mrmoor/cyber-threat-intelligence · Datasets at Hugging Face

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1,214	The message body contains the term “You will use” (translated from Chinese shown in Figure 4).	[]	[]	[]
1,215	Some of these policies are hard-coded in the SDKs, e.g., in UmPay; but others are pre-fetched from cloud servers that are operated by the SDKs’ providers (Figure 5).	[ { "id": 46604, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 60, "end_offset": 65 } ]	[]	[]
1,216	Again, all the functions mentioned above run silently in the background.	[]	[]	[]
1,217	Except for LinkSMSPayment, all the IAP SDKs listed in this post do not notify the user in any way that they are taking actions against the user’s daily SMS communication.	[]	[]	[]
1,218	Users have no idea if an SMS was blocked or if it was delivered.	[]	[]	[]
1,219	All of the IAP SDKs in this post target Chinese users.	[]	[]	[]
1,220	Both SMS sending and SMS blocking will only affect Android phones with a valid Chinese mobile phone number.	[ { "id": 46605, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 58 } ]	[]	[]
1,221	Some of them will even check which SIM operator a user is using (Figure 6).	[]	[]	[]
1,223	An interesting observation is that half of these IAP SDKs implement the send and block SMS functions in separate codes.	[]	[]	[]
1,224	More specifically, the code was separated into two parts.	[]	[]	[]
1,225	One piece is embedded into Android apps or games for developers as a part of the source code.	[ { "id": 46608, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 34 } ]	[]	[]
1,226	The other piece is included separately in the assets directory in APK files, and will be invoked by Java reflection in runtime (Figure 7).	[]	[]	[]
1,227	For example, JoloPay, WiPay, TPADPay and EgamePay follow this design exactly.	[ { "id": 44941, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 13, "end_offset": 20 }, { "id": 44942, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 22, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 44943, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 30, "end_offset": 36 }, { "id": 44945, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 41, "end_offset": 49 } ]	[]	[]
1,228	AstepPay implements both sending and blocking in the “assets/astep.bin” file.	[ { "id": 46610, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 8 }, { "id": 46611, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 54, "end_offset": 70 } ]	[]	[]
1,229	This separation of functions may be intended to avoid detection by security products.	[]	[]	[]
1,230	SMS should not be used in payment or authentication for e-finance transactions.	[]	[]	[]
1,231	On the existing Android platforms it is very easy for any installed apps to send, intercept, or even forward SMS messages in background without any user knowledge or interaction.	[ { "id": 46612, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 23 } ]	[]	[]
1,232	Previous attack cases, such as Zitmo and Cardbuyer, showed the risk of using SMS for payment authentication.	[ { "id": 46613, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 36 }, { "id": 46614, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 41, "end_offset": 50 } ]	[]	[]
1,233	For instance: To improve the security of IAP, some payment platforms try to add a verification step in order to confirm an SMS was really sent by the user, for example, it will ask the user to reply with certain text that was sent to a phone number specified by the user.	[]	[]	[]
1,234	However, two months ago, WildFire discovered a new Android malware, Cardbuyer, that circumvents this verification technique.	[ { "id": 46615, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 25, "end_offset": 33 }, { "id": 46616, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 46617, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 77 } ]	[]	[]
1,235	Cardbuyer targets 11 different online payment platforms, as well as stolen prepaid cards, by parsing their verification SMS and automatically replying.	[ { "id": 46618, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 9 } ]	[]	[]
1,236	The good news is this technique might be partially mitigated in Android KitKat (version 4.4), where Google introduced a security enhancement around SMS security.	[ { "id": 46619, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 101, "end_offset": 107 }, { "id": 46620, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 65, "end_offset": 93 } ]	[]	[]
1,237	A user can set a system-wide default SMS app as the only app with permission to send and receive SMS.	[]	[]	[]
1,238	However, other installed apps are still allowed to receive SMS and upload the content via Internet.	[]	[]	[]
1,239	But as of June 4, 2014, only 13.6% of worldwide users had installed Android 4.4 or above.	[ { "id": 44947, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 10, "end_offset": 22 }, { "id": 44948, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 80 } ]	[]	[]
1,240	This means more than 86% of Android users do not benefit from this enhancement and are vulnerable.	[ { "id": 46621, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 35 } ]	[]	[]
1,241	However, Palo Alto Networks users are protected from these PUAs by subscribing to WildFire and GlobalProtect services.	[ { "id": 46624, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 95, "end_offset": 108 }, { "id": 46625, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 46622, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 90 } ]	[]	[]
1,242	SMS-based IAP SDKs have become a gray zone that needs close attention.	[]	[]	[]
1,243	Because of convenience and popularity, SMS-based IAP will likely continue to spread and increase in worldwide use.	[]	[]	[]
1,244	However, users need to be protected from PUAs and malware that abuses the SMS-based IAP.	[]	[]	[]
1,245	Also, developers need to be aware that SMS cannot meet security requirements (e.g. authentication) during the payment transactions.	[]	[]	[]
1,246	We would like to thank Kyle Sanders for his contribution to this work.	[ { "id": 46626, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 36 } ]	[]	[]
1,247	Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us Please enter your email address!	[]	[]	[]
1,248	Please mark, I'm not a robot!	[]	[]	[]
1,249	By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.	[]	[]	[]
1,250	This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Palo Alto Networks Unit 42	[ { "id": 3816, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 53, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 3817, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 79 } ]	[]	[]
1,251	used the AutoFocus threat intelligence service to identify a series of phishing attacks against Japanese organizations.	[ { "id": 46627, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 18 }, { "id": 44949, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 96, "end_offset": 118 }, { "id": 44950, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 71, "end_offset": 87 } ]	[]	[]
1,252	Using AutoFocus to quickly search and correlate artifacts across the collective set of WildFire and other Palo Alto Networks threat intelligence, we were able to associate the attacks with the group publicly known as “DragonOK.”	[ { "id": 3823, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 87, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 3826, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 218, "end_offset": 226 }, { "id": 46628, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 15 }, { "id": 46629, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 106, "end_offset": 124 } ]	[ { "id": 196, "from_id": 3826, "to_id": 3823, "type": "authored-by" } ]	[]
1,253	[1] These attacks took place between January and March of 2015.	[ { "id": 46630, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 62 } ]	[]	[]
1,254	DragonOK has previously targeted Japanese high-tech and manufacturing firms, but we’ve identified a new backdoor malware, named “FormerFirstRAT,” deployed by these attackers.	[ { "id": 3828, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 9 }, { "id": 3832, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 130, "end_offset": 144 }, { "id": 44952, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 34, "end_offset": 76 } ]	[ { "id": 198, "from_id": 3832, "to_id": 3828, "type": "authored-by" }, { "id": 197, "from_id": 3828, "to_id": 44952, "type": "targets" } ]	[]
1,255	See the “Malware Details” section for analysis of the three RATs and two additional backdoors deployed in this persistent attack campaign.	[]	[]	[]
1,256	This campaign involved five separate phishing attacks, each carrying a different variant of Sysget malware, also known as HelloBridge.	[ { "id": 46631, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 38, "end_offset": 54 }, { "id": 46632, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 99 }, { "id": 46633, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 123, "end_offset": 134 } ]	[ { "id": 199, "from_id": 46633, "to_id": 46632, "type": "variant-of" } ]	[]
1,257	The malware was included as an attachment intended to trick the user into opening the malware.	[ { "id": 44954, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 81 } ]	[]	[]
1,258	This included altering the icon of the executable to appear as other file types (Figure 1) as well as decoy documents to trick users into thinking they had opened a legitimate file.	[]	[]	[]
1,259	Figure 1. Icons used by malicious Sysget attachments.	[ { "id": 46635, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 41 } ]	[]	[]
1,260	All of the Sysget files used in this campaign communicate with a single command and control (C2) server, hosted at biosnews[.]info.	[ { "id": 44955, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 116, "end_offset": 131 }, { "id": 44956, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 73, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 44957, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 12, "end_offset": 24 } ]	[ { "id": 42, "from_id": 44957, "to_id": 44956, "type": "communicates-with" }, { "id": 201, "from_id": 44956, "to_id": 44955, "type": "hosts" } ]	[]
1,261	Sysget communicates with this server using the HTTP protocol; see the Malware Details section for specifics of the command and control traffic.	[ { "id": 46636, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 6 } ]	[]	[]
1,262	All five phishing campaigns targeted a Japanese manufacturing firm over the course of two months, but the final campaign also targeted a separate Japanese high-tech organization.	[ { "id": 46637, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 46639, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 146, "end_offset": 177 }, { "id": 46638, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 61 } ]	[ { "id": 203, "from_id": 46637, "to_id": 46639, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 202, "from_id": 46637, "to_id": 46638, "type": "targets" } ]	[]
1,263	(Figure 2)	[]	[]	[]
1,264	Figure 2.	[]	[]	[]
1,265	Five Sysget samples used to target two Japanese organizations.	[ { "id": 46640, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 61 }, { "id": 46641, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 11 } ]	[]	[]
1,266	Four of the five Sysget variants included a form of decoy document to trick users into believing they had opened a legitimate file rather than malware.	[ { "id": 46642, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 18, "end_offset": 24 }, { "id": 44958, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 53, "end_offset": 67 } ]	[ { "id": 204, "from_id": 46642, "to_id": 44958, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
1,267	Two of the executables used decoy documents that included information about obituaries.	[]	[]	[]
1,268	Figure 3 shows a GIF file containing an obituary notice for a woman, while Figure 4 shows a Microsoft Word document containing the obituary of a man.	[ { "id": 46643, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 106 } ]	[]	[]
1,269	Figure 3. Japanese decoy document containing an obituary notice for a woman.	[ { "id": 44959, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 34 } ]	[]	[]
1,270	Figure 4. Japanese decoy document containing an obituary notice for a woman.	[ { "id": 46644, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 34 } ]	[]	[]
1,271	The Sysget sample with a PDF icon created a second executable, named Adobe.exe, which simply displayed the following warning.	[ { "id": 46645, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 11 }, { "id": 46646, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 70, "end_offset": 79 } ]	[]	[]
1,272	Figure 5. Error message generated by Adobe.exe	[ { "id": 44960, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 38, "end_offset": 47 } ]	[]	[]
1,273	The final Sysget sample used a Microsoft Excel icon and opened an Excel document that contained cells filled with “XXXXXX.”	[ { "id": 46648, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 46647, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 46 }, { "id": 46649, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 16 } ]	[]	[]
1,274	(Figure 6) Figure 6.	[]	[]	[]
1,275	Excel spreadsheet with Xs in multiple rows and columns.	[ { "id": 44961, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 5 } ]	[]	[]
1,276	These Sysget variants appear to be a first stage payload in these attacks.	[ { "id": 46650, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 7, "end_offset": 13 } ]	[]	[]
1,277	During analysis of this threat, we identified five additional backdoor tools hosted on biosnews[.]info which may be downloaded by the Sysget variants once the attackers have established a foothold.	[ { "id": 46651, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 87, "end_offset": 102 }, { "id": 46652, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 134, "end_offset": 140 } ]	[ { "id": 206, "from_id": 46651, "to_id": 46652, "type": "hosts" } ]	[]
1,278	Three of the backdoors, NFlog, PoisonIvy, and NewCT have previously been publicly associated with DragonOK.	[ { "id": 44962, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 25, "end_offset": 30 }, { "id": 44963, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 41 }, { "id": 44964, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 52 }, { "id": 44965, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 99, "end_offset": 107 } ]	[ { "id": 48, "from_id": 44962, "to_id": 44965, "type": "authored-by" }, { "id": 47, "from_id": 44963, "to_id": 44965, "type": "authored-by" }, { "id": 46, "from_id": 44964, "to_id": 44965, "type": "authored-by" } ]	[]
1,279	Additionally, the actors have now added the popular PlugX backdoor to their toolkit.	[ { "id": 46653, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 52, "end_offset": 66 } ]	[]	[]
1,280	An additional backdoor appears to be a new, custom-built tool, which we have not previously associated with DragonOK or any other attack group.	[ { "id": 46654, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 108, "end_offset": 116 } ]	[]	[]
1,281	We’ve named this tool “FormerFirstRAT” as it appears to be the names used by the developers to refer to their creations.	[ { "id": 44966, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 37 } ]	[]	[]
1,282	Figure 7 shows the relationship between these backdoors and their respective command and control servers.	[]	[]	[]
1,283	Figure 7. Relationship between five additional backdoors used by DragonOK and their C2 servers in this campaign.	[ { "id": 46655, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 74 }, { "id": 46656, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 85, "end_offset": 95 } ]	[ { "id": 208, "from_id": 46655, "to_id": 46656, "type": "uses" } ]	[]
1,284	The following section details the functionality of the malware deployed in this campaign.	[]	[]	[]
1,285	Sysget/HelloBridge	[ { "id": 46657, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 7 }, { "id": 46658, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 8, "end_offset": 19 } ]	[]	[]
1,286	In this campaign, Sysget samples were attached to e-mails and used various icons to trick users into infecting their systems.	[ { "id": 46659, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 18, "end_offset": 24 } ]	[]	[]
1,287	The majority of these samples are self-extracting executables that contain both a malicious downloader, along with a legitimate file.	[ { "id": 44967, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 102 } ]	[]	[]
1,288	When the self-extracting executable is launched, the downloader and legitimate file are typically dropped in one of the following directories and then executed: When the malicious downloader is executed, it begins by creating the 'mcsong[]' event in order to ensure one instance is running.	[ { "id": 46660, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 171, "end_offset": 191 } ]	[]	[]
1,289	It then spawns a new instance of 'C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe' with a window name of 'Chrome-Update'.	[ { "id": 46661, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 34, "end_offset": 64 } ]	[]	[]
1,290	It attempts to obtain a handle to this window using the FindWindowW API call and then proceeds to send the following command to this executable.	[]	[]	[]
1,291	This allows the malware to indirectly execute a command within the cmd.exe process.	[ { "id": 3938, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 74 } ]	[]	[]
1,292	This registry key will ensure an executable that it later downloads is configured to persist across reboots.	[]	[]	[]
1,293	It then sends the 'exit' command to this executable, which will kill this particular process.	[]	[]	[]
1,294	The malware then attempts to read the following file.	[]	[]	[]
1,295	This file is used to store a key that is later used to decrypt data received during network communications.	[]	[]	[]
1,296	If the file does not exist, it will make the following GET request: The filename and name parameters are statically set in the above request.	[]	[]	[]
1,297	The server responds with data similar to the following: The first two pieces of data ('17' and 'gh204503254') are then written to the ibmCon6.tmp file referenced earlier.	[ { "id": 46662, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 135, "end_offset": 146 } ]	[]	[]
1,298	The malware will copy itself to the %TEMP% directory with the executable name of 'notilv.exe'.	[ { "id": 46663, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 43 }, { "id": 46664, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 83, "end_offset": 93 } ]	[]	[]
1,299	Due to the previously written registry key, this file will execute when the machine is restarted and the current user logs in.	[]	[]	[]
1,300	The malware then makes the following request: The filename and uid parameters are statically set in the above request.	[]	[]	[]
1,301	The response data is decrypted using the RC4 cryptographic stream cipher.	[]	[]	[]
1,302	The 'gh204503254' data that was previously downloaded is used as the key.	[]	[]	[]
1,303	The following Python code can be used for decryption, using the 'gh204503254' key: At this stage, the remote server can send a number of different responses.	[]	[]	[]
1,304	The following example response will instruct the malware to download a remote executable file: 'filename.exe' is the path where the downloaded file will be stored, and '01234567890123456789012345678901' is the value supplied in the subsequent HTTP request.	[ { "id": 46665, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 109 } ]	[]	[]
1,305	When this command is received, the following example request is made:	[]	[]	[]
1,306	At this point, the remote server will respond with an unencrypted file that the malware saves to the system.	[]	[]	[]
1,307	The remote server can also send the following example response.	[]	[]	[]
1,308	This response will instruct the malware to upload the specified file:	[]	[]	[]
1,309	An example upload request can be seen below: The remote server can also send the following example response.	[]	[]	[]
1,310	This response will instruct the malware to execute the given command: The results of this -execution are stored in a temporary text file in the %TEMP% directory.	[ { "id": 46666, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 145, "end_offset": 151 } ]	[]	[]
1,311	These results are encrypted using the same technique mentioned previously.	[]	[]	[]
1,312	An example upload of these results can be seen below: PlugX PlugX is a backdoor that is often used by actors in targeted attacks.	[ { "id": 3977, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 55, "end_offset": 60 }, { "id": 3978, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 67 } ]	[]	[]
1,313	This version of PlugX attempts to disguise itself as a Symantec product.	[ { "id": 3979, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 21 }, { "id": 46667, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 55, "end_offset": 63 } ]	[]	[]
1,314	The following icon is present in this sample: Figure 8.	[]	[]	[]

1,214

The message body contains the term “You will use” (translated from Chinese shown in Figure 4).

[]

1,215

Some of these policies are hard-coded in the SDKs, e.g., in UmPay; but others are pre-fetched from cloud servers that are operated by the SDKs’ providers (Figure 5).

[ { "id": 46604, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 60, "end_offset": 65 } ]

[]

1,216

Again, all the functions mentioned above run silently in the background.

[]

1,217

Except for LinkSMSPayment, all the IAP SDKs listed in this post do not notify the user in any way that they are taking actions against the user’s daily SMS communication.

[]

1,218

Users have no idea if an SMS was blocked or if it was delivered.

[]

1,219

All of the IAP SDKs in this post target Chinese users.

[]

1,220

Both SMS sending and SMS blocking will only affect Android phones with a valid Chinese mobile phone number.

[ { "id": 46605, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 58 } ]

[]

1,221

Some of them will even check which SIM operator a user is using (Figure 6).

[]

1,223

An interesting observation is that half of these IAP SDKs implement the send and block SMS functions in separate codes.

[]

1,224

More specifically, the code was separated into two parts.

[]

1,225

One piece is embedded into Android apps or games for developers as a part of the source code.

[ { "id": 46608, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 27, "end_offset": 34 } ]

[]

1,226

The other piece is included separately in the assets directory in APK files, and will be invoked by Java reflection in runtime (Figure 7).

[]

1,227

For example, JoloPay, WiPay, TPADPay and EgamePay follow this design exactly.

[ { "id": 44941, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 13, "end_offset": 20 }, { "id": 44942, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 22, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 44943, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 30, "end_offset": 36 }, { "id": 44945, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 41, "end_offset": 49 } ]

[]

1,228

AstepPay implements both sending and blocking in the “assets/astep.bin” file.

[ { "id": 46610, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 8 }, { "id": 46611, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 54, "end_offset": 70 } ]

[]

1,229

This separation of functions may be intended to avoid detection by security products.

[]

1,230

SMS should not be used in payment or authentication for e-finance transactions.

[]

1,231

On the existing Android platforms it is very easy for any installed apps to send, intercept, or even forward SMS messages in background without any user knowledge or interaction.

[ { "id": 46612, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 23 } ]

[]

1,232

Previous attack cases, such as Zitmo and Cardbuyer, showed the risk of using SMS for payment authentication.

[ { "id": 46613, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 36 }, { "id": 46614, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 41, "end_offset": 50 } ]

[]

1,233

For instance: To improve the security of IAP, some payment platforms try to add a verification step in order to confirm an SMS was really sent by the user, for example, it will ask the user to reply with certain text that was sent to a phone number specified by the user.

[]

1,234

However, two months ago, WildFire discovered a new Android malware, Cardbuyer, that circumvents this verification technique.

[ { "id": 46615, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 25, "end_offset": 33 }, { "id": 46616, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 51, "end_offset": 58 }, { "id": 46617, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 77 } ]

[]

1,235

Cardbuyer targets 11 different online payment platforms, as well as stolen prepaid cards, by parsing their verification SMS and automatically replying.

[ { "id": 46618, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 9 } ]

[]

1,236

The good news is this technique might be partially mitigated in Android KitKat (version 4.4), where Google introduced a security enhancement around SMS security.

[ { "id": 46619, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 101, "end_offset": 107 }, { "id": 46620, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 65, "end_offset": 93 } ]

[]

1,237

A user can set a system-wide default SMS app as the only app with permission to send and receive SMS.

[]

1,238

However, other installed apps are still allowed to receive SMS and upload the content via Internet.

[]

1,239

But as of June 4, 2014, only 13.6% of worldwide users had installed Android 4.4 or above.

[ { "id": 44947, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 10, "end_offset": 22 }, { "id": 44948, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 68, "end_offset": 80 } ]

[]

1,240

This means more than 86% of Android users do not benefit from this enhancement and are vulnerable.

[ { "id": 46621, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 28, "end_offset": 35 } ]

[]

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However, Palo Alto Networks users are protected from these PUAs by subscribing to WildFire and GlobalProtect services.

[ { "id": 46624, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 95, "end_offset": 108 }, { "id": 46625, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 46622, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 90 } ]

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SMS-based IAP SDKs have become a gray zone that needs close attention.

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Because of convenience and popularity, SMS-based IAP will likely continue to spread and increase in worldwide use.

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However, users need to be protected from PUAs and malware that abuses the SMS-based IAP.

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Also, developers need to be aware that SMS cannot meet security requirements (e.g. authentication) during the payment transactions.

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We would like to thank Kyle Sanders for his contribution to this work.

[ { "id": 46626, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 24, "end_offset": 36 } ]

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This post is also available in: 日本語 (Japanese) Palo Alto Networks Unit 42

[ { "id": 3816, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 53, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 3817, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 72, "end_offset": 79 } ]

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used the AutoFocus threat intelligence service to identify a series of phishing attacks against Japanese organizations.

[ { "id": 46627, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 18 }, { "id": 44949, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 96, "end_offset": 118 }, { "id": 44950, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 71, "end_offset": 87 } ]

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Using AutoFocus to quickly search and correlate artifacts across the collective set of WildFire and other Palo Alto Networks threat intelligence, we were able to associate the attacks with the group publicly known as “DragonOK.”

[ { "id": 3823, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 87, "end_offset": 95 }, { "id": 3826, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 218, "end_offset": 226 }, { "id": 46628, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 6, "end_offset": 15 }, { "id": 46629, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 106, "end_offset": 124 } ]

[ { "id": 196, "from_id": 3826, "to_id": 3823, "type": "authored-by" } ]

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[1] These attacks took place between January and March of 2015.

[ { "id": 46630, "label": "TIME", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 62 } ]

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DragonOK has previously targeted Japanese high-tech and manufacturing firms, but we’ve identified a new backdoor malware, named “FormerFirstRAT,” deployed by these attackers.

[ { "id": 3828, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 9 }, { "id": 3832, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 130, "end_offset": 144 }, { "id": 44952, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 34, "end_offset": 76 } ]

[ { "id": 198, "from_id": 3832, "to_id": 3828, "type": "authored-by" }, { "id": 197, "from_id": 3828, "to_id": 44952, "type": "targets" } ]

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See the “Malware Details” section for analysis of the three RATs and two additional backdoors deployed in this persistent attack campaign.

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This campaign involved five separate phishing attacks, each carrying a different variant of Sysget malware, also known as HelloBridge.

[ { "id": 46631, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 38, "end_offset": 54 }, { "id": 46632, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 93, "end_offset": 99 }, { "id": 46633, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 123, "end_offset": 134 } ]

[ { "id": 199, "from_id": 46633, "to_id": 46632, "type": "variant-of" } ]

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The malware was included as an attachment intended to trick the user into opening the malware.

[ { "id": 44954, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 81 } ]

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This included altering the icon of the executable to appear as other file types (Figure 1) as well as decoy documents to trick users into thinking they had opened a legitimate file.

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Figure 1. Icons used by malicious Sysget attachments.

[ { "id": 46635, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 35, "end_offset": 41 } ]

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All of the Sysget files used in this campaign communicate with a single command and control (C2) server, hosted at biosnews[.]info.

[ { "id": 44955, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 116, "end_offset": 131 }, { "id": 44956, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 73, "end_offset": 105 }, { "id": 44957, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 12, "end_offset": 24 } ]

[ { "id": 42, "from_id": 44957, "to_id": 44956, "type": "communicates-with" }, { "id": 201, "from_id": 44956, "to_id": 44955, "type": "hosts" } ]

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Sysget communicates with this server using the HTTP protocol; see the Malware Details section for specifics of the command and control traffic.

[ { "id": 46636, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 6 } ]

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All five phishing campaigns targeted a Japanese manufacturing firm over the course of two months, but the final campaign also targeted a separate Japanese high-tech organization.

[ { "id": 46637, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 27 }, { "id": 46639, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 146, "end_offset": 177 }, { "id": 46638, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 61 } ]

[ { "id": 203, "from_id": 46637, "to_id": 46639, "type": "targets" }, { "id": 202, "from_id": 46637, "to_id": 46638, "type": "targets" } ]

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(Figure 2)

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Figure 2.

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Five Sysget samples used to target two Japanese organizations.

[ { "id": 46640, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 39, "end_offset": 61 }, { "id": 46641, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 11 } ]

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Four of the five Sysget variants included a form of decoy document to trick users into believing they had opened a legitimate file rather than malware.

[ { "id": 46642, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 18, "end_offset": 24 }, { "id": 44958, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 53, "end_offset": 67 } ]

[ { "id": 204, "from_id": 46642, "to_id": 44958, "type": "uses" } ]

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Two of the executables used decoy documents that included information about obituaries.

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Figure 3 shows a GIF file containing an obituary notice for a woman, while Figure 4 shows a Microsoft Word document containing the obituary of a man.

[ { "id": 46643, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 92, "end_offset": 106 } ]

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Figure 3. Japanese decoy document containing an obituary notice for a woman.

[ { "id": 44959, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 34 } ]

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Figure 4. Japanese decoy document containing an obituary notice for a woman.

[ { "id": 46644, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 20, "end_offset": 34 } ]

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The Sysget sample with a PDF icon created a second executable, named Adobe.exe, which simply displayed the following warning.

[ { "id": 46645, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 5, "end_offset": 11 }, { "id": 46646, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 70, "end_offset": 79 } ]

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Figure 5. Error message generated by Adobe.exe

[ { "id": 44960, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 38, "end_offset": 47 } ]

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The final Sysget sample used a Microsoft Excel icon and opened an Excel document that contained cells filled with “XXXXXX.”

[ { "id": 46648, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 71 }, { "id": 46647, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 31, "end_offset": 46 }, { "id": 46649, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 9, "end_offset": 16 } ]

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(Figure 6) Figure 6.

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Excel spreadsheet with Xs in multiple rows and columns.

[ { "id": 44961, "label": "SOFTWARE", "start_offset": 0, "end_offset": 5 } ]

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These Sysget variants appear to be a first stage payload in these attacks.

[ { "id": 46650, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 7, "end_offset": 13 } ]

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During analysis of this threat, we identified five additional backdoor tools hosted on biosnews[.]info which may be downloaded by the Sysget variants once the attackers have established a foothold.

[ { "id": 46651, "label": "DOMAIN", "start_offset": 87, "end_offset": 102 }, { "id": 46652, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 134, "end_offset": 140 } ]

[ { "id": 206, "from_id": 46651, "to_id": 46652, "type": "hosts" } ]

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Three of the backdoors, NFlog, PoisonIvy, and NewCT have previously been publicly associated with DragonOK.

[ { "id": 44962, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 25, "end_offset": 30 }, { "id": 44963, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 32, "end_offset": 41 }, { "id": 44964, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 47, "end_offset": 52 }, { "id": 44965, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 99, "end_offset": 107 } ]

[ { "id": 48, "from_id": 44962, "to_id": 44965, "type": "authored-by" }, { "id": 47, "from_id": 44963, "to_id": 44965, "type": "authored-by" }, { "id": 46, "from_id": 44964, "to_id": 44965, "type": "authored-by" } ]

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Additionally, the actors have now added the popular PlugX backdoor to their toolkit.

[ { "id": 46653, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 52, "end_offset": 66 } ]

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An additional backdoor appears to be a new, custom-built tool, which we have not previously associated with DragonOK or any other attack group.

[ { "id": 46654, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 108, "end_offset": 116 } ]

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We’ve named this tool “FormerFirstRAT” as it appears to be the names used by the developers to refer to their creations.

[ { "id": 44966, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 23, "end_offset": 37 } ]

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Figure 7 shows the relationship between these backdoors and their respective command and control servers.

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Figure 7. Relationship between five additional backdoors used by DragonOK and their C2 servers in this campaign.

[ { "id": 46655, "label": "threat-actor", "start_offset": 66, "end_offset": 74 }, { "id": 46656, "label": "Infrastucture", "start_offset": 85, "end_offset": 95 } ]

[ { "id": 208, "from_id": 46655, "to_id": 46656, "type": "uses" } ]

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The following section details the functionality of the malware deployed in this campaign.

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Sysget/HelloBridge

[ { "id": 46657, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 1, "end_offset": 7 }, { "id": 46658, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 8, "end_offset": 19 } ]

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In this campaign, Sysget samples were attached to e-mails and used various icons to trick users into infecting their systems.

[ { "id": 46659, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 18, "end_offset": 24 } ]

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The majority of these samples are self-extracting executables that contain both a malicious downloader, along with a legitimate file.

[ { "id": 44967, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 82, "end_offset": 102 } ]

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When the self-extracting executable is launched, the downloader and legitimate file are typically dropped in one of the following directories and then executed: When the malicious downloader is executed, it begins by creating the 'mcsong[]' event in order to ensure one instance is running.

[ { "id": 46660, "label": "attack-pattern", "start_offset": 171, "end_offset": 191 } ]

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It then spawns a new instance of 'C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe' with a window name of 'Chrome-Update'.

[ { "id": 46661, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 34, "end_offset": 64 } ]

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It attempts to obtain a handle to this window using the FindWindowW API call and then proceeds to send the following command to this executable.

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This allows the malware to indirectly execute a command within the cmd.exe process.

[ { "id": 3938, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 67, "end_offset": 74 } ]

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This registry key will ensure an executable that it later downloads is configured to persist across reboots.

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It then sends the 'exit' command to this executable, which will kill this particular process.

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The malware then attempts to read the following file.

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This file is used to store a key that is later used to decrypt data received during network communications.

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If the file does not exist, it will make the following GET request: The filename and name parameters are statically set in the above request.

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The server responds with data similar to the following: The first two pieces of data ('17' and 'gh204503254') are then written to the ibmCon6.tmp file referenced earlier.

[ { "id": 46662, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 135, "end_offset": 146 } ]

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The malware will copy itself to the %TEMP% directory with the executable name of 'notilv.exe'.

[ { "id": 46663, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 37, "end_offset": 43 }, { "id": 46664, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 83, "end_offset": 93 } ]

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Due to the previously written registry key, this file will execute when the machine is restarted and the current user logs in.

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The malware then makes the following request: The filename and uid parameters are statically set in the above request.

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The response data is decrypted using the RC4 cryptographic stream cipher.

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The 'gh204503254' data that was previously downloaded is used as the key.

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The following Python code can be used for decryption, using the 'gh204503254' key: At this stage, the remote server can send a number of different responses.

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The following example response will instruct the malware to download a remote executable file: 'filename.exe' is the path where the downloaded file will be stored, and '01234567890123456789012345678901' is the value supplied in the subsequent HTTP request.

[ { "id": 46665, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 97, "end_offset": 109 } ]

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When this command is received, the following example request is made:

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At this point, the remote server will respond with an unencrypted file that the malware saves to the system.

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The remote server can also send the following example response.

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This response will instruct the malware to upload the specified file:

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An example upload request can be seen below: The remote server can also send the following example response.

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This response will instruct the malware to execute the given command: The results of this -execution are stored in a temporary text file in the %TEMP% directory.

[ { "id": 46666, "label": "FILEPATH", "start_offset": 145, "end_offset": 151 } ]

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These results are encrypted using the same technique mentioned previously.

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An example upload of these results can be seen below: PlugX PlugX is a backdoor that is often used by actors in targeted attacks.

[ { "id": 3977, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 55, "end_offset": 60 }, { "id": 3978, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 62, "end_offset": 67 } ]

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This version of PlugX attempts to disguise itself as a Symantec product.

[ { "id": 3979, "label": "malware", "start_offset": 16, "end_offset": 21 }, { "id": 46667, "label": "identity", "start_offset": 55, "end_offset": 63 } ]

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The following icon is present in this sample: Figure 8.

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