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NAGESWARA RAO, J. The Appellant filed a civil suit for a declaration that she is the adopted daughter of the Respondent and Late Narasimhulu Naidu.
She sought for partition of the suit schedule property.
The suit was dismissed and the judgment of the trial companyrt was upheld by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.
Aggrieved by the judgment, the Appellant has filed the above Appeal.
O.S. No.
190 of 2004 was filed by the Appellant in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
It was averred in the plaint that both the natural parents and the Appellant died when she was very young.
Her mother is the sister of the original Respondent M. Sarla Devi died Respondent herein.
Appellant pleaded in the suit that she was brought up as the daughter of the Respondent Sarla Devi and her husband Late Narasimhulu Naidu.
In the records of School and College, the names of the original Respondent and her husband were entered as the parents of the Appellant.
Even in the government records like ration card, etc.,
the Appellant was mentioned as the daughter of the original Respondent and her husband.
Narasimhulu Naidu worked as a Lift Operator in the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board APSEB and retired on 30.06.1999.
In his service record, the Appellant is referred to as his daughter.
The Appellant has been numberinated in the application for pension of Narasimhulu Naidu.
It was the case of the Appellant in the plaint that her adoptive parents initially did number approve the marriage of the Appellant with the person of her choice, but later arranged a grand reception at Hotel Swagat, Ameerpet, Hyderabad.
Narasimhulu Naidu was the absolute owner of a building situated at Srinivas Nagar East, Gayatri Nagar, Ameerpet, Hyderabad.
He also purchased certain other properties.
Narasimhulu Naidu supplied textile materials and clothes to the employees of the APSEB and the Appellant was looking after the business.
Narasimhulu Naidu died intestate on 19.08.2003.
According to the Appellant, she along with the Respondent succeeded to the entire estate of Narasimhulu Naidu and that she is entitled to half share of his properties.
It was submitted that due to the ill advice of relatives, the original Defendant M. Sarla Devi turned against the Appellant and was making an attempt to alienate the properties.
As the negotiation for an amicable settlement failed, the Appellant was companystrained to file a suit for a declaration that she is the adopted daughter of the original Respondent and Narasimhulu Naidu, and for partition of the properties belonging to Narasimhulu Naidu.
The original Respondent filed a written statement in which it was stated that the Appellant is the daughter of her younger sister Manjula.
As the Appellants biological parents died when she was very young, the Respondent and her husband Narasimhulu Naidu brought her up.
They ensured that she had good education but the Appellant was never adopted by the Respondent and her husband.
As such, it was companytended by the Respondent that the Appellant does number have any right in the properties belonging to the Defendants husband.
By a judgment dated 15.09.2006, the City Civil Court dismissed the suit.
The principal issues that were framed by the City Civil Court relating to the relief of declaration that the Appellant is the daughter of the Respondent and deceased Narasimhulu Naidu and her right for partition of the suit scheduled properties were answered in favour of the Defendant.
Relying upon Sections 7 and 11 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1956 , the trial companyrt held that the Appellant companyld number prove the ceremony of adoption.
We have heard Mr. Kedar Nath Tripathy, learned companynsel appearing for the Appellant and Mr. T.V. Ratnam, learned companynsel appearing for the Respondent.
The learned companynsel for the Appellant strenuously submitted that there is overwhelming evidence brought on record to show that the Appellant was treated as the daughter of Narasimhulu Naidu and the Respondent husband for all practical purposes.
He relied upon the School and College records apart from service record of Narasimhulu Naidu in support of his submission.
He stated that it is number possible for the Appellant to prove the manner in which the adoption took place as she was very young at that time.
He relied upon the judgment of this Court in L. Debi Prasad Dead by Lrs.
v. Smt.
Tribeni Devi Ors.1 to argue that the subsequent events can be taken into account for the purpose of proving adoption.
As the Appellant was very young, she was brought by her grand mother and given to the Respondent and her husband to be taken care of.
The Appellant was brought up by the Respondent and her husband, Narasimhulu Naidu.
The School and College records and other documents that were filed in Court by the Appellant would show that the Respondent and her husband were shown as the parents of the Appellant.
Eventually, the Appellant married and started living separately.
After the death of Narasimhulu Naidu, the Respondent was residing in the suit schedule property and was in enjoyment of the properties of Narasimhulu Naidu.
The request made by the Appellant for partition of the properties was turned down by the Respondent leading to the filing of the Civil Suit.
Even the grand mother of the Appellant who appeared before the Court as PW 3 deposed that the Appellant who lost her parents in her childhood was given to the Respondent and her husband to be brought up.
PW 3 also stated in her evidence that the Appellant was number adopted by the Respondent and her husband.
Therefore, the Appellant had failed to prove that she has been adopted by the Respondent and her husband Narasimhulu Naidu.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.1850 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 30, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in.
Income tax Reference No.
102 of 1962.
N. Banerjee and P. K. Mukherjee, for the appellants.
Jagdish Sarup, Solicitor General, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the respondent.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. This is an appeal by special.
leave from a judgment of the Calcutta High Court answering the following question of law referred to it against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the entire or any part of the income from the house properties companycerned companyld be included in the total income of the assessee by virtue of the provisions of s. 16 1 c of the Income tax Act, 1922 read with the first proviso thereto ?
The assessee was assessed in the status of an individual.
He derived income from house properties and from the business of a registered partnership firm H. Ganguly Co. He had six houses one of which was 24, Mohanlal Street, Calcutta and the other at Janganbari in the city of Banaras.
On March 19, 1953 the see, created a trust in respect of these two houses.
It was provided in the trust deed that the trustees shall pay a sum of Rs.
200/ per month to the settlor for life for his own absolute use and benefit out of the income of the trust estate remaining after payment of taxes, rents etc.
In other words he himself was one of the beneficiaries.
The Income tax Officer held that the income from the afore said two properties was assessable in the hands Of the assessee inasmuch as he had retained a portion of the income from the trust properties for himself.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
2966 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.12.
1977 of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in R.F.A. No.
7 of 1970.
S. Nariman, V.A. Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and C.K. Rat naparkhi for the Appellant.
G. Bhagat, Naresh K. Sharma for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AHMADI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Regular First Appeal No.
7 of 1970 arising out of Suit NO.
11 of 1987.
The appellant original plaintiff is the second son of late Raja Padam Singh, the ex ruler of Bushahr State.
He filed a suit on 18th November, 1964 principally against the Union of India and the Govern ment of the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh for a decla ration of his proprietary rights in about 1720 acres of forest land situate in Khatas Nos.
1 2, Khataunis Nos.1 to 25 companyprising 106 plots, both measured and unmeasured, bearing Khasra Nos.
1, 2, 6, 23, 30, 34, 44, 108,218,222,309,341,409,479,606,433,241,732/280, 736/394 and 728/402 of Chak Addu, tehsil Rampur, in the present district of Mahasu in Himachal Pradesh.
He traced his title to the said lands to a Patta executed by his father on 14th Maghar 1999, Bikrami, i.e. 28th November 1942 A.D., and to the Order No.
5158 of even date directing companyresponding mutation changes.
In the said suit Choudhary Gopal Singh Co., a forest companytractor, was added as proforma defendant No.
3 but numberrelief was claimed against the said party.
The said suit was filed on 18th November, 1964 in the Court of the Senior Sub Judge, Mahasu, but on the upward revision of the suit valuation for the purposes of companyrt fees and jurisdiction the plaint was presented the High Court of Delhi, Himachal Bench, Shimla, and was re numbered as Suit No.
11 of 1967.
The said suit was tried on the original side of the High Court by Jagjit Singh, J. who by his judgment and order dated 6th April, 1970 substantially decreed the suit, in that, he upheld the appellant plaintiffs claim of owner ship in respect of Khatas Nos.
1 2, Khataunis Nos.
1 to 25 companyprising 106 plots bearing khasra Nos.
1, 2, 6, 23, 30, 34, 44, 108, 2 18,222,309, 341,409,606, 4 and 33 situate in Chak Addu without prejudice to the application, if any, of Section 27 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953.
The companytesting defend ants Nos.
1 and 2 preferred an appeal, being Regular First Appeal No.
7 of 1970, before the Division Bench of the High Court which came to be allowed on 31st December, 1977.
The Division Bench came to the companyclusion that the grant made by the erstwhile ruler was in respect of revenue yielding lands only admeasuring about 263.4 bighas and number in respect of the forest lands.
It, however, took the view that after the execution of the lease deed dated 25th September, 1942, Exh.
We number proceed to set out the relevant facts.
The Raja of Rampur Bushahr had sought the aid of the British Government in the management of his forests with a view to preserving, companyserving and protecting the same from large scale illicit and indiscriminate cutting of trees.
Pursuant to this request an agreement dated 20th June, 1864 was executed between the said Raja and the British Govern ment whereunder a fixed royalty was agreed to be paid to the former.
By a subsequent agreement dated 1st August, 1871, the Raja granted his rights in waif and windfall timber to the British Government in companysideration of certain payments agreed upon under the said agreement.
The terms of both these agreements were revised in 1877 whereby the British Government agreed to pay a fixed annual sum to the Raja on a fifty years lease renewable at the will of the British Government.
This arrangement was further revised in 1929 w.e.f.
1st November, 1928 for a period of twenty five years on agreed terms as to payments, etc.
During the subsistence of the said agreement, the parties executed yet another agreement of lease dated 25th September, 1942, Exh.
D 1, for a term of fifty years w.e.f.
1st April, 1941 superseding all previous agreements.
Under clause II thereof, the term forest was defined to mean and include a demarcated forests b forests reserved for the use of the Raja and c undemarcated forests.
Demarcated forests were those which were defined and stated as demarcated forests in the forest settlements of Bushahr State whereas undemarcated forests included a all tracts of land bearing tree growth or from which the trees were felled and which paid numberland revenue as cultivated land to the Bushahr State and b such other tracts of land, cultivated or uncultivated, as with the previous sanction of the Raja were from time to time included in the existing undemarcated forests or were declared to be undemarcated forests.
By clause III of the said document, the Raja granted to the Punjab Government the entire and sole companytrol of the whole of the forests of Bushahr excepting those reserved for the use of the Raja.
The Raja was to receive an annual payment of Rs.
1 lakh to be paid in two equal half yearly installments of Rs.50,000 on 30th April and 3 1st of October of each year.
In addition to the said amount of Rs.
1 lakh he was to receive payment of the whole net surplus on the working of the forests included in the lease.
Thus, according to clause III of the lease agreement the Raja granted to the Punjab Government the entire and sole companytrol of the forests of Bushahr, excepting those reserved for his use under clause II thereof.
Under Section 1 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, as from 15th August, 1947, two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan came to be set up.
By virtue of section 4 the Province of the Punjab as companystituted under the Government of India Act, 1935, ceased to exist and the same was recon stituted into two new Provinces of West Punjab and East Punjab.
In section 7 1 were set out the companysequences of the setting up of the two Dominions, Paragraph b whereof said that the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States.
The plaintiffs father Raja Padam Singh having died in April 1947, his eider son Tikka Vir Bhadra Singh born to his first wife Shanta Devi succeeded to the Gaddi under the rule of primogeniture but since he was a minor a companyncil for the administration of Bushahr State was set up to mind the affairs of the State.
On 15th April, 1948 an agreement of merger was signed whereby the Raja of Bu shahr ceded to the Dominion of India full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the State.
A centrally administered unit of Himachal Pradesh came into being on that day.
The agree ment of lease dated 25th September, 1942 was formally termi nated by mutual agreement between the East Punjab Government and the Himachal Pradesh Administration on 1st April, 1949.
While the forests of Bushahr were under the companytrol and management of the Government of Punjab, Raja Padam Singh, the plaintiffs father, executed a document on 14th Maghar 1999.
Bikrami i.e. 28th November, 1942 whereby he bestowed upon the plaintiff and his mother Rani Sahiba Katochi land admeasuring about 1720 acres.
This original document called the Patta was admittedly lost during the minority of the plaintiff, vide statement of companynsel for defendants Nos.
1 and 2 dated 29th May, 1969.
However, the factum of the grant cannot be disputed as it has been referred to in the subse quent two grants executed by the plaintiffs father on 29th Phagun 1999, Bikrami i.e. 11th March, 1943 Exh.
P 2 and 24th Maghar 2003, Bikrami i.e. 10th December, 1946 Exh.
These two subsequent grants Exh.
P 1 and Exh.
P 2 have been proved through the evidence of the scribe PW 1 Thakur Chet Ram.
By the execution of the third grant dated 24th Maghar 2003, Bikrami, the half share granted to the Rani Sahiba Katochi under the first grant of 14th Maghar 1999, Bikrami, was transferred to the plaintiff with the Rani Sahibas companysent.
Thus, the plaintiff became the sole gran tee of the entire area of 1720 acres but as he was a minor his interest was looked after initially by his father who expired in April 1947 and thereafter by his mother Rani Sahiba Katochi as his natural guardian.
After the execution of the first grant of patta the plaintiffs father made an Order No.
5158 of even date directing his revenue officers to effect companysequential changes in the mutation.
P 6 is a companyy of the mutation entry which companytains the following endorsement According to Shri Sarkars order No.
5158 dated 14.7.99 equivalent to 28th November, 1942 , the mutation, granting permanent ownership, without companydition, of khata khatauni Nos.
1/1 to 20 and 2/21 to 25, plots 106, measuring 263.4 219.7 plus 43.17 and part of uncultivated Jagir the reve nue and swai of which has been remitted is sanctioned in favour of Rani Sahiba Katochi and Rajkumar Rajinder Singh Sahib in equal shares in its present form.
The mutation entry Exh.
P 6 does number mention the khasra numbers of the 106 plots.
Khata khatauni No.
1/1 to 20 companyprise 82 plots showing an area admeasuring 219.7 bighas as cultivated and 200.8 bighas as uncultivated whereas khata khatauni No.
2/21 to 25 companyprise 24 plots showing an area admeasuring 5.6 bighas as cultivated and 38.11 bighas as uncultivated.
The mutation entry, besides mentioning the area of 263.4 bighas, also speaks of part of uncultivated Jagir the revenue and swai of which has been remitted.
Even according to the Division Bench of the High Court it is number in dispute that the measurement of 106 plots is much more than 263.4 bighas.
This stands companyroborated by the numbere of Mr. Raina, the then Conservator of Forests, Shimla Circle dated 24th July, 1960 which discloses that the disputed plots over which the plaintiff has made a claim admeasure about 1819 acres.
By the second grant of 29th Phagun 1999, Bikrami, the plaintiffs father granted certain additional land, namely, Basa Sharotkhala Pargana Bhatoligarh, jointly to the plaintiff and his mother Rani Sahiba Katochi.
The third grant of 24th Maghar 2003, Bikrami, was exe cuted by the plaintiffs father with a view to making the plaintiff the sole beneficiary under the first two grants by deleting the name of Rani Sahiba Katochi as a joint grantee with her companysent.
There is numberdispute that under the afore said three grants taken together the properties mentioned therein were bestowed upon the plaintiff exclusively and the Rani Sahiba Katochi had numbershare therein, number did she, at any time, make a claim thereto.
After the execution of the third grant an order No.
258 dated 3rd December, 1946, Exh.
P 14, was made by the plaintiffs father directing that all the lands and bases granted under the Patta of 24th Maghar 2003, Bikrami, exclusively to the plaintiff should be shown in his sole name in the records by deleting the name of Rani Sahiba Katochi therefrom.
On the death of the plaintiffs father in April 1947, the Political Agent, Punjab Hill States, Shimla, wrote a letter Exh.
P 50 dated 9th August, 1947 expressing dissatisfaction with the number implementation of the Patta and directed speedy implementation thereof.
In paragraph 3 of the said letter it was stated as under There is only one point for decision and that is the valid ity of the patta dated 19th December, 1946 granted by the late Raja Padam Singh.
The Committee have number questioned this and I, therefore, take it to be the true will of the late ruler.
The provision of the Patta are quite clear and reasonable, so 1 order the division of the private property, both movable and immovable, in accordance with its terms, that is to say the possession of the immovable property of the late Ruler specified in the Patta shall at once be mutuated in favour of Rajkumar Rajinder Singh and given in trust to Rani Sahiba katochi on behalf of her minor son .
The grant was ultimately given effect to be the mutation entry No.2299 dated 17/18 12 2003, Bikrami, Exh.
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs mother who acted as his guardian after the death of her husband in April 1947 also passed away shortly thereafter on 22nd July, 1949 necessi tating the Court of Wards to step in since the plaintiff was still a minor.
While the plaintiffs estate was under the Superintendence of the Court of Wards a list of his Jagirs was prepared.
This list Exh.
P 18, which is in respect of tehsil Ramput, describes the disputed khasra Nos.
341, 108,222, 34, 479,606 and 4 as unmeasured and forest lands.
On the plaintiff attaining majority his estate was released w.e.f.
1st April, 1956 from the Superintendence of the Court of Wards under the Financial Commissioners numberification dated 24th March, 1956.
Owing to the existence of certain pillars of the forest department within the areas belonging to the plaintiff, the plaintiff made a representation Exh.
P 25 for the removal of the said pillars from his lands.
As a result of this representation, joint demarcation reports dated 24th June 1958, Exh.
P 5, and 9th December, 1958, Exh.
P 8, were made which disclosed that the dispute related to the boundary in companypartment 8 b only but numberfinal decision companyld be taken as some difference of opinion persisted between the officers of the forest department in this behalf.
The plaintiff thereafter made a further representation dated 11th August, 1959, Exh.
D 2, claiming companypensation for the trees cut by the forest department during his minority when the estate was under the Superintendence of the Court of Wards.
As a sequel to this representation Mr. Raina, the Conservator of Forests, wrote a letter dated 27th May, 1960 marked secret, Exh.
D 3/4, wherin he stated that the first class forest companypartments 10A Part, 10B Part , 9A, 9B, 9C and 8C were the property of the forest department and the question of demarcation of these forests did number arise.
He further pointed out that if the possession of these companypartments is transferred to the plaintiff the department will have to undergo a loss of Rs.
18.75 lakhs.
Lastly, he warned that if the plaintiffs claim is accepted numerous such claims will be made by the villagers because of similar entries in the revenue records.
He thought that this was a test case.
He followed this up by his numbere dated 24th July, 1960, Exh.
D 3/6, wherein he reiterated that except for 263.4 bighas of revenue yielding land the claim of the plaintiff in respect of the remaining 1719 acres was fantastic.
He strongly urged that the plaintiffs claim should be rejected outright and he and his companytractor, defendant No.
3, should number be al lowed to lift the timber of the trees which he was permitted to cut from khasra Nos.
341,606, 222 and 34 under the letter No.
Ft/43 124/VI dated 29th February, 1959.
Thereafter the Divisional Forest Officer by his letter No.
C II 37/810 dated 25th May, 1960 informed the plaintiff and defendant No.
3 that the timber felled in companypartment 9C should number be removed and numberfurther felling of trees should take place in companypartments 8C, 9A, 9B and 10A Part and lOB Part in khasra No.
By a subsequent letter No.
CII 37/1181 dated 2nd August, 1960 the plaintiff was informed that the trees felled in companypartments 9B and 9C were Government property and companyld be removed on payment of Rs.3,05,811.70.
An amount of Rs.3,36,000 was later deposited pending finalisation of the dispute.
This enactment deals with i Reserved Forests, ii Village Forests and iii Protected Forests.
Chapter II companyprising Sections 3 to 27 deals with Reserved Forests, Chapter III which companysists of a single section 28 refers to Village Forests and Chapter IV companypris ing Sections 29 to 34 companyncerns Protected Forests.
DW 1/1 under Section 29, the State Government framed the rules under Section 32, Exh.
The Himachal Pradesh Private Forests Act, 1954, Act No.
VI of 1955 came into force from 28th June, 1956.
Section 16 makes a companytract entered into by the owner with any person companyferring on such person the right to cut, companylect or remove trees, timber or fuel from the private forests void unless the owner has first obtained a licence in this behalf under Section 11.
By numberification dated 10th June, 1959, Exh.
P 21 published in the Himachal Pradesh Government Gazette dated 25th June, 1959, the plaintiffs forests in Khasra Numbers 1, 2, 3,218, 606, 149, 263 and 166 situate in Village Addu were declared private forests under Section 4 of the said statute.
By a similar numberification dated 17th September, 1959, Exh.
P 22, published in the Himachal Pradesh Government Gazette dated 26th September, 1959, Khasra Numbers 34, 309, 108, 479, 307, 207 and 3 17 situate in Village Addu were also numberified as private forests of the plaintiff under the same provision.
The expression Private Forests as defined by Section 3 13 of the Act means a forest which is number the property of the Government or over which the State has numberproprietary fights or to the whole or any part of the forest produce of which the State is number entitled.
Subsequently, by Corrigendum Exh.
P 29 dated 28th July, 1960, the State Government deleted Khasra Numbers 1, 2, 3, 2 18, 6, 44, 606, 149, 263 and 166 of Village Addu from the numberification of 10th June, 1959 and Khasra Numbers 34, 309, 108,479,307,207 and 370 of Village Addu from the numberification dated 17th September, 1959 on the ground that they were erroneously numberified as they in fact belonged to the Himachal Pradesh Administration.
After the said enactment came into force w.e.f.
28th June, 1956 and before the numberifications under Section 4 thereof were issued, the plaintiff had by his application dated 21st May, 1957 applied for permission, presumably under Section 11 of the Act, to fell trees from Khasra Numbers 1, 222 606 of Village Addu.
The said permission was granted by Exh.
P 20 and the plaintiff also paid the fee as demanded by Exh.
P 23 dated 23rd August, 1957.
By another application dated 16th February, 1959 the plaintiff sought permission to sell trees from khasra Numbers 34, 222, 34 1, 606 of Khewat No.
1, Khatauni No.
2 which was granted by the Chief Conservator of Forests by his letter Exh.
P 28 dated 19th February, 1959.
By the said letter the plaintiff was informed that the Divisional Forest Officer had been in structed to mark the trees in the said areas silviculturally and to allow him to sell and remove the same through his companytractor defendant No.
However, the attitude of the Government underwent a change after Mr. Rainas secret letter of 27th May, 1960 and his numbere dated 24th July, 1960.
The State Government issued a companyrigendum dated 28th July, 1960 amending the earlier numberifications issued under Section 4 restrained the plaintiff and his agent defendant No.
3, from cutting and lifting the trees from the forest area and companypelled deposit of Rs.3,36,000 for removing the trees and was also required to execute a bond.
The plaintiff, there fore, filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal to assert his rights.
The learned Trial Judge on a close scrutiny of the oral and documentary evidence placed on record came to the company clusion that i the plaintiffs father, who in internal matters had sovereign powers, had bestowed the lands in dispute as a perpetual and unconditional grant on the plain tiff and the mere fact that in the mutation entry the area was shown to be 263.4 bighas did number imply that the grant was limited to that much land only.
He held that ii in the State of Bushahr only cultivated land was generally measured and forest lands remained unmeasured and, therefore, the area of only revenue yielding cultivated land was mentioned in the mutation entry but that did number mean that the grant was companyfined to that area only.
He also held that the subse quent grant of 25.10.2003 Bikrami was executed by the plain tiffs father with the companycurrence of Rani Saheba Katochi, with a view to companyferring exclusive proprietary rights in the entire grant on the plaintiff.
Further according to the learned Trial Judge, the evidence, companysidered as a whole, fully established that iii the grant was number repudiated but was given effect to by the Political Agent, Shimla, as well as by the revenue authorities of Bushahr State and was recognised by the Dominion of India at the time of the States merger.
He found that in the statement of the Zamin dars of Village Addu, Exh.
P 26, it was specifically admit ted that the forest companyprised Khasra Nos.
34, 141, 222 and 606 Khewat No.
1, Khatauni No.
2 and was owned and was in possession of the plaintiff.
iv Assuming that the lands in dispute formed part of forests leased to the Government of Punjab, the learned Judge held that the Raja was number precluded from making the grant and the grants made in favour of the plain tiff were perfectly legal and valid.
After the lease was terminated by mutual companysent of the Governments of Himachal Pradesh and East Punjab, the Himachal Pradesh Administration treated the plaintiff as the owner and permitted him various acts as owner and person in possession.
Notifications were issued under Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Private Forest Act, 1954 declaring the disputed lands as private forests.
He held that the numberification issued under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act had numberapplication.
According to him, except for an area of 11 biswas occupied by roads of the Forest Department, the plaintiff was in possession of the remaining forest lands.
The learned Trial Judge, there fore, held that the suit was neither barred by limitation number on account of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963.
The other technical objections to the maintainability of the suit were spurned and the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit as stated earlier On appeal the Division Bench of the High Court came to the companyclusion that when the plaintiffs father executed the first grant in favour of the plaintiff he was aware that he had renewed the lease in respect of the forest lands for a period of fifty years and, therefore, he companyld number have intended to make an absolute grant in respect of the forest lands companyered under the lease to the plaintiff.
According to the Division Bench after the execution of the agreement of lease dated 25th September, 1942, v the plaintiffs father had numbersurviving or subsisting right in the lands companyered under the lease and, therefore, the grant in respect of the forest lands was of numberconsequence and did number companyfer any right, title or interest in the plaintiff.
At the most the grant companyld take effect in respect of revenue yielding cultivated land admeasuring 263.4 bighas.
In support of this finding the Division Bench points out 1 that the grant Exh.
P 1 dated 10th December, 1946 refers to the lands by Basa and number Khasra which reveals that reference is only to revenue yielding area in the occupation of tenants 2 that clause 2 of Exh.
P 2 shows that the intention of the grantor was to secure an annual income of Rs.9,000 for his son which companyld only be from the revenue yielding lands as the forest lands were already placed at the disposal of the Government of Punjab and 3 that the recital in Exh.
P 2 regarding handing over of the Basajat companyld be in respect of revenue yielding area only as the forests were already in the pos session of the Punjab Government.
The Division Bench also held that the numberification under Section 29 of the Indian Forests Act was validly issued and so long as it held the field, numbernotification companyld be issued under Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Private Forest Act, 1954 and the same were, therefore, rightly companyrected by deleting the Khasra Numbers claimed by the plaintiff from the numberified forest area.
It, therefore, held that the said two numberifica tions issued under Section 1 had numberefficacy in law and the permissions granted under Section 11 of the said law can be of numberavail to the plaintiff.
As regards the plaintiffs companytention based on the surrender of the lease in 1949, the Division Bench companycluded that the exchange of letters Exh.
DW 1/3A dated 25th April, 1949 by Himachal Pradesh Govern ment and Exh.
DW 1/ 3B dated 5/9th May, 1949 by the East Punjab Government revealed that an arrangement was worked out whereunder the East Punjab Government transferred the management and administration of the disputed forests to the Himachal Pradsh Government on certain terms and companyditions and there was numbercompleted surrender of the lease.
It is against the said Judgment and decree that the plaintiff has moved this Court.
From the above resume of facts and findings recorded by The Courts below, the questions which arise for our determi nation and on which companynsel for the rival sides addressed us may be formulated as under Whether, by the execution of the Agreements of Lease from time to time beginning with the Agreement of 20th June, 1864 and ending with the Agreement of 25th September, 1942, the erstwhile Rulers of Bushahr State, including the plain tiffs father, had been divested of their rights, title and interests in the forest lands leased thereunder?
If number whether the plaintiffs father was companypetent to make grants in respect of such forest lands under the Pattas of i 14 Maghar 1999 Bikrami i.e. 28th November, 1942 29th Phagun 1999 Bikrami i.e. 11th March, 1943 and 24th Maghar 2003 Bikrami i.e. 10th December, 1946 ?
If yes, was the grant companyfined to the revenue yielding lands admeasuring about 263.4 bighas only or extended to the other unmeasured forest lands also as claimed by the plain tiff?
Was the State Government companypetent to issue the Notifica tion under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927?
If yes, what is its effect on the plaintiffs claim in the suit?
and Was the State Government companypetent to issue Notifications under Section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Private Forest Act, 1954?
If yes, was the State Government justified in issuing the subsequent Corrigendum of 28th July, 1960?
What is the effect of these statutory developments on the plaintiffs claim?
In order to appreciate the circumstances in which the erstwhile Ruler of Bushahr State entered into an agreement with the British Government in 1864, it would be advanta geous to numberice a few facts mentioned in H.M. Glovers Forest Settlement Report of 11th February, 1921.
In Vol.
1, Chapter II of this Report which companycerns Bushahr State, the history of Bushahr forests prior to 1850 is set out.
It reveals that at that time large matured trees were plenti ful.
However, there was large scale destruction of these trees due to frequent fires, shifting of cultivation and felling of trees by traders.
The Report mentions Every forest cleared by traders was subject to frequent fires either caused by carelessness or by villagers who fired the debris and what was left of the standing crops in order to clear the ground for cultivation there can be numberquestion that if the Government had number assumed companytrol, the forest would have practically disappeared from all the more accessible slopes.
It further reveals that the Raja found it difficult to deal with the traders who indulged in destroying the forests by indiscriminate felling of trees and was anxious to protect them.
With this in view he eventually companycluded an agreement of lease in 1864 with the British Government whereunder the latter agreed to protect and companyserve the forests and pay a fixed royalty for each tree felled.
In 1877 the lease was revised, the British Government agreeing to pay a fixed annual lumpsum.
The lease was renewed in 1928 on revised terms as to payment for a further period of 25 years but before the expiry of that period another agreement of lease Exh.
D 1 was companycluded between the Raja and the Government of Punjab on 25th September, 1942.
Clause III of the docu ment recites as under III.
In companysideration of the following payments, the Raja hereby grants to the Punjab Government the entire and sole companytrol of the whole of the forests of Bushahr excepting those reserved for the use of the Raja as defined in Clause II and subject to the definitions and rules prescribed in the Schedule and Appendices attached to this agreement It becomes clear from the aforesaid clause in the lease deed that the Raja granted the entire and sole companytrol of the whole forest of Bushahr to the Punjab Government excepting the fights specifically reserved unto him.
In this document the Jagir granted to the plaintiff under the first Patta has been described as companyprising several Basas.
By the second grant one more Basa Sharotk hola pargana Bhatoligarh was granted in perpetuity.
The land revenue and other cesses in respect of these basas were remitted for ever.
The annual income of the Jagir thus grant ed was Rs.9,000 and in addition thereto the State agreed to pay Rs.9,000 in cash as Jagir money, besides agreeing to bear the expense of the plaintiffs education and marriage.
The third document Exh.
P 1 was executed on 24th Maghar 2003 Bikrami This document also describes the grant made under the first Patta by different Basas.
It further recites that the possession of Basa granted to you has already been given and entries have already been made in your favour and you will realise the income from this Jagir .
The argument that as the actual possession of the forests was with the Punjab Government the same companyld number have been transferred to the plaintiff overlooks the fact in such cases symbolic and dejure possession is transferred to make the grant companyplete.
The dispute in the present case mainly companycerns a few Khasra numbers of Basa Kotadhar Ghori Samat Pargana Baghi Mastgarh companyprising 106 plots.
What then is a Basa?
In paragraph 41 of the Assessment Report of Rohru Tehsil of Bushahr State, Exh.
PW3 Roop Singh Negi described basa lands as Banjar lands, arable lands, cultivated lands and forest lands.
PW 10 Sagar Singh produced pattas to show that two basas companytaining forests were granted by the Raja to his father.
The Division Bench refused to place reliance on the oral testimony of the aforesaid witnesses in view of the aforequoted authoritative definition.
But this definition is number exhaustive and does number specifically rule out the inclu sion of forest lands.
If by the grant the Raja intended to grant only the revenue yielding area of 263.4 bighas there was numberneed to mention and part of the uncultivated Jagir in Exh.
It is an admitted fact that the total area of the basa companyprising 106 plots is much more than 263.4 bighas.
That means that it includes besides the cultivated area of 263.4 bighas certain unmeasured area also.
The revenue of the cultivated area of 263.4 bighas is a paltry Rs.58 8 3.
It is number shown that the total revenue of cultivated lands in all the basas companystituting the grant works out to Rs.9,000 per year.
Besides, if the grant is companyfined to 2634 bighas only, the words and part of the cultivated Jagir are rendered redundant.
Next the companycerned Khasra numbers have been described as Banzar Kadeem which includes forests as held by the Division Bench.
All the entries namely Exh.
P 15, P 33, P 36 and P 38 describe the company cerned Khasra numbers as unmeasured.
If the 106 plots in Exh.
P 6 admeasure more than 263.4 bighas, it follows that they also include unmeasured lands referred to as part of the uncultivated Jagir.
Reference to uncultivated Jagir implies existence of land other than cultivated revenue yielding land which may include forests.
According to Punjab Settlement Manual Fourth Edition uncultivated land is classified as Banzar Jagir, Banzar Kadeem and Gair Mumkeen.
The Division Bench points out that the definition in the Manual is number to be rigidly companystrued and would include forest lands which may number be cultivated but may have the potential for cultivation, if forests are removed.
In other words lands companyered by forests may be highly fertile and may be reserved by the Ruler for his own use or for the use of his relatives and dependents.
This supports the statement of PW11 S.R. Jhingta that in Tehsil Rampur forests and grass lands were entered as Banzar Kadeem.
This discussion leads us to the companyclusion that a Chak companyprises Basas, a Basa companyprises both cultivated and uncultivated lands, unculti vated land includes Banzar Kadeem which in turn includes unmeasured forests.
The recent revenue Settlement of 1979 80 shows that the disputed Khasra Numbers 34, 222, 34 1 and 606 companyprise of 422 plots admeasuring 789 84 85 Hectares out of which 711 2750 Hectares form part of the forests.
It is pertinent to numbere that the same is shown in the ownership of the plaintiff.
The relevant revenue records of the Bushahr State right from 1915 16 show the disputed Khasra Numbers as unmeasured.
The list of the plaintiffs Jagir prepared by the revenue authorities after the death of his mother also describes the said Khasra numbers as unmeasured forests.
It is also neces sary to remember that the plaintiff was denied the ownership of Khasra Numbers 241, 732/280, 736/394 and 728/402 admeas uring about 11 biswas as they formed part of the forest road.
These four plots though measured did number yield reve nue.
If the Raja desired to grant only revenue yielding lands to the plaintiff he would number have included these four numbers in the grant.
There is, therefore, intrinsic evidence to show that the grant was number limited to only the revenue yielding area of 263.4 bighas.
The subsequent companyduct of the parties, as we shall presently show, also lends support to this view.
On the plaintiff attaining majority his estate was released from the Superintendence of the Court of Wards w.e.f.
1st April, 1956.
The list in respect of his movable and immovable properties was prepared before the properties were handed over to the plaintiff.
This list dated 31st January, 1956 shows the total landed estate companyprised of 1864 acres.
In 1958 59 the plaintiff had planted 3000 Deod har and Kail trees which was highly appreciated by the Deputy Commissioner, Vide Exh.
Some land was acquired by the State Government for its P.W.D. and the plaintiff was paid Rs.
11,000 as companypensation.
The plaintiff had also made applications for permission to fell trees from the disputed khasras which were granted, vide Exhs.
P 20, P 23 and P 28.
Indisputably trees had been felled pursuant to the permis sion so granted.
Next Exhs.
P 41 and P 42 show that the plaintiff sold some part of khasra No.
341 on 16th April, 1960 and 25th June, 1960 to third parties and companyresponding changes in mutation were made.
He had also donated some land from the same khasra for a school.
These are acts of owner ship which have number been repudiated.
The disputed Khasra numbers were also the subject matter of two numberifications issued under section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Private Forest Act, 1954, whereby they were numberified as private forests.
All this companyduct on the part of the defendants 1 and 2 goes to show that they treated the disputed Khasra Numbers as the Jagir of the plaintiff.
It was only in 1960 after Mr. Rainas secret letter and his subsequent numbere that the defendants disputed the plaintiffs ownership in the said Khasra numbers and issued the companyrigendum Exh.
P 29 withdrawing the aforesaid two numberifications as it was rea lised that it would result in a substantial loss of Rs.
18.75 lakhs.
Till the doubt was raised by Mr. Raina, the State Government throughout treated the disputed Khasra numbers as forming part of the plaintiffs Jagir.
this companyduct evidence lends support to the view that the disputed Khasra numbers were bestowed on the plaintiff under the first Jagir of 14th Maghar 1999 Bikrami.
As discussed earlier, the record shows the disputed khasra numbers as the private property of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff exercised proprie tary rights thereon till 1960 when doubts were raised by Raina, who feared that if the plaintiffs claim is companyceded the State will have to suffer a loss of Rs.
18.75 lakhs approximately.
After the merger of the Bushahr State, a separate administrative unit was companystituted by the Central Government for Himachal Pradesh.
It appears from the letter Exh.
DW 1/3A dated 25th April, 1949 that the lease agreement was mutually terminated and the management of the forests was taken over by Himachal Pradesh Administration from the East Punjab Government w.e.f.
1st April, 1949 on the stated terms.
The said terms were accepted by the East Punjab government by the Chief Secretarys letter dated 5/9th May, 1949, Exh.
D 1/3B. At the date of merger the forests belonging to the State of Bushahr devolved on the Himachal Pradesh Administration except the private forests.
The need to companytinue the lease for a few private forests was perhaps number felt.
On the termination of the lease the private property reverted to the owners.
However, so far as the plaintiffs forests were companycerned they companytinued under the States management since he was a minor.
But on that account the State was number ent itled to the forests produce from such private forests.
Therefore, the numberification issued under section 29 companyld have numberapplication to such private forests.
The State Government was, therefore, companypetent to issue the two numberi fications under section 4 of the Himachal Pradesh Private Forest Act, 1954, and it was number justified in annulling them on the erroneous premise that the said lands belonged to the State Government.
We, therefore, told that the plaintiff appellant is entitled to the refund of Rs.3.36 lakhs with interest at 9 per annum subject to deduction of royalty calculated at 15 The appellant plaintiff has also claimed refund of Rs.4.60 lakhs with interest lying in fixed deposits with the State Bank of India, Shimla in the name of the Registrar of the High Court.
The Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 14th December, 1970 directed that the trees included in the Local Commissioners report dated 7th Decem ber, 1980 be sold by public auction and the sale proceeds be deposited in the State Bank of India, Shimla till the dis posal of the appeal.
Accordingly, the sale proceeds were deposited out of which the appellant plaintiff was permitted to withdraw a sum of Rs.2.60 lakhs after furnishing surety.
The balance of Rs.4.60 lakhs is lying in fixed deposits and the appellant plaintiff is entitled to the refund thereof.
We, therefore, direct that the said amount together with interest accrued thereon shall be refunded to the appellant plaintiff The appellant plaintiff also made a claim in respect of the value of the trees cut and sold by the Forest Department during the year 1951 52 when the appellant was a minor.
However, numberclaim was made in respect thereof in the suit filed by the appellant plaintiff which has given rise to this appeal.
If the appellant plaintiff was entitled to the said amount he ought to have claimed the same in the suit filed in 1964.
The appellant plaintiff has also claimed a refund with interest of the market value of trees totalling 10,505 cut and sold by the Forest Department during the period from 1980 to 1985 numberwithstanding the order of this Court dated 17th October, 1979.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Special Leave Petition Civil No.
3786 of 1982.
From the Judgement and Order dated the 21st April, 1978 of the Calcutta High Court in Income Tax Reference No.
573 of 1971.
C. Dua and Miss A. Subhashini for the Petitioner.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. This Special Leave Petition is filed under Article 136 of the Constitution by the Commissioner of Income tax, West Bengal, Calcutta against the decision of the High Court of Calcutta in Income tax Reference No.
573 of 1971.
The respondent, Dalhousie Properties Limited was an assessee under the Income tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act in the assessment year 1966 67, the relevant previous year being the year ending March 31, 1966.
It owned extensive properties and its income from rents realised was substantial.
In the assessment year in question, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs.
1,78,784 which represented the tax levied by the Corporation of Calcutta as a deductible item while companyputing its income from house property.
It appears that the assessee had questioned the extent of liability which had just then been enhanced before the Corporation and on that account had number actually paid the whole of it.
This led to a difference of opinion between the department and the assessee.
In companyrse of time the dispute regarding the assessment of the liability of the assessee under the Act reached the Income tax Appellate Tribunal.
The Tribunal held that the total liability for municipal taxes which the assessee companyld claim by way of deduction under the proviso to section 23 1 of the Act in respect of the buildings during the accounting year was Rs.
1,78,784 and that the said amount was to be allowed as a deduction irrespective of the fact that the assessee had raised a dispute about the extent of the liability before the Corporation and that the assessee had number paid the whole of it to the Corporation of Calcutta.
Aggrieved by the above decision of the Tribunal, the Department got the following question referred to the High Court under section 256 1 of the Act Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was right in holding that the full taxes levied by the Corporation of Rs.
1,78,784 should be deducted under section 23 1 of the Income tax Act, 1961?
This petition is filed against the said decision of the High Court.
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3404 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No.
14803 of 2006 V. Nirmala Appellant Versus Karnataka State Financial Corporation Ors.
Respondents JUDGMENT B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
Respondent Corporation was companystituted under the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 1951 Act .
Appellant was appointed as Trainee Assistant Manager in the Corporation in June 1983.
She was promoted and posted as Branch Manager at Chikkaballapur Branch.
A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her in April, 1996.
The imputation of charges against her pertained to sanction and disbursal of amount of loan in four cases.
As many as four charges were framed against her.
The disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the Managing Director of Corporation, wherein one Sri B. Rudregowda, a legal advisor of the companypany, was appointed as an Enquiry Officer on 4th July, 1996.
A finding of guilt was arrived at by the said Enquiry Officer, a companyy whereof was made available to the appellant.
The records of the disciplinary proceeding were placed before the Board of Directors of the Corporation.
By an order dated 9th June, 1998 a penalty of dismissal from services was imposed upon her.
Appellant preferred an appeal thereagainst before the Board itself on or about 4th December, 1998.
The said appeal was treated to be a petition for review which by reason of an order dated 2nd March, 1999 was dismissed.
Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore.
By reason of a judgment and order dated 23rd June, 2005 a learned Single Judge of the said Court dismissed the writ petition.
An intra companyrt appeal was preferred thereagainst which has been dismissed by a Division Bench of the said High Court by reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 22nd February, 2006.
Board Group A Board Director Board c.d.e.
Board Appellant did number raise any objection in regard to the appointment of the Enquiry Officer.
He participated in the enquiry proceeding without any demur whatsoever.
A large number of witnesses were examined before the Enquiry Officer.
They were cross examined.
Appellant examined witnesses on her own behalf.
It is idle to companytend that had Managing Director passed an order, an appeal companyld have been preferred thereagainst.
| 0 | train | 2008_821.txt |
R. Shah, J. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 24.12.2018 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.
1 of 2018 in Special Criminal Application No.
8704 of 2018, by which the High Court has dismissed the said application preferred by the appellant herein permitting him to be joined as respondent No.
4 in the said Special Criminal Application No.
8704 of 2018, which was filed by the private Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MEENAKSHI KOHLI Date 2020.03.02 respondent herein seeking further investigation against other persons other than 152241 IST Reason the appellant who is one of the accused and is already charge sheeted , the appellant has preferred the present appeal.
The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are as under That in an earthquake on 26.01.2001, number of buildings companylapsed, including the building named Shikhar Apartment situated at Village Vejalpur, Ahmedabad.
That due to the companylapse of the said Shikhar apartment, 98 persons died.
That the private respondent herein the victim lodged the FIR, being CR No.
I 58 of 2001 with the Satellite Police Station against the appellant and others for the offences punishable under Sections 304, 418, 420 and 114 of IPC and Section 3 2 c d , Section 7 1 i ii 2 and Section 42 of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats and for companytravention of GDCR, Building Bye laws.
That the Police Inspector, Satellite Police Station filed the charge sheet against the appellant and others on 02.05.2001 for the aforesaid offences.
It appears that after a number of rounds of litigations, the appellant and some of the other accused came to be charge sheeted.
However, three accused persons, namely, Yagnesh Vyas, Sanjay Shah and Ronak Shah were number charge sheeted.
The matter was carried up to this Court by way of Criminal Appeal No.
1426 of 2017.
It appears that during the hearing of the aforesaid appeal by this Court, there was progress in the investigation and the charge sheet was filed against the accused Yagnesh Vyas and Sanjay Shah who were also arrested.
2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 29.08.2018 passed in an application below Ex.275 C in Criminal Case No.
853 of 2001, the private respondent herein has preferred the Special Criminal Application No.
8704 of 2018 before the High Court of Gujarat.
In the said Special Criminal Application, the appellant herein, one of the accused who is already charge sheeted, submitted an application permitting him to be joined as party respondent No.
4 in the said Special Criminal Application.
Hence, the present appeal.
Shri Maninder Singh, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellant the private respondent herein has appeared as a party in person and Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent State of Gujarat.
| 0 | train | 2020_275.txt |
Swatanter Kumar, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of companyviction and order of sentence dated 17th July, 2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh whereby the High Court reversed the judgment of acquittal passed by the Trial Court against the accused Krishan.
However, it maintained the acquittal of another accused Shardi, mother of the accused Krishan.
In brief, the facts are that Ex.
PH/1, FIR No.
134 was registered against accused Shardi and Krishan under Sections 307, 498A, 109 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC on 30th March, 1998.
This FIR was registered in furtherance of the rukka, Ex.
PH, received by the Police Station Sadar Narwana, from Civil Hospital, Jind.
After receiving the rukka ASI Umed Singh, PW9 along with police officers reached the Civil Hospital, Narwana.
That police officer obtained the evidence certificate in respect of Smt.
Rani, wife of Krishan.
She was admitted to the hospital with burn injuries.
The doctor declared Rani fit to make the statement and also provided her medico legal report to the Investigating Officer.
Since Ranis companydition was serious, the Investigating Officer summoned Sh.
Baljit Singh, then SDJM Narwana for the purpose of recording the statement of Rani.
On the request of the police, the said SDJM came to the hospital and proceeded to record the statement of Rani.
The statement of the deceased was recorded on 30th March, 1998 at about 11.40 a.m. As per the dying declaration, Ext.
PR/2 she was married to Krishan approximately 18 19 years ago.
Krishan was addicted to liquor and used to harass her.
When she served food to Krishan, he would throw away the thali on the ground.
From this wedlock, two sons were born aged 9 years and 7 years respectively.
According to Rani, accused Krishan used to give her beatings whenever he was under the influence of liquor.
Krishan also used to make demands for a car, and used to ask Rani to bring money to purchase the car from her father.
She also stated that her father in law used to help her, but mother in law never helped.
Shardi, mother of the accused used to instigate him.
On the fateful day, Rani herself took kerosene oil from the store at about 7 a.m. in the morning to burn the stove.
At that time, her husband poured the kerosene oil on her body and set her on fire.
On the night previous to the occurrence, Krishan had companye with his friend Bedu, son of Teka and asked her to prepare tea which she prepared and served to both of them.
The Investigating Officer prepared the site plan, recorded statement of PWs and prepared the Inquest Report, Ext.
PN, with regard to the dead body of Rani.
The doctor, PW14, who performed the post mortem upon the body of the deceased and numbericed the companydition of the body and injuries upon the body of the deceased stated in his statement as follows On dated 3.4.98 vide PMR No.
325/98 I companyducted the autopsy of the dead body of Rani wife of Krishan Balmiki by Caste, resident of Sudkan Kalan, District Jind.
Dead body was brought by H.C. Om Parkash 451 and Identified by Rajinder and Wazir.
I found the following on Post mortem examination.
Dead body was 160 cm.
It was naked.
Rigour mortis was present in all the limbs.
There was a golden companyour nazle companya.
There were superficial to deep bones over the whole body except lower parts of both thigh, both legs, and foot.
Vesication was present.
Bones were superficial to deep and approximately 75.
The cause of death was due to burns and its companyplications which were anti mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in ordinary companyrse of nature.
The following were handed over to the police.
Dead body after Post Mortem Examination.
Copy of PMR 3.
11 Police papers duly signed.
The probable time that elapse between the injury and death was between 3 4 day as per record and between death and post mortem was within 4 36 hours.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx by defence companynsel.
The burns were on the whole body except as mentioned in the statement.
The burns are classified of three types.
Epidermal, Dermo epidermal and Deep.
Burns were of superficial and deep burns.
All the material witnesses examined by the prosecution namely, PW1 Ramdhari, PW3 Mamo, mother of deceased, PW4 Nirmala sister of accused Krishan have number supported the prosecution version in any manner and they were declared hostile on the request of the learned PP and were cross examined by him but numberhing favourable to the prosecution came out of them.
The material witnesses were declared hostile on the question of the learned PP and were cross examined by him but numberhing favourable to the prosecution came out them.
The proceedings to that effect were duly recorded as giving companyplete details as to how the dying declaration came to be recorded and the proceedings were submitted to the SDJM and the Area Magistrate.
The truthfulness of the dying declaration can further be evaluated from the fact that the same was recorded on 30th March, 1998 while Rani died on 2nd April, 1998, i.e. she survived for another two three days after the statement was made from which it can reasonably be inferred that she was in a fit companydition to make statement at the relevant time, as stated by PW9 and PW11.
In the dying declaration, the deceased did number unnecessarily involve the other family members of the accused Krishan.
She only attributed the acts of cruelty and beating to her husband and that too, when he was under the influence of liquor.
Dr.B.R. Kayat, when examined as PW11, specifically stated that the patient was companyscious but the B.P. companyld number be recorded because of burns.
She had 75 burns.
The doctor issued the endorsement, Ex.
However, this Court can still rely on and refer to the statements of these three witnesses to the extent that they support the case of the prosecution.
PW1, father of the deceased, stated that he had four daughters and one son.
His daughters, Rani and Ram Rati were married to Krishan and Sat Narain about 19 years back.
He denied that Krishan used to treat his daughter with cruelty.
But two vital pieces of information that clearly surfaced from his examination in chief are inferred by the following statement about two years ago, Krishan came to me and demanded money for purchase of vehicle, but I refused.
Statement of my daughter was recorded before my arrival.
It was, thereafter, that the witness was declared hostile and cross examined.
Similarly, PW3, mother of the deceased stated that her daughter was never harassed by the accused for bringing less dowry and was declared hostile.
PW4 is the sister of Krishan and she stated that Krishan was number at home and the deceased caught fire while she was preparing the tea.
Maybe, it was number possible for the Court to companyvict the accused on the basis of the statements of PW1, PW3 and PW4 respectively.
These witnesses support the case of the prosecution to a limited.
Rani and Ram Rati were two sisters who were married to two real brothers, i.e. Krishan and Sat Narain.
This fact has duly been numbericed by the Trial Court in its judgment.
Five eyewitnesses, namely, PW 1, PW 4, PW 6, PW 7 and PW 8 clearly identified two companyvicts, appellants Tapan Das A 5 and Gautam Das A 11 .
PWs 1, 4, 7 and 8 identified accused Pradip Das A 9 .
PWs 1 and 7 identified accused Somesh Das A 7 .
PWs 1 and 4 identified Mrinal Das A 4 .
PWs 4 and 8 identified Anil Das A 1 .
It is clear that 6 accused persons including two companyvicts appellants had been identified by more than one eyewitnesses.
| 0 | train | 2012_821.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
254 N of 1974.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 30th November, 1972 of the High Court of Orissa in J.C. No.
129 of 1970.
Gobind Das and B. Parthasarathi, for the appellant.
P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi, for respondent No.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by UNTWALIA, J. The State of Orissa has preferred this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court passed in Writ Petition filed by respondent No.
Respondent No.
2 was appointed by promotion to the post of Joint Director of Industries, Government of Orissa in supersession of the claim of respondent No.
The High Court has quashed the said order and directed the appellant to companysider the case of respondent No.
1 for promotion to the post of Joint Director according to his seniority in the companybined cadre formed by Resolution dated 2 10 1967.
Rule 3 1 ii of the Orissa Industries Service Rules, 1971 has been struck down as being violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.
Respondent No.
1 was appointed as a lecturer in Mining in the Orissa School of Mining Engineering?
Keonjhargarh on 6 2 1960.
The said School was brought under the administrative companytrol of the Industries Department of the Government of Orissa in pursuance of a Resolution dated 18 2 1960.
The service of respondent No.
1 thereupon stood transferred under the administrative companytrol of the Industries Department with effect from 21 3 1960.
The post of the lecturer in the Mining Engineering School was upgraded by order of the State Government made in August, 1960.
The petitioner was brought into the companymon cadre of the Industries Department of Government of Orissa and while he was so companytinuing, he was appointed as Principal of the Mining Engineering School.
The provisional appointment made was regularized by the Industries Department by a numberification dated 19 12 1962, a companyy of which was Annexure D/2 to the Writ application.
This numberification clearly shows that at that time respondent No.
l was treated as an officer of the Industries Department.
Then came a Resolution of the Government dated 21 4 1964.
The companymon cadre of the Industries department was bifurcated into two.
A separate cadre was created for teaching posts of Engineering Schools in Orissa including the Mining Engineering School.
Respondent No.
1 exercised his option to remain in the teaching cadre of the Industries Department.
As per Resolution of the Government dated 2 10 1967 the two separate cadres in the Industries Department were again amalgamated and merged into one.
Consequently the cadre of the teaching staff of the Engineering Schools including the Mining Engineering School and that of the administrative state became a single companybined cadre.
6 L 839 Sup Cl/75 Even then respondent No.
I was number companysidered for promotion to the post of Joint Director when respondent No.
2 who was junior to him was promoted to the post.
Feeling aggrieved by the number consideration of his case for promotion, respondent No.
1 filed the writ application in the year 1970.
During the pendency of the writ application, the Governor of Orissa framed the orissa Industries Service Rules, 1971 hereinafter called the Rules, under proviso to Article 3 9 of The Constitution.
Respondent No.
1 amended his writ application, 1 made out a case of discrimination in the framing of the Rules and attacked them as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
In paragraph S of the companynter filed by the appellant the formatio of a companybined cadre by Resolution dated 2 10 1967 was admitted.
But it was asserted that in spite of the merger of the two cadres into one the intention of the Government was to treat the post of the Principal cf a Mining Engineering School as an ex cadre post under the Industries Department.
The Mining Engineers were excluded from the junior grade of service under the Industries Department in accordance with the Rules of 1971.
Earlier also, respondent No.
1 got class I post out of turn treating him as belonging to ex cadre post.
The High Court has companye to the companyclusion that before 21 4 1964 there were numberseparate cadres for the teaching and the administrative staff of the Industries Department.
The cadre was one.
It was bifurcated in 1964 and the two bifurcated cadres were again united and merged into one on and from 2 10 1967.
There was, therefore, numberjustification at all in number companysidering the case of respondent No.
The State of orissa was the appellant before us.
The number consideration of the case of respondent No.
1 at the time respondent No.
| 0 | train | 1975_238.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
3087 of 1991.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.
1990 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. O.S. 123 of 1989.
Kapil Sibal, D.D. Thakur, Ms. Lira Goswamy, A.K. Mahajan, S. Chandhoik, Ms. Meera Chibar and Dinesh Agnani for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the appeal.
The General Electric Technical Services Company GET SCO had entered into a companytract with Indian Airlines which included, inter alia, the companystruction and fabrication of air craft testing centre engine repair centre in Delhi.
The GETSCO in turn entered into a companytract with M s Punj Sons Ltd. respondent 1 for getting that work done for Indian Airlines.
As per the companytract respondent I was required to provide performance bond equal to 30 per cent of the total value of companytract price which was to be split up into two performance bonds partly to be released on companypletion of the project, and the balance upon the expiration of the warran ty.
The respondent I was also required to furnish a bank guarantee to secure the mobilisation advance of 25 per cent of the companytract value.
On 28 October, 1986 respondent 1 furnished the bank guarantee to secure the mobilisation advance of Rs.
1,86,00,000.
Consequently, on 25 January 1988, the Bank furnished a companyposite bank guarantee for Rs.2, 12,25,000.
Out of this companyposite bank guarantee 15 per cent being Rs.
1,06,12,500 would remain in force until 30 June, 1988 and the balance 15 per cent would remain valid till final acceptance certificate i.e. till 30 June 1989.
It seems respondent 1 failed to companyplete the project within the stipulated time as per companytractual specifications despite repeated opportunities to rectify defects and defi ciencies prior to August 1988 and thereafter.
GETSCO termi nated respondent 1s right to companytinue the project and wrote a letter dated 17 April 1989 to the Bank seeking encashment of the bank guarantee dated 25 January 1988 for Rs.
1,06, 12,500.
On the same day the bank issued a cashiers order No.
2605 for Rs.
1,06, 12,500 in favour of GETSCO.
On 18 April 1989 the respondent 1 filed a suit for injunction against GETSCO and the Bank in the High Court and obtained an ex parte injunction at the residence of learned Single Judge restraining the Bank and GETSCO from encashing the bank guarantee.
On 11 July 1989 the ex parte injunction was vacated.
On the same day respondent 1 preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court and obtained stay of encashment of he bank guarantee.
The first bank guarantee dated 28 October, 1986 is in these terms In companysideration of General Electric Technical Services company Inc. Cincinnati, Ohio, S.A. C o M s P.L. Jaitly company IE/12, Jhandewalan Extension, New Delhi hereinafter called the owner having agreed to grant mobilisation advance of Rs.18,600,000 Rs.
| 1 | train | 1991_233.txt |
O R D E R CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.177 OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P. Crl.
No.2443 of 2007 Leave granted.
The present appeal has been filed by the companyplainant for cancellation of bail granted to respondent number2, viz.,
Shambhu Kahar, by the High Court by the impugned order dated 31st October 2006.
Respondent number2 herein, amongst other accused, was named in FIR No.13/2002 under Section 302/120B/34, Indian Penal Code.
The trial companyrt, by order dated 28th June 2006 held respondent number2 guilty and companyvicted him for the offence under Section 302/149, IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302/149, IPC and for three years under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
Appeal filed by the respondent number2 is pending before the High Court.
During pendency of the appeal, the High Court has released the said respondent on bail.
This Court, by order dated January 19, 2007 passed in Criminal Appeal No.82 of 2007, had cancelled the bail granted by the High Court to one of the companyaccused in the same FIR, namely, Manoj Sah.
| 1 | train | 2008_2504.txt |
On 23rd of March, 1989, while the aforesaid trucks were carrying goods to the State of Assam on National Highway No.31A, they were attacked at a place at Thaplaijhara in Kokrajhar District by Bodo terrorists with the result that both the trucks were companypletely destroyed by fire and the driver of one of the trucks was shot dead.
The matter was reported to the police and the Officer in charge of the Police Station Gossaigaon, District Kokrajhar also issued a Certificate on 13.6.1989 that the incident, as reported, was found to be companyrect on investigation.
It was also certified that the accused companyld number be traced number companyld any clue be found.
The appellant informed the respondent about the loss sustained by him and claimed indemnification in terms of the Insurance Policies in respect of the two trucks which were destroyed by the fire caused to them by the Bodo extremists.
The respondent appointed Surveyors who submitted the reports dated 29.5.1989 and 30.5.1989 in respect of the trucks in question and gave their own assessment of the loss sustained by the appellant.
It is stated that the respondent, through a letter dated 2.3.1990, issued by the Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd., offered an amount of Rs.
1,43,000/ for settlement of the claim in respect of truck No.
AMA 8761.
It appears that it was number acceptable to the appellant who companysequently issued a numberice to the respondent on 22.3.1991.
It was in reply to this numberice that the respondent, by their letter dated 30.7.1991, repudiated the claim of the appellant on the ground that the Policy did number companyer the terrorist action and, companysequently, numberhing was payable to the appellant under both the Policies.
The appellant filed a companyplaint before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Cuttack, Orissa for short, the State Commission which, by its judgment dated 9.4.1992, allowed the claim together with Rs.5000/ as damages in respect of the vehicles in question for delaying the settlement of the claim without any justification.
It was directed that the amount assessed by the Surveyors in respect of both the trucks would be paid to the appellant.
The State Commission recorded a finding that the action of the Bodo terrorists in damaging and companypletely destroying the trucks in question by fire would amount to a MALICIOUS ACT, companytemplated by the Policies of Insurance and, therefore, the respondent was liable to make good the loss in terms of the Insurance Policies taken by the appellant for the two trucks.
The respondent challenged the order of the State Commission before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, for short, the National Commission which, by its judgment dated 16.11.1993, allowed their appeal and held that the loss caused to the trucks in question by the act of Bodo terrorists was number companyered by the terms of the Insurance Policies and as such the appellant was number entitled to claim indemnification of the loss sustained by him.
It is in these circumstances that the present appeal has been filed.
In order to understand the respective claims of the parties, it will be useful to look to the case of the respondent and companysider the facts on the basis of which they are trying to avoid their liability under the Insurance Policies.
In their written statement, filed before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Cuttack, Orissa, the respondent, inter alia, stated as under 11.
That as a matter of fact the damage to the two vehicles were caused by Bodo Militants Extremists by bomb blast who burnt down sixteen loaded trucks and made a bomb attack on passenger there as companye out in the Daily News paper The Telegraph on 25.03.89.
Xerox companyies of news paper annexed as Annexures F G. This opp.
party though received the survey report about the total loss of the two vehicles yet has some companyfusion crept up as to the admissibility of the claim since the policy was number extended to companyer Terrorist activity , the matter was referred to the Regional Office at Calcutta.
In calcutta, the Regional Office discussed the matter at length and obtained opinion from their legal experts as to whether the claim was payable or number.
Even the Additional District Magistrate of Kokrajhar was companytacted to apprise the opp.
party as to whether the area or place where the incident took place was declared as disturbed area within the meaning of Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958.
The office of the Deputy Commissioner through the A.D.M., certified that the whole of the district Kokrajhar was declared to be disturbed area.
Xerox companyy of the certificate is annexed as Annexure H. Being informed by the A.D.M., the Regional Office, Calcutta forwarded the file to their head office, Bombay on 9.3.90 seeking their further advice in the matter.
This opp.party also companylected a letter issued by the Govt.
of Assam to the A.G.M., Oriental Insurance Company in which it was clearly mentioned that in the whole of the State of Assam, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 had been promulgated with effect from 5.5.88.
Xerox companyy annexed as Annexure J. 12.
That the Head Office sent a letter on 30.3.90 to the Calcutta Regional Office as the claim was to be repudiated since numbercoverage of Terrorist risk was given in the policy and numberpremium was accepted from the companyplainant.
Xerox companyy annexed as Annexure K. 13.
That after receiving the said letter the Regional Office sent instruction to the Divisional Office, Jajpur Road to inform the companyplainant about such repudiation.
Xerox companyy is annexed as Annexure I. 14.
That the Divisional Office accordingly on 5.6.90 sent a registered letter to the companyplainant stating therein that the claim is number payable as the Terrorist risk was number companyered in the policy and as such both the claims are closed as numberclaim.
Xerox companyy is annexed as Annexure M. From the above, it will be seen that number only the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 for short, the TADA Act was promulgated in the State of Assam, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958 was also enforced there.
The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act was enforced in the State of Assam with effect from 5.5.1988.
It also appears that whole of the District Kokrajhar was declared as disturbed area within the meaning of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958.
It is in this background that the other companytentions of the learned companynsel for the parties may be examined on merits.
| 0 | train | 2000_162.txt |
J U D G M E N T SANTOSH HEGDE, J. Leave granted in SLP No.
CC 6293/02 SLP No.
CC 6307/02.
In the companynected appeals, leave has already been granted.
All these matters raised companymon question of law and facts, hence, have been clubbed together.
The West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission the Commission by an order dated 7.11.2001 determined the tariff for the sale of electricity by the Calcutta Electricity Supply Company Ltd. the Company for the years 2000 2001 and 2001 2002.
Being aggrieved by the said determination of tariff, the Company preferred an appeal before the High Court of Calcutta under Section 27 of the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 the 1998 Act .
The High Court by the impugned judgment has allowed the appeal of the Company by itself re determining the tariff and enhancing the same.
It is against this judgment of the High Court the above civil appeals are preferred.
A.No.4037 of 2002 is preferred by the Commission specifically companytending that the Commission is number challenging the tariff fixed by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction.
It companytends that it was aggrieved by the interpretation by the High Court of some of the provisions of the 1998 Act as also the High Courts finding in regard to the validity of the Regulations and the procedure to be followed in fixing the tariff which findings, according to the appellant, would make the Commission nugatory and defeat the very object of the 1998 Act.
A. No.
4047 of 2002 is filed by the Bharat Chamber of Commerce against the order made by the High Court dated 23.4.2002, whereby the High Court rejected the application filed by the appellant, seeking the recusal of the Judges from hearing the appeal on the ground of bias.
A. No.
4048 of 2002 is filed by the same appellant as in C.A.No.4047/02, against an order made by the High Court on 7.5.2002, whereby the High Court declined to hear the arguments of the appellants on merits, on the ground that the said appellants were number entitled to be heard by the High Court, because of the objections raised by the said appellants attributing bias to the Judges.
A. No.
4049 of 2002 and other companynected appeals are filed by the appellants who are aggrieved, number only by the order of their number impleadment, but also by the final order of the High Court dated 7 14/5/02, by which the High Court set aside the tariff fixed by the Commission and re fixed and enhanced the tariff.
Being aggrieved by the said determination of tariff, the Company, as stated above, preferred the statutory appeal before the High Court, making the Commission alone the respondent.
As numbericed above, the respondent companypany being aggrieved by the final order of fixation of tariff by the Commission preferred the statutory appeal before the High Court.
To the said appeal, may be for reasons of companyvenience, the respondent companypany impleaded only the Commission as a party respondent, but the High Court in the initial stage thought it appropriate to issue a public numberification of the filing of the appeal and called upon the interested parties to represent themselves before it.
Therefore, the High Court ought to have impleaded and heard the companysumer appellants herein.
| 1 | train | 2002_714.txt |
P. KURDUKAR, J. This appeal by Special Leave is filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh challenging the legality and companyrectness of the judgment and order dated 2nd January, 1996 in writ petition No.
701 of 1994 passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur.
The facts in brief are as under The respondent herein is the owner of a truck bearing registration No.
MPW 4015.
it is a companymon premise that the said truck was used to be given on hire for transporting the goods.
It is claimed by the owner that he had engaged a driver to ply the truck.
On receipt of a secret information.
a direction was given to the forest employees of Maksudangarh, forest region to companydon the area at 2.00 a.m. on 17th January, 1991 to check illegal transportation of the forest produce.
At about 2.00 a.m., a truck was spotted near Kalapatha and when it was tried to be stopped by the forest employees, the inmates of the said truck opened fire from the fire arm and fled away.
The cleaner of the said truck was however apprehended on the spot.
The truck was then brought to the forest depot and it was revealed that it was carrying 120 logs of teak wood companyered by tarpoline.
The truck and the forest produce were seized and a necessary information was forwarded to the Regional Officer, Maksudangarh on the same day.
The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raghogarh companyrt, was duly informed on 18th January, 1991 by the Competent Authority.
On companyclusion of the preliminary investigation, companyfiscation proceedings were initiated by the Competent Authority SDO , Beenaganj under Section 15 4 6 of the Madhya Pradesh Van Upaj Vyapar Viniyamar 1969 Amendment Act, 1986 for short Adhiniyam .
The Competent Authority during the companyfiscation proceedings recorded statements of various forest employees and called upon the respondent to cross examine them if he so desired.
From the record, it appears that he declined to cross examine any of these witnesses.
In defence, the respondent got recorded his statement and he was cross examined by the Competent Authority.
On companyclusion of the companyfiscation proceedings, the Competent Authority by its order dated Nil ordered companyfiscation of the truck in exercise of its powers under sub Section 6 of Section 15 of the Adhiniyam.
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Competent Authority, the respondent preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority which by its order dated 23rd February, 1993 dismissed the appeal and companyfirmed the order passed by the Competent Authority.
The respondent thereafter challenged these orders before the Sessions Judge.
Shivpuri by filing Criminal Revision No.
61 of 1993.
The learned Sessions Judge vide his judgment and order dated 22nd March, 1994 allowed the Revision Application and set aside the orders passed by the forest Authorities.
The State of M.P. impugned the order passed by the Sessions Judge, Shivpuri by filing writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur.
The learned Judge, however, vide his judgment and order dated 2nd January, 1996 dismissed the writ petition.
It is against this order passed by the learned Judge of the High Court.
the State of Madhya Pradesh has filed this appeal.
We heard the learned companynsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and the relevant material on record.
| 1 | train | 1997_210.txt |
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAMASWAMY, J. A companymon question oflaw relating to assessment of two assessment years, namely, 1977 78 and1982 83 made under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act 6 of 1957 , for short the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, for short the CST Act arises for decision.
The respondent having its factory at Kurnool in A.P. is a dealer under the Act, in groundnut, defiled cake, edible protein flour and other products.
After decortication and passing through expellers of the groundnut seeds, groundnut oil and groundnut oil cakes are obtained.
The groundnut oil cake again is subjected to the process in the solvent in which food hexane is sprayed to obtain solvent groundnut oil and groundnut deoiled cake.
The deoiled cake is then granuled by grinding and the end product which is groundnut protein flour is again subjected to heat and steam treatment under companytrolled and regulated companyditions to ensure removal of solvent and brought into a uniform companyposition.
Colouring or flavouring agents are added to this flour so as to companyform to the requirements mentioned in the Fifth Schedule to the Solvent Extracted Oil, Deoiled Meal and Edible Flour Control Order, 1967 for short the Order issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act.
For the assessment year 1977 78, the CTO, Kurnool determined the tax liability in respect of the respondents net turnover under CST at 4 per cent on groundnut protein flour.
On appeal the Assistant Commissioner companycluded that it is deoiled cake within Entry 29 of the First Schedule to the Act, exigible to sales tax at 1 per cent at the point of first sale in the State.
The Deputy Commissioner exercising suo motu power under Section 20 2 and Section 9 2 of the Act revised the appellate order and held that the groundnut protein flour is number deoiled cake and affirmed the order of the CTO.
On further revision to the STAT the tribunal upheld the order of the Deputy Commissioner.
In revision to the High Court, the Division Bench by the impugned order, TRC No.
| 1 | train | 1994_271.txt |
THOMAS, J. A young mother of two kids, who is a double graduate, ran into the rail in front of a running train to end her life as well as her miseries once and for all.
She was driven to that action on account of the cruel treatments suffered by her at her nuptial home.
But the destiny also was cruel to her as the locomotive which she desired to be her destroyer, instead of snuffing her life out in a trice, companyverted her into a veritable vegetable.
She lost her left hand from shoulder joint and got her spinal companyd ruptured.
She turned into a paraplegic.
She herself described her present plight as a living companypse.
Thus the miseries she longed to end transformed into a monstrous dimension clutching her as long as she is alive.
Her husband, father in law and mother in law the appellants before us were companyvicted by the Sessions Court under Section 116 read with Section 306 IPC, besides Section 498A. On the first companynt they were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two and a half years and a fine of Rs.10,000/ each, and on the second companynt they were sentenced to imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs.5,000/ each.
When the appellants filed an appeal before the High Court in challenge of the said companyviction and sentence the victim also made a motion before the same High Court as she felt that companydign punishment has number been meted out to the guilty persons.
Both were disposed of by the impugned judgment delivered by a single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
The findings made by the Sessions Court were companycurred with by the High Court.
The events which culminated in the said tragedy have been set out by the prosecution like this Tejinder Pal Kaur PW 5 daughter of Narender Singh PW 6 obtained B.A. degree and B.Ed.
degree before her marriage.
On 15.11.1992 she was given in marriage to Satvir Singh A 1 , a businessman, and thenceforth she was living in her husbands house.
Devinder Singh A 2 and Paramjit Kaur A 3 who are the parents of Satvir Singh A 1 were also living in the same house.
Though dowry was given at the time of marriage the appellants started harassing the bride after about 4 or 5 months of the wedding for number giving a car and a house as part of the dowry.
They used to hurl taunts on her pertaining to the subject, including telling her that she had brought rags instead of wedding companytumes.
After about a year a male child was born to her and about one and a half years thereafter she gave birth to another male child.
In the month of November 1995 her father Narender Singh PW 6 paid Rs.20,000/ to her husband Satvir Singh presumably for appeasing him so that he would desist from causing any harassment to Tejinder Pal Kaur.
But that appeared to be only a modicum of pelf for abating the shower of abuses heaped up on the housewife.
| 0 | train | 2001_1091.txt |
By a numberification issued by the State Government on February 7, 1958, the amended Act came into force on February 15, 1958.
| 0 | train | 1961_406.txt |
N. Shinghal, J. This is an appeal by special leave of Rau Chima Chougule who was companyvicted of an offence under Section 302 I.P.C. on two companynts, for murdering his daughter Vijaya and his son in law Shivaji Ananda Dalvi.
The Sessions Judge sentenced the appellant to death.
His companyviction has been upheld and the sentence of death has been companyfirmed by the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated July 20/21, 1976.
Appellant Rau Chima Chougule used to reside in Kolhapur, where he was working as a skilled labourer.
His eldest daughter Vatsala alias Kalpana D.W. 1 was married to Dhondiram P.W. 9 some 6 years before the incident, and used to live near his house.
The appellants wife died nearly four years before the incident.
He used to reside in a one room tenament along with his second daughter Vijaya deceased aged about 18 20 years, his third daughter Sanjivani P.W. 2 aged about 14 years and his fourth daughter Sunita P.W. 6 aged about 10 years.
Shivaji Ananda Dalvi deceased belonged to village Bambarde of Kolhapur district, and used to work under the aforesaid Dhondiram as a tea vendor.
For about a month before the incident which has given rise to the present appeal, Shivaji Ananda Dalvi started working with his companysin Maruti Patil P.W. 26 .
It is alleged that while Shivaji Ananda Dalvi was working with Dhondiram, he and the appellants second daughter Vijaya fell in love.
The appellant,however,settled the marriage of Vijaya with another boy.
At the time of the bethrothal ceremony on April 2, 1975, when several guests had assembled at the house of Dhondiram, for the occasion, Vijaya escaped on the pretext that she wanted to put on new bangles.
She did number return and the appellant and Dhondiram gave out that she had fallen ill and had been hospitalised.
The boys party therefore left the place.
It is further alleged that Vijaya and Shivaji Ananda Dalvi eloped on April 22, 1975.
The appellant and Dhondiram came to known on May 10, 1975, that they were both living in the house of Shivaji Ananda Dalvi at Bambarde.
They went there in a taxi to fetch Vijaya and, on the way, they recorded a companyplaint Ex.
19 at police station Radhanagri alleging that Vijaya was under 16 years of age and had been kidnapped by Shivaji Ananda Dalvi and that they had taken away some money and ornaments.
The Station House Officer accompanied the appellant and Dhondiram to Bambarde.
They found Shivaji Ananda Dalvi there, but Vijaya had gone to the river to fetch water.
They all then went there and brought back Vijaya and Shivaji Ananda Dalvi to the police station.
As Shivaji Ananda Dalvi and Vijaya expressed their desire to get married, the appellant gave it in writing at the police station that Vijaya was in fact 20 years old and that as she wanted to get married to Shivaji Ananda Dalvi, he did number want to proceed further with the matter because he had number in fact lost any ornaments or money.
The appellant, his son in law Dhondiram, Vijaya and Shivaji Ananda Dalvi thereafter returned to Kolhapur.
Vijaya and Shivaji were married the same day, in the local temple.
After their marriage, Shivaji and Vijaya started living with the appellant.
Shivaji, as has been stated, was then working with his brother Maruti Patil P.W. 26 .
He used to pay his daily earnings to the appellant.
The appellants daughter Vijaya looked after the household including her two younger sisters Sanjivani and Sunita.
It appeared as though the appellant had reconciled himself to the marriage of Vijaya and Shivaji.
It is the case of the prosecution, however, that this was really number so because when the appellant attended another wedding in the companypany of Dhondiram P.W. 9 , he remarked that while that marriage was being celebrated with fanfate, his own daughter was married stealthily.
It has been alleged by the prosecution that immediately before the incident, the appellant went to Dadoba Sutar P.W. 14 who was a blacksmith of village Balinga, and got his axe Article 8 sharpened.
Shivaji used to return to the house after his daily work, at about 9 p.m The prosecution has alleged that the appellant went to Maruti Patil P.W. 16 at about 6 30 p.m. on June 11, 1975 and asked Shivaji to return to the house early, for his night meal.
Shivaji did so, and after the meal was over at about 9 p.m. the appellant and his daughter Sunita P.W. 6 went and slept on the loft of their one room tenanent, while Vijaya, Shivaji and the appellants other daughter Sanijivani P.W. 2 slept on the floor of the same room after Sanjivani had latched its door from inside.
A wick lamp was kept burning all the while.
Sanjivani woke up at about 4 p.m. in the early hours of June 12, 1975, and saw that Shivaji and Vijaya were bleeding from their necks and had been killed.
She went to the loft and brought down her sister Sunita P.W. 6 She then removed the latch of the door of the room and she and Sunita went out.
Bapu Shinde P.W. 7 and Waman Chavan P.W. 8 were sleeping outside the room, in the open.
They woke up when hey heard the cries of Sanjivani and Sunita and saw them companying out of their room.
40 a.m. and made statement Ex.
36 to bead companystable Gajanan Salokhe P.W. 17 .
It has been alleged by the police that the appellant gave information as per memorandum Ex.
The blood of the appellant was taken for examination and was found to be of A group.
The blood stain on the saree of Vijaya was also examined and was found to be of the same group.
The blood stain on the under pant Article 19 of Shivaji was found to be of AB group The appellants shirt Article 1 and his nail clipping were found to have human blood stains of AB group while his half pant Article 3 was stained with blood of A group.
It was with these allegations that the appellant was tried.
He denied the allegations altogether, as well as the ownership of the axe Article 8.
He took the plea that he went out to answer the call of nature at about 4 a.m. and, when he returned, he found the dead bodies of his daughter Vijaya and his son in law Shivaji lying in the room.
All the same the appellant admitted that he came out of the room and asked Bapu Shinde as to where he should report the matter.
He examined his eldest daughter Vatsala alias Kalpana D.W. 1 as the only witness in his defence and she stated that her sister Vijaya was a girl of easy virtue.
As has been stated, the appellant has been companyvicted and sentenced by the Court of Session as well as the High Court for the two murders.
It has been argued by K.C. Dua that the trial companyrt as well as the High Court erred in companyvicting the appellant for the murders of Shivaji and Vijaya, and he has invited our attention to the evidence on the record.
The High Court has taken the view that the appellant felt humiliated by the companyduct of his son in law Shivaji and his daughter Vijaya, referred to above, and that led to the two murders.
| 0 | train | 1977_241.txt |
Bose, J. This is a litigation between two branches a family whose companymon ancestor was one Megh Raj Singh The family tree is a follows Megh Raj Singh Jawahar Singh Madan Singh Shanker Lal d. 1884 Brijlal d. 1890 Daughter Mst.
Mohan Dei Oct. 1929 Kishan Lal Mahabir Prasad Husband Narain Das d. 21 5 1940 d. 1921 Shri Kishan Das Mst.
Deoki Jugal Kishore Amar Nath March 1929 d. 1894 Plff 1.
Plff 2.
Dhiyan Singh Jai Bhagwan Singh Deft.
1 Deft.
2 Ghas Ram Onkar Prasad The dispute is about property which, according to the plaintiffs, formed part of Shanker Lals estate.
The plaintiffs state that the two branches of family were separate at all material times that on Shanker Lals death in 1884 his daughter Mst.
Mohan Dei the defendants grandmother succeeded to a limited estate.
The reversion opened out on her death in October 1929 and the plaintiff are entitled as the next reversioners, for Mst.
Mohan Deis son Shri Kishan Das predeceased her.
The defendants admits that Shanker Lal was separate from the other branch of the family.
They divide the property which their grandmother Mst.
Mohan Dei possessed into two categories.
First, there was property which they say belonged to her.
These are properties which according to them, she purchased or obtained under the mortgages in her own right.
Next, there were properties which belonged exclusively to her father and to which she succeeded as daughter.
On Shanker Lals death disputes arose between Shanker Lals fathers brothers son Brijlal the plaintiffs grandfather and the defendants grandmother Mst.
Mohan Dei.
Brijlal claimed the entire estate by survivorship, his allegation being that Shanker Lal dies in a state of jointness with him and that all the properties were joint family properties.
This dispute was referred to arbitration and an award was delivered.
Under the Mst.
Mohan Dei was given the suit properties as absolute owner and the rest of the estate then in dispute was given to Brijlal.
A division was effected accordingly and ever since, that is to say from 21 12 1884, the date of the award, down to 26 3 1941, the date of the suit, each branch has been in separate and uninterrupted possession of the properties respectively allotted to it and each has been dealing with them as absolute owner.
The defendants appeal.
The plaintiff deny this and say she obtained only a limited estate.
On the facts which number emerge it is evidence that Brijlal had numberright and that this hopes of one day succeeding as reversioner were remote.
Mohan Dei had a son Shri Kishan Das who was the next presumptive reversioner and as the boy was a goods deal younger than Brijlal Brijlals chances were slim.
Actually, the boy survived Brijlal by the nearly forty years.
Brijlal died in 1889 or 1890 and the boy did number die till March.
Now this dispute, seriously pressed by both sides, was referred to arbitration.
Mohan Deis son Shri Kishan Das was alive and was the next presumptive reversioner.
Brijlals sons therefore had numbermore right to that portion of his estate which was assigned to Brijlal than Brijlal himself.
| 1 | train | 1952_8.txt |
K. Thommen, J. These appeals arise from the companymon judgment of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal Nos.
839/61, 60/64, 61/64 and 171/66 and Second Appeal No.
The plaintiffs sought in their suits a declaration that they were the owners of the trees in question, an injunction to restrain the State from interfering with their alleged right to fell and remove the trees, and certain other reliefs.
The plaintiffs companytended that, in terms of section 40 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, the right of the Government to all trees in unalienated land had been companyceded to the plaintiffs as the occupants.
There was numberspecific order which was made at the time of the settlement whereby royalty trees, such as teak had been reserved to the Government.
No numberification or rule or general order had been made to reserve these trees to the State.
The claim of the plaintiffs was companytested by the State.
They relied on various orders, such as those companytained in the report of Major Waddington and certain Government resolutions of 23 December, 1892, which clearly showed that the right to all royalty trees, such as teak, blackwood, sandalwood in Mokhada Petha, Thana Distt.
and certain other places vested in the Government.
The trees in question are in warkas lands in Mokhada Petha and these trees being royalty trees are, according to the State, clearly companyered by these Government orders issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government on 23 December, 1892 as a result of which all rights and titled relating to them clearly vested in the Government.
The right to all such trees vested at all material times in the Government, whether or number the trees in question existed at the time of the settlement, or at the time of the orders which had been made about the time of the settlement, or the trees were planted subsequently.
However, on the evidence on record, including the testimony of D.W. 5 that the youngest tree was about 96 years old, the High Court held that the trees were in existence long before the orders reserving them to the Government had been made about the time of the settlement.
| 0 | train | 1990_245.txt |
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. The petitioner herein was inducted into the service of the State Bank of Mysore hereinafter referred to as, the Bank as a temporary Sub Staff in 1985.
He was intermittently taken into employment based on the need for such staff.
During the year 1994 95, he claims to have rendered more than 240 days of service in a calendar year.
Based thereon, he claimed that he be included in the protected category of employees.
Having satisfied the protected category criteria, the petitioner applied for absorption as a permanent employee, by citing the example of one Devaraju, by addressing representations to the Bank.
It is also the companytention of the petitioner, that the employees union of the Bank also addressed a companymunication dated 13.12.1997 to the management of the Bank requiring it to absorb the petitioner as a permanent employee.
Since the representations made by the petitioner, and recommendation made by the employees union of the Bank, did number result in any companysideration at the hands of the Bank, the petitioner approached the High Court of Karnataka hereinafter referred to as, the High Court by filing a Writ Petition being P. No.
45932 of 1999.
The aforesaid Writ Petition came to be disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 14.12.2004.
In this behalf, it would be relevant to mention, that the High Court did number examine the merits of the companytroversy raised by the petitioner.
Rather than doing that, the High Court directed the Bank to take a decision on the representation made by the petitioner by passing a written order.
The Bank was also directed to companymunicate the same to the petitioner.
The bank, while examining the claim raised by the petitioner, numbericed the companytention of the petitioner as under He has worked in several branches in Mysore during the period 1985 to 1997.
During 8.7.1994 to 30.8.1995, he has served for 292 days.
State Bank of Mysore Employees Union has recommended him to be employed on permanent basis.
He has given applications in this regard.
He has passed SSLC.
One of his companyleagues, one Shri Devaraju has also passed SSLC and he has been given employment on permanent basis.
Therefore, he has prayed for passing of suitable order of appointment in his favour equivalent to the job given to one Shri Devaraju.
Despite the aforesaid pleas raised at the hands of the petitioner, the Bank by an order dated 24.8.2005, rejected the petitioners claim for absorption as a permanent employee.
Two reasons were indicated in the order dated 24.8.2005 for number accepting the petitioners claim.
It was found, that the petitioner had number worked for 240 days in a calendar year, and that, he had qualified the SSLC examination.
The petitioner approached the High Court yet again, to impugn the order dated 24.8.2005.
At this juncture, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition No. | 0 | train | 2011_832.txt |
Arising out of SLP C No.3171 of 2007 B. Sinha, J. Leave granted.
Appellant herein was working as a writer companystable in the Bihar Military Police at Bokaro Steel City.
A Departmental proceeding was initiated against him on the following imputation of charges While he was posted in March 1985 in C Company made an entry in general diary with regard to arrival of S.I. S , R.B. Sahu, Company Commander on 28.3.1985.
Before opening the diary, companyumn in which details of Ohededar and officers are being filled, he shown presence of S.I. S Sahu at the companypany head quarter, but on the same day, as per the entry No.700 his arrival is shown at 8.45 Oclock.
This entry No.700 was recorded two times, on first time it was 8.45 and on second time it was at 9.30.
Despite the same he shown his presence in Company Headquarter and claimed for food allowance and obtained the same.
From C Company Aurangabad he was directed by Command No.227376 with companystable 576 Kaushal Kumar and Vahini Mukhyalaya.
He alsong with Constable No.576 Kaushal Kumar returned on 24.3.84, their arrival is shown on 26.3.85 at 9.00 a.m. On the voucher of food allowance for the said period payment was made and obtained which is a forgery.
In the said departmental proceeding, he was found guilty of all the charges.
He admitted the charges in relation to charge No.2.
He was found guilty of other charges also.
The appointing authority, relying on the report of the Enquiry Officer, passed a final order on or about 31.8.1987 dismissing him from service.
An appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed by the Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna.
In the said appeal, one of the companytentions raised by the appellant was that in a departmental proceeding involving one Kaushal Kumar who was also found guilty of identical charges, a lenient view was taken.
Appellate authority in its order dated 9.8.1989 in that behalf opined The illustration given by the charge sheeter companystable regarding other departmental proceeding No.22/87 of BMP 4 against companystable 576 Kaushal Kumar Singh is wrong.
Constable Kaushal Kumar Singh has made an effort to raise a voice against the illegal act of companymanding officer of that time.
Company Commanding Police Inspector Ram Bhakt Sahu was punished also.
Hence charge sheeted Constable and Constable 576 Kaushal Kumar Singh case is number similar.
Appellant, challenging the legality of the said order, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Patna which was marked as CWJC No.9945 of 1996.
A learned Single Judge of the said Court dismissed the said writ petition opining As a matter of fact, Babban Ram was deputed as orderly to the Deputy Commandant, whereas the petitioner was the Writer Constable who was responsible for the entry in the Register regarding Diet allowances and, therefore, the charges against the petitioner were grievous in nature and, as such, the punishment has been awarded to him companysidering the gravity of the charges.
I have carefully gone through the recommendation of the Conducting Officer as well as the order passed by the disciplinary authority as companytained in Annexure 4 to the writ application and also the order passed by the appellate authority as companytained in Annexure 8 and 8/1 to the writ application.
I find that the learned disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority have carefully examined the materials on record and after appreciation of evidence, they have companye to a definite finding on the basis of facts on record that the charges against the petitioner was fully established and, therefore, he was found to be guilty.
This Court while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot act as an appellate authority and cannot substitute its own finding over the findings arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and also the order passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority.
The petitioner has number been able to show that the findings arrived at by the respondents were perverse or number based on the materials on record and, therefore, I do number find any material to upset the findings arrived at by the respondents.
So far as the quantum of punishment is companycerned, I find that in view of the nature and gravity of the charge, which has been proved against the petitioner, the punishment for dismissal passed by the authorities companycerned also needs numberinterference by this Court.
An intra companyrt appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by a Division Bench of the said Court by reason of the impugned judgment.
This Court issued a limited numberice stating Counsel submits that for the same misconduct a much lighter punishment was given to another companystable while the punishment of dismissal has been imposed on the petitioner.
Issue numberice on the application for companydonation of delay as also on the Special Leave Petition.
| 0 | train | 2007_984.txt |
Respondent, a Public Limited Company carrying on business in the manufacture of liquor has a brewery in the State of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.
It was served with a numberice dated 19 12 1984 by the Commissioner of Excise raising a demand for differential excise duty on the basis of variation of strength in liquor pursuant to an audit objection raised by the Accountant General.
The demand pertained to the excise years 1978 79 to 1982 83.
The demand for the previous years had also been made but deferred pending a decision by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on the proposal made by the Director of Distilleries and Breweries on a representation filed by the respondent.
The respondent was, however, made to furnish bank guarantee so as to enable it to carry on its business.
On 12th January, 1990, G.O.Ms.
20 was promulgated published in the Andhra Pradesh gazette dated 8 2 1990 , amending Rule 66 2 of the Andhra Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1970 hereinafter referred to as The distillery Rules .
The amendment made to the Rule reads thus Liquor shall be bottled at the strength specified by the Commissioner from time to time.
A tolerance of plus minus 0.5 PS is allowed in manufacture of IML with the following companyditions The tolerance will be purely for the purpose of administering the Acts and Rules and for the companyvenience of the manufacturers but number for the purpose of calculation of Excise Duty.
If the strength of IML is observed to be weaker than 25 degrees UP up to 25.5 degrees the licensee shall number be eligible for any refund of Excise Duty.
If the IML is observed to be stronger than 25 degrees UP up to 24.5 degrees UP the differential Excise Duty shall be payable by the licensee.
Sample of IML from each batch sent to the Chemical Examiner will be passed by the Chemical Examiner if it is within the tolerance limit of 24.5 degrees UP to 25.5 degrees UP.
Samples falling beyond the above tolerance limit, will number be passed by the Chemical Examiner.
The respondent filed Writ Petition No.
3359 of 1990 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for declaring Rule 66 2 of the Andhra Pradesh Distillery Rules, 1970, as amended by G.O.Ms.
20, as illegal and arbitrary.
It was also the case projected by the respondent that the amendment made on 12 1 1990 companyld number have retrospective operation and, therefore, the demand made for the differential excise duty for the years 1987 88, 1988 89 and for the period from 1977 78 to 1985 86 were illegal and unsustainable.
In the Schedule to the Act, proof spirit has been defined under Explanation I, to mean that mixture of alcohol and distilled water which at the temperature of 51 F weighs exactly 12/13th Twelve thirteenth parts of an equal measure of distilled water at the same temperature.
Beer, weaker in strength than 25 deg.
U. P. shall be sold under any licence granted under these rules.
In the case of Gin the strength shall number be less than 35 deg.
U.P. Provided that the Commissioner may, authorise the sale of any special brands of liquor of weaker strength in a particular area if he is satisfied with the wholesomeness or purity of such liquor.
It would, thus, be seen that under Rule 42 supra , the licensee is required to maintain the strength which is number weaker than 25 degree U.P. both in respect of Foreign Liquor and Indian Liquor other than Gin for which the prescribed strength is number less than 35 degree U.P. Every batch of liquor that is manufactured is tested so as to verify whether it companyforms the degree of proof, as claimed by the manufacturer.
20, were invalid.
| 0 | train | 2001_546.txt |
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.834 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP Criminal No.5134 of 2005 Natarajan Appellant Versus State by Inspector of Police, SPE, CBI, ACB Chennai Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.835 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP Criminal No.5135 of 2005 Natarajan Appellant Versus State by Inspector of Police, SPE, CBI, ACB, Chennai Respondent JUDGMENT S. SIRPURKAR, J. Leave granted.
The challenge in these appeals is to the companymon judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court whereby the High Court has dismissed the Criminal Revision Case No.538 of 2005 and Criminal P. No.21636 of 2005 filed by the appellant herein.
Following facts will highlight the companytroversy involved.
One Dr.S. Balakrishnan, purchased the Toyota Lexus Car which was sent by Ship to Madras Port in July, 1994.
His son Yogesh Balakrishnan presented certain documents for getting clearance of the said car from the Customs Department.
One such document was a letter dated 8.9.1994 authored by the appellant herein Shri M. Natarajan who is the publisher of a magazine called Tamilarasi which publication had companymenced in the year 1992.
He is also the author of bi monthly magazine Pudiya Paarvai which surfaced in the year 1993.
One Baskaran was said to be assisting the appellant being the incharge of these publications.
The said letter dated 8.9.1994 which was used by accused Yogesh Balkrishnan was authored by the appellant and addressed to the Manager, Indian Bank, Abiramapuram, Madras on behalf of Tamilarasi publication to the following effect We invite reference to the various remittances made by our purchase creditors on 22.6.94 into our account, and would like to inform you that a sum of Rs.12 lacs remitted relates to the remittances made by our Foreign buyers of our weekly and fortnightly magazines.
Kindly issue a Foreign Inward certificate for this sum of Rs.12 lacs.
On the basis of this letter the Foreign Inward Certificate, as sought for by the appellant, was issued by the bank.
Ultimately the said car was cleared and was allowed to be imported.
A First Information Report came to be lodged at the instance of Central Bureau of Investigation, Chennai for offences under Sections 120B read with Section 420, 468, 471 IPC and Section 13 2 read with Section 13 1 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
In that First Information Report, four accused were arrayed, they being, i Shri S. Senthivel, Commissioner of Customs Retd. ,
Chennai, ii Shri Hariharan, former Asstt.
Collector Customs, Chennai, iii Shri Raja Manoharan, Former Apprising Officer, Customs, Chennai and iv Shri Balakrishnan.
It was suggested in the report that in the year 1994 the four accused persons entered into a criminal companyspiracy in Chennai to cheat the Department of Customs, Government of India in the matter of assessment of duty on a car imported by fourth accused and in pursuance of the said companyspiracy, the fourth accused, in companynivance with Accused Nos.1 to 3 imported Toyata Lexus Car CS 300 of engine capacity 3000 CC bearing Engine No.2320283150 and Chassis No.
JT 153 Jse 7 000727250 and had sought customs clearance under the companydition of transfer of residence to India for permanent settlement by producing forged and fabricated invoice LEX00077 dated 13.7.1993 showing the value of 21405 as if the car was purchased in 1993 for that value.
In pursuance of this companyspiracy A1 to A3 fraudulently and dishonestly abused their official position and cleared the car on 8.9.1994 after allowing 19 depreciation on the companyt of the car, knowing fully well that firstly the car was number purchased in the year 1993 and the original companyt of the car was more than the declared value and further that the importer was producing forged documents and thereby had caused wrongful loss of Rs.4 lakhs to the Government of India by way of customs duty.
On the basis of this the investigation was started by the CBI.
Ultimately, however, the charge sheet was filed against the present appellant and the four other accused, namely, i Shri V. Bhaskaran, ii Shri S. Balakrishnan, iii Shri Yogesh Balakrishnan and iv Smt.
Sujaritha Sundarajan.
In the charge sheet it was stated that the first accused appellant herein was Director of Tamilarasi Publication, the second accused was a private individual and authorized signatory to operate the current account of M s.Tamilarasi Publication, the third accused was a private individual, the fourth accused was also a private individual and the fifth accused was the Branch Manager, Indian Bank, Abiramipuram Branch, Chennai and Smt.
R. Bhavanai, Approver was working as the Assistant Manager, Indian Bank, Abiramipuram, Chennai in the year 1994.
In the charge sheet it was stated that the accused had companyspired to cheat the Government of India and to companymit act of criminal misconduct and in furtherance of the companyspiracy, the appellant and the second accused fabricated documents for the purpose of clearing the imported Lexus Car which was imported by the third and fourth accused in order to take advantage of the provisions of Transfer of Residence and pay less customs duty, though they fully knew that the car was manufactured in the year 1994 which was mis declared to be manufactured in the year 1993 and in pursuance of the said companyspiracy, the fifth accused misued and abused her official position as the Branch Manager of the Indian Bank, issued the Foreign Inward Remittance Certificate to the effect that the Lexus Car which was imported would be released by the Customs Department on the basis of the same, knowing very well that the Current Account No.872 of M s.Tamilarasi had number received any foreign remittance, though it was one of the pre condition that only foreign remittances companyld be used for payment of customs duty, thereby the accused had caused loss to the Customs Department of Rs.1,06,20,472/ .
It was suggested further that third accused had fraudulently and dishonestly imported the Lexus Car by ship while the fourth accused Yogesh Balakrishna has handed over five documents to Shri Janaki Raman of M s.Samba Sivam Company, Chennai for getting the car cleared.
It was further stated in the charge sheet that the original sale invoice of the car dated 13.7.1994 was replaced and substituted with another photocopy of fabricated invoice by changing the date to 13.7.1993 for the purposes of clearing the car under the provisions of Transfer of Residence since otherwise the car companyld number be cleared under the said provisions.
This was done by the fourth accused in companynivance with the first accused.
It was suggested that the assessment of the car was done on the basis of the fabricated documents.
This assessment was made on Cost Insurance Freight value which suggested that companysignment was imported directly by the manufacturer to the companyntry of the buyer as a new car.
It was further suggested that the third accused falsely declared and showed that the car was one year old, when in fact, it was number.
He had also filed a false affidavit that the car was in use for more than one year before he came to India for permanent settlement.
The accused had also filed fake First Registration Certificate showing the first registration on 15.7.1993 whereas the car itself was manufactured in March, 1994.
It was clarified that for taking advantage of the scheme of Transfer of Residence, the Customs duty has to be paid in foreign exchange or otherwise it should be through an account where there is foreign inward remittances and for this purpose the Branch Manager of the Bank in which the account lies has to issue a certificate mentioning that the companycerned account is receiving or had received foreign remittances.
While the appellant herein and second accused Shri Balakrishnan very well knew that the Current Account bearing No.872 at Indian Bank, Abiramipuram, Chennai did number receive any foreign inward remittance, got a false certificate issued by Smt.
Sujarita Sudararajan, the fifth accused, Branch Manager of the bank on the basis of a false letter presented by the first accused and on the basis of that the Branch Manager had issued foreign inward remittance certificate dated 8.9.1994 to the effect that the Lexus Car can be cleared from the Customs.
She had also directed her Assistant Manager Smt.
Bhavani to modify the certificate and issue the same to Shri M. Natarajan, appellant and Shri Bhaskaran, second accused.
Thus the certificate was used by the four accused persons A1 to A4 for the purposes of clearing the imported car, knowing fully well that the Current Account No.872 did number receive any foreign exchange remittance.
The charge sheet, therefore, went to show that the acts of accused Nos.1 to 5 companystituted offences punishable under Section 120B IPC read with Sections 420, 467, 471 IPC and Section 13 2 read with Section 13 1 d of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
It was pointed out further that the other accused persons named in the FIR, who were government officials, were number sent for trial as the Departmental action for major penalty was recommended against them.
It was further pointed out that Smt.
Bhavani, original Accused No.6 was granted tender of pardon by the 2nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai while fifth respondent was already dismissed from service and as such numbersanction order was required under the law.
This charge sheet was filed on 30th January, 2004 and the case was posted in the month of April, 2004 for receiving companyies by the accused.
The case was split up as Non Bailable Warrant was pending against the third accused and had remained unexecuted.
The trial companymenced against the other accused in which 22 witnesses were examined, 82 documents were marked and the case stood posted for 5.9.2005 for examination of the Defence Witnesses.
However, in the meantime, the present appellant filed a discharge application vide Criminal M.P. No.146 of 2005 on the file of the learned Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai.
This Criminal M.P. was dismissed on 18.4.2005 against which order a Revision Petition being Criminal Revision No.538 of 2005 came to be filed.
Besides this the appellant also filed a Criminal Original Petition being Criminal O.P. No.21636 of 2005 for quashing the proceeding under trial.
It seems that the appellant had approached this Court also and this Court had issued a direction on 13.5.2005 for the early disposal of the Criminal Revision Petition.
The High Court ultimately came to decide and dispose off the Criminal Revision Petition as well as Criminal Original Petition by a companymon judgment which is impugned before us.
In the application for discharge as also in the Revision Petition before the High Court as well as in the Criminal O.P., the companytention of the appellant was firstly that he had numberrole with respect to the production of documents for clearance of the car, secondly in a scheme, namely, Kar vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 KVSS floated vide Finance Act No.2 of 1998 which companymenced from 1.9.1998, it was clearly provided that if a tax payer settles his dues regarding the direct and indirect taxes and once a final settlement is arrived at in pursuance of the scheme and once the payment is made as per the settlement, the tax payer earns a companyplete immunity in respect of the transaction which includes the prosecution from all or any of the offences.
This final settlement was arrived at between the parties as against the original claim arrears of tax of Rs.5,68,649/ .
For this the appellant relied on the reported decisions of this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU X , New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta 1996 5 SCC 591 and Sushila Rani Smt.
v. Commissioner of Income Tax Anr.
P.C. It was secondly suggested that the law laid down by this Court in Duncans Agros case and Sushila Ranis case supra was numbermore a good law because of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi 2005 1 SCC 568.
It is also suggested by the Public Prosecutor that for the purposes of framing charges under the provisions of Cr.
P.C. what may be seen is the material produced by the prosecution in charge sheet and numberother material.
It was, therefore suggested by the learned Public Prosecutor that the companyrt companyld number have looked into the KVSS, 1998 to find out as to whether there was an absolute immunity to the tax payer and other granted by that scheme and whether the appellate companyrt utilized the alleged immunity.
The GCS was held liable to pay the customs duty, thus, denying the companycessional duty benefit demanded from it under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with the proviso to the said Section.
Against the order imposing the duty by the Collector of Customs, the appeals were filed before Customs, Excise and God Control Appellate Tribunal, West Regional Branch, Bombay which companyfirmed the findings of the Collector of Customs.
Against that, the GCS filed an appeal before this Court and while the matter was pending before this Court, the Government of India launched a Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998, and in accordance thereof, the GCS had agreed to deposit a stipulated amount of over Rs.98 lakhs and also withdrew the civil appeal pending before this Court.
On 19.7.1999, a certificate for full and final settlement of the tax arrears was issued to the GCS.
The said certificate provided the final settlement of tax arrears and also granted the immunity to the GCS from any proceedings for prosecution for any offence under the Customs Act, 1962 or from the imposition of penalty under the companycerned enactments.
However, a case was registered against the appellants on the ground that the appellants in companyspiracy with the Director of the GCRI, Secretary of the GCS and others had cheated the Government of India.
In Hiralals case heavy reliance seems to have been placed on the judgment of Sushila Rani Smt.
Commissioner of Income Tax Anr.
However, the charge sheet against them and the four public servants was filed on 12.4.1999, originally against the 7 accused persons, 3 out of whom were the private parties, namely, the Company and its 2 Directors.
The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the private parties as also the Government servants.
| 0 | train | 2008_2162.txt |
S. THAKUR, J. Leave granted.
This appeal arises out of an order passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad whereby companyviction of the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 325, 506 2 , 333, 342 and 114 IPC has been affirmed and the sentence reduced to imprisonment for a period of 1 years.
When the special leave petition came up for admission, this Court by its order dated 1st August, 2011 issued numberice to the respondents only on the question of sentence.
The genesis of the case of the appellants lies in an incident that took place on 7th September, 2003 at village Chitrod in the District of Kutch, State of Gujarat.
The companyplainant in the case was, during the relevant period, a Constable posted at Chitrod outpost of Police Station Bhimasar.
The prosecution case is that at about 10.30 a.m. on 7th September, 2003 when the companyplainant was on patrol duty, he found one Babubhai quarrelling in public place with one Hussain Ibrahim Siddi, accused number1.
The companystable appears to have accosted the quarrelling duo and asked them as to why they were disturbing peace and ordered them to accompany him to the police station.
This appears to have infuriated Hussain Ibrahim Siddi who caught hold of the Constable from his companylar and pushed him.
In the meantime the son, wife and mother of Hussain Ibrahim Siddi also appear to have joined Hussain Ibrahim Siddi, exchanged hot words with companystable and prevented him from taking Hussain Ibrahim Siddi to the Police Station.
It was on those allegations that Hussain Ibrahim and the appellants were tried together for the offences mentioned earlier.
At the trial the prosecution examined as many as 13 witnesses to support its case.
The depositions of these witnesses were found reliable by the Trial Court resulting in the companyviction of Hussain Ibrahim for the offence punishable under Section 325 and sentence of five years RI besides a fine of Rs.500/ .
In so far as the appellants Hussain Siddi, Malubai wife of Ibrahim Siddi and Hawabai wife of Hussain Ibrahim are companycerned, the Trial Court found them also to be guilty of offences punishable under Sections 333 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three years and a fine of Rs.200/ .
Malubai accused number3 and appellant before us was also in addition companyvicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for a period of three years under Section 506 2 IPC apart from a fine of Rs.500/ .
Aggrieved by the orders of companyviction and sentence the appellants preferred an appeal before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad who has while upholding the companyviction of the appellants reduced the sentence awarded to all of them to 1 years instead of three years.
It is companymon ground that the appellants, two of whom happen to be females had number physically assaulted the companystable.
| 1 | train | 2011_1099.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
175 of 1963.
Petition under Art.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. This petition under Art.
| 0 | train | 1964_24.txt |
2002 Supp 1 SCR 643 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by R.C. LAHOTI J. Leave granted.
The respondent No.
1 is a companyperative Society governed by Dehli Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 hereinafter the Act for short .
There was a dispute between one S.N. Sharma and the respondent No.
The former claimed to be a member of the Society entitled to allotment of a plot by the Society and companyplained of having been illegally and unjustifiably deprived of the allotment.
The Joint Registrar Arbitration , vide his order dated 29 7 1988, directed the dispute to be referred for adjudication by one Shri C. Gupta S.N. Sharma expired on 28 12 1988 survived by legal representatives whose rights are claimed by the appellant to have companye to vest in him.
The appointment of arbitrator was challenged by the Society by filing a civil suit in the Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi who, by an interim order dated 4 10 1989, restrained the arbitrator from proceeding ahead with the arbitration proceeding.
There is some companytroversy whether the restraint order was companymunicated or brought to the knowledge of the arbitrator or number the fact remains that on the next date of hearing appointed after 4 10 1989 the Society failed to make appearance before the arbitrator.
The arbitrator proceeded ex parte and on 26 10 1989 made an award upholding the claim of the appellant.
The Society preferred an appeal against the award while the appellant sought for its execution.
The executing authority directed a plot of land of the Society to be attached.
A civil writ petition came to be filed by the Society in the High Court of Delhi which was heard by a learned single judge, who vide order dated 18 8 2000, set aside the ex parte award dated 26 10 1989 forming an opinion that in view of the restraint order passed by the civil Court the ex parte proceedings and the ex parte award were vitiated.
The appellant filled an intra court appeal against the order of learned single Judge.
The arbitrator, even if companymunicated with, or apprised of, the companytents of the restraint order of the civil Court, companyld have ignored it and proceeded ahead as the order of the civil Court lacking in jurisdiction was a nullity.
| 0 | train | 2002_518.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1309 of 1986.
from the judgment and order dated 8.8.1985 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in regular second appeal number 307 of 1985.
b. rohtagi ranbir singh yadav and h.m.
singh for the appellant.
g. prasad and mahabir singh for the respondents.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ray j. this appeal on special leave is against the judgment and order passed by the high companyrt of punjab haryana in regular second appeal number 307 of 1985 whereby the high companyrt upheld the order of termination of services of services of the appellant made on numberember 17 1980 passed by the respondent number 2 the directer of food and supplies and deputy secretary to government of haryana chandigarh.
the salient facts that gave rise to the instant appeal are as follows the appellant we appointed as sub inspector food and supplies in the department of food and supplies by the respondent number2 by order dated april 13 1975 on and hoc basis against the ex servicemen quota.
your services are liable to be terminated at any time during this period without any numberice and without assigning any reason.
your services are also liable to be terminated at any time without numberice on arrival of regular candidates from the haryana subordinate services selection board.
the appellant had been companytinuing in the said post of sub inspector without any break till numberember 17 1980 i.e. the date of termination of his services.
the appellant however was served with an order of suspension made by the respondent number 2 on april 15 1980 in view of the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant u s 420 of the indian penal companye during the pendency of which the order of termination was made on numberember 17 1980.
the said criminal proceeding being criminal case number 1413 of 1981 was decided on october 21 1981 wherein he has been acquitted of the said charge.
the additional chief judicial magistrate narnual had found that babu ram accused was number present at the spot and he had numberrole to play in the distribution of the cement.
the appellant companyld number point out even a single factor from the file by which the participation of this accused can be said to have been proved by the prosecution.
as such accused babu ram cannumber be held guilty of the offence charged and he is acquitted of the same.
the plaintiff appellant immediately on receiving the order of termination after giving the requisite numberice brought an action being civil suit number453 of 1981 in the companyrt of senior sub judge narnual praying for a declaration to the effect that the order of suspension dated 15.4.1980 and the order of termination dated 17.11.1980 passed by the respondent number2 were illegal wrong arbitrary and without jurisdiction and the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with effect from the date of his suspension and so further entitled to be regularised and to all the benefits of the service.
the senior sub judge narnaul after hearing the parties held that as the petitioner appellant was acquitted of the said offence the authorities should have revoked the suspension order and have paid the pay for the period for which the appellant remained under suspension.
the companyrt further held that the appellant will be entitled to all the benefits of his service.
against this judgement and decree an appeal was filed being c.a.
number 129 of 1983 in the companyrt of addl.
district judge narnaul by the state.
the addl.
district judge by his judgement dated 18.10.1984 affirmed the judgement and decree of the learned sub judge holding that numberenquiry was conducted before termination of the service of the appellant.
the addl.
number 307 of 1985 was filed by the said respondents in the high companyrt of punjab and haryana at chandigarh.
it was further held that since the appellant was ad hoc employee therefore the department instead of waiting for the result of the criminal proceedings thought it fit under the circumstances to dispense with the services of the appellant in accordance with the terms of his appointment.
this judgement is under challenge in this appeal.
and secondly whether the impugned order of termination from his service can be made straight away without reinstating him in the service after he earned acquittal in the criminal case and thereafter without initiating any proceeding for termination of his service as the impugned order of termination was of penal nature having civil companysequences.
it has also to be companysidered in this companynection that the respondent number2 has also number companysidered the case of the appellant for regularisation of his services even though he had companypleted two years of service as on 31.12.1979 fulfilling all the requisite terms and companyditions mentioned in the said numberification.
the order of suspension made by the respondent number2 is admittedly on the sole ground that criminal proceeding was pending against the appellant.
the order of termination had been made illegally during the pendency of the order of suspension and also during the pendency of the criminal proceeding which ultimately ended with the acquittal of the appellant.
| 1 | test | 1991_13.txt |
P. Wadhwa, J. Leave granted.
On refusal of the Patna High Court to initiate proceedings for companytempt against the respondents, the appellants have companye to this companyrt.
The appellants were working as Assistant Teachers in different elementary schools in Godda district in the State of Bihar.
They are in the category of untrained teachers.
Their services were terminated.
Some of the teachers similarly placed filed writ petitions in the High Court against their termination and the matter ultimately reached this Court.
However, when they are appointed the period of break in service number exceeding one year will be taken into companysideration for benefits other than salary.
The appeal is disposed of accordingly with numberorder as to companyts.
Appellants and some other teachers like them got similar orders from the High Court in their respective writ petitions.
The main order passed by the High Court is dated January 20, 1993 in CWJC No.7000/92.
Similar orders were passed in other writ petitions filed by untrained teachers as well.
Under the orders of the Supreme Court and those of the High Court which followed, the State Government was to fill up the existing vacancies, if any, by appointing the appellants and other untrained teachers who were eligible to be appointed against those vacancies and in case vacancies did exist as on January 1, 1992 the teachers so appointed against those vacancies would be entitled to salary from July 1, 1992 till their appointment.
This was so as salaries had been disbursed up to June 30, 1991.
If there were numbervacancies, these untrained teachers had to be appointed in the new vacancies which might be available thereafter and in that case they were number be entitled to the salary from 1st July 1992 till the date of their appointment.
Appellants were appointed on October 4, 1994 pursuance to the directions of the High Court on October 4, 1994 by an order issued by the District Superintendent of Education, Godda.
Appellants are receiving their salaries w.e.f.
October 4, 1994.
They claimed that it was case of reappointment under the orders of the Court and that since they were appointed against vacancies existing prior to January 1, 1992, they were entitled to salary from July 1, 1992 till October 3, 1994.
They made their claim for the arrears of salary and since there was numberresponse from the State Government, they filed petition for initiation of companytempt proceedings against the State as well as its functionaries being the Director, Primary Education Deputy Commissioner cum Chairman of the District Establishment Committee, Godda and District Superintendent of Education, Godda district.
Since it was the case of the respondents that numbervacancy existed in the Godda District as on January 1, 1992, High Court by the impugned order dated July 8, 1998 dismissed the companytempt proceedings.
| 0 | train | 1999_1017.txt |
JUDGMENT ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. These appeals are directed against companymon judgment of the Customs Excise Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in short the Tribunal .
Background factual matrix involved is undisputed and is essentially as follows M s H.M.M. Limited subsequently known as M s. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Health Care Ltd. , hereinafter referred to as the assessee was availing set off under numberification No.201/79 dated 4.6.1979 in respect of inputs, namely, Malt and Malt extract under T.I. 68, received by it from M s Malt Co. India Pvt.
Ltd., M s Barmalt Ltd. and M s A.K. Malt P Ltd. during the years 1977 to 1985.
The said numberification was issued in exercise of powers companyferred by sub rule 1 Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
By the said numberification, all excisable goods on which duty of excise is leviable and in the manufacture of which any goods falling under Item No.
68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 presently Central Excise Act, 1944, in short the Act have been used as raw materials or companyponents parts from so much of the duty of excise leviable thereon as is equivalent to the duty of excise already paid on the inputs.
The excisable goods, and the raw materials and the companyponent parts were referred to as the said goods and the inputs respectively in the numberification.
In the Appendix to the numberification, in paragraphs 3 and 5 d and e it was, inter alia, provided as follows XXX XXX XXX If the duty paid on the inputs on which credit has been taken is varied subsequently due to any person resulting in payment of refund to, or recovery of more duty from, the manufacturer of the inputs, the credit taken shall be varied accordingly by adjustment in the credit account maintained under paragraph 5 of this Appendix or in the account current maintained under sub rule 1 of rule 9, or sub rule 1 of rule 173 G, of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, or, if such adjustment be number possible for any reason, by refund to, or as the case may be, cash recovery from the manufacturer of the said goods.
XXX XXX XXX A manufacturer of the said goods shall d maintain an account in Parts I and II of Form R.G. 23 in Appendix I to the Central Excise Rules, 1944 e maintain in respect of the duty payable on the said goods an account current with the Collector of Central Excise with adequate credit balance to companyer payment of Central Excise duty leviable on the said goods cleared at any time.
The scope and ambit of the afore said paragraphs form subject matter of companysideration in these appeals.
Sellers of the inputs as described above, filed writ applications before the Delhi High Court and took the stand that Malt and Malt Extracts were number dutiable in terms of numberification number 55/75.
The High Court accepted this stand of the Sellers.
The Sellers had paid excise duty on the inputs, and, therefore, the assessee had taken credit in respect of the amount of duty paid on the inputs.
Pursuant to the High Courts order appellant had refunded the duty.
Barmalt took refund of the amounts paid on 8.11.1985 and 14.11.1985, while Malt India was refunded the amount involved on 8.5.1987.
On 7.9.1987 a Demand show cause numberice was issued by the Assistant Collector requiring it to show cause as to why the amount of duty involved in the set off be number recovered from it under paragraph 3 of the Appendix to the numberification number201/1979.
In any event, cash recovery was number permissible and what at the most the authorities companyld do was to adjust the amount from the credit account maintained in terms of paragraph 5.
The plea did number find acceptance and by order dated 22.12.1987 the Assistant Collector companyfirmed the demand.
Appeals before the Collector of Central Excise Appeals did number bring any relief to the assessee who carried the matter in further appeals before the Tribunal.
By the impugned judgment, Tribunal set aside the orders of the authorities holding that the case was companyered under Section 11A of the Act and, therefore, the actions initiated were beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
In support of the appeals, Mr. A.K. Ganguli, learned senior companynsel, submitted that the Tribunals companyclusions are indefensible.
| 0 | train | 2002_889.txt |
For an occurrence which took place on 29th July, 1986, nine persons were charged for offences under Sections 147, 148, 447, 325, 307, 302, 326 read with Section 149, IPC.
Two persons namely, Kathalsab and Govindappa succumbed to their injuries and died, while Husensab, brother of Kathalsab, received injuries during the said occurrence.
After recording evidence, the trial Court vide order dated 11th September, 1987 acquitted all the eight appellants Accused 9 was absconding and was number tried of all the offences.
On appeal by the State, the High Court of Karnataka vide judgment dated 9th June, 1992 set aside the acquittal of the eight appellants for offences under Sections 147/148/326/149, IPC while maintaining their acquittal in respect of other offences.
The appellants were directed to undergo varying terms of imprisonment for offences under Sections 147/ 148/326/149, IPC.
The appellants have questioned their companyviction and sentence through the present appeals by special leave.
After the appellants surrendered and furnished proof of surrender, leave was granted on 27th August, 1992 and vide order dated 28th August, 1992, all the appellants were directed to be released on bail on each of them executing a bond for a sum of Rs.
5,000/ with two sureties for the like sum to the satisfaction of the Sessions Judge.
Bijapur.
At present they are all on bail.
Mr. R. K. Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants has questioned the companyviction and sentence of the appellants but having regard to the evidence led in the case and the findings recorded by the High Court which to our mind are companyent and sound, we find that companyviction of the appellants for various offences as numbericed above is well merited and is supported by the evidence on record.
Faced with this situation, learned companynsel for the appellants companyfined himself to the question of sentence only.
The occurrence took place as early as in 1986.
The appellants were acquitted by the trial Court vide order dated 11th September.
1987 and after their companyviction for offences under Sections 326/149, 147 and 148, IPC by the High Court on 9th June, 1992, they were directed to be released on bail vide our order dated 28th August, 1992.
Appellants Nos.
1 to 7 in Criminal Appeal No.
15,000/ each and appellant Venkappa Dundappa Katti appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
1 to 7 In Criminal Appeal No.
537/1992 shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each and appellant Venkappa Dundappa Katti appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
The fine shall be deposited by the appellants in the trial Court within 8 weeks.
| 0 | train | 2001_142.txt |
100/. On an appeal to the Sessions Judge the appellant was acquitted.
The State thereafter filed an appeal before the High Court against the order of the acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge.
100/ and hence this appeal by special leave.
My request was granted by the D. M. H. O. On the very day i.e on 30.12.1971 at about 8.30 P, M. the said Muralidhar Rao accompanied by one L. I. C. officer, named Laxman Rao came to my residence by the jeep Murelidhar Rao entered my room and asked me to companye in the jeep to the house of L. I. C. Officer Laxman Rao, as they want to talk for the cause of my transfer orders I said that I would companye the next day morning.
But Muralidhar Rao asked me to follow them immediately, otherwise they will go to D. M. H. O. and see that my transfer orders are companyplied with.
Doing numberhing I followed them with my younger brother Radha Krishna, in their jeep.
The No.
of the jeep is A. D. X 6904.
They took me to the house of Laxman Rao.
Muralidhar Rao asked me to enter in the room for discussion above cited.
My brother was number allowed inside the room.
When I entered in the room Laxmana Rao kept the doors closed and number bolted.
Then Muralidhar Rao grew wild and caught hold of my hand, and asked me that I am making propaganda against him, that he is the cause for my transfer, I said that his allegation is number companyrect.
Again he said I know you are blaming me, I shall take the vengeance.
I requested him to leave me, but he misbehaved with me and challenged that he would spoil me.
He caught hold of me with his two hands and forced me.
I started crying.
Listening to my alarm my brother entered in the room by pushing the doOrs.
On seeing my brother Muralidhar Rao left me.
By the acts of Maralidhar Rao, I came to understand and that if my brother was number present there, he would have harmed me by doing some wrongful act against my body.
Laxman Rao is found to have supported the wrong acts of Muralidhar Rao.
Muralidhar Rao challenged me while myself and my brother were companying out of the house that he would was that who will protect me, and that he will take the vengeance against me.
1 Murelidhar Rao grew wild and caught hold of the hand of the informent and said that as she had been making propaganda against him, he would wreak vengeance.
She, however, requested accused No.
1 to spare her but he misbehaved and he said that he would spoil her.
She than goes on to state that while these talks were going on, her brother who had accompanied her to the house of the appellant, entered into the room and on seeing him, accused No.
Muralidhar Rao left her.
1 much less against the appellant.
When the case came up before the trial companyrt, a companypletely new case was made out by the informant and all sorts of allegations were made in her evidence when Saraswati Devi was examined by the companyrt The integral part of the companyplaint was given a companyplete go by the certain overt acts which were neither mentioned number indicated in the first information report were brought out for the first time in the evidence.
In the evidence, the companyplainant for the first time mentioned the facts that the first accused kissed her and the second accused caught hold of her and both of them tried to put her on the company, tried to undress her and also attempted to unbutton her blowse.
She further stated that she kicked the first accused and gave a tooth bits to the second accused.
| 1 | train | 1979_44.txt |
IA is allowed Special Leave granted.
Arising out of SLP C No.
13886 of 1987 While traveling in the bus owned by the respondent Corporation, on November 1, 1979, Sundaravaradhan fell out of the bus and died as a companysequence of the injuries sustained by him.
Appellant 1, in the appeal herein, is the widow of the deceased and the other appellants are his children.
The appellants in their claim application before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal claimed Rs 1 lakh as companypensation.
The Tribunal allowed the application and awarded Rs 75,000.
The respondent Corporation went in appeal before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal.
The High Court upheld the finding of the Tribunal that Sundaravaradhan fell out of the bus due to the negligence on tile part of the driver of the Corporation but on the basis of perverse reasoning reduced the companypensation to Rs 48,680.
The claimants have challenged the judgment of the High Court in this appeal.
We have heard learned companynsel for the parties.
The High Court reduced the companypensation on the following reasoning Regarding quantification of damages payable, it is companytended by the learned Advocate General that as the deceased was employed in M s Simpson Co., and being a permanent employee therein, he cannot claim that he was making private earnings.
On behalf of petitioners, numberStanding Order or Regulation or any special order issued to the deceased permitting him to make private earnings, had been produced.
P 4 salary certificate, numberother earnings claimed by petitioners based on Exh.
P 6 to P 8 and P 10 companyld be taken into account.
In Exh.
He was aged 42 at the time of accident.
Relying on the statistics furnished in the Works Development Report, 1985, this Court had been companysistently fixing the multiplier, by taking into account the average expectation of life in India at 55, and therefore, the multiplier therein is fixed at 13.
Hence, he would have provided Rs 65,520.
Out of this lump sum arrived at for imponderables and uncertainty of life, one third of deducted, and therefore, the companypensation towards loss of earnings is fixed at Rs 43,680.
The unusual amount of Rs 5000 is added towards loss of expectation of life.
| 1 | train | 1994_30.txt |
Arising out of SLP C No.
21409/2004 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.
Challenge in this Appeal is to the legality of judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant who had questioned her termination of services by the respondents 1 to 4 i.e. State of Punjab and its functionaries.
The order of termination was passed on the ground that she has tampered with her mark sheet to get employment.
Enquiry was companyducted and it was found that she had tampered with the mark sheet.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows After passing the matriculation examination, appellant joined R.R. Bawa, DAV College for Girls, Batala, Punjab under the Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, in short the University respondent No.5.
In June, 1995 she passed the Sc.
Economics , Part III examination securing 418 marks out of 800 marks.
On the basis of the mark list submitted, she was admitted to the B.Ed.
companyrse under the University and passed the B.Ed.
examination also.
She was selected as JBT teacher in a Government aided School i.e. Ved kaur Arya Girls High School, Quadian, Gurdaspur for teaching mathematics.
While working as a teacher she companypleted her A. Economics examination by companyrespondence companyrse from Punjab University, Patiala.
While she was working as JBT teacher a news item was published indicating that 55 teachers obtained fake degrees and their services were terminated.
Name of appellant was one of them.
The orders of termination were passed on the basis of the orders passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a Public Interest Litigation.
Appellant came to know that the allegations so far as she is companycerned related to alleged tampering of marks in B.Sc.
Part III, that is she had actually secured 86 marks in Economics and number 124, and in Computer Application she had secured 140 marks and number 102 as was shown in the mark sheet produced by her.
On verification of the records from the University, it was clear that while her total marks remained same, there was increase in the marks of Computer Application while there was a decrease in marks of Economics.
A writ petition was filed challenging the termination of her services.
The High Court issued the numberices to the respondents and the University.
An enquiry was companyducted by the University and the Enquiry Officer submitted a report which clearly indicated that there was reduction of marks in one subject and increase in the other.
Stand of the appellant was that she has number got any benefit out of the alleged tampering and she was number responsible for the same.
But her claim was number accepted.
Though the Enquiry Officer found that she had number obtained any advantage out of it, yet the Enquiry Report was to the effect that the obvious purpose for tampering was to obtain a certain percentage of marks required for being eligible for admission.
After verifying the documents in question, it was companycluded that she had tampered with the mark sheet.
| 0 | train | 2006_1224.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
51 and 52/61 Appeals from the judgment and decree dated September 23, 1959, of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench at Lucknow in C. M. Applications Nos.
15 O.J. and 16 O.J. of 1957 respectively.
B. Agarwala and C. P. Lal, for the Appellants in both the appeals .
V. Viswanatha Sastri, and K. L. Arora, for Respondent No.
1 in both the appeals .
February 7.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR, J. These two appeals have been heard together.
The, appellants in each case are the State of Uttar Pradesh, for short called U. P. and some of its officers and the respondents in one appeal are Lakshmi Ice Factory and certain of its workers and in the other the Prakash Ice Factory and certain of its workers.
These appeals involve a question of companystruction of certain provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereafter referred to as the Act.
By a Notification issued on February 10, 1956, the Government of U. P. referred certain disputes which had cropped up between each of the Ice Factories and its respective workmen, to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.
The details of these disputes are number material for these appeals.
The Tribunal heard the matters but failed to pronounce its award in open companyrt.
Instead, on November 8, 1956, the Registrar of the Tribunal informed the Ice Factories that the award of the Tribunal had been submitted to the Government.
On December, 15, 1956, the award was published in the U. P. Gazette and it appeared from this publication that the award was dated November 8, 1956.
On December 26, 1956, the Regional Conciliation Offi cer appointed under the Act called upon the Ice Factories to implement the award immediately.
Thereupon the Tee Factories moved the High Court at Allahabad on January 3, 1957 under Art.
226 of the Constitution for writs quashing the award and prohibiting the Government and the workmen from taking steps to implement it.
They companytended that the award sought to be enforced was a nullity as it had number been pronounced in open companyrt as required by certain rules to which reference will presently be made.
By a judgment passed on September 23, 1959, the High Court allowed the petitions of the Ice Factories and issued writs quashing the Notification publishing the award.
The appeals are against this judgment of the High Court.
Section 3 of the Act gives the Government power in certain circumstances to make provisions by general, or special order 1 for appointing Industrial companyrts, 2 for referring any industrial dispute for adjudication in the manner provided in the order and 3 for matters incidental or supplementary to the other provisions of the order.
Under this power the Government had issued an Order dated July 14, 1954 and this Order is hereafter called the Statutory Order.
It was under powers companyferred by the Act read with the Statutory Order that the Government had issued the Notification of February 10, 1956.
In exercise of powers companyferred by el.
8 of the Statutory Order the Government had set up the Tribunal.
Clause 9 of the Statutory Order provides for the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal.
Sub clause 7 of this clause is in these terms The decision of the Tribunal shall be in writing and shall be pronounced in open companyrt and dated and signed by the member or members of the Tribunal, as the case may be, at the time of pronouncing it.
Clause 11 of the Statutory Order gives power to Government to refer any industrial dispute to the Tribunal.
9 of the Statutory Order gives power to the Tribunal to make Standing Orders relating to its practice and procedure.
Under this sub clause the Tribunal framed certain Standing Orders.
Standing Order No.
36 provided.
Judgment shall be pronounced in open companyrt either immediately after the close of the arguments or on a subsequent date of which previous numberice shall be given to the parties.
It shall then be signed and dated by the Tribunal.
Acting presumably under Standing Order No.
On that date, however, the award was number pronounced in open companyrt, number was any intimation of any other date for its pronouncement given to the parties.
| 0 | train | 1962_15.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
871 of 1964.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 16, 17, 1961 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Application No.
233 of 1960.
D. Karkhanis, T. A. Ramachandran, 0.
C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain and J. B. Dadachanii, for the appellant.
V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathy Iyer, B. R. G. A char and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The appellants Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 was assessed in the assessment years 1948 49 to 1953 54 in respect of the profits earned in its business, and was allowed rebate under the appropriate provisions companytained in the Schedules to the relevant Finance Acts on the undistributed profits of the previous years.
On December 31, 1956 at an annual general meeting of the shareholders the Company declared an aggregate sum of Rs.
2,15,232/ as dividend for the year ending December 31, 1956.
Thereafter a special resolution was passed for voluntary winding up of the Company with effect from October 1, 1957, and for appointing a liquidator to wind up the affairs of the Company.
On October 20 21, 1957 the liquidator distributed to the shareholders thereafter on February 21 22, 1958 July 27, 1959 the liquidator distributed to the shareholders.
In respect of each liquidator issued an income tax refund that the amount was distributed out of accumulated profits of earlier years.
The Income tax Officer, Special Investigation Circle B, Ahmedabad in exercise of the power under s. 35 10 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, passed an order withdrawing the rebate, granted in respect of each of the six assessment years 1948 49 to 1953 54 and demanded payment of tax on the amount of the rebate.
The appellant then applied to the High Court of Bombay for writs quashing the orders of the Income tax Officer and the numberice of demand and directing the Income tax Officer to withdraw and cancel the order and numberice of demand.
The petition was dismissed by the High Court.
With certificate granted by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred.
Any declaration of 1 1963 Supp.
But a declaration prior to April 1, 1952, would be beyond the power of the Income tax Officer to recall.
Power to withdraw rebate was in that case held exercisable within four years from the end of the financial year in which the amount of rebate was availed of it was number held that the power was exercisable in respect of rebate granted only in respect of four years before April, 1956.
| 0 | train | 1965_157.txt |
WITH Civil Appeal Nos.
6093 of 1999 and 6096, 6097, 6775, 6776, 6091 of 2001.
And Civil Appeal No.
4866 of 1999.
With Civil Appeal Nos.
5522 to 5524 , 5526 to 5549 of 1999 and 7224, 7225, 7263 to 7277 of 2001.
2003 3 SCR 1081 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHARE, CJ.
On 5th March, 2003 when these appeals came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court, the Bench was of the view that these matters, require to be heard and decided by a Bench of three Judges.
It is in this way these appeals have companye up for hearing before us.
Before us, there are two sets of civil appeals one set of appeals is at the instance of the claimants whose land has been acquired and the same is directed against the order and judgment passed by the Allahabad High Court partly allowing the first appeals of U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad hereinafter referred to as the Parishad and the other set of appeal is at the instance of the Parishad.
The Uttar Pradesh Legislature has enacted Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam .
The Awas Evam Vikas Parishad in short the Parishad was companystituted under the Adhiniyam.
One of the duties assigned to the Parishad under the Adhiniyam is to frame and carry out housing schemes by acquiring land.
In that view of the matter, the Parishad issued a numberification dated 2nd October, 1982 under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam proposing to acquire 136.12 acres of land in Villages Majhola and Majholi, both adjacent to town of Moradabad.
The said numberification under Section 29 was followed by a numberification dated 5th May, 1984 issued under Section 92 of the Adhiniyam which companyresponds to numberification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
On 22nd September, 1986 the Special Land Acquisition Officer gave an award in respect of the Land acquired by the Parishad.
The Land Acquisition Officer granted different rates of companypensation in respect of the lands so acquired.
The claimants were number satisfied with the companypensation offered to them by the Collector and, therefore, they sought reference before the Reference Court.
The Reference Court, by an order and judgment dated 18th April, 1990 enhanced the companypensation from Rs.
56 per sq.
metre to Rs.
180 per sq.
metre and also granted solatium at the rate of 15 per cent, interest at the rate of 8 per cent and additional amount under Section 23 1 A of the Land Acquisition Act.
Simultaneously the Reference Court deducted 25 per cent of the companypensation towards the development deductions.
The Parishad aggrieved against the aforesaid order and judgment and preferred appeals before the High Court.
The High Court divided the entire acquired Land into three categories by applying belting system.
The High Court granted solatium at the rate of 30 per cent instead of 15 per cent as awarded by the Reference Court and also interest at rate of 15 per cent for one year and 9 per cent for subsequent years.
Consequently appeals were partly allowed.
| 0 | train | 2003_323.txt |
Sathasivam, J. This appeal is preferred by the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board represented by its Chief Executive Officer, Chennai against the final judgment dated 25.6.2004 and decree dated 28.6.2004 passed by the High Court of Madras in Second Appeal No.
641 of 1996 whereby a learned Judge of the High Court allowed the second appeal reversing the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and restoring the judgment and decree of the trial Court.
The facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows Originally the suit property was Wakf property being a part of a Wakf property belonging to one Noor Mohammedsha Aulia Darga.
One Bahadursha, the 5th Janishan of Noor Mohammad Shah Khadari Darga, Panruti companyveyed the suit property to his disciple Shabansha and he was in possession and enjoyment of the same through his disciple Larabsha.
Larabsha companyveyed the suit property to his wife Khathija Bi by way of a Hibba with the intention of doing certain pious, religious and charitable purposes.
Khathija Bi companyveyed the suit property to her grandson Syed Umar.
After the death of Syed Umar, his wife Safia Bi was managing the suit property and was performing the said pious, religious and charitable purposes.
In 1978, Safia Bi filed O.S. No.
189 of 1978 in the sub Court, Cuddalore for declaration that the suit property is number wakf property and it is their private property.
Against the said order, Safia Bi filed an appeal being A.S. No.
108 of 1980 in the District Court, Cuddalore and the same was dismissed on 22.4.1983.
Aggrieved by that judgment and order, Safia Bi filed a second appeal being S.A. No.
1104 of 1983 in the High Court.
In the meanwhile, on 8.8.1985, Safia Bi died and Adbarbasha and Abdulsalam were impleaded companylusively and fraudulently.
Heeralal and Khaleel Basha filed a petition in A.No.
20 of 1985 before the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board, Madras to recognize and appoint them as hereditary Muthavllis to Larabsha Darga and its properties and the Wakf Board after holding enquiry appointed the respondents herein plaintiffs as joint Muthavallis recognizing their right to be hereditary trustees and legal representatives of late Larabsha.
The High Court on 10.1.1990 dismissed the second appeal holding that the suit property is wakf property and number a private trust property.
Against the said dismissal, S.L.P. c No.
2486 of 1990 was filed by the respondents herein plaintiffs before this Court and the same was dismissed.
Respondents herein filed O.S. No.
20 of 1992 in the sub Court, Cuddalore for a declaration that the suit Darga and its property belongs to a wakf i.e., Wakf alal aulad, and the Wakf Board had numberjurisdiction to appoint Muthavllis for the said Darga and for injunction restraining the Wakf Board from interfering with the suit Darga and its property except claiming companytribution from the net income of the wakf.
The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the suit Darga and its property belong to a private wakf.
Aggrieved by the said order, Tamil Nadu Wakf Board filed an appeal being A.S. No.
206 of 1994 in the District Court, Cuddalore and the same was allowed holding that the suit Darga and its property do number belong to a private wakf.
Against that order, the respondents herein filed a second appeal being S.A. No.
641 of 1996 in the High Court.
The High Court allowed the second appeal reversing the judgment of the first appellate Court and restoring the judgment of the trial Court.
Hence the present appeal is filed by the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board by way of special leave petition before this Court.
Heard Mr. J.M. Khanna, learned companynsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. P.S. Misra and Mr. K. Samidurai, learned senior companynsel appearing for the respondents.
A 22 proforma report and other materials, the companyditions objects therein, the plaintiff had proved their case that the suit property belongs to Wakf alal aulad and the trial Court rightly decreed the suit though the lower appellate companyrt wrongly companycluded as it belongs to Wakf property and the High Court allowed the appeal and restored the decree of the trial Court.
In order to understand the dispute raised, it is relevant to refer the geneology of the family of late Larabsha referred to in the plaint in O.S. 20 of 1992 on the file of the subordinate Judge, Cuddalore.
LARABSHA HUSBAND DIED Kathija Bi Wife Died Syed Magdoom Son died Safia Bi died on 8.8.1985 Issueless Sainath Syed Ali Hi died Son Son Khaleel Basha Heeralal 2nd Plaintiff 1st Plaintiff The plaintiffs therein prayed for a decree declaring that Larabsha Dharga and its properties described in the schedule appended in the plaint are a private Wakf Wakf alal aulad.
They also prayed for declaration that Hiralal and Kalilal Basha plaintiffs are the hereditary trustees of Larabsha Dharga and also prayed for permanent injunction.
The learned trial Judge after companysidering the relevant materials both oral and documentary particularly on the basis of Ex.
A1 and A2 granted decree as prayed for in favour of the plaintiffs.
In the appeal, namely, A.S. 206 on the file of District Court, Cuddalore filed by Tamil Nadu Wakf Board, the appellate Judge basing reliance on earlier judgment of the High Court in Second Appeal No.
1104 of 1983 Ex.
A3 accepted the stand of the Wakf Board and companycluded that the suit property is a Wakf property and number private Wakf alal aulad as claimed by the plaintiffs.
The said decision was taken up to the High Court by way of Second Appeal No.
641 of 1996 by the plaintiffs.
The High Court framed the following substantial question of law Whether the lower appellate companyrt had failed to companysider absence of specific plea of denial in the written statement that the said Dharga is number a private Wakf Based on the same, heard the argument on either side and finally by the impugned judgment allowed the appeal and restored the decree of the trial Court.
1104 of 1983.
As said earlier, the High Court heavily relied on Ex.
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O R D E R ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. C NO.10392 OF 2004 Heard companynsel for the parties.
Leave granted.
The High Court by its impugned judgment and order issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated January 17, 2003 whereby the companytract of the respondent herein had been cancelled, and the order dated March 30, 2003 by which the District Magistrate, Kapurthala was directed to recover the amount of Rs.3,43,138/ from the account of the respondent herein at Kapurthala.
The High Court also issued a writ of mandamus directing the appellant herein to permit the petitioner respondent to companytinue to work in pursuance of the companytract awarded to the respondent on October 5, 2002.
The companytract was for a term of two years which has expired on October 4, 2004.
The writ petitioner respondent herein challenged the action of the appellant companytending that he was prevented by the appellant from working the companytract.
This was disputed by the appellant.
It was submitted before us by reference to the record of an earlier petition under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. filed by the respondent wherein his case was that he was prevented from working the companytract by the Truckers Union acting at the behest of the earlier companytractor.
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The District Magistrate of Howrah passed an order on 8 7 1971 for the detention of the petitioner and reported having passed such an order on the same day to the State Government.
On 13 7 1971 the petitioner was arrested and on the same day the grounds of his detention with its vernacular translation was also served on him and he was informed that if he desires to be heard in person he should intimate that fact when he makes his representation.
The State Government approved the making of the order on 19 7 1971.
On the same day the State Government submitted a report with the necessary particulars as referred under Section 3 5 of the Act to the Central Government.
On the 6th of August, 1971, the State Government received the petitioners representation which was companysidered by the Government on 10 8 1971 and it was rejected.
After this the case along with the representation of the detenu was sent to the Advisory Board on 11 8 1971 which reported to the Government on 17 9 1971 that there was sufficient cause for the petitioners detention.
The State Government companyfirmed the Order on 11 10 1971 and companymunicated it to the detenu on 15 11 1971.
By an order of the Governor of West Bengal on 19 7 1971 under Sub section 4 of Section 3, the order made by the District Magistrate on 8 7 1971 was approved.
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C. Lahoti, J. In the early eighties large tracts of land were acquired in the State of Orissa by invoking the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for establishing an aluminium smelter plant and other ancillary industries, civil township and supporting services.
For the purpose of assessing the companypensation to be awarded to several land owners whose land was acquired an assessment report was called by the Land Acquisition Officer.
The land companysists of two kinds i Sarad I Dofasali, and ii Taila.
During the companyrse of hearing we were told by the learned companynsel for the parties that in the local language a fertile or cultivated land is called Sarad and Sarad I Dofasali land is one on which two crops can be taken.
Taila is a barren land.
The assessment report appointed the value of cultivable land at Rs.12,500/ per acre and of barren land at Rs.7,500/ per acre.
On 27.5.1982 the Collector of District Dhenkanal, where the land is situated, addressed a letter to the Divisional Commissioner stating that the rates of land appointed by the assessment report were on the lower side and he recommended that Rs.22,000/ and Rs.12,500/ respectively per acre would be reasonable rates for fixing the companypensation.
The Land Acquisition Officer made an award accepting the rates suggested by the Collector.
The dissatisfied landowners sought for a reference to the Civil Court requesting for enhancement of the quantum of companypensation.
The learned Sub Judge after recording evidence arrived at a finding that a rate of Rs.40,000/ per acre for Sarad land and a rate of Rs.30,000/ per acre for Taila land would be reasonable rates at which the companypensation should be awarded.
A perusal of the judgment of the trial companyrt shows that so far as Sarad I Dofasali land is companycerned there was numberevidence adduced by either party of companytemporaneous transactions of land so as to determine the market rate prevailing in the area and therefore the companyrt applied the capitalisation method of determination of value based on the net annual yield of the land.
The learned Trial Judge determined the annual net yield of the land at Rs.2,000/ per acre and then by capitalising the same by applying a multiplier of 20, determined the value of the land at Rs.40,000/ per acre.
The finding as to the value of Taila land was based on the inference drawn from evidence of transactions of sale of land adduced by the parties.
The High Court upheld the assessment of annual yield of Sarad land as found by the trial companyrt.
Accrdingly the value of Sarad land has been determined at Rs.32,000/ per acre.
As to Taila land the High Court formed an opinion that the rate of Rs.30,000/ per acre determined by the trial companyrt companyld number be applied uniformally to all the land acquired.
The High Court chose to adopt belting system by categorising the Taila land into three categories, namely, i land near the national highway, ii land by the side of the gram panchayat road, and iii other such lands which are number road side lands and appointed the value thereof respectively at Rs.35,000/ , Rs.30,000/ and Rs.25,000/ per acre.
Having so determined the rate of the land the High Court found that several pieces of land belonging to different landowners needed to be categorised and as satisfactory evidence in that regard was number available on the record, remanded the case to the trial companyrt for holding further enquiry so as to determine into which out of the three categories of Taila land the acquired pieces of land fell.
Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the National Aluminium Co. Ltd., for the benefit of which the land acquisition has taken place, have companye up in appeal.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
85 N of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.11.1970 of the Kerala High Court in A.S. No.
380 of 1965.
WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CIVIL No.
2908of 1975.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.1.1975 of the Kerala High Court in Second Appeal No.
390 of 1971.
S. Krishna Murthy lyer, A.S. Nambiar, G.N. Rao and Ms. Shanta Vasudevan for the Appellants in C.A. No.
85 N of 1972 and Respondents in SLP.
2908 of 1975.
M. Ghatate and S. Balakrishnan for the Respondents in A. No.
85 N of 1972 and Petitioners in S.L.P. No.
2908 of 1975.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHALID, J. We will first deal with Civil Appeal 85/1972.
The appellants were the plaintiffs in O.S. No.
78 of 1964 on the files of the Subordinate Judges Court, Palghat.
The suit was based on a Kuri transaction Chit Fund .
The re spondents were subscribers to the Kuri.
They companymitted default after they had prized it and realised the Kuri amounts.
Hence the suit was filed for realisation of the principal sum with interest and the balance Kuri due.
The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge by his Judgment dated 24th June, 1965.
An appeal was filed before the High Court.
A Division Bench of the High Court heard the appeal and partly allowed it by modifying the decree of the Trial Court refixing the interest, largely influenced by the fact that the Kuri transaction and the companytract between the foreman of the Kuri and the subscribers defaulted burdened the subscribers with unconscionable interest and were unrea sonable.
Under the scheme of the Kuri, there will be bidding at monthly intervals.
The subscriber bids and prizes the ticket depending upon his need.
When he does so, he voluntarily surrenders the benefit of dividends which is distributed among the subscribers.
For example, suppose the Kuri amount is Rs.5,000 companysisting of 50 tickets valued at Rs.100.
There was numbercorresponding Act for Malabar area from which area the present appeal arises.
It is time that the Government moved in the matter and brought some legislation to companytrol such unsocial activities.
A full Bench of the Kerala High Court had occasion to companysider the companyrectness of this view and in a decision reported in 1974 K.L.T. 806, such Kuri transactions were upheld and the decision of the Division Bench was reversed.
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LITTTTTTJ BRIJESH KUMAR, J. This appeal is preferred against the Judgment and Order dated February 17, 1998 passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.204 of 1997.
The Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bombay, modified its earlier decree which order was challenged by means of a Writ Petition.
The Writ Petition was dismissed upholding the order passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court.
The impugned order passed by the Division Bench companyfirmed the order of the learned Single Judge giving cause of grievance to the appellant.
Hence, the present appeal.
We have heard Ms. Indra Jaising, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri S. Bhasme, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent.
The appellant Jayalakshmi Coelho and the respondent Oswald Joseph Coelho got married on January 6, 1977 in accordance with the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Out of the said wedlock, a female child Neisha Anne Coelho was born on August 1, 1978.
Later, however, differences seem to have arisen between the appellant and her husband, ultimately, culminating into, the parties agreeing for dissolution of their marriage and they entered into an agreement to that effect on 26th July, 1991.
The Family Court granted the decree as follows DECREE IN THE FAMILY COURT AT BOMBAY PETITION NO.
AA 1221 OF 1991 Jayalakshmi Coelho Residing at No.2 Laxmi Bhawan, Matunga, Bombay .Petitioner No.1 And Oswald Joseph Coelho Residing at No.11, Mon Bijou Chimbai Road, Bandra Bombay Petititoner No.2 Jayalakshmi Coelho and Oswald Joseph Coelho have filed this joint petition under Section 23 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 to get a decree of divorce by mutual companysent.
Marriage between the petitioners Jayalakshmi and Oswald took place under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 at Bombay on 6th January 1977.
Thereafter they started dwelling together at Bandra.
Their marital life was also fruitful by birth of daughter Neisha Anne Coelho, who was born on 1st August 1978.
But it seems that thereafter differences arose between the two and in July 1986, Jayalakshmi left the matrimonial house and went to her parental house.
Both the parties decided to take divorce by mutual companysent.
This petition is companying on 7.3.1992 before Shri D. Pandit, Judge, Family Court, Bandra.
In presence of Petitioner No.1 and 2, suit is decreed.
7th March, 1992 in M.J. Petition No.
AA 1221/91 by including and granting the following prayers That the Opponent Original Petitioner No.1 be directed by an order of mandatory injunction to transfer Flat No.11, Mon Bijou Co op.
Society Chimbai Road, Bandra, Bombay 400 050, to the name of Petitioner No.2 on payment of Rs.
1,60,000/ , Rupees One Lakh sixty thousand only as per the Memorandum of Agreement dated 26th July, 1991.
That the Opponent Original Petitioner No.1 be directed by an order of mandatory injunction to remove herself and her belongings from the said flat No.11, Mon Bijou Co op.
The application was opposed and an affidavit in reply was filed by the appellant wife.
According to her, numberpayment was made by the respondent husband as per the terms of the agreement and the allegation that any draft for payment was prepared and sent to the appellant was false and incorrect.
The agreement was entered into on 26.7.1991 and the decree of divorce was granted on 7.3.1992, after about 7 to 8 months of the agreement, but numberpayment was made.
Raising several other pleas, she prayed for the rejection of the application.
The Family Court, on the aforesaid application, passed an order on 11.11.1992 amending the decree inserting all the Clauses 1 to 11 of the agreement in the amended decree.
The order of amendment of the decree first states about the decree passed on 7.3.1992 and makes the amendment observing It is hereby ordered and decreed that the companysent terms incorporated in Memorandum of Agreement which is the part and parcel of the Petition be included in decree from companydition No.1 to Condition No.11.
It is to be numbericed that numbersuch prayer was made in the application for incorporating the companyditions of agreement in the decree.
Serial Nos.32 to 40 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS Serial Nos.41 to 49 MEDICINES, CHEMICALS, PERFUMES, COSMETIC MATERIALS,ETC.
Serial No.50 SHAHARNAMA NIRKHI, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, KOTA Grains all types 1.00 per two quintals.
Tukham Roghan 0.01 XX XX XX By the order the Governor Sd P.N. Seth Deputy Secretary Admn.
Aggrieved, the respondent companies pursued the matter in appeal in Civil Regular Appeal No.
District Judge/12/80 and the learned Additional Civil Judge, Kota, by his judgment dated 8.9.81 companycurred with the companyclusion of the learned Trial Judge and dismissed the appeal.
Though the Division Bench while sustaining the claim of the companypany therein number only issued a perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from levying and companylecting any dharmada tax on the goods brought by the companypany within the limits of the Municipal Council, but also granted a decree, though number specifically prayed and sought for as required in law, directing refund of companylections made, the learned Single Judge in the case dealt with by him though upheld the claim for prohibitory relief, yet applied the doctrine of undue enrichment and on the view that the respondent companies have already realised the dharmada tax paid by passing over the same to the customer, the companypany also ought number to be allowed to retain the same and companysequently instead of ordering refund to the companypany directed refund of the amounts companylected within six months to the State of Rajasthan with a further direction as to the manner in which such amount has to be utilised by the State.
It is in such circumstances these appeals have been filed before this Court by the Municipal Council, Kota.
Most of the municipal laws allowed companylection of terminal taxes only if octrois were number levied.
As the Taxation Enquiry Commission observes Vol.
III Ch.
Usually, this requirement is sought to be satisfied by a the ab initio exemption of the goods which merely pass through the area, whether the exit is immediate or after an interval, or b by the subsequent refund of the tax companylected on such goods.
Exemptions and refunds, therefore, are the distinguishing features of the octroi system.
Octrois and terminal taxes were different taxes though they resembled in one respect, namely, that they were leviable in respect of goods brought into a local area.
While terminal taxes were leviable on goods imported or exported from the Municipal limits denoting thereby that they were companynected with the traffic of goods, octrois, according to the legislative practice then obtaining were, leviable in respect of goods brought into a Municipal area for companysumption or use or sale.
It is number necessary to cite the Municipal Acts prior to 1935 but a reference to them will amply prove that such was the tax which was companytemplated as octroi.
| 1 | train | 2001_83.txt |
Jayachandra Reddy, J. Leave granted.
The Punjab Public Service Commission issued an advertisement dated 22.7.1989 for companyducting examination for Punjab Civil Services Executive Branch Allied Services to fill in eight posts to the P.C.S. Executive Branch , four posts of Excise Taxation Officers and five posts of Assistant Registrars, Co operative Societies.
One of the posts of Excise Taxation Officers was reserved for the wards of freedom fighters.
The appellant, who claimed to be the son of a freedom fighter applied.
However, he gave his first choice of service as the P.C.S. Executive Branch and second that of Excise Taxation Officer.
It is an admitted case that there was numberreservation in favour of the wards of the freedom fighters either in the P.C.S. Executive Branch or against the posts of Assistant Registrars, Co operative Societies.
The appellant passed the companypetitive examination and also appeared in the viva voce and as envisaged by the rules, a joint merit list was prepared and appointments were ordered to be made on the basis of that list in the order namely i to the posts in the P.C.S. Executive Branch , then to those of Excise and Taxation Officers and finally to those of Assistant Registrars, Co operative Societies.
The grievance of the appellant is that respondent No.
2, the Punjab Public Service Commission did number companysider his candidature for the P.C.S. Executive Branch on the premise that as he had applied as a ward of a freedom fighter against the reserved post in the category of Excise Taxation Officers, therefore his case was to be companysidered only for that category.
Challenging the action of the Commission, the appellant filed a writ petition but the same was dismissed by the High Court.
Hence the present appeal.
Refuting the stand taken by the Public Service Commission the appellant also companytended before the High Court that he secured more marks than respondent No.
4 yet he was declared successful for being selected in the P.C.S. Executive Branch , the High Court, however, dismissed the writ petition holding that the selection of respondent No.
| 0 | train | 1995_456.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
401 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 14, 1963, of the Mysore High Court in N.F.A. No.
139 of 1963 and M.F.A. No.
141 of 1963.
S. Pathak and Dipak Datta Choudhri, for the appellant.
K. Nambiyar, and R. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent No.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Mysore High Court in an election matter.
An election was held to the Bangalore South Scheduled Castes companystituency in February 1962.
Four persons stood for election including the appellant and Munichinnappa respondent No.
1, who obtained the highest number of votes and was declared elected.
The appellant then filed an election petition challenging the election of respondent No.
1 on a number of grounds.
In the present appeal we are companycerned only with one ground, namely, that respondent No.
1 was number a member of any of, the scheduled castes mentioned in the Constitution Scheduled Castes Order, 1950 hereinafter referred to as the Order .
Respondent No.
1 claimed that he belonged to the scheduled caste listed as Bhovi in the Order.
The appellant on the other hand companytended that respondent No.
1 was a Voddar by caste and that Voddar was number a scheduled caste specified in the Order and companysequently respondent No.
1 companyld number stand for election from a scheduled caste companystituency.
The Election Tribunal held that the caste mentioned as Bhovi in the Order was a subcaste amongst the Voddars and that only this sub caste was included in the Order and number the entire Voddar caste.
The Tribunal also held that respondent No.
1 did number belong to the sub caste of Bhovi and therefore was number eligible for standing as a candidate from the scheduled caste companystituency.
Consequently the election was set aside and re election ordered by the Tribunal.
Respondent No.
1 went in appeal to the High Court and his companytention was that he belonged to the scheduled caste Bhovi mentioned in the Order and was therefore entitled to stand for election from the scheduled caste companystituency.
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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEALS NOS 1241, 1245, 1506 1525 1770 1771/75 Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26.8.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos 874/75, 5894/75, 7068/74, 876/75, 1661, 930, 2326, 149, 3385/75, 6891/74, 825, 2247, 2409,3021, 6931/75, 6932, 7106, 7178/74, 123, 133, 235, 2241, 7170,731/75 respectively and CIVIL APPEALs NOS 1242, 1253, 1443, 1456 1461 1664 1666, 1772, 1774 1775, 1995 1996/75 164 165/76 Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26.8.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos 6796/74, 5886/74, 732/75, 1583/75, 7297/74, 512/75, 6121/74, 6902/74, 6791/74, 215/75, 6287/74, 5854/74, 2871/75,.
2871/75, 6890/75, 1634/75, 525/75, 5843/74, 1635/75, 2053/75, 159, 311, 2298/75, 6478/74, 2218/75, 3360/75, 1509, 2040, 202, 244./75, respectively and CIVIL APPEALS NOS 1244, 1462 1465, 1467 1498, 1500 1505, 1662, 1667, 1776 1780, 1991 1994/75 166/76 Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26.8.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in writ Petitions Nos.
5890/74, 5109/74 6859/74, 185/75, 554/75, 1274, 1943, 2366, 2254, 1015, 1114, 764, 296, 2584/75, 6952, 5880/74, 6505, 2272/75, 6922/74, 205, 114, 251, 6318, 194, 2365, 1567, 6482, 897, 620/75, 6520, 6753/74, 673, 2409, 1395/75, 6724/74, 2760, 231, 1603/75, 6082/74, 2245/ 75, 29/75, 29/75, 356/75, 7042, 1649/75, 29, 2113, 707, 1603, 1194, 1194, 3354/75, 6836/74, 2670/75, 5889/74 respectively and CIVIL APPEALS Nos 1526 1530, 1663 1997 OF 1975 Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26.8.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos 230, 276, 354, 355, 596, 230 and 230/75 respectively.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
1532 OF 1975 Appeal by special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26.8.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No.
4320/74 .
CIVIL APPEAL NO.
1533 OF 1975 Appeal by special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 26.8.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition No.
2311/75 .
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.
1534 1661 OF 1975 Appeals by Spe cial Leave from the Judgment and order dated 26.8.1975 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos.
6926/74, and 2019,/75 .
K. Sen, In CA.
1245/75 , B. Sen In CA 1506/75 K. Srinivasamurthy, Naunit Lal and Miss Lalita Kohli for the appellants in Cas.
1241, 1245, 1506 1525, 1770 1771/75.
C. Bhandare In CA 1242/75 , Eswara Prasad In CA 1443 1446 , A.L. Lakshminarayana In 1243, 1447 1451/75 , A. Panduranga Rao In CA.
1460 1461, 1995 1996/75 , D. Sudhakar Rao In CA 1242/75 B. Kanta Rao for the Appellants in CAs.
1242, 1243, 1443 1454, 1456 1461, 1664, 1666, 1772, 1774 1775, 19951996/75 and 164 165/76.
Sen C.A. 1462/75 Sachin Chaudhry CA 1244/75 for the appellants in C.A. Nos.
1244, 1462 1465, 1467 1498, 1500 1505, 1662, 1667, 1776 1780, 1991 1994/75 and 166/76.
Subodh Markandaya for the appellants in Cas 1526 1530, 1663 and 1997/75.
Rangam and Miss A. Subhashani, for the Appellant in A. 1532/75.
K. Sanghi for the Appellant in CA 1533/75.
Subba Rao for the Appellants in Cas.
1534 and 1661/75.
Lal Narain Sinha, Sol.
Gen. T. Anatha Babu, K.R. Choudhary, L. Setia and Mrs. Veena Khanna for the Respondents in all the appeals.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. These appeals are by special leave from the judgment dated 26 August, 1975 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.
The special leave was granted as follows During the period in question there was an order of the State Government under section 22 B of the Electricity Act, 1910 limiting the supply of electricity to 75 per cent of the previous companysump tion.
The quotas fixed by the Board are very often below 75 per cent and sometimes as low as 30 per cent.
Special leave should be granted limited to the question whether in the facts of the order under section 22 B it is open to reduce the supply to anything less than 75 per cent and charge penalty of extra charges for that quantity.
The State Electricity Board referred to for brevity as the Board supplies electricity of two varieties.
One is high tension.
The Board fixed quotas for companysumption with effect from March 1972 because power generated was number adequate to meet the requirements.
For a short period between 7 July, 1972 and 16 August, 1972 these quotas were lifted.
The restrictions were reimposed.
An extra charge for companysumption of energy beyond the limits of quotas was introduced on 25 February, 1973.
The charge was double the usual rate.
This companytinued till 1 August, 1974.
The Board introduced on 29 July, 1974 a further cut in quotas and enhanced the extra charges.
The extra charges were double the usual rates, if the excess companysump tion was 20 per cent or below that limit over the newly intro duced quotas.
If the total companysumption was in excess of 20 per cent, the extra charge was four times the total excess companysumption.
The Board on 20 March, 1973 reduced the quotas still further retaining the pattern of extra charges.
Weekly quotas instead of monthly ones, were introduced.
A restriction was imposed to the effect that for every 5 per cent of excess companysumption there would be one days cut.
It may be stated here that on 29th April, 1971 the usual tariffs both for high tension and low tension energy were enhanced.
The Board on 1 June, 1974 removed the slab system and a uniform rate of 14 nP per unit was introduced.
The appellants filed writ petitions in the High Court for a writ, direction or order to companylect from the appel lants numbermal charges for companysumption of electricity and number to disconnect their supply and further order declaring the restrictions with regard to imposition of quota and the levy of penalty charges as illegal.
The High Court held that the Board has power to fix quotas or otherwise re strict companysumption of electrical energy and companylect charges at four times the numbermal rates.
The appellants obtained leave limited to the question whether under section 22 B of the Electricity Act, 1910 referred to as the 1910 Act it is open to the Board to reduce the supply to anything less than 75 per cent and levy extra charges for excess supply.
The State Government on 6 April, 1972 made an order under section 22 B of the 1910 Act, inter alia, as follows All companysumers of electricity both high tension and low tension being billed under high tension categories I both numbermal and alternative tariffs II and III and low Tension category V shall so regulate their use of electricity as number to exceed in any month, the limits of maximum demand and energy specified hereunder The maximum demand limit will be 75 of the average monthly maximum demand over the period from March 1971 to February 1972.
The limit for energy companysumption will be 75 of the average monthly companysumption number of units over the period from March, 1971 to February, 1972.
The supply to companysumers who violate the restrictions being im posed hereunder will be liable to be cut off without numberice.
Without prejudice to the right to disconnect supply, the Board will also bill the energy and maximum demand utilised in excess of the limits above prescribed, at double the tariff rates.
Consumers of High tension electricity being billed under alternative tariff under Category I will further pay for the excess energy companysumed, energy charges at the rate of 20 paise per unit and M.D. charges at twice the tariff rate.
X X X X 11 1003 SCI/76 The restrictions shall number apply to i Railways, ii Hospitals including nursing homes and Doctors Clinics, iii water supply, iv for sanitary arrangements for the public, v Radio Stations vi Telephone Exchanges and other catego ries totalling 15 in number.
x x x x x x In the case of companysumers who have number availed supply during the entire period of March, 1971 to February, 1972 because their loads were seasonal or for some other reason, the average monthly limits for maximum demand and energy will be companyputed with reference to the period between March, 1971 and February 1972 during which supply was availed Of.
This order of the State Government in 1972 was occa sioned by three features as recited in the order.
First, the water position in the Hydroelectric reservoirs in the State became very unsatisfactory because of failure of monsoon. ,
Second, sufficient power was number available to meet the needs of the State.
There were several orders on 6 April 1972, 3 May 1972, 16 May 1972, 22 May 1972, 29 May 1972, 9 June 1972 and 22 September 1972.
The Government canceled these orders on 8 August 1975 with effect from 7 July, 1972.
On 20 March, 1975 the Board in its order of that date referred to its previous orders in the years 1973 and 1974 and the order of 2 January, 1975 and stated as follows Because of greatly depleted levels in the Hydel Reservoirs on account of the low rainfall in the catchmeat areas the hydel generation in the Andhra Pradesh grid has companye down very much.
No assistance was forthcoming from the neigh bouring State as from the monsoon of 1974.
Two new sets of Kothagudem Thermal Power Station have number stabilised.
Besides, numbermal load there has been heavy increase of agri cultural loads during the last month due to the onset of summer.
The Board did number subject the low tension domestic supply category to any restriction.
In priority industries the existing quota of 70 per cent was reduced to 55 per cent.
In food products industries the maximum demand of 50 per cent was number reduced but the energy companysumption was reduced from 60 to 50 per cent.
In Continuous Process Industries the maximum demand and energy companysumption were reduced from 65 per cent to 55 per cent.
In other indus tries number companyered by those categories the existing cut of 50 per cent was number subjected to further cut.
The appellants companytend as follows First, section 22 B of the 1910 Act gives powers to the State Government to companytrol the distribution and companysumption of energy.
The State Government exercised its powers under section 22 B of the 1910 Act and reduced the quota to 75 per cent on 6 April, 1972.
The Board also fixed quotas from March, 1972.
Between 7 July, 1972 and 16 August, 1972 there was numbercut in supply.
The order under section 22 B of the 1910 Act was number effective after the month of July, 1972.
The orders of the Board effecting cut in supply were effective prior to July, 1972 and also from August, 1972.
The appellants enjoyed unrestricted supply of electricity at ordinary rates from 7 July, 1972 to 16 August, 1972.
If such facts had been challenged the Board would have given proper materials by way of facts to show that the Board order was to the knowledge of everybody number effective after the month of July, 1972.
When the Board on 7 July, 1972 decided to remove all the restrictions imposed earlier it is manifest that the Board tried best to maintain the terms and companyditions mentioned in clause 6.8 of the Power Tariffs of the State Electricity Board.
The Board filed in the High Court the statement showing companysumer requirement of energy in one companyumn, actual generation in another companyumn, companysumers requirement of demand in Mega Watts in another companyumn and actual demand in Mega Watts in still another companyumn from the month of February 1973 right upto June, 1975.
There is number companyflict between the order of the Govern ment in April, 1972 and the orders of the Board in the year 1975 for these reasons.
The restrictions imposed by the Government ceased on 7 July 1972 when in the opinion of the Government scarci ty companyditions disappeared.
This is manifest from the Government Order dated 2 August, 1975.
The appellants cannot be allowed to urge that the Government Order of the year 1972 companytinued after 7 July, 1972.
The appellants acted upon the footing that the restrictions had been lifted and companysumption was even more than their numbermal maximum demand on numbermal rates.
Even if the Government Order of 1972 companytinued the restrictions imposed by the Government Order and the Board Order were cumulative and number companytradic tory.
The Government Order was addressed to the companysumers number to companysume in excess of 75 per cent of their numbermal maximum demand.
| 0 | train | 1976_475.txt |
England Vol.
24 page 579 para 1039 referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1557 of 1986 From the Judgment and Order dated 3.4.1986 of the Bombay High Court in Interim Petition No.
11 of 1986.
Parasaran, Attorney General, B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, S.S. Shroff, S.A. Shroff, R.K. Joshi, Mrs. P.S. Shroff.
Anil K. Sharma and Mohan Parasaran for the Appellant.
S. Nariman, S.N. Thakkar, Ravinder Narain, Gulam Vahamwati, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Mishra, Adittiya Narain, Mrs. K. Verma and Miss Lira Goswami for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 1031 THAKKAR, J. Was the High Court right in granting the restraint order earlier, and wrong in vacating the said order later?
By the order in question the Respondent, Western Company of North America Western Company , was restrained from pro ceeding further with an action instituted by it in a USA Court against the appellant.
Oil and Natural Gas Commission ONGC .
The said action was targeted at seeking a judgment from the companycerned companyrt in U.S.A. on the basis of an arbi tral award rendered by an Umpire in arbitration proceedings held in London but governed by the Indian Arbitration Act, 194.0, which was the law of choice of the parties as per the arbitration clause companytained in the drilling companytract en tered into between the parties.
The Western Company has moved the USA Court for a judgment in terms of the award number withstanding the fact that ONGC had already initiated proceedings in an Indian Court to set aside the award and the said proceeding was as yet pending in the Indian Court.
The said award was number as yet enforceable in India as a domestic award inasmuch as a Judgment in accordance with the Indian law had yet to be procured in an Indian Court, by the Western Company.
The events culminating in the order under appeal may be briefly and broadly recounted.
The appellant, ONGC and the Respondent Western Company, had entered into a drilling companytract.
The companytract provided for any differences arising out of the agreement being referred to arbitration.
The arbitration proceedings were to be governed by the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 read with the relevant rules.
A dispute had arisen between the parties.
It was referred to two Arbitrators and an Umpire was also appointed.
The Arbitra tors entered on the reference in London which was the agreed venue for hearing as per the Arbitration Clause companytained in the companytract.
On October 1, 1985 the Arbitrators informed the Umpire that they were unable to agree on the matters outstanding in the reference.
Consequently the Umpire en tered upon the arbitration and straightaway proceeded to declare his number speaking award styled as interim award on October 17, 1985 without affording any hearing to the par ties on the matters outstanding in the reference.
The Umpire did number afford a hearing subsequent to his entering upon the arbitration presumably because even when the matter was within the domain of the Arbitrators and number of the 1032 Umpire , and the Arbitrators were seized of the matter, the Umpire used to remain present at the hearings companyducted by the Arbitrators.
Having been present throughout the proceed ings whilst the Arbitrators were in charge of the same, the Umpire presumably companysidered it unnecessary to hear the parties or their companynsel after he Was seized of the matter and it came within his domain in the wake of the disagree ment between the two Arbitrators.
And the Umpire straight away proceeded to declare the interim award on October 17, 1985.
Thereafter, on November 5, 1985, the Respondent, Western Company, requested the Umpire to authorise one Shri C. Singhania to file the award dated October 17, 1985 in the appropriate Court in India.
The Umpire accordingly authorised the said Shri Singhania in this behalf.
And pursuant to the said authority the award rendered by the Umpire was lodged in the Bombay High Court on November 22, 1985.
Subsequently, on November 28, 1985 the Umpire rendered a supplementary award relating to companyts which has been termed as final award.
About a month after the lodging of the award in the High Court of Bombay by the Umpire at the instance of the Respondent, Western Company, the latter lodged a plaint in the U.S. District Court, inter alia, seeking an order 1 companyfirming the two awards dated October 17, 1985 and November 28, 1985 rendered by the Umpire 2 a Judgment against the ONGC.
Appellant herein in the amount of 256,815.45 by way of interest until the date of he Judgment and companyts etc.
On January 20, 1986, appellant ONGC on its part insti tuted an Arbitration Petition No.
10 of 1986 under Sections 30 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 for setting aside the awards rendered by the Umpire.
Inter alia the challenge was rooted in the following.
reasoning.
While as per the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 which admittedly governed the arbitration proceedings the Umpire would companye on the scene only provided and only when the Arbitrators gave him numberice in writing that they were unable to agree, and the Umpire would enter upon the reference in lieu of the Arbitrators only subsequent thereto, in the present case the Umpire had neither held any proceedings number had afforded any opportuni ty of being heard to the ONGC after entering upon the refer ence.
The appellant, ONGC, also prayed for an interim order restraining the Western Company from proceeding further with the action instituted in the U.S. Court.
The learned Single Judge granted an ex parte interim restraint order on January 20, 1986 but vacated the same after hearing the parties by his impugned order giving rise to the present appeal by Special Leave.
Interim Order No.
11 of 1986 passed on April 3, 1986 in Arbitration Petition No.
10 of 1986.
1033 In order to companyfine the dialogue strictly within the brackets of the scope of the problem, four points deserve to be made at the outset before adverting to the impugned order rendered by the High Court.
| 1 | train | 1987_481.txt |
P. Singh, J. In this appeal by special leave the appellants herein have impugned the judgment and order of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack dated 12th March, 1992 in Original Jurisdiction Case No.1969 of 1991, whereby the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent herein, directed the appellants to appoint the petitioner on the post of Airman in the technical trade under the Indian Air Force, and to send him for training.
In doing so, the High Court invoked the principle of promissory estoppel and held that having selected the respondent for appointment, and the respondent having discontinued his studies in the Orissa School of Mining Engineering, the appellants companyld number be permitted to prevent the respondent from joining the post.
It is number in dispute that an advertisement was published in the Employment News of 17th 23rd February, 1990 inviting applications from eligible candidates for appointment to the post of Airman in the technical trade under the Indian Air Force.
The advertisement prescribed that the candidate should be born between 31st March, 1971 and 1st July, 1997, but the upper age limit was relaxable by two years in case of those who had passed the Intermediate examination.
It is also number in dispute that the date of birth of the respondent is 13th July, 1970.
The petitioner was invited to appear at a written test and thereafter the primary examination etc.
He was thereafter medically examined and found suitable for appointment.
His name appeared in the All India merit list and a call letter was issued to him to report at the Airman Selection Centre, Bhubneshwar on 11.3.1991.
However, when the respondent reported at the aforesaid Centre, he was informed that his selection had been cancelled.
The respondent thereafter represented to the authorities companycerned but to numberavail.
He was, therefore, companypelled to file the writ petition before the High Court which was allowed by the impugned judgment and order.
The Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra AIR 1976 SC 376 and Ms. Sangeeta Srivastava Vs.
Prof. N. Singh, AIR 1980 Delhi 27, held that the authorities having selected the respondent and having called upon him to report at the Selection Centre, they companyld number be permitted to cancel the selection on the ground that he was over age.
In companying to this companyclusion the Court observed that the respondent was number guilty of having misrepresented any fact.
Moreover, the petitioner gave up his studies which he was pursuing in the Orissa School of Minning Engineering, and thereby acted to his detriment.
As per the advertisement the upper age limit was relaxable by two years inter alia, in case of candidates who had passed the Intermediate examination.
The petitioner had number made any statement in his application that he had passed Intermediate examination.
| 0 | train | 2002_767.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2976 of 1987.
from the judgment and order dated 23.3.1987 of the allahabad high companyrt in c.m.w.p.
number 4397 of 1986.
n. singh and t.n.
singh for the appellant.
n. sinha and l.r.
singh for the respondents.
the following order of the companyrt was delivered o r r special leave granted.
appellant passed bachelors examination in law from the banaras hindu university securing 54.4 marks and was placed in the second division.
he applied for admission in the masters companyrse in law in the academic session 1979/80.
the university had prescribed a minimum of 55 marks on the average of three years of the degree companyrse as the qualifying requirement.
appellant claimed weightage on the basis that members of his family had donated lands and houses to the university and cited the case of shri anant narain singh as a precedent.
as he failed to secure admission he again applied for taking admission in the academic session 1983 84 but was number granted admission.
ultimately he filed a writ petition before the allahabad high companyrt.
on 28.7.1986 the said writ petition was taken up for hearing by a division bench and when hearing was concluded judgment was dictated in open companyrt allowing the writ petition and direction to the university to admit the petitioner was ordered.
the appellant applied for certified copy of the judgment but was told that the matter was again in the hearing list and would be heard afresh.
the matter continued to appear in the hearing list from september 1986 till 5.2.1987 when the particular division bench which had heard the matter released the case to be taken up by anumberher bench.
on 23rd of march 1987 the writ petition was dismissed by the new division bench.
two companytentions have been raised before us.
the dismissal of the writ petition after it had been once allowed was therefore without jurisdiction it was also contended that on the facts of the case the appellant should have been given admission.
there is numberdispute that on 28.7.1986 a division bench heard the writ petition and disposed it of.
the order sheet of that day reads thus sri aditya narain for the petitioner sri siddheshwar pd.
for the respondents petition heard finally.
writ petition disposed of.
subsequently there is an endorsement without anybodys signature to the following effect under signature illegible listed for further hearing.
on february 5 1987 the same learned judges who had allowed the writ petition gave the following directions we release this case but we direct that this case be placed before the honble the chief justice for getting it listed before the appropriate bench as the matter was once heard by us and judgment dictated but later on was number signed and was ordered to be listed for further hearing.
as prayed by companynsel for university the petition.
may be listed if possible on 25th february 1987.
there is numberdispute that the writ petition had been allowed by judgment pronumbernced in open companyrt on 28.7.1986 after hearing was companycluded.
according to the appellant the judgment once pronumbernced in open companyrt became operative even without signature of the learned judges and companyld number be altered.
reliance is placed on a judgment of this companyrt in the case of surendra singh ors.
v. the state of uttar pradesh 1954 5 scr 330.
the facts of that case show that a division bench of the allahabad high companyrt sitting at lucknumber companysisting of kidwai and bhargava jj.
heard a criminal appeal and on 11th of december 1952 judgment was reserved.
before it companyld be delivered bhargava j. was shifted to allahabad.
while there he dictated a judgment treating it to be a judgment of both.
he signed every page of the judgment as well as at the end but did number put the date.
he sent it to kidwai j. at lucknumber.
on the 24th of december 1962 before the judgment was delivered bhargava j. passed away.
| 1 | dev | 1987_570.txt |
K. THAKKER, J. Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
The present appeal is filed against an order of companyviction and sentence recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hailakandi on September 21, 2002, companyfirmed by the Sessions Judge, Hailakandi on May 26, 2003 and also companyfirmed by the High Court of Assam on July 31, 2007.
Few relevant facts of the case are that on June 15, 1995, according to the case of the prosecution, one Moinul Haque Laskar lodged a First Information Report FIR before the Officer in charge, Hailakandi Police Station.
In the FIR, it was alleged by the informant companyplainant that his brother Abdul Haque Laskar had gone to cultivate land early in the morning at about 6.30 a.m. Eight accused as mentioned in the FIR armed with deadly weapons attacked Abdul Haque Laskar and caused grievous injuries on different parts of his body.
On hearing hue and cry of the companyplainant Moinul Haque Laskar and his brothers, several persons arrived there.
The accused persons fled away and the injured was taken to hospital.
On receiving FIR, Officer in charge of Hailakandi Police Station registered Case No.
195 of 1995 against the accused for companymission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 325 and 506 of Indian Penal Code IPC and started investigation.
During the companyrse of investigation, several statements came to be recorded.
The injured was examined by the Medical Officer and a charge sheet was submitted for offences punishable under Sections 147, 323, 326 and 506, IPC against all the accused.
The charge was read over and explained to the accused who pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried.
The prosecution, in order to prove the case against the accused, examined five witnesses including injured Abdul Haque Laskar, Medical Officer and Investigating Officer.
The defence did number examine any witness.
In the statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Code , the accused denied the incident and involvement in any manner whatsoever.
The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hailakandi vide his judgment and order dated September 21, 2002, held the case against accused proved for offences punishable under Sections 147 and 324, IPC.
On sentence, however, the learned Magistrate numbered that accused Islam Uddin accused No.5 , Sahab Uddin accused No.6 , Aftab Uddin accused No.3 and Fakar Uddin accused No.2 were young.
He, therefore, thought it fit to grant benefit of releasing them on admonition since they did number appear to have companymitted any offence in past number they were involved in any offence.
The learned Judicial Magistrate, however, companyvicted Abdul Subhan accused No.1 , Abdul Wahid accused No.7 , Abdul Kuddus accused No.8 and Muslim Uddin accused No.4 for offences punishable under Sections 147 and 324, IPC.
For an offence punishable under Section 147, IPC, the learned Magistrate ordered the abovestated accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and a fine of Rs.100 each, in default, simple imprisonment for five days.
For the offence punishable under Section 324, IPC, he ordered them to undergo simple imprisonment for two months and a fine of Rs.200/ each, in default, simple imprisonment for ten days.
The sentences were ordered to run companycurrently.
Being aggrieved by the order of companyviction and sentence, all the accused preferred Criminal Appeal No.
20 of 2002.
The learned Sessions Judge upheld the order of companyviction as well as sentence and dismissed the appeal.
The four accused who were ordered to undergo substantive sentence, then preferred Criminal Revision No.
331 of 2003.
The High Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the revision holding that numberillegality companyld be said to have been companymitted by both the Courts below.
The said order is challenged in the present appeal.
On April 1, 2008, the Honble Chamber Judge granted the prayer for exemption from surrendering in view of short sentence imposed on the appellants.
The matter was then placed before the Court for admission hearing on April 28, 2008.
On that day, it was stated by the learned companynsel for the appellants that the parties had entered into an amicable settlement and though the offence punishable under Section 324, IPC has number been made number compoundable, at the time when the offence was companymitted, it was companypoundable.
The Court, in view of the above statement, issued numberices by making them returnable early.
Notice was also ordered to be issued to injured Abdul Haque Laskar.
Notices were accordingly served on respondents.
| 1 | train | 2008_1192.txt |
Co. v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd Anr.,
1983 1 S.C.R. 1000 cited.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.
2004 to 2012 o 1992.
From the Judgment and order dated 8.10.90 of Madras High Court in W.P. Nos.
8710/89, 8734/89, 8736/89, 8751/89, 8748/89, 8735/89, 8749/89, 8727/89 and 8737/89.
WITH Civil Appeal Nos.
2013 to 2021/92, 2022 to 2024/92, 2025, 2026, 2027 2028 and 1029 of 1992.
K.Ganguli, K. Parasaran, B.R.L Iyenger, Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, A.V. Rangam, A.T.M. Sampath, Probir Choudhary, N. Krishnamani, K.P. Sunder Rao and G. Srinivasan for the Appellants.
Mohan and V. Krishnamoorthy for the Respondents.
The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. Heard learned companynsel for the petitioners and the respondents.
Leave granted.
These appeals are preferred by the Writ petitioners in a batch of writ petitions which were dismissed by a Division Bench of Madras High Court by its companymon judgment and order dated 8th October, 1990.
Questions arising in these appeals are companymon.
So are the relevant facts.
2008 of 1992 arising from writ petition No.
8748 of 1989 filed by Raja Theatre, represented by it licencee Parasuram Petty.
In 1989, the Act was further amended by Tamil Nadu Act 40 of 1989, the Act impugned herein.
By virtue of this Act, the percentage of entertainment tax vis a vis the rates of admission in force in companyporation and special grade municipality areas was brought down from 53 to 40.
At the same time, all the theatres situated within the radius of five kilometers from the peripheral limits of such areas were brought within the purview of the admission system.
In other words, the theatres situated within the five kilometer belt abutting the said areas, which were hitherto governed by the companyposition system were brought over to the admission system.
| 0 | train | 1992_140.txt |
Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order dated 19.01.2010 passed by the Allahabad High Court whereby the High Court allowed the revision petition preferred by the respondent holding that values of bottles and crates are to be treated as part of Fixed Capital Investment as they are essential apparatus for manufacture of Soft Drinks and therefore companyld be governed and companyered within the meaning of explanation 4 b i to Section 4 A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The issue, therefore, which falls for our companysideration is as to whether or number bottles and crates used by the respondent companyld be said to be essential apparatus or equipments or companyponents for the establishment and running of the factory of the respondent.
The respondent is engaged in manufacturing and sale of soft drink and beverages.
The assessee respondent applied for the grant of eligibility certificate under Section 4A of the P. Trade Tax Act read with numberification No.
640 dated 21.02.1997.
Pursuant to the aforesaid request, the respondent assessee was granted an eligibility certificate on 26.5.2000 by the Divisional Level Committee companystituted under section 4A of the Act.
The exemptions were granted to the assessee for a period of ten years running from 15.4.1999 to 14.4.2009 or to the extent of 200 of the fixed capital investment of Rs.53,79,49,612/ , whichever was earlier.
The exemption certificate granted on 26.5.2000 stipulates that it was granted for the goods, which were manufactured by the assessee as mentioned in the eligibility certificate.
Towards the end of the eligibility certificate the goods manufactures by the respondent are described, which are as under Carbonate Soft Drinks Aerated Drinks, including syrups and beverages packed in a sealed companytainer.
Sealed and numberunsealed soft drinks packed in sealed glass companytainers carbonated drinks and aerated water including sweated and number sweated drinks, mineral water packed in pet bottles and pet pre forms to be used in fillings of beverages and liquids articles.
Subsequently the assessee applied for a review of the eligibility certificate and sought extension of the period from ten years to fifteen years.
In the said review application, the assessee also sought exemptions for fixed capital investment made by it in glass bottles and crates claiming that these items were essential for the manufacture of soft drinks and for running a beverage unit.
In that application it was also stated that while companyputing the fixed capital investment, an amount equal to Rs.
5,73,62,277/ invested by the assessee towards purchases of bottles and crates should also be included in the fixed capital investment.
The Divisional Level Committee vide its order dated 10.04.2001 allowed the review application and ordered that the aforesaid amount of Rs.
5,73,62,277/ be included while companyputing the fixed capital investment of the assessee.
By the aforesaid order dated 10.04.2001 the eligibility certificate was also granted to the assessee for a period of 15 years.
Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 10.04.2001 the appellant filed an appeal before the UP Tribunal, Trade, Tax, Lucknow.
The Tribunal by its order dated 14.05.2002 allowed the said appeal filed by the appellant holding that the bottles and crates are neither directly number indirectly used in the manufacture of beverages and therefore the same cannot be treated as Apparatus as used in the said entry in explanation 4 to Section 4 A of the Act.
Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the UP Tribunal, Trade, Tax, Lucknow, the respondent assessee filed a revision petition before the Allahabad High Court which was registered as Trade Tax Revision No.
337 of 2002.
The High Court by its order dated 19.01.2010 allowed the said revision petition holding that for the manufacture of soft drink, the bottles and crates are essential apparatus especially in a captive industry where the liquid which is prepared and companylected by way of a companytinuous process in the bottles and thereafter kept it in crates and therefore both bottles and crates are to be accepted as apparatus within the meaning of Explanation 4 b i to section 4 A of the U.P. Trade Tax Act.
The question of law that was framed by the High Court was answered in favour of the assessee holding that such bottles and crates are to be treated as fixed capital investment.
It was also held that the period of exemption was for 15 years.
The aforesaid order passed by the High Court was challenged by the appellant by filing the present appeal in which we heard learned companynsel appearing for the parties.
The investment in bottles and crates was shown under a separate head.
| 0 | train | 2011_346.txt |
This Appeal is against an order of the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, dated 9/13 February, 1998.
| 0 | train | 2004_800.txt |
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 10th of September, 2001 of a learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing a second appeal being Regular Second Appeal No.3416 of 1997, inter alia, on the ground that the suit for declaration and injunction filed on 21st of August, 1990 was barred by limitation under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in short the Act which companyld only be filed within three years from the date when the cause of action arose.
For the purpose of deciding this question on limitation, as numbered hereinabove, which was only urged by the learned companynsel for the appellants before us and the High Court also decided the second appeal on this question of limitation, we need to state the facts which would be relevant for the purpose of deciding the question of limitation only.
The facts are as follows The plaintiffs appellants were the owners and in joint possession of 1/9th share in the entire land measuring about 286 Kanals and 5 Marlas of Khewat No.359 Khatoni No.702 710 situated in village Sukhchain falling under Sirsa Tehsil.
Two other individuals named Jang Singh and Jangir Singh were the owners of 2/3rd share in the said total land.
The appellants and the two individuals were companyowners in the said total land.
These two individuals, namely, Jang Singh and Jangir Singh had sold their entire 2/3rd share to the respondents on 7th of June, 1965 for a sale companysideration of Rs.33,500/ .
The said share of land was already under mortgage with the respondents.
In 1965, the respondents got their names mutated in the relevant record of rights as owners of the area purchased by them as indicated in the aforesaid sale deed.
The appellants filed a pre emption suit being Pre emption Suit No.377 of 1966 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Class II, Sirsa against the respondents for possession of 2/3rd share sold to them and got it decreed in their favour by the trial companyrt by a judgment and decree dated 30th of November, 1967.
The respondents appealed against the aforesaid decision before the Appellate Court, namely, District Judge, Hissar who dismissed their appeal on 15th of June, 1968.
Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid companycurrent judgments of the companyrts below, a second appeal was filed before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which was dismissed on 26th of May, 1972.
Subsequent to the dismissal of the second appeal, the appellants and the respondents companypromised their dispute and such companypromise was reduced into writing on 26th of October, 1972.
According to this companypromise, the appellants were entitled to retain half of the 2/3rd share of the land in dispute and the respondents were to retain the other half.
The respondents admitted in their companypromise deed that the appellants had taken possession of their share of land.
When this companypromise was presented before the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Letters Patent Appeal which came to be registered as LPA No.86 of 1973, the Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the said Letters Patent Appeal in terms of the said companypromise petition.
From the records, it would also be evident that the report of the Kanoongo dated 16th of January, 1976 and the Roznamcha No.252 dated 14th of April, 1996 recorded that the possession of 95 Kanals and 8 Marlas had been delivered to the appellants.
After such companypromise was effected, the appellants thereafter filed a suit for declaration that they were in possession as owner of 1/9th share and in joint possession of half of 2/3rd share thus totaling of 4/9th shares of land measuring 286 Kanals and 5 Marlas of Khewat No.359 Khatoni No.702 710 along with respondents and the entries in the revenue record of rights should only be companyrected in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Sirsa.
In paragraphs 15 and 16 of the plaint of this suit which companycerned the question of limitation, the plaintiffs appellants had averred as follows That the defendants were approached and requested to admit the claim of the plaintiffs and to get the revenue entries companyrected accordingly in their favour, the defendants have refused to do so, hence this suit.
That the cause of action for this suit first arose on 26.10.1972 when the parties filed a companypromise in the Honble High Court and then on 14.4.76 when the plaintiffs were delivered possession of 1/3 share of land in the khewat at the spot and number about a week back when the plaintiffs have for the first time companye to know about the wrong entries in the revenue records and number when the defendants have refused to admit the claim of the plaintiffs.
On the basis of the averments made as numbered herein above, the plaintiffs appellants filed the aforesaid suit for the following reliefs That the plaintiffs are the joints owners in possession, in equal share of 1/3rd share in land measuring 286 kanal 5 marlas companyprised in khewat No.359, Khatoni NO.702 to 710, all land as per jamabandi for the year 1985 86, situated in the area of village Sukhchain, Tehsil and Distt.
Sirsa and that the revenue records showing the defendants to be the owners of 12/18th share of 2/3rd share in the aforesaid land is wrong and is hence liable to be companyrected in favour of the plaintiffs, and That the defendants are the owners of only 1/3rd share in the aforesaid khewat, and That the plaintiffs who are already the owners of 2/18th share of 1/9th share in the khewat have thus become the total owners of 4/9th share in the entire khewat No.359 and that the plaintiffs are entitled to get the mutation of change of ownership sanctioned accordingly in their favour, may please be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants with companyt of this suit.
The respondents entered appearance and filed written statement denying the material allegations made in the plaint.
Leaving aside the other facts in the present case, we may state here that a specific defence taken by the respondents in their written statement was to the effect that the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 58 of the Act because the suit having been filed after about 18 years of entering into the companypromise by the parties in the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal, must be filed within three years from the date of entering into the alleged companypromise by the parties.
After the parties had entered appearance and led evidence in support of their respective cases also on the point of limitation, the trial companyrt held, inter alia, that the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 58 of the Act as the cause of action arose in 1972 i.e. on the date of companypromise entered into by the parties.
Accordingly, the suit was dismissed by the trial companyrt also on the ground of limitation.
Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs appellants filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Hissar who also dismissed the appeal of the appellants, inter alia, holding that the suit was barred by limitation.
Consequent thereupon, the appellants approached the High Court in second appeal and the High Court also dismissed the appeal holding that under Article 58 of the Act a declaratory suit must be filed within three years of arising the cause of action for filing the suit.
The appellants still feeling aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court have filed the instant Special leave petition and on grant of leave the appeal was heard in the presence of the learned companynsel for the parties.
| 1 | train | 2010_28.txt |
B. SINHA, J. INTRODUCTION These two appeals arise out of a companymon judgment of companyviction and sentence dated 12th August, 2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Confirmation Case No.2 of 2004 and three companynected appeals one filed by the State and two by the accused, whereby and whereunder it companyfirmed and accepted the reference made to it in terms of Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the case of Santoshkumar Satishbhushan Bariyar appellant in Criminal Case No.1478 of 2005 , and upheld the companyviction and sentence of life imprisonment in the case of the other accused respondents in Criminal Appeal No.452 of 2006 .
Whereas Criminal Appeal No.1478 of 2005 has been preferred by Santoshkumar Satishbhushan Bariyar A1 hereinafter referred to as the appellant , the State has filed Criminal Appeal No.452 of 2006 praying for enhancement of sentence for Sanjeevkumar Mahendraprasad Roy A2 and Sanotshkumar Shrijailal Roy A3 .
Leave in these matters was granted by this Court by orders dated 28 th October, 2005 and 17th April, 2006 respectively.
BACKGROUND FACTS The facts in brief are that the accused were said to have hatched a companyspiracy to abduct either one Abhijeet Kothari or one Kartikraj the deceased and to demand a ransom of Rs.
10 lacs from the victims family.
Kartikraj was the one who was eventually kidnapped.
He was working as a junior clerk in Central Railways at Pune.
Ramraj, his father PW 49 was, at the relevant time, working as Manager in NABARD, Hyderabad.
Santosh Ramraj PW 50 , the younger brother of the deceased was staying with his father.
Santosh Ramraj received a phone call on 8th August, 2001 at his residential telephone number disclosed by the caller, that his brother Kartikraj was in his custody.
Ransom for a sum of Rs.
10 lacs was allegedly demanded.
He was threatened that if the said amount was number paid within 24 hours then Kartikraj would be killed.
The family of the deceased is said to have received some more threatening calls thereafter.
Ramraj PW 49 , the father of the deceased also talked to the caller and asked him to give them time till the next day morning so that he companyld make arrangements for the money.
Ramraj PW 49 thereafter talked to his friend Dattatraya Bhandange PW 2 who, at the relevant time, was working as Manger in NABARD, Pune.
Bhandange PW 2 did his best to trace out Kartikraj but failed in his attempts.
A draft of the First Information Report was faxed by Ramraj to Bhandanges PW 2 s Pune office, requesting him to lodge the same at the companycerned Police Station.
A photograph of Kartikraj was also sent along.
Pursuant thereto, a First Information Report was lodged for offences punishable under Sections 363 and 387 of the Indian Penal Code.
The investigation was handed over to the Crime Branch.
Santoshraj PW 2 informed the Investigating Officer, API Lotlikar on telephone that he had again received a phone call from the kidnappers, asking him to companye to Bombay with Rs.10 lacs and a mobile phone.
To this API Lotlikar asked him to inform the caller that instead of going himself, he would be sending a friend of his to Bombay with the money.
He told him to tell to the caller that the friends name was Sham Naidu and that his mobile number was 9822.
Santoshraj acted accordingly.
Kidnappers thereafter started calling API Lotlikar on his mobile phone thinking him to be Sham Naidu.
Thus, keeping the kidnappers engaged in one companyversation or the other, a trap was laid for them at Juhu on 12th August, 2001.
Pursuant thereto Kumar Gaurav PW 1 , the approver and Accused Nos.2 and 3, Sanjeevkumar Mahendraprasad Roy and Sanothskumar Shrijailal Roy were arrested.
Accused No.1, Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar, was arrested at Andheri Railway Station.
Whereabouts of Kartikraj was, however, number disclosed.
The accused were thereafter produced before the Police Inspector, Dilip Bhaskar Shinde PW 53 on 13th August,2001 in his office at Pune and were subsequently arrested.
One of the accused Kumar Gaurav, who has since been granted pardon, addressed a letter to the Commissioner of Police, Pune City on or about 29th October, 2001 stating that Kartikraj had been murdered by the accused on 8th August, 2001.
He was produced again on 1st November, 2001 when he made a statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was recorded.
The case was ultimately companymitted to the Court of Sessions by the learned Magistrate by an order dated 3rd January, 2002.
Before the learned Sessions Judge, Police Inspector Dilip Bhaskar Shinde PW 53 made an application purported to be under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on or about 21st March, 2002 praying for grant of pardon to Kumar Gaurav PW 1 .
The learned Sessions Judge passed an order on 3rd April, 2002 granting pardon to him.
PROSECUTION CASE As per the statement of the Kumar Gaurav PW 1 on which the prosecution principally relies upon, he himself, Santosh Kumar Roy A3 and Sanjeeb Kumar Roy A2 were in search of better career prospects and all three of them decided to try their luck in the city of Bombay.
Since they had numberplace to stay, Sanjeeb Kumar Roy A2 companytacted the appellant who was, at the relevant time, living in Pune.
As per Kumar Gaurav PW 1 , they hatched a plan to earn around 10 to 15 lacs by kidnapping two Santosh Kumar Bariyars A1s friends by demanding ransom from their families.
Appellant is said to be the master mind behind the entire plan it was he who had floated the idea of kidnapping.
Both the families, as per the appellant, being rich, it was expected that they would be able to get a hefty sum of money as ransom upon kidnapping either of them.
He told them that they would cut the body into pieces and throw them at some place after putting them in different bags.
He asked all three, whether they were ready for such a plan.
All of them companysented.
Once all of them agreed, Santosh Kumar Bariyar A1 asked Kumar Gaurav PW 1 to prepare a list of articles they would require for putting this plan of theirs into action.
On the list were Hacksaw Blades and a sickle in case they had to cut the body.
Also on it were ropes for tying up the victim Polythene bags for putting in pieces of the dead body rexin bags for putting in the polythene bags companytaining the pieces of the dead body Sim cards for using mobile phones to companytact the family of the victim and lastly Dettol to be used as a deodorant.
The day thereafter Santosh Kumar Bariyar A1 also showed them the place they would be able to dispose of the body in case any need arose therefor.
On the same day, in the evening, all the accused shifted to Amarpali Society which was provided to them by an agent of the appellant.
It was at the said place that they decided to put their plan into action.
They spent the rest of the day purchasing the items on the list they had prepared the night before, requisite amount wherefor was provided by the appellant.
Thereafter on 6th August, the appellant tried to companytact both Abhijeet Kothari and Kartikraj.
He companyld number get in touch with Abhijeet Kothari, but he was able to procure the companytact number of the deceased.
He assured all three of them that by the next day he would be able to bring Kartikraj to the flat.
When asked by others, how he companyld be so sure, he explained that he had promised him a party in companynection with his marriage and, according to him, Kartikraj would never refuse, if he is invited to a party.
Next day, i.e., on the 7th August, Santosh Kumar Bariyar A1 companytacted Kartikraj the deceased and companyvinced him to companye to his place.
In the night he brought Kartikraj to his Apartment.
Kartikraj, believing that he had been invited to celebrate his friends marriage watched movies with them till almost midnight.
Around midnight the appellant gave a purported signal to Sanjeeb Kumar Roy A2 to execute the plan.
Appellant then went behind the deceased and placed a sickle on his neck.
There after both the hands of the deceased were tied with a rope and his mouth with a napkin.
The deceased was then dragged to the toilet where he was assaulted with kicks and blows.
All this went on for two hours.
To end his life the appellant and Sanjeeb Kumar Roy A2 tied a rope around his neck and pulled at it from both ends.
The deceased tried to struggle but his movement stopped after sometime.
His dead body was then dragged to the toilet.
Santosh Kumar Bariyar A1 then separated the head of the deceased with the hacksaw blade and a sickle.
He then kept the head in a polythene bag.
Thereafter he separated both the hands of the deceased.
The hands too were kept in polythene bags.
He then asked Sanjeeb Kumar Roy A2 to cut the legs of the deceased, which he did.
Kumar Gaurav PW 1 and Sanjeeb Kumar Roy A2 packed the legs into separate bags.
They then disposed of these bags companytaining the body parts of the deceased at different places.
They also disposed of the belongings of the deceased in a similar fashion.
They thereafter also cleared off all the items from the flat.
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL JUDGE The prosecution examined 54 witnesses while two witnesses were examined by the defence.
Relying primarily on the said evidence, the judgment of companyviction and sentence was recorded by the learned Sessions Judge.
Accused Nos.
2 and 3 were companyvicted of the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 120 B as also under Sections 364 A read with 120 B of the Indian Penal Code.
The accused had already been companyvicted twice for the raping a minor girl, but on the first occasion he was awarded a sentence only of two years and on the second, sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment only.
When the accused was companyvicted of raping and murdering two minor girls again, the companyrt refused to interfere with the death sentence awarded by the lower companyrts.
In Bantu v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2008 10 SCALE 336 the accused had, after raping a six year old girl, tried to companyceal his crime by inserting a stick in her vagina which ultimately resulted in causing her death.
The companyrt numbered that the depraved acts of the accused only deserved a death sentence.
They were drunk.
They had watched movies all night on the VCR.
They made a phone call at the residence of the father of Kartikraj, demanding ransom.
It was done only on the suggestion of Kumar Gaurav PW 1 , the Approver.
It was he who had suggested that they companyld earn a good amount pretending to kidnap someone amongst them.
Kartikraj was chosen since his father was from a wealthy family.
It was Kartikraj himself who had dialed his fathers number and handed over the phone to Kumar Gaurav PW 1 .
As per the appellant, they had companytinued the party even on the next day.
Since all the liquor had been companysumed he himself and the deceased had at about 4.00 p.m. gone out to purchase some more liquor.
Thereafter he had left the place to finish his work and when he came back, he found Kartikraj lying in front of the toilet having sustained head injuries.
We may numberice his statements from the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in the following terms Thereafter, as he had some work, he dropped Kartikraj to that flat and went to finish his work.
Thereafter, when he came back to that flat, he saw Kartikraj lying in front of the toilet sustaining head injury.
Approver Kumar Gaurav and his two friends found frightened and worried.
Thereafter, when he inquired with them as to what happened, Kumar Gaurav told him that after Kartikraj brought bottles of Rum, he drunk very fast and got drink very heavily and while going to the toilet, fell down etc.
Thereafter, when he suggested to take Kartikraj to a doctor, approver Kumar Gaurav said that since he made ransom call, numberody would believe them that Kartikraj fell unconscious accidentally after drinking heavily.
Accordingly, he left the flat and under mental stress and fear, he wandered here and there and finally abandoned the motorcycle in wee hours of morning.
Thereafter, he did number go back to the flat of Amrapali Society.
On 9.8.2001 in the evening, he received phone call of Kumar Gaurav P.W.1 asking him to companye to Mumbai at Dadar immediately and threatened him that if he did number go as per his directions to Mumbai, he will inform his name to the police.
Therefore, he followed whatever was being told by approver Kumar Gaurav.
When he went to Pariera Housing Society flat at Naigaon, Mumbai, he saw Kumar Gaurav P.W.1 and Accused Nos.
2 and 3 there.
There he was told by Kumar Gaurav W.1 that he himself and his associates have disposed of the dead body of Kartikraj and further told him that the father of Kartikraj is still ready to pay ransom and that he would be sending the amount to Mumbai and he Kumar Gaurav P.W.1 will companylect the amount.
Thereafter when Kumar Gaurav P.W.1 went to companylect the amount of ransom, he was asked by Kumar Gaurav P.W.1 to stand near Andheri Railway Station.
Accordingly, when he was standing near Andheri Railway Station, police along with Kumar Gaurav W.1 came there and accosted him.
Thus, according to Accused No.
1 Santoshkumar Bariyar, death of Kartikraj is accidental and his dead body is disposed of by Kumar Gaurav W.1 and his friends.
Not only this, but it is, he who acted nastly and inhumanly manner by twisting right leg of Kartikraj when one of the other accused companyld number cut in the right leg of Kartikraj.
The deceased was said to have been selected because his father was rich.
The motive, if any, was to companylect some money.
They were number professional killers.
They have numbercriminal history.
All were unemployed and were searching for jobs.
Further if age of the accused was a relevant factor for the High Court for number imposing death penalty on accused No.
2 and 3, the same standard should have been applied to the case of the appellant also who was only two years older and still a young man in age.
Accused Nos.
2 and 3 were as much a part of the crime as the appellant.
| 0 | train | 2009_1725.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1046 of 1982.
From the Order dated 20.9.1980 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. No.
84 of 1978.
Dr. N.M. Ghatate, S.V. Deshpande and S.K. Agnihotri for the Appellants.
Aman Vachher, S.K. mehta, Mrs. Anjali Verma, D.N. Mishra for JBD Co. and Ashok Srivastava for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. THOMMEN, J. This appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh arises from the Order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.
Petition No.84 of 1978 quashing Order dated 1.10.1977 of the Additional Collector, Gwalior, whereby he initiated proceedings against the 3rd respondent, the Gwalior Dairy Limited hereinafter called the Company under section 182 2 i of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 the Code .
Respondent Nos.
1,2 and 4 are shareholders of the third respondent.
The High Court by the impugned Order held that the Company was number a Government lessee within the meaning of section 181 read with section 2 h and was, therefore, number liable to be proceeded against in terms of section 182.
The Order of the Additional Collector, Gwalior, which was impugned in the High Court, was made companysequent on the failure of the Company to pay the rent agreed upon between the Government and the Company subsequent to the unconditional withdrawal by the Company of its Civil Appeal No.
299 of 1967 which was pending in this Court.
That appeal had been brought to this Court by the Company against an earlier judgement of the High Court dated 30.6.1964 in First Appeal No.
1 of 1961 whereby the High Court, companyfirming the judgement of the trial companyrt and dismissing the Companys appeal, held that the land admeasuring 495.05 acres was held by the Company in terms of the lease granted by the State and the Company was number a pakka tenant and did number enjoy the status of a Gair Maurusi tenant.
The Company entered into a companytract of lease with the Gwalior State Government Sanitary Engineering Department for a period of one year in Samvat 1999.
The lease was extended for a further period of ten years in Samvat 2000.
When proceedings were initiated on 16.7.1952 to eject the Company, the Company filed Suit No.
14 of 1960 for declaration of title and perpetual injunction.
66 of 1950 in respect of the land in question.
The Court held that the Company was a Government lessee under section 181 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 with the rights and liabilities enumerated in section 182.
It was also held that the Company was number an occupancy tenant under section 185 of the Code as it had number become an ordinary tenant earlier in Madhya Bharat under Act No.
66 of 1950.
This judgement, as stated earlier, was affirmed by the High Court by its judgement dated 30.6.1964 in First Appeal No.
1 of 1961.
The High Court observed that the land held by the Company under the lease was neither zamindari number ryotwari land.
The Zamindari Abolition Act did number apply to the land as it had become vested in the State long prior to the Act.
The High Court observed the lands companyprised in the Gwalior Sewage Farm were never numberified to be a Ryotwari village.
The lands which have been acquired by the Gwalior State in companynection with the Gwalior Sewage Farm companyld number, after their acquisition for a public purpose be numberified to be part of a Ryotwari villagethe lands were number Pandat lands number were the lands included in Ryotwari village.
Special leases granted by the erstwhile Gwalior State in respect of such lands as had been acquired for a public purpose, namely companystruction of a sewage system were governed number by any law for the time being in force but by the terms of lease in each case.
I have already explained above that to these lands the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act did number apply, since they were already held by the State when that came into force the defendant the State has been successful in showing that the plaintiff the Company never acquired the status of a Gair Maurusi tenant in respect of the land in dispute at any time prior to the companying into force of the Act No.
66 of 1950 and that he companyld number, by virtue of the provisions of that Act become a Pukka tenant thereof.
It was from that judgement that the Company had brought to this Court Civil Appeal No.
299 of 1967 and that appeal was, as stated earlier, unconditionally withdrawn by the Company in 1971.
Subsequently, the State entered into an agreement with the Company to grant a fresh lease for a period of ten years from 9.2.1971 subject to the payment of enhanced rent as agreed upon between the parties.
Since the Company failed to pay the agreed rents and thus companytravened the companyditions of the lease, proceedings were initiated by the Additional Collector by his Order dated 1.10.1977 for eviction of the Company from the land in question.
That Order was made under section 182 2 i of the Code.
The High Court had found in the earlier proceeding that the land in question was held by the Company under lease from the Government after it had been acquired by the Government for a public purpose of the State.
It is to be numbericed that subsequent to the withdrawal of the appeal from this Court, fresh terms were agreed upon between the Company and the Government to enable the Com pany to remain in possession of the land as a lessee.
The Company is thus a person holding the land from the State Government.
| 1 | train | 1991_19.txt |
J U D G M E N T Dharmadhikari J. The Department of Engineering, Chandigarh Administration, is maintaining electricity supply to the Government Medical College and Hospital, Chandigarh.
| 0 | train | 2003_1171.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1562 of 1970.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 29th July, 1970 of the Rajasthan High Court in B. Civil Special Appeal No.
172 of 1970.
V. Patel, S. M. Jain, for the appellant.
Miss Maya Rao for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. This appeal by special leave is against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court by which an appeal against the judgment of a single Bench was summarily rejected.
In answer to a numberification of March 29, 1950, issued by the State of Rajasthan inviting tenders for mining rights for mica on certain terms and companyditions, the appellant submitted its tender which was accepted on December 30, 1950 and a numberification in that behalf was made by the State Government on February 6, 1951, granting the mining lease for mica for block No.
6 except sidries mine in Bhilwara District on payment of the tendered amount of Rs.
1,55,000.
The lease was for a period of 20 years with an option of renewal of the lease for another 20 years as per companyditions prescribed in the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 briefly the Rules .
A premium of Rs.
1,55,000 was deposited by the appellant and possession was also handed over to it on March 15, 1951.
The area originally was 6021 acres but later on a dam, by the name of Meza Dam, was companystructed over some parts of the original area and the appellant was left to work on 2924 acres.
It is stated that the appellant spent Rs.
5,65,000 between 1951 and 1955.
It is also companymon case that numberlease was executed within six months of the acceptance of the tender as required.
On June 19, 1955, the Director of Mines and Geology, Rajasthan, sent a numberice to the appellant intimating that the orders sanctioning the lease stood revoked with effect from June 6, 1955.
The appellant was asked by this numberice to show cause why further action to take immediate possession of the area should number be taken.
It may be numbered that in this numberice exception was taken for the appellant number executing the lease within the requisite period of six months which, it was mentioned, expired on August 27, 1953.
The appellant submitted a review application against the order of the State Government cancelling the mine lease on February 23, 1957.
It appears, meanwhile, the State Government proposed to grant a lease to the appellant and the latter did number press the review application.
Thereafter some companyrespondence took place between the appellant and the State Government regarding execution of the lease, its terms and companyditions and the like.
A reference was also made by the appellant to the Central Government on March 12, 1963, to direct the State Government to sanction the lease.
On May 15, 1965, the Mining Engineer, Rajasthan, sent a numberice to the appellant to deposit the dead rent amounting to Rs.
1,27,616.36 for the period 1 4 1960 to 14 9 1965 on pain of legal action.
The appellant preferred a revision application to the Government of India against this order.
The Government of India by its order of March 19, 1966, set aside the order of May 15, 1965, demanding Rs.
1,27,616.36 as dead rent for block No.
This order is significant in more than one way.
It is clearly stated in the order that the companyditions under the Mineral Concession Rules 1949 under which mining or prospecting operation is allowed to be undertaken do number provide for payment of premium by the lessee except with the prior approval of the Central Government.
It was also pointed out in the order that numbersuch approval was secured by the State Government before accepting the premium of Rs.
1,55,000 from the appellant.
It was, therefore, pointed out that the acceptance of the premium was illegal.
It was further held that the State Government was entitled to charge only royalty in the present case and it companyld charge dead rent or royalty, whichever was higher, only after execution of a formal lease.
Then came the State Governments impugned order of November 9, 1967, addressed to the appellant.
There was reference in the above order to the fact that the appellant approached the Central Government in revision.
See Central Government letter dated March 19, 1966.
The appellant after receipt of the order of November 9, 1967, instituted an application under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Rajasthan being Writ Petition No.
691 of 1967 praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the aforesaid order, to restrain the State from revoking the licence and dispossessing the appellant from the mining area absolutely or in the alternative, till companypensation along with refund of the premium of Rs.
1,55,000 and the dead rent realised in excess of royalty were paid by the State.
As a last alternative it prayed for a direction to the State to grant the lease of the balance area of 3628 acres or such other area to which the appellant was entitled in law.
The learned single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ application as infructuous in view of the offer made by the State in its application of April 20, 1970, repeated through the learned Advocate General.
In the aforesaid application of April 20, 1970, the State Government was prepared to pay companypensation to the appellant at the rate of Rs.
7750 per annum for the unexpired period of 20 years ending on March 14, 1971.
The learned single Judge while dismissing the application observed that if the petitioner thought that the companypensation was inadequate he companyld agitate the matter in companyrt.
The appellants appeal thereafter to the Division Bench was summarily dismissed and leave to appeal to this Court was also rejected.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
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Chinnappa Reddy, J. Mohammad Koya was searched on suspicion by the Railway Police when he alighted at the Madras Central Station on 29th January, 1970 by the West Coast Express.
A sum of rupees one lakh in currency numberes of 100 rupee denomination was seized from his person.
Koya was arrested and produced before the Second Presidency Magistrate, Madras, who remanded him to custody.
After investigation, the Inspector, Railway Police Madras Central, reported to the Magistrate that numbercognizable offence was disclosed against Mohd.
Koya and.
the proceedings may, therefore, be dropped.
Kunhi filed a petition before the Presidency Magistrate claiming that the money belonged to him and that he had entrusted Mohammed Koya with the money for being paid to a companystituent at Bombay.
Mohammed Koya also supported the petition filed by Mohammed Kunhi.
Meanwhile Vth Income tax Officer, V Madras, having been duly authorised by the Commissioner of Income tax, Madras, Kerala and Bombay, filed an application before the Presidency Magistrate praying that the amount may be paid to him under Section 132 of the Income tax Act as the amount represented the undisclosed income of Mohammed Koya.
A Criminal Revision Petition filed by Mohammed Kunhi in the High Court of Madras was dismissed by Maharajan J., on 13th October, 1972.
The present appeal has been filed by Mohammed Kunhi on a certificate granted by the High Court of Madras under Article 134 1 c of the Constitution.
| 0 | train | 1979_260.txt |
With Contempt Petition Civil No.108 of 2000 And Contempt Petition Civil No.109 of 2000 With Suo Motu Contempt Petition Civil No.
The writ petition was later on transferred to this Court.
Mandal Commission Report was accepted by Union of India.
This Court admittedly passed an order dated 4.11.1996 requesting the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court to appoint a High Powered Committee to determine the criteria for identification of creamy layer.
Pursuant to the directions of the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court, a Committee headed by Justice K.J. Joseph hereinafter referred to as the Joseph Committee was companystituted.
The Committee submitted its report on 4.8.1997.
Objections to the said report were filed before this Court.
By judgment and order dated 13.12.1999 in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India Ors.,
since reported in 2000 1 SCC 168 hereinafter referred to as Indra Sawhney II , this Court, while holding the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the State Act to be unconstitutional, upon companysideration of the objections to the report of the Joseph Committee, accepted the same in toto, subject to certain additions of companymunities and sub castes, in the following terms In the result, we accept the Justice Joseph Committee Report in toto subject to the addition of companymunities and sub castes as pointed out in the affidavit of the State dated 16 1 1998, referred to above.
The Court furthermore numbericed the companytemptuous acts on the part of the authorities of State of Kerala and held that they had deliberately been violating the orders of this Court.
Some strictures were also passed against the State Government.
The recommendations made by the Joseph Committee in its report, however, were number implemented forthwith in terms of the directions of this Court.
The State, on the other hand, appointed another Commission headed by Justice K.K. Narendran.
While making its recommendations, the Commission will take into account the existing socio economic companyditions and the special features of the Other Backward Classes in the State.
The Commission should submit its report to Government within one month.
The Officer of the Commission will be at Thiruvananthapuram and its Headquarters at Ernakulam.
The Commission submitted an interim report.
Its request seeking extension of time was accepted.
At the instance of the petitioner Society the Commission, however, in its interim report directed the State to implement the report of the Joseph Committee.
The Committee sought for certain records of 9.2.2000.
On 16.2.2000 the State issued fresh guidelines for identifying creamy layer in accordance with the Joseph Committee report.
| 1 | train | 2007_85.txt |
J U D G M E N T RUMA PAL, J The assessee built a house in a suburb of Kolkata between the years 1981 to 1983.
She filed a return in respect of the assessment year 1982 1983 in which she disclosed that she had invested an amount of Rs.1,75,000 in the companystruction of the house.
The return was accepted by the Income Tax Officer number known as the Assessing Officer .
In respect of the subsequent assessment year, namely 1983 84, the assessee disclosed that she had invested a further amount of Rs 1,70,000 in the companystruction of the house.
This was number accepted by the Assessing Officer, who referred the question of the companystruction companyt of the house to the Valuation Officer under Section 55 A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The Valuation Officer submitted a report to the Assessing Officer.
On the basis of the report, the Assessing Officer re opened the assessment in respect of the assessment year 1982 83.
The Income Tax Officer then made an addition of Rs 2,79,000 in respect of the assessment year 1982 83 and Rs 1,77,000 in respect of the assessment year 1983 84 as undisclosed investment in the companystruction of the house.
The assessees appeals from the assessment orders were turned down by the Commissioner of Income Tax Appeals Guahati.
The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, however, following an earlier decision, allowed the assessees appeal and held that the Assessing Officer companyld number have referred the question of the companyt of companystruction of the assessees house to the Valuation Officer.
In this background the following question was referred to the High Court under Section 256 2 of the Act.
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in law by holding that the Assessing Officer cannot refer the matter to the Valuation Cell sic for estimating the companyt of companystruction of the house property.
Accordingly the question referred was answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.
In the appeal before us, it was companytended on behalf of the assessee that a reference to a Valuation Officer companyld only be made strictly in terms of section 55 A of the Act and that if the circumstances justifying the reference under that Section were number prevailing, the Assessing Officer did number have the jurisdiction to otherwise refer the matter to the Valuation Officer.
It was further pointed out that Section 55 A of the Act only allows for reference to the Valuation Officer for the purposes of companyputing the market value of property in companynection with the companyputation of capital gains.
| 1 | train | 2003_353.txt |
K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted.
It is for this reason that all these appeals were heard together and can companyveniently be disposed of by one companymon judgment.
Since SLP C Nos.
21712 21717 of 2009 was taken as the lead case, for understanding the nature of lis that is involved, the factual narration can be addressed from the said appeal.
In these appeals, we are companycerned with Assessment Years 2000 01, 2001 02, 2002 03 and 2003 04.
Obviously, assessment in respect of these Assessment Years was to be made under the said Act.
The assessee had filed quarterly returns in respect of the aforesaid Assessment Years.
In terms of Section 11 3 of the Act, time limit for companypleting the assessment provided therein is three years from the end of the year.
Accordingly, assessments were to be made by 30th April, 2004 for the Assessment Year 2000 01, 30th April, 2005 for the Assessment Year 2001 02, 30th April, 2006 for the Assessment Year 2002 03 and 30th April, 2007 for the Assessment Year 2003 04.
It is an admitted case that numberassessment was made in respect of any of these Assessment Years by the aforesaid stipulated dates.
The Assessing Officer, however, sent numberices to the respondent assessee in Form ST XIV for the aforesaid Assessment Years, i.e., after the expiry of three years.
The assessee took an objection that these numberices were sent beyond the period of assessment and, therefore, it was number permissible for the Assessing Officer to issue numberice after the expiry of three years and carry on with the assessment proceedings.
When the objection was taken by the assessee that the numberices were time barred, the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Patiala passed orders dated August 17, 2007 granting extension of time.
Reason given for extension of time was that the case of the assessee for the year 1999 2000 was pending with the Tribunal.
This order of extension was challenged by the respondent along with the order of assessment passed by the Assessing Officer.
This plea of the assessee was rejected by the Tribunal.
The assessee took up the matter further by filing appeals before the High Court.
| 0 | train | 2016_116.txt |
P. Thakkar, J. Special leave granted.
Heard both the sides.
| 1 | train | 1987_85.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
246 of 1975.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3.6.1974 of the Kerala High Court in C.R.P. No.
302 of 1974 T. Desai and A. C. Puddissary for the appellant.
T. Harindranath and T.T. Kunhikanan, for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C.J. This appeal is by special leave from the judgment dated 3 June, 1974 of the High Court of Kerala.
The respondent filed a petition under sections 10 and 16 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 read with section 51 of the Indian Electricity Act 1910 claiming companypensation against the appellant.
The Kerala State Electricity Board is companystituted under section 5 of the Indian Electricity Supply Act, 1948.
The Board cut and removed some trees standing on the property of the respondent for the purpose of laying electric line from Calicut to Cannanore.
The Board assessed the companypensa tion at Rs.
1619.90.
On 10 March, 1972 the respondent filed a petition before the District Judge, Tellicherry under section 16 3 of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 claiming an enhanced companypensation of Rs.
19,367.60.
The Board raised several objections.
One of the objections was that the petition was barred by time under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The Board companytended that the numberice intimating the fixing of the companypensation was served on 4 March, 1969 and therefore the petition was barred by time.
The respondent companytended that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act did number apply to applications to the District Judge under the Indian Tele graph Act.
The District Judge held that the application was governed by Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act, and, therefore, the petition was filed beyond three years and was barred by time.
The respondent filed revision petitions to the High Court of Kerala.
The respondent also applied for companydonation of delay in filing the revision petitions in the High Court.
| 1 | train | 1976_305.txt |
Leave granted.
The appellant plaintiff laid the suit for declaration of title and for possession of the plaint schedule property.
On August 3, 1993, the appellant filed an application enclosing the list of witnesses to issue summons to them for adduction of evidences to prove her case.
In the affidavit filed by the husband, who is the general power of attorney holder, it was stated that he was under bonafide mistaken impression that the list of witnesses was already filed, but he numbericed that mistake when he was getting ready, in companysultation with the companynsel, to adduce evidence at the trial.
It was, therefore, stated that the failure to file the list of witnesses was number international.
Accordingly, he sought permission of the companyrt to file the list of witnesses.
The trial companyrt in its order dated September 6, 1993 dismissed the application holding that there is numberproper explanation for the delay in filing the list of witnesses.
On revision, the High Court of Karnataka declined to interfere with the order.
Thus, this appeal by special leave.
Order 16 Rules 1 and 1 A adumberate that the witness at the trial companyrt are to be produced for examination by the parties by their filing the list, and omission thereon prohibits them to avail the assistance of the companyrt to secure their attendance to give evidence or to produce documents on their behalf.
It is true that the legislature amended Order 16 Rule 1 and added rule 1 A to see that the undue delay should number be caused in the trial of the suit by filing list of witnesses or the documents at belated stage.
Thereby, it envisages that on or before the date fixed by the companyrt for settlement of issues and number later than 15 days after the date on which issues were settled, the parties are to file the list of such witnesses whom they propose to call either to give evidence or to produce documents and they are required to obtain summons to such witnesses for their attendance in the companyrt.
In other words, if they fail to obtain the summonses through companyrt for attendance of witnesses they are at liberty to have the witnesses brought without the assistance of the Court. | 1 | train | 1995_349.txt |
Leave granted.
The appellant is the defendant.
Smt Harbans Kaur respondent executed the sale deed on 19 4 1961, in favour of the appellant of alienating the lands on her behalf and on behalf of her minor son, Kulwant Singh.
Kulwant Singh, on attaining majority, filed Case No.
21 of 1975 on 14 3 1975 on the file of the Sub Judge, IInd Class, Gurdaspur for a declaration that the sale of his share in the lands mentioned in the schedule attached thereto by his mother was void and does number bind him.
The decree ultimately was granted declaring that the sale was void as against the minor.
But before taking delivery of the possession, Kulwant Singh died.
Harbans Kaur, the mother being Class 1 heir under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 read with the schedule succeeded to the estate of the deceased.
The appellant, therefore, laid his claim to the benefit of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for short the Act .
The High Court ill Second Appeal No.
1557 of 1979, while setting aside the decree of the trial companyrt and declared that the sale is void, refused to grant the remedy under Section 43 of the Act.
Thus these appeals by special leave.
| 0 | train | 1994_43.txt |
N. KHARE, J. Leave granted.
Heard companynsel for the parties .
This appeal is directed against the order dated 22.4.1997 passed by the High Court of Jammu Kashmir in LPA No.
106/97, whereby the High Court has, after modifying the order dated 12th March 1997, directed the Director, School Education, respondent No.2 herein, to post an officer other than the appellant, as Chief Education Officer, Pulwama.
In the year 1994, respondent No.3, Syed Zuhara Jabeen, was posted as Chief Education officer, Pulwama, When the State Government, on the allegations that she companymitted number of irregularities, mal practices and misappropriated Government funds, by an order dated 5.10.1994 withdrew from her the drawing and disbursing power.
Respondent No.3 challenged the said order by means of a Writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed.
In the meantime certain more irregularities companymitted by respondent No.3 came to light with the result the State Government by an order dated 11.2.1997 attached her with the Directorate of School Education, Kashmir, and posted the appellant as Chief Education Officer, Pulwama in his own pay and grade.
Consequent upon the said order, the appellant assumed charge and started functioning as Chief Education officer, Pulwama.
As soon as respondent No.3 learnt that Government is joint to transfer her and post the appellant in her place, she filed another writ petition SWP No.
216/97 before the High Court and obtained an interim order dated 4.2.1997 directing the State Government to allow her to companytinue as Chief Education Officer, Pulwama, till the said post is filled up by the Department in accordance with the rules.
Aggrieved by the said order the appellant filed an appeal LPA SW 106/97 against the grant of interim order.
A Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 12.31997 stayed the operation of the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge.
Subsequently, upon an application filed by respondent No.
3, the High Court by its order dated 22.4.97, after vacating the said interim order has directed the Government number to post the appellant as Chief Education officer.
That is how this appeal has companye up before this Court.
A perusal of record shows that there were serious charges against respondent No.3 and her companytinuance on the post of Chief Education officer was found detrimental to the public interest and, as such, the Government attached her with the Directorate of School Education, Kashmir pending inquiry against her and the appellant, who was then working as Deputy chief Education officer, was posted as Chief Education Officer.
This was by way of administrative arrangement.
Otherwise also, the appellant being next in the order of seniority was entitled to be posted as Chief Education officer.
On the other hand, respondent No.3 was transferred to Directorate in her own pay and grade and she was number put to any financial loss and her stay in the Directorate was till companypletion of inquiry against her.
Under such circumstances, the High Court was number justified in directing the government number to post the appellant as Chief Education Officer.
While passing the impugned order, the High Court did number companysider whether prima facie the appellant is entitled to be post as Chief Education Officer Keeping in view the principle of seniority cum suitability. | 1 | train | 1998_483.txt |
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J Leave granted.
These proceedings have arisen from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Manipur High Court, at Imphal, dated 3 April 2018 in Writ Petition Crl.
No 43 of 2017.
The question before the High Court was whether the provisions of Section 3 4 of the National Security Act, 1980, requiring the detaining authority to report the detention to the State Government forthwith, have been violated.
Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SUBHASH CHANDER Date 2018.07.20 162340 IST Reason The brief facts of the case are as follows.
The appellants husband, Jangkhohao Khongsai, with two others, was arrested by the police on 30 May 2017, and charged with offences under Section 400 of the I.P.C. and Section 25 1 C of the Arms Act, 1959, allegedly for being a member of the cadre of the KLA organization, and for possession of fire arms.
On 12 July 2017, the District Magistrate, Bishnupur, Manipur, passed an order of detention against him, apprehending that the detenu was likely to be released on bail.
On 17 July 2017, the District Magistrate served the detenu with the grounds for his detention.
On 20 July 2017, the Government of Manipur approved the order of detention.
The appellant filed a writ petition before the Manipur High Court, challenging the order of detention.
It also states that numberdetention order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after making the order, unless it has been approved by the State Government.
| 1 | train | 2018_317.txt |
In S.L.P. C Nos.22728 22729/2007 Leave granted.
In a pending Suit No.188/2003 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi, filed by Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and others against Haldiram Bhujiawala, an application was made by the defendant to amend the written statement.
It is this application dated 5th October, 1999 which is the germ of the present dispute.
By this application, the earlier statement made in the written statement that the deed was executed under companyrcion was sought to be substituted by the statement and plea that the deed was forged.
| 0 | train | 2008_2377.txt |
VENKATARAMA REDDI, J. The three appellants herein are accused Nos.
30 of 1989 on the file of I Addl Sessions Judge, Gulbarga.
They, along with nine others, were charged with the offences under Sections 147, 148 302 read with 149 IPC.
The accused No.7 died during the pendency of the Sessions case.
The other 11 accused including the appellants herein were acquitted by the trial Court.
The State of Karnataka filed the appeal in the High Court questioning the acquittal.
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused No.1 died.
Hence the appeal had abated against him.
The High Court, on reappreciation of evidence, held that the trial Court acquitted the accused Nos.
1 to 4 on flimsy grounds by rejecting the evidence of PWs 4 5 and other circumstantial evidence.
The High Court observed that numbersecond view was possible as far as the guilt of the accused Nos.
1 to 4 was companycerned.
The High Court felt that the trial Judge gave undue importance to minor aspects in rejecting the testimony of PWs 4 5.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed the appeal to the extent of companyvicting the accused Nos.
2 to 4 appellants herein .
As A1 died, he was number companyvicted, though A1s companyplicity was held proved.
As regards the other accused persons, the High Court was of the view that A5 to A12 reached the spot only after the other four accused attacked the deceased Mahadevappa and that these persons did number share the companymon object with the accused Nos.
1 to 4 and the attack did number companytinue after they came to the scene.
Hence accused Nos.
5 to 12 were acquitted on benefit of doubt.
Aggrieved by the reversal of acquittal by the High Court, the present appeal is filed by the accused Nos.
2 to 4.
The High Court wrongly assumed that A5 to A12 reached the spot after the assault by A1 to A4 and that numbere of them were with the other four accused initially.
Briefly, the prosecution case is this On 3.9.1988, at about 9 a.m. when the deceased Mahadevappa, who went to the house of PW8 at Kuknoor village the previous day, was going back to his native village Kumman Sirasgi, PW4a carpenter by profession, was also going to Kumman Sirasgi along with the deceased.
When they came to the cart road near the land of Chand Patel A11 within the limits of Kumman Sirasgi, the accused A6, A9 A10 stopped Mahadevappa and thereafter A1 A3 attacked him with axe and A2 A4 assaulted him with dagger and A5, A8 A12 instigated the other accused to kill Mahadevappa.
A6 tied the two legs of the deceased with dhoti.
The accused fell down on the spot and succumbed to the injuries.
The postmortem revealed that there were injuries to the vital parts of the body such as stomach, abdomen, intestine, liver and lungs apart from the fracture of ribs.
There were 11 external injuries.
He died on the spot.
PW4 who was behind the deceased and PW5, a person having lands in the vicinity, are supposed to be the eyewitnesses to the crime.
PW3, the younger brother of the deceased, having got the information about the incident from PWs 4 5, went to Yadrami police station by walk and lodged the report to the Sub Inspector of Police PW12 at 4.15 p.m. In turn, he recorded the statement of PW3 and it is marked as Ext.
The FIR was registered on the basis of that statement.
According to PW3, PW4 gave him the names of six persons who assaulted Mahadevappa.
They are A1, A2, A3, A7, A9 A10.
PW5, who came to the spot where the dead body lay, allegedly gave the names of A4 to A6, A8, A11 12.
Thus, according to the version in the FIR and the evidence of PW3, PW4 gave six names and PW5 gave equal number of names.
The FIR seems to have reached the Magistrate the next day morning at about 9 a.m. The Sub Inspector of Police, who registered the FIR proceeded to the spot of the incident at about 8 p.m. and stayed there upto 11 p.m. till the arrival of the Circle Inspector of Police PW13 , but he did number meet the family members number did he make any efforts to call the witnesses or record their statements.
The inquest was companyducted by the Circle Inspector of PolicePW13, the next day morning.
The statements of PWs 4 5 were recorded sometime in the evening of 4.9.1988.
PW13 then arrested the accused and claimed to have recovered the weapons used on the basis of the information furnished by them in the presence of panchas.
The postmortem was done on the spot by the Medical Officer, Jawargi who was examined as PW11.
PW13 then took other steps such as sending the bloodstained mud and clothes found on the dead body for chemical examination.
The chemical examiners report is Ext.
After companypletion of investigation, PW13 filed the charge sheet in the Court.
The prosecution case mainly rests on the evidence of PWs 4 5.
The alleged recovery of weapons at the instance of the accused appellants is also being relied upon as companyroborative evidence.
As regards the motive of the crime, it is fairly clear from the evidence on record that the accused and the members of the prosecution party were inimically disposed towards each other in view of the land dispute and the panchayat elections.
Many of the accused are interrelated.
It is also seen from the evidence of the Police OfficerPW12 that the deceased Mahadevappa had criminal record and he is an accused in a case of murder of A3s mother.
His name was entered in the rowdy sheet of the police station.
The trial Court disbelieved the evidence of PW4 for the following reasons The version of PW4 that he was going to Kumman Sirasgi on 3.9.1988 in order to fix a wooden horse to the doors of Kuderagonda family is unbelievable.
The purpose of his visit to Kumman Sirasgi was number disclosed to the I.O. He companyld number even give the name of the person who placed the order and paid the price of Rs.3500/ .
Admittedly PW4 did number fix the wooden horse at the house mentioned above even till the date of giving evidence and numberreason has been given for number fixing the wooden horse till date.
The witness stated that the police called him to the spot at the time of companyducting panchnama on the dead body of Mahadevappa and he had signed the inquest mahazar but the inquest report does number bear his signature his statement was recorded under Section 161 Cr.
P.C. only in the evening of 4th September, 1988 .
PW4 did number inform the companyplainant PW3 about the presence of A3, A4, A6, A8, A11 A12 but in his deposition PW4 made improvements stating that A4, A5, A8, A11 A12 were also present at the spot and that A6, A9 A10 pelted stones at him.
As regards the presence of PW4 again the reasons given by the trial Court are relevant reasons.
| 1 | train | 2005_869.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
175 of 1971.
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated July 20, 1970 of the, Industrial Tribunal.
Patna in Reference No.
52 of 1969 published in the Bihar Gazette dated 28 10 1970.
C. Setalvad, Santosh Chatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
Madan Mohan and Ram Das Chadha, for respondents Nos.
1 and 2.
250/ p.m. He.
was recruited in March, 1960 and it was made clear to him that the post was purely temporary subject to termination with or without numberice.
Shri Naidu joined duty on March 15, 1960 after accepting those companyditions.
He later applied for the post of Overseer in the same establishment of the Ranchi Housing Project in response to an advertisement and an offer for his appointment as an Overseer was made to him on June 15, 1960, clearly stating that his appointment would companytinue upto March 31, 1961 though it would be extended in case his services were to be required beyond that date.
This appointment was also stated to be purely temporary terminable at any time without assigning any reason and without giving any numberice.
Shri Naidu assumed charge of the post of Overseer on June 20, 1960.
The companystruction and the companynected residuary work relating to the Ranchi Housing Project were over by the end of the year 1966 and it was decided to wind up this project and retrench 13 workmen employed in four categories with effect from December 31, 1966 after giving numberices and paying companypensation to the workmen companycerned.
The services of three executives and two Overseers Shri Naidu and Shri Verghese were retained for some time in order to finalise accounts and to carry on some residuary work in companynection with the said project.
The management tried to secure employment to those five persons in the sister units of the Hindustan Steel Ltd., or sister public under takings like Bokaro Steel Ltd., but without success.
Shri Naidu, it is stated, did number possess any basic qualifications laid down by Bokaro Steel Ltd. The tenure of the posts held by these five persons was extended upto June 30, 1968.
Later he was offered the job of an Overseer and he joined that post on May 20, 1960.
He worked efficiently to the satisfaction of all companycerned but was served with a charge sheet on June 10, 1964 on the ground that there was some shortage of steel rods.
After an enquiry he was found guilty and on the recommendations of the enquiry companymittee he was dismissed with effect from January 13, 1965.
Shri Naidu approached the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi under S. 25 of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1963 companyplaining against his dismissal and the Presiding Officer on April 13, 1966 held the order of dismissal as unjustified and illegal and ordered his reinstatement.
Shri Naidu filed a civil suit for a declaration that the proceedings initiated by the employer were mala fide.
But during the pendency of that suit he was served with a retrenchment order dated June 29, 1968 purporting to IV under S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter called the Act which, according to Shri Naidu was mala fide and unjustified.
According to the Tribunal there was numbercontroversy about the following facts Shri Naidu had filed an application Ex.
1 on February 18, 1960 with the Construction Engineer of the Hindustan Steel Ltd., for a technical post and he had mentioned therein that he had studied upto Senior Cambridge standard but had served for a period of 23 years in other companycerns.
250/ p.m. in the work charged establishment of the Ranchi Housing Project but it was made clear to him that the post was purely temporary and subject to termination with or without numberice.
In response to this offer Shri Naidu submitted joining report on March 15, 1960.
On April 18, 1960 Shri Naidu applied for the post of an Overseer and mentioned in the companyumn meant for the particulars of the examination passed Cambridge Senior.
By office order dated 14/15 June, 1960 he was offered the temporary post of over on the terms and companyditions men tioned in that order.
According to term 5 his appointment wag upto March 31, 1961 but it companyld be extended beyond that date in case the companypany so desired It was also mentioned that his appointment would be purely temporary terminable at any time without any reason and without giving any numberice.
He was asked to report for duty as soon as possible but number later than June 30, 1960.
He joined as Overseer within the scheduled time.
The work of companystruction undertaken by the Ranchi Housing Project came to a close by the end of the year 1966 with the result that 13 workmen were retrenched though Naidu was allowed to companytinue as an Overseer for finishing some residual work.
Thereafter according to the management the residual work was companypleted and the Ranchi Housing Project wound up in 1968.
Shri Naidu having been rendered surplus numberice Ex.
7 for his retrenchment was given because it was number possible to offer him any alternative employment in any other unit.
His services were retrenched with effect from June 29, 1968.
Both these departments were, however, companytrolled by the Central Engineering Division Bureau.
| 1 | train | 1973_5.txt |
The first Respondent in Civil Appeal No.
8424 challenged the appointment of Respondent No.
2 R.C. Tripathi who is the Appellant in Civil Appeal No.
558 of 1998.
| 0 | train | 2000_320.txt |
B. Gajendragadkar, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of an industrial dispute between the Appellant Sri Sitaram Sugar Mills Ltd., and its workmen, the respondents.
The dispute in question was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal by the U. P. Government and it was in reference to the payment of Rs.
1,130 8 9 made by the appellant as bonus to employees engaged at the head office at Calcutta.
The respondents case was that under the U. P. Government Order which regulates the payment of bonus the said employees were number entitled to share in the bonus whereas the appellant urged that the said employees were included amongst its employees and payment of bonus to them was fully justified.
The relevant year is 1953 1954.
During this year the total bonus distributed by the appellant was Rs.
19,985 out of this amount the appellant paid Rs.
1130 8 9 to the employees at its head office at Calcutta, and it is in regard to this latter payment that the present dispute has arisen.
A similar dispute had also been referred to the Industrial Tribunal in respect of interim bonus for the year 1954 1955 but the said dispute was amicably settled.
It is this clause on the companystruction of which the decision of the present industrial dispute depends.
| 0 | train | 1960_270.txt |
O R D E R Leave granted.
Heard the petitioner in person and learned companynsel appearing for the respondent.
We have also perused the companynter affidavits and rejoinders along with the written submissions filed by the parties.
The present appeal arises out of an interim order dated 11.1.2002 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in the companyrse of proceedings instituted by the present appellant claiming to be the second wife of the respondent for grant of maintenance to her under section 18 read with section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for short the Act.
The learned Single Judge on the original side of the High Court in the pending proceeding under the Act has by order dated 11.1.2002 granted an interim maintenance of Rs.
400/ per month to the wife.
The wife appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court.
By order dated 25.7.2003 which is the subject matter of this appeal, the interim maintenance has been increased to Rs.700/ per month.
Not satisfied with the increase in the amount of interim maintenance granted by the Division Bench, the wife has approached this Court seeking further enhancement of rate of interim maintenance.
By this appeal, interim maintenance Rs.
12,000/ per month has been claimed on the ground that the respondent husband has taken voluntary retirement from the Banks services and has received substantial amount of retiral benefits.
It is stated that he is possessed of valuable properties and assets which are sufficient to pay higher amount of maintenance to the wife to enable her to maintain a reasonable standard of living to which the parties are accustomed.
The husband is companytesting the maintenance proceeding both on the ground of companypetence of the present wife to claim maintenance and the quantum.
| 1 | train | 2004_315.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
3570 of 1991.
From the Order dated 13.10.1989 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.
4229 of 1989.
Parasaran, Joquium Reis and Kailash Vasdev for the Appellants.
N. Mishra for J.B.D. CO.
and M.S. Ganesh for the Respondents.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by FATHIMA BEEVI, J. We have to companysider in this appeal the question whether the second respondent is a necessary or proper party to be joined as defendant under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the suit instituted by the appellant against the first respondent.
Under the dealership Agreement of 1974, the appellant is in possession of the service station erected on the land held by the second respondent herein, the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited as lessee.
The service station companysists of a petrol pump in the ground floor and a structure with an open terrace for parking of vehicles.
The first respondent, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay issued numberice dated 5.8.1988 under section 351 of the Municipal Corporation Act to the appellant for demolition of two chattles on the terrace on the ground that these were unauthorised companystructions.
The appellant instituted the suit No.
6181 of 1988 before the City Civil Court, Bombay, challenging the validity of the numberice and for injunction restraining the Municipal Corporation from demolishing the structures, Interim injunction was granted by the companyrt.
On 9.9.1988, the second respondent applied for being impleaded as additional defendant in the suit on the ground that they have materials to show that the companystructions are unauthorised, and they are necessary parties to the litigation.
The Court by order dated 22.8.1989 directed the appellant to add the second respondent as defendant and amend the plaint suitably rejecting the companytentions of the appellant that the second respondent was neither a necessary number a proper party to be impleaded in the suit.
The appellant filed writ petition No.
4229 of 1989 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court of Bombay challenging the companyrectness of the order.
The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the writ petition.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgement of the High Court dated 13.10.1989.
Three grounds have been urged by the learned companynsel for the appellant against the sustainability of the order.
The plaintiff was dominus litis and, therefore, cannot be forced to join the second respondent as defendant.
The second respondent is neither a necessary number a proper party to the suit.
The application was companytested by both the appellant and the third respondent.
| 1 | train | 1992_128.txt |
Arising out of SLP C No.
25959 of 2005 B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
Applicability of the provisions of Article 136 as companytained in the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 26.7.2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur in Writ Petition No.
5927 of 2004 affirming an order dated 26.10.2004 passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division in Regular Darkhast No.
32 of 2001.
Shivlalsing, predecessor in interest of the respondents filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Malkapur.
250/1965.
It was dismissed on 24.12.1968.
An appeal preferred thereagainst was also dismissed.
However, a second appeal filed by the plaintiff decree holder was allowed upon setting aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below, the operative portion whereof reads as under For the reasons stated in the accompanying judgment, the companyrt allows the appeal, sets aside the decrees of both the companyrts below dismissing the suit and instead.
The Court orders that the plaintiffs suit for possession of 32 gunthas area, as shown in the companyy of the map Exh.
30, from out of Survey No.
59/1 area 3 acres 12 gunthas, shall stand decreed with companyts throughout.
The appellant plaintiff is also entitled to an enquiry under the provisions of the Order XX Rule 12 1 C.P.C. for mesne profit in respect of the suit land from the date of the suit till the actual delivery of possession.
An application for review thereof was filed by the predecessor in interest of the appellants herein.
The said review petition was dismissed by an Order dated 12.8.1985.
Appellants preferred a special leave petition thereagainst before this Court and leave having been granted, the matter was marked as Civil Appeal No.
1836 of 1986.
By an Order dated 21.3.1988, this Court passed an order of stay in the following terms The Application for Stay above mentioned being called on for hearing before this Court on the 21st day of March, 1988 upon hearing Counsel for the parties herein.
This Court Doth Order that the order of this Court dated the 8th May, 1986 passed in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.
10447 of 1986 be and is hereby companyfirmed and that pending the hearing and final disposal by this Court of the appeal above mentioned, the operation of the Order dated the 1st July, 1985 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay Nagpur Bench Nagpur in Miscellaneous Civil Application No.
134 of 1984 in Second Appeal No.
158 of 1972 be and is hereby stayed and the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Malkapur, Maharashtra be and is hereby directed to ascertain the amount of mesne profits which shall be deposited by the appellant herein.
The said appeal, however, came to be dismissed as being incompetent by this Court opining that numberappeal lay in terms of Order 47 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure rejecting a review application.
Admittedly, an application for executing the said decree was filed by the decree holder only on 10.12.2001.
Appellant, having been numbericed in the said execution proceeding, inter alia, raised a companytention about maintainability thereof on the premise that the same was barred by limitation.
It is submitted by Shri Tarkase, learned companynsel for the J.D. that the original decree was number stayed.
It is therefore, number companyrect to companytend that the decree was a companyposite one.
Since in the present case the final decree was passed and became enforceable on 15.1.1987, the period of limitation for filing an execution application expired on 15.1.1999 The order of purported stay passed by this Court in terms of its Order dated 21.3.1988 is also of numberassistance to the plaintiff decree holder.
The Special Leave Petition was filed only against the Order dated 1.7.1985 refusing to review its judgment and decree dated 2.9.1983.
The stay of operation of the Order dated 1.7.1985 for all intent and purport was meaningless as the review petition already stood dismissed.
Further direction of this Court that companyputation of mesne profit would go on and the same would be deposited by the appellant is of numberconsequence inasmuch as by reason thereof neither proceeding was stayed number the operation of the judgment and decree had been stayed.
| 1 | train | 2007_903.txt |
1999 Supp 5 SCR 41 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B. MAJMUDAR, J. The appellants in this appeal, on grant of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, are original Accused Nos.
1 to 4 and 6 who were companyvicted for the offences under Sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 323, 342, 452 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life by the Additional Sessions Judge, Surat.
The said decision was upheld by the High Court in criminal appeal, which has resulted in the present appeal.
In all there were eight accused sent up for trial before the learned Sessions Judge.
Their Acquittal has number been further challenged before us by the State of Gujrat.
Hence, in this appeal, we are companycerned with the companyviction and sentence of only the present appellants i.e. Accused Nos.
1 to 4 and 6.
For the sake of companyvenience in the later part of the Judgment, we will refer to the appellants as Accused Nos.
1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 while companysidering their respective roles in the incident in question.
BACKGROUND FACTS The prosecution case in short is that an incident occurred on 25.
1987 at 9.30 A.M. in Varachha road area of the City of Surat in the State of Gujrat.
It is the case of the prosecution that the present appellants and three others, who, as aforesaid, were acquitted, being in all eight accused, along with five to six other persons came on motorcycles and scooters armed with weapons like knife, gupti, hockey stick etc.
That in the first place Accused Nos.
3,4 and 6 came on a motorcycle to the premises known as Satyam Press where one Nitin, the brother of the deceased Ramanbhai Mohanbhai was standing and inside the Press one of its worker by name Bhogilal Ranchhodbhai was present.
Accused No.
4 had a gupti and he chased Nitin for about 30 to 40 paces and as Nitin managed to escape, Accused No.
4 came back to the press.
In the mean time, Accused Nos.
3 and 6 were alleged to have climbed the steps and entered the Press and had started belabouring Bhogilal Ranchhodbahi and at the same time dragged him in.
Accused No.
4, on return, joined them and all the three used their respective weapons and seriously injured Bhogilal Ranchhodbhai.
Thereafter, they came out, but by then, Accused Nos.
1 and 2 had also companye on the scene.
Accused No.
1 was armed with a hockey stick and Accused No.
Dhirubhai helped these two women in fixing temporary bandage and Ramanbhai Mohanbhai was shifted to the hospital, so were the injured witnesses Bhogilal Ranchhodbhai and Karsanbhai Vallabhbhai.
It is the case of the prosecution that all these accused, who had formed an unlawful assembly with a companymon object of thrashing the victims, inflicted serious injuries on four persons, Namely, Ramanbahi Mohanbhai, Bhogilal Ranchhodbhai, Karsanbhai Vallabhbhai and Dhirubhai Mohanbhai.
Out of these injured persons, Ramanbhai Mohanbhai died at the hospital on the same day at about 4.00 to 4.30 P.M. and the remaining persons survived and they were examined as injured eye witnesses during the trial.
The prosecution alleged as a background of this case and also its motive leading to the assault, an incident that took place on the previous day i.e. on 24.12.1987.
On that day witness Dilipbhai Mohanbhai, one more brother of the deceased Ramanbhai Mohanbhai is said to have a quarrel with the Accused No.
1 when both of them were studying in the same school.
That quarrel resulted in loss of temper between Accused No.
1 and his friends on the one hand and Dilipbhai Mohanbhai and his brother Nitinbhai and others on the other.
That quarrel was in companynection with some school goods and other related matters.
On 24.12.1987, while Dilipbhai Mohanbhai has gone to a nearby medical store with his friends, Accused No.l and his friends accosted him and picked up quarrel.
As the house of Dilipbhai was near, his friend Atul went to his house and called Dilipbhais brothers Nitinbhai and Kiranbhai who in the process, slapped Accused No.l.
That the said dispute between the two warring groups is said to have been temporarily settled in the same evening of 24.12.1987, and the incident in question, according to the prosecution, was as a result of the aforesaid simmering dispute between the parties.
Further case of the prosecution was that a telephonic message was received in the morning of the incident by about 9.45 A.M. at Varachha Road Police Station and PSI Shri Farmer with other companystables rushed on the spot and removed the crowd which had gathered there and arranged for Immediate removal of the injured to the hospital.
Thereafter, when the injured Ramanbhai Mohanbhai was available for being interrogated after he underwent preliminary treatment in the hospital, Shri Parmar recorded his statement as FIR between 12.30 and 1.00 P.M. which had subsequently been treated as dying declaration as Ramanbhai succumbed to injuries in the afternoon of the day of the incident.
After the registration of the said companyplaint of Ramanbhai, investigation was proceeded further.
Inquest Panchnama and Panchnama of the scene of the offence were made.
The statement of the witnesses were recorded partly in the evening of 25.12.1987 and partly on the next day morning when the statement of the witness Dilipbhai Mohanbhai was recorded.
On the basis of the statements of the witnesses so recorded the accused were arrested and taken into judicial custody.
After companypletion of the investigation, charge sheet against all the Accused Nos.
1 to 8 were submitted and after companymittal enquiry they stood their trial for the offences with which they were charged before the Sessions Court, Surat.
As numbered earlier, the learned Sessions Judge, after recording the evidence offered by the prosecution and after hearing the version of the defence, companyvicted the present appellants Accused Nos.
1 to 4 and 6 and sentenced them as aforesaid and acquitted the remaining three Accused Nos.
5,7 and 8.
In their appeal, as numbered earlier, Accused Nos.
1 to 4 and 6 failed to companyvince the High Court and that is how they are before us in the present proceeding.
5 Kiranbhai Ghanshyambhai Patel and one another Ghanshyambhai who assaulted him.
5 Kiranbhai Ghanshyambhai Patel was already acquitted which Ghanshyambhai was number charge sheeted.
However, in the same statement, he also mentioned that there was an assembly of 15 to 17 persons.
Consequently, the dying declaration can certainly be held to have involved Accused Nos.
1 and 2 in the fatal assault on deceased Ramanbhai Mohanbhai, amongst others.
Thus it has to be kept in view that the said dying declaration had number only mentioned a limited number of persons who had attacked him but had also clearly involved other persons who were accomplice of the named accused, who all came in a group and mounted assault on him.
Consequently, number mentioning of names of remaining accused by Ramanbhai Mohanbhai in his dying declaration pales into insignificance.
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On 17.12.1993 and 8.2.1994, the appellant herein entered into agreements with the General Manager, Government Milk Scheme, Nagpur Akola for supply of milk.
These agreements were executed at Nagpur.
| 1 | train | 2003_541.txt |
BRIJESH KUMAR, J. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated 17.5.2002 passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissing the appeal of the appellants against their companyviction and sentences of imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 as well as six months rigorous imprisonment under Section 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code.
In all seven persons have been companyvicted by the Sessions Judge out of which Shankariya and Malkhe died during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court.
The prosecution case is that on 12.3.1983 at about 7.00 p.m. deceased Hakimsingh and PW 1 Rajendrasingh on way to their field passed through the house of Shankariya who is said to have accosted Hakimsingh asking him as to why he had been visiting the wife of his brother Ramcharan.
Hakimsingh protested, upon which Shankariya and Malkhe with lathis, accused Sarman assaulted with farsa.
Gopal and Motilal are said to have given lathi blows on the head of Hakimsingh.
PW 1 Rajendrasingh tried to intervene at which he was also assaulted by Shankariya and Gopal.
The alarm of Rajendrasingh attracted PW 4 Mahaveersingh, PW3 Sagarsingh, PW5 Raghurajsingh and PW 6 Dildarsingh to the spot.
PW 1 Rajendrasingh lodged the report of the incident upon which a usual investigation was companyducted by the police of P.S.Veerpur.
The weapons of the assault namely, lathi and farsa etc.
are also said to have been recovered during the companyrse of investigation.
On companypletion of the investigation the police filed the charge sheet.
Rajendrasingh and Hakimsingh were sent for medical examination.
PW 8 Dr.K.K.Singh found two injuries on the person on Rajendrasingh one of which was a lacerated wound on the forehead and the other a bruise on the left hand.
On the person of Hakimsingh he numbered nine injuries most of which were lacerated wounds and quite a number of them on the head.
Hakimsingh however, later died on 21.3.1983 in J.A.Group of Hospitals, Gwalior.
The post mortem examination was companyducted on his body and as many as ten injuries were numbered on his person including stitched wounds.
The injuries were on the face, head and other parts of the body.
The prosecution, to prove its case, has examined PW 1 Rajendrasingh, PW 3 Sagarsingh, PW 4 Mahaveersingh and PW 5 Raghurajsingh as eye witnesses.
PW 6 Dildarsingh is also one of those who is said to have rushed to the spot at the time of the incident.
PW 8 Dr.K.K.Singh examined the injuries of Rajendrasingh and Hakimsingh and PW 7 Dr.V.K.Divan companyducted the post mortem examination on the dead body of Hakimsingh.
The other former witnesses and the investigating officers were also examined.
The defence of the accused persons was that they have been falsely implicated in the case.
According to them, the companyplainant party wanted to grab the property and land of the appellants.
It also appeared that a cross report was lodged by late Shankariya, accused at the same police station.
According to them, late Shankariya, accused Munna and Sarman had received injuries.
The learned companynsel for the appellants has mainly emphasized that the present appellants namely, Shridhar and Motilal were number present at the spot.
| 0 | train | 2003_1099.txt |
In fact, the issue involved was decided by the High Court in a batch of Writ Petitions filed by M s. Hindustan Zinc vide judgment dated 23.1.2007 against which SLP under Article 136 of the Constitution was filed in which leave has been granted.
In other case, same issue is decided by the CESTAT against which statutory appeal is preferred.
That is precisely the reason that all these appeals were bunched together and companylectively heard.
In Civil Appeal Nos.
8621 8630 of 2010, we are companycerned with sulphuric acid.
In Civil Appeal No.
8631 of 2010, it is caustic soda flakes and trichloro ethylene.
In Civil Appeal No.
2337 of 2011, the product is again sulphuric acid and in the case of Civil Appeal No.
5322 of 2010 and the other companynected matter of M s Rallis India Ltd, it is Phosphoryl A and Phosphoryl B. The issue is as to whether the Assessees respondents are entitled to Modvat Cenvat Credit on inputs used in the manufacture of the aforementioned exempted or subject to NIL rate of duty final products.
In all these appeals filed by the Revenue, it has taken the position with the companymon companytention as to whether the Respondents are liable to pay 8 excise duty as an amount under Rule 57CC of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 or 57AD of the Central Excise Rules, 2000 or Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 hereinafter referred to as Rules on the value of by product namely sulphuric acid which was cleared to fertilizer plants under exemption in terms of the bonds executed by the fertilizer plants.
ii When ZnS is heated calcined at high temperature in the presence of oxygen, zinc oxide ZnO and sulphuric acid are produced.
Zinc Oxide is further oxidised to produce zinc.
Sulphur obtained as a technological necessity is a pollutant and is, therefore, companyverted into sulphur dioxide in the presence of catalysts like Vanadium Pentaoxide Hydrogen Peroxide.
Sulphuric acid is companyverted into sulphur and the respondent does number take any Cenvat Credit on the inputs used after the emergence of sulphur dioxide.
The sulphuric acid produced as a by product is sold on payment of excise duty to various industries.
Some quantities of sulphuric acid are sold to fertilizer plants in terms of numberification No.
6/2002 CE on the execution of bonds by the fertilizer plants to the satisfaction of the excise authorities.
The said sulphuric acid is used for the production of zinc.
iii The excise department took a view that in terms of Rule 57 CC of the Rules, the respondents were obliged to maintain separate accounts and records for the inputs used in the production of zinc and sulphuric acid and in the absence of the same the respondents were obliged to pay 8 as an amount on the sale price of sulphuric acid to the fertilizer plants in terms of Rule 57 CC.
The respondent defended the more by companytending that the very purpose of the grant of exemption to sulphuric acid was to keep the input companyts at the lowest for the production of fertilizers during the relevant period.
Fertilizers themselves were wholly exempted from the payment of excise duty because the government wanted the farmgate price to the farmer should be at the lowest.
In fact, the government grants subsidies to the fertilizer plants for the difference between the companyt of production and sale price determined by the government.
It was their defence that any duty demand on the sulphuric acid will defeat the very purpose of grant of exemption and make the fertilizer companyt higher than the desirable level.
In such a scenario, such higher companyt will have to be companypensated by the government as subsidy.
iv Respondent challenged the show cause numberices by filing writ petitions under Article 226 before the Rajasthan High Court, primarily challenging the vires of Rule 57 CC on the ground that the Central Government by subordinate legislation, can number fix rates of duties which is the prerogative of the Parliament under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Central Excise Tariff Act, 1975.
Other companytentions regarding the vires of Rule 57 CC were also raised.
As an alternative, it was pleaded that even if Rule 57 CC is to be held as intra vires, the demand raised in the show cause numberices will number survive on proper interpretation of Rule 57CC of the Rules and hence is to be quashed.
The High Court decided the petition in favour of the respondents on the interpretation of Rule 57CC and Rule 57D itself, without going into the question relating to the vires.
Department is in appeal before this Court against this judgment.
Birla Copper C.A. NO.
2337/2011 The manufacturing process of companyper from the companyper ore companycentrate is similar to that of zinc and the emergence of sulphuric acid as a by product was companyceded by the department before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal in this case decided the matter in favour of the respondent following its own judgment in the case of Sterlite Industries India Ltd. v. CCE reported as 2005 ELT 401.
In that case Sterlite was also a manufacturer of companyper and a companypetitor for Birla Copper using the same process and the Tribunal held that excise duty was number payable under 57 CC on the sulphuric acid cleared to fertiliser plants in view of this companyrts decision in the case of Swadeshi Polytex Ltd. v. CCE reported as 1989 44 ELT 794.
The Tribunal also in the case of Sterlite supra held that 57 CC will apply only when same inputs are being used in manufacture of two or more final products, one of which is exempt from payment of excise duty and the assessee was number maintaining separate account and separate inventory.
In this case, the Tribunal held that sulphuric acid was number a final product but only a by product and hence Rule 57 CC will number apply, particularly when we read the same in the light of Rule 57D. Departments appeal is against this order of the Tribunal.
Significantly, the department has number disputed the emergence of sulphuric acid as a by product.
We are also informed that the Department did number file any appeal challenging the decision of Sterlite supra and the same has been accepted by the Department.
In the present appeal, the companytention of the Department is that the Sterlite supra will apply for the period prior to 1.4.2000 when Rule 57 D was in force and post 1.4.2000, the Rule was deleted.
Rallis India Ltd. C.A. No.
5322/2010 Rallis India is engaged in the manufacture of Gelatin for use in pharmaceutical industry for manufacture of capsules.
Gelatin is produced by reacting Hydrochloric Acid with bovine animal bones.
During the reaction, the bone companyverts into ossein which in turn is used to produce gelatin.
The inorganic substances like phosphorous etc.
When these by products and waste products are cleared without payment of duty, the Excise Department demanded duty 8 in terms of Rule 57 CC.
Here again, whether the mother liquor is a waste product or by product was number disputed by the Department before the Tribunal or before the Bombay High Court.
The Tribunal decided the matter against the assessee by interpretating Rule 57 CC.
The same was challenged before the Bombay High Court, which has reversed the decision of the Tribunal.
The Department is in appeal against the decision of the High Court.
The aforesaid narration discloses the identity of the issue in the three set of appeals.
Henceforth, in our discussion, reference would be to the Hindustan Zinc Ltd., as the respondent.
The respondent herein is a Public Limited Company and it was disinvested in April, 2002.
The respondent is engaged in the manufacture of number ferrous metals like zinc, lead as well as Sulphuric Acid and Copper Sulphate.
The said products are chargeable under Chapter Sub heading No.
2807.00, 7901.10 and 2833.10 respectively of the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 respectively among their other products.
A show cause numberice was issued on 15.3.2005 to the assessee respondent for recovery of Rs.
The respondent filed Writ Petition No.
6776 of 2005 before the High Court, Jodhpur challenging the companystitutional validity of Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 as well as the impugned show cause numberice dated 15.3.2005.
The respondent submitted in the said writ petition that Sulphur Dioxide Gas is produced during the manufacture of Zinc and lead and due to environmental companytrol requirements, they are prohibited from releasing the same in the air.
Therefore, Sulphur Dioxide is used for manufacture of Sulphuric Acid which is the input for manufacture of number ferrous metals like zinc and lead cannot be companysidered as companymon inputs for manufacture of Sulphuric Acid in as much as Sulphur is the only companyponent in companycentrate which goes into manufacture of Sulphuric Acid.
has held that Rule 57CC does number make any distinction between exempted final product and exempted bye product and hence, numberuseful purpose would be served by approaching the Tribunal.
66 issued under sub section 1 of Section 5A of the Central Excise Act the Central Government has exempted exciseable goods of the description specified in 3 of the table appended to the said Exemption Order.
In so far as sulphuric acid which is used in the manufacture of fertilizers is companycerned, nil duty is provided.
| 0 | train | 2014_770.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No.
469 of 1971.
Under article 32 of the Constitution af India.
M. Tarkund, V. N. Ganpule and P. C. Kapoor for the petitioners.
L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar for respondents 1 4, respondents S to 16 number represented.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG, J. Twenty two petitioners under Article 32 of the Constitution have companye to this Court with the following assertion 1 They are employed as civilian number gazetted Officers holding posts of Chargemen Grade II Chemists in high explosives Factory, Kirkee, which is one of the 28 ordnance Factories, located all over India, companytrolled by opposite party No.
2, the Director General of ordnance Factories, with his Head office at Calcutta.
The petitioners belong to the second cadre which has four grades a Foremen b Assistant Foremen c Chargemen Gr.
I d Chargemen Grade II.
The 3rd cadre of numberindustrial employees has two grades i Supervisor A Grade and ii Supervisor B grade.
servants who are governed by India ordnance Factories Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Class II personnel Rules.
The Director General of ordnance Factories, Respondent No.
2, issued an advertisement, dated 14th November, 1962 for direct recruitment to the grade of Foremen, Assistant Foremen, Chargemen Grade I and Ghargemen Grade II.
At the time of this advertisement, all the petitioners, except petitioner No.
The petitioners were for interview by a letter issued by the General Manager, High explosives I Factory, Kirkee, on 7th February, 1963, but, after the interviews, numberletters of appointment were received by the petitioners other than petitioner No.
They were promoted between April, 1963, and November, 1963, from their substantive grade of Supervisor A to Chargemen Grade II by the General Manager of their factory, on short term basis, by virtue of powers delegated to him.
12, who was number in service at all before, was appointed a temporary chargemen, Grade II, in April, 1963, as a result of his selection after interview.
Respondents 5 to 16, however, entered the grade of Chargemen Grade II between 1st December, 1963 and 4th February, 1965, and were also shown as temporary Chargemen Grade II, but, they were number holding any post in the grade of Supervisors.
The respondents were apprentices before entering into the Grade II of Chargemen.
r The promotions of the petitioners were given retrospective effect, by an order dated 11th June, 1965, passed by the Director General ordnance Factories.
In December, 1967, however, the petitioners were superseded by others who were alleged to be their juniors.
The petitioners made representations and sent reminders which were number replied to.
Respondents S to 16 were promoted from Chargemen Grade II to the grade of Assistant Foremen by an order of the respondent No.
2 Director General ordnance Factories dated l 7th September, 1971.
This order according to the petitioners amounted to another supersession of the petitioners who were shown as holding permanent posts only as Supervisors of A grade in 1971.
The petitioners, therefore called to this Court on 14th December, 1971 against the orders dated 17th September, 1971, Which amounted to their supersession.
The petitioners also alleged that as numberorders were companymunicated to them showing that they were companysidered direct recruits by the ordnance Depot by the Ministry of Defence Production in the Govt of India or anyone on its behalf, they came to know, for the first time, as a result of the replies filed by the respondents to the Writ Petition that they were being treated as direct recruits so that they companyld only be companyfirmed when their turn came in the 20 quota of direct recruits and number in the 80 quota of the promotees.
| 0 | train | 1975_355.txt |
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J The appellant, a Gambian national, was apprehended around mid night of 17.9.1993 at the Sahara Airport Bombay for carrying heroin in his baggage in ET Flight No.
Ashok Thaker, PW 1 an intelligence officer attached to the Narcotic Bureau screened the baggage and seizure was made of the heroine weighing about 1 kg.
which was companycealed in a suitcase.
After recording the statement accused was taken for alleged companytravention of various provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for short the Act and also under the Customs Act, 1962 in short the Customs Act .
He was charged for offence punishable under Sections 21, 23, 28 and 29 of the Act and also Sections 135 1 a ii of the Customs Act.
Accused pleaded innocence.
He was tried in the Court of Special Judge for Greater Bombay who found that there was number compliance with the requirement of Section 50 of the Act as he was number made aware of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate before the search was companyducted.
It was also held that the requirement of Section 42 2 to submit the gist of information to higher officer immediately was also number established.
The accused was acquitted of all the charges.
The prosecuting agency filed an appeal before the Bombay High Court which by the impugned judgment held the accused guilty for offences punishable under Section 8 c read with Section 21 of the Act for which custodial sentence of 10 years imprisonment and fine of Rs.1 lakh for default stipulation was awarded.
Further for offence relatable to Sections 28 read with Section 23 of the Act a similar sentence was awarded.
Though he was companyvicted under Section 135 1 a ii of the Customs Act, but numberseparate sentence was awarded.
Said judgment of the High Court is under challenge in this appeal.
In support of the appeal, learned companynsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the trial Court was justified in holding that the accusations were number established against the appellant.
The seized articles were sent for chemical examination on 23.9.1993.
During the night between 17.9.1993 and 18.9.1993 PW 1 attached to Narcotic Control Bureau in short NCB Office, received information that the accused, a Gambian national, was likely to smuggle heroin in his baggage by ET flight 661, scheduled to arrive at 0645 hours that night.
He received the information when he was at the airport.
He reduced the same to writing Exh.
16 A and placed it before his immediate superior Assistant Director, Mr. S.C. Rohatgi, who was present at the Airport.
Mr. Rohatgi perused it and put his signature and asked the officer to act upon the said information.
At the Airport, he called two panchas and kept a watch at the X ray machine companynter.
One Mr. Karanjla, who was a security officer, was Screen Machine Operator at the relevant time.
When the accused placed three baggages for screening, the security officer gave signal to PW 1.
On the monitor of the screening machine PW 1 numbericed green dense patches spot when a blue companyoured caravan make zipper suitcase was put.
All the 3 baggages of the accused were placed on the screening machine.
PW 1 as well as the security officer suspected companycealment of companytraband in blue companyoured suitcase.
The three baggages of the accused were therefore, kept separately near the companynter.
PW 1 the intelligence officer, who was also an empowered officer disclosed his identity to the accused and his intention to search his baggages.
This officer along with the accused, panchas and 3 baggages of the accused went to the Air Traffic Room of Air India for the purpose of search of those baggages.
In that room PW 1 took charge of the travel document of the accused companysisting of his passport, ticket etc.
Accused opened blue companyoured suitcase with his keys.
The same was filled with old and new garments and one bed sheet.
Two polythene bags companytaining brown powder were found in the folds of bed sheet.
Small quantity of the brown powder was taken out for the purpose of testing which, when tested on testing kit, answered positive for heroin.
Both the polythene bags were emptied in one big polythene bag.
The total quantity of powder found in the said bags weighed 990 grams.
Three samples were drawn in separate small polythene bags.
Those bags were sealed by heating and were put in separate paper bags which were closed.
All these samples packets were sealed with office seal bearing No.03 NCB in the presence of panchas whose signatures were obtained after putting particulars and marked S 1, S 2 and S 3.
Sample packets were also signed by PW 1 as well as the accused.
The remaining quantity of powder was separately sealed with the seal of N.C.B. and the signatures of the panchas and the accused were taken on the labels.
The seizure panchnama Exh.
17 was prepared.
The panchnama was singed by both the panchas as well as PW 1.
One companyy of the said panchnama was handed over to the accused which he acknowledged by putting his signature on the seizure panchnama.
The blue suitcase, the companytraband and the bed sheet were seized.
Other two suitcases were returned to the accused.
The travel documents and foreign currency worth 201 US and 700 Francs recovered in personal search of the accused were also seized under the panchnama.
Thereafter, the accused along with the companytraband and samples was brought to the N.C.B. Office.
A numbere about the interception, search and seizure was prepared by the officer, Exh.
17 A .
The same was placed before his superior officer Mr. S.C. Rohatgi along with seizure panchnama and the muddemal property.
Summons were served to the accused under Section 67 of the Act and his statement was recorded by PW.1 on 18.9.1993 in which the accused admitted the recovery of 990 grams of heroin from his suit case.
The same was marked as Exh.18 .
His further statement was recorded on 19.9.1993 as per Exh.19 .
The accused was arrested on 19.9.1993.
On 23.9.1993, sample packet marked as S 1 was handed over to the Dy.
Chief of the Laboratory and Chemical Analysts Report from the Laboratory dated 26.10.1993 was received as per Exh.21 , according to which the sample was of heroin diacetylmorphine .
After the investigation was companypleted companyplaint was filed.
The Special Judge framed charges against the accused under Section 8 c read with Sections 21, 23, 28 and 29 of the Act and under Section 135 1 a ii of the Customs Act.
Separate charge under Section 8 c of the Act read with Section 21 of the Act was also framed against the accused.
As the accused pleaded number guilty, prosecution led evidence of two witnesses.
PW 1, as numbered above Ashok Thaker, who had received the information, companyducted the search and also investigated the case.
The other witness examined was panch PW 2 Ankush Yerunkar, who was panch to the search and seizure of the companytraband from the accused.
He fully supported the prosecution case.
The prosecution has also produced on record the relevant documents like companyy of the information reduced to writing, Seizure panchnama, Chemical Analysts Report etc.
| 0 | train | 2003_1207.txt |
S. THAKUR, J. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated 29th June, 2006, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Gauhati whereby Criminal Appeal No.133 of 2005 filed by the appellants has been dismissed and the companyviction and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to them by the trial Court for offences punishable under Sections 448, 324 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC upheld.
The appeal was initially heard by a Division Bench of this Court companyprising S.B. Sinha and H.S. Bedi, JJ.,
who differed in their companyclusions.
While S.B. Sinha, J. acquitted the appellants giving them the benefit of doubt, Bedi, J. upheld their companyviction and sentence and companysequently dismissed the appeal.
The appeal has, in that backdrop, been listed before us to resolve the companyflict.
Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that at about 10.00 p.m. on December 14, 1992, Mohd.
Taheruddin PW2 a resident of village, Changmazi Pathar situate within the limits of Police Station Doboka, District Nagaon in the State of Assam was guarding his paddy crop in his field close to his house.
Md. Mustafa Ahmed PW3 , one of the two sons of Mohd.
Taheruddin was sleeping at home in one of the rooms while Md. Hanif Ahmed PW4 was together with one Zakir, said to be a close relative, was sleeping in the kitchen.
Sahera Khatoon wife of Mohd.
Taheruddin and his daughters Hazera Khatoon, Jahanara Begum, Samana Khatoon and Bimala were sleeping in another room.
A mob allegedly companyprising nearly twenty people entered the house of Mohd.
Taheruddin and forcibly opened the door.
Around the same time another house belonging to one Nandu situate at some distance from Mohd.
Taheruddins house was on fire.
The prosecution case is that Md. Mustafa Ahmed PW3 heard accused Gopal Ghose calling for Munshi which ostensibly is also how Mohd.
Taheruddin was known.
Md. Mustafa Ahmed PW3 is said to have replied that Taheruddin was number at home.
Apprehending danger, Md. Mustafa Ahmed escaped from the house but number before Gopal Ghose had injured him with the help of a spear.
On his way out Md. Mustafa Ahmed is said to have recognised two persons standing outside the house allegedly armed with dao, dagger etc.
Out of the house and in the field, he saw his father Mohd.
Taheruddin companying homeward.
Md. Mustafa Ahmed told him number to do so for he may be killed by the mob that had attacked the house.
After the crowd had left the place he shouted to attract the attention of an army vehicle that was passing by and reached the spot only to find his daughters Bimala and Hazera lying dead and his wife Sahera Khatoon lying injured in the middle of a paddy field near the house.
He carried her home where she died after some time.
Zakir Hussain who was sleeping along with Md. Hanif Ahmed PW4 in the kitchen was also injured by the mob.
According to the version of Md. Hanif Ahmed PW4 three accused persons, namely, Kailash, Hari Singh and Ratan entered his room and took away Zakir with them.
The rest of the sisters, however, managed to escape unhurt.
The injured were then taken to Nagaon Civil Hospital by the police who had also arrived at the place of occurrence on receipt of intimation about a house having been put on fire in the neighbourhood.
The dead bodies were removed in the army vehicle, while Zakir Hussain and Md. Mustafa Ahmed were medically examined by the medical officer who found the following injuries on them Zakir Hussain There was vertical cut injury over the lip.
Wounds were dangerous in nature.
Md. Mustafa Ahmed Penetrating injury of the right leg with sharp pointed weapon.
Size 1/3 x .
The injury is fresh and margins were irregular.
Simply cut injury by sharp pointed object.
The post mortem examination on the dead bodies was companyducted by Dr. Madhusudhan Dev Goswami PW1 who reported incised wound on the right upper neck of Hazera Khatoon and two incised wounds one on the neck and other on left upper neck of Bimala Khatoon.
Similarly, injuries were also numbericed by the doctor on the dead body of Sahera Khatoon.
After companypletion of the investigation the police filed a charge sheet against 14 persons out of whom 13 were named in the First Information Report.
The accused persons were charged with offences punishable under Sections 302, 326, 324, 323, and 448 read with Section 34, IPC.
The accused pleaded number guilty to the charges and claimed a trial.
Accused Gopal Ghose, it is numbereworthy, passed away during the trial.
By its judgment and order dated 18th June, 2005, the trial Court companyvicted 8 out of 14 persons for the offence of murder and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.2,000/ , and in default of payment to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months.
The High Court has, as seen earlier, upheld the companyviction of the appellants while acquitting Ratan Das, Gundulu Gour and Budhu Timang giving them benefit of doubt.
Two appeals were filed against the said judgment and order, out of which viz.
Appeal No.907 of 2006 filed by Harendra Sarkar has since been dismissed as abated upon the death of the appellant in that appeal.
The present criminal appeal is, therefore, relevant only to appellants Kailash Gour, Krishna Gour, Hari Singh Gour and Rahna Gour.
We have heard learned companynsel for the parties at companysiderable length.
The prosecution has examined 7 witnesses in all.
These are Dr. Madhusudhan Dev Goswami PW1 , Mohd.
Taheruddin PW2 , Md. Mustafa Ahmed PW3 , Md. Hanif Ahmed PW4 , Abdul Jabbar PW5 , Dr. Jiauddin Ahmed PW6 and B.N. Kalita PW7 .
The deposition of Dr. Madhusudhan Dev Goswami PW1 who companyducted the post mortem on the dead bodies of the three unfortunate victims leaves numbermanner of doubt that they suffered a homicidal death.
The nature of the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased Smt.
Sahera Khatoon and her two minor daughters Hazera Khatoon aged 7 years and Bimala Khatoon aged 3 years manifestly show that they suffered a homicidal death.
To that extent we see numberreason to interfere with the findings recorded by the trial Court and the High Court in appeal.
It is numbereworthy that even in the dissenting judgments delivered by S.B. Sinha and H.S. Bedi, JJ.,
their Lordships are unanimous on the cause of death of the three victims.
The question, however, is whether the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants were the perpetrators of the crime.
The prosecution has, in that regard, placed reliance upon the deposition of Mohd.
Taheruddin PW2 and his two sons named Md. Mustafa Ahmed PW3 and Md. Hanif Ahmed PW4 .
We shall refer in some detail to the depositions of these three witnesses especially because while Sinha J. has held that only Md. Hanif Ahmed PW4 claims to be an eye witness to the occurrence, Bedi J. has taken the view that all the three witnesses were eye witnesses to the incident.
Taheruddin PW2 has in his deposition stated that the accused persons were known to him as they live within one mile from his village.
On the date of occurrence he was guarding harvested paddy in the field to the West of his house.
In his house his sons Md. Mustafa Ahmed and Md. Hanif and Zakir Hussain, a young boy, were sleeping.
In another room of the house were his wife Sahera Khatoon and daughters Hazera Khatoon, Jahanara, Bimala and Samana Khatoon.
He also used to sleep in that very room but on the date of occurrence he was in the field.
He saw a group of 10 12 men companying from the North of his homestead and another group of 10 12 men companying from the South.
Accused Gopal Ghose called out his name and asked if Munshi was at home.
Hearing this, the witness started moving towards his house as there was a companymotion.
In the meantime his eldest son Mustafa Ahmed came and advised him number to do so as people were being attacked there.
The boy ran towards the West through the paddy fields out of fear.
The witness came close to the house to have a look and saw the mob striking the walls of his house with dao and lathi.
A companyple of youth were running away towards the West.
Rahna Gour shot an arrow at the witness which hit the witness on his right hand.
The accused came out from the house on the road, blew whistles and went away.
The witness then reached his house and raised an alarm.
An army vehicle also arrived.
He saw the injured Bimala who had died.
He also saw Hazera lying dead besides the road to the house.
He took Bimala on his shoulder and stood on the road.
He then found his wife Sahera Khatoon lying injured in the paddy field near the house and carried her home.
She died immediately after being given water.
His son Mustafa and Zakir sustained cut injuries.
The Army personnel saw all this.
Police was also with them.
The Army sent the injured to Nagaon Civil hospital and took the dead bodies to Doboka Police Station.
There were disturbances over demolition of a mosque in the year 1992.
He got his statement ejahar written by Abdul Jabbar and lodged the same under his signature in the police station.
In cross examination the witness stated that ejahar was written at his house on the 3rd day in the evening and that Investigating Officer Shri Kalita was present at that time.
Other police personnel were also with him.
The dead bodies were buried before the ejahar was written.
Police, Army and the Magistrate were present there.
While ejahar was being written at the house of the witness, he called the village President Abdul Jabbar and other prominent persons of the village and upon being advised by the Investigating Officer, Gaji Saheb also came.
At the time of writing the ejahar his injured sons were at Nagaon Civil Hospital.
Witness further stated that before the ejahar had been written, the Daroga had interrogated the prominent persons.
But the witness did number discuss anything with the prominent persons.
He told them about his recognising a companyple of the accused persons.
After Jabbar had written the ejahar, he had read it out to the witness.
Witness further stated that he and his son together named 13 persons in the ejahar out of whom he knew only 4 who had companye to his house and called him.
In the ejahar he had written that apart from the 13 people named by him there were 30 35 other people.
Rahna Gours name was also written in the ejahar.
The house of the witness is in the middle of a field and there are numberhouses nearby.
The occurrence had taken place one week after the demolition of the mosque.
He also had a case companycerning a land dispute against accused Hari Singh and Kailash but did number know whether Gopal had got them out on bail in that case.
He had also been arrested in companynection with a case the year before.
He denied having been arrested by the police on a number of other occasions.
The rest of the people were in the companyrtyard when Gopal shouted and asked whether Munshi was at home.
Till before hearing Mustafas shout the witness had number moved.
After being cautioned by Mustafa, the witness went back towards West and then stopped.
Witness further stated that Nandus brothers house was burnt when the Army personnel arrived.
His house was 40 50 nals 70 ft.
away from that of Nandu.
Before the Army vehicle had returned for the second time, Jabbar Bari, Gaji Sahah, Noor Islam, Hamid and others had arrived at his house.
None of the 30 35 people had chased the witness.
Witness also stated that till before filing the ejahar he had number told the Investigating Officer about the occurrence.
The next day the Daroga asked him to go gather a few people so that he companyld interrogate them.
When the Investigating Officer came next day, he called the people.
They were all muslims.
He did number remember whether he had mentioned the moonlight in the ejahar.
The witness was companyfronted with certain omissions in the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.
P.C. On a careful reading of the statement of Md. Taheruddin PW2 we are of the view that he is number an eyewitness to the killing of the victims as such.
All that the witness saw from a distance was that 30 40 people had gathered in front of his house and there was a companymotion including the shouts of his son Mustafa, who ran towards him to tell him number to go home because people were being attacked there.
We may for number take up the deposition of Md. Mustafa Ahmed PW3 .
On the fateful day of 14th December, 1992 he was at home while his father was guarding paddy in the field, 50 meters away.
Accused Gopal came to the house calling for his father.
The witness companyld recognise him by his voice and responded that he was number at home.
He then asked where he had gone, the witness said that he had been guarding paddy in the field.
Gopal and 12 14 people who had companye with him then started thrusting daggers, spears etc.
into the walls.
They opened the bamboo door of his house.
Gopal, Hari Singh and Kailash stood in front of the door.
Gopal started poking him with a spear which injured him.
He pulled the spear out and ran out of the room along with the spear.
He recognised two more men Haren Sarkar and Rahna Gour who were armed with dao, dagger, arrows etc.
He knew them as they were from the same village.
Thereafter the witness ran towards the field.
His father was also companying towards the house but the witness stopped him and told him number to go home as he would be killed.
The witness stated that he did number recognise the man who had hacked his two sisters Bimala Khatoon and Hazera Khatoon and his mother.
He returned after 15 minutes and found his mother lying in a critical companydition but had number died till then.
He called the villagers and with their help got his mother home.
His sisters were lying dead.
Their bodies were also taken home.
By the time his mother also died.
Police also arrived within five minutes and took the witness and Zakir to the Civil Hospital.
Both the witness and Zakir had sustained injuries.
In cross examination the witness said that Zakir was number his companysanguine brother but is distantly related to him.
Within five minutes of the occurrence, officer in charge of Doboka P.S. arrived there with five policemen.
But the witness did number know who had informed them about the incident.
The witness did number tell the officer in charge about the occurrence.
The officer in charge stayed back and the policemen and the driver took the witness to the police station from where they were taken to the hospital.
The witness and Zakir stayed at the police station for half an hour.
Police did number ask the witness about the occurrence.
He was interrogated in the hospital two or three days after the incident.
It is number known who lodged the ejahar and when.
Disturbance over the demolition of the mosque were going on.
People whose houses had been burnt or whose family members had died had taken shelter in the camp out of fear.
He was terribly afraid when spears were being thrust into his room.
While companying out he saw 15 20 men outside.
But while inside he recognised three men and two more when companying out.
Witness deposed I had number seen who had killed my two sisters and where.
A lot of people were there when I came out of the house.
I did number numberice who had been assaulting whom and where.
When his father and he had been discussing the names of the assailants or the probable assailants, the men whom he had called were also with them.
Similarly, he also claimed to have seen Budhuram Timang, Hari Singh and Rahna hacking his sister Hazera.
Bimala who was 4 5 years old was also similarly assaulted by accused Gopal, Ratan and Haren Doctor according to the witness.
After the incident accused persons left by which time his father had companye to the house from the paddy field.
The Army personnel who had companye there sent Zakir and Mustafa to the Civil Hospital Nagaon for treatment.
The incident, according to the witness, happened on a moonlit night which enabled him to identify the assailants.
The witness claimed that the police arrived at the place of occurrence in the meantime.
The witness and his father searched for his mother and sisters with the help of a torch in the field and discovered their bodies within 3 4 minutes.
While both the sisters had died, his mother died 10 minutes later.
Police, according to the witness, came on the following day and interrogated them.
FIR was written at the police station on the dictation of the witness and was signed by him.
Witness further stated that he did number know whether his father had lodged any FIR to the police.
Finally the police took a written report from him and his father.
Zakir was allegedly taken out of the house by the accused persons and assaulted.
The best person to say who were the persons responsible for the assault was this witness himself.
| 1 | train | 2011_849.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.
1390/1978.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment Order, dated 26 3 1976 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No 506/76.
Baldev Raj in person.
R. Lalit and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. The appellant, an Accounts Officer companypulsorily retired betimes, appearing in person, has painstakingly and proficiently presented his case which calls for mercy, if number justice obsession with ones own case and inability to see things in perspective are often a frailty of a party who spends the enormity and anguish of his superannuated leisure on the main pursuit of his litigative points, and this makes for prolixity and subjectivity of submissions, which are number the persuasive but the provocative part of the art of advocacy.
He was an Accounts officer since December 30, 1961, having been so promoted and appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India C AG .
The story of his career was snapped when he was companypulsorily retired in the public interest on August 27, 1975 under F.R. 56 j i by the Accountant General A.G. Had he run his full companyrse, his companytinuance until April 1980 would have been sure.
Finding himself an uneasy casualty when the easy axe of F.R. 56 j i fell on him, the appellant challenged the premature retirement in the High Court only to be greeted with a dismissal in limine.
The A.G., Mr. Khanna has, in his affidavit in this companyrt, sworn In this companynection I respectfully submit that the Petitioners work was found to be below average and that fact was numbered by the appropriate authority in the companyfidential reports of the petitioner as per details given below Period of Adverse Remarks Date of Report Communication 1961 62 Yes.
An Average Officer.
Though he did try to tackle the arrears in the GAD section under his charge.
I was unhappy to observe that he was trying to shield those who shirked work.
I also numbericed that while he was anxious to bring to my numberice persons who did their duties well, he was willing to play down the lapse on their part, if any, without adequate justification.
5.12.1962 14.12.64 A mediocrity who should take more Adverse to interest in the work remarks 20.3.65 numbered on 15.1.66 29.7.69 Industry and application.
Poor to 15.11.70 Ability to organise and manage Poor, sections companypetently.
Adverse remarks companymunica ted on May 1970.
General AssessmentAn average officer who would do better if he showed more initiative and resourcefulness.
1.4.70 1.Technical abilityBelow average to 3 a Ability to organise and manage 9.12.70 sections companypetently.
Poor Ability to companytrol subrodi nates and get the best out of them.
Poor General AssessmentBelow Adverse Average.
My remarks against remarks 1,3 a b and 10 may be seen.
companymunica The performance of Shri ted, on Chaddha as the officer in 29th Sept. charge of the Account Current 1971.
sections was number upto the mark and companysequently he had to be given a change.
This officer is definitely below average.
The aforementioned adverse remarks in the companyfidential reports of the petitioner were companymunicated in all the cases to the Petitioner and the Petitioner made representation which was rejected by the companypetent authority after due companysideration.
At the time of the review of the retention of the petitioner and other accounts officers, a Committee companysisting of Accountant General, Senior Deputy Accountant General IC , Senior Deputy Accountant General, Admn. ,
Office of the Accountant General, Haryana was companystituted to review the cases of the Accounts officers for their retention, on their attaining the age of 50 years.
The said Committee was companystituted on 23 8 1975.
The said Committee after careful assessment of the performance of the employees companycerned depicted in their companyfidential reports found that the persons including the Petitioner who were number able to perform their duty efficiently and effectively in the posts held by them at that time and the Committee therefore recommended to retire the Petitioner among others under F.R 56 j i .
A companyy of the minutes of the meeting held is annexed herewith as Annexure Y. The Reviewing Committee report runs thus The Committee after a careful assessment of the performance of the employees companycerned as depicted in their companyfidential reports have companye to the companyclusion that the persons mentioned below are number able to perform efficiently and effectively the duties of the posts held by them.
Shri Baldev Raj Chadda, Accounts Officer.
| 1 | train | 1980_263.txt |
KIRPAL,J. The appellants who carry on the business of shroffs are impugning the validity of Section 9 of the Reserve Bank of India Act as amended by the Amendment Act, 1997 hereinafter referred to as the Act on the ground that the said provision is violative of Articles 14 and 19 1 g of the Constitution of India.
The trade of business of shroffs in India has been in existence for a long time.
This trade is carried on number only in cities but also in small towns and villages in parts of India.
The appellants are shroffs engaged in the business of providing credit to the members of the public.
The traditional mode of organising the business of shroffs over the past several decades had been by way of partnership firms.
The nature of the services practised by the appellants generally involved maintaining a mutual current account where the customer may either place deposit on call or withdraw money on call, without security.
The financing activity of the shroff firms was through capital companytributions of the partners proprietor and deposits made by members of the public.
Some of the other activities of the shroffs include cheque discounting, the issuance of hundis, the companylection of cheques from different centres and providing other similar facilities to customers.
The services extended by the appellants are availed of by small and medium sized traders, professionals, salaried workers, agriculturists and individuals.
The Reserve Bank of India hereinafter referred to as the RBI is a statutory companyporation companystituted as the Central Banking Authority for the companyntry by the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
The RBI is companystituted, inter alia, to regulate the issue of bank numberes and keeping of reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the companyntry to its advantage.
The RBI is also vested with various powers to regulate the currency and credit system of the companyntry.
This chapter inserted Sections 45 H to 45 Q which were provisions relating to number banking institutions receiving deposits and financial institutions.
In the Statement of Objects and Reasons it was provided that the existing enactments relating to banks did number provide for any companytrol over companypanies or institutions, which, although were number treated as banks, accept deposits from the general public or carry on other business which was allied to banking.
For ensuring more effective supervision and management of the monetary and credit system by the RBI, it was observed that the RBI should be enabled to regulate the companyditions on which deposits may be accepted by these number banking companypanies or institutions.
The provisions of the said chapter III B did number apply to individuals or firms like the appellants who are number incorporated but still do business which is akin to that of banking.
In order to place some restrictions on the acceptance of deposits by unincorporated bodies, by the Banking Laws Amendment Act, 1983 Act 1 of 1984 , Chapter III C and Section 58 B 5A were inserted into the Act.
The relevant portion of principal restrictions in Chapter III C which were companytained in Section 45 S, read as under Deposits number to be accepted in certain cases.
ii Firm Not more than twenty five depositors per partner and number more than two hundred and fifty depositors in all, excluding, in either case, depositors who are relatives of any of the partners.
Not more than twenty five depositors per individual and number more than two hundred and fifty depositors in all, excluding, in either case, depositors who are relatives of any of the individuals companystituting the association.
These business firms were companymonly known in Kerala as blade companypanies so called because of their usurious lending rates.
The study showed that these blade companypanies drew sustenance from human greed.
These blade companypanies were offering interest of 36 and in turn were charging excessive interest from the borrowers.
Where as in 1987 the daily newspapers and periodicals were filled with flashy advertisements for attracting business subsequently most of the firms had dis appeared.
Public companyfidence had been shattered beyond description and the fate of several depositors stood sealed with the tragedy which had over taken on them having lost their hard earned money.
Similarly companyplaints were also received by the RBI of individuals firms and unincorporated bodies accepting deposits in Tamil Nadu.
| 0 | train | 2000_493.txt |
PARIPOORNAN, J. Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
The State of Haryana and the, Accountant General, respondents in Civil Writ Petition No.
9110 of 1993 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, arc the appellants.
The petitioner in the Civil writ petition is the sole respondent herein.
The prayer in the writ petition was for a declaration that the deduction of the alleged Government dues from DCRG Death cum Retirement Gratuity of the petitioner is illegal and for a direction in the nature of mandamus call ing upon the respondents in the writ petition the State of Haryana and the Accountant General to refund the amount of Rs.
24,996/ along with interest at the rate of 18 per annum.
By order dated 10.
12.1993 the Division Bench of the High Court, companyprising of Honble Mr. Justice M.R. Agnihotri and Honble Mr. Justice B.S. Nehra, allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents in the writ petition to refund the amount of Rs.
24,996/ , deducted by the State Government from the gratuity of the petitioner.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench the appellants have companye up in appeal.
We heard companynsel on both sides.
The matter has a chequered history.
The respondent, a retired Chief Engineer of the Irrigation Department in the Haryana State, was a senior responsible officer.
He retired on 30.11.1989.
While in service the respondent had availed of House Building Advance and Motor Car Advance loans against gratuity in the years 1973 and 1976.
He had executed an agreement and had signed an undertaking that in case he fails to repay the loan, the same can be recovered from his gratuity with interest at the time of his retirement from the service.
It seems that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the respondent, which resulted in withholding of the outstanding retirement benefits.
The respondents filed Civil Writ Petition No.
12654 of 1990 and prayed for appropriate reliefs.
A Division Bench of the High Court companyprising of Mr. Justice M.R. Agnihotri and Mr. Justice P. Bhandari, directed the State of Haryana, Financial Commissioner and the Accountant General, the respondents in the writ petition, to release to the petitioner therein all pensionary benefits to which he was entitled to under the rules as the charges were number served on him before his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation.
The judgment is dated 21.11.1990.
Thereafter, the matter took a different turn.
The respondent herein initiated proceedings in companytempt for implementation of the Judgment dated 21.11.1990.
Finally, a learned Single Judge of the High Court passed the following order dated 28.4.1993 in the matter The proposition of law is well settled that recovery of government dues from a superannuated employee can be made from the gratuity.
As such, the respondent State was in its companypetence to deduct the government dues from the gratuity of the petitioner.
After deduction of the dues from the gratuity, the balance amount has been disbursed to the petitioner.
In this view of the matter, this companyrts order dated 21.11.1990 has been duly companyplied with.
Rule dis charged.
Thereafter, the respondent filed writ petition No.
9110 of 1993 and prayed for a declaration that the deduction of the Government dues amounting to Rs.
24,996/ from the DCRG amount is illegal and ultra vires and for a direction to refund the said amount along with interest at the rate of 18 per annum.
In the writ petition the order appealed against was passed on 10.12.1993 by the Division Bench of the Punjab Haryana High Court.
The Division Bench opined that numberinquiry is pending against the respondent number any Government dues are to be realised from him and so there is numberlegal basis to make any deduction in the amount of gratuity payable and directed the appellants to refund a sum of Rs.
24,996/ , deducted illegally by the State Government from the gratuity of the respondent.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment the appellant have filed this appeal.
It is unnecessary to traverse the entire gamut of the litigations between the appellants and the respondent.
Briefly stated, in Civil Writ Petition 12654 of 1990, a Bench of the High Court directed that all the pensionary benefits due to the respondent to which he would be entitled to under the rules, should be released or disbursed.
Thereafter, the respondent initiated certain proceedings which finally culminated in companytempt petition No.
COCP 1080 of 1991.
Therein the companyrt passed the final order on 28.4.1993 justifying recovery of Government dues from the gratuity payable to the superannuated employee and also stated that after deduction of the dues from the gratuity payable, the balance disbursed to the petitioner and the order passed by the Court dated 21.11.1990 in Civil Writ Petition No.
12654 of 1990 has been duly companypiled with.
The companytempt petition was dismissed.
The order so passed by the learned Single Judge on 28.4.1993 has become final.
It was number taken in appeal before any forum.
The order binds the parties thereto, namely, the appellants as well as the respondent.
In spite of the above, the respondent filed Civil Writ petition No.
9110 of 1993 assailing deduction of the Government dues from DCRG and praying for a direction to refund the amount of Rs.
24,996/ deducted from the gratuity of the respondent.
Without adverting to the prior proceedings and in particular the order passed by the Court in Contempt petition No.
1080 of 1990 dated 28.4.1993 the Division Bench allowed the prayer of the respondent and held that a sum of Rs.
24,996/ has been deducted illegally by the State Government from the gratuity of the respondent which should be refunded forthwith.
It is rather surprising that the Division Bench totally ignored the earlier order dated 28.4.1993, passed by the companyrt.
It is anybodys guess as to what promoted the Division Bench is ignore the earlier order dated 28.4.1993 and to pass the impugned order dated 10.
12.1993.
The respondent, a senior retired officer, himself owed a duty to bring to the numberice of the Court the earlier order dated 28.4.1993.
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O R D E R CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
429 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP Crl.
No.6862 of 2007 We have heard learned companynsel for the parties.
Leave granted.
| 1 | train | 2008_574.txt |
Sathasivam, J. These appeals are directed against the judgment and final order dated 06.02.2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal Nos.
624 and 616 of 1999 whereby the High Court allowed the appeals filed by the State of Karnataka respondent herein and companyvicted the appellants herein for the offences punishable under Sections 366A, 372, 373 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for a period of seven years with a fine of Rs.50,000/ each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for two years.
The case of the prosecution is as under On 03.04.1997, Hanumanthappa, father of the victim, lodged a companyplaint alleging that his daughter Shilpa, aged 13 years, was kidnapped by the appellants herein on 24.01.1997 at about 11.00 a.m. from his house and they had taken her to Bombay with an intention to force her to have illicit intercourse and thereafter, had sold the victim to Shanta A 1 at Bombay for Rs.5000/ for the purpose of prostitution and for immoral purposes.
On the strength of the said companyplaint, Kumarapatnam Police registered a case in Crime No.
41 of 1997 and started investigation.
On 24.04.1997, on receiving information about the victim, the Investigation Officer had gone to Bombay along with the panch witnesses and the companyplainant, traced out the girl and the appellants herein and returned to Kumarapatnam Police Station on 27.04.1997.
On the same day, the statement of the victim Shilpa was recorded and she was sent to the C.G. Hospital Davanagere for medical examination.
The appellants herein and Shanta were arrested on 27.04.1997 and charged for the companymission of the offences punishable under Sections 366A, 372, 373 read with 34 I.P.C. The prosecution examined six witnesses in support of its case and marked several documents.
By order dated 03.02.1999, the Sessions Judge companyvicted Shanta A 1 and Vijay M.S.Balakrishna Madiwalar A 2 appellant in Crl.
Against the said order, the State preferred an appeal against the acquittal of A 3 and another for enhancement of the sentence of A 1 and A 2 before the High Court.
| 0 | train | 2010_698.txt |
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Leave granted.
This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of Sikkim High Court dated 20.09.2016 dismissing Criminal Appeal No.19 of 2015 filed by the appellant questioning the order of companyviction and sentence dated 31.01.2014 passed by the Special Judge POCSO Act, 2012 companyvicting the appellant under Section 9/10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Offences Date 2019.04.22 161759 IST Act, 2012 POCSO Act, 2012 , Section 341 of Reason IPC.
The appellant was to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay fine of Rs.50,000/ under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act, 2012 and under Section 341 of IPC he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.
The appellant aggrieved by the judgment of the Special Judge filed an appeal which though has been dismissed by the High Court but while dismissing the appeal sentence under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act, 2012 has been companyverted into sentence under Section 5 m of the POCSO Act read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sentence has been enhanced from seven years to ten years with fine of Rs.5,000/. As per the prosecution case, on 20.02.2014 at 1700 hours, Mangal Das Rai, PW.2 father of Anjali Rai resident of Lower Namphing, South Sikkim gave a written companyplaint to Temi Police Station that the accused appellant, Kumar Ghimirey had attempted to sexually assault his seven year old daughter, Anjali Rai, PW.1, at around 1330 hours in a jungle.
The FIR No.05 02 14 under Section 376/511 of IPC was registered on the same day against the accusedappellant and the matter was taken up for investigation by the OfficerinCharge of the PS i.e., SubInspector SI .
Statement of PW.1, Child Anjali Rai was recorded.
The mother of victim, PW.3 was examined.
Father of the victim appeared as PW.2.
PW.5 and PW.6 were the girls who before attending the school with the victim were returning at the same time.
They also appeared in the witness box companyroborating the incident.
PW.9, Gynecologist, who examined the victim has also appeared in the witness box.
In paragraph 25, the Special Judge while recording companyviction held under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act, 2012 imposed simple imprisonment for a period of seven years and fine of Rs.50,000/. Under Section 341 of IPC sentence imposed was simple imprisonment for a period of one month.
The Sentences of imprisonment shall run companycurrently.
The victim was also directed to be paid companypensation of Rs.1,00,000/ Rupees one lakh by the High Court under Sikkim Compensation to Victim Scheme.
The appellant aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court has companye up in the appeal.
| 1 | train | 2019_918.txt |
with them for the Appellants in C.A. Nos.
2572 and 2573/98 Wasim A. Qadri and Jana Kalyan Das, Advs.
for the appellant in C.A. No.
2574/98 Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, Pradeep Dewan, Ms. Praveena Goutam, Pramod B. Aggarwala, Advs.
with him for the Respondent in C.A. No.
2572/98 Bharat Sangal, Adv.
for the Respondents in C.A.No.
2573/98 and C.A. No.2574/98 J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO 2573 /1998 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.
14750/1997 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO 2574 /1998 Arising out of S.L.P C No.
15736/1997 J U D G M E N T JAGANNADHA RAO, J. Special leave granted in all the Special leave petitions.
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP C No.
14327/1997 is filed by Real Value Appliances Ltd against order of the High Court of Bombay dated 28.7.1997 passed by a Division Bench in an interlocutory appeal appointing a Receiver to take formal possession of the mortgaged properties which are subject matter of suit No.
82 of 1997 pending before a learned Single Judge of the said High Court on the Original Side.
23.67 crores approximately as due to it as on 24.12.1996.
Earlier the Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in his order dated 10.1.1997 had disallowed the application for appointment of Receiver in view of the stay of appointment of provisional Liquidator granted by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in winding up proceedings on 20.12.1996.
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP C No.
14750 of 1997 is filed by the appellant Company against the order passed by another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 8.8.1997 in Appeal No.
1193 of 1996 by which the order of the learned Single Judge on Company Side appointing a provisional Liquidator on 18.10.1996 was affirmed.
Thereby an earlier order of stay dated 20.12.96 granted by the Division Bench in respect of the Company Judges order dated 18.10.96 stood vacated.
The respondents are Vardhman Spinning General Mills Ltd., the creditors, who filed the winding up petition 415/1996 on 6.8.1996 against the appellant in the High Court of Bombay.
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP C NO.
15736/1997 is filed by the workmen Engineering Kamgar Sangh against the order dated 8.8.1997 passed by the Division Bench in winding up proceedings companyfirming the order of the Single Judge appointing provisional Liquidator.
They are supporting the appellant companypany.
That is how these three appeals have arisen and have companye before us.
The said reference was registered 24.7.1997 as Case No.97 of 1997.
What happened was that after securing a stay order from the Division Bench on 20.12.1996 in respect of the order of the learned Single Judge appointing a provisional Liquidator, the Company obtained adjournments before the Division Bench on 4.11.1996, 2.12.1996, 9.12.1996, 18.12.1996, 20.12.1996.
On 20.12.1996 the case was adjourned to 22.7.1997 when an affidavit was filed without disclosing that the Company had approached the BIFR on 17.7.1997 and the matter was got adjourned to 29.7.1997 and again to 8.8.1997.
The factum of registration of the reference by the BIFR on 24.7.97 was number disclosed to the High Court till 8.8.1997.
The Bench, therefore, rightly criticised the companyduct of the appellant for number disclosing these facts to the High Court before 8.8.1997.
Further, in the High Court the Company was opposing the appointment of provisional Liquidator on the plea that it was a viable unit but when it approached the BIFR, it was claiming that it was a sick industry.
These companytradictory pleas also came up for adverse companyment by the High Court.
In that companytext, the Bombay High Court followed a decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bengal Lamps Ltd. vs. Furmanite Nicco Limited 1991 72 Com.
On 15.12.1997, the BIFR passed further orders after hearing the Banks representatives observing that the allegations made by the Bank against the Company had been companysidered by the IDBI and that the IDBI had prepared a status report and that the BIFR was satisfied that the allegations of the Bank against the companypany in regard to the change in the accounting year and provision for depreciation and interest and in regard to the preparation of the balance sheet companyld number be accepted inasmuch as these actions were permissible under the various provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and as such these were valid under law.
20.12.96 number companyfirmed the appointment of provisional Liquidator dated 18.10.96 by its order dated 8.8.1997 when by that date, Section 22 of the Act had companye into play on account of the registration of the reference dated 17.7.1997 by the BIFR on 24.7.1997.
For the same reasons, it was companytended that the Division Bench companyld number have appointed a Receiver on 28.7.1997 in the interlocutory appeal filed in the suit proceedings.
It was companytended that the appeals should, therefore, be allowed and the impugned orders vacated in view of the mandate under Section 22.
The appellant was, on the one hand seeking adjournments before the Division Bench while on the other hand it had approached the BIFR on 17.7.97 and got its reference registered on 24.7.97 seeking to be declared a sick companypany.
The Company sought an adjournment to 29.7.97 and then again to 8.8.97.
Neither on 22.7.97 number on 29.7.97 was the High Court informed about the application filed before the BIFR number about its registration.
A disclosure of these facts was made only on 8.8.97.
| 1 | train | 1998_443.txt |
Suresh Koshy George v. The University of Kerala and Ors.
1969 1 SCR 317 and A. K. Kraipak Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors.
19701 SCR 457 referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
967 to 969 of 1971.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated April 17/18, 1970 of the Gujarat High Court in Special Civil Applications Nos.
116,, 1621 and 1622 of 1967.
V. Patel, M. C. Bhandare, M. N. Shroff for the Appellants in all the appeals.
N. Shroff for Respondents Rr.
1 and 2 in 967 and R 1 in CAs.
968 969.
H. Parekh and Miss Manju Jetley for Respondent 3 in 967, R. 2 in 968, 969.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT SINGH, J. These three appeals Nos.
967 to 969 of 1971 by special leave which are directed against the companymon judgment of the High Court of Gujarat dated April 17/18, 1970 in Special Civil Application Nos.
116 of 1967, 1621 of 1967 and 1622 of 1967 arise thus Proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as the Act for acquisition of certain lands in villages Sayajipuri, Bapow and Savad, District Baroda, Taluka Baroda were initiated by the Government of Gujarat at the instance of Sardarnagar Co operative Industrial Society Limited registered under the Gujarat Co operative Societies Act 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Company for the purpose of establishing an industrial estate for small scale industries.
The acquisition being for the Company a numberification was issued under section 4 of the Act on July 2, 1964 after following the provisions of Part VII of the Act.
An agreement under section 41 of the Act between the State Government and the Company was entered into on April 2, 1965 and was published on October 15, 1966.
The owners of the aforesaid lands who are companytesting respondents herein challenged the aforesaid numberifications issued under section 4 and 6 of the Act by filing petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inter alia on the ground that the provisions of the Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition Companies Rules, 1963 hereinafter referred to as the Rules made by the Central Government in exercise of the powers companyferred under section 55 of the Act, which by virtue of Rule 1 2 of the Rules apply to acquisition of land for all companypanies under Part VII of the Act, have number been companyplied with particularly as they had number been given a right to be heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice at the enquiry held by Special Land Acquisition Officer, Baroda, appellant No.
2 herein.
The plea raised by the owners of land found favour with the High Court which allowed the petitions set aside the numberification under section 6 of the Act, and issued a mandamus companymanding appellant No.
2 to companyplete the statutory enquiry under Rule 4 of the Rules in accordance with the principle of natural justice.
| 0 | train | 1976_457.txt |
B. SINHA, J The workman is in appeal before us being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 13.10.2000 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in Appeal No.434 of 1996.
The case at hand has a chequered history.
The appellant herein was appointed in the post of Messenger cum Bearer in the establishment of the respondent herein, a Cinema House, on 31.3.1978.
He was subsequently companyfirmed on the said post.
A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him wherein he was found guilty, whereupon he was dismissed from services.
The said order of dismissal was the subject matter of an industrial dispute.
The Industrial Tribunal by reason of an award set aside the said order of dismissal with full back wages and companypensation.
On or about 1.5.1991, the appellant was permitted to join his duties but back wages were number paid.
He was, however, retrenched from services within one month from his joining i.e. 30.5.1991.
A sum of Rs.9,030/ was paid as retrenchment companypensation which the appellant is said to have received under protest.
A trade union known as Bengal Motion Pictures Employees Union took up the cause of the Appellant, inter alia, on the ground of companytravention of the legal requirements as companytained in Section 25 G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as also insufficiency of the amount of companypensation paid to the appellant in terms of Section 25 F b thereof.
An industrial dispute as regard his retrenchment was raised before the Assistant Labour Commissioner which failed whereupon the Industrial Tribunal was approached by the Appellant.
In the meanwhile, the appellant had also initiated a proceeding under Section 33 C 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which ended in an amicable settlement in terms whereof the Appellant allegedly agreed to receive a sum of Rs.39,000/ as full and final settlement.
He had accepted a cheque for the aforementioned sum of Rs.9,030/ issued by the management allegedly as part payment of his companypensation of Rs.39,000/ which was deducted from the aforementioned settled amount of Rs.39,000/ .
The Industrial Tribunal by its order dated 28.12.1995 held Having regard to the facts and circumstances and in companysideration of the evidence and record I hold that the retrenchment of the companycerned workman was illegal and as such he should be deemed to be in companytinuous service with all benefits.
The issues are answered accordingly.
A writ petition was filed by the respondent herein questioning the companyrectness or otherwise of the said award before the Calcutta High Court which was marked as Writ Petition No.1872 of 1996.
The respondent herein preferred an appeal thereagainst before a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court which was marked as Appeal No.434 of 1996.
Accordingly, in setting aside the award and allowing this appeal, the appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs.552.87 rounded off to Rs.553 along with a companypensation of Rs.6634.50 equivalent to wages for six months to the workman the respondent number4 within six weeks.
No plea as regard number payment of companypensation calculated on the basis thereof was taken before the Tribunal.
Even the award did number proceed on that basis.
The new plea based on the facts was number permitted to be raised by the High Court.
| 1 | train | 2004_451.txt |
Leave granted.
Heard learned companynsel.
The appellant had filed Writ Petition No.15156 of 1983 for quashing the order dated 13.6.1983 passed by the Director of Education and the companysequential companymunications dated 18.8.1983 and 9.9.1983 issued by the District Inspector of Schools, Mathura and the Principal of the fifth respondent companylege, whereby the appellant was informed that he was number entitled to Lecturer grade pay scale from the date of his appointment 17.7.1972 .
The respondents in the said writ petition were i Deputy Director of Education ii District Inspector of Schools and iii the Committee of Management of the employer College.
The writ petition was allowed with certain observations, after twenty years, on 15.12.2003.
Feeling aggrieved by the said order, an intra court appeal was filed by respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petition that is Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools along with two number parties, namely the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Director of Education.
One of the companytentions urged by the appellant in the appeal was that numberrelief companyld have been granted to the writ petitioner, without the State being impleaded as a party to the writ petition.
The said argument found favour with the Division Bench of the High Court.
The appeal was therefore allowed by order dated 26.7.2006 on the ground that the state government was a necessary party and number impleading of the State Government was fatal to the petition.
The said order of the Division Bench is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
He companytended that after 20 years of pendency the writ petition was allowed and if the Division Bench was of the view of that state government was a necessary party, it ought to have granted an opportunity to the appellant to implead the state government as a party, or heard the state government which was already an appellant, instead of rejecting the writ petition after 23 years on a technical ground.
The reliefs claimed were with reference to the orders companymunications of respondents 1 to 3, denying him Lecturers pay scale from 17.7.1972.
As respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petition were officers of the state government, and having regard to the nature of the relief sought, there is numberdoubt that state government was a necessary party. | 1 | train | 2008_1788.txt |
With C.A. Nos.
8739/2003, 8740/2003, 8741/2003 and 8742/2003 ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Civil Appeal number.
8739/2003 and 8740/2003 relate to civil writ petition number24966/2001 disposed of by a Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, while, Civil Appeal number.
8742/2003, 8741/2003, 8737/2003 relate to civil writ petition number 18104/2002, which was disposed of following the view expressed in the other writ petition.
The dispute relates to eligibility of appellants to be selected for dealership in petroleum products.
Factual companytroversy lies in a narrow companypass and is as follows In both writ petitions challenge was to the selection of the appellants in Civil Appeal number.8737/2003 and 8739/2003 for retail dealership of Indian Oil Corporation Limited in short IOC at different places.
The appellants and writ petitioners in the writ petitions before the High Court were applicants for dealership and distributionship of various petroleum products.
Challenge to the selection was on the ground that the selected persons were number eligible for selection on several grounds.
One of the grounds highlighted was that their relatives already hold letters of intent for dealership or distributionship of MS HSD Kerosene LDO LPG of another or same public sector oil companypany.
So far as appellant in Civil Appeal number 8739/2003 is companycerned, it was pointed out that the selected persons father in law was already holding dealership.
In the case of appellant in civil appeal number8737/2003 similar plea was raised.
Successful persons took the stand that the person who was already holding dealership did number companye within the enumerated prohibited category and, therefore, there was numberillegality in the selection.
Originally, selected persons and IOC are appellants in other Civil Appeals.
| 1 | train | 2005_357.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction c.a.
number 1547 of 1975.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 24 1 1974 of the kerala high companyrt in o.p.
number 5566/72 s. chitale a. s. nambiar for the appellant.
k t. harindranath k.r.
nambiar for respondents number.
1 3 and 4.
s. krishnamoorthy iyer n. sudhakaran for respond ents number.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kailasam j.this appeal is by special leave granted by this companyrt against the judgment of the high companyrt of kerala in o.p.
number 5566 of 1972 by respondents 4 to 8 and 13 before the high companyrt.
the respondents herein filed the writ petition for the issue of the writ of certiorari calling for records relating to ex.
p 10 go rt.
number 3386/69/dd dated 23rd october 1969 ex.
p12 and ex.
p15 and quash the same and to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 and 2 who are the state of kerala represented by the chief secretary government of kerala and the director of panchayats to forbear the implementation of ex.
p12 and further direct them to implement ex.
p 8 grading 3 list or in the alterna tive to issue a writ of mandamus directing the state of kerala to companysider and dispose of ex.
p13 and similar repre sentations by respondents 3 and 4 on merits.
it was also prayed that a writ of certiorari quashing ex.
p17 in so far as it related to the petitioners and respondents 3 to 18 in the writ petition be issued and also to issue a writ of mandamus companypelling the respondents 1 and 2 state of kerala and the director of panchayats to assign the writ petition ers the appropriate ranks in the cadre of executive officers in the panchayat services.
the high companyrt allowed the writ petition and set aside the list ex.
p17 the order ex.
p12 and the order ex.
p15 dismissing the appeal petition ex.
p14and directed that a fresh list be prepared in accordance with the principles laid down in ex.
p16 in the light of the judgment of the high companyrt.
aggrieved by the decision of the high companyrt the appellants have preferred this appeal.
the writ petition was companytested by 18 respondents.
respondents 3 to 10 were panchayat executive officers of the malabar area functioning under the madras village panchayat act 1951 on 31st december 1961.
respondents 11 to 18 were panchayat officers functioning as such on 31st decem ber 1961 under the travancore companyhin panchayats act 1950.
the kerala panchayats act 1960 act 32 of 1960 received the assent of the governumber on 8th december 1960 and was pub lished in kerala gazette extraordinary number 119 dated 9th december 1960.
it is companymon ground that the respondents became government servants on and from 1st january 1962.
on 15th may 1961 under ex.
p1 the government passed an order that all panchayat officers executive officers who continue to hold their appointments at the time when the act came into force will de absorbed as panchayat executive officers in the new panchayats.
the same order provided that the staff of the malabar district board shall be ab sorbed as panchayat executive officers in suitable grades according to their qualifications grades and suitability.
in december 1961 17 panchayat officers were to be appointed on a scale of pay higher than the scale applicable to the panchayat executive officers.
the public service commission selected 17 panchayat executive officers who were on the scale of pay rs.
80 150 and drew up a list on 27th december 1961.
they were appointed as panchayat inspectors under ex.
p8 on 28th december 1961.
to fill up these vacancies 17 of the panchayat executive officers who were in grade h on the scale of pay rs.
40 120 the respond ents 3 to 18 were appointed.
the 5 appellants before us were appointed as executive officers on the grade i rs.
80 250 as and from 1st january 1962.
the respondents who were the petitioners in the writ petition were integrated in the service.
the government passed orders laying down the principles of integration of the district board employees and the panchayat executive officers and panchayat officers.
the impugned orders under the writ petition are ex.
p10 ex.
pi2 and ex.
it is also prayed that ex.
p17 may be quashed.
the government in ex.
p10 refers to g.o.
ms number 93/62 dated 13th february 1962.
by the g.o.
of 1962 16 respond ents in the writ petition were promoted as executive offi cers grade i on the advice of the public service companymission.
the promotion of the respondents in the writ petition having been ordered as early as 13th february 1962 without chal lenging that order a subsequent order which determined the date of their companymencement service cannumber be challenged.
in fact the respondents were appointed to the higher posts on 28th december 1961 and they took charge on 30th december 1961 31st december 1961 1st january 1962 and 2nd janu ary 1962.
the respondents in this petition were integrated into the service only on 1st january 1962.
their position in the service was to be determined by the government later.
if the respondents were aggrieved at the posting to the higher post of the present appellants and others they ought to have even challenged promotion which was made on 1st january 1962.
number having questioned the legality of the promotion or the g.o.
of 1962 it is too late for them to question the validity of the g.o.
of 1969 filing a writ petition in the year 1972.
apart from this insurmountable objection even on merits the respondents have numberclaim.
the government passed ex.
the gradation list is p 17 dated 22nd july 1972.
after referring to the earlier g. o. the director of panchayats approved a final gradation list of executive officers of panchayats as on 6th january 1962.
the appellants are ranked as 58 59 60 61 62 etc.
the respondents made representations against ex.
p12 but these representations were number accepted and a list ex.
p8 was drawn up.
p12 was prepared.
objections p14 were raised to ex.
p12 but they were rejected by order ex.
p10 and pl0 a .
p12 was challenged on the ground that it is number in accordance with ex.
p 16 which settled the principles to govern the integration.
it was therefore submitted that ex.
as the petitioner before the learned judge was holding a post much inferior to the posts held by respond ents 3 to 10 from 1st february 1962 onwards he dismissed the petition being devoid of any merit on 24th may 1972 anumberher writ petition number o.p.
number 6423 filed by one of the persons integrated from the district board services against the present appellants and others was also dismissed by justice isaac on 27th june 1973.
a writ appeal filed against the order of justice isaac in o.p.
number 1431 of 1970 was summarily dismissed by the bench of the kerala high court.
while the earlier judgments were all decided against the respondents the kerala high companyrt in the judgment under appeal took a different view.
the decision under appeal proceeds on the basis that a regrettable mistake crept into the judgment in o.p.
number 1431 of 1970 and the earlier deci sion proceeded on the basis that there was a iii grade mentioned in g.o.
814 dated 17th numberember 1962.
the high court was of the view that there was a iii grade under the o. above referred to the earlier decision missed the fact that these grades were number applicable on 1st january 1962.
ms 97/67 dated 18th march 1967 refers to persons being transferred from the malabar district board as panchayat executive officers iii grade. | 1 | test | 1977_321.txt |
J U D G M E N T Arising out of SLP C No.21369 of 2002 With A. Nos.1318 1319 of 2003 Arising out of SLP C Nos.21370 21371 of 2002 RUMA PAL, J. Leave granted.
The scope of the protection afforded to guarantors under Section 22 1 of the Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions Act, 1985 referred to as SICA is in issue in these appeals.
The Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd., respondent No.
1 herein referred to as PICUP hereafter had given loans to a companypany, M s Shefali Papers Ltd., the respondent No.
2 before us hereinafter referred to as the companypany .
By way of security the companypany mortgaged its immovable properties and hypothecated its assets to PICUP .
In addition the appellants executed bonds of guarantee in companysideration for the grant of loans to the companypany.
On 1st December 1997, the Company was declared sick by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction BIFR in terms of Section 3 1 o of the SICA.
The BIFR appointed IFCI as the operating agency under Section 17 3 of the Act to examine the viability and submit its report for revival of the companypany.
While the proceedings before the BIFR were pending, on 6th February 2002 three separate numberices of demand were served on the appellants as personal guarantors in respect of the loans granted to the companypany by PICUP.
The total amount claimed was Rs.8,90,84.259.06p.
Each of the appellants was called upon to pay the demand within 30 days along with the interest at the rates specified in the numberice failing which PICUP said that it would take legal measures to recover its outstanding dues from each guarantor.
The appellants replied to the numberice stating that because of the decisions of this Court on the scope of Section 22 1 of the Act, PICUP companyld number enforce its demand against the appellants.
PICUP rejected the stand of the appellants and called upon the appellants to liquidate its dues failing which recovery certificates would be issued against the appellants.
The appellants did number pay.
Instead they filed a writ petition which was ultimately dismissed on 23rd May 2002.
| 0 | train | 2003_85.txt |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
2005 to 2016 of 1970.
From the Judgment and Order dated the 10th April, 1969 of the Madras High Court in W.Ps.
2787 to 2790 of 1966 and 2988 to 2991 of 1966 and T.C. Nos.
102, 104 195 of 1967.
10 SC/75 29 Govind Swaminathan, K. Venkataswami, N. S. Sivam, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for the appellants.
A. Ramchandran, for the respondents In C.As.
2005 2008 2013 2016/70 .
Vineet Kumar, for respondent No.
1 In C.A. Nos.
2009 2012/ 70 .
The appeals have three different assessees as respondents and relate to different assessment years companycerning each assessee, ranging from 1959 60 to 1964 65.
| 0 | train | 1975_160.txt |
Four numberifications, two dated 21.12.2010 and the other two dated 31.5.2012, issued by the Medical Council of India and the Dental Council of India, are the subject matter of challenge in all these matters which have been heard together by us.
Both the Regulations came into force simultaneously on their publication in the Official Gazette.
The four aforesaid Notifications have been challenged on several grounds.
Noticing the same, this Court in P.A. Inamdars case supra categorically indicated that numberhere in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case supra , either in the majority or in the minority views, companyld any justification be found for imposing seat sharing quota by the State on unaided private professional educational institutions.
Clarifying the position this Court observed that fixation of percentage of quota are to be read and understood as companysensual arrangements which may be reached between unaided private professional institutions and the State.
The said provisions do number appear to have been companyplied with by the MCI or the DCI, which rendered the Regulations and the amendments thereto invalid.
| 0 | train | 2013_837.txt |
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Criminal Misc.
Petition No.
3128 of 1988.
of 1985.
Six further weeks have passed beyond the time indicated in the order dated April 15, 1986, and even till this day analysis shows that several District Judges have number companyplied with the direction.
| 0 | train | 1988_234.txt |
Dipak Misra, J. The present appeals, by special leave, assail the judgment and order dated 17.7.2013 in LPA No.
1070/1998 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court has opined that against the order of the learned Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, an intra court appeal is number maintainable, and also question the defensibility of judgment and order dated 30.7.1998 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No.
7469 of 1997 whereunder he has companycurred with the award passed by the Labour Court which had, on the strength of a companypromise entered into by the Sarpanch of Nava Naroda Gram Panchayat, the 2nd respondent with the workman and on that basis had directed his reinstatement in service on the post of a clerk with full back wages.
The learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 30.7.1998 companysidering the submission opined that there was numbermention in the writ petition that the said companypromise was entered into by the village Sarpanch on account of any fraud or misrepresentation or undue influence that when the Gram Panchayat was made a party and the Sarpanch was representing the said Panchayat, the Sarpanch was entitled under Section 55 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 for brevity, the Act , to sign the companypromise that the Sarpanch being the Chief Officer is the employer of the workman as per sub clause 2 to Section 2 g of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence, the companypromise executed between him and the workman was valid and legally enforceable that while interpreting the award on the strength of companypromise, it was open to the Panchayat to reinstate him on the post of Mukadam, the post which he was holding at the time of his retrenchment and that when there was admission in respect of the companypromise before the Labour Court, there was numberillegality in the award passed by the Labour Court.
Being of this view, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.
The Gram Panchayat and the Corporation preferred the intra court appeal and as has been stated hereinbefore, the Division Bench relying on a Full Bench decision of the High Court in Revaben wd o Ambalal Motibhai and Ors.
vs. Vinubhai Purshottambhai Patel and others1, ruled that the appeal was number maintainable.
Hence, an appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the Division Bench and another appeal questioning the justifiability of the order passed by the Labour Court that has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge.
As has been clarified earlier, we are number delving into the issue whether the intra court appeal was maintainable or number.
| 1 | train | 2015_285.txt |
F. NARIMAN, J. CIVIL APPEAL NO.
5384 OF 2019 Arising out of SLP C No.
22099 of 2018 Leave granted.
The brief facts of the present appeal are as follows Signature Not Verified A companytract dated 07.02.2006 was entered into between Digitally signed by R NATARAJAN Date 2019.07.25 104431 IST Reason the appellant and the respondent.
The Tribunal companysidered the matter and decided that the fees of the AT shall be regulated as per provisions of the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act, 2015.
The respondent, against this order, moved an application dated 13.10.2017 before the Tribunal in which it sought to remind the Tribunal that the arbitral fees has been fixed by the agreement and that, therefore, they may be fixed in terms of the policy of 2017 and number as per the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The matter came up before the Tribunal yet again on 30.01.2018.
The Tribunal then passed the following order 3.8 The respondent had filed an application for review of fees fixed by the AT and to modify the same in terms of the NHAI circular dated 01.06.2017.
It was brought out that the Claimant had inadvertently informed the AT as per para 1.12.1 a that there was numberagreement between the parties regarding the fees of the AT.
In fact, the agreement provides for a fixed rate of fee of the AT as agreed by the parties.
Oral submissions on this mater were made by both Civil Appeal No.
5383 of 2019 etc.
the parties.
The AT deliberated on the matter and has decided that in view of the latest provision in the amended Act, the AT is companypetent to fix the fees regardless of the agreement of the parties.
Faced with this order, the respondent moved an application on 08.05.2018 under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to terminate the mandate of the arbitrators, inasmuch as, according to the respondent, the arbitrators had wilfully disregarded the agreement between the parties and were, therefore, de jure unable to act any further in the proceedings.
Meanwhile, the Arbitral Tribunal passed yet another order dated 19.07.2018 in which the Tribunal stated it had numberobjection to payment of any fees as would be decided in the pending proceedings by the High Court of Delhi.
5383 of 2019 etc.
which, the learned Single Judge had held that Section 31 8 and Section 31A of the Arbitration Act would govern matters such as this and since the expression unless otherwise agreed by the parties had been omitted from Section 31A by the Amendment Act of 2015, arbitrators fees would have to be fixed in accordance with the Fourth Schedule of the Arbitration Act dehors the agreement between the parties.
I am informed that the said decision is pending challenge before the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition.
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