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Appeal No. LXVI of 1949. Appeal from the High Court of judicature, Bombay, in a reference under section 66 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1022. K.M. Munshi (N. P. Nathvani, with him), for the appel lant. ' M.C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India (H. J. Umrigar, with him), for the respondent. 1950. May 26. The judgment of the Court was delivered by MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN J. This is an appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in an income tax matter and it raises the question whether munici pal property tax and urban immoveable property tax payable under the relevant Bombay Acts are allowable deductions under section 9 (1) (iv) of the Indian Income tax Act. The assessee company is an investment company deriving its income from properties in the city of Bombay. For the assessment year 1940 41 the net income of the assessee under the head "property" was computed by the Income tax Officer in the sum of Rs. 6,21,764 after deducting from gross rents certain payments. The company had paid during the relevant year Rs. 1,22,675 as municipal property tax and Rs. 32,760 as urban property tax. Deduction of these two sums was claimed under the provisions of section 9 the Act. Out of the first item a deduction in the sum of Rs. 48,572 was allowed on the ground that this item represented tenants ' burdens paid by the assessee, otherwise the claim was disal lowed. The, appeals of the assessee to the Appellate As sistant Commissioner and to the Income tax Appellate Tribu nal were unsuccessful. The Tribunal, however, agreed to refer two questions of law to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, namely, (1) Whether the municipal taxes paid by the applicant company are an allowable deduction under 555 the provisions of section 9 (1) (iv) of the Indian Income tax Act; (2) Whether the urban immoveable property taxes paid by the applicant company are an allowable deduction under section 9 (1) (iv) or under section 9 (1) (v) of the Indian Income tax Act. A supplementary reference was made covering a third question which was not raised before us and it is not there fore necessary to refer to it. The High Court answered all the three questions in the negative and hence this appeal. The question for our determination is whether the munic ipal property tax and urban immoveable property tax can be deducted as an allowance under clause (iv) of sub section (1) of section 9 of the Act. The decision of the point depends firstly on the construction of the language employed in sub clause (iv) of sub section (1) of section 9 of the Act, and secondly, on a finding as to the true nature and character of the liability of the owner under the relevant Bombay Acts for the payment of these taxes. Section 9 along with the relevant clause runs thus: (1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head ' income from property ' in respect of the bona fide annual value of property consisting of any buildings or lands appurtenant thereto of Which he is the owner, . . subject to the following allowances, namely : (iv) where the property is subject to a mortgage or other capital charge, the amount of any interest on such mortgage or charge; where the property is subject to an annual charge not being a capital charge, the. amount of such charge; where the property is subject to a ground rent, the amount of such ground rent; and, where the property has been acquired, constructed, repaired, renewed or recon structed with borrowed capital, the amount of any interest payable on such capital; . . . " It will be seen that clause (iv) consists of four sub clauses corresponding to the four deductions allowed 556 under the clause. Before the amending Act of 1939, clause (iv) contained only the first, third and fourth sub clauses. Under the first sub clause interest is deductible whether the amount borrowed on the security of the property was spent on the property or not. There is no question of any capital or other expenditure on the property. The expression "capital charge" in the sub clause cannot connote a charge on the capital, that is, the property assessed. That would be a redundancy as the opening words themselves clearly indicate that the charge is on the property. We are therefore of opinion that capital charge here could only mean a charge created for a capital sum, i.e., a charge to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature. In 1933 the Privy Council decided the case of Bijoy Singh. Dudhuria vs Commissioner of Income tax, Calcutta (1 ). It was not an assessment under section 9 but an assess ment on the general income of an assessee who was liable to pay maintenance for his step mother which had been charged on all his assets by a decree of Court. It was not a li ability voluntarily incurred by him but one cast on him by law. The Privy Council held that the amount paid by him in discharge of that liability formed no part of his real income and so should not be included in his assessment. Though the decision proceeded on the principle that the outgoings were not part of the assessee 's income at all, the framers of the amending Act of 1939 wanted, apparently, to extend the principle, so far as the assessment of property was concerned, even to cases where obligatory payments had to be made out of the assessee 's income from the property charged with such payments, and the second sub clause, namely, "where the property is subject to an annual charge not being a capital charge, the amount of such charge" was added. It is this sub clause which the appellant invokes in support of its claim to deduction of the municipal and urban, property taxes in the present case. In view of the opening words of the newly added sub clause, the expression "capital charge" also used therein cannot have reference to a charge on the property, and we think it must (1) I.L.R. 60 cal. 557 be understood in the same sense as in sub clause (1); that is to say, the first sub clause having provided for deduc tion of interest where a capital sum is charged on the property, this sub clause provides for a deduction of annual sums so charged, such sums not being capital sums, the limiting words being intended to exclude cases where capital raised on the security of the property is made repayable in instalments. In Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay vs Mahomedbhoy Rowji (1), a Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the meaning of these words. As regards "annual charge," Beau mont C.J. observed as follows : "The words, I think, would cover a charge to secure an annual liability." Kania J., as he then was, said as follows : "I do not see how a charge can be annual unless it means a charge in respect of a payment to be made annually." This construction of the words has been followed in the judgment under appeal. In Gappumal Kanhaiya Lal vs Commissioner of Income tax (2) (the connected appeal before us), the Bench of the Allahabad High Court agreed with the construction placed on these words in the Bombay case, i.e., the words "annual charge" mean a charge to secure an annual liability. It is therefore clear that there is no conflict of judicial deci sions as to the meaning of the phrase "annual charge" occur ring in section 3 (1) (iv) and the meaning given is the natural meaning of these words. As to the phrase "capital charge", Beaumont C.J. in the case above referred to took the view that the words mean a charge on capital. Kania J., however, took a different view and observed that he was not prepared to accept the sugges tion that a document which provides for a certain payment to be made monthly or annually and charged on immoveable property or the estate of an individual becomes a capital charge. In the Allahabad judgment under appeal these (1) I.L.R. (2) I.L.R. 1944 All. 558 words were considered as not meaning a charge on capital. It was said that if an annual charge means a charge to secure the discharge of an annual liability, then, capital charge means a charge to secure the discharge of a liability of a capital nature. We think this construction is a natu ral construction of the section and is right. The determination of the point whether the taxes in dispute fall within the ambit of the phrase "annual charge not being a capital charge" depends on the provisions of the statutes under which they are levied. Section 143 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, authorises the levy of a general tax on all buildings and lands in the city. The primary responsibility to pay this property tax is on the lessor (vide section 146 of the Act). In order to assess the tax provision has been made for the determination of the annual rateable value of the building in section 154. Section 156 provides for the maintenance of an assessment book in which entries have to be made every official year of all buildings in the city, their rateable value, the names of persons primarily liable for payment of the property tax on such buildings and of the amount for which each building has been assessed. Section 167 lays down that the assess ment book need not be prepared every official year but public notices shall be given in accordance with sections 160 to 162 every year and the provisions o+ the said sec tions and of sections 163 and 167 shall be applicable each year. These sections lay down a procedure for hearing objections and complaints against entries in the assessment book. From these provisions it is clear ' that the liabil ity for the tax is determined at the beginning of each official year and the tax is an annual one. It recurs from year to year. Sections 143to 168 concern themselves with the imposition, liability and assessment of the tax for the year. The amount of the tax for the year and the liability for its payment having been determined, the Act then pre scribes for its collection in the chapter "The collection of taxes. " Section 197 provides that each of the property taxes shall be payable in 559 advance in half yearly instalments on each first day of April and each first day of October. The provision as to half yearly instalment necessarily connotes an annual li ability. In other words, it means that the annual liability can be discharged by half yearly payments. Procedure has also been prescribed for recovery of the instalments by presentment of a bill, a notice of demand and then distress, and sale. Finally section 212 provides as follows : "Property taxes due under this Act in respect of any building or land shall, subject to the prior payment of the land revenue, if any, due to the provincial ,Government thereupon, be a first charge . . upon the said build ing or land . " It creates a statutory charge on the building. Urban immove able property tax is leviable under section 22 of Part VI of the Bombay Finance Act, 1932,on the annual letting value of the property. The duty to collect the tax is laid on the municipality and it does so in the same manner as in the case of the municipal property tax. Section 24 (2) (b) is in terms similar to section 212 of the Bombay Municipal Act. It makes the land or the building security for the payment of this tax also. For the purposes of section 9 of the Indian Income tax Act both these taxes, namely, the munici pal property tax as well as the urban immoveable property tax are of the same character and stand on the same foot ing. Mr. Munshi, the learned counsel for the appellant con tended that both the taxes are assessed on the annual value of the land or the building and are annual taxes, although it may be that they are collected at intervals of six months for the sake of convenience, that the income tax itself is assessed on an annual basis, that in allowing deductions all payments made or all liabilities incurred during the previ ous year of assessment should be allowed and that the taxes in question fell clearly within the language of section 9 (1) (iv). The learned Attorney General, on the other hand, argued that although the taxes are assessed for the year the liability to pay them arises at the beginning 560 of each half year and unless a notice of demand is issued and a bill presented there is no liability to pay them and that till then no charge under section 212 of the Act could possibly arise and that the liability to pay being half yearly in advance, the charge is not an annual charge. It was also suggested that the taxes were a capital charge in the sense of the property being security for the payment. We are satisfied that the contentions raised by the learned Attorney General are not sound. It is apparent from the whole tenor of the two Bombay Acts that the taxes are in the nature of an annual levy on the property ' and are assessed on the annual value of the property each year. The annual liability can be discharged by half yearly instalments. The liability being an annual one and the property having been subjected to it, the provisions of clause (iv) of sub sec tion (1) of section 9 are immediately attracted. Great emphasis was laid on the word"due" used in section 212 of the Municipal Act and it was said that as the taxes do not become due under the Act unless the time for the payment arrives, no charge comes into existence till then and that the charge is not an annual charge. We do not think that this is a correct construction of section 212. The words "property taxes due under this Act" mean property taxes for which a person is liable under the Act. Taxes payable during the year have been made a charge on the property. The liability and the charge both co exist and are co exten sive. The provisions of the Act affording facilities for the discharge of the liability do not in any way affect their true nature and character. If the annual liability is not discharged in the manner laid down by section 197, can it be said that the property cannot be sold for recovery of the whole amount due for the year ? The answer to this query can only be in the affirmative, i.e., that the proper ty is liable to sale. In Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay vs Mahomedbhoy Rowji(1) Beaumont C.J., while rejecting the claim for the deduction of the taxes, placed reliance on (1) I.L.R. 561 section 9 (1) (v) which allows a deduction in respect of any sums paid on account of land revenue. It was observed that land revenue stands on the same footing as municipal taxes and that as the legislature made a special provision for deduction of sums payable in regard to land revenue but not in respect of sums paid on account of municipal taxes that circumstance indicated that the deduction was not allowable. For the same purpose reference was also made to the provi sions of section 10 which deal with business allowances and wherein deduction of any sum paid on account of land reve nue, local rates or municipal taxes has been allowed. In the concluding part of his judgment the learned Chief Jus tice said that it was not necessary for him to consider what the exact meaning of the words was and that it was suffi cient for him to say that it did not cover municipal taxes which are made a charge on the property under section 212 of the Bombay Municipal Act. Without determining the exact meaning of the words used by the statute it seems to us it was not possible to arrive at the conclusion that the taxes were not within the ambit of the clause. It is elementary that the primary duty of a Court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the words used by it and no outside consideration can be called in aid tO find that intention. Again reference to clause (v) of the section is not very helpful because land revenue is a charge of a paramount nature on all buildings and lands and that being so, a deduction in respect of the amount was mentioned in express terms. Municipal taxes, on the other hand, do not stand on the same footing as land revenue. The law as to them varies from province to province and they may not be necessarily a charge on property in all cases. The legis lature seems to have thought that so far as municipal taxes on property are concerned, if they fall within the ambit of clause (iv), deduction will be claimable in respect of them but not otherwise. The deductions allowed in section 10 under the head "Income from business" proceed on a different footing and a construction of section 9 with the aid of section 10 is apt to mislead. 562 Kania J. in the above case in arriving at his conclusion was influenced by the consideration that these taxes were of a variable character, i.e., liable to be increased or re duced under the various provisions of the Municipal Act and that the charge was in the nature of a contingent charge. With great respect, it may be pointed out that all charges in a way may be or are of a variable and contingent na ture. If no default is made, no charge is ever enforceable and whenever there is a charge, it can be increased or reduced during the year either by payment or by additional borrowing. In Moss Empires Ltd. vs Inland Revenue Commissioners (1) it was held by the House of Lords that the fact that certain payments were contingent and variable in amount did not affect their character of being annual payments and that the word, "annual" must be taken to have the quality of being recurrent or being capable of recurrence. In Cunard 's Trustees vs Inland Revenue Commissioners (2) it was held that the payments were capable of being recur rent and were therefore annual payments within the meaning of schedule D, case III, rule 1 (1), even though they were not necessarily recurrent year by year and the fact that they varied in amount was immaterial. The learned Attorney General in view of these decisions did not support the view expressed by Kania J. Reliance was placed on a decision of the High Court of Madras in Mamad Keyi vs Commissioner of Income tax, Madras(3), in which moneys paid as urban immoveable property tax under the Bombay Finance Act were disallowed as inadmis sible under section 9 (1) (iv) or 9 (1) (v) of the Indian Income tax Act. 'This decision merely followed the view expressed in Commissioner of income tax, Bombay vs Mahomedb hoy Rowji (4)and was not arrived at on any independent or fresh reasoning and is not of much assistance in the deci sion of the case. The Allahabad High Court (1) (2) [1948] 1 A.E.R. 150. (3) I.L.R. (4) I.L.R. 563 in Gappumal Kanhaiya Lal vs Commissioner of Incometax (1) (the connected appeal) took a correct view of this matter and the reasoning given therein has our approval. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the two questions which were referred to the High Court by the Income tax Tribunal and cited above are answered in the affirmative. The appellants will have their costs in the appeal. Appeal allowed.

The charge created in respect of municipal property tax by section 212 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, is an "annual charge not being a capital charge" within the mean ing of section 9 (1) (iv) of the Indian Income tax Act, 199.2, and the amount of such charge should therefore be deducted in computing the income from such property for the purposes of section 9 of the Indian Income tax Act. The charge in respect of urban immoveable property tax created by the Bombay Finance Act, 1939 is similar in character and the amount of such charge should also be deducted. The expression "capital charge" in s.9(1) (iv) means a charge created for a capital sum,that is to say, a charge created to. ' secure the discharge of a liability of a capi tal nature; and an "annual charge" means a charge to secure an annual liabili ty. 554

Pursuant to the directions of the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, the Income tax Officer, determined the assessee 's capital gains under section 12B of the Income tax Act, 1922. He did not, however, make any order under section 23(3) of the Act, nor did he issue a notice of demand under section 29 of the Act. The assessee filed an application before the Commissioner of Income tax, under section 33A(2) of the Act, for revising the computation made by the Income tax Officer drawing his attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Baijnath 's case, , as to how the capital gains should be ascertained. That decision was based upon a consideration of the very documents which were the basis of the assessees ' claim. The Commissioner dismissed the revision petition as not maintainable, as well as on merits, ignoring the Bombay decision. Meanwhile, the assessee filed an application requesting the Income tax Officer to issue a notice of demand under section 29, to enable him to file an appeal, but the Officer declined to do so. The assessee filed a writ application in the High Court for issuing appropriate writs to the Commissioner and the Income tax Officer, but the High Court dismissed it in limine. In his appeal to this Court, the assessee contended that (i) the High Court erred in holding that the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition was not in accordance with law, and that even if there were any defects the High Court should have given him an opportunity to rectify them, and (ii) the High Court erred in distinguishing the Bombay decision and in holding that there was no force in the revision filed before the Commissioner, and that, the High Court should have directed the Commissioner to entertain the revision and dispose of it in accordance with law by giving suitable directions to the Income tax Officer. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that as the order of the Commissioner was an administrative act, article 226 of the Constitution could not be invoked. HELD:(i) As no appeal lay to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the calculations made by the Income tax Officer, the Commissioner had powers under section 33A(2) to revise the Income tax Officer 's order. The jurisdiction conferred on the Commissioner by the section is a judicial one, The nature of the jurisdiction and the rights decided carry with them necessarily the duty to act judicially in disposing of the revision. Further, the fact that a Division Bench of one of the High Courts in India had taken a view in favour of the assessee, indicated that the question raised was arguable and required serious consideration. Therefore, a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Commissioner dismissing the assessee 's revision petition, should be issued. [544E G; 548D] 537 Sitalpore Colliery Concern Ltd. vs Union of India, , Additional Income tax Officer, Cuddapah vs Cuddapah Star Transport Co. Ltd. and Suganchand Saraogi vs Commissioner of Income tax, , overruled. Even if the Commissioner only made an administrative order in refusing, to give any direction to the Income tax Officer, the assessee would still be entitled to approach the High Court under article 226, and a writ of mandamus directing the Income tax Officer to discharge his statutory duty of passing the order and issuing the notice of demand in accordance with law, should be issued. [546C E] (ii)The affidavit filed on behalf of the assessee was complete and compiled with the rules made by the High Court. The affidavit spoke only of matters which were within the deponent 's own knowledge, because, the phrase "deponent 's own knowledge" is wide enough to comprehend the knowledge derived from a perusal of relevant documents. Even if the affidavit was defective in any manner, the High Court instead of dismissing the petition in limine should have given the assessee, a reasonable opportunity to file a better affidavit. [547F G, H] (iii)The High Court was also in error in holding that the decision of the Bombay High Court was given on different facts, for the facts in both cases were the same and they arose out of the same transaction. [548B C]

In 1865, the Government of Bombay called upon the prede cessor in title of the Corporation of Bombay to remove some markets from a certain site and vacate it, and on the appli cation of the then Municipal Commissioner the Government passed a resolution approving and authorising the grant of another site to the Municipality. The resolution stated further that "the Government do not consider that any rent should be charged to the Municipality as the markets will be, like other public buildings, for the benefit of the whole community. " The Corporation gave up the sites on which the old markets were situated and spent a sum of over 17 lacs in erecting and maintaining markets on the new site. In 1940 the Collector of Bombay, overruling the objection of the Corporation, assessed the new site under section 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act to land revenue rising from Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 30,000 in 50 years. The Corporation sued for a declaration that the order of assessment was ultra vires and that it was entitled to hold the land for ever without payment of any assessment. The High Court of Bombay held applying the principle of Ramsden vs Dyson(1) that the Government had lost its right to assess the land in question by reason of the equity arising on the facts of the case in favour of the Corporation and there was thus a limitation on the right of the Government to assess under section 8 of the said Act: Held per KANIA C.J., DAS, CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and BOsE JJ. (PATANJALI SASTRI J. dissenting) that the Govern ment was not, under the circumstances of the case, entitled to assess land revenue on the land in question. Per KANIA C.J., DAS and Bose JJ. Though there was no effectual grant by the Government passing title in the land to the Corporation by reason of non compliance with the statutory formalities, yet, inasmuch as the Corporation had never the less taken possession of the land in terms of the Government resolution and continued in such possession openly, uninterruptedly and as of right for over 70 years, the Corporation had acquired the (1) (1866)L.R. 44 limited title it had been prescribing for during the period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent, but only for the purposes of a market and for no other purposes. The right acquired included as part of it an immunity from payment of rent which constituted a right in limitation of the Government 's right to assess in excess of the specific limit established and preserved by the Government Resolution within the meaning of section 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act (II of 1876) there being for the purposes of this case no distinction between rent and revenue. Per CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. If the Resolution of 1865 can be read as meaning that the grant was of rent free land the case would come strictly within the doctrine of estoppel enunciated in section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. Even otherwise, if there was merely the holding out of a promise that no rent will be charged in the future the Government must be deemed to have bound themselves to fulfil it. The right to levy assessment is a prerogative right of the Government and it is hard to conceive of a ease where it could be said to be lost by adverse possession. A court of equity must prevent the perpetration of a legal fraud. PATANJALI SASTRI J. (contra) The principle of Ramsden vs Dyson cannot prevail against statutory requirements regarding disposition of property or making of contracts by Government. No question of estoppel by representation arises, as the Government made no representation of fact which it now seeks to deny. Nor can any case of estoppel by acquiescence be rounded on the facts of the case as there was no lying by and letting another run into a trap. No right of exemption has been established either on the basis of express or implied contract or on the basis of equitable principles of part performance or estoppel by acquiescence. The right to levy land revenue is no part of the Govern ment 's right to property but a prerogative of the Crown and adverse possession of the land could not destroy the Crown 's prerogative to impose assessment on the land.

The respondent Company was assessed to wealth tax for the assessment year 1957 58 and the respondent claimed deduction of an amount laid out for setting up a new unit. The licence for setting up the new unit was granted in 1955; the construction of the factory building was completed by December 1957; the erection of the machinery and plant was completed in several stages commencing from June 1957; the licence for working the factory was obtained in June 1958; and time given to complete the project also was extended by Government up to March 17, 1959. The Wealth Tax Officer disallowed the claim on the ground that the unit was, set up prior to the date on which the Wealth Tax Act came into force, ie., April 1, 1957. This order was upheld in appeals. But in reference, the High Court answered the question in favour of the assessee, for, it proceeded on the basis that the unit was completed and became ready to go into business after the Act had come into force. HELD : The assessee was entitled to the claim as it satisfied the condition laid down in cl. (xxi) of section 5(1) of the Act. The criterion for determining the period of exemption is based on the commencement of the operations for establishment of the unit. These operations for establishment of the unit cannot be simultaneous with the setting up of the unit, but must precede the actual setting up of the unit. [1764 G H] The word "set up" in clause (xxi) of section 5(1) of the Act, is equivalent to the word "established" but operations for establishment cannot be equated with the establishment of the unit itself or its setting up. The applicability of the, proviso has, therefore, to be decided by finding out when the company commenced operations for establishment of the unit, which operations must be antecedent to the actual date on which the company is held to have been set up for purposes of the principal clause.[1764 D E] Western India Vegetable Products, Limited vs Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City, referred to. In the present case, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that whatever be the exact date of commencement of the operations for establishment of Ibis unit,, it was certainly before April 1, 1957 and that fact by itself is sufficient to entitle the assessee to claim the exemption. The Commissioner cannot be allowed to raise a new question and ask this Court to decide that the date of commencement of the operation for establishment of the unit by the respondent was different from that accepted by the Tribunal. That question was not raised and dealt with by the Tribunal, [766 E] Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay vs Scindia Steam Navigation Co., Ltd., ; relied on.

The appellant company was a dealer in ghee and groundnut oil etc. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer assessed it to sales tax for the year 1948 49 on a turnover of Rs. 28,69,151 and odd. Similarly for the year 1949 50 the appellant was assessed to sales tax on a turnover of Rs. 28,72,o83 and odd. The appellant challenged these assessments and its appeal before the Commercial Tax Officer having failed the two matters came up in second appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. In the Tribunal the appellant did not place any materials in support of its contentions and the two appeals were disposed of by the Tribunal holding that the appellant was correctly assessed to sales tax. In respect of the aforesaid orders of the Tribunal the appellant filed applications for review under section 12A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. Act IX Of 1939), taking the plea that in the first case the materials could not be placed before the Tribunal as there was none to instruct the appellant 's advocate in English or Telegu, and in the second case the relevant correspondence was mixed up with other records. The Tribunal rejected the applications for review on the ground that a failure to produce the necessary materials in support of a plea taken before it, due either to gross negligence or deliberate withholding, did not come within the reason of section 12A(6)(a) of the Act. The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. On appeal by special leave in one case and a certificate of the High Court in the other: Held, that the provision in section 12A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. Act IX Of 1939), permits a review when through some oversight, mistake or error the necessary facts, basic or evidentiary, were not present before the Court when it passed the order sought to be reviewed, but a party was not 805 entitled to ask for a review when it had deliberately or intentionally withheld evidence in support of a claim made by it. State of Andhra vs Sri Arisetty Sriyamulu, A.I.R. 1057 Andhra Pradesh 130, not approved.

The respondent 's appeal against an order of assessment was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and he, thereafter appealed to the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal, after having granted some adjournments, dismissed the appeal for default in appearance On a day fixed for the hearing, purporting to do so under rule 24 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946. The High Court directed the Tribunal to refer two questions to itself one relating to the merits and the other to the effect whether rule 24 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, in so far as it enables the Tribunal to dismiss an appeal in default in appearance, is ultra vires. A special bench of the High Court took the view that under section 3 3 (4) the Tribunal was bound to dispose of the appeal on the merits, whether the appellant was present or not. On appeal to this Court, HELD : It follows from the language of section 33(4) and in particular the use of the word "thereon" that the Tribunal has to go into the correctness or otherwise of the points decided by the departmental authorities in the light of the submissions made by the appellant. This can only be done by giving a decision on the merits on questions of fact and law and not by merely disposing of the appeal on the ground that the party concerned had failed to appear. [824 C D] The provisions contained in section 66 about making a 'reference on questions of law to the High Court would be rendered nugatory if a power is attributed to the Appellate Tribunal by which it can dismiss an appeal, which has otherwise been properly filed, for default, without making an order thereon in accordance with section 33(4). So far as the questions of fact are concerned the decision of the Tribunal is final and reference can be sought to the High Court only on questions of law. The High Court exercises purely advisory jurisdiction and has no appellate or revisional powers. The advisory jurisdiction can be exercised on a proper reference being made and that cannot be done unless the Tribunal itself has passed a proper order under section 33(4). [824 E H] Rule 24 clearly comes into conflict with section 33(4) and in the event ,of repugnancy between the substantive provisions of the Act and a rule, it is the rule which must give way to the provisions of the Act. [825 H] Shri Bhagwan Radha Kishen vs Commissioner of Income tax, U.P. ; Ruvula Subba Rao & Ors. vs Commissioner of Income tax Madras, ; Mangat Ram Kuthiala & Ors. vs Commissioner of Income tax, Punjab, ; Hukumchand Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income tax, Central Bombay, ; Commissioner of Income 819 tax Madras vs Mtt. section Ar. Arunachalam Chettiar, and Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay vs Scindia Stearn Navigation Co. Ltd. ; , referred to.

The appellant firm filed appeals against orders assessing it to income tax and super tax for the years 1945 1946 and 1946 1947 beyond the time prescribed by section 30(2) of the Income tax Act. The appeals were numbered, and notices were issued for their hearing under section 31. At the hearing of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Department took the objection that the appeals were barred by time. The appellant prayed for condonation of delay, but that was refused, and the appeals were dismissed as time barred. The appellant then preferred appeals against the orders of dismissal to the Tribunal under section 33 of the Act, and the Tribunal dismissed them on the ground that the orders of the Assistant Commissioner were in substance passed under section 30(2) and not under section 31 of the Act and that no appeal lay against them under section 33 of the Act. On a reference under section 66(1) of the Act the High Court held that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were made under section 30(2) and were not appealable under section 33 of the Act. On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court the question for determination was whether an order dismissing an appeal presented under section 30 as out of time was one under section 30(2) or under section 31 of the Act because if it was the former there was no appeal provided against it; if it was the latter it was open to appeal under section 33. Held that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner fell within section 31. A right of appeal is a substantive right and is a creature of the statute. section 30(1) confers on the assessee a right of appeal against certain orders and an order of assessment under section 23 is one of them. The appellant had therefore a substantive right under section 30(1) to prefer appeals against orders of assessment made by the Income Tax Officer. 167 An appeal presented out of time is an appeal and an order dismissing it as time barred is one passed in appeal. Section 31 is the only provision relating to the hearing and disposal of appeals and if an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation as in the present case is one passed in appeal it must fall within section 31 and as section 33 confers a right of appeal against all orders passed under section 31, it must also be appealable. To fall within section 31 it is not necessary that the order should expressly address itself to and decide on the merits of the assessment and it is sufficient that the effect of the order is to confirm the assessment as when the appeal is dismissed on a preliminary point. An order rejecting an appeal on the, ground of limitation after it had been admitted is one under section 31, though there is no consideration of the merits of the assessment. Held therefore that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner holding that there were no sufficient reasons for excusing the delay and rejecting the appeals as time barred would be orders passed under section 31 and would be open to appeal, and it would make no difference in the position whether the orders of dismissal were made before or after the appeals were admitted. Commissioner of Income tax, Madras vs Mtt. `r. section Ar. Arunachalam Chettiar, ([1953] S.C.R. 463), explained. Case law discussed.

In respect of the assessment for the assessment year 1974 75, the appellant assessee preferred an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. During the hearing of the appeal, the assessee raised an additional ground as regards its liability to Purchase Tax and claimed a deduc tion of Rs.11,54,995. After giving an opportunity of hearing to the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner allowed the said claim. The Revenue preferred an appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain any additional ground not raised before the Income Tax Officer and set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commis sioner. The assessee 's application for making reference to the High Court was refused by the Tribunal. The High Court also rejected the assessee 's application for calling the state ment of the case and reference from the Tribunal. Hence, this appeal by special leave. Disposing of the appeal, the Court, HELD: 1.1 The declaration of law is clear that the power of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is co terminus with that of the Income Tax Officer. If that be so, there appears to be no reason as to why the appellate authority cannot modify the assessment order on an additional ground even if not raised before the Income Tax Officer. No exception could be taken to this view as the Act does not place any restric tion or limitation on the exercise of appellate power. Even otherwise an Appellate Authority while hearing appeal against the order of a subordinate authority has all the powers which the original 341 authority may have in deciding the question before it sub ject to the restrictions or limitation if any prescribed by the statutory provisions. In the absence of any statutory provisions to the contrary the Appellate Authority is vested with all the plenary powers which the subordinate authority may have in the matter. [155G H; 156A B] 1.2 If the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is satisfied he would be acting within his jurisdiction in considering the question so raised in all its aspects. Of course, while permitting the assessee to raise an additional ground, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should exercise his discre tion in accordance with law and reason. He must be satisfied that the ground raised was bona fide and that the same could not have been raised earlier for good reasons. The satisfac tion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and no rigid prin ciples or any hard and fast rules can be laid down for this purpose. [157D F] Commissioner of Income Tax vs Mc Millan & Co., ; ; Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. vs Kanpur Coal Syndicate,, ; Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. vs Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Calcutta, ; relied on. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs Shapporji Patton Ji Mistry, ; Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax Gujarat vs Gurjargravures ?. Ltd., ; distinguished. Rai Kumar Srimal vs Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal 111, , approved. Narrondas Manordass vs Commissioner of Income Tax, [1957] 31 referred to. 2. In the instant case, the assessee was assessed to Purchase Tax. The appellant disputed the demand and filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority and obtained stay order. The assessee thereafter claimed deduction for the amount of Rs.11,54,995 towards his liability to pay Purchase Tax as deduction for the assessment year 1974 75. The asses see had not actually paid the Purchase Tax as it had ob tained stay from the Appellate Authority; nonetheless its liability to pay tax existed, and it was entitled to deduc tion of Rs. 11,54,995. [158B C] 3. Since the view taken by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is 342 not sustainable in law, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal to consider the merit of the deduction permitted by the Appellate As sistant Commissioner. If the Tribunal thinks it necessary, it may remand the matter to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (Deputy Commissioner of Appeals) for hearing [158F H]

Civil Appeal No.94 of 1949. 107 834 Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judi cature at Patna in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 97 of 1946 (Mannohar Lall and Mukherji JJ.) dated 23rd Decem ber, 1947, confirming the judgment of the District Judge of Purulia in Appeal No. 159 of 1944. S.P. Sinha (P. K. Bose, with him) for the appel lant. N.C. Chatterjee and Panchanan Ghosh (Chandra Narayan Naik, with them) for the respondent. 1950. December 1. The Judgment of the Court was deliv ered by PATANJALI SASTRI J. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the respondent in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, for recovery of arrears of royalty and cess from the appellant and another alleged to be due under a compromise decree passed on the 6th March, 1923, in a previ ous suit between the predecessors in interest of the par ties. The only plea which is material for the purpose of this appeal is that the compromise decree not having been registered was inadmissible in evidence. The courts below held that the document did not require registration and gave effect to its terms in decreeing the suit. The second defendant has preferred this appeal. The facts are not now in dispute and may be briefly stated. On 11th March, 1921, one Kumar Krishna Prasad Singh (hereinafter referred to as Kumar) granted a perma nent lease of the right to the underground coal in 5,800 bighas of land belonging to him to Shibsaran Singh and Sitaram Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Singhs) by a registered patta stipulating for a salami of Rs. 8,000 and royalty at the rate of 2a. per ton of coal raised subject to a minimum of Rs. 8,000 and for certain other cesses and interest. On 7th June, 1921, Kumar executed another perma nent patta leasing the right to the coal in 500 bighas out of the 5,800 bighas referred to above to one Prayngji Bal lavji Deoshi and his son Harakchand Deoshi (hereinafter referred to as the Deoshis). By this document. 835 the Deoshis agreed inter alia to pay royalty at the rate of 2a. per ton on all classes of coal raised subject to a minimum of Rs. 750 a year. The Singhs feeling themselves aggrieved by the latter transaction brought a title suit (No. 1291 of 1921) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad for a declaration of their title and for possession of the 500 bighas leased to the Deoshis under the aforesaid patta of 7th June, 1921. To that suit Kumar was made a party as defendant No. 3, the Deoshis being defendants 1 and 2. The suit was however cornpromised on 6th March, 1923, by all the parties and a decree based on the compromise was also passed on the same day. The interest of the Singhs was brought to sale in 193S in execution of a decree obtained against them and was purchased by the plaintiff who insti tuted the presnt suit on 3rd October, 1942, claiming the royalty and cesses payable under the compromise decree for the period from Pous 1345 to Asadh 1349 B.S. from defendants 1 and 2 as the representatives of the Deoshis who entered into the compromise of March, 1923. In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to set out the relevant terms of the compro mise decree which are as follows : "The plaintiffs (the Singhs) within two months from this date shall pay Rs. 8,000 as salami to defendant No. 3 (Kumar). Otherwise all the terms of the compromise Will stand cancelled and the plaintiffs shall not be competent to claim any right to or possession over the.land covered by the patta dated 11th March, 1921. The patta which defend ant No. 3 executed in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of 5,800 bighas of coal land in village Rahraband shall remain in force, and the plaintiffs will get a decree of declara tion of their right and title to the 500 bighas of coal land in dispute but defendants 1 and 2 (the Deoshis) shall hold possession as tenants. Besides the terms mentioned below, defendants 1 and 2 shall remain bound by all the remaining terms under which they took settlement of the 500 bighas of coal land from defendant No. 3 under 836 patta and Kabuliyat, and both the defendants 1 and 2 shall possess the same under the plaintiffs from generation to generation and all the terms of the said patta and Kabuliyat shall remain effective and in force between them. Both the defendants 1 and 2 shall remain bound to pay to the plain tiffs commission at the rate of 2a. per ton on all sorts of coal instead of 2a. a ton as stated before in the patta of 5,800 bighas of land settled with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs shall pay to defendant No. 3 in future the mini mum royalty of Rs. 6,000 instead of Rs. 8,000 as stipulated in the original patta of 11 th March 1921 and commission at the rate of la. a ton in place of 2a. a ton as stipulat ed in the patta of March 21 . Unless the plaintiffs pay to the defendant No. 3 Rs. 8,000 within 2 months from this day they shall not be competent to take out execution of this decree, nor shall they be competent to take posses sion of the land in dispute. The defendants 1 and 2 within one month from the date of payment of Rs. 8,000 as aforesaid to defendant No. 3 shall execute a new Kabuliyat in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the modified terms stated above, i.e., on the condition to pay commission at the rate of 2a. per ton. In the new patta which defendant No. 3 will execute in favour of the plaintiffs he shall embody the condition that the annual minimum royalty will be Rs. 6,000 instead of Rs. 8,000 and commission will be at the rate of la. 9p. per ton in place of 2a. per ton as mentioned in the aforesaid patta. If the defendant No. 3 does not execute the parts on the aforesaid modified terms in favour 'of the plaintiffs within the time aforesaid and both the defendants 1 and 2 also do not execute a kabuliyat on the aforesaid modified terms, then this very rafanama shall be treated as the parts and kabuliyat, and the plaintiffs in accordance with the terms of the rafanama shall pay to defendant No. 3, Rs. 6,000 only as minimum royalty and commission at the rate of la. per ton with respect to 5,800 bighas and shall continue to realise commission at the rate of 2a. 6p. per ton from defendants 1 and 2 who shall remain bound to pay the same. " 837 The answer to the question whether this compromise decree requires registration depends on the legal effect of the changes in the status quo ante of the parties brought about by the document. A careful analysis reveals the following alterations : (1) In the lease to the Singhs, the rate of royalty or commission was reduced from 2a. per ton of coal raised to la. per ton and the minimum royalty was reduced from Rs. 8,000 to Rs. 6,000 while the area of coal land in their khas possession was reduced by 500 bighas. (2) In the lease to the Deoshis the rate of royalty or commission was enhanced from 2a. per ton to 2a. per ton and tiffs was made payable to the Singhs. The Singhs and the Deoshis were brought into a new legal relationship, the former accepting the latter as tenants holding the disputed 500 bighas under them in consideration of the latter agreeing to pay the enhanced royalty to the former. (4) The whole arrangement was made conditional on the Singhs paying Rs. 8,000 to Kumar within 2 months from the date of the compromise, it being expressly provided that the Singhs were not to be entitled to execute the decree or to take possession of the disputed area of 503 bighas which evidently had not till then passed into their possession. Now, sub section (1) of section 17 of the , enumerates five categories of documents of which regis tration is made compulsory which include" (d) leases of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent;". Sub sec tion (2) however provided that "nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub section (1)applies to . (vi) any decree or order of court. " It may be mentioned in passing that this clause was amended with affect from the 1st April, 1930, by the , so as to exclude from the scope of the exception compromise decrees comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject matter of the suit. But 838 the amendment cannot affect the document here in question which came into existence in 1923. Before the amendment, the clause was held to cover even compromise decrees comprising immovable property which was not the subject matter of the suit: [Vide Hemanta Kumari Debi vs Midnapur Zamindari Co. ( ')]. That decision applies to the present case and obviates the objection that because the compromise in question covered also the remaining 5,300 bighas which were not the subject matter of the title suit of 1921, it was outside the scope of the exception in sub section (2), clause (vi). The only question, therefore, is whether the compromise decree is a "lease" [which expression includes "an agreement to lease" by the definition in section 2 (7)] within the meaning of el. (d) of sub section (1). It is obvious that if the compromise decree fails within clause (d) of sub section (1) it would not be protected under clause (vi) of sub section (2) which excepts only documents falling under the categories (b) and (c) of sub section (1). The High Court was of opinion that, on a proper construction of the terms of the compromise, it did not fall under clause (d). Mano har Lall J., who delivered the leading judgment, observed: "It was a tripartite agreement embodied in the decree of the court and was, therefore, exempt from registration. It will be oh.served also that so far as the defendants were con cerned, their possession of the 500 bighas was not inter fered with and they still remained in possession as the lessees, but instead of paying the royalty to the plaintiffs it was agreed between all the parties that the defendants would pay the royalty in future to Shibsaran and Sitcram. If the matter had stood there, the learned Advocate for the appellant could not have seriously contested the position, but he vehemently argued that when the agreement was not to pay the same amount of royalty or commission as previously agreed to but an altered amount of royalty and commission, the document should be held to fall within the mischief of section 17 (1)(d)of the (1) P.C. 839 . The answer to this contention is, as I have stated just now, to be found in the Full Bench decision of this court :" [see Charu Chandra Mitra 's case ()]. It was there held that a mere alteration of the rent reserved does not make the transaction a new lease so as to bring it within clause (d)of subsection (1). We are unable to share this view. It oversimplifies the compromise transaction which, in our opinion, involves much more than a mere alteration of the royalties stipulated for in the previous pattas executed by Kumar. Nor can we accept the suggestion of Mr. Chatterjee for the respondents theft the compromise operated as an assignment to the Singhs by Kumar of the latter 's reversion under the "lease granted to the Deoshis and all that the latter did was to acknowledge the Singhs as their landlords and attern to them. On tiffs view it was said that the transaction would not fall under clause (d), although it would fall under clause (b) but then would be saved by the exception in clause (vi) of sub section (2). The argument, however, overlooks that Kumar had leased the area of 5,800 bighas to the Singhs by his patta dated 11th March, 1921, and the compromise by providing that the Singhs should pay the reduced royalty of 1a. per ton in respect of the whole area preserved Kumar 's reversion intact. He could not therefore be deemed to have assigned any part of his inter est in 5,800 bighas as landlord to the Singhs who continue to hold the entire extent as tenants under him. What the compromise really did was. as stated already, to bring the Singhs and the Deoshis into a new legal relationship as underlessor and under lessee in respect of 500 bighas which were the subject matter of the title suit; in other words, its legal effect was to create a perpetual underlease be tween the Singhs and the Deoshis which would clearly fall under clause (d) but for the circumstance that it was to take effect only on condition float the Singhs paid Rs. 8,000 to Kumar within 2 months (1) 840 thereafter. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Hemanta Kumar 's case (1) "An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to include, must, in their Lordships ' opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease . The phrase which in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in their opinion relate to some document which creates a present and immediate interest in the land. " The compromise decree expressly provides that unless the sum of Rs. 8,000 was paid within the stipulated time the Singhs were not to execute the decree or to take possession of the disputed property. Until the payment was made it was impossible to determine whether there would be any under lease or not. Such a contingent agreement is not within clause (d) and although it is covered by clause (b). is excepted by clause (vi) of sub section ( '2). We therefore agree with the conclusion of the High Court though on dif ferent grounds and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismisseel.

An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the Indian declared to include, must be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease. It must create present and immediate interest in land. Where a litigation between two persons A and B who claimed to be tenants under C was settled by a compromise decree the effect of which was to create a perpetual underlease between A and B which was to take effect only on condition that A paid Rs. 8,000 to C within a fixed period: Held, that such a contingent agreement was not "a lease" within el. (a) of section 17 (t) of the Indian , and even though it was covered by cl. (b) of the said sec tion it was exempt from registration under el. (vi) of subs. (2) of section 17. Hemanta Kumari Debi vs Midnapur Zamindari Co. (I P.C.) relied on.

The respondent imported 2,000 drums of mineral oil and the appellant confiscated 50 drums and imposed a personal penalty. The appeal of the respondent was dismissed by the Central Board of Revenue. The respondent filed a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court. A Full Bench of the High Court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ against the Central Board of Revenue in view of the decision in the case of Saka Venkata Subbha Rao. However, as the Central Board of Revenue had merely dismissed the appeal against the 564 order of the appellant, the High Court further held that it had jurisdiction to pass an order against the appellant. The appellant came to this Court after obtaining a certificate. Held that the appellant had merged into that of the Central Board of Revenue and hence no order could be issued against the appellant. It is only the order of the appellate authority which is operative after the appeal is disposed of. It is immaterial whether the appellate order reverses the original order, modifies it or confirms it. The appellate order of confirmation is as efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification. As the appellate authority in this case was beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, it was not open to the High Court to issue a writ to the original authority which was within its jurisdiction. Election Commission, India vs Saka Vankata Subba Rao, , A. Thangal Kunju Mudatiar vs M. Venkitachalam Poiti, ; , Commissioner of Income tax vs M/s. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. [1959] section C. R. 713 and Madan Gopal Rungta vs Secretary to the Government of Orissa, (1962) (Supp.) 3 S.C.R. followed. Barkatali vs Custodian General of Evacuee Property, A. 1. R. , overruled. Joginder Singh Waryam Singh vs Director, Rural Rehabilitation, Pepsu, Patiala, A. 1. R. 1955 Pepsu 91, Burhanpur National Textile Workers Union vs Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Bombay, A. I. R. , and Azmat Ullah vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, A.I.R. 1955 All 435, approved. State of U. P. vs Mohammed Nooh, ; , distinguished.

The petitioners, who were land owners of Himachal Pradesh, challenged the constitutional validity of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953 (Himachal 15 of 1954), said to have been passed by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Himachal Pradesh functioning under the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act (32 Of 1954). The impugned Act was introduced as a bill in the first session of the Legislative Assembly of the Old Himachal Pradesh elected under the Government of Part C States Act (49 Of 1951). Before the bill could be passed, the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act (32 Of 1954) came into force on July 1, 1954, abolishing the old Act and uniting the two States into one. While the Legislative Assembly for the New State was yet to be constituted, on July 7, 1954, the Governor issued the following notification, " The Lieutenant Governor, in exercise of. the powers conferred by Section 9 of the (49 Of 1951), has been pleased to direct that the Second Session, 1954, Of the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly will commence from Monday, the 16th August, 1954, at 9 30 a.m. in the Council Chamber, Simla 4. " It was at this session that the impugned Act was passed. Its provisions were said to be drastic and to infringe articles 14, 19 and 31 Of the Constitution. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that apart from violating those Articles, the impugned Act was void as it had not been passed by a duly constituted legislature. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the respondent that under the new Act the members of the Old Legislative Assembly must be deemed to constitute the legislature for the New State and it was as such called by the Governor. Held, that the contention raised by the respondent was with out substance and must be negatived. It was apparent that the so called Assembly which the Governor had convened and which purported to pass the impugned Act was not the Legislative Assembly of the New State constituted under the Himachal Pradesh and Bilaspur (New State) Act (32 Of 1954) and as such the Act could not be regarded as a valid piece of legislation.

The respondent had agreed to transport coal from the appel lant 's colliery to the railway station. The appellant had to keep the road in repair and arrange for petrol and had to make the payment for the actual coal despatched by the 10th of the following month. The appellant complained that he was suffering loss as the respondent had slowed down the work and the respondent complained that by not arranging for the petrol, not keeping the road in repairs and not making payments of amounts due the appellant had made it impossible to fulfil the contract. The quantity of coal transported was a fact within the knowledge of the appellant and the agreement merely provided for payment of the bills by 10th of the following month, without stating expressly that the presentation of bill was a condition precedent to the payment. The appellants contended that time was not of the essence of the contract and in any case the payment of the bills depended upon the presentation of bills in time and also challenged the award of the interest. Held, that in commercial transactions time is ordinarily of the essence of the contract and was made so in the contract and when this important condition of the agreement was broken, section 55 of the Indian Contract Act could be invoked by the aggrieved party and he was entitled to rescind the contract. In the present case by withholding the payment of the bills cl. (5) of the contract was breached by the appellant. Held, further, that interest for a period prior to the com mencement of suit is claimable either under an agreement or usage of trade or under a statutory provision or under the Interest Act for,% sum certain where notice is given These 640 conditions not being satisfied and this being not a case in which Court of Equity grants interest, interest was not awardable as damages. Held, further, that interest pendente lite being in the discretion of Court, should be fixed in accordance with the circumstances and practice of the Court and should not be too high. Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd. vs Ruttanji Ramji, (1937) L.R. 65 I.A. 66, referred to.

The plaintiff respondent instituted a suit in the court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Gauhati, against the Union of India and the Northern Frontier Railway represented by the General Manager, having its headquarters at Pandu. Pandu is within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate judge. The claim was for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 8,250/ on account of nondelivery of the goods which had been consigned to the plaintiffs firms, The consignment was booked from Kalyanganj station of defendant No. 2 fair carriage to Kanki, a station of the same defendant. It was alleged in the plaint that the cause of action arose at Pandu within the jurisdiction of the Court, where the defendant railway had its principal place of business by virtue of its headquarters being at Pandu. The suit was resisted by the defendants on the ground that the court bad no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Relying on the decision of the Assam High Court in P. C. Biswas vs Union of India, A. I. R. , the court of first instance held that the principal place from which the railway administration in a particular area is carried on is the principal place of business for the purpose of jurisdiction under section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff. The revision petition filed by the appellants was rejected by the High Court. The present appeal was filed with special leave granted by this Court. It was contended in the appeal by the appellants that the running of the railway by the Union of lndia could not be said to amount to carrying on of business and that therefore the fact that the headquarters of Northern Frontier Railway Administration was at Pandu within the jurisdiction of the 625 Court at Gauhati did not give the Court jurisdiction under section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Held that articles 19 (6) and 298 of the Constitution clearly indicate that the State can carry on business and can even exclude citizens completely or partially from carrying on that business. The running of railways which is a business when carried on by private companies or individuals does not cease to be a business when they are run by the Government. It is the nature of the activity which determines the character of an activity. The fact as to who runs it and with what motive cannot affect it. 'Profit element ' is not a necessary ingredient of carrying on of business, though usually business is carried on for profit. The fact that the Government runs the railways for providing cheap transport for the people and goods and for strategic reasons will not convert what amounts to carrying on of business into an activity of the State as a sovereign body. The Union of India carries on the business of running railways and can be sued in the court of the Subordinate judge of Gauhati within whose territorial jurisdiction the headquarters of one of the railways run by the Union is situated. Case Law reviewed. State of Bombay vs Hospital Mazdoor Sabha [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866, The Corporation of the City of Nagpur vs Ito Employees, ; and Satya Narain vs District Engineer, P. W. D., A. I. R.

A Hindu father executed a registered deed of trust giving away his properties to public charities and appointed himself and two others as trustees. The son in assertion by his right to a moiety share therein started to alienate them. There was litigation between the trustees and the son which ultimately ended in a compromise decree for partition between the father and the son, the two other trustees having retired pending litigation. After the death of both the father and the son a suit was brought under 1123 section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the framing of a scheme for the administration of the trust. The trial court held that the trust deed had been substituted by the compromise decree which itself created a trust and decreed the suit on that basis. On appeal by two of the defendants who were transferees in possession of some of the properties in suit, the High Court affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that the compromise decree created a trust for public charities in respect of the properties allotted to the third plaintiff, meaning the father. The said defendants appealed to this Court. The principal question for decision was one of construction of the compromise decree, whether it created a trust or a charge. The relevant terms of the compromise decree were as follows: " that as regards the aforesaid schedule property, the third plaintiff should be the 'sole trustee ' till his lifetime for the purpose of conducting the charities described in the trust deed, dated 17th March, 1919, and he should utilise the income derived therefrom for the charities according to the necessity and should enjoy the said property till his lifetime without rights to gift, sale etc. , therein ; that after his death, the said entire property should pass on to his grandson Ramalingeswara Rao subject to the (performance of) the aforesaid kainkaryams (charities) ; that if the third plaintiff should die before the expiry of the minority of the aforesaid Ramalingeswara Rao arrangement should be made to have a guardian appointed through Court for the property made to pass to the said Rainalingeswara Rao, the said guardian should take possession of the property and conduct the aforesaid charities and deliver possession of the same to the said Ramalingeswara Rao as soon as the minor attains majority ; that, thereafter the said Ramalingeswara Rao should conduct the above mentioned charities and enjoy the properties :" Hald, that the courts below were in error in construing the compromise decree in the way they did and the appeal must succeed. There can be no doubt from the terms of the compromise decree read as a whole that what was intended to be created was a charge and not a trust in respect of the properties allotted to the father which retained their private character. The principles of Hindu Law applicable to questions relating to charitable trust are well settled. Whether or not a dedication to charity is complete must depend on the intention of the donor which has to be gathered from the terms of the document in any particular case read as a whole. If the dedication is complete, a trust is created, if not, a charge follows. The mere use of the word 'trust ' or 'trustee ' cannot by itself be conclusive as to the intention of the donor and the real test is whether private title 1124 over the property is sought to be extinguished by a complete transfer of it to the charity. Maharani Hemanta Kumati Debi vs Gauri Shankar Tewari, (1940) L. R. 68 I.A. 53, Jadu Nath Singh vs Thakur Sita Ramji, (1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 187, Pande Har Narayan vs Surja Kunwari, (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 143, Sonatun Bysack vs Sreemutti juggul soondyee Dossee, 8 Moo. I.A. 66 and Gopal Lal Sett vs Purna Chandya Basak, (1921) L.R. 49 I.A. 100, applied.

The appellant assessee is a company carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling Textile at Porbunder (formerly a princely State) in Saurashtra in the State of Gujarat. No income tax was levied by the former Porbunder State prior to 1948. In 1949 the princely State of, Porbund er integrated into newly formed Saurashtra State. In 1949 the State of Saurashtra promulgated the Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance wherein provision for grant of depreciation based on written down value was made. On 26.1.1950, State of Saurashtra became a part of the Union of India as a Part 'B ' State and thus the Income Tax Act, 1922 became applicable to the State of Saurashtra from 1st April 1950 under the Fi nance Act, 1950. The said Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance was repealed under Sec. 13 of the Finance Act, 1950. Section 12 of that Act provided for removal of difficulties, if any, arising in giving effect to the Income Tax Act. The Central Govt. on 2.12.50 issued an order known as "Taxation Laws (Part B States) Removal of Difficulties) Order 1950". Clause 2 of the said order provided the manner in which the aggre gate depreciation allowance and written down value were to be computed. On March 9, 1953, the Central Government in the exercise of its powers under Sec. 60A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, added an Explanation to the said clause (2). The vires of the said Explanation was challenged before the Andhra Pradesh High Court which held that the Explanation referred to above was ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under Sec. 60A of the Income Tax Act. Commissioner of Income Tax, Hyderabad vs D.B.R. Mills Ltd., Thereupon, the Central Government issued another notifi cation dated the 8th May, 1956 in exercise of its powers under Section 12 of the Finance Act 1950, whereby an Expla nation in identical terms as the earlier Explanation was added to Clause (2) of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 1950. The validity of the said Explanation added by the notification dated 8th May, 1956 was upheld by this Court in The Commissioner of Income tax, Hyderabad vs Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Ltd., ; On the appeal from the said decision of the High Court 2 of the Andhra Pradesh in Commissioner of Income tax, Hydera bad vs D.B.R. Mills, The assessee was assessed under the Indian Income Tax Act from 1940 41 in respect of the income arising or deemed to arise in British India from 1940 41 onwards. For these years its income was assessed on receipt basis but in calcu lating the world income depreciation was taken into consid eration for arriving at the income outside British India. The assessee was also assessed for the assessment year 1949 50 under the Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance, 1949. From 1950 51 it was assessed under the Income Tax Act. The assessment years concerned in this case are 1957 58, 1958 59 and 1959 60, the corresponding previous years being the Calender years 1956, 1957 and 1958 respectively. The case of the assessee is that during the course of the assessment of its income, depreciation was allowed for the assessment year 1950 51 and thereafter on the original cost of the assets as reduced by the depreciation allowance given under the Sau rashtra Income Tax Ordinance 1949. The respective written down values for the assessment years 1951 52 and 1952 53 were fixed on the basis of the written down value for the assessment year 1950 51. But later the concerned Income Tax Officer rectified the calculations of depreciation allowance by further reducing the written down value of the assets of the assessee. The Income Tax Officer took the written down value for the assessment years 1940 41 as the starting point. The assessee was not satisfied with this rectification. Its contention was that the depreciation for the previous years should have been calculated only on the basis of Clause (2) of the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order 1950, which provided for computation of the aggregate depreciation allowance on the basis of the deduction which was actually allowed under the Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance, 1949. Regarding the explanation, the assessee contended that it was ultra rites the powers of the Central Government as it was not necessary for the removal of any difficulty. The contentions of the assessee were rejected by the Income Tax authorities as well as by Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. It was contended by the assessee before the Tribu nal that the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Hyderabad vs Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Ltd., ; was no longer good law in view of the later decision of this Court in Straw Products Ltd. vs Income Tax Officer "A" Ward, Bhopal and Ors., The Tribunal having rejected the said contentions, at the in stance of the assessee a reference was made to the Gujarat High Court in which the following question was raised: 3 "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. the Tribunal was justified in holding that the depreciation allowable and not 'actually allowed ' under the Saurashtra Income tax Ordinance, 1949, should be taken into account in computing the aggregate depre ciation allowance and written down value under Sec. 10(2)(vi) of the Income Tax Act 1922. " The High Court held that in its advisory jurisdiction under the Income Tax Act, it could not go into the question of the vires of the said Explanation and therefore answered the question against the assessee. Therefore, the appellant filed Special Civil Application 1797 of 1972 in the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment disposing of the said special Civil Application pointed out that the decision of this Court in the Commissioner of Income Tax, Hyderabad vs Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills, case, referred to above had upheld the validity of the Explanation in question. The High Court further opined that some of the arguments which did not find favour with this court in the said case were accepted by a Bench of 7 Learned Judges in the Straw Products Ltd. vs Income Tax Officer, "A" Ward, Bhopal and Ors., The High Court fur ther pointed out that in its decision in the said case of Straw Products this court had considered the decision in Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Ltd. and explained that on the facts of that case a difficulty had arisen and it was for removing that difficulty that the Order of 1956 was issued. For the said reason the High Court considered that decision was good law and following the same, it dismissed the Spe cial Civil Application. Hence this appeal by the assessee. In this appeal the Explanation added by the Central Government by its notification dated May 8, 1956 as well as the assessments made on the assessee for the assessment year 1957 58 to 1959 60 have been assailed. It was inter alia contended on behalf of the assessee that there was no diffi culty which had arisen in giving effect to the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act in the State of Saurashtra and hence the pre condition on which the Central Government was authorised to make an Order under the Removal of Difficul ties Order and add the Explanation in question had never come into existence and as such the Explanation was without the authority of Law, invalid and of no legal effect. It was further contended by the assessee that under the scheme of the Income Tax Act, generally speaking, almost the entire cost of a capital asset used for purposes of business or profession should 4 be allowed to be written off by way of depreciation, whether worked on the basis of straight line method or written down value. The assessee disputed the mode of assessment and the applicability of the Explanation. Following this Court 's decision in Dewan Bahadur Ramgo pal Mills ' Ltd. ; this Court dismissing the appeal, HELD: The Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance was repealed by Section 13 of the Finance Act 1950 and not by any provi sion in the Indian Income Tax Act. The basic and normal scheme of depreciation under the Indian Income Tax Act is that it decreases every year, being a percentage of the written down value which in the first year is the actual cost and in succeeding years actual cost less all deprecia tion actually allowed under the Income Tax Act or any Act repealed thereby etc. [18D E] Commissioner of Income Tax Hyderabad vs Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Ltd., ; The Saurashtra Income Tax Ordinance having been repealed not by the Indian Income Tax Act but by Sec. 13 of the Finance Act 1950, a difficulty had come into existence, and hence it could not be said that the Government had no good basis to come to the conclusion that a difficulty had, in fact, arisen. [18F G] Madeva Upendra Sinai vs Union of India & Ors., [1975] 98 I.T.R. 209.

FACTS challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a division bench of the madhya pradesh high court dismissing the writ appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that it was not maintainable. the appeal was filed u/s.2(1) of the m.p.uchacha nyayalay (khand nyaypeth ko appeal) adhiniyam,2005. it was held that the order was passed in exercise of power of superintendence u/art.227 of the constitution of india,1950 (in short the 'constitution') against which the letters patent appeal is not maintainable. ARGUMENT learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the order of this court is very clear and the conclusions of the high court that merely limitation was waived is contrary to the clear terms of the earlier order of this court. additionally it is submitted that the prayer in the writ petition was to quash the order passed by the assistant commissioner,commercial tax. ISSUE whether to quash the order of assessment passed by the assistant commissioner,commercial tax levying purchase as well as entry tax. ANALYSIS the writ petition was styled u/art.227 of the constitution is of no consequence. it is the nature of the relief sought for and the controversy involved which determines the article which is applicable. a bare reading of the order shows that the direction was to consider the lpa on merits and time was granted to prefer the lpa within three weeks. the high court's order is unsustainable. the high court seems to have gone by the nomenclature gone by the nomenclature i.e.the discription given in the writ petition to be one u/art.227 of the constitution. the high court did not consider the nature of the controversy and the prayer involved in the writ petition. by art.226 the power of issuing prerogative writs possessed by the chartered high courts prior to the commencement of the constitution has been made wider and more extensive and conferred upon every high court. in umaji keshao meshram v. radhikabai [air 1986 sc 1272 1986 indlaw sc 651. it was noted as follows. u/art.226 an order,direction or writ is to issue to a person,authority or the state. in a proceeding under that article the person,authority or state against whom the direction,order or writ is sought is a necessary party. under article 227,however,what comes up before the high court is the order or judgment of a subordinate court or tribunal for the purpose of ascertaining whether in giving such judgment or order that subordinate court or tribunal has acted within its authority and according to law. the nature of the exercise of the power under article 226,however,remains the same as in the case of the power of issuing prerogative writs possessed by the chartered high courts. it was open to the respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of the high court both u/arts.226 and 227 of the constitution of india. once such a jurisdiction was invoked and when his writ petition was dismissed on merits,it cannot be said that the learned single judge had exercised his jurisdiction only u/art.226 of the constitution of india. this conclusion directly flows from the relevant averments made in the writ petition and the nature of jurisdiction invoked by the respondent as noted by the learned single judge in his judgment,as seen earlier. consequently,it could not be said that cl.15 of the letters patent was not attracted for preferring appeal against the judgment of the learned single judge. it is also necessary to note that the appellant being the respondent in letters patent appeal joined issues on merits and did not take up the contention that the letters patent appeal was not maintainable. for all these reasons,therefore,the primary objection to the maintainability of the letters patent appeal as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant,has to be repelled. the high court was not justified in holding that the letters patent appeal was not maintainable. in addition,a bare reading of this court's earlier order shows that the impugned order is clearly erroneous. STATUTE s.2 of the m.p.uchacha nyayalay (khand nyaypeth ko appeal) adhiniyam,2005 reads as follows: "2(1. an appeal shall lie from a judgment or order passed by the one judge of the high court in exercise of original jurisdiction u/art.226 of the constitution of india,to a division bench comprising of two judges of the same high court. provided that no such appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction u/art.227 of the constitution of india.

iminal Appeal No. 40 of 1951, 127 Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 1st June, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature in Assam (Thadani C.J. and Ram Labhaya J.,) in Criminal Reference No. I of 1951, arising out of Judgment and Order dated the 15th November, 1950, of the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, Lakhimpur, in Case No. 1126C of 1950. Jindra Lal for the appellant. Nuruddin Ahmed for the respondent. October 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. Rameshwar Bhartia, the appellant, is a shopkeeper in Assam. He was prosecuted for storing paddy without a licence in excess of the quantity permitted by the Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947. He admitted storage and possession of 550 maunds of paddy, but pleaded that he did not know that any licence was necessary. The 'Additional District Magistrate recorded a plea of guilty, but imposed him a fine of Rs. 50 only, as he considered his ignorance of the provisions of the Food Grains Control Order to be genuine. The stock of paddy was left in the possession of the appellant by the Procurement Inspector under a Jimmanama or security bond executed in his favour. He was subsequently unable to produce it before the court, as the whole of it was taken away by a Congress M.L.A. for affording relief to those who suffered in the earthquake, and so, the appellant was ordered to procure a similar quantity of paddy after taking an appropriate licence, and to make over the same to the procurement department payment of the price. The District Magistrate, being moved to do so by the procurement department, referred the case to the High Court under section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, for enhancement of the sentence, as in his opinion the sentence was unduly lenient and the Jimmanama, which was admittedly broken, should have been forfeited. 128 The reference was accepted by the High Court, and the sent ence was enhanced to rigorous ' imprisonment for six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000. As regards the Jimmanama, the case was sent back to the trial court for taking action according to law under section 514, Criminal Procedure Code, for its forfeiture. The appellant applied to the High. Court for a certificate under article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court. This application was granted. Out of the three points urged for the appellant, two were rejected, but the third one was accepted as a good ground, namely, that there was a contravention of the provisions of section 556, Criminal Procedure Code and that consequently the, trial before the Additional District Magistrate was void. One of the contentions urged before us was that Shri C.K. Bhuyan was not a "Director" at all and therefore there was no valid sanction under section 38 of the Order. A notifications dated 16th May) 1950, and published in the Assam Gazette of the 24th May, 1950, was produced before us to show that Sri C.K. Bhuyan was an Additional Deputy Commissioner and it was conceded by the appellant 's counsel before the High Court that if he was a Deputy Commissioner, he would be a Director under the Order, as all Deputy Commissioners in Assam were notified as Directors for the purposes of the Order. Mr. Jindra Lal sought to draw a distinction between a Deputy Commissioner and an Additional Deputy Commissioner in this respect, but there is no warrant for the same,, apart from the circumstance that it is a question of fact which has to be investigated afresh, and which we cannot allow to be raised now for the first time. The primary question to consider in this appeal is whether there has been any infringement of Section 556, Criminal Procedure Code, and a consequent want of jurisdiction in the court which tried the offence. The facts relevant to this question lie 129 within a narrow compass. The Procurement Inspector sent a report , Ist July,1950 about the nature of the offence ; he wrote out a short note the, subject, and requested that the accused might be prosecuted and the Assistant Director of Procurement, Dibru garh, might be authorised to dispose of the paddy immediately to avoid loss due to deterioration, Sri 0. K. Bhuyan,who was the then District Magistrate Lakhimpur, made the following order: "Prosecution sanctioned under section 7 (1) of ,the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, for violation of sections 3 and 7 of the Assam Food Grains Oontrol Order, 1947. " The case happened to be tried by the same gentleman in his capacity as Addtional District Magistrate, and the accused was convicted as aforesaid. The argument for the appellant was that having sanctioned the prosecution, Sri C.K. Bhuyan became "personally interested" in the case within the meaning of section 556, and was therefore incompetent to try the same. It was contended that the trial was not only irregular but illegal. There is no question that "personal interest" within the meaning of the section is not limited to private interest, and that it may well include official interest also. But what is the extent of the interest which will attract the disability is a subject which different views are possible and have been taken. Section 556 itself indicates the difficulty. The Explanation to the section runs in these terms: "A Judge or Magistrate shall not be deemed a party, or personally interested, within the , meaning of this section, to or in any case by reason only that be is a Municipal Commissioner or otherwise concerned therein in a public capacity, or by reason only that he has viewed the place in which an offence, is alleged to have been committed, or any other place .in which any other transaction material to the case 'is alleged to have occurred, and made an inquiry III connection with the case. " 130 This shows that to be connected with a case in a public capacity is not by itself enough to render the person incompetent to try it. Even if he had made an enquiry in connection with this case, it would not matter. But look at the illustration: "A, as collector, upon consideration of information furnished to him, directs the prosecution of B for a breach of the excise laws. A is disqualified from trying this case as a Magistrate. " It is evident from the words of the illustration that if a prosecution is directed by a person in one capacity, he shall not try the case acting in another capacity as a Magistrate. The explanation and illustration lend some support to the view that there is a distinction between a passive interest and an active interest, and that it is only in the latter case that the disqualification arises or intervenes. Under sub section (3) (a) of section 2 of the Assam Food Grains Control Order "Director" means "the Director of Supply, Assam, and includes, for the purpose of any specific. provision of this Order, any other officer duly authorised in that behalf by him or by the Provincial Government by notification in the Official Gazette. " Section 38 provides: No prosecution in respect of an alleged contravention of any provision of this Order shall be instituted without the sanction of the Director. " A little confusion is likely to arise from the employment of the word " Director" in the Control Order and the word "directs" in the illustration to section 556 of the Code '. It has to be borne in mind that a sanction by the Director within the meaning of the Code does not necessarily mean "a direction given by him that the accused should be prosecuted. " In both cases of sanction and direction, an application of the mind is necessary, but there is this essential difference that in the one case there is a legal impediment to the prosecution if there be no sanction, and in the other case, there is a positive order that 131 the prosecution should be launched. For a sanction, all that is necessary for one to be satisfied about is the existence of a prima facie case. In the case of a, direction, a further element that the accused deserves to be prosecuted is involved. The question whether a Magistrate is personally interested or not has essentially to be decided the facts in each case. Pecuniary interest, however small, will be a disqualification but as regards other kinds of interest, there is no measure or standard except that it should be a substantial one, giving rise to a real bias, or a reasonable apprehension the part of the accused of such bias. , The maxim " Nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa" applies only when the interest attributed is such as to render the case his own cause. The fulfllment of a technical requirement imposed by a statute may not, in many cases, amount to a mental satisfaction of the truth of the facts placed before the officer. Whether sanction should be granted or not may conceivably depend upon consideration extraneous to the merits of the case. But where a prosecution is directed, it means that the authority who gives the direction is satisfied in his own mind that the case must be initiated. Sanction is in the nature of a permission while a direction is in the nature of a command. Let us now examine some of the decisions the subject. For the appellant, strong reliance was placed the judgment of the Privy Council in Gokulchand Dwarkadas vs King(1), and it was argued the basis of some of the observations of the Judicial Committee that a sanction was an important and substantial matter and not a mere formality. The facts in that case were that while there was a sanction of the Government for a prosecution under the Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control, Order, there was nothing in the sanction itself, or in the shape of extraneous evidence, to show that the sanction was accorded after the relevant facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. To quote their Lordships ' own words; (1) (1948) 52 C.W.N.325. 132 "There is no evidence to show that the report of the Sub Inspector to the District Superintendent of Police, which was not put in evidence, was forwarded to the District Magistrate, nor is there any evidence is to the contents of the endorsement of the District Magistrate, referred to in the sanction, which endorsement also was not put in evidence. The prosecution was in a position either to produce or to account for the absence of the 'report made to the District Superintendent of Police and the endorsement of the District Magistrate referred to in the sanction, and to call any necessary oral evidence to supplement the documents and show what were the facts which the sanction was given. " It is in this connection that their Lordships em phasise that the sanction to prosecute is an important step constituting a condition precedent, and observe: "Looked at as a matter of substance it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge the obligation of deciding whether to give or withhold a sanction without a knowledge of the facts of the case. Nor, in their Lordships ' view, is a sanction given without reference to the facts constituting the offence a compliance with the actual terms of clause 23. " This, however, is no authority for the position that a sanction stands the same footing as a direction. It is true that the facts should be known to the sanctioning authority ; but it is not at all necessary that the authority should embark also an investigation of the facts, deep or perfunctory, before according the sanction. The decision lends no support to the view that wherever there is a sanction, the sanctioning authority is disabled under section 556 of the Code from trying the case initiated as a result of the sanction. the other hand, there is plenty of support for the opposite) view. In the very early case of The Government of Bengal vs HeeraLall Dass and Others(1), at a time when there (1) (1872) 17 Weekly Reporter, Criminal Rulings, 39. 133 was no such statutory provision as section 556 of the Code but, only the general rule of law that a man could not be judge in a case in which he had an interest, the facts were that a Sub Registrar, who was also an Assistant Magistrate, having come to know in his official capacity as a registering officer that an offence under the Registration Act had been committed, sanctioned a prosecution, and subsequently tried the case himself. A Full Bench consisting of Sir Richard Couch C. ' J. and five other learned Judges came to the conclusion, after an examination of some of the English cases, that the trial was not vitiated. The learned Chief Justice said: "In this case, I think, the Sub Registrar has not such an interest in the matter as disqualifies him from trying the case; and I may observe with reference to some of the arguments that have been used as to the Sub Registrar having made up his mind, and that the accused would have no chance of a fair trial, that the sanction of the superior officer, the Registrar, is required before the prosecution can be instituted, and certainly I do not consider that the prosecution will not be instituted unless the Sub Registrar has made up his mind as to the guilt of the party. It is his duty, when he comes to know that an offence has been committed, to cause a prosecution to be instituted, by which I understand that there is prima facie evidence of an offence having been committed, that there is that which renders it proper that there should be ail enquiry, and the Registrar accordingly gives his sanction to it ; and certainly, I cannot suppose that, because an officer in his position sanctions the institution of a prosecution, his mind is made up as to the guilt of the party and . that he is not willing to consider the evidence which may be produced before him when he comes to try the case. In this case, there appears to 'be no such interest as would prevent the case from going" before the Magistrate as the trying authority . 134 In Queen Empress vs Chenchi Reddi(1) it was pointed out that when there was only an authorisation and not a direction, there was no supervening disability ; and the case of Girish Chunder Ghose vs The QueenEmpress(2) was distinguished, the ground that there the Magistrate had taken a very active part in connection with the case as an executive officer. The Bombay High Court went even a step further in the case reported in Emperor vs Bavji(3), where the Magistrate who tried the case had earlier held a departmental enquiry and forwarded the papers to the Collector with his opinion that there was sufficient evidence to justify a criminal prosecution. As he did no more than express an opinion that there was evidence, which he, had neither taken nor sifted, which made a criminal prosecution desirable, it was held that the Magistrate was not disqualified from holding the trial, though, no doubt it would have been more expedient had the Collector sent the case for disposal to another of his subordinates. As stated already, the question whether the bar under section 556 comes into play depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, the dividing line being a thin one somewhat but still sufficiently definite and tangible, namely, the removal of a legal impediment by the grant 'of sanction and the initiation of criminal proceedings as the result of a direction. In the present case before us, we have nothing more than a sanction, and consequently we are unable to hold that the trial has become vitiated by reason of the provisions of section 556, Criminal Procedure Code. The other point taken behalf of the appellant is a more substantial one. The security bond was taken from him not by the court but by the Procurement Inspector. It is true that it contained the undertaking that, the seized paddy would be produced before the court, but still it was a promise made to the particular official and not to the court. The High (1) Mad. 238. (3) (19O3) (2) Cal. 857. 135 Court was in error in thinking that section 514, Criminal Procedure Code, applied. Action could be taken only when the bond is taken by the court under the provisions of the Code such as section 91 for appearance, the several security sections or those relating to bail. Clause (1) of section 514 runs: "Whenever it is proved to the satisfaction of the, Court by which a bond under this Code has been taken, or of the Court of a Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class, or when the bond is for appearance before a Court, to the satisfaction of such Court, that such bond has been forfeited, the Court shall record the grounds of such proof, and may call upon any person bound by such bond to pay the penalty thereof, or to show cause why it should not be paid. " The language is perfectly clear; the power to forfeit and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the later parts of the section arise only if the preliminary conditions are satisfied. There was no argument addressed to us that the High Court in suggesting that action should be taken under section 514 for forfeiture of the bond acted in the exercise of its inherent powers under section 561 A. It did not purport to exercise any such power; and, moreover, there will then arise the question whether when the Code contains an express provision a particular subject, there could be any resort to inherent jurisdiction, under a general provision. We have got an additional circumstance in the appellant 's favour in this case that the seized paddy was taken away by a member of the Legislative Assembly for giving relief to those affected by the earthquake, and if that is true, as it seems to be from the letter written by the ' M.L.A. to the Additional District Magistrate the 1st November, 1950, it appears to us harsh, if not unjust, to ask him to produce the same paddy or a similar quantity of paddy. The order of the High Court sending back the case to the 136 Magistrate for taking action according to law under section 514 will, therefore, stand set aside. We generally do not interfere in the matter of sentence, but in this case we find that the Magistrate has held that the appellant 's plea that he was ignorant of the provisions of the Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947, was a genuine one. Having regard to this circumstance and the fact that from a fine of Rs. 50 to 6 months ' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 is a big jump, we think it is appropriate that the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the High Court should be set aside and we order accordingly. The fine of Rs. 1,000 will stand. Sentence reduced.

The question whether a Magistrate is "personally interested" in a ease within the meaning of section 556, Criminal Procedure Code, has essentially to be decided the facts of each case. Where an officer as a District Magistrate exercising his powers under section 7(1) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, sanctioned the prosecution of a person for violation of sections 3 and 7 of the Assam Food Grains Control Order, 1947, and the same officer as Additional District Magistrate tried and convicted the accused, and it was contended that as the officer had given sanction for prosecution he was "personally interested" in the case within the meaning of section 656, Criminal Procedure Code, and the trial and conviction were therefore illegal: Held, that bymerely giving sanction for prosecution he did not become personally interested" in the case and the trial and conviction were not illegal. In both cases of sanction and direction to prosecute, an application of the mind is necessary, but there is this essential difference that in the one case there is a legal impediment to the prosecution if there is no sanction and in the other case there is a positive order that the prosecution should be launched. For a sanction, all that is necessary for one to be satisfied about is the existence of a prima facie case. In the case of a direction, a further element that the accused deserves to be prosecuted is involved. Whether sanction should be granted or not may conceivably depend considerations extraneous to the merits of the case. But where a prosecution is directed, it means that the authority who gives the sanction is satisfied in his own mind that the case must be initiated. Sanction is in the nature of a permission, while direction is in the nature of a command. Gokulchand Dwarka Das vs The King , Government of Bengal vs Heera Lall Dass and Others (1872) 17 W. R. Cr. 39, Queen Empress vs Chenchi Reddi (1901) I.L.R. , Girish Chunder vs Queen Empress (1893) I.L.R. , and Emperor vs Ravji , referred to.

The appellant, a firm dealing in buying and selling jute with headquarters at Calcutta, used to purchase raw jute grown in Orissa and despatch them in bags from Cuttack and Dhanmandal Railway Station to the Railway Mills Siding Station in Calcutta. The goods were booked in the name of the buyer "KB & Co" through its licensed broker "EIJ & HE Ltd." and on the arrival of the goods the buyer inspected the goods and if they were found in accordance with the specifications mentioned in the agreement of sale, accepted them and paid their price. On the basis of these concluded transactions of sale the respondent State, levied sales tax under section 3(a) of the on the basis that the sales were interstate sales. Since the assessing authorities negatived the contention of the appellant that the sale was merely an internal sale which took place in the State of West Bengal and since the Tribunal refused to make a reference, the appellant moved the High Court under section 24(3) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act to direct the Tribunal to make a statement of the case to the High Court. The Tribunal referred two points, viz., (i) Did the title to the goods pass in Orissa or in West Bengal and (ii) Even if the title in the goods passed in West Bengal, whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the transaction constituted "sale in the course of inter state trade" ? The High Court held that although the title in the goods passed in West Bengal and the sale took place there, since the sale occasioned the movement of goods from Orissa to West Bengal it was an inter State sale, and, therefore, it was clearly governed by section 3(a) of the . Affirming the judgment of the High Court and dismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court, ^ HELD: (1) The definition of "sale" in section 2(g) of the postulates the following conditions. (i) There must be a transfer of property in goods by one person to another; (ii) The transfer must be for cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration; and (iii) That such a transfer includes a transfer of goods on the hire purchase or other system of payment by instalment etc. The word "sale" defined in cl. (g) of section 2 and used in section 3(a), 4(2) (a) and (b) is wide enough to include not only a concluded contract of sale but also a contract or agreement of sale provided the agreement of sale stipulates that there was a transfer of property or movement 940 of goods. An agreement to sell by which the property did not actually pass was also an element of sale. [944H, 945A, C, G] Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. vs The State of Bihar and others, , relied on. Sales Tax Officer, Pilibhit vs Budh Prakash Jai Prakash, 5 S.T.C. 193, 196, followed. (2) When the statute uses the words "sale or purchase of goods", it automatically attracts the definition of "sale of goods" as given in section 4 of the , and is to some extent pari materia to section 3 of the so far as the transactions of sale is concerned. The inevitable conclusion that fellows from the combined effect of the interpretation of section 3 of the and section 4 of the is that an agreement to sell is also an essential ingredient of sale provided it contains a stipulation of transfer of goods from the seller to the buyer. [946E F, 947A] (3) Since the word "sale" appearing in section 2(g) as also in section 3(a) of the Act includes an agreement to sell provided the said agreement contains a stipulation regarding passing of the property, if there is a movement of goods from one State to another, not in pursuance of the sale itself, but in pursuance of an agreement to sell, which later merges into a sale, the movement of goods would be deemed to have been occasioned by the sale itself wherever it takes place. When the movement of goods start, they shed the character of either unascertained goods or future goods. For the purpose of application of section 3(a) of the , the question whether the contract is a forward contract or not makes no material difference. [947B, C D, 948F] (4) A statutory provision cannot be interpreted in a way which defeats the very object of the Act. It is equally well settled that the Legislature does not waste words or introduce useless or redundant provisions. The contention that section 3(a) of the was redundant or would apply to contingencies which may not happen at all, is not correct. [948D] Indian Chamber of Commerce vs C.I.T., West Bengal II Calcutta, 1976(1) SCR 830, applied. (5) The following conditions must be satisfied before a sale can be said to take place in the course of interstate trade or commerce: (i) that there is an agreement to sell which contains a stipulation express or implied regarding the movement of the goods from one State to another. (ii) that in pursuance of the said contract the goods, in fact, move from one State to another; and (iii) that ultimately a concluded sale takes place in the State where the goods are sent which must be different from the State from which the goods move, because the tax is on sale and not on an agreement to sell or a forward contract. If these conditions are satisfied then by virtue of section 9 of the it is the State from which the goods move which will be competent to levy the tax under the provisions of the . The question whether the agreement to sell is in respect of ascertained or unascertained goods, existing or future goods, make no difference whatsoever so far as the interpretation of section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax is concerned. [949A C, E] Cement Distributors (P) Ltd. vs Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Lalgudi and others, 23 S.T.C. 86, 94, distinguished. Larsen and Toubro Ltd., Madras 2 & others. vs Joint Commercial Tax Officer, 20 S.T.C. 150, 186 & 187; The State of Madras vs N. K. Nataraja Mudaliar ; , 391; Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. vs section R. Sarkar and others ; , 391; State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. vs State of Mysore, , 797 798; Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. 941 vs The Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Anr., ; , 866; M/s. Kelvinator of India Ltd. vs The State of Haryana , 560; The State of Tamil Nadu vs The Cement Distributors (P) Ltd. and others and Oil India Ltd. vs The Superintendent of Taxes and others, referred to.

The appellant and its workmen, represented by their unio.n called the Indoxco Labour Union, Jamshedpur, made a joint application to the Government referring certain disputes to the Industrial Tribunal. The application stated that the number of workmen employed in the undertaking affected were those employed in the company 's factory at Jamshedput, and that the same number were likely to be affected by the disputes. The Government referred the disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, and the notification also stated that the disputes were between the management of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and their workmen represented by Indoxco Labour Union. Two of the demands were (1) payment of overtime to office staff should be 1 1/2 times the ordinary rate .and (2) the union representatives should be allowed special leave to attend law courts for matters connected with the workers and the management, to attend the annual conventions of their federation, to attend to Executive Committee meetings of the union federation and the conventions of the central organisation i.e., INTUC. The union at a general meeting, held prior to the reference, had passed a resolution changing the name of the union to Indian Oxygen Workers Union and making the workmen of all the establishments of the Appellant company in Bihar eligible for its membership. By a letter the union informed the appellant company at Jamshedpur of this amendment. The Tribunal held that (i) the award in this case was to apply to all of the workmen and could not be restricted to the workman working at Jamshedpur; (ii) 11/2 times the ordinary wages 'for overtime work exceeding 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours per week should be paid; and if the overtime exceeded 48 hours per week, the company would be liable to pay double the ordinary rate of wages; and (iii) the appellant company had been allowing without loss of pay the representatives of the workmen to attend proceedings before conciliation officers and Industrial Tribunals, and that this concession was sufficient; therefore the Tribunal rejected the demand for special Leave with pay to attend the law courts; but held the union 's representatives were to be given special leave to attend (a) meetings of its executive committee, (b) meetings of the federation of the union, (c) the annual convention of that federation when held at Jamshedpur and (d) the convention of the INTUC. In appeal to this Court, HELD: (i) The award was operative only in respect of the workmen of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and not the workmen of its other establishments. [561 C D] The agreement by which the parties agreed to refer the said disputes for adjudication was between the management of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur. and the wo 'rkmen employed in that factory and represented by their said union, the Indoxco Labour Union. Under the notification of the Government also 'the disputes referred to the Tribunal 551 were those set out in the said agreement. Even assuming that the Indoxco Labour Union validly amended its constitution so as to extend its membership to the company 's other workmen in its other establishments, inasmuch as the disputes referred to. the Tribunal were only those set out in the said agreement, any award made by the Tribunal in respect of those disputes must necessarily be confined to the disputes refered to it, the parties to those disputes and the parties who had agreed to refer those disputes for adjudication. There is nothing to show in that notification that other workmen of the company had raised similar demands. or that there were any disputes existing or apprehended which were included in that reference. [555 D G] The Union did not produce any evidence to show that the amendments purported to have been carried out by the resolution were sent to the Registrar as provided in sections 6(g), 28(3), 29 and 30(3) of the Trade Union Act and regulation 9 of the Central Trade Union Regulation, nor did it produce any communication of the Registrar notifying the fact of his having registered the said amendments. The only evidence it produced was its letter to the appellant company which indicated that the Registrar notified to the union of his having registered the said amendments. The Tribunal 's conclusion, therefore, that the union 'section constitution, was duly amended or that the Indian Oxygen Workers Union represented the workmen of the company 's factory at Jamshedpur and that consequently it made no difference that the name of Indoxco Labour Union as representing the workmen concerned was mentioned in the said agreement and the said statement and not that of the Indian Oxygen Workers Union is erroneous and cannot be sustained. Any award, therefore, made by the Tribunal in these circumstances can operate only in respect of the workmen of the appellant company 's factory at Jamshedpur and the Tribunal 's extension of that award to workmen in the company 's other establishments was clearly without jurisdiction. [557 D G] The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs Their Workmen, ; a 'nd Ramnagar Cane and Sugar Co. Ltd. vs Jatin Chakravorty, , distinguished. (ii) Under the conditions of service of the co.mpany, the total hours of work per week were 39 hours. The Bihar Shops and Establishments Act fixes the maximum number of hours of work allowable thereunder, i.e. 48 hours a week, and provides for double the rate of ordinary wages for work done over and above 48 hours. But no reliance can be placed on the provisions of that Act for the company 's contention that it cannot be called upon to. pay for overtime work anything more than its ordinary rate of wages if the workmen do work beyond 39 hours but not exceeding 49 hours a week. Any workman asked 'to work beyond 39 hours would obviously be working overtime and the company in fairness would be expected to pay him compensation for such overtime work. If the company pays at the ordinary rate of wages for work done beyond 39 hours but not exceeding 48 hours work a week, it would be paying no extra compensation at all for the work done beyond the agreed hours of work. The company would thus be indirectly increasing the hours of work and consequently altering its condition of service. [558 C F] If after taking into consideration the fact of the comparatively higher scale of wages prevailing in the appellant company, the Tribunal fixed the rate for overtime work at 11/2 times the ordinary rate of wages, it is impossible to say that the Tribunal erred in doing so or acted unjustly. (iii) The demand for special leave must be disallowed. 552 The appellant company. has been allowing those,of its workmen who are the union 's representatives to attend without loss of pay proceedings before conciliation officers and industrial tribunals. In conceding the demand of the union for more leave the Tribunal does not appear to have considered the adverse effect on the company 's production if furthern absenteeism were to be allowed especially when the crying need of the country 's economy is more and more production. In awarding this demand the Tribunal also did not specify on how many ' occasions the executive committee meetings of the union and other meetings would be held when the company would be obliged to give special leave with pay to the union 's representatives. Similarly, there is no knowing how many delegates the union would send to attend the conventions of the federation and the INTUC. The Tribunal could not in the very nature of things specify or limit the number of such meetings for such an attempt would amount to interference in the administration of the union and its autonomy. Its order must of necessity, therefore, have to be indefinite with the result that the appellant company would not know before hand on how many occasions and to how many of its workmen it would be called upon to grant special leave. Further, in case there are more than one union in the company 's establishment, the representatives of all such unions would also have to be given such leave to attend the aforesaid meetings. In considering such a demand, the question as to why the meetings of the executive committee of the union cannot be 'held outside the hours of work should be considered. It was said that it may not be possible always to do so if an emergency arises. But emergencies are not of regular occurrence and if there be one, the representatives can certainly sacrifice one of their earned leave. Similarly the meetings of the federation and the annual conventions of the INTUC too can be artended by the union 's delegates by availing themselves of their earned leave. [559 D E; 560 C H] J. K. Cotton and Spinning and Weaving Mills vs Badri Malt, [19641 3 S.C.R. 724, referred to.

The appellant (in Criminal Appeal No. 553/89) was prose cuted for selling adulterated supari with admixture of saccharin. He filed a petition in the Kerala High Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quash ing the criminal proceedings which was dismissed by a single judge. Against the decision of the single judge an appeal was filed in this Court. The appellant (In Criminal Appeal No. 283/91) was also prosecuted for selling adulterated Supari but was acquitted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palakkad. On appeal the Kerala High Court set aside his acquittal and convicted him under section 16(1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adul teration Act and sentenced him to imprisonment for 6 months and a fine of Rs.1000. Against the order the Kerala High Court an appeal was filed in this Court. The appellant (In Criminal Appeal No. 284/91) was con victed ruder section 7(i) and (v) read with sections 16(i) (a) (ii) of the prevention of Food Adulteration Act for sale of adulterated supari with admixture of saccharin. He filed a Revision Petition in the Kerala High Court and a Single Judge dismissed the same. Against the order of the Single Judge an appeal was filed in this Court. The facts in the connected civil appeal (Nos. 3708 13/89) are that a batch of writ petitions was filed in the Andhra Pradesh High 391 Court for a declaration that the admixture of saccharin in supari was in accordance with Rule 44 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 and for restraining the re spondents from interfering with the business of sale of supari. A Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petitions. Against the decision of the Division Bench Union of India has filed appeals in this Court. Civil Appeal No. 1897/91 is directed against the order of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court which held that the learned Single Judge should have declined jurisdic tion for the reason that the relief claimed was of a general character for a declaration that the admixture of saccharin in Roja Scented betelnut is not a blanket ban under Rule 47 read with Appendix 'B ' of the Prevention of Food Adultera tion Rules, 1955. Criminal Appeal No. 722/91 is directed against the order of the High Court of Kerala setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial court and remanding the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal according to law. The High Court did not agree with the submission that the arti cle of Supari was not adulterated as saccharin could be added to Supari. Accordingly it held that saccharin could not be added to supari and consequently remanded the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal according to law. In appeals to this court it was contended on behalf of the accused that on the construction of Rule 44(c) it per mits sale of Article of food which contains artificial sweetener with the standard as laid down in Appendix 'B ' to Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. Disposing the appeals, this Court, FIELD: 1. Rule 44(g) of the Prevention of Food Adultera tion Rules, 1955 indicates that sale of any article of food which contains artificial sweetener is banned. The ban is lifted only if such artificial sweetener is permitted to be added to the article of food for which standards have been laid down in Appendix 'B ' to the Rules. Rule 47 in other form specifically bars saccharin or any other article of artificial sweetener to be added in any article of food, except where the addition of such artificial sweetener is permitted in accordance with the standards laid down in Appendix ' 'B '. Thus both Rules 44(g) and 47 constitute a total blanket ban on the addition of any artificial sweeten er including saccharin to any article of food 392 unless standards for that article of food is prescribed which authorises the use of such an artificial sweetener. [398 G, 399 A B] 2. The prescription of standard of saccharin or any artificial sweetener in Appendix 'B ' is really irrelevant. It is not the question of standard being prescribed for saccharin which is irrelevant what is relevant is the stand ard being prescribed in Appendix 'B ' of the article of food which is being sold and which standard permits user of saccharin. This is the real intention of the legislature while enacting Rule 44(g) of the Rules. [399 E F] 3. What one has to see is the article of food in which the artificial sweetener is sought to be added. The article which was being sold should contain a standard and the standard should permit artificial sweetener to be added. If the standards for that article of food is provided in Appen dix 'B ' to the Rules and such standards permit the addition of saccharin or any other artificial sweetener, then and then only saccharin or any other artificial sweetener could be added and not otherwise. [399 A C] 4. Admittedly no standard has been laid down for Pan Masala or Supari i.e. the article of food which was being sold. Therefore, the exception permitted by clause (g) of Rule 44 has no application and no relevance. [398 H, 399 A] Pyarali K. Tejani vs Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange and Ors., ; , explained and applied. State of Maharashtra vs Ranjitbhai Babubhai Suratwalla, ; Thummalapudi Venkata Gopala Rao vs The State. , M/s Wahab and Co. a proprie tary concern represented by its ' proprietor N.A. Wahab son of N. Mohammad Sheriff vs Food lnspector. Tiruchirappalli Municipal Corpn., Trichy. [1990] L.W. (Crl.) 437; Kailash vs The ,State of Rajasthan, ; State of Assam vs Ram Karani anti Ors., (1987) 3 All India Prevention of Food Adulleration Journal 153; Ujjain Municipal Corpn. , Ujjain vs Chetan Das, (1985) I F.A.C. 46, overruled. State by public prosecutor vs K.R. Balakrishnan, ; Food Inspector vs Usman. ; Krishna Chandra (In jail) vs State of Uttar pradesh, , approved.

The appellant State of West Bengal was carrying on trade as owner and occupier of a market at Calcutta without obtaining a licence as required under section 218 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. The respondent Corporation of Calcutta filed a complaint against the State for contravention thereof. The trial Magistrate, accepting the State 's contention that the State was not bound by the provisions of the Act acquitted the State. on appeal, theHigh Court convicted the State and sentenced it to a fine, holding thatthe State was as much bound as a private citizen to take out a licence. In appeal to this Court the appellant, relying on this Court 's decision inDirector of Rationing vs Corporation of Calcutta, ; ,contended that the State was not bound by the provisions of a statute unless it was expressly named or brought in by necessary implication and this common law rule of construction, accepted as the law in India was "law in force" within the meaning of article 372 of the Constitution and that in any event by necessary implication the State was excluded from the operation of section 218 of the Act. Held:Per Subba Rao C.J., Wanchoo, Sikri, Bachawat, Ramaswami, Shelat, Bhargava and Vaidialingam, JJ. (Shah, J. dissenting) : The State was not exempt from the operation of section 218 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 and was rightly convicted. Per Subba Rao C. J. Wanchoo, Sikri, Ramaswami. Shelat, Bhargava and Vaidialingam, JJ. (i) The Common Law rule of construction that the Crown is not, unless expressly named or clearly intended, bound by a statute,, was not accepted as a rule of construction throughout India and even in the Presidency Towns, it was not regarded as an inflexible rule of construction. It was not statutorily recognized either by incorporating it in different Acts or in any General Clauses Act; at the most, it was relied upon as a rule of general guidance in some parts of the country. The legislative practice establishes that the various legislatures of country provided specifically, exemptions in favour of the Crown 171 whenever they intended to do so indicating thereby that they did not rely upon any presumption but only on express exemptions. Even those courts that accepted it considered it only as a simple canon of construction and not as a rule of substantive law. In the City of Calcutta there was no universal recognition of the rule of construction in favour of the Crown. The Privy Council, in Province of Bombay vs Corporation of the City of Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 27 gave its approval to the rule mainly on concession made by counsel. [180 D G; 183 H; 184 E F; 186 D G] The archaic rule based on the prerogative and perfection of the Crown has no 'relevance to a democratic republic it is inconsistent with the rule of law based on the, doctrine of equality and introduces conflicts and anomalies. The normal construction, namely, that an enactment applies to citizens as well as to State unless it expressly or by necessary implication exempts the State from its operation, steers clear of all the anomalies and is consistent with the philosophy of equality enshrined in the Constitution. B] If a rule of construction accepted by this Court is inconsistent with the legal philosophy of the Constitution it is the duty of this Court to correct its self and lay down the right rule. This Court must more readily do so in constitutional matters than in other branches of law. [176 B C] Director of Rationing vs Corporation of Calcutta, ; ,, reversed. Province of Bombay vs Corporation of the City of Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271, held inapplicable. Bengal Immunity Co. vs State of Bihar, , referred to. Case law discussed. (ii)Even assuming that the common law rule of construction was accepted as a canon of interpretation throughout India the rule is not "law in force" within the meaning of Article 372 of the Constitution. There is an essential distinction between a law and a rule of construction. A rule of construction adopted to ascertain the intention of the legislature is not a rule of law. [187 D] (iii)The State is not excluded from the operation of section 218 of the Act by necessary implication. The State is not the payer as well as the receiver of the fine, or the fine, when levied goes to the municipal fund. Though the expression fine ' is used, in effect and substance, section 541 is a mode of realization of the, fee payable in respect of the licence. The provision for imprisonment in default of fine is only an enabling provision and the court is not bound to direct the imprisonment of the defaulter. [189 D H; 190 A B] Per Bachawat, J : (i) This Court should have in Director of Rationing and Distribution vs Corporation of Calcutta, , refused to recognise the rule that the Crown is not bound by a statute save by express words or by necessary implication. In India the Crown never enjoyed the general prerogative of overriding a statute and 'standing outside it. The doctrine of the general immunity of the Crown from the operation of statutes so far as it is based upon the 'royal prerogative was never imported into India. Nor is there any compelling reason why the courts in India should not give full effect to the general words of a statute on the basis of some artificial rule of construction prevailing in England. The bulk of the Indian legislation proceeds upon the assumption that the Government will be bound unless the contrary is stated. The 172 rule,as rule of construction, never gained a firm foothold in untilthe Privy Council decision in Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation for the City of Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271, in 1946, till which time there was no settled course of decisions of the Indian courts necessitating or justifying the application of this rule to the construction of Indian statutes; and even in this decision the propriety of applying the rule to Indian legislation was not considered. The imposition of this strict rule of construction by the Privy Council was received very unfavourably in India till this Court 's decision in the Director of Rationing case wherein Province of Bombay was held to have laid down the correct law. But subsequent decisions of this Court disclosed a tendency to relax and soften the rigour of the rule. Further, in a country having a federal system of government it is difficult to apply the rule of Crown exemption from statutes. This rule was not in force in India and therefore was not "law in force" within the meaning of article 372 of the Constitution. [201 D E; 202 C; 210 A B, C D; C, H; 210 H; 211 F] This Court has power to reconsider its previous decisions and this is a fit case where this power should be exercised. [211 E] Director of Rationing vs Corporation of Calcutta, ; , reversed. Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation for the City of Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271, held inapplicable. Shivenkata Seetararnanjaneya Rice & Oil Mills vs State of Andhra Pradesh, ; and Bengal Immunity Co. vs State of Bihar, , referred to. Case law discussed. (ii)On a question of construction of a statute no rational distinction can be made between the trading and non trading activities of the State. [210 G] (iii)There is nothing in the Act to indicate that the State should be excluded from the purview of section 218(1) 'requiring the taking out of a licence on payment of the prescribed fee and section 5441(1) providing the remedy for the recovery of fee in face of default. If the State is to be exempt from the application of section 541(1)(b) it would lead to the anomaly that the State is liable to pay the licence fee but the Municipality will have no remedy for the recovery of the fee. Also, the fact that under section 547(A) the court is competent to direct imprisonment in default of fine is no reason why section 5411 1) (b) should not be applied to the State. The special provisions of section 541(2) indicate that the fine realizable under section 541 is receivable by the Municipality. It follows that the State Government is the payer but is not the receiver of the fine. The fine, when levied, is taken by the Municipality in full satisfaction of the demand on account of the licence fee. [212 H; 213B] State of Bihar vs Rani Sonavati Kumari ; , relied on. Shah, J. (Dissenting); (i) The English Common Law rule that the Crown is not, unless expressly named or clearly intended, bound by a statute, is a rule of construction and was settled law in India before the Constitution. [197 F; 198 D] The Common Law of England was adopted in this country subject to local variations and the personal law of the parties and the courts which functioned in the former British India territory were enjoined to cases not governed by any specific statutory rules according to equity and good conscience,, which meant rules of English Common Law 173 in so far as they were applicable to Indian society. Them was practically a consistent course of decisions of the High Courts in India, prior to the Constitution, in support of the view, affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 271, that the rule that the Crown is not unless expressly named or clearly intended bound by a statute applied to India. It was accepted as a rule of interpretation ofstatutes applicable to all statutes governing state action, authority or property. A difference may have prevailed in Parts of the territories now comprising theIndian Union. But this is not peculiar to this rule of interpretation adoptedby the Courts in British India. Where uniform statutes do not apply differences do arise and must be determined according to the law and jurisdiction inherited by the courts administering justice. The present case concerns the administration of law in the town of Calcutta which has for more than two centuries been governed by the English Common Law as adopted by the various Acts, Regulations and finally by the Letters Patent. [191 A D; 192 D E; D F] Director of Rationing and Distribution vs The Corporation of Calcutta, ; , followed. Province of Bombay vs Municipal Corporation of the City of Bom. bay, L.R. 73 I.A. 271, applied. State of West Bengal vs Union, [1964] 1 S.C.R. 371 Srivenkata Seetaramanjaneya Rice & Oil Mills vs State of Andhra Pradesh, ; , Builders Supply Corporation vs Union of India, ; , referred to. Case law referred to. There is no reason to hold that the rule which previously applied to the interpretation of a statute ceased to apply. on the date on which the Constitution came into force. The Constitution has not so fundamentally altered our concept of 'State ' as to abandon the traditional view about State privileges, immunities and rights because they had a foreign origin and on the supposed theory of equality between the State and its citizens. The guarantee of equal protection clause of the Constitution does not extend to any differential treatment which may result in the application of a special rule of interpretation between the State and the citizens nor has the Constitution predicated in all respects equality in matters of interpretation between the State and its citizens. A State can, in the interest of public good, select itself for special treatment. This being so, there is no reason to suppose that a Statute which was framed on the basis of a well settled rule of pre Constitution days which accorded the State a special treatment in the matter of interpretation. of statutes must be deemed to have a different meaning on the supposition that the Constitution has sought to impose equality between the State and the citizens. [198 H 199 F] The fact that in the Indian federal set up sovereignty is divided between the Union and the States, and in the application of the rule that the State is not bound by a Statute, unless expressly named or clearly implied, conflict between the State enacting a law and the Union,, or another State, may arise, does not give rise to any insuperable difficulty which renders the rule inapplicable to the changed circumstances, for, it is the State which enacts a legislation in terms general which alone may claim benefit of the rule of interpretation and not any other State. [199 G] (ii)The rule of interpretation being a settled rule is "law in force" within Me meaning of article 372 of the Constitution. A rule is not any 174 the less a rule of law because it is a rule for determination of the intention of the legislature and for its application requires determination of facts and circumstances outside the statute. Acceptance of the proposition that a decision of the highest judicial tribunal before the Constitution, is law, does not involve the view that it is immutable. A statue may be repealed, ' and even retrospectively, it would then cease to be in ,operation; a decision which in the view of this Court is erroneous may be overruled and may cease to be regarded as law, but till then it was law in force. [198 D G] (iii)The application of the rule cannot be restricted to cases where an action of the State in its sovereign capacity is in issue. In the context of modem notions of the functions of a welfare State, it is difficult to regard any particular activity of the State as exclusively trading. [200 A B] (iv)The State of West Bengal was not bound by the provisions relating to the issue of licences for occupation or conduct of a market. [200 F] There is no, express reference to the State, nor is there anything peculiar in the nature purpose and object or in the language used in the enactment relating to the issue of licences, which may suggest that the State must by necessary implication be bound by its provision. [200 E]

The three respondents, who were the General Manager, the Assistant Manager and the Secretary of the Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd., were charged under sections 12, 13 and 26 of the United Provinces Shop and Commercial Establishment Act, 1947, for contravening the provisions of the Act relating to holidays, leave and maintenance of certain registers regarding a class of field workers employed by the company to guide, supervise and control growth and supply of sugar cane for use in the factory. It was contended on their behalf that those employees were workers within the meaning of the and the United Provinces Shop and Establishment Act did not apply to them. The Judicial Magistrate rejected that contention and convicted the respondents under section 26 of the Act and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 30 each. On a reference by the Sessions judge recommending that the said convictions and sentences may be set aside, the High Court acquitted the respondents. The State Government appealed to this Court by Special Leave. Held, that the order of acquittal passed by the High Court was erroneous. The provisions of the were intended to benefit only workers employed in a factory and since field workers guiding, supervising and controlling growth and supply of sugar cane for use in the factory were not employed in the factory, the did not apply to them and they fell within the definition of " Commercial Establishment " under the United Provinces Shop and Commercial Establishment Act, 1947.

A Jagirdar executed a deed on August 5, 1949 in favour of the appellant for the sale of logs of a specified girth to be obtained from cutting the trees in his forests. On February 19, 1951 the Forest Officer of the ' respondent State prevented the appellant and the Jagirdar from cutting the trees. On the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Act 1 of 1951, the, interest of the Jagirdar in his estate vested in the respondent State. The appellant instituted a suit in June 1954 against the respondent Stateand the Jagirdar for breach of contract and claimed compensation (i) for logs which were cut but which he could not remove; (ii) for logs which were cut but were stated to have 'been lost due to the negligence of the respondent; and (iii) logs from the standing timber which had not been cut or could not be cut by the appellant from the jagirdar 's villages. The ' respondent State contested the suit on the ground inter alia that the deed could not be enforced against it because of the vesting of the Jagir under the Act in the State and that the contract created a mere personal liability against the Jagirdar. The Trial Court granted the appellant a decree for compensation under all the heads claimed at a rate per log determined by the Court. The High Court in appeal disallowed the appellant 's claim, under items (ii) and (iii). In appeal to this Court by certificate it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the rate of compensation determined was inadequate; that the High Court erred in disallowing compensation four the logs which were cut *but were lost, and that it had wrongly disallowed the claim for value of logs of timber which the appellant was entitled to, but could not cut because of the restrictions imposed by the ' State. HELD: Dismissing the appeal, (i) On the evidence, the High Court had rightly disallowed the claim in respect of logs cut but which were stated to have been lost. (ii) Where a thing is attached to, or forms part of, land at the time of the contract and which is to be severed by the buyer, under section 18 of the the property in the thing passes in the absence of a contract to the contrary to the buyer on the severance of the thing from, the land. Again under section 21 of the Act, even if there be: a contract for the sale of specific goods, but the seller is obliged under the terms of the contract to do something to the goods for the purpose of putting them into, a deliverable state, the property passes only when the thing agreed to be done is done and the buyer is informed thereof. [453 D] In the present case the contract by its terms was for the sale of logs out of trees in the forest with a girth of two feet or more; but the timber had to be cut and had to be put in a deliverable state,. Before the trees. 446 were cut and the logs appropriated to the contract, the estate of the Jagirdar vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh. The, appellant 's claim to cut standing trees in the forests of the Jagir after they vested in the State was therefore rightly negatived. [456 F G] Badische Anilin Fabrik vs Hickson, at p. 421; KurseH vs Timber Operators and Contractors Ltd., ; Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Company vs The State of Madhya Pradesh, ; ; Shrimati Shantabat vs State of Bombay & Ors. 11959] S.C.R. 265; Mahadeo vs The State of Bombay, [1959] Supp. (2) S.C.R. 339: .State of Madhya Pradesh vs Yakunuddin, [1963] S.C.R. 13; referred tO.

% The question which arose for determination in this case was whether a Letters Patent Appeal would lie to a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat from an interlocutory order of a Single Judge of that High Court in the course of the trial of an election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appellant and respondents Nos. 1 to 6 were candidates at an election held to fill a seat in the Legislative Assembly of the Gujarat State. The appellant was declared elected. Thereupon, the 1st respondent filed an election petition in the High Court, challenging the validity of the election of the appellant on a number of allegations, and in order to establish his case, he filed an application before the Single Judge who was trying the election petition, to direct the Returning Officer to produce all the records of the election, mentioned in the application, and prayed for permission to inspect the same. The appellant opposed the prayers made by the 1st respondent. The Single Judge declined to grant the application made by the Ist respondent. Against the order of the Single Judge, the Ist respondent preferred an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Gujarat High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal to the extent indicated in its judgment, overruling the contention of the appellant that the appeal was not maintainable as there was no provision in the Act, permitting an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court against an interlocutory order of a Single Judge hearing an election petition filed under the Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the Division Bench, the appellant moved this Court for relief by special leave. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the Division 1044 Bench of the High Court and dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal while expressing no opinion on the merits of the case, the Court, ^ HELD: The only point urged in this appeal by the appellant was that the appeal filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court against the interlocutory order passed by the Single Judge was not maintainable and, therefore, the judgment of the Division Bench was liable to be set aside. [1048C D] Under the provisions of the Act as amended and the provisions of the Constitution of India, no Court exercising power under any ordinary law other than the Judge of a High Court who had been assigned the work of trying an election petition under sub section (2) of section 80 A of the Act and the Supreme Court which was empowered to hear an appeal against any order passed by the judge of the High Court under section 98 or section 99 of the Act, could decide any question arising out of an election petition. The power of the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Constitution was, however, unaffected by any of the provisions of the Act. It meant that when an election petition was pending in the High Court, only the judge who was asked to try the election petition could deal with the questions arising in it and no other judge or judges of the High Court could deal with them. When an order was passed under section 98 or section 99 of the Act by a judge of the High Court in an election petition, it was subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under section 116 A of the Act, Article 136 of the Constitution being excluded in view of the express provisions of section 116 A of the Act, and being resorted to by any party aggrieved by any order passed by the judge trying an election petition not falling under section 98 or section 99 of the Act. It followed that the Division Bench of the High Court, which was entitled to hear an appeal against any order of a Single Judge under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, which was an ordinary law, could not hear an appeal against any interlocutory order passed in the course of the trial of an election petition by the Judge trying the election petition, since the Division Bench was not specified in the Act as an appellate authority which could deal with questions arising out of an election petition filed under the Act. [1053G H; 1054A D] Under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, an appeal no doubt lay from an order of a Single Judge of the High Court exercising Original Jurisdiction to the High Court itself irrespective of the fact that the judgment was preliminary or final or that it was one passed at an interlocutory stage, provided it satisfied certain conditions, but the said 1045 provision could not be extended to an election petition filed under the Act. Conferment of the power to try an election petition under the Act did not amount to enlargement of the existing jurisdiction of the High Court. The jurisdiction exercisable by the Single Judge under the Act was a special jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by virtue of Article 329(b) of the Constitution. In view of the limited nature of the appeal expressly provided in section 116 A of the Act, it should be held that any other right of appeal (excluding that under the Constitution) was taken away by necessary implication. Therefore, it was difficult to subscribe to the view that when once the jurisdiction to try an election petition was conferred on the High Court, all other powers incidental to the ordinary original jurisdiction exercised by a single Judge of a High Court would become applicable to an election petition under the Act. If the Parliament had intended that the Division Bench of the High Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court, probably, it would not have enacted sub section (7) of section 86 of the Act, having regard to the well known tendency of one or the other party to an election petition preferring appeals against the interlocutory orders to the Division Bench. If such appeals against the interlocutory orders to the High Court, were permitted, perhaps, no election dispute would be finally settled till the next election became due. As regards the jurisdiction to try an election petition and the right of appeal of the parties to an election petition, the provisions of the Act (apart from the provisions in the Constitution) constituted a complete code and no Judge or Judges other than the Single Judge of the High Court, who was asked to try an election petition, and the Supreme Court, exercising the appellate powers under section 116 A of the Act in respect of orders passed under section 98 or section 99 of the Act or under Article 136 of the Constitution in respect of other orders, could have any jurisdiction to deal with any matter arising out of an election petition filed under the Act. The Court disagreed with the view expressed on this question by the Gujarat High Court in Dr. Chotalal Jivabhai Patel vs Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta & Ors., (12 Gujarat Law Reporter 850), and overruled that decision of the High Court. The Court also overruled the decision of the Madras High Court in Kadiravan alias Shamsudeen vs B. Thirumalaikumar, ILR (1970) 2 Mad. 183 and the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Laxmi Narayan Nayak vs Ramratan Chaturvedi & Ors, AIR 1986 Madhya Pradesh 165 which had taken the same view as in Dr. Chotalal Jivabhai Patel 's Case (supra). The Court agreed with the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Siaram vs Nathuram & Ors., [1968] ALL. L.J. 576 and by the Rajasthan High Court in Ramdhar vs Shanwar Lal, AIR which held that by necessary 1046 implication an appeal to the High Court from an interlocutory order of the Single Judge of the High Court in the course of trial of an election petition filed under the Act, was excluded. [1054G H; 1055A H; 1056A H] The Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal filed by the Ist respondent against the interlocutory order passed by the Single Judge who was trying the election petition. Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court set aside, Letters Patent Appeal dismissed. [1057B] Dr. Chotalal Jivabhai Patel vs Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta Shamsudeen vs B. Thirumalai Kumar, ILR ; and Laxmi Narayan Nayak vs Ramratan Chaturvedi and Ors., A.I.R. 1986 Madhya Pradesh 165, overruled. Siaram vs Nathuram and Ors., [1968] All. L.J. 576 and Ramdhan vs Bhanwarlal, A.I.R. approved. N.P. Ponnuswami vs Returning Officer, Namekkal Constitutency and others; , ; Shah Babulal Khimji vs Jayaban D. Kania & Anr., ; and National Telephone Company Ltd. vs Post Master General, [1913] A.C.546, referred to.

"Appeal No. 388 of 1960.\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 3, 1959(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant was a member of a joint Hindu family which carried on the business of Government stoc(...TRUNCATED)

"The respondent was appointed as a Sub Inspector of police in a temporary post in 1955.\nHe was disc(...TRUNCATED)

"Under Rule 2 of the Bihar Public Works Department Code, the Governor of Bihar took a decision on 7.(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant who had agricultural income from his Zamindari was assessed to income tax for the fou(...TRUNCATED)

"Election for the office of Pramukh of a block was held under the provision of the Uttar Pradesh Ksh(...TRUNCATED)

"The State filed an application under section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C, 1973, for leave to appeal agains(...TRUNCATED)

"By an office memorandum of the Central Government issued on the 4th January 1957, in respect of pos(...TRUNCATED)

"The respondents, who lost the State Assembly elections as candidates of the Mezo National Front(MNF(...TRUNCATED)

"Appeal No. 198 of 1954.\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated October 16, 1952, of the former N(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster which was later integrated with the State of Mad(...TRUNCATED)

"In 1945 one R who was the thekadar of the proprietary rights of a village, sued the appellants and (...TRUNCATED)

"The respondent admitted the execution of two Hundis in suit which were tendered and marked as exhib(...TRUNCATED)

"The areas in question which were parts of two estates belonging to the appellants, called Gangole A(...TRUNCATED)

"One B who held a large number of shares in the appellant company, transferred two blocks of 100 sha(...TRUNCATED)

"The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands(...TRUNCATED)

"The respondent gave notice to the appellants terminating the lease of agricultural land situated wi(...TRUNCATED)

"In 1951 three pieces of land belonging to the appellant situated in Bihar were acquired by the Stat(...TRUNCATED)

"Appeals Nos. 155 to 160 of 1956.\nAppeals from the judgments and orders of the Bombay High Court da(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellants held personal inams which were governed by Bombay Acts Nos.\nII and VII of 1863 by v(...TRUNCATED)

"These appeals arose out of a representative suit filed on behalf of the creditors of defendants I t(...TRUNCATED)

"Certain lands were situated in the erstwhile State of Baroda before it became a part of the State o(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellants who were descendants of a former ruling chief and had lost their exemption from land(...TRUNCATED)

"The Education Society of Bombay (respondent No. 1) has been running a recognised Anglo Indian Schoo(...TRUNCATED)

"Held, per MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA, DAs and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.\n(PATANJALI SASTRI C.J. dissenting)(...TRUNCATED)

"After the estates and tenures of proprietors or tenure holders had passed to and became vested in t(...TRUNCATED)

"H & S filed a suit against the appellant for recovery of money and during the pendency of the suit (...TRUNCATED)

"iminal Appeal No. 68 of 1958.\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 11, 1(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant, who was working as a Loco Foreman, was found to have accepted a sum of Rs. 375 from (...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant 's election to the M.P. Legislative Assembly in February 1957 was challenged by an el(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant Board passed a special resolution on September 28, 1956, imposing water tax in Hapur (...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant who was charged for the offences (a) under section 120B I.P.C. (b) under section 161 (...TRUNCATED)

"The respondent was holding the post of an Assistant to the Additional Development Commissioner, Pla(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant company retired three of its workmen and the industrial dispute thus arising was refe(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant who was an employee of the State Government in the Horticulture department, was on de(...TRUNCATED)

"The respondent was appointed as a Sub Inspector of police in a temporary post in 1955.\nHe was disc(...TRUNCATED)

"minal Appeal No. 124 of 1959.\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 19 an(...TRUNCATED)

"During the search of the premises of the appellant No. 1 a complete working still was found which w(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant was running a Octroi Clearing Agency at 'Mulund Check Post ' in the State of Maharash(...TRUNCATED)

"% The question which arose for determination in this case was whether a Letters Patent Appeal would(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant Co operative Housing Society Ltd. made some unauthorised constructions in a 36 storey(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant instituted a suit for the recovery of money against the respondents in a Court in Gwa(...TRUNCATED)

"Civil Appeal Nos. 931 of 1977 and 200 of 1978 relate to the same dispute though arose from, two sui(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant, a public limited company, was a lessee of four cinema houses situated within the mun(...TRUNCATED)

"In 1931 the respondent, a registered firm, was appointed the sole selling agents and distributors f(...TRUNCATED)

"Appeal No. 198 of 1954.\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated October 16, 1952, of the former N(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant was the Ruler of the State of Baster which was later integrated with the State of Mad(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant, a Cotton Mill in Indore in Holkar State was taxed in respect of profits, gains and i(...TRUNCATED)

"The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply (...TRUNCATED)

"The appellants, a Hindu undivided family, carrying on business in the former State of Mysore, were (...TRUNCATED)

"The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands(...TRUNCATED)

"% The lands of the appellant were situated on the banks of the river Tapti known for its frequent f(...TRUNCATED)

"After the estates and tenures of proprietors or tenure holders had passed to and became vested in t(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellants and others were the Zamindars of a village in which certain lands were given on Thek(...TRUNCATED)

"Appeal No. 285 of 1959.\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 13th July, (...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant Corporation was assessed to sales tax under section 13(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act,(...TRUNCATED)

"The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. was formed in 1971 as a wholly owned subsidiary(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant company was manufacturing and selling black and galvanised steel tubes and pipes.\nIn(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellants belonging to the Revenue Department of Gujarat State were allocated to the Panchayat(...TRUNCATED)

"In Civil Appeal No. 855(N) of 1979 and Civil Appeal No. 2665 of 1991 the issue raised was common an(...TRUNCATED)

"The respondents brought a suit for a mandatory injunction directing the removal of certain masonry (...TRUNCATED)

"Respondent No. 1 a Private Limited Company, was sanctioned a loan of Rs.30 lakh by the Appellant Co(...TRUNCATED)

"The appellant was a member of a joint Hindu family which carried on the business of Government stoc(...TRUNCATED)