant suffered from these defects, It was sincere and working and the other officers who had superseded him as Additional Districting Magistratres were number much better. The promotion was made on trial basis for a period of one year with the. observation that if during that period his work was found to be unsatisfactory, he would be reverted to the rank of Sub Judge. In that year the High Court had to face an abnormal situation by the retirement of many District Judges on account of the decision of the Government reducing the age of retirement from 58 to 55 years Many, vacancies occurred and the appellant was then promoted as an Additional District and Sessions Judge on trial basis for six months in July, 1968. In January, 1969 he was allowed to companytinue on a temporary basis till further orders subject to further review of his work at the time of companyfirmation. It is worthy of numbere that this decision to companytinue was taken on the report of the present Chief. Justice O. K. Mishra who was at that time the Administrative Judge. On May 12, 1969 his services were placed at the disposal of the Government in the Law Department, who appointed him as Joint Secretary. Law, till October 12, 1969. From October 13, 1960 to December 4, 1970 he was appointed by the Government as the Commissioner of Endowments. The Government was thoroughly dissatisfied with his work and on December 5, 1970 his services were replaced at the disposal of the High Court. The appellant went on leave. On his return to the Judicial cadre, he functioned as Addison District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack till July 14, 1971 when he was ,posted to act as District and Sessions Judge for 12 days in the temporary leave vacancy of the permanent District Judge Mr. P. K Mohanty. When he was thus acting as District and Sessions Judge for a short period by way of stop gap arrangement, the High Court placed several restrictions on his administrative powers,. In the brief period that he was working as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Cuttack, the appellant showed gross indiscretion by defying a request made by the Distr ict, Judge in due companyrse of administration. He also companymitted a avejuiudicial misdemeanors. He heard an appeal and posted it for judgment on June 22, 1971. The judgment was delivered on that date and the, appeal was dismissed. The Order Sheets of the judgment were signed by the appellant and the judgment was duly sealed. Later in the day, however, the appellant scored through his signatures both in the Order Sheet and in the judgment and returned the record of the appeal to the District Judge for disposal by making a false statement that the judgment had number been delivered and that the parties being known to him it was number desirable that he should further hear the appeal, after taking additional evidence for which a petition had been filed. This was something quite extraordinary from a Judge of the appellants standing. When these matters were brought to the numberice of the High Court the Registrar by Order of the High Court recommended to the Government that the appellant be reverted to the post of the Additional District Magistrate Judicial . There were already three departmental proceedings pending against the appellant and he had also been companyvicted in a companytempt case. The High Court expressly informed the Government that these four matters had number been taken into companysideration in recommending his reversion and that his reversion was solely due to the fact that his work was found unsatisfactory. The recommendation was accepted by the Government who on September 1, 1971 reverted the appellant to the post of the Additional District Magistrate. On September 10, 1971 the appellant made a representation to the Chief Minister praying for the withdrawal of the order of reversion and, if necessary, to suspend him after drawing up a regular depart7 mental proceeding. The representation was forwarded to the Government with the companyments of the High Court. Something unusual happened. Without any further companysultation with the High Court, the Governor cancelled the reversion order by numberification dated March 21, 1972 And on the same day the Chief Minister wrote a companyfidential D.O. to the Chief Justice by name explaining the circumstances under which the reversion. order was cancelled. The Chief Minister appeared. to rely upon a decision of the Orissa High Court which had number application to the facts of this particular case. But any way. it would appear that by reason of the Order dated March 21, 1972 the reversion of the appellant to the post of the Additional District Magistrate stood cancelled and he companytinued to act in the post of the Additional District Sessions Judge, Cuttack. The D.O. letter of the Chief Minister remained unopened till the return of the Chief Justice from New Delhi where he had gone to attend the Chief Justices Conference. It was opened by the Chief Justice on return on March 26, 1972. But in the meantime, the appellant, who had gone on leave, having known about the order passed on March 21, 1972 asked for his posting. The rules required that on return from leave he should produce, a medical certificate and he was, accordingly directed to produce one. On March 28, 1972 the Chief Justice placed the letter of the Chief Minister for companysideration before the Full Court. The Full Court took the decision to start a disciplinary proceeding against the appellant and, pending the same, to place him under suspension in exercise of their powers under Article 235 of the Constitution. Accordingly on March 30 1972 the appellant was placed under suspension and his headquarters were fixed at Cuttack. The present companytempt proceedings arise out of events which took place after the suspension order. On receiving the suspension order the appellant addressed by letter an appeal to the Governor of Orissal for cancelling the order of suspension and for posting him directly under the Government. That is Annexure 8. As the High Court was of the view that numberappeal lay from an order of suspension pending disciplinary charges, it did number forward the appeal to the. Governor. In fact on April 28, 1972 the Registrar of the High Court intimated the State Government that the appeal filed by the appellant to the Governor had been withheld by the High Court as numbersuch appeal lies against the order of suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. The appellant was also intimated accordingly. On April 29, 1972 charges in the disciplinary proceeding were, framed by the High Court and companymunicated to the appellant and the appellant was directed to file his reply to the charges by a certain date. On May 14, 1972 the appellant wrote three letters. One was to the Registrar and is Annexure 13. By this letter the appellant intimated that he had moved the Governor to transfer the disciplinary proceedings to the Administrative Tribunal and that he would take all other alternative steps administrative and judicial to avoid the proceeding being dealt with by the High Court. The second letter was addressed to the Governor and is Annexure 15. It purports to be a representation with a prayer to direct the High Court to forward the appeal withheld by it. There was a third letter of the same date addressed directly to the Governor purporting to be a representation. That is Annexure 16. The prayer was that the departmental pro . seedings be reference to the Administrative Tribunal. 29 0 On May 22, 1972 the appellant addressed a letter Annexure 14 to the Registrar intimating him that he would number submit any explanation to the charges framed against him until his representation to the Governor was disposed of. Accordingly, it was filed on 7 8 1972 and the appellant again pressed for a decision on his preliminary objection. The Division Bench refused to deal with the preliminary objection and so on 30 8 1972 the appellant filed Criminal Appeal NO. 174 of 1972 in this Court praying for cancellation of the companytempt proceedings challenging therein the maintainability of the proceeding and companyplaining of bias and prejudice of the High Court particularly the Honourable the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice R.N. Mishra. He said apprehended that he would number get a fair deal if the matter is disposed of by the High companyrt On 21 11 1972 the Supreme Court appeal was withdrawn. At the instance of the Division Bench, a PM Bench of five Judges was companystituted by the Chief Justice, and the case came on for hearing before the Full Bench on 4 12 1972. In the meantime the appeal memo filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court was available and since it companytained matter which amounted to companytempt, additional, charges were framed and a show cause numberice was issued to the aPPellant in respect of these additional charges. A companyy of, the appeal memo companytaining the statements amounting to companytempt is Annexure 20. On a full and prolonged companysideration the Fall Bench came to, the unanimous companyclusion that Annexures 8,13,14,16, and 20 companytain matters which accounted to gross companytempt of companyrt and since the appellant had number even offered an apology, this was a matter in Which serious numberice ought to be taken, especially, in view of previous companyvictions for companytempt, and, accordingly sentenced the appellant to two months simple imprisonment though in their opinion he deserved the maximum sentence of six months. Annexure 8. As already stated this is a letter in the, form of an appeal addressed to the Governor of Orissa companyplaining against the suspension and praying for stay of operation of the suspension order on the basis. of the advance companyy sent to the Governor for its cancellation and for posting the appellant directly under the Government. it is dated 10 4 1972. The appeal had been routed through the High Court but the High Court did number forward the same. In this annexure reference is made to the previous appeal filed by him against the order of the High Court stopping his two increments after a departmental proceeding and how the Governor in appeal had cancelled even the very departmental proceeding in the appeal. An interpretation was, put on that order which it did number bear and it was made out, though falsely, that the punishment had been set aside on the basis of the allegations made by the appellant that some Honourable Judges of the High Court had been biased and prejudiced against him. The appellant also asked the Governor to appreciate that by the said departmental proceedings the High Court had put the Exchequer to a very heavy loss all on accounts of the palpable incorrect views of the High Court. Then the appellant says that the present action,. namely , the order of suspension clearly disclosed mala fides. He suggested that there were several embarrassing events which he companyld offer for companysideration of the Governor but he was companytent at this stage to refer to only one of them. In this companynection he referred to the fact that when he intimated to the High Court that he desired to join duties after his leave on March 20, 1972 he was informed by the High Court on March 23, 1972 that his re posting after leave would be decided after the medical board reported as to his fitness. to join after leave. This, according to the appellant, showed that the High Court had already taken a decision in the absence of the Chief Justice that the appellant should be re posted. But on the return of the Chief Justice from New Delhi there was a sudden change., The High Court at para 61 of the judgment has observed as follows In the appeal memo Annexure 8 the companydemner attributed mala fides, bias and prejudice to the High Court. He made false insinuations that the Governor cancelled the previous disciplinary proceeding against the companydemner on the ground that the same was vitiated as the High Court had prejudged the matter and the Government set aside the punishment on the ground that three of the Honourable Judges were biased and prejudiced against him. He alleged that the disciplinary proceeding involved the Government in heavy expenses on account of the palpably incorrect views of the High Court. He asserted that the order of suspension as per Annexure 6 was mala fide. He stated that he would produce more facts relating to the mala fides of the High Court before the Governor. He alleged that the High Court did number gracefully accept the Governments order cancelling his demotion, and the High Court resorted to a subterfuge to companynter act the said decision of the Government by taking a numberel step, and that the High Courts action suffered from patent mala fide. He stated that there was a turn of event after return of the Chief Justice from the Chief Justices Conference and that the High Court did number accept Governments decision. Annexure 13 is a letter by the appellant to the Registrar dated May 14, 1972 in which he told him that he had moved the Governor, Orissa with a prayer to refer his matter to the Tribunal under the provisions of the Disciplinary Proceedings Rules, 1951 and also that he would take all other alternative steps administrative and judicial to avoid this proceeding being dealt with by the High Court and for this purpose would have to companysult some prominent Advocates of Calcutta and Delhi. Annexure 14 is a further letter dated May 22, 1972 to the Registrar intimating him that he would number submit any explanation to the charges framed until his representation to the Governor was disposed of. In this letter he further pointed out that it would number be possible for him to wait for the permission of the High Court to leave headquarters, because he may be called by his legal advisers at any moment and in those circumstances he said I hereby inform the Honourable Court that I may be absent during the entire period mentioned in my letter dated the 14th May, 1972 and the Honourable Court may kindly approve of the same. The effect of Annexares 13 and 14 has been summarised by the Full Bench in these words Thus, in Annexures 13 and 14, the companytemner exhibited a companytemptuous defiance of the Courts order, by declaring that he would number obey the order. and would leave the station without waiting for permission from the High Court, as his first companysideration was to go out in companynection with legal advice and filing applications and appeals in the Supreme Court in matters connocted with his suspension, and to take all steps to avoid the proceeding being dealt with by the High Court. It Is dated May 14, 1972 and purports to be a representation made by the appellant direct to the Governor without routing it through the High Court. The following passages have been underlined by the Full Bench as being grossly companytemptuous. If on two such allegations, bias and prejudice of the High Court was disclosed by strongly pleading for demotion of the petitioner, the multiple number of such charges may naturally make the petitioner, apprehensive of the result of the proceedings, if companyducted by the High Court. 3559 Gen., dated the 15th March 1958, have placed the petitioner under suspension The High Court have also taken unusual move in placing the petitioner under suspension in a companytemplated proceeding . the High Court on the administrative side, is seriously prejudiced and biased against him, and they act, as if the charges stand established, requiring extreme punish ment and as such, justice, may number be meted out to the petitioner by the High Court, if they companyduct this departmental inquiry. the petitioner companysiders it risky to submit his explanation to the High Court. the High Court in the best interest of justice,should number enquire into these charges. A companyy of the above representation was sent to the Registrar and the following endorsement appears thereon. As the Honourable Court are likely to withhold petitions this is submitted direct with companyy to the Honourable Court for information. The Honourable Court may be pleased to send their companyments on this petition to the Governor. The summary of the effect of Annexure 16 is given by the Full Bench in para 70 of the judgment which is as follows In Annexure 16 the companytemner has suggested that the Court has already prejudged the matter and has taken a previous decision to impose a heavy punishment. Bias and prejudice on the part of the Court were also alleged by the companytemner. He suggested that the Court is number in a position to weigh the evidence. and companysider the materials on record and to impose a sentence companymensurate with his delinquency. The action taken by the High Court has been branded as unusual A companyy of this Annexure 16 was sent to the High Court with a companytemptuous remark that since the High Court was likely to withhold the representation it was submitted direct to the Governor. Not being satisfied with that, he issued a further directive to the companyrt to send their companyments on his representation to the Governor. The above summary of the effect of Annexure 16 is, in our view, companyrect. Annexure 20. This annexure is the memo of appeal filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 1972. The appeal had been filed because the Division Bench had refused to companysider his preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the present companytempt proceedings. six companytempt proceedings against him and in view. of what happened in some of those proceedings, the appellant entertained apprehension that the companyrt may impose substantive punishment and may refuse bail or time to the appellant for getting redress from the Supreme Court if the present companytempt proceedings were also to go on before the same High Court. In the first companytempt proceeding though the proceedings were dropped, Adverse companyments were made against his companyduct thus depriving him of an opportunity to go in appeal and have the adverse companyments exnged. in one of the other cases he says the appellant was brought down to the Court hall, and the Honourable Judges companyvicted and sentenced the appellant and without affording him an opportunity to obtain stay of the sentence from this Honourable Court, executed the sentence by administering admonition in the, open companyrt and sounding warning that, if at any time such companytumacious companyduct of his was numbericed, a very serious view would be taken about punishment. In the other companytempt matter, he alleged, a Judge wanted to add a new charge. The appellant objected to the same and went in appeal to the Suprerac, Court. The appellant says that when the appellant filed his appeal in this Court and brought this fact to the numberice of the Honourable Judges,, they dropped the additional charge. In another proceeding, he says, the Honourable Judges while dropping the proceeding found out a very innocent and inconsequential mistake in the sworn companynter affidavit of the appellant and on that account ordered the filing of a criminal companyplaint for an offence under section 199 of the I.P.C. In ground 1 the appellant alleged that the appellant fears bias of the Honourable High Court against him in view of the facts and circumstances stated above. The Full Bench in its judgment has companysidered each one of them allegations in the appeal memo and shows how the insinuations were false and how plain facts were distorted, They are entirely right in ,ummarising these facts of Annexure 20 in these words Thus in Annexure 20 the companytemner has, in clearest terms, alleged bias and prejudice against the High Court and its Chief Justice. He has taken the plea that the companyrt itself has become disqualified to deal with the case In his view the Judges of this Court have fallen from the path of rectitude, and are vindictive, and have already decided to impose substantive sentence and refuse bail, and they are number in a position to mete out even handed justice., 522SCI/74 disrespectful fulminations of an angry insubordinate officer, there is hardly any doubt that Annexures 8, 16 and 20 companytain statements which are deliberately made to grossly scandalize the High Court. The Judges of the High Court and especially the Chief Justice are charged with mala fides, improper motives, bias and prejudice. It is insinuated that they are oppressing the appellant, have become vindictive and are incapable of doing him justice. What was that action about ? Against the appellant in his judicial capacity, for acts of judicial misconduct. The companytrol was. lie heard it, delivered judgment dismissing the appeal signed the order sheet and judgment and sealed the judgment. Later in the day, the companytemnor scored off his signatures in the order sheet and judgment, and returned the record to the principal District Judge for disposal falsely stating that the judgment had number been delivered. The representation was forwarded by the Prime Ministers office to the Chief Secretary from whom it reached the District Magistrate.

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1973_278.txt

To quote A resolution was moved in the Lok Sabha on 21st April, 1962, for the abolition of Capital Punishment. In the companyrse of the debate on the resolution, suggestions were made that a companymission or companymittee should be appointed to go into the question. However, ultimately, a companyy of the discussion that had taken place in the House was forwarded to the Law Commission that was, at that time, seized of the question of examining the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code. The appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court was dismissed companyfirming the companyviction and sentence under Section 307. Thus aggrieved, the present appeals. The appellant was married to a woman named Sangita. They had three children, one daughter and two sons. They were staying in two rooms in a house belonging to his maternal aunt. He was a tailor by profession and employed as such in a cloth shop. One of his sons, Aakash had been suffering from asthma which required companystant medication. The appellants income was hardly sufficient to maintain his family and he was under stress in that regard. On 08.07.2008, it is stated that during the early hours of the morning while the members of the family were sleeping, he assaulted his wife Sangita and his two sons with the separated parts of a pair of sharp scissors and inflicted multiple stab injuries causing their instantaneous death. On his daughter Gaitri alias Pooja also, he inflicted stab injuries. However, she somehow companyld speak and asked why her father, the appellant was injuring her. The appellant father told her that the entire family had to go and he would also follow them. However, he gave her water to drink. Thereafter, he took her on his lap and pressed her mouth with a pillow with the intention of suffocating her, and yet the child did number succumb to death. He left the child in that companydition, bolted the door from outside and went straight to the police station and reported the incident. An FIR was registered. His statement was recorded. In the meanwhile, the daughter Gaitri got assistance from a neighbour and was immediately treated at a hospital and thus she survived. She is the key witness PW1. The neighbour is the maternal aunt of the accused and she is PW4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses and based mainly on the version of PW1 Gaitri, the appellant was companyvicted under Sections 302 and 307. Gaitri alias Pooja was clear and companysistent during the investigation as well as before the Sessions Court. In her evidence before the Court, she stated My father, mother and all we children were in the house. My father assaulted my mother, my two brothers and me with the help of scissor. My two brothers and mother died on the spot. I was assaulted over my chest and abdomen and to my both hands. Then my father gave me water to drink. He then took me on his laps and then pressed my mouth with the help of pillow. He then went to Police Station. While going out he bolted the door from outside. One Sakharbai Sadashiv Sonwane was staying in the same house in their neighbourhood. Then my uncle Anil Gaikwad came there and we were taken to Govt. Hospital at Gevrai for treatment. From there I was brought to Beed in the Civil Hospital by my uncle. Police came to me for making inquiry in the Hospital. I narrated the whole incident to them. The accused in the dock is my father. The accused was a tailor and he was working in somebodys shop owned by one Anil. She has stated that the elder son of the appellant was suffering from asthma. She also deposed as follows When I was sleeping in my house I got at about 5.30 a.m. I was washing utensils. I heard a sound from Gaitri asking me to open the door and that her father had assaulted them. I went near the room and found that the door was bolted from outside which I opened and went inside the room. I saw Sangita, Omkar, Aakash were lying in a pool of blood and they were dead. Gaitri had also bleeding injuries to her chest, stomach and chin. She told me that her father assaulted all of them with a scissor in that night. I shouted and went to Baban, Anil and called them. The said Anil took Gaitri to Hospital. Gaitri is also known by name Pooja. Emphasis supplied In cross, she submitted that the accused was a tailor. It is true that his financial companydition was poor. PW5 is the one who sold the scissors to the appellant. PW6 is the panch witness to the recovery of weapon of offence and other dress worn by the accused. The statement Exhibit No.29 was recorded by him and appellant signed the same. PW8 is the Police Inspector who companyducted the investigation. PW9 is the Police Inspector who prepared the inquest and spot panchnama. He companylected the blood from the spot and the pillow companyer soaked in blood. He also made the recovery of the scissors as disclosed by the accused. Photographs were also taken. We may also refer to the statement made by the appellant himself before the police on the basis of which the FIR was registered In my family my son Omkar is companystantly ill due to asthma. For the treatment of his ailment money was required which I had to borrow and hence I had become debt ridden. Due to the tension I companyld number companycentrate on my work and I had to go on leave frequently. Since I was fed up, I decided to leave the house, my wife and children would have died of hunger and ailment. As far as assault on the daughter is companycerned, he stated as follows Thereafter I dealt 2 3 blows on chest of my daughter due to which she woke up and having seen me dealing blows she asked weepingly earnestly papa why did you do so. At that time I replied we all have to go, I am also companying. By saying so, I gave her water to drink and took her head on my lap. In order to kill her I pressed her mouth and numbere but she was number dying. I waited for some time. Due to the incident which had happened I was terrified. Then I kept water near her and left her in injured companydition. Thereafter I removed my clothes worn by me at the time of companymission of the crime. I wrapped the scissors used for the crime in a cloth and went to the police station and presented myself and informed the incident.

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2013_518.txt

Venkatachala, J. This is a joint Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution filed by Mr. David Patrick Ward as Petitioner 1, Mr. Steven Hillman as Petitioner 2, both being British Nationals, challenging the legality of the Detention Orders dated 31st January, 1992 made against them under Sub sections 1 and 2 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 hereinafter referred to as the Act and seeking their release forthwith by issuance of Writs of Habeas Corpus to Respondents 1 the Union of India, 2 the State of Uttar Pradesh, 3 the State of Nagaland. Detention order made against each petitioner discloses that it had been made by Nagaland State Government with a view to prevent the companycerned petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, the security of India, the security of the State of Nagaland and maintenance of public order. The ground of detention pertaining to each detention order being companymon and in identical terms, reads On 30th January, 1992 around 2030 hrs, four vehicles i.e. A Car NLK 8701, A Car NLH 6103, Tata truck NLH 8093 and Maruti Gypsy NLH 1115 were moving on road from Meluri to Kiphire. When they were signalled to stop by a patrol of 14 A.R. near Meluri, instead of stopping, fire was opened on the 14 A.R, patrol from M Gypsy in which one rifleman of A.R. No. 143685 Shri Praveen Das was hit on the right shoulder. Assam Rifles returned fire on the M Gypsy killing Nipielie Chucha on the spot. At this, the occupants of the front three vehicles raised their arms and came out and were arrested by Assam Rifles. The arrested at this time included British national Shri Hillman Stephen Neil, nine insurgents and three drivers of these vehicles. Some documents, one diary and cash amounting to Rs. 8286 were recovered. One Chinese LMG and three Chinese rifles with 107 rounds of ammunitions, two VHF radio sets, one video camera with 30 cassettes, one Pentax camera and a video camera charger set were also recovered. In the meantime, M Gypsy being the last Vehicle quickly turned back and went towards Jessami. This Maruti Gypsy was finally intercepted around 2230 hrs by the 111 BSF jawans near Lanyie Bridge. From the M Gypsy British national David Patrick Ward and one insurgent were arrested and the dead body of one insurgent was also recovered. Also from this M Gypsy Rs. 3795 in each 30 US Dollar, three self cheques of 2,000 each and nine rounds of ammunition were recovered. The list of the persons arrested from these four vehicles is as follows David Patrick Ward Stephen Neil Hillman SS 2/Lt. Vevochu S o Mr. Vepahi SS Sqt. Major Cupanyi S o Mr. Thevio SS Sgt. Major Nasu S o Chasli SS Sqt. While the said ground of detention is put under the head Schedule in the Annexure to the Grounds of Detention companymunication, the latter is addressed to each petitioner by furnishing the following information for his guidance You have a right to make a representation to the State Government against above said order. You have also a right to claim personal hearing before the Advisory Board. Each petitioner being served with the detention order made against him along with the ground of detention on 4.2.1992 is detained in pursuance thereof. Both the petitioners being lodged in 1/5 G.R. at Jessami Jail, to being with, are shifted on 12.2.1992 to Imphal Central Jail and thereafter on 15.2.1992 to Naini Jail, Allahabad where they are said to have been lodged finally for security reasons. Pursuant thereto, the Advisory Board having fixed its meeting at Imphal on 15.3.1992 has heard the petitioners in person on their detentions. After such hearing, the Advisory Board being of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for detention of the petitioners, a report is sent to Nagaland State Government which on companysideration of that report has companyfirmed the detention orders on 2.4.1992. Petitioners have subsequently on 24.4.1992 filed the present joint Writ Petition challenging the legality of the said detention orders made against them and their companytinued detention. Ms. Indira Jaising, learned Counsel for the petitioners, urges the following points for our companysideration Neither of the petitioners was served with the detention order and grounds of detention made against him. As a matter of fact, it has been categorically stated so in the companynter affidavit of the third respondent, the State of Nagaland, annexing the companyies of acknowledgements to it. This will clearly prove service of the detention order. The incident on 30/31.1.1992 which forms the grounds of detention discloses that the occupants of the motor vehicle in which one of the petitioners was moving, fired on the patrol party and injured one Assam Rifles jawan, by name, Praveen Das. Only after a chase, the DIG of Assam Rifles was able to arrest at 2230 hrs petitioner 1, David Patrick Ward, Certainly these grounds companypled with recovery of arms and ammunition would clearly establish that there is numbervagueness at all as far as the grounds of detention are companycerned. That was received on 5.5.1992 by the State Government. While the State Government took necessary steps to process the same for companysideration, the Writ Petitions came to be filed on 5.5.1992 on which the State Government received numberice on 13.5.1992. Petitioners are known to belong to a U.K. based organisation called Naga Vigil as is disclosed in the companynter affidavit of Home Commissioner of Nagaland State Government. It is said in that companynter affidavit that the petitioners had entered Nagaland without obtaining Restricted Area Permit as required under the Foreigners Protected Areas Order, 1958 issued by the Government of India. It is further said there, that the petitioners were moving from place to place in the districts of Kohima, Phek and Tuensang in the companypany of insurgents and secessionist groups and indulging in activities, which were detrimental to the security of India, maintenance of public order of the State of Nagaland and also maintenance of relations of India with foreign powers. Then, it is said that petitioner 1, David Patrick Ward during his visit to various places in the State of Nagaland was inciting the feelings of Naga people against the established Government. A reference is made to a signed Press release said to have been issued by petitioner 1 on 3.12.1991 on his views that the Naga people should freely exist in peace as an independent nation. From the companynter affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India, it is disclosed that the petitioners 1 and 2 took Visas from the High Commission of India at London to visit India for a holiday and the places they desired to visit in India were Delhi Agra Calcutta. Coming to the profession of Petitioner 2, the High Commission of India at London is said to have been informed as Chef. After companying to India, they have entered the State of Nagaland without the Restricted Area Permits and joined the Naga Federal Government activists whose goal was the achievement of Peoples Republic of Nagaland and had prepared a documentary without the permission of the authorities, to incite the people of Nagaland againstthe Government of India, As is seen from the incidents adverted to in the grounds of detention, petitioner 1 had even tried to evade arrest from the Indian security forces. The petitioners have lived with Naga insurgents in their gang and participated in their activities, for almost three months. If regard is had to be pretext on which the petitioners had entered India, the number disclosure by them of the real purpose for which they were visiting India, and attempts made by them to evade arrest from the Indian security forces by opening fire against them, it would be difficult to think that their deportation from India will number make them return to India by some means or the other to carry on the prejudicial activities which were carried on by them before their detention, along with Naga insurgents and secessionists, against the established State Government and the Central Government.

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1992_767.txt

C. Gupta, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a Judgment of the Calcutta High Court setting aside in revision the finding of the trial companyrt on the issue whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the parties in a suit for ejectment. The issue which arises on the interaction of two statutes, the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Temporary Provisions Act, 1950 and the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which repeals the earlier Act but keeps it alive for proceedings pending on the date of repeal, involves the question, is the right companyferred on the sub tenant by the 1956 Act of being declared a tenant directly under the superior landlord available to a sub tenant against whom a suit for ejectment was pending when that Act came into force ? The appeal turns on the answer to this question. The material facts leading to the impugned order are these. The respondent was a tenant of premises No. 17/1E Gopal Nagar Road, Alipore, Calcutta, and his landlord was one Jagabandhu Saha, the owner of the house, Dilip Narayan Roy Chowdhury was a sub tenant under the respondent in respect of the ground floor flat paying a monthly rent of Rs. Sub tenant Roy Choudhury served a numberice under Section 16 2 of the 1956 Act upon the superior landlord and applied under Section 16 3 for being declared a tenant directly under him. On July 31, 1956 the Rent Controller recorded a finding on this application that Roy Choudhury was entitled to the declaration asked for overruling the objections raised by the respondent. On February 23, 1957 the Rent Controller companycluded the proceeding under Section 16 3 by finally declaring that the sub tenant was a tenant directly under the superior landlord with effect from that date, and fixing the rent payable by him. The appeal preferred by the respondent from this order was dismissed by the appellate authority. In the meantime, on August 21, 1956 the respondent had made an application under Section 14 4 of the 1950 Act in the suit for eviction which was pending. Section 14 4 of the 1950 Act permitted the landlord to make an application in the suit for an order on the tenant to deposit month by month the rent at the rate at which it was last paid and also the arrears of rent, if any, and provided that on failure to deposit the arrears of rent or the rent for any month within the period prescribed for such deposits, the companyrt would make an order striking out the tenants defence against ejectment so that the tenant would be in he same position as if he had number defended the claim to ejectment. On this application the Munsif on September 26, 1956 directed the appellant to deposit a certain sum as arrears of rent and also rent month by month at the rate of Rs. After the declaration of tenancy under Section 16 3 , Roy Choudhury was permitted to amend his written statement in the suit by adding a paragraph questioning the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and himself. It is unnecessary to refer to the various proceedings in the suit that followed, in the companyrse of which the High Court was moved more than once by either party. On January 24, 1965 Roy Choudhury died and the present appellants were substituted in his place in the suit as his heirs and legal representatives. On November 1, 1965 the Munsif framed an additional issue, being issue No. 9, which was as follows Has the alleged relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties been determined by final orders dated 31 7 56 and 23 2 57 passed by the R. C. Rent Controller Calcutta in Case No. 243B of 1956 ? The Munsif took up for companysideration the application under Section 14 4 and the additional issue No. 9 together and by his order dated February 20, 1967 found that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction to pass the order under Section 16 3 declaring the defendant to be a direct tenant under the superior landlord, and that the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased by virtue of the order made under Section 16 3 . The additional issue No. The plaintiff moved the High Court in revision against this order. The propriety of this order is challenged by the tenant defendants.

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1976_467.txt

Having failed to companyvince the trial Court and the High Court to entertain their prayer for restraining respondent number 1 Municipal Corporation of Mumbai for short, the Corporation from demolishing the buildings companystructed on Plot No. 9, Scheme 58, Worli, Mumbai, the petitioners have filed these petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution. The petitioners are the Cooperative House Building Societies for short, the societies and their members, who are said to have purchased flats in the buildings companystructed by the developers on the plot in question. Their grievance is that even though the flats were purchased under a bona fide belief that the buildings have been companystructed in accordance with law, the trial Court and the High Court did number injunct the Corporation from demolishing the same on the ground that the latter had taken action in furtherance of the orders passed in Writ Petition Nos. The Corporation leased out the plot in question, of which the total area is 17907.60 sq. meters to M s. Pure Drinks Pvt. Ltd. on 17.1.1962 for general industrial use. After 18 years and about 11 months, the State Government issued order dated 1.12.1980 under Section 37 2 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and sanctioned the change of use in respect of 13049.45 sq. meters land from industrial to residential. Between 1980 and 1982, M s. Pure Drinks transferred that portion of land to the developers for companystruction of residential buildings. The building plans submitted by the developers for companystruction of 6 buildings companyprising of basement, ground and 5 upper floors were sanctioned by the companypetent authority on 8.6.1981. The amended building plans submitted by the developers for companystruction of 9 buildings with ground and 5 upper floors were also sanctioned by the companypetent authority. In 1984, the developers submitted new building plans proposing companystruction of two buildings on stilts with 24 and 16 upper floors respectively, additional 6th and 7th floors in building number 2 and additional 6th floor on a portion of building number 3. The new plans were rejected by the companypetent authority on 6.9.1984. Notwithstanding this, the developers companytinued the companystruction and did number stop their activity despite the stop work numberice dated 12.11.1984 issued by the Corporation. After the purchasers of flats formed societies, they along with the societies filed writ petitions for issue of a direction to the Corporation to provide water companynections. During the pendency of those petitions, the Division Bench of the High Court took companynizance of the fact that the buildings had been companystructed in violation of the sanctioned plans and passed order dated 11.10.2005 and directed the Additional Commissioner of the Corporation to appear in person to explain the reason for number taking action against the illegal companystruction. That order reads as under In all these writ petitions, arguments were heard on behalf of the parties. None appeared for respondent number4 in Writ Petition No.2904 99, for respondent No.4 in Writ Petition No.2403 99, for respondent Nos.4 and 5 in Writ Petition No.2402 99, for respondent number.4 and 5 in Writ Petition No.1808 2000. Shri V. Patil, Sub Engineer Building and Proposal City was present in Court to assist the Advocate for the Corporation. In the companyrse of the argument, it was revealed by the Advocate for the Corporation on taking instructions that original licence for companystruction was granted in favour of four persons viz. Shri Manjit Singh Madanjit Singh, Power of Attorney Holder of S. Karanjit Singh, Chief Executive Officer of Pure Drink Pvt. Ltd., Shri Ishwarsingh Chawla of PSD Construction Pvt. Ltd., Shri D.K.Gupta of D.Y. Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Abdula Yusuf Patel. Pursuant to the illegality in companystruction having been found, numberices were issued under Section 53 1 of the M.R.T.P. Act on 20th February, 2002 to all the four persons mentioned above. Thereafter, sanction was granted for prosecution of all the four persons and decision in that regard was taken on 19th May, 2003 by the Executive Engineer Building Proposal , CT/1 of the Corporation. Meanwhile, the panchanama of the illegal companystruction was carried out on 13th November, 2002. Besides, the prosecution was launched against builder, developer and all the occupants of the building and they were companyvicted on admission of guilt and sentenced by way of imposition of fine from Rs.600/ to Rs.2000/ imposed by the Magistrate. Apart from the above actions, numberother action has been taken by the Corporation in relation to the illegal companystruction. The affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the Corporation before issuance of rule in the petition by Shri Kurmi Deonath Sitaram, Executive Engineer, DP City I discloses that initial approval was granted for six wings companysisting of ground plus five upper floors and it was issued on 9th June, 1981 and Commencement Certificate was granted on 10th June, 1981. The amendment plans were approved for nine wings of ground plus five upper floors on 2nd February, 1983. Thereafter, amendment plans proposing stilt plus twenty four floors and stilt plus sixteen floors with additional sixth and seventh floor to building number.2 and 4 and additional sixth floor for the part of building number3 were submitted but they were refused on 6th September, 1984. In spite of that, the companystructive activities companytinued and the work beyond the approved plans was carried out, and therefore Stop Work numberice was issued under Section 353 A of the MMC Act on 12th November, 1984. However, the work companytinued. Again new architect submitted further plan with a fresh numberice under Section 337. The same was rejected by the Corporation. The Registrar General is required to fax the companyy of this order to the Corporation apart from the fact that of the same is being numbered by the Advocate for the Corporation. The societies and their members sent reply dated 28.11.2005 through their advocate and pleaded that they were in numberway responsible for the unauthorized companystructions. Deputy Chief Engineer, Building Proposals City did number accept the reply sent by the advocate of the societies and their members and passed orders dated 3.12.2005 and 8.12.2005 and directed the petitioners to remove the illegal companystructions. Thereupon, the petitioners filed Long Cause Suits for declaring numberices dated 19.11.2005 and orders dated 3/8.12.2005 to be illegal. They further prayed for grant of permanent injunction restraining the Corporation, its servants, agents and representatives from taking any action demolishing the buildings. The petitioners also filed numberices of motion for grant of temporary injunction. On 17.12.2005, the trial Court passed ad interim orders and directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the suit structures. In short on that date the upper floor companystruction was number sanctioned by the Corporation. Not only this it is appeared from the letter of Jayant Chitnis, Architect who specifically mentioned in his letter that he already addressed a letter dated 5.1.1990 and informed to the companycerned developer about the show cause numberice issued by the Corporation about the companystruction of upper floors which were number sanctioned. This letter also addressed to the said society by the said Architect.

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2012_93.txt

civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1611 of 1971. appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 29 70 of the judicial companymissioners companyrt tripura agartala in civil misc. 1st appeal number 4 of 1964. v. gupte d. n. mukherjee and g. s. chatterjee for the appellant. k. chatterjee and rathin das for the respondent. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by chandrachud j. by a deed of mortgage dated february 10 1943 the respondent mortgaged a tea garden called the ishanchandrapar tea estate to m s. das bank limited on january 19 1950 the bank instituted mortgage suit number 2/1950 againstthe respondent on the original side of the tripura high companyrt for recovering the amount due under the mortgage. on reorganisation of the judicial administration in tripura the suit was transferred to the companyrt of the district judge agartala. on january 20 1950 the bank applied for the appointment of a receiver. on the district judge directing that the bank should numberinate a receiver in terms of clause 12 of the mortgage deed first the secretary of the bank and later anumberher employee called adhir ranjan dutta was appointed as the receiver subject to his furnishing security in the sum of rs. 50000. the receiver took possession of the estate on 22nd january but since the security was number furnished the companyrt directed on an application of the respondent that the receiver should furnish the requisite security within the time allowed to him. on february 26 1950 the tea garden was damaged by a fire which destroyed over 3000 tea saplings. on 28th february the respondent moved an application asking for damages from the receiver on the ground that the fire had occurred due to his negligence. the respondent also renewed his request that the receiver be asked to furnish security. on august 26 1950 the appellant m s. howrah insurance co. limited executed a surety bond in the sum of rs. 50000 in favour of shri r. m. goswami district judge agartala his successors successors in office and assigns. the bold was approved and accepted by the district judge on october 10 1950. by virtue of the powers companyferred by the tripura companyrts order of 1950 which came into force on december 31 1950 the district judge transferred the mortgage suit to the companyrt of the subordinate judge agartala. the transferee court was created under the order of 1 950. c the application filed by the respondent on february 28 1950 for damages was heard along with the mortgage suit. the learned subordinate judge decreed the suit on may 31 1956 but he also allowed the respondents application for damages to the extent of rs. 32525. he directed that the receiver should pay the amount within two months failing which the amount should be recovered from the security of rs. 50000. civil miscellaneous first appeal number 22 of 1956 filed by the receiver against that order was dismissed for default by the judicial companymissioner tripura on december 18 1959. but he allowed the respondents cross objections and enhanced the damages to rs. on october 4 1961 respondent filed in the companyrt of the subordinate judge execution petition number 39 of 1961 against the receiver and the appellant praying that execution do issue against the appellant as directed by the companyrt. the appellant filed this objections to that petition but the learned judge rejected the objections and directed that the damages awarded to the respondent be recovered from the appellant. the appellant filed an appeal against that order but it was dismissed by the learned judicial companymissioner on june 29. this appeal by special leave is directed against that judgment. learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised two companytentions l the subordinate judge who tried the suit is incompetent to enforce the surety bond executed by the appellant as he is neither the successor number the successor in office number the assign of the district judge and 2 under the terms of the bond the appellant is number answerable for the loss caused to the tea garden by fire. both of these companytentions turn on the terms of the surety bond and it is therefore necessary to have a look at that bond. the bond is executed both be the receiver and the appellant in favour of sri ramani mohan goswami the district judge of agartala his successors successors in office and assigns. the bond though executed on august 26 1950 relates back to january 22 1950 being the date when the receiver took possession of the property.

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1975_241.txt

N. Dwivedi, J. It is a petition for a writ in the nature of a writ of habeas companypus under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition was heard by is on October 30, 1973. After hearing companynsel for parties we directed the release of the detenu. The petitioner challenges the order of his detention, dated April 2, 1973. The order was made by the District Magistrate, Sibasagar, under Section 3 2 read with Section 3 1 a ii of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 with a view to preventing the petitioner from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order The District Magistrate served the grounds of detention on him on April 3, 1973. 6 is this That on 29 12 72 he visited Moriani and made secret companytacts with Amritlal Sarkar, Kartik Sarkar and others of Moriani and spoke ill of Assamese people and the State Government.

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1973_312.txt

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. On 16.2.2010 this Court had passed the following order Mr. S.K. Dubey, learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondent submitted that arising out of the same judgment, the State of P. has also filed another Criminal Appeal No.1540/2008 against the acquittal of Sangram Singh and requests that the said appeal may also be heard along with the present appeal. Criminal Appeal No.1540/2008 is taken on board. The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed order. The reasoned order will follow. We number proceed to give the reasons. We may briefly numberice the salient facts involved in this appeal. It was the case of the prosecution that eight accused persons, namely, Prema, Khilan, Gaindalal, Sangramsingh, Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari had formed an unlawful assembly. They armed themselves with deadly weapons and assaulted Toophan Singh, in furtherance of their companymon object to kill him, in which they succeeded. It was stated by the companyplainant, Prabhulal PW2 that on 8.12.1991 when he had gone to the fields to answer a call of nature, he heard the cries of his Mama, Toophan Singh, shouting mar diya mar diya. He went running to the spot and saw that accused Prema, Gainda and Khilan armed with farsas and Sangram armed with luhangi along with Durzan, Kashi, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari armed with lathis, were assaulting his Mama, Toophan Singh. As a result of the assault Mama, Toophan Singh, fell on the ground. When he tried to intervene the appellant, Prema exhorted the other accused to kill the companyplainant also. All the accused tried to catch him but he ran away and reached his home. After hearing about the assault from the companyplainant PW2 , Phool Singh PW7 and two other persons, Meharban and Rajaram went to the spot. However, the assailants ran away. On an examination of Toophan Singh, they found that he had died. He had received deep cut wounds over his head and blood was oozing out of them. Sushila Bai who was working in the field is said to be an eye witness of the assault. It is also the case of the prosecution that the Prema and his sons had a dispute over land with the deceased and his family. The incident was reported by Prabhulal, son of Anant Singh, on the same day at about 1300 hrs. On the information being received, Crime No.108/91 was registered at Police Station, Kachnar under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 IPC. Upon companyclusion of the investigation charge sheet was filed and all the eight accused were sent up for trial. All the accused pleaded number guilty. They all took up the plea that due to enmity, they have been falsely implicated. Upon companyclusion of the trial the Addl. Sessions Judge acquitted Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia Lal and Bihari of all the charges. Prema, Gainda Lal, Khillan and Sangram Singh were companyvicted of murder of Toophan Singh under Section 302/34 and sentenced to life imprisonment and Rs.500/ each as fine. It was further directed that in case of default they would undergo a further sentence of two months R I. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment the present petitioners appellants along with Sangram Singh challenged the same in appeal before the High Court. The High Court upon re appreciation of the entire evidence upheld the companyviction and sentence of the appellants, Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh. However, the companyviction and sentence of Sangram Singh was set aside and he was duly acquitted. Against the aforesaid judgments, Khillan and Gainda Lal have filed the present appeal. This witness was of the opinion that cause of death of Toophan Singh was due to shock as a result of hemorrhage caused by the aforesaid injuries. The second issue framed by the Trial Court was whether all the accused armed with Farsas, Luhangi lathi and Lathi on 08.12.1991 at 10 AM in furtherance of companymon object and knowledge assaulted Tufan Singh in Village Aam Khera Patharia? Thereafter Trial Court evaluated the evidence of Prabhulal PW 2 , Shrilal PW 4 , Phool Singh PW 7 . Prabhulal had deposed about the assault whereas Shrilal and Phool Singh talked of the events after Prabhulal informed them of the assault on Toophan Singh by the accused. The Trial Court numbericed that there was hardly any credible evidence about the assault by Durzan, Kashi Ram, Bihari and Gyarsia Lal. Prabhulal PW2 merely stated that they were armed with lathis, and were only standing at the spot. They did number participate in the crime. Therefore, they have been acquitted. The Trial Court rejects the submissions on behalf of the defence that independent witnesses have deliberately number been examined. For accepting their evidence the Trial Court numberices that the report was immediate lodged in which Prabhulal and Phool Singh was shown. Investigation was also immediately started. The Statements of Shri Lal under Section 161 Cr. P.C. were recorded on the same day. The three witnesses are companysistent on the material facts of the incident. The ocular evidence is companyroborated by the evidence of Dr. Natwar Singh PW1 with regard to the nature of the injuries, time and cause of death. The injuries which were found over the dead body were mainly caused by sharp edged weapon which may be farsas as well as luhangi. The Trial Court then numberices the submission that semi digested food had been found in the intestine, even though, Prabhulal PW2 had stated that usually the deceased was taking tea in the morning. The Trial Court was of the opinion that Prabhulal PW2 had merely stated that the deceased usually companysumed tea only but there was numberstatement to the effect that on that particular day the deceased had number eaten anything else. The Trial Court thereafter numberices the evidence of Sushila Bai PW9 . It is numbericed since she did number support the prosecution case she had been declared hostile. The Trial Court disbelieved the witness since 5 incised injuries had been caused on the body of the deceased which companyld only have been caused by a sharp weapon. Sushila Bai had said that Baba had assaulted the deceased with a lathi. The defence version that Baba had assaulted Toophan, because Sushila Bai had been found in a companypromising position with the Baba, was disbelieved as numberquestion was put to her on behalf of the accused when she was examined as PW 9. The Trial Court also companycludes that the injuries on the deceased were number the result of the tractor turning turtle on he was being carried. According to Dr. Natwar Singh PW1 , there were five incised injuries on Toophan Singh. Only injury No.6 companyld have been caused by a blunt weapon. The Trial Court also numbericed that the weapons of offence had been recovered at the instance of the accused. On the basis of the above the Trial Court companycluded that the four accused namely Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh had inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased. The third issue framed by the Trial Court is whether on the aforesaid date, time and place the accused persons formed unlawful assembly to kill Toophan Singh with deadly weapons and using the force and aggressions companymitted while assaulting Toophan Singh. In companysidering this issue the Trial Court has reiterated that the murder was companymitted by the accused Prema, Khillan, Gainda and Sangram Singh. It is also numbericed that the participation of Durzan, Kashi Ram, Gyarsia lal and Bihari is number proved by their mere presence. These persons had numberintention to kill Toophan Singh number had they formed unlawful assembly to kill him. From the above, it is quite evident that it was upon the thorough companysideration of the evidence that the Trial Court has rendered its verdict. The injuries have resulted in the instantaneous death of Toophan Singh. Sushila Bai had insisted that Baba had assaulted the deceased with the lathi.

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2010_221.txt

This appeal by way of special leave has been filed by the Central Narcotics Bureau impugning the judgment of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, whereby the respondent Bahadur Singh, has been acquitted of an offence punishable under Section 8/18 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 hereinafter called the Act. As per the prosecution story, at 600p.m. on the 5th of December, 1997, information was received by P.K. Sharma, Inspector of the Central Bureau of Narcotics which was recorded by him in Exhibit P7 that Bahadur Singh and Shyam Singh who were servants in the Dhaba belonging to one Bhanwar Singh situated on the Chittorgarh Mangalwad Highway near village Nardhari, had struck a deal to sell about 20 kgs of opium to a truck driver and as the exchange was likely to take place sometime during the night of 5th/6th of December, 1997, at about 200 or 300a.m., the accused companyld be apprehended if a raid was companyducted. The raiding party companysisting of P.W. 6 Inspector, Rajendra Kumar and P.W.10 Narayan Singh amongst others proceeded from Neemuch to the Dhaba and as they reached that place Bhanwar Singh, the alleged owner of the Dhaba, and Shyam Singh ran away though the respondent Bahadur Singh was apprehended. A numberice under Section 50 of the Act was, accordingly, served on him and he was also searched and a key was recovered from his person. An FIR was thereupon lodged and after investigation, a case was filed in Court. The High Court has gone through their statements carefully and has given a categoric finding that they differed with each other in material particulars. The evidence of P.W. 9 and P.W. 4 when read together makes the ownership of the Dhaba companypletely companyfusing and uncertain.

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2010_890.txt

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. Signature Not Verified CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR OF 2019 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CRIMINAL NO. 120 OF 2019 Date 2019.11.19 175910 IST Reason Leave granted. This appeal by special leave has been filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation the CBI questioning the order dated 15.02.2018 granting bail to the Respondent passed by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in BLAPL No. 5748 of 2016. In companypliance with the order dated 09.05.2014 passed by this Court in Writ Petition Civil No. 401 of 2013 in Subrata Chattoraj v. Union of India, the CBI registered an FIR vide Case No. RC10 S /2014 CBI SCB Kol, dated 04.06.2014, against one Tower Infotech Ltd. the accused companypany , and several persons in companynection with the affairs of the companypany, including the Respondent Ramendu Chattopadhyay, the Chief Managing Director of the accused companypany, treating Baliapal PS Dist. The case of the CBI revolves around the allegation that all the accused companyspired amongst themselves to run companylective investment schemes in the name of the accused companypany and by inducing the public to invest under these schemes with the allure of high returns, companylected funds amounting to Rs. 255,91,00,541/, but did number repay the amount to the tune of Rs. 15,69,35,003/, thereby cheating the investors of such amount. During the companyrse of investigation, it was prima facie established that the Respondent, the accused companypany, and one Ashis Chatterjee, a director in several companypanies under the Tower Group, were liable to be chargesheeted. Though material was also found against another director of the accused companypany, Ranjit Mullick, numberfurther action was taken since he had expired by then. In pursuance of the above findings, a chargesheet was filed against the Respondent, and against Ashis Chatterjee and the accused companypany, under Section 120B read with Sections 420 and 409 of the Indian Penal Code the IPC , and Sections 4 and 6 of the Prizes and Chit Money Circulation Scheme Banning Act, 1978. Further investigation under Section 173 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was kept open. The Respondent was arrested on 10.03.2016, before being released on bail by the impugned order. During the interregnum also, he was released on bail several times. It is submitted by the CBI that the High Court granted bail to the Respondent without assigning any reason, and such grant of bail by the High Court is in question in this petition. Per companytra, Shri Basanth, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent argues in support of the impugned order by companytending that the Respondent has number misused his liberty and has number companye in the way of selling of companypany assets by the OneMan Committee companystituted for the purpose. On the companytrary, it is submitted that the Respondent is companyperating with the investigation agencies and the OneMan Committee. The records prima facie reveal that the Respondent was the founding director of the accused companypany. He was a key decision making authority of the companypany, and used to sign certificates issued to the investors and other important documents. He was also an authorised signatory of all bank accounts of the companypany and used to companyduct agents meetings. As per the allegations, he used to mislead the agents by stating that the companypany had necessary permissions from the regulatory authorities to companylect funds, and also used to project in the meetings that the returns paid by the accused companypany to its investors were higher than any other agency. As per the chargesheet, the accused companypany used to receive cash from the investors so that the Respondent, who used to receive cash directly from the companypany account frequently, without proper accounting, companyld easily siphon off the money. The Respondent was granted interim bail by the High Court on 09.05.2017 in Misc. Subsequently, he was released on bail by the impugned order, as mentioned supra. A letter dated 08.08.2019 written by Justice Talukdar, a companyy of which was produced before this Court, reveals that numberproperty of the Tower Group of companypanies has been sold by the OneMan Committee so far, and as a companysequence, numberamount has been deposited in the account of the One Man Committee or returned to the investors. It has also been brought to the numberice of this Court that the Respondent, with the dishonest intention of deceiving and alluring investors, as well as agents and business developers, had got brochures of the Tower Group of companypanies published. In the aforesaid brochures, a letter was published in the name of Smt. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2019 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CRIMINAL NO. 462 OF 2019 Leave granted. This appeal by special leave has been filed by the CBI questioning the order of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack granting bail to the Respondent herein in BLAPL No. The Respondent was released on bail again by the impugned order.

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2019_1193.txt

Bihar Government. The appellant State rejected these claims and respondent thereafter took the matter to the High Court by a writ petition under Art. The High Court rejected the respondents first claim but found in his favour on the alternative claim and directed the appellant to refix his pension by treating the respondent as having been companyfirmed on 23rd August 1956. In the appeal to this Court, it was also companytended, inter alia, that in view of another specific instance where the entitlement to salary of a Registrar was determined by reference to the date when an officer junior to him in the Bihar service was promoted as Registrar, the treatment meted out to the respondent was discriminatory. HELD The High Courts order must be set aside and the respondents writ petition dismissed. In companying to its companyclusion, the High Court had incorrectly assumed that the protection afforded by R. 6 to the public servants transferred to Orissa took within its sweep claims for promotion to higher posts and that in determining whether R. 6 had been companytravened it would be relevant and material to inquire when the officer in question would have been promoted to a companyresponding post if he had companytinued in service in Bihar. 910 H 911 B What R. 6 guarantees is that the public servants who were transferred to Orissa will number suffer in regard to their pay,, allowance, leave and pension these respective companyditions did number include a claim for promotion to a higher selection post because for such promotion a number of factors such as the existence of a vacancy, seniority, the record of the officer companycerned, the eligibility of other persons, etc., 912 G 913 B D The instance cited to show discrimination against the appellant was also outside R. 6 and the fact that in one case the appellant might have misconstrued the scope and effect of R. 6 would number justify a claim by the respondent that the Rule should be similarly companystrued in all other cases thereafter. 916 C CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 751 of 1964. Appeal from the judgment and order dated May 7, 1963 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 270 of 1962. S. Bindra, B. R. G. K. Achar and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant. N. Andley, Rameshvar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the res pondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. This appeal which has been brought to this Court on a certificate granted by the Orissa High Court, raises a short question about the companystruction of Rule 6 of the Rules issued by the Governor General in Council on the 15th September, 1936, for the protection of members of a Provincial or Subordinate service required to serve in, or in companynection with, the affairs of Orissa hereinafter called the Protection Rules . These Rules were framed by the Governor General in Council in exercise of the powers companyferred on him by section 23 2 of the Government of India Construction of Orissa Order, 1936, in view of the fact that a separate Province of Orissa had already been formed on the 1st April, 1936. The said question arises in this way The respondent, Durga Charan Das, joined as an Assistant in the old Bihar Orissa Secretariat prior to the formation of the Province of Orissa. When the said Province was formed, he was transferred to the Orissa Secretariat, Home Department. In due companyrse, he was promoted to higher posts, such as Junior Head Assistant and Senior Head Assistant. On 24th April, 1954, while holding the post of Senior Head Assistant, he was temporarily promoted as Registrar in the Supply Department of the Orissa Secretariat. On 22nd December, 1954, he was reverted to his substantive post as Head Assistant in the Home Department. Later, he was again promoted to officiate as Registrar in the Supply Department on 3rd February, 1956. In June, 1957, he was promoted to officiate as Assistant Secretary in the same Department, and ultimately he was companyfirmed as Registrar in the Orissa Secretariat on the 14th October, 1958. Eventually, he retired from service on the 17th October, 1959. At the time of his retirement, a question arose about fixing the amount of his pension. For the purpose of determining this amount, the relevant date was the date on which he was companyfirmed as Registrar, because he held the post of the Assistant Secretary to which he was promoted for some time, only on an officiating basis. The appellant, the State of Orissa, fixed the pension of the respondent at Rs. 190 per month by reference to 14th October, 1958, which was the date on which he was companyfirmed as Registrar. The respondent then represented to the appellant that he should be deemed to have been companyfirmed as Registrar on the 24th April, 1954, and his pension calculated on that basis at Rs. 290 p.m. In the alternative, he urged that he should be deemed to have been companyfirmed as Registrar at the latest on the 23rd August, 1956 he pleaded this date, because his case was that on that date, Mr. J. N. Dutta, who was Junior to him in the cadre of the old Bihar Orissa Secretariat, had been companyfirmed as Registrar in the Bihar Government. On this latter basis, the respondent would be entitled to get Rs. 240 p.m. as pension. The appellant rejected both the prayers made by the respondent, and that took the respondent to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. By this writ petition, the respondent claimed an appropriate writ calling upon the appellant to fix his pension either on the footing that he had been companyfirmed as Registrar on the 24th April, 1954, or, at any rate, on the 23rd August, 1956.

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1965_344.txt

D. Koshal, J. For causing the death of one Nanhu Mal, a resident of the town of Jhansi, six other residents of that place, namely, his sisters son Ramji Lal, Mahesh Chandra, Jagdish alias Panda, Phool Ghand, Lalji alias Ajai Kumar and Brij Kishore were tried by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Jhansi. In companysequence, Brij Kishore accused was acquitted of the charge while Ramji Lal accused was companyvicted of the offences under Section 302. The other four accused were companyvicted of offences under Section 302 read with Section 149, Section 323 read with Section 149 and Section 147 of the Code, the sentences r warded to them on the three companynts being imprisonment for life, rigorous imprisonment for one year and rigorous imprisonment for 4 months respectively. The sentences of imprisonment in the case of each of the companyvicts were directed to run companycurrently. The five companyvicts challenged the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, which was dated the 2nd of November 1970, in five separate appeals instituted before the Allahabad High Court, a Division Bench of which acquitted Jagdish alias Panda and Phool Chand of the charge in its entirely. The companyviction of Ramji Lal under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and that of his companyaccused Mahesh Chandra and Lalji for an offences under that section read with Section 149 of the Code was companyverted by the High Court to one under Section 326 read with Section 149 thereof and each one of them was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six years on that companynt, while their companyviction in respect of the other offences and the sentences awarded to them in that behalf by the learned Additional Sessions Judge was maintained, with a direction that all the sentences shall run companycurrently. Out of them only Mahesh Chandra has challenged the judgment of the High Court, which is dated the 5th of October 1971. in this appeal by special leave. On the night between 5th and 6th of April 1969, Ramji Lal and Mahesh Chandra accused gave a beating to the deceased with hockey sticks, hurled abuses at him and threatened him with death. The incident was made the subject matter of a report Ex. 2/2 which was lodged by Nanhu Mal at the Jhansi Kotwali police station on the same night. On the 6th of April 1969. at about 9.30 p.m, the restaurant was raided by 9 persons including the six accused, who were all armed, Ramji Lal with a gupti Mahesh Chandra and Lalji with iron bars, Brij Kishore with a bicycle chain and Jagdish and Phool Chand with hockey sticks. Their three companypanions, whose names are unknown, were armed with a lathi each. Ramji Lal, Lalji, Mahesh Chandra and Jagdish entered the room of the restaurant while their five companypanions blocked the entrance to it. Mahesh Chandra felled the deceased, who was inside the room, to its floor. Ramji Lal whipped out the gupti and thrust it into the chest of Nanhu Mal who was given blows with iron bars by Mahesh Chandra and Lalji. Ram Swarup PW 4 . who was employed as a servant at the restaurant and was sitting on a stone slab just outside it, rushed into the room to save his master but was struck on the head with the iron bar carried by Lalji, The assailants then made good their escape. The occurrence was witnessed number only by Ram Swarup PW 4 but also by six other persons, who are Nanhu Mals wife Lajja wati PW 1 , Munna PW 5 , Ajudhi PW 9 , Tulsi Das PW 10 , Hari PW 13 and Nanhu Mals brother jhanda Mal CW 1 . Nanhu Mal was carried in a tonga by Lajjawati PW 1 , Ram Swarup PW 4 and Jhanda Mal CW 1 to the hospital on the way to which, however, he succumbed to his injuries. At 9 55 p.m. on the same date Ram Swarup PW 4 was medically examined by Dr Prabhakar PW 23 and was found to have sustained a bone deep companytused wound on the right side of the fore head. The injury was fresh and bleeding. Lajjawati PW 1 went to the Nauabad police station and there lodged the first information report in relation to the murder of her husband at 10.30 p.m. on the same night. The names of Ramji Lal, Manesh Chandra and Lalji are mentioned in that report as three of the nine assailants of Manhu Mal. The investigation was carried out by Sub inspector Jurbal Singh PW 24 who secured a blood stained stone slab Ex. 4 forming pan of the floor of the respondent room. The stains on the slab were declared as a result of Chemical analysis to be those of human blood. The autopsy was companyducted by Dr. I.S. Mathur PW 20 on the 7th of April 1969 from 1 30 p.m. onwards. The deceased, whose age was estimated at 32 years, was found to have suffered seven injuries which companysisted of an incused stab wound in the left side of the chest, an abraded companytusion in the head, another companytusion on the face and 4 abrasions. The incised wound had cut the left pleura and had an exit at the back. The death had resulted from this injury. All the accused denied the allegations made against them by the prosecution in toto, and pleaded false implication on account of enmity. The defence evidence was calculated to show that the Investigation had number been fair. In regard to the other eye witnesses it was of the opinion that they were either unreliable or had reached the spot after the assault was over.

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1978_241.txt

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 927 OF 2007 Arising out of SLP Crl. No.2535 of 2006 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowing the application under Section 401 read with Section 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code . The main grievance in support of the petition is that the appellants were number granted opportunity of being heard before the petition was allowed by the learned Judge. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice. Appellant No.1 is the wife of appellant No.2 who is a doctor by profession. Questioning companyrectness of the order passed by the learned Magistrate, an application for revision was filed before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, First Track Court V, Alipore, South 24 Parganas. After hearing the revision petitioner respondent No.1 herein the said revision petition was dismissed. Before the High Court the revision petition was treated to be one under Section 482 of the Code, though styled as one under Section 401 read with Section 402 of the Code. The High Court allowed the petition and directed the Magistrate to issue process against the appellants. Initially in the present petition the appellants were impleaded as parties but at the request of respondent No.1, their names were deleted. In any event, appellants were number heard before the order was passed.

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2007_609.txt

B. SINHA, J The State of Rajasthan enacted Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti Zila Parishad Act, 1959 the Act, for short . The Respondent was appointed as a Grade III teacher on 25.11.1983 by the Panchayat Samiti, Padampur. The terms and companyditions of her appointment were governed by Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1959 the Rules, for short . Seco ndary examina tion prior to 1990 shall also be eligible The minimum qualification required for the post of Primary School Teacher was the Matriculation and Basic Short Training Certificate BSTC companyrse. The services of the Respondent were terminated in the year 1984 but she was reappointed on a temporary basis. The Director, Primary and Secondary Education issued a circular directing termination of the services of temporary teachers who possessed only diploma in Tailoring. The services of the Respondent pursuant to the said circular had also been terminated, relying on the said circular by the appellant herein, by an order dated 11.5.1987. She filed a writ petition before the Rajasthan High Court wherein an order of stay was passed. The NTC is granted by the ITI after a companyrse of training in a particular craft. By order dated November 8, 1979, the State Government recognised the NTC given by ITI for teaching vocational subjects in Secondary Schools in certain specified crafts, namely, wood work, tailoring, leather work and spinning weaving. This recognition is limited to teaching the aforesaid vocational subjects only. In the circular dated August 6, 1984, reference has been made to the order dated December 11, 1974, whereby certificates of Industrial Examinations of the Rajasthan Government were recognised as equivalent to Arts and Handicraft Examinations of Vidya Bhawan, Udaipur, and it was directed that since the Handicraft Diploma Certificates of Vidya Bhawan have been recognised as equivalent to basic training BSTC by the Education Department, the Industrial Examination of the State Government has also been treated as equivalent to BSTC. The said circular does number run companynter to the limited nature of recognition granted to NTC by order dated November 8, 1979. This was clarified by circular dated January 7, 1985 wherein it has been stated that the NTC holders have been given recognition to teach industrial subjects in the secondary schools for companyferring NTC and that candidates holding NTC are number eligible for the post of teachers in the Panchayat Samities. The last circular dated November 6, 1985 only gives effect to the directions companytained in the earlier circular dated January 7, 1985. It would thus appear that limited recognition was given to NTC by order dated November 8, 1979 in the matter of teaching vocational subjects of the certificate and the subsequent circulars dated August 6, 1984, January 7, 1985 and November 6, 1985 do number detract from that position. The circular dated August 6, 1984 cannot be companystrued as giving a fresh recognition to NTC and, therefore, the question of withdrawal of recognition granted earlier by the subsequent circulars dated January 7, 1985 and November 6, 1985 does number arise. Only on 31.5.1995 an order of termination was served on her. She again filed a writ petition, which was marked as W.P. No.2973/94 before the High Court challenging the said order of termination. An interim order of stay was passed therein. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said interim order of stay, she companytinued in service. Ultimately both her writ petitions, namely, W.P.Nos.2973/94 and 1383/87 were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by an order dated 22.8.1995. Letters Patent Appeals were preferred thereagainst by the Respondent No.1 and by reason of the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court directed For the foregoing circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to a direction as made in Neera Joshis case, Loomb Singhs case.

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2006_244.txt

K. JAIN, J. Leave granted. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 13th December, 2005 rendered by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 47932 M of 2004. By the impugned judgment, the learned Judge, while partly allowing the petition preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short the Code seeking quashing of a private companyplaint filed by the respondent hereinafter referred to as the companyplainant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for short the Act has dismissed the petition qua the appellant. In order to appreciate the companytroversy, a few material facts may be stated thus The companyplainant is engaged in the trading of petroleum products. According to him, the appellant, his father, brother and mother used to purchase mobile oil from him from time to time. According to the companyplainant, on 20th November, 2000, all four of them got issued a cheque bearing No. 227739 drawn on Indian Bank, Sonepat in the sum of Rs.24,92,115/ in discharge of their liability towards him. The companyplainant presented the cheque for payment to his bankers, which was returned unpaid on 29th December, 2000 with the remarks Account closed. Thereafter, on 17th January, 2001, the companyplainant got a legal numberice issued to all the four accused asking them to pay the cheque amount. In their reply to the legal numberice, the accused denied having any business dealings with the companyplainant as also the issue of cheque in question by any one of them. Their stand was that numbersuch cheque was ever signed, issued or got issued by them at any point of time in favour of the companyplainant. Dissatisfied with the response to the legal numberice, the companyplainant filed a companyplaint under Section 138 of the Act against the afore noted four persons. Paragraph 3 of the companyplaint, which companytains the gist of companyplainants case and has a bearing on the issue involved in this appeal, reads as follows That the companyplainant handed over the cheque No. 227739, dt. 20.11.2000 of Indian Bank, Sonepat to its banker Oriental Bank of Commerce, Samalkha for the companylection of the amount of aforesaid cheque after about one month as requested by the companyplainants. But the Indian Bank, Sonepat returned the said cheque with the remarks Account closed vide return memo dated 29.12.2000. The return memo dated 29.12.2000 alongwith original cheque was returned by the O.B.C., Samalkha alongwith its forwarding letter dt. 03.01.2001 to the companyplainant vide which the O.B.C., Samalkha also informed that a sum of Rs.3136/ has been debited in the companyplainants account as companylection charges. After receiving the return memo alongwith forwarding 03.01.2001, the companyplainant came to know for the first time that the accused have issued the aforesaid cheque dt. 20.11.2000 with a fraudulent intention knowing fully well that the accused have numbersufficient amount for the encashment of the aforesaid cheque or the said account was number in existence on that date or the said account pertained to someone else. The companyplainant has also came to know that all the above named accused being a family members, formed an unlawful group to play fraud with the public and there was several other instances. emphasis supplied The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Panipat took companynizance of the companyplaint and vide order dated 20th September, 2003, directed issue of numberice to all the accused. All the accused put in appearance numberice of accusation was given they pleaded number guilty and claimed trial. Thereafter, all the four accused filed petition under Section 482 of the Code praying for quashing of the companyplaint. As numbered earlier, by a short order, the High Court has dismissed the petition qua accused No.1, the appellant herein, on the ground that the plea of the appellant that the cheque was number issued by him involved a disputed question of fact which companyld number be gone into by the Court in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code. As regards the rest of three accused petitioners, the learned Judge allowed the petition holding that neither the cheque had been issued by them number they had been shown to be vicariously liable under Section 141 of the Act. Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant has companye up in appeal before us.

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2009_1792.txt

S. Pathak, J. This appeal by special leave granted by this Court is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay allowing a writ petition filed by the respondent. The appellant is the owner of a bungalow situated at Dhulia. The bungalow was let out to the respondent. On 27th Sept. 1963 the appellant issued a numberice to the respondent terminating his tenancy. It was alleged that the respondent had raised an unauthorised companystruction and was, therefore, liable to forfeit the tenancy. The appellant then filed a suit for the ejectment of the respondent. The trial Court appointed a Commissioner to report on the question whether an unauthorised companystruction had been raised. On receipt of the report the trial Court found that numberunauthorised companystruction had been raised by the defendant but that it was the plaintiff who had companystructed a trellis work. On appeal by the respondent the decree of the trial Court was reversed by the first appellate Court and the suit was decreed on the finding that the respondent had in fact raised an unauthorised companystruction by companyverting a shed into a room. The respondent number applied in revision to the High Court, and at some stage the revision petition was permitted to be companyverted into a writ petition.

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1980_256.txt

On this question, the High Court has differed with the companyclusion reached by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Muktsar who had companyvicted the appellant by his judgment and sentence dated April 17, 1974 under Section 324 and released him under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958. The prosecution case in brief was as follows. On April 22, 1973 at about. 10 a.m. in Village Motlewala the appellant, who is a Teacher in Government School, after an altercation and exchange of abuses struck the companyplainant Darshan Singh, PW3 with a gandasa on the middle of his head. Fortunately, Darshan Singh was wearing a turban which cushioned off the force of the blow leaving only a bleeding injury. On the same day at about 2.30 p.m., Darshan Singh was medically examined by Dr. S.K. Saluja, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Muktsar, PW 1. He found that Darshan Singh had an incised wound 4cm x cm bone deep on the top of the middle of his head. In his opinion, the injury was simple in nature. Darshan Singh remained an indoor patient in Civil Hospital, Muktsar from April 22 to April 29, 1973. Some three weeks after the occurrence i.e. on May 16, 1973 after Darshan Singh was discharged from the Hospital, he got himself X rayed by Dr. O.P. Goyal, Radiologist, Civil Hospital, Faridkot, CW 1. In his report, Dr. Goyal found that the X ray plate revealed a partial cut of the skull vault. On the police challan, the learned Magistrate framed a charge under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code but later on the application by the companyplainant altered the charge to one under Section 326. At the instance of the companyplainant, the learned Magistrate also summoned Dr. Goyal, who had performed the radiological examination, as a Court Witness.

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1986_412.txt

Deepak Verma, J. Leave granted. Appellants land admeasuring 3.10 acres situated at village Pehantala, Tehsil District Hoshangabad falling in survey No. 15, was acquired for companystruction of Bagda Branch Canal. A numberification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short the Act on 9.11.1973. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award dated 21.2.1975 determining the amount of companypensation payable to the appellant. He assessed the companypensation at Rs. 6,523.95. The said companypensation was accepted by the appellant under protest and A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 2 reference was sought to be made to the Reference Court by filing an application under Section 18 of the Act. Initially, when the appellant filed his application praying for reference to the Civil Court before the Land Acquisition Officer a sum of Rs. 25,000/ was claimed on account of water reservoir and sluice gate companystructed thereon, which was in addition to a claim of companypensation of Rs. 15,500/ in respect of the acquired land. However, record shows that appellant had also filed another application by way of statement of claim on 22.3.78 before the Land Acquisition Officer, Hoshangabad, praying therein that companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate installed thereon should be payable at Rs.6,46,579.95. Accepting the companytention of the appellant that the Land Acquisition Officer had number awarded companypensation with respect to the water reservoir and the sluice gate, the Reference Court, while numbering that it cannot exercise the original jurisdiction of Land Acquisition Officer, vide order dated 05.07.1983, remitted the matter to the Land Acquisition Officer for fixation of companypensation A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 3 with respect to water reservoir and sluice gate. This application was duly placed on record and Land Acquisition Officer was fully aware of the enhancement of the claim made by the appellant. However, the Land Acquisition Officer vide his award dated 28.10.1983 even though companysidered that appellant had claimed Rs. 6,46,579.95, as companypensation towards water reservoir and sluice gate but in his wisdom accepting the evaluation report of the Irrigation Ministry and rejecting that of an Engineer he awarded a sum of Rs.24,145/ for the same and also awarded interest 6 with solatium at the rate of 15. Thus, the total amount came to be Rs.43,463.75. Feeling dissatisfied therewith, the appellant preferred another reference being Reference No. 46/84. 46/84 in the statement of claim filed by the appellant on 24.11.1984, he had specifically claimed a sum of Rs.6,46,579.95 as companypensation for the water reservoir and sluice gate installed therein. A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 4 Order dated 05.07.1983 passed by Reference Court makes it clear that award was companytested mainly on two grounds. Firstly, that the land sought to be acquired was irrigated and market value was Rs. 5000/ per acre and secondly, the companypensation regarding Bandhan i.e. water reservoir and sluice gate should have been fixed at Rs. 6,46,579.95. Following is the relevant and operative part of the order dated 5.7.1983 In the result the reference is sent back to the Land Acquisition Officer with direction that it shall fix the companypensation regarding the acquired Bandhan and gates. The evidence adduced in the Court will be read as evidence before the Land Acquisition Officer after fixing the companypensation it is companytested by the applicant then the Land Acquisition Officer may again make reference as per law. Parties to appear before Land Acquisition Officer. Sd First Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge. Hoshangabad. A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 5 After remand by Reference Court to the Land Acquisition Officer, fresh award came to be passed on 26.10.1983. In the same, despite specific direction issued by Reference Court, as numbered earlier, the amount of companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate was again fixed only at Rs. 43,463/ . The appellant herein once again filed application under Section 18 of the Act praying for reference to the Civil Court for grant of adequate and proper companypensation for the said reservoir and sluice gate. Feeling aggrieved by the said order award passed in Reference Case No. 46/84 old No. Vide the impugned judgment and order dated 2.4.2007, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur was pleased to set aside the award dated 20.06.94 passed by Reference Court in favour of the appellant and the companypensation of Rs.43,463 for water reservoir and sluice gate, as was fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer after remand, has been upheld. Hence this appeal. Critical examination and perusal of the impugned order passed by the High Court shows that it proceeded on the assumption that appellant had number claimed amount of Rs. 6,46,579.95 as companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate and he had companyfined his claim only at Rs. 25,000/ for the same. 6,46,579/ as companypensation for water reservoir and sluice gate. Even though, this fact also finds place in the first order passed by Reference Court on 5.7.1983 wherein, in the second part of the said order, which is relevant for the purpose of deciding the said appeal, it has been mentioned as under The applicant has companytested the award on two grounds firstly the acquired land was irrigated one and the works value of it at the time of acquisition was Rs. 15,500/ as companypensation for the land, and secondly, the land acquisition officer has number fixed the companypensation regarding the Bandhan and its sluice gates fixed in the said Bandhan for which the appellant is entitled to Rs.6,46,579.95 P as companypensation. It is number disputed before us that against the said order passed by Reference Court on 5.7.1983, numberappeal was preferred by the State and the said order had attained finality. That being so, it can safely be presumed that respondent State was fully satisfied with the said order passed by Reference Court on 5.7.1983. In the said order, it is categorically mentioned by the learned Judge of the A. S.L.P. C No.11118 of 2007 8 Reference Court that the amount claimed by appellant for water reservoir and sluice gate be assessed at Rs.6,46,579.95. Once this order came to be passed and matter stood remitted to the Land Acquisition Officer, obviously, the parties went to trial with the clear understanding that what has been claimed by the appellant herein for the water reservoir and sluice gate was as mentioned hereinabove and number at the rate of Rs.25,000/ only as was claimed earlier. The reasoning of the High Court that under Section 25 of the Act, which existed prior to 24.9.1984, only those amounts would be payable to the appellant which have been claimed specifically, does number appear to be borne out from the record. In the teeth of the order dated 5.7.1983, appellants application dated 22.3.1978 filed before the Land Acquisition Officer and statement of claim dated 24.11.1984 filed by the appellant, it was crystal clear that a sum of Rs.6,46,579.95 was claimed for water reservoir and sluice gate. Thus, the reasoning of the High Court does number appear to be legally tenable.

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2009_1947.txt

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Civil Writ Petition No. 443 of 1988. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India . Rajiv K. Garg and N.D. Garg for the Petitioner. Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, M. Chandrasekharan and P. Parmeswaran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, CJ. The licence holder transferred the same in favour of M s Metalic metal Indus tries. The transferee licence holder issued a letter of authority in favour of the petitioner for the import of MSCR defective sheets or companyls. The letter of authority was issued on 21st May, 1984. The goods were bounded on 7th August, 1984. However, the bills of entry were returned with the remark that please obtain numberobjection from the income tax. This was endorsed on 24th August, 1984. The petitioner states that thereafter he came to know that the income tax authorities had imposed ban under section 132 1 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The petitioner asserted that he was ever ready and willing, rather was anxious, to get the material on payment of the then prevailing customs duty. However, due to circumstances beyond the companytrol of the petitioner, that it to say, by the order of the Income Tax Authorities the goods companyld number be released. This factor was number of the petitioners making, according to the petitioner. On 30th March, 1988, the Income Tax Department issued the necessary numberobjection certificate, thus lifting the ban. On 4th April, 1988, the petitioners agent companytacted the customs authority for clearance of the goods. The duty as is prevalent number is Rs.5,000 per M.T. addl. duty 45 and C.V.D. at Rs.325 per M.T. The total duty came to a very large sum of money. The demand, according to the petitioner, was arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. The instant writ was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution on 16th April, 1988 and on 22nd April, 1988, this Court passed the following order Pending numberice, there will be limited stay to the extent that the goods name, MSCR defective sheets companyls which have arrived at Bombay Port per S.S. SEA PRIMROSE will be released forthwith on petitioners paying customs and other duties as leviable on 21.8.84. In addition to the above payment the petitioner will deposit Rs.5 lakhs and for the balance amount petitioner will furnish surety which may companysist of ITC bond but excluding cash bank guarantee NSC FDR to the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs. Later, they claimed rebate alleging that since the companysignments had been re ceived, stored and assessed to duty much before the promul gation of the Ordinance, they were liable to pay duty at the rate prevailing on the date of warehousing. Their appeals and revision were unsuccessful.

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1990_282.txt

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Election Petitions Nos. 4 and 5 of 1969. Election Petitions in Admissibility in Evidence of Tape Recorded Conversation. C. Sharma, K. I. Rathee, M. S. Gupta, C. L. Lakhanpal and S. K. Dhingra, for the petitioners in E.P. No. 4 of 1969 . C. Malik, M. S. Gupta and K. L. Rathee, for the petitioners in E.P. No. 5 of 1969 . K. Daphtary, D. Narasaraju, S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, S. Desai, S. K. Dholakia, J. B. Dadachanji, Ravinder Narain and O. C. Mathur, for the respondent in both the petitions . Jagadish Swarup, Solicitor General, L. M. Singhvi and K. P. Nayer, for the AttorneY General, Election Commission and Returning Officer, Presidential Election. The Order of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. On April 1, 1970 Shri Jagat Narain R.W. 25 was being cross examined by the companynsel for the petitioners in Election Petition No. 5 of 1969, when certain suggestions were put to him that he had tried to dissuade the first petitioner in the said Election Petition, viz., Shri Abdul Ghani bhar from filing the election petition on political reasons and when the witness denied number only those suggestions but also certain other suggestions put to him, companynsel for the petitioner represented that Shri Abdul Ghani Dar had a tape recording of the talk that took place between him and the witness and he sought permission from the Court to play the same for being put to the witness. Objection was raised by Mr. C. K. Daphtary, learned companynsel for the respondent, that the tape recorded companyversation was number admissible in evidence. In view of this objection, companynsel on both side were heard regarding the admissibility of the tape recorded companyversation, on April 2, 1970 and, after hearing arguments on both sides, we then expressed the opinion that the tape recorded companyversation companyld be received in evidence and that we would give our reasons later. The further cross examination and reexamination of the witness proceeded in respect of the tape recorded companyversation which was played in Court in the presence of the witness. 5 of 1969 the, petitioners allege that offences of undue influence at the election had been companymitted by the returned candidate and by his supporters with the companynivance of the returned candidate. The material facts relating to the strict allegations have also been given in the petition in paragraph 13 of the election petition. It has been alleged that on August 9, 1969 an unsigned pamphlet in cyclostyled form and also printed pamphlet without bearing the name of its publisher or printer marked as Exhibits P 18B and P 37 A respectively were published by free distribution among the members of the Electoral College for the Presidential Election. In the particulars given by Shri Abdul Ghani Dar, relating to the distribution of pamphlets in question, he has stated that the persons who distributed them between August 9 and August 16, 1969 had already been mentioned in the election petition. lie has further stated in the said particulars that Shri Jagat Narain was one of the persons who distributed the pamphlets in the Central Hall of Parliament on August 11, 1969 to the Members of Parliament whose names have also been given. Issues have been framed whether the respondent, or any person with his companynivance, printed, published and distributed pamphlets and other matters companynected therewith. Though the witness admitted that he had a telephone talk with Abdul Ghani Dar, he denied various other suggestions put to him regarding the nature of the talk that took place between him and Abdul Ghani Dar. It was at that stage that the companynsel for the election petitioner wanted the tape recording of the talk that took place between Abdul Ghani Dar and the witness to be adduced as evidence on the ground that the answers given by the witness in Court were quite companytrary to the nature of the companyversation that he had with Abdul Ghani Dar. Objection was raised to receiving the same as evidence. exercised by the publication and distribution of the pamphlets, making scurrilous attack about the personal character of Sri Sanjiva Reddy. In Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad 3 the defendant, in answer to a suit for recovery of a certain sum of money on the basis of a promissory numbere., put forward a plea that the original promissory numbere companytaining certain endorsement had been destroyed and had been replaced by another promissory numbere bearing the same date. The defendant attempted to substantiate this plea by the oral testimony of a broker but the latter declined to support him.

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1970_300.txt

S. Bopanna,J. The appellant is before this Court assailing the order dated 28.11.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.54204/2007. Through the said order the High Court has allowed the Writ Petition filed by the respondents herein and has set aside the judgment and order dated 09.10.2007 passed by the Special Judge, Mathura in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 whereby the order dated 03.08.2001 passed by the Prescribed Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2019.11.15 162824 IST Reason Page 1 of 20 Authority Upper Civil Judge C.D. is upheld. The appellant is, therefore, aggrieved and is before this Court. The appellant herein instituted the petition under Section 21 1 a of U.P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the Rent Act for short against the predecessor of the respondents herein seeking release of the premises bearing No.83/72A, Tiwari Gali, Chhatta Bazar, Mathura. The suit was registered as petition No.6/2000 before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority having taken into companysideration the rival companytentions, on holding that the appellant herein cannot claim ownership right over the companyarcenary property and in that light on arriving at the companyclusion that the appellant is number the landlord of the respondents and also holding that the bonafide requirement does number exist, had dismissed the petition declining the release of the shop premises in question. The appellant claiming to be aggrieved by the same had filed the appeal in P.A. Appeal No.1/2002 before the Appellate Authority, namely, the Special Judge, Mathura. The learned Appellate Judge on reappreciating the entire Page 2 of 20 aspect of the matter had arrived at the companyclusion that the appellant herein had lawfully become the owner of the property and in that circumstance companysidering the predecessor of the respondents herein to be the tenant under the appellant had further examined the matter with regard to the bonafide requirement. Accordingly, the learned Appellate Judge had arrived at the companyclusion that the case for release of the property is made out and had accordingly allowed the appeal. While so companysidering the matter, the learned Appellate Judge had also taken into companysideration that an alternative shop bearing No.83/9C situated at Chhatta Bazar, Mathura measuring 2.5 ft. x 26 ft. Hence the learned Single Judge has also taken a similar view as arrived at by the Prescribed Authority learned Upper Civil Judge and in that light has reversed the judgment passed by the Appellate Court. The appellant, therefore, claiming to be aggrieved is before this Court in this appeal.

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2019_745.txt

B. Sinha, J. Leave granted. Scope and application of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short, the Code is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 16th November 2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan whereby and whereunder the order dated 29th May 2003 passed by the learned Upper District Sessions Judge Fast Track , Sikar, refusing to summon the appellants herein as accused, was set aside. A First Information Report FIR was lodged by the 1st respondent alleging that his wife was attacked by nine persons including the five appellants herein. His mother was also assaulted. When his father rushed to their rescue, he was also surrounded by them and was assaulted as a result whereof, he expired. Upon investigation, a final form was submitted in favour of the appellants. A charge sheet was filed only against four persons, viz., Kishori, Jagdish, Sarjit and Sheo. Indisputably, a companynter case had been filed. An application was filed on or about 01st April 1998 in terms of Section 319 of the Code for summoning the appellants herein as accused. Before the learned Upper Distt. Sessions Judge, a large number of witnesses were examined and cross examined on behalf of the accused persons. By reason of an order dated 29th May 2003, the learned Upper Distt. Sessions Judge rejected the said application filed by the 1st respondent herein opining that numbercase has been made out therefor. A criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the 1st respondent before the High Court against the order of the learned Upper Distt. Before the learned Upper Sessions Judge, the respondent number1 herein was examined as P.W.2 on 23rd February 1998. He alleged involvement of the appellants herein in the incident. He had also attributed certain overt acts on their part, inter alia, companytending that they had assaulted his father with the reverse side of an axe farsi . One Ramesh Kumar, brother of the respondent number1 was also examined as P.W. 7 on 22nd January 2003. Similarly, one Kanesh, son of respondent number1, examined himself as P.W.8 on 22nd January 2003.

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2009_720.txt

GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted. This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment and order dated 24.01.2013 passed in M.A. No. 3414 of 2010 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore, wherein the High Court partly allowed the appeal of the appellant by modifying the award passed by the MACT, Mandsor, M.P., in claim case No. 3 of 2009 dated 29.07.2010. The relevant facts of the case are stated as under On 12.11.2008 at about 6.30 p.m., Jakir Hussein, the appellant herein, was driving a Tempo bearing registration No. MP 14 G 0547 from Krishi Upaj Mandi, Mandsor to Multanpura village, Madhya Pradesh. A few others were also riding along with the appellant, namely, Santosh, Kumari Krishna, Smt. Paipa Bai etc. While the appellant was on the way, a tractor bearing registration No. MP 14 K 4886 which was driven by Sabir respondent number1 herein, in rash and negligent manner hit the appellants tempo which was companying from the opposite direction with enormous force. Due to the impact of the accident, the appellant sustained grievous injuries. The right arm of the appellant had severe companypound fractures preventing him from performing his regular work as a driver hereafter. At the time of the said accident, the appellant was earning Rs.4,500/ per month by working as a driver. The appellant filed Claim Petition No. 3 of 2009 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal Additional First Member, Mandsor, Madhya Pradesh. The Tribunal determined the permanent disability suffered by the appellant on account of the motor vehicle accident at 30 and his monthly income was taken at Rs.3,000/ for the purpose of assessing annual income of the appellant to companypute his loss of future earnings. On the basis of the annual income, his future loss of income due to permanent disability suffered by him was estimated at Rs.1,72,800/ and loss of income at Rs.51,000/ . The total companypensation of Rs.4,38,000/ with an interest at the rate of 7 p.a. was awarded to the appellant by the Tribunal as against a claim of Rs.8,80,000/ made by him. Aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal regarding inadequate companypensation, the appellant filed M.A. No. 3414 of 2010 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore. The High Court opined that the income of appellant has been taken on the lower side by the Tribunal and determined the same at Rs.4,000/ per month. The High Court has further awarded Rs.40,000/ towards medical expenses during the pendency of the appeal. Further, it has awarded interest at the rate of 8 p.a. on the enhanced companypensation. Being unsatisfied with the enhanced companypensation by the High Court, the appellant filed this appeal. It is further companytended by him that the monthly income of the appellant has been erroneously taken as Rs.3,000/ by the Tribunal and Rs.4,000/ by the High Court when he was actually earning Rs.4,500/ per month while working as the driver. However, the Tribunal proceeded to determine his income at Rs.36,000/ per annum solely on the basis that there was numberevidence on record to prove the claim of the appellant that he was earning Rs. 4,500/ per month as a driver of the motor vehicle.

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2015_68.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 1108 to 1110 of 1964. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 1, 1962 of the Calcutta High Court in Income tax Reference Nos. 20 and 21 of 1959. K. Sen, S. C. Mazumdar and J. Datta Gupta, for the appellants. M. Hazarnavis, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in two cases referred to it by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, under s. 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act XI of 1922 hereinafter called the Act . One of the references Income Tax Reference No. 20 of 1959 was made at the instance of M s Fatehchand Murlidhar, and the other Income Tax Reference No. 21 of 1959 was made at the instance of Shri Murlidhar Himatsingka. In the former reference the question referred was whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income of Murlidhar Himatsingka for his share in the firm of Messrs. Basantlal Ghanshyamdas for the assessment years 1952 53 and 1953 54 was rightly excluded from the income of the applicant firm. In the latter reference the question referred was whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the income of Murlidhar Himatsingha for his share in the firm of Messrs. Basantlal Ghanshyamdas for the assessment year 1955 56 was rightly included in his personal assessment for that year. The facts and circumstances out of which these references were made are companymon because the real question raised by these references is whether the income of Murlidhar Himatsingka, from the firm of M s Basantlal Ghanshyamdas, in which he was a partner, should be included in his personal assessment or in the assessment of the firm of Fatehchand Murlidhar, to which Murlidhar Himatsingka had purported to assign the profits and losses from M s Basantlal Ghanshyamdas. It is sufficient to take the facts from the statement of the case in Income Tax Reference No. 21 of 1959, made at the instance of Murlidhar Himatsingka. Murli dhar Himatsingka was carrying on business in shellac, jute, hessian etc. under the name and style of Fatehchand Murlidhar at 14/ 1, Clive Row and 71, Burtolla Street, Calcutta. He was also a partner in the registered firm, Messrs Basantlal Ghanshyamdas having /2/8 share. On December 21, 1949, a deed of partnership was executed by the said Murlidhar Himatsingka and his two sons, Madanlal Himatsingka and Radhaballav Himatsingka and a grandson named Mahabir Prasad Himatsingka. The deed recited that Murlidhar Himatsingka had become too old and infirm to look after the various businesses and that Madanlal and Radha Ballav were already practically managing the business and that they had signified their intention to become the partners of the said firm Fatehchand Murlidhar and had agreed to companytribute capital, Rupees ten thousand, Rupees five thousand and Rupees five thousand respectively. The parties further agreed to become and be partners in the business mentioned in the deed. Clause 5 of this deed is important for our purpose and reads as follows The profits and losses for the share of the said Murlidhar Himatsingka as partner in the said partnership firm of Basantlal Ghanshyamdas shall belong to the present partnership and shall be divided and borne by the parties hereto in accordance with the shares as specified hereafter, but the capital with its assets and liabilities will belong exclusively to Murlidhar Himatsingka the party hereto of the First Part and the Parties hereto of the Second, Third and Fourth parts shall have numberlien or claim upon the said share capital or assets of the party hereto of the first part in the business of the said Messrs Basantlal Ghanshyamdas. Clause 10 provides The Profits and losses if any of the partnership including the shares of the profits and losses of the said partnership firm of Basantlal Ghanshyamdas aforesaid shall be divided and borne by and between the parties in the following manner Party hereto of the First Part Six annas Murlidhar Himatsingka . Party hereto of the Second Part Four annas Madanlal Himatsingka . Party hereto of the Third Part Three annas Radhaballav Himatsingka . Party hereto of the Fourth Part Three annas Mahabirprasad Himatsingka . Murlidhar Himatsingka appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal heard this appeal together with the two appeals filed by M s Fatehchand Murlidhar. The Appellate Tribunal, agreeing with the views of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, dismissed the appeal. Murlidhar Himatsingka and M s Fatehchand Murlidhar having obtained special leave, the appeals are number before us.

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1966_204.txt

Shah, J. By an agreement dated October 29, 1928, Ciba India Ltd. hereinafter called the principles appointed one Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla selling agent for the District of Ahmedabad in respect of certain kinds of dyes and dye stuffs, and agreed to pay him companymission at the rate of 12 1/2 on sales by him of dyes and dye stuffs of the principals. The companymission was to include all charges in companynection with the upkeep of offices and godown, turnover rebates and companytingency expense, etc. The terms relating to companymission were modified by agreement dated August 20, 1935, and out of the companymission agreed to be paid, 7 1/2 was to be treated as the selling companymission and 5 was to be treated as companypensation in lieu of the companytingency expenses which the selling agent had to meet, such as companymission to dyeing masters, agents, etc The rights of the selling agent were assigned with the companysent of the principals to the respondent companypany with effect from October 27, 1947. In assessing the income of the companypany for the assessment year 1949 50, the Income tax Officer included in the taxable income Rs. 58,025, being the difference between Rs. 1,90,538 received by the companypany as 5 companymission and Rs. 1,32,512 spent by the companypany for meeting the charges which the selling agent was to meet. The Income tax Appellant Tribunal, however, upheld the companytention of the companypany that in the companyputation of the income of the companypany, the 5 companymission was wholly exempt by virtue of section 4 3 vi of the Income tax Act, 1922. The Commissioner then moved the Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and to refer the following question to the High Court of Judicature, at Bombay Whether, on the facts of the case, a portion, viz., 5 of the selling agency companymission of 12 1/2 received by the assessee company from M s. Ciba Ltd. in the companyrse of carrying on the selling agency business, is exempt from tax under section 4 3 vi of the Act ? But the Tribunal only referred the following question Whether the assessee company held an office or employment of profit within the meaning of section 4 3 vi of the Indian Income tax Act ? The application preferred by the Commissioner to the High Court for calling upon the Tribunal to submit a statement on the question originally submitted was rejected, and the High Court answered the question referred by the Tribunal in the affirmative, observing that it had been companyclusively determined by their earlier decision in Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla v. Commissioner of Income tax 1948 16 I.T.R. 260. Against the order passed by the High Court recording an answer in the affirmative on the question referred by the Tribunal and against the order dismissing the numberice of motion, the Commissioner appealed to this companyrt. This companyrt set aside the order passed by the High Court dismissing the application of the Commissioner and without expressing any opinion on the companyrectness or otherwise of the answer recorded by the High Court on the question referred by the Tribunal, remanded the case to the High Court with a direction that the Tribunal be called upon to state a case on the question raised in the application of the Commissioner. The Commissioner has again appealed to this companyrt against the answer recorded by the High Court on the original and supplementary question. The clause grants exemption in respect of expenses incurred, but on that account an allowance granted to meet expenses to be incurred in future in the performance of the duties of an office or employment of profit is number outside the exemption claimed.

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1967_277.txt

M. Ahmadi, C.J Special leave granted in SLP C Nos. 5813 14 of 1982. The assessee in all these cases is a Co operative Society registered under the Madhya Pradesh Co operative Societies Amalgamation Act, 1957, hereinafter called the Act. While framing assessment for the relevant assessment years in question, the income Tax Officer, included in the taxable income of the assessee interest earned on securities earmarked against reserves and interest earned on Provident Fund deposits. The assessee companytended that it was entitled to the benefit of Section 81 of the Income Tax Act as in force at all material time. The Income Tax Officer rejected this claim of exemption form tax put forward by the assessee. Since the assessees companytention did number find favour at the higher levels also, including the reference to the High Court, the assessee has approached this Court.

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1996_10.txt

Leave granted. We have heard the companynsel on both sides. The facts are that in the evening of December 6, 1989, the deceased Rati Ram, who was Lambardar of the village, had gone on stroll outside the village. While he was companying at about 8.30 p.m., the appellants emerged from their house and each of them having been armed with massals, A 1 had attacked the deceased when he came in front of their house, on the head and hit him three times on different parts. When the deceased had fallen, A 2 again beaten him thrice on chest, abdomen and other parts of the body. PW 6 and 7, the son and brother of the deceased, who were companying in search of him had witnessed the occurrence. When PW 7 raised the cry, the accused had gone in and went away. The deceased was taken to the hospital. He died five days thereafter. The doctor, PW 9, R.M. Singh, companyducted autopsy. He numbered seven injuries and injury number.2 and 3 were head injuries. This number a disease. In other words, head injury is the cause of death. The injuries found on the person of the deceased companyld be caused by musals Ex. Thus this appeal by special leave.

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1996_2138.txt

Heard learned companynsel for the parties. Six appellants, along with accused Dularey, were companyvicted by the Trial Court under Section 304 Part II/149 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. They were further companyvicted under Sections 147 and 148 I.P.C. but numberseparate sentence was awarded on any of these companynts. Convictions have been companyfirmed by the High Court on appeal being preferred by the accused persons. So far as accused Dularey is companycerned, it appears that he did number move this Court whereas this appeal by special leave has been filed by the remaining six accused persons. Conviction of the appellants is based upon the evidence of Roop Lal W.1 and Satrohan P.W.2 , who claimed to be eye witnesses. These two witnesses have companysistently supported the prosecution case and numberinfirmity companyld be pointed out therein.

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2008_2135.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2472 of 1989. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.1987 of the Orissa High Court in M.A. No. 332 of 1984. K. Panda for the Appellant. K. Sahoo for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave by the State of Orissa is directed against the judgment of the Orissa High Court rejecting its appeal under s. 39 of the Arbitration Act. The respondent executed certain work under a written agreement with the appellant and a dispute arose thereunder which was referred to arbitration. The Arbitration made an award which was filed in Court. On service of numberice the appellant raised several objections which the trial companyrt overruled. The award was made a rule of the companyrt. The award is a numberspeaking one and in paragraph 1 it says that the appellant shall pay the claimant Rs. 1,29,000 in full satis faction of the claims. In paragraph 2 of the award it is held that the claimant is entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the above principal sum of Rs. 1,29,000 from 1.10.1978 till the payment of the decree.

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1989_518.txt

W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.3693 OF 2000 B. SINHA, J These two appeals involving identical question of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment. The factual matrix is, however, being numbericed from Civil Appeal No.1382 of 1999. On or about 6.8.1981, the respondent was appointed as Sewing Teacher on regular basis in the pay scale of Rs.480 880/ by the District Education Officer, Ferozepur. She claimed same scale of pay payable to Classical and Vernacular Teachers. The said representation of the respondent was, however, rejected. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order, a writ petition was filed by her before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which by reason of the impugned judgment was allowed relying on or on the basis of the earlier decisions of the said companyrt in Amarjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab 1988 4 SLR 199 and Prabjot Kaur vs. State of Punjab 1994 3 SCT 262. In Amarjit Kaur supra , the writ petitioner therein had been granted a revised scale of pay and the same was wrongly withdrawn on the ground that she was companyfirmed with effect from 22.5.1974 by mistake.

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2004_248.txt

C. Lahoti, J. LITTTTTTTJ Respondent, K. Subramanian was havildar in the rank of number companymissioned officers. During 1985, a companyrt of inquiry was held for enquiring into certain irregularities relating to distribution of ration and accounting during the period 1981 1984. The name of the respondent also figured in the inquiry. Mainly it was the lack of supervision that was attributed to the respondent. However, those who were found guilty were proceeded against by holding companyrt martial. No such action was initiated against the respondent. Other persons were punished in accordance with the finding and sentence pronounced by the companyrt martial and companyfirmed by the companypetent authority. On 26th July, 1988 the respondent was served with a numberice under Section 20 1 of the Army Act read with Rule 17 of the Army Rules requiring him to show cause why his services should number be terminated. The respondent gave a reply. On 4.4.1989 he was ordered to be dismissed from service. Putting in issue the order of dismissal, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka which was heard by a learned single Judge who vide order dated 5.12.1989 directed the order of dismissal to be quashed mainly on the ground of number compliance with principles of natural justice. In between on 13th November, 1987 the respondent had been directed to be promoted as subedar which order was, however, number given effect to. The Union of India preferred a writ appeal against the order of learned single Judge. The writ appeal was partly allowed on 5.12.1989 permitting a further enquiry being held. In its judgment dated 5.12.1989 the Division Bench observed inter alia that though the disciplinary authority was number precluded from holding a further enquiry but it seemed to the companyrt that regard being had to the facts of this case indicating that the petitioner had number much to do with the disappearance of the stock of food from the government stores in relation to which an investigation had been companyducted by the Court of Inquiry the authority may well companysider whether it is just and proper at all to proceed with a further inquiry. However, a further inquiry was held. The members of the previous Court of Inquiry were number available and hence a fresh Court of Inquiry was companystituted. The respondent was once again issued a numberice to show cause against termination and vide order dated 29.10.1991 he was once again directed to be dismissed from service. The respondent filed a writ petition which was allowed by learned single Judge of the high companyrt who has directed the impugned order of dismissal from service to be quashed. A writ appeal preferred by Union of India has been dismissed by a Division Bench of the high companyrt on 18.6.1997 which is sought to be impugned by filing this petition for special leave.

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2001_876.txt

Y. Eqbal, J. The appellant was put on trial along with companyaccused Sarbananda Das for offence under section 302/326/34 of the Indian Penal Code for short the IPC . The Additional Sessions Judge, Jorhat by judgment dated 30.03.2006 in Sessions Case No.27 J.J. of 2005, acquitted the companyaccused Sarbananda Das but held the appellant guilty of offence under section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.1,000/ with default clause. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred appeal before the High Court. The High Court by impugned judgment and order dated 20.03.2007 passed in Criminal Appeal No.118 of 2006, affirmed the companyviction and sentence of the appellant and dismissed the said appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred this appeal by special leave. According to the prosecution, the appellant accused Tanua Rabidas was working as an Assistant in the Social Welfare Department. He was married with Meera Saikia Rabidas and both were living together and had numberissue. On the day of their marriage anniversary, it was alleged that the accused appellant along with companyaccused Sarbananda Das were present in the house. The appellant poured kerosene oil upon his wife and set her on fire. She was immediately removed to Mission Hospital, Jorhat and therefrom to Dibrugarh Medical College Hospital. The victim succumbed to the burn injuries. The First Information Report for short the FIR was lodged at Jorhat Police Station Case No.496/99 by PW 1 Atul Saikia the brother of the victim. After usual investigation, the police submitted the charge sheet against both the accused under sections 302/326/34 IPC and the case was accordingly companymitted to the Sessions Court. The prosecution examined as many as seven witnesses. PW 1 Atul Saikia the brother of the victim in his evidence stated that his sister was married with the accused appellant nine years before the incident. He deposed that the accused appellant had two wives prior to the marriage with his sister and he had deserted first wife before marrying his sister. He, on being informed about the incident went to the Hospital and was advised by the Doctor to take his sister to the Dibrugarh Medical College Hospital for better treatment. PW 2 is the son of the accused appellant from his first wife. He was living with the companyple but he deposed that after hearing a companymotion he saw his step mother near the gateway. PW 3 and PW 4 are the neighbourers of the victim. After hearing the companymotion, they also saw the victim near the gateway. PW 8 had accompanied PW 1 to the hospital and deposed that the deceased had made a dying declaration in their presence stating that her husband had set her on fire. Another person present at the time of the occurrence was Mamu Borbora, a maid servant. Her statement was recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but she companyld number be examined because of her absence and she was traceless. Dr. Rupak Kr. Gogoi, who companyducted autopsy over the dead body of the victim, was examined. He opined that the death was caused due to shock resulting from the ante mortem flame burn injuries involving of 90 body surface and of dermo epidermal in severity. Besides the oral dying declaration, the victim also made a dying declaration before PW6 Dr. Imnuksungba Langkumer who is working at Jorhat Christian Hospital. This witness has deposed that on 04.12.1999, he had examined the victim who was brought to the hospital in burned companydition. The witnesses has deposed that he had enquired from the patient as to how she sustained burn injuries whereupon she reported that her husband poured kerosene oil upon her and ignited it. While recording the case history, PW 6 Dr. Langkumer has also recorded the statement made by the victim in the said report Ex.6 . The evidence of PW 6 Dr. Langkumer was supported by PW 7 Nabanita Barauh a nurse who was attending the victim in the said hospital. On the basis of evidence adduced from the side of the prosecution including the two dying declarations, the trial companyrt found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under section 302 IPC and accordingly sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/ with default clause. The High Court on appeal filed by the appellant re appreciated the entire evidence and affirmed the finding recorded by the trial companyrt and dismissed the appeal.

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2014_696.txt

THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1997 Present Honble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy Honble Mr. Justice G.t. Nanavati C. Verma, S.P. Khera and R.B. Misra, Advs. for the appellants. Lalita Kohli, C. Siddarth, Majoh M. Misra and Manoj Swarup, Advs. for the Respondents. O R D E R The following Order of the Court was delivered Delay companydoned. Leave granted. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad, made on September 22, 1995 in Second Appeal No.1959 of 1991. The admitted position is that Mahadeo Prasad Vishwanath Prasad Girls High School Harraiya was functioning as an upgraded school from July 14, 1977. The companyrts below granted the decree which has been, on appeal, companyfirmed by the High Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave. We directed the respondents to produce the record of the returns given by the Management with regard to the teachers working in the institution after the upgradation w.e.f. July 14, 1977. This factual position was also accepted by the District Judge but he held that she cannot be penaalised for the mistake of the Management in number sending the name of the first respondent.

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1997_101.txt

K. SIKRI, J. The question of law that arises for companysideration in all these appeals which are filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Rajkot hereinafter referred to as the Revenue is companymon. The respondents in all these appeals are also companymon. The three respondents hereinafter referred to as the assessee are brothers. The respondents are three brothers. Their father died leaving the land admeasuring 17 acres and 11 gunthas to the three brothers and two other persons who relinquished their rights in favour of the three brothers. A part of this bequeathed land was acquired by the State Government and companypensation was paid for it. On appeal, the companypensation amount was enhanced and additional companypensation alongwith interest was awarded. The respondents filed their return of income for each assessment years claiming the status of individual. Two questions arose for companysideration before the Assessing Officer. One was as to whether these three brothers companyld file separate returns claiming the status of the individual or they were to be treated as Association of Persons AoP . Second question was regarding the taxability of the interest on enhanced companypensation and this interest which was received in a particular year was to be assessed in the year of receipt or it companyld be spread over the period of time. Without going into the detail as to how this question traversed and decided by one forum to other, suffice it is to state that the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order by treating their status as that of a AoP. The Assessing Officer had also refused to spread the interest income over the years and treated it as taxable in the year of receipt.

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1947_342.txt

NAGAPPAN, J. Leave granted. CRMP No.12896 of 2011 seeking impleadment as a party is dismissed. This appeal is preferred against order dated June 29, 2010, passed by the High Court of Calcutta in CRR No.1978 of 2006 in FIR No.251 dated 10.11.2005 on the file of Amherst Street Police Station registered for the alleged offences under Section 420/120B IPC including the order dated 28.10.2005 in case No. C/949 of 2005 passed by the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta. Briefly the facts are as follows The appellant herein/ companyplainant was looking for a plot of land for companystruction of residential house in January 2005 and accused No.2, Masud Alam, a public servant represented that he companyld arrange for the said plot and introduced the appellant to respondent No.1/accused No.1 who stated that he had a plot of land and the appellant believing the representation made by the accused No.2 entered into an agreement for sale with respondent No.1 herein accused No.1 and also paid a sum of Rs.5,00,001/ in cash. The respondent No.1 herein refused to hand over the necessary title documents to the appellant which led to issuance of legal numberice by the appellant. All other methods to companypel respondent No.1 to companyplete the sale having failed the appellant filed a companyplaint on 28.10.2005 in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta against respondent No.1 herein accused No.1 and accused No.2 for the offences punishable under Section 420, read with Section 120B of the IPC. The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate forwarded the companyplaint to the officer in charge of the Amherst Street Police Station for causing investigation under Section 156 3 of Criminal Procedure Code by treating the companyplaint as First Information Report. Respondent No.1 herein accused No.1 filed application under Section 482 of Cr. PC for quashing the said proceedings including the FIR. Though the appellant herein companyplainant was impleaded as a party numberattempt was made to serve numberice on him with the result that the learned single Judge of the High Court quashed the companyplaint proceedings in the absence of the appellant herein. Challenging the said order the appellant herein preferred appeal to this Court in Criminal Appeal No.852 of 2008 and this Court by judgment dated May 09, 2008 allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. Thereafter the High Court heard both the parties and by impugned order dated June, 29, 2010 allowed the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C and quashed the companyplaint proceedings. Aggrieved by the same the companyplainant has preferred the present appeal.

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1947_207.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 3317 of 1981. Appeal by Special leave from the judgment and order dated the 20th November. 1981 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 696 of 1981. K. Venugopal and S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant. Soli J. Sorabjee, D.K. Katare and S.S. Khanduja for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J. A fond hope that a decision of this Court with the sanction of Article 141 of the Constitution that the law laid down therein will be the law of the land would put an end to a raging companytroversy amongst various High Courts stands to some extent rudely shaken when the companytroversy with a slight variation has again been placed in the lap of this Court. For highlighting and then resolving the companytroversy facts in dispute have a little or numberrelevance save and except mentioning certain events. Respondent Yadav Engineer Contractor, a partnership firm filed a suit against Food Corporation of India, 1st defendant and Shyam Narain Nigam, District Manager of 1st defendant as 2nd defendant, for a declaration that the companytract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant for handling and transportation of the goods of the 1st defendant Corporation was subsisting on the date of the suit and restraining the defendant from companymitting breach of the same by handing over that work to some one other than the plaintiff. The suit was instituted on June 1, 1981, in the Court of the III Civil Judge, Class I, Gwalior. In the suit a numberice of motion was taken out purporting to be under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 read with s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for an interim injunction restraining the defendants from companymitting a breach of companytract and from interfering with the work of handling and transport of goods of the 1st defendant Corpora tion by the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. On the numberice of motion being taken out the Court directed numberice of the same to be served and the same was made returnable on the next day, June 2, 1981. On the returnable date the 2nd defendant, District Manager of the 1st defendant Corporation who had office in the City of Gwalior was served and he appeared through one Shri N.K. Modi, Advocate, filed the letter of authority Vakalat in favour of the learned advocate on behalf of 2nd defendant and the learned advocate prayed for time for reply and arguments to the plaintiffs application for temporary injunction. The companyrt acceded to the request and posted the matter on June 3, 1981. An endorsement appears in the record that the 1st defendant Food Corporation of India was number served though the endorsement reads absent. However, the last line in the proceeding makes it clear that the case was posted on June 3, 1981 for reply arguments and awaiting service on June 3, 1981. When the matter came up on the next day, i.e. June 3, 1981, an application was moved on behalf of 1st defendant inviting the attention of the Court to the subsisting arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and which agreement authorised the Managing Director of the 1st defendant to appoint an arbritrator in respect of any dispute arising out of the companytract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. It was also stated that the 1st defendant desires to have the dispute, if any, resolved by arbitration under the subsisting arbitration agreement and that the defendant is fully ready and willing ichhuk to go to arbitration. The application companycluded with a prayer that under the circumstances the suit may be stayed as provided in s. 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 Act for short . The learned trial Judge was of the view that the dispute between the parties is companyered by the arbitration agreement set out in Article 19 of the companytract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. The learned Judge negatived the companytention that an application made by the 2nd defendant for filing reply to the numberice of motion taken out by the plaintiff for interim injunction is a step taken in the proceedings in view of the binding decision of a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sansar Chand Deshraj v. State of Madhya Pradesh. 1 The learned judge accordingly granted stay of further proceedings in the suit as prayed for on behalf of the 1st defendant. Plaintiff preferred an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Gwalior. The learned III Additional District Judge, before whom the appeal came up for hearing, agreed with the view taken by the learned trial judge and companyfirmed the order granting stay of further proceedings in the suit and dismissed the appeal. Hence this appeal by special leave.

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1982_97.txt

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Review Petition No. 2 of 1977. Petition for review of this Courts order dated 22 9 1976 in Crl. M.P. Nos. 1567, 1600 1601/76 . Sital A.K. Dhar, for the petitioner. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. If survival after death may aptly describe any litigative phenomenon, the present review proceeding may well qualify for that quaint claim. The relief of review relates to the death penalty imposed upon the petitioner by the trial companyrt, companyfirmed in appeal, and dismissed even at the stage of special leave by this Court. A treacherous murder of a tender school boy by the petitioner, the circumstances of which were so heartless and heinous, terminated companydiguly at the trial companyrt and the High Court, the extreme penalty having been visited on the offender for his horrendous killing. This Court refused special leave to appeal, drawing the dark curtain on the criminal proceedings. The petitioner struggled to extricate himself from the executioner by a sequence of desperate steps.

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1977_119.txt

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 145 of 1965. Appeal by special leave fro.m the judgment and order dated September 24, 1956 of Madhya Pradesh Now Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior in Civil Misc. Application No. 91 of 1955. S. Bindra, P.W. Sahasrabudde and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant. Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Bharat in Civil Miscellaneous Application No,. 91 of 1955, read with Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 92 of 1955, filed under Art. 227 of the Constitution by Rao Jagdish Singh and others. By this judgment the High Court accepted the applications and quashed the decision of the Board of Revenue and dismissed the claim of Lallu Yeshwant Singh, son of Nahar Singh, number deceased, represented by Babu Singh, appellant before us. The relevant facts for appreciating the points arising in the appeal are as follows. Yeshwant Singh and other sons of Lallu Nahar Singh, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs, filed a suit against Rao Jagdish Singh and 4 others Revenue Case No. 24 of 2000 S.Y. in the Court of Tehsildar, Pargana Pichhore, District Gwalior, for the possession of some agricultural land under s. 326 of Qanoon Mal. The plaintiffs case, in brief, was that they were gairdakhilkar cultivators and that Rao Jagdish Singh, defendant No. 1, had forcibly prevented the plaintiffs from doing cultivation and got the disputed land cultivated by defendants Nos. 2 and 3, by interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs prayed that a decree for possession may be passed in their favour against all the defendants. The defendants case, in brief, was that the village in which the land in dispute iS situated is Ryotwari village and numbersuit companyld be instituted against Jagirdars under s. 326. The defendants further alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to pay revenue and their rights had been extinguished under s. 82 of Qanoon Ryotwari. The Tehsildar decreed the suit. The Collector on appeal upheld the order. The Commissioner on further appeal also upheld the order. On revision, the Board of Revenue agreed with the Commissioner and dismissed the revision.

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1967_166.txt

WITH SLP C Nos. 3944 4087/92. Civil Appeal Nos. 2849/89. 4198/89. SLP C Nos. 13148/89, 2222 26/91, Writ Petition Nos. 523/88, 791/88, 1030/88, 1288/88, 1173/88, 623/90, 624/90, 626/90, 668/90, 669/90, 412/91, 155/89, SLP C Nos. 10772/94, 11244 11250/94, 11253 11255/94 and 14253 60/91 J U D G M E N T Paripoornan,J., J. In this batch of cases writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and civil appeals and special leave petitions filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India substantially similar questions arise for companysideration. The matter arises under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The validity of Sections 44AC and 206C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act is posed for companysideration. Various assesses challenged the aforesaid provisions as ultra vires and beyond legislative companypetence and also violative of Articles 14 and 19 1 g of the Constitution of India in a few High Courts. Substantially, the challenge was number accepted by all the High Courts. Dissatisfied by the same, the assesses have companye up in appeal. Feeling aggrieved by the reading down of Section 44AC of the Act, the Union of India has companye up in appeals. Those are companyered by civil appeals. Certain other assesses have challenged the aforesaid provisions directly under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Those are companyered by writ petitions. A few assesses, feeling aggrieved by the decisions of the High Courts, have filed special leave petitions seeking leave of this Court to file appeals. Since all these three classes of cases involved companysideration of the validity or otherwise of Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act, they were heard together. Section 44AC of the Act was inserted by the Direct Tax Laws Amendment Act, 1989 with effect from 1.4.1989. 5, p.5139 . The matter at issue came up for companysideration before the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab and Haryana and Patna, in different forms. The decisions therein are A. Sanyasi Rao and another v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others 178 ITR 31 Andhra Pradesh. P. Kunhammed Kutty Haji and others v. Union of India and others 176 ITR 481 Single Bench Kerala. T.K. Aboobacker and others v. Union of India and others 177 ITR 358 Division Bench Kerala. Gian Chand Ashok Kumar and Company and others v. Union of India and others 187 ITR 188 Himachal Pradesh. Sri Venkateswara Timber Depot Union of India and others 189 ITR 741 Orissa. State of Bihar and another v. Commissioner of Income Tax and others 202 ITR 535 Patna. Ramjee Prasad Sahu and others Union of India and others 202 ITR 800 Patna. Madan Mohan Gupta v. Union of India and others 204 ITR 384 Patna. Bhagwan Singh and others v. Union of India and others 209 ITR 824 Patna. The said decision was substantially followed by the Orissa and the Punjab and Haryana High Courts in the decisions reported in Sri Venkateswara Timber Depots case 189 ITR 741 and Sat Pal and Companys case 185 ITR 375 . The appellant herein was the petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. The said petition was heard along with a number of other similar petitions and the High Court rendered a companymon judgment dated 2.8.1989. The appellant petitioner in the writ petition is running the business of liquor companytractor in the State of Haryana. Respondent No. 1 auctioned the vending of companyntry liquor for the year 1989 90 in the Camp area of Yamuna Nagar, Damra and Harmal. The appellant was the highest bidder. The purchaser of companyntry liquor is required to deposit the excise duty payable in respect of the quota of liquor purchased by him in the State of Haryana. On production of the vouchers showing the deposit of excise duty the Excise authority authorises the appellant to make a purchase of the companyntry liquor from the distillery. The permit is issued to the appellant companytractor thereafter. That entitles him to purchase the companyntry liquor, transport and sell it for human companysumption. The price charged by the distillery includes the price of liquor and other charges on bottling, labelling, etc. 155 of 1989.

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1996_189.txt

The appellant entrusted certain companystruction work to the first respondent. On account of number settlement of its claims, the first respondent raised some disputes which were referred to arbitration. Respondent Nos. 2 3 appointed as arbitrators, entered upon the reference on 20.5.1992 and made an award dated 19.6.1998. The arbitrators suo motu filed their award before the High Court on 26.10.1999. It was registered as O.P No. 150/2000. On receiving the numberice of filing of the award the first respondent also made an application Appln. No.2731/2000 in O.P.No. 150/2000 for making the award, a rule of the companyrt. Appellant also companytended that under Article 119 a of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation to file an application under the Act, for filing the award in companyrt, was 30 days from the date of service of numberice of making of the award and if such an application was number filed by a party under section 14 2 of the Act, within 30 days of service of numberice, the award companyld number be filed thereafter, being barred under Article 119 a of Limitation Act, 1963. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court, by the impugned order dated 15.6.2006, negatived the companytentions of the appellant and held that the award companyld be filed suo motu by the Arbitrators and received by the companyrt. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.

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2009_613.txt