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1,315
PlugX file uses Symantec logo icon.
[ { "id": 3983, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 5 }, { "id": 46668, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 24 } ]
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Upon execution, the malware will install itself as a service with the following parameters: It may also set the following registry key for persistence:
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PlugX is a well-studied malware family with a long history of use in targeted attacks.
[ { "id": 44968, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 6 } ]
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More information on its history is available at the following links.
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FormerFirstRAT This remote administration tool (RAT) is referred to as “FormerFirstRAT” by its authors.
[ { "id": 3989, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 15 }, { "id": 3992, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 74, "end_offset": 88 } ]
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FormerFirstRAT communicates using unencrypted HTTP over port 443; the use of mismatching ports and communication protocols is not uncommon in targeted attack campaigns.
[ { "id": 3993, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 14 }, { "id": 46669, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 142, "end_offset": 167 } ]
[ { "id": 210, "from_id": 46669, "to_id": 3993, "type": "uses" } ]
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In addition, port / protocol mis-match traffic can be an indicator of bad activity.
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When the malware starts, it writes the following registry key to ensure persistence: The malware then proceeds to send an HTTP POST request with information about the victim system.
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The following information is collected:
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The following settings are used for command and control: The malware encrypts network communication using the AES128 encryption cipher.
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It uses the MD5 of 'tucwatkins' in order to generate the key.
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All data is sent via HTTP POST requests.
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While not a distinct TTP, the author of this malware may be a soap-opera fan.
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The following code demonstrates how you can decrypt the malware communications using Python: The malware then enters a loop where it will send out periodic requests to the remote server.
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The remote server has the ability to respond and provide instructions to the RAT.
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We have identified the following functionalities:
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An example HTTP POST request can be seen below. NFlog When loaded inside of a running process, NFlog begins by spawning a new thread.
[ { "id": 4011, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 50, "end_offset": 55 }, { "id": 4012, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 98, "end_offset": 103 } ]
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This new thread is responsible for all malicious activities produced by this DLL.
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Initially, the malware will set the following registry key: Where [current_executable_filename] is the path to the current running executable, which is acquired via a call to GetModuleFileNameA.
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This registry key ensures that the malware will persist across reboots when the current user logs in.
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Multiple string obfuscation routines are included in this malware sample.
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Strings contained in the binary are decrypted via a simple binary XOR against a single byte key of 0x25.
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The malware proceeds to create a named event object of 'GoogleZCM' and uses this event in order to ensure only one instance of this malware is running at a given time.
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The malware proceeds to make an attempt at binding to the local host on port 1139.
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The malware attempts to ensure Internet connectivity by making a request to www.microsoft.com.
[ { "id": 46670, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 77, "end_offset": 94 } ]
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An example request is shown below.
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Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot!
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By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.
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This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Beginning on Jan. 14, 2022, reports began emerging about a series of attacks targeting numerous Ukrainian government websites.
[ { "id": 46672, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 149, "end_offset": 169 }, { "id": 46671, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 79 } ]
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As a result of these attacks, numerous government websites were found to be either defaced or inaccessible.
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A day later, public reporting outlined new malware called WhisperGate that originally was observed on Jan. 13, 2022.
[ { "id": 46675, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 102, "end_offset": 115 }, { "id": 46676, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 58, "end_offset": 69 } ]
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This malware disables Windows Defender Threat Protection, is destructive in nature and was discovered to have targeted multiple organizations in Ukraine.
[ { "id": 44970, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 22, "end_offset": 56 }, { "id": 44971, "label": "location", "start_offset": 145, "end_offset": 152 } ]
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Microsoft has publicly attributed the use of this custom malware to a threat actor they refer to as DEV-0586.
[ { "id": 4045, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 100, "end_offset": 108 }, { "id": 46677, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 9 } ]
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Though both attacks have targeted Ukrainian organizations, the two threats have so far been implemented in separate situations.
[ { "id": 46678, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 58 } ]
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As a result of these events, Palo Alto Networks researchers took immediate action to ensure that customers anywhere in the world can be appropriately protected against these reported threats, however they may be exploited.
[ { "id": 44972, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 30, "end_offset": 48 } ]
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These attacks ultimately resulted in the investigation of the following two threats: Palo Alto Networks customers can use Xpanse or Threat Prevention for the Next-Generation Firewall to identify vulnerable and/or internet-facing instances of OctoberCMS.
[ { "id": 46679, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 86, "end_offset": 104 }, { "id": 46680, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 123, "end_offset": 129 }, { "id": 46681, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 133, "end_offset": 150 }, { "id": 46682, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 243, "end_offset": 253 } ]
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Protections against WhisperGate malware have been included in Cortex XDR, as well as in the WildFire and Advanced URL Filtering subscriptions for the Next-Generation Firewall.
[ { "id": 4060, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 100 }, { "id": 4058, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 31 }, { "id": 46683, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 72 } ]
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There is a Cortex XSOAR pack available to assist with detecting and mitigating both threats.
[ { "id": 44973, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 11, "end_offset": 23 } ]
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CVE-2021-32648 Vulnerability WhisperGate Malware Family Mitigation Actions Hunting for WhisperGate Conclusion Additional Resources
[ { "id": 46685, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 30, "end_offset": 41 }, { "id": 46684, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 15 }, { "id": 46686, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 88, "end_offset": 99 } ]
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The CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability lies within the OctoberCMS platform prior to version 1.0.472 and results in an attacker gaining access to any account via a specially crafted account password reset request.
[ { "id": 46687, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 19 }, { "id": 46688, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 50, "end_offset": 60 } ]
[ { "id": 211, "from_id": 46688, "to_id": 46687, "type": "has" } ]
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This vulnerability is believed to have allowed threat actors to gain access to the underlying websites leveraged by the Ukraine government.
[ { "id": 44974, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 120, "end_offset": 138 } ]
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Once the vulnerability was discovered, Palo Alto Networks threat researchers quickly began reverse-engineering the patch that remediated this vulnerability and were able to produce a working proof of concept (PoC) in a very short time.
[ { "id": 46689, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 40, "end_offset": 58 } ]
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Later that day, a public PoC surfaced, allowing organizations to better understand this vulnerability and how it is exploited.
[ { "id": 4075, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 14 } ]
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Using our PoC, we created the following demonstration video of how a malicious actor would exploit the CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability, log into the compromised OctoberCMS account and to deface a web page hosted by the server:
[ { "id": 44975, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 103, "end_offset": 117 }, { "id": 44976, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 158, "end_offset": 168 } ]
[ { "id": 49, "from_id": 44976, "to_id": 44975, "type": "has" } ]
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To determine how this vulnerability was exploited, we analyzed the patch that developers added to OctoberCMS version 1.0.472 to mitigate the CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability.
[ { "id": 46690, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 141, "end_offset": 155 }, { "id": 46692, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 98, "end_offset": 108 } ]
[ { "id": 212, "from_id": 46692, "to_id": 46690, "type": "has" } ]
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We discovered that the vulnerable code existed in the Auth/Models/User.php file within the October Rain library of OctoberCMS.
[ { "id": 46693, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 54, "end_offset": 74 }, { "id": 46694, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 115, "end_offset": 125 } ]
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The code that exposes this vulnerability is within a function named checkResetPasswordCode, specifically, line 281 in User.php.
[ { "id": 44977, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 118, "end_offset": 126 } ]
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The following line of code attempts to validate the inbound password reset request by comparing the reset code submitted within the HTTP request with the reset code generated by OctoberCMS during a legitimate reset process: To exploit this vulnerability, the actor would simply supply a boolean true value as the reset code within a custom-crafted HTTP request to reset the password of an account.
[ { "id": 46695, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 178, "end_offset": 188 } ]
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By supplying the boolean true, the comparison between boolean true and the reset code string results in a boolean true, even though the two variables have different types.
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This effectively validates the actor’s inbound password reset request, which allows the actor to then change the password To fix this vulnerability in version 1.0.472, the OctoberCMS developer changed the line of code above to use === instead of == when comparing the values of the reset code provided by the user via an HTTP POST request.
[ { "id": 44978, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 173, "end_offset": 183 } ]
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The difference between === and == involves the === comparing the value and type of value of the variable, not just the value, as happens when using ==.
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To demonstrate the difference, the following two commands run PHP code to show that a comparison of the string code with boolean true using == results in a boolean true, while the same comparison using === results in a boolean false: As a result of the analysis of the CVE-2021-32648 vulnerability, various product protections were created or enhanced.
[ { "id": 46696, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 270, "end_offset": 284 } ]
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More information about these protections can be found within the Mitigation Actions section of the briefing.
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First observed by Microsoft on Jan. 13, 2022, WhisperGate malware is computer network attack (CNA) malware aimed at deleting Microsoft Windows Defender and corrupting files on the target.
[ { "id": 46699, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 19, "end_offset": 29 }, { "id": 46697, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 126, "end_offset": 152 }, { "id": 46698, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 45 }, { "id": 46700, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 58 } ]
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It consists of two samples: One appears as ransomware while the other is a beaconing implant used to deliver an in-memory Microsoft Intermediate Language (MSIL) payload.
[ { "id": 4118, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 122, "end_offset": 131 } ]
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The in-memory code uses Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBINs) to evade detection and also performs anti-analysis techniques, as it will fail to detonate when certain monitoring tools exist.
[ { "id": 44979, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 62 } ]
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At the time of writing, there are two known samples identified as WhisperGate: Stage1.exe and Stage2.exe.
[ { "id": 46701, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 77 }, { "id": 46702, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 79, "end_offset": 89 }, { "id": 46703, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 94, "end_offset": 104 } ]
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Stage1.exe purports to be ransomware, as it overwrites the target’s master boot record with 512 bytes and upon reboot displays the following ransom note: Stage2.exe is a beaconing implant that performs an HTTPS connection to download a JPG file hosted on Discord’s content delivery network (CDN).
[ { "id": 46706, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 155, "end_offset": 165 }, { "id": 46707, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 256, "end_offset": 296 }, { "id": 46705, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 10 } ]
[ { "id": 213, "from_id": 46706, "to_id": 46707, "type": "beacons-to" } ]
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Discord’s CDN is a user-created service that allows users to host attachments and is not malicious.
[ { "id": 46708, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 7 } ]
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The hosted file is retrieved from the following URL: hxxps://cdn.discordapp[.]com/attachments/928503440139771947/930108637681184768/Tbopbh.jpg
[ { "id": 46709, "label": "URL", "start_offset": 54, "end_offset": 143 } ]
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File Tbopbh.jpg is the malicious payload that is in-memory loaded and kicks off the destructive capabilities.
[ { "id": 46710, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 15 } ]
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The following patterns of activities are associated with this payload: 1. File InstallUtil.exe is copied to the host’s %TEMP% directory, e.g. C:\Users\[USERNAME]\AppData\Local\Temp.
[ { "id": 44981, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 80, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 44983, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 120, "end_offset": 126 }, { "id": 44982, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 143, "end_offset": 181 } ]
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This file is a legitimate Microsoft Windows binary.
[ { "id": 4137, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 26, "end_offset": 35 } ]
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Two instances of PowerShell are spawned with an encoded command to sleep for 10 seconds, e.g. C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -enc UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0AUwBsAGUAZQBwACAALQBzACAAMQAwAA== 3.
[ { "id": 46711, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 94, "end_offset": 151 }, { "id": 46712, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 17, "end_offset": 27 } ]
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A Visual Basic Script (VBS) is created in C:\Users\[USERNAME]\AppData\Local\Temp named: Nmddfrqqrbyjeygggda.vbs 4. Process wscript.exe is used to execute the VBS script in step 3.
[ { "id": 44985, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 88, "end_offset": 111 }, { "id": 44986, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 124, "end_offset": 135 }, { "id": 44984, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 42, "end_offset": 80 } ]
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The VBS script is used to call PowerShell to set Windows Defender exclusion path to C:\ e.g. C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Set-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\' 5. AdvancedRun.exe is created and written to the C:\Users\[USERNAME]\AppData\Local\Temp directory. 6.
[ { "id": 46713, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 84, "end_offset": 87 }, { "id": 46716, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 185, "end_offset": 188 }, { "id": 46718, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 49, "end_offset": 65 }, { "id": 46714, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 150 }, { "id": 46715, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 194, "end_offset": 209 }, { "id": 46717, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 240, "end_offset": 278 }, { "id": 46719, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 41 }, { "id": 46720, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 4, "end_offset": 14 } ]
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AdvancedRun.exe is used to execute PowerShell.exe to delete and stop Windows Defender.
[ { "id": 46721, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 15 }, { "id": 46722, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 49 }, { "id": 46723, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 69, "end_offset": 85 } ]
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The following command parameters are passed to AdvancedRun: "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "rmdir 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender' -Recurse" /StartDirectory "" /RunAs 8 /Run "C:\Users\USERNAME]AppData\Local\Temp\AdvancedRun.exe" /EXEFilename "C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "stop WinDefend" /StartDirectory "" /RunAs 8 /Run 7.
[ { "id": 44990, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 313, "end_offset": 339 }, { "id": 44987, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 119 }, { "id": 44988, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 157, "end_offset": 198 }, { "id": 44989, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 245, "end_offset": 297 }, { "id": 46724, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 58 } ]
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PowerShell process used to delete Windows Defender, e.g. C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe rmdir 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender' -Recurse 8. File InstallUtil.exe running from C:\Users\[USERNAME]\AppData\Local\Temp directory.
[ { "id": 4148, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 10 }, { "id": 46727, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 122, "end_offset": 163 }, { "id": 46726, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 57, "end_offset": 114 }, { "id": 46728, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 183, "end_offset": 198 }, { "id": 46725, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 34, "end_offset": 50 }, { "id": 46729, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 212, "end_offset": 251 } ]
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The in-memory payload (Tbopbh.jpg) is running within the context of the InstallUtil.exe process 9. Multiple instances of cmd.exe calling Ping.exe to delete file InstallUtil.exe, e.g. cmd.exe /min /C ping 111.111.111[.]111 -n 5 -w 10 > Nul & Del /f /q %TEMP%\InstallUtil.exe 10. File AdvancedRun.exe is deleted from the C:\Users\[USERNAME]\AppData\Local\Temp directory by the stage2.exe binary. 11. ICMP traffic to host: 111.111.111[.]111 12.
[ { "id": 4149, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 122, "end_offset": 129 }, { "id": 4150, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 184, "end_offset": 191 }, { "id": 4151, "label": "tools", "start_offset": 200, "end_offset": 204 }, { "id": 4152, "label": "IPV4", "start_offset": 205, "end_offset": 222 }, { "id": 4154, "label": "IPV4", "start_offset": 423, "end_offset": 440 }, { "id": 46732, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 285, "end_offset": 300 }, { "id": 46730, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 33 }, { "id": 46731, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 252, "end_offset": 274 }, { "id": 46733, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 321, "end_offset": 387 } ]
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All files and directories, including those on mounted USB drives, excluding the floppy drive (A:) are targeted.
[ { "id": 46734, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 94, "end_offset": 96 } ]
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The following file extensions are overwritten with a one-byte value of 0xCC.
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13. Targeted files greater than one megabyte are truncated to one megabyte when overwritten.
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14. Virus & Threat protection is no longer available from Windows Security.
[ { "id": 46735, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 59, "end_offset": 75 } ]
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Organizations running OctoberCMS prior to Build 472 and v1.1.5 are encouraged to update to the latest version.
[ { "id": 46736, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 33 } ]
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Additionally, in order for this vulnerability to be exploited, the web server must be running PHP below 7.4.
[ { "id": 46737, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 94, "end_offset": 97 } ]
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Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against the OctoberCMS vulnerability in the following ways: Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against WhisperGate malware in the following ways: The Cortex XSOAR "WhisperGate & CVE-2021-32648'' pack can help automatically detect and mitigate the two threats.
[ { "id": 44991, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 }, { "id": 44996, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 216, "end_offset": 228 }, { "id": 44998, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 244, "end_offset": 258 }, { "id": 44993, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 111, "end_offset": 129 }, { "id": 44994, "label": "vulnerability", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 86 }, { "id": 44995, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 168, "end_offset": 179 }, { "id": 4172, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 230, "end_offset": 241 } ]
[ { "id": 51, "from_id": 44995, "to_id": 44998, "type": "exploits" }, { "id": 214, "from_id": 4172, "to_id": 44998, "type": "exploits" } ]
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Read more on the XSOAR marketplace.
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If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200.
[ { "id": 46738, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 99 }, { "id": 46739, "label": "location", "start_offset": 131, "end_offset": 144 }, { "id": 46740, "label": "location", "start_offset": 185, "end_offset": 189 }, { "id": 46741, "label": "location", "start_offset": 208, "end_offset": 212 }, { "id": 46742, "label": "location", "start_offset": 232, "end_offset": 237 } ]
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Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR customers may leverage the following XQL queries, written by the Cortex Managed Threat Hunting service experts, to hunt their datasets for indicators related to WhisperGate malware: The Unit 42 Threat Intelligence team remains vigilant in monitoring this evolving situation, is actively hunting for known indicators from recent events and is ready to put protections in place to thwart attacks against our customers.
[ { "id": 45003, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 192, "end_offset": 203 }, { "id": 45002, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 19 }, { "id": 45001, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 30 }, { "id": 45004, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 218, "end_offset": 225 }, { "id": 46744, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 218, "end_offset": 250 }, { "id": 46745, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 96, "end_offset": 133 } ]
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Product-specific protections have been implemented as a result of research performed in recent days, and those protections will be augmented as needed as more details come to light.
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Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.
[ { "id": 46746, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 18 } ]
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Updated March 4, 2022, at 6:15 a.m. PT.
[ { "id": 45006, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 39 } ]
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Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address! Please mark, I'm not a robot! By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.
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At 06:47 PST on May 20 Palo Alto Networks WildFire detected the start of the latest Kuluoz spam campaign.
[ { "id": 4212, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 42, "end_offset": 50 }, { "id": 46747, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 3, "end_offset": 22 }, { "id": 46748, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 41 }, { "id": 46749, "label": "campaign", "start_offset": 84, "end_offset": 104 } ]
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1,401
The total number of e-mails detected quickly rose to over 30,000 per hour around noon PST and had not begun to slow down as of 1:30PM PST.
[ { "id": 45007, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 127, "end_offset": 137 }, { "id": 4218, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 81, "end_offset": 89 } ]
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1,402
Kuluoz is a descendant of the Asprox malware and spreads by sending copies of itself as an e-mail attachment.
[ { "id": 46751, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 37 }, { "id": 46750, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 7 }, { "id": 46752, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 61, "end_offset": 109 } ]
[ { "id": 216, "from_id": 46750, "to_id": 46751, "type": "variant-of" }, { "id": 217, "from_id": 46751, "to_id": 46752, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 218, "from_id": 46750, "to_id": 46752, "type": "uses" } ]
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1,403
As the malware infects more systems, the systems begin sending more e-mails which leads to more infections.
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1,404
Kuluoz makes money for its owner by installing other malware, such as crimeware or fake antivirus programs.
[ { "id": 45008, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 6 }, { "id": 45009, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 70, "end_offset": 79 }, { "id": 45010, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 83, "end_offset": 106 } ]
[ { "id": 53, "from_id": 45008, "to_id": 45009, "type": "uses" }, { "id": 54, "from_id": 45008, "to_id": 45010, "type": "uses" } ]
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1,405
Kuluoz e-mails often trick the reader into thinking they are delivery notifications (such as UPS or Fedex), or notices from airlines or payment processors.
[ { "id": 46753, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 7 } ]
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1,406
In this case the e-mails claim to contain a document about a court case.
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1,407
Subject: Hearing of your case in Court
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1,408
From: Notice of Appearance Pretrial Notice, Please, download the copy of the court notice attached herewith to read the details.
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1,409
Note: The case may be heard by the judge in your absence if you do not come.
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1,410
Truly yours, Clerk to the Court.
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1,411
Olivia Smith
[ { "id": 46754, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 12 } ]
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1,412
Each e-mail carries one of the following attachments: These attachments are different versions of the malware that has been packed to evade antivirus engines.
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1,413
Twelve of the 53 scanners on virustotal.com now detect the first variant of the malware, but only three detect the latest version.
[ { "id": 45011, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 29, "end_offset": 43 } ]
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1,414
To determine where the highest number of infected nodes are, we mapped the sending IP address for each of the attach e-mails to their rough geographic location.
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1,416
Geographic Distribution of Koluoz Spam Nodes in North America Thus far we’ve detected the following command and control servers in use.
[ { "id": 45013, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 45 }, { "id": 45016, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 103, "end_offset": 121 }, { "id": 45012, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 34 }, { "id": 45014, "label": "location", "start_offset": 49, "end_offset": 62 } ]
[ { "id": 55, "from_id": 45012, "to_id": 45013, "type": "communicates-with" }, { "id": 56, "from_id": 45013, "to_id": 45014, "type": "located-at" } ]
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