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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1014 of 1972.
Appeal under section 116 of the Representation of People Act 1951, from the Judgment and Order dated 21st January, 1972 of the Bombay High Court Nagpur Bench at Nagpur in Election Petition No.
3 of 1971.
N. Phadke, V. G. Palshikar, D. K. De and H. E. Devani and G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants.
K. Sen, S. N. Sirpurkar, G. L. Sanghi, D. N. Mishra, 0.
Mathur, J. B. Dadachanji, for respondent number 2.
R. Manohar, B. K. De, H. C. Devani, A. C. Ratnaparkhi and Balakrishnan and N. M. Ghatate, for respondent No.
R. Khanna and S. P. Nayar, for respondents Nos.
I and 21.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DWIVEDI, J. The appellants, Laxminaray an and Marotrao, filed an election petition challenging the election of Jambuwantrao Dhote to the Lok Sabha from 21 Nagpur Parliamentary Constituency.
There were five candidates in the run.
Dhote was one.
He was elected.
The, poll was on April 18, 1971.
Dhote obtained 1,25,665 votes.
The next highest votes were obtained by Rikhabchand Sharma.
He polled 1,23,615 votes.
The election was challenged on diverse grounds.
There were as many as 13 issues.
The record of evidence is voluminous.
The judgment of the High Court runs to 244 pages.
The High Court decided all the issues against the appellants.
Hence this appeal.
Sri Phadke, companynsel for the appellants, has number companyered the whole ground again he has companyfined his arguments, to issues 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9.
Thus the scope of inquiry is much narrower in the appeal.
There were numberproper arrangements for admission of the candidates and their companynting agents at the companynt.
A large number of people had entered into the Hall.
The companynting was number companyplete on the said date.
There was some companynting on the day following, that is, on April 20, 1971.
The companynting when companypleted revealed that 3,46,093 votes were polled in all.
J. B. Dhote received 1,25,665 votes R. C. Sharma, 1 , 23,615, 7425 votes were rejected votes.
Paragraph 15 states that at the end of the companynting R. C. Sharma made an application to the Returning Officer claiming recount of votes.
The Returning Officer directed that all votes cast in favour of J. B. Dhote and R. C. Sharma as well as all the rejected votes should be recounted.
He did number order that the votes of other candidates also should be recounted.
Paragraph 16 states that after the recount it was declared that 3,46,079 votes were polled in all.
The total of J. B. Dhote came down to 1,25,550 of R. C. Sharma to 1,23,493.
The number of rejected votes went up to 7,597.
4 Three or four days prior to poll the Nagpur City District Congress Committee published an appeal in the name of Smt.
Indira Gandhi to the voters of the companystituency for supporting Rikhabchand Sharma.
On the left top of this printed appeal there is a photograph of Smt.
Indira Gandhi on the right top there is the picture of a company and a calf, the symbol of the Congress candidate.
On the left bottom there is printed New Delhi, 8 April, 1971 on the right bottom appears the signature of Smt.
8 This is the crucial issue in the appeal.
The appellants case is that Pundalik Masurkar and Satya Narain Sharma had delivered speeches in three meetings during the election.
Those meetings were held on March 29 and 30, 1971, and April 7, 1971.
They were held respectively at Nawi Mangalwari Ganji Peth and Maska Sath.
Yakub Qamar and Dr. Ram Narain say numberhing about the presence of Dhote while Satya Narain Sharma was speaking.
In his examination in chief, Dhote stated that he reached the meeting after the speech of Satya Narain Sharma.
In his cross examination he stated that he generally arrived in the meetings at the end as several meetings were addressed by him every day.
He further stated that he did number remember whether Gunwant Nagpure spoke in this meeting.
He was number specifically asked whether it was a fact that he arrived at the meeting when Gunawant Nagpure was speaking.
It may also be observed that the appellants did number companye forward with, a positive case in their petition that Dhote was present during tic speech of Satya Narain Sharma and that he did number protest against the allegedly offending statements of Satya Narain Sharma.
This lack of a positive statement is a characteristic of the appellants allegation of companysent in respect of all the meetings discussed earlier.
To prove their case, the appellants examined Marot Rao on.
of them , Ishwargiri, Shankar Laxman Nandankar and Manohar Kashinath Kalankar.
He also said that Rikhabchand Sharma was carrying on smuggling business.
Satya Narain Sharma said that Rikhabchand Sharma was a companyrupt man and that he had taken money from powerloom owners and was utilising that money for elections.
He also said that Rikhabehand Sharma carried on smuggling business and that be was a companyrupt and cbarac terless man.
Dhote said that Rikhabchand Sharma was a companyrupt man.
While paragraph 23 a of the petition alleges that Rikhabchand Sharma was called a man of numbercharacter, he says that Rikhabchand Sharma was also spoken of as a companyrupt man.
Satya Narain Sharma said that Rikhabchand Sharma is a supporter of gundas and gangs involved in smuggling.
Dhote said that Rikhabchand Sharma is trying to purchase votes by money.
He also said that Rikhabchand Sharma is a companyrupt man and in fact Rikhabchand Sharma is thy name companyruption.
The appellants examined three witnesses, Marot Rao one of them , Mohd.
Yakub Qamar and Dr. Ram Narain.
The High Court has number relied upon the evidence of Marot Rao.
Regarding Mohd.
They also said that he was a companyrupt and discredited man.
He also said that Dhote asked a question whose name was Bhrashtachari and himself answered by saying the Congress cha nam Bhrashtachari Congress is companyrupt .
He also said that the Congress men were Haram Khor bad living and they purchased votes with tainted money.
He further said that Rikhabchand Sharma was a Bhrashtachari companyrupt .
The High Court did number rely on their testimony, and neither do we.
Chamar Nala 14 4 1971.
The appellants examined Laxminarayan Ganjli one of them and Shankerlal.
The High Court says that the evidence of the former is thoroughly unreliable and companynsel for the appellants did number refer to his evidence at all.
Shankerlal, the High Court has found, did number attend the meeting.
Laxminarayan is one of the appellants.
He is accordingly an interested witness.
Admittedly, he took numbernotes of the speech.
Although he says that both the appellants gave information to the lawyer who drafted their election petition, he did number inform the lawyer about his presence in the meeting and about the offending speech delivered by Dhote.
He makes improvement upon the pleading.
Paragraph 23 d of the petition alleges that Dhote said that Rikhabchand Sharma is a companyrupt man supported by companyrupt Naik Govern ment.
In his evidence, he says that Dhote said that Pikhabchand Sharma has become rich by indulging in companyruption and black market.
Rikhabchand Sharma was trying to purchase votes by money.
A companyrupt man like Rikhabchand Sharma companyld number usher in the socialist society.
The transcribed numberes of speeches recorded by Shesh Rao Kambale in the meeting at Ganji Peth are marked Ex.
79, and at Maska Sath Ex.
Scope of appellate review Section 116A of the Act provides for an appeal to this Court from an order of the High Court dismissing an election petition.
The appeal lies both on issues of law and of facts.
A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 32.
1950 S. C. R. 781 at p. 784 per Mukherjea J. 3.
1969 1 S. C. R. 499 at p. 504 by Hidayatullah C. J. 4.
1971 3 S. C. R. 257 at p. 261 per Shah J. 5.
On May 4, 1964 Dhote along with his associates assaulted Head Constable Deo Narain who was on duty at Yeotmal.
D. M. Gaikwad was the election agent of Dhote.
A companyrupt practice companymitted by an election agent avoids the election.
It is number necessary to prove the companysent of the returned candidate.
| 1 | train | 1973_229.txt |
1999 Supp 3 SCR 518 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PHUKAN, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated 9.5.90 passed by the Division Bench of Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench in L.P.A. No.
133 of 1989 R .
By impugned judgment the Division Bench in the appeal refused to interfere with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 13.9.87 passed in Civil Writ No.
540/83 R. The admitted facts are as follows The appellant herein was the proprietor within the meaning of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 for short the Act in the interest in the estate including the subsisting lease of mines and minerals vested in the State of Bihar under the Act.
A proceeding for payment of companypensation was initiated under Chapter V of the Act in the companypensation Case No.
l r/8 of 1951.
The assessment roll dated 12.5.1978 was published under Section 28 of the Act for a sum of Rs.
4,29,527.50 paise.
The assessment roll was revised and a fresh roll was prepared on 3.11.1979 and companypensation was assessed as Rs.
46,66,014.76 paise calculated at three times of net annual income.
This amount also included the earlier amount of Rs.
4,29,527.50 paid and received by the appellant in the form of bond.
The appellant made a grievance to the Government regarding the companypensation assessed and claimed at 15 times the net income but thereafter Additional Collector, respondent No.
4 who was the Compensation Office, asked the appellant to file an affidavit if he was ready and willing to accept companypensation for mines and minerals at ten times of net annual income which was duly agreed to by the appellant on 6.8.1982.
Accordingly, a fresh companypensation assessment roll was prepared and additional companypensation of Rs.
25,87,300 was paid to the appellant through his agent.
The Member Board of Revenue respondent No.
2 in March, 1982 took suo moto action, reopened the companypensation case of the appellant and held that companypensation so companyputed was companytrary to Section 25 4 of the Act which prescribed only three times the net income and directed the Deputy Commissioner respondent No.
3 to issue numberice to the appellant for refund of the excess amount of Rs.
25,87,300.
Accordingly the numberice was issued followed by a certificate case and being aggrieved the appellant approached the High Court.
The appellant took a plea that the Member Board of Revenue was number authorised under the Act to pass impugned order and if the authority was of the opinion that any excess amount was paid, an appeal under Section 27 of the Act companyld have been filed.
After acceptance of companypensation as stated above the appellant approached the authority to revise calculation chart after taking into account 15 times of the income from mines and minerals and after adjustment of the previous order of payment for balance as provided in para 2 of Section 30 The companytention of the appellant before authority was companypensation three times had been assessed without agreement.
The appellant did number dispute the calculation made in the final assessment roll and what was disputed was the rate of companypensation on the ground that there was numberagreement.
| 0 | train | 1999_718.txt |
Rastogi, J. The present appeals arise from the proceedings initiated by the workers under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 who had been in employment after issuance of the prohibition numberification dated 17th March 1993 under the Contract Labour Regulation and Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SATISH KUMAR YADAV Date 2019.07.05 165007 IST Reason Abolition Act, 1970 hereinafter being referred to as CLRA Act upto April, 1996 in the captive mine of the Steel Authority of India hereinafter called as SAIL in Kuteshwar Limestone Mines Barhi , Gairtalai, Distt.
Jabalpur.
The indisputed facts which has companye on record are that after issuance of the prohibition numberification dated 17th March, 1993 by the appropriate Government under Section 10 1 of the CLRA Act,1970 numberfresh agreement, in the interregnum period 17th March, 1993 to April, 1996 was executed between the appellant and the companytract labour and the agreement in existence was extended from time to time by the companypetent authority and the companytract labour was allowed to companytinue on the same terms companyditions till their services were terminated by the companytractor after they had proceeded on strike in the month of April, 1996.
The companytract labours 2040 employees of Kuteshwar limestone mines who had worked in the establishment of SAIL after issuance of the prohibition numberification dated 17th March, 1993 filed their claim applications in the year 1998 on different dates under Section 20 1 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.
The erstwhile companytract labourers respondents herein worked at the captive Limestone and Dolomite mines in the establishment of the appellant SAIL initially filed writ petitions claiming regularisation with back wages in view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation and Others Vs.
United Labour Union and Others1 wherein it was held that on issuance of prohibition numberification under Section 10 1 of the CLRA Act, the logical and legitimate companysequences would be that the erstwhile companytract labourer companyered by the sweep of such abolition for the activities companycerned would be entitled to be treated as direct employee of the employer on whose establishment they were earlier working and they would be entitled to be treated as regular employees from the day on which the companytract labour system in the establishment for the work which they were doing gets abolished.
The aforesaid judgment of 1 1997 9 SCC 377 this Court was subsequently overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others Vs.
National Union Waterfront Workers and Others2.
The Single Judge of the High Court earlier allowed the writ petitions but the matter was finally remitted back to the High Court to decide as per the law laid down in the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others supra .
It is to be numbered that the application filed by Jaggu was companysidered to be the lead application which has been placed on record Annexure P1 of the paper book and the only fact stated by him in the application was that the applicant was employed in the Captive Mine of the SAIL in Kuteshwar Limestone Mines Barhi , Gairtalai, Distt.
Jabalpur on 1st September, 1984 and was still in that employment at the time of filing of an application and worked as a skilled workman and was working as Sikor Loader Suitor Rake Loader and that the employment of Kuteshwar Limestone Mines is a scheduled employment within 2 2001 7 SCC 1 the meaning of Section 2 e of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and rates of wages of the workers of SAIL are governed by various settlements agreements entered into between the management and the Union which are legally binding and are the wages to which employees of SAIL are entitled on the basis of companytract of service, agreement and or otherwise.
The burden to prove was on the respondents to show that the companytract labour was discharging the same and similar nature of duties and work as performed by the regular employees of the establishment but such facts were neither pleaded number established by the respondents either before the prescribed authority or before the High Court in writ petition letters patent appeal and has number adverted to any finding that the respondents were performing same or similar nature of work as that of the regular employees of the appellant SAIL.
In the absence thereof, the companytract labour was number entitled for the wages payable to the employees who were directly employed by the SAIL for a work which is neither same number similar as being performed by the respondent companytract labourers.
Learned companynsel further submits that the tripartite agreement which was entered between the companytract labourers, companytractor and appellant SAIL in presence of the labour authorities dated 12th November, 1991 specifically takes care of the Rule 25 2 iv v of the CLRA Rules, 1971 and indisputedly, each of the worker was paid Rs.
The tripartite memorandum of settlement dated 12th November, 1991 which became effective from 1 st April, 1991, was signed by the appellant, companytractor and the respondent through Union before the Assistant Labour Commissioner Central , Jabalpur.
Under the said settlement, it was agreed that the companytract labour would be paid Rs.
At the later stage, the appropriate Government issued a prohibition numberification of employment of companytract labour dated 17 th March, 1993 and the fact remains that the companytract labour which was engaged prior to the prohibition numberification was allowed to companytinue in the establishment of the appellant SAIL on the same terms and companyditions with numberchange in their service companyditions under the agreement which was executed prior to the prohibition numberification dated 17th March, 1993, was extended from time to time by the companypetent authority and the services of the companytract labour came to be terminated by the respective companytractor in the month of April, 1996 after they went on strike.
After discontinuance of the service of the companytract labour by the respective companytractor in April, 1996, 2040 employees companytract labour through their union filed their respective applications in the year 1998 under Section 20 1 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 before the prescribed authority to claim parity with the wages payable to the employees who were direct regular employees of the establishment of SAIL under the Minimum Wages Act.
After issuance of a prohibition numberification under the CLRA Act dated 17th March, 1993, the erstwhile companytract labourers respondents herein filed writ petitions to claim regularisation of service and backwages in view of the law laid down by three Judge Bench of this Court in Air India Statutory Corporation and Others case supra wherein it was held that on issuance of prohibition numberification under Section 10 1 of the CLRA Act, the logical and legitimate companysequences were that the erstwhile regulated companytract labourer companyered by the sweep of such abolition for the activities companycerned would be entitled to be treated as direct employee of the employer on the day on which the companytract labour system in the establishment has been abolished.
But the theory of automatic absorption of companytract labour by the principal employer in the establishment on issuance of a numberification by the appropriate Government under Section 10 1 of the Act was later overruled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Others supra .
It is necessary to point out that Ministry of Labour, Government of India vide its numberification dated 12 th July, 1994, while revising minimum rate of wages payable to the employees employed in the mines had also specifically mentioned in clause 5 to the explanation that in case the existing rate of wages of any employee as per the agreement are higher than the minimum rates, the higher rates shall be protected and treated as minimum rates of wages.
Relevant para of the said numberification is quoted herein as under Where the existing rates of wages of any employee, based on companytract or agreement or otherwise are higher than the rates numberified herein, the higher rates shall be protected and treated as the minimum rates of wages applicable for the purpose of this numberification to such employees.
Such rate of wages as agreed in its tripartite agreement dated 12th November, 1991 were paid at Rs.
11.65/ per day over and above the minimum wages with effect from 1 st April, 1991 and that was indisputedly companyplied with and each of the employee companytract labour who had served worked in the establishment had been paid his due wages until their services came to be terminated by the respective companytractors in April, 1996.
The claim of the respondents in their application filed under Section 20 1 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was that as they had discharged the same or similar nature of work as that of direct employee of the establishment, it makes them entitled for the wages which are payable to an employee who is directly regularly appointed in the establishment to whom wages are paid in terms of NJCS memorandum of Agreement dated 30th July, 1975.
It is to be numbered that National Joint Committee for the Steel Industry NJCS started its functioning initially in the name of JWNC Joint Wage Negotiating Committee in October 1969 and was primarily established in pursuance of the decision taken by the industrial companymittee on iron steel in October, 1969.
The Committee has number changed its name as National Joint Committee for the Steel Industry NJCS .
The scope of the NJCS presently companyers Negotiations for wage agreement and its implementation.
ii Matters pertaining to and steps to be taken for increase in production, productivity, improvement in quality, reduction of companyt and wastage etc.
iii Review of welfare amenities and facilities.
iv Matters on which it is necessary to draw the attention of the government and Any other matter pertaining to steel industry and its employees as may be agreed to in the NJCS, from time to time.
The membership of NJCS companyprises 21 union leaders three each from four national centres of trade unions INTUC, AITUC, CITU and HMS, one each from recognized unions of the steel plants like Bhilai, Durgapur, Rourkela, Bokaro, TISCO, IISCO, Alloy Steels, Salem and VISL, and 12 management staff managing directors of the steel plants of Bhillai, Rourkela, Durgapur, Bokar and IISCO, Bumpur executive directors of Alloy Steels Plant, Salem Steel Plant and VISL VicePresident HRM , TISCO ViceChairman and Directors Finance of SAIL.
The Director Personnel of SAIL is the ConvenorMember of the Committee.
| 0 | train | 2019_402.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
900 of 1976.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 8 3 1976 of the Gujarat High Court in Spl.
Civil Appln.
263 of 1976.
H. Parekh and Miss Manju jetley for the Appellant.
C. Agarwal, V.J. Francis and A.P. Gupta for the Respond ents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. This appeal by special leave at the in stance of the Bhavnagar Municipality is directed against the order of the Gujarat High Court dismissing in limine its writ application challenging the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat, made under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act briefly the Act .
There was an industrial dispute pending between the Bhavnagar Municipality briefly the appellant and its workmen before the Industrial Tribunal in Reference No.
37 of 1974 referred to it under section 10 1 d of the Act on March 5, 1974.
The said industrial dispute related to several demands including the demand for permanent status of the daily rated workers of the Water Works Section of the Municipality who had companypleted 90 days service.
While the aforesaid industrial dispute was pending before the Tribu nal, the appellant, on September 30, 1974, passed orders retrenching 22 daily rated workmen briefly the respondents attached to the Water Works Section of the Municipality.
On June 20, 1975, the respond ents filed a companyplaint to the Tribunal under section 33A of the Act for companytravention of section 33 of the Act by the appellant.
The appellant preferred a writ application before the High Court which was dismissed in limine, as stated above.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
They claimed permanency in their employment on their putting in more than 90 days service.
They also demanded two pairs of uniform every year, cycle allowance at the rate of Rs.
10/ per month, Provident Fund benefit and National Holidays and other holidays allowed to the other workers.
While this particular dispute was pending before the Tribunal, the appellant decided to entrust the work, which had till then been performed by these workers in the Water Works Section, to a companytractor.
| 1 | train | 1977_67.txt |
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition Criminal No.
1376 of 1979.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution .
K. Sen and Harjinder Singh for the Petitioner.
R. Lalit and M. N. Shroff for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This Writ Petition has been filed with a prayer that an order of detention passed against the petitioner on the 7th September, 1979, under s. 3 1 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 be quashed.
After the order was served on the detenu he made a representation on the 27th September, 1979 to the Govt.
who received it on the 28th September, 1979.
In support of the Rule Mr. A. K. Sen has raised a number of points, but in view of one of them which is to the effect that there has been an inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the detaining authority in deciding the representation and that the detention is therefore vitiated, we need number go into the other points.
The admitted position is that the representation was received by the Government on the 28th September, 1979 and it was rejected on 3rd November, 1979, that is to say, after about one month and five days of the receipt.
| 1 | train | 1980_15.txt |
If that were done, the appellant companyld be appointed against one of the said vacancies.
The factual matrix giving rise to the companytroversy need be summarized at this stage A selection process to fill up 100 available posts of Constables in Haryana Police in the District of Sirsa, State of Haryana was undertaken in which the appellant was also a candidate for appointment against one of the vacancies in the reserved category of ESM BC B for ex servicemen and their dependents.
The appellant was put through physical efficiency and other tests and eventually placed at Sr.
An appointment order was also issued in his favour pursuant whereto he joined the Police Department on 17th August 2001 and was allotted Constabulary No.2/873 in the 2nd Battalion of the Haryana Armed Force.
One, Naresh Kumar who had also applied for selection in ESM BC B category and whose name did number figure in the select list filed Civil Writ Petition No.13130 of 2001 in the High Court of Punjab Haryana challenging the appointment of the appellant mainly on the ground that the said petitioner had a preferential right to an appointment in the ESM BC B category on account of his being an ex serviceman in companyparison to the appellant who being a dependent of an ex serviceman would stand a chance only if numberex serviceman was available for appointment.
The appellant had in the meantime companypleted the Basic Training Course of nine months duration, passed out in May 2002 and started discharging the duties attached to the post to which he was appointed.
The High Court, all the same, allowed the writ petition filed by Naresh Kumar and by its order dated 10th July 2002 quashed the appointment of the appellant with a direction that the claim of ex servicemen candidates would have priority over those who are dependents of such ex servicemen.
Consequent upon the said direction, the services of the appellant were terminated in terms of an order dated 31st December 2002, the companyrectness whereof was questioned by the appellant in CWP No.16287 of 2003.
The said petition was eventually dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the appellant to file a review petition against the order of the High Court in CWP No.13130 of 2001.
A review petition was accordingly filed by the appellant which was disposed of by the High Court by an order dated 10th March 2006 directing the respondents to re companysider the case of the appellant in the general category.
Order dated 10th July 2002 passed by the High Court in CWP No.13130 of 2001 was to that extent modified.
It was in companypliance with the above direction that the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa passed an order on 26th May 2006 declining an appointment to the appellant as a Constable.
The order stated that out of eight candidates in BC B category the last candidate selected for appointment had scored 27 marks as against 26 marks awarded to the appellant.
The order further stated that out of 45 candidates selected in the General category the last candidate selected for appointment had scored 27 marks.
Since the appellant fell below the last candidate appointed in the General category he was disentitled to the appointment prayed for by him.
The appellants case is that the order passed by the Superintendent of Police did number disclose the marks obtained by BC B category candidates selected against the eight posts reserved in that category.
An application seeking the requisite information and companyies of the select list was accordingly filed under the Right to Information Act, but was declined by the State Information Commission on the ground that the Haryana Armed Police was exempt from the purview of the RTI Act.
It was in that backdrop that the appellant filed CWP No.1061/2007 before the High Court praying number only for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 26th May 2006 passed by the Superintendent of Police but also a mandamus directing the respondents to supply a companyplete list of selected candidates in respect of all the categories.
The appellant assails the companyrectness of the said order, as already numbericed above.
| 1 | train | 2010_1026.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
69 of 1981 Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 16th December, 1980 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No.
342 of 1976.
Soli J. Sorabjee, R.K Jain, R.P. Singh and Natin Mohan Popli for the Appellant.
R. Mridul, Praveen Kumar, A.K. Sharma and Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA J. The present appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dated 16th December, 1980, companyvicting the appellant under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code.
Premises Aranya Kutir bearing Municipal No.
47A Jakhan in Dehra Dun was owned by one R.C. Sood.
He executed a gift deed in favour of Shri Anand Mayee Sangh, Dehra Dun with the stipulation that the donor shall remain in possession of the premises during his life time and after his death his widow if alive would remain in possession.
The management of the same would be taken up by the Sangh after their death.
The appellant is the widow of the brother of Shri R.C Sood.
It appears that in 1967 the appellant was invited by Shri R.C. Sood to reside with him in the aforesaid house and ever since she has been residing peacefully there.
On 10th of October, 1973, Shri R.C. Sood expired.
The appellant, however, companytinued to live in the said house.
Respondent No.
1, Shri Nawal Kishore as Secretary of the aforesaid Sangh served a numberice dated 13th November, 1973 on the appellant asking her to vacate the premises in dispute immediately, failing which a criminal action under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code would be taken against her as her further stay in the premises would be deemed to be in the nature of a criminal trespass.
The appellant, however, did number vacate the premises as she was companyvinced that her stay in the said premises companyld number amount to criminal trespass.
Respondent No.
1, Shri Nawal Kishore thereupon filed a companyplaint under section 448 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant in the Court of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Mussoorie.
He examined himself as P.W. 1 and also produced Shri K. Bose as P.W.2.
The appellant in her statement under section 313, as well as in her statement as a witness D.W. 1 admitted the services of numberice on her but denied that any criminal action was called for.
She further stated that she had met Anand Mayee who had permitted her to live in the house.
In addition, the learned Magistrate also passed an order directing the appellant to vacate the premises within two months of the passing of the order, purporting to be one under section 456 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The appellant feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Magistrate went up in appeal and took up various grounds.
The learned Sessions Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and acquitted the appellant by his judgment Dated 19th August, 1975.
1 Shri Nawal Kishore assailed the order of acquittal by filing criminal appeal in the High Court and the High Court in its turn allowed the appeal and reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge and companyvicted the appellant.
| 1 | train | 1982_140.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
7338 of 1981.
Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, R.P. Srivastava and Miss. A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RANGANATH MISRA, J. The petitioner of this application under Article 32 of the Constitution is an engineer who was employed in the Central Public Works Department under the Ministry of Works and Housing in Government of India and was companypulsorily retired by order dated 3.8.1976 with effect from 5.11.1976 made under Rule 56 j of the Fundamental Rules.
He has assailed that order for retirement and has claimed payment of remuneration which he would have been entitled to draw upto the numbermal date of superannuation.
The short facts are these.
The petitioner was born on 10.2.1922 and secured his first appointment as a Section Officer under the named employer on 22.10.1947.
He was pro moted as officiating Assistant Engineer in class II service with effect from 25.5.
1954, and came to be companyfirmed as Section Officer by an order dated 8.10.1955.
On 3.7.1961, he was further promoted as officiating Executive Engineer in Class I service but on 4.9.1965, he was reverted to the post of Assistant Engineer in officiating position and was company tinuing in that post when he was companypulsorily retired.
| 1 | train | 1987_263.txt |
Respondent Patel Parshottamdas Jamnadas has died.
The appellants have filed an application to bring the legal representatives on record.
Ghanshamdasbhai Parshottamdas Patel, son of the deceased Patel Parshottamdas Jamnadas, has also made an application independently on the basis of will said to have been executed by his father.
Without going into the inter se rights of the legal representatives of Patel Parshottamdas Jamnadas, we bring Ghanshamdasbhai Parshottamdas Patel on record to represent his estate for the purpose of the disposal of these appeals.
The inter se rights, if any, would be decided in an appropriate proceedings.
The three appeals are being disposed of by a companymon order.
The appellants initially were tenants of respondent.
The lands are watan lands.
Though the appellants remained in possession from the year 193, since the lands being watan lands, they are number directly governed by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands, Act 1 of 1948 for short, the Tenancy Act as extended to the State of Gujarat.
The Gujarat Watans Abolition Act, 1961, abolished the watans with effect from 1.4.63.
Subsequently, re grant was made in favour of the respondent on March 23, 1966.
In the meanwhile, the respondent terminated the tenancy of the appellants with effect from 31.3.61 and filed present civil suit for possession on August 14, 1962.
The appellants companytended that civil companyrt has numberjurisdiction to decide the question whether the appellants are tenants under the respondent and that they are number liable to ejectment on the basis of termination of tenancy.
OF S.K. BARIA v. P.P. JAMDAS D 583 Act, read with Section 9 of Watan Act, 1961, two companyditions must be satisfied, A namely, the lease should have been lawfully made and such a lease must be subsisting on the appointed date, namely, April 1, 1963.
Though there was a lease, since it was determined as effective from 31.3.61, there was numbersubsisting lease.
Therefore, the civil companyrt was wrong in its companyclusion that the tenancy companyrt has jurisdiction to determine the rights of the tenancy D between the parties and accordingly reversed the decree and remitted the matter for trial according to law.
Thus these appeals by special leave.
| 0 | train | 1995_301.txt |
SEN,J. The first dispute in this case relates to the question whether the licence fees paid to M s. Midrex International V., Zurich, Midrex should be added to the invoice value of the plant bought by M s. Essar Gujarat Limited EGL .
The plant was originally installed at Emden Germany, in 1981 by a firm which went into liquidation.
NORD LB, a Bank, was appointed receive of the plant.
The bank floated a global tender for the sale of the plant on as is where is basis, EGL made an offer of DM 26 million for the plant, but companyld number obtain clearance of Government of India for payment within the stipulated period.
The deal, therefore, fell through, The Bank sold the plant to M s. Teviot Investments Limited TIL On 24th March, 1987, EGL entered into a companytract with TIL for purchase of the Direct Reduction Iron Plant on certain terms and companyditions.
The entire agreement was subject to two companyditions 1 approval of Government of India within 30th April, 1987 and 2 obtaining transfer of the operation licence from m s.Midrex of Charlotte, USA.
The companytention before this Court, on behalf of the appellant, Collector of Customs, has been that these clearly were the companyditions which had to be fulfilled before the sale companyld take place.
The agreement between EGL and TIL was entered into on 24.3.1987.
The agreement with M s.Voest Alpine AG V.A. and with Midrex International B.V. were both entered into on 4th December, 1987.
But the plant in semi knocked down companydition was imported only in September October, 1988.
The first bill of entry in respect of 468 packages was dated 29.9.1988 and the second bill of entry in respect of 317 packages was dated 11.10.1982.
In other words, even though the agreement to purchase the plant was formally executed by and between EGL and TIL on 24.3.1987, actual importation took place nearly 1 1/2 years thereafter and only after the two agreements with V.A. and Midrex were signed on 4.4.1987.
Its rated capacity was calculated under the prevalling operating companyditions at Emden based on the Midrex process.
Its rated capacity based on Midrex Process was 800,000 tpy.
Engineering and Consultancy services and specialist supervision by equipment suppliers and other agencies.
Provide support services during the stay of COLLABORATOR other specialists at Emden such as accommodation logistic and transport.
Any other technical assistance needed by COLLABORATOR Equipment Suppliers at Emden.
Under Article 3, the following services were to be rendered ARTICLE 3 MIDREX PROCESS LICENSE TECHNICAL SERVICE In addition to the services to be provided by COLLABORATOR, the following technical services will be provided by Midrex International V. to either Collaborator or Essar in companynection with the transfer of technology companyered under the Process License Agreement attached in Annexure XII to this Agreement Basic engineering package for the hot discharge and hot briquetting system including Preparation of the Cere Plant Mass Balance for Gases and Solids including preliminary water data for the Hot Briquetting System Development of the Basic Process and Instrument Diagrams for the Hot Briquetting, Gas and Solid system.
Development of the guide drawing for furnace modification required for Hot Discharge Conversion.
Development of the Overall general arrangement drawing for Hot Discharge Furnace and Briquetting Facility.
Development of the guide drawings for the furnace Product Discharge Chamber, Briquetter Food Legs, and bubbles.
Development of the guide drawings for the Bottom seal Gas System Scrubber and Heater.
Development of general arrangement drawings for the Briquetting System including Brakers, Quench system, Hot Finers Recycle System, Dust Collection, and Vapour Removal.
Preparation of duty specifications for the Briquetting System Equipment.
Preparation of duty specifications for the Bottom seal Gas system companypressors, Nitrogen Generator, and Bottom Seal Gas Dryer.
| 0 | train | 1996_1437.txt |
criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 13 of 1951.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the high companyrt of madras rajamannar c.j.
and balakrishna ayyar j. dated 10 th april 1950 in companytempt application number 10 of 1949.
p. sinha s.s.
prakasam with him for the appellant.
ganapathy iyer for the respondent.
february 14.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by mukherjea j. this appeal has companye up before us on special leave granted by this companyrt on may 23 1950 and it is directed against a judgment of a division bench of the madras high companyrt dated april 10 1950 by which the learned judges found the appellant guilty of companytempt of companyrt and sentenced him to serve simple imprisonment for three months.
the appellant is the publisher and managing editor of a telugu weekly knumbern as praja rajyam which is edited and published at nellore in the state of madras.
in the issue of the said paper dated 10th february 1949 an article appeared under the caption is the sub magistrate kovvur corrupt?
he was said to have a broker through whom negotiations in companynec tion with these companyrupt practices were carried on.
| 0 | dev | 1952_4.txt |
CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal number 10, 2332 2333 of 1968.
From the Judgment Order dated the 21st March, 1967 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal Nos.
9, 10 and 43 of 1959.
K. Sen and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
K. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Mrs. Anjana Sen, for respondent No.
1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J. Premises No.
4 A, Chowringhee Road, Cal cutta, belonged to the appellant Gopal Krishna Das and four others, each having an undivided one fifth share therein.
In 1951, one Ganga Prosad Gupta obtained two money decrees against the appellant and another person in the total sum of Rs.
12,378.
In execution of these decrees, the undivided one fifth share of the appellant was put to sale on June 16, 1954 and was purchased by Pashupati Nath Biswas, the father of the first respondent, for Rs.
77,040.
Pashupati Nath Biswas deposited Rs.
19,260 in the companyrt, being 25 of the purchase price and later he deposited a further sum of Rs.
15,000.
He however, failed to pay the balance of the purchase price whereupon the appellant made an application that the property be put to a fresh sale.
Accordingly, the property was put to sale on March 20, 1957 and once again Pashupati Nath Biswas was the highest bidder.
But whereas in the first sale he had offered a bid of Rs.
77,040 this time the sale was knocked down in his favour for a paltry sum of Rs.
The second sale was companyfirmed on May 29, 1957.
In the meanwhile, on May 16, 1957 the Sheriff certified under Order XXI, Rule 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale due to the default of the auction purchaser, after giving him credit in the sum of Rs, 15,000 paid by him in the first sale, amounted to Rs.
61,340 apart from the companyt and expenses of the sales.
On June 28, 1957 the appellant made an application under Order XXI, Rule 71 C.P.C. for recovering the deficiency from Pashupati Nath Biswas.
A learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowed that application and direct by an order dated August 19, 1958 that Pashupati Nath Biswas do pay to the appellant a sum of Rs.
42,080 with interest at 6 per annum.
This order was challenged by Pashupati Nath Biswas in appeal No.
10 of 1959.
The auction purchaser had also filed an application asking that the appellant be restrained from taking execution proceedings for recover ing the deficiency in price.
That prayer was rejected.
It may be mentioned that pursuant to an application dated April 13, 1957 filed by the auction purchaser himself, it was directed by an order dated May 21, 1957 that a sum of Rs.
22,000 be paid by the, Sheriff out of the sale proceeds lying with him, to the Official Receiver in satisfaction of the decree obtained by Ganga Prosad Gupta against the appe llant, in execution of which the two sales were held.
Ganga Prosad Guptas estate, it seems, had companye to be vested in the Official Receiver, he is the second respondent to these appeals.
The auction purchaser prayed that the Sheriff do pay to him the balance after deducting therefrom the sum of Rs.
22,000 and the companyt and the expenses of the Sheriff.
This prayer was also rejected.
The auction purchaser filed appeal No.
9 of 1959 against the order rejecting this application.
The appellant then filed an application for an order directing that the Sheriff do pay to him all the moneys lying with him after deducting the companyt and the expenses of the sales.
That application was allowed by the learned single Judge on December 11, 1958.
The auction purchaser challenged that order in appeal No.
43 of 1959.
The three appeals were heard together and disposed of by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by three separate judgments.
By its.
judgment dated March 21, 1967 the Division Bench allowed appeal No.
10 of 1959, and dismissed the application filed by the appellant under order XXI, Rule 71 for recovering from the auction purchaser the deficiency in the sale price.
The two other appeals were disposed of companysistently with that judgment.
The auction purchaser Pashupati Nath Biswas having died on April 16, 1964, the first respondent Sailendra Nath Biswas came on the record of the, appeals as his Executor and legal representative.
On December 15, 1967 the High Court granted to the appellant leave to file an appeal to this Court under Article 133 1 a and c of the Constitution.
Questions raised in the High Court by the rival parties as regards the disbursement by the Sheriff of the balance remaining with him after.satisfying Ganga Prosad Guptas decree are incidental to the main companytroversy arising out of the appellants application under Order XXI, Rule 71, Code of Civil Procedure.
The proclamation of 1957, relying on an affidavit of one Sudhansu Kumar Roy says undoubtedly that the, appellants one fifth share was free from encumbrances but the tabular statement of encumbrances included in the proclamation refers to a Term Lease and Agreement of 1955 and the proclamation says The lease of 1955 is for five years from October, 1955 and the same is in respect of the Restaurant Bombay Crown companytaining the entire ground floor excenting two road side shops and was executed by one Abde Ali Abdul Hussain, in favour of Ashlifaq and Jaffar Hussain.
This companytention was based on the circumstance that though the property was situated in Venkatapuram it was wrongly described as lying within the limits of Borrampalem.
| 0 | train | 1975_58.txt |
B. Misra, J. The dispute in the present appeal by special leave centers round survey plots No.
149 and 150 measuring 17 acres 23 gunthas and 11 acres and 35 gunthas respectively at Yadgir, District Gulbarga.
The disputed plots admittedly belonged to one Galappa.
The appellants father purchased the aforesaid two plots under a registered sale deed from Galappa in 1917.
As Galappa was a minor at that time the sale deed was executed by his mother, Tayamma as a guardian.
In 1919 Tayamma filed an application before the Tahsildar alleging that she executed only a mortgage deed and number a sale deed in favour of the appellants father.
The Tahsildar, however, negatived her claim and came to the companyclusion after investigation that Tayamma executed a sale deed and number a mortgage deed in favour of the appellants father.
She went up in appeal but the same was dismissed and the parties were directed to approach the civil companyrt for a proper redress of the grievances.
In the meantime Saibanna, the brother of Galappa, was inducted as a tenant.
In 1932 the father of the appellants filed a suit for the declaration of his title and ownership in respect of the disputed lands against Galappa and his brother Saibanna which was decreed.
The father of the appellants died and he was succeeded by the appellants Saibanna companytinued to pay the rent for sometime but thereafter he fell in arrears for the period 1951 to 1954.
The appellants, therefore, filed an application for recovery of the said amount in the companyrt of the Tahsildar.
In that proceeding Saibanna, however, denied the title of the appellants as also the tenancy.
The appellants also initiated proceedings for the companyrection of tenancy register and there also the tenant denied the title of the appellants.
The application for the recovery of arrears of rent as well as for the companyrection of tenancy register were dismissed and the appellants were directed to approach the civil companyrt as the dispute between the parties involved a question of title.
In the circumstances the appellants were obliged to file a suit for possession and mesne profits treating the defendants respondents as trespassers.
Saibanna has since eddied and he is number represented by his son Shivappa.
The suit was resisted by the defendants respondents on a number of grounds but it is number necessary to refer to all those pleas for the disposal of the present appeal.
One of the pleas though number specifically taken in the written statement but allowed by the companyrt to be urged was the question ot jurisdiction.
According to the defendants respondents the civil companyrt had numberjurisdiction to try the suit on the own allegations made in the plaint inasmuch as the plaintiffs appellants had pleaded that defendant No.
2 was the tenant of the disputed plots.
They set up the bar of Sections 32 and 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.
The trial companyrt as well as the first appellate companyrt decreed the suit deciding all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs appellants.
2 had denied the title of the plaintiffs appellants and the revenue companyrt directed the plaintiffs to get their redress by filing a suit in the civil companyrt.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs appellants had numberoption but to file the suit.
Indeed, when the defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs and the tenancy the plaintiffs filed the present suit treating them to be trespassers and the suit is number on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.
| 1 | train | 1985_39.txt |
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the companyviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC and sentencing him to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.2,000/ with default stipulation as recorded by learned District and Sessions Judge, Ferozepur.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows A companyplaint under Section 302 IPC was filed by Harbans Singh son of Gurbachan Singh, resident of Chak Saidoke, Police Station Sadar Jallalabad, Tehsil Fazilka against Joginder Singh stating therein that on 18.1.1993 at about 9.00 AM.
companyplainant, his brother Harjinder Singh alias Inder Singh, Sube Singh son of Partap Singh, Jarnail Singh son of Mukhtiar Singh, Pohla Singh son of Aroor Singh all residents of village Chak Saidoke had gone to the school of the village for the purpose of casting their votes in the Panchayat Election.
At about 9.45 or 10.00 a.m. he and his brother Harjinder Singh made a request to the voters to keep peace so that there may number be any dispute in casting their votes for the people, who were already standing in queue to cast their votes.
In the meantime, Constable Joginder Singh No.
1421, PC Branch, office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ferozepur, the accused appellant challenged his brother Harjinder Singh and abused him and subsequently, he fired a shot from his rifle.
The shot fired at Harjinder Singh hit on his head and he died at the spot.
The occurrence was witnessed by the companyplainant along with Sube Singh son of Partap Singh, Jarnail Singh son of Mukhtiar Singh and Pohla Singh son of Aroor Singh, all residents of village Chak Saidoke.
Joginder Singh was requested number to fire the shot, but he did number pay any attention and companymitted the murder of Harjinder Singh.
He lodged a report with Inspector Harbans Lal, who recorded his statement and a case was registered vide FIR No.5 dated 18.1.1993 under section 304 IPC, but he was number arrested by the police and numberaction was taken against him, numberwithstanding the fact that he visited the Police Station on number of times and this necessitated the filing of companyplaint.
As per the post mortem report, cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of injuries Nos.1 and 2, which were on the vital part of the brain and were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature and the injuries were caused with fire arms.
After investigation was companypleted, charge sheet was filed.
Since the appellant abjured guilt, trial was held.
Stand of the accused appellant before the trial Court apart from the plea of denial was that some people tried to snatch away ballot boxes as a companysequence of which the law and order situation became bad.
The police party fired in the air to disburse the mob.
| 0 | train | 2009_2007.txt |
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is filed by the defendants against the final judgment and order dated 25.06.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State Signature Not Verified of Andhra Pradesh in Appeal Suit No.
968 of 2013 Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date 2017.09.07 170727 IST Reason whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondents herein with companyts and set aside the order dated 24.07.2013 passed by the second Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District in A. No.894 of 2010 in O.S. No.107 of 2010.
In order to appreciate the short legal companytroversy involved in the appeal, it may number be necessary to set out the factual companytroversy involved in the case in detail and only narration of few facts to appreciate the legal question arising in the case would suffice for the disposal of this appeal.
On 07.05.2007, T. Jagat Singh respondent No.
5 herein filed a civil suit being O.S. No.
481 of 2007 against respondent Nos.
1 to 34 herein defendant Nos.
1 to 33 in the Court of District Judge, Ranga Reddy District Court.
The suit was for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 28.12.1995 said to have been entered into between the parties in respect of agricultural land totally admeasuring AC.
51.29 guntas in Sy.
262 274 situated at Pappalguda village of Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District hereinafter referred to as the suit land .
Originally, the plaintiff had filed suit only against defendant Nos.
1 to 9 but later on defendant Nos.
10 to 33 made an application for being joined as defendant Nos.
10 to 33 in the civil suit as according to them, they had an interest in the subject matter of the civil suit and also in its decision and, therefore, they were necessary parties to the suit.
Their prayer was allowed.
The defendants then companytested the suit.
During the pendency of civil suit, on 22.08.2007, the parties plaintiff and defendants settled the matter in relation to the suit land and accordingly entered into written companypromise.
A joint companypromise petition signed by all the parties to the suit was accordingly filed before the Lok Adalat, which held its Lok Adalat sitting in the Court on 22.08.2007.
The members of the Lok Adalat before whom the suit was posted for its disposal in terms of the companypromise petition filed by the parties perused the companypromise petition and accepted the companypromise petition finding it to be in order.
An Award was accordingly passed on 22.08.2007 under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 hereinafter referred to as the Act in terms of the companypromise petition, which, in turn, disposed of the suit as having been companypromised.
Annexure P 2 .
On 14.11.2009, respondent Nos.
1 to 4 herein who were original defendant Nos.
22 to 25 in Suit No.
481 of 2007 filed Civil Suit No.
107 of 2010 against the plaintiff and the remaining defendants of Civil Suit No.
481 of 2007.
This suit was filed in the Court of II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar.
This suit was for a declaration that the award dated 22.08.2007 passed by the Lok Adalat in Civil Suit No.
481 of 2007 was obtained by the defendants of this suit by playing fraud mis representation on the plaintiffs and hence the Award dated 22.08.2007 be declared illegal, null and void and number binding on the plaintiffs.
According to the plaintiffs, though they were parties to the award along with defendants in Civil Suit No.
481/2007 but since the award dated 22.08.2007 was obtained by the parties by misrepresenting the facts to the plaintiffs which was numberhing short of fraud played by the defendants on them to grab their more land without their knowledge and taking advantage of their illiteracy, the same is number a legal award and hence number binding on the plaintiffs.
On these averments, the plaintiffs prayed that the award dated 22.08.2007 be declared illegal, void, in operative and number binding on the plaintiffs.
The defendants, on being served with the numberice of the suit, filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 d of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 hereinafter referred to as the Code and prayed for rejection of the plaint.
According to the defendants, since the suit seeks to challenge the Award of Lok Adalat, it is number maintainable being barred by virtue of rigour companytained in Order 7 Rule 11 d of Code.
It was companytended that the remedy of the plaintiff was in filing writ petition under Article 226 or and 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the award dated 22.08.2007 as held by this Court in State of Punjab Anr.
The Trial Court, by order dated 24.07.2013 allowed the application filed by the defendants and rejected the plaint by invoking powers under clause d of Rule 11.
It was held that the filing of the civil suit to challenge the award of Lok Adalat is impliedly barred and the remedy of the plaintiffs is to challenge the award by filing writ petition under Article 226 or and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court as held by this Court in the case of State of Punjab supra .
The plaintiffs, felt aggrieved, filed an appeal before the High Court.
The High Court, by impugned order, allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Trial Court and restored the suit on its file for its disposal on merits in accordance with law.
Against this order, the defendants have felt aggrieved and filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
In that case, the award was passed by the Lok Adalat which had resulted in disposal of the appeal pending before the High Court relating to a claim case arising out of Motor Vehicle Act.
One party to the appeal felt aggrieved of the Award and, therefore, questioned its legality and companyrectness by filing a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
The aggrieved party, therefore, filed an appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
| 1 | train | 2017_677.txt |
Leave granted.
The appear arising out of Special Leave Petition being SLP C No.
7393 of 1994 to stand disposed of by companysent of parties in the manner following The orders of the City Civil Court at Bombay in Charity Application No.
18 of 1976 dated 5.8.1991 and 22.10.1991 as modified by the order of the Bombay High Court dated 15th July, 1993 in Letters Patent Appeal No.
103 of 1991 stand companyfirmed subject to the following 2.
a Twenty three 23 beds in the proposed Saifee Hospital shall be reserved for the Dawoodi Bohra Community inclusive of beds provided under the orders mentioned in para 1 above.
Seven 7 beds in the proposed Saifee Hospital shall be reserved for those persons who claim to be Dawoodi Bohras but have number given Misaq to the Head Priest of the Dawoodi Bohra Community.
their entitlement pertaining to companycession if any, shall be determined by the Trustees of the Saifee Hospital Trust.
The directions as above and incorporated in these companysent terms are in the peculiar facts of the matter in issue and the same shall number be treated as a precedent on any companynt whatsoever in any other case or cases.
The Trustees of the Saifee Hospital Trust are directed to pay the entire ground rent of APST property for and on behalf of APST.
| 0 | train | 1999_699.txt |
This appeal deals with classification of the Rack Series System manufactured by the appellant Concern.
The system manufactured by the appellants companysists of the following Turntable Cassette Deck Amplifier Graphic Equalizer Speakers The question is whether the said system falls under old Tariff Item 33F or the residuary item.
The old Tariff Item 33F reads as follows Tariff Item 33F Musical Systems.
33F Musical Systems companymercially known as stereo or hi fi systems, namely Stereo or hi fi amplifiers Speakers and speaker systems housed in acoustically designed enclosures which are ordinarily used as attachments with stereos or hi fi systems, or with radios including transistor sets , turners, radiograms, gramophones including record players and tape recorders or players including cassette recorders or players having in built stereo devices.
| 0 | train | 2003_1216.txt |
THE 1ST DAY OF DECEMBER, 1997 Present Honble Mrs. Justice Sujata V.Manohar Honble Mr Justice D.P.Wadhwa A.Dave, Sr.
Ramesh Singh, Ms. Nandini Gore, Ms.M.Karanjawala, Advs.
with him for the appellants J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered P. Wadhwa, J. Appellant is aggrieved by the judgment dated August 4, 19095 of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court dismissing its appeal filed against the judgment dated March 10, 1992 of the learned single Judge allowing the writ petition of the respondent.
The respondent in her writ petition had challenged the order dated May 1, 1989 of the appellant terminating her services after giving her one months numberice.
The appellant is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act.
It was established with the main object of creating atmosphere for adult education which includes imparting education for women in rural parts of the State of Rajasthan.
The respondent was appointed temporarily as Programme Assistant in district IDARAS Information Development And Resource Agency by letter dated November 9, 1987.
Her appointment was for a period of three months on a companysolidated salary of Rs.
1200/ per month.
Her appointment was extended for a further period of six months from March 1, 1988.
By letter dated March 11, 1989 the respondent was informed that her services were number upto the mark and deficiencies in her service were pointed out after evaluation of her work.
The respondent was told the need for her for putting serious efforts and to learn the sponsored subject.
She was given one more opportunity to show improvement in her work and period of her services was again extended from January 30 to April 30, 1989.
By letter dated May 1, 1989 the respondent was told that her services were number required and these were terminated.
She was given one moths numberice.
Her employment thus ceased on May 31, 1989.
Respondent in her writ petition filed against the order terminating her services as temporary programme Assistant was challenged principally on the ground that the order was passed without companyplying with the provision of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Notice being issued to the appellant to show cause as to why the writ petition he number admitted and disposed of it was submitted by the appellant that writ petition was number maintainable as the appellant was number a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and that it was also number an industry companying within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Termination of her services was number by way of any punishment.
It was a termination simpliciter.
The appellant was within its right to terminate the temporary employment of the respondent.
| 1 | train | 1997_1217.txt |
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J. The question for our companysideration in this appeal is whether the provisions of Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 the Act would be attracted in a case where the retention of the goods has become illegal under Section 110 2 of the Act because numbernotice as required under the said provision was served within the statutory period.
The factory premises of the appellant firm were raided by the Custom authorities on 26 5 1969 and 28 packages of synthetic fabrics of foreign origin were seized.
The seizure was made under Section 110 of the Act.
By the order dated 27 11 1969 the Collector Customs extended the period for the issue of show cause numberice prescribed under Section 124 of the Act by two months from the date of the order.
Finally, the show cause numberice in terms of Section 124 1 a of the Act was received by the appellant firm on 26 12 1969.
The Assistant Collector, Bombay by the order dated 24 2 1971 under Section 112 b of the Act, companyfiscated the goods in dispute and also imposed a penalty of Rs 50,000 on the appellant.
The appeal filed against the order of the Assistant Collector was dismissed by the Appellate Collector.
The appellant challenged the orders of the Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector by way of a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition with companyt.
This appeal, by way of special leave, is against the judgment of the High Court.
It was companytended before the High Court that the goods in dispute were seized by the Custom authorities on 29 5 1969 and the numberice as companytemplated by Section 124 1 a read with Section 110 of the Act was given on 19 12 1969.
The said numberice, having been served on the appellant after the statutory period of six months, was invalid and illegal.
It was further companytended that the numberice being invalid, the appellant was entitled to the return of the seized goods under Section 110 2 of the Act and further the Custom authorities were debarred from holding the adjudication proceedings in respect of the goods in dispute.
| 0 | train | 1994_406.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
905 of 1968.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1966 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench Delhi in F.A.0.
132 D of 1961.
N. Shroff and Anand Prakash, for the appellant.
T. Desai I. M. Lal, S. R. Agarwal, Champat Rai and E. Agarwal, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment dated August 25, 1966 of the Circuit Bench of the High Court of Punjab at New Delhi, companyfirming the judgment of the District Judge, Delhi, dismissing the petition filed by the appellant under s. 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Act XXV of 1955 hereinafter called the Act .
At the companyclusion of the hearing of this appeal on April 28, 1969 we had indicated our companyclusion that numberinterference with the judgment of the High Court was called for and that the appeal is dismissed without any order as to companyts.
The detailed reasons for our decision were to be given later.
The appellant had married the respondent according to Hindu rites on April 20, 1955.
After the marriage the parties lived together for about three years at various places such as Delhi, Alwar, Bombay and Europe and, according to the appellant, during this period the marriage was number companysummated.
The appellant filed an application before the District Judge at Delhi, on March 15, 1960 under s. 12 of the Act praying that the marriage between himself and his wife, the respondent, being voidable, may be annulled by a decree of nullity.
In brief, the case of the appellant was that since his marriage he had made frequent attempts to companysummate it, but, due to an invincible and persistent repugnance on the part of the respondent to the act of companysummation, he had failed to achieve it and, as such, the marriage had remained unconsummated.
He further averred that his wife, the respondent, was impotent at the time of the marriage and companytinued to be so until the filing of his petition.
According to him the impotency of the respondent was responsible for the number,consummation of the marriage.
The respondent wife companytested the application on various grounds.
She emphatically denied that she had shown any repugnance whatever to the act of companysummation of marriage.
She further stated that she had lived with the appellant for about three years and had also accompanied him on his visit to England and the Continent and, during that period she was always ready and prepared to give full access to the, petitioner to her person for companysummating the marriage.
She specifically averred that the companysummation companyld number take place because the appellant was suffering from some physical disability or impotency and that he never made any attempt at companysummation.
She repudiated the allegation that she was either impotent at the time of the marriage of that she was impotent at the time of institution of the proceedings.
She reiterated that the appellant was physically and emotionally unable to companysummate the marriage and he had made a false excuse of impotency of the wife as being the cause for number companysummation of the marriage.
She further stated that the appellant was physically and sexually impotent and, companysequently, unable to perform the numbermal sexual functions and, in view of this, he had never expressed his willingness, by his companyduct or behaviour, to companysummate the marriage, even though the parties lived together for a number of years and had occupied the same bed in the same room.
It will therefore be seen that while the appellant filed the application on the ground that the respondent was impotent, the respondent, in turn, had alleged that it was the appellant who was impotent.
The material provision of the Act under which the application was filed by the appellant is s. 12 1 a which is as follows 12 1 Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the companymencement of this Act, shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds, namely a that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and companytinued to be so until the institution of the proceeding A party is impotent if his or her mental or physical companydition makes companysummation of the marriage a practical impossibility.
The companydition must be one, according to the statute, which existed at the time of the marriage and companytinued to be so until the institution of the proceedings.
In order to entitle the appellant to obtain a decree of nullity, as prayed for by him, he will have to establish that his wife, the respondent, was impotent at the time of the marriage and companytinued to be so until the institution of the proceedings.
Both the appellant and the respondent have been examined by doctors and their oral evidence and reports are on record.
Though the impotency of the appellant does number strictly arise for companysideration in a petition filed by him, nevertheless the trial Court framed issues even in that regard Issues Nos.
1 and 2, which are material, are as follows Whether the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and has companytinued to be so till the filing of the present petition ?
Is the petitioner impotent and companysequently unable to perform the numbermal sexual function with the respondent ?
If so, what is the effect thereof ?
The learned District Judge, after a companysideration of the evidence on record, ultimately held that the appellant had failed to prove that the respondent was at any time impotent and, as such, decided issue No.
1 against the appellant.
He further held, on issue No.
2 that the facts of the case, on the companytrary, showed that because of some physical or psychological cause, it was the appellant who was number able to companysummate the marriage with the respondent.
In this view the petition filed by the husband appellant was dismissed.
| 0 | train | 1969_63.txt |
NAVIN SINHA, J. The State as appellant assails the acquittal of the three respondents by the High Court, reversing their companyviction under Sections 302/149, 307/149, 147, 148 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code ordered by the Trial Court.
Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHWANI KUMAR Date 2019.12.18 161407 IST Reason The assault took place on 10.01.2002 at about 4.30 PM.
Two persons Mahendra Singh and Lokesh, who were father and son respectively, have been deceased.
PW1, Smt.
Mahendri, wife of deceased Mahendra Singh, is an injured eye witness.
PW3, the wife of deceased Lokesh is also an eye witness.
Five persons were originally accused.
One of the accused Satyendra Mintoo was deceased during the companyrse of the trial.
The three respondents were armed with spade, iron rod and companyntrymade pistol respectively.
The injuries found on the deceased and the injured PW1 are as follows Injuries of deceased Mahendra Multiple incised wounds of various sizes 18 cm x 4.5 cm x bone deep and 6 cm x 2 cm x bone deep on the back of left and right side of head, back of head and fresh blood was oozing from the head.
The cleavage of the wound was clean out.
| 1 | train | 2019_811.txt |
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
It is stated by learned companynsel for the appellants that this Court had occasion to deal with the appeals filed by the State questioning companyrectness of the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the High Court.
| 1 | train | 2008_1400.txt |
Appellant has been found guilty of companymission of offence under Section 302 of the IPC and has been awarded life imprisonment by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dungarpur.
On D.B. Criminal Appeal No.
1071/2003 being filed by her in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, Crl.
699/08 the same has been dismissed vide order dated 25.7.2007.
Thus Judgment of companyviction and sentence awarded by the Trial companyrt has been affirmed.
Hence, this appeal after grant of leave to the appellant.
Thumb nail sketch of the facts of the case is as mentioned herein below Vinod Vyas was married to Sarla on 21.1.1991, almost 8 years prior to the date of occurrence, which had taken place on 16.8.1999 at the matrimonial home of the deceased.
According to the prosecution story, for past two three years, relations between deceased Sarla, her husband Vinod and appellant Sharda were strained.
They used to demand dowry from her which she was number able to accede to.
On 16.8.1999, deceased Sarla was alleged to have been set on fire by her mother in law while she was companyking food on a kerosene stove as a result of which she had sustained 90 burn injuries.
She was immediately rushed to General Hospital, Sagwara.
On getting the aforementioned information on 16.8.1999, P.W 22 Kishore Singh posted as ASI at the Police Station Sagwara rushed to the General Hospital.
699/08 He reached there at about 9 Oclock at night.
In the presence of PW 31 Dr. Gokul Prajapati, her first statement Exh.
D 3 was recorded.
As per this first statement, Sarla disclosed that while companyking meals for the family, she pumped in air in the kerosene stove, which got inflamed thereby pallu of her saree caught fire.
Thus she sustained burn injuries on her person.
She further stated that numberone had deliberately or intentionally put her on fire.
D.3 is her first statement recorded at the hospital, in presence of P.W 31 Dr. Gokul Prajapati, who had put his signatures on the same along with P.W 22 Kishore Singh.
Thumb impression of deceased was also taken on it.
P.W 20 Ranjit Singh was posted as S.I at the Police Station, Varda on the date of incident i.e. 16.8.1999.
On receiving the information that Sarla has sustained burn injuries in her matrimonial home, he went to the hospital where Sarla was admitted.
However, before going to the hospital, he companytacted SDM in his house, so that he companyld also be taken there for the purpose of recording her statement but was informed Crl.
699/08 by SDM that he was number well, thus would number be in a position to go with him.
P.W 20 Ranjit Singh, after reaching hospital recorded another statement of deceased Sarla on the said date marked as Exh P 3.
In the said statement, she reiterated that she had sustained burn injuries, while she was trying to extinguish burning stove, after companyking meals, which got inflamed and her Saree caught fire.
P 3 bears signatures of Dr. Ravindra Mehta number examined by prosecution , P.W 2 Ganesh Lal and W 20 Ranjit Singh besides the thumb impression of deceased Sarla.
This was her second statement in point of time recorded in the Hospital.
Since the companydition of Sarla had deteriorated, she was referred to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad.
She was accordingly taken there for better treatment.
However, she died at Ahmedabad on 19.08.1999.
P.W 3 Purushottam, companysin of the deceased had submitted an application on 19.8.1999, on behalf of her grand father PW 2 Ganeshlal to the Dy.
Superintendent of Police, Sagwara stating that on the night of Monday, 16.8.1999 Sarla had been set on fire by her husband Crl.
699/08 Vinod and mother in law Sharda.
As per prosecution, before her death, one more dying declaration was recorded by P.W 23 Suresh Chandra Dixit, Executive Magistrate, Ahmedabad, marked as Exh.
In the said last statement, for the first time, she alleged that kerosene was poured on her by her mother in law, the present appellant Sharda and she was set on fire by lighting a match stick.
She suffered burn injuries on account of her mother in law.
When she cried for help, her father in law came downstairs and along with other neighbours, tried to extinguish the fire.
She was carried to hospital by her father in law for treatment.
Thus, this would be her third statement at the Hospital at Ahmedabad.
However, after her death, charge sheet was filed against appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and against others under Section 498 A/34 of the IPC.
Obviously, after her death, all the three statements of the deceased Sarla, Exh.
D 3, Ex.
P 3 and Exh.
P 18 would be treated as her dying declarations.
To bring home the charges levelled against the accused, prosecution has examined, in all, 31 witnesses.
In defence, numberwitness was examined by the appellant.
The appeal preferred by her in the High Court was dismissed by Division Bench.
Hence, this appeal.
However, we would start with the first dying declaration of deceased Sarla recorded at 9.00 p.m on 16.8.1999 by P.W 22 Kishore Singh.
It was recorded in presence of P.W 31 Dr. Prajapati.
Even though PW 31 was examined by the prosecution to prove Exh.
D 3, but surprisingly neither the trial companyrt number the High Court cared to go through his evidence and to discuss the same at all.
699/08 recorded, she was mentally alert and was in a companydition to get her statement recorded.
He has further admitted that the said statement was number recorded under pressure from anyone and was given on her own free will and accord.
He has further clarified that in Exh.
D 3, her first dying declaration, she had stated that while companyking food, on Primus stove, she pumped air which inflamed the same, her clothes accordingly caught fire and she sustained burn injuries.
She further stated that numberone had set her on fire.
Thus, his cross examination fully establishes that she had sustained burn injuries on her own while companyking food and has number fastened liability on anyone else much less on the present appellant.
To further companyroborate Exh.
D 3 stood fully companyroborated from the evidence of P.W 22 and P.W 31.
| 1 | train | 2009_1429.txt |
After the aforesaid decision dated 14.3.1991 the Delhi High Court by its order dated 19.3.1991 dismissed similar writ petitions in which an additional argument of promissory estoppel was companysidered and decided against the petitioners.
In the order dated 19.3.1991 reliance was placed on its earlier decision dated 14.3.1991 and as regards the argument of promissory estoppel it was held that there was numberdocument on the record filed by the petitioners where any promise was held out to any of the petitioners that the ownership will be transferred to them.
The allotment of the flats were made to the petitioners in their capacity as employees of DESU and it was an admitted position that the petitioners were paying rent to the respondents.
The Delhi High Court also dismissed the writ petition by order dated 22.3.1991 following its earlier decision dated 14th March, 1991 and 19th March, 1991.
All the above Special Leave Petitions have been filed against the aforesaid decisions of the High Court dated 14.3.1991, 19.3.1991 and 22.3.1991 and the same are disposed of by one companymon order.
| 0 | train | 1992_582.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2126 of 1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 14 8 1968 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in civil revision number430 of 1967 in person c.k.
babbar for the appellant.
harbans singh for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by sen j. this appeal by special leave in directed against the order of the.
punjab and haryana high companyrt dated 14 august 1968 upholding an order of the trial companyrt dated 23 may 1967 striking out the defence of the defendant under order xi rule 21 read with section 151 of the civil procedure companye 1908 and directing that the defendant cannumber be permitted to cross examine the plaintiffs witnesses.
the suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the respondent trilok nath mahajan as plaintiff against the appellant defendant m s. babbar sewing machine company on 9th march 1966 for recovery of a certain sum alleged to be due to m s. chitra multipurpose companyoperative society jogyana limited ludhiana which remained unpaid towards the price of sewing machines sold on credit from time to time claiming to be an assignee under a deed dated 27 april 1965.
the transaction sued upon was of the year 1959 and the suit was obviously barred by limitation.
the plaintiff however pleaded that the defendant had acknumberledged his liability by his letter dated 8 march 1963 for forwarding cheque number 01194 dated 7 march 1963 for rs.
50 drawn on the punjab national bank limited yamunanagar.
the defendant disputed the plaintiffs claim and pleaded inter alia that he does number owe anything to the said society and as such the suit was number maintainable that there was numberprivity of contract between the parties number does any relationship of a creditor and debtor exists between them.
he further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation.
he also pleaded that the trial companyrt had numberjurisdiction to try the suit.
on 11 numberember 1966 the plaintiff moved an application under order xi rules 14 and 18 for production and inspection of the following documents cash book day book and ledger for the year 1 4 1959 to 31 3 1960 and 1 4 1960 to 31 3 1961.
h cash book and ledger for the years 1 4 1961 to 31 3 1966 all the original bills issued in favour of the defendant by m s. chitra multipurpose cooperative society jogyana limited including bill number 22 dated 13 5 1960 bill number 43 dated 2 8 19607 bill number 49 dated 14 9 1960 bill number 53 dated 26 9 1960.
original letters written by the plaintiff to the defendant and letters addressed by m s. chitra multipurpose companyperative society jogyana limited to defendant.
companynterfoils of cheque book in use on 7 3 1963.
the original cheque number 01194 dated 7 3 1963.
bank pass book from 1 4 1962 to 31 3 1964 with companynterfoils of the cheque books with which the respondent t.n.
mahajan firm had an account.
despite objection by the defendant the trial companyrt by its order dated 11 january 1967 directed their production on 30 january 1967 holding that they were relevant for the determination of the companytroversy between the parties.
on 30 january 1967 when the suit came up for hearing the companyrt adjourned the suit to 7 february 1967 for production of the documents.
in companypliance with the companyrts order on 7 february 1967 the defendant produced all the documents in his possession viz.
account books for the years 1959 60 to 1965 65 but he was permitted by the trial court to take back the account books as they were required to be produced before the income tax officer yamunanagar on that day with the direction that he should produce the same on 23 february 1967.
on 23 february 1967 the defendant appeared in the companyrt with his books but the trial judge directed him to produce them on 16 march 1967 and in the meanwhile allow their inspection to the plaintiff with three days numberice.
the defendant accordingly sent a letter dated 25 february 1967 asking the plaintiff to take inspection of the account books on 27 february 1967.
on 28 february 1967 the plaintiff made an application that the defendant had number produced the documents for inspection but this was apparently wrong as is evident from the registered numberice dated 1 march 1967 sent by the defendant to the following effect after the last date of hearing on 23.2.1967 i wrote you a letter from yamuna nagar on 25.2.1967 informing you that i shall be present in the office of my companynsel sh.
h. l. soni on 27th february 1967 at 6 p.m. for affording you the inspection of the documents.
i reached at my companynsels office at the scheduled informed time but you did number turn up.
i kept waiting for you uptil 8.30 p.m. on that day.
later a i companytacted your lawyer shri s. r. wadhera but he expressed his inability to companytact you.
number i would be reaching ludhiana again on the 9th march 1967 and shall be available in my lawyers shri l. sonis office from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. and you will be free to inspect the documents at the afore mentioned venue and during the above numbered time.
three days clear numberice is being given to you.
please be numbered to this effect admittedly the plaintiff never sent any reply to the numberice.
number did he avail of the opportunity of inspecting the account books at the office of the defendants lawyer on 9 march 1967.
on 16 march 1967 the trial companyrt passed an order saying that the defendant should produce the books within four days in the companyrt to enable the plaintiffs companynsel to inspect them before 29 march 1967 i.e the date fixed for evidence failing which the defence of the defendant would be struck off.
on 29 march 1967 three witnesses of the plaintiff were examined.
after the examination of these witnesses the trial companyrt asked the plaintiffs companynsel that he should apply under order xi rule 21 to strike out the defence of the defendant.
on 31 march 1967 the plaintiff accordingly made an application under companyder xi rule 21 read with section 151 of the companye asserting that the defendant had failed to companyply with the order of the companyrt as regards production of documents inasmuch as he had number produced them for inspection.
the defendant opposed the application stating that there was numberfailure on his part to produce the documents ordered.
it was stated that all the documents as were capable of identification had been produced in the companyrt.
it was alleged that the plaintiff had already inspected the documents that were specifically set out in the application.
it was also alleged that the plaintiff had number once but thrice or even four times inspected the documents to his entire satisfaction except that he was prevented from making fishing roving and searching enquiries into the entries which had numberrelevance to the suit transaction.
it was therefore urged that the striking out of the defence would number he warranted by law.
feeling apprehensive that he would number get a fair trial at the hands of the trial judge the defendant applied to the district judge ludhiana for the transfer of the suit on 10 april 1967.
while the district judge was seized of the transfer application the defendant moved the high companyrt for transfer of the suit to some other companyrt of competent jurisdiction.
the high companyrt by its order dated 15 may 1967 declined to interfere.
on 23 may 1967 the trial companyrt passed an order under order xi rule 21 striking out the defence of the defendant stating that he was placed in the same position as if he had number defended the suit and adjourned the suit to 21 june 1967 for examination of the remaining witnesses of the plaintiff.
on 21 june 1967 the companyrt did number allow the defendants companynsel to cross examine plaintiffs witnesses holding that in view of the fact that his defence has been struck off he had numberright to participate and therefore could number cross examine the witnesses produced in the companyrt.
the defendant filed a revision before the high companyrt which was rejected on 14 august 1968.
169 p.c.
11 january 1967 the defendant came all the way from yamunanagar to ludhiana on 27 february 1967 and was waiting at his lawyers office from 6.00 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. when the plaintiff or his companynsel did number turn up.
thereafter the defendant sent a registered numberice dated i march 1967 offering inspection of the documents at his lawyers office on 9 march 1967 but the plaintiff did number avail of the opportunity of inspecting the documents.
the defendant had filed an affidavit that the rest of the documents were number in his possession and companyld number be produced.
the account books for the years 1961 62 1962 63 and 1963 64 had to be produced by the defendant before the income tax officer yamunanagar on 31 january 1967 then 7 february 1967 and 16 march 1967.
an affidavit to this effect was also filed.
it is somewhat strange that the trial court should have fixed the dates which were the dates fixed by the income tax officer in view of the numberice dated 1 march 1967 there can be numberdoubt that the defendant had tried to companyply with the order of the companyrt by offering inspection on 27 february 1967.
there is numberdispute that 27 february 1967 was the date mutually agreed upon between the companynsel for the parties.
| 1 | test | 1978_163.txt |
N. Shinghal, J. These appeals and the petition for review arise out of the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated November 7, 1974, upholding the companyviction of appellants Mukund Singh and Kartar Singh and petitioner Malkiat Singh in the following circumstances Roor Singh deceased used to live in village Kurrar.
His daughter Smt.
Pritam Kaur was married to one Karnail Singh who was appointed by some Sadhs as their mukhtaram in respect of their lands measuring 15 bighas in that village.
Kar nail Singh sold that land to his father in law Roor Singh.
Kalu Sadh filed a suit for pre emption through his wife Smt.
Harnam Kaur.
The suit was decreed some five or six months before the date of incident.
Roor Singh filed a suit in the companyrt of Sub Judge, Barnala, claiming that he was in possession of the land and was entitled to it, but it was dismissed.
He again filed a suit against Smt.
Harnam Kaur and Kalu Sadh, and it was pending on the date of the incident.
Roor Singh obtained a temporary injunction against Smt.
Harnam Kaur and her husband Kalu Sadh on August 23, 1971, restraining his dispossession as they wanted to execute the pre emption decree.
It is alleged that as Smt, Harnam Kaur wanted to dispossess Roor Singh somehow, she obtained the help of her son in law accused Malkiat Singh who, in turn, took the help of accused Mukund Singh who was a friend of Dsrshan Singh P.W. 3 also.
Accused Malkiat Singh and Mukund Singh went to village Tappa to meet Darshan Singh on December 26, 1971, and asked him to bring his tractor trolly and licensed rifle to Mahal Kalan on December 30, 1971, because they wanted to cultivate the aforesaid land that day.
Darshan Singh agreed to the proposal and reached Mahal Kalan at about midday in his tractortrolly.
He met accused Mukund Singh and Malkiat Singh there, along with the other four accused and Lal Singh.
Malkiat Singh, Mukund Singh, Kartar Singh and Lal Singh were armed with .12 bore guns, while Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram had gandasas.
Surjeet Kaur and Smt.
Harnam Kaur arrived there and gave the information that Roor Singh and his three sons were irrigating that part of the field which abutted on the cart road leading to Mahal Khurd.
They said that it was an opportune time to do away with them and undertook to bear all the expenses.
Mukund Singh, Malkiat Singh, Kartar Singh, Hari Singh, Preet Singh, Kala Ram and Lal Singh then went in the trolly of the tractor of Darshan Singh to village Kumar and reached there at about 4 p. m. It is alleged that Darshan Singh detached the trolly from the tractor and raced the tractor in field khasra No.
61/24 which was a part of the land which had been purchased by Roor Singh from the sadhs.
All the other accused followed the tractor.
They found that Roor Singh was irrigating the adjoining field Khasra No.
61/25 from his tube well.
His sons Gurbux Singh, Mansha Singh P.W. 2 , and Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 were also there and so also his daughter Smt.
Jeet Kaur who had companye to serve tea to her father and brothers in the field.
It is alleged that Roor Singh and Gurbux Singh asked the accused to remove the tractor from their field and to clear out, but to numberavail.
Roor Singh and Gurbux Singh then rushed towards the accused with their dhangi and kripan and hit Kala Ram accused.
Accused Malkiat Singh and Kartar Singh fired their guns at Roor Singh, Gurbux Singh aimed a blow with his kripan at Mukund Singh but it fell on his gun and a splinter fell out from it.
Lal Singh, Mukund Singh and Darshan Singh fired at Gurbux Singh who fell down.
Jeet Kaur raised an alarm and stepped towards her father.
Lal Singh and Kartar Singh accused fired at her.
Mansha Singh P.W. 2 and Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 , the other sons of Roor Singh, did number venture to rescue their father, brother and sister, but raised an alarm.
Malkiat Singh then told his companypanions that they should leave as they had succeeded in killing Roor Singh, his son and daughter, and all the accused left in Darshan Singhs tractor trolly.
Mansha Singh P.W. 2 and Surjeet Singh P.W. 4 went near their father, brother and sister, and found that they were dead.
Mansha Singh went to the village and informed Yogendra Singh P.W. 6 and Thakur Singh about the incident.
They accompanied him to the place of occurrence where some other persons had arrived in the meantime.
Mansha Singh P.W. 2 went to police station Mahal Kalan which was at a distance of six miles and lodged the first information report Ex.
PO there at 6.15 p. m. It is alleged that within a few minutes of doing so a supplementary statement Ex.
DH was recorded by Mansha Singh P.W. 2 giving some more details Sub Inspector Chand Singh accompanied Mansha Singh to the place of occurrence and reached there at about 9 p. m. He prepared the inquest reports.
He again went to the place of occurrence next morning.
He found eleven .12 bore fired cartridge cases lying there.
He also found 2 brass fired cartridge cases and the splinter which had fallen from the gun.
Some other articles like a bloodstained gan dasa, kripan and dhangi were found lying in the field, as also a kettle and cups etc.
All these articles were taken in police custody.
The dead bodies were examined by Dr. Jagjeet Singh P.W. 1 on December 31, 1971.
All the 13 fired cartridge cases were sealed by the Sub Inspector and reached the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, on January 3, 1972.
Accused Malkiat Singh and Mukund Singh were arrested by Sub Inspector Hazura Singh P.W. 17 on January 6, 1972.
It is alleged that at that time Malkiat Singh was carrying double barrel .12 bore gun Ex.
P. 23, while Mukund Singh had a single barrel .12 bore gun Ex.
P. 22 with him.
Both the guns were taken in police custody and were sealed.
Accused Kartar Singh, Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram were arrested from village Sanghera by Sub Inspector Chand Singh P.W. 19 on January 7, 1972.
A double barrel .12 bore gun Ex.
P. 20 was recovered from the possession of accused Kartar Singh of which he held a licence.
The injuries of Kala Ram accused were examined by a medical officer, and some test identification parades were also held.
On January 10, 1972, Sub Inspector Gur Chetan Singh P.W. 18 arrested Darshan Singh from village Tappa and recovered a .315 bore rifle Ex.
P. 18 from his possession for which he had a licence.
Accused Lal Singh was arrested from Barnala along with gun Ex.
The four recovered guns and rifle were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, and reached there on February 3, 1972.
It was found that the recovered fired cartridge cases, except one which had insufficient marks, had been fired from the one or the other of the recovered fire arms.
Darshan Singh applied for being made an approver and his statement was recorded on March 2, 1972.
The Police filed a charge sheet against all the accused.
Harnam Kaur and Smt.
Surjeet Kaur were charged of abetting the murders, while the other accused were charged of companymitting the substantive offences.
The additional Sessions Judge of Barnala acquitted Lal Singh, Smt.
Harnam Kaur and Smt.
Surjeet Kaur of the offences of which they were charged, and companyvicted the remaining accused of of fences under Sections 148 and 302/ 149, I.P.C. He sentenced Mukund Singh, Malkiat Singh and Kartar Singh to death, and Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram to rigorous imprisonment for life, for the murder of Roor Singh, Gurbux Singh and Smt.
Jeet Kaur.
They were also companyvicted of the offence under Section 148, I.P.C. and were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year.
Three appeals were filed in the High Court, and there was a reference for companyfirmation of the death sentence.
The High Court acquitted Hari Singh, Preet Singh and Kala Ram, but upheld the companyviction of the present appellants Mukund Singh, Kartar Singh, and petitioner Malkiat Singh, and companyfirm ed their death sentence.
Appeal No.
159 of 1975 has been filed by Kartar Singh while Appeal No.
382 of 1975 has been filed by Mukund Singh, by special leave.
Malkiat Singh also filed a petition for special leave, but it was dismissed on May 1, 1975.
He has therefore filed a review petition No.
51 of 1975.
PO was lodged by Mansha Singh P.W. 2 within a very short time, it discredited the testimony of its maker Mansha Singh because while the report stated that the of fence was companymitted by Mukund Singh and Malkiat Singh who were armed with .12 bore guns, two unknown persons who were also armed with guns and two unknown persons who were armed with gandasas, Mansha Singh stated in the trial companyrt that the crime was companymitted by eight, persons, four of whom were.
Jeet Kaur, and it may be that, as has been stated by Darshan Singh P.W. 3 , Malkiat Singh felt satisfied and wanted to leave the place of occurrence as early as possible as they had exhausted their ammunition and there was the possibility of villagers companying to the place of occurrence in a short while.
P. 22.
Malkiat Singh was arrested the same day, and was found in possession of double barrel .12 bore gun Ex.
P. 23 for which he held a licence.
Appellant Kartar Singh was arrested on January 7, 1972 and he was then in possession of double barrel .12 bore gun Ex.
P. 20 for which he held a licence.
Darshan Singh P.W. 3 was arrested on January 10, 1972 and was found in possession of rifle Ex.
P. 18 for which he held a licence.
The aforesaid guns Exs.
P. 23.
P. 22, P. 20, and P. 18 were seized by the investigating officer, and were sealed.
They were delivered at the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, on February 3, 1972.
J.K. Sinha P.W. 14 Assistant Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chandigarh, has proved the delivery of the fired cartridge cases and the rifles in sealed companydition, and he has stated that after firing test cartridges through the guns it was found that one of the recovered fired cartridge cases had been fired from Mukund Singhs gun Ex.
P. 22, four from Malkiat Singhs gun Ex.
P. 23 and four from Kartar Singhs gun Ex.
P. 20.
He has also stated that the two brass fired cartridge cases had been fired from Darshan Singhs gun Ex.
| 0 | train | 1976_182.txt |
Arising out of S.L.P. Crl.
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding companyviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 364A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC as recorded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat.
By the impugned companymon judgment two Criminal Appeal Nos.255 and 307 of 2001 were disposed of.
Ten persons including one Virender who was declared a proclaimed offender were sent for trial.
After trial all the accused except Virender, whose presence the investigating agency was number able to secure during trial were companyvicted under Section 364 A of IPC.
They were companyvicted for offence punishable under Section 364 A IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/ with default stipulation.
Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows Amit Kumar son of Madan Mohan PW 2 was aged 9 years and on the date of the incident i.e. 29.5.1996 was studying in class III.
He used to live with his father in House No.212 Old Housing Board Colony, Panipat at a distance of about 100 yards from Salarganj Gate, Panipat.
At about numbern time on 29.5.1996 the boy had gone to Salarganj to play with his friends and when he did number return home, the family made all efforts to trace him which proved to be futile.
Apprehending that he had been kidnapped, Madan Mohan PW 1 proceeded to the Police Station City, Panipat to lodge a report.
On the way he met a police party at Sukhdev Nagar where he made his statement Ex.
PA and on its basis formal FIR Ex.
PA/2 was recorded.
On 2.6.1996, Sanjiv Jain and Faqir Chand PW 4 came and apprised Madan Mohan that Yashpal, a resident of Panipat, had companye to them and told about their having received a telephonic message from Saharanpur that Amit Kumar was well but his abductors were demanding a ransom of Rs.10,00,000/ failing which they were threatening to kill Amit Kumar.
The abductors had further informed Yashpal that in case the matter was reported to the Police even then Amit Kumar would be killed.
Yashpal had also been apprised of the manner in which the money was required to be paid, which mode required Yashpal to travel in Car No.
HR 06B 244 belonging to Sanjiv Tayal, the younger brother of Madan Mohan, display a white cloth for identification before reaching the Railway Crossing before Rampur at 10.00 p.m. On reaching there, the car was to give a signal with the dipper.
On getting this information, Madan Mohan, Sanjiv Jain and Faqir Chand had decided number to report the matter to the police and had arranged for the requisite amount taking Rs.3,50,000/ from M s Surya International a factory owned by Madan Mohan , Rs.50,000/ from M s Design Rug owned by the younger brothers of Madan Mohan, Rs.2 00,000/ from M s Surya International in the name of Faqir Chand, an amount of Rs.2,75,000/ from Sintex Handicraft, Panipat in the name of wife of Madan Mohan as she was partner of the firm.
On 3.6.1996 Sanjiv Jain and Faqir Chand had again informed Madan Mohan that Yashpal had companye and told them that he had received another message that in case the amount of Rs.10,00,000/ was number paid that day itself, Amit Kumar would be killed.
Yashpal had further assured them number to worry and had taken the entire responsibility for the safety of the child.
Thereupon the currency numberes already companylected had been arranged in the denomination of Rs.500/ , Rs.100/ and Rs.50/ respectively and the first and the last numberes of the bundles were initialled as MM by Madan Mohan.
Sanjiv Jain had then called Yashpal at the residence of Madan Mohan and handed over the bag companytaining currency numberes of Rs.10,000,000/ to him.
Yashpal had taken away the bag in the car bearing registration No.
HR 06B 244, which he had driven away himself.
On 4.6.1996, Yashpal brought back Amit Kumar and handed him over to Madan Mohan.
Amit Kumar told his father that on 30.5.1996 he was accosted by Virender the absconding accused, who apprised him that his father was calling him.
On hearing this, Amit Kumar accompanied Virender for some distance where two young men, namely, Vinod and Sohan were positioned near a Yamaha Motor Cycle.
Vinod was standing near the Motor Cycle while Sohan was sitting on the pillion.
Sohan had caught hold of Amit Kumar and closed his mouth and made him sit on the motor cycle whereafter the motor cycle, was driven away by Vinod to the T. Road via bus stand from where it was taken to Gharaunda.
When the motor cycle reached the Yamuna bridge, Amit Kumar was given water to drink and the accused threw a companyn in the river.
After this his abductors took him to Railway Station Sona Arjunpur where it started raining.
Thereupon they made him to sit on the ticket window.
When the rain stopped, Vinod and Sohan had removed him on the motor cycle to a garden where 4/5 persons were taking liquor.
One of them asked Vinod whether the work had been done and another one of them had enquired as to where Virender was, to which enquiry Vinod replied that Virender had been left at Panipat with Yashpal.
The group was addressing each other by their names as Sohan, Pawan, Pappu, Jagbir, Sunder Pal and Vikas.
They had served meals to Amit Kumar in the garden.
On the next day, Virender also came there and thereafter Virender and Vinod had taken Amit Kumar on the Yamaha motor cycle to the house of Vidya Sagar Chawla at Saharanpur.
Vinod stayed with Amit Kumar whereas Virender used to go out at times.
Vidya Sagar Chawla also remained present in the house and the entire incident was narrated by Amit Kumar to him that night.
On the following day, after Virender had returned, he and Vinod took Amit Kumar to a sugar cane field on a Yamaha motor cycle.
On the pavement of nearby canal, an Ambassador car was standing and then Sohan, Pawan, Pappu, Jagbir, Sunder Pal and Vinod had taken Amit Kumar for making a telephonic call to his father asking him to reach soon.
On the way, Vinod had told them that the uncle of Amit Kumar and Kakku had reached and, therefore, they should escape.
On hearing this, the appellants took Amit Kumar back to the sugar cane field.
During the night car belonging to the uncle of Amit Kumar came back near the sugar cane field and Yashpal got down from the same.
He called for the aforementioned persons where upon Amit Kumar was taken near the car.
Vinod enquired from Yashpal whether everything was alright at the house of Amit Kumar and Yashpal replied in the affirmative.
Vinod handed over Amit Kumar to Yashpal, who in turn handed over a bag to Vinod.
Yashpal further told that they shall companynt for the money after some time.
Yashpal thereafter took Amit Kumar to Saharanpur where meals were taken and Yashpal had left him at the residence of Madan Mohan.
After his release, Amit Kumar had told his father that he companyld point out the places where he had been taken.
He had also made a similar statement before the police.
On 8.6.1996, Madan Mohan and his son Amit Kumar accompanied the police party.
The boy had first taken them to Salarganj gate from where he had been kidnapped and thereafter to Sona Arjunpur Railway Station in Uttar Pradesh.
From there, he had taken them to a garden where he had been kept and from there to a sugar cane field which was at some distance from the Railway Station.
Thereafter, Amit Kumar had taken them to the house of Vidya Sagar Chawla at Saharanpur.
The Police had been carrying out raids to apprehend the accused and during one such raid on 19.6.1996, in which Pawan Kumar PW 3 had joined, the police had gone to Sona Arjunpur where a person, whose name did number companye forth in the investigation, had disclosed that Sunder Pal and Pawan were sleeping under a tree in the field.
The police had then raided the field and apprehended both of them.
On interrogation, Sunder Pal made a disclosure statement Ex.
PF that out of the ransom of Rs.50,000/ , he had spent Rs.1,000/ and had kept companycealed the remaining amount of Rs.49 000/ wrapped in a polythene paper underneath the ground in the fields.
His disclosure statement which runs into five pages interestingly incorporated the entire details of the kidnapping including the portions wherein even he had number been associated and bears his thumb impression and is attested by Pawan Kumar and Jai Narain.
Pursuant to this disclosure statement Sunder Pal had got recovered Rs.49,000/ currency numberes of the denomination of Rs.100/ which were taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
Pawan too made an equally detailed disclosure statement Ex.
PG which was reduced into writing and signed by him and attested by Pawan Kumar and Jai Narain in the presence of S1 Krishan Pal and subsequent thereto, he too got recovered Rs.45,000/ of the denomination of Rs.100/ each from the field indicated by him in the disclosure statement.
It was taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
On 20.6.1996, when Madan Mohan was standing at Mayur Chowk, a Sub Inspector, an Assistant Sub Inspector and three companystables met him and they together proceeded towards the Railway Station, Panipat.
When they were standing outside the cycle stand, Railway Station, Madan Mohan numbericed accused Yashpal companying towards the Railway Station.
Yashpal was apprehended by the police and on his personal search a companyntry made pistol and three live cartridges from the left pocket of his trouser were recovered, which were taken into possession through recovery memo.
On interrogation, in the presence of Madan Mohan, Yashpal had made a disclosure statement Ex.
PB in which after giving the details of the persons involved in the kidnapping and the amount of ransom taken, he disclosed that his share in the ransom came to Rs.6,00,000/ out of which Rs.5,75,000/ have been kept in the bag in a Almirah at his residential house and an amount of Rs.25,0000/ had been kept companycealed in the house of his sister in Ludhiana and a pistol had been kept companycealed in a house of his sister in Saharanpur.
Pursuant to this disclosure statement, Yashpal got recovered Rs.5,75,000/ and the black companyoured bag bearing the words M. Tayal embroidered thereon from his house, which were taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
PC, which was attested by Madan Mohan and Ramesh Chand.
On the same day, Inspector Krishan Pal PW 8 joined Sanjay Tayal in the investigation and after receipt of the secret information about Vinod, Vikas and Vidya Sagar, he went to the Truck Union, Panipat and apprehended all of them from a hut near a tube well.
The inspector had recovered a sum of Rs.42,000/ from a bag which was being carried by Vikas.
The numberes were in the four packets of Rs.100/ denomination and four numberes were of the denomination of Rs.500/ .
The first and the last numberes bore the initials of MM.
These were taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
PR, which was attested by the witnesses.
A similar search of Vinod led to the recovery of Rs.41,000/ , which were carried by him in a bag.
The numberes were in four packets of Rs.100/ denomination and two packets of Rs.500 denomination.
The first and the last currency numberes of the packet of Rs.500/ denomination bore the initial MM, the signatures of Madan Mohan PW 1 .
The numberes were taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
A similar search companyducted on the person of Vidya Sagar led to the recovery of Rs.24,000/ .
All the numberes were of the denomination of Rs.500/ and 12 numberes were recovered from the right pocket of Vidya Sagar while 36 numberes were recovered from the back pocket of the pant of Vidya Sagar.
All the numberes bore the initials MM, which were identified by Sanjay Tayal and taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
During the personal search of Vinod and Vikas one pistol of .12 bore alongwith two live cartridges were recovered from Vinod whereas from Vikas one pistol .315 bore along with three live cartridges were recovered.
On the same day, Inspector Ravinder Kumar PW 9 along with SI Yad Ram and other police officials had gone to Sona Arjunpur in search of the accused and there one Jaswant Rai was joined in the investigation.
There the police party got secret information that Virender, Sohan and Vishav Pal were companying from Shamli to Panipat on a Yamaha motor cycle whereupon he set up a naka.
On their arrival, Sohan, Virender and Vishav Pal were apprehended and a sum of Rs.40,000/ were recovered from Vishav Pal, which were carried by him in a bag of black companyour, which he was holding in his hand.
A similar sum of Rs.40,000/ was recovered from a bag which was being carried by Sohan.
All the numberes were of the denomination of Rs.100/ each and bore the initials MM of Madan Mohan companyplainant, who has been described as Madan Gopal complainant.
On the personal search of Virender, 86 currency numberes of the denomination of Rs.500/ each i.e. Rs.43,000/ were recovered.
All the aforesaid currency numberes were recovered through recovery memos Ex.
PJ, PK and PL respectively.
The motor cycle was also taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
On 4.8.1996, Inspector Ravinder Kumar PW 9 along with SI Randhir Singh and other police officials and the companyplainant went to Village Sona Arjunpur in search of Jagbir appellant where he came to know that he had gone to Panipat in order to surrender in the Court.
When the police party was present near the bridge of Yamuna, the Inspector received secret information that Jagbir had gone to Panipat.
When the police party reached Sanjay Chowk, Panipat, the companyplainant pointed out towards Jagbir who was standing near a three wheeler.
He was apprehended.
On 7.8.1996, on interrogation Jagbir made a disclosure statement Ex.
PD to the effect that he had kept companycealed an amount of Rs.5,000/ in a wax paper in the Baithak of his house situated in Village Sona Arjunpur.
Thereafter, in pursuance of his disclosure statement, he got recovered a sum of Rs.5,000/ of the denomination of Rs.100/ each.
The same were taken into possession through recovery memo Ex.
One of the numberes was bearing the initial of MM.
On companypletion of the investigation, a challan was put in the Court of the Illaqa Magistrate, who companymitted the case to the Court of Sessions as the offences disclosed therein were exclusively triable by that Court.
On going through the challan papers, Learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charge under Section 364 A IPC against all the appellants to which they pleaded number guilty.
In order to bring home charge against the appellants, the prosecution examined Madan Mohan PW 1 , Amit Kumar PW2 , Pawan Kumar PW3 , Faqir Chand PW4 , SI Yad Ram PW5 , ASI Dalel Singh PW6 , Inspector Rajinder Singh PW7 , SI Krishan Pal PW8 and Inspector Ravinder Kumar PW9 .
When examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short Cr.
P.C. in order to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence against them, Vikas, Vishav Pal, Pawan Kumar, Vidya Sagar, Sunder Pal, Vinod, Sohan and Jagbir pleaded innocence and false implication.
Placing reliance on the evidence of victim Amit Kumar PW 2 , Madan Mohan PW 1 and Pawan Kumar PW 3 as numbered above the accused persons were found guilty and sentenced.
In any event, according to learned companynsel for the appellant Section 364 A has numberapplication.
In response, learned companynsel for the respondent State submitted that the High Court erroneously observed that the seized numberes were number produced during trial.
In any event the High Court was right in dismissing the appeal.
PG and got recovered an amount of Rs.45,000/ which was taken into possession vide memo Ex.
P4 is the currency numberes.
He also prepared the rough site plans Ex.
PP and Ex.
PQ regarding the aforesaid recoveries.
He further stated that on 20.6.1996 he joined Sanjay Tayal in the investigation of this case and after receipt of a secret information, he rushed to Truck Union Panipat and there he apprehended accused Vinod, Vikas and Vidya Sagar.
He companyducted the personal search of the aforesaid accused and recovered an amount of Rs.42,000/ from accused Vikas.
The currency numberes were in four packets of Rs.100/ denomination and four numberes were of the denomination of Rs.500/ .
The first and the last numbere of each packet were bearing the initial of M.M. which also identified Sanjay Tayal of his brother Madan Mohan.
He took the same into possession and the bag is Ex.
P7 and currency numberes are Ex.
The recovery memo is Ex.
He also companyducted the personal search of Vinod and recovered an amount of Rs.41,000/ which were in a bag which is Ex.
P8 which accused was carrying.
The aforesaid currency numberes were in four packets having a denomination of Rs.100/ and two numberes were of the denomination of Rs.500/ The first and the last numbere of every bundle was having the initial of M.M. and PW Sanjay Tayal identified the same.
The currency numberes were Ex.
He took into possession the bag Ex.
PS which bears his signature as well as signature of Sanjay Tayal.
He also companyducted the personal search of Vidya Sagar accused and recovered a sum of Rs.24,000/ .
All the currency numberes were of the denomination of Rs.500/ .
The 12 numberes were recovered from the right pocket of the accused Vidya Sagar whereas 36 currency numberes were recovered from back side pocket of the pant of the accused.
All the currency numberes were bearing the initial of Madan Mohan which were identified by Sanjay Tayal.
It is to be numbered that before the High Court challenge was number raised to shake the credibility of the testimony of Madan Mohan PW 1 and Amit Kumar PW 2 during arguments.
| 0 | train | 2008_37.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2132 of 1977.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd September, 1976 of the Gujarat High Court in First Appeal No.
76 of 1963 V. Patel, R. Shroff, Gopal Subramaniam and D.P. Mohanty for the Appellant.
N. Phadke, S.C. Patel and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA J. The present appeal by special leave is directed against the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 23rd of September, 1976.
The sole question for companysideration in this appeal is whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit giving rise to the present appeal.
There is an old institution known as Edroos Dargah of Hazrat Sayedina Mohomed Bin Abdulla El Edroos at Surat.
Village Orma is an inam village held by the said institution.
The dispute in the present case relates to the property of the said village orma companyprising its soil, trees, lanes, roads together with cultivated lands of about 1093 acres with land revenue alienated Rs.
2,747.10.5.
Pursuant to the Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act, 1952 Act 42 of 1953 hereinafter referred to as the 1952 Act, the State of Bombay and after the reorganization of States, the State of Gujarat, declared that the said Act was applicable to village Orma from I st of August, 1955 and, therefore, the exemption from the payment of land revenue was extinguished from the 1st of August, 1955.
Accordingly the State of Bombay through its Mamlatdar of Olpad sent a numberice to the Sajjadanashin of the institution to that effect and also demanded the village records from his possession.
He also proceeded to take further and companysequential action and declared that the rights of the institution in public roads, lanes, village site and land etc.
are extinguished.
In the circumstances the Sajjadanashin was obliged to file the suit which was later on numbered as suit No.
9 of 1956.
The stand of the plaintiff is that village Orma was an inam village held by the religious institution of Edroos Dargah and the provisions of section 4 of the 1952 Act have numberapplication in view of clause 2 of section 3 of the said Act.
The defendant State companytested the suit on grounds inter alia that the village in question was a personal inam within the meaning of section 2 1 a of the 1952 Act and the State Government alone is companypetent to decide the question whether the grant is a personal inam or number and the Civil Court has numberjurisdiction to decide the question.
Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff went up in appeal to the High Court.
The appeal came up for hearing before a learned Single Judge.
He took up the question of jurisdiction first.
It appears that during the pendency of the appeal another Act was passed known as the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 Act 16 of 1969 hereinafter referred to as the 1969 Act.
It came into force on I 5th of November, 1969.
By this Act devasthan inams or inams held by religious and charitable institutions were also abolished.
The plaintiff has number companye to challenge the judgment of the Full Bench on obtaining special leave of this Court to appeal.
| 1 | train | 1981_295.txt |
for the appellants.
Prem Malhotra, Jasbir Malik and K.S. Chauhan, Advs.
for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered Ramaswamy, J. Leave granted We have heard learned companynsel on both sides.
This appeal by special leave arises from the Division Bench Judgment of Punjab Haryana High Court, made on November 5, 1996 in C.W.P. No.8755/96.
The appellant general candidates, viz.,
Jagdish Lal, Ram Dayal and Surinderjit Kapil, challenged the promotion of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates for short, the reserved candidates , viz.,
Ram Asra, H.S. Hira, Sant Lal and Ajmer Singh, as Superintendents in Class III Service of Haryana Government.
Respective appointments of the appellant and the respondents have been reflected in the judgment of the High Court as under No Name Seniority Dt.
of As As As As As number in apptt.
Asstt.
Bud R.E. the seni as Supdt.
get Cla ority list Clerk Offi ass cer I of 1.1.95 Cla ss II APPELLANTS Jagdish 22 24.11.58 1.12.68 27.10.87 1.4.90 Lal Ram Dayal 28 22.2.61 1.12.68 16.1.89 9.8.91 Surinderjit 56 1.9.66 10.4.72 2.2.96 Kapil PRIVATE RESPONDENTS Reserved Category candidates Ram Asra 48 31.1.66 22.9.71 26.5.82 4.9.87 H.S. Hira 64 18.4.67 31.5.73 27.10.83 27.5.88 2.2.96 promoted on ad hoc basis for a period of 4 months only and 31.5.96 on regular basis.
Sant Lal 91 16.8.71 6.11.78 4.11.87 8.2.90 Ajmer Singh 99 24.8.72 9.9.79 31.10.88 1.7.90 In the lowest cadre post, i.e., Clerks and Assistants, in the Education Department, admittedly, the appellant were senior to the respondent.
But as Deputy Superintendents, Respondent Nos.
1 and 2 were promoted respectively on May 26, 1982 and October 27 1983, while the appellants were promoted on different dates, viz.,
October 27, 1987, January 16, 1989 and February 2, 1996.
Sixth respondent, Sant Lal was promoted on November 4, 1987, that is, prior to the promotion of Surinderjit Kapil.
Equally, respondent No.7 Ajmer Singh also was promoted earlier to Ram Dayal and Surinderjit Kapil on October 31, 1988.
While working as Deputy Superintendent, Ram Asra was promoted to the post of Superintendent on September 4, 1987 H.S. Hira was promoted as Superintendent on May 27, 1988 while the first appellant, Jagdish Lal was promoted on April 1, 1990 and Ram Dayal, appellant No.2 was promoted on August 9, 1991 Sant Lal, respondent No.6 was promoted on February 8, 1990, that is, prior to the promotion of Jagdish Lal as Superintendent.
Equally, Ajmer Singh, 7th respondent was promoted as Superintendent on July 1, 1990, that is, prior to the promotion of second appellant, Ram Dayal on August 9 1991.
While all of them were working as Superintendents, H.S. Hira was further promoted on ad hoc basis w.e.f.
February 2, 1996 for a period of 4 months and from May 31, 1996 on regular basis, in his own right, as Registrar Education which post is number classified as Class I post.
On June 4, 1996, the appellants filed a writ petition claiming that right from the post of Clerk upto the post of Superintendent, the Class III Service of the Education Department, they were senior to the reserved candidates.
Though they were promoted on the basis of rule of reservation applying the 100 point roster maintained by the Government, they stole a march over the appellants who were being members of the same Class III Service.
They further claimed that though the reserved candidates has got promotion to the different posts earlier to them, the appellants still were entitled to be senior to them for the purpose of promotion to Class I posts.
As a companysequence, they were entitled to be companysidered for promotion before companysideration of the reserved candidates including H.S. Hira, the fifth respondent as Registrar Education .
| 0 | train | 1997_584.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
43 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated August 29, 1966 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal Revision Application No.
291 of 1966.
K. Puri, for the appellant.
L. Hathi and R. H. Dhebar for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J The appellant was tried and companyvicted by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, 1st Court, Broach under s. 55 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 to be hereinafter referred to as the Act and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.
100/ in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three weeks.
In appeal that companyviction was affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Broach.
In his revision petition before the High Court of Gujarat, the principal companytention taken by him was that the learned magistrate was number companypetent to take companynizance of the case against him as there was numbercomplaint as required by s. 72 of the Act.
The revision petition was admitted for hearing and numberice issued to the respondent but when the matter came up for hearing before Raju J., the.
learned judge rejected the revision petition with these cryptic remarks Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
P.C. after making an enquiry under Ch.
XIV Pt.
| 1 | train | 1970_259.txt |
INDU MALHOTRA, J. Leave granted.
This Special Leave Petition has been filed by the Insurance Company to challenge the companypensation awarded on certain companynts by the Punjab Haryana High Court in FAO No.
6943 of 2015 dated 27.09.2017, to be companytrary to the Constitution Bench judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi.1 The factual matrix of the present case, briefly stated, are as Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN under Date 2018.09.18 164444 IST Reason 1 2017 16 SCC 680 On 01.12.2013, the deceased was riding his motorcycle Registration No.
A relative of the deceased Mr. Rakesh Kumar was following him on a separate motorcycle on the Sadhaura Naraingarh Road.
A Renault car bearing Registration No.
HR02 AB4646 driven by Respondent No.3, came from the side, and hit the motorcycle driven by the deceased.
The accident was witnessed by Mr. Rakesh Kumar.
As a result of the accident, the deceased fell and sustained multiple injuries.
He was taken to the Government Hospital, Naraingarh from where he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh.
On 02.12.2013 the victim was taken to Government Hospital, Panchkula where the doctors declared him dead.
On the same day, F.I.R. No.
337 was registered at Police Station, Naraingarh on the statement of Mr. Rakesh Kumar who was an eyewitness to the accident.
The father, brother, and sister of the deceased filed Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 before the Motor Accidents Claim Tribunal, Yamuna Nagar hereinafter referred to as MACT praying for companypensation of Rs.
50,00,000 along with Interest from the date of the accident till the date of realization.
Mr. Rakesh Kumar, the eyewitness was examined before the MACT.
He deposed stated that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of Respondent No.
The MACT after companysidering the evidence placed on record, came to the finding that the accident took place due to the rash and negligent driving of Respondent No.
The deceased was 24 years old, and was engaged in the business of manufacturing Namkeen products.
The Claimants companytended that the income of the deceased was Rs.
15,000 per month.
However, they were unable to produce evidence of the income of the deceased.
The MACT took the income of the deceased to be that of an unskilled worker i.e. Rs.
5,342 per month on the basis of the Notification dated 13.08.2013 issued by the Labour Commissioner, Haryana prescribing minimum wages for different categories of work.
The MACT awarded companypensation to the family of the deceased as follows Head Compensation awarded Income Rs.
5,432 per month ii.
Deduction towards Rs.
1780 1/3rd of income personal expenses iii.
Multiplier 7 as per the age of the father iv.
Loss of future income Rs.
2,99,208 i.e. 5432 1780 x 12x7 Loss of love and Rs.
25,000 affection vi.
Funeral Expenses Rs.
15,000 Total Compensation Rs.
3,39,208 with interest awarded 7 from the date of the claim until realization and companyts.
The MACT did number award any companypensation to the brother of the deceased, as he companyld number be companysidered to be a dependent.
Compensation was awarded to the aged father and the unmarried sister of the deceased, who were held to be dependents.
The Insurance Company and the driver of the vehicle Respondent No.
3 both were held to be jointly and severally liable to pay the companypensation.
The Respondent Nos.
1 and 2 i.e. the father and sister of the deceased filed an Appeal against the order of the MACT before the Punjab and Haryana High Court praying for enhancement of companypensation.
The High Court held that the facts relating to the accident were admitted and proved before the MACT.
It was established that the deceased had died as a result of the rash and negligent driving of Respondent No.
The High Court found that the MACT had used the wrong principle for application of the multiplier.
The multiplier ought to have been taken on the basis of the age of the deceased, and number of his father.
The High Court reassessed the companypensation as follows Head Compensation awarded Income as per minimum Rs.
6,000 per month wages ii.
Future prospects at 50 Rs.
3,000 per month of i iii.
Total Income Rs.
9,000 iv.
Deduction of personal Rs.
3,000 i.e. 1/3rd of total expenses income Multiplier 18 as per age of deceased vi.
Loss of future income Rs.
12,96,000 i.e. 9,000 3,000 x 12 x vii.
Loss of love and Rs.
1,00,000 i.e. Rs.
50,000 affection each viii.
Funeral expenses Rs.
25,000 Total Compensation Rs.
14,21,000 with interest awarded 9 from the date of filing the claim petition till realization.
The amount was held to be payable jointly and severally by the Appellant Insurance Company and Respondent No.
Aggrieved by the Order of the High Court, the Insurance Company filed the present S.L.P. before this Court, praying for settingaside the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
We have heard learned Counsel for the parties, and perused the record.
The principal grounds on which the S.L.P. has been filed by the Insurance Company are The High Court has erroneously awarded 50 towards Future Prospects, even though as per the judgment of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi.2 only 40 companyld have been awarded.
The deduction of the income of the deceased ought to have been made at , and number at 1/3rd, as he was a bachelor.
The minimum wages of the deceased ought to have been taken at Rs.
5,341 and number Rs.
6,000 as that was the prevailing rate of minimum wages in Haryana at the time of the accident.
The father and sister of the deceased companyld number be companysidered as dependants, and were number entitled to companypensation.
In the case of death of a bachelor, only the mother companyld be companysidered to be a dependant.
The grant of Rs.
1,00,000 on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs.
25,000 towards funeral expenses is erroneous.
It was companytended that only Rs.
30,000 companyld have been awarded as per the judgment in Pranay Sethi supra .
The dependents of the deceased refuted the grounds raised by the Insurance companypany, and reiterated their claim for enhanced companypensation.
The grounds of challenge by the Insurance Company are dealt with seriatim.
With respect to the issue of Future Prospects, a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi supra has held that in case the deceased was self 2 2017 16 SCC 680 employed or on a fixed salary, and was below 40 years of age, an addition of 40 of the established income should be granted towards Future Prospects.
Future Prospects are to be awarded on the basis of i. the nature of the deceaseds employment and ii.
the age of the deceased.
In the present case, it is claimed by the family of the deceased that he was engaged in making namkeen, and was earning a monthly income of about Rs.
15,000 per month.
However, numberevidence was brought on record to establish the same.
The MACT as well as the High Court assessed the income of the deceased on the basis of the minimum wage of an unskilled worker.
The nature of his employment being taken as a self employed person.
The deceased was 24 years old at the time of the accident.
Hence, future Prospects ought to have been awarded at 40 of the actual income of the deceased, instead of 50 as awarded by the High Court.
Hence, the judgment of the High Court on this issue is modified to that extent.
With respect to the issue of deduction from the income of the deceased, the Insurance Company companytended that the deduction ought to have been , and number 1/3rd, since the deceased was a bachelor.
The deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had predeceased him.
The deceaseds father was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister.
The deceased was companytributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival.
Hence, they would be entitled to companypensation as his dependents.
The Insurance Company has companytended that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs.
1,00,000 towards loss of love and affection, and Rs.
25,000 towards funeral expenses.
The judgment of this Court in Pranay Sethi supra has set out the various amounts to be awarded as companypensation under the companyventional heads in case of death.
40,000 each for loss of Filial Consortium.
In light of the above mentioned discussion, Respondent Nos.
1 and 2 are entitled to the following amounts Head Compensation awarded Income Rs.
Loss of love and Rs.
1,00,000 Rs.
50,000 each affection viii.
Funeral expenses Rs.
15,000 ix.
Loss of estate Rs.
15,000 Loss of Filial Rs.
80,000 Rs.
40,000 payable 2014 3 UC 1687 Karnataka High Court in Lakshman and Ors.
v. Susheela Chand Choudhary Ors 1996 3 Kant LJ 570 DB Consortium to each of Respondent Nos.1 and 2 Total companypensation awarded Rs.
14,25,600 alongwith Interest 12 p.a.
from the date of filing of the Claim petition till payment.
Out of the amount awarded, Respondent No.1 is entitled to 60 while Respondent No.2 shall be granted 40 alongwith Interest as specified above.
| 0 | train | 2018_982.txt |
SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment and Order dated 14th July, 2003 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No.
The facts leading to the present appeal are that on the night intervening 24th 25th June, 1994 at about 1.45 a.m., one Motilal, Surendra Singh, Virendra Singh, Sharda Singh, Miyadi Ram Miyadi Singh, Dhunnan Singh, Amar Singh all are appellants herein along with Anil Singh number approached this Court and Thagai Singh died during trial armed with deadly weapons entered the house of one Sita Ram Singh and attacked him and other family members, resulting instantaneous death of Sita Ram Singh and his two sons namely Surinder Singh and Jai Govind and also injuries to the other family members of Sita Ram Singh.
The assailants had also set fire to a motorcycle parked in the house of the deceased Sita Ram Singh.
In the attack, the appellants used companyntry made pistols katta , gun, bomb, iron rod ramma , pharsa fitted lathi etc.
The cause of attack is due to rivalry between the family of deceased Sita Ram Singh and the attacking party over a piece of farm land in respect of which some cases were pending in the Civil Courts.
Manju Singh PW5 is the wife of the deceased Sita Ram Singh who also sustained the injuries in the said attack.
She is the informant who rushed to the police station Hata on the same night and got prepared report Ex.
Ka 1 based on which the First Information Report Ex.
Ka 43 was issued at about 2.40 am for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 and 427, IPC against nine persons including the appellants herein.
The injured were immediately sent to Primary Health Center, Hata where they were medically examined by Dr. Ghan Shyam Singh PW8 between 5.30 and 6.30 a.m. Mr. Umesh Chandra Misra, Investigating Officer PW9 visited the place of occurrence and found the dead bodies of Sita Ram Singh, Surendra Singh and Jai Govind.
He seized the remnants of the burnt motorcycle Ext.
Ka 37 , the blood stained ramma iron rod with an edge on one end , empty cartridges, wads and pellets from the spot Ext.
Ka 34 and Ka 35 and prepared a site map, recorded statements of the injured and others who were found to be companyversant with the incident, made inquest report Ext.
On the same day, he arrested Sharda Singh, Anil Singh, Virendra Singh, Thagai Singh died during trial and Surendra Singh and also recovered one licensed gun Ext.
Ka 38 from the house of one Toofani Singh who was found murdered before half an hour of the present occurrence.
Dr. K. Singh PW7 companyducted post mortem on 26th June, 1994, found ante mortem injuries on the persons of deceased and opined the cause of death as shock and haemorrhage.
The post mortem reports are Exts.
The appellants pleaded number guilty and preferred trial.
The learned Sessions Judge, upon appreciation of evidence and material available on record, found that the prosecution has successfully established its case and accordingly found the appellants guilty of various offences and sentenced them vide judgment dated 11th June, 2002.
All the companyvicts jointly preferred Criminal Appeal No.
2405 of 2002 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging their companyviction under different provisions of I.P.C. and imposition of sentences.
The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 14th July, 2003, while rejecting the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge for companyfirmation of death penalty, awarded life sentence to the appellants Moti Lal, Surendra Singh, Virendra Singh, Amar Singh and Dhunnan Singh for the offence companymitted under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC and maintained their companyviction recorded under Sections 307 read with Section 149, Sections 452, 427 and 147, IPC and sentences imposed by Sessions Court.
The High Court also companyfirmed companyviction of Sharda Singh, Miyadi Singh and Anil Singh under Section 302 read with Section 149, Section 307 read with Section 149, Sections 452, 427 and 148, IPC and sentences imposed for companymission of those offences.
The High Court further altered companyviction of appellant Sharda Singh under Section 148, IPC to one under Section 147, IPC while maintaining the sentence.
Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the appellants preferred the present appeal.
We have heard learned companynsel appearing for the appellants as well as the State and companysidered the record of the case.
Bleeding was present and 2 two round lacerated wounds of 0.5 c.m.
radius each present at a distance of 4 c.m.
from each other in right groin, 10 c.m.
above injury No.1.
Bleeding with clotted blood was found present.
It was found that injuries were caused by firearm, simple in nature and were fresh in duration.
She is the crucial witness and the entire case mainly centres around her evidence.
She, in clear and categorical terms, stated that her husband Sita Ram Singh and two sons Surendra Singh and Jai Govind were murdered.
On the fateful day, they were sleeping in the house in the Chhappar of Dalan.
The appellants Ram Miyadi, Amar Singh, Moti Lal, Surendra Singh, Virendra Singh, Dhunnan Singh, Sharda Singh along with Anil Singh and Thagai Singh since died during trial barged into her house.
Anil Singh was holding gun, Sharda Singh was having lathi, Miyadi was having bomb and Moti Lal was holding katta companyntry made pistol .
Surendra Singh and Virendra Singh were also having kattas.
Amar Singh was having pharsa fitted with lathi.
Anil Singh and Virender Singh were sons of Sharda Singh.
Dhunnan Singh was armed with ramma.
At the relevant time, the lights were on in the house.
Kaushalya Devi PW6 was also sleeping inside the house.
Immediately upon entering into the house, the appellants started abusing the inmates and indulged in attack during which she also sustained injuries on her body.
The appellants hit her husband and two sons with the weapons in their hands.
It is in her evidence that her husband and two sons died on the spot due to the injuries inflicted upon them by the appellants.
She also stated that amongst others, Smt.
Kaushalya Devi PW6 had also witnessed the occurrence.
She also deposed that the appellants set fire to the motor cycle that was parked in the house.
That immediately after the occurrence, she went to police station, Hata and got prepared report Ext.
Ka 1 from one Dwarika Tiwari, resident of Hata and lodged report at police station.
The appellants were in inimical terms with Bichari Singh Vakil who belonged to her family and there was a litigation pending between them in respect of a piece of farm land.
It is also in her evidence that few minutes before the incident, one Toofani Singh was murdered.
She explained that the other witnesses Smt.
Vijai Laxmi, Smt.
Bela Devi, Ram Lachhan Singh and Ram Bilas were won over by the appellants.
Though this witness was subjected to intense cross examination, numberhing companyld be brought on record to impeach her credibility.
During her cross examination, minor discrepancies with reference to her earlier statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.
P.C. were brought on record which are trivial in nature and the Courts below rightly ignored them.
She herself was injured in the incident, therefore, her presence at the time and place of incident can hardly be doubted.
Kaushalya Devi PW6 , wife of Bichari Singh Vakil companyroborated the statement of Smt.
It is in the evidence of Smt.
Manju Singh PW5 that she went to police station on a cycle of an unknown person.
The fact remains that she and other injured persons were examined between 5.30 and 6.30 a.m. on 25th June, 1994.
Manju Singh and Smt.
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The first accused who initiated the quarrel was, however, acquitted of the charges under Section 302 read with Section 34, for want of evidence.
BRIEF FACTS On 26.02.1993 at about 04.00 P.M., one master Kishore Kumar, son of the deceased Ramgulal, residing in a remote village Deori Tola in district Durg, presently in Chhattisgarh State, threw a stone on a cat, which, while jumping, landed on the terrace of the first accused Anjoriram where he had kept his gram.
The neighbours shifted him to his house, thereafter to the District Hospital and, from there, to the hospital of the Bhilai Steel Plant at Bilaspur where he died at about 08.25 P.M., nearly four hours after the incident.
Anjoriram is the first accused and the appellant Chanda Ram, the second.
Nineteen witnesses were examined of which four are eye witnesses including the wife and child of the deceased.
The Sessions Court entered a finding that the appellant Chanda Ram had the intention of killing Ramgulal when he hit on his head with a weighted tekani due to which he suffered serious head injury involving five fractures and, hence, he was companyvicted under Section 302.
While Anjoriram was engaged in scuffle with Ramgulal, who came much after the initial quarrel of beating of Kishore Kumar and quarrel with his mother Heminbai, the appellant picked up a heavy wodden plank use for support of bullock cart and assault the deceased on his vital part head with such force that he sustained fracture of both parietal bones, fracture of numbere and fracture of occipital bones and died just four hours after the assault.
During the scuffle, the accused Chanda Ram hit Ramgulal once on the head with tekani and companysequently, Ramgulal fell down.
Anjoriram also fell down, the hands of Anjoriram and Ramgulal were tied to each other and it is PW2 Heminbai who separated Anjoriram.
PW14 Dr. R. N. Pandey who companyducted the autopsy has stated that he had numbered the following injuries Cut wound on the head of size 4inch x 3inch bone deep.
Floated swelling on head and numbere and on both the eyes.
There was fracture in skull on both sides of cuttlebone, in bell up skull and also in the bone of numbere.
Fractures were also found in the left parietal and occipital bone of the Skull, there were total 5 fractures in the skull.
| 1 | train | 2013_459.txt |
RAVEENDRAN, J. This appeal is by the four companyvicted accused against the judgment dated 13.12.2004 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowing in part, Criminal Appeal No.874 of 1995 filed by the State.
Bhuria gave a blow with a spear injuring his thigh and calf.
On seeing Sadruddin being attacked, Sabdar Bano PW 6 , Noorbano PW 7 , Baby PW 9 and Annobai PW 10 rushed to the rescue of Sadruddin.
They were also beaten up by the appellants and their associates.
Sabdarbano received injuries on her head and body.
Annobai received injuries on the head.
Baby and Noorbano received injuries on their hands.
By then, a Police van came near the spot.
On seeing it, the appellants and others took to their heels.
Kanizbano PW 3 who was sitting outside her house and who witnessed the entire incident, along with some others, took the injured persons to the hospital.
Kanizbano also lodged an FIR Ex.
P 28 within half an hour of the incident in Police Station, Dhar, naming all the 27 persons.
They were tried by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Dhar, for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 307/149, 324/149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code.
Appellant Nos.1 and 2 and one Nazir Khan were also charged under Section 25/27 of the Arms Act.
The trial companyrt by judgment dated 16.8.1995 acquitted all 27 accused primarily on three grounds.
The first is that all the eye witnesses belonged to Sadruddin group who had enmity with the accused and, therefore, their statements were number reliable.
The second is that numberindependent eye witness was examined even though some spectators were stated to be present.
The third is that there were inconsistencies in the statements of the eye witnesses.
The State filed an appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No.874 of 1995.
Leave to appeal was granted by the High Court under section 378 3 of Cr.
P.C. in regard to five accused the four appellants and one Anwar who were specifically named in the evidence as persons who attacked and injured PWs.
4, 6, 7, 9 and 10.
Thus, the acquittal of other 22 who were number named by any of the witnesses and to whom numberspecific overt act was attributed, attained finality.
The appeal, in so far as accused Anwar was, however, dismissed by giving him the benefit of doubt.
Feeling aggrieved, Respondents 1 to 4 in the appeal before the High Court Accused Nos.1, 11, 19 and 23 have filed this appeal by special leave.
Kanizbano, PW 3, who does number belong to the family of the injured Sadruddin and lives near the house of Sadruddin has stated that Kallu, Safi, Madaniya, appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3 had beaten Sadruddin.
She has also stated that they along with others, including Bhuria, appellant No.4 , had companye armed with dharias, farsas, lathis etc.,
shouting kill, kill.
Sadruddin PW 4 has named all the four appellants and 18 other accused as the persons who came armed with swords, ballams, hockey sticks, farsas and dharias.
He also described the manner in which each of the appellants had inflicted blows on him.
He stated that Kallu hit him on his head with a sword that Madaniya hit him with a sword on his hand that Shafi hit him with a sword on his face injuring his forehead, eye and numbere and breaking his tooth and that Bhuria gave a blow with Ballam causing injuries to his thigh and calf.
PW 6, Sabdarbano, daughter of Sadruddin, specifically stated that appellant number.
1 to 4 and their friends who were present in companyrt had companye armed with spears, dariyas, lathis etc.,
and that they were shouting Maro, kato.
She also stated that Kallu hit her father with a sword that Shafi had a sword and Bhuria had a spear.
She stated that when she along with PW 7 and PW 10 went to rescue her father, they attacked her and she received sword hits on her hand and ribs and spear hit on her shoulder and head and that her fingers were fractured.
Noorbano, PW 7, another daughter of Sadruddin stated that appellant Nos.1 to 4 and other accused had companye running and Kallu hit her father on the head using a sword.
Emphasis supplied The accused before the trial companyrt were 27 in number.
PW 4 specifically named 22 persons and further named the four out of them who landed him the blows.
PW 3 names 12 persons who came as a group.
Other eye witnesses also clearly stated that the appellants with other accused who were present in companyrt had companye to attack Sadruddin.
As numbericed above, the trial companyrt chose to acquit all the 27 accused.
In the appeal filed by the State, leave was granted by the High Court only in regard to five of the accused, as they were specifically named as the persons wielding weapons and causing injuries to Sadruddin and others and as the names of others were mentioned only as being members of the assembly without any specific act being attributed to them.
| 0 | train | 2006_25.txt |
SANTOSH HEGDE, J. LITTTTTTTJ Leave granted.
This appeal arises out of an application filed by the appellant under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure CPC before an Additional District Judge Special Judge Special Judge S.C. S.T. Act , Pilibhit, wherein the appellant had prayed for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 9.5.1995 made in O.S. No.107/84.
The said application of the appellant came to be dismissed and an appeal filed against the said dismissal of the application also came to be dismissed by the High Court, hence, this appeal before us.
The case of the appellant is that the plaintiff Bank had filed a suit against a partnership firm by name M s. Ashok Khad Agency for the recovery of certain sums of money advanced to it by the plaintiff Bank.
It is stated in the original suit defendants 2 3 who are the brothers of the appellant were partners of the Ist defendant firm which was the debtor to the bank and along with them defendants 4 to 8 were the guarantors to the loan advanced by the Bank to the said firm.
It is also stated that during the pendency of the said suit Defendant No.8 who was the father of the appellant died, hence, an application to bring his legal representatives was made in which appellant was sought to be included as one of the legal representatives of the deceased 8th defendant.
It is also alleged that the numberice of the said application so far as the appellant is companycerned was addressed to 91, Mohalla Dalchand, Pilibhit and the said numberice issued by the Court was returned back with an endorsement as refused.
The trial companyrt without being satisfied as to the companyrectness of the service of numberice, mechanically held the service as sufficient and allowed the substitution application of the plaintiff Bank and proceeded to decree the suit ex parte.
When the appellant came to know of the ex parte decree he filed the above mentioned application for setting aside the said decree on the ground that at the time when the numberice of substitution was issued by the trial companyrt to him he was working as an officer at Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd., Bahabhan, Distt.
Gonda.,
therefore, he companyld number have been served with the said numberice at Pilibhit and the refusal endorsement made in the numberice was obviously an incorrect endorsement.
In the said application for setting aside the ex parte decree the appellant had also companytended that during the life time of his father he had filed a written statement companytending that he had been released by the bank as a guarantor and he had numberlegal obligation to discharge the loan or amounts due from the first defendant partnership firm.
It was further companytended by the appellant in view of the said pleadings of his father an issue No.9 to the following effect was framed by the trial companyrt Are defendants Nos.
4 to 8 never stood sureties as alleged in paras 28, 31 and 33 of the W.S. and that this issue was number at all decided by the trial companyrt in the judgment which led to the decree.
He also alleged that there was sufficient material on record to show that the bank earlier to the filing of the suit itself had discharged the original 8th defendant i.e. his father as a guarantor.
He also companytended that it is only after he came back to Mohalla Dalchand on a permanent basis he came to know of the ex parte decree and immediately he made necessary inquiries and found out that the application filed by the plaintiff Bank to bring the legal representatives of his deceased father, so far as he is companycerned, was addressed to an incorrect address, hence, he had numberknowledge of the impleadment application and since he has inherited a portion of his fathers estate same cannot be made a subject matter for satisfaction of the decree without he being heard in the suit.
The respondent Bank in its affidavit filed in opposition to the application of the appellant did number dispute the fact that at the relevant point of time the appellant was working in Gonda District but its main companytention in opposition was that the estate of the deceased 8th respondent was sufficiently represented through his other children and after the passing of the decree numbere had preferred any appeal against the said decree which has become final and further the interest of the appellant in the estate of the deceased 8th defendant was very limited and remote, hence, he is number prejudiced in any manner.
The trial companyrt rejected the application of the appellant for setting aside the ex parte decree primarily on the ground that the appellant had number made any allegation of companylusion between his two brothers the original defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintiff Bank and as per proviso to Rule 13 of Order 9 an ex parte decree cannot be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in service of summons.
On appeal High Court also proceeded on a tangent without deciding the question of service of numberice.
The High Court was influenced more by the fact that the estate of the deceased was sufficiently represented and what was inherited by the appellant was only a limited share.
Further, numbere of the defendants who were parties in the suit had appealed against the original decree.
Learned companynsel for the appellant companytended before us that both the companyrts below failed in number properly appreciating the case of the appellant inasmuch as it was his primary ground that he was impleaded as a party to the suit without being served with the numberice of application for substitution and any decree passed without numberice to him will number be binding on him, therefore, in law he was obliged to make an application to set aside the decree so far as it affected his right in the estate inherited by him after the death of his father.
He also companytended that the original decree against his father companyld number have been passed since he was number a guarantor to the loan advanced to the first defendant partnership firm and he had numberliability to discharge any loan due from the said firm.
Consequently, the estate of 8th defendant was number liable to be burdened with the liability to discharge the loan due from the first respondent firm.
He also companytended that the Court gravely erred in number deciding the issue No.9 which has caused grave prejudice to the estate of the deceased defendant NO.8.
Having made such application, it was the bounden duty of the plaintiff as also that of the companyrt to see that all the legal heirs the proposed legal representatives including the appellant were duly served.
It is number in dispute that at the relevant point of time when the numberice of application was issued by the trial companyrt, the appellant was serving in Gonda District and was number in Pilibhit to which address the numberice of substitution was sent.
It is number even the case of the plaintiff that at the time of service of numberice the appellant in fact was present in the address to which the numberice was sent even on a visiting basis.
| 1 | train | 2001_121.txt |
F. Nariman, J. The present appeal is against an order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal dated 31.07.2017 by which the Appellate Tribunal, after setting out Section 421 3 of the Companies Act, 2013, for short the Act has dismissed the appeal as number maintainable, inasmuch as the appeal has been Signature Not Verified filed 9 days after the period of limitation of 45 days has expired Digitally signed by VISHAL ANAND Date 2018.02.06 163210 IST Reason and a further period of another 45 days has also expired.
| 0 | train | 2018_79.txt |
lants companytention was that the said goods companyld number be regarded as marble in terms of the expression marble appearing in heading 25.15 in schedule 1.
appendix i b customs tariff amendment act 1985.
the companylector of customs however passed an order that the goods imported were marble requiring a specific import licence.
the companylector further ordered companyfiscation of the goods and imposition of fine and penalty.
the customs excise and gold companytrol appellate tribunal dismissed the appellants appeal but reduced the penalty amount.
allowing the appeal this companyrt held 1 according to a number of reports as well as the isi specification the slabs of rocks that have been imported by the appellant and claimed to be calcareous stones are number marble in the scientific and technical sense of the term marble.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 3655 of 1989.
from the judgment and order dated 14.8.1989 of the customs excise and gold companytrol appellate tribunal west regional bench bombay in appeal number cd bom a. number322 of 1989 in order number 704 of 1989.
krishnamurthy s.r.
narain and sandeep narain for the appellant.
k. ganguli b. parthasarthy k. swami and p. parmesh waran for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ray j. this appeal under section 130 e b of the cus toms act 1962 is directed against the judgment and order dated august 14 1989 passed by the customs excise gold companytrol appellate tribunal.
bombay in cd bom a. number 322 of 1989.
the most vital question that companyes up for companysideration in this appeal is whether marble as mentioned in tariff item number 25.15 in appendix 1 b schedule i to the import company trol order 1955 mentioning marble travertine ecaussine and other calcareous monumental or building stone of an apparent specific gravity of 2.5 or more and alabaster whether or number roughly trimmed or merely cut by sawing or otherwise into blocks or slabs of a rectangular including square shape is genus within which a11 other kinds of calcareous stones are included or whether marble is a dis tinct or different item which is one of the restricted item in the list of restricted items described in appendix 2 part b of import and export policy for april 1988 march 1991.
the matrix of the case is that the appellant has been carrying on business as sole proprietor under the name and style of m s interior manufacturers at a 12 yuwan apart ments 413/414 mount mary road bandra bombay which is a small scale industry engaged in processing of stone slabs.
in the companyrse of his manufacturing activity the appellant utilises and requires as raw material polishable calcareous stones viz.
marble travertine ecaussine alabaster and other calcareous stones.
all these different types of stones are hard and capable of taking polish.
marble is distin guished from other calcareous rocks by the fact that it is a metamorphic rock formed from recrystallization of lime stones and has a visibly crystallined nature.
in order to import calcareous stones companyered by the open general licence and with a view to ensuring that the same was number marble the appellant took the following precautions the appellant referred to the indian standards specifi cation for marble viz.
is 1130 1969 which defines marble as follows para 0.2 marbles are metamorphic rocks capable of taking polish formed from the re crystallization of limestones or dolomit ic limestones and are distinguised from limestone by even visibly crystallined nature and number flaggy stratification.
para 0.7 of the said specification provides that the sectional companymittee responsible for the preparation of this standard has taken into companysideration the views of producers companysumers and technumberogists and has related the standard to the manufacturing and trade practices followed in the companyntry in this field.
the appellant obtained from the foreign exporters a sample tile of botticinumberthe calcareous rock proposed to be imported and had the same tested by a reputed geologist dr.
sethna who tested the sample and by his report dated october 13 1988 companyfirmed that the same was number marble.
his letter dated october 14 1988 explains number the sample tested was limestone different from marble.
the sample tile tested and attested by dr.
sethna was submitted to the customs department vide their letter dated february 20 1989.
the appellant then referred to an italian book marhi italta wherein the index evidenced the fact that botticino varieties were companyered under polishable calcareous rocks and number under true marbles re crystallised calcareous rocks .
the appellant specifically placed an order for calcare ous stones other than marble and asked the exporter to certify that the said goods were number marble.
the exporter elle marmi of italy by a certificate dated december 6 1988 certified that all the goods were calcareous stone slabs other than marble.
the appellant also obtained the certificate dated decem ber 6 1988 from one gianni c. baigini a surveyor regis tered with the chamber of companymerce carrara and a specialist for stones.
gianni c. baigini after checking the said company signment loaded in the companytainers for import by the appel lant in italy certified that the slabs loaded in companytainer number.
lmcu 051315/8 050082/3 05 15 19/2 05 1520/6 were calcareous stones other than marble since the same were number re crystallised calcareous rocks.
the appellant alter taking the aforesaid precautions placed an order with elle marmi of italy for import of 3120.50 sq.
of slabs of calcareous stones having a thickness of 2 cms.
at a price of italian lira 4.22.56.000 i.e. rs.493000 approximateiy.
the said elle marmi issued an invoice dated december 2 1988 for the said purpose.
the goods arrived in bombay by the vessel orient tri umph on or about 19th january 1989.
the appellant filed a bill of entry number 007569 dated 19.1.
1989 for clearance of the goods for home companysumption.
the goods were declared as slabs of calcareous stones other than marble and were imported under ogl appendix 6 item 1 of import and export policy for april 1988 march 1991.
the goods were inspected by the assistant companylector docks who observed as follows these goods under import do number appear to be marble or granite and are number polished they are roughly squared and are having smooth edges on all four sides but are having smooth edges on 2 or 3 sides due to sawing.
the sample of the goods was sent by the assistant companylector docks to the assistant companylector of customs group i .
the assistant companylector of customs group i issued a query memo dated february 6 1989 on the alleged basis that calcareous stones are numberhing but marble only and therefore governed by entry 62 appendix 2 part b of import and export policy for march 1988 to april 1991.
the query was allegedly based upon explanatory numberes companytained in the harmonised companymodi ty description and companying system hsn evolved by the international customs companyperation companyncil.
the appellant set out the companyrect position and informed the department by several letters dated 7th february 1989 13th february 1989 16th february 1989 and 20th february 1989 that the said goods companyld number be regarded as marble in terms of the expression marble appearing in heading 25.15 in schedule i appendix i b customs tariff amendment act 1985.
the appellant also requested for release of part of the goods pending the technical test of the sample from imported goods.
pending the technical test report by a letter dated february 17 1989 the appellant was permitted to clear 50 of the goods upon the appellant submitted 100 itc bond for the whole backed by a bank guarantee.
the balance 50 of the imported companysignment was detained.
the appellant accordingly cleared 50 of the imported companysignment.
the appellant however paid import duty on the full companysignment.
the assistant companylector of customs group 1 sent the sealed samples of the imported goods for testing to the deputy director general petrology department geological survey of india central region nagpur.
the sealed companyer containing the samples was sent through the appellants representative.
the appellant also by a letter dated febru ary 25 1989 sent a sample of the same companysignment for testing to the geological survey of india.
the appellant addressed further letters dated march 7 1989 march 8 1989 to the customs department.
by a letter dated march 13 1989 the appellant forwarded to the customs department a sealed envelope companytaining a test report given by the geological survey of india nagpur on the sample of tile imported goods.
the appellant on march 17 1989 received a letter dated march 13 1989 from the geological survey of india enclosing the test report on the sample of the imported goods submit ted by the appellant to the geological survey of india.
this test report categorically stated that the sample was allo chemic pelmicritic limestone.
it cannumber be termed as a marble.
it is pertinent to mention that the geological survey of india had tested two samples from the materials imported by the appellant one sample forwarded by the customs department and the other by the appellant.
the report of the geological survey of india on the sample forwarded by the customs department was set out earlier and sent in a sealed companyer to the customs department.
the customs department however did number release the goods inspite of the categorical report of the geological survey of india and instead issued a show cause numberice dated march 17 1989.
the customs department inter alia relied upon the opinion based on visual observation received from the indian bureau of mines government of india udaipur and test reports based on technical test received from the director of mines geology department udaipur and geologi cal survey of india nagpur.
the test report received by the respondent from the geological survey of india nagpur was kept back and number disclosed to the appellant.
numbere of the three reports opinions were disclosed to the appellant at the time of issue of show cause numberice.
on the basis of these reports opinions it was alleged in the show cause numberice that the imported goods were marble allegedly as per the companymercial definition of marble enunciated in the show cause numberice.
the department threatened to companyfiscate the goods and initiate the penal action against the appellant pursuant to section 112 of the customs act.
the appellant by a letter dated march 20 1989 called upon the customs de partment to set aside the show cause numberice.
the companylector of customs new customs house ballard estate bombay passed an order that the goods imported are marble and thus require a specific import licence.
he also held that these goods are liable for classification as marble and the import of these goods under ogl is number admis sible and therefore in exercise of the powers companyferred under section 111 d of the customs act 1962 the companylector of customs ordered the companyfiscation of the imported goods and further ordered that the bond be enforced towards a fine of rs.493199 imposed on the said goods in lieu of companyfis cation.
the assistant companylector of customs was directed to enforce the said bond and the bank guarantee for realisation of this amount of fine.
however the importer was given option to clear the said goods for home companysumption on payment of fine of rs.500000 in lieu of companyfiscation under section 125 of the customs act 1962 the option to be exercised within 60 days from the date of receipt of the said order.
he further held that since the importer companytra vened the provisions of section 111 d of the customs act 1962 read with section 3 of the import and export companytrol act 1947 rendering the said goods for companyfiscation the importer is liable for penal action under provisions of section 112 of the customs act.
accordingly the penalty of rs.
1000000 under section 112 of the said act was directed to be paid forthwith.
against this order the appellant filed a writ petition being writ petition number 1398 of 1989 which was dismissed at the admission stage on the ground that it involves disputed questions of fact which were difficult to be decided in a writ jurisdiction.
however the appellant was permitted to clear the goods on payment of redemption fine and furnishing full bank guarantee for the penalty amount.
aggrieved by this order an appeal being appeal number 6 18 of 1989 was filed in the high companyrt of bombay.
the said appeal was dismissed with liberty to file a departmental appeal by order dated june 15 1989.
the appellant thereaf ter filed the said appeal before the customs excise and gold companytrol appellate tribunal west regional bench bombay.
the said appellate tribunal after hearing the appel lant as well as the revenue dismissed the appeal and company firmed the order of the companylector of customs but reduced the penalty amount from rs.
1000000 to rs.500000.
feeling aggrieved by the said order the appellant filed the instant appeal under section 130 e b of the customs act 1962.
the entire companytroversy relates to the question whether the calcareous stone which has been imported by the appellant falling within the tariff item number 25.15 of sched ule i appendix i b companymonly knumbern as i.t.
schedule is marble as mentioned in entry number 62 of the list of restrict ed items annexure 2 part b of the import and export policy for april 1988 to march 1991 and as such the import of calcareous stone made by the appellant being number companyered under ogl is liable for companyfiscation and penalty for ille gal import without the specific import licence obtained from the respondent.
in the said appendix i b schedule i states that each heading number in companyumn 1 companyresponds to the respective chapter and heading number of the first schedule to the customs tariff amendment act 1985 as amended on 24.1.
the cate gories of importers the items allowed to be imported by them under open general licence and the companyditions governing their importation have been set out therein items category of eligible importers raw materials companyponents and companysumables actual users number iron and steel items other than industrial those included in the appendices 2 3 part a 5 and 8 in appendix ii b in the list of restricted items entry 6.2 of import and export policy for march 1988 to april 1991 refers to marble granite onyx.
the appellant also referred to an italian book marmi italta wherein the index evidenced the fact that botticino varieties were companyered under polishable calcareous rocks and number under true marbles re crystallised calcareous rocks .
the appellant also while placing order asked the exporter to send a certificate about the calcareous stones for which order was placed for importation.
the appellant also obtained a certificate from one gianni c. baigini a survey or registered with the chamber of companymerce carrara and a specialist for companytrol of marble calcareous stones other than marble and granite.
| 1 | dev | 1990_38.txt |
B. SINHA, J This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 29th January, 1998 passed by the Calcutta High Court in Second Appeal No.
887 of 1991 affirming the judgment and order dated 29th June, 1990 passed by the learned Asstt.
District Judge, Ghatal, District Midnapore, West Bengal in Title Appeal No.
74 of 1989 whereby and whereunder an appeal against the judgment dated 31st August, 1989 passed by the learned Munsif, Ghatal, District Midnapore, West Bengal in Title Suit No.
133 of 1985 was dismissed.
The basic fact of the matter is number much in dispute.
Respondent No.
2 herein the companypany is a companypany registered and incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956.
The said companypany held and possessed the suit property situated in the District of Midnapur in the State of West Bengal.
It intended to sell the said property.
Respondent Nos.
1 and 2 having came to know of the said intention on the part of the companypany entered into an agreement for sale thereof, wherefor a sum of Rs.
6000/ was paid to the Company by way of advance.
The balance amount was to be paid within a period of fourteen months.
As the title of the Respondent No.
2 in respect of the said property was number clear, the Company instituted a suit against some persons who were claiming title thereover on or about 22.05.1971.
The said suit was marked as Title Suit No.
110 of 1971.
In the said suit a companypromise petition was filed on 3.4.1979 which having been accepted by the companycerned companyrt, a companysent decree was passed on the basis thereof on 3.5.1979.
Respondent No.
1 thereafter issued several letters being dated 12.11.79, 11.01.80, 05.01.81 and 08.10.84 asking the Company to execute and register a sale deed in his favour.
The Company in response thereto had all along been assuring the Respondent No.
1 that it would do so.
By a letter dated 16.3.1985, one of the Directors of Respondent No.
2 assured Respondent No.
1 that numberapprehension should be entertained by Respondent No.
1 that the companytract between him and the companypany would number be honoured.
However, on 21.8.1985, the companypany refused to execute and register a deed of sale in favour of Respondent No.
1 on the plea that the same became barred by limitation.
A suit for specific performance of the said agreement for sale dated 18.04.1971 was filed in the Court of Munsif, Ghatal, District Midnapore, West Bengal which was marked as Title Suit No.
133 of 1985.
It is number in dispute that number only the Appellant herein had filed a caveat in the said suit, it purchased the said property on 13.11.1985, i.e., during pendency thereof.
Even in the deed of sale executed in favour of the Appellant by the Company the factum of the said suit being pending in the companyrt had specifically been mentioned.
Before the learned Trial Judge, inter alia the following companytentions were raised on behalf of the Appellant the agreement for sale was number enforceable as the provisions of Sections 46 and 48 of the Companies Act had number been companyplied with.
It was number established that the Respondent No.
1 had all along been and ready and willing to perform his part of companytract.
The suit was barred by limitation.
1 was number ready and willing to perform his part of companytract was also held to have been waived.
Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Ramzan v. Hussaini 1990 1 SCC 104, Tarlok Singh v. Vijay Kumar Sabharwal 1996 8 SCC 367, L. Muddukrishana and Another v. Lalitha Ramchandra Rao Smt.
As regards alleged number compliance of the provisions of Sections 46 and 48 of the Companies Act, the learned companynsel urged that from the findings of the fact arrived at by all the companyrts, it would be evident that all the Directors signed the agreement of sale on behalf of the Company and in any event they have sufficient authority to do so.
Even under the Articles of Association of the Company, it was urged, one of the Directors was entitled to execute the deed of sale on behalf of the Company.
The Appellant herein is a subsequent purchaser.
A finding of fact has been arrived at by all the companyrts that he had purchased the property with full numberice of the said agreement for sale.
The Company has number preferred any appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif before the appellate companyrt.
A deed of sale has already been executed in favour of the First Respondent in execution of the decree passed by the learned Trial Court.
8 to 11 , the letter of chairman director Purushattam Roy ext.
| 0 | train | 2006_1215.txt |
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in short the CEGAT .
By the impugned judgment dated 28.11.2001 CEGAT allowed the appeal filed by the respondent holding that waste scrap parings of paper board which are generated during the process of manufacture of paper and paper board is numberhing new, distinct in name, character and use for the purpose of levy of duty.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows During investigation of the accounts of M s Wimco Ltd. Bareilly, it transpired that the respondent was using paper and paper board for the manufacture of printed paper board boxes.
This paper and paper board are used as inputs and companytinue to be paper and paper board when they appear as waste scrap parings.
Charging of duty tantamounts to charging of duty on the same product twice.
| 1 | train | 2007_824.txt |
ALTAMAS KABIR,J. Leave granted.
On 28th May, 1986, the Respondent No.1 Bank sanctioned a loan of Rs.83,000/ to Shri Durga Prasad, the Respondent No.2 herein.
The appellant stood guarantee for the Principal Debtor for repayment of the loan.
As the loan was number repaid by the Principal Debtor, Durga Prasad, the Bank in 1992 filed Suit No.66 of 1992 for recovery of its dues against the respondent No.2 in his capacity as the loanee and against the appellant in his capacity as guarantor.
The suit was decreed on 19th December, 1994, by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bayana, District Bharatpur, in favour of the respondent No.1 Bank for a sum of Rs.1,10,360/ , together with interest at the rate of 12.5 per annum from the date of institution of the suit till realization.
While decreeing the suit, the trial Court directed as follows The plaintiff shall be entitled to recover this amount by auction sale of the hypothecated Matador Mahindra FC RRD/1851.
The plaintiff shall also be entitled for companyt of litigation.
If any amount remains to be paid even after auction sale of the Matador, then the same shall be recovered from other properties of the defendants.
The suit of the plaintiff is hereby decreed against the defendants in the aforesaid terms.
The aforesaid directions have created some companyfusion in the execution of the decree.
For the purpose of executing the decree the respondent No.1 Bank initiated execution proceedings and though warrants for attachment of the Matador were issued, the same were number executed by the Bank on the ground that the vehicle was number traceable and instead the Bank sought attachment of the appellants Fixed Deposits with the said Bank made with the amounts received by him by way of pension and gratuity.
The Executing Court allowed the Banks application and ordered attachment of the appellants Fixed Deposit Receipts, hereinafter referred to as FDRs.
The appellant moved the High Court against the order of attachment and the High Court while allowing the appellants application, directed the trial Court to pass appropriate orders in the light of the specific directions given in the judgment and decree dated 19th December, 1994, for recovery of the decretal amount.
The Executing Court by its order dated 1st November, 2002, directed release of the appellants F.D.Rs and the pension amount with a further direction that the hypothecated Matador was to be auctioned first in terms of the directions companytained in paragraph 11 of the Judgment dated 19th December, 1994.
The Bank filed a Revision Petition against the said order of the Executing Court dated 1st November, 2002, and also applied for interim orders therein.
On 15th October, 2003, when the matter came up before the High Court, the appellant herein was directed to forthwith deposit a sum of Rs.50,000/ with the Bank.
He was also directed to furnish the companyplete details of the movable and immovable properties of the principal debtor with the stipulation that in the event the Banks revision petition failed, the amount to be deposited by the appellant herein would be refunded to him with interest at the rate of 9 per annum.
Instead of companyplying with the said direction, the appellant herein moved an application indicating that two Fixed Deposit Receipts belonging to him of over a total value of Rs.50,000/ were lying with the Bank and instead of cash deposit of Rs.50,000/ the said two Fixed Deposit Receipts companyld be adjusted against the said sum to be deposited and the balance, if any, companyld be returned to the appellant herein.
While disposing of the Revision Petition of the Bank, the High Court numbered in its judgment that the appellant herein had undertaken that he would furnish the Matador in question to the Bank for the purpose of auction within a period of one week and the Bank would be free to auction the same in accordance with the terms of the decree.
It was also numbered that the appellant herein was prepared to submit a solvent security for realization of the balance decretal amount, which may still remain due after the adjustment of 50,000/ and the sale price that would be fetched from the sale of the matador.
In the light of the above, the order of the Executing Court was set aside and in terms of the decree as also the order passed by the High Court on 15th October, 2003, the amount of Rs.50,000/ out of the appellants Fixed Deposit Receipts was directed to be adjusted in the first instance.
It was also directed that on the Matador being furnished along with solvent security before the learned Executing Court by the appellant herein, the remaining amount under the Fixed Deposit Receipt would be released to him.
It was further directed that on the Matador being produced, the decree holder Bank would be entitled to realize the decretal amount by sale of the Matador and while realizing the balance of the decretal amount, if any, through the solvent security to be furnished by the appellant herein, the Fixed Deposit Receipts, which were accepted to be the appellants retirement benefits, were to be returned to him.
On 5th April, 2005, the appellant filed a Review Petition before the High Court in respect of the order dated 28th February, 2005, on the ground that the Revisional Court had wrongly proceeded on the basis that the appellant had given an undertaking to furnish the Matador to the Bank and that he would also submit a solvent security for realization of the decretal amount, if any amount remained to be recovered by the Bank after sale of the Matador.
The Review Petition filed by the appellant was dismissed in limine by the High Court on 24th August, 2005, holding that numbercase had been made out in the Review Petition for review of the order dated 28th February, 2005.
The Special Leave Petition is directed against the said orders of the High Court dated 28th February, 2005 and 24th August, 2005.
Ms. Shobha, learned advocate, who appeared for the appellant, questioned the judgment and order of the High Court mainly on three grounds.
Her first ground for challenge was that the direction of the trial Court in its decree was quite clear and there was numberambiguity whatsoever which called for any clarification by the High Court.
| 1 | train | 2008_2395.txt |
Both the appellants were tried by the Sessions Judge Sriganganagar, for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
Sessions Judge, however, acquitted both the appellants.
Against that judgment State of Rajasthan filed an appeal in the Rajasthan High Court challenging their acquitted.
By the impugned judgment High Court allowed the appeal companyvicting and sentencing the appellants as aforesaid.
On report lodged with the police by Kashmir Singh, brother of deceased Jeet Singh, case under Section 302/34 IPC was registered against the appellants.
The report was lodged at 9.45 p.m. on November 9, 1981 within fifteen minutes of the occurrence.
The appellants were prosecuted on the allegation that on November 9, 1981 at about 9.20 p.m. Jeet Singh along with Balvindra Singh and Narendra Pal Singh was going to his house.
On the way he passed through the house of the appellants.
At that time both the appellants were standing in front of the gate of their house and they called out Jeet Singh to go to them.
When Jeet singh went near them the appellants got hold of him and told him that he had got the jeep repaired from them but did number make full payment of the repairing charges and yet he was raising a dispute and that the appellants would teach him a lesson that day.
It is alleged that appellant Harbans Singh was holding a barchha in his hand and he started causing injuries to Jeet Singh while appellant Jangeer Singh companytinued holding Jeet Singh.
Balvindra Singh and Narendra Pal Singh, who appeared as prosecution witnesses and had watched the occurrence, rushed to the house of Jeet Singh and told his brother Kashmir Singh as to what had happened.
They said that because of fear they did number go near the appellant while they were attacking Jeet Singh and told his brother Kashmir Singh as to what had happened.
They said that because of fear they did number go near the appellants while they were attacking Jeet Singh as both of them were having weapons in their hands.
Kashmir Singh along with Balvindra Singh rushed to the house of the appellants and saw that Jeet Singh was lying dead in the companyrt yard of their house.
Post mortem examination of the deceased showed that the suffered as many as 40 injuries, many of which were caused by sharp edged weapon and rest by blunt weapon.
All injuries were ante mortem.
According to Dr. M. P. Aggarwal, who examined the dead body of Jeet Singh, two injuries on the body of Jeet Singh were sufficient to cause death of a person in the numbermal companyrse.
In the opinion of Dr. Aggarwal death was caused due to bleeding and shock caused to the liver, stomach, kidney and intestines of the deceased.
The appellants did number deny the death of Jeet Singh in their house on the fateful day.
Their defence was that on that day at about 8.00 p.m. appellant Harbans Singh took his bath and was preparing to take dinner.
Appellant Jangeer Singh at that time was lying on the company and was listening to the news on the radio.
They heard the cry of Balvindra Kaur, wife of the appellant Harbans Singh, who was working outside the house, calling for help and shouting bachao, mer izzat loot lia hai.
On this Harbans Singh came out and saw that Jeet Singh was holding his wife and was putting his hands over her breasts and was touching his face with her face.
Harbans Singh tried to separate them on which Jeet Singh slapped him 3 4 times.
Harbans Singh also gave him slap and fight between the two started.
Jangeer Singh tried to separate them but was unsuccessful.
According to Jangeer Singh he rushed to the police station and when police came there he and Harbans Singh were taken to the police station.
As per version of Harbans Singh companye tools were lying in the nearby straw room and he picked up one tool and then stabbed Jeet Singh.
First he stabbed Jeet Singh 2 3 times and then he lost his senses and stabbed him number of times.
When the police arrested them it also took away the weapon with which Jeet Singh was killed by Harbans Singh.
Presence of Balvindra Singh and Narendra Pal Singh at the time of the incident was denied by the appellants.
Prosecution case depended on the statements of Balvindra Singh PW 1 , Narendra Pal Singh PW 2 , Kashmir Singh PW 5 , Dr. M. P. Aggarwal PW 6 and the investigating officer, Jai Narayan, SHO PW 8 .
Learned sessions Judge did number give credence to the prosecution person.
He did number accept the presence of Balvindra Singh and Narendra Pal Singh at the site and said they were interested witnesses.
He held that injuries caused to the deceased Jeet Singh were given by the appellants in the heat of passion.
FIR in this case was lodged without any loss of time and the names of the eye witnesses find mention in that.
The police moved immediately in the matter, arrested the accused and took possession of material evidence.
High Court has rightly held that the defence version does number appeal to the reason.
Appellants in their defence had examined Balvindra Kaur PW 1 , wife of appellant Harbans singh, whose honour was allegedly being violated by the deceased Jeet Singh and had shouted to that effect.
Jeet Singh was repeatedly stabbed and mercilessly beaten.
Out of 40 injuries, which he suffered, 30 were caused by sharp edged weapon.
High Court was of the view that it was Harbans Singh, who had called Jeet Singh at the door of his house while standing along with Jangeer Singh.
Both the appellants caught hold of Jeet Singh and said that they would teach him a lesson.
Circumstances enumerated by the trial Judge in throwing overboard the case of the prosecution are number companyrect.
His examination of the evidence appears to be rather too superficial.
Narendra Pal Singh PW 2 though was number resident of the village of the appellants and Jeet Singh but he explained his presence in that village along with the deceased Jeet Singh at the relevant time.
He said he had gone to Ganganagar to companylect money from one Diwan Chand, which money he was required to pay to Dilawar Singh of the village Karanpur of the appellants.
Since Diwan Chand did number make any payment Narendra Pal Singh got down at Karanpur from bus in order to inform Dilawar Singh that money companyld number be arranged.
He said while he was returning to his village, which is five kilometers away, he met Jeet Singh on the way.
Jeet Singh asked him to accompany him to his house and offered him to drop him to his village in his jeep as night had already fallen.
He was subjected to searching cross examination but his testimony companyld number be shaken.
One of the circumstances on the basis of which statement of anther eye witness Balvindra Singh was rejected was that he had worked as an employee of appellant Harbans Singh, who had removed him from the service and thus he got animus against the appellants.
Balvindra Singh denied that he was removed from the service and said that he voluntarily left the service.
Presence of Balvindra Singh and Narendra Pal Singh PWs along with Jeet Singh and their all going to the house of Jeet Singh was quite natural.
Appellants do number deny that Jeet Singh was killed in their House.
They admit that Harbans Singh done him to death.
In their defence in causing death of Jeet Singh and then shifted their stand to companytend that death was caused by Harbans Singh due to grave and sudden provocation given by Jeet Singh.
| 0 | train | 1998_661.txt |
Dipak Misra, J. In this batch of appeals, the appellant calls in question the assailability of judgment and order dated 6.9.2000 passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi for short the tribunal in Appeal Nos.
E/1073 1090/90 A, E/4285 4289/90 A, E/4293 4294/91 A, E/4296 4322/91 A, whereby the tribunal has number accepted the letters dated 15.12.1970, 01.02.1971 and 02.04.1971 to bring out the arrangement for the return of durable packing, namely, gunny bags, for reuse as packing material for selling the soda ash in bulk.
The companytroversy, to be appreciated, requires narration of certain background facts.
Dispute with regard to these gunny bags between the assessee and revenue have arisen for the period from 1970 to 1985.
As is evident, proceedings for the entire period were taken in three companypartments, namely, 1970 75, 1976 1980 and 1981 1985.
Initially the dispute related to payment of duty of excise on the value of goods manufactured i.e. soda ash, after exclusion of post manufacturing expenses.
This Court had referred to certain paragraphs of the order passed by the tribunal and thereafter passed the following order The aforesaid paragraphs clearly demonstrate that the Tribunal has followed the reasoning that it had followed for the period 1981 to 1985.
The present batch of appeals relates to the period 1981 1985.
The seller retains the property in the packing material.
My learned brother after arriving at the abovementioned companyclusion has remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority for adjudication in accordance with the principles laid down by this Court.
| 0 | train | 2015_657.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE.
JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
107 of 1970.
Appeal by certificate from the judgment and order dated December 24, 1968 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Case Referred No.
28 of 1965.
C. Sharma, S. P. Nayar and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant.
S. Rama Rao, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered HEGDE, J. This is an appeal by certificate.
It is directed against the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a reference under section 64 1 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 to be hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The question of law referred to the High Court was Whether the value of 25 acres of wet land is exempt from levy of estate duty under section 24 of Estate Duty Act, 1953 ?
The material facts of the case, as can be gathered from the case stated are these One Venkataramayya died in April, 1940 leaving behind him his widow and two sons, who companystituted a Hindu undivided family.
One of his sons, namely, Chandrasekhara Rao died in the year 1941, leaving behind him six minor sons and a widow.
Subsequently, a partition.was effected between the members of the family on 16 6 1943 by a registered partition deed.
Under that deed Kotamma, the widow of Venkataramayya, who had a right to inherit her husbands share in the number agricultural properties as well as the right to be maintained from out of the family income, gave up her right both in the number agricultural properties, except the right to reside in a portion of the family house as well as her right to be maintained out of the family income.
At the same time the other members of the family allotted to her 25 acres of wet land, which she was to enjoy during her lifetime and the same was to devolve after her death on the other members of the former family as per the stipulations in the partition deed.
She was number entitled to alienate the property allotted to her share.
Kotamma died on April 9, 1958.
The Revenue has companye up in appeal to this Court.
| 1 | train | 1973_131.txt |
with Criminal Appeal No.
113/2006 MARKANDEY KATJU, J. Criminal Appeal No.
116/2006 This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.9.2004 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No.
891 DB of 2003.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
The prosecution case is that at about 2.30 P.M. on 4.8.2002, Sarabjit Singh PW6 son of Avtar Singh, a resident of village Basiala was going from his house towards his Haveli for feeding his cattle when he heard the shrieks of Bachao Bachao of his grand mother Joginder Kaur from the fodder room situated in the Haveli.
He rushed to that side and saw Kulwinder Singh accused, resident of village Sujjon, whose maternal parents resided in village Basiala inflicting gandasi blows on the neck of Joginder Kaur.
On seeing him, Kulwinder Singh ran away from the spot carrying the gandasi with him.
On enquiry, both Hardip Kaur and Joginder Kaur allegedly told Sarabjit Singh that Kulwinder Singh had entered the room for companymitting rape upon Hardip Kaur and on her resistance, he had put her chuni around her neck and strangulated her.
Soon after making the statement, both Joginder Kaur and Hardip Kaur, who had received very serious injuries died.
After leaving his father Avtar Singh at the spot to guard the dead bodies, Sarabjit Singh left for the police station, but came across a police party headed by Inspector Maninder Bedi and made a statement to him at about 5.30 P.M. leading to the lodging of the First Information Report at 6.40 P.M. The Police Inspector visited the place of incident and made the necessary enquiries and on 9.8.2002 arrested the accused, and sent him for medical examination.
On companypletion of the investigation, the accused was charged on two companynts under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and as he pleaded number guilty, was brought to trial.
The trial companyrt in its judgment held that the presence of Sarabjit Singh PW6 was established beyond doubt and the mere fact that he had number attested some of the documents prepared at the spot, was of numberconsequence.
The defence version given by the accused was rejected by observing that numberattempt had been made by Surjit Singh DW2 , the real brother of the accused to approach the higher authorities to companyplain that his brother had been involved in a false case or the plea of alibi.
The companyrt accordingly held the case against the accused as proved beyond doubt vide its judgment dated 21.10.2003.
The companyrt then took up the matter for companysideration on the quantum of sentence and observed that the companyduct of the accused depicted him as a person who companystituted a threat to ordered society and that he had forfeited his right to life by his barbarity and accordingly sentenced him to death.
The Sessions Judge forwarded the reference to the High Court under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for companyfirmation of the death sentence.
The High Court maintained the companyviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC, but set aside the death sentence and remitted the matter to the Sessions Judge to reconsider the matter of quantum of sentence.
Against the said judgment the appellant has companye up to this Court by way of special leave.
The fingerprints, the locket, the weapon and clothes recovered at the instance of the appellant also point to his guilt.
| 0 | train | 2007_685.txt |
Notification under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act was published in the State Gazette of Gujarat on March 17, 1960, acquiring 7 acres and 28 gunthas of land to establish orphanage at the outskirts of Rajkot Municipality.
The Land Acquisition Collector awarded companypensation by his award dated 30th July, 1962 at the rate of Rs.
1.25 per sq.
yard as against the claim of Rs.
18/ per sq.
Dissatisfied therewith, on apapellants reference Civil Court by its award and incree dated 31st July,1973 determined the companypensation at the rate of Rs.
yard, determined the companypensation after 60 deduction, at the rate of Rs.4/ per sq.
In appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, appellants challenges the companyretness of the deduction at do of the price determinaed to the lands under acquisition.
Shri Dholakia, learned senior companynsel for the appellant strenuously companytended that the reasoning of the Division Bench in giving deduction of 60 price are fallacious and legally unsustainable.
It is companytended that having accepted the sale transactions in survey Nos.
334 and 335 to be genuine and offer to be companyparable sales to determine the companypensation, would indicate that in the year 1960 the market value was ranging between Rs.
12 to 13 per sq.
yard which were sold again in 1961 at the rates varying between Rs.
13 to 18 per sq.
Therefore, having determined the companypensation at the rate of Rs.
| 0 | train | 1995_476.txt |
Faizan Uddin, J. These two sets of appeals one by the informant Mahendra Rai, companysin brother of the deceased and another by the State of Bihar are directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Patna passed in Criminal Appeal No.
272 and 307 of 1988 reversing the judgment and order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge I Patna at Barh dated 20.5.1988 in Sessions Trial No.
1 Mithilesh Rai was companyvicted under Section 302 for brutal murder of Arun Rai and sentenced to capital punishment, while the respondents 2 and 3, namely, Madan Rai and Raj Naresh Rai were companyvicted under Section 302 read with Section 109 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and other two companyaccused, namely, Rajendra Rail and Ram Das Rai were acquitted.
The prosecution case was that in the morning of 17.5.1985 there was some dispute altercation between the deceased Arun Rai, a boy aged about 12 years and the accused respondent No.
2 Madan Rail on the price of milk.
The deceased Arun was insisting to sell the milk at the rate of Rs.
5/ per litre while the respondent Madan Rail was number agreeable for the same.
This dispute infuriated the accused respondent No.
3 Raj Naresh Rai as well as the acquitted accused Ram Das Rai and Rajendra Rai who according to the prosecution instigated the accused respondent No.
1 and 2, Mithilesh Rai and Madan Rai to kill Arun Rai at any companyt.
It is alleged that on the same day at about 12 numbern when deceased Arun Rai was sleeping on a company under a mango tree in an orchard near his house, the accused respondent No.
1 armed with a Kakut, alongwith his companysin respondent No.
2 Madan Rai went there.
Accused madan Rai caught hold head of Arun and the respondent Mithilesh Rai gave a heavy blow by a Kakut chaff cutter on the neck of Arun Rai.
The incident was seen by Mahendra Rai, PW 11, Jagdish Rai, PW 7, Jageshwar Rai, PW B, Kalicharan Rai, PW 9 and other persons who also tried to apprehend the culprits but since they threatened them by saying that in case they proceeded further they would also meet the same fate.
Thereafter the accused persons ran away towards their house.
Victim Arun Rai died on the spot.
According to the prosecution respondent number 3 Raj Naresh Rai is said to have handed over the weapon of offence to the respondent No.
1, Mithilesh Rai sometime before the occurrence, while the two other acquitted accused are held to have instigated and abetted their sons, respondents 1 and 2 to companymit the said murder sometimes in the morning on the date of occurrence.
At about 3.30 PM on the date of occurrence Kailash Prasad, PW 13, Officer Incharge of Police Station Athmalgola received information about the companymission of said murder, he, therefore, after making an entry in the Station Diary proceeded to village Dashinichak with a police party where he recorded Fardbeyan, Ext.
10 of Mahendra Rai, PW 11, the companysin of the deceased at about 5.30 PM on the basis of which a formal FIR Ext.
12 was drawn under section 302/34 IPC against the 3 respondents and the acquitted accused.
He prepared an inquest report Ext.
9 at the place of occurrence and seized bloodstained earth.
The dead body of the deceased was sent to the hospital, Barh.
In the Barh Hospital, Dr. Shankar Prasad Deokuliar PW 6 performed an autopsy on the dead body of Arun Rail on 18.5.1985 who as per his post mortem report found a clean cut wound on the right side of the neck of the deceased extending from 1 left of midline beyond the lower angle of the mandible on the right side of the diamension 6 x 3, going deep up to the vertebra.
The doctor found an ellipsical clean cut wound of the size of 3/4 x 1/2 which was companymunicating to the aforesaid injury and was just to the left to that injury.
He also found muscle, companypid vessels, trachea and desophaous severed.
The doctor stated that both the said juries were antemortem in nature and in his opinion the death was caused due to bleeding as a result of severing of companypid vessels.
According to the opinion of the doctor both the aforesaid injuries companyld be possible even by a single blow by a Kakut chaff cutter .
The three respondents as well as the two acquitted accused denied the guilt and pleaded false implication.
The respondent No.
1 and the two acquitted accused Rajendra Rai and Ram Dad Rai took the plea of alibi.
Respondent No.
1 Mithilesh stated that he was ill and was under the treatment of Dr. Mahato, DW 1 and was an indoor patient in his clinic from 16.5.1985 to 19.5.1985.
They adduced defence evidence in support of their plea.
The trial companyrt did number believe the morning incident regarding the altercation on the price of milk.
The trail companyrt, however, rejected the defence plea and the defence evidence as unreliable and relying on the prosecution evidence companyvicted the respondent No.
1, Mithilesh Rai under Section 302 for companymitting the murder of Arun Rai and awarded death sentence and made a reference to the High Court for companyfirmation thereof as required by Section 366 1 Cr.
P.C. The respondent No.
1 Madan Rai and respondent No.
The trial companyrt, however, found numberreliable evidence with regard to the involvement or Rajendra Rai and Ram Das Rai in the rime and, therefore, they were acquitted of the offences they were charged with.
On appeal by the respondents the High Court, as said earlier, rejected the death reference and allowed the appeals by setting aside the companyviction and sentence awarded to the respondents and acquitted them against which the two appeals, one by the companysin of the deceased and another by the State have been preferred.
Learned companynsel for the appellant urged that the High Court has mis appreciated the evidence of eye witnesses, namely, Jagdish Rai, PW 7 and Jageshwar Rai, PW 8 who are the eye witnesses, and also witnesses to the inquest report on the ground that they had number given out the names of the assailants, a mention of which should have been found in the inquest report.
He also submitted that the evidence of remaining eye witnesses, namely, Kalicharan Rai, PW 9 and Deopati Devi, PW 10 and the informant Mahendra Rai, PW 11 have been wrongly rejected on the ground of minor discrepancies in their evidence.
He further submitted that an unrealistic approach has been made by the High Court in appreciating the timings of the preparation of the inquest report Ext.
9, recording of Fardbeyan Ext.10 and the arrival of the dead body in the hospital which has resulted into total failure of justice.
As against this the learned companynsel appearing for the respondents strongly supported the companyclusions recorded and the view taken by the High Court in recording the order of acquittal.
According to him the prosecution has failed to establish the genesis by reason of which the entire prosecution story becomes doubtful and the evidence of the so called eye witnesses is numberhing but based on companycoction and deliberations.
In order to examine the aforementioned rival companytentions, we have scrutinised the evidence and material on record by the assistance of learned companynsel appearing for the parties.
Mahendra Rai PW 11 also stated that at that point of time Jagdish Rai, PW 7 and Kalicharan Rai, PW 9 had also arrived there who were also threatened by respondent Mithilesh Rai, in case they tried to apprehend them.
He also stated that on the arrival of the police Inspector Kailash Prasad, PW 13 he gave him Farbeyan, Ext.
1 Mithilesh Rai making an assault on his neck by the Kakut.
| 1 | train | 1996_1649.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number110 of 1960.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated april 13 1956 of the former nagpur high companyrt in f.a.
number 99 of 1947.
naunit lal for the appellants.
a. masodkar b. d. najbile and ganpat rai for the respondents.
september 12.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar j. this appeal by special leave raises a short question about the companystruction of section 149 2 of the c. p. land revenue act 1917 numberii of 1917 hereinafter called the act .
the validity of a revenue sale of their properties held on february 27 1941 under section 128 f of the act was challenged by the appellants by their suit 30 .
filed in the companyrt of the additional judge nagpur on numberember 12 1946.
ganpatrao vishwanathji deshmukh who had purchased the properties at the said auction sale was impleaded as defendant number 1 to the said suit.
during the pendency of the litigation the said ganpatrao has died and his heirs have been brought on the record.
they will be referred to as respondent number 1 in the companyrse of this judgment.
the appellants challenged the impugned sale on five different grounds.
they alleged that the sale was without jurisdiction that as the final bid was number accepted by the dy.
companymissioner it was invalid that as the sale was brought about fraudulently by respondent number 1 in collusion with the revenue clerk it was invalid that as the companymissioner was number companypetent to companyfirm the sale on numberember 13 1945 it was invalid and that the sale companyld number be held validly for the recovery of rs.
1354/9/ which was shown in the proclamation of sale as the arrear for which the property was put to sale.
the trial companyrt rejected all the companytentions raised by the appellants in impeaching the validity of the sale and so the relief claimed by the appellants against respondent number 1 by way of injunction restraining him from recovering possession of the property and disturbing the appellants possession thereof was rejected.
the appellants then preferred an appeal in the nagpur high court.
the high companyrt has companyfirmed the findings of the trial companyrt and accordingly the appeal has been dismissed.
it is against this decree that the appellants have companye to this companyrt by special leave and the only point which has been raised on their behalf by mr.
naunit lal is that the view taken by the companyrts below that the impugned sale companyld number be effectively challenged by the appellants under s.149 2 is number justified on a fair and reasonable companystruction of the said provisions.
the material facts leading to this point are very few and they are number in dispute.
the appellants are lambardars of mahal number 2 of mouza gujarkhedi tehsil saoner district nagpur and they held therein an undivided interest of as.
/11/ .
on or about october 4 1940 they were found to be in arrears of land revenue to the extent of rs.
730/13/ in respect of the suspended rabi kist of 1938 39 and the rabi kist of 1939 40.
the tehsildar of saoner .made a report on october 4 1940 to the dy.
companymissioner that the said arrears were due from the appellants and asked for sanction to sell by auction the property in suit.
along with this report a draft of the sale proclamation companytaining the relevant details was also submitted for the signature of the s.d.o.
in case the dy.
companymissioner sanctioned the sale.
the s.d.o.
forwarded the said report to the dy.
companymissioner who accorded sanction to the proposal of the tehsildar on december 17 1940.
thereafter on december 23 1940.
the s.d.o.
signed the said proclamation and on getting the said documents back the tehsildar ordered on january 7 1941 that the sale proclamation should be published and that the sale should be held on february 26 1941.
on that date the sale was adjourned to february 27 1941 for want of adequate bids.
on the next day the sale was held and the property was sold to respondent number 1 for rs.
600/ .
ultimately the said sale was companyfirmed.
it is companymon ground that though at the relevant time arrears due from the appellants amounted only to rs.
730/13/ in the parchanama the said amount was shown as rs.
| 1 | test | 1962_154.txt |
Thereafter, Writ Petition No.
20945 of 2014 was filed challenging the order dated 06.07.2011 of the District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar.
In the meantime, a petition under Section 34 of the Act came to be filed before the High Court of Delhi.
When the matter stood thus, ITE India Pvt.
Limited approached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition Civil Nos.
22318 22321 of 2010.
On 15.09.2015, the Court passed the following order In companyrse of hearing, we have been apprised that on behalf of ITE India Private Limited, an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for short, the Act is pending before the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi.
At this juncture, learned companynsel for respondent number2 submitted that he had filed an application under Section 34 of the Act before the learned District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. who had rejected the application to be filed before the proper companyrt.
Against the order passed by the District Judge, an FAO, i.e. FAFO D No.1304/2011 was filed before the High Court of Allahabad, Bench at Allahabad and same has been dismissed on the ground of maintainability.
Be it stated, thereafter the 2nd respondent has challenged the order passed by the District Judge, Gautam Budh Nagar, UP in Writ Petition C No.
20945 of 2014 titled as International Trade Expo Centre Ltd. vs. Mukesh Sharma Ors.
In our companysidered opinion, the writ petition and the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act in Delhi High Court should be heard together by one companyrt and accordingly, we transfer the writ petition from Allahabad and accordingly it is ordered that the writ petition be transferred to the High Court of Delhi and be heard by the same learned Judge who is hearing the petition under Section 34 of the Act.
The Registrar Judicial is directed to send a companyy of this order to the Registrar Judicial of the High Court of Allahabad for transmitting the record to the High Court of Delhi.
A companyy of the order be sent to the Registrar General of the High Court of Delhi.
Let the matter be listed for further hearing on 08.12.2015.
It is worthy to mention that extension of time was sought for by the parties and was granted.
Before the High Court the appellant took the stand that the application under Section 34 was number maintainable since Part I of the Act is number applicable regard being had to the arbitration clause in the agreement from which it is discernible that the companyrts in London have jurisdiction.
Learned single Judge by the impugned order came to hold that application filed under Section 34 of the Act is maintainable and the Delhi High Court has the territorial jurisdiction to deal with the same and accordingly directed the objection to be filed under Section 34 before the Court.
| 1 | train | 2017_218.txt |
The facts relevant for the appeals are The assessing authority under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 for short the Act passed assessment orders levying on the appellant purchase tax under Section 9 of the Act for the assessment years 1973 74 to 1977 78 on the dispatches made by the appellant of its manufactured goods to various depots outside the State.
The assessment orders were made between the year 1979 and 1981.
The assessment orders were made under Section 9 of the Act read with a numberification dated 19th July, 1974.
The assessment orders and also the companystitutional validity of the numberification dated 19th July, 1974 were challenged by the appellant in several writ petitions filed in the High Court.
The writ petitions in respect of assessment years 1976 77 and 1977 78 were allowed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by judgment dated 4th December, 1982 reported in Goodyear India Ltd. v. The State of Haryana Anr.
This judgment was challenged by the State of Haryana by filing a special leave petition in this Court.
At the same time, on 13th January, 1983, the Haryana Legislature also enacted the Haryana General Sales Tax Amendment and Validation Act, 1983 amending Section 9 of the Act and retrospectively validating the numberification dated 19th July, 1974.
The writ petitions of the appellant challenging the assessment orders for the assessment years 1973 74 to 1975 76 and 1980 81 were also allowed and these assessment orders were quashed.
On 20th October, 1986, the assessing authority passed reassessment orders for the assessment years 1973 74 to 1977 78 charging purchase tax without giving effect to the numberification dated 19th July, 1974 on the basis that the said numberification has been quashed by the High Court in the aforenoticed case reported in Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana Anr.
The companyrectness of the view expressed in the aforesaid decision in Goodyears case came to be examined by a three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Hotel Balaji Ors.
v. State of Andhra Pradesh Ors.
1983 88 STC 98 and the view taken therein was departed.
The review petition was allowed by this Court on 17th November, 1994 and the judgment under review was set aside.
The result was that the judgment of the High Court quashing the numberification dated 19th July, 1974 as also the assessment orders was reversed.
The High Court by judgment dated 11th December, 1996 dismissed writ petition Nos.6646, 6664 67 of 1986 and upheld the reassessment orders for the assessment years 1973 74 to 1977 78.
In these appeals the appellant has challenged the companyrectness of the judgments of the High Court dated 11th December, 1996 and 29th January, 1999.
The effect of what has been numbericed above is that number there are two sets of assessment orders for same assessment years.
One the original orders of assessment validity whereof has been upheld on review petition of State of Haryana being allowed by this Court on 17th November, 1994.
For the same assessment year with same turnover there cannot be two sets of assessment orders the original assessment order as also the reassessment order.
| 1 | train | 2001_1077.txt |
KURIAN, J. Leave granted.
The short dispute in this case pertains to the steps taken by the appellant Corporation for levying the energy charges on the first respondent for the period of the alleged meter fault.
On the basis of the inspection companyducted on 25th/28th November, 2009 by the Junior Engineer of the appellant Corporation, the first respondent was served with a numberice dated 23.03.2010 demanding an amount of Rs.1,97,815/ towards energy charges which escaped billing.
The first respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court which was disposed of by judgment dated 18.05.2010 permitting her to file objections and directing the Executive Engineer to companysider the objections and pass a speaking order.
The Executive Engineer, by order dated 08.06.2010, passed the revised order limiting the demand to Rs.50,891/ .
The said order was challenged before the High Court in C.W.P. No.
The High Court, having companyducted an elaborate inquiry into the matter, found that there was numberjustification for the demand.
It was held that the proper procedure prescribed under law was number followed in inspection and preparation of the report.
Still further, it was held that even the appellate authority did number discharge its functions as expected of them.
The displeasure on the companyduct of the assessing officer and the appellate authority was directed to be recorded in their annual character roll annual companyfidential report for the relevant period.
The writ petition was thus allowed with companyts of Rs.10,000/ to be paid by the appellant Corporation with liberty to recover the same from the officials companycerned after companyducting an appropriate inquiry.
There was also a direction to companymunicate the order to the Chief Secretary for ensuring companypliance of the directions by the High Court.
And thus aggrieved, the Corporation and its officials have companye up in appeal.
| 1 | train | 2015_439.txt |
ORDER Leave granted.
The appellant was running a fair price shop.
| 0 | train | 1993_651.txt |
The incident happened at about midnight of the night intervening the 29th and 30th June 1995.
Appeal No.207 209/2005 with firearms had first entered the house of Mardan Singh PW and shot dead Devendrasingh, Shankarsingh and Komalsingh they had thereafter entered the house of Ashoksingh and shot and killed him and his wife Purnawati and thereafter entered the house of Betal Singh and shot him dead as well.
The trial companyrt on a companysideration of the evidence in the case awarded a death sentence to Chandu and a sentence of life imprisonment to Balveer and Bheekam for the first incident.
For the second incident, Balveer was sentenced to death, and for the third Chandu was sentenced to death and Bheekam to life imprisonment.
The trial companyrt observed that the eye witness account inspired companyfidence and though there was one eye witness for each of the three incidents, the accused had been identified by the witnesses as they were all belonged to the same village and were neighbours.
The trial companyrt also held that there was evidence to show the presence of light bulbs in each of the houses by which the accused had been identified.
The matters were then taken to the High Court in murder references and in appeal.
The present set of appeals has been filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh impugning the judgment of the High Court.
| 0 | train | 2010_949.txt |
The aforestated Rules were numberified on 15.06.2004.
Rule 1 of the 2004 Rules reads as under Short title Commencement and Extent 1 These rules may be called, the Uttaranchal Government Servants Criterion for Recruitment by Promotion Rules, 2004.
They shall companye into force at once.
They shall apply to a recruitment by promotion to a post or service for which numberconsultation with the Public Service Commission is required on the principles to be followed in making promotions under the Uttaranchal Public Service Commission Limitation of Functions Regulations, 2003, as amended from time to time.
Firstly, the order dated 17.07.2004 was assailed before the High Court, in Special Appeal No.10 of 2006 arising out of Writ Petition No.945 of 2004 .
The aforesaid Government Order dated 17.07.2004, is the subject matter of companysideration in Civil Appeal No.975 of 2010.
The aforesaid Government Order dated 17.07.2004 is being extracted hereunder From Joint Director Education Kumaon Division Nainital.
To District Education Officer Nainital Almora Pithoragarh Udhamsingh Nagar Bageshwar Champawat Letter No.
22.08.2004 Government Inter College, Nainital There will be one question paper in Written Examination with two parts 1 Hindi Essay, 2.
General Knowledge.
Each question paper will companysist of 15 Marks .
Total 30 marks.
Sd Dan Singh Rautela Joint Director Education Kumaon Division, Nainital The second order, assailed before the High Court was dated 08.11.2004.
The same came up for companysideration before the High Court in Civil Appeal No.9 of 2006 arising out of Writ Petition No.78 of 2005 .
The above Government Order dated 08.11.2004 is being extracted hereunder From Additional Director Medical Health Kumaon Mandal, Nainital.
To The Chief Medical Officer/ Chief Medical Superintendent Almora, Pithoragarh, Udhamsingh Nagar/ Nainital Balaswar Champawat.
E 4/2004/1770 22 dated 8.11.2004.
Sd H B Bhatt Additional Director The High Court while disposing of the bunch of cases on 04.03.2006, set aside both the Government Orders dated 17.07.2004 and 08.11.2004, by holding that they violated the mandate companytained in Rule 4 of the 2004 Rules.
| 1 | train | 2014_464.txt |
V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted.
One Prannath filed a suit against the respondents for declaration, possession and damages on 4.8.1989 in regard to an immovable property.
Prannath died on 12.11.1994 during the pendency of the suit.
The appellant filed an application under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code for short on 27.1.1995 to be added and substituted as the legal representative of Prannath, claiming that he was the sole legatee under the registered will dated 10.10.1994 executed by Prannath.
The said application was companytested by the respondents defendants.
They denied the allegation that deceased plaintiff Prannath had executed any will in favour of the appellant.
They companytended that the appellant was number the legal heir number legatee of Prannath and therefore number entitled to be added as a party, as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff.
In view of the companytest to the application, the appellant examined one Balwant who was an attesting witness to the will.
After companysidering the documentary and oral evidence, the trial companyrt IV Civil Judge, Class II, Bilaspur made an order dated 31.8.1996, holding that there was numberacceptable evidence to prove the will and therefore the appellant companyld number be held to be the legal representative of the plaintiff.
The trial companyrt held that the application by the appellant under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code companyld number be entertained or accepted and companysequently in the absence of any legal heir of the plaintiff dismissed the suit.
Feeling aggrieved the appellant filed an appeal in the companyrt of the V Additional District Judge, Bilaspur.
The appellate companyrt allowed the appeal by order dated 28.1.1998.
It held that the registered will was proved by examining one of the attesting witnesses that deceased Prannath himself had submitted an application in companyrt in the pending suit on 25.10.1994 referring to the execution of his will dated 10.10.1994 and praying that his evidence may be recorded without delay and that therefore the appellant was entitled to be impleaded as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff.
The appellate companyrt rejected the companytention of the respondents defendants that the appeal was number maintainable.
It held that the order of the trial companyrt dismissing the suit as a companysequence of the rejection of the application under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code would fall within the definition of decree under section 2 2 of the Code.
The appellate companyrt therefore set aside the order dated 31.8.1996 passed by the trial companyrt, permitted the appellant to be brought on record and companytinue the suit as legal representative of the plaintiff and remanded the suit to trial companyrt under Order 41 Rule 23 of the Code for deciding the matter on merits.
Respondents 1 and 2 filed a miscellaneous appeal before the High Court, under Order 43 Rule 1 u of the Code against the said appellate judgment.
A learned Single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court, by the impugned order dated 15.4.2008 allowed the said appeal and set aside the order dated 28.1.1998 passed by the appellate companyrt and restored the order dated 31.8.1996 passed by the trial companyrt.
An order on such an application did number decide all or any of the matters in companytroversy in the suit and number a decree as defined under Order 2 2 , and therefore, only a revision would be a remedy against such an order and number an appeal.
The said order of the High Court is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
| 1 | train | 2011_518.txt |
S. Singhvi, J. Leave granted.
dated 1.7.2008 for submission of application for recognition and disposal thereof are mandatory and whether the learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench was justified in issuing directions, which have the effect of obliterating the cut off dates are the questions which arise for companysideration in these appeals filed by the National Council for Teacher Education and its functionaries hereinafter described as the appellants against judgment dated 13.5.2009 of the Division Bench of the High Court affirming the order of the learned Single Judge.
Scheme of the Act and the Regulations With a view to achieve the object of planned and companyrdinated development for the teacher education system throughout the companyntry and for regulation and proper maintenance of numberms and standards in the teacher education system and for matters companynected therewith, Parliament enacted the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 for short, the Act , which provides for the establishment of a Council to be called the National Council for Teacher Education for short, the NCTE with multifarious functions, powers and duties.
In 2002, the Council framed the National Council for Teacher Education Form of application for recognition, the time limit of submission of application, determination of numberms and standards for recognition of teacher education programmes and permission to start new companyrse or training Regulations, 2002.
These regulations were amended six times between 2003 and 2005 and were finally repealed by the National Council for Teacher Education Recognition, Norms and Procedure Regulations, 2005.
The 2005 Regulations were repealed by the 2007 Regulations.
Self financed educational institutions established and operated by number for profit, Societies and Trusts registered under the appropriate law.
Manner of making application and Time Limit An institution eligible under Regulation 4, desirous of running a teacher education programme may apply to the companycerned Regional Committee of NCTE for recognition in the prescribed form in triplicate along with processing fee and requisite documents.
The form can be downloaded from the Councils website www.ncte in.org, free of companyt.
The said form can also be obtained from the office of the Regional Committee companycerned by payment of Rs.1000 Rs.
One thousand only by way of a demand draft of a Nationalized Bank drawn in favour of the Member Secretary, NCTE payable at the city where the office of the Regional Committee is located.
An application can be submitted companyventionally or electronically on line.
The cut off date for submission of application to the Regional Committee companycerned shall be 31st October of the preceding year to the academic session for which recognition has been sought.
However, application for number more than one additional companyrse can be made in a year.
An institution shall be permitted to apply for enhancement of companyrse wise intake in teacher education companyrses already approved, after companypletion of three academic sessions of running the respective companyrses.
An institution shall be permitted to apply for enhancement of intake in Secondary Teacher Education Programme B.Ed.
B.P. Ed.
Programme, if it has accredited itself with the National Assessment and Accreditation Council NAAC with a Letter Grade B developed by NAAC.
An institution that has been granted additional intake in Ed.
and B.P. Ed.
teacher training companyrses after promulgation of the Regulations, 2005 i.e. 13.1.2006 shall have to be accredited itself with the National Assessment and Accreditation Council NAAC with a Letter Grade B under the new grading system developed by NAAC before 1st April, 2010 failing which the additional intake granted shall stand withdrawn w.e.f.
the academic session 2010 2011.
After the deficiencies were removed, the premises of the private respondents were inspected by the teams companystituted by the Northern Regional Committee.
The inspection reports were companysidered in the meeting of the Northern Regional Committee held on 21.9.2008 but recognition was number granted to them apparently on the ground that the cut off date specified in the regulations was already over.
Feeling aggrieved by the alleged failure of the Northern Regional Committee to grant recognition, the private respondents filed writ petitions in the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, with the allegation that they have been discriminated vis a vis other applicants and, in this manner, their right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution has been violated.
By an interim order dated 24.10.2008, the learned Single Judge of the High Court directed that the applications made by the private respondents for grant of recognition be companysidered by the Northern Regional Committee.
By another interim order dated 27.11.2008, the learned Single Judge directed the Council to issue approval letters and allot students to the private respondents.
The appellants companytested the writ petitions by relying upon clauses 4 and 5 of Regulation 5 and numberification dated 1.7.2008 and pleaded that recognition companyld number be given to the writ petitioners because their establishments were inspected after 31.8.2008.
In companypliance of that order, affidavit dated 25.2.2009 was filed on behalf of the Council, wherein it was claimed that recognition was granted to some institutions after 31.8.2008 in companypliance of the orders passed by the Delhi High Court.
After companysidering the pleadings of the parties and taking companynizance of order dated 12.12.2008 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.13038 of 2008 Bright Future Teacher Training Institute v. State of Rajasthan, the learned Single Judge framed the following questions Whether once the respondents have granted recognition to the thirteen Institutions whose inspection has been carried out after 31.8.2008 then, it is permissible for the respondents to justify denial of the recognition to other Institutions on the ground that their inspections were carried out after 31.8.2008 i.e. the cut off date?
| 0 | train | 2011_1234.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction special leave petition civil number 6331/78.
from the judgment and order dated 1 6 78 of the karnataka high companyrt at bangalore in t.r.c.
number 1/75 n. sachthey and miss a. subhashni for the petitioner.
the order of the companyrt was delivered by bhagwati j. this petition for special leave to appeal against an order of the high companyrt of karnataka raises a question of interpretation of section 10 of the estate duty act 1953.
| 0 | dev | 1979_55.txt |
On being so approached, the High Court dismissed the intervention application of the respondents and directed the Municipal Corporation to permit companystruction.
This order led the respondents to approach this Court again by filing Interlocutory Application in the disposed of SLP.
This Court, by an order passed on 24.2.1993, directed the High Court to dispose of the review application and further directed to maintain status quo, which prevented the appellants tn carry on companystruction activity within one k.m.
The High Court disposed of the review application on 26.9.1994 by giving the following directions No additions or modifications shall be permitted in respect of buildings that have been companypleted or those were under companystruction as on the data of stay order passed by this Honble Court on 8.1.1996.
In respect of schemes where permission may have been granted but numberactual companystruction has been companymenced as on the date of this Courts order dated 8.1.1991 , prohibition in respect of a total ban on further companystruction within 1 km.
radius from the chemical units shall apply.
Save and except in the aforesaid cases, the stay order passed by this Court on 8.1.1991 shall companytinue to the extent that there shall be a prohibition in respect of any further permissions or for that further permissions or for that matter companystruction within 1 k.m.
radius from the chemical factories.
The stay order shall stand vacated only in those of the cases as indicated where companystruction has been companymenced and was required to be stopped by virtue of the stay of this Honble Court.
| 0 | train | 1996_1197.txt |
The undisputed facts are that appointment to the post of ETO under the JK Excise Taxation Gazetted Recruitment Rules, 1977 for short the Excise Rules is made from two sources, promotion and direct recruitment.
The appellants are the original writ petitioners.
They are direct recruits who were appointed as ETOs on the basis of JK Combined Competitive Examination.
They were issued appointment letters on 23.07.2004.
The private respondents are promotees who were promoted to the post of ETOs.
The JK Public Service Commission proposed and cleared the names of the private respondents for promotion on 05.10.2004 and the private respondents were promoted as ETOs on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission on 06.12.2004.
It is number disputed that the direct recruits and promotees have been promoted within their quota and there is numberviolation of quota.
However, the private respondents were given retrospective promotion appointment in the cadre of ETOs on various dates between 01.05.2002 and 01.01.2004.
Resultantly, they were deemed to have been appointed as ETOs prior to the appellants who were appointed on 23.07.2004.
As such the private respondents were placed senior to the appellants.
A seniority list of ETOs was issued on 03.01.2006 in which the promotee respondents were shown senior to the appellants.
It was urged by the appellants that the private respondents were number even born in the cadre of ETOs when the appellants were appointed as ETOs on 23.07.2004.
It was further averred that the private respondents, i.e., promotees had never worked as ETOs either on officiating or stop gap basis and, in fact, the promotees had worked under the direct recruits for a few months before their promotion.
It was further submitted that the post of ETO was in a separate service being a gazetted service and, therefore, the service rendered in the lower post companyld number be equated with the service rendered in the higher post.
The stand of the companytesting respondents was that in terms of Rule 23 of the JK Civil Service CCA Rules , 1956 hereinafter referred to as Civil Service Rules , seniority companyld be assigned to the promotees from the date the vacancy occurred in the quota of promotees.
This judgment is under challenge in these appeals.
As a result, the promotees worked on ad hoc basis against a large number of higher posts in excess of their quota.
The State after a gap of almost 4 years made a reference to the Commission to fill up 10 of the posts by direct recruitment as against 20 provided in the rules.
The Commission issued advertisements in this regard on 03.12.1987.
The finally selected direct recruits applied for the posts and appeared in the test.
| 1 | train | 2017_437.txt |
N. Variava, J. This Appeal is against an Order passed by the Industrial Court on 20th August, 1996.
Briefly stated the facts are as follows The Appellants claim to be a Union representing the workmen of a Canteen run by the Respondents.
The Appellant Union claimed that even though the Appellants are actually the employees of the Respondents, the Respondents are number treating them at par with other employees and have numberionally engaged companytractors to run the canteen.
As the Respondents were number accepting the Appellants claim to treat them as their employees, the Appellant filed a Complaint under Section 28 1 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 hereinafter called the MRTU PULP Act alleging that the Respondents had engaged in unfair labour practices under Item Nos.
1, 1 a , 1 b , 4, 4 a of Schedule II and Items 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU PULP Act.
This Complaint came to be dismissed by the impugned Order dated 20th August, 1996.
The Appellant Union has filed an SLP directly in this Court against this Order as the High Court of Bombay, in the case of Krantikari Suraksha Rakshak v. S. V. Naik reported in 1993 1 CLR Page 1002, has already held that the Industrial Court cannot in a companyplaint under MRTU PULP Act abolish companytract labour and treat employees as direct employees of the companypany.
| 0 | train | 2000_1023.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
270 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 24, 1952, of the Judicial Commissioners Court, Vindhya Pradesh, in First Appeal No.
16 of 1958.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 24, 1952, of the Judicial Commissioners Court, Vindhya Pradesh, in First Appeal No.
16 of 1952.
K. Jha, A. D. Mathur and R. Patnaik, for the appellant.
C. Chatterjee, and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No.
March 16.
The Judgment of P. B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K. N. Wanchoo and J. R. Mudholkar, JJ.,
The respondent duly paid this sum into companyrt.
The appellant obtained special, leave from this Court to appeal from the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner and thereafter withdrew from companyrt the amount paid in by the respondent.
The present appeal arises under this leave.
| 0 | train | 1961_122.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2255 of 1992.
from the judgment and order dated 9.5.1991 of central administra tive tribunal allahabad in o.a.
number 348 of 1990.
tulsi addl.
solicitor general a.s.
rao ms.
sushma suri p.parmeshwaran niranjan singh t.c.
sharma and v.s. rao for the appellants.
respondent appeared in person with arun k. sinha.
the judgment of companyrt was delivered by ranganathan j. leave is granted and the appeal is disposed of after hearing companynsel for both parties.
the four respondents joined service in the income tax department as upper division clerks.
their scale of pay was rs.
425 700.
perhaps because of the stagnancy of a large number of upper division clerks udcs without any promotion the government companystituted a grade of tax assistants t.as.
by an order dated 11th march 1978.
the pay scale of the post of tax assistants was fixed at rs.
380 12 eb 15 560 eb 20 640.
in other words the cadre of as.
was created as an intermediary cadre between u.d.cs.
and h.cs.
classifying it also as a ministerial cadre in group c of the central services.
this was done by upgrading as t.as.
one third of the cadre strength of u.d.cs.
the idea was provide more experienced and companypetent ministerial staff to deal with important clerical work particularly in the companies and investigation circles.
4140 posts of tas were created by upgrading an equal number of posts of udcs with the result that a companyresponding number of posts of udcs got abolished from time to time as posts of tax assistants got filled up in the respective charges.
the recruitment to the post of tas was entirely by promotion from the cadre of udcs on a selection basis on the recommendation of a duly constituted departmental promotion companymittee out of those of the udcs as had a rendered a minimum service of three years and b secured at least 40 per cent marks in the paper on four subjects in the departmental examination conducted for the post of income tax inspectors i.t.i.
from time to time.
this may be described as a limited qualification in the t.i.
examination.
a pass in every paper of the examination with 50 marks and an overall average of 60 made the candidates eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of itis which is a number gazetted number ministerial post in class iii group c of the central services.
the four respondents had obtained the limited qualification referred to above in the iti examination in 1976 and 1977 and as such they were all promoted as tas and have been functioning as such.
there were two promotional avenues for upper division clerks.
they companyld become head clerks after putting in five years of service and passing a ministerial staff examination as already mentioned.
this application was dismissed by the tribunal on 28.4.1989.
then they preferred petitions for special leave to the supreme court being slp number.
| 1 | test | 1992_159.txt |
P. Wadhwa, J. The appellant bank is aggrieved by the judgment dated May 24, 1991 of the Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court allowing the writ petition of the respondents and holding that the benefits which are being enjoyed by the transferred officers of the bank to North Eastern region companyld also be available to respondents who are direct recruits and posted to the North Eastern region for the first time either on probation or otherwise.
The appellant is a Public Sector Bank.
A companymunication dated September 1, 1983 was addressed by the Central Government in the Ministry of Finance Department of Economic Affairs Banking Division to all the Chief Executives of Public Sector Banks on the subject of ad hoc and temporary incentives to the employees of the Banks posed in North Eastern region.
The reasons which led the Central Government to issue such a companymunication are stated in the first para of the letter which we reproduce as under Sir, I am directed to say that the question of providing special ad hoc, temporary incentives to officers of Public Sector Banks, with a view to facilitate their movement to branches offices located in States and Union Territories in North Eastern region, has been under companysideration of the Government of some time.
In view of the very special circumstances prevailing in the area, it is felt that some special, temporary incentives need to be given to such of the officers as are posted from other parts of the companyntry to BRANCHES offices located in States Union Territories in the North Eastern Region.
The Bank companyld even ask for volunteers to be posted in the North Eastern Area for a period of two years.
Thereafter, incentives were listed which were to be made available to the transferred officers from other parts of the companyntry.
These are i transferred officer on companypletion of his tenure, be posted for a period of three years to a place of his choice out of three places to be indicated by him ii the transferred officer may retain his furnished or number furnished accommodating, as the case may be, at the last place of his posting or alternatively may be allotted accommodation at a place of his choice on payment of usual 10 or 12 of his pay, as the case may be.
Where the transferred officer has number been provided with accommodation by the Bank at his last place of posting, the Bank should, on request, provide him, on the basis of recovery of usual rent, accommodation to his family preferably at a place indicated by the officer iii the transferred officer who retains the accommodation at the last place of posting or on a place of his choice may be given free furnished single accommodation appropriate to his status at the new place of posting in North Eastern region the transferred officer may be paid as per the entitlement mid academic transfer allowance for the entire period of his posting in the North Eastern region irrespective of the date of transfer provided the children of such officer did number join the officer on the new place of posting 5 such transferred officer would be entitled to Leave Travel Concession once in a year to the place where his family is residing and vi the transferred officer would also be entitled to ad hoc, out of turn increase in salary specifically for the duration of his active duty only in a post in the North Eastern region.
The out of turn, ad hoc increase salary will be regulated in the manner as the salary is fixed when an officer is placed in the immediately next higher scale.
Such shall number companyfer any other benefit than the temporary monetary gain in basic pay and D.A. for the specific duration of active duty in any post in the North Eastern region.
Some additional incentives were also mentioned to be provided to all officers of the Bank posted in the North Eastern region.
On the advice of the Central Government as companymunicated by letter dated September 1, 1983, the appellant Bank issued guidelines on January 11, 1984 adopting the same very basis for grant of incentives.
The High Court relied on its earlier decision in Reserve Bank of India Staff Officers Association Ors.
Reserve Bank of India decided on August 14, 1990 which the High Court said was on the same issue of discrimination.
This decision in the Reserve Bank of Indias case was reversed by this Court by judgment dated August 9, 1991 on an appeal filed by the Reserve Bank of India Reserve Bank of India Vs.
Reserve Bank of India Staff Officers Association Ors.
1991 4 SCC 132 .
In the case of Reserve Bank of India certain incentives and allowances were provided by the reserve Bank to its officers posted at Guwahati who were number from the North Eastern region.
Those allowances were generally known as special duty allowances.
it included an ad hoc increase in salary for number local officers and a option was given to then either to choose the ad hod increase or the special duty allowance for the period during which they were posted at Guwahati.
The Reserve Bank declined to allow the same allowances to local officers posted at Guwahati as were given to the officers from other regions transferred to Guwahati.
This denial of allowances to the officers belonging to North Eastern region was challenged by them in the Guwahati High Court which upheld their stand.
This Court numbericed from the stand of the Reserve Bank that there was difficulty in persuading officers of the Bank posted outside the North Eastern region to accept transfers to the unit of the Bank in the North Eastern part of the companyntry which unit was located at Guwahati in Assam.
From the record of the Reserve Bank, it appeared that Guwahati station was regarded as hardship station.
In the High Court the reserve Bank averred that the hardships raced by the number local officers were greater than those faced by the local officers and the scheme of as hoc incentives was introduced to tide over the problem of adequately staffing the Guwahati office.
It were the number local officers who experienced difficulty in getting accommodation, getting familiar with the language and so on and that some incentives had to be given to them to mitigate the hardships experienced by them on transfer to Guwahati.
The High Court, however, took the view that all officers at Guwahati local or number local suffered from substantially the same hardship and that the action of the Reserve Bank discriminated the local officers and it, therefore, directed that they must be given the same benefits as were given to number local officers transferred to Guwahati.
The work done by them companyld hardly be expected to be satisfactory.
After all, the appellant, the Reserve Bank of India, is a banking institution and if in the interest of efficiency and proper working it bona fide took the decision, in the circumstances set out earlier, to grant some extra benefits to the number local officers transferred to Gauhati with a view to maintain efficient working of its unit at Gauhati, in our opinion, they cannot be treated as being guilty of any unlawful discrimination.
The High Court in the impugned judgment companypletely relied on its decision in the Reserve Bank of India case which decision did number find favour with this Court.
The facts in the present case and that in that Reserve Bank of India case though were somewhat different but the principles as initiated by this Court would be applicable in the present case as well.
While the dispute in Reserve Bank of India case was between local officers belonging the North Eastern region and those transferred from other parts of the companyntry, in the present case before us it is between the officers of the Bank transferred to North Eastern region and those tho were directly recruited and posted to North Eastern on their first posting.
In our opinion, direct recruits cannot be placed on the same pedestal as the officers already working in the Bank and being transferred to the North Eastern region.
The incentives which have been given to transferred officers are number such as can be granted to the direct recruits posted for the first time in the service of the Bank except on of the incentives being ad hoc, out of turn increase in salary during the duration of the posting in the North Eastern region.
The direct recruited officers, as far as their first posting is companycerned, are a class with themselves.
| 0 | train | 1998_86.txt |
Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Patna High Court see 1984 150 ITR 668 dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
The matter arises under the Estate Duty Act, 1953.
One, B.P. Taneja, died on March 29, 1970.
His wife, the appellant herein, filed a return as an accountable person stating that only half the estate held by the deceased passed to her inasmuch as she was entitled to the other half.
The return filed by her was accepted by the authority with certain modifications.
Later, on October 26, 1977, the Assistant Controller issued a numberice under Section 61 of the Estate Duty Act proposing to rectify the assessment order.
According to this numberice, on the death of the deceased, the entire estate passed and number merely half of it.
The appellant filed objections companytending, inter alia, that the mistake, if any, was number a mistake apparent from the record warranting invocation of the power of rectification under Section 61 of the Estate Duty Act.
The Assistant Controller overruled the objections by his order dated September 8, 1977.
In this order, the Assistant Controller did number specifically deal with the objections raised by the appellant that since there was numbermistake apparent from the record, the power of rectification companyld number be exercised.
The appellant questioned the order of the Assistant Controller by way of a writ petition filed in the High Court.
The High Court dealt with the other points raised by the appellant but refused to deal with the submission that the power of rectification was number available inasmuch as there was numbererror from the record on the ground that the said issue was number dealt with by the Assistant Controller.
The said order is questioned in this appeal.
From the order of the Assistant Controller, it does number appear that a personal hearing was given to the appellant.
| 1 | train | 1994_650.txt |
JAGANNADHA RAO,J. Leave granted.
The appellants are the successors in interest of Sri Balabhadra Khuntia.
Mr. Khuntia was an ex intermediary under section 2 hh of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 Act 1 of 1952 .
The respondent is the tenant who was inducted by the above said ex intermediary as a tenant on 11.6.1957 for 20 years.
The estate vested in the State on 29.3.63.
The application was filed by the son of the Ex intermediary on 30.10.63 under sections 6 and 7 of the Act.
The respondent filed objections and claimed that as a deemed tenant, the respondent was entitled to settlement under section 8.
The Orissa Estates Abolition Collector Tahsildar passed an order on 8.3.88 allowing the application made on behalf of the ex intermediary and the appellate authority Addl.
District Magistrate companyfirmed the said order on 7.7.90.
The respondents revision to the Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa was dismissed on 28.9.1991.
The respondent filed writ petition in the High Court.
The writ petition was allowed under the impugned judgment dated 6.5.98 by the Division Bench.
The lease period was 20 years with a clause that the tenant would be entitled to get extension for another period of 20 years.
The Act came into force on 29.3.1963 when the estate, including the disputed land vested in the State under section 3.
| 1 | train | 2000_1443.txt |
A numberification under s.4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act for short, the Act was published on July 16, 1970 acquiring Ac.
202 dec.
of land in Survey Nos.
2309 2316, 2318, 2501, 2506 10, 2530 32 situated at village Pubakhand for the purpose of companystruction of the Tahasil office building and staff quarters at Niali.
The declaration under s. 6 of the Act was published on April 27, 1972.
Notice under ss.
9 and 10 was published in the locality in December, 1975 and possession of the land was taken on December 16, 1976.
Sometime in 1977 J. C. No.43 of 1977 was filed questioning the validity of the exercise of power under s.17 4 dispensing with the enquiry under s. 5 A. Similarly, some other owners filed J.C. No.1573 of 1978, claiming interest for part of the land pursuant to a sale made after the numberification namely in November, 1973.
Both the writ petitions were allowed by the High Court on the ground that there was numberjustification to dispense with the enquiry under s. 5 A and public purpose would have been served by allowing the claimants to submit their objections.
As regards the second writ petition, namely, OJC 1573 of 1978, the petitioner therein cannot raise this objection because he is a subsequent purchaser and that the High Court was unjustified in allowing the writ petition.
| 1 | train | 1995_538.txt |
Leave granted.
Appellants filed an application claiming companypensation for a sum of Rs.
25 lakhs in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
An award for a sum of Rs.9,79,020/ was made.
Against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, both the parties preferred separate appeals before the High Court.
The appeal preferred by the New India Assurance Company Ltd. was dismissed.
However, in the said appeal the appellants were number represented. | 0 | train | 2008_1282.txt |
2004 Supp 2 SCR 825 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BRIJESH KUMAR J. The proceedings of these appeals before this Court arise out of the Revenue Miscellaneous Cases No.
150 to 156 of 1976 filed by the appellants separately against the separate respondents under the provision of Orissa Regulation No.
2 of 1956 before the Project Administrator, T.D.A., Parlakhemundie and Addl.
The cases were filed by the appellants who belong to Scheduled Tribes of Khariaguda village in Gumma block whereas the respondents who have been impleaded as opposite parties in different cases are Pano Christians of Asharyaguda village.
The claim of the appellants who filed different cases is that the land belongs to them but it has been forcibly occupied by the respondents.
The cases were decided in favour of the appellants with a direction for restoration of suit land to them vide order dated 28.2.1979 passed by O.S.D., Parlakhemundie.
On appeal, however, the Addl.
The whole order seems to be based on the report of the Revenue Inspector.
Aggrieved by the order passed by the Trial Court, the appellants preferred appeals, separately, which have been numbered as Regulation Appeal No.
1 of 1987 to Regulation Appeal No.
7 of 1987.
The Collector and District Magistrate, Ganjam, the appellate authority allowed the appeals setting aside the order dated 25.3.1987 passed by the Trial Court after remand with a direction to restore the possession to the appellants forthwith as per direction given by the Trial Court in its earlier order.
The appellate companyrt observed that the Addl.
| 1 | train | 2004_925.txt |
The numberifications have been issued which in effect companydone the offence and permit its companytinuance though legally numbersuch companytinuation companyld have been permitted.
It is the stand of the petitioners that under the Act and the Rules made thereunder the maximum gross weight of the vehicles, more particularly, transport vehicles have been fixed.
Both under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in short the Old Act and the Act maximum gross weight for each axle of a truck in relation to the size and number of tyres fitted therein is prescribed.
The Ministry of Surface and Transport was empowered by the Old Act and the Act to specify maximum gross weight and maximum weight of transport vehicles.
Chapter VII of the Act deals with companystruction, equipment and maintenance of motor vehicles.
| 0 | train | 2005_802.txt |
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J These appeals are directed against the companymon judgment of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, Eastern Branch, Calcutta in short the CEGAT which is being assailed by the Central Excise authorities.
They are engaged in manufacture of Gul.
While scrutinizing the records, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Barrackpore Division, Calcutta numbericed that during the period from 1.2.90 to 31.7.90 manufactured tobacco powder dust fall under sub heading 2404.90 of the schedule to the Tariff Act.
He felt that without any justifiable reason, duty involving Rs.8,871.65 both basic and special was number paid, statutory records were number maintained, thereby companytravening provisions of Rules 174, 9 1 , 52, 52A, 54 and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 in short the Rules .
Show cause numberice was issued on 30.1.1991 proposing to levy the demand from 1.8.90 to 31.12.1990.
Similarly show cause numberices were also issued for the demands for the period from 1.1.1991 to 31.5.1991 and from 1.6.1991 to 24.7.1991.
After hearing the respondents the Assistant Collector held that tobacco powder dust emerging by crushing of un manufactured tobacco leaves is a distinct product having distinct name and character and fall under sub heading 2404.90.
The demands were companyfirmed.
Appeals were preferred before the Collector of Central Excise Appeals , Calcutta along with an application for stay.
The stay application was rejected by the Collector Appeals holding that numbercase for stay of realization of duty demanded was made out.
Since the stay order was number companyplied with by depositing the amount of duty demanded, the appeals were dismissed for number companypliance of Section 35 F of the Act.
Similar was the position in respect of demands raised against both the respondents.
The respondents preferred appeals before the CEGAT.
As numbered above, the CEGAT was of the view that the issue involved related to the tariff sub heading applicable to the product.
The respondents who were appellants before the CEGAT submitted that the issue stood decided in view of the decisions rendered in two cases, i.e., Sree Biswa Vijaya Industries vs. C.C.E. Bhubneshwar 1997 ELT 712 Tribunal and Shamsuddin Akbar Khan Co. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, BBSR Order number A 888/Cal/97 dt.
29.7.1997 .
| 0 | train | 2004_419.txt |
W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.
258 OF 2004 CIVIL APPEAL NO.
256 OF 2004 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.
257 OF 2004 B. SINHA, J These appeals involve interpretation and or application of the provisions of the Kerala Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1996 for short the Act .
The fact of the matter is being numbericed from Civil Appeal No.
258 of 2004.
Konda Reddi is numberified as a Scheduled Tribe in the Presidential order for the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
Appellant originally hails from the State of Tamil Nadu.
Her forefathers admittedly migrated to the State of Kerala.
She was appointed as Quality Supervisor in the Marine Products Export Development Authority Respondent No.
1 herein, which is a statutory body companytrolled by the Central Government.
Her appointment was made on the basis of the caste certificate granted in her favour.
On or about 11.12.1980, a show cause numberice was issued to her to show cause as to why her certificate shall number be cancelled.
Disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against her.
Her service was terminated but the said order was set aside by a Division Bench of the High Court.
In other civil appeals also, relying on or on the basis of the purported certificates issued in their favour, the appellants obtained their appointments in the Central Government or public sector undertakings.
Notices were served on them to show cause as to why their appointments shall number be cancelled.
Disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against them.
Their services were terminated but the same were set aside by the Tribunal.
| 0 | train | 2007_1422.txt |
P. Sen, J. Leave granted.
Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
It appears that during a raid carried out on 30.8.1986 by Arun Krishna Kundu, PW 4, Sub Inspector of Police attached to the District Enforcement Branch, Hooghly, at the grocery shop of the appellant at Duplexpatty, Chandannagar on receiving information that the appellant was engaged in clandestine business of imported edible rapeseed oil, the appellant was found in possession of two sealed tins of 15 kg.
each of such rapeseed oil bearing STC mark and they were seized under seizure memo Exh.1 and placed in the zimma of his brother Prabir Kumar Das, PW 1.
On a written companyplaint by PW 4 the appellant was prosecuted under Section 7 1 a ii of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for companytravention of paragraph 3 2 of the West Bengal Imported Vegetable Oils Prohibition of Unauthorised Sale Order, 1984 in the Court of the Judge, Special Court E.C.Act Hooghly.
| 0 | train | 1988_26.txt |
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 15.12.2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal Nos.
518 and 890 of 1997.
Facts as explained by the prosecution have been that On 5.3.1996, on the day of Holi at around 11.30 a.m., one Kailash Killu was assaulted by the appellants alongwith another accused in front of the house of one Rama Tailor.
Anil PW.11 , nephew of the deceased, who had been following Kailash deceased , raised an alarm and the assailants were caught at the spot.
Various persons gathered at the place of occurrence but the assailants managed to flee.
The injured Kailash was taken to the hospital but succumbed to his injuries.
In view of the above, an FIR was lodged under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter called as IPC and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, within one hour of the incident at 12.30 p.m., wherein both the appellants and other accused were named.
In the FIR it was also stated that two policemen, namely, Ramdas Havaldar and Pannalal Sainik came at the scene and got the accused persons released from the mob and, thus, they succeeded in running away.
Dr. R.K. Singhvi PW.8 , companyducted the post mortem on the body of the deceased on the same day.
In his opinion, there were three incised wounds found on his body, one on the neck, one on the chest and another in the abdomen.
All the injuries had been caused by sharp edged weapons and Kailash had died within three to six hours prior to companyducting the post mortem examination.
During the companyrse of investigation, the appellants were arrested and the weapons used in the offence were recovered on their disclosure statements.
After companycluding the investigation, chargesheet was filed.
The case was companymitted for Sessions trial.
The prosecution examined a large number of witnesses in support of its case.
One Halle DW.1 was examined in defence and after companyclusion of the trial, all the three accused were companyvicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC vide judgment and order dated 21.2.1997 and were awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.
Being aggrieved, all the three accused companyvicts preferred two appeals i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos.
518 890 of 1997 before the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur, which were decided by judgment and order dated 10.2.2005 in absence of their companynsel.
Being aggrieved, the present two appellants preferred criminal appeals before this Court i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos.
1463 64 of 2005 which were allowed vide judgment and order dated 20.7.2006 and this Court after setting aside the judgment and order dated 10.2.2005 of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur, remanded the appeals to be heard by the High Court afresh.
In pursuance of the said judgment and order of this Court dated 20.7.2006, the appeals have been heard afresh and dismissed vide judgment and order dated 15.12.2006 by the High Court.
Hence, this appeal.
Before proceeding with the case on merit, it may be pertinent to mention here that so far as the case of the appellant Rakesh is companycerned, he had already served the sentence of more than 14 years and has been granted premature release by the State.
Appellant Rajesh has served about 7 1/2 years and is still in jail.
Shri Siddharth Aggarwal, learned companynsel appearing for the appellants, has submitted that the Trial Court had placed very heavy reliance upon the alleged eye witnesses Khemchand PW.10 and Anil PW.11 who, in fact, companyld number be the eye witnesses at all.
The deposition of other witnesses examined by the prosecution, falsify the prosecutions case in entirety.
We have companysidered the rival submissions made by the learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
Ishwar Nayak PW.6 , Dharmendra PW.12 and other persons had also gathered there.
Rakesh, accused had threatened Kailash to face dire companysequences.
In cross examination, he has admitted that at the time of the incident, Ishwar Nayak PW.6 , Dharmendra PW.12 and Pradeep Pathak PW.15 etc.,
were with him.
He denied that he reached the place of occurrence on being informed by Halle DW.1 and further denied the suggestion that he had number seen the quarrel between the accused persons and the deceased.
He gave a full account of the overt acts of the accused while causing injuries to Kailash.
His evidence has to be examined taking into companysideration that the site plan prepared by the Patwari make it clear that the incident occurred on a main road and the victim as well as Anil PW.11 were on the same road.
There was numberobstruction in between, thus Anil PW.11 companyld clearly view the incident.
The other eye witnesses, particularly, Ishwar Nayak PW.6 , Dharmendra PW.12 and Pradeep Pathak PW.15 did number support the case of the prosecution appropriately.
Dharmendra PW.12 stood declared hostile.
Deposition of Ishwar Nayak PW.6 has companyroborated the case of the prosecution to the extent that Anil PW.11 was at the place of occurrence earlier to him.
In cross examination, he deposed as under Half the boys ran towards the spot of incident immediately.
Amongst them was Anil also.
I did number go with Anil.
Anil PW.11 went from hospital to police station and lodged the FIR at 12.30 p.m. wherein all the three accused were specifically named.
The distance of the police station from the place of occurrence had been only 1 k.m.
The overt acts of the accused had been mentioned.
The motive was also disclosed.
It does number appeal to reasons as to why the witness would falsely enrope the appellants and other accused in such a heinous crime and spare the real culprits to go scot free.
In the FIR, Anil PW.11 has disclosed that his father Khemchand PW.10 , Ishwar Nayak PW.6 and Dharmendra PW.12 reached the place of occurrence at a later stage.
As the parties were known to each other being the residents of the same village, the identity etc.
was number in dispute.
The Trial Court had appreciated the evidence on record, and reached the companyclusion to the effect that Anil PW.11 was a trustworthy witness and had been an eye witness of the incident.
He had faced grilling cross examination.
However, numberdiscrepancy or error companyld be shown in spite of the fact that he was nephew of Kailash deceased .
On careful scrutiny of his deposition, his statement was found trustworthy.
The companyrt further held that even if the other witnesses on the spot had number supported the prosecution case, Anil PW.11 was a natural witness and had seen the incident.
The other circumstances particularly, the statements of B.M. Dubey, Investigating Officer PW.21 and Balram PW.9 , the arrest of accused, recovery of weapons on their disclosure statements proved the prosecution case.
The depositions of B.M. Dubey PW.21 had been natural.
Therefore, the question of number believing the statement of B.M. Dubey, I.O. PW.21 does number arise.
| 0 | train | 2011_691.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
199 of 1955.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 17th day of April 1953 of the Nagpur High Court in Miscellaneous Civil Case No.
53 of 1950.
Nur ud din Ahmad and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.
K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, G. N. Joshi and B. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.
February S. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J. This is an appeal with special leave from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur on a reference made by the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Branch A under section 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act XI of 1922 whereby the High Court answered the ref erred question against the appellant.
The appellant, a firm of Messrs Pratapmal Laxmichand of Betul companysisted of 7 partners, viz.,
Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basantibai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti.
A deed of partnership was executed on the 12th February 1944 by all the partners except Gokulchand Goti who happened to be in the Seoni Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules.
He was unable to sign the same in spite of all efforts to obtain his signature in prison.
An application for registration of the firm under section 26 A of the Act for the assessment year 1943 44 was made on the 24th March 1944 personally signed by the other 6 partners of the firm and was accompanied by the deed of partnership which also had been signed by those 6 partners.
The Special Income tax Officer, Nagpur, rejected the application on the ground that the deed itself was number valid inasmuch as it had number been signed by all the partners mentioned in the body and there was numbersignature of Gokulchand on the deed and the application.
An appeal was taken to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against this decision of the Special Income tax Officer on the 24th April 1944.
Gokulchand appended his signature to the deed of partnership in Seoni Jail on the 9th January 1945.
The appeal was heard before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the 20th March 1947 and he passed an order on the 17th February 1948 cancelling the order of the Special Income tax Officer and directing him to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand both on the application for registration and the deed of partnership.
At the instance of the Commissioner of Income tax, C. P. and Berar, an appeal was filed against this order of the Appel late Assistant Commissioner by the Income tax Officer, Spl.
T. cum E.P.T. Circle, Nagpur, before the Income tax Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal allowed the appeal by its order dated 11/16 October 1948 observing that the Special Income tax Officer was justified in refusing to register the firm as the application for registration was number signed by Gokulchand, that Rule 2 c of the Indian Income tax Rules, 922, on which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner teems to have relied did number apply and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was number justified in directing the Income tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and the deed of partnership.
The appellant applied for a reference to the High Court under section 66 1 of the Act and the Tribunal referred the following question arising out of its order for the opinion of the High Court Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was legally companypetent to direct the Income tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership.
When the statement of the case was being drawn up by the Tribunal, companynsel for the appellant suggested that the words appearing in para 6 of the statement, viz.,
No application was submitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner seeking his permission under Rule 2 c of the Indian Income tax Rules be deleted.
He also suggested that the companycluding words in the question referred to the High Court, viz.,
after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership be deleted.
With regard to the latter suggestion the Tribunal observed that they were unable to delete the same inasmuch as the words sought to be deleted were the companycluding words appearing in the Appellate Assistant, Commissioners order dated the 17th February, 1948 giving directions to the Income tax Officer and were words which were material to the question before the High Court.
With regard to the first suggestion companynsel for the appellant had stated that the appellant had submitted three applications to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner all dated 20th March, 1947 and that it would be wrong to state that numberapplication was submitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The allegation made by the appellant was properly investigated subsequently and the Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant did number appear to have put in the application dated 20th March, 1947 as alleged.
This being the position the Tribunal stated that numberchange in the statement of case was called for as suggested by the appellant.
It was on this statement of case by the Tribunal that the referred question came to be determined by the High Court.
Before the High Court the appellant had applied on the 27th November, 1950 that the three certified companyies of the three applications dated 20th March, 1947 made by the appellant to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with their originals should be sent for by the High Court from the Incomeax Tribunal and an order had been made accordingly.
he High Court was of the opinion that the Appelate Assistant Commissioner should have ordered egistration of the firm provided there was an application before him duly signed by all the partners.
As, however, there was numbersuch application, he companyld number have directed the Income tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand on the application and also in the partnership deed .
No such application signed by all the partners of the firm including Gokulchand was also available before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner when he heard the appeal on the 20th March 1947.
The appellant companytended that he had in fact filed in the office of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the said 20th March 1947 three applications one of which was such an application signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand and it was strenuously urged on his behalf that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed his order dated the 17th February 1948 ignoring the said application which had been filed in his office.
The reference was beard by the High Court on this statement of case prepared by the Tribunal and numbersteps were taken by the appellant before the High Court for having the statement of case amended by the Tribunal or for having a further statement of case submitted by the Tribunal recording therein the facts alleged by the appellant.
| 0 | train | 1956_98.txt |
RANJAN GOGOI, J Leave granted.
The order dated 23.9.2009 passed by the High Court of Guwahati in a Letters Patent Appeal No.
Writ Appeal No.
18/ SH /2005 as well as the order dated 16.6.2011 declining the review application filed by the appellant is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal.
In view of the limited numberice issued by this Court on 16.9.2011, at the very outset, we had heard learned companynsel for the parties as to whether the matter should be remanded to the High Court for reconsideration of the LPA, making it clear that in the event such a companyrse of action is companysidered to be number feasible or appropriate, the companytentions of the parties on the merits of the dispute would be companysidered by us.
To resolve the aforesaid question a brief recital of the companye facts will be required.
The respondent No.1 in the present appeal i.e. the Holy Mother of Aurobindo Ashram had filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging an order dated 8.11.1976 allotting two plots of lands measuring 0.69 acres i.e. 30,290 sq.
yards and 0.67 acres, i.e. 29,290 sq.yards in favour of the Young Women Christian Association and Young Men Christian Association impleaded as respondent Nos.
5 and 6 in the writ petition.
The case of the respondent writ petitioner before the High Court was to the effect that two plots of land numbered as plot 5 and 5A included within an estate known as Morven Estate was gifted to the respondent No.
1 way back in the year 1955.
The land in question was companyered by a lease agreement made in favour of the original owner Shri HL Hadow for a period of 99 years, w.e.f.
1.9.1865.
On expiry of the period of lease, i.e. 99 years, the Government of Meghlaya, though by order dated 2.1.1976, had companyveyed its decision to renew the lease for another period of 75 years in favour of the respondent No.1 writ petitioner formal orders in this regard were number forthcoming.
At the same time by order dated 8.11.1976 part of the property was allotted to the respondents in question.
Accordingly, the writ petition was filed challenging the aforesaid order dated 8.11.1976 and also seeking directions for execution renewal of the lease deed in favour of the respondent writ petitioner for a further period.
By order dated 3.10.2000 a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition the orders impugned were set aside and the State of Meghalaya was directed to issue formal orders for execution renewal of the lease deed in favour of the respondent No.
1 writ petitioner.
In paragraph 23 of the order of learned Single Judge it was however observed as Before parting with the record, it is made clear that the possession of the private respondents over a portion of the land shall number be disturbed in view of the specific averment made in the writ petition.
In view of the use of the expression private respondents in para 23 of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 3.10.2000, the appellant YMCA, it is companytended, had numbercause to be aggrieved by the said order.
However, numberwithstanding the directions companytained in para 23 numbered above, as interference with the possession of the land by the appellant was made Review Petition No.
4 SH of 2002 was filed before the High Court seeking suitable clarification of the observations companytained in para 23 of the order dated 3.10.2000.
By order dated 6.1.2004 the learned Single Judge clarified that the word private respondents mentioned in para 23 meant the respondent YWCA and numberother party.
The position having been so clarified by the order dated 6.1.2004 in Review Petition No.
4 SH of 2002, Writ Appeal No.18/2005 was filed by the appellant challenging both the orders passed by the learned Single Judge i.e. order dated 3.10.2000 in the main writ petition and the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in Review Petition No.
4 SH of 2002.
Along with the appeal an application for companydonation of delay of three years and 135 days that had occurred in respect of the main order dated 3.10.2000 as well as the delay of 61 days that had occurred with regard to the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the review petition was prayed for.
In the application for companydonation of delay it was stated by the appellant that it was number aggrieved by the order dated 3.10.2000 as it stood and it is only after the said order was clarified by the subsequent order dated 6.1.2004 that the cause of action to file the appeal had arisen.
18/2005 being against the main order dated 3.10.2000 as well as the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the Review Petition, in the fitness of things, the entire matter ought to be remanded to the High Court for due companysideration on merits.
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Hegde, C.J. This petition for awrit of.
habeas corpus was submitted by the petitioner Ram Rishi.
Anal from Jail.
At present, he is held in judicial custody in Central Jail, New Delhi.
He prays that he may be set at liberty as his detention, according to him, is an illlegal detention.
The petitioner was arrested on November 7,1966.
He says that he was arrested when he was attending a public meeting organised by Gau Raksha Mahabhian Samiti near Parliament Street Police Station.
His case is that at the time of his arrest, he was number informed as to the cause of his arrest number was he produced before any Magistrate at any time, but yet he is companytinued to be detained.
These acts of the respondents, according to him, amount to a companytravention of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
The application of the pentitioner came up before a bench of this Court on January 9, 1967.
On that day, numberice of the petition was order 4 The respondents made their return on January 17, 1967.
Sri C.L. Chhabra, Deputy Seperintendent of police.
Parliament Street police Station, New Delhi, filed an affidavit on behalf of the respondents.
Along with the teturn, numberdocuments were produced.
In fact, neither the records of the investigation number the remand orders said to have been made by the various Magistrates were produced before the Court till the respondents were specifically directed to do so.
Sri Chhabra swore in his affidavit that the detenu was arrested on November 7, 1966, while he was participating in the demonstration outside the Parliament house.
On November 20, 1966, it was said that the petitioner was again remanded to judicial custody by Sri R. N. Melhotra, Magistrate, 1st Class, Delhi.
Here again, the petitioner was number produced before the learned Magistrate either in his office or in his house, but the learned Magistrate went to the Central Jail, Tihar, wherein the petitioner was lodged evidently for granting him further remand In justification of his adopting such a companyrse, Sri Mehrotra cites the numberification of the Lt.
F. 2 216 /66 Home P dated November 1966.
Under that numberification, a companyy of which has been produced before me, the Lt.
New Delhi.by the Magistrates mentioned there in, to try cases under Section 188 1.P.C. against persons arrested in companynection with the recent demonstration against company slsughter.
Sri Mehrotra was number the trail Magistrate in this case.
Sri Anad was the Magistrate at New Delhi where the Concerned incidents took place.
It was number for the purpose of trying the petitioner, Sri Mehrotra had been to the Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi.
He had been there for granting a further remand to the petitioner.
At that time, numberease against the petitioner was pending before him, number even a first information report was pending before him.
The orignal remand reports were produced before me for my perusal.
As they were in Urdu, I got them translated into English and as desired by the learned Government Advocate, I ordered the return of the originals to him While retaining with me the English translations.
On numbere of those occasions, the police had cared to submit either the police diary or companyy of any entry therein along with the remand report.
| 1 | train | 1967_5.txt |
M. Ahmadi, J. Three appellants, Ajit Singh, Sukhdev Singh and Darshan Singh, have been companyvicted under Section 302/34, I.P.C. for causing the death of Gurmej Singh.
They have also been companyvicted under Sections 307, 324 and 323.
I.P.C., respectively with the aid of Section 34 for causing injuries to PW 5 Avtar Singh and PW 6 Mohan Singh.
Briefly stated, the prosecution case was that these three appellants along with Jai Ram were cultivating the land of Dilbagh Singh original accused No.
On October 30, 1977 at about 5.30 p.m., Bachan Singh, Avtar Singh.
Mohan Singh and deceased Gurmej Singh were near the samadhi of Baba Balak Nath when Dilbagh Singh arrived there.
The deceased, Gurmej Singh, is stated to have asked Dilbagh Singh why he had misbehaved with his sister.
On hearing this, Dilbagh Singh went to the house of Jai Ram and returned to the samadhi accompanied by the other four accused persons.
Jai Ram was armed with a sua, Ajit Singh was armed with a Gandasi while Sukhdev Singh and Darshan Singh were armed with Dangs.
Dilbagh Singh, it is stated, was armed with a knife.
Jai Ram raised a lalkara exhorting the others number to spare Gurmej Singh.
So saying Jai Ram is stated to have given a sua blow near the neck of Gurmej Singh.
However, as this part of the prosecution story was number found to be companysistent with the medical evidence Jai Ram came to be acquitted, the prosecution story further was that Dilbagh Singh gave two knife blows to Gurmej Singh on the left flank and in the abdomen on receipt whereof Gurmej Singh fell on the ground.
Prosecution witnesses.
Avtar Singh and Mohan Singh, tried to rescue Gurmej Singh whereupon Ajit Singh gave two Gandasi blows on the head of Avtar Singh and one Gandasi blow on the head of Mohan Singh.
Accused Darshan Singh gave six or seven blows with his Dang to Avtar Singh while accused Sukhdev Singh gave three or four Dang blows to Mohan Singh.
Thereafter, the assailants fled away with their weapons in the meantime, prosecution witnesses Gurmej Singh and Sewa Singh had also arrived and they too witnessed the incident.
The injured Gurmej Singh died shortly after the occurrence.
Dilbagh Singh has number questioned his companyviction.
The medical evidence referred to in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the Trial Courts judgment shows that the deceased had one incised wound on the upper part of the sternum 12 below the lower part of the neck, a stab wound on the left of the abdomen and another stab wound on the left side of the chest to the left of the nipple.
So far as Avtar Singh is companycerned he had two incised wounds and seven wounds on different parts of the body possible by a hard and blunt substance.
Mohan Singh had one incised wound over the surface of the head and three injuries possible by a hard and blunt substance.
The evidence of the prosecution witnesses against the appellant is that after Gurmej Singh was attacked when prosecution witnesses Avtar Singh and Mohan Singh went to his rescue, accused Ajit Singh gave two Gandasi blows on the head of Avtar Singh and one Gandasi blow on the head of Mohan Singh, accused Darshan Singh gave six to seven Dang blows to Avtar Singh while accused Sukhdev Singh gave three to four Dang blows to Mohan Singh.
The Trial Court placed reliance on the evidence of the said two injured witnesses as well as PW 5 Bachan Singh.
The High Court also accepted the evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses so far as the appellants are companycerned.
| 0 | train | 1991_120.txt |
The unfortunate background in which the aforesaid questions have arisen is the allegation that the Members of Parliament MPs indulged in unethical and companyrupt practices of taking monetary companysideration in relation to their functions as MPs.
A private channel had telecast a programme on 12th December, 2005 depicting 10 MPs of House of People Lok Sabha and one of Council of States Rajya Sabha accepting money, directly or through middleman, as companysideration for raising certain questions in the House or for otherwise espousing certain causes for those offering the lucre.
This led to extensive publicity in media.
The Presiding Officers of each Houses of Parliament instituted inquiries through separate Committees.
Another private channel telecast a programme on 19th December, 2005 alleging improper companyduct of another MP of Rajya Sabha in relation to the implementation of Member of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme MPLAD Scheme for short .
This incident was also referred to a Committee.
The Report of the inquiry companycluded, inter alia, that the evidence against the 10 members of Lok Sabha was incriminate the plea that the video footages were doctored morphed edited had numbermerit there was numbervalid reason for the Committee to doubt the authenticity of the video footage the allegations of acceptance of money by the said 10 members had been established which acts of acceptance of money had a direct companynection with the work of Parliament and companystituted such companyduct on their part as was unbecoming of Members of Parliament and also unethical and calling for strict action.
Almost a similar process was undertaken by the Rajya Sabha in respect of its Member.
The matter was referred to the Ethics Committee of the Rajya Sabha.
As per the majority Report, the Committee found that the Member had accepted money for tabling question in Rajya Sabha and the plea taken by him in defence was untenable in the light of evidence before it.
However, one Member while agreeing with other Members of the Committee as to the factual finding expressed opinion that in view, amongst others, of the divergent opinion regarding the law on the subject in judgments of different High Courts, to which companyfusion was added by the rules of procedure inasmuch as Rule 297 d would number provide for expulsion as one of the punishments, there was a need for clarity to rule out any margin of error and thus there was a necessity to seek opinion of this Court under Article 143 1 of the Constitution.
The Report of the Ethics Committee was adopted by Rajya Sabha companycurring with the recommendation of expulsion and on the same date i.e. 23rd December, 2005, a numberification numberifying expulsion of the Member from membership of Rajya Sabha with immediate effect was issued.
The case of petitioner in Writ Petition C No.129/2006 arises out of different, though similar set of circumstances.
The programme was telecast on 19th December, 2005.
On the same date numberification was issued by Rajya Sabha Secretariat.
By far, the advisory opinion given by a Constitution Bench companyprising of seven Judges of this companyrt in UP Assembly case is the most elaborate discourse on the subject of powers, privileges and immunities of the legislatures under the Constitution of India.
The matter had arisen out of a Reference by the President of India under Article 143 1 of the Constitution seeking opinion of this companyrt on certain issues, the genesis of which was traceable to certain unfortunate developments companycerning the legislative assembly of the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Lucknow Bench of the High Court at Allahabad.
The legislative assembly of Uttar Pradesh had companymitted one Keshav Singh, who was number one of its members, to prison for its companytempt.
The warrant of companymittal did number companytain the facts companystituting the alleged companytempt.
Keshav Singh moved a petition, inter alia, under Article 226 of the Constitution through his advocate challenging his companymittal as being in breach of his fundamental rights.
A division bench of the High Court sitting at Lucknow gave numberice to the Government companynsel and on the appointed day proceeded to hear the application for bail.
At that stage, the Government Counsel did number appear.
The division bench heard the application and ordered release of Keshav Singh on interim bail pending decision on his writ petition.
A full bench of the High Court admitted the writ petitions and ordered the stay of execution of the assemblys resolution against them.
Subsequently, the legislative assembly passed a clarificatory resolution modifying its earlier stand and asking the Judges and the advocate to appear before the House and offer their explanation.
It was against this backdrop that the President made a reference under Article 143 1 of the Constitution seeking opinion mainly as to the Constitutional relationship between the High Court and the State Legislature in matters of the powers and privileges of the latter.
The companytours of the main companytroversy were summarized by this companyrt at page 439 in the report in the following words 27.
On the same day, at about 6 P.M., the Honble Speaker made another statement on the issue, announcing the companystitution of an Enquiry Committee companysisting of five Parliamentarians.
Relevant portion of that statement is extracted below I have decided, which has been agreed to by the Hon.
Leaders, that all the companycerned Members will be asked to submit their individual statements explanations regarding the allegations made against them today on the TV Channel Aaj Tak before 10.30 a.m. on 14th December, 2005.
The statements explanations given by those members will be placed before the Enquiry Committee companysisting of the following Hon.
Members Shri Pawan Kumar Bansal Chairman Prof. Vijay Kumar Malhotra Md. Salim Prof. Ram Gopal Yadav Thiru C. Kuppusami The Committee is requested to give its Report by 4 p.m. on 21st December, 2005.
The Lok Sabha Secretariat sent companymunications dated 12.12.2005 to the ten members calling for their companyments in regard to the improper companyduct shown in the video footage.
They were also instructed number to attend the sitting of the House till the matter was finally decided.
The members submitted their responses and denied any wrong doing on their part.
The Speaker secured VCDs companytaining the video footage showing improper companyduct from the News Channel.
The ten members were supplied companyies thereof.
The Enquiry Committee examined on oath Shri Aniruddha Bahl, Ms. Suhasini Raj and Shri Kumar Badal of the Portal Cobrapost.
Com who had carried the sting operation.
The Committee viewed all the VCDs companytaining the relevant video footage as also the unedited raw video footage and perused the transcripts.
The ten members alleged that the video tapes were morphed manipulated, but, however, refused to view the video clippings in the presence of the Committee and point out the portions which according to them were morphed manipulated.
They were number given any opportunity to cross examine the sting operators, number granted companyies of the entire unedited video footage and other documents requested by them.
After companysidering the said material, the companymittee submitted its report dated 22.12.2005 to the Speaker.
It was tabled in the House on the same day.
The said report companytained the following findings The representatives of the Portal Cobrapost.com namely Shri Aniruddha Bahal, Ms. Suhasini Rajand and Shri Kumar Badal approached the members posing as representatives of the fictitious companypany, through a number of middlemen, some of whom were working as Private Secretaries Personal Assistants of the members companycerned.
They requested the members to raise questions in Lok Sabha and offered them money as companysideration.
Money was accepted by the members directly or through their Secretaries Assistants.
Acceptance of money by the ten members was thus established.
The plea put forth by the ten members that the video footages were morphed manipulated has numbermerit.
Their companyduct was unbecoming of members of Parliament, unethical and called for strict action.
Stern action also needs to be taken against the middlemen, touts and persons masquerading as Private Secretaries of members since they are primarily responsible for inducting members of Parliament into such activities.
The Committee was of the view that in the case of misconduct by the members or companytempt of the House by the members, the House can impose any of the following punishments i admonition ii reprimand iii withdrawal from the House iv suspension from the House v imprisonment and vi expulsion from the House.
The Committee companycluded that companytinuance of the ten persons as members of Lok Sabha was untenable and recommended their expulsion.
On 23.12.2005, the Leader of the House moved the following Motion in the House That this House having taken numbere of the Report of the Committee to inquire into the allegations of improper companyduct on the part of some members, companystituted on 12th December, 2005, accepts the finding of the Committee that the companyduct of the ten members of Lok Sabha namely, Shri Narendra Kumar Kushawaha, Shri Annasaheb M. K. Patil, Shri Manoj Kumar, Shri Y. G. Mahajan, Shri Pradeep Gandhi, Shri Suresh Chandel, Shri Ramsevak Singh, Shri Lal Chandra Kol, Shri Rajaram Pal and Shri Chandra Pratap Singh was unethical and unbecoming of members of Parliament and their companytinuance as members of Lok Sabha is untenable and resolves that they may be expelled from the membership of Lok Sabha.
An amendment to the Motion for referring the matter to the Privileges Committee, moved by a member Prof. Vijay Kumar Malhotra , was rejected.
After a debate, the Motion was adopted by voice vote.
As a companysequence on the same day, a numberification by the Lok Sabha Secretariat was issued numberifying that companysequent on the adoption of a Motion by the Lok Sabha on the 23rd December, 2005 expelling the ten members from the membership of the Lok Sabha, the ten members ceased to be members of the Lok Sabha, with effect from the 23rd December, 2005 afternoon .
Similar are the facts relating to Dr. Chhattrapal Singh Lodha, Member of Rajya Sabha.
On 12.12.2005, the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha made a statement in the House that the dignity and prestige of the House had suffered a blow by the incidents shown on the TV Channel, that it was necessary to take action to maintain and protect the integrity and credibility of the House, and that he was referring the episode to the Ethics Committee for its report.
On the same day, Ethics Committee held a meeting and took the view that the member had prima facie companytravened Part V of the Code of Conduct which provided Members should never expect or accept any fee, remuneration or benefit for a vote given or number given by them on the floor of the House, for introducing a Bill, for moving a resolution or desisting from moving a resolution, putting a question or abstaining from asking a question or participating in the deliberations of the house or a Parliamentary Committee.
It submitted a preliminary report recommending suspension pending final decision and giving of an opportunity to Dr. Lodha to explain his position.
The said report was accepted.
By letter dated 13.12.2005.
Dr. Lodha was required to give his companyments by 1 P.M. on 15.12.2005.
Thereafter the Committee gave a report holding that the member had companytravened Part V of the Code of Conduct and had acted in a manner which seriously impaired the dignity of the House and brought the whole institution of Parliamentary democracy into disrepute.
The Committee recommended Dr. Lodha to be expelled from the membership of the House.
On 23.12.2005, the Chairman of the Ethics Committee moved that its final report be accepted.
After debate, the House agreed with the recommendation in the report by voice vote.
The same member was also expelled from the Irish Parliament on 11th October 1703.
15th February 1711 Thomas Ridge Poole Having been companytracted to supply the fleet with 8,217 tuns of beer, supplied only 4,482 tuns from his brewery and paid companypensation at a discounted rate for the number supplied beer, thereby defrauding public funds.
12th January 1712 Robert Walpole Kings Lynn Corruption while Secretary at War.
Forage companytracts he negotiated stipulated payments to Robert Mann, a relation of Walpoles, but Walpole signed for them and therefore received the money.
19th February 1712 Rt.
Adam de Cardonnel Southampton While Secretary to the Duke of Marlborough, he received an annual gratuity of 500 gold ducats from Sir Solomon de Medina, an army bread companytractor.
18th March 1714 Sir Richard Steele Stockbridge Seditious libel.
Published an article in The Guardian and a pamphlet called The Crisis exposing the governments support for French inaction on the demolition of Dunkirk demolition was required under the Treaty of Utrecht.
2nd February 1716 Thomas Forster Northumberland Participation in the 1715 Jacobite rebellion he was General of all the pretenders forces in England .
23rd March 1716 Lewis Pryse Cardiganshire Refused to attend the House to take oaths of loyalty after the Jacobite rebellion.
22nd June 1716 John Carnegie Forfarshire Participation in the 1715 Jacobite rebellion.
23rd January 1721 Jacob Sawbridge Cricklade Director of the South Sea Company.
28th January 1721 Sir Robert Chaplin, Bt.
Great Grimsby Director of the South Sea Company.
28th January 1721 Francis Eyles Devizes Director of the South Sea Company.
30th January 1721 Sir Theodore Janssen, Bt.
Yarmouth, Isle of Wight Director of the South Sea Company.
8th March 1721 Rt.
4th February 1725 Francis Elde Stafford Corrupt attempt to companypromise an election petition against him.
16th May 1726 John Ward Weymouth and Melcombe Regis Involved in a fraud against the estate of the late Duke of Buckingham companypelled to buy Alum from Wards Alum works, but which Ward kept and sold again to others.
30th March 1732 John Birch Weobley Fraudulent sale of the Derwentwater Estate escheated to the Crown by the Earl of Derwentwater, companyvicted of High Treason during the 1715 rebellion .
30th March 1732 Denis Bond Poole Fraudulent sale of the Derwentwater Estate escheated to the Crown by the Earl of Derwentwater, companyvicted of High Treason during the 1715 rebellion .
3rd April 1732 George Robinson Great Marlow Fraudulent use of the funds of the Charitable Corporation for speculation.
Diverted 356,000 of funds 200,000 of which was in shares of the Corporation into buying York Buildings Company stock, the profits from the sale of which were given to him.
3rd February 1769 John Wilkes Middlesex Previous companyviction for libel and blasphemy, and a further seditious libel in the Introduction to a letter to Daniel Ponton Chairman of Quarter Sessions at Lambeth in the St. Jamess Chronicle.
17th February 1769 John Wilkes Middlesex Returned despite his previous expulsion.
The House resolved that he was, and is, incapable of being elected a Member to serve in the present Parliament.
4th December 1783 Christopher Atkinson Hedon Convicted of perjury after swearing that accusations against him of fraud were untrue.
The accusations related to his dealings with the Victualling Board, and were in a letter printed in the General Advertiser on 31st January 1781.
2nd May 1796 John Fenton Cawthorne Lincoln Convicted by companyrt martial of fraud and embezzlement of the funds of the Westminster Regiment of the Middlesex Militia cashiered for companyduct unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman.
23rd May 1810 Joseph Hunt Queenborough Absconded to Lisbon after being found to have embezzled public funds as Treasurer of the Ordnance.
During his term he left a deficit of 93,296.
5th March 1812 Benjamin Walsh Wootton Bassett Convicted later pardoned of attempting to defraud Solicitor General Sir Thomas Plumer.
Plumer had given Walsh a draft of 22,000 with which to buy exchequer bills, but Walsh used it to play the lottery, and lost he then companyverted his remaining assets into American currency and set off for Falmouth to sail to America, but was brought back.
Walsh had been expelled by the Stock Exchange for gross and nefarious companyduct in 1809.
5th July 1814 Hon.
Andrew James Cochrane Grampound Convicted of companyspiracy to defraud circulated false rumours of the defeat and death of Napoleon Buonaparte in order to boost share prices absconded to France before sentence.
5th July 1814 Lord Cochrane Westminster Convicted of companyspiracy to defraud circulated false rumours of the defeat and death of Napoleon Buonaparte in order to boost share prices .
16th February 1857 James Sadleir Tipperary Absconded after arrest for fraudulent companyversion.
He had abstracted 250,000 of stock from the Tipperary Joint Stock Bank for his brothers use.
22nd February 1882 Charles Bradlaugh Northampton Contempt of orders of the House of Commons excluding him from the Parliamentary estate.
12th May 1891 Edmund Hope Verney Buckingham Convicted of procuring a girl under the age of 21 Miss Nellie Maud Baskett for an immoral purpose.
26th February 1892 Edward Samuel Wesley de Cobain Belfast, East Absconded to the United States of America after a warrant for his arrest on charges of companymission of acts of gross indecency was issued.
On 21st March 1893 he was companyvicted and sentenced to twelve months imprisonment with hard labour.
2nd March 1892 George Woodyatt Hastings Worcestershire, Eastern Convicted of fraudulent companyversion.
As a Trustee for property under the will of John Brown, appropriated to himself over 20,000 from the estate.
1st August 1922 Horatio William Bottomley Hackney, South Convicted of fraudulent companyversion.
For the first time, a limited right of freedom of speech was companyferred on the Members of Legislature by the Government of India Act, 1919 Section 67 .
By the Legislative Members Exemption Act, 1925, two parliamentary privileges were allowed to Members i exemption from jury service and ii freedom from arrest.
The Government of India Act, 1935 extended the privileges companyferred and immunities granted.
The Indian Independence Act, 1947 accorded sovereign legislative power on the Indian Dominion.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS The Constitution of India came into force from January 26, 1950.
Part V companytains the relevant provisions relating to the Union.
Whereas Chapters I and IV deal with the Executive and Judiciary Chapters II and III relate to Parliament.
Articles 79 to 88 provide for companystitution, companyposition, duration, etc.
of both the Houses and qualification of members, Articles 89 to 98 make provisions for election of Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chairman, Deputy Chairman and their salaries and allowances.
K filed a petition for habeas companypus by engaging S as his advocate and a Division Bench of two Judges of the High Court of Allahabad Lucknow Bench released him on bail.
The Assembly passed a resolution to take in custody K, S as also two Honble Judges of the High Court.
Both the Judges instituted a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad.
A Full Court on judicial side admitted the petition and granted stay against execution of warrant of arrest against Judges.
One of the questions referred to by the President related to Parliamentary privileges vis vis power of Court.
AIR 1954 All 319, the petitioner who was an elected representative of the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh wanted to move a motion in companynection with forcible removal by police of three teachers who were on hunger strike.
Permission was number granted by the Speaker.
The petitioner, however, companytinued to disturb proceedings of the House and by use of minimum force, he was removed from the House.
The Committee of Privileges companysidered the companyduct of the petitioner and resolved to suspend him.
The petitioner challenged the resolution in the High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Both the Judges forming the Division Bench ordered dismissal of the petition by recording separate reasons.
His Lordship further held that the House is the sole Judge of its own privileges.
In Yeshwant Rao Meghawale v. Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Ors.,
AIR 1967 MP 95, the petitioner obstructed the proceedings in the House, jumped on the dias and assaulted the Deputy Speaker.
A motion of expulsion of the petitioner was moved and was passed.
So far as the Committee companystituted by the Lok Sabha is companycerned, it stated IV.
Findings and Conclusions The Committee viewed the VCDs companyprising the relevant video footage aired on the Aaj Tak TV Channel on 12 December, 2005, perused the transcripts thereof, companysidered the written statements submitted by each of the said ten members and their oral evidence and also the oral evidence of Shri Aniruddha Bahal, Kumar Badal and Ms. Sushasini Raj of Cobrapost.
Com who companyducted the Operation Duryodhan.
The Committee numbere that the companycerned representatives of the Portal Cobrapost.
Com namely Shri Aniruddha Bahal, Ms. Suhasini Raj and Shri Kumar Badal approached the members posing as representatives of a fictitious companypany, through a number of middlemen, some of whom were also working as Private Secretaries Personal Assistants of the members companycerned.
They requested the members to raise questions in Lok Sabha and offered them money as a companysideration thereof.
Money was accepted by the members directly and also through their Private Secretaries.
They deposed on oath that in the money sequences shown on TV Channel Aaj Tak there was numbermisrepresentation.
They have also given to the Committee the raw footage companyering the situation before and after the scene in question.
While the Aaj Tak clippings have gone through video cleaning and sound enhancement, companyresponding thereto are extended versions of unedited raw footage of the tapes to make it apparent that numberhing had been misrepresented.
Com and Aaj Tak.
The Committee has also viewed the video tapes and heard the audio transcripts more than once.
After taking all factors into companysideration, the overwhelming and clinching evidence that the member has, in fact, companytravened para 5 of the companye of companyduct for members of the Rajya Sabha and having companysidered the whole matter in depth, the companymittee, with great sadness, has companye to the companyclusion that the member has acted in a manner which has seriously impaired the dignity of the house and brought the whole institution of parliamentary democracy into disrepute.
The Committee therefore recommend that Dr. Chhattrapal Singh Lodha be expelled from the membership of the House as his companyduct is derogatory to the dignity of the House and inconsistent with the companye of companyduct which has been adopted by the House.
The Committee thus recommended expulsion of Dr. Lodha.
A numberification was issued on December 23, 2005 numberifying that Dr. Lodha had ceased to be a member of Rajya Sabha with effect from afternoon of December 23, 2005.
| 0 | train | 2007_44.txt |
CHANDRAMAULI KR.
PRASAD, J. The State of Delhi, aggrieved by the order dated 28th of November, 2011 passed by the Delhi High Court in Criminal M.C. No.
2540 of 2011, whereby it had directed for release of the vehicle bearing Registration No.
HR 56 7290 to the registered owner on security, has preferred this special leave petition.
Leave granted.
Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving rise to the present appeal are that while companystables Raghmender Singh and Sunil were on night patrolling duty at Kirari Nithari turn on 17th of April, 2011, they saw a vehicle companying from the side of the Nithari Village.
Constable Raghmender Singh signalled the driver to stop the vehicle, but he did number accede to his companymand and turned the vehicle into the Prem Nagar Extension Lane.
Both the companystables chased the vehicle on their motorcycle and the driver of the vehicle, apprehending that he would be caught, left the vehicle and ran away from the place, taking advantage of the darkness.
The vehicle abandoned by the driver was Cruiser Force and had registration No.
HR 56 7290.
After opening of the windows of the vehicle, 27 Cartons, each companytaining 12 bottles of 750 ml.
Mashaledar companyntry made liquor and 20 Cartons, each companytaining 48 quarters of Besto Whisky were found inside the vehicle.
All the 47 Cartons were embossed with Sale in Haryana only.
Constable Raghmender Singh gave a report to the police and on that basis FIR No.
112 of 2011 dated 17.04.2011 was registered at Aman Vihar Police Station under Section 33 a and Section 58 of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009.
During the companyrse of investigation, Narender, respondent herein, claiming to be the owner of the vehicle, filed an application for its release on security, before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini, who, by his order dated 24th of May, 2011 rejected the same, inter alia, holding that he has numberpower to release the vehicle seized in companynection with the offence under the Delhi Excise Act.
The respondent again filed an application for the same relief i.e. for release of the vehicle on security before the Metropolitan Magistrate but the said application also met with the same fate.
By order dated 14th of July, 2011, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate declined to pass the order for release, inter alia, observing that any order directing for release of the vehicle on security would amount to review of the order dated 24th of May, 2011, which power the companyrt did number possess.
Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed an application before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure hereinafter referred to as the Code , assailing the order dated 24th May, 2011 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate.
The High Court, by its impugned order dated 28th of November, 2011 directed the vehicle to be released in favour of the registered owner on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Metropolitan Magistrate.
While doing so, the High Court has observed as follows The vehicle in question was seized by the Police and number companyfiscated and if that was so, Section 58, Delhi Excise Act would number apply with regard to the vehicle in question and the procedure that was to be followed regarding the vehicle was to be found in Chapter VI of Delhi Excise Act and also Section 451, Cr.
P.C Mr. Mohan Jain, Additional Solicitor General appears on behalf of the appellant whereas the respondent is represented by Mr. Harish Pandey.
| 1 | train | 2014_30.txt |
criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 167 of 1968.
appeal from the judgment and order dated january 18 1968 of the allahabad high companyrt in criminal revision number 1482 of 1966.
p. rana for the appellant.
bashir ahmed and s. shaukat hussain for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by dua j. the state of u.p.
has appealed to this companyrt on certificate of fitness granted by the allahabad high companyrt from that companyrts order dated january 18 1968 acquitting the respondent of an offence punishable under s. 14 of the foreigners act act number 31 of 1946 .
on july 11 1963 the respondent was arrested for over staying in india as a foreigner and on march 6 1965 he was charged by the city magistrate varanasi with the commission of an offence punishable under s. 14 of the foreigners act act number 31 of 1946 .
the charge reads i d. s. sharma city magistrate varanasi hereby charge you rahmatullah as follows that you being a pakistani citizen entered into india on 1 4 55 on pakistani passport number 283772 dated 15 3 55 and indian visa number 16326 category c dated 22 3 55 and got your extension to stay in india up to 25 5 56 after which date you are overstaying in india illegally without any passport and visa and thereby companymitted an offence punishable u s 14 of foreigners act within my companynizance and hereby i direct you to be tried on the said charge by me.
thereafter the respondent went underground and has since been residing in india illegally.
he was treated after several years and was arrested on july 11 1963.
the respondent pleaded in defence that though he had entered india on a pakistani passport he was number a pakistani national.
on the companytrary he claimed to be an indian citizen and therefore rightfully living in india.
according to him he had been born in india of indian parents in 1932 and was an indian citizen under the companystitution.
during the pendency of the present criminal proceedings an inquiry was made by the central government under s. 9 2 of the citizenship act read with r. 30 of the citizenship rules 1956 and by means of an order dated numberember 5 1964 it was determined that the respondent had acquired citizenship of pakistan after january 26 1950 and before march 15 1955.
march 15 1955 was apparently fixed because on that date the respondent had secured his pakistani passport.
the companystitution when it 1 1962 supp.
3 s. c. r. 233 2 1962 1 s. c. r. 737.
came into force and there being numberdetention by the central government that he had lost his nationality thereafter.
the order of the high companyrt acquitting him was upheld.
in shuja ud din v. the union of india and anumberher 1 this court speaking through gajendragadkar j. as he then was said it is number well settled that the question as to whether a person who was a citizen of this country on january 26 1950 has lost his citizenship thereafter has to be determined under the provisions of section 9 of the citizenship act 1955 number lvii of 1955 .
there is also numberdoubt that this question has to be decided by the central government as provided by rule 30 of the rules framed under the citizenship act in 1956.
28 1962 that this question has to be determined by the central government before a person who was a citizen of india on january 26 1950 could be deported on the ground that he has lost his citizenship rights thereafter under s. 9 of the citizenship act.
unless the central government decides this question such a person cannumber be treated as a foreigner and cannumber be deported from the territories of india.
in abdul sattar haji ibrahim patel v. the state of gujarat 2 gajendragadkar c. j. speaking for a bench of five judges approved the decisions in the cases of izhar ahmed khan 3 and syed mohd.
khan 4 it being emphasized that the decision of the government of india is a companydition precedent to the prosecution by the state of any person on the basis that he has lost his citizenship of india and has acquired that of a foreign companyntry.
that an inquiry under s. 9 of the citizenship act can only be held by the central government was again reaffirmed by this companyrt in mohd.
ayub khan v. companymissioner of police madras 5 .
in view of these decisions it seems to us to be obvious that till the central government determined the question of the respondent having acquired pakistan nationality and had thereby c. a. number 294 of 1962 decided on oct.
30 1962.
a. number 153 of 1961 decided on feb.
| 0 | dev | 1971_570.txt |
WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.
14573 OF 1996 J U D G M E N T VENKATASWAMI, J. These two appeals by special leave arise out of one order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, dated 23.196 made in O.A. No.
1744 of 1993.
Civil Appeal No.
1477/96 was preferred by the Union of India and Civil Appeal No.
14573/96 was filed by the aggrieved individuals against one and same order of the Central Administrative Tribunal.
Shortly put the facts leading to the filing of O.A.No.
1744/93 before the Tribunal are the following The first appellant and the members of the second appellant were all originally appointed as ad hoc Group B Doctors under the Central Health Services Rules, 1963 between the years 1968 to 1977.
After the first year of service those doctors companytinued in service in companysultation with the Union Public Service Rules, 1982 came into force and under those Rules the posts were classified as Medical Officers, Senior Medical Officers and Chief Medical Officers.
All these Medical Officers were brought under one Group, Namely, Group A. Group B was totally abolished.
In spite of the appellants making repeated representations for regularities, which made them to move the Delhi High Court in W.P. No.
1144/83 for regularisation.
The Delhi High Court dismissed the Writ Petition.
However, this Court granted leave and t he appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No.
3519/84.
At the instance of Union of India, this Court by an order dated 14.7.86 gave liberty to the Government of India to request the Union Public Service Commission to companyduct a special selection under Rule 8 2 of the 1982 Rules for selection regularisation of the appellants only from their original dates of appointments.
Some of the appellants, who were appointed by the Union Public Service Commission on a regular basis as fresh entrants, moved this Court in Writ Petition No.
1228/86 seeking direction from this Court that their services rendered on ad hoc basis to be companynted .
This Court on 9.4.87 disposed of Civil Appeal No.3519/94 and Writ Petition No.
A Review Petition filed by the Union of India was dismissed by this Court on 15.9.87.
In spite of this Courts order, the Union of India did number give effect to the orders of this companyrt, which made the appellants to move this Court in Contempt Petition in CMP No.
8076/88.
The Contempt Petition was ultimately disposed of by this Court on 29.10.81 issuing certain directions, which read as follows Each of the appellants will be treated as regularised in Group A of the Central Health Service From 1.1.1973 or the date of his first initial appointment in the service though as ad hoc Group B doctor , whichever is later.
| 1 | train | 1998_149.txt |
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No.
17 of 1968.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 17, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No.
668 of 1967.
Bhutani and Urmila Kapur, for the appellant.
R. L. Iyengar and P. C. Bhartari, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. At all material times respondent I had her office premises in Nawab Building, Fort, Bombay, which companysisted of two cabins.
On July 10, 1964, she entered into an agreement with the appellant permitting him, to occupy one of the cabins on leave and licence for a period of eleven months.
On June 9, 1965, the agreement was extended for a period of eleven months.
The appellants case was that it was further extended for another eleven months as from May 10, 1966 and respondent 1 accordingly accepted Rs.
450 as companypensation for May 1966.
Respondent I thereafter demanded higher companypensation which he refused to pay and thereupon respondent 1 refused to execute the renewal and threatened to eject him forcibly if he did number vacate.
His case further was that in the morning of June 11, 1966 respondent 1 broke open the staple of the cabin, removed the door from its hinges, removed all his belongings lying in the cabin and dumped them in the passage outside.
She then handed over possession of the cabin to respondents 2 and 3 purporting to do so under an agreement of licence dated June 1, 1966.
When he went to the cabin he found the cabin occupied by respondents 2 and 3.
On his asking them to place back his belongings and to restore possession to him, the respondents threatened him with dire companysequences.
He, therefore, went to the police station but the police refused to take action and only recorded his N.C. companyplaint.
From the police station he and his friend, Mahomed Salim returned to the cabin when, on their demanding possession of the cabin, the respondents attacked them.
In the companyrse of that attack, the said Salim received injuries.
He and the said Salim once again went to the police station but the police again refused to take action and recorded another N.C. companyplaint and sent Salim to the hospital for examination.
Due to the persistent refusal by the police to help him to get back the cabin, the appellant approached higher authorities in companysequence of which the police at last recorded a case of assault against respondent 1.
They then arrested respondent 1 but released her on bail.
Respondent 1, however, kept some persons near the cabin to prevent the appellant from recovering possession.
There was, therefore, every likelihood of a breach of the peace had he gone to the cabin to regain possession.
In these circumstances he filed an application before the Additional Chief Presidency Magistrate under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Magistrate then directed the parties to file affidavits and to adduce such further evidence as they desired.
Accordingly, the parties filed affidavits of various persons who had their offices in the same building.
The appellant, besides other affidavits, also filed an affidavit of one Nathani, the Manager of his companypany at whose instance, it was the case of respondent 1, the appellant had agreed to hand over and actually did hand over possession of the cabin in the morning of June 11, 1966.
That affidavit, however, did number support respondent 1 but, on the companytrary, denied that Nathani had agreed that the appellant companyld vacate or that the appellant at his instance had agreed to do so.
In her written.
statement, respondent I denied that the said licence was renewed a second time in May 1966.
Her case was that at the request of the appellant she had permitted him to companytinue in possession, till May 1966 on his promising to vacate by the end of that month, that on June, 11, 1966, the appellant vacated the cabin, kept his belongings in the passage and thereupon she permitted respondents 2 and 3 to occupy it as, relying on the appellants promise that he would vacate by the end of May 1966, she had already entered into an agreement of licence on June 1, 1966 with respondent She denied that any incident, as alleged by the appellant, had occurred on that day or that the appellant or the said Salim was assaulted by her or by respondent 2 or 3.
She, therefore, denied that any dispute existed on that day or that there was any likelihood of a breach of the peace.
Respondents 2 and 3 also filed their written statements on the lines taken by respondent 1.
But after filing them, they did number participate any more in the proceedings as they had since then vacated the said cabin.
Possession, therefore, of the cabin since then remained with respondent 1.
Respondent 1 in the meantime filed a suit in the City Civil Court and took out a numberice of motion for restraining the appellant from, interfering with her possession of the cabin.
The Court dismissed the numberice of motion refusing to rely on the said agreement.
In the proceedings before the Magistrate the main question was whether the appellant was in actual possession on June 11, 1966 and whether he was forcibly and worngfully dispossessed by respondent 1 or whether he had vacated and surrendered the cabin to respondent 1.
After companysidering the affidavits and the evidence led by the parties, the Magistrate reached the following findings.
1 that respondent 1 started harassing the appellant from the beginning of June 1966 and gave threats to forcibly dispossess him if he did number vacate 2 that the appellants version that the respondents had forcibly and wrongfully taken possession of the cabin in the morning of June 11, 1966 was true and 3 that when the appellant and the said Salim went to the cabin, the respondents manhandled them as a result of which Salim received injuries.
On these findings, he held that the appellant was in actual possession on June 11, 1966 and that under the second proviso to s. 145 4 , though he had been dispossessed on June 1 1, he must be deemed to be in possession on June 20, 1966 when the Magistrate passed his preliminary order.
By his final order dated June 22, 1967 passed under sub s. 6 , the Magistrate directed restoration of possession to the appellant till he would be evicted in due companyrse of law and prohibited the respondents from interferring with his possession till then.
In the revision before the High Court, the respondents raised two companytentions 1 that the Magistrate, in entertaining the said application and passing the said preliminary order,.
misconceived the scope of proceedings under s. 145, and 2 that he had numberjurisdiction to pass the said preliminary order as in the events that had happened there was numberexisting dispute likely to result in a breach of the peace. ,
The High Court accepted these companytentions .and set aside the order of the Magistrate.
In doing so, it observed that the object of s. 145 was to, preserve peace and to provide a speedy remedy against a likely breach of peace where there is an existing dispute regarding possession of an immovable property until such dispute is adjudicated upon by a proper tribunal.
The High Court then observed that assuming that the appellant was forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed and the said Salim was assaulted by respondent 1 and her men, it companyld number even then necessarily mean that there was an existing dispute relating to possession of the cabin which was likely to cause breach of peace on June 20, 1966 when the Magistrate passed his preliminary order.
The acts of respondent I might companystitute an offence, for which the appellant had filed a companyplaint under s. 341 of the Penal Code and the police had arrested respondent 1.
and released her on bail, In the light of these facts the Magistrate ought to have held that on that day there did number any longer exist any dispute regarding possession of the said cabin which was likely to lead to a breach of the peace.
The High Court also numbered that respondent I had placed respondent 3 in possession, that respondent 3 had remained in possession for nearly a year by the time the Magistrate passed his final order, that the final order would, therefore, affect his vested rights, and that this fact companypled with the fact of the appellants companyplaint under s. 341 of the Penal Code on June 13, 1966 ought to have been companysidered by the Magistrate before passing the final order.
As aforesaid, the High Court set aside the Magistrates order whereupon the appellant obtained special leave and filed this appeal challenging the companyrectness of the High Courts order.
| 1 | train | 1968_23.txt |
CHANDRAMAULI KR.
PRASAD, J. Appellant was put on trial for offence under Sections 366, 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter referred to as the Penal Code .
The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 29th of May, 2007 passed in Sessions Trial No.220 of 2004 arising out of the Manigachi S. Case No.13 of 2004 held the appellant guilty of all the charges and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for offence under Section 366 of the Penal Code, life imprisonment under Section 376 of the Penal Code, rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for offence under Section 201 of the Penal Code and death penalty for offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code.
The trial companyrt made Reference to the High Court for companyfirmation of the death sentence which led to registration of Death Reference No.
6 of 2007.
Appellant aggrieved by his companyviction and sentence also preferred appeal which was registered as Criminal Appeal DB No.
963 of 2007.
Both, the reference and appeal were heard together and by a companymon judgment dated 19th of August, 2008, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court accepted the reference and dismissed the appeal.
On 28th of September, 2004, the appellant gave Rs.2/ to the niece of the informant, namely, Kalyani Kumari aged about 8 years to bring betel from a shop at Hanuman Chowk.
After some time, appellant left the work, went to the Hanuman Chowk and got seated Kalyani Kumari on the carrier of his bicycle.
PW 5 Maya Devi and other women heard the companyversation which the appellant was having with Kalyani Kumari.
Appellant, according to women folk, asked Kalyani Kumari as to where her father lives to which she replied that he stays at Bombay.
A search was made when Kalyani Kumari did number return home for sometime and in the companyrse thereof, it surfaced that she was seen going on a bicycle with a man.
The informant Sharwan Kumar Jha PW 10 and his family members set out in search of the girl and while they were returning from Bahera saw the appellant going towards Bahera.
Appellant tried to escape but was apprehended and on enquiry he showed ignorance about the girl.
Appellant was brought to the residence of the informant where PW 5 Maya Devi disclosed that she had seen the appellant who had taken away Kalyani Kumari on his bicycle.
Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the Police Station and handed over to the officer in charge with a written report, for taking suitable action, alleging that the appellant had kidnapped Kalyani Kumari.
On the basis of the aforesaid information, a case was registered and PW 11 Hari Ram, the officer in charge took up the investigation.
During the companyrse of investigation, the appellant gave a companyfessional statement in the presence of the witnessess Amar Kishore Jha PW 2 and Devi Kant Jha PW 8 and other villagers.
The appellant companyfessed his guilt and disclosed the place where he had raped and killed Kalyani Kumari.
The statement given by the appellant led to the recovery of the dead body of Kalyani Kumari from a field.
She was identified by the informant and other villagers.
The dead body of Kalyani Kumari had injury on the private parts, her nails were munched and there were marks of bruises all over the body.
The Inquest Report was prepared and the dead body was sent for post mortem examination which was companyducted by PW 4 Dr. Prafulla Kumar Das, a Tutor in the department of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology at Darbhanga Medical College and Hospital.
Police, after usual investigation, submitted charge sheet against the appellant for kidnapping, raping and killing a minor girl and causing disappearance of evidence of offence.
Appellant was ultimately companymitted to the Court of Sessions to face the trial, where charges under Sections 366, 376, 302 and 201 of the IPC were framed against him.
Appellant denied to have companymitted any offence and claimed to be tried.
The prosecution in order to bring home the charge has examined altogether 11 witnesses besides a large number of documentary evidence, including the First Information Report, the Post mortem Report and the Inquest Report, were exhibited.
The plea of the appellant in the statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is denial simplicitor and false implication.
However, numberdefence witness has been examined.
There is numbereye witness to the occurrence and the prosecution sought to bring home the charge on the basis of the circumstantial evidence.
Those are Appellant was working as Mason in the House of Devi Kant Jha PW 8 Appellant sent the deceased to the betel shop to get betel Appellant proceeded towards the betel shop few minutes after the deceased left Appellant was last seen with the deceased going together on a bicycle and Appellants companyfession leading to the recovery of dead body from a field.
All these circumstances led the trial Court to hold that the chain is companyplete which points towards the guilt of the appellant and accordingly companyvicted him as above.
In the opinion of the trial companyrt, the case fell in category of the rarest of the rare cases and accordingly it inflicted the death penalty.
The High Court companycurred with the finding of the trial companyrt and affirmed the companyviction and while doing so, it observed as follows as per disclosure made by the appellant and on his disclosure the dead body was recovered from a lonely place surrounded and companycealed by standing crops of wheat and rahar.
Hence the part of the companyfession made by appellant which is disclosure regarding the place where the dead body companyld be found, is clearly admissible as evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Since the rape and murder on the victim girl has been proved by medical evidence and since such offences were companymitted against the victim soon after her kidnapping by the appellant, a presumption arises against the appellant that he companymitted rape and murder of the victim and tried to companyceal the evidence of such offence by hiding the body at a lonely place companycealed by standing crops.
| 0 | train | 2011_1178.txt |
G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I. Leave granted.
In the present case, the trial companyrt had acquitted the appellant accused in a case related to the dishonour of a cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Hereinafter Act.
This finding of acquittal had been made by the Addl.
JMFC at Ranebennur, Karnataka in Criminal Case No.
993/2001, by way of a judgment dated 30 5 2005.
75,000, failing which he would have to undergo three months simple imprisonment S.I. Aggrieved by this final order passed by the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No.
1367/2005 dated 26 10 2005, the appellant accused has approached this Court by way of a petition seeking special leave to appeal.
The said companystruction was companypleted on 20 10 1998 and this indicates that the parties were well acquainted with each other.
As per the respondent complainant, the chain of facts unfolded in the following manner.
| 0 | train | 2010_1266.txt |
RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. A petition was filed in public interest in the Patna High Court being W.J.C. No.
1311 of 2003 by Bihar Vyavsayik Sangharsh Morcha and another raising several issues relating to law and order problem in the State of Bihar.
The State of Bihar, the Director General of Police of Bihar and others were made party respondents.
The issues raised inter alia were whether the respondents were duty bound to provide safe and healthy atmosphere for the proper development of the State or number and whether the inaction of the respondents was violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution of India.
The petitioner inter alia sought direction to the respondents to take measures to stop exploitation of shopkeepers, dealers, artisans, labourers and industrial units by officers and police personnel.
The High Court issued numberices to the respondents pursuant to which they filed affidavits.
On 14/08/2003 the High Court directed the Director General of Police to make a list of officers from the Station House Officers upto the Additional Director General of Police, of those who have remained in their station for more than four years.
Relevant paragraphs from the High Courts order companyld be quoted The companyrt suggests the following measures as an ad interim exercise Let the Director General Police make out a list of officers from the Station House Officer upto the Additional Director General of Police, of those who have remained in their station for more than four years.
This dossier is to be supported with information from service record as to which officer throughout their career has remained at which station and for how long.
Officers who have remained at one station for over four years must see a posting out within six weeks from today.
In December, 2003, the appellant, who was holding the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation Department CID , Bihar, filed an intervention application being I.A.No.5588 of 2003.
The appellant claimed in the application that he was the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh, a service association of members of Bihar Police Service.
He stated in the application that the transfers and postings of the officers of Bihar Police Service were done arbitrarily in violation of guiding principles framed by the Home Department of Government of Bihar.
The appellant referred to a Writ Application filed by him being C.W.J.C. No.12225 of 1999 against the State of Bihar for an order directing the respondents to implement the said guiding principles.
He stated that the said writ application has been pending in the High Court for last four years during which the government has tried to victimize him mala fide.
He further stated that his application should be heard along with the C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.
He, therefore, prayed that he may be impleaded in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.
Admittedly, the appellant is posted at Patna for several years.
It is clear from several orders that the High Court has passed in this matter that while dealing with the question of law and order situation in Bihar, the High Court was looking into the State Governments policy of postings and transfer of police officers, obviously because that has a direct bearing on efficiency and rectitude of the police officers.
The High Court even recorded the statement of the Advocate General that certain transfers of police officers are being effected.
The appellant was unhappy and disturbed about the task undertaken by the High Court.
This is evident from the first paragraph of his intervention application where he has referred to the order passed by the High Court directing the respondents to submit a list of officers who have number been removed from their station for more than four years.
It is this that made him intervene in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.
The appellant wanted his writ application pending in the Patna High Court to be heard with C.W.J.C. No.
The High Court has further observed that the appellant baited the companyrt.
He wanted his writ application to be companysidered out of turn on the ground that it was companycerning transfers and postings of police officers.
The High Court, therefore, called for the record, perused the appellants application and found out that it mainly related to his own transfer.
The writ petitioners disrupted the proceedings by using very offensive, intemperate and abusive language at a high pitch.
One of the petitioners stated that the Judges should be jailed by initiating proceedings against them and threw footwear at the Judges.
The petitioners stood by what they had said and done in the Court.
| 0 | train | 2014_136.txt |
Dipak Misra, J. In this appeal, by special leave, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has called in question the legal propriety of the judgment and order passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.
35 and 36 of 2009 whereby the High Court has companyverted the companyviction recorded by the learned trial Judge holding the accused respondents guilty of the offence punishable under Section 20 b ii C of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for brevity, the NDPS Act and sentencing each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of 12 years and further to pay a fine of Rs.2 lakhs each and in case of default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for period of one year to one under Section 8 read with Section 20 b ii B of the NDPS Act and restricted the period of custody to the period already undergone, that is, slightly more than seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/ each with a modified default clause.
The facts which are necessary to be stated are that the accused respondents were chargesheeted under Section 8 read with Section 20 of the NDPS Act and accordingly, they were sent up for trial.
Accused persons denied the accusations and claimed trial.
The prosecution to substantiate its stand examined number of witnesses and brought in series of documents in evidence.
The learned trial Judge taking numbere of the fact that Mushtaq Ahmad, the first respondent and Gulzar Ahmad, the second respondent were in possession of 6 kg.
200 gms and 4 kgs.
of charas respectively and the prosecution had been able to establish the same, treated the companytraband article as companymercial quantity and accordingly found them guilty for the offence punishable under Section 20 b ii C of the NDPS Act and eventually companysidering the gravity of the offence and the proliferating and devastating menace the drugs have been able to create in the society and keeping in view the need for eradication, sentenced each of them as has been mentioned hereinabove.
The aforesaid judgment of companyviction and order of sentence companystrained the respondents accused to prefer Criminal Appeal Nos.
35 and 36 of 2009 and the Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Jammu heard both the appeals together.
The Division Bench addressed to various aspects and taking into companysideration the law laid down in Amar Singh Ramaji Bhai Barot v. State of Gujarat1 and Samiullah v. Superintendent Narcotic Control Bureau2, and E. Micheal Raj v. Intelligence Officer Narcotic Control Bureau3 came to hold that the narcotic drug proved to have been recovered from the possession of the accused persons was of intermediate quantity in terms of Section 2 viia of the NDPS Act read with S.O. 1055 E dated 19.1.2001 and the addition of Note 3 after Note 4 did number change the companyplexion of the matter for the reason that the alleged recovery had been made way back on 5.4.2004, that is, more than five years prior to the amendment had companye in force and further there was numberallegation that there were more than one narcotic drugs or isomers, esters, ethers and salts of the narcotic drug detected in the recovered substance.
In Amar Singh Ramaji Bhai Barot supra the appellant was found carrying a black packet which companytained black companyour liquid substance that smelled like opium.
The police officer weighed the said substance recovered from him and found the weight to be 920 gms.
4.250 kg of a grey companyoured substance suspected to be a drug, was recovered from the other accused who had already died.
Out of the 920 gms opium recovered from the appellant, samples were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory which opined that substance which had been sent was opium companytaining 2.8 anhydride morphine and also pieces of poppy flowers posedoda .
The appeal preferred by the other accused abated as he expired during the pendency of the appeal and the appeal of the Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot was dismissed.
| 1 | train | 2015_444.txt |
Arun Mishra, J. Leave granted.
The plaintiff is in appeal before us aggrieved by reversal of the judgment and decree of first appellate Court by the High Court in Second Appeal and restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff filed a suit before the trial Court for possession of disputed property and mesne profits based upon the title.
It was averred in the plaint that Veeraiah and Balaiah were sons of late Rajaiah.
Both the sons predeceased their father Rajaiah.
Plaintiff is son of Veeraiah and Yashoda is wife of the said late Balaiah.
After the death of Rajaiah, the property was given as widows estate to Yashoda.
It was to be reverted to the plaintiff after the death of Yashoda.
Yashoda enjoyed the property in her lifetime.
However, after her death, Smt.
Gandla Buchamma, surviving sister of late Balaiah succeeded to the property and sold it to plaintiff vide registered sale deed dated 25.4.1981 and also delivered the possession.
Thereafter on 12.6.1981 the defendants forcibly evicted the plaintiff from the property.
The defendants in their written statements companytended that Ballaiah was the absolute owner of the property and after his death Yashoda became the absolute owner of the property.
She was in possession of the property.
It was number to be reverted back to the plaintiff after the death of Yashoda.
Yashoda after death of her husband, as per authority given by her late husband, had adopted defendant number 3 Sarojana when she was aged 12 years and thereafter she resided in the house of Yashoda as her daughter.
Thus, Buchamma did number succeed to the property.
The adopted daughter defendant number 3 succeeded to property by inheritance.
Defendants had numberknowledge of the registered sale deed.
Buchamma was number in possession and had numberauthority to sell the property to the plaintiff.
The trial Court framed the issue as to the ownership of Yashoda and also on the question of factum of adoption of defendant number 3 on 18.2.1959 and whether she became the owner by virtue of adoption after the death of Yashoda.
A specific issue was also framed by the trial Court on the question whether on death of Yashoda, Buchamma, who is the surviving sister of Yashodas late husband Balaiah, became heir and owner of the said property and whether the plaintiff had acquired the title to the suit property vide registered sale deed dated 25.4.1981executed by Buchamma in favour of the plaintiff.
The trial Court while dismissing the suit inter alia found that passing of companysideration has number been proved under the sale deed and that it was a numberinal document.
The plaintiff ought to have filed suit for declaration of title.
Defendant number 3 was cultivating the suit land from the date of the death of Yashoda since 1981.
However, it has number been proved that defendant number 3 was adopted daughter of late Yashoda.
The factum of adoption has number been established.
The possession had number been delivered by Buchamma to the plaintiff on the date of the execution of the sale deed i.e. 25.4.1981.
The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case, number on the weaknesses of the defendants.
The trial Court also found that it was number established that Buchamma was the sole surviving sister of late Balaiah.
On first appeal being preferred into the Court of 1st Additional District Judge, Karimnagar, it allowed the appeal and the suit of the plaintiff had been decreed.
It found that the execution of the sale deed has been established.
Yashoda was the absolute owner in possession of the property in her lifetime.
There was numberClass I heir of deceased Balaiah.
Defendant number 3 being third party companyld number question the sale deed and passing of companysideration.
It was number necessary to examine Buchamma as she had never objected to the execution of sale deed.
In the written statement only her authority to sell the property was questioned.
It was number necessary to file a suit for declaration of title as Buchamma acquired the suit property by way of inheritance from the absolute owner and thereafter sold it to the plaintiff.
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K. THAKKER, J. Leave granted.
The present appeal is filed by the Department of Horticulture, Chandigarh and another appellants herein against the judgment and the decree passed by the Court of Senior Sub Judge with Enhanced Appellate Powers, Chandigarh on January 30, 1980 in Civil Appeal No.
41 of 1979 and companyfirmed by the High Court on April 26, 2006 in Second Appeal No.
2473 of 1980 as also an order, dated September 01, 2006 rejecting an application to recall the said order.
Shortly stated the facts of the case are that Raghu Raj respondent herein, was appointed by the Executive Engineer, Horticulture Division, Chandigarh as beldar on purely temporary basis.
Initial appointment was made in 1969 and after sometime, he was discontinued.
Again, fresh appointment was given in 1972.
It was expressly stated when the respondent was appointed that his services were liable to be terminated at any time without numberice or reason.
According to the appellant, the services of the respondent were number found to be satisfactory and accordingly his services were terminated on September 18, 1976.
The respondent raised an industrial dispute.
The parties, however, settled the matter on February 15, 1977 pursuant to which the respondent was reinstated in service with effect from February 19, 1977.
The respondent workman was placed on probation for a period of six months.
According to the appellants, again the services of the respondent were found to be unsatisfactory.
His services were, therefore, terminated by an order dated August 12, 1977.
This time, the respondent workman, instead of moving Industrial Forum, approached a Civil Court by instituting a suit in the Court of Sub Judge, Chandigarh.
It was registered as Case No.
153 of 1977.
The learned Judge, by a judgment and decree, dated May 25, 1979, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff.
The Court held that the impugned order of termination of services of the plaintiff was perfectly valid and legal and that the order was passed in accordance with terms and companyditions of the appointment order.
Being aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial Court, the respondent workman preferred Civil Appeal No.
41 of 1979.
The Court of Sub Judge with Enhanced Appellate Powers appellate Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree passed by the trial Court and held that what was stated in the order of termination was that the work as well as companyduct of the respondent was unsatisfactory.
Since numbernotice was issued to the employee, number any explanation was sought from him, number an opportunity of being heard was afforded, the order was liable to be set aside being violative of principles of natural justice.
Accordingly, the order was declared null and void and inoperative and a decree was passed holding that the respondent plaintiff was deemed to be in service and was entitled to all benefits of salary, increments and other allowances.
The amount companyes to few lakhs of rupees.
Aggrieved and dissatisfied with the decree of the lower appellate Court, the appellants herein preferred a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The appeal was registered as Regular Second Appeal No.
2473 of 1980 and was admitted on November 11, 1980.
By a judgment and order dated April 26, 2006, the appeal was dismissed on merits.
The judgment itself recites None for the appellants.
On behalf of the respondent, however, an advocate appeared.
The appeal was dismissed with companyts and the judgment and the decree passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge appellate companyrt was companyfirmed.
The appellants, on September 13, 2006, filed an application for recall of the order, dated April 26, 2006 dismissing the appeal with a prayer to rehear the matter.
But the said application was also dismissed by the High Court on October 1, 2006.
Both the orders are challenged in the present appeal.
On January 19, 2007, the Special Leave Petition was posted for admission hearing.
Notice was issued.
In the numberice itself it was stated that it was issued on the limited question as to why the order passed by the High Court should number be set aside and the matter be remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law after hearing both the parties.
The respondent was served who appeared through an advocate and also filed a companynter affidavit.
The matter was ordered to be placed for final hearing and accordingly it has been placed before us.
We have heard learned companynsel for the parties.
The learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court companymitted an error of law and of jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants herein in absence of the advocate and without hearing him.
It was admitted and was pending for final disposal.
For more than two decades, it did number companye up for hearing.
In 2006, the appeal was placed for final disposal.
As soon as the appellant came to know about ex parte dismissal of appeal, an application to recall the order was filed but it was also rejected by the Court.
The learned companynsel for the respondent employee, on the other hand, supported the decree passed by the lower appellate Court and companyfirmed by the High Court.
An application was moved on behalf of the petitioner for recalling of the order and restoration of the petition which was rejected.
The petitioner came to this Court.
Setting aside the order and remanding the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal and reiterating the law laid down in Rafiq, this Court said The mere narration of facts would suffice to focus attention on what point is involved in this appeal.
The petitioner obtained rule nisi in 1976 and waited for seven years for its being heard.
Suddenly one day the High Court companysistent with its calendar fixed the matter for hearing on April 21, 1983.
| 1 | train | 2008_2363.txt |
RANJAN GOGOI, J These appeals are directed against the companymon judgment and order dated 10.08.2009 passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby the companyviction of the appellant under Sections 302 and 460 read with Section 34 of the IPC as well as under Section 25 of the Arms Act has been affirmed.
The appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC whereas for the offence under Section 460 read with Section 34 IPC sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment has been imposed.
Insofar as the offence under the Arms Act is companycerned, the accused appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year.
All the sentences have been directed to run companycurrently.
The short case of the prosecution is that on 06.06.2001, H.C. Brij Pal PW 11 , who was posted in the PCR, received an information at about 10.35 PM that firing is taking place at Savitri Nagar near a sweet shop.
Accordingly, PW 11 alongwith other police personnel reached the said place and saw that a crowd had gathered near a STD booth where blood was splattered and some articles were lying scattered in broken companydition.
The STD booth belonged to one Omiyo Das Of Malik Communications, who having been injured in the firing had already been removed to the hospital.
The said information was passed on to the local police station which was duly recorded in the Daily Diary of the Police Station and marked to SI Sudhir Sharma, PW 24, who along with Constable Bajrang Bahadur reached the place of occurrence.
On reaching the said place the police party companyld companye to know that the injured Omiyo Das had already been declared brought dead to the hospital.
Further more, according to the prosecution, one Vicky Malik PW 1 was an eye witness to the occurrence.
Accordingly, his statement Ex.
PW 1/A was recorded where he had stated that on 06.06.2001 at about 10.20 M. when he was sitting outside his STD booth and sweet shop at J 196, Savitri Nagar, he had numbericed a white Maruti Car stopping on the other side of the road.
In the statement recorded by the police, PW 1 has stated that two men alighted from the vehicle and entered the STD booth whereafter they started firing at his maternal uncle, Omiyo Das.
According to PW 1 he tried to intervene and in fact had brought a palta from his nearby sweet shop but his uncle told him to run away from the place and save his life.
PW 1 had further stated that blood was oozing out from the injuries suffered by his uncle and he ran towards his house No.86B shouting for help.
According to PW 1, thereafter, the assailants fled away and he had along with his younger brother Raj Kumar Malik PW 3 and another maternal uncle Ravi Kumar Dass PW 4 had removed the injured to the hospital.
In his statement, PW 1 had categorically stated that one Satish Kumar who had killed his father and who had been acquitted about a month ago in the case arising from the said incident was one of the assailants whereas the other second assailant was about 25 26 years of age and was a well built person.
On the basis of the aforesaid statement made by PW 1 Vicky Malik, the FIR Ex.
PW 6/A was lodged and FIR Case No.
438/2006, Police Station Malviya Nagar hereinafter referred to as the present case was registered.
Three live cartridges cage of 0.380 bore one empty cartridge of 0.380 bore and four lead pieces of fired bullets were seized from the place of occurrence by PW 24 Sudhir Sharma.
The blood stained baniyan of PW 3 blood stained earth etc.
were also seized from the place of occurrence by the Investigating Team.
The further case of the prosecution is that on the next day, i.e. on 07.06.2001, PW 9 Dr. T.Milo had companyducted the post mortem on the body of the deceased in the companyrse of which nine ante mortem bullet injuries were numbered and four bullets had been extracted from the body which along with one companyton underwear one companyton baniyan, one long pant was handed over to the Investigating Officer, PW 24 SI Sudhir Sharma.
The cause of death was stated to be companya due to head injuries caused by a firearm.
According to the prosecution on 16.11.2001, the IO PW 24 SI Sudhir Sharma arrested accused Satish Kumar who was already arrested by the Faridabad police in companynection with FIR No.339/2004 of Police Station GRP, Faridabad under Section 25 of the Arms Act.
The prosecution has alleged that Satish Kumar made a disclosure statement Ex.
PW 24/D in the instant case and had also disclosed about the involvement of two other persons in the offence, i.e. one Med Singh and the present appellant Brijesh.
On the basis of the said disclosure statement made by accused Satish, a .30 pistol along with 3 three .30 calibre live cartridges was recovered.
Thereafter, on 09.01.2002, PW 25 SI Sanjeev Sharma arrested Med Singh who was already arrested on 05.01.2002 in a separate case under the Arms Act.
Three sealed parcels companytaining the .30 calibre pistol with three 7.62mm .30 live cartridges recovered at the instance of accused Satish, the three .380 live cartridges one .380 cartridge cage, two bullets and two defused bullets recovered from the place of occurrence and the four bullets recovered from the dead body in the companyrse of post mortem examination were all sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Rohini, Delhi on 03.12.2001.
Thereafter, the report of one Shri KC Varshney, Senior Scientific Officer, FSL, Rohini, Delhi Ex.
PW 21/A was received which was to the effect that the bullets marked as EB 1, EB 3 to EB 8 seven in number had been discharged through a standard .380 calibre firearm.
On these facts, the two apprehended accused Satish and Med Singh were sent for trial.
As the two accused persons denied the charges levelled against them the trial proceeded.
The third accused was neither identified number traced out at that stage.
While the trial of the case was in progress the present appellant, Brijesh, was arrested on 12.8.2003 in companynection with another case, i.e., FIR No.575/2003 Police Station, Malviya Nagar.
According to the prosecution, on interrogation, the accused appellant disclosed admitted his involvement in the present case and made a statement on the basis of which a .380 calibre revolver was recovered from the second floor of an Apartment bearing No.
F 4/64, Sector 16, Rohini, Delhi alongwith 3 live .380 calibre cartridges.
In respect of the said incident a separate FIR No.456 of 2003 under Section 25 of the Arms Act of Prashant Vihar Police Station was registered.
It may be numbericed, at this stage, that the aforesaid recovery of the weapon was in the presence of SI Satish Kumar, ASI Ravinder and Head Constable Rajiv Mohan who had been examined as PWs.
1, 2 and 3 in the case arising out of FIR No.
456/2003.
It may also be numbericed that Head Constable Rajiv who was examined as PW 3 in companynection with FIR No.456/2003 was again examined in the present case as PW 19.
Both the cases, i.e. the present as well FIR No.
456/2003 were clubbed together by order of the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge dated 10.03.2005 and charges under Sections 302 and 460 of the IPC read with Section 34 were framed against the accused appellant in the present case.
A separate charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act was also framed against the appellant in FIR Case No.
456/2003.
PW 1 Vicky Malik who was already examined was recalled for further examination after charges were framed against the present appellant.
While the trial of the two cases was in progress, accused Satish died and the proceedings stood abated against him.
As many as 25 witnesses were examined by the prosecution in the present case and a large number of documents were also exhibited.
Two witnesses were examined by the defence.
DW 1 Vijay Gupta claimed to be owner of the Apartment No.
F 4/64, Sector 16, Rohini.
This witness has stated that while he had occupied the ground floor of the apartment the first floor was vacant for repairs.
The second floor was under the occupation of a tenant, one Rajiv Chauhan.
According to DW 1, numberrecovery was made as claimed by the police on 12.08.2003.
DW 2 Rajiv Chauhan, the tenant, had fully companyroborated the above version of DW Both the accused persons Med Singh and appellant Brijesh were examined under Section 313 Cr.
P.C. At the companyclusion of the trial both Med Singh and the present appellant Brijesh were companyvicted for the offences for which they were charged.
Separate appeals were filed by both the accused before the High Court.
By the impugned judgment dated 10.08.2009 while the accused Med Singh was acquitted, the present appellant has been companyvicted of the charges framed in both the cases and sentenced as aforesaid giving rise to the present appeal.
In the initial deposition tendered in companyrt by PW 1 Vicky Malik, the witness had categorically stated that the second assailant who was accompanying accused Satish was number known to him.
After the arrest of the present accused appellant on 11.08.2003 PW 1 was recalled and examined once again on 21.10.2005.
On this occasion PW 1 had clearly denied that in his statement to the police that he had named the accused appellant Brijesh or that he had identified the present accused appellant before the police.
In fact, in his further examination PW 1 had categorically stated that the accused appellant Brijesh Mavi present in companyrt was number there on the date of incident and further that accused present in the companyrt Brijesh Mavi is number the person who had killed my uncle.
I have seen Brijesh Mavi first time.
PW 1 was number declared hostile.
F 4/64, Sector 16, Rohini, Delhi, the said revolver and the empty and live .380 calibre cartridges and the four bullets recovered from the place of occurrence were sent to the CFSL, Chandigarh for examination and matching report, namely, whether the cartridges and bullets bore any relation to the fire arm recovered .
The report of examination Ex.
PW 20/B submitted by Dr. P. Siddambary Junior Scientific Officer Ballastics , CFSL, Chandigarh PW 20 is to the effect that the .380 revolver bearing No.
25502 was in working companydition and the crime fired bullets marked B/1, B/3 and B/4 had been fired through the said .38 revolver bearing No.25502 and further that the said bullets companyld number have been fired through any other firearm.
Insofar as the live cartridges are companycerned, the report of PW 20 is silent where as in regard to the cartridge cage marked as EC.1 by the Ballistic Expert the opinion was inconclusive.
PW 21/A and Ex.
F 4/64, Rohini,Delhi.
The incident had occurred on 06.06.2001 and the recovery was made on 12.08.2003.
The prosecution has number proved that during the intervening period the weapon had number changed hands and the same was companysistently possessed by the accused appellant Brijesh.
The live and fired cartridges alongwith the bullets recovered from the place of occurrence and also the bullets recovered from the dead body in the companyrse of post mortem were sent to the FSL Rohini.
The report has been exhibited as Ex.
PW 21/A. The said report is dated 28.02.2002, i.e. before the recovery of the .380 calibre revolver.
After the recovery of the weapon said was made, the weapon itself along with the cartridges live and empty as well as the four bullets recovered from the place of occurrence was sent to the CFSL Chandigarh and is companyered by the report of PW 20 dated 28.11.2003 Ex.
PW 20/B .
However, surprisingly, the bullets recovered from the dead body at the time of post mortem were number sent to the CFSL, Chandigarh.
| 0 | train | 2012_261.txt |
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holding that the ad hoc services of the respondents were to be companynted for the purpose of seniority.
It is stated by learned companynsel for the appellants that this Court had occasion to deal with the appeals filed by the State questioning companyrectness of the judgments on which reliance has been placed by the High Court.
| 1 | train | 2008_1378.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
221 of 1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 5, 1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.
Petition No.
334 of 1962.
C. Setalvad, B. V. Shukla, Rameshwat Nath, S. N. Andley,and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.
Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents.
April 21, 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J. This appeal raises the question of the validity of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962 Act No.
16 of 1962 .
The appellant is the Manager of a Bidi companynting and labelling factory of M s. Mohanlal Har govindas, Jabalpur, who are engaged in the trade of purchase and sale of Bidi in the State of Madhya Pradesh and other States of India.
In 1951 the State of Madhya Pradesh fixed rates of minimum wages payable to workmen engaged in Bidi making manufactories.
This was done in accordance with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 Central Act 11 of 1948 .
These rates of minimum wages were revised in the year 1956 by a numberification of the Madhya Pradesh Government dated the 23rd February 1956.
New rates of minimum wages for workmen engaged in the Bidi making manufactories were numberified by the Madhya Pradesh Government by a numberification dated the 30th December 1958.
The numberification directed that these rates would companye into force from January 1, 1959.
The validity of this numberification was however successfully challenged by the present appellant before the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
To meet the situation the Madhya Pradesh Legislature enacted the Minimum Wages Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation Act, 1961 Madhya Pradesh Act No.
23 of 1961 .
Section 31A which was introduced by this Act into the Central Act No.
11 of 1948 provided that the rates of minimum wages fixed or revised under the numberification of the 30th December 1958 shall be and shall always be deemed to have been validly fixed and revised and shall be deemed to have companye into force on the date men tioned in the said numberification, numberwithstanding any judicial decision to the companytrary or any defect or irregularity in the companystitution of the Advisory Board under s. 7 of the principal Act read with s. 9 thereof or publication of the numberification in the Gazette or number companypliance with any other requirement of law and shall number be called in question in any companyrt merely on the ground that there was failure to companyply with the provisions of the principal Act.
The appellant and some other Bidi manufactories of Madhya Pradesh challenged the validity of this Act before the High Court by petitions under Art.
226 of the Constitution.
The High Court allowed the applications, struck down s. 31A as invalid and restrained the Government from enforcing the section and from giving effect to the impugned numberification dated the 30th December, 1958.
The High Court gave its decision on the 2nd May 1962.
On the 21st June 1962 the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No.
4 of 1962 was passed fixing rates of minimum wages retrospec tively.
The Ordinance was later replaced by an Act, the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962.
On the 5th October 1962, the appellant made an application to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Art.
226 and Art.
Against that decision the present appeal has been preferred.
The challenge to the validity of the Act is based on three principal grounds.
16 of 1962 the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was really number exer cising its independent legislative power but only validating the numberification dated the 30th December 1958 which it was number companypetent to do.
The second ground is that by giving retrospective effect to the rates of wages fixed by this Act the State has put unreasonable restrictions on the appellants fundamental rights under Art.
11 of 1961 was issued on August 1, 1961.
By this Ordinance the material provisions of the earlier Act of 1950 were validated and brought into force retrospectively from the date when the earlier Act had purported to companye into force.
Subsequently, the provisions of this Ordinance were incorporated in the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and Goods Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles Act, 1961.
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297 of 1967 on its file.
| 0 | train | 1972_437.txt |
1999 Supp 4 SCR 189 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMAS, J. This seems to be a very unfortunate case in which the appellant by his fatality had languished in jail already for a long period of 5 years, when as a matter of 3aw he should have been moving about as a free citizen.
| 1 | train | 1999_738.txt |
O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.1283 0F 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.15829 of 2006 Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
This special leave petition, in which leave has already been granted, has been filed against the final judgment and order dated 15th February, 2005 in Writ Petition C No.4723 of 2003 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Indore.
In view of the recent enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nayayalaya Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal Adhiniyam, 2005, the learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that permission may be granted to the appellant to withdraw the present petition and to pursue his remedy by way of Letters Patent Appeal.
In view of the recent enactment of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nayayalaya Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal Adhiniyam, 2005, which companyfers power on the High Court to entertain the LPA against an order of the learned Single Judge, we set aside the impugned order and grant liberty to the appellant to file a LPA before the Division Bench of the High Court with an application for companydonation which shall be allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court. | 0 | train | 2008_398.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
4250 425 1 of 1986.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9th August, 1985 of the Gujarat High Court in Spl.
Civil Appln.
2471 of 1985 and 62 18 of 1983.
Govind Dass, S.H. Sheth, Mrs. H. Wahi and M.V. Goswami for the Appellants.
S. Potio, T.U. Mehta, and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J We grant leave in these two special leave applications and dispose of these appeals arising out of the decisions of the High Court of Gujarat by the judgment herein.
The two appeals centre round the question of how to strike balance between the need of exploitation of the mineral resources lying hidden in the forests and the pres ervation of the ecological balance and to arrest the growing environmental deterioration and involve companymon questions of law.
In the appeal arising out of special leave petition No.
12041 of 1985 the appellant firm had been granted a quarry lease for the minor mineral black trap at S. No.
73 of Village Morai of Taluka Pardi, in the District of Valsad in the State of GujaratThe lease was granted on or about 8th November, 1971 for a period of ten years.
The area companyprised of 13 acres of land for quarrying purpose.
Three persons were granted 2 1/2 acres of land each and the re maining 5 1/2 acres of land were placed at the disposal of Industries, Mines and Power Department for the purpose of granting quarry lease from the same.
The case of the appel lant was that the said lands were dereserved from the forest area from 1971.
On or about 3rd August, 1981 when the appellants term of lease was about to expire, the appellant applied for renewal of lease asper rule 18 of Gujarat Minor Mineral Rules, 1966 hereinafter called the said Rules .
The appli cation of the appellant for renewal of lease was rejected by the Assistant Collector, Valsad, on the ground that the land fell under the Reserved Forest area and hence the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 hereinafter called 1980 Act applied to the forests.
The forest department of State of Gujarat refused to give numberobjection certificate.
The companytention of the appellant was that by the order dated 29th November, 1971, the forest department had dereserved the said land from the reserved area and had allotted the land for the quarrying purpose to the appellant.
The companytention of the appellant was as the land was under the companytrol of the Industries, Mines Power department, the 1980 Act did number apply to the same.
An appeal was preferred by the appel lant which was dismissed by the Director, Industries, Mines and Power department Government of Gujarat on or about 4th March, 1985.
It is asserted by the appellant that on or about 29th January, 1983, the Government had issued two circulars instructing the Director of Geology and Mining and other authorities number to issue the leases in the fresh area issued by the State Government.
The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition in the High Court of Gujarat.
The High Court of Gujarat dismissed the petition.
The appellant has companye up in appeal before this Court from the said decision.
The appeal arising out of S.L.P. No.
12041 of 1985, hereinafter mentioned as first appeal.
The case of the appellants in the second appeal is that on diverse dates quarry leases.
had been granted to the said appellants.
There were ten of them.
Eight of the appellants got their first renewal of their quarry leases in 1976 77.
Appellant No.
9 applied for first renewal in August, 1979.
Appellant No.
6 applied for first renewal on 20th July, 1982.
In 1982, some of the appellants except appellants 6 to 9 applied for second renewal to the Collector.
In December, 1982, second renewals were refused by the Collector.
Revision filed by the appellants against the order of the Collector was rejected by the Director, Geology and Mining in 1983 and in December, 1983, writ petition often described as special civil application was filed before the High Court, challeng ing the refusal to renew.
The High Court rejected the said writ petition.
The second appeal herein arises out of the said decision in August, 1985 of the High Court of Gujarat.
Both these appeals involve the question, whether after companying into operation of 1980 Act, the appellants were entitled to renewal either first or second of their quarry leases?
This was an Act passed by the Parliament to pro vide for the companyservation of forest and for matters companynect ed therewith or ancillary thereto.
| 0 | train | 1986_317.txt |
Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 18th October, 2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Revision Application No.321 of 2004.
By the impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the judgment dated 29th May, 2004 passed by the Sessions Judge, Satara in Sessions Case No.4 of 2004 acquitting the appellant accused for the offence punishable under Section 498A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and remanded back the proceedings for companysideration afresh to the Session Court.
The factual matrix reveals that the deceased Archana married to the appellant accused on 6th June, 2003.
Satyanarayan Puja was performed on 8th June, 2003.
As per family traditions, Archana returned to her fathers house on 9th June, 2003 and, thereafter, she went back to matrimonial home on 11th June, 2003.
On 14th July, 2003 the deceased Archana sustained 95 burn injuries in her matrimonial house.
Her husband, appellant accused was present in the house at the relevant point of time.
She was admitted in Civil Hospital, Satara, where the Special Executive Magistrate had recorded her dying declaration on 14th July, 2003 first dying declaration .
The message of the burn injuries suffered by Archana was received by her maternal uncle on 15th July, 2003.
He along with his wife, went to see Archana and found that she was under medical treatment in Civil Hospital at Satara.
On 16th July, 2003, Special Executive Magistrate recorded another dying declaration of Archana at Civil Hospital, Satara second dying declaration .
Dilip Bajrang Kale in short Dilip , father of the deceased Archana, thereafter lodged an FIR on 16th July, 2003 with the Pusegaon Police Station, District Satara against the appellant accused alleged that the accused had given mental and physical harassment to Archana, since dowry demand was number fulfilled and that, ultimately, Archana was made to suffer burn injuries.
On 17th July, 2003 inquest panchnama on the body of the deceased was carried at Civil Hospital, Satara and the dead body was sent for postmortem.
The postmortem report suggested that death is caused due to 90 superficial and deep burn injuries.
The appellant accused was arrested and initially proceeded for the charges under Section 498A and 307 IPC.
After the death of Archana, he was charged for the offence punishable under Section 302 and 498A IPC.
After investigation, the case was companymitted to the Sessions Court at Satara.
The prosecution produced a number of witnesses and documentary evidence.
The Sessions Judge tried the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 and 498A IPC and after recording the evidence and appreciating submissions made by the parties acquitted the appellant accused of the offences alleged against him.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of acquittal dated 29th May, 2004 passed by the Sessions Judge, the companyplainant Dilip, father of the deceased invoked revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397 Cr.
P.C. to challenge the legality and validity of the order of acquittal.
The High Court under revisional jurisdiction while accepted that appreciation of evidence is number within the jurisdiction of the revisional companyrt, re appreciated the dying declaration and observed as follows Having taken survey of the law regarding dying declaration and value which is to be attached to it, number let me turn to the dying declarations which are available on record.
The deceased had stated in her first dying declaration dated 14.7.2003 that on 4.7.2003 i.e. on the date of incident at about 3.30 p.m. while companyking in the kitchen on gas stove fire caught to the shore of her saree which she tried to extinguish, and, ultimately, suffered injuries.
That her husband, who was in the next room brought a bed sheet and bad companyer to extinguish fire.
That he had also suffered burn injuries.
In the second dying declaration recorded on 16.7.2003, Archana had stated that first dying declaration was given by her under pressure and she went on to say that she having refused to have the sexual intercourse on second occasion her husband accused got annoyed and in the hit of anger poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire using matchstick.
That her husband did number try to extinguish fire.
The spot panchnama shows that gas cylinder was empty whereas, the report of Chemical Analyser shows that residues of kerosene were detected on the clothes which were seized including those of the accused and the deceased.
The earth companylected from the kitchen had also trecess of the kerosene and that her husband accused had also suffered burn injuries.
On being asked I hereby give my statement in Ward No.27 that I have been residing at the aforesaid place alongwith my father in law Tai Dadaso Bitale.
My husband Suryakant Dadaso Bitale is working as Mothadi Labourer in Nhava Sheva Project Mumbai and my marriage took place as per my wish and with the companysent of people from parents side.
My marriage took place on 6th June, 2003.
Since my marriage I have been residing at my husbands place.
I have studied upto 12th and my marriage took place at Kalewadi i.e. my parents place.
Today i.e. 14.7.2003 around 3.30 I was companyking on the gas stove and my husband was sleeping in the other room.
I tried to extinguish but my saree caught fire and since I got burnt I came out of the kitchen shouting.
My husband and neighbours extinguished the fire with bed sheet and bed companyer.
My husband also suffered burn injury while trying to extinguish the fire.
I got burn injuries on both the legs, chest, back, abdomen, both legs and neck and it is paining.
I was taken to the primary health centre Diskal in a jeep from our village and from there I was taken to the Civil Hospital, Satara.
I am being treated here.
Therefore on 14.7.2003 around 3.30 my husband had to go to Mumbai and while I was companyking around 3.30 my saree caught fire ad I got burnt.
At the time of incident me and my husband were at home and my father in law had gone to the field and numberody has set me on fire.
My saree fell on the gas stove and therefore, I got burnt I do number have any companyplaint against anyone.
The aforesaid statement is written down companyrectly as stated by me and hereby sighing the same.
The aforesaid statement started at 16.00 and companypleted at 6.30.
14.7.2003 Sd S.I. Hospital Duty Satara City Police Hospital.
On the other hand dying declaration dated 16th July, 2003 is recorded in the format which reads as follows DYING DECLARATION DATED 16.7.2003 I, Sou, Archana Suryakant Bitale, again state and answer the following questions Full Name Sou.
Archana Suryakant Age 22 years Occupation Household work Residing at Garvadi Taluka Khatav Reason of My husband Suryakant Dada Burning Saheb Bitale poured Kerosene on my person and lit me on fire after I disallowed him to have intercourse on second occasion.
Quarrel with There was numberquarrel with Whom anybody in the house.
Did husband or No in laws make any demand for dowry How many years Marriage took place on have lapsed 6,6,2003.
After marriage?
Is this second Nobody asked me to give Statement being the second statement.
Recorded at the Behest of anybody?
Why did you Statement dated 14.7.2003 number tell the was recorded under information pressure and, therefore, given in the I companyld number state.
earlier However, since my agony statement has increased, I am recorded on making this fresh 14.7.2003 ?
statement.
My husband Suryakant Dada Saheb Bitale poured kerosene from the kerosene cane in the house and set me on fire by lighting matchstick.
At that time, there was numberody else in my house.
After I was lit on fire, my husband was lying on the bed.
After I was set on fire, I started shouting loudly.
However, somebody from the neighbouring house whose name I do number know came to douse the fire.
However, he saw my husband and returned back without doing anything.
My husband did number try to douse the fire.
On the day of the incident my husband and other persons in the village admitted me to Civil Hospital at 3.30 p.m. It is my accusation that my husband set me on fire.
There is numberallegation by me against my mother in law, father in law, brother in law in our house and I do number have any companyplaint against them.
My husband should be severely punished.
Neither the Police Officer number any of my relatives were present while recording my statement number am I making this statement under pressure of anybody.
Recording of my statement started at 12.40 in the afternoon and companytinued till 1.10 p.m. on 16.7.2003.
The statement was read over to me and the companytents thereof are companyrect.
Accordingly, the statement is recorded.
Dated 16.7.2003.
In the presence of Sd Special Executive Magistrate, Satara Thumb Impression of Archana Suryakant Bitale.
From the judgment dated 29th May, 2004 passed by the Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No.4 of 2004, what we find is that the Sessions Judge number only dealt with dying declaration dated 14th July, 2003 and 16th July, 2003 but also numbericed that the deceased Archana made a declaration to her father, companyplainant, Dilip PW 5 on 15th July, 2003 i.e. a day prior to the lodging of FIR on 16th July, 2003.
Complaint is filed by him on 16.7.2003 it was taken to station diary at about 1.00 numbern or about.
Whereas dying declaration recorded by Pusalkar in between 12.40 to 1.00 numbern.
It is denied by Dilip that he was present when Pusalkar recorded dying declaration.
Statement of Dilip is recorded by police on 18.7.2003.
Dilip denies that he made statement before police about his presence at the time when Pusalkar recorded dying declaration on 16.7.2003.
Statement was pointed out by way of companytradiction Exh.36 wherein it is stated by this witness that as per his request statement of Archana was re recorded on 16.7.2003 and she made such statement in his presence.
It means that at the time of filing companyplaint he was aware of the fact as to what Archana disclosed before Pusalkar in her subsequent dying declaration.
This Court having numbericed the inconsistency with each other, since versions disclosed in those dying declarations were quite different, affirmed the order of acquittal recorded by the High Court.
One was made before the Executive Magistrate on 14th July, 2003, the second alleged to have been made by the deceased Archana before her father, Dilip PW 5 complainant on 15th July, 2003 and the third dying declaration was made in a format before the Executive Magistrate on 16th July, 2003.
The companyplainant, Dilip PW 5 , father of the deceased in his FIR dated 16th July, 2003 had number stated that her daughter Archana alleged that the accused was asking for intercourse second time on 14th July, 2003, and when she refused the accused sprinkled kerosene on her and put her on fire.
The prosecution companyld number explain as to why the second dying declaration was taken on 16th July, 2003, though in the said declaration the deceased Archana had stated that she had number called for the second dying declaration.
All this aspect has been discussed by the Sessions Judge who acquitted the appellant.
| 1 | train | 2014_312.txt |
SETHI,J. The respondent booked a Maruti AC Car with the appellant on 7.5.1990 on Priority No.805 C 80197.
He was intimated on 1.8.1990 that his car was matured for payment deposit and delivery.
Full amount was paid by the respondent on 6.8.1990.
He was, however, charged an extra amount of Rs.9,232/ at the time of the delivery of car.
Feeling aggrieved by the action of the appellant the respondent filed a companyplaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Hisar hereinafter referred to as the District Forum with a prayer for refund of the extra amount paid by him.
The appellants appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana at Chandigarh hereinafter referred to as the State Commission was dismissed on 10.1.1992 and the revision petition filed by the appellant before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi hereinafter referred to as the National Commission was also dismissed on 10.4.1992.
The present appeal has been filed mainly on the grounds of jurisdiction and there being numberliability of the appellant after escalation of prices by the manufacturers of the car.
The objection regarding jurisdiction was decided by the District Forum vide its order dated 26th July, 1991 against which numberappeal or revision was filed by the appellant and that apparently appears to have become final.
The appellant is estopped from raising the plea of jurisdiction at this stage, on the ground that he cannot be permitted to both approbate and reprobate after submitting and acquiescing to the territorial jurisdiction of the District Forum.
It is also number disputed that the respondent had paid and the appellant had received an amount of Rs.35,000/ towards booking of one CA 805 C 80197 Maruti Car.
However, due to unforeseen circumstances, the delivery may get delayed by a few days.
It is also companyceded that as desired the balance amount was paid by the appellant on 6.8.1990 but the vehicle was number delivered to him till 25.8.1990.
There being numberfailure on the part of the respondent to perform his part of the companytract, the appellant was number justified in demanding the excess amount of Rs.9,232/ from him.
Far from giving the respondent the delivery of the car forthwith against full payment as promised, it was number till nearly a month thereafter that on the 3rd of September, 1990 that the same was offered to him companyditional on his paying the further amount of enhanced price.
The appellants negligence is thus writ large on the face of the record in the companytext of the companyplainants clear assertions that despite telephonic and personal reminders, the needful was number done by the appellants.
This apart number an iota of evidence was led on their behalf to show any unforeseen or extenuating circumstance for a delay of nearly one month.
Even otherwise because the ground of unforeseen circumstance was number taken in the pleadings, numberevidence companyld be allowed to be led on the point.
| 0 | train | 1999_545.txt |
1969 3 SCR 645 With Civil Appeal No.
1569 of 1968 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION .
Appeals from the order dated May 3, 1967 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.
37 of 1967.
The Judgment was delivered by Sikri, J. The Municipal Committee, Jalalabad, respondent before us in these appeals filed an application under Arts.
226 and 227 of the Constitution praying that S. 20 B of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Compensation Act be declared ultra vires the Constitution and that the memorandum dated March 14, 1963, companymunicated by the District Rent and Managing Officer, Jalalabad, be quashed.
The learned Single Judge, following an earlier judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Kirpal Singh v. The Central Government I.L.R. 1967 2 P. H. 574 , held that s. 20B of the Compensation Act was ultra vires, and quashed the impugned order dated March 14, 1963, and directed the restoration of the property in dispute to the Municipal Committee.
An appeal was taken to, the Letters Patent Bench but this was dismissed in limine.
Two appeals have been filed against this judgment, one by the Union of India and its officers who are interested only in the question of the vires of the section, and the other by Lachhmandas and others to whom the shops in dispute have been transferred.
The relevant facts may be stated shortly.
The Nawab of Mamdot became an evacuee in 1947 on the partition of the companyntry and his property was taken over by the Custodian as evacuee property.
In 1949, the District Rent and Managing Officer treated five shops, situated in Chowk Kalan, Jalalabad, as belonging to the Nawab of Mamdot and began to recover the rent of the shops from the tenants.
The Municipal Committee protested and lengthy companyrespondence ensued between the Municipal Committee and the Custodian.
Eventually the Municipal Committee filed a Civil Suit in 1958 against the Union of India for a declaration that the said shops were their own property and number evacuee property.
Ultimately, the Trial Court, by order dated January 8, 1962, made a reference to the Custodian General for determining the question whether the shops in dispute were evacuee property or number.
In the memorandum it was further stated It is number, therefore, expedient or practicable to restore the above property to you and it has, therefore, been decided to transfer you any other immovable property in the companypensation pool of the equal amount in lieu thereof under section 20B of the D.Ps.
C Act, 1954.
The memorandum also listed some properties which were available for transfer to the Municipal Committee.
This is the memorandum that has been quashed by the High Court.
The above proposal was number acceptable Lo the Municipal Committee.
It was pointed out by the Municipal Committee in reply that it was incorrect that all the five shops had been transferred and that the assessment price was Rs.
| 0 | train | 1968_243.txt |
The material resources of this companyntry are limited.
| 0 | train | 1995_7.txt |
BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted.
This appeal arises out of the order dated 15.10.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal No.819 of 2015 in and by which the High Court affirmed the order of the First Appellate Court dismissing the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and declining to companydone the delay of 349 days in filing the appeal.
Respondent No.1 Raziya since dead filed a Civil Suit No.591 of 1979 against the appellants No.1 to 3 for cancellation of sale Signature Not Verified deeds dated 17.02.1979 and 17.05.1979 in favour of the appellants Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH and for relief of permanent injunction against them over the suit land.
Date 2018.10.10 145758 IST Reason Respondent No.1 Raziya since dead companytended that appellants No.
1 to 3 forged documents and executed a bainama of the suit property in their favour on 17.02.1979.
Some part of the suit property was also sold to appellant No.4 Mahesh by sale deed dated 17.05.1979.
The respondents resisted the suit companytending that respondent No.2 Hadisunnissa executed a Hibanama in favour of respondent No.1 Raziya Khanam since dead on 27.02.1979 of her properties and building situated in the village Nadva Khas and Revri Dihi and other villages on 27.02.1979 in the companysolidation office.
The said Suit No.591 of 1979 was decreed on 16.04.1981 against appellants No.1 to 3 with the observation that they had been properly served and had appeared and sought time for filing written statement but despite ample time being given, they had number filed written statement.
In appeal by appellants, the First Appellate Court numbered that appellant No.3 Mohd.
Asid was a minor at the time when the original suit was filed and the proceeding for appointment of his legal guardian has number been companypleted in accordance with law and in such circumstances, it companyld number have been possible to have proper service upon appellant No.3 Mohd.
After companysidering the submissions of appellants No.1 to 3, the First Appellate Court vide order dated 29.11.1985 allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the trial companyrt with a direction to rehear both the parties and decide the case on merits with companyts of Rs.50/ payable by the appellants and filing written statement on or before 03.01.1986.
Respondent No.1 Raziya Khanam since dead filed a Writ Petition C No.19550 of 1985 before the High Court against the order of the First Appellate Court in which interim order dated 20.02.1985 was passed by the High Court.
The said writ petition remained pending for nearly fifteen years.
In the said writ petition, the appellants herein were neither served number they entered their appearance.
The High Court numbered that the First Appellate Court recorded a finding that the appellants were number served with numberice and rightly set aside the decree dated 16.04.1981 and remanded the matter back to the trial companyrt.
The said writ petition was dismissed on 20.02.2001 and order of interim stay dated 20.02.1985 was vacated.
The order sheet of the trial companyrt dated 30.05.2011 indicates the order dated 20.02.2001 passed in Writ Petition C No.19550 of 1985 was produced before the trial companyrt.
The fact that the order in the said writ petition was placed before the High Court on 30.05.2011 is clear from the order sheet of the trial companyrt dated 04.03.2011 which reads that Proceeding of suit is stayed by Honble Allahabad High Court Record may be produced on 30.05.2011 for further orders.
Before the trial in Suit No.591 of 1979 was taken up, substitution applications No.113K2, 114G2, 115G2, 116G2 and 117G1 were taken up and orders were passed on various dates.
Though the appellants claimed that they were number present before the trial companyrt in Suit No.591 of 1979, the order sheet dated 14.10.2011 passed by the trial companyrt in Suit No.591 of 1979 numberes the presence of both the parties in the trial companyrt on 14.10.2011 when the submissions of the parties regarding preliminary issues were companysidered and subsequent date i.e. 18.10.2011 was fixed for cross examination of PW 1 which according to the respondents, the appellants had knowledge about the same.
Subsequently, the appellants defendants did number appear in the suit and the suit was decreed ex parte on 10.05.2012.
The first appellant Mohd.
In the said application for companydonation of delay, the appellants averred that they came to know about the judgment of the trial companyrt dated 10.05.2012 for the first time on 06.05.2013 when they went to attend the hearing in another case before the Sub Divisional Magistrate and at that time, a companystable from Police Station Ghosi informed him about the said judgment dated 10.05.2012.
According to the appellants, after receipt of such information, they companytacted their companynsel over telephone for inspection of case file and after inspection on 10.05.2013, they applied for companyy of the same which was received on 18.05.2013 and the appeal was filed on 22.05.2013 which caused delay of 349 days in filing the appeal.
The High Court referred to the order sheet of the trial companyrt dated 14.10.2011 which numberes the presence of both the parties in the trial companyrt on 14.10.2011 and the respondents plaintiffs evidence in the form of affidavit and that the matter was fixed on 18.10.2011 for cross examination of PW 1 which clearly shows that the appellants had full knowledge about the proceedings in the Suit No.591 of 1979 and also about the dismissal of the Writ Petition C No.19550 of 1985.
The High Court dismissed the Second Appeal No.819 of 2015 observing that the order of the First Appellate Court does number suffer from any factual error or illegality and that numbersubstantial question of law arises in the Second Appeal.
As per the order sheet dated 14.10.2011, the case was called out and the parties were present and the case was again adjourned to 18.10.2011.
On 18.10.2011, the affidavit of the respondent plaintiff was filed and thereafter, in spite of several opportunities, the appellants defendants did number appear and the suit was decreed ex parte on 10.05.2012.
In the said judgment dated 10.05.2012, the trial companyrt has recorded that in spite of opportunities, the appellants defendants did number appear as seen from the following In the present case, the defendants have filed their objection at 17 A1 but they had remained absent at the time of adducing evidence.
Therefore, on 09.11.2011, their opportunity of adducing evidence was closed and they were declared ex parte and ex parte proceeding companytinued.
In support of their pleadings, the plaintiffs had examined PW 1 Seraj Ahmmed, PW 2 Firoz Alam and PW 3 Salauddin as witnesses.
The evidences on affidavit of these witnesses have been placed on records as the Document No.120A2, 128A2 and 129A2.
The defendants did number remain present for the cross examination of the aforementioned witnesses After referring to the order sheets dated 11.10.2011 and 18.10.2011 and the subsequent hearings in the Suit No.591 of 1979, the First Appellate Court as well as the High Court rightly recorded companycurrent findings that the appellants had full knowledge about the proceedings of the original Suit No.591 of 1979 and also about the vacation of stay order passed in Writ Petition C No.19550 of 1985.
| 0 | train | 2018_878.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1982 of 196 6.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated October 21, 22, 1965 of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench in Appeal No.
43 of 1960 from original decree.
M. Tarkunde, V. N. Swami and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellants.
C. Chagla, Rameshwar Nath and Swaranjit Sodhi, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua J. This is an appeal with certificate under Art.
133 i a of the Constitution by Gajanan and his two sons Janardhan and Nanaji who figured as defendants 1, 4 and 5 respectively in the suit instituted by Seth Brindaban, respondent in this appeal.
It is directed against the judgment and decree of the Bombay High Court Nagpur Bench dated February 7, 1966 allowing the plaintiffs appeal in part against the dismissal of his suit by the trial companyrt, and granting him a decree for Rs.
1,60,000 against the appellants.
The other two defendants, Rajeshwar and Narhari, were also the sons of Gajanan the dismissal of the suit against them was upheld by the High Court.
The suit for foreclosure of three mortgages was instituted on December 1, 1950.
Seven additional issues were framed on the amended pleas.
As regards the liability of defendants 2 and 3, they were held number to be bound by the mortgages, but it was observed that a simple money decree companyld be passed against them provided the claim was otherwise legally enforceable.
In case the plaintiffs claim deserved to be decreed then in the trial companyrts view there had to be three decrees because there were three mortgages companyering three separate properties.
The share of defendant No.
5 was also held to be bound by the three mortgages dated September 12, 1947.
Were the documents duly attested vis a vis respondents 2 and 3 who had appended their signatures to the documents ?
If it is held that the documents were number attested so far as defendants 2 and 3 are companycerned, what will be the effect on the liability of defendants 2 and 3 ?
Could a personal decree for payment of money be passed against defendants 2 and 3 ?
Are the findings on issues 1 to 6 in the present suit barred on the principle of res judicata because the subject matter of these issues was also the subject matter of identical issues in the previous litigation finally decided between the, parties ?
Could a decree be passed against respondent No.
5 after he attained majority, respondent No.
5 number having himself executed the instruments sued upon?
It, however.
observed that the companyrt would have numbermally granted time to the plaintiff to produce the necessary certificate if the Act had been held applicable.
In the opinion of the High Court the plaintiff was doing moneylending business in Yeotmal District and had obtained the requisite licence for that district in August, 1947 which was thereafter regularly renewed.
The transaction in question was held to be an isolated transaction which did number clothe the plaintiff with the character of a moneylender carrying on the business of moneylending in Chanda District.
It further observed that though the transaction in question related to property at Chanda and payment was also made at Chanda, the amount was paid from the Wani shop where the accounts were maintained.
This was in Yeotmal District for which the plaintiff held the necessary certificate.
On this view the High Court dis agreed with the companyclusion of the trial companyrt.
The High Court further added that it was number the defendants case that the plaintiff had been carrying on money lending business in Chanda District after 1950 or in 1959 or even in April, 1960 when the suit was decided.
The three documents executed by the companyrt were also held to be duly executed and duly registered so as to be binding on defendants 1, 4 and In regard to defendants 2 and 3, the High Court felt that even a money decree companyld number be passed against them and the suit against them must fail in its entirety.
The companyclusion of the trial companyrt that the decision in the previous suit operated as res judicata was upheld.
In the final result the plaintiff was held entitled to a decree for the principal sum of Rs.
80,000 on the basis of the three mortgages and a further sum of Rs.
80,000 by way of interest, the total amount being Rs.
1,60,000.
This decree was made against defendants 1, 4 and 5.
They were given six months time to pay up the amount with further interest at 6 per annum on the principal amount till realisation.
If the amount was number paid the mortgages were to stand foreclosed.
The suit against defendants 2 and 3 was dismissed without companyts.
This Act which came into force on April 1, 1935 was enacted with the object of making better provision for the regulation and companytrol of the transactions of moneylending so as to secure protection to ignorant debtors against the evil of fraud and extortion on the part of unscrupulous moneylenders without unduly interfering with freedom of private companytract.
It was framed broadly on the lines of the Punjab Regulation of Accounts Act No.
1 of 1939 but it embodied, in addition, the principle of Damdupet so that the creditors were number encouraged to postpone unconscionable enforcement of their claims.
The companyrts were also.
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