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laches

LACHES

Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

laches

SOCRATES

Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

laches

LACHES

That is most true.

laches

SOCRATES

And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

laches

LACHES

Quite the reverse.

laches

SOCRATES

Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent.

laches

LACHES

To what extent and what principle do you mean?

laches

SOCRATES

The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance.

laches

LACHES

I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

laches

SOCRATES

But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?

laches

LACHES

Certainly, he should.

laches

SOCRATES

And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

laches

LACHES

I should like that.

laches

SOCRATES

Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see our extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage.

laches

NICIAS

I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

laches

SOCRATES

What is it, Nicias?

laches

NICIAS

I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'

laches

SOCRATES

That is certainly true, Nicias.

laches

NICIAS

And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

laches

SOCRATES

Do you hear him, Laches?

laches

LACHES

Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him.

laches

SOCRATES

I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

laches

LACHES

What can he possibly mean, Socrates?

laches

SOCRATES

That is a question which you must ask of himself.

laches

LACHES

Yes.

laches

SOCRATES

Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

laches

NICIAS

Certainly not.

laches

SOCRATES

Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

laches

NICIAS

No.

laches

SOCRATES

But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

laches

LACHES

I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

laches

NICIAS

I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.

laches

LACHES

How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

laches

SOCRATES

Why do you say so, Laches?

laches

LACHES

Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.

laches

SOCRATES

That is just what Nicias denies.

laches

LACHES

Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly.

laches

SOCRATES

Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?

laches

NICIAS

Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same.

laches

LACHES

Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall endeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

laches

NICIAS

Not at all.

laches

LACHES

No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous a whit the more for that.

laches

SOCRATES

What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying something of importance.

laches

NICIAS

Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true.

laches

SOCRATES

How so?

laches

NICIAS

Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man no more than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two?

laches

LACHES

Yes certainly so in my opinion.

laches

NICIAS

And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?

laches

LACHES

Certainly not.

laches

NICIAS

And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear and hope? And him I call the courageous.

laches

SOCRATES

Do you understand his meaning, Laches?

laches

LACHES

Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?

laches

NICIAS

What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?

laches

LACHES

Indeed I do: who but he?

laches

NICIAS

Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeat in war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.

laches

LACHES

I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in so doing; but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?

laches

SOCRATES

I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.

laches

LACHES

Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked enough.

laches

SOCRATES

I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both of us.

laches

LACHES

Very good.

laches

SOCRATES

Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

laches

NICIAS

I do.

laches

SOCRATES

And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and the soothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless they acquire it--that is what you were saying?

laches

NICIAS

I was.

laches

SOCRATES

Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous.

laches

NICIAS

I think not.

laches

SOCRATES

Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage.

laches

LACHES

Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage.

laches

NICIAS

Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash;--my courageous actions are wise actions.

laches

LACHES

Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.

laches

NICIAS

Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing to say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you are courageous and therefore wise.

laches

LACHES

I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian.

laches

SOCRATES

Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are not aware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of words of this sort.

laches

LACHES

Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her.

laches

SOCRATES

Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to have a great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.

laches

LACHES

Then examine for yourself, Socrates.

laches

SOCRATES

That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.

laches

LACHES

I will if you think that I ought.

laches

SOCRATES

Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.

laches

NICIAS

Very true.

laches

SOCRATES

And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were many other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.

laches

NICIAS

Certainly.

laches

SOCRATES

Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same?

laches

NICIAS

Certainly.

laches

SOCRATES

Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and the hopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another. Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right: in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches?

laches

LACHES

Yes, Socrates, entirely.

laches

SOCRATES

That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?

laches

NICIAS

I agree.

laches

SOCRATES

And the knowledge of these things you call courage?

laches

NICIAS

Precisely.

laches

SOCRATES

And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself as to a third point.

laches

NICIAS

What is that?

laches

SOCRATES

I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; but that of all three there is one science only: for example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will be my witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, and that he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war: and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?

laches

LACHES

Quite correct.

laches

SOCRATES

And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

laches

NICIAS

Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion.

laches

SOCRATES

And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful?

laches

NICIAS

Yes.

laches

SOCRATES

And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils?

laches

NICIAS

True.