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In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission (2014),[110] the Court ruled that federal aggregate limits on how much a person can donate to candidates, political parties, and political action committees, combined respectively in a two-year period known as an “election cycle,” violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.[111]

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The divisive issue of flag desecration as a form of protest first came before the Supreme Court in Street v. New York (1969).[112] In response to hearing an erroneous report of the murder of civil rights activist James Meredith, Sidney Street burned a 48-star U.S. flag. Street was arrested and charged with a New York state law making it a crime "publicly [to] mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or act [any flag of the United States]."[113] In a 5–4 decision, the Court, relying on Stromberg v. California (1931),[114] found that because the provision of the New York law criminalizing "words" against the flag was unconstitutional, and the trial did not sufficiently demonstrate that he was convicted solely under the provisions not yet deemed unconstitutional, the conviction was unconstitutional. The Court, however, "resist[ed] the pulls to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis" and left the constitutionality of flag-burning unaddressed.[115][116]

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The ambiguity with regard to flag-burning statutes was eliminated in Texas v. Johnson (1989).[117] In that case, Gregory Lee Johnson burned an American flag at a demonstration during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas. Charged with violating a Texas law prohibiting the vandalizing of venerated objects, Johnson was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction in a 5–4 vote. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote in the decision that "if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable."[118] Congress then passed a federal law barring flag burning, but the Supreme Court struck it down as well in United States v. Eichman (1990).[119][120] A Flag Desecration Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has been proposed repeatedly in Congress since 1989, and in 2006 failed to pass the Senate by a single vote.[121]

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While the unauthorized wear or sale of the Medal of Honor has been a punishable offense under federal law since the early 20th century,[122][123] the Stolen Valor Act criminalized the act of not only wearing, but also verbally claiming entitlement to military awards that a person did not in fact earn.[124] In United States v. Alvarez (2012), the Supreme Court struck down the Act, ruling that the First Amendment bars the government from punishing people for making false claims regarding military service or honors where the false claim was not "made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations." The decision was a 6–3 ruling, but the six justices in the majority could not agree on a single rationale for it.[125]

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The Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment also protects citizens from being compelled to say or pay for certain speech. For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), the Supreme Court ruled that school children could not be punished for refusing either to say the pledge of allegiance or salute the American flag.

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Commercial speech is speech done on behalf of a company or individual for the purpose of making a profit. Unlike political speech, the Supreme Court does not afford commercial speech full protection under the First Amendment. To effectively distinguish commercial speech from other types of speech for purposes of litigation, the Court uses a list of four indicia:[126]

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Alone, each indicium does not compel the conclusion that an instance of speech is commercial; however, "[t]he combination of all these characteristics . . . provides strong support for . . . the conclusion that the [speech is] properly characterized as commercial speech."[127]

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In Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942),[128] the Court upheld a New York City ordinance forbidding the "distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter."[129] Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Owen Roberts explained:

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This court has unequivocally held that streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in their public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.[130]

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In Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council (1976),[131] the Court overruled Valentine and ruled that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection:

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What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients . . . . [W]e conclude that the answer to this one is in the negative.[132]

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In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association (1978),[133] the Court ruled that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment as much as other types of speech:

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We have not discarded the "common-sense" distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite a dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.[134]

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In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980),[135] the Court clarified what analysis was required before the government could justify regulating commercial speech:

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Six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court, applying the Central Hudson standards in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico (1986),[136] affirmed the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico's conclusion that Puerto Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948, including the regulations thereunder, was not facially unconstitutional. The lax interpretation of Central Hudson adopted by Posadas was soon restricted under 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996),[137] when the Court invalidated a Rhode Island law prohibiting the publication of liquor prices.

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In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969),[138] the Supreme Court extended free speech rights to students in school. The case involved several students who were punished for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court ruled that the school could not restrict symbolic speech that did not "materially and substantially" interrupt school activities.[139] Justice Abe Fortas wrote:

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First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate . . . . [S]chools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students . . . are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.[140]

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In Healy v. James (1972), the Court ruled that Central Connecticut State College's refusal to recognize a campus chapter of Students for a Democratic Society was unconstitutional, reaffirming Tinker.[141]

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However, since 1969 the Court has also placed several limitations on Tinker interpretations. In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986),[142] the Court ruled that a student could be punished for his sexual-innuendo-laced speech before a school assembly and, in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988),[143] the Court found that schools need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with their basic educational mission.[144] In Morse v. Frederick (2007),[145] the Court ruled that schools could, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at school-sponsored events, even events away from school grounds, if students promote "illegal drug use".[146]

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In Packingham v. North Carolina (2017), the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing various websites impermissibly restricted lawful speech in violation of the First Amendment.[147] The Court held that "a fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more."[148][149]

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The federal government and the states have long been permitted to limit obscenity or pornography. While the Supreme Court has generally refused to give obscenity any protection under the First Amendment, pornography is subject to little regulation. However, the definitions of obscenity and pornography have changed over time.[10]

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In Rosen v. United States (1896), the Supreme Court adopted the same obscenity standard as had been articulated in a famous British case, Regina v. Hicklin (1868).[150] The Hicklin test defined material as obscene if it tended "to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall".[151] In the early twentieth century, literary works including An American Tragedy (Theodore Dreiser, 1925) and Lady Chatterley's Lover (D.H. Lawrence, 1928) were banned for obscenity. In the federal district court case United States v. One Book Called Ulysses (1933), Judge John M. Woolsey established a new standard to evaluate James Joyce's novel Ulysses (1922), stating that works must be considered in their entirety, rather than declared obscene on the basis of an individual part of the work.[152]

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The Supreme Court ruled in Roth v. United States (1957)[153] that the First Amendment did not protect obscenity.[152] It also ruled that the Hicklin test was inappropriate; instead, the Roth test for obscenity was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest".[154] This definition proved hard to apply, however, and in the following decade, members of the Court often reviewed films individually in a court building screening room to determine if they should be considered obscene.[155] Justice Potter Stewart, in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964),[156] famously stated that, although he could not precisely define pornography, "I know it when I see it".[157][158]

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The Roth test was expanded when the Court decided Miller v. California (1973).[159] Under the Miller test, a work is obscene if:

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(a) . . . ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find the work, as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) . . . the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) . . . the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.[160]

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Note that "community" standards—not national standards—are applied whether the material appeals to the prurient interest, leaving the question of obscenity to local authorities.[152] Child pornography is not subject to the Miller test, as the Supreme Court decided in New York v. Ferber (1982) and Osborne v. Ohio (1990),[161][162] ruling that the government's interest in protecting children from abuse was paramount.[163][164]

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Personal possession of obscene material in the home may not be prohibited by law. In Stanley v. Georgia (1969),[165] the Court ruled that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."[166] However, it is constitutionally permissible for the government to prevent the mailing or sale of obscene items, though they may be viewed only in private. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002)[167] further upheld these rights by invalidating the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, holding that, because the act "[p]rohibit[ed] child pornography that does not depict an actual child" it was overly broad and unconstitutional under the First Amendment[168] and that:

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First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.[169]

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In United States v. Williams (2008),[170] the Court upheld the PROTECT Act of 2003, ruling that prohibiting offers to provide and requests to obtain child pornography did not violate the First Amendment, even if a person charged under the Act did not possess child pornography.[171][172]

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In some states, there are Son of Sam laws prohibiting convicted criminals from publishing memoirs for profit.[173] These laws were a response to offers to David Berkowitz to write memoirs about the murders he committed. The Supreme Court struck down a law of this type in New York as a violation of the First Amendment in the case Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Board (1991).[174] That statute did not prohibit publication of a memoir by a convicted criminal. Instead, it provided that all profits from the book were to be put in escrow for a time. The interest from the escrow account was used to fund the New York State Crime Victims Board – an organization that pays the medical and related bills of victims of crime. Similar laws in other states remain unchallenged.[175]

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American tort liability for defamatory speech or publications traces its origins to English common law. For the first two hundred years of American jurisprudence, the basic substance of defamation law continued to resemble that existing in England at the time of the Revolution. An 1898 American legal textbook on defamation provides definitions of libel and slander nearly identical to those given by William Blackstone and Edward Coke. An action of slander required the following:[176]

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An action of libel required the same five general points as slander, except that it specifically involved the publication of defamatory statements.[177] For certain criminal charges of libel, such as seditious libel, the truth or falsity of the statements was immaterial, as such laws were intended to maintain public support of the government and true statements could damage this support even more than false ones.[178] Instead, libel placed specific emphasis on the result of the publication. Libelous publications tended to "degrade and injure another person" or "bring him into contempt, hatred or ridicule".[177]

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Concerns that defamation under common law might be incompatible with the new republican form of government caused early American courts to struggle between William Blackstone's argument that the punishment of "dangerous or offensive writings . . . [was] necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty" and the argument that the need for a free press guaranteed by the Constitution outweighed the fear of what might be written.[178] Consequently, very few changes were made in the first two centuries after the ratification of the First Amendment.

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The Supreme Court's ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964)[52] fundamentally changed American defamation law. The case redefined the type of "malice" needed to sustain a libel case. Common law malice consisted of "ill-will" or "wickedness". Now, a public officials seeking to sustain a civil action against a tortfeasor needed to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that there was actual malice. The case involved an advertisement published in The New York Times indicating that officials in Montgomery, Alabama had acted violently in suppressing the protests of African-Americans during the civil rights movement. The Montgomery Police Commissioner, L. B. Sullivan, sued the Times for libel, stating that the advertisement damaged his reputation. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the $500,000 judgment against the Times. Justice Brennan suggested that public officials may sue for libel only if the publisher published the statements in question with "actual malice"—"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."[179][180] In sum, the court held that "the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity)."[181]

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While actual malice standard applies to public officials and public figures,[182] in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps (1988),[183] the Court found that, with regard to private individuals, the First Amendment does "not necessarily force any change in at least some features of the common-law landscape."[184] In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. (1985)[185] the Court ruled that "actual malice" need not be shown in cases involving private individuals, holding that "[i]n light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern . . . the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages—even absent a showing of 'actual malice.'"[186][187] In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), the Court ruled that a private individual had to prove actual malice only to be awarded punitive damages, but not to seek actual damages.[188][189] In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell (1988),[190] the Court extended the "actual malice" standard to intentional infliction of emotional distress in a ruling which protected parody, in this case a fake advertisement in Hustler suggesting that evangelist Jerry Falwell's first sexual experience had been with his mother in an outhouse. Since Falwell was a public figure, the Court ruled that "importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern" was the paramount concern, and reversed the judgement Falwell had won against Hustler for emotional distress.[191]

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In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. (1990),[192] the Court ruled that the First Amendment offers no wholesale exception to defamation law for statements labeled "opinion", but instead that a statement must be provably false (falsifiable) before it can be the subject of a libel suit.[193] Nonetheless, it has been argued that Milkovich and other cases effectively provide for an opinion privilege.[194] In consequence a significant number of states have enacted state opinion privilege laws.[citation needed]

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State constitutions provide free speech protections similar to those of the U.S. Constitution. In a few states, such as California, a state constitution has been interpreted as providing more comprehensive protections than the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has permitted states to extend such enhanced protections, most notably in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.[195] In that case, the Court unanimously ruled that while the First Amendment may allow private property owners to prohibit trespass by political speakers and petition-gatherers, California was permitted to restrict property owners whose property is equivalent to a traditional public forum (often shopping malls and grocery stores) from enforcing their private property rights to exclude such individuals.[196] However, the Court did maintain that shopping centers could impose "reasonable restrictions on expressive activity".[197] Subsequently, New Jersey, Colorado, Massachusetts and Puerto Rico courts have adopted the doctrine;[198][199] California's courts have repeatedly reaffirmed it.[200]

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The free speech and free press clauses have been interpreted as providing the same protection to speakers as to writers, except for wireless broadcasting which has been given less constitutional protection.[201] The Free Press Clause protects the right of individuals to express themselves through publication and dissemination of information, ideas and opinions without interference, constraint or prosecution by the government.[202][203] This right was described in Branzburg v. Hayes as "a fundamental personal right" that is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.[204] In Lovell v. City of Griffin (1938),[205] Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes defined "press" as "every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion".[206] This right has been extended to media including newspapers, books, plays, movies, and video games.[207] While it is an open question whether people who blog or use social media are journalists entitled to protection by media shield laws,[208] they are protected equally by the Free Speech Clause and the Free Press Clause, because both clauses do not distinguish between media businesses and nonprofessional speakers.[202][203][209][210] This is further shown by the Supreme Court consistently refusing to recognize the First Amendment as providing greater protection to the institutional media than to other speakers.[211][212][213] For example, in a case involving campaign finance laws the Court rejected the "suggestion that communication by corporate members of the institutional press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the same communication by" non-institutional-press businesses.[214]

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A landmark decision for press freedom came in Near v. Minnesota (1931),[215] in which the Supreme Court rejected prior restraint (pre-publication censorship). In this case, the Minnesota legislature passed a statute allowing courts to shut down "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspapers", allowing a defense of truth only in cases where the truth had been told "with good motives and for justifiable ends".[216] In a 5–4 decision, the Court applied the Free Press Clause to the states, rejecting the statute as unconstitutional. Hughes quoted Madison in the majority decision, writing, "The impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by criminal alliances and official neglect emphasizes the primary need of a vigilant and courageous press".[217]

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However, Near also noted an exception, allowing prior restraint in cases such as "publication of sailing dates of transports or the number or location of troops".[218] This exception was a key point in another landmark case four decades later: New York Times Co. v. United States (1971),[219] in which the administration of President Richard Nixon sought to ban the publication of the Pentagon Papers, classified government documents about the Vietnam War secretly copied by analyst Daniel Ellsberg. The Court found, 6–3, that the Nixon administration had not met the heavy burden of proof required for prior restraint. Justice Brennan, drawing on Near in a concurrent opinion, wrote that "only governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an evil kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order." Justices Black and Douglas went still further, writing that prior restraints were never justified.[220]

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The courts have rarely treated content-based regulation of journalism with any sympathy. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo (1974),[221] the Court unanimously struck down a state law requiring newspapers criticizing political candidates to publish their responses. The state claimed that the law had been passed to ensure journalistic responsibility. The Supreme Court found that freedom, but not responsibility, is mandated by the First Amendment and so it ruled that the government may not force newspapers to publish that which they do not desire to publish.[222]

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Content-based regulation of television and radio, however, have been sustained by the Supreme Court in various cases. Since there is a limited number of frequencies for non-cable television and radio stations, the government licenses them to various companies. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that the problem of scarcity does not allow the raising of a First Amendment issue. The government may restrain broadcasters, but only on a content-neutral basis. In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,[223] the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Communications Commission's authority to restrict the use of "indecent" material in broadcasting.

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State governments retain the right to tax newspapers, just as they may tax other commercial products. Generally, however, taxes that focus exclusively on newspapers have been found unconstitutional. In Grosjean v. American Press Co. (1936),[224] the Court invalidated a state tax on newspaper advertising revenues, holding that the role of the press in creating "informed public opinion" was vital.[225] Similarly, some taxes that give preferential treatment to the press have been struck down. In Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland (1987),[226] for instance, the Court invalidated an Arkansas law exempting "religious, professional, trade and sports journals" from taxation since the law amounted to the regulation of newspaper content. In Leathers v. Medlock (1991),[227] the Supreme Court found that states may treat different types of the media differently, such as by taxing cable television, but not newspapers. The Court found that "differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas."[228]

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In Branzburg v. Hayes (1972),[229] the Court ruled that the First Amendment did not give a journalist the right to refuse a subpoena from a grand jury. The issue decided in the case was whether a journalist could refuse to "appear and testify before state and Federal grand juries" basing the refusal on the belief that such appearance and testimony "abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First Amendment".[230] The 5–4 decision was that such a protection was not provided by the First Amendment. However, a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell, in which he stated that a claim for press privilege "should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.", has been frequently cited by lower courts since the decision.[231]

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The Petition Clause protects the right "to petition the government for a redress of grievances".[202] This includes the right to communicate with government officials, lobbying government officials and petitioning the courts by filing lawsuits with a legal basis.[210] The Petition Clause first came to prominence in the 1830s, when Congress established the gag rule barring anti-slavery petitions from being heard; the rule was overturned by Congress several years later. Petitions against the Espionage Act of 1917 resulted in imprisonments. The Supreme Court did not rule on either issue.[232]

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In California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,[233] the Supreme Court stated that the right to petition encompass "the approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition."[234] Today thus this right encompasses petitions to all three branches of the federal government—the Congress, the executive and the judiciary—and has been extended to the states through incorporation.[232][235] According to the Supreme Court, "redress of grievances" is to be construed broadly: it includes not solely appeals by the public to the government for the redressing of a grievance in the traditional sense, but also, petitions on behalf of private interests seeking personal gain.[236] The right not only protects demands for "a redress of grievances" but also demands for government action.[232][236] The petition clause includes according to the Supreme Court the opportunity to institute non-frivolous lawsuits and mobilize popular support to change existing laws in a peaceful manner.[235]

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In Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011),[237] the Supreme Court stated regarding the Free Speech Clause and the Petition Clause:

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It is not necessary to say that the two Clauses are identical in their mandate or their purpose and effect to acknowledge that the rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground . . . . Both speech and petition are integral to the democratic process, although not necessarily in the same way. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond the political sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the government seeking redress of a grievance.[237]

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The right of assembly was originally distinguished from the right to petition. In United States v. Cruikshank (1875),[238] the Supreme Court held that "the right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."[239] Justice Morrison Waite's opinion for the Court carefully distinguished the right to peaceably assemble as a secondary right, while the right to petition was labeled to be a primary right. Later cases, however, paid less attention to these distinctions.[232]

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In two 1960s decisions collectively known as forming the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,[b] the Court established that the right to petition prohibited the application of antitrust law to statements made by private entities before public bodies: a monopolist may freely go before the city council and encourage the denial of its competitor's building permit without being subject to Sherman Act liability.[240]

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Although the First Amendment does not explicitly mention freedom of association, the Supreme Court ruled, in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama (1958),[241][242] that this freedom was protected by the Amendment and that privacy of membership was an essential part of this freedom.[243] The U.S. Supreme Court decided in Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) that "implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment" is "a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends".[244] In Roberts the Court held that associations may not exclude people for reasons unrelated to the group's expression, such as gender.[245]

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However, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995),[246] the Court ruled that a group may exclude people from membership if their presence would affect the group's ability to advocate a particular point of view.[247] Likewise, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000),[248] the Court ruled that a New Jersey law, which forced the Boy Scouts of America to admit an openly gay member, to be an unconstitutional abridgment of the Boy Scouts' right to free association.[249]

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"Man Gave Names to All the Animals" is a song written by Bob Dylan that appeared on Dylan's 1979 album Slow Train Coming and was also released as a single in some European countries. It was also released as a promo single in US. The single became a chart hit in France and Belgium.[1][2] However, the song also has detractors who consider it the worst song Dylan ever wrote.[2] A 2013 reader's poll conducted by Rolling Stone Magazine ranked "Man Gave Names to All the Animals" the 4th worst Bob Dylan song, behind the hit single from Slow Train Coming, "Gotta Serve Somebody" in second place.[3]

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"Man Gave Names to All the Animals" has been covered by multiple artists, including Townes Van Zandt, who covered the song on his 1993 album Roadsongs.[2] The lyrics were turned into a children's book published by Harcourt in 1999, with illustrations by Scott Menchin.[2] The Singing Kettle covered this song in the second episode of their third BBC TV series. The Wiggles covered it on their "Furry Tales" CD in 2013.

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The music to "Man Gave Names to All the Animals" is reggae-inspired.[2][4] The lyrics were inspired by the biblical Book of Genesis, verses 2:19–20 in which Adam named the animals and birds.[2][4] The lyrics have an appeal to children, rhyming the name of the animal with one of its characteristics. So after describing an animal's "muddy trail" and "curly tail," Dylan sings that "he wasn't too small and he wasn't too big" and so that animal was named a pig.[4] Similarly, the cow got its name because Adam "saw milk comin' out but he didn't know how" and the bear got its name because it has a "great big furry back and furry hair."[4]

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In the last verse, the lyrics take a more sinister turn.[1] In that verse the man

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The verse ends there, with the music hanging and the lyrics avoiding naming the snake.[1][4] In concert, Dylan sometimes elaborated on the meaning of the snake to him at the time.[1] For example, in a concert in Pittsburgh in May 1980 Dylan confirmed that the animal in the final verse is the same snake that appeared to Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden.[1] In Dylan's description that day, Lucifer had put his spirit into that snake, and Jesus later died not only for forgiveness of sins but also to destroy the devil's work.[1] Despite the obvious biblical source for the song, Dylan avoids any explicit mention of Adam and Eve, which to author Oliver Trager seems to pin the blame for the fall of man solely on the snake.[2] Music critic Michael Gray finds it interesting that Dylan avoids blaming Eve for man's fall, appreciating that he stops "the song short on a beautifully hungover note at the arrival on the scene of the serpent.[5]

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According to backup singer Regina Havis Brown, originally Dylan wasn't sure if he wanted to include "Man Gave Names to All the Animals" on Slow Train Coming.[2] But when Dylan heard Brown's three-year-old son laughing at the identification of the animals, he said that "I'm going to put that on the record."[2]

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Dylan regularly played "Man Gave Names to All the Animals" in concert between 1979 and 1981, and he played it in concert again during his 1987 European tour in light of the song's popularity there.[1][2] In concert he often played with the lyrics switching animals and messing up the rhymes.[2] For example, the line "he wasn't too small and he wasn't too big" might be followed by identifying the animal as a giraffe rather than a pig.[2][6] Dylan's backup singers would often hiss to replace the missing line identifying the snake.[2]

Man Gave Names to All the Animals

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Rolling Stone Magazine described "Man Gave Names to All the Animals" as being "clever" but "not very profound" and that although it "went over pretty well live" it is "simplistic" and easy to see "why it has detractors."[3] Author John Nogowski calls it "an embarrassment," "silly", and "just awful."[7] But music critic Michael Gray praises it as one of the standout tracks on Slow Train Coming, citing its humor, its quality as a children's song, and the self-mocking contrast to the more fundamentalist tone of the songs Dylan wrote during this period.[5]

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Waivers is a National Hockey League (NHL) labor management procedure by which an NHL team makes a professional ice hockey player's contract and rights available to all other NHL teams. Other NHL teams "waive" any claim to a player designated for assignment in the American Hockey League (AHL) or designated for release. The process is typically referred to as "being placed on waivers."

Waivers (NHL)

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In the NHL, each player signs what is, or is a variation of, a standard NHL player's contract. The contract specifies that the team has exclusive rights to the player playing in the NHL. Once an NHL player has played in a certain number of games or a set number of seasons has passed since the signing of his first NHL contract (see here), that player must be offered to all of the other NHL teams before he can be assigned to a minor league affiliate.[2] In the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) assignment waivers applies only to loans from an NHL club to its American Hockey League (AHL) affiliate.[3]

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After a player has been designated for assignment, the other 30 NHL teams can put in a claim or waive their claim for that player. The claims process starts at noon Eastern Time and ends 24 hours later. If only one team makes a claim for the player, then he will be transferred to the claiming team. If more than one team makes a claim, then the player will be transferred to the team having the lowest percentage of possible points in league standings at the time of the request for waivers. When a waiver claim has been secured, the claiming team must pay a transfer fee to the original club, though this fee is not counted against the salary cap. If waivers are requested outside the playing season, or before November 1, then the player shall be transferred to the team with the lowest points in the preceding season.[4] If no team places a claim, the player can be sent to a minor league affiliate.

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When a player clears waivers and is sent down and then is called up again, he does not have to clear waivers to be sent down again unless he has played ten games or has been "up" for 30 days.[4]

Waivers (NHL)

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The 2005 NHL-NHLPA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) introduced "re-entry waivers." With limited exceptions, any player who was subject to waivers before assignment to the minors must clear re-entry waivers before being called back up if said player is on a one-way contract or a two-way contract with an AHL salary in excess of $105,000. Exceptions are players who have played in over 320 professional games (180 for goaltenders) and have not spent more than 80 games on an NHL roster in the past two seasons or 40 games during the previous season. The procedure to make a claim on re-entry waivers is the same; however, teams who claim players on re-entry waivers are only responsible for half the salary and cap hit, while the original team is responsible for the other half, unless the claimed player is later assigned to the AHL again before his contract has expired, in which case the salary and cap hit comes off the books of both teams.

Waivers (NHL)

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The CBA ratified in January 2013 eliminated re-entry waivers.[5]

Waivers (NHL)

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Players who play ice hockey outside North America during a regular season and who are not on loan from or whose playing rights are not already owned by an NHL club (that is, the player is not already on a team's 90-player reserve list such as a qualified restricted free agent or a draft pick) must also be placed on waivers if they are signed to play in the NHL. If the player is picked up by another NHL club on waivers, the player must be placed on waivers again before a further trade or loan can take place.[6]

Waivers (NHL)

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A third type of waivers, "unconditional waivers," applies when a player is to be given an unconditional release from his contract. NHL teams give notice to the player and the league that they intend to buy-out a player's rights under the terms of the CBA. In this case, the waiver period is 48 hours. These waivers can only be requested during two periods:

Waivers (NHL)

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Salaries of players playing for an NHL team count against its salary cap, while the salaries of players playing for a team's minor league affiliates do not. NHL teams have waived players with high salaries, thereby freeing up salary cap space for other signings. In 2010, Wade Redden of the New York Rangers,[1] Sheldon Souray of the Edmonton Oilers and Jeff Finger of the Toronto Maple Leafs[9] were all assigned to their team's AHL affiliate without any other team putting in a claim.

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In a more interesting case, following the 2011 NHL pre-season, forward Sean Avery of the New York Rangers was waived to the AHL. As Avery had been claimed off re-entry waivers from the Dallas Stars, the cap hit had been split between the Rangers and Stars, but when Avery was demoted to the AHL again, the cap hit came off both teams' books. As a result, the Stars, who had been using Avery's re-entry waiver loss to reach the salary floor for the 2011–12 season, had to trade for winger Eric Nystrom to reach the salary floor.

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Under the 2005 CBA, if an NHL player is being sent to an NHL affiliate team in the AHL and is put through waivers and clears successfully, then his salary will not count against the respective NHL team's salary cap. The player is still paid his full salary. There is an exception to this rule; if the player has a contract that took effect after a player's 35th birthday, then that player's salary would still count against the NHL cap. Under the 2013 CBA, a team only derives a specific savings from demoting a player on a one-way contract to the AHL. This savings is calculated as league minimum plus $375,000.

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If a player is claimed on waivers, then the claiming team is responsible for the rest of their contract.

Waivers (NHL)

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Re-entry waivers had existed under the 2005 CBA, under which if a player cleared waivers and was sent down to the minors, and then recalled during the season, and his salary was more than $105,000 in the AHL (essentially, any player not on an entry-level or two-way contract), he was subject to re-entry waivers where if a team claimed him they are only responsible for half the salary for the remainder of the contract. Re-entry waivers were eliminated in the 2013 CBA.

Waivers (NHL)

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The Price Is Right is an American game show where contestants made successive bids on merchandise prizes with the goal of bidding closest to the actual retail price of the prize without going over. The show was a precursor to the current and best-known version of the show, which premiered in 1972 on CBS' daytime schedule. This makes The Price Is Right one of only a few game shows that have aired in some form across all three of what were then the Big Three television networks.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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The series premiered on NBC's daytime schedule on November 26, 1956, and quickly spawned a primetime series that aired once a week. The Price Is Right became one of the few game shows to survive the rigging scandal of the late 1950s, and gained even more popularity after other game shows exposed for being rigged had been cancelled.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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In 1963, The Price Is Right switched networks and both the daytime and primetime series moved to ABC. On September 3, 1965, the show aired its final episode after nearly nine years on the air.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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On the original version of The Price Is Right, four contestants – one a returning champion, the other three chosen from the studio audience – bid on items or ensembles of items in an auction-style format.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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A prize was presented for the contestants to bid on. A minimum bid was specified. After the opening bid, contestants bid on the item in turn with each successive bid a certain amount higher than the previous bid. A contestant could freeze his/her current bid instead of increasing it if he/she believed his/her bid was close enough to win. A later rule allowed contestants, on their opening bid only, to "underbid" the other bids, but this automatically froze their bid and prevented them from later increasing the original bid. Some rounds were designated as one-bid rounds, where only one round of bidding was held (this is the format used on the current version of The Price is Right); sometimes the minimum-bid and higher-bid threshold rules also were waived.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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The bidding continued until a buzzer sounded, at which point each contestant who had not yet "frozen" was given one final bid. Bidding also ended when three of the contestants had frozen, at which point the fourth contestant was allowed one final bid, unless he/she already had the high bid. Cullen then read the actual retail price of the prize. The contestant whose bid was closest without going over the actual price won the item. If everyone overbid, the prize was not won; however, Cullen sometimes had the overbids erased and instructed players to give lower bids prior to reading the actual price (similar to what is done on the current CBS version and its syndicated spinoffs).

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Frequently, a bell rang after the winner was revealed, indicating a bonus prize accompanied the item up for bids. While this was typically an additional prize, a bonus game often accompanied the prize (e.g. a tune-matching game, where a clip of a well-known song was played and the contestant matched it with a face for a cash bonus).

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After a set number of rounds (four on the nighttime version, six on the daytime), the contestant who accumulated the highest value in cash and prizes became the champion and returned on the next show.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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The Price Is Right frequently featured a home viewer "Showcase", a multi-prize package for which home viewers were invited to submit their bids via postcard. The viewer who was closest to the actual retail price without going over won everything in the Showcase, but one item was sometimes handmade so the viewer could not check the price of all the items. The term "showcase" was later replaced by "sweepstakes".

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Very often, home viewers were stunningly accurate with their bids, including several viewers who guessed the price correct down to the penny. In such a case, the tied contestants were informed and asked to give the price of a specific item; this continued until one of the contestants broke the tie (re-ties and all-overbids were thrown out.)

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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The Home Viewer Showcase was reformatted as the final round of the current CBS version. The two Showcase Showdown (since 1975; before then, and on the 1970s and 1980s syndicated shows, the top two overall winners automatically advanced to the Showcase round) winners on the current version's show compete to bid on separate showcases of prizes, with the contestant who bids closer (without going over) to the actual retail price of his/her own showcase winning the prizes contained within.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Home Viewer Showcases have also been featured on the CBS version, in 1972, 1978, annually from 1980–1987, 1990, and in 2011. Its format was unchanged through 1990, but the 2011 version, because of the advance in technology, changed to a ten-prizes-in-a-week format, with two prizes appearing per episode during the week. Each day the price of one of the prizes was revealed to the home audience, and the price of the second prize (which was in either of the two Showcases) was not provided. Instead of postcards, the bids had to be submitted through the show's website.[1]

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While many of the prizes on the original Price Is Right were normal, standard game show fare (e.g., furniture, appliances, home electronics, furs, trips, and cars), there were many instances of outlandish prizes being offered. This was particularly true of the nighttime version, which had a larger prize budget.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Some examples:

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Sometimes, large amounts of food – such as a mile of hot dogs along with buns and enough condiments (perhaps to go with a barbecue pit) – were offered as the bonus.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Some other examples of outlandish or "exceptionally unique" bonus prizes:

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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In the early 1960s, the dynamic of the national economy was such that the nighttime show could offer homes in new subdivisions (sometimes fully furnished) as prizes, often with suspenseful bidding among the contestants.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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In the last two seasons of the nighttime run, the series gave away small business franchises.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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In some events, the outlandish prizes were merely for show; for instance, in one episode contestants would bid on the original retail price for a 1920s car, but would instead win a more contemporary model.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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The Price Is Right was created and produced by Bob Stewart for Mark Goodson–Bill Todman Productions. Stewart already had created one hit series for Goodson-Todman, To Tell the Truth and he would later create the enormously successful Password. In 1964, Stewart left Goodson-Todman to strike out on his own as a producer. (Frank Wayne, who later produced the Barker version of The Price Is Right, took over Stewart's Password spot.)

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Bob Stewart attributes the creation of The Price Is Right to watching an auctioneer from his office window in New York City, auctioning off various merchandise items.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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In 1959, shortly after the quiz show scandal broke, most game and quiz shows lost their popularity rapidly and were cancelled. The Price Is Right was an exception; Goodson and Todman had built a squeaky-clean reputation upon relatively low-stakes games. Thus, as the more popular competition was eliminated, The Price Is Right became the most-watched game show in the country, and remained so for two years.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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When the series moved to ABC in 1963, three studio contestants – including the returning champion – played. The fourth chair was filled by a celebrity who played for either a studio audience member or a home viewer. If the celebrity was the big winner of the show, the civilian contestant who had the most winnings was considered the champion; it is unknown what would have happened in the event of a shut-out with the celebrity winning.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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As Don Pardo was still under contract at NBC, he was replaced by Johnny Gilbert, who currently serves as the announcer for Jeopardy!. Coincidently, Pardo would announce on the original Jeopardy! for 11 years.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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When the show moved to ABC, several CBS affiliates took up ABC secondary affiliation to show The Price Is Right (especially if its market lacked full ABC affiliation), in part because of the still-high ratings the show enjoyed in daytime.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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Goodson-Todman wanted The Price Is Right to be ABC's first non-cartoon color show, but the network could not afford to convert to color. This meant that the nighttime version reverted to black-and-white.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)

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After the success of The Price Is Right, To Tell the Truth, and Password, producer Stewart left Goodson-Todman in 1964. Stewart's follow-up to The Price Is Right, his first independent production, was Eye Guess, a sight-and-memory game with Bill Cullen as host. Later, Stewart created other successful shows such as Jackpot! and The $10,000 Pyramid.

The Price Is Right (1956 U.S. game show)