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FOURTH SECTION CASE OF MARDOSAI v. LITHUANIA (Application no. 42434/15) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 11 July 2017 FINAL 11/10/2017 This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Mardosai v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Ganna Yudkivska, President,Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,Faris Vehabović,Egidijus Kūris,Iulia Motoc,Georges Ravarani,Péter Paczolay, judges,and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 6 June 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in an application (no. 42434/15) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Lithuanian nationals, Ms Vaida Mardosienė (“the first applicant”) and Mr Vygandas Mardosas (“the second applicant”), on 21 August 2015. 2. The applicants were represented by Ms S. Mardosaitė, a lawyer practising in Vilnius. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė. 3. The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention regarding the effectiveness of the criminal investigation into the alleged medical negligence which had led to their newborn daughter’s death. 4. On 25 May 2016 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5. The first and second applicants were born in 1981 and 1971 respectively and live in Jurbarkas. They are wife and husband. A. Death of the applicants’ newborn daughter 6. On 15 May 2009 the first applicant, who was nine months pregnant and already past her due date, was admitted to the obstetrics and gynaecology ward of Jurbarkas Hospital. 7. On the morning of 20 May 2009 she was given medication in order to induce labour, but the medication was subsequently discontinued and she was given sedatives. In the late afternoon her waters broke. The doctors noticed that the heartbeat of the foetus was weak and decided to perform a Caesarean section. Following the surgery, the first applicant gave birth to a daughter. The newborn baby was in a serious condition, so she was taken to a hospital in Kaunas for intensive care. 8. On 22 May 2009 the baby died. The applicants decided not to have an autopsy performed on her body – according to them, they were informed by doctors that an autopsy was not necessary. The Government contested this and submitted that the applicants had been informed that an autopsy had been necessary but refused it nonetheless. 9. Following the baby’s death, Jurbarkas Hospital conducted an internal inquiry into the medical services provided to the first applicant. The inquiry report, issued on 16 June 2009, found that some erroneous entries had been made in the first applicant’s medical file, the assessment of her and the baby’s condition had probably been inadequate, and certain actions to resuscitate the baby had been taken too late. 10. At the applicants’ request, the Ministry of Healthcare also conducted an inquiry into the medical services provided to them at Jurbarkas Hospital. A provisional report, issued on 22 June 2009, found that the first applicant’s labour had not been induced in compliance with the relevant rules, the condition of the foetus had not been properly monitored, there had been shortcomings in the resuscitation of the baby, and one of the doctors (R.B.) had not been properly qualified to provide obstetric services. The report issued a series of recommendations to the hospital, and also suggested that the State Inspectorate for Medical Inquiries conduct a more in-depth inspection of the medical services at Jurbarkas Hospital. 11. The State Inspectorate for Medical Inquiries issued its report on 26 August 2009, in which it identified several shortcomings in the work of doctors who had provided care to the first applicant, and concluded that the medical services had been inadequate. 12. Subsequently, doctor R.B. was dismissed from Jurbarkas Hospital, and the hospital stopped providing obstetric services, citing a lack of qualified medical personnel. V.K., a gynaecologist, and three other doctors were officially reprimanded for having provided inadequate medical services to the first applicant and V.K. was later dismissed at her own request. B. Criminal proceedings 1. Pre-trial investigation 13. On 22 June 2009 the applicants asked the Jurbarkas district prosecutor (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) to open a pre-trial investigation into the medical negligence at Jurbarkas Hospital which had led to their newborn daughter’s death. The pre-trial investigation was opened on the same day and carried out by the Jurbarkas police. In July and August 2009 the applicants were interviewed and granted victim status in the investigation. 14. On 7 August 2009 a court-appointed doctor delivered a specialist opinion (specialisto išvada) that the applicants’ daughter’s death had resulted from asphyxia during birth and meconium aspiration syndrome. 15. In August and September 2009 the police interviewed the doctors who had provided medical services to the first applicant, and obtained various documents from Jurbarkas Hospital. 16. In September 2009 the applicants asked the prosecutor to exhume their daughter’s body so that an autopsy could be performed and the cause of her death could be more precisely determined. However, the prosecutor denied their request, relying on an opinion from medical experts that performing an autopsy more than three months after the baby’s death would not give any results because of the significant post-mortem changes to the body during that time. 17. In October 2009 the police asked four court-appointed doctors for a specialist opinion on the causes of the baby’s death and the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital. The applicants also submitted questions and their questions were forwarded to the specialists. The opinion, delivered on 5 May 2010, stated that no causal link between the doctors’ actions and the death could be established, and that it was not possible to determine whether the death could have been avoided because an autopsy of the body had not been performed. Subsequently, the applicants asked the police to order another opinion from specialists, and they submitted additional questions. On 10 February 2011 three other court-appointed doctors provided answers to the applicants’ questions. Their overall conclusions were the same as those of the previous specialists. 18. On 4 March 2011 the prosecutor discontinued the pre‑trial investigation on the grounds that no causal link between the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital and the baby’s death had been established. On 24 March 2011 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision, but on 2 May 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court upheld a complaint submitted by the applicants and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court found that the two specialist opinions (see paragraph 17 above) had not answered some of the questions submitted because certain medical data had not been made available. It also found that the investigation had not established why an autopsy had not been performed (see paragraph 8 above). Therefore, the court ordered the prosecutor to ask additional questions of some of the witnesses and order a comprehensive forensic examination. 19. On 2 June 2011 the prosecutor asked the court to order a forensic examination of the causes of the baby’s death and the causal link between the doctors’ actions and the death. The applicants submitted a list of additional questions to be forwarded to the forensic expert. On 27 June 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court ordered the examination, but that order included only the prosecutor’s questions and did not provide any reasons as to why the applicants’ questions had not been included. The applicants appealed against it, but on 14 October 2011 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed their appeal on the grounds that deciding which questions to forward to the expert was the lower court’s prerogative. 20. On 25 October 2011 the applicants again submitted their questions to the prosecutor and asked for an additional forensic examination. On 5 December 2011 the Jurbarkas District Court ordered an additional forensic examination, and that order included the applicants’ questions. However, the court’s order was only forwarded to the forensic expert on 5 February 2013. 21. On 29 January 2013 a court-appointed forensic expert delivered the answers to the prosecutor’s questions (see paragraph 19 above). The expert found that the cause of the baby’s death had been determined correctly, the medical services provided to the first applicant had been adequate, and there was no causal link between the doctors’ actions and the death. 22. On 13 February 2013 the applicants submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General, stating that the pre-trial investigation was being conducted inefficiently and with undue delays. They complained, in particular, that the court’s decision of 5 December 2011 to order an additional forensic examination (see paragraph 20 above) had not been forwarded to the expert until 5 February 2013, one year and two months after it had been issued. The Prosecutor General’s Office conducted an official inquiry, which on 18 June 2013 concluded that Jurbarkas prosecutors had committed disciplinary violations, and that the pre-trial investigation had not been properly conducted and supervised. The inquiry found that the Jurbarkas district prosecutor’s office had been reorganised in 2012, which was the likely reason for the above-mentioned shortcomings. No individuals were penalised. 23. On 25 June 2013 a court-appointed forensic expert delivered the answers to the applicants’ questions (see paragraph 20 above). Among other things, the expert found that some of the doctors’ actions had not been in line with the relevant requirements, but there was no direct causal link between their actions and the applicants’ daughter’s death. 24. On 5 July 2013 the prosecutor discontinued the investigation on the grounds that no causal link between the actions of the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital and the applicants’ daughter’s death had been established (see paragraphs 17, 21 and 23 above). The applicants appealed against that decision, and on 4 November 2013 a senior prosecutor reopened the pre‑trial investigation and assigned it to a different police department. The senior prosecutor considered that, following the decision to discontinue the investigation, new relevant circumstances had emerged, although he did not specify what those circumstances were. 25. On 28 February 2014 V.K., the gynaecologist, was served with a notice that, under Article 229 of the Criminal Code, she was suspected of having failed to perform her official duties (see paragraph 37 below). On 8 April 2014 the case was referred to the Jurbarkas District Court for examination on the merits. 2. Court proceedings 26. On 28 April 2014 the Jurbarkas District Court held an oral hearing. V.K. was not present and her lawyer informed the court that she had been admitted to hospital, although no medical certificate was submitted. The court adjourned the case until 12 May 2014. 27. On 12 May 2014 V.K. was again not present, and the court received a medical certificate confirming her hospitalisation until 14 May 2014. The court decided to adjourn the case and proposed three alternative dates: 13 May, 16 May and 19 May 2014. V.K.’s lawyer stated that V.K. would not be well enough by 13 May, and that on the later dates he would be unable to represent her. The court adjourned the case until 25 June 2014. 28. On 23 June 2014 the applicants applied to the court to reclassify the charges against V.K. as negligent homicide in violation of special conduct security rules under Article 132 § 3 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 38 below). The court adjourned the case until 14 July 2014 in order to give the accused enough time to acquaint herself with the case file. 29. On 14 July 2014 the Jurbarkas District Court terminated the case on the basis that it was time-barred. It held that V.K. had been charged with a crime of negligence, and the five-year statutory limitation period had ended on 21 May 2014 (see paragraphs 8 above and 39 below). The court also dismissed the application to reclassify the charges and noted that, in any event, reclassification would not alter the statutory limitation period. 30. The applicants appealed against that judgment. They submitted that, in line with the Criminal Code, the statutory limitation period must have been suspended while the examination of the case had been adjourned owing to V.K.’s illness (see paragraph 40 below). 31. On 6 November 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. It firstly held that the legal provision cited by the applicants had been adopted after the alleged offence had been committed, and that at the time the alleged offence had been committed domestic law had not provided for suspension of the statutory limitation period during the adjournment of a case (see paragraphs 39-40 below). The court further held that, in any event, the examination of the case had been adjourned for an important reason ‑ V.K.’s hospitalisation – so there were no grounds for suspending the statutory limitation period. 32. On 24 February 2015 the Supreme Court refused to examine a cassation appeal lodged by the applicants, on the grounds that it did not raise any important legal questions. C. Civil proceedings 33. The Government in their observations informed the Court that on 15 September 2011 the applicants instituted civil proceedings against Jurbarkas Hospital, claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage caused by inadequate medical services provided to the first applicant and their newborn daughter. They revised their claim in December 2011 and August 2013. The applicants claimed a total of 600,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 173,770 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and a total of LTL 16,295 (approximately EUR 4,720) in respect of pecuniary damage, consisting of funeral expenses and the second applicant’s lost earnings during his time off work after their daughter’s death. 34. On 26 November 2014 the Kaunas Regional Court granted the applicants’ claim in part. Relying on the available inquiry reports, as well as the specialist opinions and results of the forensic examinations delivered in the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 17, 21 and 23 above), the court held that the doctors at Jurbarkas Hospital had breached their duty of care and that their actions “had contributed” (turėjo įtakos) to the death of the applicants’ daughter, so there were grounds for the hospital incurring civil liability. However, the court considered that the doctors’ actions had not been premeditated or grossly negligent, so the applicants’ claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage was granted in part, and they were awarded a total of LTL 80,000 (approximately EUR 23,170) under that head. They were also awarded a total of LTL 6,716 (approximately EUR 1,945) in respect of pecuniary damage, on the basis of the documents in the court’s possession. 35. The applicants and the hospital appealed against that judgment, but on 17 September 2015 the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s findings. The hospital transferred the awarded amount to the applicants’ bank accounts in November and December 2015. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 36. Article 19 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania reads: “The right to life of a human being shall be protected by law.” 37. At the material time, Article 229 of the Criminal Code provided: Article 229. Failure to perform official duties “A civil servant or a person equivalent thereto who, by negligence, has failed to perform or has inadequately performed his or her official duties and has thereby caused major damage to the State, an individual or a legal entity, shall be punished by deprivation of the right to have a certain occupation or to engage in a certain type of activity, or a fine, or detention, or imprisonment for a term of up to two years.” 38. Article 132 § 3 of the Criminal Code provides: Article 132. Causing death by negligence “... 3. Anyone who has [negligently caused the death of another person] by violating special conduct security rules shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of up to eight years.” 39. The relevant parts of Article 95 of the Criminal Code, in force from April 2003 until June 2010, provided: Article 95. Statute of limitations for conviction “1. A person who has committed a criminal offence cannot be convicted if: 1) the following period has lapsed: ... b) five years, in the case of a crime of negligence or a minor premeditated crime; ... 2) during the period laid down in sub-paragraph 1, the person did not evade the pre‑trial investigation or the trial and did not commit a new criminal offence ...” 40. In June 2010 a new version of Article 95 of the Criminal Code was passed, the relevant parts of which provide: Article 95. Statute of limitations for conviction “1. A person who has committed a criminal offence cannot be convicted if: 1) the following period has lapsed: ... b) eight years, in the case of a crime of negligence or a minor premeditated crime; ... 2) during the period laid down in sub-paragraph 1, that person did not evade the pre‑trial investigation or the trial and did not commit a new premeditated criminal offence ... 5. During the examination of a case before a court, the statute of limitations is suspended for the period during which: 1) the court adjourns the examination of the case because of the absence of the accused or his or her counsel; 2) the court adjourns the examination of the case until a forensic examination requested by the court or a specialist investigation has been carried out, or until a legal assistance request sent to another State has been executed; 3) the court adjourns the examination of the case and instructs a prosecutor or a pre‑trial investigation judge to carry out investigative measures provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure; 4) the court adjourns the examination of the case in order to allow newly appointed defence counsel to acquaint himself or herself with the case file ...” THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE PROCEDURAL LIMB OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION 41. The applicants complained that the criminal investigation into the alleged medical negligence which had led to their newborn daughter’s death had been lengthy and ineffective. They relied on the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally ...” A. Admissibility 42. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, because they had not lodged a civil claim against the State for compensation in respect of damage caused by the allegedly ineffective criminal proceedings. They provided examples of domestic case‑law where damages had been awarded in similar cases. The Government also submitted that the applicants could have lodged a civil claim for compensation in respect of damage caused by the excessive length of the criminal proceedings – a remedy which the Court had found to be effective in Savickas and Others v. Lithuania ((dec.), no. 66365/09, 15 October 2013). 43. The applicants submitted that they had exhausted criminal and civil remedies against Jurbarkas Hospital and were therefore not required to initiate any more proceedings. 44. The Court observes that the applicants have fully exhausted both the criminal and civil law avenues in pursuit of their complaint concerning medical negligence. Accordingly, it does not share the Government’s view that they ought to have used a separate remedy of civil proceedings against the State (see Kraulaidis v. Lithuania, no. 76805/11, § 51, 8 November 2016, and the cases cited therein). Furthermore, the Court has previously held that, in the assessment of the authorities’ compliance with the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention, length of proceedings remedies are insufficient, as it is not merely the length of the proceedings which is in issue. The main question is rather whether, in the circumstances of the case seen as a whole, the State could be said to have complied with its procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention (see Bilbija and Blažević v. Croatia, no. 62870/13, § 110, 12 January 2016, and the cases cited therein). The Government’s argument as to non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies must therefore be dismissed. 45. The Court further notes that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The parties’ submissions (a) The applicants 46. The applicants argued that the criminal proceedings concerning their daughter’s death at Jurbarkas Hospital had been lengthy and ineffective. They submitted that the pre-trial investigation had been discontinued and reopened twice (see paragraphs 18 and 24 above), there had been unexplained periods of inactivity, and the prosecutor had only forwarded the order for a forensic examination to the relevant expert one year and two months after it had been issued (see paragraph 20 above). They further submitted that the Jurbarkas District Court had not made any effort to speed up the examination of the case before the expiry of the statute of limitations. (b) The Government 47. The Government firstly argued that the criminal proceedings had been effective. They submitted that the pre-trial investigation had been opened on the day of the applicants’ request, it had been conducted by independent and impartial authorities, the applicants had been given sufficient opportunity to participate in it, and the authorities had carried out all the necessary investigative measures, such as obtaining documents, questioning witnesses and requesting forensic examinations. The Government argued that the decisions to discontinue the investigation had not been arbitrary, because they had been based on specialist opinions and forensic examinations which had found no causal link between the doctors’ actions and the baby’s death. The Government also argued that the applicants themselves had contributed to the length of the investigation by requesting additional specialist opinions and forensic examinations. 48. The Government further submitted that the length of the pre‑trial investigation had resulted mainly from the time taken to deliver specialist opinions and perform forensic examinations, and that had been caused by the experts’ workload. While acknowledging that the order for an additional forensic examination had only been forwarded to the expert one year and two months after it had been issued (see paragraph 20 above), the Government contended that that had not significantly prolonged the investigation, because the results of that examination had been delivered only five months after those of the previous forensic examination (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). 49. Lastly, the Government submitted that the State’s positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention did not require criminal liability in cases concerning medical negligence. They submitted that the applicants had successfully lodged civil proceedings against the hospital and had been awarded compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by inadequate medical services (see paragraphs 33-35 above). The Government submitted that the Court had acknowledged the adequacy of the Lithuanian legal framework with regard to the liability of doctors in Rinkūnienė v. Lithuania ((dec.), no. 55779/08, 1 December 2009). 2. The Court’s assessment (a) Relevant general principles 50. The Court reiterates that the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention requires the States to set up an effective independent judicial system so that the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical profession, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible made accountable (see Šilih v. Slovenia [GC], no. 71463/01, § 192, 9 April 2009, and the cases cited therein). This procedural obligation is not an obligation of result but of means (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477/99, § 71, ECHR 2002‑II). 51. The Court also reiterates that, although the Convention does not guarantee a right to have criminal proceedings instituted against third parties, the effective judicial system required by Article 2 may, and under certain circumstances must, include recourse to criminal law. However, if the infringement of the right to life is not caused intentionally, the procedural obligation imposed by Article 2 does not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. In the specific sphere of medical negligence the obligation may also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any responsibility of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such as an order for damages and/or for the publication of the decision, to be obtained (see Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002‑I; Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 90, ECHR 2004‑VIII; and Šilih, cited above, § 194). 52. Lastly, the Court reiterates that, apart from the concern for the respect of the rights inherent in Article 2 of the Convention in each individual case, more general considerations also call for a prompt examination of cases concerning death in a hospital setting. Knowledge of the facts and possible errors committed in the course of medical care is essential to enable the institutions and medical staff concerned to remedy the potential deficiencies and prevent similar errors. The prompt examination of such cases is therefore important for the safety of users of all health services (see Byrzykowski v. Poland, no. 11562/05, § 117, 27 June 2006, and Šilih, cited above, § 196). (b) Application of the above principles to the present case 53. Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court will firstly address the applicants’ submissions concerning the effectiveness of the criminal proceedings at the pre-trial and trial stage. 54. The pre-trial investigation in the case lasted more than four years and nine months (see paragraphs 13 and 25 above), a period which the Court considers excessive even taking into account the complexity of the case. As seen from the case file, there were several periods of inactivity (almost four months from October 2009 to February 2010, three months from June to September 2010, almost four months from September 2010 to January 2011, more than five months from December 2011 to May 2012, and more than two months from July to October 2012), which together amounted to about one year and six months of inactivity imputable to the authorities. The Court also notes that for the rest of the time the investigation was conducted very slowly and the investigative measures were sparse. 55. The Government submitted that many of the delays in the investigation had been caused by the workload of specialists and experts, but the Court cannot accept that argument and reiterates that it is for the State to organise its judicial system in such a way as to enable its institutions to comply with the requirements of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, O’Reilly and Others v. Ireland, no. 54725/00, § 33, 29 July 2004; Rakhmonov v. Russia, no. 50031/11, § 60, 16 October 2012; and W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125/06, § 69, 23 January 2014). The Government also argued that the applicants had themselves prolonged the investigation by requesting additional specialist opinions and forensic examinations. The Court acknowledges that the applicants’ request for an additional specialist opinion (see paragraph 17 above) appeared to have been based on their disagreement with the conclusions of the previous opinion rather than on any shortcomings therein. However, it notes that the authorities were not obliged to satisfy the applicants’ request for an additional opinion if they did not consider it necessary (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, § 180, 14 April 2015). The Court further observes that the applicants’ request for an additional forensic examination (see paragraph 20 above) resulted from the fact that their questions had not been forwarded to the experts conducting the previously ordered examination, without any reasons being provided (see paragraph 19 above), so in the Court’s view, the applicants cannot be reproached for asking for another examination which would address their questions. 56. Of particular concern to the Court is the authorities’ failure to forward an order for a forensic examination to the relevant experts for one year and two months, for which nobody was held responsible (see paragraphs 20 and 22 above). Although the Government submitted that that failure had prolonged the investigation by “only five months” (see paragraph 48 above), the Court considers such a delay to be significant, especially in view of the total length of the pre-trial investigation and the fact that the proceedings eventually became time-barred. 57. The Court further notes that, following the lengthy pre-trial investigation, the case was transferred to the Jurbarkas District Court for examination on the merits when only slightly more than one month remained until the expiry of the statute of limitations (see paragraphs 8 and 39 above). In such circumstances, the Court considers that there was little that the domestic court could do to avoid the case becoming time-barred, especially as the domestic law at that time did not allow suspending the statute of limitations (see paragraphs 39-40 above). It nonetheless observes that, after the first two hearings were adjourned as a result of the illness of the accused, the Jurbarkas District Court scheduled the next hearing on 25 June 2014 – a date which was already after the expiry of the statute of limitations – because of the defence lawyer’s schedule, without examining the possibility of finding another date before 21 May 2014 or suggesting that the accused appoint a different lawyer (see paragraph 27 above). 58. Accordingly, the Court is of the view that in the present case the criminal proceedings could not be regarded as effective for the purpose of Article 2 of the Convention. 59. However, the Court observes that there is no dispute that the death of the applicants’ daughter was not intentional. It reiterates that, in cases concerning medical negligence, the procedural obligation under Article 2 of the Convention does not necessarily require criminal liability, and civil liability may be sufficient (see Calvelli and Ciglio, § 51; Vo, § 90; and Šilih, § 194, all cited above). In the present case, the applicants lodged a civil claim against Jurbarkas Hospital and were awarded compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the inadequate medical services which had contributed to their daughter’s death (see paragraphs 33‑35 above). 60. The applicants lodged their civil claim in September 2011 (and revised it in December 2011 and August 2013 – see paragraph 33 above), but the first-instance judgment was only issued in November 2014 (see paragraph 34 above), thereby raising the question as to whether the proceedings were sufficiently prompt. No information was provided to the Court as to the reasons for that delay. However, it may be assumed that the civil proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings, especially as the courts in the former proceedings relied on the evidence obtained in the course of the latter (see paragraph 34 above; see, mutatis mutandis, Koceski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 41107/07, § 27, 22 October 2013). After the criminal proceedings became time‑barred, the civil proceedings were concluded without undue delay (see paragraphs 29, 31 and 34 above). 61. The Court further observes that the amount awarded to the applicants in the civil proceedings (EUR 23,170 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,945 in respect of pecuniary damage) corresponded to the degree of the hospital’s liability (see paragraph 34 above), and was adequate by Convention standards. 62. Lastly, the Court notes that the applicants complained only about the ineffectiveness of the criminal proceedings, but did not allege that the civil proceedings had been unfair or ineffective in any way, or that the amount awarded to them in the latter proceedings had been inadequate. 63. The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the State complied with its procedural obligations under Article 2 of the Convention. There has therefore been no violation of that provision in the present case. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT 1. Declares, by a majority, the application admissible; 2. Holds, by five votes to two, that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb. Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 July 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Marialena TsirliGanna YudkivskaRegistrarPresident In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment: (a) joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Yudkivska, Motoc and Ravarani; (b) dissenting opinion of Judge Motoc; (c) statement of dissent by Judge Paczolay. G.Y.M.T. JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES YUDKIVSKA, MOTOC AND RAVARANI 1. To our regret, we are unable to agree with the majority’s finding concerning the admissibility of the application. Instead of finding no violation on the merits, the Court should have found the present application inadmissible, as the applicants had lost their victim status. 2. Even though the criminal proceedings might not have been effective, it follows clearly from the Court’s case-law that where medical negligence is at stake, an award of damages through civil or administrative proceedings may offer appropriate redress, a fact also conceded in the present judgment (see paragraph 51 of the judgment). In Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy the Grand Chamber found that “if the infringement of the right to life or to personal integrity is not caused intentionally, the positive obligation imposed by Article 2 to set up an effective judicial system does not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy in every case. In the specific sphere of medical negligence the obligation may for instance also be satisfied if the legal system affords victims a remedy in the civil courts, either alone or in conjunction with a remedy in the criminal courts, enabling any liability of the doctors concerned to be established and any appropriate civil redress, such as an order for damages and for the publication of the decision, to be obtained. Disciplinary measures may also be envisaged”[1]. In that case the Court also noted various procedural shortcomings in the criminal investigation, as a result of which the criminal proceedings instituted against the doctor concerned had become time-barred. However, since the applicants were also entitled to issue proceedings in the civil courts and had done so, the positive obligations arising under Article 2 were satisfied. In that connection, the Court reiterated that where a relative of a deceased person accepts compensation in settlement of a civil claim based on medical negligence he or she is in principle no longer able to claim to be a victim, and found it unnecessary to examine whether the fact that a time-bar had prevented the doctor being prosecuted for the alleged offence was compatible with Article 2. Therefore, having joined an objection on the applicants’ victim status to the merits of the case, the Court found no violation of Article 2, basing its finding precisely on the lack of victim status. The same approach, we believe, should have been taken here. 3. As the judgment concedes in paragraph 59, the applicants also had access to civil proceedings and introduced a civil claim against the hospital. They were awarded compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the inadequate medical services that contributed to their daughter’s death. In its decision in Kolaczyk and Kwiatkowski v. Poland (no. 34215/11, 22 October 2013), the Court found that “the action for damages in the civil courts was an effective remedy that enabled the applicants to obtain redress ... Therefore it is not necessary to assess the effectiveness of the criminal investigation carried out in the present case. There is no doubt that the procedural obligation under Article 2 was complied with in the present case”[2]. 4. Against this background we wonder whether it was the correct approach, as stated in paragraph 53, to “firstly address the applicants’ submissions concerning the effectiveness of the criminal proceedings at the pre-trial and trial stage”, given that the detailed examination in paragraphs 54-57 ultimately led to a conclusion in paragraph 58 which remains a pure obiter dictum. 5. In sum, following the case-law of the Court and having regard to the fact that the present case concerns a death through negligence, we consider that the applicants had an effective remedy in civil proceedings (as they did not claim that these proceedings were unfair or ineffective[3]) and thus can no longer claim to be victims of the alleged violation of Article 2. Accordingly, this complaint is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and should have been rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. We therefore voted against point 1 in the operative part of the judgment. DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MOTOC I have voted for the inadmissibility of the case for the reasons I have set out with Judges Yudkivska and Ravarani in our joint separate opinion. I consider, however, that once the case had been considered admissible, it was logical for the Court to find a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention. In fact, the domestic courts had never properly addressed the procedural violation of Article 2, only the substantive violation. STATEMENT OF DISSENT BY JUDGE PACZOLAY I am unable to follow the finding of the majority that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention. [1]. Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967/96, § 51, ECHR 2002‑I. [2]. Kolaczyk v. Poland (dec.), no. 34215/11, § 50; see also Vo v. France [GC], no. 53924/00, § 91, ECHR 2004‑VIII. [3]. See § 60 of the judgment.

THIRD SECTION CASE OF CHEPINOGA AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (Application no. 48836/09 and 4 others – see appended list) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 6 July 2017 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Chepinoga and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Luis López Guerra, President,Dmitry Dedov,Jolien Schukking, judges,and Liv Tigerstedt, Acting Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 15 June 2017, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in applications against Russia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table. 2. The applications were communicated to the Russian Government (“the Government”). THE FACTS 3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 4. The applicants complained that they had been denied an opportunity to appear in person before the court in the civil proceedings to which they were parties. THE LAW I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 5. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 6. The applicants complained that their right to a fair hearing had been breached on account of the domestic courts’ refusal of their requests to appear in court. They relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows: Article 6 § 1 “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...” 7. The Court reiterates that the applicants, detainees at the time of the events, were not afforded an opportunity to attend hearings in civil proceedings to which they were parties. The details of those domestic proceedings are indicated in the appended table. The Court observes that the general principles regarding the right to present one’s case effectively before the court and to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, have been stated in a number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities, Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, §§ 59-60, ECHR 2005-II). The Court’s analysis of an alleged violation of the right to a fair trial in respect of cases where incarcerated applicants complain about their absence from hearings in civil proceedings includes the following elements: examination of the manner in which domestic courts assessed the question whether the nature of the dispute required the applicants’ personal presence and determination whether domestic courts put in place any procedural arrangements aiming at guaranteeing their effective participation in the proceedings (see Yevdokimov and Others v. Russia, nos. 27236/05 and 10 others, § 48, 16 February 2016). 8. In the leading case of Yevdokimov and Others v. Russia, nos. 27236/05 and 10 others, 16 February 2016, the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case. 9. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. In particular, the Court dismisses the Government’s argument about belated applications in cases nos. 41652/12 and 27066/13. It notes that the applicants in the two cases first complained to the Court about their absence from civil proceedings in letters dispatched on 22 May 2012 and 17 March 2013, respectively, that is within the six months after the final judgments in their cases (see the appended table for further details). Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the domestic courts deprived the applicants of the opportunity to present their cases effectively and failed to meet their obligation to ensure respect for the principle of a fair trial. 10. These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 11. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 12. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table. 13. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, 1. Decides to join the applications; 2. Declares the applications admissible; 3. Holds that these applications disclose a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the applicants’ absence from civil proceedings; 4. Holds (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 July 2017, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Liv TigerstedtLuis López GuerraActing Deputy RegistrarPresident APPENDIX List of applications raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (applicant’s absence from civil proceedings) No. Application no.Date of introduction Applicant name Date of birth Nature of the disputeFinal decision First-instance hearing date Court Appeal hearing date Court Amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses per applicant (in euros)[1] 48836/09 06/05/2009 Anatoliy Anatolyevich Chepinoga 02/03/1964 non-pecuniary damages for bad conditions of detention 08/10/2009 Abakan Town Court of the Khakassiya Republic 27/01/2010 Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic 1,500 41652/12 22/05/2012 Viktor Valeryevich Sablin 11/03/1976 non-pecuniary damages for wrongful conviction 02/08/2011 Tsentralnyy District Court of Chita 28/12/2011 Zabaykalskiy Regional Court 1,500 27066/13 17/03/2013 Andrey Mikhaylovich Korolenko 09/03/1968 victim’s claim for damages 13/08/2012 Leninskiy District Court of Vladimir 29/11/2012 Vladimirskiy Regional Court 1,500 19691/14 07/04/2014 German Nikolayevich Vyushkin 31/01/1976 non-pecuniary damages for bad conditions of detention (no doors in the restrooms; mould on the walls) 04/12/2013 Omutninskiy District Court of the Kirov Region 18/02/2014 Kirov Regional Court 1,500 35134/14 01/08/2014 Marsel Mirgayazovich Garayev 12/01/1978 non-pecuniary damages for unlawful criminal prosecution 21/10/2013 Aznakayevo Town Court of the Tatarstan Republic 16/01/2014 Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic 1,500 [1]. Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

THIRD SECTION CASE OF ČESKÝ v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC (Application no. 33644/96) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 6 June 2000 FINAL 04/10/2000 This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the official reports of selected judgments and decisions of the Court. In the case of ČESKÝ v. the Czech Republic, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: MrJ.-P. Costa, President,MrL. Loucaides,MrP. Kūris,MrsF. Tulkens,MrK. Jungwiert,SirNicolas Bratza,MrsH.S. Greve, judges,andMrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 31 August 1999 and 16 May 2000, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in an application (no. 33644/96) against the Czech Republic lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr Libor Český, a Czech citizen (“the applicant”), on 23 November 1995. 2. The applicant was represented by Mr K. Fiala, a lawyer practising in Prague. The Government of the Czech Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr E. Slavík, Ministry of Justice. The application concerned the applicant’s detention on remand and the criminal proceedings brought against him. 3. On 14 January 1998 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government. The Government’s written observations were submitted on 20 March 1998. The applicant replied on 5 May 1998. 4. On 1 November 1998, by operation of Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, the case fell to be examined by the Court in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol. The case was assigned to the Third Section. 5. On 31 August 1999 the Court declared admissible the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that there had been a breach of his right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. It declared inadmissible the remainder of the application concerning, inter alia, the alleged unreasonable length and unfairness of the criminal proceedings. 6. On the same day the Chamber decided that it was not necessary to hold a hearing. 7. On 22 December 1999, 31 October 1999, 11 and 16 February 2000 and 21 March 2000, the parties submitted their observations on the merits and just satisfaction. AS TO THE FACTS I.THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 8. In 1987 the Prague Municipal Court (městský soud) (hereinafter “the Municipal Court”) convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to six and a half years’ imprisonment. On 4 April 1990 he was released and placed on probation for three years. At the beginning of October 1990 the former Czechoslovak authorities investigated a case about two missing persons. On 16 October 1990 a certain Mr B. was heard in connection with this investigation and stated that he, the applicant and another person had decided to rob these people at the apartment of one of them. Mr B. did not know how the two persons had been killed but he saw their bodies being removed from the apartment, and stated that the applicant and his accomplice had removed them. 1.Proceedings leading to the High Court’s decision of 16 January 1995 9. On 18 October 1990 the Prague Municipal Prosecutor (městský prokurátor) was requested by the investigator (vyšetřovatel) to authorise the applicant’s arrest. Agreement was given. On 19 October 1990 the Prague 1 police investigator charged the applicant with complicity in robbery under Article 9(2) and Article 234(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code. On 22 October 1990 the Municipal Court ordered the applicant’s arrest and detention. At the same time, a lawyer was appointed to represent the applicant. 10. On 12 January 1991 the applicant was arrested in Italy where he was working as a waiter. On 6 December 1991 he was released. On 2 December 1992 the Rome Court of Cassation upheld an extradition warrant. On 6 February 1993 the applicant was arrested, pursuant to the extradition warrant, and on 18 February 1993 he was extradited. 11. On 19 February 1993 a judge at the Municipal Court (soudce městského soudu), ordered the applicant’s detention on remand under Article 67(a)-(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with backdated effect from 6 February 1993. The court held that on 15 October 1990 the applicant had left the country although he had known that he was sought by the police. He had not returned and had not informed the competent authorities about his stay abroad. He had illegally obtained a passport with the likely intention of travelling to the United States. The court further noted that the applicant was being prosecuted for a robbery committed while on conditional release in connection with a sentence for a similar offence. This reasonably gave rise to the risk that he would re-offend. The court also found that the applicant could influence witnesses: during his stay in Italy, he had intervened in the investigation procedure and had advised potential witnesses. Moreover, the investigator did not hear the applicant, and it could not be excluded that he would influence his co-accused who were not detained on remand. 12. The applicant complained about his detention on remand to the High Court (Vrchní soud). He contended, in particular, that there was no reason to fear that he would abscond or influence witnesses, that he had his permanent residence in the Czech Republic where his family was living and that, in Italy, he had stayed at a known address and had appeared in court during the extradition proceedings. He also submitted that the majority of the witnesses had been heard. He further disputed the Municipal Court’s argument that his previous conviction justified the fear that he would re-offend. 13. On 29 March 1993 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unsubstantiated and found that his detention was legal and justified. It upheld the reasons given by the Municipal Court. 14. Following the request of 29 March 1993 by the Prague Municipal Prosecutor (městský státní zástupce) (hereinafter “the Prosecutor”), on 5 April 1993 the Municipal Court extended the applicant's detention on remand until 6 June 1993. The court held that the detention was still necessary within the meaning of Article 67 (a)-(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It stressed that the court awaited the results of the expert reports, the confrontation of the applicant with his co-accused and the completion of other steps in the investigation. 15. On 14 April 1993 the Municipal Court decided that, according to Article 71(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the time spent in detention pending extradition, i.e. from 6 to 18 February 1993, would not be counted as part of the length of the applicant’s detention on remand. Accordingly, the applicant’s detention on remand started on 18 February 1993 when he was extradited to the Czech Republic. 16. On 2 June 1993 the Municipal Court, upon the Prosecutor’s request, extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 6 July 1993. 17. On 2 July 1993 the Prosecutor indicted the applicant, pursuant Article 234(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code, for robbery before the Municipal Court. He requested the Municipal Court, inter alia, to hear 62 witnesses and to consider further evidence taken during the investigation. At the same time, he requested the court to remand the applicant in custody under Article 67(a)-(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 18. On 20 July 1993 the applicant lodged a request for release claiming that there was no concrete reason for him to remain in custody and that the previous conclusions drawn by the Municipal Court were incomplete or insufficiently justified. On 10 November 1993 the Municipal Court dismissed the request, considering that the reasons for the applicant’s detention on remand, as set out in the earlier decisions, were still relevant. It emphasised that the fear that the applicant would influence witnesses was justified by the existing contradictions between the statements given by the applicant and one of his two co-accused, who was not held in detention on remand. 19. On 17 November 1993 the applicant appealed against this decision, disputing the reasons for his detention on remand and claiming inter alia that four months had elapsed between the introduction of his request for release and the decision of the Municipal Court. 20. The trial before the Municipal Court was held on 13 December 1993, but was adjourned until 29 December 1993 and 28 February 1994, respectively, because one of the defendants and the victims were absent. The hearing on 28 February 1994 was held by a differently constituted chamber which had to recommence the assessment of the evidence. 21. On 3 March 1994 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s further request for release, stating that there was still a risk that the applicant would abscond and considered, therefore, that the applicant’s detention was necessary within the meaning of Article 67(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22. On 10 March 1994 the applicant’s lawyer requested a hearing of further witnesses and the appointment of a medical expert. 23. The trial resumed on 11 April 1994 but was then adjourned until 6 June 1994 because of the absence of some witnesses and the need to repeat the evaluation of numerous elements of evidence. Moreover, the applicant and his co-accused requested the examination of further evidence. 24. On 15 April 1994 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s third request for release submitted on 8 April 1994. The court found that there was still a risk that the applicant would abscond. It referred to the fact that in Italy, when the applicant had become aware that criminal proceedings had been brought against him, he had not informed the Czech authorities of his whereabouts. On 11 May 1994 the applicant appealed against this decision submitting that, when he had become aware that criminal proceedings had been initiated against him, Czech television had portrayed him as a killer, contrary to the presumption of innocence. This had convinced him not to return to the Czech Republic. 25. On 10 June 1994 the Municipal Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment, and the confiscation of his car as well as a sum of CZK 4,372,000. The court found it established that in October 1990 the applicant and his two co-accused had killed two persons and stolen CZK 8,750,000. 26. On 16 January 1995 the High Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the Prosecutor for further investigations. The court considered that the Municipal Court had not established all the relevant facts of the applicant’s case with sufficient certainty. 2.Proceedings leading to the High Court’s decision of 17 February 1997 27. On 26 January 1995 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud), at the High Court’s request of 17 January 1995, extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 30 June 1995 because of the complexity of the investigation. The court recalled that, shortly after the crime, the applicant had absconded to Italy. It further recalled that in the past the applicant had committed a similar offence. It therefore considered his detention necessary, within the meaning of Article 67(a)-(c) of the Code of Criminal Proceedings. 28. On 4 April 1995 the Prague 10 District Court (obvodní soud) dismissed the applicant’s fourth request for release of 8 March 1995, finding that there was a risk of absconding, repetition of offences of the same nature and influencing witnesses. The court recalled that the case had been remitted to the Municipal Prosecutor who would necessarily hear further witnesses whom the applicant could influence, thereby frustrating the investigation of the facts which were of importance for the conduct of the proceedings. The applicant appealed against this decision. He submitted that the Municipal Court had previously stated that there no longer existed specific grounds to believe that he would influence the witnesses or that he would re-offend. He also maintained that the necessity to hear further witnesses could not in itself justify the court’s anxiety that he would influence them and frustrate the criminal proceedings. 29. On 14 April 1995 the investigator ordered a medical examination of the applicant’s mental health and appointed two experts for that purpose. 30. On 3 May 1995 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Prague 10 District Court of 4 April 1995. It found that there was still a suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged. It held that the Municipal Court’s previous finding that there had been no reason for the applicant’s detention under Article 67(a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure related to that particular stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the situation with regard to the evidence had changed, as the High Court had quashed the judgment of the first instance court and had sent the case back to the investigating authorities. Moreover, the fear that the applicant would influence the witnesses was justified by the fact that one of his co-accused (Mr B.) had modified his statement and the court would call a new witness, whose identity was known to the applicant, and whose statement could be necessary for consideration of his guilt. 31. On 14 June 1995 the Supreme Court, upon the Prosecutor General’s (Nejvyšší státní zástupce) request, extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 30 November 1995, upholding the reasons given for the previous extension. 32. On 18 August 1995 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against this decision. He complained under Articles 5 § 3 and 6 § 1 of the Convention about delays in the proceedings and the unreasonable length of his detention on remand. The Constitutional Court apparently rejected the appeal as having been lodged outside the 60 day time-limit, pursuant to the Constitutional Court Act no. 182/1993. 33. On 21 November 1995 the High Court, at the Prosecutor General’s request, extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 31 March 1996, pursuant to Article 71(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that it was necessary to examine further evidence, confirming that all the reasons for detention under Article 67(a)-(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure continued to apply. The court stated that the investigating authorities had not yet been provided with a report by the Czech Commercial Bank or with a statement of a witness in France, taken by French judicial authorities. It further held that the applicant, being a dangerous offender who had already been convicted and sentenced to a heavy prison sentence, could, in case of his release, jeopardise the criminal proceedings. On 20 December 1995 the Supreme Court confirmed this extension. 34. On 16 January 1996 the applicant lodged a second constitutional appeal against the decisions of the High Court on 21 November 1995 and of the Supreme Court on 20 December 1995. He complained in particular that he had been detained for more than two years and that the courts had not dealt with the case fairly when extending his detention on remand. He invoked Article 8 §§ 1, 2 and 5 (personal liberty), Article 36 § 1 (fair trial) and Article 40 §§ 2 and 4 (presumption of innocence) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod) (hereinafter “the Charter”). 35. On 26 March 1996 the High Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 30 June 1996, pursuant to Article 71(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that the reasons for his detention within the meaning of Article 67(a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure continued to exist. The court considered inter alia that, given the legal qualification of the applicant’s offence, he was likely to be sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence. It also recalled that the applicant had already been convicted in the past and, if released, could frustrate the purpose of the present criminal proceedings. It noted that the applicant had frustrated the investigation when he had been in Italy. Even if he had stayed at a known address, he had not been at the disposal of the Czech authorities and his absence had therefore impeded the proceedings. 36. On 4 April 1996 the applicant appealed, disputing the findings of the High Court and claiming, inter alia, that there were no relevant facts justifying his continued detention on remand. On 2 May 1996 the Supreme Court upheld this extension. 37. On 14 May 1996 the applicant introduced a third constitutional appeal against the aforesaid decisions of the High Court and the Supreme Court. He alleged violations of his constitutional rights, in that the reasons for his detention invoked by the courts were not sufficient and relevant. The applicant also alleged that the decisions in question were not based on the real facts of his case. He complained that the detention had lasted unreasonably long. The applicant further pointed out that his previous constitutional appeal had still not been decided by the Constitutional Court. 38. On 31 May 1996 the Prosecutor informed the applicant about the re-assessment of his criminal offence and his new indictment for murder, pursuant to Article 219(1), (2)(a) and (h) of the Criminal Code. 39. On 3 June 1996 the Prosecutor formally indicted the applicant before the Municipal Court. 40. On 5 June 1996 the President of the Municipal Court submitted a request to the High Court for a further extension of the applicant’s detention on remand until 18 February 1997, pursuant to Article 67(a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She stated that the criminal proceedings were at the stage of an indictment, that the chamber dealing with the case would be overburdened until November 1996 and that the case was very complex. 41. On 18 June 1996 the High Court granted the request and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 18 February 1997. The court referred to its decision of 26 March 1996, upheld by the Supreme Court on 2 May 1996, by which the applicant’s detention had been previously extended, recalling that the investigation was very complex and that there was still a risk that the applicant would abscond and re-offend. The court considered that there were no delays in the investigation. 42. On 24 June 1996 the applicant appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court, which dismissed his appeal on 11 July 1996. The court noted that the offence with which the applicant had been charged was punishable by a lengthy prison sentence, and that the applicant’s release would frustrate or hinder the purpose of the criminal proceedings. It recalled that the applicant had absconded from the Czech Republic to Italy, where he had lived illegally. It therefore considered his detention necessary, within the meaning of Article 67(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court further recalled that the applicant had been convicted in the past and concluded that he could re-offend. It therefore held that the applicant’s detention was also necessary, pursuant to Article 67(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court added that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s complaint about the delays in the proceedings, which fell within the sole competence of the President of the Municipal Court. 43. On 30 July 1996 the applicant made a fourth constitutional appeal, this time against the last extension of his detention on remand. 44. On 26 August 1996 the re-trial started before the Municipal Court and it was adjourned on 29 August 1996 until 18 November 1996 because certain witnesses did not appear and the applicant and his co-accused had suggested producing further evidence. Before the adjournment, the applicant requested to be released from custody. 45. On 28 August 1996 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s second constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It noted that the decisions extending the applicant’s detention had always been taken in accordance with the law, and that it was clear from the evidence available that the decisions concerned had always been given on the basis of the facts as they had been established at the relevant period. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the reasons for which the ordinary courts had considered the applicant’s detention on remand necessary. 46. On 3 September 1996 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s request for release of 29 August 1996, considering that his detention was still necessary within the meaning of Article 67(a) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court referred to the applicant’s previous conviction and his avoidance of the criminal prosecution abroad. It also noted that neither the applicant nor his co-accused had given evidence before the court. 47. On 1 November 1996 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against this decision. It noted that there was still a danger that he would abscond and re-offend. The court noted that the decision of the Municipal Court could have been formulated more precisely, but this did not make it unlawful. It recalled that the applicant had been charged, on the basis of the guilty plea of his co-accused, with an offence punishable by a heavy prison sentence, and that the circumstances in which he had left the Czech Republic and stayed successively in Germany and Italy unambiguously proved that he had not been looking for a job but had been trying to avoid the criminal prosecution. The court also recalled that the applicant had entrusted more than CZK 4,000,000 to an acquaintance, bought a car using another person’s identity card, obtained a false passport and tried to get details about the criminal procedure. It further noted that the character of the criminal offence with which the applicant had been charged justified the fear that he would re-offend, and recalled that the offence was committed during the applicant’s probationary period. 48. On 18 November 1996 the trial was resumed before the Municipal Court. It was adjourned on 21 November 1996 until 9 December 1996 because certain witnesses did not appear. 49. On 9 December 1996 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint of bias against the President of the chamber dealing with his case. 50. On 17 December 1996 the Municipal Court convicted the applicant of robbery under Article 234(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code and sentenced him as a very dangerous recidivist, pursuant Article 41(1) of the Criminal Code, to 13 years’ imprisonment and the confiscation of his car. 51. On the same day, the court rejected the applicant’s further request for release. It found that, with reference to the previous decisions concerning the latter’s detention, there was still the risk of his absconding and re-offending. 52. On 15 January 1997 the applicant completed his appeal against the decision of the Municipal Court of 9 December 1996, by which his complaint of bias against the President of the chamber had been dismissed. 53. On 3 February 1997 the High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the Municipal Court’s decision of 17 December 1996, by which his further request for release had been dismissed. The court stated that, having regard to the applicant’s personality and his criminal record, it could not be excluded that, if released, he would abscond and avoid prosecution. It also stated that the applicant’s prosecution for the offence committed during his probationary period justified the fear that he would re-offend. 54. On 10 February 1997 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Municipal Court’s decision of 9 December 1996. 55. On 17 February 1997 the High Court quashed the judgment of the Municipal Court of 17 December 1996 and remitted the case to that court for a new consideration of the case and a decision on the merits. The court considered that the Municipal Court had not properly assessed the evidence produced, had not established all the relevant facts of the applicant’s case and had based its judgment on evidence which had not been before it. The High Court determined what evidence it would be necessary to consider. 56. On 18 February 1997 the applicant was released because of the expiration of the four year maximum permissible period for detention on remand, pursuant to Article 71(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3.Proceedings leading to the High Court’s decision of 1 October 1997 57. On 8 July 1997 the Municipal Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to 13 years’ imprisonment and the confiscation of his car. On 1 October 1997 the High Court quashed this judgment and sent the case back to the Municipal Court ordering that the case should be heard by a different chamber of the Municipal Court. It found, inter alia, that the Municipal Court had not respected the High Court’s decision of 17 February 1997 and had practically copied its previous judgment. 4.Proceedings leading to the High Court’s decision 18 September 1998 58. On 21 January 1998 the third re-trial before a new chamber of the Municipal Court was held. It was adjourned until 3 March 1998. 59. By judgment of 11 March 1998 the Municipal Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to 13 years’ imprisonment and the confiscation of his car. On 18 September 1998 the High Court quashed this judgment and sent the case back to the Prague Municipal Court. 5.Proceedings leading to the Municipal Court’s judgment of 20 January 2000 60. On 20 January 2000 the Municipal Court delivered its fifth judgment convicting the applicant of robbery and sentencing him to 12 years’ imprisonment. The applicant’s appeal is still pending before the appellate court. II.RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 61. Until 31 December 1993, the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure read as follows: Article 67 “An accused person may be remanded in custody only if there exist specific grounds to believe that he or she a) will abscond in order to avoid prosecution or punishment, in particular if his or her identity cannot be immediately established, if he or she has no permanent residence or if he or she is under the threat of a heavy penalty; b) will try to influence the witnesses or co-accused or otherwise frustrate the investigation into the facts which are of importance for the conduct of the proceedings, or c) will carry on the criminal activity for which he or she is prosecuted, will complete an offence attempted by him or her or will commit an offence which he or she was preparing or threatened to commit.” 62. Article 68 provides that only an accused person may be remanded in custody. The relevant decision shall be issued by a court or, at the pre-trial stage, by a judge upon a proposal lodged by the public prosecutor, and it must be justified by the particular circumstances of the case. 63. Under Article 72(2), an accused person is entitled to request his or her release at any time. Decisions on such requests are to be delivered without delay. In case of dismissal, a request for release may be re-introduced after fourteen days, when the dismissal becomes binding, unless it is based on different reasons. 64. As of 1 January 1994 the Code of Criminal Procedure was revised, its Article 67 continuing in effect, except for a slight modification to paragraph (b), as follows: “An accused person may be remanded in custody only if there exist specific grounds to believe that he … b) will try to influence the witnesses or co-accused who have not yet been heard by the court or otherwise frustrate the investigation into the facts which are of importance for the criminal proceedings, … .” 65. Pursuant to Article 71(1), the competent authorities shall give priority to cases involving a person’s detention on remand and shall deal with them as speedily as possible. 66. Article 71(3) provides that a person’s detention on remand shall not exceed two years. If, because of the complexity of the matter or for other serious reasons, it is not possible to complete the criminal proceedings within this period, and if the release of the accused person would jeopardise or substantially complicate achieving the aim of the proceedings, the High Court may extend the detention for the necessary period. 67. Under Article 71(4), a person’s detention on remand shall not exceed three years. In cases of particularly serious offences, within the meaning of Article 41(2) of the Criminal Code, the maximum permissible period of a person’s detention on remand is four years. FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT 68. The Government asked the Court to find that the facts of the case disclose no breach of the Convention. 69. The applicant requested the Court to find a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and to make an award of just satisfaction under Article 41. AS TO THE LAW I.ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION 70. The applicant maintained that his detention on remand had been unreasonably long and that he should have been released pending the trial. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention which provides, so far as relevant, as follows: “Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this article … shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.” Right to trial within a reasonable time 1.Period to be taken into consideration 71. The Court may examine under Article 5 § 3 the length of the applicant’s detention between 6 February 1993 and 10 June 1994, i.e. from the moment when he was arrested in Italy, in respect of the criminal proceedings brought against him in the Czech Republic, until the delivery of the first Municipal Court’s judgment. It may also examine the applicant’s detention on remand between 16 January 1995 and 17 December 1996, i.e. from the moment when the High Court quashed the first judgment delivered by the Municipal Court until the latter delivered its second judgment, and between 17 and 18 February 1997, i.e. from the moment when the High Court quashed the second judgment given by the Prague Municipal Court until the applicant’s release (see the B. v. Austria judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 175, pp. 15-16, § 39). Accordingly, the detention to be taken into consideration lasted three years, three months and seven days. 2.Reasonableness of the length of detention 72. The applicant contended that the national authorities had failed to establish any sufficient grounds reasonably permitting a suspicion of his having committed an offence. 73. The Government maintained that the reasons invoked in the relevant decisions were sufficient and that the detention did not exceed the maximum period permissible under Czech law. 74. The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the length of the detention must be assessed in each case according to its special features. Continued detention may be justified in a given case only if there are clear indications of a genuine public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweigh the right to liberty. 75. It falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to examine the circumstances for or against the existence of such an imperative interest, and to set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions, and of the facts established by the applicant in his appeals, that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. 76. The persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but after a certain lapse of time it no longer suffices: the Court must then establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings (see, for example, the Assenov v. Bulgaria judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑VIII, p. 3300, § 154, and the I.A. v. France judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII, p. 2978, § 102). 77. The Court notes that the applicant was charged with complicity in a robbery during which two persons were killed. The national investigation authorities heard a certain Mr B. who had stated that he, the applicant and another person had decided to rob these people at the apartment of one of them. In these circumstances, the Court considers that there existed a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed an offence. 78. As to the grounds for continued detention, the domestic courts relied on the complexity of the investigation, the danger that the proceedings would be obstructed if the applicant were released due to the risk of his absconding, influencing witnesses and repeating offences of the same nature. 79. As regards the risk of the applicant’s absconding, the Czech courts noted, in particular, that the applicant had left the country although he had known that criminal proceedings had been initiated against him and that he was sought by the police. He had not returned to the Czech Republic and had not informed the competent authorities about his stay abroad. The circumstances in which he had left the country and stayed successively in Germany and Italy, unambiguously proved that he had not been looking for a job but had been trying to avoid the criminal prosecution. Moreover, the applicant had entrusted more than CZK 4,000,000 to an acquaintance, bought a car using another person’s identity card, obtained a false passport and tried to get details about the criminal proceedings. The national courts also noted that, given the legal qualification of the applicant’s offence, he was likely to be sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence. In the Court’s view, this reasoning is “sufficient” and “relevant” and it outweighs the arguments put forward by the applicant based on his claim to have left the country to find a job, and his permanent residence in the Czech Republic where he was living with his family. 80. Having reached this conclusion, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the other grounds for the applicant’s detention invoked by the domestic courts. 81. As regards the conduct of the proceedings by the national authorities, the Court notes that almost four months elapsed between remanding the applicant in custody and filing the indictment on 2 July 1993. The Government do not explain the length of this period. 82. Over five more months then elapsed between the filing of the indictment and the first trial hearing before the Municipal Court on 13 December 1993. Subsequently, the Municipal Court adjourned four other hearings because of the absence of certain participants to the proceedings and the request by the applicant and one of his co-accused to have further evidence examined. As a result, it delivered its first judgment after a period of six months. 83. The High Court subsequently quashed the judgment of 10 June 1994 on the ground that the Municipal Court had not established all the relevant facts of the applicant’s case with sufficient certainty. 84. The Municipal Court delivered its second judgment after a delay of another twenty-three months. The length of this period does not appear, as such, to be excessive as the Municipal Court held and adjourned three main hearings for different procedural reasons, such as the non-appearance of certain witnesses, and requests by the applicant and his co-accused for the hearing of further witnesses and the production of further evidence. Moreover, the national authorities were faced with difficulties in obtaining evidence from the French judicial authorities, namely the statement of a witness living in France, and from the Czech Commercial Bank. 85. The Municipal Court delivered its second judgment on 17 December 1996. It was quashed by the High Court on 17 February 1997, i.e. two months later, on the grounds that the Municipal Court had not properly assessed the evidence produced, had not established all the relevant facts of the case, and had based its judgment on evidence which had not been before it. The High Court determined what evidence it would be necessary to consider. The next day the applicant was released as the maximum length of detention permitted by law expired. 86. Nevertheless, having regard to the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Court finds that “special diligence” was not displayed in the conduct of the proceedings. 87. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention as a result of the length of the applicant’s detention on remand. II.APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 88. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A.Damage 89. The applicant originally claimed DEM 440,000 (CZK 8,052,000), which he subsequently reduced to DEM 286,000 (CZK 5,233,800), as compensation for the length of his detention on remand. This amount included compensation for the applicant’s loss of earnings (CZK 324,000), calculated on the basis of average wages in the Czech Republic between 1993 and 1997, and compensation for his health, psychological and social injuries which, according to the applicant, could not be objectively assessed. 90. The Government opposed these claims, arguing that they were unjustified and unsubstantiated. They also maintained that the calculation of loss, on the basis of average salary, was not relevant in the present case. 91. The Court notes that the fifth judgment of the Municipal Court of 20 January 2000, by which the applicant was convicted of robbery and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, has not yet become final as the applicant’s appeal against this judgment is still pending before the appellate court. It cannot, therefore, be said that the length of the applicant’s detention pending trial was deducted from his sentence. In these circumstances, and even assuming that the applicant did not have permanent employment in the Czech Republic when he was arrested and detained on remand, the Court considers that there is a certain causal link between the violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention found and the sums claimed by the applicant to compensate for his loss of earnings. The Court awards the applicant, on an equitable basis, CZK 100,000 as compensation for pecuniary damage. 92. The Court further considers that the finding of a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant. B.Costs and expenses 93. The applicant claimed payment of the costs and expenses he had incurred before the Czech courts (CZK 60,000) and the Court (CZK 6,000). He presented the relevant documents in this respect. 94. The Government made no comment on these claims. 95. The Court recalls that in order for costs and expenses to be recoverable under Article 41 of the Convention, it must be established that they were actually and necessarily incurred, and reasonable as to quantum (see, among other authorities, the Nikolova v. Bulgaria judgment of 25 March 1999, to be published in the Court’s official reports, § 79). 96. The Court is satisfied that the applicant’s claim is established and accordingly awards the applicant the total sum of CZK 66,000. C.Default interest 97. According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in the Czech Republic at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 10% per annum. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY 1.Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention; 2.Holds (a)that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final according to Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts: (i) 100,000 (one hundred thousand) Czech crowns in respect of pecuniary damage, (ii) 66,000 (sixty six thousand) Czech crowns for costs and expenses, (b)that simple interest at an annual rate of 10% shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement; 3.Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant; 4.Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 June 2000, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. S. DolléJ.-P. CostaRegistrarPresident

THIRD SECTION CASE OF STEPANOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA (Applications nos. 44388/17 and 3 others - see appended list) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 28 June 2018 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Stepanov and Others v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Alena Poláčková, President,Dmitry Dedov,Jolien Schukking, judges,and Liv Tigerstedt, Acting Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 7 June 2018, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in applications against Russia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table. 2. The applications were communicated to the Russian Government (“the Government”). THE FACTS 3. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 4. The applicants complained of the inadequate conditions of their detention. In applications nos. 44497/17 and 60480/17 the applicants also raised complaints under Article 13 of the Convention. THE LAW I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 5. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 6. The applicants complained principally of the inadequate conditions of their detention. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 7. The Court notes that the applicants were kept in detention in poor conditions. The details of the applicants’ detention are indicated in the appended table. The Court refers to the principles established in its case‑law regarding inadequate conditions of detention (see, for instance, Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 90‑94, ECHR 2000‑XI, and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 139‑165, 10 January 2012). It reiterates in particular that extreme lack of space in a prison cell or overcrowding weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings (see, amongst many authorities, Karalevičius v. Lithuania, no. 53254/99, §§ 36‑40, 7 April 2005). 8. In the leading case of Sergey Babushkin v. Russia, no. 5993/08, 28 November 2013, the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case. 9. Having examined all the material submitted to it, as well as the Government’s objection concerning the six-month requirement in relation to application no. 60480/17, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court rejects the Government objection of six months in application no. 60480/17, considering the applicant’s situation to be of a “continuous” nature (see Benediktov v. Russia, no. 106/02, § 31, 10 May 2007), and finds that in the instant case the applicants’ conditions of detention as described in the appended table below were inadequate. 10. These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED CASE-LAW 11. In applications nos. 44497/17 and 60480/17, the applicants also submitted complaints under Article 13 of the Convention. These complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other ground. Accordingly, they must be declared admissible. Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that they also disclose violations of the Convention in the light of its findings in Sergey Babushkin, cited above, §§ 38-45. IV. REMAINING COMPLAINTS 12. In applications nos. 44497/17 and 63056/17, the applicants also raised other complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. 13. The Court has examined the applications listed in the appended table and considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 14. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 15. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Sergey Babushkin v. Russia, (just satisfaction), no. 5993/08, 16 October 2014, and Mozharov and Others v. Russia, no. 16401/12 and 9 others, 21 March 2017), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table. 16. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, 1. Decides to join the applications; 2. Declares the complaints concerning the inadequate conditions of detention and the other complaints under well-established case-law of the Court, as set out in the appended table, admissible and the remainder of the applications nos. 44497/17 and 63056/17 inadmissible; 3. Holds that these complaints disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention concerning the inadequate conditions of detention; 4. Holds that there has been a violation of the Convention as regards the other complaints raised under well-established case-law of the Court (see appended table); 5. Holds (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 June 2018, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Liv TigerstedtAlena Poláčková Acting Deputy RegistrarPresident APPENDIX List of applications raising complaints under Article 3 of the Convention (inadequate conditions of detention) No. Application no. Date of introduction Applicant name Date of birth Representative name and location Facility Start and end date Duration Inmates per brigade Sq. m. per inmate Number of toilets per brigade Specific grievances Other complaints under well-established case-law Amount awarded for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses per applicant (in euros)[1] 44388/17 25/05/2017 Stepan Sergeyevich Stepanov 03/08/1988 IK-34 Krasnoyarsk Region 15/04/2015 to 17/05/2017 2 year(s) and 1 month(s) and 3 day(s) 1.3 m² Overcrowding, lack of privacy for toilet. 5,000 44497/17 13/06/2017 Natalya Vasilyevna Zhorzhesko 02/01/1974 Vinogradov Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kostroma IK-8 Kostroma Region 24/08/2011 to 19/05/2017 5 year(s) and 8 month(s) and 26 day(s) 100 inmate(s) 0.6 m² Infestation of cell with insects/rodents, overcrowding, lack of or insufficient physical exercise in fresh air, lack of or insufficient electric light, sharing cells with inmates infected with contagious disease, poor quality of food, lack of privacy for toilet, no or restricted access to shower. Art. 13 - lack of any effective remedy in respect of inadequate conditions of detention. 5,000 60480/17 04/08/2017 Yuriy Nikolayevich Lobynev 09/07/1987 Egle Denis Sergeyevich Krasnoyarsk IK-15 Norilsk 14/11/2011 to 22/12/2016 5 year(s) and 1 month(s) and 9 day(s) IK-17 Krasnoyarsk Region 22/12/2016 to 03/03/2017 2 month(s) and 10 day(s) 180 inmate(s) 0,25 m² 6 toilet(s) 220 inmate(s) 0,45 m² 5 toilet(s) Lack of fresh air, lack of or inadequate hygienic facilities, lack of privacy for toilet, no or restricted access to shower, no or restricted access to toilet, overcrowding; Inadequate temperature, lack of fresh air, lack of or inadequate hygienic facilities, lack of privacy for toilet, no or restricted access to shower, no or restricted access to toilet, overcrowding, poor quality of food. Art. 13 - lack of any effective remedy in respect of inadequate conditions of detention. 5,000 63056/17 14/08/2017 Grigoriy Vladimirovich Larionov 17/03/1966 IK-5 Kirov Region 15/11/2016 to 15/03/2017 4 month(s) and 1 day(s) IK-5 Kirov Region 28/03/2017 to 03/08/2017 4 month(s) and 7 day(s) 1 m² 1 m² No or restricted access to potable water, poor quality of potable water, no or restricted access to shower, no or restricted access to warm water, inadequate temperature, lack of or insufficient physical exercise in fresh air, infestation of cell with insects/rodents, lack of fresh air, lack of or poor quality of bedding and bed linen, overcrowding. See above. 3,900 [1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

THIRD SECTION CASE OF ABDULKHADZHIYEVA ANDABDULKHADZHIYEV v. RUSSIA (Application no. 40001/08) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 4 October 2016 FINAL 30/01/2017 This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Abdulkhadzhiyeva and Abdulkhadzhiyev v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Luis López Guerra, President,Helen Keller,Dmitry Dedov,Branko Lubarda,Pere Pastor Vilanova,Alena Poláčková,Georgios A. Serghides, judges,and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 6 September 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in an application (no. 40001/08) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Russian nationals, Ms Malika Abdulkhadzhiyeva (“the first applicant”) and Mr Ramzan Abdulkhadzhiyev (“the second applicant”), on 29 July 2008. 2. The applicants were represented by Mr I.Y. Timishev, a lawyer practising in Nalchik, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights. 3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that in October 1999 they had been wounded by State servicemen and that the authorities had failed to effectively investigate the matter. 4. On 8 November 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5. The applicants were born in 1953 and 1957 respectively and live in the village of Savelyevskaya, in the Naurskiy District of the Chechen Republic. The second applicant is the first applicant’s brother-in-law. 6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. The events of 8 October 1999 1. Background information 7. At the material time, a counterterrorist campaign – involving intense military clashes between federal troops and local rebels – was taking place in the Chechen Republic. The law-enforcement bodies and the courts were not functioning. Upon the arrival of the military in Savelyevskaya, the local residents did not flee but remained in their homes. The village and the area around it were under the control of federal troops that were stationed in the vicinity. 8. At the beginning of October 1999 the outskirts of the village came under artillery fire, which forced the residents to seek the military’s permission to evacuate their cattle. 2. Wounding of the applicants 9. After permission to evacuate the cattle was obtained, on 8 October 1999 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 8 October 2000), at around noon, the applicants and their neighbours, Mr R.M. and Mr M.R., arrived at the agreed spot at a copse of trees next to Savelyevskaya and approached the Russian federal servicemen who were stationed in the vicinity. The servicemen agreed to let them pass through to the field where their cattle were pastured to retrieve them. However, after the applicants, Mr R.M. and Mr M.R., had walked about several dozen metres away in the direction of the pasture, the servicemen opened fire on them. As a result, both applicants received wounds to the upper extremities (верхние конечности) and fell on the ground. Having witnessed the attack, a civilian, Mr D., tried to approach the servicemen, but was shot dead in the presence of the applicants and Mr M.R. Meanwhile, Mr R.M. managed to crawl away and inform the local authorities about the incident. 10. Both applicants and Mr M.R. remained on the ground for several hours; each time they tried to get up they were subjected to gunfire. Then three military servicemen approached, blindfolded them and took them to the premises of military unit no. 54262. In the meantime, after Mr R.M. informed the authorities of the incident, the head of the local administration, Mr Kh.S., arrived at the military unit, spoke to the servicemen and had the detainees released. As a result of the injuries she had sustained during the attack the first applicant was left with a permanent disability of the third degree. 11. The applicants’ cattle remained under the control of the servicemen and were never returned. According to the first applicant, as a result of the incident she lost sixteen head of cattle and the second applicant four head of cattle. In November 1999, after military unit no. 54262 had changed its stationing location from the vicinity of Savelyevskaya to a site elsewhere, the applicants and their relatives found the remains of seven cows whose meat had been consumed by the military unit; nine head of cattle were missing completely. 12. In July 2000, as soon as the local law-enforcement bodies had begun functioning again in their district, the applicants lodged an official complaint in respect of the events of 8 October 1999 with the local police (see paragraph 15 below). Towards September 2000 the law-enforcement bodies in other parts of Chechnya started to function again. 13. In support of their account of the events of 8 October 1999 the applicants furnished the Court with statements from witnesses Mr M.R. and Mr R.M., both dated 10 July 2008. 14. The Government did not contest the applicants’ account of the attack against them on 8 October 1999 and the loss of their cattle, but stressed that the perpetrators had not been identified. In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application of 9 April 2012, they stated, in particular, the following: “... the damage to the applicants’ health occurred as a result of unidentified persons opening fire on them on 8 October 1999 in the village of Savelyevskaya in the Naurskiy District. After the shooting the unidentified persons stole cattle belonging to the applicants ...” 3. The official investigation and related court proceedings (a) The official investigation 15. On 17 July 2000 the first applicant complained in writing of the infliction of bodily injuries and the theft of her livestock to the Naurskiy district temporary department of the interior (Наурский Временный Отдел Внутренних Дел) (hereinafter “the Naurskiy VOVD”). 16. In her complaint she described the circumstances of the attack and stated, in particular, that she had been wounded by military servicemen, who had then blindfolded her and taken her and two other men to the premises of their military unit. She further stated that after her release the cattle had remained in the hands of the military and that all her efforts to recover them had been to no avail. 17. On 20 July 2000 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who stated that on 8 October 1999 she, the second applicant and Mr M.R. had gone to the pasture where cattle had been grazing, including a number of cows belonging to her. On the way there, at around noon, she had seen one of her cows lying shot and dying on the ground. The first applicant had approached her cow, but had been stopped by a group of military servicemen in light-coloured camouflage uniform, armed with machine guns, standing next to an armoured personnel carrier (hereinafter “the APC”). The first applicant had asked for their permission to drive the cattle home; one of the servicemen had gone to the APC and spoken to someone on the radio. After that he had returned and said that the applicants and Mr M.R. could proceed and collect their cattle. The applicant had walked just several metres away when she and her two companions had been subjected to gunfire, as a result of which she had been wounded in the left arm and the second applicant in the right arm. They had fallen to the ground and stayed there for about three to five hours; each time they had tried to get up, shots had been fired in their direction. Then three military servicemen had approached them, ordered them to put their hands behind their heads, blindfolded them and taken them in the APC to the premises of military unit no. 54262. The applicant provided the investigators with a detailed description of those three servicemen’s appearance. At the military unit the applicants had been given medical assistance. The applicant had asked the unit commander to drive her cattle over to pasture land lying closer to the village. The commander had promised to do that but he had not kept his promise and her cattle had gone missing. Then the head of the village administration had arrived and taken the applicants and Mr M.R. home. The applicant provided the investigators with a detailed description of the unit commander. She further stated that after the military unit had left the place where it had been stationed, she had gone to the field and found an envelope with the address of one of the servicemen who had been stationed there and that she still had the envelope and could provide it to the investigators. Subsequently the unit commander, Vadim, had visited her at home with a nurse to assist with the treatment of her wounded arm. Between August 1999 and February 2000 the applicant had not been able to seek official medical assistance, as hospitals in Chechnya had not been functioning. In February 2000, when the local hospital had resumed its activities, she had gone there and sought medical assistance for her wounded arm; she had stayed in the hospital for one month but had been left with a disability. 18. On 20 July 2000 the investigators questioned the second applicant and Mr M.R., both of whom stated that on 8 October 1999 they and the first applicant had gone out to drive their cattle home. On their way to the pasture they had met military servicemen who had given them permission to take their cattle home. However, after they and the applicant had then walked a dozen metres away from the servicemen the latter had opened fire. The first applicant had fallen to the ground, bleeding. Then the second applicant and Mr M.R. had screamed, asking the servicemen to stop firing, but to no avail. As a result, the second applicant had been shot in the upper extremities. Then they had fallen to the ground and after several hours had been found by the servicemen and taken to the military unit. 19. On 12 October 2000 the Naurskiy VOVD opened criminal case no. 30471 on account of the infliction of minor bodily injuries on the applicants (Article 112 § 2 of the Criminal Code). The decision stated: “... on 8 October 1999 during the day unidentified persons intentionally inflicted bodily injuries on [the applicants] ...” 20. On 20 October 2000 the investigators granted the first applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned her again. She reiterated her earlier statement (see paragraph 17 above) and added that the unit commander’s name had been Vadim and that he had had the rank of lieutenant-colonel. She also provided a detailed description of her disappeared cattle and reiterated that as a result of the incident she had lost sixteen cows. 21. On 20 October 2000 the investigators seized the envelope found by the applicant on the former premises of the military unit (see paragraph 17 above). 22. On 23 October 2000 the investigators granted the second applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned him again. His statement was similar to that of the first applicant (see paragraph 17 above). In addition, he stated that after the servicemen had taken him, the first applicant and Mr M.R. to the military unit’s premises, they had provided him with medical assistance for his wounded arm and that the unit commander, a lieutenant-colonel named Vadim, had given him his apologies for his soldiers’ actions. Subsequently, the officer had visited him at home with a nurse to assist with the treatment of his wounds, as the local hospitals had not been functioning at that time. The second applicant also provided the investigators with a detailed description of his four cows, which had disappeared as a result of the incident. 23. On 24 October 2000 the investigators granted Mr M.R. victim status in the criminal case and questioned him. His statement concerning the incident was similar to the ones given by the applicants (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). In addition, he provided a detailed description of the three servicemen who had approached him and the applicants after the shooting. He also stated that the commander’s name had been Vadim and that his military rank had been that of lieutenant-colonel. Two days after the events, on 10 October 1999, he had gone to the place of the incident and found the corpses of two of his cows, which had been shot. Two other cows had gone missing. 24. On 24 October 2000 the investigators questioned two of the first applicant’s neighbours, Ms S.G. and Ms P.Kh., both of whom stated that they had not witnessed the incident in October 1999, but that they had been told that the first and second applicants had been shot and wounded by the military servicemen and one man had been shot dead by them and that as a result of the incident the applicants’ cattle had been lost. 25. On 30 October 2000 an expert examination ordered by the investigator took place; the examination identified the scars on the first applicant’s left forearm as likely to have resulted from a perforating firearms wound in the circumstances described by her and categorised them as bodily harm of “medium gravity”. 26. On the same day, 30 October 2000, the second applicant was also examined by the expert. The examination identified the scars on his right forearm and the fingers of the left hand as likely to have resulted from perforating firearms wounds and categorised them as bodily harm of “minor gravity”. 27. On 20 and 23 October 2000 respectively both applicants were granted victim status in the criminal case. The relevant decisions stated, amongst other things, that: “... on 8 October 1999 unidentified persons ... inflicted bodily injuries on [the applicants] and stole [their] cattle ...” 28. Two months later, on 12 December 2000, the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed of that suspension. 29. On an unspecified date between January 2001 and May 2005 the first applicant complained to a supervising prosecutor about the delays in the investigation. On 29 July 2005 the Naurskiy VOVD replied to the complaint, stating that the investigation had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 30. On an unspecified date in 2005, the first applicant also lodged an official complaint about his lack of access to the investigation file. On 28 December 2005 the Naurskiy district prosecutor’s office (hereinafter “the district prosecutor’s office”) replied to her, stating that she could access the file only upon the completion of the criminal investigation. 31. In 2005 the first applicant lodged several complaints about the delays in the investigation with the Prosecutor General’s office, which forwarded them to the district prosecutor’s office. The complaints remained unanswered. 32. It appears that as a result of the first applicant’s complaints, the investigation was resumed on 18 January 2006 and the applicants were informed accordingly. 33. On 28 January 2006 the investigators examined the envelope seized from the first applicant (see paragraph 21 above). As a result, the name and the address of officer B. (to whom it had been sent at an address in the town of Kostroma) were established. 34. On 6 February 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene in the vicinity of the village of Savelyevskaya. No evidence was collected. 35. On 20 February 2006 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the ones she had given previously (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above). 36. On 22 February 2006 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who reiterated his earlier statements (see paragraphs 18 and 22 above). In addition, he stated that the body of the man who had been shot dead during the incident had been recovered by the villagers about a week after the events and buried shortly afterwards. 37. On 22 February 2006 the investigators questioned Mr Z. Kh., who stated that in October 1999 he had assisted in negotiating the applicants’ and Mr M.R’s release from the premises of the military unit. Mr Z. Kh. stated that he did not know what military unit it was. 38. On 22 February 2006 the investigators questioned Mr Kh.S., who stated that since 1999 he had been the head of the local administration. His statement was similar to those given by the applicants. In addition, he stated that the commander of the military unit had promised to drive the cattle back to the village, but that this had not happened. 39. On 22 February 2006 the investigators again questioned Mr M.R., whose statement was similar to the ones he had previously given (see paragraphs 18 and 23 above). 40. On 26 February 2006 the investigators terminated the investigation of criminal case no. 30471 because of the expiry of the time-limits for prosecution under Articles 78 and 112 of the Criminal Code. 41. On the same date (26 February 2006) the investigators refused (in the light of the expiry of the time-limit) to initiate a new criminal investigation into the injuries sustained by the applicants on 8 October 1999. 42. On 17 March 2006 investigators in Kostroma questioned officer B., who stated that in October 1999 he had been serving in military unit no. 54262, which had been stationed in the Naurskiy District, Chechnya. He had no information concerning the attack on the applicants and had no idea who had been the commander of the military unit at the material time. Officer B. stated that in December 2000 (while he had been in Chechnya) he had been questioned about the incident, but he could not remember by whom and under what circumstances. 43. On 26 April 2008 the head of the Naurskiy VOVD overruled the decision to terminate the criminal investigation as unsubstantiated and premature and ordered that the proceedings be reopened and the case file be transferred to another law-enforcement body, in accordance with the rules of jurisdiction. The reasoning for the decision stated, inter alia, the following: “... The investigation established that an unidentified person had opened fire and wounded in the arm [the first and the second applicants], causing them medium and minor gravity bodily harm, respectively [...] ... it was also established that unidentified persons had committed the theft of sixteen cows belonging to [the applicants] and of two cows belonging to Mr M.R. On 26 February 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was terminated for failure to identify the perpetrators. The examination of the contents of the criminal case file demonstrated that the victims [the applicants] had been shot at with firearms, from a distance ... and the location of their wounds showed that life-threatening damage could have been caused to them ... In addition, according to the information in the case file, Mr D. had been shot and killed on the spot in [the applicants’] presence. In the light of the above, the investigation of the criminal case failed to establish in full whether an attempt on the lives of [the applicants] had been made by the unidentified persons who [were responsible for] their gunshot wounds ...” 44. On 29 April 2008 the re-opened criminal case file no. 30471 was forwarded to the Naurskiy Inter-district Investigations Department of the Chechnya Prosecutor’s office (hereinafter “the investigations department”) for investigation. 45. On 7 May 2008 the investigations department refused to institute criminal proceedings, noting that: “... [the applicants] had been injured in non-vital parts of their bodies, which was confirmed by expert examinations. Therefore, there are no grounds for thinking that the alleged perpetrators intended to commit ... ‘attempted murder’,.. as argued by [the applicants] ...” The decision did not mention anything about the applicants’ cattle. 46. On 14 May 2008 the investigations department adopted a decision terminating the investigation in criminal case no. 30741 because of the expiry of the time-limits for prosecution. 47. From the documents submitted it appears that on 10 July 2008 the supervising prosecutor overruled the above decision to terminate the criminal investigation as unsubstantiated and premature. 48. On 14 March 2012 the deputy Chechnya district prosecutor overturned the investigations department’s decision of 7 May 2008 to refuse to open a criminal case (see paragraph 45 above) as unlawful and unsubstantiated. The applicants were informed thereof. 49. On the same date (14 March 2012) the deputy Chechnya prosecutor also ordered that the criminal case file be sent to the Chechnya Investigations Committee for further investigation. The decision criticised the investigators’ failure to take basic steps and stated, amongst other things, the following: “... at the same time, the investigation established that the shooting had been aimed at them [the applicants, Mr M.R., Mr R.M. and Mr D.] and had been carried out with automatic firearms simultaneously, from the same place next to the forest; as a result [the applicants] had received gunshot wounds of varying gravity and [Mr D.] had been shot dead. Therefore, the above information provides grounds for concluding unequivocally that the unidentified person had the clear intention of killing [the applicants and Mr D.]; ... thus, the actions of the unidentified person should be deemed to constitute murder under parts 1 and 2 (subparagraph “a”) of Article 105 of the Russian Criminal Code, and the case file in respect of criminal case no. 30471 should be transferred to the Chechnya Investigations Committee for investigation and joined with criminal case no. 60012 [concerning the killing of Mr D.]. In addition, up until the present, no request for information concerning the exact place where military unit no. 546262 was stationed has been sent. Neither has any request for information concerning the possible stationing of a military unit next to Savelyevskaya in the Naurskiy District been forwarded. The military commander of the Naurskiy District, officer A.S. Kalugin, has not been questioned about the circumstances of the incident.” 50. As can be seen from the documents submitted, the investigation is still pending. (b) Proceedings against the investigators 51. On 12 April 2008 the first applicant lodged a complaint before the Naurskiy District Court (hereinafter “the District Court”) challenging the decision of 26 February 2006 to terminate the investigation. She argued, inter alia, that she had been both the target of an attempted murder and a victim of theft and asked for the case to be transferred to the Military Prosecutor’s Office for a proper investigation. 52. On 26 April 2008, shortly before the scheduled start of the first-instance court hearing (see paragraph 43 above), the prosecutor quashed the decision of 26 February 2006 and as a result, by a decision of 28 April 2008 the District Court rejected the first applicant’s complaint as groundless. 53. On 19 June 2008 each applicant lodged a complaint before the District Court challenging the investigations department’s refusal of 7 May 2008 to initiate a criminal investigation. 54. On 10 July 2008 the District Court rejected the complaints, as the impugned decision had already been quashed earlier on the same date (see paragraph 47 above). 55. On an unspecified date between January and March 2009 the applicants lodged a complaint before the District Court about the defects in the investigation and the investigators’ failure to act with expedition. 56. On 8 April 2009 the District Court examined and partly rejected their complaint. It ruled that the investigators could only be criticised for their failure to inform the applicants in a timely manner about the procedural decisions in the criminal case. The decision stated, among other things, the following: “... the court has no legal rights to impose obligations on the investigation bodies concerning the order and direction of the conduct of the investigation. ... The complaint should be allowed only in part and only in so far as the investigator ... failed to inform [the applicants] in a timely manner about the decisions taken in the case ...”. 57. On 13 May 2009 this decision was upheld by the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic on appeal. II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 58. For a summary of the relevant domestic law and the relevant Council of Europe documents, see Abakarova v. Russia, no. 16664/07, §§ 59-62 and §§ 68-70, 15 October 2015. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION 59. The applicants complained that the attack of 8 October 1999 constituted a violation of their right to life. They also alleged that no effective investigation of the incident had been carried out, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” A. The parties’ submissions 1. The Government 60. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to appeal against the decision to suspend the investigation of 12 December 2000, that they had remained passive during the subsequent suspension of the proceedings and that they had lodged their complaint with excessive delay. Therefore, the applicants had failed to demonstrate due diligence and to comply with the six-month requirement. 61. In the same submission, the Government also argued that the complaint was premature, as the criminal investigation – conducted in compliance with the national legislation – was still in progress. The applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as they had not appealed before the domestic courts against the investigators’ actions and omissions. 62. The Government further argued that the complaint should be dismissed as manifestly ill-founded and unsubstantiated, as there was no proof that the perpetrators of the attack on the applicants had been State agents. 2. The applicants 63. The applicants submitted that they had complied with the six‑month rule as they had done everything possible to assist the authorities with the investigation and that there been no excessive delays in the submission of their application to the Court. 64. The applicants further alleged that the only remedy in their case – the criminal investigation – had proved to be ineffective. They stated that – contrary to the Government’s submission – they had complained about the inactivity of the investigators before the domestic courts, but to no avail. 65. The applicants alleged that the perpetrators of the attack on them had been State servicemen and that the use of lethal force against them had been unjustified. B. The Court’s assessment 1. Admissibility 66. A summary of the principles concerning compliance with the six‑month rule in cases involving violations of Article 2 allegedly perpetrated by military servicemen may be found in Kukavica v. Croatia (dec.), no. 79768/12, §§ 19-25, 2 June 2015 and, mutatis mutandis, Sultygov and Others v. Russia, nos. 42575/07, 53679/07, 311/08, 424/08, 3375/08, 4560/08, 35569/08, 62220/10, 3222/11, 22257/11, 24744/11 and 36897/11, §§ 369‑74, 9 October 2014. 67. Turning to the circumstances of the case at hand, the Court notes that the criminal investigation was pending when the applicants lodged their application with the Court and is still in progress. The applicants complained about the events in question to the authorities in July 2000 – that is to say shortly after the law-enforcement bodies in the Chechen Republic had begun functioning again – and that was not contested by the Government. Furthermore, shortly after the beginning of the investigation in October 2000, the applicants provided detailed statements to the investigators, underwent expert medical examinations and handed over the piece of evidence found by the first applicant (see paragraphs 17 and 21 above). The steps taken by the authorities must have appeared to the applicants as a promising start to the investigation into the attack on them. However, from the documents submitted it can be seen that the investigation was suspended on 12 December 2000 and that the applicants were not informed of that suspension. Further, the documents submitted indicate that – unaware that the investigation had been suspended – on several occasions in 2005 (including in July 2005) the first applicant tried to obtain information on the progress of the proceedings; the documents further indicate that that upon her requests for information and access to the investigation file proceedings in respect of the criminal case were resumed in January 2006 (see paragraphs 29-32 above). Therefore, considering that the applicants lodged an offical complaint without undue delay and that they demonstated an active stance in the proceedings, the Court does not find that the lack of progress in the criminal proceedings during their five-year suspension should be held against the applicants or interpreted as a failure on their part to demonstrate due diligence and to comply with the six-month requirement (see, by contrast, Nasirkhayeva v. Russia (dec.), no. 1721/07, 31 May 2011, and Kukavica, cited above, §§ 5-6 and 32). 68. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicants complied with the six-month time-limit. 69. As to the Government’s non-exhaustion plea, the Court considers that the question of whether the applicants exhausted domestic remedies is closely linked to the question of whether the domestic authorities carried out an effective investigation into their allegations. These issues relate to the merits of their complaint under Article 2 of the Convention. The Court therefore decides to join these issues to the merits, which are to be examined below, and declares the complaint admissible. 2. Merits (a) Alleged violation of the right to life 70. At the outset, the Court should address the issue of the applicability of Article 2 of the Convention to the present case. It is true that the applicants did not lose their lives in the attack, but the Court has held before that the requirements of Article 2 apply to an attack where the victim survives but which, because of the lethal force used, by its very nature put his or her life at risk (see Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, §§ 49‑55, ECHR 2004‑XI; Makhauri v. Russia, no. 58701/00, § 117, 4 October 2007; Nakayev v. Russia, no. 29846/05, § 58, 21 June 2011; and Sašo Gorgiev v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 49382/06, § 29, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Having regard to the circumstances of the attack on the applicants and the injuries sustained by them, the Court concludes that the degree and type of force used clearly bring the facts of the present case into the ambit of Article 2 of the Convention. 71. The Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention, which safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances where deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention. In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2 of the Convention, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, §§ 146‑50, Series A no. 324; Andronicou and Constantinou v. Cyprus, 9 October 1997, § 171, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VI; and Oğur v. Turkey [GC], no. 21594/93, § 78, ECHR 1999‑III). The same applies to an attack where the victim survives but which, because of the lethal force used, amounted to attempted murder (see Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00, § 171, 24 February 2005, with further references). 72. It is not disputed by the parties that on 8 October 1999 the applicants were the victim of an attack during which they were wounded and one person killed. The Government did not dispute the circumstances of the incident but denied that State servicemen had been responsible for the incident. At the same time, the Government did not put forward any alternative version of the events or suggest that the exceptions set forth in the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention could be applicable in the present case. The question remains as to whether the respondent State may be held responsible for this attack. 73. The Court notes in this connection that the applicants and at least two other persons, Mr R.M. and Mr M.R., were subjected to gunfire by the servicemen and that from the very beginning of the official investigation all of them were consistent in their allegation of an attack by military servicemen and provided a detailed description of the perpetrators and their military unit (see paragraphs 17, 18, 20, 22 and 23 above). As can be seen from the documents submitted, the forensic reports corroborated the applicants’ allegations (see paragraphs 25 and 26 above); further the domestic investigators must have accepted the applicants’ submissions because they attempted to take (albeit unsuccessfully) some steps to identify the military unit that had been stationed in Savelyevskaya at the relevant time (see paragraphs 21, 33, 42 and 49 above). 74. Furthermore, the Government did not deny that federal military troops had been stationed at the place in question at the material time and did not dispute the circumstances of the incident. They submitted, however, that it had been impossible to establish the identity of the perpetrators of the attack (see paragraphs 14 and 49 above) and that the allegation of the involvement of State agents in the attack was groundless. At the same time, in their submission the Government did not advance any explanation for the events or any other version of the incident. 75. The Court observes that all of the witnesses questioned by the investigators supported the applicants’ version of the events (see paragraphs 18, 23, 24, 37 and 37 above). Moreover, from the documents submitted it does not appear that the investigators made any attempts to identify other witnesses to the attack, such as the servicemen who had driven the applicants in the APC to the premises of the military unit after the wounding or the nurse who had tended their injuries (see paragraphs 17 and 22 above). 76. In such circumstances, the Court accepts the applicants’ argument that they were attacked in the circumstances described by them and considers that the applicants have made a prima facie case that State servicemen attempted to kill them on 8 October 1999 in Savelyevskaya. 77. In the absence of any justification put forward by the Government in respect of the use of lethal force by their agents, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive limb. (b) Alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation 78. The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force (see Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014/05, §§ 169-82, 14 April 2015). The authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure evidence concerning such an incident. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 301, ECHR 2011). What form of investigation will achieve the purposes of Article 2 of the Convention may vary depending on the circumstances. However, whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion once a matter has come to their attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next of kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the conduct of any investigative procedures (Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721/07, § 165, ECHR 2011). 79. The Government submitted that the official investigation into the incident of 8 October 1999 had been carried out in accordance with the national legislation and that the applicants could have appealed before domestic courts against the investigators’ actions and omissions, but had failed to do so. In any event, the effectiveness of the investigation had been largely undermined by the lateness of the submission of their complaint – eight months after the attack had occurred – which had impeded the investigation into the incident. 80. The Court observes that it is uncontested by the Government that at the material time and at least until July 2000 the law-enforcement bodies in the Chechen Republic were not functioning due to violent confrontations between the federal armed forces and rebel fighters (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above). There was a delay of eight months between the attack on the applicants and their lodging of an official complaint in July 2000, when the relevant authorities resumed their functioning (see paragraph 15 above). It is for the Court to assess whether the delay hampered the progress of the proceedings and affected their effectiveness. 81. The Court observes that once the complaint was lodged on 17 July 2000, a few days later – on 20 July 2000 – the police questioned the applicants, who gave detailed statements about the attack and the loss of their livestock, described the military servicemen and named the witnesses to the events. However, the criminal investigation into the incident was only initiated almost three months later, on 12 October 2000. Within the following couple of weeks, the investigators obtained from the applicants and from Mr M.R. a detailed description of the alleged culprits and the piece of evidence found by the first applicant and carried out an expert examination of the wounds the applicants had sustained as a result of the attack (see paragraphs 20-26 above). However, in December 2000, without any examination of the crime scene or the evidence obtained and without questioning key witnesses such as Mr Kh.S. (who had negotiated the applicants’ release from the military unit) or any attempt to establish the identity of the lieutenant-colonel named Vadim – the proceedings were suspended; and the applicants were not informed of that suspension. It appears that – being unaware proceedings had been suspended – the applicant lodged requests for information with the investigators and that those efforts to obtain information galvanised the investigators into resuming the suspended proceedings in January 2006; basic steps were taken, such as an examination of the crime scene (see paragraphs 29-31 above). Considering the inactivity on the part of the investigators after the initiation of the official investigation in 2000 and the fact that they took important steps only several years after the events, it is doubtful that the delay of eight months in the lodging of the complaint with the authorities could have hampered the investigation to such an extent as to undermine its overall progress. Moreover, the Court also notes that a number of important steps were taken only after the applicants spurred on the proceedings (see paragraphs 32 and 43 above) and reiterates in this connection that the authorities cannot leave it to the initiative of the next of kin to conduct an investigative procedure (see Al-Skeini and Others, cited above, § 165). 82. The Court further notes the criticism of the investigation by the supervisory authorities (see paragraphs 43 and 49 above) and the Court’s findings concerning the ineffectiveness of investigations into similar incidents in which applicants were wounded by State servicemen in the region at the material time (see, for example, Goncharuk v. Russia, no. 58643/00, § 82, 4 October 2007; Makhauri, cited above, § 125; and Umayeva v. Russia, no. 1200/03, § 81, 4 December 2008). 83. Turning to the Government’s non-exhaustion plea, the Court notes that the applicants, contrary to the Government’s submission, did lodge complaints before domestic courts challenging the investigators’ decisions (see paragraphs 51-57 above) and that their complaints were rejected as groundless in the light of the quashing of the impugned decisions just prior to their judicial examination (see paragraphs 52 and 54 above) or the inability of the court to order which steps the investigators were to take (see paragraph 56 above). In such circumstances, the remedy referred to by the Government was incapable of remedying shortcomings in the criminal investigation and was therefore ineffective. 84. The Court concludes that the applicants should be considered to have exhausted the domestic remedies available to them within the context of the criminal investigation. It therefore dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection in this respect. 85. The Court finds on the basis of what has been established above that the authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the circumstances of the applicants’ wounding. There has therefore been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION 86. The applicants complained of the loss of their cattle as a result of the incident of 8 October 1999. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention provides, in particular: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. ...” A. The parties’ submissions 87. The Government submitted that the complaint should be declared inadmissible for the applicants’ failure to exhaust domestic remedies within the criminal investigation. In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, the Government stated that “after the attack on [the applicants] unidentified persons had stolen the applicants’ cattle” but that the investigators had not established the identity of the perpetrators and that the applicants should have appealed before the domestic courts against the investigators’ actions. 88. The applicants argued that they had lodged complaints before the domestic courts challenging the investigators’ decisions and that the attackers had deprived them of their property, in breach of the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. B. The Court’s assessment 1. Admissibility 89. The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the applicants’ complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. Further, the Court has already found that the Government’s objection concerning the alleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies should be joined to the merits of the complaint (see paragraph 69 above). The complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention must therefore be declared admissible. 2. Merits 90. As to the Government’s objection that the applicants failed to exhaust available domestic remedies, the Court points out that on several occasions the applicants reported the events of 8 October 1999 to the domestic authorities and mentioned, in particular, the seizure of their cattle by military servicemen (see paragraphs 15-18 above). In the absence of any domestic findings of State responsibility for the alleged attack on the applicants and the seizure of their cattle, the Court is not persuaded that the court remedy referred to by the Government was accessible to the applicants and would have had any prospects of success (see Betayev and Betayeva v. Russia, no. 37315/03, § 112, 29 May 2008, and Khutsayev and Others v. Russia, no. 16622/05, § 151-55, 27 May 2010). The Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must, therefore, be dismissed. 91. The Court further notes that the information concerning the loss of the cattle was communicated promptly to the domestic law-enforcement authorities and that the latter considered the actions of the perpetrators as theft (see paragraphs 27 and 43 above). Further, it observes that although the Government denied their responsibility for the alleged violations of the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, they conceded that the perpetrators of the attack had taken the applicants’ cattle (see paragraphs 14, 27 and 43 above). In their submission to the Court, the Government neither questioned the applicants’ title to the livestock nor disputed the circumstances of its seizure, as submitted by the applicants; they only denied State responsibility for it. 92. In the light of the fact that the Court has already found above that the men who attacked the applicants on 8 October 1999 were State servicemen, it therefore finds that the loss of the applicants’ cattle was imputable to the respondent State. Accordingly, there was an interference with the applicants’ right to respect for the protection of their property. 93. In the absence of any justification on the part of the State for its agents’ actions in that regard, the Court finds that there has been a violation of the applicants’ right to protection of property, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION 94. The applicants complained that they had been deprived of effective remedies in respect of the aforementioned violations, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which provides: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A. The parties’ submissions 95. The Government contended that the applicants had had effective remedies at their disposal, as required by Article 13 of the Convention, and that the authorities had not prevented them from using those remedies. The applicants had had an opportunity to challenge any acts or omissions on the part of the investigating authorities in court. In sum, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention. 96. The applicants reiterated their complaint. B. The Court’s assessment 1. Admissibility 97. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. 2. Merits 98. The Court reiterates that in circumstances where, as here, a criminal investigation has been ineffective and the effectiveness of any other remedy that might have existed has consequently been undermined, the State has failed in its obligation under Article 13 of the Convention (see Umayeva, cited above, § 103). 99. Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 2 of the Convention. 100. As to the applicants’ complaint under Article 13 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the Court considers that given that the authorities denied involvement in the attack on the applicants and the taking of their cattle and that the domestic investigators failed to effectively investigate the matter, the applicants did not have access to any effective domestic remedies in respect of the alleged violations of their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation on that account. IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 101. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Pecuniary damage 102. The first applicant claimed 480,000 Russian roubles (RUB), about 12,000 euros (EUR) for the loss of sixteen head of cattle, that is RUB 30,000 per head, and RUB 33,200,000 (about EUR 830,000) in lost profits in respect of the cattle. The second applicant claimed RUB 120,000 (about EUR 3,000) for the loss of four head of cattle, that is RUB 30,000 per head, and RUB 11,670,000 (about EUR 292,000) in lost profits in respect of the cattle. The applicants’ calculations were based on their own estimate of the value of the livestock and projections concerning potential income from breeding. No other documents, other than calculation sheets, were enclosed. 103. The Government submitted that the applicants’ claim for pecuniary damages was not supported by any documents and invited the Court to reject it as unsubstantiated. 104. Having regard to its conclusions above under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and the parties’ submissions, the Court awards EUR 12,000 to the first applicant and EUR 3,000 to the second applicant in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on these amounts. B. Non-pecuniary damage 105. The first applicant claimed EUR 50,000 under this head. In support of her claim, she enclosed a translation of a medical statement dated 3 November 2004 certifying that she suffered from permanent disability of the third degree. The second applicant claimed EUR 40,000 under this head. 106. The Government stated that the finding of a violation would constitute adequate satisfaction in the applicants’ case, but submitted that any award should be determined on an equitable basis. 107. The Court observes that it has found a violation of the procedural and substantive limbs of Article 2 and a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. The Court accepts that the applicants have suffered non‑pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated solely by the finding of violations. It awards the first applicant EUR 30,000 and the second applicant EUR 10,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. C. Costs and expenses 108. The applicants did not make any claim under this head. D. Default interest 109. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, 1. Decides to join to the merits the Government’s objection as to non‑exhaustion of criminal domestic remedies and dismisses it; 2. Declares the application admissible; 3. Holds that there has been a substantive violation of Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the applicants; 4. Holds that there has been a procedural violation of Article 2 of the Convention; 5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; 6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of the alleged violations of Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; 7. Holds (a) that the respondent State is to pay, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the date of settlement: (i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the first applicant in respect of pecuniary damage; (ii) EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the second applicant in respect of pecuniary damage; (iii) EUR 30,000 (thirty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the first applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (iv) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, to the second applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points; 8. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 October 2016, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Stephen PhillipsLuis López GuerraRegistrarPresident

SECOND SECTION CASE OF MUSTAFA AND ARMAĞAN AKIN v. TURKEY (Application no. 4694/03) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 6 April 2010 FINAL 06/07/2010 This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Mustafa and Armağan Akın v. Turkey, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: Françoise Tulkens, President,Ireneu Cabral Barreto,Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,Danutė Jočienė,András Sajó,Nona Tsotsoria,Işıl Karakaş, judges,and Sally Dollé, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 16 March 2010, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in an application (no. 4694/03) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Turkish nationals, Mr Mustafa Akın and Mr Armağan Akın (“the applicants”), on 6 January 2003. 2. The applicants were represented by Ms Leyla Hülya Tuna, a lawyer practising in İzmir. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent. 3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that a domestic court decision, which prevented the second applicant from seeing his younger sister, had infringed their right to respect for their family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. 4. On 22 January 2008 the President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 3). THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5. The applicants were born in 1957 and 1988 respectively and live in Ödemiş. 6. On 30 September 1999 the first applicant's wife instituted divorce proceedings and asked for the custody of their two children; Armağan (the second applicant) and his younger sister Damla who was born in 1993. 7. The Ödemiş Civil Court of First Instance (“the Ödemiş Court”) granted the couple's divorce on 23 June 2000. Having regard to the “parties' incomes and the ages of the two children”, the Ödemiş Court awarded custody of Armağan to the first applicant and that of Damla to her mother. It also decided that the parents would exchange the children between 1 and 15 February every year, during the month of July and for a total period of four days during the two religious holidays. 8. On 30 November 2000 the first applicant requested the Ödemiş Court to grant an interim measure to the effect that he would have both children one weekend and his ex-wife would have them the next. This way, he argued, the children would not lose contact with each other and he would have the opportunity to spend every other weekend with both his children. This request was rejected on 19 December 2000 by the Ödemiş Court which considered that its decision concerning the custody issue had been correct. 9. The appeal lodged by the applicant against the Ödemiş Court's decision of 23 June 2000 was rejected by the Court of Cassation on 8 December 2000. A request made by the first applicant for a rectification of that decision was rejected on 8 February 2001. 10. On 11 September 2001 the first applicant brought a court case on behalf of his son and on his own behalf against his ex-wife. He claimed that although he and his son were living in the same town and very close to his ex-wife and his daughter, the decision of the Ödemiş Court had prevented the two children from seeing each other and him from spending time with both his children. This, he claimed, was causing irreversible psychological problems for the children. Even when the children saw each other in the street they were prevented from talking to each other by their mother. He requested that the children be able to see each other every weekend. He also asked the court to order his ex-wife to pay maintenance to him in respect of Armağan. 11. The Ödemiş Court refused the applicants' requests on 1 February 2002. It held that, although diligence had to be shown to satisfy the needs of the parents and their children and to improve the ties between them, ordering Damla to spend every weekend with her father would mean a continual change of environment for her and would confront her with variations in discipline. 12. The applicants appealed and referred in their appeal to a number of decisions of the Court of Cassation. According to those decisions, the applicable law and procedure required domestic courts to ensure that access arrangements do not prevent the children of divorced parents from seeing each other. The applicants maintained that ensuring this was a matter for a court of law to consider of its own motion. They also argued that the children's best interests should be given paramount importance. They drew the Court of Cassation's attention to the fact that the two siblings had not seen each other for two years. 13. The appeal was rejected by the Court of Cassation on 29 April 2002 which considered that the Ödemiş Court had “adequately examined the evidence available to it and that its conclusion had been in accordance with the applicable legislation”. A subsequent rectification request lodged by the applicants was rejected on 15 July 2002. In their request for rectification the applicants submitted that the two children had not seen each other for almost three years and that their request for rectification was their last chance of seeing each other. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 14. The applicants complained that the decision of the domestic court preventing the two children from seeing each other infringed their right to respect for their family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his ... family life,... 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 15. The Government contested that argument. A. Admissibility 16. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 17. The applicants argued that the domestic court's decision amounted to an unjustified interference with their right to respect for their family life, Moreover, in reaching their decisions the domestic court had failed to observe and protect the best interests of the two children. 18. The Government were of the opinion that the decisions adopted by the domestic courts had not prevented the two siblings from seeing each other; as the children were living in the same neighbourhood, contact was possible. In any event, if the applicants' requests had been accepted by the domestic courts, Damla would have spent one weekend with her mother and the next weekend with her father. This, in the opinion of the Government, would have adversely affected her development. 19. The Court considers at the outset that there can be no doubt that a bond amounting to family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention exists between the parents and the children born from their marriage-based relationship, as is the case in the present application. Such a natural family relationship is not terminated by reason of the fact that the parents separate or divorce, as a result of which the child ceases to live with one of its parents (see Cılız v. the Netherlands, no. 29192/95, § 59, ECHR 2000‑VIII and the cases cited therein). Likewise, the Court considers that family life within the meaning of the same provision also exists between the second applicant Armağan and his sister Damla, with whom he lived in the same house until the divorce of his parents in 2000 (see, inter alia, Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1), 24 March 1988, § 81, Series A no. 130). Noting, in any event, that the existence of a family life in the instant case is not disputed by the parties, the Court will proceed to examine whether the applicants' right to respect for their family life has been adequately protected. 20. The Court reiterates that the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public authorities. There are in addition positive obligations inherent in effective “respect” for family life. However, the boundaries between the State's positive and negative obligations under this provision do not lend themselves to precise definition. The applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see Tuquabo-Tekle and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 60665/00, § 42, 1 December 2005). 21. In the present case the Court considers that the decision of the Ödemiş Court separating the two siblings constituted an interference with the applicants' right to respect for their family life. It not only prevented the two siblings from seeing each other, but also made it impossible for the first applicant to enjoy the company of both his children at the same time. Having regard to the facts of the present application, and in particular the fact that the domestic courts have been requested on a number of occasions by the applicants to reconsider their decisions, the Court deems it more appropriate to examine whether the respondent State complied with its positive obligation and whether its authorities acted with a view to maintaining and developing the family ties. 22. In its examination the Court will take into account its case-law under Article 8 of the Convention, which emphasises the authorities' obligation to have regard to the best interests of the child (see Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638/03, § 82, 23 June 2008). Moreover, an assessment of the quality of the decision-makıng process requires the Court to establish whether the conclusions of the domestic authorities had a sufficient evidentiary basis (including, as appropriate, statements by witnesses, reports by competent authorities, psychological and other expert assessments and medical notes) and whether the interested parties, including the children themselves, were able to express their views (see, for example, Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic, no. 23499/06, § 62, 21 June 2007; Haase v. Germany, no. 11057/02, § 97, ECHR 2004‑III (extracts)). 23. The Court notes at the outset that the custody of the second applicant and his younger sister was determined by the Ödemiş Court of its own motion; neither parent had requested the judge to make such a determination. In fact, the mother had asked the Ödemiş Court for the custody of both children (see paragraph 6 above). The Court is thus struck by the absence of reasoning justifying the separation of the children. 24. The Government submitted that the decisions adopted by the domestic courts had not prevented the two siblings from seeing each other because the children were living in the same neighbourhood and it was thus possible for them to keep in contact. The Court cannot accept that argument and considers that maintaining the ties between the children is too important to be left to the discretion and whim of their parents. Indeed, it is not disputed by the Government that the children were prevented by their mother from even speakıng to each other when they saw each other in the street. 25. On two occasions the applicants made pertinent submissions to the Ödemiş Court and argued that the access arrangements was rupturing the family ties between them and Damla (see paragraphs 8 and 10). They also submitted that the situation was causing irreversible psychological problems for the children. The Ödemiş Court was informed about the mother's uncooperative behaviour. Nevertheless, it concluded that regulating contact between the applicants and Damla in the way sought by the applicants would mean “a continual change of environment for her and would confront her with variations in discipline”. 26. The Court cannot concur with that conclusion for a number of reasons. Firstly, it notes that no explanation was given by the Ödemiş Court as to exactly how and why allowing the two siblings to spend time together every weekend would confront Damla with variations in discipline or would amount to an unacceptable change of environment, especially given the fact that they lived in the same neighbourhood. In the alternative, even if it deemed the access arrangements proposed by the applicants to be unsuitable, it would have been possible for the Ödemiş Court to consider other methods of access between the two children and thus uphold their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 27. Neither did the Ödemiş Court seek to differentiate the case from those of the Court of Cassation's previous decisions which had been relied on by the applicants in support of their submissions and from which it appears that the established practice of the judiciary in Turkey is to ensure that contact between the children of divorced couples is maintained (see paragraph 12 above). Moreover, the Court observes that the Ödemiş Court did not only fail to seek the opinion of the children but also failed to base its decision on any evidence, such as psychological and other expert assessments, despite the fact that it was informed by the applicants that the situation had been causing them psychological problems. 28. Neither can the Court accept the Government's argument that allowing Damla to spend every other weekend with her father would have adversely affected her development, in the absence of solid evidence in support of that submission, such as the psychological or other expert assessments referred to in the preceding paragraph. At this juncture the Court reiterates that, contrary to the Government's submission, the mutual enjoyment by parents and children of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (see Kutzner v. Germany, no. 46544/99, § 58, ECHR 2002‑I and the cases cited therein). 29. The Court also observes with regret that, despite the importance of the case it had before it, in its decision rejecting the appeal the Court of Cassation did not address the two detailed submissions made by the applicants which included references to its own case-law concerning the need for siblings to keep in contact (see paragraphs 12-13 above) but merely held that the Ödemiş Court had “adequately examined the evidence available to it and that its conclusion had been in accordance with the applicable legislation”. 30. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the domestic courts' handling of the applicants' case, during which they failed to have due regard to the best interests of the family, fell short of the State's positive obligation. There has therefore been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLE 5 OF PROTOCOL No. 7 TO THE CONVENTION 31. The applicants complained that different conclusions reached by different courts were not compatible with Article 6 of the Convention. They also argued that the inability of the children to see each other, and that ordering the first applicant to pay maintenance to his ex-wife in respect of his daughter because he was a male, was discriminatory within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention and infringed their rights under Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention. 32. The Court has examined these complaints. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 33. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 34. The applicants claimed 13,352 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. This amount represented the first applicant's unsuccessful claim for maintenance payments from his ex-wife in respect of his son Armağan (see paragraphs 10-11 above). The applicants also claimed the sum of EUR 80,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In support of this latter claim the applicants submitted medical reports showing that they had received treatment for depression. 35. The Government submitted that the claim in respect of pecuniary damage had no basis. Concerning the claim for non-pecuniary damage, the Government suggested that, after Damla reaches the age of eighteen, she will be able to have contact with other members of her family. 36. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, deciding on an equitable basis, it awards the applicants jointly the sum of EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. B. Costs and expenses 37. The applicants also claimed EUR 1,796 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 5,882 for the fees of their legal representative before the Court. In support of their claims the applicants submitted various bills and a fee agreement with their representative. 38. The Government considered that the expenses relating to the domestic proceedings could not be claimed under this head. As for the applicants' claim for their costs and expenses before the Court, the Government submitted that they were not supported by any documentary evidence. 39. According to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In response to the Government's argument concerning the costs and expenses relating to the proceedings at the national level, the Court reiterates that, if it finds that there has been a violation of the Convention, it may award the applicant the costs and expenses incurred before the national courts for the prevention or redress of the violation (see Société Colas Est and Others v. France, no. 37971/97, § 56, ECHR 2002-III, and the cases cited therein). In the present case the applicants brought the substance of their Convention rights, that is their right to respect for their family life, to the attention of both the first-instance court and the appeal court. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicants have a valid claim in respect of part of the costs and expenses incurred at the national level. 40. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,500, covering costs under all heads. C. Default interest 41. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY 1. Declares the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible; 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; 3. Holds (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants jointly, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 2,500 (two thousand five hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, to be converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable on the date of settlement; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; 4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 April 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Sally DolléFrançoise TulkensRegistrarPresident

THIRD SECTION CASE OF VRBANEC v. SLOVENIA (Application no. 33549/02) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 1 June 2006 FINAL 01/09/2006 This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Vrbanec v. Slovenia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of: MrJ. Hedigan, President,MrB.M. Zupančič,MrL. Caflisch, MrV. Zagrebelsky,MrE. Myjer,MrDavid Thór Björgvinsson,MrsI. Ziemele, judges,and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 11 May 2006, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1. The case originated in an application (no. 33549/02) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mrs Marija Vrbanec (“the applicant”), on 11 June 2001. 2. The applicant was represented by the Verstovšek lawyers. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr L. Bembič, State Attorney-General. 3. The applicant alleged under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings before the domestic courts to which she was a party was excessive. In substance, she also complained about the lack of an effective domestic remedy in respect of the excessive length of the proceedings (Article 13 of the Convention). 4. On 7 September 2004 the Court decided to communicate the complaints concerning the length of the proceedings and the lack of remedies in that respect to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time. 5. In accordance with Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar informed the Croatian Government of their right to submit written comments. On 20 February 2006 they informed the Court that they did not wish to exercise their right to intervene in the instant case. THE FACTS 6. The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Nedelišče. 7. On 29 November 1981 the applicant was injured in a car accident which was caused by V.D. 8. On 16 May 1988 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against V.D. in the Celje Basic Court, Velenje Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Celju, Enota v Velenju), seeking damages for the injuries sustained. On 24 March 1994 the court upheld the applicant’s claim in part. On 28 June 1994 the Convention entered into force with respect to Slovenia. On 29 June 1994, forward to the applicant’s appeal of 20 April 1994, the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju) quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on 17 August 1994. 9. Further to the reorganisation of the Slovenian judicial system, the case was transferred to the Celje District Court (Okrajno sodišče v Celju) on 30 December 1994. On 13 February 1997 the judge to whom the case had been assigned was promoted and the case was consequently reassigned to a new judge. Between 6 September 1994 and 2 June 1999 the applicant lodged three preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence. A hearing was held on 3 June 1999. On 30 June 1999 the court delivered a judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 7 December 1999. 10. On 22 December 1999 V.D. appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). On 4 July 2001 the court dismissed the appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 29 August 2001. THE LAW I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION 11. The applicant complained about the excessive length of the proceedings. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...” 12. In substance, the applicant further complained that the remedies available for excessive legal proceedings in Slovenia were ineffective. Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A. Admissibility 13. The Government pleaded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 14. The applicant contested that argument, claiming that the remedies available were not effective. 15. The Court notes that the present application is similar to the cases of Belinger and Lukenda (Belinger v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 42320/98, 2 October 2001, and Lukenda v. Slovenia, no. 23032/02, 6 October 2005). In those cases the Court dismissed the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies because it found that the legal remedies at the applicant’s disposal were ineffective. The Court recalls its findings in the Lukenda judgment that the violation of the right to a trial within a reasonable time is a systemic problem resulting from inadequate legislation and inefficiency in the administration of justice. 16. As regards the instant case, the Court finds that the Government have not submitted any convincing arguments which would require the Court to distinguish it from its established case-law. 17. The Court further notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. Article 6 § 1 18. The period to be taken into consideration began on 28 June 1994, the day when the Convention entered into force with respect to Slovenia, and ended on 29 August 2001, the day the Celje Higher Court’s judgment was served on the applicant. Given that the case was remitted for re-examination on 29 June 1994, the Court will consider that the proceedings lasted about seven years and two months for two levels of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in order to assess the reasonableness of the length of time in question, the Court will have regard to the stage reached in the proceedings on 28 June 1994 (see, among other authorities, Humen v. Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, § 59, 15 October 1999). 19. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 20. Having examined all the material submitted to it, and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable-time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. 2. Article 13 21. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156, ECHR 2000-XI). It notes that the objections and arguments put forward by the Government have been rejected in earlier cases (see Lukenda, cited above) and sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. 22. Accordingly, the Court considers that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 13 on account of the lack of a remedy under domestic law whereby the applicant could have obtained a ruling upholding her right to have her case heard within a reasonable time, as set forth in Article 6 § 1. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 23. Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A. Damage 24. The applicant claimed 22,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 25. The Government contested the claim. 26. The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards her EUR 4,800 under that head. B. Costs and expenses 27. The applicant also claimed approximately EUR 1,450 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 28. The Government argued that the claim was too high. 29. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to reimbursement of her costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum. The Court also notes that the applicant’s lawyers, who also represented the applicant in Lukenda (cited above), lodged nearly 400 applications which, apart from the facts, are essentially the same as this one. Accordingly, in the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court. C. Default interest 30. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY 1. Declares the application admissible; 2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; 3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention; 4. Holds (a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,800 (four thousand eight hundred euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable; (b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; 5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 1 June 2006, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Vincent BergerJohn HediganRegistrarPresident

" \n \n \nFOURTH SECTION\n \n \n \n \nCASE OF ELORANTA v. FINLAND\n \n(Application no. 4799/03)\n \n(...TRUNCATED)

" \n \nFIRST SECTION\n \n \nCASE OF VOLKOVA AND BASOVA v. RUSSIA\n \n \n(Application no. 842/02)\n \(...TRUNCATED)

" \n \nFOURTH SECTION\n \n \n \n \n \n \nCASE OF M.M. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM\n \n(Application no. 240(...TRUNCATED)