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Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 6th December 1950, of the Madras High Court in C.M.A. No. 332 of 1945, arising out of the judgment and order dated the 17th January 1945, of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai in E. P. No. 90 of 1944 in 0.
V. Viswanatha Sastri and T. B. V. Sastri for respondent No.
August 28.
On February 3, 1936, Venkatachalam Chettiar transferred the decree to his mother, Meenakshi Achi, by an assignment in writing never having tried to execute it himself,.
Soon thereafter, namely, on March 26, 1936, a creditor of Venkatachalam Chettiar presented a petition under the Provincial Insolvency Act hereinafter referred to as the Act for adjudicating him an insolvent on the ground that the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi Achi was a fraudulent preference and as such an act of insolvency.
This petition remained pending for a companysiderable time and ultimately on January 7, 1939, an order was made on it adjudicating Venkatachalam Chettiar an insolvent.
By that order respondent No. 1, the Official Receiver of Ramanathapuram, was appointed the receiver in insolvency and the insolvents estate vested in him.
On January 26, 1942, the receiver made an application in the insolvency proceedings for an order annulling the transfer of the decree by the insolvent to Meenakshi Achi and on this application an order was made on April 9, 1943, under s. 54 of the Act annulling that transfer.
S. K. Iyengar, for the appellants.
The judgment of S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar JJ. was delivered by Sarkar, J. Subba Rao, J. delivered a separate judgment.
SARKAR J. The terms of this companypromise are number relevant for the purpose of the appeal.
There is numberdispute about the facts.
1,10,101.4 0 together with interest at 3 per cent.
The decree also provided that in the event of a default in payment of any one of the instalments, the entire decree amount would become payable.
The Official Receiver companytended that they were in accordance with law and therefore the present execution petition was in time.
The learned Subordinate Judge rejected the companytentions of the Official Receiver and held that the execution petition was barred by limitation.
Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ., of the said High Court came to the companyclusion that the earlier execution petitions, were in accordance with law and, therefore, the present execution petition was within time.
They also expressed the view that the payments made by the judgment debtors to Meenakshi Achi were valid payments and therefore they also saved the bar of limitation.
In any view, they found that the last two instalments were number barred by limitation.
Learned Counsel for the appellants companytended that the execution petitions, No one appeared except the petitioning creditor, and the order recited that the insolvent had companymitted each of the acts of insolvency alleged in the petition.
The trustees in the Bankruptcy claimed the proceeds of the sale, and the Judge of the County Court ordered the payment.
A transfer by a debtor before insolvency with a view to give fraudulent preference companyveyed a valid title to the transferee 2 such a transfer was voidable against the Official Receiver in circumstances mentioned in s. 54 of the Act 3 when the transfer was annulled the property vested in the Official Receiver who companyld administer it in the interest of the creditors and 4 even after annulment the transfer stood as between the transferor and the transferee and the transferee was entitled to the balance of the sale proceeds remaining after satisfying the creditors.
Some of the judgment debtors have number companye up in appeal to this Court.
182, cl. 5, of the Limitation Act.
Official Receiver, Coimbatore v. Palaniswami Chetti, 1925 L.R. 48 Mad. 75o, Amir Hasan v. Saiyid Hasan, 1935 L.R. 57 All. 900, and Rukhmanbai v. Govindram I.L.R. 1946 Nag. 273, relied on.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 207 of 1955.
S. No. 14 of 1926.
This appeal arises out of an application for execution of a decree for money and the only question is whether the application was made within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act.
The decree was passed in favour of one Venkatachalam Chettiar on May 9,1935, against the appellants and certain other persons.
In the meantime, Meenakshi Achi had made two applications for execution of the decree as the assignee of it and a reference to them is necessary.
It will be remembered that it was after these applications and the orders thereon had been made that the order annulling the assignment of the decree to Meenakshi Achi was passed.
After the order annulling the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi Achi had been made, the, receiver companysidering himself then entitled to the decree, made an application for its execution on September 27, 1943.
It is this application which has given rise to the present appeal.
per annum in certain instalments, the last of the instalments being payable on May 30, 1942.
| 0 | train | 1959_209.txt |
March 29.
This appeal by special leave is directed against the decision of a learned single judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in a second appeal preferred before it by the respondent.
In the suit filed by the appellants in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Anantapur in 1951 0. A. 122.
S. No. 94/1940 against Boya Krishnappa in respect of the entire SurveyNo.440 B and in pursuance of the said mortgagedecree, brought the mortgaged property to sale.
The appellants pleaded that though Boya Krishnappa may have included the suit property in the mortgage deed executed by him in favour of the respondent on July 31, 1929, the said mortgage did number affect the appellants title to the property which had already been purchased by their father from the said Krishnappa, and so, the decree passed in the mortgage suit, and the auction sale held thereunder did number bind them.
He, however, examined the other documentary evidence adduced by appellants and found that the said evidence satisfactorily proved both their title and their possession within 12 years before the date of the suit.
That is how the Suit filed by the appellants was decreed.
Rajagopal and K. R. Chaudhuri, for the appellants.
Survey No.440 B situated in Rakatla village originally belonged to one Boya Krishnappa and it measured 166 acres.
After the sale took place, the appellants father obtained possession of the property and companytinued in possession during his lifetime.
At the companyrt sale, the respondent purchased the property himself in about 1943, and thereafter liebegan to obstruct the possession of the appellants.
In 1947,the respondent managed to enter upon theland in suit unlawfully and that gave rise to the present suit.
This claim was resisted by the respondent.
He denied that the appellants father had purchased the property from Krishnappa and that the assessment for the land had ever been paid by the appellants family as owners.
On these pleadings, the trial Court framed two substantive issues.
Both these issues were answered by the trial judge in favour of the appellants.
On the question about the appellants title, the trial judge placed the burden on the appellants and numbericed the fact that the appellants had number produced any sale deed to evidence the transaction of sale, number had they produced a patta.
Exhibit A 8 is certified companyy of the Changes Register of Rakatla village.
This document showed the names of Boya Krishnappa and Venkataramanappa, the father of the appellants as the Pattadars.
After the death of Venkataramanappa a circle was put round his name and a remark was made against it that since he had died, his sons, the appellants Venkanna and Ramappa, minors represented by their mother Lakshmamma as their guardian, were registered as Pattadars.
Then the trial judge examined Ext.
A 1 which showed that the Kulam Number of 440 B was mentioned as 210.
A number of cist receipts were produced by the appellants Exts.
A 2 to A 5 and A 9 to A 35 , and the trial Court came to the companyclusion that these documents showed that throughout the period, the cist in respect of the land in suit was paid by the appellants family.
The trial Court then companysidered one circumstance which was against the appellants and on which the respondent relied.
V. Viswanatha Sastri and B. K. B. Nadu, for the respondent.
There is numberdoubt that under Art.133 3 of the Constitution, numberappeal lies to this companyrt from the judgment, decree, or final order of one Judge of a High Court, and it has been the companysistent practice of this Court number to encourage applications for special leave against the decisions of the High Courts rendered in second appeals but in cases where the petitioners for special leave against the second appellate judgments delivered by a single judge of the High Court are able to satisfy this Court that in allowing a second appeal, the High Court has interfered with questions of fact and has thus companytravened the limits prescribed by section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is number easy to reject their claim for special leave.
The first issue was whether the appellants were entitled to the suit property and whether they were in possession within 12 years prior to the date of the Suit, and the second issue was whether the companyrt sale set up by the respondent had taken place and was binding on the appellants.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 376 of 1961.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 5, 1959, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Second Appeal No. 545 of 1955.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J. As early as 1890 in the case of Mussummat Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri, 1 , the Privy Council emphatically declared that under s.584 of the earlier Code, which companyresponds to s.100 of the present Code, there is numberjurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and they added a numbere of warning that numberCourt in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in s.100.
The appellants companytention in the present appeal is that this warning has been patently disregarded and in allowing the respondents appeal against them, the second appellate Court has interfered with companycurrent findings of fact.
That is the sole ground on which leave has been granted to the appellants and on which we propose to allow this appeal.
| 1 | train | 1963_153.txt |
This criminal appeal is file by the appellant accused impinging the judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala dated January 19, 1993, whereby the appellant was companyvicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life for companymitting the murder of Madhavan.
The trial companyrt at the companyclusion of the trial found the appellant number guilty and acquitted him.
The State of Kerala filed the appeal to the High Court and the said criminal appeal was allowed by the High Court vide its impugned judgment.
On this day, a Thaiyyam a village ballet was arranged by Madhavan in the evening and for that purpose, he needed a petromax which was available in the shop of the appellant.
Madhavan had gone to the shop of the appellant and requested him to give a lighted petromax.
The appellant refused to oblige.
Earlier in the day, brother of Madhavan had also gone to the shop of the appellant and requested him to give him two benches to celebrate the said festival.
When Madhavan had gone to the shop of the appellant with a request to give him a lighted petromax and on the latters refusal, there were exchange of words which was followed by a scuffle.
The appellant who was then sitting on a stool picked up a pair of scissors M.O.2 lying on the table in front of him and caused a stab injury on the right side of the chest of Madhavan.
The appellant again tried to inflict one more blow which landed on right cheek of Madhavan who thereafter fell down on the ground.
The appellant denied the accusations levelled against him and pleaded that he is innocent.
Learned Sessions Judge after the companyclusion of the trial by his judgment and order dated May 9, 1989, found the accused number guilty and companysequently passed the order of acquittal.
The State of Kerala preferred the criminal appeal to the High Court which was allowed and the appellant stood companyvicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
P. KURDUKAR.
J. Chalil Krishnan PW 1 who happened to be in the shop intervened and separated them A. Narayanan PW 6 who runs a tea shop near the shop of the accused also reached the place of incident and held Madhavan with a view to take him away.
A lorry was hired to carry Madhavan to the hospital but on the way it broke down.
Chalil Krishnan PW 1 then proceeded to Kasaragod police station and made a report to the head companystable on duty PW 13 .
After companypleting the necessary investigation, a charge sheet was submitted against the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
He, therefore, pleaded that he had companymitted numberoffence and he be acquitted.
In addition to this ocular evidence, the prosecution examined Dr. George Mathew PW 10 to prove the post mortem examination report and the cause of death.
Formal witnesses to prove various panchanmas were also examined by the prosecution.
Briefly state the prosecution case is as under The incident in question took place at about 8.00 p.m. on May 19, 1988 at Kattapunna.
The case was then transferred to Bakel police station in whose jurisdiction the incident had taken place.
The First Information Report Ex.
P11 came to be recorded at 9.00 p.m. which was forwarded to the Magistrate at about 10.00 p.m. After holding the inquest on the dead body of Madhavan, it was forwarded to the civil hospital for post mortem examination.
He further pleaded that Madhavan was the aggressor and infact in that scuffle, at the instance of Madhavan he sustained an injury on his head.
The prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of the accused examined as many as six witnesses of facts who were W.1 to P.W.6.
It is this judgment and order of the High Court which is sought to be challenged in this criminal appeal.
| 1 | train | 1997_34.txt |
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated June 3, 1955, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Appellate Decree C. Chatterjee and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.
February 21.
Anath Nath Mittra hereinafter referred to as Mittra mortgaged four parcels of land to Haridas Mondalhereinafer referred to as Mondal by deed dated April 25, 1930.
Mondal filed suit, No. 18 of 1937 on June 11, 1937, for enforcement of the mortgage in the Court of the 2nd Subordinate Judge, Midnapore, and obtained a preliminary mortgage decree for Rs.
Availing himself of this Act, Mittra filed a suit under s. 36 of the Bengal Money lenders Act for an order reopening the personal decree.
By order dated August 16, 1941, the Subordinate Judge, Midnapore, decreed the suit and directed that a new decree for Rs.
Mittra then filed another suit under s. 36 of the Bengal Money lenders Act in the 2nd Court of the Subordinate Judge, Midnapore, for reopening the, decrees preliminary and final passed in the mortgage suit.
He filed a suit which was decreed on November 13, 1937, when a preliminary decree for Rs. 5,000/ plus companyts was passed against the respondent.
On May 17, 1939, the four properties were sold for Rs. 4,160/ , and the balance then remaining due was Rs. 2,176/ .
Three of the properties were purchased by the appellant decree holder , and the fourth, by the wife of the mortgagor.
The respondent appealed, and the appellant cross objected.
The Judgment of Kapur and Shah, JJ. was delivered by Shah, J. Hidayatullah, J. delivered a separate judgment.
SHAH, J To secure repayment of Rs. 2,500/ 5,000/and interest and companyts.
2,176,66 out of the decretal amount remained due and payable under the mortgage decree.
Out of the four parcels of land sold, three were purchased by Mondal and the remaining was purchased by Mittras wife.
2,338,15,0 against Mittra.
1,431 15 0 be drawn up and that the amount due under the personal decree be paid in three annual instalments.
The respondent there.
If the earlier decrees had been reopened, the amount due would have been Rs.
5,591 15 0, but the Subordinate Judge said As Rs. 4,160/ was paid, I find numbernecessity of cancelling the sale and ordering restitution, but for the balance of Rs.
He held that the personal decree was liable to be reopened, and restored the decree for Rs.
1,431 15 0 passed by the Subordinate Judge.
The respondent who was directed to pay the amount by instalments under the orders of Mitter, J. made default in payment, and a money execution case was ,started against him.
upon made an application under s. 36 of the Bengal Money lenders Act for reopening the decree.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 508 of 1957.
No. 1090 of 1949.
C. Panda and P. K. Chaterjee, for the respondent, 1961.
This decree was made absolute and in execution of the decree, the mortgaged property was sold for Rs. 4,160/ and an amount of Rs.
Mondal then applied for a personal decree under 0.
34, r. 6 of the Civil Procedure Code and obtained on September 7, 1940, a decree for payment of Rs.
Mondal then applied for executing the personal decree by Misc.
Execution Cage No. 1 1 of 1941.
In the meanwhile, the Bengal Legislature enacted the Bengal Money lenders Act, 1940, which enabled the companyrts in certain circumstances to reopen decrees already passed.
Against this decree, an appeal was preferred to the District Court, Midnapore. 1442 of 1942, the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta set aside the decree of the District Judge and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Midnapore.
Mittra did number pay the amount as directed under the new decree and Mondal applied for executing the decree.
In appeal to the District Court, the decree was companyfirmed.
But the High Court in Second Appeal ordered that the preliminary and final decrees be reopened and the case be remanded to the trial companyrt for passing a fresh preliminary decree.
Against the said decree of the High Court, this appeal is filed with special leave.
This decree was made final on February 25, 1938.
On September 7, 1940, a personal decree for Rs. 2,338 15 3 was passed against the respondent.
In 1941, execution of that decree was taken out.
In the meantime, the Bengal Money lenders Act had companye into force on August 1, 1940.
The respondent did number say which decree he wanted reopened but with his application he gave a statement of account of the entire amount as reduced under the Bengal Money lenders Act and by the amount realised A by sale of the four properties, and asked that a decree for the balance, Rs. 66 13 2, should be passed against him.
The application was partly allowed, and afresh decree for Rs. 1,431 15 0 was passed.
1,431 15 0, a new decree be drawn up.
| 1 | train | 1961_316.txt |
Chinnappa Reddy, J. Special leave granted.
The appellant who secured the first rank in order of merit in the IIIrd M.B.B.S. examination of the Marathwada University in May, 1985 and who also stood first in Surgery and ENT Ophthalmology, sought admission to the M.S. degree companyrse companymencing in July, 1986.
| 1 | train | 1987_234.txt |
Appellant versus Director of Income Tax, Mumbai Respondent KAPADIA, J. Leave granted.
CIVIL APPEAL No. 2914 OF 2007 arising out of S.L.P. C No. 12907 of 2006 with CIVIL APPEAL No.
| 1 | train | 2007_564.txt |
K. Agrawal, J. The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by the petitioner herein by filing this writ petition against the alleged unfair treatment meted out to several retired government servants in their old age and their state of affairs pertaining to reimbursement of medical claims under the Central Government Health Scheme CGHS .
Aggrieved of the above, the petitioner herein filed a representation before the Secretary, Ministry of Health Family Welfare.
After presenting the memorial to the Director General of the CGHS, the government credited an amount of Rs. 4,90,000/ in the petitioners Bank Account, however, he was never heard on any point number any speaking order was ever companymunicated to him.
However, this Court, vide order dated 01.02.2016, directed the respondent State to pay a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/ to the petitioner as an interim relief.
Aggrieved by the decision of the CGHS in number allowing the medical bills in full, the petitioner herein has filed this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India claiming that he being in late 70s of his age, needs money to meet the needs for his survival.
Heard the petitioner in person and Ms. Binu Tamta, learned companynsel for the respondent State.
As per this Courts direction dated 01.02.2016, a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/ has also been paid by the respondent.
With a view to provide the medical facility to the retired serving CGHS beneficiaries, the government has empanelled a large number of hospitals on CGHS panel, however, the rates charged for such facility shall be only at the CGHS rates and, hence, the same are paid as per the procedure.
Brief facts Signature Not Verified a Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date 2018.04.13 The petitioner herein is a CGHS beneficiary retired 151113 IST Reason pensioner having a CGHS Card valid for whole life for medical treatment in Private Ward.
The petitioner herein submitted the first Bill on 02.01.2014 and the second Bill two on 19.07.2014 to the authority companycerned.
Again, in fourth attempt, the petitioner herein approached the Director General of the CGHS.
In the second set of Bills of the Jaslok Hospital, the petitioners claim was curtailed to the tune of Rs. 94,885/ , being just one fourth of the claim and numberopportunity of being heard was granted to the petitioner.
Thus, the petitioner herein was denied an amount of Rs. 4,96,343/ from the first claim and Rs.
3,03,212/ from the second set of claim.
In other way, out of the total bills amounting to Rs. 13,84,440/ , the petitioner herein was paid Rs. 5,84,885/ , meaning thereby, the petitioner herein was denied Rs. 7,99,555/ .
To both the hospitals, the petitioner had to pay out of his personal resources.
The petitioner companytended that the impugned CAGs Report with regard to Reimbursement of Medical Claims to the Pensioners under CGHS have also expressed the indifference against the pensioners.
Further, the writ petitioner was admitted in emergency companydition with companyplaint of breathlessness on 11.11.2013 in Fortis Escorts Health Institute, which was a number empanelled hospital at the relevant time.
He underwent angiography on 12.11.2013 which revealed diffused disease in left anterior descending companyonary artery 50 60.
He had been implanted the CRT D device Combo as part of cardiac resynchronization therapy CRT on 12.11.2013.
The hospital charged an amount of Rs.
11,56,293/ for the said treatment, out of which, an amount of Rs.
10,70,000/ was for the companyt of the unlisted cardiac implant CRT D and an amount of Rs. 3,19,950/ was paid by the Insurance companypany directly to the hospital.
However, on examining the same, the Committee did number find any justification for the implant of CRT D device of the petitioner.
On a further request by the petitioner, the Special Technical Committee again did number find any justification for the implant of CRT D device on 10.07.2014.
The total expenditure incurred by the petitioner towards his medical treatment at Fortis Escorts Heart Hospital, Delhi was Rs.
9,86,343/ and at Jaslok Hospital, Mumbai was Rs. 3,98,097/ , hence, the total amount claimed by the petitioner was Rs. 13,84,440/ .
Therefore, out of the total amount i.e., Rs. 13,84,440/ , an amount of Rs. 4,90,000/ was paid to the petitioner on the direction of the authority and Rs. 94,885/ for the treatment at Jaslok Hospital.
Hence, a sum of Rs. 4,99,555/ is the claim of the petitioner in the present writ petition.
The petitioner herein submitted two sets of his Medical bills under the Central Government Health Scheme CGHS for reimbursement on account of his treatment done in November, 2013 in the Fortis Escorts Hospital, New Delhi for Rs. 9,86,343/ for his cardiac ailments involving the implant of CRT D device and two sets of bill amounting to Rs. 3,98,097/ for his treatment at Jaslok Hospital, Mumbai for cerebral stroke and paralytic attack.
The first Bill was companysidered by the Technical Standing Committee in May 2014 and the claim was rejected without informing him of the reasons for rejection.
The case was again companysidered by the Standing Committee on 10.07.2014 and was rejected on the ground that CRT D implant was number required.
The said representation was again companysidered by the Standing Committee on 15.01.2015 and was rejected for the reason that Prior approval for such device implant was number sought.
A Special Technical Committee meeting was held on 29.04.2014 to companysider the case of the petitioner.
On a request for reconsideration by the petitioner, on 15.01.2015, the case of the petitioner was again reconsidered by the Special Technical Committee which denied the claim of CRT D. Though the Special Technical Committee did number find the implant justified, the companypetent authority, keeping in view the emergency nature of the case of the petitioner, approved the reimbursement of implant as per AIIMs rate.
| 0 | train | 2018_200.txt |
N. Khanna and Harbans Singh, for the appellant.
The respon dent who is a director of the Company presented a petition in the High Court of Delhi under ss.
On July 18, 1966, Capoor, J., directed that numberice of the petition be issued to the appellant Company.
The order has number been formally drawn up, and it is number clear whether by that order it was intended to call upon the Company to show cause why the petition should number be admitted, or that by the order the petition was admitted and numberice under r. 96 of the Companies Court Rules, 1959 was issued.
The appellant Company filed its reply companytroverting the allegations made by the respondent.
The Company also filed an application that the winding up petition filed by the respondent be taken off the file and be dismissed and that the petition in the meantime be number advertised.
C. Khanna and Maharaj Krishan Chawla, for the respon dent.
The appellants private limited Company is engaged in the manufacture of electric companyduit pipes.
433 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956, for an order for companypulsory winding up of the Company.
The respondent claimed that it was just and equitable within the meaning of s. 443 f of the Companies Act, 1956, to make an order for companypulsory winding up, because one of the three factories of the Company had been closed, that the accounts of the Company were number being shown to the respondent, that numbermeeting of the Company had been held, numberbalance sheet had been prepared and a letter of resignation purported to be signed 430 by the respondent had been forged.
H. R. Khanna, J., held that the appropriate remedy of the respondent on the allegations of mismanagement of the affairs of the Company and oppression of the minority shareholders by the group of Anandi Lal was to file a petition under ss.
The learned Judge directed that the petition be number advertised and be.
the petition was acting with ulterior motive and his attempt to obtain an order for winding up was unreasonable.
397 and 398 of the Companies Act.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1082 of 1967.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 7, 1967 of the Delhi High Court in Company Appeal No. 3 of 1967.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. In appeal against the order passed by H. R. Khanna, J., the High Court of Delhi held that under the Companies Court Rules, 1959, once a petition is admitted to the file, the Court is bound forthwith to advertise the petition.
The companypany challenges that order in this appeal.
| 1 | train | 1967_73.txt |
He filed an application under Section 9 1 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 for eviction of the respondents herein, who were his tenants.
One of the tenants filed a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Ferozepur for declaration that the order of the Collector was number valid and for a declaration that he companytinued to be a tenant in possession.
The respondents filed suits for permanent injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the possession of the land.
One Mahadeo Prasad was the owner of lands which form the subject matter of these appeals.
But during the pendency of that suit, he admitted that he was number in possession of the land.
On appeal the District Judge held that the finding in the earlier proceedings that the respondents were trespassers would operate as res judicata.
According to the plaintiffs in those suits they were tenants in possession and companyld number be evicted except in due companyrse of law.
An order was passed on 20 9 1968 by the Assistant Collector in which a companydition was imposed that the tenants should be resettled on areas equal to the areas in their possession.
The order was executed and possession was handed over to the owner on 27 10 1969.
On recording the said admission the suit was dismissed.
The respondents herein took possession of the land once again on 17 5 1970.
Mahadeo Prasad had sold the land to the appellants herein on 11 6 1973.
He found also as a fact that the respondents were dispossessed in execution of the order of eviction passed by the Assistant Collector and they ceased to be tenants.
That judgment was challenged in second appeal.
The companytention raised by the appellants in the High Court was that dispossession was in pursuance of an order passed by a Magistrate who had numberjurisdiction in the matter and therefore, such dispossession was a nullity.
The District Judge has found, after accepting the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, that after the ejectment orders were passed against the defendants they were dispossessed on 27 10 1969.
| 1 | train | 1998_665.txt |
The respondent plaintiffs filed a suit for i specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 30.1.1995, ii delivery of vacant possession and iii a declaration that the defendant No.1 was an absolute owner of the land measuring 102 kanals and 14 marlas as described in the plaint.
PW 8, Ashok Kashyap, who is stated to be Hand Writing and Finger Prints Expert, deposed that he had examined the original agreement to sell dated 30.1.1995 and found evidence of interpolation at pages 2 and 3.
In the appeal filed before the learned District Judge, an application under Order XLI, Rule 27 CPC read with Section 151 CPC is filed by the respondents to adduce additional evidence.
Being aggrieved by that order, a revision petition was preferred before the High Court, as stated earlier.
A mere reiteration of the circumstances set forth in the said representation will number disentitle the appellant to file this special leave petition.
RAJENDRA BABU, J. Leave granted.
In pursuance of the said agreement, it is alleged that the defendants submitted on 7.2.1995 an application to the Income Tax Department for obtaining clearance for sale of the said land which was signed by the plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 along with certain other documents attached thereto.
In the companyrse of the trial the original agreement of sale produced before the companyrt was sent for scientific examination.
LITTTTTTTJ This appeal arises out of an order made by the High Court in a revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by which it allowed an application filed by the respondents plaintiffs under Order XLI, Rule 27 read with Section 151 CPC by setting aside the order dated 24.12.1999 passed by the learned District Judge, Gurgaon, refusing to permit the respondents plaintiffs to adduce additional evidence by the said application.
After trial, the trial companyrt dismissed the suit against which a regular appeal was filed.
Preliminary objection is raised by the respondents to the effect that the case came up for hearing in the High Court on 28.3.2000 and 25.4.2000, while the representation had been made on 23.3.2000 but number brought to the numberice of the learned Judge number any objection to this effect during the companyrse of the hearing of the matter by the learned Judge was raised before him before the arguments were companycluded and, therefore, reiteration of those apprehensions in the companyrse of the special leave petition will tantamount to making allegations against the learned Judge of the High Court which are uncalled for and this Court should number entertain the special leave petition at all in view of the companyduct of the appellant.
| 1 | train | 2000_847.txt |
From the Judgment Order dated 29 6 1970 of the Gujarat High Court in SCA No. 46/68.
Appellant in person.
The facts leading to the petition decided by the impugned judgment are number in dispute and may be shortly stated.
On the 6th October 1932 the appellant was appointed by the Secretary of State for India to the Indian Civil Service and was allotted to its Bombay cadre.
The Government of India number having agreed with the stand taken by the appellant, he moved the High Court as stated above and in his petition challenged the validity of the second proviso to section 14 of the 1954 Act as also of clause a of section 15 thereof read with Part II of the said First Schedule.
M. Abdul Khader, J. L. Jain and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent.
The stand taken by the appellant was that he was number bound to exercise any option and that pension in relation to his service as a High Court Judge was payable to him under section 14 of the 1954 Act read with Part I of the said First Schedule.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 278 of 1972.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KOSHAL, J. This is an appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Gujarat under article 133 1 c of the Constitution of India and is directed against its judgment dated 29th June 1970 dismissing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution in which the appellant, who began his career as a member of the Indian Civil and was ultimately appointed a High Court Judge, prayed for the issuance of appropriate writs to ensure that he was granted two pensions independently of each other, one in relation to his service as a High Court Judge and the other for the service rendered by him prior to his appointment as such.
He was appointed Additional Judge of the Bombay High Court on the 12th June 1959 and on bifurcation of the State of Bombay on the 1st May 1960 became an Additional Judge of the High Court of Gujarat wherein he was made a permanent Judge on the 5th April 1961 and companytinued to serve as such till 10th February 1969 on which date he submitted his resignation from and relinquished charge of his office Through a letter dated 28th May 1966 addressed to the Registrar of the High Court of Gujarat, the Accountant General, Gujarat requested the appellant to exercise his option in accordance with the proviso to section 15th of the high Court Judges Conditions of Service Act, 1954 hereinafter called the 1954 Act and to intimate whether he would receive his pension under Part I or Part II of the First Schedule to that Act.
| 0 | train | 1980_321.txt |
B. Bagchi, S. N. Mukherjee for P. K. Bose, for the respondent No. April 18.
The facts giving rise to this appeal lie in a small companypass and they are as follows Pyare Mohan Bannerji died in October 1874 leaving behind him companysiderable property.
He executed a will dated February 12, 1874, making various bequests, including the payment of certain amounts to the first respondent, Uttar para Hitakari Sabha.
On March 17, 1950, the first respondent, Uttarpara Hitakari Sabha hereinafter referred to as the Sabha filed an application in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under s. 10 of the Official Trustees Act Act II of 1913 claiming that the late Pyare Mohan Bannerji had created a trust by his will and praying that an official trustee be appointed to be the trustee of the properties of the trust.
Thereafter, the property went into the possession of the appellants, who are the heirs at law of the testator.
The appellants companytested the claim of the Sabha and companytended, inter alia, that numbertrust had been created by the testator and that the appellants, being the legal heirs of the testator, were entitled to succeed to the entire pro perty left by him.
Mootham, J., as he then was, who heard the said case at the first instance, held that by his last will Pyare Mohan Bannerji created a trust in favour of the Sabha, and appointed the Official Trustee a trustee of all the properties left by Pyare Mohan Bannerji specified in Schedule B to the petition.
On appeal, a division bench of the said High Court, companysisting of Malik, C. J., and Agarwala, J., agreed with Mootham, C. J., that the will created a trust in favour of the Sabha but the learned Judges held that the Sabha was entitled only to a half share in the cash and properties pertaining to the estate of the said testator, and appointed the Official Trustee as trustee only in regard to the said share on that basis, suitable directions were given.
V. Viswanatha Sastri, C. P. Lal and G. C. Mathur, for the appellants.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SUBBA RAO, J. This appeal by certificate raises the question of companystruction of a will executed by one Pyare Mohan Bannerji.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1958.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated January 4, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 36 of 1955.
After his death, his widow held the property for life till her death on March 25, 1945.
This was registered as Testamentary Case No. 9 of 1950.
The first respondent accepted that position, but the appellants, i.e., the persons claiming to be the heirs at law, preferred the present appeal against the judgment of the High Court in so far as it went against them.
| 0 | train | 1961_373.txt |
Sidhartha Shankar Ray, R.K. Lala and T.V.S.N. Chari for Respondent No.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The first appellant, Jyoti Basu, is the Chief Minister and appellants two and three Budhadeb Bhattacharya and Hashim Abdul Halim, are two Ministers of the Government of West Bengal.
The first respondent filed an election petition in the High Court of Calcutta questioning the election of the second respondent Mohd.
The District Magistrate and Returning Officer was impleaded as the fifth respondent, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, the Minister for Information and Publicity, Government of West Bengal as the sixth respondent.
Amin, the Minister of the Transport Branch of the Home Department as the eighth respondent, Hashim Abdul Halim, the Minister of the Legislative and the Judicial Department as the ninth respondent and the Electoral Registration Officer as the tenth respondent.
It was averred in the election petition that the Chief Minister and the other Ministers of the Government of West Bengal who were impleaded as parties to the election petition had companyluded and companyspired with the returned candidate to companymit various alleged companyrupt practices.
The Chief Minister and two of the other Ministers, Hashim Abdul Halim and and Buddhadeb Bhattacharya filed an application before the High Court of Calcutta to strike out their names from the array of parties in the election petition.
136 of the Constitution.
Somnath Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Aninda Mitter for the Appellants.
There were five candidates who sought election from the Constituency.
Ismail, the first respondent, whose candidature was sponsored by the Communist Party of India Marxist was, elected securing 2,66,698 votes as against Debi Ghosal, a candidate sponsored by the Indian National Congress led by Smt.
The other candidates Ramjit Ram, Robi Shankar Pandey and Bejoy Narayan Mishra secured 25,734, 12,271 and 2,763 votes respectively.
Ismail on various grounds.
He impleaded the returned candidate as the first respondent, and the other three unsuccessful candidates respondents 2, 3 and 4 to the election petition.
Besides the candidates at the election, he impleaded several others as respondents.
Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister as the seventh respondent, Md. Apart from denying the companymission of the various alleged companyrupt practices, the Chief Minister and the other Ministers claimed in their written statements that the election petitioner was number entitled to implead them as parties to the election petition.
They claimed that as they were number candidates at the election they companyld number be impleaded as parties to the election petition.
The appellants have preferred this appeal after obtaining special leave of this Court under Art.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1553 of 1980.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 3rd July, 1980 of the Calcutta High Court in Election Petition Case No. 1 of 1980.
They have been impleaded by the first respondent as parties to an election petition filed by him questioning the election of the second respondent to the House of the People from the 19 Barrackpore Parliamentary Constituency in the mid term Parliamentary election held in January, 1980.
The application was dismissed by the Calcutta High Court on the ground that the applicants appellants were proper parties to the election petition and, therefore, their names should number be struck out of the array of parties.
Shri Somnath Chatterjee, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the companycept of a proper party was number relevant in election law and that only those persons companyld be impleaded as parties who were expressly directed to be so impleaded by the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
| 1 | train | 1982_30.txt |
j. kolah and r. patnaik for the appellant.
may 14.
the appellant is a hindu undivided family carrying on extensive business in grain as merchants and companymission agents.
it is one of the premier grain merchants and wholesalers of sahibganj in the district of santhal parganas in the state of bihar.
the appellant filed its income tax return for the assessment year 1946 47 showing a loss of rs. 46415 in the business.
the income tax officer patna however in the companyrse of the assessment numbericed that the appellant had encashed high denumberination numberes of the value of rs. 29 1000 on january 19 1946.
the income tax officer asked for an explanation which the appellant gave stating that these numberes formed part of its cash balances including cash balance in the almirah account.
the cash balances of the appellant on january 12 1946 on which date the high denumberination bank numberes demonetisation ordinance 1946 was promulgated were rs. 29284 the appellant sought to prove the fact that the high denumberination numberes eneashed by it formed part of its cash balances from certain entries in its accounts wherein the fact that moneys were received in high denumberination numberes had been numbered.
n. kripal and d. gupta for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by bhagwatt j. these are two companynected appeals with special leave granted by this companyrt under art.
it has branches at nawgachia in the district of bhagalpur and at dhulian in the district of murshidabad in west bengal.
3 9 in its rokar and rs.
the almirah account was an account for moneys withdrawn and kept at home.
he company.
the income tax officer further took into consideration the circumstances that nawgachia and dhulian were very important business centers and sahibganj the principal place of business had gained sufficient numberoriety for smuggling foodgrains and other companymodities to bengal by country boats.
dhulian which was just on the bengal bihar border was also reported to be a great receiving centre for such companymodities.
1000 each remained unexplained to its satisfaction.
in regard to the excess profits tax appeal the tribunal after taking into account the preceding and succeeding assessments and the nature of the appellants business and the opportunities that it had to make substantial business profits outside the books held that the add back of rs. 141000 must be made to the business profits disclosed by the appellant.
the high court was of the opinion that the onus of proving the source of the said amount was on the appellant which the appellant did number discharge and that there was evidence before the tribunal to companye to the companyclusion it did.
the tribunal however appears to have been influenced by the suspicions companyjectures and surmises which were freely indulged.
in that case the assessee had to satisfactorily explain the possession of 61 high denumberination numberes of rs. 1000 each and the tribunal came to the companyclusion that the assessee had satisfactorily explained the possession of 31 of these numberes and number of the remaining 30.
behalf companyld number be assailed by a purely imaginary calculation of the nature made by the income tax officer or the appellate assistant companymissioner.
the appellant thereafter applied to the tribunal for stating a case and raising and referring to the high companyrt the following questions of law arising from the said order of the tribunal both as regards the incometax and the excess profits tax assessments whether there is any material to justify the conclusion that rs.
by its order dated august 15 1952 the tribunal dismissed these applications stating that the finding of the taxing authorities was a pure finding of fact based on evidence before them and that numberquestion of law arose out of the said order of the tribunal.
the finding arrived at by the tribunal was therefore a pure finding of fact and it companyld number be urged that it was based on no evidence.
these applications were rejected by the high companyrt on august 25 1955 observing that it had answered the question of law number on the academic principles of onus but on the material from which it was open to the income tax authorities to arrive at the companyclusion at which they arrived.
the position as it obtained in this case was closely analogous to that which obtained in messrs. mehta parikh co. v. the companymissioner of income tax bombay 1 .
the assessee having given a reasonable explanation the tribunal companyld number by applying a rule of thumb discard it so far as the rest were companycerned and act on mere surmise.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.
679 and 680 of 1957.
appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated the january 5 1955 of the patna high companyrt in m.j.c.
374 375 of 1952.
136 of the constitution and arise out of the appellants assessment to income tax for the assessment year 1946 47 and excess profits tax for the chargeable accounting period january 9 1945 to february 2 1946.
on further appeals from the said orders of the appellate assistant companymissioner to the income tax appellate tribunal the tribunal by its order dated april 29 1952 dismissed both the appeals as regards the incometax as well as excess profits tax.
even though before the income tax officer and the appellate assistant companymissioner the case of the appellant was that the account book which companytained the entries in regard to the receipts of moneys in high denumberination numberes were genuine and companyrect this position was abandoned by the appellant before the tribunal.
| 1 | test | 1959_212.txt |
It is from the order of the High Court that this appeal, by special leave has been filed.
| 0 | train | 1974_224.txt |
KAPADIA, J. The appellant questions the companyrectness of the judgment of the High Court of judicature at Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court, in Appeal, allowed the writ petition filed by the Assistant Executive Engineer SD I , Athani and set aside the order of the Labour Court dated 27.10.1999 directing reinstatement with 50 back wages from the date of the award till the date of reinstatement.
Facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows Appellant was appointed as a daily waged earner by the Assistant Executive Engineer on 26.11.1988.
The labour companyrt found on facts and on the basis of evidence led before it that the appellant had worked with SD 1 at Athani companytinuously for more than 240 days prior to 20.6.1994 date of termination that the then Assistant Executive Engineer had issued a certificate Ex.
However, when the respondent was called upon to produce the M.R. extracts for relevant period, it has chosen to produce Ex. M.1 to M.5 and companysolidated statement showing the period for which the claimant had worked as on 20.6.1994.
The respondent has number chosen to produce the N.M.R. extracts for a period of 12 months immediately prior to 20.6.1994.
However, since there was a delay of three years in raising the industrial dispute and since the appellant was only a daily waged earner, the labour companyrt directed the management to reinstate the appellant into service as a daily wager with 50 back wages from the date of the award till the date of reinstatement.
The said writ petition was dismissed in limine vide order dated 7.6.2000.
By impugned judgment, the division bench held that the certificate produced by the appellant Ex.
The reference was in following terms Whether the management was justified in removing the claimant from service w.e.f.
20.6.1994? If number, to what reliefs the claimant was entitled for? On receipt of the said reference, the labour companyrt issued numberices to the companycerned parties.
The labour companyrt found that Ex. W1 was duly proved.
It companytained the signature of the then Asstt.
Executive Engineer.
Further, the labour companyrt came to the companyclusion that the management had suppressed the material evidence from the Court.
Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge dated 7.6.2000, the management carried the matter in appeal to the division bench vide writ appeal number5660 of 2000.
Executive Engineer and that the records produced by the department showed that Ex. W1 was a fabricated document.
By the impugned judgment, the division bench also set aside the order of the learned Single Judge.
The board denied the allegations made in the application before the labour companyrt.
Some of the workmen were also examined before the labour companyrt.
However, numberdocument was produced in the form of letter of appointment, receipt indicating payment of salary etc.
After examining the entry in the muster rolls, the labour companyrt came to the companyclusion that the workmen had number worked for 240 days companytinuously in a given year, hence, they companyld number claim permanency number companyld they term their number employment as retrenchment.
Accordingly, the industrial companyrt granted reinstatement to the workmen with 50 back wages.
However, numberother material was produced by the workmen to establish the fact that they had worked for 240 days companytinuously in a given year.
Drawing of such an adverse inference was challenged before this Court by the MP Electricity Board.
As per the documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent and the oral version of MW.1, the claimant had worked only for a period of 84 days during the year 1993 and for a period of 43 days during the year 1994 up to 20.6.1994.
Aggrieved by the said award, the management challenged the award vide writ petition number17636 of 2000.
Following the judgment of this companyrt in the case of Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani reported in 2002 3 SCC 25, the division bench vide its impugned judgment quashed the award passed by the labour companyrt in favour of the appellant.
Hence, this civil appeal.
The project jobs came to an end in 1991 and the workmen were never re employed by the board.
Aggrieved by the award of the labour companyrt, the workmen preferred an appeal before the industrial companyrt at Bhopal which took the view that since the board has failed to produce the entire muster roll for the year ending 1990, an adverse inference was required to be drawn against the board and solely based on the said inference, the industrial companyrt accepted the case of the workmen that they had worked for 240 days companytinuously in a given year.
| 1 | train | 2005_536.txt |
These appeals arise from the judgment of the National Consumer Disputes Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Redressal Commission1 dated 28 April 2015.
Eventually, a companyplaint was filed before the NCDRC.
The NCDRC placed reliance on safety guidelines for water sports issued by the National Institute of Water Sports, Ministry of Tourism, Government of India.
Appeals have been filed against the decision both by the KTDC as well as by the original companyplainants.
Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 The Appeals are admitted.
2 The companyplainants had booked accommodation at Hotel Samudra at Kovalam for a family holiday.
Other guests of the hotel were present in the pool at that time.
All of a sudden, Satyendra Pratap Singh became unconscious and sank into the pool.
It was alleged by the companyplainants that on witnessing the incident, a foreigner who was in the vicinity in the pool lifted him out of the water.
The incident is number in dispute.
However, according to KTDC, the lifeguard on duty also jumped into the swimming pool.
The victim was pulled out of the water and was taken to hospital.
He died at 9.30 p.m. on the same day.
Insofar as they are material and as extracted in the impugned order of the NCDRC, the instructions read as follows Pool Lifeguard Scope The regulations companytained below are applicable for lifeguarding at swimming pool, Water Park and Lake front.
The stipulations are being framed to ensure that the people participants enjoy swimming water borne activities and are free from fear of safety and security Life Guarding Instructions Duties should number exceed 4 hours at a time.
Brain was companygested and oedematous.
Air passages were companygested and companytained blood stained fluid.
Lungs were crepitant and voluminous exuding companyious amount of frothy blood stained fluid on sectioning OPINION AS TO CAUSE OF DEATH Postmortem appearances are companysistent with death due to Drowning.
Emphasis supplied The death of the deceased was due to drowning.
Significantly, there was numberevidence of the presence of alcohol in the body of the deceased.
The death was due to drowning.
Considering the delay in the response by the life guard who was preoccupied with bartending duties, the drowning of the deceased was a direct companysequence of negligence.
23 The deceased was 35 years old.
He was a partner in a firm engaged in the business of trading in companysumer goods and office automation along with two other persons.
The young children have been deprived of the support and affection of their father.
Their mother has lost the companypanionship of a spouse.
The nature of the loss is incapable of being fully companypensated in monetary terms.
NEELAM GULATI Date 2019.03.27 102706 IST Reason 3 A companysumer companyplaint in regard to an alleged deficiency of service of the Kerala 1 National Commission Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. 2 was instituted by Ms Deepti Singh for and on behalf of herself and her two minor children.
On the above facts, we are of the view that the finding of a deficiency of service 11 2000 1 A.C. 360 which was arrived at by the NCDRC was companyrect and was sustainable with reference to the material on the record.
Material was produced on the record to indicate that the deceased was carrying on business and also had agricultural income.
On 21 March 2006 between 6.30 and 7 p.m., Satyendra Pratap Singh, the spouse of the first companyplainant and father of the two minor children entered the swimming pool of the hotel with his brother.
4 A First Information Report3 was lodged at about 2 p.m. on 22 March 2006 at the Medical College Police Station.
| 0 | train | 2019_217.txt |
Manjula on or about 23.12.2001 made a companyplaint alleging that ten days prior thereto, i.e., on 13.12.2001 a quarrel had taken place by and between the companyplainant and appellant, during companyrse of which, the appellant trespassed in her companypound, restrained her, pulled her hair, assaulted her with chappal, removed the mangalsutra and damaged the bangles causing loss of Rs.200/ to her.
A first information report on the said basis was lodged for companymission of offences punishable under Sections 447, 341, 323 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code for short, the IPC .
The same having number been served, number bailable warrant was issued.
On the basis of the said purported requisition, the case was reopened and a number bailable warrant of arrest was issued against the appellant.
She filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for short, the Code before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed, stating that as the order of the trial companyrt dated 14.10.2004 was clear that further proceedings had been stopped on the premise that whereabouts of the appellant were number known and as the case had number been closed and having regard to the fact that she has number been traced out, the trial companyrt companyld permit the prosecution to reopen its case.
The proceedings were stopped by the learned Magistrate in terms of the order dated 14.10.2004.
The benefit of effect of discharge companyld have been claimed by the appellant had she been directed to be released, the effect of discharge being companyrelated with release.
B. SINHA, J. Leave granted.
One Smt.
A charge sheet was submitted on 15.2.2002 upon companypletion of investigation.
Cognizance of offences was taken on 28.9.2002.
Processes were issued against the accused.
The matter was listed on various dates.
It is numbered that accused vacated her address and her whereabouts are number known.
The said application is number on record.
Non bailable warrant of arrest issued against her had number been executed.
An order of discharge can be passed in terms of Section 245 of the Code.
For passing an order under the aforesaid provision, reasons are required to be recorded.
If she had number been released, the question of her obtaining the benefit of the effect of discharge does number arise.
No companysequential order was passed and indeed companyld number have been passed.
| 0 | train | 2009_267.txt |
It has companye to this Court by special leave against the judgment of the High Court of Mysore number Karnataka , having been deprived of the leasehold right granted to it pursuant to the order of Government dated July 17, 1968.
Considerable lands had been acquired in the last century in the village of Gudas in Belgaum District by the Government of Bombay on the score that they were likely to be submerged by the companystruction of a weir on the river Ghataprabha.
Therefore, the Government of Bombay resolved by Ex.
A of 1898 that such lands companyld be let annually for cultivation to such persons and on such terms as may be decided soon, and a further policy decision was taken regarding the persons to whom the lands might be given for seasonal cultivation, and the resolution of Government ran to the effect that in companysideration that the original holders have been dispossessed for a public purpose, Government are pleased to direct as a matter of grace that they should have the first option of cultivating their former holdings.
D, dated June 19, 1931, passed a resolution, which is the function of the claim of the writ petitioners in the High Court respondents 4 and 5 in this appeal and had better be fully reproduced here at this stage RESOLUTION GOVERNMENT Accept the opinion of the Commissioner, Southern Division, and in supersession of the previous orders on the subject are pleased to issue the following orders.
As years passed, Government changed its policy and by a circular dated December 19, 1953, a new decision was reached and companymunicated to the companycerned officers.
On February 23, 1968 the Government cancelled the lease in favour of the appellant and directed the grant of the lease to the respondents 4 and 5.
Government was moved for reconsideration of its policy decision and for re grant of the lease in the societys favour.
The social policy of Government swayed it in favour of the appellant society and on July 17, 1968.
the impugned order was passed by the first respondent, the Government, directing the Divisional Commissioner to grant the lease of the lands in question in favour of the appellant society.
However, during summer when the storage of water would shrink, the lands on the companytours would be exposed for a whole season and companyld be put to agricultural use.
emphasis added .
A few decades later, the same Government, by Ex.
BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL.
When this cancellation of the appellants lease came to its numberice.
It was this order which was successfully challenged in the High Court by the present respondents 4 and 5.
Although the term of the lease, namely, five years, has by number expired, still the finding of the High Court is sure to injure the claims of the petitioner society in future and so we proceed to companysider the subject matter on the merits.
Krishna Iyer, J. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 602 of 1971 is a companyoperative society claiming to companysist of members who are local landless backward class people.
| 1 | train | 1974_139.txt |
No. 1 Gokulananda Panda Original plaintiff instituted the suit giving rise to the present appeal.
No. 1 Rahasa on March 22, 1956.
Defendant No. 1 resisted the suit and finally denied that she had taken Gokulananda Panda in adoption as alleged.
The trial companyrt on an appreciation of evidence disbelieved the version of the plaintiff and dismissed the suit on taking the view that the plaintiff had failed to establish that any such adoption had taken place, A learned Single Judge of the High Court reversed the findings recorded by the trial companyrt and decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff had established that such an adoption had indeed taken place.
Thereupon original defendant No. 1 Rahasa Pandiani approached this Court by way of the present appeal by special leave.
One Rahasa Pandiani original defendant Respondent He was a minor at the material time and the suit was instituted through his natural father and maternal uncle seeking a declaration that he was adopted as a son by defendant The suit was instituted because she had alienated some of the properties in favour of appellants 2 to 8 and had made a will in favour of the deity bequeathing the rest of the properties on the premise that there was numbersuch adoption and she was free to deal with the properties of her deceased husband.
The defendants preferred a Letters Patent Appeal to a Division Bench of the High Court, but it was dismissed in limine.
P. Thakkar, J. Whether or number an adoption had taken place way back in 1956 is the companytroversy at the center of the stage.
No. 1 , widow of Lakshminarayana Panda had adopted one Gangapani, the son of the sister of her deceased husband in 1942 by a registered document.
The said Gangapani died in 1953.
She having died during the pendency of the present appeal, the estate is number represented by her legal heirs whose names have been brought on record pursuant to the order of this Court on January 25, 1982.
| 1 | train | 1987_494.txt |
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.3.
M. Lodha, H.M. Singh and R.S. Yadav for the Appellant.
K. Ghose, M. Qamaruddin and Mrs. M. Qamaruddin for the Respondent.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 105 of 1990.
327 of 1976.
| 1 | train | 1990_332.txt |
Suspecting that the respondent was involved in the sale of adulterated food items, the appellant purchased 750 grams of red gram dal and after companypliance of the statutory formalities, sent one of the samples to the public analyst for its analysis.
After obtaining the necessary sanction from the authorities, the appellant filed a charge sheet before the additional district munsif against the respondent under Section 16 read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The appeal filed against the order of acquittal was also dismissed by the High Court vide the order impugned in this appeal on the same grounds.
The appellant, food inspector visited the shop of the respondent where he was transacting food grains business.
Upon analysis, the sample was found to be companytained keshari dal which was held to be injurious to health and therefore the sample was proved to be adulterated and mis branded.
To prove the charges the companyplainant examined PWs 1 to 3, besides proving of Exhibits P1 to P16.
Despite pleaded number guilty, the respondent did number lead any defence.
The trial magistrate acquitted the respondent mainly on the ground that the statement of PW 1 had allegedly number been companyroborated by the other witnesses.
We have heard the learned companynsel and perused the record.
| 1 | train | 2002_416.txt |
Notice of surrender was given on June 3, 1961 calling upon the respondents to deliver possession of the aforesaid surplus land within ten days from the date of the receipt or the numberice.
Admittedly, the possession of 18.82 standard acres of land was taken by the State officials from Inder Singh who had acknowledged taking over possession on July 12, 1961.
Consequently, when he filed an application before the authorities, the Commissioner as well as the revisional authorities negatived the claim resulting in filing of the writ petition.
As stated earlier, the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court have set aside the Government order on the ground that Inder Singh was found having less land than the prescribed standard acres under the Act as was determined in the companysolidation proceedings.
Therefore, the surplus land was required to be redetermined and restituted.
Substitution allowed.
This appeal by special leave arises against the order of the Division Bench of the Punjab Haryana High Court made on 20.9.1978 in LPA No.404/75 companyfirming the order of the learned single Judge dated May 8, 1975 setting aside the order of taking over possession of the surplus land dated July 20, 1961 and directing redetermination of the surplus land.
The admitted facts are that the Collector exercising the power under PEPSU Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 determined surplus land of the respondents at 18.82 standard acres by proceedings dated May 28, 1960.
The order was number challenged by filing the appeal.
Subsequently, it would appear by companysolidation proceedings that had taken place in the year 1961 62, it was found that Inder Singh was having less extent of land than the prescribed standard acres under the Act.
That order having been allowed to became final.
| 0 | train | 1996_2176.txt |
the order of the companyrt was delivered by krishna iyer j. an unusual grievance of a government pleader the petitioner ventilated in a writ petition was given short shrift by the high companyrt in a laconic order but undaunted by this summary brevity the petitioner has pursued his case to this companyrt under article 136.
in utter nudity his case is a claim of monumberoly of all government cases in the patna district including lucrative land acquisition litigation as part of the professional estate of a government pleader.
civil appellate jurisdiction special leave petition civil number 6056 of 1979.
from the judgment and order dated 12 7 1979 of the patna high companyrt in c.w.j.c. number 1618/79.
| 0 | dev | 1979_326.txt |
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 27 1 77 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 3967 and 3987/76 respectively.
Venkataramana, K. Rajendra Chaudhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Appellant.
Parmeswara Rao and G. Narayana Rao for Respondent No.
In CA No. 503/77 for Respondent No.
In CA No. 503/77 for Respondent No.
It is sufficient to state the facts appertaining to Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co operative Society Ltd. briefly the appellant as these are companymon.
The area of operation of the appellant was provided in its bye laws was for the entire taluk with a view to grant arrack licences to it in respect of all the arrack shops within the said taluk.
also encouraged by the Cooperative Department to form their own village companyperative societies and to ask for grant of licences of their village shops in favour of the respective village societies instead of granting all the licences of the taluk to a single society, such as the appellant.
Having thus registered the village companyoperative societies briefly the village societies , the Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies gave a numberice to the appellant under section 16 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Co operative Societies Act, 1964, calling upon it to, amend its bylaws so as to restrict its area of operation only to the taluk head quarters.
The underlying idea behind such a numberice was that the appellant should be given the licence in respect of shops situated in the taluk headquarters while licences in respect of shops Situated within the villages should be granted to the respective village societies which have since been registered.
The appellant filed a petition of revision before the Registrar of Co operative Societies challenging the above numberice.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against the aforesaid order of the Government dated 6th October 1976.
On the very day, viz., 6th October, 1976, when the respondents filed their revision before the Government, the appellant filed anapplication to the Government disputing the claim of the village societies.
The appellant also field before the Government a similar applicationon 28th October, 1976.
On 5th November, 1976, the appellant prayed to the Government for an opportunity to file companynter in the revision petition filed by the respondents.
The appellant felt aggrieved by the, above order of the Government and filed two writ petitions The High Court rejected this plea on the ground that from a perusal of the voluntary applications filed by the appellant it was clear that the appellant had anyhow met with the points urged by the respondents in their revision petition before the Government.
Yenkatarama Sastry There was, however, an infection of the companyperative movement and it appears that trials in the various villages in the taluk were.
This direction, however, companyld number be implemented since by that time the village societies had already been granted licences in respect of shops situated in the respective villages.
The High Court issued Rule nisi, but declined to stay the impugned order.
The Excise Superintendent was also requested to issue thereafter fresh individual licences to all the village level societies in the Chintapalli taluk for arrack shops existing in their respective villages.
It was, however.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 503 504 of 1977.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co operative Society Ltd. and the Paderu Taluk Tribal Arrack Sales Co operative Society Ltd. were registered as Co operative Societies by the Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies, Yelamanchili.
The question raised in this case by these two Societies has been decided by a companymon judgment of the High Court of 27th January, 1977.
The appellant was registered by the Deputy Registrar of Co operative Societies, Yelamanchili, on 26th September, 1975.
With this purpose of initiating them into the liquor trade, the village societies were registered on 4th October, 1975.
The petition was allowed by the Registrar by his order dated 10th December , 1975.
In the said order the Registrar number only set aside the aforesaid numberice of the Deputy Registrar but also directed the District Co operation authorities to recommend the case of the appellant for grant of licences for all the shops situated within the taluk for the excise year 1975 76 ending 30th September, 1976.
The appellants licence was companyfined to the area in taluk headquarters for the year 1975 76.
With the said recommendation staring in the face, the village societies apprehended trouble in the year 1976 77 and filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the Registrars order of 10th December, 1975.
Indeed the licences for 1976 77 were granted to the appellant for the entire area as recommended by the Registrar.
No stay orders companyld be obtained by the respondents and hence the licences, for 1976 77 companytinued with the appellant.
The village societies also, almost simultaneously approached the Government by way of revision under section 77 of the Andhra Pradesh Co operative Societies Act, 1964 briefly the Act against the order of the Registrar of 10th December, 1975.
On 6th October 1970, the Government suspended the operation of the order of the Registrar dated 10th December 1975 and further directed the Collector Cooperation Visakhapatnam to recommend the case of the village societies to the Excise Superintendent for the issue of licences for the excise year 1976 77.
The Government, however, without any numberice to the appellant, passed final orders on 4th December, 1976, allowing the two review petitions filed by the village societies and set aside the order of the Registrar dated 10th December, 1975.
Nos. 3947 and 3987 of 1976, in which the impugned order was passed by the High Court and with which alone we are companycerned in these appeals.
| 1 | train | 1977_237.txt |
from the judgment and order dated 29.2.1980 of the delhi high companyrt in l.p.a.
in the year 1970 the appellant corporation served a numberice on the respondent proposing that the ratable value of the building should be revised.
aggrieved by this order dated 1.2.1973 a writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the companystitution was filed before the high companyrt of delhi in c.w. by a judgment and order dated 29th february 1980 it was held inter alia as under suffice it is to say the education cannumber be under stood in the limited sense of teaching being given by hold ing classes or by delivery of lectures.
by an order dated 26.11.80 special leave was granted.
the appellant society filed a suit and sought interim injunction but the senior sub judge was of the view that the subject matter of the suit being rs.532683 he companyld number entertain the suit.
therefore on 24.12.1988 the appellant withdrew the suit with liberty to file a fresh petition.
by a judgment dated 9th february 1989 it was held that the exemption claimed by the appellant was unavailable to it.
from the judgment and order dt.
3 2 89 of the delhi high companyrt in c.w.p.
harish n. salve rajiv shakdhar ms rita bhalla s s shroff for s.a.shroff company dr. a.m. singhvi and r.sasiprab hu for a interveners.
for the said year the value of the property was assessed at rs. 851480 while the portion of the property which was exempt was valued at rs.596870.
1629750\. the deputy assessor and companylector held that the respondent had number proved its charitable character.
further the user of the property did number go to prove that the property was used for the charitable purpose and the same cannumber be exempt from tax.
the claim of the respondent who figured as the petitioner therein was that the withdrawal of exemption from the payment of general tax previously enjoyed on portions of the property was wrong.
the learned single judge rajinder sacharj. allowed the writ petition.
he held that the trust would be entitled to claim total exemption for the payment of tax under section 115 4 of the act for all the portions occu pied by it except which is occupied by the press namely the basement area of 11217 sq.
ft on the ground floor rear portion for which the monthly rental value has been fixed at rs.346250.
aggrieved by the judgment l.p.a.number 102 of 1974 was preferred by the appellant to the division bench of the said court.
the acquisition of information or knumberledge from whatever source and in any manner has to be regarded as education.
that was heard by a division bench.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by mohan j. both these appeals can be dealt with under common judgment since the scope of section 115 4 delhi municipal companyporation act 1957 hereinafter referred to as the act alone arises.
from the year 1964 65 only a part of property was subject to the general tax in accordance with the provisions of the act.
when there was a proposal by the deputy assessor and companylector to assess the society for the general tax the appellant society claimed that it was a society for charitable purpose and therefore numbertax companyld be levied on its building since the exemption under sub section 4 of section 115 of the act would be applicable to it.
therefore the case was number companyered by section 115 4 of the act.
accordingly finding numberinfirmity in the order of assessment the writ petition was dimissed in limine.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2805 of 1980.
number 102 of 1974 and civil appeal number 228 of 1990.
number263 of 1989 sen r.k. maheshwari and vineet maheshwari for the appellant in c.a.number 2805 of 1980 and respondent of c.a. number 228 of 1990.
harish n. salve anil mallick vineet kumar and vijay bhasin for the appellant in c.a. 228 of 1990.
b. pai ms. uma mehta jain for the respondent in a.2805 of 1980.
civil appeal number2805 of 1980 the property knumbern as nehru house number4 bahadur shah zafar marg new delhi is owned by respondent childern boot trust .
it is a society registered under the societys registration act 1960.
on 1st february 1973 the deputy assessor and companylector of the appellant corporation passed an order to the effect that the ratable value of the property be revised and enhanced to rs.
number318 of 1974.
ft.for which monthly rental value has been assessed at rs.14.021.25 and an area of 2000 sq.
the result being the appeal of the appellant corporation was allowed partly.
under these circumstances the municipal companyporation of delhi has companye up in appeal.
hence civil appeal number2805 of 1980.
| 0 | test | 1992_208.txt |
The appellant is the owner of a building which is a lodging house companystructed sometime in the year 1981.
Respondent 1 filed a writ petition inter alia companytending that this building was companystructed in a residential area and the Corporation companyld number have given permission to companystruct a companymercial building in a residential area.
When numberaction was taken by the Corporation, Respondent 1 filed a writ petition.
A report from the Commissioner was called for and it was accepted by the Division Bench, on the basis of the said report, that the property in question number fell in the companymercial zone and was to longer in the residential zone.
The second companytention was that the existing bye laws were violated.
The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.
When the Division Bench heard the appeal, it was brought to its numberice that in 1984 there had been a change in the zoning regulations of the building bye laws.
He shall do so after giving an opportunity to Respondent 2 and the appellants herein.
If the Commissioner companyes to the companyclusion that the building or any portion thereof is number in companyformity with the existing zoning regulations and the building bye laws, he shall order the demolition of such offending portion so as to bring the building in companyformity with the existing law.
| 0 | train | 1999_333.txt |
Leave granted.
The High Court has quashed charge framed against the respondents under Sections 308/34 IPC and has sequels quashed proceedings against the respondents under Sections 323/34 IPC on the ground that the police companyld number have investigated the said offence without the permission of a magistrate.
Both sides allegedly were injured.
| 1 | train | 1997_1548.txt |
The respondent who was deputed to undergo a companyrse as an electrician sought leave for 10 days on December 10, 1982, which was granted.
For this misdemeanor his services came to be terminated by an order dated May 7, 1983.
The petitioner was directed to be reinstated with all monetary and other service benefits.
While he was on leave he sent a telegram for extension of leave by 12 days which request came to be rejected.
His departmental appeal as well as revision were also rejected, whereupon he filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the order of termination which writ petition came to be allowed by the order of January 3, 1989.
It is against this order that the present appeal is preferred.
| 0 | train | 1993_148.txt |
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 9, 1958 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision P. Khanna and R. IV.
Sachthey, for the appellant.
November 27.
J. This is an appeal by special leave preferred by the State of west Bengal against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta dated 9.5.1958 in Criminal Revision Case No. 1128 of 1957.
The first respondent was at the relevant date, which was some time towards the latter part of 1950, the Sub Postmaster in a post office in the town of Calcutta, received information that in certain post offices in Calcutta, including that in which the first respondent was the Sub Postmaster, systematic misappropriation of Government monies was taking place by, inter alia, the affixing of used postage stamps.
It is number necessary to set out the details of the charges against the accused except to state that they included, offences under s.409 and, s.120 B/409 of the Indian Penal Code, but we shall proceed to narrate briefly the matters that transpired which have companytributed to keep the e proceedings pending these 12 years.
Immediately thereafter the charge sheets against the respondents were re filed in the Court of Special judge at Alipore, who issued summons on June 2, 1952 to the respondents to appear before him The first respondent thereupon preferred a revision petition to the High Court praying that the proceedings before the Special Judge and the summons issued by him be quashed.
The precise points that he urged on this occasion in support of this petition are number very clear but numberhing turns on them because the revision was withdrawn and was dismissed by an order dated 24 5 1.954.
When, however, after the termination of the revision before the High Court the Special judge issued numberice to the accused and companymenced proceedings, the first respondent filed a petition before him questioning his Jurisdiction to try the case on the ground that by reason of the provision companytained in s. 12 of Act XII of 1952, it was the Chief Presidency Magistrate alone that had jurisdiction over the case and that it companyld number legally be allotted by the State Government to the Special judge for trial.
The Respondent in person.
The police devised a, plan.
The learned .judges held that in the absence of a provision in the Ordinance 8 of 1952 or in the Act replacing it Act 12 of 1952 to keep alive things done or action taken or proceedings had in exercise of powers companyferred by or under the Ordinance, there was a termination of proceedings companymenced under the Ordinance, and so the summons issued by the Special judge on 2 6 1952 during the pendency of the Ordinance as also the proceedings before him were held to have become dead on the expiry of the Ordinance and so were liable to be quashed.
Either because of the view which they entertained on the point just number mentioned and that was companysidered sufficient to dispose of the case, or because their attention was number drawn to the terms of s.12 of Act XII of 1952, the learned Judges did number pronounce upon the effect of that provision on the jurisdiction of the Special judge.
The first respondent again questioned the jurisdiction of the Special judge and invoked the revisional powers of the High Court, .
The Special judge over ruled this objection and dismissed the petition.
It was at that stage that the Government issued the numberification under s. 4 of the Act allotting the case to the Special judge at Alipore and directed a trial by him.
and s.5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Pending proceedings in other companyrts number to be affected Nothing in this Act shall apply to any proceedings pending on the date of the companymencement of the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Special Courts Amending Ordinance, 1952, in any companyrt other than a Special Court.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 1959.
No. 1128 of 1957.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR, The three respondents are alleged to have companymitted the offences with which they are charged in September 1950 and though 12 years have passed by since then numberstep has been taken beyond the issue of numberices to them.
This delay has been caused by companyflicting views which have been entertained from time to time about the Court having jurisdiction to try the respondents whether it is the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, or the judge of the Special Court companystituted under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Special Courts Act, 1949.
The judgment of the High Court number under appeal has held that the judge of the Special Court had numberjurisdiction to proceed with the trial but that the Chief Presidency Magistrate before whom a charge sheet in respect of the offences alleged against the respondents had been laid in January 1951 had alone jurisdiction to try the case.
The State which has companye up in appeal against this order companytends that on a companystruction of the relevant statutes and other matters to which we shall refer, it was the Special judge who had the jurisdiction to try the case.
by, which they had a foot companystable appointed, as a, Packer in the Sub Post Officer in order to watch the happenings there, and thereafter, on information furnished by him a raid was companyducted in September 1950 and the first respondent as well as respondents 2 and 3 who were respectively the Money Order clerk and the Registration clerk in the said Post Office were arrested.
After the police companypleted the investigation a charge sheet was submitted on 16 1 1951 to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, charging the three accused with offences under s.120 .B read with s.409 of the Indian Penal Code etc.
| 1 | train | 1962_162.txt |
The facts are number in dispute and may be stated as follows By numberification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the Act published in the Government Gazette on 26 October 1967, the State Government declared its intention to acquire the land belonging to the respondent for estab lishing Naval Air Station Dabolim.
On 23 February 1968, numberification under section 6 was published in the Gazette.
On 28th May 1985, the Court after investigation of the claim awarded companypensation at Rs.3 per square meter.
The appellant is further entitled to interest at the rate of 9 for the first year from the date of taking over possession and thereafter at the rate of 15 per annum till the date of deposit or payment as the case may be.
The appellant shall be entitled to further 15 per cent solatium in addition to the 15 per cent already granted to him.
Anil Dev Singh, C. Ramesh, C.V.S. Rao and P. Parmeshwa ran for the Appellants.
K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachher, Atul Nanda and M. Satin for the Respondent.
The Court also awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6 per cent from the date of taking possession till payment of companypensation.
To the extent indicat ed above, the award shall stand modified.
The High Court has thus granted three more reliefs to the claimant i Additional amount at the rate of 12 per cent of the market value from the date of numberification under section 4 till the date of taking over possession ii interest at the rare of 9 for the first year from the date of taking possession and 15 per cent for the subsequent years and iii solatium at 30 per cent on the market value.
Shortly thereafter there was another decision by a three Judge Bench in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chand igarh, 1985 3 SCC 737.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 4802 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.1987 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 24 of 1986.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETrY, J. Special Leave granted.
On 5 March 1969 the Land Acquisition Officer declared award determining companypensation at the rate of 40 paise per square meter with solatium at 15 per cent.
Not being satisfied, the claimant preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking further enhancement of companypensation and also solatium at 30 per cent.
This claim was apparently based on the new provisions introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984.
This decision was rendered on 14 February 1985.
| 1 | train | 1989_364.txt |
No. 133/97 was filed by M s Khandaka Jain Jewellers, petitioner respondent herein in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur who prayed that a direction may be issued to the respondent 23 to register the sale deeds sent by the Court of additional district Judge No. 1, Jaipur city in execution application No. 15/94 and 16/94 and to send back the same to the Court immediately after registration.
It was also prayed that the respondents may be directed to register the sale deeds on the stamps on which it is executed by the executing companyrt and number to charge more stamp duty from respondent herein .
As the vendor failed to companyply with the terms of the agreement, the respondent vendee filed a suit for specific performance of the companytract in the Court of district Judge, Jaipur city which was later on transferred to the Court of additional district Judge No.1, Jaipur city under registration No. 216/86.
The suit was decreed by the Judgment and decree dated 2nd February,1994.
Since the vendor did number execute the sale deed, therefore, the respondent firm filed the execution application No. 16/90 before the Court of additional district Judge No. 1, Jaipur city.
Consequently, the respondent firm filed another suit for specific performance of the companytract in the Court of district Judge, Jaipur city.
No. 1, Jaipur city under registration No. 151/91.
The execution application No. 15/94 was filed before the Court of additional district Judge No. 1, Jaipur city.
Both these applications No. 15/94 and 16/94 were taken up by the executing companyrt and the respondent firm was directed to submit the stamp papers for the execution of the two sale deeds.
In case No. 442/95 he assessed value of the property as Rs. 5,60,000/ and deficient stamp duty was raised to the extent of Rs. 41,900/ and deficient registration fees as Rs 1500/ and he also levied the penalty of Rs. 1000/ .
In the second case No. 443/95 he assessed value of the property as Rs.
3,87,580/ and deficient stamp duty to the extent of Rs.
33,758/ and deficient registration fees as Rs. 1500/ and the penalty of Rs. 1000/ .
The respondent firm filed writ petition challenging both these orders and the companytention of the respondent firm was that the valuation of the property should be taken when the agreement of sale deed was executed, and number at the time of the registration of the sale deed.
The property was agreed to be purchased for a sum of Rs. 1,41,000/ out of which Rs. 20,000/ were paid at the time of the agreement.
The respondent firm purchased the stamp papers and got the sale deed typed.
It was also transferred to the companyrt of additional district Judge The Sub Registrar exercising its powers under Section 47A 1 of the Stamp Act sent these two sale deeds to Collector Stamps Jaipur for determining the market value and to assess the charge of the stamp duty.
Thus, the total amount against the respondent firm raised was Rs. 44,400/ .
Thus the total amount directed to be recovered from the respondent firm was Rs.
The respondent firm was ready and willing to pay the amount, and therefore, it was number his fault.
The learned Judge after companysidering the matter directed to set aside both the orders and held that for the purpose of charging stamp duty, etc, the relevant date for assessment of the market value shall be the date on which the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sale was filed.
Aggrieved against this order, an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench and the Division Bench affirmed the order of the learned single Judge.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5273 OF 2007 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.19439 of 2006 K. MATHUR, J. Leave granted.
This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.11.2005 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in SBCWP No. 133/1997 and DBCSA No. 427/2002 whereby the division bench has affirmed the order of the learned Single Judge.
Brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under The S.B. Civil writ petition It was further prayed to quash and set aside the proceedings taken under Section 47A 2 of the Stamps Act, 1952 in case No. 442/95 and 443/95 on 4th March, 1997 for determination of the valuation of the sale deed for registration.
The respondent is a registered firm and it entered into two agreements for purchase of properties with Shri Prem Chand Ajmera, resident of 2148, Haldiyon Ka Rasta Jaipur by one agreement dated 20th October, 1983.
In pursuance of the said decree, the respondent firm deposited an amount of Rs. 1,21,000/ in the Court on 9th May, 1994.
In another agreement dated 20TH October, 1983 the vendor Premchand agreed to sell a portion of property for a sum of Rs. 50,000/ out of which Rs. 10,000/ was paid at the time of agreement.
In this case also the vendor failed to fulfill the companydition of agreement and to execute the sale deed.
The suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 2nd February, 1994 and the respondent firm was directed to deposit the remaining amount of Rs. 40,000/ and the judgment debtor would execute the sale deed.
If the judgment debtor fails to companyply with the decree, the decree holder would be entitled to get the sale deed registered and to get the possession.
In companypliance of the judgment and decree passed by the Court, the respondent firm deposited an amount of Rs. 40,000/ in the companyrt but the judgment debtor did number execute the sale deed.
The stamp papers for a sum of Rs.14,100/ and Rs. 5,000/ for execution of the sale deeds in respect of properties purchased for a sum of Rs. 1,41,000/ and Rs. 50,000/ respectively, were submitted by the respondent firm.
| 1 | train | 2007_869.txt |
In pursuance of an interim order passed by this Court, a sum of Rs.2 crores Rupees two Crores has been paid by the petitioners to the respondent Bank and the said amount has been kept in a separate account by the respondent Bank.
It would number be necessary for the petitioners to pay a further sum of Rs.65 lakhs as directed by the Tribunal.
At that stage, Writ Petition No.367/2011 had been filed in this Court.
In the afore stated appeal an interim order had been passed whereby the petitioner had been directed to pay Rs.65 lakhs Rupees sixty five lakhs by way of pre deposit.
| 0 | train | 2015_737.txt |
N. Grover, J. This is an appeal Under Section 116A of the Representation of People Act 1951, hereinafter called the Act from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing an election petition filed by the appellant challenging the election of respondent No 1 to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from Constituency No. 84 Sandila District Hardoi held in February 1969 on the ground that one of the candidates had number been made a party to the petition.
The date for filing the numberination papers of the candidates for the mid term election in the State of U.P. was January 9, 1969 On that date nine candidates filed their numberination papers.
No. 1 was declared elected on February 10, 1969.
1 secured 32, 031 and the appellant 31, 955 votes.
On March 27, 1969 the appellant filed an election petition in the High Court of Allahabad Respondent No. 1 and other six candidates who had companytested the election were duly impleadcd as parties but Aizaz Rasul who had withdrawn from the companytest was number made a party.
Sanitary Inspector Kachauna Block Sandila, a person in the service of the U.P. Government who resides in the kothi of respondent No. 1 at Sandila for the furtherance of the prospects of her election.
No. 1 her election agent by interfering with the free exercise of electoral rights of electors taking advantage of his official position and telling them that they will have to suffer from his hands in case they will number support the candidature of respondent No. 1 and vote for her.
That in case it is number proved that the companyrupt practices mentioned in paragraph 20 and in its sub paragraphs were companymitted by respondent No. 1 and her election agent or by her agents with her companysent they were companymitted by the persons named in respective Schedules viz.
Schedules VIIA and VIII in fhe interest of the respondent No. 1 and the same has materially affected the result of the election as the respondent No. 1 who has succeeded by a margin of 76 votes she secured more than 1000 votes due to the companyrupt practices companymitted in her interest.
Schedule VIII of the petition which is a part of para 20 c may also be reproduced to the extent necessary SCHEULE VIII Name of the person Date Place Remarks companymitted companyrupt practice 2 2 1969 Village He went with Nawab Nawab Ezaz Rasool Malaiya Ezaz Rasool in a jeep husband and Election and canvassed support Agent of respondent for her in that village No. along with him.
After the numberination papers had been accepted Aizaz Rasul and one other candidate withdrew from the companytest and seven candidates were left in the field.
Respondent It is unnecessary to mention the votes polled by all the candidates.
These are in the following terms That respondent No 1 herself and through her companysent, her agents obtained or procured and attempted to obtain or procure the services of Shri Madan, Gopal Misra.
A companyplaint regarding his working at the aforesaid election was made by Bishamber Dayal Gupta of Jan Sangh party to the district Magi strate, District Medical Officer of Health and District Election Officer, Hardoi on 3 2 1969, particulars of this companyrupt practice as far as possible are being given in schedule VIII annexed to this petition.
The name, date and place of companymission of such companyrupt practice are the same as are given in Schedule VIII to the election petition.
An attempt was made long after the period of limitation for filing the election petition had expired to amend companyunm I of the heading of Schedule VIII by the insertion of words in whose companypany Madan Gopal Misra between the words persons and companymitted in companyumn I of that Schedule That was rightly disallowed by the learned trial judge as a defective petition companyld number be allowed to be rectified after the period of limitation for filing it had expired.
That the said Madan Gopal Misra, Sanitary Inspector mentioned in foregoing paragraph companymitted companyrupt practice of undue influence defined in Section 123 2 of the Representation of Peoples Act with the companysent of respondent
1, had been numberinated as a candidate and his numberination papers were held to be in order by the Returning Officer on January 9, 1969.
The polling took place on February 7, 1969.
The allegations relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal which need be numbericed from the election petition are companytained in Clauses b and c of para 20 and para 21.
No. 3 2 1969 Village He accompanied respondent No. 1 in her jeep and canvassed support for her in the village along with her.
| 0 | train | 1970_284.txt |
The appellant was appointed temporarily as a T Mate by the respondent Haryana State Electricity Board on November 20, 1968.
On that date he was appointed as a shift attendant on a regular basis.
This order the appellant did number challenge.
Be that as it may, he was appointed on an ad hoc basis in the same post on December 12, 1974.
On September 10, 1975, however, the said ad hoc appointment was also terminated.
On September 11, 1987, he was transferred to A.E.E. Transformer Repair Workshop, Karnal, as a T Mate.
Since numberaction was taken by the Board, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court on August 1, 1990, challenging the order of termination dated November 15, 1974 and for certain other reliefs.
On January 8, 1991, the High Court disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the Board to companysider the appellants representation dated February 10, 1990 within six months from the date of the order.
The appellant then filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court claiming that in view of the revocation of the termination orders, he is entitled to his seniority and other benefits with effect from November 15, 1974.
He goes further and says that by virtue of the order dated July 18, 1991, the Board has withdrawn number only his termination order dated November 15, 1974 but also the termination order dated September 10, 1975.
Heard companynsel for the parties.
Leave granted.
This order he did number challenge.
Though the order does number specify on which post was the said regular appointment was made, it must necessarily be understood as regularisation in the post which he was holding on that date viz., T Mate.
The appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated August 2, 1991 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition in limine.
He companytinued as such till April 16, 1973.
His services were terminated on November 15, 1974 with effect from December 15, 1974.
After a gap of about three years he was appointed on daily wages as a laborer on July 7, 1978.
It appears that on February 10, 1990 the appellant made a representation to the respondent Board to recall the termination order of November 15, 1974, and to regularise him in the post of shift attendant with effect from 1968.
Accordingly, the Board companysidered the appellants case and by an order dated July 18, 1991, directed as follows taking a sympathetic and humanitarian companysideration he has been allowed relaxation in age for first entry into the Board service on October 10, 1988 and accordingly, his termination orders have been withdrawn.
It was this writ petition which was summarily dismissed by the High Court.
July 7, 1978 and from July 7, 1978 to date, he has only a service of about 10 years as daily wages work charge and number 20 years as companytended by him in his representation under disposal.
| 0 | train | 1993_491.txt |
naunit lal and t. m. sen for the appellant.
september 5.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shah j. a dispute arising under a companytract relating to the supply of solidified fuel between messrs. mohindra supply companypany hereinafter referred to as the respondents and the governumber general of india in council was referred to arbitration of two arbitrators.
on march 19 1946 the arbitrators made and published an award directing the governumber general to pay to the respondents rs. 47250/ with interest at 3 from july 171944 till payment.
this award was filed in the companyrt of the subordinate judge first class delhi.
t. desai chatter behari and a. g. ratnaparkhi for the respondent.
before the appellate bench the governumber general companytended that the appeal under the letters patent was prohibited by s. 39 2 of the indian arbitration act.
the full bench opined that an appeal from the judgment of a single judge exercising appellate powers did lie under cl. 10 of the letters patent numberwithstanding the bar companytained in s. 39 2 of the arbitration act.
letters patent from an order of a single judge to a bench of the same companyrt were number prohibited.
in the meanwhile chundermonis moiety in the taluk was purchased by hurrish chunder.
15 of the letters patent of the high companyrt.
a full bench of the high companyrt was unanimously of the view that the discretion exercised by pontifex j. was erroneous but in the view of garth c. j. the order passed by pontifex j. was merely a ministerial order which he 1872 9 bom.
r. c. reports 398. 3 1882 l.r. 10 i. a. 4 17.
white and romeshchunder mitter jj. held that the order amounted to a judgment and was appealable under cl.
15 of the letters patent.
in negativing the argument of garth c.j.
the companymittee pointed out that pontifex j. was number shown to have usurped jurisdiction which did number belong to him but even if he had that was a valid ground of appeal and that if a judge of the high companyrt made an order under a misapprehension of the extent of his jurisdiction the high companyrt had the power to entertain an appeal to set right such a miscarriage of justice.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 112 of 1958.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated may 25 1954 of the punjab high companyrt in l.p.a.
number 82 of 1948.
the governumber general applied for an order setting aside the award on certain grounds which for the purposes of this appeal are number material.
the subordinate judge refused to set aside the award on the grounds set up and rejected the application.
against the order refusing to set aside the award the governumber general preferred to the lahore high companyrt an appeal which after the setting up of the dominions of india and pakistan was transferred to the circuit bench of the east punjab high companyrt at delhi.
falshaw j. who heard the appeal set aside the order because in his view the dispute could number be referred to arbitration under the companytract which gave rise to the dispute and that was sufficient to invalidate the award.
against that order an appeal was preferred under cl.10 of the letters patent of the high court of lahore which by the high companyrt punjab order 1947 applied to the east punjab high companyrt.
after the opinion of the full bench was delivered a division bench companysidered the appeal on its merits and set aside the order of falshaw j. the union of india appeals against the decision of the high companyrt.
1948 lah.
| 1 | test | 1961_302.txt |
the petitioners contention is that the said article companytravenes the constitutional right guaranteed to the persons employed in civil capacities either under the union or the state by art.
the petitioner was appointed as assistant superintendent of police in the erstwhile patiala state by his highness maharaja adhiraj of patiala on the 4th of february 1942.
the companyditions of his service were governed by the patiala state service regulations which had been issued by the ruler of patiala state who was at the relevant time the sovereign legislature of the state.
respondent number 1 the state of punjab and respondent number 2 have by their counter affidavit denied the petitioners companytention that the impugned article 9.1 is companystitutionally invalid and they have resisted his claim for quashing the numberice issued by respondent number 2 against the petitioner.
petition under art.
p. bhandari and r. gopalakrishnan for the petitioner.
and r. n. achthey for the respondents.
309 of the companystitution and all other powers enabling him in that behalf.
original jurisdiction writ petition number 200 of 1963.
april 1 1964.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar c. j. this petition which has been filed by the petitioner s. gurdev singh sidhu under art 32 of the constitution challenges the validity of article 9 1 of the pepsu services regulations volume 1 as amended by the governumber of punjab by the numberification issued by him on the 19th january 1960 in exercise of the powers companyferred on him by the proviso to art.
later the petitioner was confirmed in the rank on the occurrence of a regular vacancy after he had undergone practical district training companyrses in the punjab in 1947.
on the formation of patiala and east punjab states union on the 20th august 1948 the petitioner was integrated in pepsu police service.
| 1 | test | 1964_282.txt |
The following Order of the Court was delivered This appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dismissing appellants CWP No.
The first respondent filed application before the Development and Panchayat Officer cum Collector, Ludhiana for short.
Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 companytested the claim of the first respondent pleading that the land belonged to the Government of Punjab and it was allotted in their favour under a package deal in lieu of which the amount was also deposited in the Treasury that the possession of the land was given to them as per the order of the Tehsildar in the year 1970 and on that basis they have been in possession of the same that the mutation in the name of Panchayat was done without numberice to them, therefore, it is illegal that by mutation the Panchayat did number become the owner of the land in which there was potato farm which was Government Agency that the Government of Punjab established the potato farm by spending crores of rupees that pucca buildings were companystructed on the site and 27 crores and 9 electric motors were also installed there and that there are 12 tractors of the farm on the site.
It was further averred that the Government was spending about 10 to 11 lakhs per year on the potato farm.
The Collector, after discussing the evidence placed on record by the parties, pointed out the appellant Nos.
With regard to dispute of title to the land it was numbered that appellants never brought to his numberice that the title dispute should be decided first number was any application filed for that purpose before him.
Appellant Nos.
2 and 3 herein filed an appeal against the said order before the Director Rural Development and Panchayat, Punjab exercising the powers of Commissioner under the Act hereinafter referred to as, the Commissioner .
The companyrectness of the order of the Commissioner was assailed in the Writ Petition by the said appellants and the State of Punjab, which as stated above, was dismissed by the High Court by the order under challenge in this appeal.
It was held that the disputed land was owned by Gram Panchayat and in that view of the matter he ordered delivery of possession of the land to the Gram Panchayat.
2002 2 SCR 283 the Collector under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands Regulations Act, 1961 for short, the Act for possession of the land in dispute on the ground that the land has vested in it and the same was mutated in the name of Panchayat by order of the Tehsildar dated September 4, 1986.
The Commissioner, on examining record in the light of the companytentions of the parties, held that the documents brought on record did number link up the case with the land in question and that numberhing was placed on record to support the package deal and as to how and when the land was allotted to the Horticulture Department and accordingly dismissed the appeal on January 11, 1995.
| 0 | train | 2002_224.txt |
Consequently, the matter was referred to the Chairman who, by his judgment and order dated 15.2.1987, which is impugned in this appeal, agreed with the judicial Member and found that the respondent did belong to the Nuniya caste, which was duly numberified as a Scheduled Caste in the State of West Bengal. which has been declared as a Scheduled Caste in the State of West Bengal but number so in Bihar.
The parents of the respondent, before companying to West Ben gal, were living in Village Chanchopali in Siwan District in the State of Bihar where they also owned some property.
While working in the Customs House, respondent ap plied for Scheduled Caste certificate which was issued to him by the Sub Divisional Officer, Sadar.
He claimed that he belonged to Nuniya Caste which was a Scheduled Caste companymunity declared as such in the State of West Bengal.
He also indicated that his parents were ordinarily residing in District Howrah, West Ben gal.
Union Public Service Commission made necessary in quiries and by its letter dated 6.2.1967 accepted the respondent as a candidate belonging to Nuniya Caste which was a Scheduled Caste in the Howrah District of West Bengal, and thus companyfirmed the respondents can didature for the Indian Administrative Service etc.
It was for this reason that the Comptroller and Auditor General wrote to the respondent that he cannot be treated as a member of the Scheduled Caste companymunity.
This letter was received by the respondent while he was working as Deputy Accountant General and had been selected for Post Graduate Diploma Course in Financial Studies in the United Kingdom under Colombo Plan, While he had made all preparations and even purchased the air ticket to proceed to the United Kingdom, he received the above letter which scut tled his programme.
Respondent, at that stage, approached the Central Administrative Tribunal where he companytended that he belonged to Nuniya caste and the Caste Certificate produced by him at the lime of his examination, which was only checked and verified by the Union Public Service Commission UPSC, for short , had been properly issued by the Sub Divisional Of ficer, Howrah, as his parents has been residing in that State for over 30 years prior to the date on which the examination was held by the Union Public Service Commission.
His companytention was accepted by the Judicial Member of the Tribunal, but the Administrative Member did number agree and gave a dissenting judgment.
It was further found that the ordinary place of residence of the parents of the respondent was Howrah from where the Caste Certificate was produced by the respondent, which was a proper and valid certificate.
The Claim Petition was allowed with these findings and it is against this judgment that the Union of India has companye in appeal before us.
Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel for the Union of India has companytended that in allowing the Claim Petition the Tribunal companymitted a manifest error in number companysidering the true impact of the vital fact that the respondent was born in a village in Siwan District in the State of Bihar where he also received his early education.
He also graduated from a University in Bihar and, therefore, for all intents and purposes, he was to be treated as a member of Nuniya companymunity of Bihar, which, for that State, had number been declared to be a Scheduled Caste.
The mere fact that the respondent, for purposes of education, stayed in the Stale of Bihar and graduated from a companylege in that state, would number affect the status of his parents who were already living in District Howrah for more than 30 years and companysequently companyld be treated as ordinarily residing in District Howrah.
2000 1 SCR 1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Respondent is a member of the Indian Administrative and Allied Services.
He was appointed in 1968 against a reserved vacancy as he was treated to belong to Nuniya companymunity which was declared to be a Scheduled Caste companymunity in the State of West Bengal and number in the State of Bihar where the respondent was born and had his schooling throughout even upto Graduate level.
Ex amination, 1966.
after verification of his character and antecedents, ap pointed him to the Indian Administrative Allied Services against a Reserved vacancy as a Scheduled Caste candidate in the year 1968.
Divisionin the Statebelongs to the companymunity which is recognised as a Scheduled Castes Tribes under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists Modification Order, 1956, read with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders Amendment Act, 1956, the Constitution Jammu Kash mir Schedule Castes Order, 1956 and the Constitution Andaman and Nicobar Islands Scheduled Tribes Order, 1959.
NOTE THE TERM ORDINARILY RESIDE USED HERE WILL HAVE THE SAME MEANING AS IN SECTION 20 OF THE REPRESENTATION OF PEOPLE ACT, 1950 The Examination in which the respondent had appeared was the 1966 Examination for recruitment to Indian Administrative and Allied Services which was held 30 years after the parents of the respondent had settled down in Howrah District.
| 0 | train | 2000_14.txt |
Accused No. 2, Bakha Singh and Accused No. 7 All the accused filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab Haryana.
The High Court acquitted accused No. 6, Labh Singh, son of Inder Singh and companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence of all other accused persons.
Jassa Singh made a companyplaint before the Deputy Commissioner, Karnal, alleging that the Sarpanch Surmukh Singh had leased out the land to his own persons for a lesser amount and stated that he was prepared to deposit an amount of Rs.84,000/ .
Narinder Singh, son of Balwant, and Subeg Singh then filed a civil suit before the civil companyrt, Karnal, for an injunction to restrain the officers from putting up the land on re auction.
Gurmukh Singh and his deceased brother, Surmukh Singh made an appeal to the appellants number to pick up a quarrel and that they may settle the dispute in companyrt.
Appellant Sukha Singh also fired a shot at Surmukh Singh with his 12 bore gun.
Darbara Singh stated that at about 6.15 PM, he along with his son Gurdev Singh went to the dera of Resham Singh where Tehal Singh and Kuldeep Singh had also companye in search of some labourers for planting paddy on the next day.
PW 25 took over the investigation and as stated before, he visited the place of incident from where he recovered three empty cartridges and some blood stained earth was also taken into possession under a seizure memo.
We heard the learned companynsel for the appellants as well as learned companynsel for the State of Haryana.
G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. Ten accused persons were tried by the Additional Court of Sessions, Karnal, for offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 148 read with Section 149 IPC, for causing death of two persons, namely, Surmukh Singh and Tehal Singh.
All the accused were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life for the offences under Section 302 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC.
Sukha Singh were also found guilty under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act .
Their companyviction and sentence are challenged before us in these appeals.
Deceased Surmukh Singh was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Jalmana.
This Gram Panchayat had leased out 25 acres of land in favour of the first accused, Jassa Singh alias Jaswant Singh and the 8th accused , Sarang Singh, son of Dalip Singh.
They had been in possession of this land for about 10 12 years.
About two and half months prior to the date of occurrence of the incident, this land was re auctioned and Subeg Singh, Narinder Singh and Kehar Singh became successful bidders.
Kehar Singh is the brother of deceased Surmukh Singh.
Surmukh Singh, the Sarpanch, then initiated proceedings before the Sub Divisional Magistrate to evict Jassa Singh from the property.
Pursuant to the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, Jassa Singh deposited the sum of Rs.84,000/ with the Block Development Panchayat Officer.
Sub Divisional Magistrate, Assandh, took up the proceedings for ejectment of Jassa Singh and others.
There were two tractors one was being driven by one Gurvinder Singh and the other by Subeg Singh.
Along with them, Ajmer Singh, Waryam Singh, Narinder Singh, son of Bawa Singh, were also there.
At about 6.00 PM when Surmukh Singh and Narinder Singh were sitting on the boundary of the field, all the appellants came there.
While appellants Jassa Singh, Bakha Singh Suklha Singh were armed with guns, other accused persons were having Gandasis with them.
According to prosecution, Labh Singh and Jassa Singh made exhortations to kill Surmukh Singh, the Sarpanch.
But the appellants advanced towards the tractor driven by Gurvinder Singh and Jassa Singh fired a shot at Surmukh Singh.
Appellant, Bakha Singh also fired a shot at Surmukh Singh.
Surmukh Singh fell down on the ground.
According to prosecution case, appellants Jassa Singh, Kabul Singh, Jeet Singh, Labh Singh, Lakha Singh, Sarang Singh, Satnam Singh and Swaran Singh started attacking Surmukh Singh with their Gandasis.
The learned companynsel submitted that this was a wanton act of criminal trespass and the appellants were entitled to exercise their right of private defence and, therefore, they have number companymitted any offence.
PW 2, the doctor gave evidence to the effect that while injury number 1 was caused by a sharp weapon, injury number.2, 3, 4 5 were caused by fire arms and injury number.
Except the testimony of PW 9 and PW 10, there is numberevidence to speak about the presence of ten accused persons together at the place of incident.
There is also numberevidence to show that these Gandasis were stained with human blood.
All possible independent evidence to companynect these five appellants to the crime is lacking.
Briefly stated, the facts of the case are thus.
Accused Jassa Singh instituted a civil suit to retain possession of the said leasehold land.
The Gram Panchayat companytested the suit and the civil companyrt passed an order to the effect that Jassa Singh shall be divested of his possession only in accordance with law.
The civil companyrt granted the injunction in favour of Narinder Singh and others.
While these proceedings were pending, on 2nd July, 1992 at about 5.00 PM, Surmukh Singh, his brother Gurmukh Singh, along with some others went to the lease hold property.
After some time, Gurmukh Singh heard the sound of a firearm shot from the side of the dera of Labh Singh and later he came to know that Tehal Singh had died of gunshot injuries sustained at the hands of Lakha Singh and others.
The Sessions Court as well as the High Court accepted the testimony of these witnesses and based on their depositions, passed orders of companyviction and sentence of these appellants.
He also companytended that the Sessions Court should number have tried the cases relating to two incidents as one case and this has seriously prejudiced the case of the appellants.
It is pertinent to numbere the injuries sustained by deceased Surmukh Singh.
| 1 | train | 2002_39.txt |
State of Madhya Pradesh has filed the appeal questioning the judgment of Division Bench of the High Court dated 30.10.2013 passed in Writ Appeal The Additional District Magistrate, Gwalior has passed an order dated 26.02.2013 externing the respondent for a period of one year from the district companycerned.
A writ Petition No. 4818 of 2013 was filed by the respondent challenging the order of the Additional District Magistrate as well as of the Commissioner, Gwalior Division.
Reliance was also placed on an order passed by another learned Single Judge dated 30.05.2013 in Writ Petition No. 8555/2012 State of Madhya Pradesh Ors.
Writ Appeal was filed against the judgment of the High Court by the State of Madhya Pradesh being Writ Appeal No. 71 of 2014.
State aggrieved by the order has companye up in this appeal.
ASHOK BHUSHAN,J. Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified 2.
Digitally signed by SANJAY KUMAR Dharmendra Rathore.
These two appeals raising similar question of law Date 2019.01.29 164223 IST Reason has been heard together and are being decided by this companymon judgment.
Arvind Sharma Vs.
The High Court relying on judgment of Arvind Sharma Vs.
Arvind Sharma, in which judgment, the High Court after companysidering the provisions of Sections 3, 13 and 29 of the Adhiniyam, 1990 and relying on the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Ajaib Singh Vs.
No. 244 of 2013 and judgment of Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 71 of 2014 dated 20.06.2014 following the earlier judgment dated 30.10.2013.
For deciding the appeals, it shall be sufficient to refer to the facts in Civil Appeal The State of Madhya Pradesh Ors.
An appeal was filed by the respondent against the order of the Additional District Magistrate before the Commissioner, Gwalior Division, which too was dismissed on 17.06.2013.
The main ground taken by the respondent before the High Court was that the Additional District Magistrate had numberjurisdiction to pass the order under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 hereinafter referred to as Adhiniyam, 1990 .
The order can be passed only by District Magistrate.
State of Madhya Pradesh Ors. allowed the writ petition holding that Additional District Magistrate was incompetent to pass the order under the Adhiniyam, 1990.
By judgment and order dated 20.06.2014, the writ appeal has been dismissed by Division Bench relying on its judgment in Writ Appeal No. 244 of 2013 dated 30.10.2013 State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1619 held that the order companyld number have been passed by any authority lower than the rank of District Magistrate.
| 1 | train | 2019_25.txt |
As there was numberplayground in the companylege run by the appellant, it appears from the facts that on an application made by the appellant, the Assistant Commissioner, Belgaum, by his order dated 18th February, 1970, granted the land in question in favour of the appellant.
Against the said order, Vidya Prasarak Samithi filed a revision petition before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal.
Hence, Vidya Prasarak Samithi filed a writ petition before the High Court, being Writ Petition No.3314 of 1979.
Being aggrieved by the order passed by Respondent No.1, Respondent No.3 filed a writ petition before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore.
BVVS filed an appeal before Respondent No.1 The Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum District.
BVVS Respondent No.3 filed an appeal being Appeal No.129 of 1999, before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal.
The Appellate Tribunal by its order dated 27th August, 1999, modified the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and ordered the appellant and Respondent No.3 to use the playground bearing CTS No.1674/1 on alternative days.
Respondent No.3 was given a preference to make use of it on Sunday and alternative days and the appellant was to use it from Monday and alternative days.
In these circumstances, the appellant feeling aggrieved filed a writ petition, being Writ Petition No.2325 of 2003, before the High Court of Karnataka.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court by his order dated 24.11.2003 allowed the writ petition filed by the appellant and set aside the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal companyfirming the grant of land in favour of the appellant.
On the other hand, the appellant has numberland of its own for use as playground and BVVS did number ever question the said plea of the appellant.
Being aggrieved, BVVS filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court.
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. Leave granted.
The Deputy Commissioner companyfirmed the order of the Assistant Commissioner granting land.
The order of the Deputy Commissioner was further companyfirmed by the Divisional Commissioner.
The said Tribunal dismissed the revision petition and companyfirmed the arrangement suggested by the Divisional Commissioner.
It is further held by the High Court that if the plot purchased by BVVS is number sufficient for its requirement or if there is numbersuch purchase, then the Assistant Commissioner should work out a satisfactory arrangement to share CTS No.1674/1, for use as playground on alternative dates by the said two institutions.
The High Court further held that the Assistant Commissioner should also hold inquiry after affording opportunities to the parties of being heard.
The BVVS companystructed a school building meant for Girls Junior College on this land.
The remaining area 120 Mtr.
The said point was number companysidered by the Tribunal.
Furthermore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court held that the Government at the instance of respondent No.3 has acquired 4 acres of land for the purpose of playground.
Therefore, it was the duty of Respondent No.3 to reserve sufficient extent of land for use as playground and rest of the land would have been utilized for companystruction of the school.
In these circumstances, the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal.
Accordingly, the Public Works Department fixed the market value of the property in question at Rs.51,600/ vide valuation letter, which was duly paid by BVVS in favour of the Public Works Department by challan vide document produced at Annexure R 3 in the office of Bagalkot Treasury on 8.11.1982 which was brought to the numberice of the Public Works Department.
Thereafter, a trust deed was registered by BVVS Respondent No.3 wherefrom it would be evident that the property in question though belonged to the Education Department, since the administration and management of the High School run by the Education Department was transferred to BVVS, its property, namely, playground was also transferred in favour of BVVS for its market value.
The Division Bench also held that the undisputed fact was that the said playground was being used by the Government High School and the said property was one of its properties, and the same had been transferred to BVVS after fixing the market value by the Public Works Department and that therefore, Respondent Nos.1 and 2 have companymitted illegality in law in granting the land in question in favour of Vidya Prasarak Samithi, the appellant herein.
This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 29th October, 2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal No.850 of 2004, whereby the High Court allowed the appeal filed by Respondent No.3 herein.
The High Court by the impugned judgment held that the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner Respondent No.2 herein and companyfirmed by Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum Respondent No.1 herein , are number legal and valid and set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge affirming the orders passed by the said respondents.
The facts of the case are as follows The appellant Vidya Prasarak Samithi, Ramdurg, a Trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and Basaveshwar Vidya Vardhak Sangha BVVS for short , respondent No.3 herein, are running educational institutions at Ramdurg.
This order was challenged by Respondent No.3 by filing an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum.
Against the said order passed by the Assistant Commissioner granting land in favour of the appellant herein, an appeal was preferred by BVVS before the Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum.
The Deputy Commissioner dismissed the said appeal.
Further, an appeal was preferred by BVVS before the Divisional Commissioner, who allowed the appeal, cancelled the grant of land and further directed that both the institutions, instead of litigating, should evolve an arrangement for the companymon use of the playground for the benefit of their students.
| 0 | train | 2016_709.txt |
The Second Respondent, Karnataka State Industrial Investment Development Corporation Ltd. hereinafter the Corporation , had extended financial assistance to the Defaulting Company.
However, the Defaulting Company defaulted in repayment of the loans granted to it by the Corporation.
On 17.3.1992, the Corporation advertised the sale of the assets of the Defaulting Company i.e. the land, building, plant and machinery.
In response to the advertisement, and after several rounds of negotiations, Shreyas Papers P Ltd. hereinafter the First Respondent entered into an agreement with the Corporation for purchase of the land, building, plant and machinery of the Defaulting Company, which was put up for sale.
In Clause 2 of the offer to purchase dated 5.6.1992 , the First Respondent specifically stated We shall be taking over the unit with zero liabilities and shall number be held responsible for any existing statutory liabilities of the above said unit like Sale Tax, Excise Duty, Municipal taxes, E.S.I. and P.F. development loan, Central and State subsidy and rank liabilities etc. except as agreed in the meeting for KEB.
This offer was accepted by the Corporation and the sale took place companysequent thereto.
On 8.1.1993, the Commercial Tax Officer Recovery , Dharwad hereinafter the Second Appellant addressed a letter to the Secretary, Mandal Panchayat, Aloor, Haliyal Taluk, Karnataka, requesting him to enter encumbrance into the Record of Rights of the properties specified therein, on the ground that those properties were the properties of a defaulter of sales taxthe Defaulting Companyto the extent of Rs.21,79,715/ .
The First Respondent wrote a letter dated 31.5.1993 to the Corporation thereby requesting that a letter be addressed to the Second Appellant to withdraw his letter dated 8.1.1993, as the Corporation was the first charge holder and the assets had been sold to it by the Corporation free of all charges.
A letter was addressed, as requested, on 5.7.1993 by the Corporation to the Second Appellant.
It also numbered that the assets of the Defaulting Company had been transferred from the Corporation to the First Respondent on 12.8.1992.
It was further stated that the First Respondent being the transferee of the business, was jointly liable to discharge the arrears of sales tax of the Defaulting Company by virtue of Section 15 1 of the KST Act.
As the sales tax authorities were number willing to relent, the First Respondent moved a Writ Petition No. 32428/93 before the High Court of Karnataka, assailing the claim of the Second Appellant.
The substantive reliefs claimed therein were two fold Declare that the provisions of Section 15 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act are void Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction restraining the respondents 1 and 2 number to take any action against the petitioner for the recovery of the alleged sales tax recovery as mentioned in the companymunication No.
RRY.CR.3.92 93.1168 dated 11.8.1993 By a companymon judgment dated 22.9.1999 rendered in four similar writ petitions, the High Court of Karnataka allowed the writ petition.
The High Court held that the petitioner, being the purchaser in the auction from the Corporation, only of the land, building, plant and machinery, companyld number be companysidered as the transferee of the ownership of the business of the Defaulting Company.
Being aggrieved thereby, the State of Karnataka hereinafter the First Appellant and the Second Appellant are before us.
For the first time, by letter dated 8.1.1993 of the Second Appellant to the Mandal Panchayath, Aloor Taluk, the issue of sales tax dues of the Defaulting Company was brought to the surface.
This is further borne out by the companyrespondence between the First Respondent and the Corporation.
and labour dues.
On 11.8.1993, the Second Appellant issued a numberice under Section 15 of the KST Act informing the First Respondent that a charge had been created on the properties of the Defaulting Company on 17.2.1992 as the latter had defaulted in payment of sales tax.
Acting under the provisions of Section 29 1 of the SFC Act, the Corporation took over the assets of the Defaulting Company.
The Facts in Civil Appeal 3170/2000 A companypany by name Mishal Paper Mills P Ltd. hereinafter the Defaulting Company , was running a medium scale duplex board manufacturing unit.
At the stage of admission before this Court, the appeal against the Second Respondent was dismissed.
| 0 | train | 2006_34.txt |
It appears that the Government of U.P. framed certain rules for the admission in the superspeciality Courses.
Under the said rules candidates will be admitted on the basis of their merits in the M.B.B.S. examinations.
No. 9 were admitted on the basis of institutional preference.
Special leave is granted.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
By the said judgment the High Court also directed the admissions of respondents Nos. 6, 7 and 8 in the said companyrse.
Under the Rules, 75 of the seats are reserved for the institutional candidates.
The appellants and the respondent
The two appellants, namely, Dr. Sanjay Mehrotra, son of Shri B.R. Mehrotra, Dr. Vivek Tandon, son of Shri T.N. Tandon and respondent No. 9, Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Aggarwal, son of Shri R.K. Aggarwal were admitted in G.S.V.M. Medical College, Kanpur in D.M. Cardiology companyrse for the session 1987 89.
The admissions of the appellants and the respondent No. 9 were set aside by the High Court by its judgment dated 16th September, 1988 at the instance of respondent
| 0 | train | 1989_541.txt |
C. Misra and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.
No. P. Sinha and P. K. Chatterjee, for respondent No.
On May 20, 1965, an agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondents referring certain differences between them to the arbitration of three persons.
On January 19, 1956, an award was made, signed by two out of the three arbitrators as the third arbitrator had refused to sign the award.
Notice of filing of the award was issued to the appellant and was served upon him on September 30, 1957.
On November 3, 1957, the appellant filed an objection in the nature of a written statement.
By this objection the appellant attacked the validity of the award on various grounds.
But the objection did number companytain any prayer at the end, number did it indicate what relief the appellant desired, though there were as many as 43 paragraphs therein.
When the matter came to be heard in the trial companyrt, the respondents companytended that the so called objection was in the nature of an application to set aside the award and companytained grounds companying under s. 30 of the Arbitration Act, No. 10 of 1940, hereinafter referred to as the Act .
Therefore, as the objection was filed more than 30 days after the numberice was served on the appellant, it was barred by limitation under Art.
As he had number done so and as the objection was itself filed more than 30 days after the service of numberice on him, he was barred from raising any ground for setting aside the award which fell under S. 30 of the Act.
also before the High Court, but the High Court held that if the main question was answered against the appellant it would number be necessary to go into other points.
The High Court further held that the objection of the appellant companyld number be treated as an application under s. 33, as, if it was treated as such application, it would be barred by time.
K. Chatterjee, for respondent The trial companyrt held that the appellants objection was number maintainable, as his remedy was to apply under s. 33 of the Act, if he wanted the award to be set aside on the grounds raised in the objection.
The trial companyrt also held that the objection companyld number be treated as an application under s. 33 of the Act in view of the fact that it was beyond 30 days as required by Art.
The trial companyrt therefore passed a decree in terms of the award.
It seems that there were other points.
It seems therefore that other points were number pressed before the High Court.
158 of the Limitation Act.
The appellant then went in appeal to the High Court, and the main question urged there was whether the appellant companyld maintain his objection when he had failed to make an application under s. 33 of the Act for setting aside the award on grounds companytained in the objection.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1964.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 15, 1963 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in First Appeal from Order No. 30 of 1960.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Allahabad High Court and arises in the following circumstances.
The award was filed in companyrt on September 7, 1957 and the respondents prayed for a decree in accordance with the award.
158 of the Indian Limitation Act, No. 9 of 1908.
The High Court came to the companyclusion that the award companyld number be set aside on grounds which fell under s. 30 of the Act, except on an application under s. 33 of the Act within thirty days of the service of numberice of filing of the award as required by Art.
| 0 | train | 1967_344.txt |
Veda Vyasa, R. Ganapathy Iyer, R. N. Sachthey and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.
A Range, Bangalore, by order dated November 4, 1961, set aside the order and directed the Income tax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making inquiries on certain matters specified in the order.
At the request of the respondents under s. 66 2 of the Mysore Income tax Act, the Commissioner of Income tax, Mysore, referred the following questions to the High Court of Mysore On the facts and in the circumstances of the assessees case whether within the meaning of s. 34 of the Mysore Income tax Act, if a numberice under that section is issued within the prescribed period, whether the Income tax Officer can proceed to assess or re assess such escaped income after four years from the close of the assessment year? The respondent , then applied to the High Court of Mysore for issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the Income tax Officer from companytinuing the assessment proceeding for the year 1949 50 on the plea that the proceeding was because of expiry of the period of limitation barred.
Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent.
At the hearing of the reference, the respondents did number press the first question, and the High Court answered the second question in the affirmative.
The Income tax Officer companymenced inquiry directed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.
The Commissioner of Income tax has appealed to this Court with special leave.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2177 of1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 12, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition No. 1076 of 1962.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. The respondents a Hindu undivided family were assessed for the assessment year 1949 50 to tax under s 23 of the Mysore Income tax Act on a total income of Rs. 10,100/ The Second Additional Income tax Officer Urban Circle , Bangalore, companymenced a proceeding under s. 34 of the Mysore Income tax Act for re assessment of the income of the respondents for the assessment year 1949 50, and served a numberice in that behalf on March 6, 1951.
On May 21, 1954 the Income tax Officer determined the respondents total income at Rs. 75,957/ .
In appeal against the order, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax.
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, whether the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Incometax is companypetent to set aside and give directions to the Income tax Officer to re do the assessment in the manner the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income tax has done?
| 0 | train | 1967_253.txt |
n. andley uma dutta and brij bhushan for the appellant.
one rajendra kumar whose widow appellant smt.
both rajendra kumar and sarls gupta filed suit against each other praying for a decree of divorce.
soon thereafter on may 25 1963 rajendra kumar companytracted second marriage with appellant smt.
the final authority deputy director of consolidation upheld the claim of the appellant and this decision was challenged by the respondents in six petitions filed under article 22 of the companystitution in the high court of allahabad.
the appellant preferred six different appeals under the letters patent.
while rejecting the petition for revocation of special leave granted to the wife wanchoo j. as he then was speaking for the companyrt observed that even though it may number have been unlawful for the husband to have married immediately after the high courts decree for numberappeal as of right lies from the decree of the high companyrt to this companyrt still it was for the respondent to make sure whether an application for special leave had been filed in this companyrt and he companyld number by marrying immediately after the high companyrts decree deprive the wife of the chance of presenting a special leave petition to this companyrt.
2585 2590/ 69.
s. desai and promod swarup for respondent number 2 in a. number.
2585 2586 2588 2589 2590/69 and lrs.
2 6 7 and 8 of respondent number 1 in all the appeals.
the constitution.
lila gupta claims to be had companytracted a marriage with one sarla gupta.
lila gupta.
the division bench dismissed these appeals and confirmed the order of the learned single judge the division bench granted certificate under article 133 1 c to the present appellant and that is how these six appeals have come up before us.
granted by the high companyrt reversing the dismissal of the petition of the husband by the trial companyrt.
soon thereafter the husband companytracted second marriage.
the respondents shall pay the companyts of the ap pellant in this companyrt in one set.
the facts have already been set out by my brother desai.
appellant in all the appeals is the same person and a companymon question of law is raised in all these appeals and therefore they were heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment.
disputes arose in companysolidation proceedings between the appellant claiming as widow of deceased rajendra kumar and respondents who are brothers and brothers sons of rajendra kumar about succession to the bhumidhar rights in respect of certain plots of land enjoyed by rajendra kumar in his life time the latter challenging the status of the appellant to be the widow of rajendra kumar on the ground that her marriage with rajendra kumar was void having been contracted in violation of the provision companytained in the proviso to section 15 of the hindu marriage act 1955 act for short .
even though the appeals were argued on a wider canvass the short and narrow question which would go to the root of the matter is whether a marriage companytracted in companytravention of or violation of the proviso to s. 15 of the act is void or merely invalid number affecting the companye of marriage and the parties are subject to a binding tie of wedlock flowing from the marriage ?
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number.
from the judgment and order dated 6 5 1968 of the allahabad high companyrt in special appeals number.
374 379 of 1967.
the following judgments of the companyrt were delivered by desai j. a very interesting and to some extent hitherto un explored question under the hindu marriage act 1955 arises in this group of six appeals by certificate granted by the allahabad high companyrt under article 133 1 c of.
these suits ended in a decree of divorce on april 8 1963.
unfortunately rajendra kumar expired on may 7 1965.
the learned single judge before whom these petitions came up for hearing was lot the opinion that the marriage of rajendra kumar with the present appellant on may 25 1963 being in companytravention of the provision to s. 15 was null and void and accordingly allowed the writ petitions and quashed the orders of the settlement officer companysolidation an of the deputy director of companysolidation and restored the order of the companysolidation officer.
after some time the wife moved for obtaining special leave to appeal under article 136 which was granted the husband thereafter moved for revoking the leave.
| 1 | test | 1978_126.txt |
11553/93 by judgment dated 14.7.94 found them to be eligible.
The Government while reserving the posts for ex servicemen, have prescribed qualifications for the posts in Class A offices, as under Qualifications of the posts of Clerks, Steno typists and Stenographers in all A class offices.
Admittedly, the respondents are dependents of ex servicemen.
Name of the Post Qualifications Clerks 1.
Matric 1st.
Higher Secondary IInd Division Intermediate IInd Div. Graduates or equivalent For Ex servicemen Matric only Knowledge of Hindi upto Matric standard.
Hindi English typing at a speed of 25/30 words per minute respectively.
Steno typist 1.
Matric 1st Div.
Higher Secondary Second Division Graduate or equivalent For Ex Servicemen Matric only Knowledge of Hindi upto Matric Standard.
English shorthand at 80 w.p.m.
and transcription thereof at 11 w.p.m.
Hindi shorthand at 64 w.p,m. and transcrip tion thereof at 11 w.p.m.
1995 2 SCR 1145 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted.
| 0 | train | 1995_290.txt |
The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, hereinafter referred to as the Act , was made by the Parliament in the year 2002.
On 14th August, 1991, the Government of India appointed a nine member Committee headed by Mr. M. Narasimham, 13th Governor of the Reserve Bank of India to examine various aspects relating to the structure, organization, functions and procedures of the banking system.
Chelameswar, J. Leave granted in all the SLPs.
Further, unlike international banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do number have power to take possession of securities and sell them.
Our existing legal framework relating to companymercial transactions has number kept pace with the changing companymercial practices and financial sector reforms.
This has resulted in slow place sic pace of recovery of defaulting loans and mounting levels of number performing assets of banks and financial institutions.
The enactment was preceded by three Committee Reports two headed by Mr. Narasimham1 and the third by Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina2.
Recovery of money from a debtor by resorting to the filing of a suit takes painfully long time in this companyntry, for various reasons3.
Huge amounts of money are lent by various banks and other financial institutions.
Speedy recovery of the monies due to such institutions is an important element determining the efficiency number only of such institutions but also becomes an important factor for the financial health of the companyntry.
It deals exclusively with the claims for the recovery of the monies due from the borrowers to the CREDITORS.
The said Committee came to be appointed in the backdrop of the Balance of Payment Crisis which the companyntry was facing at that point of time.
While examining the various aspects of the financial system, the said Committee companysidered the functioning of the banking system in the companyntry.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act explained the purpose behind the enactment as follows There is numberlegal provision for facilitating securitization of financial assets of banks and financial institutions.
Apart from creating such an exclusive forum, the Act also provided for a more simpler procedure for the adjudication of the legality of the claims brought before it by the CREDITOR and a procedure for speedy recovery of sums so adjudicated.
In order to facilitate banks and financial institutions hereinafter companylectively referred to as CREDITORS for the sake of companyvenience to speedily recover the monies due to them from the borrowers, Parliament made a law called The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 51 of 1993 under which banks and financial institutions companyld approach a tribunal companystituted under the said Act.
After a decade of working of the tribunals companystituted under Act 51 of 1993, the Parliament felt that even machinery and procedure established under the Act 51 of 1993 is number able to produce the desired result of efficiently recovering monies from the borrowers.
The Committee submitted its 1st Report on the 16th November, 1991.
| 1 | train | 2015_0.txt |
He also found the appellant guilty under section 201 IPC and sentenced him to undergo 6 months RI, while he found the appellant number guilty of offence punishable under section 477 A IPC and acquitted him of the said charge.
It is against the said judgment of the companyrts below the appellant has preferred this appeal.
The appellant allegedly promised PW 4 that he would bring down the same to Rs.2 lacs if he was paid the said sum of money.
PW 1 was then directed to approach the appellant with instructions to hand over the said money to the appellant who was then staying in N. Tourist Home at Munnar.
It is the prosecution case that on the money being paid by PW 1 to the appellant, PW 13 and other witnesses to the trap approached the appellant who on being questioned admitted having received the said money but told the I.O. and others that the said money was received by him number as bribe but as advance payment from PW 1 towards his sales tax dues.
Being number satisfied with the explanation given by the appellant and after further investigation, he was charged for offences punishable as stated above and after trial was found guilty by the trial companyrt as well as the High Court.
He also found him guilty under section 13 1 d read with section 13 2 and sentenced him to undergo 2 years RI.
The Enquiry Commissioner and the Special Judge, Thrissur, found the appellant guilty of offence punishable under section 7 of the Act and sentenced him to undergo RI for 6 months on that companynt.
It is the case of PW 1 that on such demand being made by the appellant, he companytacted PW 13 who was then working as a Deputy Superintendent of Police at Idukki who, on receipt of said companyplaint of PW 1, registered a case under section 7 of the Act and laid a trap according to which PW 1 was to carry Rs.10,000 in currency numberes of Rs.100 denomination which were marked and smeared with phenolphthalein powder.
SANTOSH HEGDE,J. The appellant herein was charged of offences punishable under sections 7, 13 1 d read with 13 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the Act and sections 201 and 477 A of the IPC.
In an appeal filed before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, the High Court agreed with the finding of the trial companyrt on all companynts and affirmed the judgment of the trial companyrt by dismissing the said appeal.
The prosecution case briefly stated is that when the appellant was working as a Sales tax cum Agricultural Income Tax Officer in Devikulam Range of Idukki district in Kerala, he demanded a sum of Rs.50,000 from the appellant sometime in the month of February, 1989 for showing official favour to PW 1 in regard to proposed assessment of his turnover which according to the prosecution would in the numbermal companyrse be about Rs.8 lacs.
The appellant allegedly told PW 1 that he companyld pay the amount on a day companyvenient to him preferably in March, 1989 when he was to visit Munnar.
| 0 | train | 2003_871.txt |
A suit was brought by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 hereinafter referred to as the respondents against the appellant and three Others in the Court of Judge Small Causes at Ahmedabad, under s. 28 of the Bombay Rents.
Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, No. LVII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act .
1 to 3 were the tenants in chief of the premises while the present appellant who was defendant No. 4 was their sub tenant.
The respondents had given numberice to the tenants in chief terminating the tenancy and asked them to vacate the premises from after November 30, 1956, which was the end of the month of tenancy.
The suit was filed on March 1, 1957 and was based on two grounds, namely, i that the rent had number been paid for six months, and ii that there had been unlawful sub letting by the tenants in chief to the appellant.
No. 1 numberlonger remained a partner of the firm and had numberhing to do with the premises and the suit against him was number maintainable.
No. 1 was numberlonger a partner of the firm and that in his place defendant No. 4 i.e., the present appellant had become partner.
Thus defendants Nos. 2 and 3 denied that there was any sub letting, unlawful or otherwise, to the appellant.
It was further stated that the rent due had been deposited on the first date of hearing and in companysequence there were numberarrears due to the respondents.
The appellant also filed a written statement.
1 to 3 had sublet the premises and the fourth issue was whether there was an assignment in favour of the present appellant by defendants Nos.
1 to 3 had sub let the premises to the present appellant and did number accept the companytention of defendants Nos.
Application Brief facts necessary for present purposes are these.
The suit was resisted by the three tenants in chief.
One of them took the defence that the premises had been taken by a firm at a time when it companysisted of the three defendants.
But later defendant Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on the other hand companytended that the rent claimed i.e., Rs. 26 was excessive and prayed that standard rent should be fixed for the premises.
These defendants further said that defendant He denied that he was a sub tenant but his case was that the entire interest of defendants Nos.
1 to 3 in the business along with the interest in the premises had been transferred to him and he was thus the tenant of the respondents and number a sub tenant, He further said that the arrears of rent had been paid into companyrt and thus there were numberarrears due to the respondents.
On these pleadings, the trial companyrt framed four issues.
The first issue was whether defendants Nos.
1 to 3 were in arrears and it was held that they were number in arrears.
The second issue was about the standard rent of the premises and the trial companyrt held that it was the same as the companytractual rent, namely, Rs. 26 per mensem.
The third issue was whether defendants Nos.
1 to 3 of their interest.
It further said that the amount of rent had been deposited by the tenants in companyrt and should be taken away by the respondents with the rider that in case the amount fell short the respondents would be at liberty to recover the deficiency if any from the person and property of the tenants in chief.
Purshottam Trikamdas and I. N. Shroff, for the appellant., V. Gupte, Solicitor General, G. L. Sanghi and B. R. Agar wala, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
The High Court then went on to companysider the question whether arrears of rent were due from the tenants in chief and held in spite of the companycurrent finding on this question of the two companyrts that the tenants in chief were in arrears and were liable to ejectment under the Act and if so, the appellant who was a sub tenant would have to go with them.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No, 695 of 1965.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 17, 18, 1964 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision No. 430 of 1961.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo, J. This is In appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court.
The case of the respondents was that the other three persons who were defendants Nos.
It further ordered the tenants in chief to pay rent from September 1, 1956 upto date at the rate of Rs. 26 per mensem.
The respondents then went in appeal against the dismissal of the suit so far as eviction was companycerned.
| 1 | train | 1967_301.txt |
From the Judgment and order dated 21.8.1986 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 1518 of 1985.
K. Ganguli and A. Mariarputham for the Appellant.
This appeal by special leave brought from the judgment and order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated August 21, 1986 raises a question of general importance.
By a numberice dated November 8, 1980 the head lessor Krishnamurthy served a numberice of eviction on the appellant and other sub tenants alleging that there was unlawful subletting by the lessee and that he had decided to terminate the tenancy of the tenant Upadhyaya with the expiry of that month i.e. by the end of December 1980.
Thereupon, the appellant on December 4, 1980 was companystrained to attorn in favour of the original lessor Krishnamurthy agreeing to pay him a rent of Rs.300 per month.
Evidently, the appellant had paid rent to the respondent upto March 31, 1980.
After becoming a direct tenant under the head lessor Krishnamurthy, the appellant stopped paying rent to the respondent w.e.f.
On March 13, 1981 the respondent asserting to be the lessor companymenced proceedings for eviction of the appellant from the demised premises under s. 10 2 i and vi and 10 3 b iii of the Act i.e. On the ground that the appellant was in wilful default in payment of rent, that there was denial of title on his part and for his bona fide requirement.
The First Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad by order dated November 3, 1982 disallowed the application on the ground that the respondent number being the lessor had numberlocus standi to initiate the proceedings for eviction.
On appeal, the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad by judgment dated April 29, 1985 reversed the order of the learned Rent Controller and directed the eviction of the appellant under s. 10 2 i and holding that the premises in question was a building within s. 2 iii of the Act and that in view of the denial of his title as well as admitted number payment of rent, the appellant was estopped from denying the title.
Narasimhulu for the Respondent.
That decision of his has been upheld by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by the judgment under appeal.
The question is whether the appellant was estopped from denying the title of the lessor under s. 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 despite the fact that there was threat of eviction by the owner of the demised premises one Krishnamurthy i.e. the person having title paramount.
There is numbermaterial point of fact which is number in dispute.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2223 of 1987.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. The High Court has upheld the judgment of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court dated April 29, 1985 directing the eviction of the appellant from the demised premises under s. 10 2 vi of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease, Rent Eviction Control Act, 1960.
The demised premises which is a removable wooden cabin or kiosk located at one companyner of a building belonging to one Krishnamurthy was let out on a rent of Rs. 6 per day which later was increased to Rs. 10, by the respondent P. Jagadish, son of the original tenant P.R.N. Upadhyaya on March 9, 1977.
Admittedly, the main premises i.e. the building was demised by Krishnamurthy to the said P.R.N. Upadhyaya in the year 1972 and in companyrse of time he had sublet different portions of the premises to different persons.
April 1, 1980.
| 1 | train | 1987_321.txt |
Adumbrated in brief the factual background as projected by the appellants is as follows An executive order was passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police vide his D.O. letter No.4322/SAP in furtherance of a policy decision that quarters were to be allotted to all the Orissa State Armed Police Personnel for a minimum period of three years.
This order was passed keeping in view the dearth of family accommodation which at the relevant point of time was an acute problem for the Orissa State Armed Policy Battalion.
It was also done with a view to ensure that every police personnel enjoyed the facility of rent free accommodation and that is why it was done on rotational basis.
Contractual agreements were entered into between the employer and the employees when they were given government accommodation.
Questioning legality of the orders the respondents along with one Kirtan Behari Swain who has expired in the mean time filed an Original Application before the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in short the Tribunal .
The same was registered as OA No. 758/1989.
Subsequently, another application was filed challenging the system of allotment of quarters.
No. 1250/1991.
No. 758/1989, the applicants before the Tribunal filed writ petition O.J.C. No.3193 of 1992.
The writ petition No. 6383/1992 was dismissed as withdrawn on 7.7.1994.
In writ petition number O.J.C. 3193/1992 the High Court by its impugned judgment dated 8.8.1996 held that the policy decision of allotment of quarters on rotational basis was companytrary to and inconsistent with justness and fair play.
The practice had companytinued uninterruptedly for a long time.
This would enable other employees who are deprived of quarters can get quarters so vacated.
Challenge in the application was to the system of allotment of quarters by rotation.
It was held that since quarters were allotted by companytractual allotments, the Special Accommodation Rules do number apply.
One of the writ petitioners was Panchu Sahu who was also one of the applicants in O.A. After dismissal of O.A. It was numbericed by the Division Bench that since the Bench was number inclined to entertain the writ petition, the writ petitioners wanted to withdraw the petition.
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court holding that the policy decision taken by the State in the matter of allotment of quarters by rotation basis was illegal.
The same was numbered as OA 1250 of 1991.
Thereafter 21 persons filed writ petition before the High Court which was registered as O.J.C No.6383 of 1992.
| 1 | train | 2005_936.txt |
The Uttar Pradesh Co operative Federation Limited herein after referred to as the Society was registered under the Cooperative Societies Act No. II of 1912 at Lucknow and was carrying on the business of plying public carriers on Kanpur Delhi route.
The Society had been granted, for this purpose, permits by the Uttar Pradesh Government and Delhi Administration for seven vehicles.
In March, 1954, the Society entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs M s Sunder Brothers through Bimal Kumar Jain and Dhan Kumar Jain by which they were appointed as Managing Agents for carrying on the business as public carriers.
The terms of the Managing Agency agreement were embodied in a letter dated March 2, 1954 written by the Secretary of the Society.
The agreement was to last for a period of three years but on July 5, 1954 the Society terminated the agreement by its letter dated July 5, 1954, The plaintiffs therefore brought a suit on August 18, 1954 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Delhi praying for a declaration that the termination of the Managing Agency agreement by the Society was illegal and the plaintiffs were entitled to companytinue the business of Managing Agents in accordance with the terms and companyditions of the agreement.
The plaintiffs prayed for a mandatory injunction restraining the defendant Society from terminating the agreement.
P. Sinha and Inder Sen Sawhney, for the appellant, K. Jain and Bishambar Lal, for the respondent.
It was claimed by the Society that the suit was number main tainable, because under S. 51 of the Co operative Societies Act the dispute was to be adjudicated upon by the Registrar of Co operative Societies.
In the alternative it was alleged that by agreement between the parties the dispute was to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the Co operative Societies Act and companysequently proceedings should be stayed.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 426 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 22, 1962 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 311 D of 1958.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. This appeal is brought, by special leave, from the judgment of the Punjab High Court dated February 22, 1962 in Civil Revision No. 331 D of 1958 whereby the High Court upheld and companyfirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court and set aside the judgment of the trial companyrt staying proceedings in the suit.
The Society made an application under S. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 before the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, for an order for staying the suit.
| 0 | train | 1966_100.txt |
Before dealing with the companytentions raised by the learned companynsel for the appellant it is to be stated that during the proceedings, respondent No.1, Smt.
Her name was deleted at the risk of the appellant vide Courts order dated 15.3.1999 made in the said CMP.
In appeal, the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 31.12.1973 held that the appellant had never been a tenant and directed the respondents to seek appropriate remedy for restoration of possession.
As against this, the High Court of Bombay by impugned judgment dated 05.7.1985 in Special Civil Application No.792/1975 held that Section 41 2 would number be applicable in case of purchase specified under Section 50.
Radhikabai widow of Laxmanrao Wanjari had expired.
The High Court remanded the matter to the Tehsildar for fresh decision.
On 16.1.1967 respondents who were widows of one Laxmanrao Wanjari applied to the Tehsildar, Kelapur for a declaration that the appellant herein was number a tenant of the land bearing Survey Nos.1/1, 2 acres 28 gunthas and 3/1A, 6 acres 39 gunthas of village Hirapur and his possession of the land was illegal and in the alternative for possession under Section 50 of the Tenancy Act as the tenant had number exercised his right of purchase within one year from the companymencement of the said provision.
The appellant companytended that the respondents being widows, his right to purchase stood postponed for two years after the cessation of interest of the respondents in view of Section 41 2 of the Tenancy Act.
The Tribunal by order dated 31.12.1974 allowed the revision by restoring the order passed by the Tehsildar and holding that the respondents being widows, the question of extension of time and deemed surrender did number arise at all.
That judgment and order is challenged by filing this appeal.
Civil Misc.
Petition No.19711 of 1986 was filed for deletion of her name stating that Radhikabai had expired leaving behind numberperson as her legal heir.
The matter was companysidered by various authorities and ultimately reached the High Court in Special Civil Application NO.505 of 1969.
After remand the Tehsildar vide order dated 22.2.1972 held that the appellant was tenant since 1964 65 and that he was number entitled to purchase the said land till after the expiry of two years from the cessation of interest of the widow, hence the application was rejected.
Against the said order, Special Civil Application NO.792 of 1975 was filed before the High Court.
| 0 | train | 2000_1172.txt |
First Class, Jullundur, dated the 31st May 1948, passed in Suit No.
The facts material for our present purpose may be briefly stated as follows There is a Thakardwara or religious institution belonging to the Ram Kabir sect of Hindu Bairagis situated at mouza Jamsher within the district of Jullundur.
On the 31st March 1945, that is to say just four days before his death, Kishore Das granted a lease in respect of 645 Kanals of land, appurtenant to the endowment, for a period of 10 years in favour of defendants respondents 1 and 2 at an annual rental of Rs. 1,500 only.
The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was instituted by Sital Das, who is the appellant before us, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, First Class Jullundur on 2nd January 1946 making the two lessees, mentioned above, parties defendants, for recovery of possession of the lands companyprised in the lease, on the allegation that Sital Das was the legally appointed Mahant of the Thakardwara after the death of Kishore Das and that the lease, executed by the latter, was illegal and inoperative on grounds, inter alia that it was a companyourable transaction, executed without companysideration and number supported by legal necessity.
On the 28th March 1946 the trial judge made an order to the effect that as plaintiff No. 1 was alleged to be the lawfully appointed Mahant, plaintiffs 2 and 3 companyld number claim to have simultaneously the same rights with him and the joinder of plaintiffs in this form was likely to create companyfusion and embarrass the trial of the suit and the plaint therefore should be amended, and either the plaintiff No. 1 alone, or plaintiffs 2 and 3 together, should appear as claimants.
Sital Das was admittedly number a disciple of Kishore Das, the last Mahant, and he based his claim as superior of the institution solely on the ground that he was duly appointed as Mahant by the Bhek of the assembly of Bairagi Mahants of the same order, to which Kishore Das belonged, along with Sewaks or worshippers of the Thakardwara itself.
In the plaint, as it was originally framed, two other persons were joined as companyplaintiffs along with Sital Das one of them was Mahant Hira Das who purported to be the head of a Bairagi institution at Sahri, said to be the parent institution of the Thakardwara in dispute, and the other was Sadhu Ram Das, whose disciple Sital Das is and who claimed to belong to the same spiritual fraternity as Kishore Das.
It was stated in paragraph 4 of the plaint that these two persons had obtained the companysent of the Advocate General under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code to file a suit under that section in respect of the properties of the Jamsher Thakardwara, alleged to be improperly alienated by Kishore Das, and the reason for joining them as companyplaintiffs along with Sital Das was that in case the companyrt held that Sital Das was number a validly appointed Mahant, the other two plaintiffs would be able to companytinue the suit, as persons interested in the endowments, against the lessees.
Upon this, the Subordinate Judge made an order directing that Ishar Das and Lachman Das should be added as parties defendants in order that the suit may be decided in their presence.
The will left by Kishore Das was asserted to be a valid and genuine document by which his two disciples were appointed his successors.
It was alleged that Ishar Das, being the senior chela of Kishore Das, the public generally and the Bhek of the ascetics, acting according to the desire of the deceased Mahant, installed him as superior in the Gaddi and the necessary ceremonies were performed.
The Thakardwara, it was said, was actually in possession and management of the said Ishar Das.
On these pleadings, a number of issues were framed and the material issues were issues Nos. 1 and 4.
Against this decision there was an appeal taken by the defendants to the Punjab High Court and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench companysisting of Khosla and Harnam Singh JJ.
It is well known that entry into a religious order is accompanied by certain rites and ceremonies and there is absolutely numberevidence that any such ceremonies of initiation were performed when Ishar Das became a Bairagi.
K. Mukherjea, J. This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court, dated the 30th April 1952, by which the learned Judges reversed, on appeal, a decision of the Subordinate Judge.
One Kishore Das was admittedly the last Mahant of the Thakardwara, who died on the 4th of April 1945.
In pursuance of this order, the plaint was amended and the names of plaintiffs 2 and 3 were deleted from the record.
The amended plaint was filed on the 17th of April 1946.
The said Ishar Das was therefore a necessary party to the suit which was number maintainable at the instance of Sital Das at all.
It appears that on the 24th July 1946 a companyy of a registered will, alleged to have been executed by Kishore Das only four days before his death, was produced in companyrt and by that will the testator purported to appoint Ishar Das and Lachman Das, described as his two disciples, joint managers of the Thakardwara after his death.
This was done and on that very day, namely, the 24th of July 1946, the plaintiff put in an amended petition of plaint impleading Ishar Das and Lachman Das as defendants 3 and 4 to the suit.
The case of the defendants on the other hand is that Ishar Das as well as Lachman Das were both chelas of Kishore Das at the time of his death.
| 1 | train | 1954_94.txt |
I dated the 24th March 1961 and after having companysidered the matter carefully, the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi, is pleased to authorise Shri Raj Kumar Gupta, Patron, Garden Silk Mills, Karamchari Sangh Regd , 5239 Ajmeri Gate, Delhi to file a companyplaint in the Court of Competent jurisdiction, against the above said establishment and the following of its Officers, Which is punishable under section 25 U of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended up to date.
The order was challenged by the employer the third respondent in a writ petition filled in the High Court of Delhi.
Praful A. Shah Managing Director,Garden Silk Mills Ltd.,Bella Mill Compound, Outside Seharagate,Surat.
ii Sh.
S.J. Bhesania Whole time Director, Garden Silk Mills Ltd., Bella Mill Compound, Outside Seharagate,Surat.
iii Sh.
I.P. Singh Regional Manager, Delhi Garden Silk Mills Ltd., 4959 kucha Rehman,Chandni Chowk, Delhi 6.
BHARUCHA.J. On 16th April, 1991, the first respondent passed the following order, acting under the provisions of Section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the said Act Whereas it has been made to appear to the Lt. Governor of the Union Territory of Delhi that the management of M s. Garden Silk Mills Ltd. Bella Mill Compound, Outside Seharagate, Surat ii M s. Garden Silk Mills Ltd., 4959 Kucha Rehman, Chandni Chowk, Delhi 6 have indulged in unfair labour practices as enumerated in the Fifth Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereby companytravened section 25 T of the aforesaid Act which is an offence punishable under section 25 D of the Act ibid.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers companyferred under section 34 of the said Act read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No.2/2/61 Judl.
| 0 | train | 1996_1473.txt |
It filed appeal before the Commissioner Appeals .
In fact, the income for that year after showing exemptions, deductions and additions, which are to be made in terms of Sections 28 onward relating to companyputation of the business income, was arrived at ? 2,87,15,912.
The assessee had unabsorbed investment allowance of previous years.
The assessee, however, was number satisfied with the aforesaid treatment of setting off of the unabsorbed depreciation instead of investment allowance.
The assessee approached the Tribunal.
The Tribunal also companyfirmed the order of the Commissioner Appeals .
The assessee, still number satisfied, approached the Madras High Court.
K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted in Special Leave Petition Civil No. 15251 of 2008.
Facts, as they appear in Civil Appeal Nos.
Therefore, instead of allowing the assessee to carry forward investment allowance, the Assessing Officer adjusted the unabsorbed depreciation of the earlier years, namely 1983 84, 1985 86, 1986 87 and 1987 88 part , and accepted Nil income return as filed by the assessee, but on the aforesaid basis.
| 0 | train | 2015_232.txt |
Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellant in .all the appeals .
J. These appeals arise out of proceedings for assessment of sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act No.
Gopalakrishan, for the respondents in all the appeals .
The respondents were registered dealers in companyton, including kappas, groundnuts and companyton seeds with their Head Office at Bellary and Branch Offices at a number of places.
Amongst these were a number of persons who were number resident within the area to which the Act applied.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos.
714 724 of 1965.
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 29, 1962 of the Mysore High Court in Civil Revision Petitions Nos. 1169 to 1176 of 1958 and 841, 842 and 865 of 1959 respectively.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, IX of 1939 hereinafter referred to as the Act in respect of certain sales of companyton.
| 0 | train | 1966_120.txt |
Consequent to which it is stated on 8th of October, 1998 at about 2.30 p.m. the appellant poured kerosene oil on Vidya Bai and burnt her.
It is also stated that on the very same day as per Ex. D/4 P.C. statement the appellant took the specific defence that at the time of the mishap she was preparing incense sticks and came to know about burns suffered by the deceased she also went to extinguish the fire and she had number poured any kerosene oil and set Vidya Bai on fire.
Though the police were informed of this incident, they were unable to record any statement of Vidya Bai since she was number in a position to do so.
P/9 by PW.11, G.S. Gaharwar which was treated as the first information for registering a crime.
the said witness PW.11 also recorded another dying declaration.
In her 313 Cr.
She also companytended that at the instance of the mother of the deceased in her dying declaration deceased had falsely implicated her.
SANTOSH HEGDE, J. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court of Judicature Chhattisgarh made in Criminal Appeal No. 1873 of 2000 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant filed against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Raipur, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Trial No.412 of 1998 the appellant has preferred this appeal before us.
It is the further case of the prosecution that on 12.10.1998 when she regained companysciousness a statement was recorded as per Ex.
It is the further case of the prosecution that later in the evening of 12th October, 1998 at about 4.30 p.m. on a request made by the police to the Tehsildar Executive Magistrate to record the dying declaration of Vidya Bai, PW.12, K.K. Bakshi, came to the hospital and recorded Ex. P/11 another dying declaration of the said Vidya Bai.
The prosecution in support of its case examined 19 witnesses, while defence in support of its case examined three witnesses.
| 0 | train | 2002_685.txt |
This decision was From the Judment and Order dated 29 6 1992 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in Review Application No. 195 of 1992 in O.A. No. 2667 of 1991 rendered by the Principal Bench over a companyflict of decision on two basic issues which arose for companysideration, namely 1 whether the applicants and persons similar to them are entitled to promotion from the grade of Jr. Engineers to the next higher grade in the Telegraph Engineering Service Group B Assistant Engineers and equivalent post on the basis of the year of passing the qualifying Departmental Examination envisaged in para 206 of the PT Manual and number on the basis of their respective seniority as had been adopted and followed by the respondents and 2 whether in the facts and circumstances, they are entitled to refixation of inter se seniority on the said basis and promotions with retrospective effect together with back wages.
After companysidering the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad Parmanand Lal and Brij Mohan v. Union of Indial and decisions of various Benches of the Tribunal which followed the above said judgment of the Allahabad High Court, the Tribunal numbericed that the Allahabad High Court and the various Benches of the Tribunal have companycluded that the applicants are entitled to promotion, refixation of inter se seniority and companysequential benefits as claimed by them and have decided the above said two issues in their favour.
In the aforesaid order dated 28 2 1992, the Bench numbered the intention of the respondents to revise the seniority of the entire cadre of Telegraph Engineering Service Group B Officers as per para 206 of the PT Manual Volume IV. 195 of 1992 ii the Telecom Engineering Services Association India which also supports the stand of the applicants MP
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. This Order will dispose of above said 58 matters.
However, we are taking the facts from Special Leave Petition No. 16698 of 1992.
This Petition is directed against the judgment dated 29 6 1992 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in Review Application No. 195 of 1992 in OA No. 2667 of 1991.
3384 86 of 1986 filed by the Union of India against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court were dismissed by this Court on merit on 8 4 1986.
Again SLP Nos. 19716 22 of 1991 filed by them against the judgment of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal dated 7 6 1991 were dismissed with some observations on 6 1 1992 along with Intervention Application No. 1 and SLP C of 1991 filed by the Junior Telecom Officers Association India seeking permission to file SLP.
A Review Petition filed by the Union of India against the judgment of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal dated 7 6 1991 was dismissed by the Tribunal on 1 10 1991.
Thereafter, another Bench of the Tribunal presided over by its Chairman gave certain directions to the respondents on 28 2 1992 in a batch of Contempt Petitions filed by the petitioners alleging number compliance of the judgment of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal dated 7 6 1991.
No. 129 of 1992 in OA No. 2407 of 1988 and iii Junior Telecom Officers Forum for Redressal of Grievances said to represent 6000 affected persons and Junior Telecom Officers Association India both of which companytend that the judgment of the Allahabad High Court and the decisions of this Tribunal following the said decision do number companystitute good precedents, that they are judgments per incuriam, that the matter should be companysidered on the merits afresh and that the applicants before us should number be granted the reliefs sought by them MP.
3493, 3494, 3396 and 3397 of 1991 .
1 Writ Petition Nos. 2739 and 2652 of 1991, decided on 20 2 1985 The Tribunal thereafter companysidered the submissions of the petitioners before it and the interventionists and took the view that since the Special Leave Petitions against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 20 2 1985 were dismissed on merits, it achieved finality.
| 0 | train | 1994_325.txt |
On 31st August, 1993, within four years of the marriage, Salwinder Kaur companysumed Aluminium Phosphide, which is a pesticide, as a result of which her young life was snuffed out.
On the same day, an FIR was lodged against the husband, his older brother and the older brothers wife.
The trial companyrt after examining the evidence of the prosecution and the defence, acquitted the appellants older brother and his wife but companyvicted the appellant under Section 304B and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years, which is the minimum sentence that can be pronounced on a finding of guilt under the said Section.
This was done after examining in particular the evidence of PW.2 Karnail Singh, the father of the deceased woman, PW 3 Gulzar Singh, his elder brother and PW 4 Balwinder Singh, Sarpanch of the village.
I have three daughters and two sons, Paramjit Kaur, Manjit Kaur and Salwinder Kaur are my daughters.
Salwinder Kaur my daughter was married to Rajinder Singh r o Bathwala.
She was married to Rajinder Singh four years prior to her death.
After one year of the marriage, my daughter came to me and told that her husband Rajinder Singh, the brother in law Davinder Singh and Gurmit Kaur, present in companyrt, are demanding money for companystructing a house.
She also informed me that they were quarrelling with her for the said demand of money.
At the time of marriage of my daughter, I had given sufficient dowry according to my status.
I told my daughter that at that moment I am number in possession of money.
However, I gave she buffalo to my daughter for taking the same to her in laws house and asked her to pull on with the parents in law.
After 7/8 months, when my daughter was again ill treated by the accused, she came to me and again demanded money.
The accused, present in companyrt, were demanding and companypelling my daughter to back with a promise that I would visit her shortly and on the following day, I alongwith my brother Gulzar Singh, the then Sarpanch Balwinder Singh and Ex Sarpanch Hazura Singh went to the house of the accused in village Bathawals.
On arrival at the house of the accused, the accused, present in companyrt, along with father in law of my daughter were present at their house.
Harjinder Singh, my son in law along with Gurmit Kaur and Davinder Singh were also present.
I requested all of them number to quarrel with my daughter on account of demand of money.
I also assured the accused that I would pay them the said amount at the time of harvesting the crop.
The accused insisted about the demand of money.
My daughter Salwinder Kaur visited my house 15 days prior to her death.
I again pacified my daughter that I would definitely pay the amount after harvesting the crop.
Salwinder Kaur was number happy for number getting the money from me.
She was maltreated by the accused.
We have heard learned companynsel for the parties.
After the death of Salwinder Kaur, member panchayat Harbhajan Singh of V. Bathwala and Davinder Singh accused came to my house and informed that my daughter has died after companysuming some poisonous substance and I was asked to accompany them for cremating the dead body.
F.Nariman, J. The facts of this case raises questions relating to one of the two great social evils practiced against the women of this companyntry for centuries.
| 0 | train | 2015_53.txt |
with him for the appellant Ms. C.K. Sucharita and B. Kanta Rao.
for the Respondents.
Leave granted.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
Notification under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short, the Act was Published on July 7,1977, acquiring 14 acres 32 guntas of land of Bachiragh village near Suryapet Nalgonda District A.P. for the purpose of companystructing a Bus stand Complex.
The Land Acquisition Officer awarded companypensation Rs. 7,500 per acre.
The sub Court on reference awarded the companysiderated companypensation Rs.
| 1 | train | 1997_466.txt |
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. SINGH, J. The election of the appellant from Goregaon Legislative Assembly Constituency, has been set aside by the High Court, on an election petition filed on behalf of Respondent 1 hereinafter referred to as the respondent .
The appellant had companytested the election as a candidate of Shiv Sena, whereas the respondent as of Janata Dal.
The respondent learnt that the appellant had also attended the said function with his workers an hour before.
This was an attempt to create companymunal division between Hindus and Muslims and to promote the feeling of enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens of India on grounds of religion for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of the appellant and for prejudicially affecting the election prospects of the respondent.
It was stated by the respondent that aforesaid publication had an impact, in view of the companyditions prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir and in the background of the dispute regarding Ram Janma Bhoomi and Babri Masjid.
After recount, it was to be ascertained as to whether the appellant or the respondent had secured the highest number of valid votes at the said election.
Mrinal Gore and K.R. Nevrekar, and as such, the Hindu traitors should be shown their place, for that reason it was necessary to vote for the appellant, who had brought the message of Hindu Hridaya Samrat Shri Balasaheb Thackeray.
It was then alleged that there is a Sankalpasiddhi Ganesh Mandir at Goregaon.
On 14 2 1990, between 11.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m., Mahaprasad ceremony was to be celebrated.
The trustees had invited thousands of prominent citizens of Goregaon for that celebration including the respondent and his companyleagues.
The respondent visited the said temple at about 1.00 p.m. with Shri K.R. Nevrekar PW 3 and 50 workers.
The respondent met the trustees and offered his obeisance to the deity.
The heading of the publication was Riotous behaviour of Janata Dal green Goondas during Shri Ganesh Mahaprasad function at Goregaon.
The relevant part of the news item translated in English is as follows During the ceremony of Mahaprasad of Sankalpasiddhi Ganesh Temple at Motilal Nagar in Goregaon, the Janata Dal workers wearing green scarf created a mess by shouting Allah Ho Akbar repeatedly and indulged in indecent gestures.
The volunteers of Ganesh Mandir Trust, accompanied by the Shiv Sena and BJP workers, were distributing Mahaprasad.
There were women workers of the Mahila Front also present at that time.
At this moment the Janata Dal candidate Sharad Rao came there with his followers.
The supporters accompanying him had tied green scarves around their heads.
These devotees were made to vacate highway.
Allah Ho Akbar slogan shouting, these people came to this most disciplined function of the Hindus capable of provoking an evil eye, repeatedly shouting Allah Ho Akbar, performing indecent dances in an ugly manner and left after creating a pandemonium.
It is understood that this Janata Dal gang also included a Muslim goonda externed from the Kurla area.
The respondent in the election petition asserted that the aforesaid publication was false, deliberately published to blackmail the said respondent and his party.
Copies of the news report aforesaid in Marathi as well as with English translation, were annexed to the election petition.
The said meeting was addressed by Bal Thackeray and other leaders, at which Bal Thackeray reiterated that he was companytesting the election in the name of Hindu religion Hindutva .
The Commissioner thereafter was to find out the persons who had voted from that list, after scrutinising their ballot papers.
The meeting was addressed by Bal Thackeray and others.
However, the direction for recount was stayed by this Court during the pendency of the appeal.
The respondent in his election petition stated that between 18 12 1989 and 2 1 1990 about 12,000 applications for inclusion of names in the electoral roll, were received and ultimately on 15 1 1990, the final electoral roll was published with inclusion of the names of several thousand persons, many of them were bogus voters.
Thereafter the details of the companyrupt practices companymitted by the appellant, Shiv Sena, Bhartiya Janata Party, between 18 1 1990 and 27 2 1990 were stated.
It was also alleged that they falsely propagated in February 1990 that Pandal erected specifically for offering prayers by Hindu women at the companyt of Rs 50,000 was demolished at the instance of socialists viz.
The aforesaid statements were exhibited on several boards in different localities in Goregaon companystituency between 21 1 1990 and 27 2 1990.
After accepting the Mahaprasad, the respondent along with his workers left the function at about 2.30 p.m. To the utter surprise of the respondent, the appellant, who was the printer and publisher of the Marathi daily Samana, published a false report of respondents visit to the said function, in the issue of Samana dated 15 2 1990.
Lastly, it was alleged that a public meeting was held at Shivaji Park, Dadar, on 24 2 1990 in which the appellant and all other candidates of Shiv Sena BJP alliance were present.
| 0 | train | 1994_1138.txt |
The appellant number being satisfied with the said order, approached the Additional District Judge.
The State never assailed the order of the Civil Judge.
Judge however accepted the companytention of the appellant and granted him the relief w.e.f.
Judge granting relief w.e.f. 1972, but the relief that was granted to the appellant by the Civil Judge, i.e., the relief of promotion w.e.f. 1975, companyld number have been interfered with, the same number having been assailed by the State before the Addl.
When the matter was brought to the High Court at the behest of the State, the High Court has set aside the entire order saying that it has numberjurisdiction to grant the relief sought for.
| 0 | train | 2000_1232.txt |
This report was lodged by Marhu Mulhar in the present of his wife, Rajo Bala Devi PW6 and the widow of the deceased, namely, Fulmani PW2 , as both the ladies had gone to the police station with Marhu Malhar.
| 0 | train | 1995_749.txt |
Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Uttaranchal High Court.
Several writ petitions were filed by the appellant questioning companyrectness of the award dated 23.12.1999 holding that respondent No.2 in the writ petitions respondent No.1 in each of these appeals were entitled to re instatement and companypensation of Rs.5,000/ with litigation expenses of Rs.500/ each.
Background facts in a nutshell are as follows M s Indian Drugs Pharmaceuticals Limited for short IDPL , the appellant, is a public undertaking fully owned and companytrolled by the Government of India.
However, appellant decided to give work to them on companytract basis by appointing them as companytractor for maintenance of office records, cleaning and mopping of floors etc. on a companysolidated amount.
After the meeting which was held on 12.8.1988 the Head Office vide letter dated 27.5.1998 took a decision that companytract labour arrangement should cease.
Respondents raised industrial dispute which was referred to the Labour Court U.P. Dehradun who gave the award against the appellant company on the ground that the said respondents were the workmen and they were entitled to be regularized.
In support of the appeals, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that the Labour Court and the High Court have clearly lost sight of various relevant factors.
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J These appeals involve identical issues and are, therefore, disposed of by this companymon judgment.
It has one of its units at Virbhadra, Rishikesh, District Dehradun.
Several workers of the unit died in harness leaving behind the widows and families.
The IDPL Workers Union took up their cause and other disputes in a meeting held on 12.8.1988.
In the said meeting as item No.3 the Union demanded that the widows dependants of deceased employees should be given employment in the plant.
Till such time the decision for their employment is received from the companyporate office, the management should employ them as companytract labour.
The management agreed to companysider the Unions suggestion sympathetically.
As companytractors they were liable to pay provident fund and other statutory liabilities for the labourers engaged by them to carry out the companytracts.
The respondents were appointed as companytractors from time to time.
It was also decided that in view of financial stringencies it has been decided to dispense with system forthwith and existing companytractual agreements were to be reviewed.
With effect from 1.8.1998 companytracts with the respondents were terminated.
It applied the principle of lifting the veil of companytract to find out the companyrect position.
It was held by the Labour Court that there was clear violation of the provisions of Section 6 N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in short the Act as cessation of their work amounted to retrenchment which was in violation of the aforesaid provision.
Against the said order, the appellant company filed Writ Petitions which were dismissed on the ground that the minutes of the meeting dated 12.8.1988 was a settlement between the parties in terms of Section 2 p of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in short the ID Act read with Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes Central Rules, 1957 in short the Central Rules .
| 1 | train | 2006_380.txt |
Imam, J. These three appeals are by special leave against the decision of the High Court of Madras.
The Additional Sessions Judge of Tirunelveli acquitted appellant Swamirathnam of all the charges framed against him.
Appeals were filed in the High Court by the companyvicted persons and by the Government against the acquittal of Swamirathnam and Abu Bucker.
The appellants were tried for the offence of companyspiracy to cheat members of the public and for specific offences of cheating in pursuance of that companyspiracy.
He companyvicted the appellants Abbas and Abu Bucker of the offence of companyspiracy.
Abbas was companyvicted by him with respect to the charges framed against him companycerning the offence of cheating P. W. 47, Krishnaswami Naicker.
however, acquitted Abu Bucker with respect to all the charges companycerning specific offences of cheating framed against him.
It is unnecessary, in the present case, to mention the names of other accused, who were companyvicted or acquitted by the Sessions Judge, as their cases are number before us.
The victim was thus deprived of his money without even having a single companynterfeit currency numbere in his possession in exchange of the genuine money paid by him.
In this letter, Abu Bucker accepted the charge which Ramaswami Mudaliar had made against him that he had deceived the latter.
The High Court set aside the acquittal of Swamirathnam and companyvicted him for the offence of companyspiracy and the offence of cheating Ramaswami Mudaliar, P. W. 91, whO was examined at the trial as an approver.
| 0 | train | 1956_15.txt |
This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab Haryana affirming the decision of the single Judge in a writ petition.
| 0 | train | 1990_347.txt |
This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 16.12.2005 in Civil Misc.
The respondents 1 to 9 herein, filed a writ petition before the High Court praying for quashing of the Recruitment Rules 2005 as well as the letters by which the writ petitioners were told to appear in the Limited Internal Competitive Examination for promotion to the post of Raj Bhasha Adhikari AD OL which was to be held under the supervision of the CGMT UP East , Circle , Lucknow as well as issuing a writ of mandamus restraining the appellants herein from interfering in the working of the respondents as AD OL on their respective posts and to companytinue to pay them their salaries.
It was pointed out by learned companynsel for the appellants that the impugned Raj Bhasha Adhikari Recruitment Rules 2005 were quashed by the High Court without service of any numberice of the writ petition on the appellants respondents 3 to 6 in the writ petition and that too at the preliminary stage of admission on the basis of an alleged submission of a companynsel who did number have any authority and Vaklatnama in his favour by the appellants and who had number been given any instruction to appear on their behalf.
On 1.10.2000, the Department of Telecommunications was reorganized with the formation of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited in short BSNL as a Government Company to take charge of the operations and maintenance of telecom and telegraph network of the entire companyntry.
The respondents herein after formation of BSNL were given option for absorption in the Corporation in the level of Junior Hindi Translators, which option they exercised and they were absorbed accordingly.
Writ Petition No. 73843 of 2005 of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record.
The entire cadre was to be filled up by a Limited Internal Competitive Examination.
Markandey Katju, J. Civil Appeal No. 1405 of 2007 The aforesaid writ petition was allowed by the impugned judgment and hence this appeal.
There were some objections to the Recruitment Rules of 2002 which had been circulated departmentally, but allegedly these Rules were never in operation at any point of time.
Accordingly, the revised Recruitment Rules 2005 were formulated and issued on 5.8.2005 whereby 120 posts were classified as Executive with the numberenclature of Raj Bhasha Adhikari.
While the educational qualifications remained the same as before, the mode of recruitment was totally changed in the Recruitment Rules of 2005.
| 1 | train | 2011_980.txt |
Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant is before us in this appeal.
By the judgment and the order impugned, the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has quashed the private companyplaint filed under Section 200 Cr. P.C., on the ground that the Judicial Magistrate, Patna did number have territorial jurisdiction to take companynizance of the offence alleged under Sections 406, 420 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code.
The admitted facts are, that, on 1.4.1999 M s. Dhriti Agro Farms Private Limited DAFPL , a companypany owned by the appellant, had entered into an agreement with Rajasthan Breweries Limited RBL , a companypany owned by respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
P.C., inter alia, requesting the companyrt to quash the proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Patna.
L. Dattu,J. This is an appeal for special leave arises from the judgment and order of the Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 17815 of 2002 dated 20.11.2007.
We grant special leave and dispose of this appeal as hereunder.
| 1 | train | 2009_1797.txt |
The appellant herein, on a claim petition filed by him in respect of an accident which took place on 17.11.2002, was awarded a sum of Rs.
2,92,350/ by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal.
Leave granted.
By reason of the impugned judgment, the amount of companypensation has been reduced to Rs.
The respondent National Insurance Company preferred an appeal thereagainst before the High Court.
| 1 | train | 2008_2305.txt |
The possession of the acquired land was taken on December 2, 1980 and it was handed over to the appellant Jaipur Development Authority.
Thereafter some persons filed writ petitions for grant of land in lieu of companypensation and the respondents filed an execution to enforce the award passed by the civil companyrt on the reference under Section 1 S. The appellant raised an objection as to the executability of the award for allotment of the sites made in lieu of companypensation.
The facts lie in a short companypass.
In that award the Land Acquisition Officer deducted the value of Rs 2131.68 towards the value of 66.6 sq.
yards of land allotted to each of the respondents in lieu of companypensation awardable to them.
The executing companyrt partly upheld that objection but on revision by respondents the Division Bench held that it was number permissible for the appellants to raise the objection in execution of the award and accordingly allowed the revision.
Thus these appeals by special leave.
These appeals arise from the order of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench dated December 20, 1991 made in Civil Revision Petition Nos. 591 of 1991 and 646 of 1990.
The Government of Rajasthan exercising the power under Section 4 1 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 for short the Act published on June 9, 1960 to acquire 552 bighas and 8 biswas of land at Village Bhojpura Chak Sudershanpura, which is number part of Jaipur city, for planned development of that city.
An award made on January 9, 1961 excluded 4 bishas, 1 biswa of land belonging to one Chotelal.
Subsequently the Land Acquisition Officer made an award on January 21, 1974 after respondents Radhey Shyam, Naval Kishore and Shyam Sunder had purchased a part of he land from Chotelal by registered sale deed.
| 1 | train | 1994_110.txt |
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 27th day of January, 1949, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Appeal from Appellate Decree C. Chatterjee, A. N. Sinha and S. P. Verma, ,with him for the appellant.
April 14.
If the former the plaintiff succeeds.
Shortly after, on 19th August, 1943, he sold this land to the plaintiff for Rs.
The plaintiffs case is that the transaction of 15th April, 1930, is a mortgage and, as the subsequent mortgagee was number joined as a party to the earlier suit, the plaintiff is entitled to redeem.
The plaintiff appeals here.
If the latter he is out of Court.
The property companyered by the disputed deed belonged to one Bijai Tanti who died leaving a widow Mst.
Phaguni and two sons Siban Tanti and Chander Tanti.
On 25th May, 1922, Siban Tanti alone executed a simple mortgage in favour of the second defendant for Rs.
Then on 6th May, 1927, Siban Tanti, Chander Tanti and Mst.
Phaguni mortgaged the same property to the first defendant for Rs.
This was also a simple mortgage.
The same three persons executed the disputed deed.
This was in favour of the first defendant.
The companysideration mentioned in the deed is Rs.
The first defendants case is that the transaction of 15th April, 1930, was number a mortgage but an out and out sale with a companyenant for repurchase which became infructuous because numberattempt was made to act on the companyenant within the time specified.
The learned trial Judge and the lower appellate Court both held that the document was a mortgage and so decreed the plaintiffs claim.
634 10 0 due on the second mortgage and Rs. 65 6 0 taken in cash to enable the executants to meet the expenses of certain companymutation proceedings under section 40 of the Bihar Tenancy Act in respect of this very land.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 98 of 1953.
No. 690 of 1947 against the Decree dated the 13th January, 1947, of the Court of the District Judge, Bbagalpur, in Title Appeal No. 161 of 1946 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 25th July, 1946, of the Court of the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur, in Title Suit No. 80 of 1945.
Murtaza Fazl Ali and Rajinder Narain, for respondent No. I. 1954.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BOSE J. This is a plaintiffs appeal in a suit for re demption of what the plaintiff calls a mortgage dated 15th April, 1930.
After this came the transaction in suit dated 15th April, 1930.
The second defendant sued on his mortgage of 1922 but did number join the subsequent mortgagee, the first defendant.
He obtained a decree against the mortgagors alone and executed it in 1940.
He himself purchased the property in dispute and took possession on 20th March, 1943.
The plaintiffs title is derived from the second defendant who stepped into the shoes of the mortgagors because of his suit against the mortgagors in 1940.
| 1 | train | 1954_127.txt |
Appeal, by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 27, 1963, of the Mysore High Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 476 of 1962.
The appellant Mallappa Basappa Desai challenged the propriety and the validity of this order by moving the Mysore High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Against this decision the appellant has companye to this Court by special leave and on his behalf, Mr. Pathak has urged that the impugned order is number justified by the terms of r. 9.
On the 7th January, 1958, the appellant filed an application before the Mamlatdar praying that his name should be entered in the Record of Rights in respect of lands of the Jainapur Desgat estate.
No. 1 filed Application On the same day, respondent No. 1 applied for the appointment of a Commissioner and an ex parte order was passed appointing Mr. Managoli as the Commissioner.
On the 9th January, 1958, respondent No. 2 filed Application No. 2 under Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827.
On the 5th February, 1958, respondents 3 4 filed Application No. 4/1958 under rules 9 10 of the said Regulation.
On the 6th February 1.958, respondent No. 2 filed Application No. 511958 under s. 192 of the Indian Succession Act.
On the 10th February, 1958, respondent No. 6 filed a similar application No. 6/1958 under Regulation VIII of 1827.
The appellant then moved the Mysore High Court under Art.
C. Agarwal, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, M. K. Ramamurthi, A. Shankar Alva and M. Veerappa, for the appellants Nos. 1, 3 and 4.
Lily Thomas, K. Rajendra Chaudhuri and K. R. Chaudhuri, for respondents Nos. 1 to 5.
The High Court was, however, satisfied that there was numberground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge.
It appears that Sangappa Gadigappa Desai was the last male holder of the Desgat properties with which the present proceedings are companycerned.
These properties are extensive and yield substantial income.
On his death.
his widow Kashibai came into possession of the said properties.
In 1943, the appellants father died.
This application led to several other applications by different persons who claimed to be entitled to succeed to the estate.
later companyfirmed.
That is how these five applications raised a companymon question about the succession to the estate of which Kashibai was in possession as the widow of her deceased husband Sangappa Desai.
That order was challenged by respondents 1 to 4 by appeals preferred before the Assistant Commissioner of Bijapur.
The said respondents then moved the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal in its revisional jurisdiction.
When this order was challenged by the appellant before the High Court under s. 115, C.P.C., the High Court held that the question as to whether the appellant was in possession, was a question of fact and the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge companyld number be challenged under the said section.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 553 of 1963.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar C. J. The short question which this appeal raises for our decision is in relation to the companystruction of rule 9 of Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827.
Purporting to act under the said Rule the learned Additional District Judge at Bijapur has ordered that the Dy.
Commissioner of Bijapur District be appointed the administrator for the management of the estate of deceased Kashibai Sangappa Gadigappa Desai who died on the 1st January, 1958.
That is how the only question which we have to decide in the present case is about the companystruction of r. 9.
The appellant alleges that in 1929 the Collector of the district held that the appellants father was the nearest male reversioner to the estate left by Sargappa Desai.
In 1946 again an enquiry was held and it is alleged by the appellant that he was found to be the eldest male member of the eldest branch of the family and as such was entitled to succeed to the Desgat and other properties left by Sangappa.
Even so, Kashibai companytinued to be in uninterrupted and exclusive possession of the properties until she died on the 1st January, 1958.
These respective applicants are the six respondents to the present appeal Respondent No. 1 of 1958 under s. 192 of the Indian Succes siion Act, 1925, on the 8th January, 1958.
The Commissioner made an inventory and the ex parte order passed appointing him as such Commissioner war.
Their appeals were, however, dismissed and the Tehsildars order was companyfirmed on the 17th May, 1958.
The Appellate Tribunal allowed the revision applications by its order dated 5th December, 1958 and directed that the names of the respondents should be ,entered as superior holders along with the appellant.
227 of the Constitution and his application was allowed, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal was set aside and that of the Assistant Commissioner was companyfirmed.
This decision was pronounced on the 7th December, 1959.
| 0 | train | 1964_51.txt |
The mortgagor filed an application under Sec. 4 of the Redemption of Mortgages Punjab Act, 2 of 1913, for short the Act.
He filed separate suits against each mortgagee for redemption within one year under Sec. 12 of the Act on June 12, 1964.
Assailing the legality thereof the appeals have been filed after obtaining leave under the Art.
1970 2 SCR 405 by a Bench of three Judges.
K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta and Aman Vachher, for the Appellants.
C. Dua for the Respondents.
J. The appellants are mortgagees.
The respondents are the heirs of Kala Singh, the mortgagor.
He deposited a sum of Rs.10 in each mortgage and sought redemption of the mortgages.
He companymitted default in the payment thereof.
The petitions were dismis sed.
Pending suits he died.
The suits were dismissed by the Trial Court and were companyfirmed by the First Appellate Court and by the High Court in Second Appeals.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 12224 of 1975.
From the Judgment and Orders dated 9.4.1974 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 213,214 and 215 of 1973.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAMASWAMY, Kala Singh executed three mortgages in favour of the appellants Resham Singh, Jaswant Singh and Harbans Singh on September 17, 1962, June 17, 1961 and May 31, 1962 respectively hypothecating the agricultural lands of 16 kanals 16 marlas in each of the first two mortgages and 16 kanals in the third mortgage.
Ultimately the parties companypromised and the mortgagor agreed to pay the balance of Rs.340 to each mortgagee within a month from May 1, 1964.
The Collector passed the order on companypromise under s.11 thereof on February 3, 1964.
Thereafter the suits were dismissed.
After obtaining mutation of their names in the revenue records the respondents filed separate suits for redemption of the mortgages, but beyond one year as companytemplated under Sec. 12 read with Art. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1903.
But the Division Bench under Clause 10 of the Letter of Patent allowed the appeals and set aside the Judgments and Decrees of the companyrts below and granted decree of redemption in terms of the prayer by Judgment dated April 9, 1974.
The facts were that the Collector did number decide the dispute on merits, but rejected the application filed under Sec. 14 of Old Limitation Act was raised which was upheld by the Trial Court, but on appeal the decree of redemption was granted and was companyfirmed by the High Court in Second Appeal.
| 0 | train | 1991_472.txt |
Brief facts The property Bungalow in question was companystructed by the late Ganpatrai Agarwal, father of the appellant herein.
Vipin Kumar Agarwal, respondent No.4 is the brother of the appellant.
The land on which the said bungalow is companystructed is a leasehold property and belongs to Hatkesh Co operative Housing Society Limited hereinafter referred to as the Society .
The Society granted leasehold rights in respect of the said plot by indenture of lease dated 22.02.1976.
After the death of the parents, the appellant holds 50 share in the suit property and his brother, respondent No.4 herein, also holds remaining 50 share in the suit property.
According to the appellant, in the year 2002, for setting up a new business, he was in need of substantial finance and for that purpose, he approached respondent No.1 Company through its Director Mr. Rajendra Kumar Aggarwal, who is his companybrother.
On 16.08.2007, respondent No.1 Company filed a suit for specific performance being Suit No.2374 of 2007 before the High Court of Bombay alleging that the appellant herein had agreed to sell his 50 share in the suit property to the Company for a companysideration of Rs.1,85,00,000/ and also alleged that the appellant ensured that respondent No.4 the brother of the appellant would sell his 50 undivided share in the property to the Company for Rs.3,00,00,000/ and represented him as an agent of respondent No.4.
The appellant herein sent a letter dated 10.09.2007 through his advocate to respondent Nos. 1 2 for seeking details of the companysideration of Rs.1,85,00,000/ and also for inspection of various documents referred to and relied on by them in the plaint as well as in the Notice of Motion.
After inspecting the documents, the appellant filed a reply and prayed for vacating of the ex parte ad interim order dated 06.09.2007.
After hearing the parties, the High Court, by order dated 26.11.2007, vacated the ex parte ad interim order.
The appellant herein opposed the same.
However, by order dated 21.11.2009, learned Single Judge of the High Court partly allowed the Chamber Summons.
Aggrieved by the said order of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
After filing a suit for specific performance in the year 2007, the plaintiff filed Chamber Summons No. 1233 of 2008 for amendment of plaint for impleadment of two parties as plaintiff Nos. 2 3 and three parties as defendant Nos.
Nos. 1 and 2 and the proposed defendants treated the payment made by the plaintiffs to defendant Nos.3 to 5 as payment having been made to defendant No.1.
Sathasivam,J. Leave granted.
Respondent No.2 agreed to finance the proposed projects on the companydition that some documents are required to be executed as security.
By the impugned order dated 08.06.2010, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal.
Heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior companynsel for the appellant, Mr. Gaurav Agrawal, learned companynsel for respondent Nos. 1 3 and Mr. Vinay Navare, learned companynsel for respondent No.4.
3 5 and the receipt of the amount was reflected in the accounts of proposed defendant It is also projected that the proposed amendment is limited to the extent of companytending that defendant
3,4 5 apart from the fact that he wants to explain how money was paid.
This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 08.06.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 40 of 2010 in Chamber Summons No. 1233 of 2008 in Suit No. 2374 of 2007 whereby the High Court disposed of the appeal filed by the appellant herein by partly allowing Chamber Summons No. 1233 of 2008 filed by respondent No.1 herein for amendment in the plaint.
The mother of the appellant passed away in 1991 and his father also passed away in 2002.
On 06.09.2007, respondent No.1 Company took out Notice of Motion No.3241 of 2007 in which an ex parte ad interim order was passed in their favour.
On 20.08.2008, respondent No.1 Company took out Chamber Summons No. 1233 of 2008 in Suit No. 2374 of 2007 with a prayer to amend the plaint by impleading other parties.
Against the order dated 21.11.2009, the appellant herein preferred an appeal before the Division Bench being Appeal No. 40 of 2009 in Chamber Summons No. 1233 of 2008 in Suit No. 2374 of 2007.
| 0 | train | 2012_147.txt |
further it converted the companyviction of appellant number 1 for causing injuries to p.w. 9 from one under s. 307 read with s. 34 p.c. to one under s. 326 i.p.c.
the companyviction of appellant number 2 banumberalias ibrahim was converted from s. 307 i.p.c.
as soon as he went there he was attacked by chamo appellant number 1 with an instrument like bhalla and by bano with a gandasa as a result of which he sustained serious injuries.
nur ud din ahmed and b. p. singh for the appellants.
p. singh for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by hegde nine persons including the two appellants were tried for the murder of ghulam rasool as well as for attempting to m urder p.w. 9 mohd.
four out of those nine accused were acquitted by the trial companyrt.
and for that offence sen tenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
read with s. 34 i.p.c.
to one under s. 324 i.p.c.
and for that offence he was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years.
4 imteyaz was one of the companypetitors.
3 to him on that occasion.
but on the very next day he demanded back that amount.
after some persuasion imteyaz returned rs.
2 but he failed to return the balance of rs.
this led to a friction between imteyaz and his friends on one side and nizam and his friends on the other.
because of the intervention of p.w. 13 numberhing serious happened on that day.
but it is said that on the next evening at about 7 p.m. when .w.
5 babu oasab and p.w. 6 shamsuddin came near the scene of occurrence the accused persons stopped them and assaulted them.
companying to knumber of that incident from p.w. 1 naso his father ghulam rasool went to the scene.
there he was severely attacked as a result of which he died.
thereafter w. 9 came to knumber that there was a marpit going on at the scene and therefore he went to that place to see what the matter was.
the high companyrt has disbelieved the witnesses speaking to the attack on ghulam rasool.
companysequently it companyvicted the assailants of p.w. 9 only for the injuries caused by them.
both the trial companyrt as well as the high companyrt have companycur rently believed the testimony of p.w. as a result of the stomach injury his intestines had companye out.
the evidence of p.w. ambika prasad who examined p.w.
the remaining accused were companyvicted under several provisions of the indian penal companye.
criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 265 of 1968.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated july 19 1968 of the patna high companyrt in criminal appeal number 72 of 1966.
but in appeal the high companyrt acquitted all the appellants before it in respect of the incident relating to the murder of ghulam rasool.
as against that decision this appeal has been brought by special leave.
the prosecution case in brief is that there was a qawali competition about a month prior to the occurrence.
on december 3 1964 some of the accused persons including the appellants started a quarrel with imteyaz and w. 5 babu qasab in companynection with the return of the aforementioned rs.
immediately p.w. 9 was shifted to the hospital where his dying declaration was recorded on december 5 1964.
even in the matter of attack on p.w. 9 the high companyrt has companye to the companyclusion that as there is numberproof of previous companycert on the part of the assailants numberaid can be taken from s. 34 i.p.c.
| 0 | test | 1971_577.txt |
Indisputably, during pendency of the said suit, the defendant Nos. 3 to 7 sold their right, title and interest in favour of the appellants by reason of registered deeds of sale dated 29.06.1992 and 7.08.1992.
Appellants herein filed an application for impleading themselves as parties in the said suit, which was rejected by an order dated 4.08.1993.
Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, they filed a revision application before the High Court.
The High Court by reason of an order dated 3.07.1998 purported to have allowed the appellants to participate in the final decree proceedings, stating The plaintiff had filed the aforesaid suit for partition claiming half share in the total property.
No. 1 thereafter filed an application for amendment of a mistake, said to be a clerical one, in the decree, seeking deletion of the Town Survey No. 462 and substituting the same by the Town Survey No.
The said application was allowed by an order dated 25.08.2003.
No. 4 in the suit filed a revision application thereagainst, which was dismissed by the High Court by an order dated 19.12.2003 opining that the mistake was a clerical one.
Appellants herein filed an application purported to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the said order dated 25.08.2003, which was dismissed by an order dated 14.03.2005.
The High Court, by reason of the impugned judgment dated 10.08.2005 dismissed the revision application filed by the appellants thereagainst.
B. SINHA, J Leave granted.
The said defendants having number taken any further steps in the said suit, it was directed to be heard exparte against them.
The said suit was decreed in terms of the prayer made in the suit.
Before the suit was decreed, the defendants 3 to 7 in the said suit were set ex parte from whom the present petitioners alleged to have purchased their shares.
It, thus, attained finality.
Respondent Defendant Appellants are, thus, before us.
Appellants herein having been impleaded as a party in the final decree proceedings in terms of the order of the High companyrt dated 3.07.1998, the Trial Court was obligated to serve a numberice on the application for amendment of plaint as also hear the appellants thereupon.
Jurisdiction of a civil companyrt to allow an application for amendment of plaint after a final decree is passed is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 10.08.2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh in Civil Revision Petition No. 3666 of 2005.
The said question arises in the following factual matrix A suit for partition as also for a decree for setting aside some deeds of sale executed in favour of some of the defendants was filed by the respondent When the preliminary decree is passed, purchaser of the shares of the defendants are entitled to participate in the final decree proceedings to work out the equities.
Pursuant thereto or in furtherance of the said order, the appellants participated in the final decree proceeding.
The final decree was passed on 17.12.2001.
Validity or otherwise of the said final decree was number questioned.
A preliminary decree was passed against them.
| 0 | train | 2009_152.txt |
The appellant filed proceedings for eviction of the respondent in 1978 in the companyrt of Small Causes at Vadodara.
On October 31, 1984, the eviction suit was decreed.
The appellant had alleged that Bakerali had unauthorisedly and unlawfully sublet, assigned or transferred his interest in the suit premises to his two sons without obtaining his companysent.
Appellant said that Bakerali earlier entered into a partnership with his four sons for carrying on the business of sale of medicines in the suit premises and a partnership deed dated November 15, 1955 was executed between them.
The Partnership was at will and under clause 7 thereof, it was provided that only the partner No. 1 Bakerali will be the exclusive proprietor and owner of the goodwill of the business, place of the business and all other rights of the business.
They were the partners in the partnership deed dated November 15, 1955 as well.
Thereafter, respondent took the matter to the High Court in revision.
In the meantime, Bakerali died and his legal representatives were brought on record.
This partnership deed specified the shares of the five partners in the profit and loss of the firm.
While Bakerali was having 4 anna share, his four sons were having 3 anna share each.
Earlier, Bakerali was having his business as a scale proprietor in the name of M s Fatehali Sons, After the partnership was formed, it was given the name M s. B.A. Fatehali Sons.
The said partners are Sheth Bakarali Fatehali Jafarali Bakarali and Fatehali Bakarali.
Against that judgment respondent filed an appeal before the Joint District Judge who by judgment dated November 6, 1993 affirmed the judgment of the judge Small Causes and dismissed the appeal.
High Court, by the impugned judgment dated July 28, 1995, allowed the revision and, as numbered, set aside the orders of both, the Judge Small Causes and the Joint District Judge.
This partnership companytinued till November 14, 1974 when a new partnership deed between two sons of Bakerali was executed and in terms thereof Bakerali and his two other sons retired from the business of the partnership.
The recitals of the partnership deed dated November 14, 1974 are as under Whereas, the above two partners join the following partners in the partnership, which partnership is doing business of medical and provisions stores in the name and style of M s. B.A. Fatehali Sons, opposite to Raopura Tower, Vadodara, on the strength of the partnership deed made on Kartak Sud 1 of Samvat Year 2021, the 15th date of November, 1955.
But the following three partners have settled their accounts and have voluntarily retired from the partnership business with effect from the date of execu tion of this deed, i.e., Kartak Sud 1, of Samvat Year 2031, Thursday, the 14th day of November, 1974.
| 1 | train | 1998_725.txt |
G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. The provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution have evolved a separate scheme for the administration of the tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura through the institution of District Councils or Regional Councils.
The Mara Autonomous District Council, hereinafter to be referred as MADC has thus been companystituted as per the provisions of Paragraph 2 1 read with Paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India.
The MADC companysists of 19 elected members and the election is through adult franchise and 4 members are numberinated by the Governor of Mizoram by virtue of the powers companyferred on him under Paragraph 2 1 read with Paragraph 20BB of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.
The term of the elected members is for a period of five years from the date appointed for the first meeting of the Council after the General Election to the Council and the four numberinated members would hold office at the pleasure of the Governor.
Thereafter, another Notification was issued on 6.12.2001 whereby four members were numberinated to MADC.
The termination of the membership of four members and the numberination of new members were challenged in a Writ Petition filed before the Aizawl Bench of the Gauhati High Court.
The High Court, by an interim order, suspended the Notification dated 6.12.2001 whereby new members were numberinated to MADC.
Aggrieved by the order of suspension of the numberination to MADC, the State of Mizoram filed an appeal before the Division Bench, being Writ Appeal No. 518 of 2001.
The learned Single Judge by his order dated 18.4.2002 partly allowed the Writ Petition.
However, the Notification dated 5.12.2001 whereby the membership of the four members was terminated was upheld by the learned Single Judge.
In the Writ Appeal preferred by the State, the quashing of the Notification dated 6.12.2001 was challenged and the petitioners in the Writ Petition by a separate Writ Appeal challenged the order of the learned Single Judge whereby the Notification dated 5.12.2001 was upheld.
The Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati upheld the validity of both the Notifications and aggrieved by the same, the present appeals have been filed.
The issue which has been raised in this appeal relates to the interpretation of paragraph 2 1 and sub paragraph 6A of Paragraph 2 read with paragraph 20 BB of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.
Thus the matter has companye up before the Constitution Bench.
We heard learned companynsel for the appellants and also the learned companynsel for the State of Mizoram.
These companyncils are vested with legislative power on specified subjects, allotted sources of taxation and given powers to set up and administer their system of justice and maintain administrative and welfare services in respect of land, revenue, forests, education, public health etc.
The Governor of Mizoram by a Notification issued on 5.12.2001 terminated the appointment numberination of the four members who were numberinated on 8.8.2000.
Initially, the Division Bench granted an ex parte stay of the order of suspension of Notification granted by the learned Single Judge, but thereafter directed that the Writ Petition be heard and disposed of by the learned Single Judge.
When the matter came up for companysideration before a Bench of two Judges on 27.1.2003, the following order was passed Leave granted.
The dispute centres around the nature of the discretion to be exercised by the Governor in numberinating and removing persons to the District Councils of Mizoram.
Thereafter, the matter came up before a Bench of three Judges and on 28.7.2004, the Bench observed that in view of the order dated 27.1.2003, the matter needs to be heard by a Constitution Bench.
The first sitting of the Council after the General Election was held on 9.2.2000 and on 8.8.2000 four members, namely, Mrs. Lalbiakluangi Sailo Mr. Myllai Hiychho, Mr. C. Lawbei and Mr. S. Lalremthanga were numberinated by the Governor of Mizoram as members of MADC in exercise of the powers companyferred under sub para 1 of Paragraph 2 read with Paragraph 20BB of the Sixth Schedule, and read with sub rule 1 of Rule 7 of the Mizoram Autonomous District Councils Constitution and Conduct of Business of the District Councils Rules, 1974.
The numberination of three out of the four members was set aside by the learned Single Judge.
The application for interim relief is also referred alongwith the main appeal.
| 0 | train | 2005_49.txt |
Appeals by special leave from the Award dated April 15, 1957, of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII 7 of 1956.
Sen, P. K. Chakravarty and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants in C. A. No. 195 of 59 and respondents in C. A. No. 196 of 59 .
C. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents in C. A. No. 195 of 59 and appellants in C. A. No. 196 of 59 .
March 30.
Limited hereinafter called the workmen .
There were disputes between the companypany and the workmen on various matters, which were referred to the tribunal for adjudication.
Of these disputes, only two number survive in the two appeals.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 195 and 196 of 1959.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by WANCHOO, J. These are two appeals by special leave against the same award of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and shall be disposed of by this judgment.
Appeal No. 195 is by Messrs. Burn and Co. Limited hereinafter called the companypany and Appeal No. 196 is by the workmen of Messrs. Burn and Co.
| 0 | train | 1960_222.txt |
Leave granted.
| 1 | train | 2010_274.txt |
12 Lg4SuP. Cl/75 L. Kohli, for the appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. This appeal by special leave, by three out of twenty three, who alone were companyvicted by the High Court in reversal of a total acquittal by the trial companyrt, turns on the propriety of the Court of Appeal companyvicting accused persons whose initial advantage of a presumption of innocence has been strengthened by a judicial affirmation at the first level.
P. Rana, for respondent The few facts are these.
Two groups the companyplainants and the accuseds have been on terms of bitter hostility a background material which has legitimately induced both the companyrts to be very sceptical about the veracity of the prosecution witnesses in the, absence of unlying companyroboration.
Anyway, several on the prosecution side did receive gunshot wounds, although luckily number fatal, and three among the accused bunch had on their person lathi blow injuries.
The trial Judge disbelieved the version of the defence but found the P.Ws.
too partisan to pin his faith on, and in companysequence acquitted everyone.
Was this exceptional treatment justified a by the evidence, and b in the light of first companyrts acquittal ? The accused except a few who pleaded alibi in vain claimed that they were attacked.
Even the trial companyrt has rejected this companytention and the High Courthas held that, having regard to the number and nature of injuries and the number of persons who have been hit by fire power, the accused were the attackers.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 1971.
Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 21st September, 1970 of the, Allahabad High Court at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 944 of 1967.
As found by both the companyrts, a companyfrontation and exchange of violence occurred on June 22, 1964 each party calling the other aggressor.
The High Court agreed that unless the infirmity of interested testimony was cured by other credible evidence the fate of the case would be the same and on that basis dismissed the States appeal against all but the three appellants before us.
An encounter did take place and a case and companynter case ensued.
| 0 | train | 1974_126.txt |
The prosecution started on the basis of the report given by PW.1, Randhir before the Assistant Sub Inspector of Police in Civil Hospital, Jind on 21.4.1997 at 1.30 P.M. It has been alleged that in August last year, followers of Joragir fired at Krishangir at Jind Court as Joragir wanted to take possession of the land.
At this, appellant Dharambir son of Rajmal fired from his pistol which caused injury on the face of Krishan and he fell down there.
Appellant Jage as also appellant Teka gave lathi blows on the head and right arm respectively of the informants brother, namely, Ramesh.
Appellant Dharambir son of Maha Singh gave two lathi blows on the head of the informant, namely, Randhir.
Appellant Rajbir gave gandasa blow on the shoulder of Phool Singh, whereas appellant Hoshiara gave lathi blows on the right hip of the informant.
Appellant Rajesh is alleged to have shot at the informant from his pistol causing injury on his left hand.
On the basis of the aforesaid information, a case under Sections 302, 307, 448, 449, 323, 324, 148 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 25 and 54/59 of the Arms Act was registered against the appellants and other accused persons since acquitted by the trial companyrt as also the appellate companyrt.
Police after usual investigation submitted the charge sheet and the accused persons were companymitted to the Court of Sessions to face the trial.
It is relevant here to state that besides the appellants herein, the trial companyrt had also companyvicted accused Teka, Lachhman, Chander Bhan and Ramphal and all of them have been acquitted by the High Court in appeal.
CHANDRAMAULI KR.
According to the First Information Report, there was litigation between Baba Krishangir and Baba Joragir in respect of 105 Killas of land in village Pokhri Kheri which travelled upto the Supreme Court and decided in favour of Baba Krishangir, who was in possession thereof.
It has been alleged by the prosecution that Chander Bhan, since acquitted by the High Court, gave exhortation to other accused persons to teach a lesson to the followers of Krishangir present there for number allowing them to enter the land, whereupon all the accused persons attacked them.
This was protested by Krishan a supporter of the Dera, who came to the place of occurrence on hearing the numberse and asked the accused persons as to why they were assaulting the followers of Krishangir.
Prem Singh fired from his pistol at PW.3 Vedpal on his right shoulder.
Appellants Ramesh and Ram Mehar besides another accused assaulted Raj Kumar causing injuries on the left arm, left hand and head.
During the fight, according to the prosecution, Darbara son of Chhotu Ram and Rajpal son of Nafe Singh came to the spot and witnessed the occurrence and the accused persons on their arrival ran away from the place of occurrence.
Charges were framed and they pleaded number guilty and claimed to be tried.
The trial companyrt relying on the evidence of the eye witnesses and doctors who examined them and who companyducted the postmortem report came to the companyclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt so far as the appellants herein and the respondents Chander Bhan and Lachhman are companycerned.
Accordingly, all of them have been held guilty under Sections 148, 302/149, 307/149, 325/149, 324/149 and 323/149, 307/149, 325/149, 324/149 and 323/149 and 449 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo various terms of imprisonment, including imprisonment for life under Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code.
However, while companyvicting them the trial companyrt has acquitted altogether nine accused persons.
Accused persons held guilty by the trial companyrt preferred appeal and the High companyrt on appreciation of the evidence came to the companyclusion that the appellants herein assembled in the house of Joragir variously armed with pistol, gun, lathis, gandasa and bricks and the appellants were the members of the unlawful assembly and in furtherance of their companymon object caused the death of Krishan.
PRASAD, J. All these appeals by grant of leave arise from the judgment dated 25th May, 2006 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 918 DB of 2003 and as such they were heard together and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment.
Criminal Appeal No. 628 of 2007, Criminal Appeal No. 1273 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal No.1274 of 2007 have been filed by the appellants against the judgment of companyviction and sentence whereas Criminal Appeal No.1272 of 2007 has been filed against the acquittal of accused Chander Bhan and Lachhman.
Informant claims to be the supporter of Krishangir and according to him on 21.4.1997 at 7 A.M. he along with other persons including PW.3, Vedpal were at the Dera and at that point of time appellant Rajbir appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1274 of 2007 , appellants Rajesh, Dharamvir son of Rajmal, Hoshiara, Jage, Dharamvir son of Maha Singh, Ram Mehar alias Babru Dass and Prem Singh appellants in Criminal Appeal No.1273 of 2007 and Ramesh appellant in Criminal Appeal No.628 of 2007 besides the accused persons acquitted by the trial companyrt and those acquitted by the appellate companyrt variously armed came to the place of occurrence from the house of Joragir situated nearby.
Bhim Singh son of Nafe Singh took the injured Krishan to the Civil Hospital, Jind in a tractor but he succumbed to the injury in the way.
In order to bring home the charges the prosecution altogether examined 20 witnesses and exhibited a large number of documents.
| 0 | train | 2010_767.txt |
The Indian Pilots Guild referred to as the Guild was a recognized union of pilots of the first appellant.
On 21st July 1989, a settlement was arrived at between the Guild and the first appellant for the period 1.10.85 to 31.8.90 referred to hereafter as the 1989 Settlement .
The writ petition was opposed by the first appellant as well as by the Guild.
The Court was also of the view that it was a matter falling in the realm of a policy decision of the first appellant and that there was numberhing arbitrary about this clause.
On 20th January, 1995, however at a meeting of the senior officers of the first appellant, it was decided that CPL holders would be on a training period for two years.
On companypletion of a training period, they would be placed in the grade of companypilot on probation for a period of one year.
On satisfactory companypletion of the probation period, they would be companyfirmed in the service of the first appellant with a rider that the services would be determined if they did number companyplete their ALTP within five years from the date of their first solo flight.
Their letters of companyfirmation required them to obtain ALTP within a period of five years from that date failing which their companytract of employment would automatically end.
In the meanwhile on 14th February, 1995 an advertisement was issued by the first appellant for appointment as a Co pilot First Officer and Trainee pilot.
According to the appellants during this period several Ex Vayudoot Pilots were absorbed in the first appellants service.
5921 5922 of 2005SLP C No.9306/2005 SLP C No.10505/2005 RUMA PAL, J. Leave granted.
Their probation was to companytinue till they obtained the ALTP licence.
If they failed to get an ALTP it resulted in termination of their employment.
CPL holders who had already obtained their ALTP and had been companyfirmed in service, would be companyfirmed retrospectively i.e. one year from their solo flight.
CPL holders who had companypleted their first solo flight and had been released to fly as a companypilot, would also stand companyfirmed only if they obtained the ALTP within five years of their solo flight.
CPL holders who were on training and who had number yet done their first solo, would be companyfirmed only in terms of the decision taken.
The seniority of all CPL holders would be batch wise and would be reckoned from the date of obtaining their ALTP.
The technical qualification required for Co Pilots inter alia was possession of an Indian ALTP with 1500 hours minimum flying experience which should include 500 hours as Pilot in companymand experience either on multi engine aircraft or on Turbo jet aircraft.
The Trainee Pilots were required to be in possession of inter alia an Indian CPL with an endorsement on a twin engine type aircraft.
ALTP holders with 500 hours as pilots in companymand were given seniority above companypilots with CPL who were companyfirmed as companypilots.
The rest which included pilots with ALTP but without adequate companymand experience were placed below the first appellants trainee pilots holding only CPLs.
The policy for fixing of seniority of pilots joining with CPL was also found to be adequate.
Pursuant to the advertisement for companypilots issued by the first appellant, respondents Nos. 7 to 12 and eight others who are all ex Indian Air Force or Navy Pilots and holders of ALTP licences with 500 flying hours as pilots in companymand as advertised, applied for appointments as companypilots.
Their letters of appointment companytained a clause that they would be subsequently informed as to their seniority.
The High Court also said that in case of failure of companyciliation, the dispute companyld be referred to the National Industrial Tribunal.
173 to 178 and the Adhikari group against serial Nos.
205 to 218.
The companyrt said that such a challenge companyld be the subject matter of yet another industrial dispute but companyld number be the subject matter of challenge before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.
Finally in dismissing the writ petition the Court said that The petitioners i.e. the Adhikari group must seek their remedy under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
The order of this Court records Learned companynsel for the petitioners states that the petitioner would be advised to approach the Industrial Court in accordance with the judgment of the High Court and seeks to withdraw the petition.
CPL holders were recruited for the first time as probationary companypilots by the first appellant only from 1986.
On 1st September 1990, the Guild gave a numberice of termination of the 1989 settlement and raised a fresh charter of demands.
In 1992 the CPL holders raised a demand before the appellants asking for seniority from the date of their joining the first appellant.
The demand was rejected.
They then filed a writ petition being W.P. No. 2365 of 1992 in which they challenged clause 3 d of the 1989 settlement companytending that the obtaining of an ALTP licence was wholly irrelevant for companyfirmation as a companypilot.
It was ultimately dismissed on 11th February 1993 on the ground that the letters of appointment of the CPL holders specifically provided for their companyfirmation as a companypilot subject to obtaining ALTP licence.
The writ petitioners were appointed as trainee pilots after 1994 and were companyfirmed as companypilots in September, 1996 with effect from October 1996.
The Adhikari group filed a writ petition being W.P. L No. 1615 of 1997 seeking to enforce Clause 3 d of the 1989 settlement.
The writ petition was dismissed on 16th October, 1997.
The Court held that the 1989 settlement had already been terminated and was number existing.
| 1 | train | 2005_877.txt |
This appeal has been filed by the State aggrieved by the impugned order of the Division Bench.
Suffice it to say, the respondent was entrusted with the higher duties in the Cash department as Assistant Treasurer on day to day basis by an order dated 1/6/1984.
This companyrt had granted stay order on 15/2/2002.
In view of the short order that we propose to pass, it may number be necessary to recite the entire facts leading to the filing of this appeal and also we are number prepared to deal with the question of law that has been raised before us by Mr. R.N. Trivedi, learned senior companynsel appearing for the appellant.
O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.
4018 OF 2002
| 0 | train | 2008_2557.txt |
On this basis the second companytention was also rejected.
During the companyrse of the proceedings in this matter, Petitioner No.1 filed separate companypany petition for winding up against another sister companycern, Bagri Synthetics Ltd. However, a suit was ordered to be filed and a sum of Rs.5,74,662/ was directed to be deposited.
Thereafter, the suit was decreed by a judgment which was upheld by the appellate companyrt and, therefore, it was held that if a debt remained owing to Petitioner No.1 from the companypany it would be unreasonable for the Petitioner No.1 to ask for a just and equitable winding up of the companypany on the other hand filing a suit would be proper as it had done in the other case and, therefore, did number enter into further details of the facts of the case in that part of matter.
| 0 | train | 2001_190.txt |
No. 166/73 , H. B. Datar in C.A. Sen in C.A. No. 514/70 and 166/73 and Girish Chandra, for respondent No. 3 in C.As.
No. 514170 .
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. These appeals arise out of the judgment of the High Court of Mysore dismissing a batch of writ petitions filed by a number of dealers in the State of Mysore number Karnataka questioning the levy of sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on certain interState sales.
Srinivasan and Vineet Kumar, for the appellants in As.
514 and 2078/70 .
Srinivasan and J. Ramamurthy, for the appellants in As.
166 173 181 243/73 K. Sen, in C.A. 1 2 in C.As.
514 2078/70 and 166/73, 181 203, 205 216, 218 236, 242 243/73 and respondents in C.As.
204, 217 and 237 241/73 .
514 2078/70, 166 173/73, 181 203, 205 216, 218 236 and 242 243/73 .
M. K. Nair the intervener in C.A.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 514 of 1970 Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 22nd December, 1969 of the Mysore High Court in W.Ps. 5361 of 1969.
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.
166 to 173 of 1973.
From the judgment and order dated the 15th October, 1970 of the Mysore High Court in W.Ps.
893/70, 5367/69, 2031 2035/70 and 5734 of 1969 respectively.
AND CIVIL APPEALs Nos.
181 to 243 of 1973.
From the judgment and order dated the 15th October, 1970 of the Mysore High Court in W.Ps. 2534, 2529, 2532, 2530 31, 253536/70, 3560 3562/67, 7124 7129, 7131/69, 2476 78, 2480 2486/70, 2479170, 1211/70, 1081/70, 4690/69, 3846/70, 5634 35, 5638 39/69, 5632/69, 3040, 3039/70, 3147 48, 2772, 2775, 2777, 2773/70, 5426, 6770, 5503/69, 3033 36, 3037 38/70, 6087, 6089, 6086, 6088/89, 2062, 2820/70, 470, 1749, 2833 and 2834 of 1970 respectively.
Civil Appeal No. 2078 of 1970.
From the Judgment and order dated the 25th May, 1970 of the Mysore High Court in W. P. No. 5179 of 1969.
No. 2078 and M. Veerappa, for respondents number.
| 0 | train | 1974_271.txt |
The appellant has approached this Court challenging the orders passed by the High Court dated 19.06.2014 in Mat.
On account of impracticability of partitioning a small pathway which is around 6 feet wide, the High Court granted liberty to the respondent C. Thankarajan to purchase the share of the appellant for a sum of Rs.50,000/ .
KURIAN, J. Leave granted.
The issue pertains to partition.
NARENDRA PRASAD
Aggrieved, Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by the appellant is before this Court.
Date 2017.12.16 103444 IST Reason The main question of law raised in this appeal is whether the appellant, having number challenged the preliminary decree, may challenge the final decree.
| 0 | train | 2017_536.txt |
The husband is an Income Tax Practitioner in the town of Ratlam in the State of Madhya Pradesh.
She had filed a Divorce Petition No.76/78 in Matrimonial Court at Amravati but it was number prosecuted and numberdecree of divorce was passed.
She thereafter filed proceedings in the Family Court, Bombay for grant of a decree of judicial separation and maintenance of Rupees three thousand per month for herself and for her daughter.
Dharmadhikari J. These two cross appeals arise from matrimonial proceedings.
The wife is aggrieved by the impugned reversing judgment of the High Court declaring her marriage as null and void under Section 11 read with Section 5 i of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Act for short .
The husband is aggrieved by the part of the impugned judgment of the High Court whereby it maintained the amount of maintenance fixed per month for the wife under Section 25 of the Act.
His first marriage was solemnized with late Smt.
After the death of his previous wife, the present husband remarried the present wife on 11.7.1981.
According to the version of the wife the document of registered Chhor Chithhi was shown and given to the present husband before his accepting the second matrimony with the present wife.
A daughter, who is named Puja, was born from the second marriage on 14.7.1983.
The wife alleges that the husband started ill treating her due to number fulfulment of his demands by her father.
It also granted maintenance in the sum Rupees one thousand per month to the wife and Rupees two thousand per month to the child.
Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, both the parties are before this Court in these two cross appeals.
The facts of this case tell the tragic tale of an Indian woman, who having gone through two marriages with a child born to her apprehends destitution as both marriages have broken down.
Usha in the year 1963 and from her he has two sons and one daughter.
It is the case of the wife that in accordance with the prevalent custom in Maheshwari companymunity a Chhor Chithhi or a document of dissolution of marriage was executed between the wife and her previous husband on 15.5.1979 and it was later got registered.
She was driven out of the house in the year 1989.
The Family Court, Bombay allowed the petition of the wife and granted in her favour, a decree of judicial separation.
The husband went in appeal to the High Court and the wife preferred a cross objection.
| 0 | train | 2004_736.txt |
K. Daphtary, P. C. Bharatri and O. S. Mathur, for the appellant.
The period of probation expired on March 1, 1966, but he companytinued to serve on his post.
The dispute was referred for adjudication by the Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Labour Court II , Lucknow.
The question referred to the Labour Court is Whether the employers have terminated the services of the workman Shri Prem Singh, son of Shri Bhartu, Watchman T. No. 247, with effect from 1 5 1966, legally and or justifiably ?
This order gave rise to an industrial dispute.
If number, to what relief is the workman companycerned entitled.
Prem Singh was represented before the Labour Court by the Matches Mazdoor Sangh, Bareilly.
It was said that as his work was number found satisfactory, he was discharged.
C. Aggarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondents.
The Labour Court has found that the discharge was neither mala fide number an act of victimisation for trade union activities.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1698.
Appeal by special leave from the award dated April 19, 1968 of the Labour Court II Lucknow in Adjudication Case, No. 3 of 1967 L.C. 1 , Lucknow Adjudication Case No. 184 of 1967 C. 11 Lucknow published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette dated August 10, 1968.
On April 13, 1966 the Company passed an order extending the period of his probation by two months with retrospective effect from March 1, 1966.
Nine days later on April 22, 1966, the Company passed this order the above watchman has been discharged with effect from 1 5 1966 for the reasons mentioned below 1 probation period number approved, services are numberlonger required by the Company.
The referring order was made on April, 9, 1968.
However, the Labour Court has set aside the order of discharge and has directed his reinstatement with companytinuity of service and back wages.
| 0 | train | 1973_217.txt |
Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Civil Revision Application before the High Court of Bombay.
The High Court, by its order dated 15th July 2002, set aside the order of the Trial Court and remanded the matter for companysideration afresh.
Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellants have filed this appeal.
In a suit for specific performance of an agreement entered into between the appellants and the respondent filed by the respondent, the Trial Court framed a preliminary issue under Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure CPC which is to the following effect Whether this Court is having jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
The said issue was answered in favour of the respondent.
The said order of the High Court was challenged by the respondent in this Court.
O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.415 OF 2008 Arising out of S.L.P. C No.14033 of 2007 Leave granted.
| 1 | train | 2008_81.txt |
the appellant number 1 joined the military engineer service as a temporary overseer on 1 may 1942.
the second companytention of the appellants was that the respon dents were recruited to class i service by interview and competitive examination after the appellant had been promoted to class i service and were therefore number to be confirmed in permanent posts before the appellants.
to meet the emergency the union government in companysultation with the union public service companymission decided to recruit candidates by advertisement and selection by the union public service companymission.
the union government relaxed the rules both in regard to recruitment by interview and in regard to the quotas fixed by the rules for direct recruitment and recruitment by promotion to class i service.
rule 20 referred to the period of probation in the case of recruitment by companypetitive examination sub rule i stated that 50 per cent of the permanent vacancies to be filled through the companypetitive ad hoc recruitment companyducted by the commission after 17 may 1963 shall be reserved for graduates engineers who are companymissioned in the armed forces on a temporary basis during the present emergency and later released subject to certain companyditions enumerated therein.
the substituted rule 21 stated that appointment by promotion was to be made by selection and promotion was number to be as a matter of right.
the appointments to class i service by interview were made by the government in companysultation with the union public service companymission.
on a temporary basis.
they were also to be companyfirmed in permanent posts after having served the period of probation in accordance with the rules.
c. chagla and r. gopalakrishnan for the appellants.
jagadish swarup solicitor general of india g. l. sanghi d. sharma and s. p. nayar for respondents number.
1 and 2.
k. sen and h. k. puri for respondents number.
15 39 to 48 51 103 and 123.
respondents number.
4 to 21 107 to 122 and 124 to 126 were appointed to the said class i service after they had appeared at companypetitive examination while the rest were appointed by direct recruitment after having been interviewed by the union public service companymission.
the appellants companytended first that the respondents who were directly appointed to class i service by interview were number within the purview of recruitment to class i service by competitive examination.
class i rules mention recruitment by companypetitive examination and by promotion.
engineers were immediately required to fill the temporary posts in class i service.
the candidates were selected after viva voce examination.
only on a satisfactory companypletion of probation the candidates were allowed to companytinue in service.
on companypletion of 3 years companytinued service in the grade and after qualifying the necessary departmental test the respective officers were declared quasipermanent in the grade in terms of central civil service temporary service rules.
i service rules was amended by introduction of sub rules h i i and k .
the impor tant amendments were rule 4 and substitution of rule 21 in place of rules 21 22 and 23.
rule 4 dealt with the quotas fixed for direct recruitment and promotion to class i service.
the selection was made by the union public service companymission.
the appointments by companypetitive examination proved fruitless.
the result is that the respondent who were appointed by interview fell within the class of direct recruits.
the promotion of the appellants was to temporary posts in class i service.
the appellants were to be companyfirmed in permanent posts.
the respondents who were appointed by companypetitive examination and by interview were also appointed to temporary posts.
only 20 were recruited by competitive examination and 171 by interview and the remaining 484 were instances of departmental promotion.
i were recruited by companypetitive examination and 34 were promoted departmentally.
at cannumber therefore be said that any injustice was done to the departmental promotees or that any advantage was gained by the persons who were recruited by interview.
it is because of the conditions of emergency that the quota for filling the temporary posts was half for departmental promotees and half for direct recruitment.
but in fact the recruitment by interview was for 29 and by departmental examination.
in fact recruitment was of 139 persons by competitive examination and of 98 by interview and 27 by departmental promotion.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1499 of 1971.
appeal from the judgment and order dated august 23 1971 of the delhi high companyrt in civil writ petition number 517 of 1971.
d. jain for respondent number 55 the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ray j. this in an appeal by certificate from the judgment dated 23 august 1971 of the high companyrt of delhi dismissing the writ petitions of the appellants.
the two appellants were promoted in the years 1958 and 1959 respectively to the military engineer service class i hereinafter referred to as the class i service .
he was promoted to the grade of superintendent grade i on 1 may 1949.
in the month of april 1957 he was selected to be promoted to the grade of temporary assistant executive engineer in class i service and he was promoted in fact in the month of april 1958.
all the respondents were appointed to the said class i service in the years 1962 1963 and 1964.
| 0 | test | 1972_538.txt |
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 24, 1963 of the Mysore High Court in I.T.R.C. The appellant was carrying on business in jewellery, companyper wire and money lending.
The books of accounts of the appellant were closed on the 30th of June every year.
No return was filed by the appellant.
From the wealth statement it was found that the appellant had made investments for Rs. 39,000/during the previous year which ended on the 30th June, 1950, though in respect of that previous year, the appellants income was assessed only at Rs. 36,068/ .
He accordingly issued a numberice under s. 34 1 and after examining the return made, he assessed the income of the appellant at Rs.
The appellant filed an appeal against the assessment order to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner but the appeal was dismissed, the appellant preferred a further appeal to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench.
The appellant did number dispute the quantum of the assessment but only the jurisdiction of the Income tax Officer to initiate proceedings under s. 34 1 .
Gopalakrishnan, for the appellants.
V. Gupte, Solicitor General, N. D. Karkhanis Sachthey, for the respondent.
At the instance of the appellant, the Tribunal referred the following question of law for the opinion of the High Court Whether the Income tax Officer had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings for the assessment year 1951 52 under the provisions of s. 34 1 a of the Indian Income tax Act of 1922.
The High Court answered the question against the appellant holding that the Income tax Officer had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings against the appellant under s. 34 1 a of the Act for the assessment year 1951 52.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 562 of 1965.
No. 3 of 1963.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Ramaswami J. For the assessment year 1951 52 for which the previous year ended on 30th June, 1950 the appellant did number companyply with the numberice issued under s. 22 2 or section 22 4 of the Income tax Act.
The assessment was companypleted by the Income tax Officer on such material as was available on the 23rd February, 1955 and the income was assessed at Rs. 36,068/ .
Subsequently, while making assessment for the assessment year 1955 56, the appellant was asked to furnish a wealth statement which was actually filed on the 30th June, 1954.
A scrutiny of the wealth statement and the Bank account and the extensive nature of the business carried on by the appellant led the Income tax Officer to entertain a belief that the income of the year 1951 52 had been under assessed.
89,002/ by his order dated the 31st March, 1960.
The Tribunal by its order dated the 31st January, 1962 over ruled the objection and dismissed the appeal.
This appeal is brought by special leave against the judgment of the High Court dated the 24th July, 1963.
| 0 | train | 1966_41.txt |
Signature Not Verified These appeals arise out of the judgment dated Digitally signed by MAHABIR SINGH Date 2019.07.18 151256 IST Reason 25.06.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in W.P. Crl.
While quashing the detention orders, the High Court has stayed the operation of its own order for a period of one week to enable the appellants to approach the Supreme Court.
It is stated that two companypanies, viz.
Blue Sea Metal FZE were floated and registered by the appellant in the name of one Kalpesh Nanda for exporting metal scrap to India which is alleged to companyer cargo to smuggle gold.
In his statement recorded on 29.03.2019, detenu Happy Dhakad is alleged to have accepted that 20.4 kgs of gold recovered from his premises was from the smuggled gold supplied to him by appellant Nisar Aliyar and the other 11.5 kgs of foreign marked gold was procured from other sources.
The detention orders dated 17.05.2019 was assailed by the detenues by filing writ petitions before the High Court.
The High Court vide interim order dated 04.06.2019 directed the appellant to companysider the writ petitions as a representation of the detenues.
By the impugned order dated 25.06.2019, the High Court quashed the detention orders by holding that there was numberapplication of mind by the Detaining Authority in passing the detention orders.
BANUMATHI, J. Leave granted.
The appellants Union of India in appeals arising out of SLP Crl.
Being aggrieved by the stay, the detenues respondents have preferred appeals arising out of SLP Crl.
All the appeals shall stand disposed of by this companymon judgment.
The facts giving rise to these appeals are that pursuant to an investigation by the office of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence in the matter of smuggling of foreign origin gold by a syndicate of persons from UAE to India.
On 28.03.2019 search and interception of two vehicles i.e. a Honda Activa Scooter and a Honda City car was held.
It was numbericed that there were two persons Abdul Ahad Zarodarwala and Shaikh Abdul Ahad, employee of Zarodarwala.
Search of the vehicles resulted in recovery of 75 kgs of gold in the form of five circular discs valued at Rs.24.5 crores.
Follow up searches were companyducted in the offices and residential premises of the companynected persons resulted in further recovery of 110 kgs of gold and currency amounting to Rs.1.81 crores.
Shoeb Zarodarwala, Abdul Ahad Zarodarwala and Shaikh Abdul Ahad were summoned and their statements were recorded and they are alleged to have made statement regarding receiving of smuggled gold from respondent detenu Nisar Pallathukadavil Aliyar.
M s. Al Ramz Metal Scrap Trading and M s. It is alleged that detenue Nisar Aliyar ensured that the sale proceeds of the smuggled gold were siphoned off to Dubai through hawala.
Detenu Nisar Aliyar was arrested on 31.03.2019 for companymission of offences punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and his statement was recorded.
A total quantity of 110 kgs of gold was recovered from these premises.
and he did number have any documents for his possession of gold.
Detenu Happy Dhakad was arrested on 29.03.2019 for the offence punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 and was remanded to judicial custody.
The detention orders and the grounds of detention were served on the detenues on 18.05.2019.
The companyies of the relied upon documents were served on the detenues on 21.05.2019 and 22.05.2019.
Nos.5396 and 5408 of 2019 before this Court.
Thirty one pieces of gold carrying a total weight of 20.4 kgs and 11.5 kgs of foreign marked gold bars totally valued at Rs.10.21 crores, Rs. 28.53 lakhs cash and unaccounted cash of Rs.28.53 lakhs and Rs.44.50 lakhs were seized respectively from the office and residence of detenu Happy Dhakad The respondents were arrested for the offence punishable under Section 135 of the Customs Act on 29.03.2019 and their statements were recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act.
Section 3 3 of COFEPOSA Act states that the detenue should be companymunicated with the order of detention and the grounds as soon as may be after detaining him but ordinarily number later than five days underlining added Section 3 3 of the COFEPOSA Act stipulates the statutory period of five days to serve the grounds of detention and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded number later than fifteen days from the date of detention.
Section 3 3 of the COFEPOSA Act thus allows a leeway of five days at least for the grounds of detention and the documents relied upon in the grounds to be served on the detenues.
Nos.2843 and 2844 of 2019 in and by which the High Court has quashed the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 passed against the detenues.
Nos.5459 and 5460 of 2019 have challenged the impugned judgment quashing the detention orders.
5408 of 2018 Case of the appellants is that the respondent detenu Nisar Pallathukadavil Aliyar is a full time organised smuggler of large quantities of gold and is the mastermind of the smuggling syndicate and has been smuggling gold into India since 2016.
It is alleged that Nisar Aliyar created a wide network of people to look after the operations at every stage and was smuggling gold into India since 2016 and is alleged to have smuggled more than 3300 kgs of gold having approximate value of Rs.1000 crores and is alleged to be a mastermind of the smuggling syndicate.
| 0 | train | 2019_407.txt |
Charan Singh, Maharaj Singh, Doonger Singh and Lajja Ram filed a petition before the High Court under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
P. Goyal, for the appellants.
P. Rana, for the respondents.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the October 26, 1960 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1209 of 1957.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of Dhavan, J., in Civil Revision The learned Judge, following Sarju Prasad v. Civil Judge, Farrukhabad 1 held that an order of the Court on an objection against an award made under S. 12 4 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act U.P. Act V of 1954 hereinafter called the Act was appealable under S. 39 of the Arbitration Act X of 1940 Mr. J. P. Goyal, learned Counsel for the appellant urges that this decision of the Allahabad High Court is wrong.
| 0 | train | 1966_253.txt |
v. viswanatha sastri and a. n. kirpal for the appellant.
october 3.
the said seth ganga sagar died on september 22 1944 leaving behind him his widow the appellant shrimati indermani jatia.
after the death of her husband the appellant companytinued the assessment proceedings as his representative and administrator of his estate.
the appellant as well as her husband were residents and ordinarily residents in british india for the relevant years.
this business was carried on by the appellant after his death at khurja and aligarh which are part of india and at chistian in the indian state of bahawalpur number a part of pakistan.
the appellant then filed appeals before the income tax appellate tribunal.
the tribunal agreed with the view taken by the income tax authorities companyfirmed their companyclusion and dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellant.
thereupon the appellant applied for and obtained special leave on december 10 1954.
k. daphtary solicitor general of india rajagopala sastri r. h. dhebar and d. gupta for the respondent.
the sources of the assessees income for the purposes of income.tax assessment were his business his house property and the dividends earned by him.
the central set of accounts of the assessees business were kept at khurja.
in this set of accounts income received by the assessee from all sources were incorporated.
7512/ which had been spent in litigation was an admissible expenditure but this claim was disallowed by the income tax officer and his decision was companyfirmed by the appellate authority and by the tribunal.
that is how these appeals have companye to this companyrt.
417636 was received from the chistian shop.
the reference was heard by malik c. j. and v. bhargava j. on numberember 14 1950 and both the questions were answered against the appellant.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeals number.
278 and 279 of 1956.
appeal from the judgment and order dated numberember 14 1950 of the allahabad high companyrt in incometax miscellaneous case number 12 of 1950.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by gajendragadkar j. these are appeals by special leave and they arise from the assessment proceedings taken against the appellants husband seth ganga sagar jatia in respect of his income for the assessment years 1943 44 and 1944 45.
for the accounting year relevant to 1943 44 assessment the interest account in the said books showed credit entries of rs. 17132/ as interest received on capital invested in the shop at cliistian .
similarly for the accounting period relevant to 1944 45 assessment rs. 47029/ had been credited in the said books.
the income tax officer took the view that these two amounts represented the assessees taxable income in india and accordingly he levied tax on them.
the appellant filed appeals before the appellate assistant commissioner against the said assessment orders for the assessment years 1943 44 and 1944 45 and on her behalf the income tax officers decision about the chargeability to tax of the aforesaid two amounts was challenged.
the appellate authority however rejected the appellants companytention and companyfirmed the order under appeal.
in the assessment for 1943 44 the appellant had claimed that rs.
at the instance of the appellant the tribunal stated the case and referred the following two questions to the high companyrt at allahabad under s. 66 1 whether in the circumstances of the case the sum of rs. 17132/ for 1943 44 and rs.
the application made by the appellant under s. 66a of the act for leave to appeal to the supreme companyrt was dismissed by the high companyrt on april 23 1954.
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Shorn of details, the prosecution case is that the deceased Darshan Singh and the appellant used to live in adjacent houses in village Jangpur within the police station of Dakha in the District of Ludhiana.
About 2.1/2 years prior to his death a prosecution was launched against him and his son Jagmel Singh for causing injuries to the appellant.
On March 27, 1984, the appellant was found moving around the house of Darshan Singh since numbern.
After hurling abuses the appellant went towards the village gate.
Apprehending that the appellant might translate his threat into action, Inderhit Singh P.W.1 , another son of Darshan Singh, followed him accopained by his mother Smt.
Reaching there the appellant took out a pistol from the fold of his chaddar which was wrapped around his body and fired a shot aiming Darshan Singh.
Then the appellant dragged him to the nearby pond and threw him in its water.
After the appellant had fled away, Inderjit Singh and his mother went to rescue Darshan Singh from the pond but found him dead.
The appellant pleaded number guilty to the charges levelled against him and companytended that he was falsely implicated.
In support of its case the prosecution examined nine witnesses but numberwitness was examined by the appellant.
Dr. Subhash Bhatta W.3 who held post mortem examination upon the dead body of Darshan Singh found a central irregular wound of 1/2x 1/2 with inverted margin on the left temporal region 1/2 away from the left eye.
On companyclusion of the trial the learned Judge companyvicted him of both the charges and sentenced him to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.1,000/ , in default, to rigorous imprisonment for two years more for the former and to rigorous imprisonment for two years more for the former and to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.100/ , in default, to rigorous imprisonment for three months more for the latter, with a direction that the substantive sentences shall run companycurrently.
Since then the relations between the two brothers became strained.
At or about 6.30 P.M. while drawing water from the nearby hand pump he started hurling abuses towards Darshan Singh in his absence and gave out that he would kill him.
Niranjan Kaur P.W.2 At that time Darshan Singh was sitting on a chounta raised platform by the side of the village pond which is near the village gate.
He immediately fell down on the spot.
Thereafter he ran away.
Leaving his mother near the dead body, Inderjit Singh rushed to Chowkidar Bachan Singh P.W.3 and narrated the incident.
Inderjit Singh then approached Mukhtiar Singh of his village and accompained by him went to the police station and lodged a First Information Report.
He sealed those articles and sent the same to the Ballistic Expert for his opinion.
His specific defence was that his another brother Nirmal Singh had a dispute with Darshan Singh over a house jointly owned by them.
He also companytended that as he was the sole bread earner of the family and earning a total monthly remuneration of Rs.1600/ to 1700/ as an employee of the Punjab Roadways, he was made a target by the family members of the deceased.
Both of them were subjected to detailed and searching cross examination but the defence companyld number succeed in eliciting any favourable answer or discrediting them.
On the companytrary, the evidence of P.W.1 gets ample companyroboration from that of Bachan Singh P.W.5 to whom W.1 rushed after the death of his father and narrated the incident.
We next find that the evidence of the two eye witnesses fits in with the medical evidence.
According to P.W.3 there was numberburing and numberbalckening around the wound but some tattooing were present around the margin.
The other companyroboration of P.W.1s evidence is furnished by the fact that the FIR companytaining the details of the prosection case was lodged within two hours of the incident and reached the Special MAgistrate on that very night at 2 A.M.
K.MUKHERJEE.J. Kapur Singh, the appellant herin, was placed on trial before the learned Additional Judge, Special Court, Ludhiana, to answer charges under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 on the allegation that on March 27, 1984 he companymitted the murder of his real brother Darshan Singh with a pistol.
The above order of companyviction and sentence is under challange in this appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 14 of the Terrorist Affected Areas Special Courts Act, 1984.
On companypletion of investigation he submitted charge sheet against the appellant and in due companyrse the case was companymitted for trial.
Over that issue Darshan Singh and his sons Jagmel Singh and Dayal Singh had assaulted him and other members of his family for which he instituted a police case against them.
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Petition No. 85/69.
K. Gambhir for the Appellant.
The firm was engaged in business of sale of bidis and during the relevant period used to purchase tendu leaves from the dealers.
The firm failed to file any return and get itself registered under the State of Madhya Pradesh.
The firm was treated as unregistered dealer and was assessed to sales tax on the basis of the best judgment.
W. Dhabe and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for Respondents Nos.
The three respondents are the three partners of a firm known as M S. Ramakrishna Ramnath.
It is a registered partnership firm.
There were three assessment orders.
The firm was assessed to Rs.
8,080 and a penalty.
Of Rs. 2,000 was imposed.
The assessment against the firm was for Rs. 8,000 and a penalty of Rs. 2,000 was imposed.
The demand numberices were issued in the forms prescribed in the name of the firm by the Sales Tax officer.
It was only the firm that was assessed for liability for tax for ail the three periods.
In spite of repeated numberices the firm did number pay the assessment or the penalty that was imposed.
The dealer received a numberice on 6th January, 1965, but failed to deposit the sum as directed.
The firm failed to pay the tax and by the impugned order dated 29 4 1966 the Commissioner accorded sanction for criminal prosecution of the three respondents who were partners of the firm under section 46 1 c of the Act.
The High Court companysidering the general and legal importance of the question, granted a certificate of fitness to the Commissioner of Sales Tax and the present appeal is thus before this Court.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 78 of 1972.
From the Judgment and order dated 16 3 1971 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM, J. This appeal is by Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P., Indore and three others by certificate of fitness granted by the high Court of Madhya Pradesh from the judgment and order dated 16th March, 1971 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 85 of 1969, whereby the High Court allowed the petition filed by the respondents and quashed a the sanction for criminal prosecution of the respondents accorded by the companymissioner of Sales Tax by his memorandum dated 29th April.
1966 and b the proceedings before the criminal companyrt started under section 46 1 c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, in Criminal Case No. 4344 of 1968.
The first was for the period 1 11 1956 to 23 10 1960 by an order dated 26th December, 1964, assessing the firm at Rs. 16,380 and imposing a penalty of Rs. 5,000.
The second order related to the period 21 10 960 to 8 11 1961 and was dated 20th December, 1964.
The third order was dated 20th December, 1964 and was for the period 9 11 1961 to 28 10 1962.
A challan was filed on 9th December, 1968 and a criminal Case No. 4344 of 1968 was registered and the respondents were asked to appear on 20th February, 1969.
On 17th February, 1969 the respondents filed writ petition out of which the present appeal arises For quashing the order of sanction for criminal prosecution dated 29th April, 1966 given by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and of the proceedings before the criminal companyrt in Criminal Case No. 4344 of 1968.
By its judgment dated 16th March, 1971 the High Court allowed the petition and quashed the sanction for criminal prosecution given by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and the criminal proceedings.
The numberice of demand in Form 19 prescribed under M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 hereinafter to be referred as Act was sent to the firm demanding payment of the tax and penalty with a direction that the whole sum should be deposited in the Government treasury within 30 days from the receipt of the numberice of the demand and the treasury receipt in proof of payment of the sum should be produced before the Sales Tax officer.
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