tasksource/deberta-small-long-nli
Zero-Shot Classification
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Drapeau’s cohorts, the cohort would be a “victim” of making the bomb. Further, firebombs are inherently dangerous. There is no peaceful purpose for making a bomb. Felony offenses that involve explosives qualify as “violent crimes” for purposes of enhancing the sentences of career offenders. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining a “violent felony” as: “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that ... involves use of explosives”). Courts have found possession of a'bomb to be a crime of violence based on the lack of a nonviolent purpose for a bomb and the fact that, by its very nature, there is a substantial risk that the bomb would be used against the person or property of another. See United States v. Newman, 125 F.3d 863 (10th Cir.1997) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dodge, 846 F.Supp. 181, | [
"holding that possession of a pipe bomb is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 3142f1",
"holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc 2113a is a crime of violence",
"holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc 16",
"holding for the purposes of 18 usc 924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc 924e2b",
"holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 16"
] | 00
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Colameta used customer information that he took from Protégé. Additionally, Colameta admits to having taken at least two Protégé proposals with him to Monument. This type of information may constitute trade secrets. See G.L.c. 266, §30 (defining “trade secret” as used in G.L.c. 93, §42, as including “anything tangible or intangible or electronically kept or stored, which constitutes, represents, evidences or records a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, production or management information, design, process, procedure, formula, invention or improvement”); Warner-Lambert Co., 427 Mass. at 49 (“ [Confidential and proprietary business information may be entitled to protection, even if such information cannot claim trade secret protection”); see, e.g., Augat, Inc., 409 Mass. at 173 (<HOLDING>). “Matters of public knowledge or of general | [
"recognizing that even if a plaintiff claims certain information constitutes trade secrets its claim may not depend on that determination",
"holding that included among trade secrets employee may not appropriate from employer is certain information such as lists of customers",
"holding that supplier lists can be trade secrets under indianas uniform trade secrets act which uses the same definition of a trade secret as montana",
"recognizing that customer lists may be protectable trade secrets",
"recognizing a legitimate need to protect an employee from disclosing an employers trade secrets or other confidential information to a competitor"
] | 11
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property tax sale. In reviewing section 6323(b)(6), this Court noted that it provides that a county’s tax lien has priority over a federal lien, and thus, Taylor purchased the property still subject to the county’s lien. Taylor v. Mill, 310 S.C. 526, 528, 426 S.E.2d 311, 312 (1992). Thus, this Court has already noted that section 6323 operates to establish priority, not extinguish ection in this manner will stifle tax sales, potential buyers must research tax sale property purchases and would be put on notice of any federal tax liens. Finally, Appellants argue that the master erred by not giving section 6323, a more specific statute, priority over section 7425, a general statute. See Capco of Summerville, Inc. v. J.H. Gayle Constr. Co., 368 S.C. 137, 142, 628 S.E.2d 38, 41 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While this is a correct statement of the law, | [
"holding that where there is a conflict between statutes the more recent statute is controlling and a specific provision prevails over a general provision relating to the same subject matter",
"holding that specific statutory provisions take priority over general statutory provisions",
"holding wills more specific provision prevails over general provision",
"recognizing that a specific statute controls over a general one",
"holding that a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general one"
] | 44
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They also rely on Oswego Laborers’ Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, 85 N.Y.2d 20, 623 N.Y.S.2d 529, 647 N.E.2d 741 (1995), which held that a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at large.” Defs.’ Mem. at 14 (quoting Oswego Laborers’, 623 N.Y.S.2d 529, 647 N.E.2d at 744). As explained above, however, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants’ unauthorized use of the DEL MONICO’S name in connection with non-Ocinomled restaurants and products caused consumer harm or injury to the public, and that they had a broad impact on consumers at large inasmuch as such. use was likely to cause consumer confusion. See, e.g., CommScope, Inc. of N.C. v. Commscope (U.S.A.) Int’l Grp. Co., 809 F.Supp.2d 33, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (<HOLDING>); New York City Triathlon, LLC v. NYC Triathlon | [
"holding that plaintiff stated a 349 claim where plaintiff alleged facts plausibly suggesting that defendant intentionally registered its corporate name to be confusingly similar to plaintiffs commscope trademark",
"holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract",
"holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference",
"holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract",
"holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity"
] | 00
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did not affect the defendant’s guideline range, a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) was properly denied). Mr. Norwood concedes that the guideline range would have remained the same based on the findings that the district court had made at sentencing. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9. But Mr. Norwood challenges these findings, arguing that the district court violated the U.S. Constitution by failing to allow the jury to decide matters involving relevant conduct. In our view, this argument is not available under § 3582(c)(2). A § 3582(c)(2) motion is available to request a sentence reduction only for the sentencing range that was lowered by the Commission’s amendment, not to challenge other aspects of a defendant’s sentence. See United States v. Price, 438 F.3d 1005, 1007 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Gay, 771 F.3d 681, | [
"holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did nothing to alter the rule that judges cannot depart below a statutorily provided minimum sentence except upon the governments motion on the basis of substantial assistance",
"holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence in plea agreement accepted before decision in united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 was not invalidated by change in law",
"holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not alter the standard of review for the interpretation and application of the guidelines",
"holding that united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction under 18 usc 3582c",
"holding that the changes in sentencing law imposed by united states v booker 543 us 220 125 sct 738 160 led2d 621 2005 did not render waiver of appeal involuntary and unknowing"
] | 33
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887 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Ramirez, 770 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983). Because dangerous people do not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, the law should not either. It is a fact that many officers are killed during traffic stops for mere infractions. But, here’s the rub: the facts are disputed, and the disputed facts here should have been submitted to the jury, even when qualified immunity from suit was an issue. Issues of credibility belong to the trier of fact. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution so requires. Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir.1997) makes this as clear as the proverbial bell. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317-18, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). As for LaLonde’s claims of excessive force, I | [
"holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity",
"holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate",
"holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision",
"holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment",
"recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue"
] | 00
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In essence, Landowners argue that Star Enterprise’s negligence has interfered with their ability to contract with third parties for the sale of their homes, the same type of damages, for which the Virginia Supreme Court imposed a physical impact requirement in Philip Morris. Landowners rely upon Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F.Supp. 975 (E.D.Va.1981), in arguing that Virginia law permits recovery for pure economic loss in the absence of direct physical impact. In Pruitt, the plaintiffs were individuals who derived their livelihoods from marine life in the Chesapeake Bay which had been polluted by chemicals allegedly discharged into the Bay by the defendant. The federal district court, construing Virginia la L.Ed.2d 562 (1986); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F.Supp. 247 | [
"holding no right to recover for economic loss resulting from defendants injury to a third party with whom plaintiff has contractual business relationship",
"holding commercial fishermen may recover for pollution resulting from defendants oil spill",
"holding that evidence resulting from an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed",
"holding that impact in the district resulting from the defendants conduct that occurred outside the district must be deliberate not incidental",
"holding plaintiff could not recover on nuisance action to recover for alleged damage to property he does not own or rent"
] | 11
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Cas. and Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 260 (3d Cir.2006) (“It has long been the rule in this Circuit that insurance policies are considered part of the property of a bankruptcy estate”) (citing Estate of Lellock v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 811 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.1987)); In re Louisiana World Exposition, Inc., 832 F.2d 1391, 1399 (5th Cir.1987); In re SN Liquidation, Inc., 388 B.R. 579, 583-584 (Bankr.D.Del.2008) ("Insurance policies purchased and paid for by a debtor are property of the estate.”); In re World Health Alternatives, Inc., 369 B.R. 805, 809 (Bankr.D.Del.2007) ("It is clear that insurance policies purchased and paid for by a debtor are property of the estate."); In re A (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1999) (same); but see In re Circle K Corp., 121 B.R. 257 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1990) (<HOLDING>). 31 . See In re Allied Digital, 306 B.R. at | [
"holding the real estate sale proceeds",
"holding that where the policy names only the directors or officers as insured the proceeds are not property of the estate",
"holding that because proceeds of a letter of credit were not secured by estate collateral the proceeds were not property of the estate",
"holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate",
"holding directors and officers liability policy was not property of the estate because it did not increase or decrease the worth of the bankruptcy estate"
] | 33
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no evidence that Georgia’s “general” K-12 local schools offer “a year round program with multi-age, student-centered classrooms featuring pedagogy that is based on constructivist and multiple intelligence learning” like CCAT. Why is that curriculum not sufficiently different to qualify as “special”? Again, the majority does not say. If a “special school” is to be compared to the ordinary local school and must only differ to some extent, then the Charter Schools Commission could create all sorts of commission charter schools that should satisfy constitutional scrutiny, even if the three charter schools at issue in this case are not “different” enough to satisfy the majority. If that is the case, the majority errs in striking down the 2008 Act on its face. See Blevins, 288 Ga. at 118 (<HOLDING>). In the normal course of constitutional | [
"recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep citation omitted",
"holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence",
"holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute",
"holding that person challenging statute as facially vague must show that the challenged law is unconstitutional in every possible application",
"holding that a statute may be facially challenged only by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep "
] | 44
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that the “Florida Legislature created the Fund as a self-insurance fund to provide liability insurance to governmental agencies and employees in civil rights cases” (citing § 284.30, Fla. Stat.)). Section 284.30 provides that when a party seeks attorney’s fees from a state agency, the party is required to serve notice with a copy of the pleading claiming the fees on DFS. On appeal, N.S. argues that a parent in a dependency proceeding does not fall within the plain language of the statute, which provides as follows: A state self-insurance fund, designated as the “State Risk Management Trust Fund,” is created to be set up by the Department of Financial Services and administered with a program of risk management, which fund is to provide insurance, as authorized by s. Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>). However, courts have not addressed whether | [
"holding that section 12309 is a condition precedent to the accrual of rights against a municipality",
"holding a suit against an agency of the state is a suit against the state",
"recognizing that the notice required by section 28430 is a condition precedent to the recovery of attorneys fees pursuant to section 12057lb in hospitals suit against the state",
"holding that section 28430s notice requirement is a condition precedent for fees in action by taxpayer against dor pursuant to section 213015",
"holding that the notice requirement is a condition precedent for attorneys fees from section 12069 proceedings in action by plaintiff against state"
] | 22
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the merits of these motions — were rendered moot by that order and are revived by this Court’s vacating the new trial order. Therefore, the majority’s opinion effectively deciding those motio ial while retaining jurisdiction over the proceedings necessarily mooted the pending motions for entry of judgment on the verdict and entry of JNOV. Under the mootness doctrine, this Court has no jurisdiction to render a judgment and opinion granting or denying either of those mooted motions. Upon this Court’s vacating the trial court’s order granting a new trial in response to this mandamus petition, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case until entry of final judgment in that court. See In re Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 280 S.W.3d 227, 230-32 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (<HOLDING>). The judgment rendered by this Court, | [
"holding that a resentencing court may reconsider a defendants criminal history category as long as the appellate court did not expressly or implicitly limit the remand to only a portion of the sentence",
"holding that this court may reconsider an erroneous ruling as long as the appeal is current",
"holding that superior court erred in reversing trial courts order granting new trial and remanding for a new trial limited to apportionment of damages",
"recognizing that a reviewing court should not reconsider credibility determinations made by the alj as long as they find some support in the record",
"holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending"
] | 44
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would result from pretrial publicity or the kind of prejudice that would require a change of venue. Moreover, the court finds that Johnson waived the issue by failing to renew or reurge her motion for a change of venue at the conclusion of jury selection on the ground that the voir dire of potential jurors demonstrated that the pool was so tainted with prejudice that she could not obtain a fair trial in this district. As the court observed in its pretrial ruling, at the second tier of the analysis of a motion for a change of venue, if the court concludes that no presumption of prejudice is warranted pretrial, the court must look at the voir dire testimony of potential trial jurors to determin 7 L.Ed.2d 909 (2004); People v. Burnham, 2001 WL 936764, *1 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug.17, 2001) (<HOLDING>); State v. Couture, 587 N.W.2d 849, 852 | [
"holding that a change of venue has no affect on the applicable state law and that change of venue is but a change of courtrooms",
"holding in a capital case that the defendant waived his argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a change of venue where the trial court took the motion under advisement but the defendant failed to seek a ruling on the motion and failed to renew the motion after the jurors had been qualified",
"holding that the defendant must renew a motion for a change of venue after voir dire to preserve the issue for appeal",
"holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived",
"holding that the defendant waived the issue of change of venue where the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue without prejudice stating that it was willing to reconsider the motion at any time during the jury selection process but the defendant never renewed the motion for a change of venue"
] | 44
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she did not remember demanding money of the store clerk and states that her companion told the clerk to open the cash register. Yet, according to the clerk’s testimony, it was she, the female robber, who demanded money. She emphasized her drunken state and implied that her accomplices threatened her. Because Miles may reasonably have thought such a statement would decrease her practical exposure to criminal liability, the statement was not reliable as being against her penal interest. Cf. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 601, 114 S.Ct. at 2435 (stating that court “may not just assume ... that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else”); id. at 604, 114 S.Ct. at 2437 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (<HOLDING>); Earnest, 87 F.3d at 1134 (noting that proper | [
"holding improperly admitted testimony was cumulative to the other properly admitted evidence and was therefore harmless",
"holding that codefendants statement was not properly admitted because a reasonable person in declarants position might even think that implicating someone else would decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability at least as far as sentencing goes",
"holding that discrepancy between declarants testimony at preliminary hearing compared to his translated statement offered at trial went to weight not admissibility of statement",
"holding that appellants statement i think i need a lawyer is just as ambiguous as the statement made by the defendant in davis",
"holding that when the testimony relating each of the statements by codefendants was admissible against at least one of the codefendants the statements were not rendered inadmissible because each statement would be hearsay as to the other two defendants"
] | 11
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sentences for bank robbery consecutively or concurrent ly. However, the statute does not permit the court to decide whether any future sentence would be consecutive or concurrent to those five sentences. Rather, when sentences are imposed at different times, § 3584(a) only authorizes a court to determine whether a sentence should be consecutive or concurrent if the defendant is “already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (emphasis added). Another sentence must exist at the time a district court imposes its sentence; a court cannot impose its sentence consecutively to a sentence that does not yet exist. The better-reasoned cases from our sister circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Quintero, 157 F.3d 1038, | [
"holding that a term of imprisonment begins at the time a prisoner is sentenced",
"holding that 3584a allows the district judge to specify the sequence of service of terms of imprisonment only when sentences are imposed at the same time or the other sentence is an undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant is already subject ",
"holding that 5g13c applied because the defendants case involved multiple undischarged terms of imprisonment only one of which was used to enhance his instant sentence",
"holding that the term of imprisonment for purposes of application note 5 is the sentence imposed by the state court and that it shall not be decreased to reflect a suspension of any part of the sentence",
"holding that the concurrent sentencing requirement of 5g13b is only triggered when there is an undischarged term of imprisonment at the time of sentencing"
] | 11
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program” were eventually incorporated into the final remedial plan for the site in September 1991. Id. at 806-07. A CERCLA cost recovery suit for contribution was filed in September 1997. Id. at 807. The court considered whether the initial installation of the wells constituted a remedial action which would trigger CERCLA’s six-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued that no remedial action could take place until a final remedial plan had been officially approved. Id. at 811. The court rejected that bright-line test in favor of an analysis of the proximity of the action to the “disclosure of the final remedial design, which may occur prior to approval of the final remedial plan.” Id. at 812; see also State of California v. Hyampom Lumber Co., 903 F.Supp. 1389, 1393 (E.D.Cal.1995) (<HOLDING>); Geraghty and Miller, 234 F.3d at 927 (actions | [
"holding that a draft rap constituted a final remedial design",
"holding that employees conviction for possession of a controlled substance constituted gross misconduct",
"holding that director of taxation may select remedial option",
"holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error",
"holding that exemption 7c categorically applies when a third party requestor seeks fbi rap sheets"
] | 00
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ignoring the “series of events” that occurred between May 2006 and January 2007, and that those events establish the requisite causal connection. The anti-retaliation provision of the FCRA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a person for opposing an unlawful employment practice or for making a charge of discrimination. Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7). The district court correctly found that Jiles had not put forth any evidence to show a causal connection between the protected activity of his administrative charge of race discrimination in May 2006 and his January 2007 termination. Further, the district court did not err when it reasoned that the time-frame of eight months does not sufficiently proximate to establish a causal connection. Doc. 72 at 12; see Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (<HOLDING>). We therefore find no error in the district | [
"holding that a three to four month period between the protected activity is not enough to show very close temporal proximity",
"holding that a three and onehalf month temporal proximity is insufficient to create a jury issue on causation",
"recognizing temporal proximity when agency had knowledge of employees protected activity",
"holding in a discrimination case that a close temporal proximity sufficient to survive summary judgment existed where the challenged employment action occurred one month after the protected activity",
"holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection"
] | 00
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for determining whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another crime: [T]he definitions accorded the crimes determine whether one crime is a lesser included offense of another crime. In other words, all of the essential elements of the lesser crime must also be essential elements included in the greater crime. If the lesser crime has an essential element which is not completely covered by the greater crime, it is not a lesser included offense. State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 635, 295 S.E.2d 375, 378-79 (1982) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 61, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993); accord State v. Hedgepeth, 165 N.C. App. 321, 324, 598 S.E.2d 202, 205, disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 193, 607 S.E.2d 656 (2004) (<HOLDING>). Defendant was indicted for first degree rape. | [
"holding that a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense of a greater crime if the lesser crime contains an essential element not included in the greater crime",
"holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime",
"holding that the crime of rape is a lesser included offense of the crime of felony murder in the perpetration of rape and that since the latter crime included all of the elements of the former consecutive sentences were therefore improper",
"holding that reviewing court in a proper case may modify a judgment of conviction below and affirm it as a conviction of a lesser degree of the offense charged or of a lesser crime included therein where the errors do not affect the conviction of the lesser offense ",
"holding that an offense is factually lesser included if the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense"
] | 00
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as McColman argues. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2) provides: When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move — at any time, even after judgment — to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue. By its plain terms, Rule 15(b)(2) only applies to claims that are tried, and this case was disposed of on summary judgment. Further, Doan did not consent to trying the handcuffing claim — he objected to the claim in both his motion for summary judgment and at oral argument on that motion. Cf. Siler v. Webber, 448 Fed.Appx. 50, 58 (6th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). The fact that Doan would not have been | [
"holding that where parties did not respond to an issue in summary judgment motion parties relinquished any claim on the issue and conceded that summary judgment should be entered against them",
"holding unpleaded claims or defenses that are tried by express or implied consent of parties are treated as if they had been raised by pleadings even in summary judgment proceedings",
"holding an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by implied consent where the issue is presented considered and ruled upon by the trial court without objection",
"holding that an issue cannot be tried by the parties consent pursuant to rule 15b2 where one of the parties opposes trial by moving for summary judgment",
"holding order nonfinal where parties agreed to reserva tion on issue ripe for adjudication and tried by parties"
] | 33
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(“No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” (emphasis added)); Petersen, 301 F.3d at 1188 (“An employer’s action against an employee cannot be because of that employee’s protected opposition unless the employer knows the employee has engaged in protected opposition.”). In other words, Mr. Jones cannot establish a causal link between his allegedly protected activity and UPS’s refusal to return him to work unless he can show that UPS knew he was engaging in protected activity. See Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). To establish causation, Mr. Jones must | [
"holding that five weeks between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to establish a causal connection",
"holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the protected activity prior to taking that action",
"holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity",
"holding in the title vii context that the plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him know of the employees plaintiffs protected activity",
"holding that the plaintiff failed to show retaliation where there was no evidence that the employees who disciplined him knew of his protected activity"
] | 22
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to the present tense, it is doubtful that this change prejudiced defendant when defendant’s response to Mr. Falvey’s question is examined in context. First, it appears that defendant’s use of the past tense was a slip of the tongue because he was responding to a question asked of him in the present tense. In addition, he began his response with the word “currently.” Moreover, defendant’s lawyer, in his cross-examination of Lieutenant Commander Donald Ray Opedal, elicited testimony to the effect that defendant represented at the August 9, 1985 meeting that he was unemployed. Finally, the Court instructed the jurors that the arguments of counsel were not evidence and that their recollection of the evidence controlled. See, e.g., United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 267 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 762 | [
"holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail",
"holding prejudicial effect of prosecutors comment not rendered harmless by courts general instruction that the arguments of counsel are not evidence",
"holding that an attorneys arguments are not evidence",
"holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify",
"holding that district court acted within its discretion in denying motion for mistrial when prosecutor commented on matter not in evidence in closing argument because comment was not sufficiently prejudicial when taken together with the courts later jury instruction that the jurys recollection of the evidence controlled and that the attorneys arguments were not evidence "
] | 44
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an offset against the alimony award by the amount stolen by defendant and now due to plaintiff. We recognize, as did the trial judge, that alimony and equitable distribution are distinct but related types of relief. However, the discretionary application of the equitable maxim of unclean hands applies to matrimonial cases. Heuer v. Heuer, 152 N.J. 226, 238, 704 A.2d 913 (1998). It is well settled that a party “ ‘in equity must come into court with clean hands and ... must keep them clean ... throughout the proceedings.’ ” Chrisomalis v. Chrisomalis, 260 N.J.Super. 50, 53-54, 615 A.2d 266 (App.Div.1992) (quoting A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 246, 66 A.2d 319 (1949)). See also Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 190 N.J. 359, 384, 921 A.2d 427 (2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 132 N.J. | [
"holding he who seeks equity must do equity ",
"holding that the formula in section 522f2a creates equity for purposes of lien avoidance even if debtors otherwise have no equity in the property",
"holding that an insufficient pleading in equity is a nullity",
"holding that an action for specific performance lies in equity",
"holding that when the company seeks cancellation or rescission it must as a condition of obtaining relief do equity by returning or tendering back the premium paid with interest"
] | 00
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Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 39 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, the federal questions “must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.” Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). A federal defense cannot serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (“Thus, it is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense.”)(emphasis in original). Similarly, federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on a counterclaim. Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831, 122 S.Ct. 1889, 153 L.Ed.2d 13 (2002)(<HOLDING>) Fannie Mae’s Charter The Davises final | [
"holding that a defendants counterclaim that is based on the breach of the same maritime insurance contract as the main claim cannot be granted a jury trial because the resolution of the defendants claim would dispose of all or part of the plaintiffs action the net result would be to resolve the case in a jury trial despite the plaintiffs 9h election",
"holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc 1367a",
"holding that a challenge to part b determinations in an order involving both part a and part b must begin in district court",
"holding that under the law of the district of columbia the filing of a complaint does not toll the statute of limitations on a counterclaim",
"holding that a counterclaim which appears as part of the defendants answer not as part of the plaintiffs complaint cannot served as the basis for arising under jurisdiction"
] | 44
|
227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) — applied retroactively to vacated Pizarro’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, and after Pizarro had filed his opening brief in this third appeal. The fact that the Supreme Court denied Pizarro’s petition for a writ of certiorari after his first appeal, Pizarro-Morales v. United States, 546 U.S. 1199, 126 S.Ct. 1397, 164 L.Ed.2d 99 (2006), does not change the fact that his judgment of conviction was not final at the time Alleyne was decided, given that we had vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. See Berman, 302 U.S. at 212, 58 S.Ct. 164 (indicating that a judgment of conviction would not be final if the sentence were vacated); see also Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152, 153, 84 S.Ct. 1157, 12 L.Ed.2d 206 (1964) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Dodson, 291 F.3d at 276 n. 3 (citing Mercer | [
"holding that supreme court need not consider issue not raised in petition for certiorari",
"holding that even a remand by the supreme court for reconsideration in light of an intervening court opinion does not require the court to consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari",
"holding it is settled that the supreme court may consider questions raised on the first appeal after which the court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari as well as those that were before the court of appeals upon the second appeal after which the court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari internal quotation marks omitted",
"holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available",
"recognizing the right to petition for writ of certiorari as a form of appellate review"
] | 22
|
in an IRA were exempt. The court determined that the Wisconsin statute continued to exempt pension-plan proceeds after receipt by the beneficiary. Because the exemption statute in Woods differs substantially from § 522(d)(10), the holding in that case is inap-posite to the present matter. Notwithstanding the specific language of § 522(d)(10), the debtor argues that whenever a debtor rolls over funds from an exempt pension plan to an IRA, “equity dictates that the exemption should remain.” Debtor’s Brief at 2. ‘Whatever the ‘equitable’ considerations to which [the debtor] refers, ... his right to an exemption is governed by statute, and ... none of the statutory exemption provisions applies....” In re Clark, 711 F.2d at 23. But cf. In re Donaghy, 11 B.R. 677, 678-80 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981) (<HOLDING>). The debtor has presented no evidence | [
"holding in a ease where debtor elected for reasons of ill health and in order to meet present needs to take pension benefits in one lumpsum payment three weeks before filing bankruptcy petition that the proceeds would retain the exempt status provided by 522d10e because they were a tangible reflection of the debtors right to receive a payment under a pension plan ",
"holding that a payment is under the plan when the debt is provided for in the plan",
"holding that the son of a pension plan participant who had not been designated to receive any of his fathers pension benefits stood no closer to beneficiary status than any other person",
"holding that the defendant withheld pension benefits in breach of the plan",
"holding that a debtors obligation to repay a pension plan loan is a debt because the plans right to offset the obligation against future benefits constitutes a method of enforcement sufficient to create a right to payment"
] | 00
|
any physician that described her as obese, much less gave an opinion that her weight imposed additional limitations upon her or exacerbated her other conditions. Therefore, even if Reynolds’ silence on the issue of obesity is not deemed to waive consideration of that issue, it does not appear that evidence existed regarding her obesity that the ALJ should have considered. The ALJ also did not err in assessing Reynolds’ credibility. An ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses’ de meanor and to make an appropriate evaluation as to their credibility. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir.1997). Therefore, an ALJ’s credibility assessment will not be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.2001); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). In making a credibility determination, Social | [
"holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference",
"holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference",
"holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error",
"recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference",
"holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight"
] | 33
|
debtor and made within 910 days of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. As discussed in more detail below, 910 car loans receive special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code. 7 . This case was filed after October 17, 2005, when most provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) became effective. Pub.L. 109-8. All future statutory references are thus to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2005), unless other specifically noted. 8 .541 U.S. 465, 484-85, 124 S.Ct. 1951, 158 L.Ed.2d 787 (2004) (adopting formula approach, requiring adjustment of prime national interest rate based on risk of nonpayment). 9 . Section 1325(a) (emphasis added). 10 . In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>) and In re Horn, 338 B.R. 110, 113 | [
"holding that under georgia law a creditors refinancing of a promissory note destroyed the purchase money nature of the creditors security interest in a wall unit which served as collateral",
"holding that a purchase money security in jewelry was not lost when the perfected purchase money security interest was consolidated with a subsequent retail installment contract",
"holding security interest in insurance premiums perfected by creation of security interest",
"holding courts must look to the law of the state in which the security interest was created to determine if creditor retains a purchase money security interest despite refinancing",
"holding that in georgia pursuant to 9107 of the ucc refinancing of a promissory note transforms the obligation thereby destroying purchase money nature of the security interest therefore the creditor lost its purchase money security interest pmsi in a television set when the loans were consolidated and lien was avoidable id 89 br 264 18 bcd 58"
] | 33
|
in the record of any possible medical treatment that Monroe County or the individual defendants could have provided to save the life of the Decedent. Phillips argues in her brief that it is not necessary for her to prove chemotherapy would have saved the Decedent’s life. First, she refers to the fright and anxiety both she and the Decedent suffered because of the delay in chemotherapy. In this regard, Phillips confuses the causation issue. In a survival action, damages for the Decedent’s physical suffering and mental anxiety as a result of the alleged deprivation of medical care would have been appropriate. In a wrongful death context, however, no damages are available until the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839, 842 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, Phillips suggests that she need only | [
"recognizing cause of action for wrongful death",
"holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute",
"holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother",
"holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action",
"holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action"
] | 11
|
Accordingly, the second Olano prong is satisfied: the error, both as to the absence of a jury determination on an essential element of the offense and the failure to include that element in the indictment, was indeed “plain.” c. Did the plain error affect Thomas’s substantial rights? An error affects a defendant’s “substantial rights” if it is “prejudicial” and it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Gore, 154 F.3d at 47. “Though ‘prejudice’ is also required to show that an error is not ‘harmless,’ pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), the important difference of plain error prejudice [in most cases] is that ‘[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of pers , 2001), with United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100-01 3d Cir. (2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, | [
"holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error",
"holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment",
"holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed",
"holding at the governments urging that a similar error was an error in both the trial and sentencing",
"holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error"
] | 33
|
as a special education teacher, and commencing her intended career. Compl. at ¶ 77. These allegations are sufficient to demonstrate ongoing harm. Likewise, Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief — that the Individual Defendants change Plaintiffs grade and permit her to continue her studies at Hunger College — is purely prospective, as it would require state officials to take future action to prevent present and future harm. See Flint, 488 F.3d at 825. The fact that this injunction also remedies a past harm does not “render[ ] an otherwise forward-looking injunction retroactive. If it did, the rule allowing prospective relief would be substantially undermined because the need for prospective relief often arises out of a past injury.” Russell v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 | [
"holding that criticism of judicial action already taken even though the cases were still pending on other points or might be revived by rehearings was not enough to satisfy the clearandpresentdanger standard",
"holding that courts should order reinstatement under the adea whenever it is an appropriate remedy because reinstatement best serves congress purpose in enacting the adea and an award of front pay is always somewhat speculative",
"holding that an award of attorney fees for services rendered at the instance of the custodial parent in defending an action for change of custody may be allowed even though the defense was unsuccessful and even though it was claimed that such an award violated public policy",
"holding that trial court did not have jurisdiction to order reinstatement of previously dismissed action and thus reinstatement order was void and of no effect and previous order of dismissal was still in effect",
"holding that reinstatement is prospective even though it contemplated changing the result of an action already taken"
] | 44
|
DCA 1999) (quoting Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). Furthermore, the Straney case relied upon by the dissent is distinguishable. That case involved an order that changed a custody order’s time-sharing arrangement to give one of the parties more time with the child, not a change in custody. As noted in Boykin, the test for proving entitlement to custody modification has two prongs: 1) whether there is a substantial and material change of circumstances; and 2) whether the child’s welfare will be promoted by a change in custody. The party seeking custody modification must overcome the “extraordinary burden of proving both elements.” 843 So.2d at 320. It is therefore incumbent on the trial court to apply this extraordinary burden test. See Hastings, 875 So.2d at 779 (<HOLDING>). The court here failed to do so. Our review of | [
"holding that trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion for rule 11 sanctions without adequate explanation",
"holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion",
"holding trial court abused discretion by assessing sanctions without supporting evidence",
"holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend",
"holding trial court abused its discretion by modifying custody without applying extraordinary burden test"
] | 44
|
Reversed. Judge HUNTER, JR. concurs in result with separate opinion. Judge STEELMAN dissents. 1 . The pseudonym T.A.S. is used to protect the identity of the juvenile. 2 . The record does not indicate whether the male students’ underwear was subject to the search or, if so, how the inspection thereof was conducted. In fact, Ms. Robinson’s testimony suggests that only the girls were subject to this more extensive search. 3 . The same standard applies here despite the presence of a law enforcement officer because, as found by the trial court, the search was conducted by school administrators and staff, and the school resource officer’s role was limited to observation, as he did not participate in the actual search. See In re Murray, 136 N.C. App. 648, 650, 525 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2000) (<HOLDING>); see also In re J.F.M. & T.J.B., 168 N.C. App. | [
"holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment",
"holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises",
"holding the tlo standard governs school searches when school resource officers who although employed by the local police department are primarily responsible to the school district are acting in conjunction with school officials",
"holding that a school district was not liable for sexual molestation of plaintiffs daughter by a teacher even though the acts occurred on school property and during school hours",
"holding search was conducted by school official where school resource officer did not search the bag himself or conduct any investigation on his own and therefore applying the tlo reasonableness standard"
] | 44
|
to suspect that the agency would refuse to adhere to clearly applicable precedent. See Philipp Bros., Inc. v. United States, 10 CIT 76, 80, 630 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 (1986). 12 Accordingly, this Court finds Timken’s arguments regarding the application of adverse facts available to Premier are without merit. Premier fully participated in the review, and has no control over it’s suppliers cooperation. Section 1677e(b) of Title 19 states that when Commerce finds “that an interested party failed to cooperate .. . [the agency] may use an” adverse inference. Premier’s suppliers are not interested parties. Therefore, the Court will not apply adverse facts to Premier as a result of its suppliers’ deficiencies. See generally Kompass Food Trading Int'l v. United States, 24 CIT 678, 682-83 (2000) | [
"holding that tax courts miller opinion will no longer be followed",
"holding that once a respondent refuses to supply information commerce no longer focuses on the true margin but rather on determining an adverse margin that will induce future cooperation",
"holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant",
"holding that aggravation was warranted where respondent admitted and the referee found that the respondent had lied in correspondence to the pcc",
"holding that since the basis for the respondents order of removal and the denial of relief no longer exists the respondent has presented exceptional circumstances justifying reopening"
] | 11
|
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established “before the defendant acted or failed to act.” Rice v. Burks, 999 F.2d 1172, 1174 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 968, 109 S.Ct. 497, 102 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988)). This requires the plaintiff to offer either a closely analogous case or evidence that the defendants’ conduct is so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the courts. See Rice, at 1173-74; McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). To determine the applicability of qualified | [
"holding that deputies use of a police dog is subject to excessive force analysis",
"holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim",
"holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since 951 requirements were satisfied",
"holding that an officer intentionally hitting the plaintiffs head into the top of the police car as the plaintiff was being placed in the police car could be excessive force",
"holding a gun to the head of a child and threatening to pull the trigger is plainly excessive force so closely analogous case is not needed to put police officer on notice"
] | 44
|
making mistakes. Thus, any prejudice against the Defendant was at best minimal and could have been turned to the Defendant’s advantage by his counsel. Even if any prejudice did result, it most certainly did not permeate the entire trial and impact the result as it appears only once in the transcript and never was mentioned later during the trial. See United States v. Beckett, 706 F.2d 519, 520 (5th Cir.1983) (“Prosecutorial misconduct, fortunately occurring only occasionally, mars any trial in which it occurs and gives grounds for appeal. But a conviction should not be set aside if the prosecutor’s conduct, however, wrongful, did not in fact contribute to the guilty verdict and was, therefore, legally harmless.”); see also United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1563-66 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). This ground for a new trial, therefore, is | [
"holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify",
"holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error",
"holding that prosecutors allegedly improper closing arguments regarding burden of proof defendants failure to testify and other allegations did not case serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury verdict or the fairness of the trial",
"holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify",
"holding that any potential prejudice regarding burdenshifting is diminished by the prosecutors statement that the burden of proof is the governments and the courts explicit instructions regarding the burden of proof in the jury charge"
] | 22
|
part: "If no objections have been timely filed, the court shall forthwith enter judgment on the referee’s report.” 2 . An amended order was entered on December 22, 2009, to correct a typographical error. 3 . Prejudgment interest awarded to a successful defendant on a counterclaim accrues from the date the counterclaim, not the plaintiff's complaint, is filed. Uncle Henry’s, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc., 382 F.Supp.2d 150, 154 (D.Me.2005) (interpreting 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5) (2009)). 4 . We recognized an exception to this general rule with respect to post-judgment interest on certain child support arrearage claims, which were deemed to be a "unique area of the law.” Walsh v. Cusack, 2008 ME 74, ¶ 9, 946 A.2d 414, 417. 5 . See also Walsh, 2008 ME 74, ¶¶ 10-11, 946 A.2d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Tarbuck v. Jaeckel, 2000 ME 105, ¶ 25 n. 5, | [
"holding that section 1961 applied where the parties agreement failed to specify that the selected interest rate applied to either judgements or judgment debts",
"holding that walsh was entitled to postjudgment interest on child support arrearage but vacating and remanding the arrearage judgment because the judgment did not state the interest rate or specify that the interest was fully or partially waived as required by section 1602c",
"holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury",
"holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case",
"holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment"
] | 11
|
of the separation of powers doctrine. Several courts and commentators have recognized, however, that this language is meaningless unless read within the context of the court’s discussion of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Guerrero, 290 F.3d at 1219-20 (“[the Boerne court’s] discussion of the separation of powers doctrine was entirely within the framework of its section 5 analysis — not an independent rationale”); Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958-59 (“Although the court did mention separation of powers concerns in [Boeme], this language must be read in the context of the entire opinion and the question being considered”); Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 Mich. L.Rev. 1903, 1914 (2001) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, the court concludes that | [
"holding that the plain language of the diversity jurisdiction statute permitted a workmens compensation claim to be filed as an original action in federal court even though congress clearly intended to prohibit the removal of such claims congress used language specifically barring removal of such cases from state to federal courts and at the same time left unchanged the old language which just as specifically permits civil suits to be filed in federal courts in cases where there are both diversity of citizenship and the prescribed jurisdictional amount in this situation we must take the intent of congress with regard to the filing of diversity cases in federal district courts to be that which its language clearly sets forth congress could very easily have used language to bar filing of workmens compensation suits by the insurer as well as removal of such suits and it could easily do so still",
"holding that because the due process clause in the federal constitution is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment the right is also guaranteed to defendants pursuant to the identical provision in article i section 5 of the hawaii constitution",
"recognizing that in boeme justice kennedy forcefully asserted the judicial prerogative to interpret the constitution in language that might be understood to implicate rfras applications to federal as well as state law but also that other language in the opinion indicates that the court situated its judicial supremacy concerns squarely in the context of the fourteenth amendment and state sovereignty",
"holding that to hold the same constitution that specifically recognizes felon disenfranchisement under 2 of the fourteenth amendment but also prohibits disenfranchisement under another amendment would be to interpret the constitution in an inconsistent manner",
"holding that an action cannot be maintained under young in unique circumstances where the suit against the state officer affects an essential attribute of state sovereignty in a manner that the action must be understood as one against the state"
] | 22
|
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized that “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of student property without probable cause); see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74, | [
"holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable",
"holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct ",
"holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence",
"holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause",
"holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause"
] | 44
|
from the class if the member so requests”). 36. Plaintiffs observe that after receiving-class notice in the ordinary case, a would-be class member cannot refuse to opt out and later object to class certification. Plaintiffs argue that through declining to opt out, the class member has in essence consented to the propriety of class certification. Courts have held, for example, that a decision not to opt out of a class should foreclose attacks on whether the class has adequate representation. See, e.g., Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 354, 357-58 (2d Cir.1979) (observing that right to opt-out of the proposed settlement protects class members’ interests from alleged inadequate representation); see also Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1220, 114 S.Ct. 2707, | [
"holding that conflicts of constitutional magnitude can arise from cases of successive representation",
"holding that the failure to optout precluded challenge to adequate representation based upon purported conflicts of interest between subclasses",
"holding that there is a qualified first amendment right of access to proceedings and documents relating to disqualification of a judge in a criminal case and to conflicts of interest between attorneys in a criminal case",
"holding that pslra barred rico claims based on pension fund scheme involving failure to disclose conflicts of interest and commission arrangements",
"holding where challenge was waived that appellate review is precluded"
] | 11
|
of the debtor. This distinction appears immaterial under the language of sec. 409.402(7), Stats. 7 In other contexts, a security interest properly perfected at one time may later become unperfected through creditor inaction. See, e.g. sec. 409.103(l)(d)l, (2)(b), (3)(e), Stats, (four month grace periods preserving perfection in collateral removed from jurisdic tion); sec. 409.403(2) (lapse of financing statements after 5 years unless continued). 8 Interestingly, the Ansley court held that a filing under "the name Ansley Farms instead of the debtor's true name — Emory Ansley — is seriously misleading, making [the]. . . security interest unperfected.. . ." Id,., 467 F.Supp. at 55. Other cases reaching similar results are In Re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr.W.D. Mich. 1972) (<HOLDING>); In Re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (D.C. | [
"holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient",
"holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation",
"holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain",
"holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart",
"holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation"
] | 33
|
address the precise language of the agreement. See id. at 1018. That case cannot stand for the proposition that any contractual rate of interest applies postjudgment, because that would conflict with the merger rule and would have made it unnecessary for the court in Hymel to emphasize that the contractual rate of interest applied both before and after judgment. 23 .See also Steven H. Reisberg & Kristin M. Pauley, An Arbitrator’s Authority to Award Interest on an Award Until "Date of Payment”: Problems and Limitations, 2013 Int’l Arb. L.Rev. 25, 29-30 ("To successfully ‘contract out’ of the statutory post-judgment interest rates, it is therefore critical that the language used specifically refer to the post-judgment period.”). 24 . Cf. also Carte Blanche, 888 F.2d at 264, 268-70 (<HOLDING>) 25 . See also Hosier v. Citigroup Global | [
"holding that arbitration award of postaward interest at 8 accruing from the 31st day after service of this award until final payment of the award was insufficient to displace federal rate",
"holding that rule 60a is the proper vehicle for correcting a judgment in order to provide for an award of prejudgment interest where among other things governing law would make the interest award automatic or the district court clearly intended to make the interest award in its prior order",
"holding that arbitral award of 10 interest to the date or dates of payment merged into the judgment",
"holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict",
"holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due"
] | 22
|
that the trial court could properly conclude that “there was no showing of uniform conduct likely to mislead the entire jury is not required for non-representative class members, the issues of reliance and injury do not foreclose Plaintiff Brown’s UCL class action. See, e.g., Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 275 F.R.D. 573, 578 (C.D.Cal.2011) (“The ... the alleged omissions and affirmative misrepresentations were consistently made and are therefore common to all members of the putative class.”); Wiener v. Dannon Co., 255 F.R.D. 658, 669 (C.D.Cal.2009) (“For a class action, an inference of reliance arises as to the entire class only if the material misrepresentations were made to all class members.”); Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 238 F.R.D. 482, 492 (C.D.Cal.2006) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Plaintiff Brown may prove with | [
"holding that the court could reasonably assume that no rational class member would have purchased the product had he known of the alleged misrepresentation",
"holding that a person cannot reasonably rely on a misrepresentation when the contents of a written instrument contradict the alleged misrepresentation",
"holding inference appropriate where no rational class member would have acted if there had been adequate disclosure",
"holding that no class member may opt out of a rule 23b1 class action",
"holding that contractor could not show that it reasonably relied upon alleged misrepresentation"
] | 00
|
to commit the crime in the manner specified. Voluntary abandonment of purpose after an act constituting an attempt is not a defense. The definition in the 1928 and 1949 Manuals was as follows: An attempt to commit a crime is an act done with intent to commit that particular crime, and forming part of a series of acts which will apparently, if not interrupted by circumstances independent of the doer’s will, result in its actual commission. Para. 152c, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1928; para. 183c, Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1949. The Articles for the Government of the Navy also did not have any general statutory prohibition of attempts; but apparently they often were punishable as lesser-included offenses. See, e.g., section 91, Naval Courts and Boards, 1937 (<HOLDING>) According to naval law: If an attempt is not | [
"holding that where an agent is guilty of independent fraud for his benefit knowledge of the fraud is not imputed to the principal",
"recognizing attempted fraud as a lesserincluded offense of fraud in violation of article 14 for the government of the navy",
"holding that under the pre1986 jurisdictional limitation a claim by the state which discovered the fraud investigated the fraud disclosed the fraud to the federal government and which was the original source of the information was jurisdictionally barred",
"holding that the issue of fraud was precluded because the previous jury necessarily considered fraud as the basis for chapter 93a liability",
"holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid the securities fraud exception by pleading mail fraud or wire fraud if the conduct giving rise to those offenses also amounts to securities fraud"
] | 11
|
unique facts and circumstances of each case” to determine whether an individual voluntarily consented to a search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The district court’s sifting of the unique facts and circumstances in this case changed from its first order to its second order. When the district court reviewed the evidence through the lens of an unlawful seizure, it was then-and only then-the court found Loos’s and Escobar’s consents were constitutionally deficient. The district court properly considered the legal effect of the officer’s lie about the drug dog alerting when pondering whether Loos and Escobar voluntarily consented to the searches of their luggage. The Supreme Court has “stated that even when of 86, 1191 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Realizing there is “a vast difference between | [
"holding that a fiftynine minute detention to wait for a drug dog was reasonable where the officer requested the dog immediately after developing reasonable suspicion",
"holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding consent where two agents testified that the defendant orally consented but the defendant denied having orally consented and would not sign a written consent form",
"holding that officers release of police dog to assist in arrest was discretionary act",
"holding district courts finding of consent was not clearly erroneous when the defendant consented after officers told him they could get a drug dog even though the defendant knew the dog would alert",
"holding that defendant voluntarily consented where defendants only basis for coercion was that the officers said that if he did not consent they would get a warrant which would take a while"
] | 33
|
§ 6323(a), leave which is never afforded to nonmilitary personnel. Furthermore, the cases Defendants cite in support of their contention address situations in which employers had unilateral policies affording additional benefits or rights to absent military personnel. While courts have consistently held that employers do not commit a USERRA violation in revoking these extra benefits, these cases do not address USERRA rights provided by statute. See Crews v. City of Mt. Vernon, 567 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir.2009) (rescission of a flexible work scheduling program did not constitute a USERRA violation); Gross v. PPG Indus., Inc., 636 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir.2011) (rescission of differential pay policy did not violate US-ERRA); Welshans v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 F.3d 1100, 1104 (Fed.Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). There is simply no plausible argument that | [
"holding that revocation of benefits provided by the employee and labor relations manual did not implicate userra",
"holding an employee manual did not create contract restricting the employmentatwill relationship",
"holding enforceable employee manual that was distributed to all employees",
"holding that there was no employment contract where personnel manual provided that after three months an employee became a permanent employee where there was no additional expression as to duration",
"holding employee manual binding based in part on its widespread distribution"
] | 00
|
for a valid charging lien set forth by the supreme court in Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So.2d 1383, 1385 (Fla.1983). “In order to give timely notice of a charging lien an attorney should either file a notice of lien or otherwise pursue the lien in the original action.” Daniel Mones, P.A. v. Smith, 486 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla.1986) (citing Sinclair, Louis, 428 So.2d at 1385). Notice is timely where the charging hen is filed prior to entry of the final judgment. See Gaebe, Murphy, Mullen & Antonelli v. Bradt, 704 So.2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Conversely, an attorney’s charging hen is untimely and may not be established in proceedings after final judgment has been entered. See Milio v. Leinoff & Silvers, P.A., 668 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>). Here, Mr. Johnson did not give notice of | [
"holding premature notice of appeal was treated as entered on date of entry of final judgment",
"holding in part as a general rule a trial courts judgment becomes final thirty days after its entry unless a party files a timely notice of appeal or specified posttrial motion",
"holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment",
"holding attorney may not wait more than thirty days from the entry of final judgment give notice of nonrepresentation and then seek to enforce a hen not noticed before the entry of the final judgment",
"holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence"
] | 33
|
S.W.2d 759, 767 (Tex.Ciim.App.1973) (stating that seizure conducted within parameters of a valid search warrant did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights where officers acted in accordance with procedural guidelines). Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s third and fourth issues. In his fifth and sixth issues, appellant contends that the method of seizure violated the constitutional provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws found in article I, section 10, clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution. Ex post facto prohibitions apply to civil statutes only when the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. See Rodriguez, 93 S.W.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>). Forfeitures under chapter 59 of the code of | [
"holding that the interpretation of statutory language should be consistent with the legislatures purpose and intent",
"holding that courts must generally give effect to the plain meaning of a statute because that is the best evidence of the legislatures intent",
"holding that the legislatures manifest intent will be rejected only where the party challenging the statute provides the clearest proof that the statute is actually criminally punitive in operation",
"recognizing language of statute as clearest indicator of legislative intent",
"holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute"
] | 22
|
purports to be — an authorization to settle the case for $500,000. In sum, the Court rejects Plaintiff's attempt to rely on this prior settlement discourse as a means to establish a viable amendment. 3 . Plaintiff could have amended her administrative claim at this time because the INS had not yet denied her claim. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). However, Plaintiff elected not to file an amendment. 4 . Plaintiff contends that Defendant has the burden of showing that Plaintiff's injury was not reasonably foreseeable when Plaintiff filed her administrative claim. (PL’s Reply at 2-3.) Plaintiff is wrong. It is well settled that a plaintiff has the burden of proving “newly discovered evidence" under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). See Milano v. United States, 92 F.Supp.2d 769, 774 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>); see also Lowry, 958 F.Supp. at 719 (“The | [
"holding that newly discovered evidence must be that which existed at the time of trial but for an excusable reason was not discoverable until later",
"holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment",
"holding that a plaintiff has the burden of proof to show newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency",
"holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed",
"holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence"
] | 22
|
or determination of an officer, board, commission, authority or tribunal. Such petition shall be filed within 30 days after the date of the decision or determination complained of and shall recite such decision or determination and set forth the errors alleged to have been committed therein. The petition shall be signed by the petitioner or his attorney, and shall be accompanied by the certificate of the attorney that he has examined the process or proceeding and the decision or determination therein sought to be reviewed, that the same is in his opinion erroneous and that the petition is not filed for delay. Super. Ct. R. 15(a). (emphasis added). To fall under the terms of Rule 15(a) whereby the thirty-day requirement would ept. of Property and Procurement, 41 V.I. 72 (Terr.Ct. 1999) (<HOLDING>) (citing In re Hodge, 16 V.I. 548, 555 (Terr. | [
"holding that the phrase party aggrieved should be given a practical rather than hypertechnical meaning",
"holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language",
"holding that federal court decisions construing and applying the federal arbitration act may be regarded as persuasive authority in construing and applying corresponding provisions of our local arbitration act",
"holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed",
"holding that party is aggrieved from date of notice but construing rule 15a"
] | 44
|
that appellee directly advertised to Pennsylvania residents. See appellants’ EXHIBIT D, E. These references serve as nothing more than indicators for visitors in ascertaining the location of the campground in relation to known areas. ¶ 17 Appellee’s newsletters are advertised in two national publications. There is no evidence in the record that these are directly targeted at Pennsylvania residents. See appellants’ EXHIBIT M, at 12. Additionally, appellee handed out brochures at the campgrounds located in New Jersey. Id. at 15. In order for a party to obtain a brochure without stepping into New Jersey, the party needs to initiate contact with appellee by written inquiry. Id. These forms of communication preclude a finding of systematic and continuous contact. See Efford, supra at 375 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 18 Moreover, the owner of Four Seasons | [
"holding interactive website did not create general jurisdiction",
"holding that the defendant maintained a passive website and was therefore not subject to general jurisdiction",
"holding that a passive website that merely makes information available is insufficient to confer general jurisdiction",
"holding that a nonresident defendant who knowingly sent false information about billing commissions into massachusetts via us mail in order to deceive the plaintiff into accepting a lower percentage than was due him was subject to specific jurisdiction",
"holding that absence of evidence that appellee internet company directed advertising towards pennsylvanians via its website and the initiation by appellant to receive information via mail precluded a finding of general jurisdiction"
] | 44
|
Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417, 425 (Colo.App.1994); Employers Insurance of Wausau v. RREEF USA Fund-II (Colorado), Inc., 805 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Colo.Ct.App.1991). Here, Plaintiffs confessed the state claims against Cox for misrepresentation, breach of contract, and estoppel against Cox. They did not confess the remainder of causes of action against him, including the state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. Because Cox was required to expend efforts beyond the filing of the motion to dismiss, an award of fees under § 13-17-201 is warranted. Moreover, Plaintiffs are liable for Cox’s attorney fees, notwithstanding that certain claims may remain against other Defendants. See Smith v. Town of Snowmass Village, 919 P.2d 868, 873 (Colo.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). I conclude, pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. § | [
"holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed",
"holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees",
"holding the dismissed defendant was not precluded from obtaining its reasonable attorney fees under 1317201 even though the action was still pending against another defendant",
"holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment",
"holding that the defendant was only permitted to recover attorney fees as an item of special damages with respect to the underlying action in which the defendant was sued and was not permitted to recover attorney fees incurred in the malpractice portion of the case as damages"
] | 22
|
to principles and interpretations of federal Title VII cases when construing the MHRA. See e.g., Continental Can Co. v. State by Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn.1980) (Title VII cases and principles are instructive and have been applied to the MHRA) (citing Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn.1978)). “Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. Several federal courts of appeal, federal district courts, and at least one state court have held that an employee has a cause of action against his or her employer when a non-employee sexually harasses the employee. See e.g., Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Trent v. Valley Electric Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524, | [
"holding employee had cause of action against her employers when nonemployee harassed her and employers failed to take corrective action",
"holding employer could be hable for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees including employers customers",
"holding that where the employer fired the plaintiff upon a good faith belief that he sexually harassed coworkers the plaintiff could not prove pretext by challenging the harassment allegations",
"holding employer may be hable for sexual harassment of employee by independent contractor",
"holding employer may be hable when its employee is sexually harassed by employers patrons and employer either ratifies or acquiesces in harassment by not taking immediate andor corrective action"
] | 44
|
plaintiff has not adequately alleged a conspiracy, nor has plaintiff put forth evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that a conspiracy existed. In fact, plaintiff has failed to identify the purported members of the conspiracy. Plaintiff cannot simply make a conclusory allegation that a conspiracy existed; rather, plaintiff must provide facts showing agreement and concerted action. Sooner Prods. Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir.1983). In this case, plaintiffs allegation of a conspiracy, without more, is insufficient to state a claim for conspiracy. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts tending to show agreement or concerted action. The court finds that plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim fails as a maicer of law. Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1303 (10th Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). D. Municipal Liability Plaintiff also alleges | [
"holding that conclusory allegation of conspiracy without supporting factual averments insufficient to state claim",
"holding that conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based citations omitted",
"holding that vague conclusory statements are insufficient",
"holding conclusory assertions of intent to cause insufficient without supporting facts",
"holding that allegations against nondiverse defendants must be factual not conclusory because conclusory allegations do not state a claim"
] | 00
|
This holding, however, not only fails to dispose of Reyes’s first complaint, it fails to consider Rule 13.1(a)’s history in addressing his second complaint. However, since Reyes’s second issue can (and should) be disposed of without doing violence to the mandatory nature of the court reporter’s duty, I concur in the court’s judgment. When the trial court renders a judgment for the recovery of real property, the amount of “security must be at least ... the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue.” Tex.R.App. P. 24.2(a)(2)(A). Therefore, to determine the proper amount t did not hold an evidentiary hearing on Reyes’s motion to set superse-deas, a reporter’s record of the hearing was not required. Cf. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Tex.2005) (<HOLDING>). The majority holds, however, that Reyes | [
"recognizing that the only record of grand jury testimony is the court reporters certified transcript not her tape recording of the proceeding",
"holding that appellant failed to preserve error in court reporters failure to make record of trial by failing to object",
"holding in the pretrial context that a reporters record is required only if evidence is introduced in open court for nonevidentiary hearings it is superfluous",
"holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due",
"holding that it is not"
] | 22
|
even if the 1993 judgment was final and appealable, they may challenge the merits of the 1993 judgment in this appeal from the 1995 order. This appeal is untimely only if the District Court’s 1993 decision — which ordered only that ISP submit a plan to remedy the constitutional flaws in its policy — was a final judgment, appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We believe that the District Court’s 1993 order was no more final under § 1291 than the one at issue in Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist., 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir.1987), which held that a district court order to a school district to submit a plan to remedy an unconstitutional atmosphere of racial hostility was not an appealable final judgment. Id. at 539; see also Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The November 1995 judgment is, therefore, the | [
"holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable",
"holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under 1292a1",
"holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable",
"holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc 1292a1",
"holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable"
] | 33
|
boundaries of a search in the same manner as the specifications in a warrant. If the government does not conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search, the search is impermissible. In justifying a consensual search, the government bears the burden of establishing that the search was conducted within the purview of the consent received. When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless. Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). See also State v. Nabarro, 55 Haw. 583, 583-87, 525 P.2d 573, 574-75 (1974) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation mark omitted). Hence, | [
"holding that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted",
"holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises",
"holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises",
"holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises",
"holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted"
] | 11
|
Perkins’ testimony were not prejudicial in these circumstances. D. Downward Departures Kornegay claims that the district court erroneously denied him a downward departure on either of two bases. Both departure arguments relate to the 14-month state drug conviction sentence which Kornegay served after the drug deal at issue in this case but before he was indicted. The first ground for departure was premised on the government’s delay in prosecuting Kornegay in order to protect Chaney from being detected as an informant. Kornegay argued that this delay foreclosed the possibility of his federal sentence running concurrently with his state sentence and that a departure should be granted so that he would not be prejudiced. See United States v. Saldana, 109 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). The district court declined to grant the | [
"holding that although the defendant was paroled rather than released unconditionally his state sentence was discharged for purposes of deciding whether the federal judge could impose a concurrent sentence",
"holding that prosecutorial delay that was extreme or sinister could support a departure if the defendant was required to serve a state sentence which could have been concurrent with the federal sentence had the federal prosecution proceeded sooner",
"holding that a federal sentence commences when the attorney general receives the convicted defendant into custody for service of that sentence",
"holding that the defendant was entitled to counsel when the offense for which he was tried could result in the imposition of a jail sentence",
"holding that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 1983 claims"
] | 11
|
See In re Russell C., 120 N.H. at 268; cf. State v. Bernaby, 139 N.H. 420, 423 (1995) (concluding that trial court did not deny defendant his right to a speedy trial where delay was due, in part, to defendant’s waiver of right and request for continuances because a “defendant cannot take advantage of a delay he has caused”). In this case, the juvenile moved to dismiss at the original adjudicatory hearing because none of the State’s witnesses was present and, therefore, the State could not go forward with the hearing. The State acknowledged that it could'not go forward with the hearing and did not object to dismissal of the petition. The State did not request a continuance or that it be given a fourteen day extension under RSA 169-B:14, II. Cf. In re Juvenile 2007-150, 156 N.H. at 802 (<HOLDING>). Rather, the only relief the State requested | [
"holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing",
"holding that trial court did not err in denying juveniles motion to dismiss for failing to complete adjudicatory hearing within statutory time limit where adjudicatory hearing began within thirty days of arraignment but prosecutor requested a continuance when one of his subpoenaed witnesses did not appear",
"holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on motion for reinstatement when appellants failed to call to the trial courts attention the need for a hearing",
"holding that trial court did not err",
"holding that the trial court did not err by failing to hold an oral hearing on a motion to dismiss an appeal because the appellant was afforded a full opportunity to respond to the motion"
] | 11
|
because federal law requires federal approval of Indian wills, 25 U.S.C. § 373, and gives BIA probate judges the authority to approve settlement agreements resolving contested Indian probate proceedings, 43 C.F.R. § 30.150. However, this conclusion cannot be squared with controlling precedent. The Supreme Court has expressly declined to recognize any “inherent power” on the part of a federal court to enforce a settlement agreement simply because the agreement resolved a federal proceeding. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377-378, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Rather, enforcement of such a settlement agreement “requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 378, 114 S.Ct. 1673; see also Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); id. at 951 (“[Wjhere the validity of a | [
"holding that the general federal regulatory scheme governing indian mineral leases did not establish federal jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration agreement made under such a lease when the plaintiffs claim sounded only in general contract law",
"holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored",
"holding that reasonableness analysis applies in general jurisdiction case under federal circuit law",
"holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates",
"holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added"
] | 00
|
with conduct of the type alleged by Hopkins in this case, we have consistently affirmed summary judgment dismissing the claims. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir.1989) (affirming directed verdict in Title VII case despite evidence that female police officer was subjected to pornographic material placed in her station mailbox and to fellow officers’ sexually explicit conversations); Harris v. Clyburn, 1995 WL 56634, at *3 (4th Cir.1995) (unpublished) (per curiam) (affirming summary judgment for employer where “only specific factual allegation of sexual harassment [was] occasional tickling [by her male superior] in the hallway”); Cobbins v. School Bd. of Lynchburg, Va., No. 90-1754, slip op. at 7-10, 1991 WL 1828 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 1991) (unpublished) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). See also Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430-31 | [
"holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her",
"holding that homosexual advances by male coworker were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable",
"holding that where male teacher asked female teacher out for a drink asked her to perform tasks she perceived as secretarial and struck her in a fight purported harassment was not genderbased and was not sufficiently severe or pervasive",
"holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment",
"holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where a supervisor allegedly touched plaintiffs hand and thigh lifted her dress hem repeatedly asked her to lunch told her that she was beautiful stared at her and called her home on numerous occasions at night and asked about personal matters"
] | 22
|
in making decisions regarding competency, and we uphold those decisions so long as they are “supported by credible evidence and not clearly erroneous.” State v. Bean, 171 Vt. 290, 295, 762 A.2d 1259, 1262 (2000). Here, despite the majority’s conclusions to the contrary, the testimony provided on the record by the two transport officers was credible and, based on this evidence, it was within the trial court’s discretion to rule that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defendant has therefore failed to show prejudice. ¶ 35. Because defendant has not shown that any prejudice occurred from whatever errors the trial court may have made, any alleged violations of defendant’s due process rights are also harmless. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 150 Vt. 483, 489-90, 555 A.2d 369, 373-74 (1988) (<HOLDING>). For these reasons, I would affirm the jury | [
"holding petitioner must demonstrate error and substantial prejudice to prevail on a due process claim",
"holding that when the prejudice from a sixth amendment violation is limited to the admission into evidence of the mental health testimony harmless error analysis applies",
"holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis",
"holding that the doctrine of harmless error applies when a due process violation is alleged and affirming a conviction when defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice",
"holding that harmless error test is satisfied when there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction"
] | 33
|
the “quick intervention” of Dr. Kasozi, “most probably [he] would not be here today.” Id. An IJ’s credibility finding is a finding of fact. Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” We interpret this statute to call for review under the substantial evidence test, under which the IJ’s finding will be upheld if “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the record as a whole.” Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. To reverse, the evidence must not only support the conclusion that the IJ erred, but compel it. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); accord Batalova, 355 F.3d at 1254 (<HOLDING>). This court has, however, joined “other | [
"holding that credibility determinations are for the jury",
"holding that the ijs or bias credibility determinations are not questioned if they are substantially reasonable",
"holding that the credibility determinations by the board are virtually unreviewable",
"holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence",
"holding that ijs and bias finding of applicants lack of credibility was substantially supported by the inconsistencies regarding the date of spouses alleged sterilization"
] | 11
|
an argument despite its abandonment on appeal, we ordinarily will not do so ‘unless manifest injustice otherwise would result.’ ” (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 27 F.3d 29, 30 (2d Cir.1994))). Here, no “manifest injustice” results from the denial of Seadinovski’s petition, as the relevant regulation provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). As the plain language of the regulation provides, failure to comply with the requirement is a ground for denial of the motion. See Zhen Nan Lin v. Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir.2006); see also Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>). Because no manifest injustice results, and | [
"holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it",
"holding that it was within the discretion of the bia to deny a motion to reopen because it was not accompanied by an asylum application",
"holding that the bia abused its discretion when it denied petitioners motion to reopen by failing to consider evidence of country conditions",
"holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds",
"holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen"
] | 11
|
Dr. Proctor testified about the 2014 Report’s conclusion that filtered cigarettes increased the risk of adenocarci-noma (a type of lung cancer) by causing smokers to inhale more deeply, and by ventilating in a way‘that “increases certain poisonous compounds.” On appeal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have been permitted to use the 2014 Report to bolster the testimony of her expert witness. On this point, we also agree with Defendants. It is well established that “experts cannot bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not testify,” as -“[s]ueh testimony improperly permits one expert to become a conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination.” Schwarz v. State, 695 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Tolbert v. State, 114 So.3d 291, 294 | [
"holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion",
"holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting 90403 fla stat",
"holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction",
"holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge",
"holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice"
] | 11
|
Division and New York Court of Appeals specifically declined to decide the issue of whether was properly precluded under C.P.L. § 250.10(2), the only court that adjudicated the claim on the merits was the County Court. Time has proven that the trial judge correctly construed C.P.L. § 250.10(2) as applying to lay evidence, such as a defendant’s own testimony, offered in support of an EED defense: Recently, the New York Court of Appeals answered in the affirmative the question it explicitly left open in Smith’s case— “whether a defendant seeking to raise an extreme emotional disturbance defense is required to provide notice pursuant to CPL 250.10 if the intent is to rely solely on lay testimony to prove the affirmative defense.” People v. Diaz, 904 N.Y.S.2d 343, 930 N.E.2d at 266 (<HOLDING>). Because the sanction of preclusion bears on a | [
"holding that error in classifying agents testimony as lay opinion and failing to subject it to the disclosure requirements was harmless",
"holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace which was based upon personal knowledge of employees was properly admitted",
"holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel",
"holding that in a seconddegree murder prosecution defendant was required to provide statutory notice of his intent to rely upon the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance eed notwithstanding his stated intention to support that defense with lay testimony only the notice requirements goals of preventing unfair surprise and allowing the prosecution an opportunity to obtain evidence from any source were implicated whether defendant sought to establish mental infirmity through expert or lay testimony",
"holding that it was error to allow a police officer who was admitted as a lay witness after a prosecution motion to admit him as an expert was denied for lack of timeliness to give testimony as to a matter about which he had no personal knowledge"
] | 33
|
applies to the bankruptcy court’s severance of these counterclaims. In its motions to sever, Kaiser moved under Bankruptcy Rules 7012, 7013, 7021 and 7042. Bankruptcy Rules 7012 and 7013 do not address the severance of claims or counterclaims. Rule 7012 simply provides for the form and time periods for filing answers and answers to cross-claims and for the admission or denial of the designation of core and non-core matters. Bankruptcy Rule 7013 is similarly unhelpful. While it concerns the filing of counterclaims and cross-claims, the rule does not cover their severance. The rule simply makes Fed.R.Civ.P. 13 applicable to bankruptcy adversary proceedings, with the exception that a party sued by a debtor in possession or a trustee need not state as a counterclaim any prepetition claim (<HOLDING>). See Bankr.R. 7013 editors’ comment. Kaiser | [
"holding claimant waived right to jury trial on claims brought against it on behalf of bankruptcy estate when it submitted its proof of claim against the estate and subjected itself to the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court",
"holding that when the claim was duly established as a valid claim against the estate the laws of limitation could no longer apply while the estate was being administered under the probate law",
"holding that a lawsuit by a third party creditor against the estate is a core proceeding",
"holding that bank as coexecutor of estate breached its fiduciary and statutory duties to creditor when it failed to pay creditors claim against estate and instead paid claims of bank and other creditors",
"recognizing that the party can instead file a claim against the estate"
] | 44
|
¶ 24. We stated, however, that a home visit has the potential to turn into a search once the officer has reasonable cause to engage in a search. Moody, ¶ 24. ¶10 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, a nonconsensual search violates the Fourth Amendment unless it is conducted pursuant to a validly issued warrant supported by probable cause. The United States Supreme Court has concluded, however, that probation searches do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment when conducted pursuant to state law and supported by reasonable suspicion to believe contraband would be found. Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. 868, 878, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3171 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A number of the federal circuit courts have | [
"holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student",
"holding that imposing the traditional warrant and probablecause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the illinois probation system because the process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officers ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer and would facilitate the probationers evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct",
"holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school",
"holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement",
"recognizing the existence of the special relationship"
] | 33
|
favorable decision.” Township of Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage Resorts, 140 F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir.1998)). Turchi Qua Guarantor While it is alleged that Turchi was to sign the forbearance agreement, he was to do so as a guarantor. That capacity is not without significance. This lawsuit does not seek enforcement of the guarantee. Indeed, it is the Debtor as the primary borrower who has brought it against the lender, the primary obligee. The Court does not read the complaint to allege that Turchi qua guarantor personally suffered a concrete injury as a result of what the Bank is alleged to have done. See e.g., Borough of Berwick v. Quandel Group, Inc., 440 Pa.Super. 367, 371, 655 A.2d 606, 608 (Pa.Super.1995) (<HOLDING>); see also Hufsmith v. Weaver, 285 Ark. 357, | [
"holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party",
"holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue",
"holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract",
"holding that majority shareholder who guaranteed debt was not a third party beneficiary and thus lack standing to bring action for tortious interference of corporations contract with defendant",
"holding that borough that guaranteed debt owed by municipal sewage authority to engineering firm lacked standing because it was not party to the contract"
] | 44
|
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 663, 667 n. 10, 669 (N.D.Ill.1983)). However, in all the cases on this issue, the courts made it clear that the client must have made disclosures to the attorney after manifesting an intent to seek legal advice. Herbes, 180 Ill.App.3d at 698-99, 129 Ill.Dec. 480, 536 N.E.2d 164 (finding that counsel for the plaintiff, who was suing a township over its open-space acquisition program, was ineligible to conduct said representation because he had previously engaged in an attorney-client relationship with the township when it interviewed only him for a possible position representing the township in the same program, evidencing the township’s intent to hire him and therefore speak freely regarding the program), Hughes, 565 F.Supp. at 670 (<HOLDING>), Int’l. Paper Co. v. Lloyd Manufacturing Co., | [
"holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client",
"holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney",
"holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved",
"holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing an adverse inference where the relief defendant refused to give information necessary to determine whether he still possessed any of the funds or whether he had a legitimate claim to them",
"holding that normal attorneyclient relationship does not bar rule 60b relief when the evidence is clear that the attorney and his client were not acting as one"
] | 11
|
against the Debtor have been discharged and that MDE’s pursuit of those claims in the State Court Action constitutes a violation of the discharge injunction. Accordingly, the Court orders the Respondents to cease any further pursuit of the Debtor in connection with the alleged claims but denies the Debtor’s -request for an award of damages and attorneys’ fees. A separate order will be entered consistent with this ruling. 1 . Unless otherwise noted, all statutory and rule references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1532, and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 2 . In addition to the pleadings filed in this matter, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the Debtor's case. See Cervac v. Littman (In re Littman), 561 B.R. 79, 83 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Unless otherwise noted, future references | [
"recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket",
"recognizing that a court may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record",
"recognizing that a court may rely on matters of which a court may take judicial notice",
"holding that the appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in related proceedings",
"holding that a court may sua sponte take judicial notice of its docket"
] | 00
|
they had him restrained on the ground. See also Hemet Chief of Police, "Use of Force," Gen. Order No. U-102 (discussing "professional presence," "compliance techniques," and other "intermediate force" less likely to cause death or serious injury). A rational jury could rely upon such evidence in assessing whether the officers' use of force was unreasonable. See Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 635(9th Cir.1991) (as amended) (finding that testimony of "an expert on proper police procedures and policies" was relevant and admissible); Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 148 994) (same). In sum, Smith has submitted a substantial amount of evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the force used against him was excessive. C. Deadly Force Smit 1168 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 914-15 (9th | [
"holding that an officer cannot use deadly force unless a suspect poses an imminent threat of serious physical harm",
"holding that an officer did not employ excessive force in shooting a suspect who turned out to be unarmed because at the time of the shooting the officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect posed a threat and was armed",
"holding that deadly force was reasonable where a suspect who had been behaving erratically swung a knife at an officer",
"holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon",
"recognizing that deadly force is only justified where a suspect poses an immediate threat"
] | 22
|
and the order denying reconsideration are both properly before this court, as both were filed within 30 days of the trial court’s original nonfinal order. Otherwise, the order denying the Partnership’s motion for reconsideration of an appealable nonfinal order is not in itself, alone, an appealable order. Agere, 931 So.2d at 245. Furthermore, while “a legally insufficient motion to vacate a default cannot be corrected as a matter of right by a motion for reconsideration or hearing, a trial court does have the inherent discretionary power to reconsider any order entered prior to the rendition of final judgment in the cause.” City of Hollywood v. Cordasco, 575 So.2d 301, 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (emphasis in original); Monte Campbell Crane Co., Inc., 510 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (<HOLDING>); see generally, James H. Wyman, | [
"holding that motion for reconsideration would be construed not as a rule 60b motion but rather as an unauthorized successive motion under 2255 which the district court may have been without jurisdiction to consider",
"holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal",
"holding that unauthorized motion for rehearing to set aside default heard by trial court will be considered as motion for reconsideration",
"holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment",
"holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing"
] | 22
|
a parent has a duty to support his or her l Assembly have taken several steps to ensure that non-supporting parents honor their obligations. For example, the State Constitution provides that a person may be imprisoned for nonpayment of child or spousal support obligations. See Md. Const, art. Ill, § 38 (stating that “[n]o person shall be imprisoned for a debt, but a valid decree of a court of competent jurisdiction or agreement approved by decree of said court for the support of a spouse or dependent children, or for alimony ... shall not constitute a debt within the meaning of this section.”); Md. Rule 15-207(e) (providing procedures for imprisonment upon non-payment of child or spousal support obligation); Middleton v. Middleton, 329 Md. 627, 639, 620 A.2d 1363, 1369 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The General Assembly authorized the Child | [
"holding that parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid child support payments or contract away a child support obligation",
"holding that an outofwedlock childs pending claim for retroactive child support was nondischargeable in bankruptcy because a debt for child support arises upon the birth of the child and that the fact that no court had yet ordered the debtor to support the child does not take the debt outside the scope of 11 usc 523a5",
"holding that since a parents child support obligation is not a debt within the prohibition of 38 the obligation of the defaulting parent may be enforced by means of the courts contempt power including imprisonment pending the purging of the default",
"holding that effect of discharge of debt under bankruptcy code is the same as it was under the 1898 bankruptcy act it is not an extinguishment of the debt but only a bar to enforcement of the debt as a personal obligation of the debt or",
"holding that the trial court had not erred in including the cost of health insurance covering both the custodial parent and the parties child in determining the noncustodial parents childsupport obligation"
] | 22
|
is not fully equated with a private law firm, in that a former agency lawyer is not considered to have been associated with all other lawyers in the agency. I might say we started out by equating the two and, as we went along the committee decided that that really was taking too hard a line because to say that all lawyers in the Justice Department or the FCC or any other agency are to be considered in the same way that you would consider the lawyers in a private law firm, that was too sweeping a disqualification and there was no good reason for it.... Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm, on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1971-73); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co., 475 U.S. at 820, 106 S.Ct. at 1585, 89 L.Ed.2d at 832 (<HOLDING>). Professor Thode added that a judge who had | [
"holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment",
"holding that the conditions delineated in canon 3c1a alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the due process clause",
"holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process",
"recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution",
"holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause"
] | 11
|
limit, modify, or eliminate altogether. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 510, 111 S.Ct. 905 (“Congress has always been.at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it.”); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384, 16 S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896) (“Indian tribes are subject to the dominant authority of congress.”). Thus, suits such as' this one are barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, unless the plaintiff shows either a clear waiver of that immunity by the tribe, or an express abrogation of the doctrine by Congress. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 509, 111 S.Ct, 905 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence that the Poarch Band | [
"holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity",
"holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him",
"holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity",
"holding that because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of the tribe and thus the tribe may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted the issue must be determined in the forum that the tribe has chosen for determination of the viability of claims against it to wit arbitration",
"holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity"
] | 44
|
UC Hastings Mot. at 5-8), and courts in their home forums have addressed related arguments in the past. See, e.g., Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271, 275 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming the district court’s holding that the University of Iowa and its Board of Regents were immune, under the Eleventh Amendment, from suit on plaintiffs § 1983 claims); Scherer v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 49 Fed.Appx. 658, 658 (8th Cir.2002) (affirming the district court’s holding that the University of Missouri and its Curators were immune, under the Eleventh Amendment, from suit on plaintiffs ADA claim) (citing Sherman v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 871 F.Supp. 344, 348 (W.D.Mo.1994)); Gallagher v. Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law, No. C011277PJH, 2001 WL 1006809, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 16, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Because the relevant circuit and district | [
"holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under 1983",
"holding that uc hastings was immune under the eleventh amendment from suit on plaintiffs 1983 claims and granting motion to dismiss",
"holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981",
"holding college school district immune from suit in federal court under eleventh amendment",
"recognizing that section 1983 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment"
] | 11
|
prolonged; and (4) the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Alpert, 816 F.2d at 964, citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). DiGiovanni’s continued investigation after issuing the warning was entirely reasonable in light of these factors. First, any detention incident to that investigation was of limited duration. The encounter between Rodriguez and law enforcement personnel, from the moment he was pulled over until the currency’s discovery, lasted approximately forty minutes. Under these circumstances, even if Rodriguez’s detention occupied that entire time interval, it might not suggest a Terry Stop of unreasonable scope. See United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1194 (4th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the alleged detention here only | [
"holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense seizing defendants luggage for 38 minutes under terry did not mature into an unlawful arrest",
"holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest",
"holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest",
"holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had dispelled the officers reasonable suspicion",
"holding that totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs and therefore officer was justified in seizing truck"
] | 00
|
indicated a willingness to consider additional factors. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). In Osborne, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Ohio could ban the possession of child pornography. Id. at 108, 110 S.Ct. 1691. In finding it could, the Court relied not only on the harm caused to the children who are used in its production (i.e., Ferber), but also on the harm that children suffer when child pornography is used to seduce or coerce them into sexual activity. Id. at 111, 110 S.Ct. 1691. Thus, in Osborne, the Court indicated that protecting children who are not actually pictured in the pornographic image is a legitimate and compelling state interest. See Id. See also United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 115, — | [
"recognizing that competing interests of parents children and the state requires additional analysis",
"recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children",
"holding that the governments interest in the welfare of children embraces not only protecting children from physical abuse but also protecting childrens interest in the privacy and dignity of their homes and in the lawfully exercised authority of their parents",
"recognizing minnesotas interest in protecting the interests of the child",
"recognizing the supreme courts subtle yet crucial extension of valid state interests to include protecting children not actually depicted"
] | 44
|
original). Here, the claim is based on Chase’s failure to pay flood insurance premiums from the escrow account. Further, plaintiff alleges that defendant breached a duty that was owed to her specifically, not a general duty owed to the public. See Harrison v. Gore, 27,254 (La.App. 2 Cir.8/23/95); 660 So.2d 563, 568 (“The classical distinction between ‘damages ex contractu’ and ‘damages ex delicto’ is that the former flow from the breach of a special obligation contractually assumed by the obligor, whereas the latter flow from the violation of a general duty owed to all persons.”). The Court, therefore, finds that plaintiffs detrimental reliance claim sounds in contract and is subject to a ten-year prescriptive period. See Stokes v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 894 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, plaintiffs claim has not | [
"holding in the context of a non 212c iirira retroactivity challenge that if reliance were required we would insist at most upon objectively reasonable reliance and not subjective reliance",
"holding that reasonable reliance is not an element of the defense",
"holding that under ohio law fraud claim failed because there was no evidence of reliance",
"holding detrimental reliance claim was subject to tenyear prescriptive period",
"holding that each class member was not required to prove justifiable reliance when an inference of reliance arises if a materially false representation was made to persons whose acts thereafter were consistent with reliance upon the representations"
] | 33
|
under § 3730(e)(4)(A). Finally, we consider whether the GAO report was a “public disclosure” under § 3730(e)(4)(A). The GAO report disclosed generally that some contractors performing the 254 ESPCs granted between 1999 and 2003 had engaged in the activity Relators allege is fraudulent, but the report did not disclose the names of any contractors or specify any locations where an ESPC may have involved fraud. Because of the large number of ESPCs granted and the GAO report’s lack of specificity, the report did not contain sufficient information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against Honeywell. Accordingly, the GAO report was not a “public disclosure” under § 3730(e)(4)(A). See United States v. Alcan Elec. and Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Because neither the AAA reports nor the GAO | [
"recognizing that information disclosed in private is not a public disclosure under the fca",
"holding that the only relevant public interest in disclosure is the extent to which disclosure would serve the core purpose of the foia which is contributing significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government ",
"holding that the disclosure is a public disclosure within the meaning of the fca if the the prior public disclosure contained enough information to enable the government to pursue an investigation against the defendant",
"holding that the government must provide the party seeking disclosure with a detailed index describing the documents the government claims are exempt from disclosure under foia",
"holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege"
] | 22
|
effect on the procreation and child-rearing practices of opposite-sex married (or unmarried) couples. See Perry II, 671 F.3d at 1088, 2012 WL 372713, at *21 (“There is no rational reason to think that taking away the designation of ‘marriage’ from same-sex couples would advance the goal of encouraging ... opposite-sex couples to procreate more responsibly.”) To the extent some people may have a bias in favor of preferring biological parents over other couples, there is no such recognition of this distinction under federal or state law. See id. There has been no showing that DOMA alters any state or federal law governing childbearing, procreation or family structure. Given the state of the law, the rationale of promoting responsible child-rearing finds no “ ‘footing in t 85, 186 (1971) (<HOLDING>)). Again, the argument that the definition of | [
"holding in a case involving not intraunion politics but rather a matter of an employer requiring the union to carry out the penalty provision of a collective bargaining agreement that the statutory term otherwise disciplined is narrowly confined to regulatory actions that affect a union members rights or status as a member of the union that the sanctions imposed were employmentrelated rather than internal union related and that the safeguards in 411a5 were not available for such action",
"holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred",
"holding that a vermont civil union is not the equivalent of a marriage",
"holding that as long as alleged breach of a continuing duty occurred within six years of the filing of the lawsuit the claim is timely",
"holding that the institution of marriage as a union of man and woman uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family is as old as the book of genesis"
] | 44
|
did wrong, and when. The target is not required to play a guessing game in that respect.”). Once Defendants cured the specific problems identified in Plaintiffs’ Notice, if Plaintiffs believed that Defendants remained in violation and wanted to motivate Defendants to change their conduct with the possibility of a citizen suit, Plaintiffs needed to provide Defendants’ with another notice, one with sufficient information to address the problems that would eventually be the subject of a federal lawsuit. The Court rejects the idea it is foisting an impossible burden on Plaintiffs by requiring that this suit be supported by a notice containing details not available at the time of the first (and only) Notice. That Notice was good, but just not for the claims Plaint 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). B. State Law Claims (Counts II-IV). | [
"holding that some of the claims raised in the plaintiffs complaint were not properly raised in its 60day citizen suit notice thus the district court correctly held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims",
"holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims",
"holding that the federal claims which arose from state court criminal contempt proceedings were inextricably intertwined with the state court action and thus the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims pursuant to the rookerfeldman doctrine",
"holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute",
"holding that the district court was not divested of subject matter jurisdiction upon the dismissal of the plaintiffs federal claims"
] | 00
|
for the spectacled eider and the Steller’s eider should be dismissed with prejudice as moot. Defendants further argue that FWS is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining part of Count VIII alleging that BLM and FWS consultations on the proposed leasing program and decision to proceed were inadequate because they failed to consider the impacts on critical habitat. The parties agree that plaintiffs’ claim that FWS violated the ESA by failing to designate critical habitat for the spectacled eider and the Steller’s eider is moot. The parties disagree as to whether that claim should be dismissed with or without prejudice. A dismissal on mootness grounds is without prejudice to future suits on the merits of the same claim. See Payne v. Panama Canal Co., 607 F.2d 155, 158 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>); DiGiore v. Ryan, 172 F.3d 454, 466 (7th | [
"holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits",
"holding that a partial adjudication on the merits followed by a voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the remaining claims is not a final judgment that gives rise to appellate jurisdiction",
"holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata",
"holding that the dismissal without prejudice of the prior actions on grounds of mootness does not serve as a final adjudication on the merits so as to bar this action",
"holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits"
] | 33
|
9 .The judge made no specific finding with respect to two issues that might have been of some importance, namely, whether Henson had access to other housing, as he had earlier told Prue that he would have, and whether he suffered pain and distress as a result of not being able to use his medication. The judge also cut off Henson's attorney somewhat abruptly when he requested an opportunity to argue on the issue of damages, but Henson has not raised this or any other procedural issue on appeal. 10 . It appears that Prue's premises may have been in the nature of a rooming house, and Henson may have been a roomer rather than a tenant. If he was, then the prohibition against self-help evictions may not have been applicable. Cf. Harkins v. Win Corp., 771 A.2d 1025, 1029 (D.C.2001) (<HOLDING>). No party has raised this issue, however, and | [
"holding evidence which established that use of property was permissive showed use of property was not adverse",
"holding that a provider of transientaccommodations may use selfhelp to evict a nonpaying lodger",
"holding that continued possession and unrestricted use constitutes regular use",
"holding intent to use or threaten to use force is required under 2l12bla",
"holding that it may not"
] | 11
|
representative. Id. at B-2. The DOL also stated that the designation of an authorized representative can limit the representative’s authority to particular types of claims. Id. at B-3. Defendants have provided examples of benefit plans that require particular procedures to designate authorized representatives. See Defs.’ Joint Resp., Exs. 49 (plan stating that participant can identify authorized representative in writing to plan), 51 (plan stating there is a process to appoint authorized representative), 58 (plan requiring participant to fill out form obtained from plan to designate authorized representative), 59 (same), 65 (plan requiring designation of authorized representative in writing), 111 (plan requiring completion of form or provision of the information in it), 115 at 5361 (<HOLDING>). The questions of compliance with these | [
"recognizing that where representative plaintiff and other members of class share an interest in prevailing on similar legal claims particular differences in amount of damages claimed or of availability of certain defenses against class representative may not render his or her claims atypical",
"recognizing general rule",
"recognizing that in certain circumstances inquiry notice may be determined as a matter of law",
"recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim",
"holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class"
] | 33
|
not admissible ... [because it is] not subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. Therefore, such statements are appropriately [ jadmissible ... to prove only that the defendant earlier spoke consistently with his present testimony, the credibility of which is being challenged.” “A defendant may introduce his or her own prior consistent statements [in limited circumstances:] when the prosecution suggests that the defendant has a motive to falsify, alleges that the defendant’s testimony is a recent fabrication, or attempts to impeach the defendant with a prior inconsistent statement. [Where] the defendant [does] not testify at trial[,] ... none of these exceptions applie[s].” (citations omitted)); cf. also Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 468, 374 S.E.2d 303, 316 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Numerous federal and state courts, applying | [
"recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify",
"holding that admitting evidence of a defendants prior statement to an investigator proffered by the commonwealth did not violate the defendants fifth amendment rights by forcing him to testify to dispute it",
"holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify",
"holding district court did not violate sixth amendment by admitting defendants outofcourt statement",
"recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify"
] | 11
|
of the Lemmon Avenue Terminal gates, they are entitled to partial summary judgment: “The [WARAj’s mandate that Dallas demolish the passenger gates deprives [Love Terminal Partners] of its pre-existing property right to exclude others (including Dallas) from invading these gates to destroy them. The legislative deprivation of [plaintiffs’] right to exclude, without more, constitutes a taking.” Pls.’ Cross-Mot. 30. The physical taking issue turns on the court’s interpretation of the requirements arising under the WARA and is an issue of law that can be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment. See Billings v. United States, 322 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“The underlying issue, one of statutory ... construction, is a question of law_”); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 294 F.3d at 1340 (<HOLDING>); see also Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C., 561 | [
"holding that a judgment on appeal constitutes the law of the case as to particular issues decided and is applicable throughout subsequent stages of the case",
"holding that constitutional questions will not be decided if case can be decided on other grounds",
"holding that it may be decided as a matter of law",
"holding that representation issues are matters relegated to the board representation issues may not be decided by contract and thus may not be decided by an arbitrator",
"recognizing in a takings case that issues of statutory interpretation and other matters of law may be decided on motion for summary judgment"
] | 44
|
missing. Even McGreal found the purportedly missing reports in the Liquor Commission files. Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks also point out that McGreal filed Judicial Inquiry Board complaint about Judge Sterba without fully investigating the circumstances. McGreal’s letter highlighted the differences between the sentence that Sean Taylor actually received and the one that Lt. Snooks related to McGreal. McGreal then drew the inference that these differences were in response to McGreal’s initial inquiries into the matter, instead of a simple mistake on the part of Lt. Snooks. Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks argue that McGreal’s speech was motivated by personal interests in making these statements, and therefore the First Amendment does not protect the speech. See e.g. Kokkinis, 185 F.3d at 844-45 (<HOLDING>). For example, Chief Wood and Lt. Snooks submit | [
"holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation",
"holding that even though speech was motivated by personal grievances it would still be protected conduct if it dealt with public concerns",
"holding that speech addressing a private interest within a letter containing matters of public interest was protected and noting that we have emphasized that speech of public importance is only transformed into a matter of private concern when it is motivated solely by the speakers personal interests quotations omitted",
"holding that public speech motivated by personal displeasure with policies was not covered by the first amendment",
"recognizing criticisms of public officials is at core of speech protected by first amendment"
] | 33
|
to further his own goals and sexual gratification; (5) divulged confidences to Linda; and (6) disregarded "all indicia of the transference and countertransference phenomena which normally occurs in the course of psychotherapy.” We note, initially, that each of these allegations is based, in part, on an underlying allegation of fraud. The trial judge has permitted the plaintiff to replead a separate fraud count, the allegations of which essentially duplicate the ones above. Fraud is a distinct cause of action in Illinois. To that extent, we do not believe the allegations of fraud are germane to a count alleging professional negligence, be it that of a psychotherapist or a cleric. Cf. Williams v. Chicago Osteopathic Health Systems, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1048, 654 N.E.2d 613 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we address the count for | [
"recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner",
"recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud",
"holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal",
"holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612",
"holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional"
] | 11
|
is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guidelines.” United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167 (5th Cir.2002). 5 . This apparent error is further illuminated by the history of § 3B1.1. The Guideline was amended in 1993 to include Note 2 in order to resolve a circuit split over the same interpretation at issue here: whether management of assets warranted an adjustment. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 500; compare, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 893 F.2d 1502 (6th Cir.1990) (requiring a degree of control over other participants), United States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir.1990) (same), United States v. Mares-Molina, 913 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.1990) (same), and United States v. Fuentes, 954 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.1992) (same), with United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263 (4th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). 6 . See United States v. Ramos-Paulino, 488 | [
"holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk",
"recognizing that the governments failure to prevail is a factor that may be considered",
"holding that intent to evade collective bargaining obligations is merely one factor among many that must be considered",
"holding that exercising control over other participants is one factor among many that should be considered not a requirement for applying the adjustment",
"holding that guidelines although advisory and only one factor among others to be considered in arriving at a reasonable sentence are entitled to substantial weight in the sentencing decision"
] | 33
|
30, 2014). 12 . U.S. Postal Serv., 339 N.L.R.B. 1175, 1185 n.29 (2003); United Parcel Serv., 327 N.L.R.B. 317, 317 (1998);, Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 420, 424 (1981); Transcon Lines, 235 N.L.R.B. at 1165; see also Valmont Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 244 F.3d 454, 472 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[E]ntrance areas to plants, where timeclocks, vending machines, and bulletin boards are located, are often mixed use ar- ‘ eas.”). ! 13 . Kaynard, 625 F.2d at 1052 n.6 ("Where, as here, a production area is regularly used by employees as a lunch area with the ‘lull knowledge and approval’ of the employer, the Board's position is that the area ceases, for the duration of the lunch period, to be a ‘work area’ where distribution can be prohibited. "); Rockingham Sleepwear, 188 N.L.R.B. at 701 (<HOLDING>); see also United Parcel Serv., 327 N.L.R.B. at | [
"holding that an employers sewing room a work area ceased to be a work area during lunch because the employer permitted employees to take their lunch in the sewing room and provided no alternate facility",
"holding that a change in employer from one federal contractor to another caused employees no lack of work",
"holding in an employees action to recover for injury sustained during work against the employer and other defendants did not state an intentional tort claim against contractor",
"holding that a company exercising substantial control of the terms and conditions of the work of the employees is an employer under the flsa",
"holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work"
] | 00
|
of America or any State thereof relating to magnesite or magnesite products brokered by Possehl, and subsequently delivered to Resco during the period from 2000 through the present. Possehl, as Assignor, will make avail- . able for copying at the sole expense of Resco, as Assignee, records documenting the producing seller to Resco of products covered by this Assignment. Id. There is nothing wrong with the abstract legal basis of Resco’s theory of standing. It is well settled in the Third Circuit that “express assignments of antitrust claims from a direct purchaser to an indirect purchaser are permissible and do not run afoul of Illinois Brick’s standing requirements.” In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 338 F.Supp.2d at 539 (citing Gulf-stream, III Associates, Inc., 995 F.2d at 438-440 (<HOLDING>)); see also In re Wellbutrin Sr Direct | [
"holding in non 17200 case that common law claims duplicative of the flsa are preempted",
"holding that any assignment of antitrust claims as a matter of federal common law must be an express assignment because an express assignment entirely eliminates any problems of split recoveries or duplicative liability",
"holding that article 4a of the ucc preempts common law claims where they are inconsistent or duplicative",
"holding that the determination of whether an individual is an independent contractor lies in the common law and not under an express provision of the act",
"holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed"
] | 11
|
prosecutions cannot be considered extreme and outrages or beyond the bounds of decency. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed. To the extent Plaintiffs claim that the alleged withholding of the videotape constitutes a violation of the rule set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), no such claim can be maintained as the Plaintiffs were made aware of the videotape prior to their trial and have made no argument or showing that any delay in its disclosure caused prejudice. United States v. Watson, 76 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir.1996). Finally, since Plaintiffs have not set forth evidence establishing the alleged underlying constitutional violations, their municipal liability claims likewise fail. Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>). The Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment | [
"holding that individual liability under 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation",
"holding that a claim for municipal liability under 1983 requires inter alia proof of an underlying constitutional violation",
"holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom",
"holding that a city may not be held liable under 1983 where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers",
"holding that a constitutional violation by a subordinate is a predicate for supervisory liability under 1983"
] | 11
|
relief in all circumstances in which a judgment fails to conform to the statute. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), a court may relieve a party from a judgment that is based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” but only on a motion made within one year of entry of the judgment. In the instant case, as the district court admitted and as seems readily apparent, the error was based on inadvertence. Thus, Rule 60(b)(1), with its one year time limitation, clearly applied. The district court attempted to circumvent the apparent harshness of the one year limitation by reading Rule 60(b)(6) as permitting nd Procedure § 2864 (1973). Therefore, because Rule 60(b)(1) plainly applied, and because the motion for relief came over one year after the entry of judgment h Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we adamantly reject appellees’ | [
"holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty",
"holding that once movant established right to summary judgment burden shifts to nonmovant to demonstrate otherwise",
"holding that in order for the movant to prevail on a summary judgment motion movant must either factually refute the affirmative defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient",
"holding that where interest was supposed to have run from the date of judgment but movant never asked for it and had accepted full payment of the judgment without it movant had forever waived his right to receive it",
"holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law"
] | 33
|
(1986) (relying on section 45(1) and comment a). 24 . See e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) (“railroad [retirement] benefits are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time”); Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int’l Union, 173 F.3d 94, 103 (2nd Cir. 1999) (a claim to vested welfare benefits is contradicted by the ... unambiguous reservation in the plan documents of its right to amend the plan”); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer. v. BVR Liquidating Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1999) (“the inclusion of a ‘reservation of rights’ provision establishes that there was no intent for benefits to vest”); McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit | [
"holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed",
"recognizing that generally with supposed unilateral contracts if the offeror expressly reserves the power to revoke the offer until the offerees performance is complete then the offer is illusory and cannot give rise to a unilateral contract but noting exceptions",
"holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein",
"holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell",
"holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged"
] | 11
|
by Davis do not establish that members of Region 2 were denied election-related privileges enjoyed by UAW members in other regions. Absent discrimination of this kind, Davis may not maintain an action under Title I. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139, 85 S.Ct. 292, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964) (finding that union members were not “discriminated against” for purposes of Title I because they were not denied a “right to vote or nominate which the union has granted to others”). This mismatch between the relief sought by Davis and the protections provided by Title I exists because Title I cannot support a cause of action that seeks to invalidate a previously conducted union election. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 541, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Although Davis purports to rely solely on | [
"holding that the exclusivity provision included in 403 of title iv plainly bars title i relief when an individual union member challenges the validity of an election that has already been completed",
"holding that because the proper defendant in a title vi case is an entity rather than an individual plaintiff could not be sued in his individual capacity under title vi",
"holding individual defendants are not an employer within meaning of title vii",
"holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original",
"holding that there is no individual liability under title vii"
] | 00
|
discretion” in the absence of explicit standards or procedures. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965). Prior restraints on expression in a public forum have generally been subjected to exacting scrutiny. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 226, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (plurality opinion) (collecting cases). However, “the context in which [a prior restraint] occurs can affect the level of scrutiny applied.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Jones, 192 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.1999). Prior restraints in a nonpublic forum have been upheld as long as they were reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (<HOLDING>); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d | [
"holding that school officials could prevent a student from distributing invitations in a public elementary school a nonpublic forum because the restraint was reasonable",
"holding that the courthouse lobby was a nonpublic forum",
"holding that a federal charity drive a nonpublic forum could limit participation to a number of select charities as long as the restriction was reasonable and viewpointneutral",
"holding that a statesponsored televised election debate was a nonpublic forum and state officials could exercise broad editorial discretion in deciding which candidates to invite as long as the decisions were reasonable and viewpointneutral",
"holding that a courthouse was a nonpublic forum but an unenclosed courthouse plaza was a designated public forum"
] | 22
|
who wore beards as a matter of their religious obligation. See id. at 360-61. This kind of unequal treatment, the Court of Appeals held, “indicates that the [police department] has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity, but that religious motivations are not.” Id. at 366. Subsections (b)(1) and (2) are also rooted in Establishment Clause jurisprudence where the Supreme Court has disapproved of unequal treatment of religious activities measured against secular ones. See Kir-yas Joel Village, 512 U.S. at 704, 114 S.Ct. 2481 (stating that “civil power must be exercised in a manner neutral to religion”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952) (<HOLDING>). This bar to unequal treatment is, of course, | [
"holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others",
"holding that no meaningful distinction exists between those who leave their native country and those who already outside decline to return",
"holding that government may not prefer those who believe in no religion over those who do believe",
"holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it",
"holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony"
] | 22
|
was unavailable in the state court.” Id. at 72. HSBC also cites several cases where federal courts have applied res judicata in this context. However, in each of these cases the state court upheld a dismissal of the plaintiffs claim. See, e.g., Day, 656 F.Supp.2d 331; Kremer, 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262. Because the respective state courts granted the plaintiffs no relief, there could be no issue as to the ability of the state court to grant full relief; they are, accordingly, immaterial. 2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction HSBC argues that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over an action for attorney’s fees only. Section 2000e — 5(f)(3), the statutory provision granting subject matter jurisdiction to federal district courts over actions bro h Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), Lewis v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., No. 3:97 | [
"holding that because plaintiff no longer has available administrative remedies his action must be dismissed with prejudice",
"recognizing that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to bringing a 1983 action",
"holding that state court judgment affirming an administrative decision did not bar a subsequent federal action for additional relief because of national policy that title vii remedies be available to supplement state remedies for employment discrimination",
"holding that if adequate administrative remedies are available it is improper to seek relief in court before those remedies are exhausted",
"holding that federal law governs remedies available under title ix"
] | 22
|
both husband and wife conceded that there was no goodwill to be had and that they simply did not think that the business was worth valuing as a going concern. Nevertheless, at the end of trial, the court assigned $10,000 of goodwill to the trucking business. The trial court issued its opinion letter in March 2000 assigning a goodwill value to the business and issued its judgment in August 2000. Between that time, husband did not object to the trial court’s assignment of goodwill. It is this lack of objection that leads wife to conclude that husband did not preserve his argument. We agree with wife that husband did not properly preserve his objection to the trial court’s decision on goodwill. See McDougal v. Griffith, 156 Or App 83, 86-87, 964 P2d 1135 (1998), rev den, 328 Or 330 (1999) (<HOLDING>). However, we may reach this issue under the | [
"holding that the failure to object at trial customarily means that a party has not preserved the claim on appeal",
"holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review",
"holding that a plaintiff who did not object to the trial courts memorandum opinion giving defendants more on their counterclaim than they had requested had not preserved that issue for appeal",
"holding that a claim was not preserved for review where the defense failed to object on the specific grounds advanced on appeal",
"holding that an issue is preserved for appeal where the issue was sufficiently raised for the court to rule on it "
] | 22
|
322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings, but bears the burden to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of every element essential to [the] case, based on the affidavits or by depositions and admissions on file.” See Harter v. GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992). 6 . The court presumes that plaintiffs’ civil rights claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, although the complaint does not specifically say so. The civil rights claims appear to be based on allegations of false arrest and malicious prosecution; thus, the court treats these claims as allegations of a violation of Gatter's rights under the Fourth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-74, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d | [
"recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment",
"holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause",
"holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment",
"holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment",
"holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person"
] | 33
|
End of preview. Expand
in Dataset Viewer.
Dataset Card for "LexGLUE"
Dataset Summary
Inspired by the recent widespread use of the GLUE multi-task benchmark NLP dataset (Wang et al., 2018), the subsequent more difficult SuperGLUE (Wang et al., 2019), other previous multi-task NLP benchmarks (Conneau and Kiela, 2018; McCann et al., 2018), and similar initiatives in other domains (Peng et al., 2019), we introduce the Legal General Language Understanding Evaluation (LexGLUE) benchmark, a benchmark dataset to evaluate the performance of NLP methods in legal tasks. LexGLUE is based on seven existing legal NLP datasets, selected using criteria largely from SuperGLUE.
As in GLUE and SuperGLUE (Wang et al., 2019b,a), one of our goals is to push towards generic (or ‘foundation’) models that can cope with multiple NLP tasks, in our case legal NLP tasks possibly with limited task-specific fine-tuning. Another goal is to provide a convenient and informative entry point for NLP researchers and practitioners wishing to explore or develop methods for legalNLP. Having these goals in mind, the datasets we include in LexGLUE and the tasks they address have been simplified in several ways to make it easier for newcomers and generic models to address all tasks.
LexGLUE benchmark is accompanied by experimental infrastructure that relies on Hugging Face Transformers library and resides at: https://github.com/coastalcph/lex-glue.
Supported Tasks and Leaderboards
The supported tasks are the following:
| Dataset | Source | Sub-domain | Task Type | Classes |
| ECtHR (Task A) | Chalkidis et al. (2019) | ECHR | Multi-label classification | 10+1 |
| ECtHR (Task B) | Chalkidis et al. (2021a) | ECHR | Multi-label classification | 10+1 |
| SCOTUS | Spaeth et al. (2020) | US Law | Multi-class classification | 14 |
| EUR-LEX | Chalkidis et al. (2021b) | EU Law | Multi-label classification | 100 |
| LEDGAR | Tuggener et al. (2020) | Contracts | Multi-class classification | 100 |
| UNFAIR-ToS | Lippi et al. (2019) | Contracts | Multi-label classification | 8+1 |
| CaseHOLD | Zheng et al. (2021) | US Law | Multiple choice QA | n/a |
ecthr_a
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) hears allegations that a state has breached human rights provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). For each case, the dataset provides a list of factual paragraphs (facts) from the case description. Each case is mapped to articles of the ECHR that were violated (if any).
ecthr_b
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) hears allegations that a state has breached human rights provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). For each case, the dataset provides a list of factual paragraphs (facts) from the case description. Each case is mapped to articles of ECHR that were allegedly violated (considered by the court).
scotus
The US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) is the highest federal court in the United States of America and generally hears only the most controversial or otherwise complex cases which have not been sufficiently well solved by lower courts. This is a single-label multi-class classification task, where given a document (court opinion), the task is to predict the relevant issue areas. The 14 issue areas cluster 278 issues whose focus is on the subject matter of the controversy (dispute).
eurlex
European Union (EU) legislation is published in EUR-Lex portal. All EU laws are annotated by EU's Publications Office with multiple concepts from the EuroVoc thesaurus, a multilingual thesaurus maintained by the Publications Office. The current version of EuroVoc contains more than 7k concepts referring to various activities of the EU and its Member States (e.g., economics, health-care, trade). Given a document, the task is to predict its EuroVoc labels (concepts).
ledgar
LEDGAR dataset aims contract provision (paragraph) classification. The contract provisions come from contracts obtained from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, which are publicly available from EDGAR. Each label represents the single main topic (theme) of the corresponding contract provision.
unfair_tos
The UNFAIR-ToS dataset contains 50 Terms of Service (ToS) from on-line platforms (e.g., YouTube, Ebay, Facebook, etc.). The dataset has been annotated on the sentence-level with 8 types of unfair contractual terms (sentences), meaning terms that potentially violate user rights according to the European consumer law.
case_hold
The CaseHOLD (Case Holdings on Legal Decisions) dataset includes multiple choice questions about holdings of US court cases from the Harvard Law Library case law corpus. Holdings are short summaries of legal rulings accompany referenced decisions relevant for the present case. The input consists of an excerpt (or prompt) from a court decision, containing a reference to a particular case, while the holding statement is masked out. The model must identify the correct (masked) holding statement from a selection of five choices.
The current leaderboard includes several Transformer-based (Vaswaniet al., 2017) pre-trained language models, which achieve state-of-the-art performance in most NLP tasks (Bommasani et al., 2021) and NLU benchmarks (Wang et al., 2019a). Results reported by Chalkidis et al. (2021):
Task-wise Test Results
| Dataset | ECtHR A | ECtHR B | SCOTUS | EUR-LEX | LEDGAR | UNFAIR-ToS | CaseHOLD |
| Model | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 |
| TFIDF+SVM | 64.7 / 51.7 | 74.6 / 65.1 | 78.2 / 69.5 | 71.3 / 51.4 | 87.2 / 82.4 | 95.4 / 78.8 | n/a |
| Medium-sized Models (L=12, H=768, A=12) | |||||||
| BERT | 71.2 / 63.6 | 79.7 / 73.4 | 68.3 / 58.3 | 71.4 / 57.2 | 87.6 / 81.8 | 95.6 / 81.3 | 70.8 |
| RoBERTa | 69.2 / 59.0 | 77.3 / 68.9 | 71.6 / 62.0 | 71.9 / 57.9 | 87.9 / 82.3 | 95.2 / 79.2 | 71.4 |
| DeBERTa | 70.0 / 60.8 | 78.8 / 71.0 | 71.1 / 62.7 | 72.1 / 57.4 | 88.2 / 83.1 | 95.5 / 80.3 | 72.6 |
| Longformer | 69.9 / 64.7 | 79.4 / 71.7 | 72.9 / 64.0 | 71.6 / 57.7 | 88.2 / 83.0 | 95.5 / 80.9 | 71.9 |
| BigBird | 70.0 / 62.9 | 78.8 / 70.9 | 72.8 / 62.0 | 71.5 / 56.8 | 87.8 / 82.6 | 95.7 / 81.3 | 70.8 |
| Legal-BERT | 70.0 / 64.0 | 80.4 / 74.7 | 76.4 / 66.5 | 72.1 / 57.4 | 88.2 / 83.0 | 96.0 / 83.0 | 75.3 |
| CaseLaw-BERT | 69.8 / 62.9 | 78.8 / 70.3 | 76.6 / 65.9 | 70.7 / 56.6 | 88.3 / 83.0 | 96.0 / 82.3 | 75.4 |
| Large-sized Models (L=24, H=1024, A=18) | |||||||
| RoBERTa | 73.8 / 67.6 | 79.8 / 71.6 | 75.5 / 66.3 | 67.9 / 50.3 | 88.6 / 83.6 | 95.8 / 81.6 | 74.4 |
Averaged (Mean over Tasks) Test Results
| Averaging | Arithmetic | Harmonic | Geometric |
| Model | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 | μ-F1 / m-F1 |
| Medium-sized Models (L=12, H=768, A=12) | |||
| BERT | 77.8 / 69.5 | 76.7 / 68.2 | 77.2 / 68.8 |
| RoBERTa | 77.8 / 68.7 | 76.8 / 67.5 | 77.3 / 68.1 |
| DeBERTa | 78.3 / 69.7 | 77.4 / 68.5 | 77.8 / 69.1 |
| Longformer | 78.5 / 70.5 | 77.5 / 69.5 | 78.0 / 70.0 |
| BigBird | 78.2 / 69.6 | 77.2 / 68.5 | 77.7 / 69.0 |
| Legal-BERT | 79.8 / 72.0 | 78.9 / 70.8 | 79.3 / 71.4 |
| CaseLaw-BERT | 79.4 / 70.9 | 78.5 / 69.7 | 78.9 / 70.3 |
| Large-sized Models (L=24, H=1024, A=18) | |||
| RoBERTa | 79.4 / 70.8 | 78.4 / 69.1 | 78.9 / 70.0 |
Languages
We only consider English datasets, to make experimentation easier for researchers across the globe.
Dataset Structure
Data Instances
ecthr_a
An example of 'train' looks as follows.
{
"text": ["8. The applicant was arrested in the early morning of 21 October 1990 ...", ...],
"labels": [6]
}
ecthr_b
An example of 'train' looks as follows.
{
"text": ["8. The applicant was arrested in the early morning of 21 October 1990 ...", ...],
"label": [5, 6]
}
scotus
An example of 'train' looks as follows.
{
"text": "Per Curiam\nSUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\nRANDY WHITE, WARDEN v. ROGER L. WHEELER\n Decided December 14, 2015\nPER CURIAM.\nA death sentence imposed by a Kentucky trial court and\naffirmed by the ...",
"label": 8
}
eurlex
An example of 'train' looks as follows.
{
"text": "COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1629/96 of 13 August 1996 on an invitation to tender for the refund on export of wholly milled round grain rice to certain third countries ...",
"labels": [4, 20, 21, 35, 68]
}
ledgar
An example of 'train' looks as follows.
{
"text": "All Taxes shall be the financial responsibility of the party obligated to pay such Taxes as determined by applicable law and neither party is or shall be liable at any time for any of the other party ...",
"label": 32
}
unfair_tos
An example of 'train' looks as follows.
{
"text": "tinder may terminate your account at any time without notice if it believes that you have violated this agreement.",
"label": 2
}
casehold
An example of 'test' looks as follows.
{
"context": "In Granato v. City and County of Denver, No. CIV 11-0304 MSK/BNB, 2011 WL 3820730 (D.Colo. Aug. 20, 2011), the Honorable Marcia S. Krieger, now-Chief United States District Judge for the District of Colorado, ruled similarly: At a minimum, a party asserting a Mo-nell claim must plead sufficient facts to identify ... to act pursuant to City or State policy, custom, decision, ordinance, re d 503, 506-07 (3d Cir.l985)(<HOLDING>).",
"endings": ["holding that courts are to accept allegations in the complaint as being true including monell policies and writing that a federal court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint has a limited task",
"holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom",
"recognizing that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true on a threshold motion to dismiss",
"holding that a court need not accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint",
"holding that where the defendant was in default the district court correctly accepted the fact allegations of the complaint as true"
],
"label": 0
}
Data Fields
ecthr_a
text: a list ofstringfeatures (list of factual paragraphs (facts) from the case description).labels: a list of classification labels (a list of violated ECHR articles, if any) .List of ECHR articles
"Article 2", "Article 3", "Article 5", "Article 6", "Article 8", "Article 9", "Article 10", "Article 11", "Article 14", "Article 1 of Protocol 1"
ecthr_b
text: a list ofstringfeatures (list of factual paragraphs (facts) from the case description)labels: a list of classification labels (a list of articles considered).List of ECHR articles
"Article 2", "Article 3", "Article 5", "Article 6", "Article 8", "Article 9", "Article 10", "Article 11", "Article 14", "Article 1 of Protocol 1"
scotus
text: astringfeature (the court opinion).label: a classification label (the relevant issue area).List of issue areas
(1, Criminal Procedure), (2, Civil Rights), (3, First Amendment), (4, Due Process), (5, Privacy), (6, Attorneys), (7, Unions), (8, Economic Activity), (9, Judicial Power), (10, Federalism), (11, Interstate Relations), (12, Federal Taxation), (13, Miscellaneous), (14, Private Action)
eurlex
text: astringfeature (an EU law).labels: a list of classification labels (a list of relevant EUROVOC concepts).List of EUROVOC concepts
The list is very long including 100 EUROVOC concepts. You can find the EUROVOC concepts descriptors here.
ledgar
text: astringfeature (a contract provision/paragraph).label: a classification label (the type of contract provision).List of contract provision types
"Adjustments", "Agreements", "Amendments", "Anti-Corruption Laws", "Applicable Laws", "Approvals", "Arbitration", "Assignments", "Assigns", "Authority", "Authorizations", "Base Salary", "Benefits", "Binding Effects", "Books", "Brokers", "Capitalization", "Change In Control", "Closings", "Compliance With Laws", "Confidentiality", "Consent To Jurisdiction", "Consents", "Construction", "Cooperation", "Costs", "Counterparts", "Death", "Defined Terms", "Definitions", "Disability", "Disclosures", "Duties", "Effective Dates", "Effectiveness", "Employment", "Enforceability", "Enforcements", "Entire Agreements", "Erisa", "Existence", "Expenses", "Fees", "Financial Statements", "Forfeitures", "Further Assurances", "General", "Governing Laws", "Headings", "Indemnifications", "Indemnity", "Insurances", "Integration", "Intellectual Property", "Interests", "Interpretations", "Jurisdictions", "Liens", "Litigations", "Miscellaneous", "Modifications", "No Conflicts", "No Defaults", "No Waivers", "Non-Disparagement", "Notices", "Organizations", "Participations", "Payments", "Positions", "Powers", "Publicity", "Qualifications", "Records", "Releases", "Remedies", "Representations", "Sales", "Sanctions", "Severability", "Solvency", "Specific Performance", "Submission To Jurisdiction", "Subsidiaries", "Successors", "Survival", "Tax Withholdings", "Taxes", "Terminations", "Terms", "Titles", "Transactions With Affiliates", "Use Of Proceeds", "Vacations", "Venues", "Vesting", "Waiver Of Jury Trials", "Waivers", "Warranties", "Withholdings",
unfair_tos
text: astringfeature (a ToS sentence)labels: a list of classification labels (a list of unfair types, if any).List of unfair types
"Limitation of liability", "Unilateral termination", "Unilateral change", "Content removal", "Contract by using", "Choice of law", "Jurisdiction", "Arbitration"
casehold
context: astringfeature (a context sentence incl. a masked holding statement).holdings: a list ofstringfeatures (a list of candidate holding statements).label: a classification label (the id of the original/correct holding).
Data Splits
| Dataset | Training | Development | Test | Total |
| ECtHR (Task A) | 9,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 11,000 |
| ECtHR (Task B) | 9,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 11,000 |
| SCOTUS | 5,000 | 1,400 | 1,400 | 7,800 |
| EUR-LEX | 55,000 | 5,000 | 5,000 | 65,000 |
| LEDGAR | 60,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 80,000 |
| UNFAIR-ToS | 5,532 | 2,275 | 1,607 | 9,414 |
| CaseHOLD | 45,000 | 3,900 | 3,900 | 52,800 |
Dataset Creation
Curation Rationale
Source Data
| Dataset | Source | Sub-domain | Task Type |
| ECtHR (Task A) | Chalkidis et al. (2019) | ECHR | Multi-label classification |
| ECtHR (Task B) | Chalkidis et al. (2021a) | ECHR | Multi-label classification |
| SCOTUS | Spaeth et al. (2020) | US Law | Multi-class classification |
| EUR-LEX | Chalkidis et al. (2021b) | EU Law | Multi-label classification |
| LEDGAR | Tuggener et al. (2020) | Contracts | Multi-class classification |
| UNFAIR-ToS | Lippi et al. (2019) | Contracts | Multi-label classification |
| CaseHOLD | Zheng et al. (2021) | US Law | Multiple choice QA |
Initial Data Collection and Normalization
Who are the source language producers?
Annotations
Annotation process
Who are the annotators?
Personal and Sensitive Information
Considerations for Using the Data
Social Impact of Dataset
Discussion of Biases
Other Known Limitations
Additional Information
Dataset Curators
Ilias Chalkidis, Abhik Jana, Dirk Hartung, Michael Bommarito, Ion Androutsopoulos, Daniel Martin Katz, and Nikolaos Aletras. LexGLUE: A Benchmark Dataset for Legal Language Understanding in English. 2022. In the Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. Dublin, Ireland.
Licensing Information
Citation Information
@inproceedings{chalkidis-etal-2021-lexglue,
title={LexGLUE: A Benchmark Dataset for Legal Language Understanding in English},
author={Chalkidis, Ilias and Jana, Abhik and Hartung, Dirk and
Bommarito, Michael and Androutsopoulos, Ion and Katz, Daniel Martin and
Aletras, Nikolaos},
year={2022},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics},
address={Dubln, Ireland},
}
Contributions
Thanks to @iliaschalkidis for adding this dataset.
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Homepage:
github.com
Repository:
github.com
Paper:
arxiv.org
Leaderboard:
github.com
Point of Contact:
Ilias Chalkidis
Size of downloaded dataset files:
564 MB
Size of the auto-converted Parquet files:
564 MB
Number of rows:
236,714
