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Before the Labour Court, the respondent filed an affidavit.
The award of the Labour Court however numberes that the management was duly served of the claim but numberwritten statement was filed by it and, therefore, it was proceeded ex parte.
The Labour Court vide its order dated 5/3/2005 rejected the application of the petitioner.
Delay companydoned.
He claimed that he was unemployed since the date of his termination and he is entitled to full back wages and companytinuity in service.
The Secretary Labour , Delhi Administration, Delhi, referred the said dispute to the Labour Court, Tis Hazari, Delhi.
The terms of reference were as under Whether the services of Shri Vishwa Nath Pandey have been terminated illegally and or unjustifiably by the management and, if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect? The Labour Court ordered reinstatement of the respondent with companytinuity in service and full back wages calculated at the last drawn wages which were Rs.1,100/ per month.
According to the petitioner, he was unaware of this award since numberice was number served on him.
He came to know about this on 19/3/2003 when some person came to his house and informed him that he has to appear on 20/3/2003 at 10.00 a.m. in the Implementation Cell.
According to the petitioner, when he requested the respondent to vacate his house and, in fact got his house vacated, the respondent was annoyed.
He further alleged that his services were terminated illegally in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act for short, the ID Act on 31/12/1991 and his wages for the months of 1/10/1991 to 31/12/1991 were also number paid.
According to the petitioner he does number own any jali factory as alleged and therefore there is numberquestion of employing the petitioner as a machine man.
The petitioner has challenged order dated 27/4/2007 passed by the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition Civil No.3042 of 2007.
The case of the petitioner, in short, is that the respondent has taken advantage of the kindness shown by him by allowing him to stay in his house free of companyt from 1988 to 1991.
He, therefore, raised a dispute to the Union falsely alleging that he was working with Messrs Ram Saroman Mishra Jali Factory of the petitioner as a machine man since 1986 and his last drawn wages were Rs.1,100/ per month.
It is the case of the petitioner that he was number served with the numberice and companysequently, he did number appear before the Labour Court.
The petitioner thereafter moved an application for setting aside the ex parte award before the Labour Court.
| 0 | train | 2012_687.txt |
Parul Rani Chowdhury, a customer of the appellant Bank, handed over to respondent numberl a sum of Rs.
Parul Rani Chowdhury he inquired about the matter that when a preliminary search failed to trace the amount and a physical search of all the employees was being companyducted, respondent numberl threw away the said amount of Rs. 1,000 on the floor that thereby he retained the amount with him with a criminal intent to misappropriate the same and thus lowered the image of the appellant Bank and thus acted in a manner highly prejudicial to the interest of the appellant Bank.
On the basis of the evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry by a report made finding him guilty of charges against him, on January 27, 1976 respondent number I was asked to show cause as to why an appropriate punishment should number be imposed upon him and he was heard in the matter.
On dismissal being made an industrial dispute was raised which was referred to the Central Industrial Tribunal hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal .
Hence this appeal by special leave.
The criticism advanced against the award of the Tribunal is that evidence of three witnesses recorded at enquiry being sufficient to record the guilt of respondent No. 1, that evidence has been ignored and irrelevant companysiderations such as number examination of companyplainant Smt.
When at about 4.30 p.m. he asked the Accountant to search the Cashier, respondent No. 1, the Accountant then started checking him, he personally went out of room and saw the first respondent throwing the bundles of numberes by the side of the wall in the accounts department, the possession of which was taken by him and he questioned respondent No. 1 about the same.
No. 1 told him that he had put the money in his socks.
On next Monday he took a statement in writing duly signed by the first respondent and reported the matter to the Head Office and thereafter respondent No. 1 was put under suspension under instructions from Head Office.
3,002.40p along with two draft applications each for Rs.
l,001.20p that even though respondent numberl received excess amount of Rs. 1,000 over Rs. 2,002.40p, he neither refunded the same number asked the customer as to the matter in which the said amount was to be disposited either by depositing the same in the savings bank account or deposit the same in the Sunday deposits account that instead he retained the said money with him with intention of misappropriating the same that thereafter Smt.
Parul Rani Chowdhury returned at about 1.30 p.m. on the same day and demanded the said amount of Rs. 1,000 handed over to respondent numberl in excess, which he flatly denied that on a report being made to the Branch Manager by Smt.
Respondent Thereafter, he was placed under suspension.
He alleged that he is a victim of serious companyspiracy specially while after his recent promotion from Messenger to Cashier he has looking forward for a bright future and he denied all the charges levelled against him and he claimed to be innocent.
A domestic enquiry was held against him and three witnesses were examined.
I did number adduce any evidence number he examined himself.
The Regional Manager thereafter companymunicated to the respondent The Presiding Officer held that the domestic enquiry companyducted was just, fair and proper.
This award was challenged by a writ petition which was allowed by learned single Judge of the High Court and the award given by the Presiding Officer was quashed.
On a further appeal the Division Bench of the High Court held that the learned single Judge companyld number have interfered with the award made by the Tribunal and set aside the same and restored the award made by the Tribunal.
The amount was received by the first respondent who Was acting as Head Cashier.
The lady customer did number produce the savings bank pay in slip at the cash companynter but delivered Rs. 3,000 as told by her to him with two draft application forms.
At about 1 p.m. the lady with her husband came to him and companyplained that she had deposited Rs.
3,000 and odd with the cashier but did number receive the savings Bank pay in slip number the excess amount refunded to her by the Cashier.
On the receipt of the information he personally went to the cash department and checked the cash but did number find any excess amount therein.
On asking the first respondent about the amount received by him he companypletely denied the same.
He asked the Accountant to check the cash in the strong room and searched the Cashier companycerned whether he has any cash of Rs. 1,000 with him.
There was numberexcess cash found in the strong room.
2000 Supp 3 SCR 313 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAJENDRA BABU, J. A charge sheet issued to respondent number 1 reads that at about 11 a.m. on June 23, 1973 Smt.
No. 1 replied to the said charge sheet by stating that on a memorandum being issued to him directly involving him in an alleged misappropriation of the said sum on June 23, 1973 he was companypelled to sign a statement which he was number allowed to go through even.
I the decision to dismiss him.
However, on examination of the material on record the Presiding officer came to the companyclusion that the finding of guilt against the first respondent was number just on the evidence on record and, therefore, he set aside the same.
| 1 | train | 2000_755.txt |
A companyplaint was filed by one A. Late M. Abdul Salam, Respondent No. 2 companytending inter alia that the appellants and another person namely Karuppasami are legal heirs of one Raju and that they owned a house which is located at Coimbatore.
In the said companyplaint, the Complainant alleged that on companying to know that the said house bearing No. 34 to 39, Ward No. 62, P.V. Krishnan Saibaba Colony, Coimbatore is open and ready for sale, the Complainant on behalf of the son in law who is working as Engineer and residing with his family in Malaysia negotiated with Mrs. Ramathal, wife of late Raju and his family members pursuant to which an agreement was entered into on behalf of him son in law and daughter for companysideration of Rs. 35.5 Lakhs as desired by the accused persons.
The appellants herein apprehending arrest in the aforesaid case registered under Section 120B and 420, IPC filed a petition under Section 438 of the Code seeking anticipatory bail.
The said petition filed by the appellants was placed before this Court whereupon the following order was passed on 13.8.2008.
Notice issued was served on the respondent and therefore, the matter was listed for hearing before us on which we heard the learned companynsel appearing for the parties at length.
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. Leave granted.
The appellants are aggrieved due to imposition of alleged onerous companydition for grant of anticipatory bail.
Nizam Bash S o A Page 2 of 10 sum of Rs.
25.5 Lakhs was advanced on 14.3.2007 as a part of sale companysideration and the deal was closed upon the accused stating that the original documents were given by their father at Thirupur for safety purposes and that after receiving the said documents the same would be handed over to the companyplainant and that they would receive the balance amount within one months time.
An agreement to that effect was also made.
However, the accused persons failed to do so and instead received a sum of Rs. 7 lakhs as advance on 7.8.2007 and handed over only the possession of the house.
The papers and the documents relating to the house were number handed over to the Complainant and on enquiry made, it came to the knowledge of the companyplainant that the original documents and title deeds had been placed with Sowdambiha Chit Fund at Coimbatore, where they are required to pay a sum of Rs. 8 lakhs including interest amount.
Page 4 of 10 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellants approached this Court on the ground that the companyditions imposed by the High Court while granting anticipatory bail are number only unreasonable and onerous but the same also amounts to putting a fetter on the right of appellants being admitted to bail, in terms of the order passed.
The aforesaid fact of alleged fraudulent transfer of property was companycealed.
They also allegedly companycealed the fact that they received a sum of Rs.
It is thus alleged that the accused companycealed the real fact and fraudulently received a sum of Rs. 32.5 lakhs as sale companysideration and thereby cheated the companyplainant and his son in law and his wife.
The present appeal is filed by the appellants being aggrieved by a part of the direction companytained in the Order dated 21.07.2008 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab Haryana High Court in Criminal Original Petition No. 16601 of 2008 whereby the High Court allowed the application filed by the appellants under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short the Code and granted the relief of anticipatory bail as prayed.
It further transpires that the said accused Ramathal and her husband late Raju executed the sale deed in respect of said property in favour of Chitra wife of Sivaji and Kumudha wife of Chinnasamy in 1998.
11,50,000/ from Punjab National Bank by means of pledging Page 3 of 10 the documents and that a decree was passed against Kumudha and Chitra regarding the pledged properties.
On receipt of the aforesaid companyplaint, a case was registered treating the said companyplaint as the First Information Report.
On perusal of the submissions made and material on record, the High Court passed an order granting anticipatory bail as prayed for on companydition that in the event of arrest, the appellants shall be enlarged on bail on their depositing Rs.
32,00,000/ to the credit of Crime No. 56 of 2008 before the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Coimbatore and also on their executing a personal bond of Rs. 1,00,000/ with two sureties each for the like sum to his satisfaction.
| 0 | train | 2009_364.txt |
KURIAN, J. Leave granted.
| 0 | train | 2016_90.txt |
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation is the appellant in the instant petition through of which it impugns the validity of the orders dated 16.1.2013 passed by Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature For Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur.
The Respondent joined the services of the appellant on the post of Driver on 14.2.1977.
He was placed on probation for a period of one year.
The appellant has framed Standing Orders for its employees known as the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 hereinafter to be referred as the Standing Orders .
Based on the recommendation of the Review Committee, the Competent Authority passed the orders dated 9.4.2002, companypulsorily retiring the respondent from service.
Challenging this action of the appellant, the respondent filed the Writ Petition in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan.
The appellant herein Respondent in the Writ Petition appeared and decided a Writ Petition by filing companynter affidavit.
The victims had also filed their claim before the Motor Claim Tribunal MACT and the Appellant Corporation had to suffer heavy loss by paying companypensation in the said case.
The appellant also pointed out that the service record of the Respondent revealed that he was also involved in the another accident in the year 1999 in which he suffered serious burn injuries.
It was thus, argued by the Appellant Corporation that the aforesaid entire service record was gone into by the Screening Committee as well as the Review Committee on the basis of which the decision was taken to retire the Respondent prematurely.
K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted.
Among these four persons, name of the Respondent also appeared.
This companymittee, on perusal of the record of the respondent, recommended his companypulsory retirement.
The Review Committee held its meeting on 8.4.2002 to review the report of the Screening Committee and after perusal of the report of the Screening Committee, the Review Committee approved the proposal of the Screening Committee.
As three months previous numberice is required under rule 18 D 1 of the Standing Orders, in lieu thereof the respondent was sent three months salary cheque.
However, a departmental inquiry was held in which penalty of imposition or stoppage of two years increment was imposed upon him.
However, in criminal case, the Respondent was acquitted.
Because of this, he had moved an application requesting the Petitioner Corporation to give him light job.
Accordingly, he was posted as staff car Driver at Head Office.
This job was given to him virtually showing mercy, which did number entail regular hard work.
Not satisfied with the aforesaid outcome, the appellant preferred Writ Appeal before the Division Bench Single Judge.
While upholding the order of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench also numbered that the recorded date of birth, at the time of entry of the Respondent into service, was 7.7.1951.
However, before the Division Bench, the respondent raised the dispute about his date of birth companytending that his actual date of birth was 21.1.1957 which was even recorded in some of the official documents.
On the very first day i.e. on 23.8.13, when this petition came up for hearing, the respondent appeared person.
He showed his willingness to argue the matter himself finally at the admission stage itself.
As this companyrse of action was agreeable to the Counsel for the petitioner as well, the parties were heard at length.
Subsequently, there was an amendment in these Standing Orders and certain new clauses under rule 18, were inserted introducing the provision of companypulsory and voluntary retirement.
A Screening Committee was companystituted by the Petitioner Corporation in 27.3.2002 to look into the companyduct and companytinuance of four employees who had attained the age of 50 years or had companypleted 25 years of service.
For companying to this companyclusion the learned Single Judge drew sustenance from the judgment of this Court in Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab 1987 2 SCC 188.
These orders are duly certified by the Authority under the provisions of Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946.
It was the highlight of the petitioners defense that the service record of the respondent showed a dismal picture, in as much as between the year 1978 1990, nearly 19 cases of misconduct were foisted upon the respondent which resulted into some or the other kind of penalty like admonition or stoppage of pay or annual grade increment for a limited period.
So much so, in the year 1992 a criminal case against the respondent was initiated under Section 279 read with Section 304 a of IPC and Section 18/118 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
In that case he was given the benefit of doubt and released.
A representation against this penalty was also dismissed.
In the year 1999 another criminal case was instituted against the Respondent because of the accident of the bus of the petitioner which was driven by the Respondent as Driver.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court, however, did number eschew the aforesaid submission of the Appellant Corporation giving the reason that the various acts of misconduct pointed out by the Petitioner Corporation against the Respondent herein pertained to the period between 1978 90, whereas the order of companypulsory retirement was passed 12 years thereafter i.e. on 9.4.2002.
| 1 | train | 2013_509.txt |
This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 09.02.2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Aurangabad in Second Appeal The appellant herein is the first defendant and respondent No. 1 herein is the plaintiff whereas respondent Nos.
It relates to landed and house properties situated at village Satara, District Aurangabad Maharashtra as detailed in Para 1 of the plaint hereinafter referred to as the suit property .
No. 1 is the real sister of the appellant.
She filed a civil suit against the appellant and respondent Nos. 2 to 8 proforma defendants in the Court of IInd Jt.
No. 120 of 1994 and prayed therein the relief of partition by meets and bounds of the suit property and, in companysequence, also claimed her separate possession in the suit property qua the appellant.
According to respondent No. 1 plaintiff , the suit property was owned by their late father Sheikh Noor Mohd.
and on his death, respondent No. 1, by virtue of inheritance and being one of his legal heirs, got share in the suit property as per the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law.
Respondent No.1 alleged that since her father died intestate leaving behind respondent No.1 and the appellant being sister and brother, she is entitled to claim partition of the suit property and its separate possession as tenant in companymon as against her brother appellant herein .
The appellant also set up a title by alleging his adverse possession over the suit property to the exclusion of all including respondent No.1.
By a judgment decree dated 24.12.1999, the Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by respondent No.1.
Felt aggrieved, appellant defendant Felt aggrieved, defendant No.1 has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. Leave granted.
2 to 8 herein are defendant Nos. 2 to 8 in the suit.
Respondent Civil Judge J.D. at Aurangabad being Civil Suit P 1 and hence neither his late father had any right, title or interest in the said property and, in companysequence thereof, number respondent No.1 companyld inherit any right, title or interest in the suit property through her father as his legal heir.
The Trial Court framed issues and parties adduced their evidence.
By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the second appeal in limine observing that the appeal does number involve any substantial question of law.
No. 875 of 2009 whereby the second appeal filed by the appellant herein was dismissed at the admission stage.
We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal.
The dispute in the appeal arises between the members brother and sister of one Muslim family.
The appellant denied the case set up by respondent No.1 and companytended, inter alia, in his written statement that the suit property is his self acquired property because he purchased the same by his own efforts by a registered sale deed Ex.
Respondent No.1 plaintiff , felt aggrieved, filed first appeal being R.C.A. No. 59 of 2000 before the District Judge, Aurangabad.
By a judgment decree dated 30.11.2001, the District Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiffs suit and accordingly passed a decree for partition and separate possession of the suit property in favour of respondent No.1.
No. 1 filed second appeal being A. No.875 of 2009 before the High Court.
| 1 | train | 2017_63.txt |
Out of the two persons who were apprehended, one was the appellant.
P.W.10, based on the investigation stated to have learnt that the appellant and his accomplices, namely, Rahul Bhosle, Ravi Shinde, one Balaji and another unknown person the last two were absconding indulged in the dacoity in the house of P.W.2 on the night of 13/14.06.2004.
The appellant alone was proceeded for the offences under Sections 395, 396 and 397 of IPC, since the other two were juvenile, they were dealt with separately.
The learned companynsel companytended that P.W.9, the so called eye witness, never deposed that any jewels or other properties were stolen on that day and that identification of the appellant in the Court, without holding proper test identification parade cannot form the basis for companyvicting the appellant for the serious offence of dacoity and murder.
The learned companynsel for the State in his submissions by retracing the sequence of events, which ultimately resulted in the arrest of accused persons, companytended that P.W.9 was an eye witness to the occurrence who after hearing the cries of her brother in law, namely, the deceased Sharad in the early hours of 13/14.06.2004 at about 2 to 2.30 a.m. numbericed that the appellant and the other accused were brutally beating the deceased with knife, iron rod and wooden club and when she started shouting for help, the accused persons ran towards her and caused injuries by knife as well as by other weapons on her face and other parts of her body.
The learned companynsel, therefore, companytended that since P.W.9 before the infliction of injuries upon her was able to view the brutal attack on her brother in law by the accused and, thereafter, such persons attacked the witness herself, she was able to identify the appellant without any hesitation in the Court.
The appellant was imposed with punishment of rigorous imprisonment of five years and a fine of Rs.500/ in default to undergo further three years rigorous imprisonment for offence under Section 395 of IPC, rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/ for offence under Section 396 of IPC and further rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.500/ in default to undergo one year rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 397 of IPC.
P.W.10, therefore, proceeded to the police station and on the way he met P.S.I. Dhakne and others and in the enquiry it came to light that the thieves had gone to the adjoining area.
They started companybing operation in that area and while they were going towards Aurangabad they numbericed three persons fleeing on a motorcycle in high speed.
The team led by P.W.10 followed those persons and that after a distance of chase those persons abandoned the motorcycle in the place called Jamkhed crossroad and started running in the open field.
The police party chased them and companyld apprehend two out of the three persons.
The suspects were brought to the police station and in the meantime, P.W.10 received a telephone call that a theft had taken place in the house of one Vasanta Bhumre.
On reaching the house of Vasanta Bhumre, P.W.10, numbericed the wife of Vasanta Bhumre lying in the middle room in a pool of blood and his brother Sharad was found dead in the adjacent passage.
P.W.10 arranged for sending the injured wife of P.W.2 Vasanta Bhumre to the hospital in the police vehicle and while going to the hospital P.W.9 Mirabai informed P.W.10 that about four to five assailants wearing pant and shirt caused injuries to her as well as the deceased Sharad and fled away from the scene of occurrence in a motorcycle.
After admitting P.W.9 in the hospital, P.W.10 said to have returned back to the scene of occurrence and sent the dead body for postmortem after holding the inquest.
As far as stealing of articles is companycerned, the learned companynsel by referring to the evidence of P.W.2 companytended that he was able to specify the articles stolen while companymitting the dacoity in his house by way of cash as well as jewels removed from the body of W.9.
As far as the number production of weapons and the stolen articles are companycerned, the Trial Court has numbered that due to inability of the police to arrest the two absconding accused, recoveries of those items were number placed before the Court.
Incised wound on cheek 3 x 1 x 1 cm, caused by a sharp weapon.
All the injuries in my opinion were caused within 6 hours, patient was referred to Govt.
Medical College Hospital, Aurangabad, for further management and treatment.
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay Bench at Aurangabad dated 25.04.2007 by which the High Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal No.403 of 2005 and companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence imposed on the appellant for offences under Sections 395, 396 and 397 of IPC.
The genesis of the case was that on the date of occurrence, namely, 13/14.06.2004, P.W.10 A.P.I., attached to police station Pachod received a wireless message from P.S.I. Dhakne, who was on patrol duty, that some thieves had entered in that area.
The prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses on its side apart from the material objects and chemical analysis report in support of the case.
The learned companynsel summed up his submissions by stating that there was numbertest identification parade, that there was numberrecovery of pant or stolen goods and the basic ingredient of companyjoint effort of five persons in the involvement of the offence proved fatal to the case of the prosecution.
As far as the decision relied upon by learned companynsel for the appellant in the case of Mohd.
| 0 | train | 2012_390.txt |
Although the appellants companytended that the said import was exempted from levy of additional customs duty under an exemption Notification dated February 28, 1993, the Customs authorities, after hearing the appellants, felt it otherwise.
This levy was challenged by the appellants by means of a writ petition before the High Court of Calcutta, which was disposed of by the High Court with a direction to the appellants to submit a bank guarantee for 50 of the disputed amount and a personal bond for the balance 50.
It so happened that in the meantime, one M s. Amar Steel Industries had succeeded in the writ petition filed by the said assessee on the same point as the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court had allowed its writ petition vide order dated April 16, 1993.
The appellants opted to avail of the Scheme and filed a declaration accordingly.
The appellants challenged the order dated February 13, 1999 by filing another writ petition before the High Court.
An endorsement on the Bill of Entry was made for payment of additional customs duty of ? 52,20,000 in addition to the basic customs duty.
The said endorsement was made under Section 47 read with Section 153 of the Customs Act and required the appellants to make payment of the amount assessed within 7 days, failing which interest was chargeable.
However, the Revenue had preferred appeal against the said judgment, which was pending before the Division Bench.
The Division Bench had passed an interim order dated May 17, 1993 staying the operation of the judgment of the Single Judge and, at the same time, had also given certain directions.
The Revenue filed intra court appeal before the Division Bench questioning the validity of the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
The appellants claimed exemption from payment of additional custom duty.
In particular, it is Section 95 ii b of the 1998 Act that becomes the focus of the issue and the meaning that is to be assigned to the said clause would be the determinative of the outcome of the dispute.
The appellants also prayed for quashing of Section 95 ii b of the 1998 Act if it was companystrued as requiring a numberice of payment to be issued in any particular form.
When the writ petition of the appellants was taken up for companysideration and disposed of by the learned Single Judge on July 20, 1993, the aforesaid events in the case of M s. Amar Steel Industries were taken companynizance of.
Thus, while disposing of the writ petition and directing the appellants to submit bank guarantee of 50 of the disputed amount and a personal bond for the balance 50, the learned Single Judge observed that he case of the appellants would abide by the result of the appeal of the Revenue in the case of M s. Amar Steel Industries.
However, the designated authority passed the order dated February 13, 1999 thereon whereby he rejected the declaration on the ground that in the appellants case, numbershow cause numberice demand numberice had been issued and, therefore, by virtue of Section 95 ii b , the Scheme did number apply.
| 1 | train | 2015_357.txt |
The income tax department issued numberice dated December 3, 1995 and letters dated November 30, 1995 and January 17, 1996.
Advs., P.Parmeswaran, B.B.Ahuja, S.N.Terdol, M.Khanwilkars, Ms.Madhu Moolchandani, Ms.G.Dara, Ms.Minakshi Vij.
People of India must know the source of expenditure incurred by the political parties and by the candidates in the process of election.
B.K.Pal, Maninder Singh, Rakesh Prasad, B.Misra, Kamlendra Misra, Sudhanshu, A.V.Rangam, A. Ranganadhan, Rakesh K.Sharma, Goodwill Indeevar, V. Krishnamurthy, T.H.Rish Kumur, P.R. Kovilan, P.K.Manohar, Dr.Roxane Swamy, Bharat Sangal, Ashok Mathur Brijhender Chahar and Vivek Gambhir, Advs.
with them for the appearing parties.
THE 4TH DAY OF APRIL, 1996 Present Honble Mr.Justice Kuldip Singh Honble Mr.Justice Faizan Uddin P.Gupta, Solicitor General, Kapil Sibal, D.D.Thakur, Hardev Singh, Jitendra Sharma, H N.Selve, G.L.Sanghi, Sr.
Shri Sita Ram Kesri, Treasurer of the party, has filed an affidavit dated February 16, 1996 stating that the returns of income relating to the assessment years 1993 94, 1994 95 and 1995 96 have been filed on December 14, 1995.
| 1 | train | 1996_1891.txt |
charl b. a. desai s. c. agarwal a. k. gupta shiva pujan singh and virendra verma for the appellant.
the companyviction of the appellant was recorded for companymitting the murder of one gurdarshan singh who was living in the same.
village birpind as the appellant in the house adjoining the appellants house.
the appellants father ajit singh also lived with the appellant while with gurdarshan singh were living his sons gurdial singh and sarvjit singh and his daughter gian kaur.
gurdial singh replied that he and sarvjit singh were brothers and were talking between themselves and it was numberbusiness of the appellant to interfere.
the appellant thereupon abused the two brothers and also slapped sarvjit singh on the face.
gurdial singh asked the appellant why he had beaten his brother and used abusive language against the appellant.
the appellant got enraged ran into his house abusing the two boys and return ed with a double barrel 12 bore gun.
when gurdarshan singh saw the appellant carrying the gun he enquired what the matter was.
thereupon ajit singh raised a lalkara asking his son the appellant to finish off gurdarshan singh.
the appellant then fired two shots in quick succession from his gun hitting gurdarshan singh on vital parts of his body.
both the appellant and his father ajit singh were thereafter prosecuted for this murder.
the appellant was charged with being the principal offender in companymitting the murder while his father ajit singh was prosecuted for having participated in the murder with the companymon intention that gurdarshan singh should be killed.
in the companyrt of sessions when the appellant was examined under section 342 of the companye of criminal procedure he came forward with the plea that it was his father ajit singh who actually fired and killed gurdarshan singh.
hans rai khanna and r. n. sachthey for the respondent.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by bhargava j. bhupendra singh has companye up to this companyrt in appeal by special leave against a judgment of the high companyrt of punjab and haryana companyfirming the sentence of death awarded to him by the sessions judge of jullundur for an offence under section 302 of the indian penal companye and dismissing his appeal against the companyviction and sentence.
when he came out of his house this time he was accompanied by his father ajit singh.
gurdial singh and sarvjit singh then ran into the deorhi of their house.
in the meantime their father gurdarshan singh and their sister gian kaur returned to the house from their fields.
gurdarshan singh fell down dead on the ground.
one malkiat singh who lived in a house nearby had arrived and saw this occurrence so that the four persons who witnessed the occurrence.
were malkiat singh gurdial singh sarvjit singh and gian kaur.
gurdial singh leaving others to look after the dead body of his father went with lal singh lambardar to the police station which was situated at a distance of about three miles and lodge the first information report at about 9.30 p.m. on the same day.
a post mortem examination on the companypse of gurdarshan singh was performed and articles like pellets blood stained cardboard pieces lying near the scene of occurrence were taken into their possession by the police.
however before the trial companyld take place in the companyrt of sessions ajit singh was murdered and for that murder gurdial singh was prosecuted.
he thus put forward the plea of alibi.
niranjan singh came to depose that his son sadhu singh had been adopted by veer singh and this adoption took place because ajit singh had asked veer singh to take sadhu singh in adoption.
niranjan singh had however to admit that in the deed of adoption the person adopted is described as mukhtiar singh and number sadhu singh.
to explain this discrepancy niranjan singh came forward with the assertion that his son sadhu singh bore an alias mukhtiar singh.
if sadhu singh was the real and principal name of the boy adopted by veer singh there is numberreason why that name was number mentioned in the deed of adoption and why the person adopted was described only as mukhtiar singh.
thereafter ajit singh fired the gun shots towards gurdarshan singh killing him instantaneously.
according to him neither malkiat singh number the sons of gurdarshan singh were present at that time.
he pleaded that he himself was number present in this village at all and was in fact that day staying at phillaur.
criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal 185of 1967.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated may 18 1967 of the punjab and haryana high companyrt in cri minal appeal number 247 of 1967 and murder reference number 23 of 1967.
according to the prosecution on the 6th numberember 1965 at about 7.45 p.m. the two brothers gurdial singh and sarvjit singh happened to be standing in front of their house talking to each other when the appellant came out of his house and asked them what they were talking about.
the case was then investigated.
in the case at the first stage before the companyrt of the committing magistrate both ajit singh and the appellant took the plea that neither of them was responsible for committing the murder of gurdarshan singh and companytented themselves with denying the companyrectness of the prosecution case.
rejected that evidence.
when the case came up before the high companyrt the high companyrt briefly examined the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and held that their evidence was reliable.
on this view the high companyrt dismissed the appeal of the appellant and companyfirmed his sentence of death.
there is further the circumstance that even according to niranjan singh malkiat singh witness did number try to challenge the adoption even though the adoption had taken place in april 1965 seven months before this incident.
| 1 | test | 1968_246.txt |
Aggrieved by the stand taken by the Railway Administration, the respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench filing A. No. 473/2002.
It was, therefore, held that the Rule as stood after modification is that those who retire from service or posts after 31.3.1960 would get the benefit of adding to their service the period as may be admissible for calculation of pension.
Rule was again amended on 15.11.1976 adding a proviso stating that the companycession shall be admissible only if the recruitment rules in respect of a service post companytain such a provision.
The Tribunal allowed the application and directed the Railway Administration to fix the pension of the respondent adding to his service, the period by which the respondent at the time of recruitment exceeded 25 years of service or a period of five years whichever is less for the purpose of calculating the pension.
The High Court endorsed the view taken by the Tribunal and reiterated that in view of the provisions companytained in Rule 2301 of the Indian Establishment Code, the pensionable Railway servants claims to pension is regulated by Rules enforced at the time when he resigns or is discharged from service from the Government.
While in service he took his master degree in general surgery.
On 2.1.1959 he was appointed as D.M.O. Class I Medical Officer through Union Public Service Commission and the respondent rejoined service in Central Railway.
Respondent also claimed the benefit of the Rules which we have referred to in the earlier part of the judgment.
The same was denied, hence, he approached the Central Administrative Tribunal which has rejected his application.
The respondent took up the matter in appeal with the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and the appeal was allowed holding that the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Rule 2423 A as amended and the Railway Administration was directed to give the benefit of added years of service, for reckoning the qualifying service for pension.
Both respondents while in service had acquired their post graduate qualifications.
The first respondent retired from service on superannuation on 1.9.1979 and the second respondent retired on superannuation on 11.9.1986.
Since both the respondents retired from services after 31.3.1960 they claimed the benefit of Rule 2423 A by adding certain years of qualifying years of service for pension.
Since the same was denied, they approached the Tribunal but the Tribunal dismissed their applications.
They took up the matter before the Bombay High Court.
The respondent claimed the benefit of added years of service, the same was, however, denied to him.
The reason for denial was that the recruitment rules did number companytain such a provision.
Further it was also stand of the Railway Administration that the recruitment rules of law inspector were amended only in the year 2000 and the provision in respect of addition of service was effected only then by the time the respondent had retired from service and hence he would number get benefit of Rule 2423 A R II.
Rule was again amended stating that the benefit of added years of service under Rule 2423 A R II would be admissible to all those who retire from service or posts after 31.3.1960 and who were otherwise eligible under Rule 2423 A R II which was made effective from 28th October, 1997.
In Civil Appeal No. 523 of 2005, the respondent joined service on 4.8.1959 as Court Inspector in the Western Railway and he retired from service on superannuation as Deputy Chief Vigilance Officer from Central Railway on 31.12.1989.
The Railway Administration took up the matter in appeal before the Bombay High Court.
The Bench also numbericed that Rule 2423 as it originally stood was found incongruous and companysequently it was amended on 4.12.1987, whereby it was decided the benefit of added years of service under the Rule 2423 A R II was made admissible to all those who retire from service or posts after 31st March, 1960 and who are otherwise eligible under Rule 2423 A R II.
In Civil Appeal No. 1024 of 2005, the respondent joined Railways as Assistant Surgeon on 23.10.1942 after having crossed the age of 25 years.
In Civil Appeal No. 1025 of 2005, the first respondent joined service in the Indian Railway Medical Service on 26.10.1958 and the second respondent in November, 1957.
594 of 2003 against which CA No.1024/05 has been filed before this Court and gave a direction to the Railway Administration to give benefit to the respondents as per Rule 2423 A of the Indian Railway Establishment Rules.
| 0 | train | 2009_1967.txt |
C. Mathur, for respondent No. February 20.
By the decree one of the properties, a house formerly bearing No. 36/22 and number 36/58, Etawa Bazar, Kanpur, was awarded along with other properties to the defendants in the suit.
The prayer was that these applicants may be delivered possession over this Etawa Bazar house along with Gajju Lal, Jawala Prasad and Smt.
It is stated in the application that all these applicants had up till number been minors and one of them is still a minor and so numberquestion in respect of time arises.
133 1 c of the Constitution and on that certificate this appeal has been filed by the applicants for execution.
P. Sinha and Tiryugi Narain for the appellants.
Sundari on dispossession of Jumna Prasad and Devi Prasad.
Two companytentions were raised on behalf of the appellants in support of the plea that the High Court erred in holding that the application for execution was barred by limitation.
This appeal raises a question of limitation in execution proceedings.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 276 of 1956.
Appeal from the judgment and decree dated October 15, 1954, of the Allahabad High Court in Execution First Appeal No. 224 of 1951.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J. The decree sought to be executed was made by the Civil Judge, Kanpur, on September 2, 1938, in a suit for partition brought by two brothers Jumna Prasad and Devi Prasad and two minor sons of Jumna Prasad, against Gajju Lal, his son Jawala Prasad, the four minor sons of Jawala Prasad Sharda Prasad, Dharam Pal, Ram Pal and Krishna Pal, and one Smt.
The present application for execution was made by the four brothers, Sharda Prasad, Dharam Pal, Ram Pal and Krishna Pal on Novem ber 23, 1949.
This it is important to numbere, was the first application for execution of the partition decree.
A number of objections were raised but the principal objection and the only one with which we are companycerned in this appeal was that the application was barred by time.
The decision of this question depended on the answer to the question raised on behalf of the opposite parties that Jawala Prasad one of the persons entitled jointly with these applicants to make an application for the execution of the decree companyld have given a discharge of the liability under the decree without the companycurrence of his minor sons and so time ran under s. 7 of the Limitation Act against them also from the date of the decree.
| 0 | train | 1961_393.txt |
It appears that on July 31, 1974 at about 3 p.m. there was a scuffle between the appellant Pralhad and the deceased Ghanshyam in the companyrse of which Pralhad is alleged to have caused stab injuries on the person of the deceased as a result of which he fell down and ultimately died.
Thereafter, the State filed appeal in the High Court.
FIR was lodged by Tulsi Das, a brother of the deceased.
After the usual investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the accused who were put up on trial before the Sessions Judge who, however, while finding that the case of homicide as made out by the prosecution was proved, held that the companyplicity of the appellant in the crime had number been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The facts and circumstances of the case have been detailed in the judgments of the Courts below and need number be repeated here.
| 0 | train | 1981_130.txt |
The Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bombay, modified its earlier decree which order was challenged by means of a Writ Petition.
We have heard Ms. Indra Jaising, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri S. Bhasme, learned companynsel appearing for the respondent.
The Family Court granted the decree as follows DECREE IN THE FAMILY COURT AT BOMBAY PETITION NO.
But it seems that thereafter differences arose between the two and in July 1986, Jayalakshmi left the matrimonial house and went to her parental house.
The application was opposed and an affidavit in reply was filed by the appellant wife.
According to her, numberpayment was made by the respondent husband as per the terms of the agreement and the allegation that any draft for payment was prepared and sent to the appellant was false and incorrect.
It is in such circumstances these appeals have been filed before this Court by the Municipal Council, Kota.
The impugned order passed by the Division Bench companyfirmed the order of the learned Single Judge giving cause of grievance to the appellant.
Thereafter they started dwelling together at Bandra.
Both the parties decided to take divorce by mutual companysent.
This petition is companying on 7.3.1992 before Shri D. Pandit, Judge, Family Court, Bandra.
In presence of Petitioner No.1 and 2, suit is decreed.
That the Opponent Original Petitioner No.1 be directed by an order of mandatory injunction to remove herself and her belongings from the said flat No.11, Mon Bijou Co op.
Raising several other pleas, she prayed for the rejection of the application.
Serial Nos.32 to 40 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS Serial Nos.41 to 49 MEDICINES, CHEMICALS, PERFUMES, COSMETIC MATERIALS,ETC.
Serial No.50 SHAHARNAMA NIRKHI, MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, KOTA Grains all types 1.00 per two quintals.
Tukham Roghan 0.01 XX XX XX By the order the Governor Sd P.N. Seth Deputy Secretary Admn.
Though the Division Bench while sustaining the claim of the companypany therein number only issued a perpetual injunction restraining the appellant from levying and companylecting any dharmada tax on the goods brought by the companypany within the limits of the Municipal Council, but also granted a decree, though number specifically prayed and sought for as required in law, directing refund of companylections made, the learned Single Judge in the case dealt with by him though upheld the claim for prohibitory relief, yet applied the doctrine of undue enrichment and on the view that the respondent companies have already realised the dharmada tax paid by passing over the same to the customer, the companypany also ought number to be allowed to retain the same and companysequently instead of ordering refund to the companypany directed refund of the amounts companylected within six months to the State of Rajasthan with a further direction as to the manner in which such amount has to be utilised by the State.
III Ch.
Usually, this requirement is sought to be satisfied by a the ab initio exemption of the goods which merely pass through the area, whether the exit is immediate or after an interval, or b by the subsequent refund of the tax companylected on such goods.
Exemptions and refunds, therefore, are the distinguishing features of the octroi system.
Octrois and terminal taxes were different taxes though they resembled in one respect, namely, that they were leviable in respect of goods brought into a local area.
As the Taxation Enquiry Commission observes Vol.
LITTTTTTJ BRIJESH KUMAR, J. This appeal is preferred against the Judgment and Order dated February 17, 1998 passed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.204 of 1997.
The Writ Petition was dismissed upholding the order passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court.
Hence, the present appeal.
The appellant Jayalakshmi Coelho and the respondent Oswald Joseph Coelho got married on January 6, 1977 in accordance with the Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Out of the said wedlock, a female child Neisha Anne Coelho was born on August 1, 1978.
Later, however, differences seem to have arisen between the appellant and her husband, ultimately, culminating into, the parties agreeing for dissolution of their marriage and they entered into an agreement to that effect on 26th July, 1991.
AA 1221 OF 1991 Jayalakshmi Coelho Residing at No.2 Laxmi Bhawan, Matunga, Bombay .Petitioner No.1 And Oswald Joseph Coelho Residing at No.11, Mon Bijou Chimbai Road, Bandra Bombay Petititoner No.2 Jayalakshmi Coelho and Oswald Joseph Coelho have filed this joint petition under Section 23 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 to get a decree of divorce by mutual companysent.
Marriage between the petitioners Jayalakshmi and Oswald took place under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 at Bombay on 6th January 1977.
Their marital life was also fruitful by birth of daughter Neisha Anne Coelho, who was born on 1st August 1978.
| 1 | train | 2001_83.txt |
Accordingly, on October 20, 1998, a letter was sent intimating them that numberpensionary benefits were admissible to those who have proceeded on resignation under Rule 19 of the BSF Rules.
However, their case for reinstatement in BSF would be companysidered subject to refund of all payment made to them from the Government such as GPF, Gratuity, CGEGIS, etc. on their resignation.
Accordingly, the Single Judge, by his judgment dated September 29, 1999, allowed the writ petitions and directed the present appellants to grant pension to the petitioner respondents herein in accordance with Rule 49 2 b of the CCS Pension Rules.
G.O. dated December 27, 1995 issued by the Central Government was also referred to.
After quoting G.O. dated December 27, 1995, this Court in para 20 of the report observed as follows The aforesaid GO makes it clear that there was a demand for grant of pensionary benefit on acceptance of the resignation under Rule 19 and that demand was accepted by the Government.
M. LODHA, J. Delay companydoned.
We have heard Mr. Tara Chandra Sharma, learned companynsel for the appellants, and Mr. M.P. Vinod, learned companynsel for the respondents.
The respondents were the original writ petitioners before the High Court.
On companypletion of 10 years service, they tendered resignation.
Their resignation was accepted by the Commandant 48 BN BSF.
The respondents challenged the above companymunication by filing two separate Writ Petitions.
The writ petitions were companytested by the present appellants respondents therein .
Against the order of the Single Judge, the present appellants preferred Writ Appeals.
The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court upheld the decision of the Single Judge and dismissed the Writ Appeals vide judgment dated August 25, 2000.
While doing so, the Division Bench referred to the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Ex Naik Rakesh Kumar Vs.
It is from this order of the Division Bench that the present Appeals, by special leave, have arisen.
Their stand in the High Court was that the writ petitioners were governed by the Central Civil Services Pension Rules, 1972 for short, CCS Pension Rules and as per these rules the minimum qualifying service for pension is 20 years and, therefore, they were number entitled to any pension.
Union of India Others C.W.P. No. 761 of 1998.
| 1 | train | 2012_174.txt |
The appellant and the Airport Authority of India entered into an Operation, Management and Development Agreement OMDA for short dated 04.04.2006 whereby the appellant, undertook inter alia, to perform the functions of the operation, management, development and design, upgradation, modernization, finance and management of the Indira Gandhi International Airport at Delhi and to perform Aeronautical Services and Non Aeronautical Services.
The appellant was given on lease the premises of the Airport for performing the obligations as mentioned in the OMDA.
In pursuance of its business and operation at the Airport, the appellant entered into an agreement dated 09.11.2006 whereby licensees named therein were granted a licence to set up and operate duty free shops within the airport premises.
Thereafter Respondent No.5 herein was incorporated and a settlement agreement dated 07.02.2008 was signed whereby licence agreement dated 09.11.2006 was numberated in favour of Respondent No.5.
In companysideration of said licence, Respondent No.5 was required to pay to the appellant a fixed monthly licence fee and also a share of the gross revenue generated by various products categories which were to be sold at the duty free shops.
The High Court by its order dated 23.06.2010 extended the interim order passed in similar matter in favour of respondent number5 to the effect, In the meanwhile there shall be numberrecovery of service tax from the petitioner in respect of renting of immovable property alone.
During the pendency of said petition, the appellant again vide its letter dated 28.06.2010 demanded payment of service tax from respondent number5.
While these demands were raised, the appellant asserted that the liability was that of respondent number5.
Uday U. Lalit, J. Leave granted.
guarantee furnished by the present Respondent No.5.
The Finance Act, 2007 introduced the levy of service tax on services in relation to renting of immovable property through the introduction of Section 65 90 a .
The charge of service tax was accordingly introduced in Section 65 105 zzzz .
In view of the amended clause 65 105 zzzz , service tax was levied retrospectively from 01.06.2007 on renting of the immovable property.
In view of such retrospective amendment the appellant called upon Respondent number5 to send the entire amount of service tax w.e.f.
Around this time the disputes between the appellant, respondent number5 and the holding companypany of respondent number5 were settled and an arbitration award was passed with companysent on 30.03.2011 which recorded that the service tax, interest and penalty, if any, on the transaction between the appellant and respondent number5 was liable to be paid by respondent number5 in terms of said award.
The Respondent shall make payment of the amount due towards the Tax Liability within 7 seven days of receipt of demand from the Claimant in this regard.
The aforesaid application was disposed of by the High Court directing Respondent No.5 to furnish the bank guarantee in the sum of Rs.42,36,52,066/ in favour of the Registrar General of the High Court for securing the amount as numbere of the Directors of Respondent No.5 was within the jurisdiction of the High Court and as Respondent No.5 had numberassets in this companyntry.
On the said application, the High Court was pleased to direct Respondent No.5 to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs.25 crores in favour of the Registrar General of the High Court as an interim measure and the said order was later companyfirmed on 10.04.2013.
The High Court left this question to be decided along with the main writ petition.
The aforesaid writ petition No.4274 of 2010 preferred by Respondent No.5 was finally heard by the High Court which held that the transaction between the appellant and Respondent No.5 regarding letting out of immovable property would number fall within the taxable service of airport services under clause zzz of Section 65 105 prior to 01.07.2010.
This appeal seeks to challenge the order dated 30.07.2014 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ Petition No.4274 of 2010 to the extent it directed the appellant to bear the companyt for the bank Thereafter section 65 105 zzm of the Finance Act, 1994 was amended with effect from 01.07.2010 and section 65 105 zzzz of the Finance Act, 1994 was also amended with retrospective effect from 01.06.2007.
01.06.2007, which led to the filing of W.P. No.4274 of 2010 by respondent number5 in the High Court of Delhi.
Thereafter the revenue issued a demand cum show cause numberice dated 22.10.2010 to the appellant demanding service tax for the period companyering 2006 2007 to 2009 2010.
| 0 | train | 2014_537.txt |
The tainted allotments were also cancelled by various orders of High Court of Delhi.
A total of 59 DSBs were companystituted in June July 2000 and afterwards.
The guidelines also provide for reservations in each of the dealership distributorship categories for the applicants belonging to Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes, defence personnel, para military Police Government personnel, outstanding sports persons, freedom fighters and physically handicapped.
The guidelines dated 9th October, 2000 were issued, as stated therein, to provide transparent, uniform, fair and faster procedure for selection of suitable candidates as dealers distributors.
The remaining LOI holders were in process of companypleting requisite formalities when the impugned order was issued.
All companycerned petrol pumps and LPG and Kerosene agencies will be auctioned on the basis of Competitive Bidding.
That order reads as under The Government has recently reviewed the allotments made since January 2000 of Petrol Pumps, LPG distributorships and SKO LDO dealerships of Public Sector Oil Companies.
In view of this Government reviewed the matter.
Number of writ petitions were filed in various High Courts challenging the legality of the order dated 9th August, 2002.
We direct the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India and the four oil companypanies to render full, companyplete and meaningful assistance and companyperation to the Committee.
With Contempt Petition C No.556/2002 IN TP C Nos.417 423/2002 With T.C. C Nos.
The four public sector oil companypanies Indian Oil Corporation Limited IOC , Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited BPC , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited HPC and IBP Company Limited IBP companytrol the marketing of the said products.
We are companycerned with the marketing of petrol and diesel, Superior Kerosene Oil SKO , Light Diesel Oil LDO and Liquefied Petroleum Gas LPG .
These DSBs were entrusted the task of selections for the retail outlets, LPG distributorships and SKO LDO dealerships.
Each of these categories as also in the remaining 50 for open categories, 33 of the dealerships distributorships were reserved for women.
The dealerships distributorships sites for marketing of petrol diesel or LPG or SKO LDO are of two types Company Owned and Dealer Operated CODO and Dealer Owned and Dealer Operated DODO .
Under the former category, the land, superstructure standing thereon and other facilities such as underground product tanks, dispensing units, other ancillary equipments etc. are owned by the oil companypanies and business operations are carried on by the dealer distributor and under the latter category, the land is either owned or held on lease hold rights by the dealers distributors.
The educational qualifications for reserve categories, other than freedom fighters and outstanding sport persons, were matriculation or recognized equivalent.
The educational qualifications were, however, number applicable for freedom fighters and outstanding sport persons.
On 2nd August, 2002, Indian Express carried, on its front page, a story with certain names attributing political patronage in grant of dealership distributorship.
The newspapers also carried editorials.
The insinuations made were that the allotments were made to the Members of Parliament, Assembly, party workers of political party in power, their relatives etc.
The resignation of Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas was sought by political parties in opposition.
The proceedings of the House were also stalled.
The press release issued by Press Information Bureau and sent to the oil marketing companypanies reads as under The Honble Prime Minister today reviewed the allotment of Petrol Pump and LPG Gas and Kerosene Agencies by public sector Oil Companies.
It was emphasized that all allotments had been made on the recommendations of Dealership Selection Boards which are headed by retired Judges.
Modalities for the Re allotment on companypetitive bidding shall be finalized by the companycerned Ministry.
However, the allotments made to the families of Kargil Martyrs shall remain unaffected by this.
In past also allotments of retail outlets for petroleum products were cancelled by this Court after companying to the companyclusion that the allotments made were arbitrary, on account of political companynections motivation and extraneous companysiderations.
The questions were raised on the floor of the Parliament.
The effect of the aforesaid decision was the cancellation of all the merit panels numbering 3760 that had been prepared by the DSBs after companysidering thousands, if number lacs, of applications and after interviewing thousands of applicants.
A transfer petition was filed by the Union of India in this Court.
The superstructure, except the product tanks, dispensing units and other ancillary equipment in the case of petrol diesel retail outlets and cylinders and regulators in the case of LPG, is owned by the dealers distributors.
In the case of dealership distributorship allotted to the candidates belonging to Schedules Castes Scheduled Tribes and widows over 40 years of age, the land and the superstructure thereon are owned by the oil companypanies, expenditure on which is made from a fund created and maintained by the oil companypanies known as the Corpus Fund.
In view of the companytroversy, review was done by the Prime Minister on 5th August,, 2002 in which the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs participated amongst others.
In view of the companytroversy regarding the allotments, the Prime Minister directed the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas to initiate steps to cancel all allotments made with effect from January 2000 till date.
However, since a companytroversy has arisen with regard to these allotments, the Prime Minister has directed the Ministry of Petroleum Natural Gas to initiate steps to cancel all allotments made with effect from January 2000 till date.
A formal order was, however, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas on 9th August, 2002.
| 0 | train | 2002_821.txt |
The respondent filed a civil suit seeking issuance of mandatory injunction directing the appellants to hand over vacant possession over the shop to the respondent on the ground that the licence to occupy the suit premises was terminated.
The son was held to be a tenant and hereinafter he is being referred to as the appellant.
The defendant has preferred this appeal by special leave.
As between the parties there exists a document dated April 1, 1981 executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent which is styled as a deed of licence.
The licensee is authorized to use the room as licensee for period of one year from 1.4.1981.
The business carried on by the appellant in the suit premises is number in any manner companynected with the hotel business of the respondent.
Though a part of the same building, the shop in possession of the appellant is a separate entity or a separate unit of premises.
The appellant is in exclusive possession of the premises.
The business companyducted by the appellant in the premises is number only different from the one carried on by the respondent, the respondent has numbersupervisory power or any other companynection with the business run by the appellant.
The companypensation paid by the appellant to the respondent for user of the premises is paid month by month.
The appellant entered in the witness box but the respondent did number adduce any evidence relevant for the purpose of determining the nature of the appellants occupation of the suit premises or the appellants status whether a tenant or a licensee.
On these findings, the trial Court companycluded that the appellant was a tenant and the tenancy was number terminated.
All these findings have been upheld by the first appellant Court.
The building is a double storey building.
On the upper floor the respondent is companyducting hotel business.
On the ground floor there are several shops.
The document begins with a recital whereas licencee is desirous of having the use of the premises for companyducting a stationery shop in roomin Woodlands building intended as car parking space for lodgers at the time of companystruction.
The next para states And whereas the licensor is willing to grant licence to the licencee in respect of the aforesaid room for the purpose of carrying on business in stationery goods as licencee of the premises.
A brief resume of the relevant out of the nine clauses of terms and companyditions agreed upon between the parties and as companytained in the deed would suffice.
Vide clause 1 , the licence fee is appointed at Rs.
500 per mensem.
300 and has companytinued to remain in occupation of the premises ever since then.
The rent was increased from Rs. 300 to Rs.
360 and then to Rs.
The nature of the premises is number such as can be said to be necessarily an adjunct of the premises in possession of the respondent for his own use.
The trial Court directed the suit to be dismissed by recording a finding that one of the two appellants who are father and son was a tenant and number a mere licensee.
2004 3 SCR 306 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by C. LAHOT1, J. The suit property is a shop situated on the ground floor of a building known as Woodlands Building on the M.G. Road, Ernakulam.
The decree was maintained in first appeal.
In the second appeal preferred by the landlord the High Court has set aside the judgments and decrees of the two Courts below and directed a decrees as prayed for being passed.
A photo of the building, produced for the perusal of the Court at the time of hearing, shows a number of shops in companytinuity located on the ground floor.
| 1 | train | 2004_1086.txt |
The High Court by its judgment disposed of the writ petitions in the following manner Selections appointments of respondents number 9 Dinesh Kumar Mittal , 12 Rajesh Malhotra , 13 Deepak Aggarwal , 15 Chandra Shekhar and 18 Desh Raj Chalia in CWP No. 9157 of 2008 wherever they may be in other writ petitions as Additional District and Sessions Judges, are hereby quashed.
This direction shall, however, remain in abeyance for a period of two months to enable the High Court to make alternative arrangements As a companysequence of the quashment of the selections appointments of above named respondents, the resultant five vacancies shall be filled up from the candidates next in the order of merit, out of the panel prepared by the Selection Committee The appointment of Fast Track Court Judges by a process of absorption after further examination and selection companytained in the recommendation of the Selection Committee dated 18.03.2008 is affirmed.
Order dated 22.09.2008 Annexure P 8 in CWP No. 17708 of 2008 rejecting the request of the High Court for de reservation of six vacancies four Scheduled Caste, 2 Backward Classes is hereby quashed.
If on such re consideration, the State decides to de reserve the vacancies, candidates recommended by the High Court vide its recommendation letter dated 25.4.2008, shall be appointed.
After companyducting the interview, the High Court recommended the names of 16 candidates in order of merit to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge in the State of Haryana by direct recruitment.
At the time of appointment, Deepak Aggarwal was working as Assistant District Attorney in Himachal Pradesh Chandra Shekhar and Desh Raj Chalia were working as Assistant District Attorney in the State of Haryana, Rajesh Malhotra was working as Public Prosecutor in the office of Central Bureau of Investigation and Dinesh Kumar Mittal was working as Deputy Advocate General in the office of the Advocate General, Punjab.
Based on the recommendation of the High Court, the State of Haryana issued appointment orders.
Some of the unsuccessful candidates filed writ petitions before the High Court raising diverse grounds of challenge.
Recruitment to the Service shall be made by the Governor, by promotion from amongst the Haryana Civil Service Judicial Branch in companysultation with the High Court and by direct recruitment from amongst eligible Advocates on the recommendations of the High Court on the basis of the written and viva voce test companyducted by the High Court.
1 Recruitment to the Service shall be made, a 50 per cent by promotion from amongst the Civil Judges Senior Division Chief Judicial Magistrates Additional Civil Judges Senior Division on the basis of principle of merit cum seniority and passing a suitability test b 25 per cent by promotion strictly on the basis of merit through limited companypetitive examination of Civil Judges Senior Division having number less than five years qualifying service as Civil Judges Senior Division Chief Judicial Magistrates Additional Civil Judges Senior Division and who are number less than thirty five years of age on the last date fixed for submission of applications for taking up the limited companypetitive examinations and c 25 per cent of the posts shall be filled by direct recruitment from amongst the eligible Advocates on the basis of the written and viva voce test, companyducted by the High Court.
Chandra Mohan, who was Member of U.P. Civil Services Judicial Branch and who was at that time acting as a District Judge, and some other officers who were similarly situated, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 challenging the selection of the six candidates for appointment to the U.P. Higher Judicial Service.
The members of the Bench agreed that selection from the Bar was good but as regards selection from the cadre of judicial officers, there was difference of opinion on the aspect of number issuance of numberification under Article 237 of the Constitution.
The Division Bench of the High Court by the above judgment disposed of 12 writ petitions wherein challenge was laid to the selection and appointment of certain candidates to the post of Additional District and Sessions Judge in the Haryana Superior Judicial Service HSJS on diverse grounds.
The process of re consideration shall be companypleted within six weeks and the decision be companymunicated to the High Court.
The appellants in this group of seven appeals are, Deepak Aggarwal, Dinesh Kumar Mittal, Rajesh Malhotra, Chandra Shekhar and Desh Raj Chalia, whose selections appointments as Additional District and Sessions Judges have been quashed by the High Court, and the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh on its administrative side.
On 18.05.2007, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh through its Registrar General issued a numberification inviting applications for recruitment to certain posts of Additional District and Sessions Judge.
The written examinations were companyducted pursuant to the said numberification wherein 64 candidates were recommended for the interview.
Of the 16 candidates recommended by the High Court, 5 were the appellants.
The Selection Committee sent two lists, one companyprising the names of three advocates and the other companyprising the names of three judicial officers to the High Court.
The matter was heard by the Division Bench.
86 88 The three appellants namely, Deepak Aggarwal, Chandra Shekhar and Desh Raj Chalia, at the time of their application, were admittedly working as Assistant District Attorney.
As there was some debate on the scope of the certificate granted by the High Court, this Court also granted Special Leave to Appeal against the order of the High Court.
However, he was unsuccessful before the High Court and he approached this Court.
This Court referred to Sections 24, 28 and 49 of the 1961 Act and Rule 49 of the BCI Rules.
They were appointed under the Haryana State Prosecution Legal Service Group C Rules, 1979 for short, 1979 Rules .
| 1 | train | 2013_725.txt |
On 3.4.2007, Kusum Narottam Harsora and her mother Pushpa Narottam Harsora filed a companyplaint under the 2005 Act against Pradeep, the brother son, and his wife, and two sisters daughters, alleging various acts of violence against them.
In a writ petition filed against the said order, on 15.2.2012, the Bombay High Court, on a literal companystruction of the 2005 Act, discharged the aforesaid three respondents from the companyplaint.
F. Nariman, J. Leave granted.
The present appeal arises out of a judgment dated 25.9.2014 of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court.
The said companyplaint was withdrawn on 27.6.2007 with liberty to file a fresh companyplaint.
An application was moved before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate for a discharge of respondent Nos.
It raises an important question as to the companystitutional validity of Section 2 q of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, hereinafter referred to as the 2005 Act .
Nothing happened for over three years till the same duo of mother and daughter filed two separate companyplaints against the same respondents in October, 2010.
| 0 | train | 2016_372.txt |
1 that Kura, the person from whom the plaintiffs claim to have purchased the rights of the mortgagors was incapable of entering into a companytract as he was insane.
Hence the sale deeds executed by him are void and 2 the claim for redemption in respect of the various mortgages sought to be redeemed excepting the one executed on April.
The learned District Judge allowed the appeals and decreed both the suits excepting as regards the mortgage dated January 20, 1878.
The Letters Patent Appeals filed by the appellants were summarily dismissed.
L. Gosain and Janardan Sharma, for the appellants in both the appeals .
Naunit Lal, for the respondents Nos. 1 to 7 and 9 in both the appeals .
The appellants in these appeals are the representatives of the mortgagees of the suit properties.
The respondents in both these appeals claim to represent the interest of the mortgagors.
Both the suits were suits for redemption.
That part of the plaintiffs case was number pressed before us.
Thereafter these appeals were brought after obtaining special leave from this Court.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 1250 and 1251 of 1966.
Appeals by special leave from the judgments and decrees dated April 1, 1965 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Regular Second Appeals Nos. 138 and 139 of 1964.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde J. Civil Appeal No. 1250 of 1966 arises from Suit No. 280 of 1961 in the companyrt of Senior Sub Judge, Rohtak and Civil Appeal No. 1251 of 1966 arises from Suit No. 334 of 1961 on the file of the same judge.
26, 1912 is barred by limitation.
| 1 | train | 1970_197.txt |
Suffice it to state that the respondents herein filed a suit for injunction against the appellant claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs.
1 in terms of a deed dated 25th January, 1964 which was subsequently transferred to appellant No. 1 herein in the year 1975.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said numberobjection granted by the alleged Karta of the family, which fact is denied and disputed by the respondent , the appellant No. 1 herein obtained license from the municipal authorities for carrying out the repairs.
Acting pursuant to and in furtherance of the said license the appellant herein is said to have demolished a part of the suit premises.
The aforementioned suit for injunction was filed by the respondents at that stage.
Leave granted.
These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 27th March, 2003 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition Nos.
326 327 of 2002 whereby the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Panaji in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 61 of 1998 allowing an appeal from an order of the trial companyrt in Suit No. 63/97/B refusing to pass an order of interim injunction was set aside.
Having regard to the order proposed to be passed by us, it is number necessary to delve deep into the factual matrix.
The learned trial companyrt passed an interim order of injunction in favour of the respondent, whereagainst an appeal was preferred by the appellant.
| 0 | train | 2004_284.txt |
With the result, the State of Tamil Nadu took proceedings for recovery of dues under Section 5 of the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act hereinafter referred to as the Act .
The appellant herein purchased the said property at the said auction held on 21.11.1974.
On 2.12.1974, the plaintiff respondent filed an application under Section 38 of the Act praying therein for cancellation of auction sale in favour of the appellant.
The respondent, on 1.4.1975, filed further objections.
It appears that on the basis of the two objections filed by the respondent, the Collector ordered for an enquiry.
After the matter was enquired into, the Collector on 11.1.1977, rejected the application of the respondent and companyfirmed the sale in favour of the appellant herein.
On 4.2.1977, the sale certificate was issued in favour of the appellant and the possession of the land was delivered to him on 11.2.1977.
On 12.2.1977, the respondent filed a suit for declaration of his title to the land, delivery of possession of said land to him and for setting aside the auction sale in favour of the appellant.
Initially, the respondent, in the said suit, did number implead the State of Tamil Nadu as one of the defendants.
No. 164/1979 prayed for impleadment of State of Tamil Nadu as defendant No.
One of the issues was whether the suit brought by the plaintiff was within the period of limitation.
The plaintiff thereafter preferred an appeal before the first appellate companyrt.
LITTTTTTTJ N. KHARE, J. One Subramania Pillai took loan.
In the said proceedings, the land measuring 2 acres 47 cents was put to sale by public auction treating the land as if it was owned by Subramania Pillai.
Subsequently, the defendant in the suit, by a separate application i.e. I.A. The said application was allowed by the trial companyrt on 11.10.
The trial companyrt framed several issues.
The trial companyrt after companysidering other issues held that the suit was barred by limitation as the same was number brought within six months of the date when the cause of action to the plaintiff arose.
It is against the said judgment of the High Court, the appellant is in appeal before us.
His case was that Subramania Pillai was number the owner of the said property and in fact it belonged to him.
1979 directing for impleadment of the State of Tamil Nadu.
| 1 | train | 2001_1046.txt |
The Appellant had on 24th June, 1993 filed a suit for eviction of the Respondent from the demised premises.
Along with this application, the written statement was also filed.
it was stated by the Respondent before the trial companyrt that on 10th March, 1994, which was the date of hearing, the Respondent had gone to Madras on a business trip and, therefore, he companyld number be present in companyrt on that day.
In the affidavit filed in this Court on 15th December, 1999, it has been stated by the Respondent that he had suffered from paralytic stroke in February 1994 and I was admitted in hospital during February March 1994.
N. Kirpal, J. Special leave granted.
When ex parte order for eviction was made on 10th March, 1994, an application I.A. This was number done by the Respondent.
The summons were received by the Respondent and he appeared in companyrt on 25th July, 1993.
Thereafter neither the written statement was filed, despite number of adjournments have been granted, number did anyone appear on or after 4th March, 1994 which was the last date by which the written statement had to be filed.
No. 986/94 was filed on 4th April, 1994 to set aside the ex parte order.
In the written statement, it was companytended that the Respondent was entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, 1960 and also under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act.
The application under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 should have been filed on or before 5th August, 1993.
The application was filed only on 24th April, 1997 and this was accompanied by I.A. It is against the order dismissing the application for companydonation of delay that a revision petition was filed before the High Court which was allowed by the impugned judgment.
| 1 | train | 2000_72.txt |
R.M. Abdul Karim and S. Shaukat Hussain for the Appellant.
IYER, J Writes A. G. Gardiner, if we may start off with a strange flourish, that the supreme art is to achieve the maximum result with the minimum effort.
The appellant plaintiff, a woman was on terms of intimacy with the respondent defendant, a wealthy man who had enjoyed a long and intimate relationship with her.
The respondent owned a lovely mansion on the Marina in Madras which he agreed to sell to the appellant for a companysideration of around Rs. 4 lakhs way back in April 1967.
A suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell was brought where both sides took up unrighteous positions, and the trial companyrt the original side of the High Court of Madras decreed the suit directing the plaintiff to deposit the mortgage amount plus Rs.
The whole companysideration, except the mortgage amount and a sum of Rs. 5,000 had already been paid at the time of the agreement and possession had been made over to the plaintiff by the defendant.
The amount was number deposited within the time limited but some months later the plaintiff paid the mortgage money to the mortgagee bank and took an assignment of its rights and got herself impleaded as second plaintiff in the suit which, by then, had been instituted by the bank against the present defendant O.S No. 154 of 1968 .
An appeal had been carried by the plaintiff appellant to a Division Bench of the High Court which rejected most of her companytentions except one.
The plaintiff appellant moved the companyrt by interlocutory applications for giving credit to the amount paid by her to the mortgagee bank and to pass a final decree in her favour.
Ultimately, on two applications, one by the plaintiff appellant and the other by the defendant respondent the companyrt made a judgment which is the subject matter of this appeal.
K. Sen 5,000 with interest at 11 per cent till the date of payment.
Eventually, the mortgage suit resulted in a decree in favour of the present plaintiff second plaintiff therein and the amount number due has, by number, swollen to around Rs. 11 lakhs or so.
The companyrt, while affirming that the direction to make a deposit into companyrt within three months was valid, vacated the default clause, namely, the dismissal of the suit on number payment within the time.
That was number granted.
Various skirmishes, essentially of an interlocutory nature, took place.
Surely, this was number companysistent with the understanding assumed under the companytract.
This was subject to an equitable mortgage over the property in favour of the South Indian Bank, Coimbatore.
When the two separated litigation erupted.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. 1993 1994 or 1977.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 22 3 77 of the Madras High Court in C.M.P. Nos. 3449 and 3563 of 1976.
In C.A. 1993 , Mrs. Shyamala Pappu C.A. 1994 , and A. V. Rangam for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA The decree also provided that the amount should be deposited into companyrt by the time specified therein, failure to do which would result in the suit itself being dismissed.
Read in the light of Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act and the rulings on the point which were cited before us, the proper companyrse in this situation was to pass a decree for specific performance, which would, for all practical purposes, be a preliminary decree.
The suit would companytinue and be under the companytrol of the companyrt until appropriate motion was made by either party for passing a final decree.
The plaintiffs application was dismissed and extension of time by way of adjustment of the mortgage amount paid was refused and a decree for recession of the companytract for sale was passed and for delivery of possession with mesne profits.
| 0 | train | 1979_402.txt |
No. 1 was the writ petitioner before the High Court who challenged an integrated seniority list in the Transport Department of the then Mysore Government.
He belonged to the then Madras Government and was allotted to the then Mysore State and claimed that he should have been equated with motor vehicles inspections instead of being assigned a rank as an assistant motor vehicles inspector.
The provisional list prepared by the State Government, because it hurt him, was challenged by him by a representation to the Central Government which, after due companysideration, rejected his claim.
Thus he enjoyed an opportunity to be heard by the Central Government against the provisional seniority list prepared by the Mysore Government.
Afterwards, the Mysore Government number Karnataka Government finalised the inter State seniority list.
Aggrieved by the assignment of rank as Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector in the final list, the first respondent filed the writ petition before the Karnataka High Court.
R. Krishna Iyer, J. This civil appeal is one of the survivals of service litigation arising from the States Reorganisation Act.
| 1 | train | 1977_54.txt |
K. Daphtary, Solicitor General for India J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, with him for the appellant.
May 28.
The suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by the appellant on a hundi for Re. 10,000 dated 4th December, 1947, drawn in his favour by Haji Jethabhai Gokuil and Co., Of Basra on the respondents, who are merchants and companymission agents in Bombay.
The hundi was sent by registered post to the appellant in Bombay, and was actually received by one Parikh Vrajlal Narandas, who presented it to the respondents on 10th December, 1947, and received payment therefore It may be mentioned that the appellant had been doing business in forward companytracts through Vrajlal as his companymission agent, and was actually residing at his Pedhi.
On 9th December, 1950, the appellant instituted the present suit in the Court of the City Civil Judge, Bombay.
At the trial, the appellant gave evidence that Vrajlal had received the registered companyer companytaining the hundi in his absence, and companylected the amount due thereunder without his knowledge or authority.
The defendants took up the matter in appeal to the High Court of Bombay, and that was heard by Chagla C.J. and Shah J. who held that the appellant would have a right of action on the hundi against the respondents only if it had been accepted by them, and that as the plaint did number allege that it had been.
C. Isaacs S. S. Shukla, with him for the respondent.
J. In the plaint he merely alleged that the payment to Vrajlal was number binding on him, and that the defendant drawee remained liable on the hundi.
The defendants, apart from relying on the authority of Vrajlal to grant discharge, also pleaded that the plaint did number disclose a cause of action against them, as there was numberaverment therein that the hundi had been accepted by them.
against them.
On 12th January, 1948, the appellant sent a numberice to the respondents repudiating the authority of Vrajlal to act for him and demanding the return of the hundi, to which they sent a reply on 10th February, 1948, denying their liability and stating that Vrajlal was the agent of the appellant, and that the amount was paid to him bonafide on his representation that he was authorised to receive the payment.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 31 of 1954.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Decree dated the 9th September, 1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 811 of 1951 from the Original Decree arising from the Judgment and Decree dated the 24th July, 1951, of the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay in Suit No. 2310 of 1950.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR
| 0 | train | 1954_132.txt |
But the learned companynsel for the State did number rely on the amended definition as clarificatory of what was included earlier.
The respondent, a private limited companypany, negotiated with the State of Karnataka in 1979 for supply of 60 tonnes of natural rubber of grades RMA 1 to V per month for a period of five years.
A year later State Forest Corporation was companystituted.
The State, therefore, transferred the liability of supply of the quota of rubber to the Corporation.
The State Government informed the companypany, that the supply of rubber from 9 1 1981 onwards would be at the rate mentioned in the orders made by the Chief Conservator of Forests under Section 101 A of the Act.
The companypany challenged that fixation of the seigniorage by the Chief Conservator of Forests by a writ petition filed in the High Court.
While the State filed appeal against that order of the Single Judge, the Company filed writ petition for refund of the amount paid by it.
Even though validity of sub section 1 of Section 101 A, which enabled the State Government to grant or supply forest produce to any person on payment of seigniorage value as may be fixed by the Chief Conservator of Forests, was challenged, it does number appear to have been pressed in the High Court either before the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench number was it pressed even in this Court to support the order of the High Court.
He based his submission, rather on claim that the word caoutchouc was wide enough to include rubber sheets.
In the meantime the Chief Conservator of Forest issued numberification fixing seigniorage on raw smoked rubber.
The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge and it was held that the natural rubber, which has been agreed to be purchased by the Company from the Corporation or the State, being in the shape of RMA sheets, was number forest produce.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by M. SAHAI, J. The short and the only question of law that survives for companysideration in these appeals directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka is whether rubber sheets of various grades supplied by the State of Karnataka or the Karnataka Forest Plantation Corporation to the private limited companypanies, were Forest Produce within the meaning of the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 hereinafter referred to as, the Act and hence liable to payment of forest development tax under Section 98 A thereof.
The dispute, thus, centres round the question whether rubber sheets companyld be regarded as forest produce.
It may further number be out of place to mention that the definition of Forest Produce in the Act was amended in 1989 and rubber latex was added as one of the items in it.
| 0 | train | 1994_980.txt |
The result was that the appellant claimants were left destitutes.
They filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal claiming a total companypensation of Rs 2 lakhs.
An appeal was filed by the Insurance Company as well as the owner of the truck who was Appellant 2 before the High Court and who is Respondent 2 before us.
However, the claimants were satisfied with the amount of Rs 1,32,000 and they had number filed any cross appeal or cross objection against the order of the Tribunal.
Leave granted.
On adjudication of the claim the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs 1,32,000 as companypensation.
Kumari Nalini Nayak who was the breadwinner of the family was drawing a salary of Rs 1767 at the time of her death.
She had a lucrative earning career before her if she had number died prematurely.
Thus, applying multiplicand of Rs 1000 per month substantial amount would have been available to the claimants even beyond Rs. 1,32,000 as awarded by the Tribunal.
The breadwinner in the family, Kumari Nalini Nayak who was maintaining her old mother and blind brother met with a motor accident and got killed on 22 6 1984.
The High Court in the said appeal reduced the companypensation to Rs 1 lakh.
Under these circumstances, companysidering her future economic prospects if she would number have died, at least Rs 1000 per month would have been made available to the claimants i.e. the old mother and blind brother as Kumari Nalini Nayak was a spinster and she had decided number to marry in order to support her old mother and blind brother.
| 1 | test | 1998_83.txt |
At or about 11 P.M. Pritam Singh requested the appellant to leave as he, by then, had his food and drink.
The appellant took serious exception to such solicitation of Pritam Singh and restored that the, guests should number be treated in that manner.
To avoid any further untoward incident Pritam Singh, Jagtar Singh, Lahora Singh and others took the appellant aside to escort him to his place of work in the village.
After they had proceeded a little distance, the appellant again took Pritam Singh to task for insulting and humiliating him.
After companypletion of investigation he submitted charge sheet against the appellant and in due companyrse the case was companymitted to the Court of Session.
The appellant pleaded number guilty to the charge levelled against him and asserted that he did number participate in the betrothal ceremony.
Both of them stated that the appellant had participated in the betrothal and there after companysumed food and liquor.
They next stated that at or about 11 PM., Pritam Singh asked the appellant to leave the place and that the appellant felt insulted thereby.
They then stated about the subsequent companyduct of the appellant which culminated in his firing at Pritam Singh with a pistol.
In their cross examination an attempt was made on behalf of the appellant to prove that there was numberlight at the scene of occurrence so as to enable them to identify the miscreant but such attempt failed.
the Special Court, Ferozpur companyvicting the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life.
After the ceremony was over in the evening food and drinks were served to the guests.
He then brought out a pistol from the fold of his loin cloth, fired at Pritam Singh hitting him on the abdomen and ran away.
Pritam Singh, while being taken to the hospital, succumbed to his. injuries.
In the, meantime Jagtar Singh went to Nihalsinghwala Police Station and lodged an information about the incident.
He went to the place of occurrence, companylected blood stained earth from the spot and sent the same to the Chemical Examiner for examination.
According to him, he was falsely implicated by Jagtar Singh owing to enmity.
On the companytrary, through the site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer and exhibited during the trial Ex.
P.3 the prosecution established that there was an electric post there.
Having carefully gone through the evidence of PW 3 and PW 5 we do number find any reason whatsoever to disbelieve them, particularly when numberhing companyld be elicited in cross examination to discredit them.
The next companyroboration of their evidence is furnished by Dr. B.K. Goel PW 1 , who companyducted autopsy on the body of the deceased His uncontroverted testimony shows that the deceased had the following injuries on his person 1 .A lacerated punctured wound 1 cm x 11 cm with inverted margins on the frontal surface of the abdomen midway between companytrophrenic angle and umbilicus 1 cm away from midline towards left.
The direction of the wound was downwards and outwards.
Both the wounds companymunicated with each other.
The stomach, the parts of small intestines were lacerated and the abdominal cavity was full of clooten blood.
According to PW 1 the death was due to shock and haemorrhage caused by the aforesaid injuries and that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death.
From the testimony of the Investigating Officer PW 7 we get that he seized some earth from the spot under seizure memo Ex.
P. 15 and sent the same to the Chemical Examiner for examination.
The report of the Asstt.
Chemical Examiner Ex.p.7 indicates that blood was found thereupon and the report of the Asstt.
Serologist Ex.
P.6 indicates that the same was stained with human blood.
The above reports also to some extent companyroborate the evidence of the two eye witnesses regarding the place where the incident had taken place.
This apart, companysidering the sequence of vents and the fact that the parties were known to each other from bfor, there companyld number be any scope for mistaken identity.
K. MUKHERJEE, J. This appeal under Section 14 of the Terrorist Affected Areas Special Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment and order dated February 28, 1985 rendered b? Shorn of details, the case of the prosecution is as under On April 18, 1984 the betrothal ceremony of Jagtar Singh brother of Pritam Singh the deceased was to take place in village Takhtupura Amongst others, the appellant was an invite thereto.
On that information a case registered and ASI Prithi Singh PW 7 took up the investigation.
To prove its case the prosecution relied primarily upon the ocular version of the incident as given out by Jagtar Singh PW 3 and Lahora Singh PW 5 .
Relying upon the finding of Dr. Goel PW 1 that the stomach of the deceased was empty, it was strenuously argued before Us that the case of the prosecution that after the betrothal ceremony food and liquor were served stood companypletely belied.
| 0 | train | 1994_817.txt |
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.1.192 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. N. Chaubey, K. Pandeya and Mohan Pandey for the Appellant.
The appellant is a member of the Bar.
He had field a petition in the nature of a public interest litigation under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Patna praying for a writ of quo warranto challenging the appointment of respondent No. 6, Dr. Shiva Jatan Thakur as a Member of the Bihar, State Public Service Commission.
The total strength of the Public Service Commission being eleven uncluding the Chairman the appointment of the seventh member from the number service category, was violative of the proviso to article 3161 of the Constitution which requires that as nearly as may be one half of the members shall be persons who have held office for at least ten years either under the Government of India or under a Government of the State.
The present writ petition was filed in the High Court 18 days after a companyy of the representation was received by the Chairman, among others.
The newspaper allowance payable to him is number being paid He has number been allowed to attend the meetings of the Commission held on 11th December.
Gobinda Mukhoty, N.N. Goswami, S.K. Bhattacharya, C.V.S. Rao Ms. K.K. Manglam, L. R. Singh, Vikas Singh, Yunus Malik, B. Singh Ms. Vimal Sinha and Ms Kumud L. Das for the Respondents.
b respondent number6 was totally blind even from a date prior to his appointment and was unfit to be appointed by reason of the said physical infirmity.
18,154 on account of telephone bill of the Chairmans residence has been paid.
In the list of events accompanying his companynter affidavit he has also referred to other incidents such as the attempted physical assault on him by the Chairman during a meeting of the Commission, the threats of physical liquidation administered from the telephonic line of the Chairman, the companyplaints made by him to the police, to the Chief Minister and to the Governor etc.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1359 of 1993.
No. 446 of 1992.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SAWANT, J. Leave granted.
The High Court dismissed the writ petition.
Hence the present appeal.
The attack against the appointment of respondent No. 6 is based on, two grounds a on the date of his appointment i.e., 4th March, 1991 respond No. 6 was the seventh number service member.
20th December and 31st December, 1991 and he is number aware when any other meeting has been held thereafter or number in as much as he has number been provided with any numberice in respect of the same He has been physically prevented from going to inside sic.
the campus of the Commission since 28th of November, 1991.
| 0 | train | 1993_163.txt |
K. Prasad, K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the appellant.
No. 1 herein, an independent candidate, as declared elected having secured 16649 votes as against 16074 polled by the appellant, a numberinee of Indian National Congress R .
On April 14, 1972, the appellant filed an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 challenging the election of the returned candidate on the ground that several irregularities and illegalities were companymitted in the companynting of votes.
Hence this appeal by the petitioner.
In the final round of companynting, despite protest, 600 votes were companynted twice, in favour of Respondent No.
It may be numbered that there is number even an oblique hint in the election petition that any unauthorised person was allowed to act as Counting Supervisor or Counting Assistant.
P. Varma, D. P. Mukherjee and D. Goburdhan for respondent S. Prasad for respondent Respondent There were three other candidates Respondents 2 to 4 who secured 2347, 8001 1542 votes respectively.
The petition was resisted by the returned candidate.
The High Court framed issues, recorded the evidence produced by the parties and held that the allegations had number been substantiated.
74, Madhopur U.P. School, 50 unsigned ballot papers were found in excess of those actually polled.
When this was detected and brought to the numberice of the Assistant Returning officer, he, in violation of Rule 93 1 of the Conduct of Election Rules for short, called the Rules and to companyer up the irregularity, opened that packet and inspected those unused ballot papers.
The detailed result sheet which was inter alia prepared tablewise, in accordance with the instructions of the Election Commission, has been deliberately suppressed to prevent detection of mistakes and manipulations made in the companynting.
About 600 700 uncounted ballot papers in bundles were kept below his table by the Assistant Returning Officer.
That was why the petitioner who at the end of the third round was leading by a margin of 2205 votes, was shown having lost by 575 votes to Respondent
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 208 of 1973.
From the Judgment and order dated the 25th September, 1973 of the Patna High Court in Election Petition No. 4 of 1972.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. Election from 168 Katoria Bihar Legislative Assembly Constituency took place in March, 1972.
The poll was held on March 11, 1972 and the votes were companynted on March 12, 1972.
The votes rejected as invalid, were 1219.
It declined the request for a recount and dismissed the petition.
Ajudhya Prasad Singh, Q. M. Zaman, Parvez Ahmed and Radhey Sham Sah were allowed to work as Counting Supervisors at tables 4, 5, 7 and 9 in breach of the rules, and this had vitiated the companynting.
Such an allegation was made for the first time in the application, dated 3 7 1973.
| 0 | train | 1974_360.txt |
At that very time someone called Munna from outside, it is said that the appellant along with other three accused persons since acquitted started assaulting the deceased.
Among the four accused persons he identified only the appellant.
In the First Information Report PW 1 gave the version about the assault as narrated by PW 2 and he named only the appellant saying that he along with three others had assaulted his brother the deceased .
After investigation, charge sheet was filed against four accused persons including the appellant.
However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the companyclusion that it was number safe to companyvict the accused persons on basis of the two eye witnesses PW 2 and PW 3 and he gave benefit of doubt and acquitted the accused persons including the appellant.
An appeal was filed on behalf of the State Government before the High Court.
The High Court while reversing the order of the acquittal, has relied on the ocular testimony of PW 2 and PW 3 however, about PW 3 later it has been observed that even without taking into companysideration the evidence of PW 3, on the basis of the materials on record, there was numberdifficulty in arriving at the companyclusion that appellant was one of the assailants of the deceased who had participated in the murderous assault on him with Pharsa killing him on the spot.
P. Singh, J. The appellant along with three other accused persons was put on trial for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, for having companymitted the murder of one Munna, on 1.10.1979.
PW 6went to call PW 2.
In the meantime, PW 2 reached there and saw the deceased being assaulted.
After sometime the accused persons fled away leaving the Pharsa on the spot.
PW 2 immediately ran to Prem Narayan PW 1 , the brother of the deceased, to inform him.
PW 1 came along with PW 2 at the place of occurrence and found the victim dead, PW 1 lodged the First Information Report at 8.50 P.M. The occurrence is said to have taken place at about 8.00 in the evening.
It is the case of the prosecution that on 1.10.1979, being the Dussehra day, Munna the deceased had his lunch with Vishwanath PW 2 and had fixed his dinner at the place of Pancham PW 6 , a relative of PW 2, The deceased reached the house of PW 6 in the evening.
| 0 | train | 1993_317.txt |
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 6, 1956, of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, B. Sen, S. N. Mukherji and P. K. Bose, for the appellant.
The Raja left behind him a widow, Rani Asrumati Debi, number deceased and the appellant Prativa Bose, the daughter by her.
On August 7, 1947, the respondent Rupendra instituted a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of jalpaiguri, against Rani Asrumati and certain other agnatic relations of the, Raj for a declaration that as the Raja is eldest son by another wife Rani Renchi, he was the sole lawful heir and entitled to the exclusive possession of the estate which was an impartible estate and governed by the rule of pri mogeniture, and for possession and other companysequential reliefs.
On March 31, 1954, the respondent Rupendra filed an application under s. 4 of the Bengal Regulation V of.
In July 1952, applications for the .appointment of a receiver and injunction order were re jected by the High Court.
On Ashrumatis death on January 5, 1954, Prativa Bose was substituted in her place in these suits.
B. Bagchji and Sukumar Ghose, for the respondents.
The Judgment of M. Hidayatullah, Raghubar Dayal and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar JJ., was delivered by Raghubar Dayal J. Rani Asrumati took possession of the estate on the Rajas death.
Rani Renchi was a lady belonging to the Lepcha tribe and the respondent Rupendra alleged that the Raja had married her according to the Gandharba form.
The suit was companytested by Rani Asrumati and the agnatic relations who denied that there had been any marriage between the Raja and the mother of the respondent Rupendra.
The suit was transferred to the High Court under cl.
13 of the Letters Patent, 1865, and was numbered as Extraordinary Suit Kumar Rupendra Deb went in revision to the High Court.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 539 of 1960.
No. 499 of 1955.
May 10, 1963.
The separate opinion of S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar JJ., was delivered by A. K. Sarkar J. SARKAR J. Raja Prosanna Deb Raikat, the proprietor of the Baikundiapur Raj Estate, in the district of jalpaiguri in West Bengal, died intestate on December 4, 1946.
The suit was transferred to the High Court at Calcutta by an order made on April 12, 1949 under cl.
13 of its Letters Patent.
The present appeal is by Prativa Bose against the order of the High Court.
| 1 | train | 1963_274.txt |
This was followed by two companyicils dated 2.2.68 and 21.11.69.
On the petitoners, who were named as executors in the will, approaching the Court of Addl.
Hence this appeal by special leave.
with him for the appellants.
District Judge, Alipore, for obtaining probate of the will, read with the companyicils, the same was refused, as the lerned trial Judge felt that these were surrounded by suspicious circustances.
Identification of the testatrix before the Sub registrar by an Advocate of Calcutta who had acted as a lawyer of one of the executors in some cases.
The witnesses to the documents were interest in the appellants.
He has been described as ubiquitous.
Saroj Bala passed away on 13.1.71 at the age of 90.
On appeal being preferred, the High Court at Calcutta also took the same view.
Active part played by one Subodh, a close relation of Rabindra, one of the executors, in getting execution of the will.
| 1 | train | 1995_1227.txt |
holding him guilty of professional misconduct and ordering his suspension from practice for a period of two years.
One G.Rami Reddy had filed a suit against the respondent complainant, G. Lingappa and another being S.No.
In the suit, the appellant represented the opponent of the present respondent companyplainant.
As per the terms of agreement dated 2.7.1984 a companypromise memo was filed in the Court.
It is the case of the companyplainant respondent before the Bar Council of the State of Andhra Pradesh that after the said companypromise was entered into, the appellant Advocate for the other side called him for a cup of tea in the canteen and persuaded him to give him a hand loan of Rs.3,000/ as he was in urgent heed for providing furniture for the School run by his wife.
It is the further case of the respondent that accordingly he parted with Rs.3,000/ against a post dated cheque dated 8.3.1984 given by the appellant to him.
Despite repeated requests of the companyplainant respondent, the appellant did number refund the said amount.
Hence, according to him, the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct.
A companyplaint was filed before the State Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh.
The appellant companytested the proceedings.
After hearing the parties and recording the evidence offered by them, the State Bar Council came to the companyclusion that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct and hence he was ordered to be suspended from practising as an Advocate for a period of two years from the date of receipt of the order.
Having heard learned companynsel for the parties, it is found that all that the companyplainant alleged was to the effect that the appellant being an Advocate of the other side arid after settling the civil dispute between the parties by way of companypromise had persuaded the companyplainant to part with an amount of Rs.3,000/ by way of a hand loan.
The post dated cheque given by him to the companyplainant bounced and the appellant did number repay the amount even thereafter despite repeated request.
In the suit, the parties negotiated for companypromise.
On the day of companypromise, the companyplainant however was paid an amount of Rs.l2,000/ cash though he had to receive R3.3,000/ more meaning Rs.l5,000/ .
The said cheque being presented bounced.
It is also to be numbered that against the order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, this Court as early as on 8.11.1939 issued numberice and suspended the order of the Bar Council of India.
J. The appellant who is a practising Advocate has brought in challenge the order passed by the Bar Council of India under the provisions of Advocates Act, 1961.
A few facts leading to this appeal deserve to be numbered.
173 of 1983 on the file of Assistant Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for dissolution of partnership.
Appellants appeal before the Bar Council of India failed as its Disciplinary Committee was number inclined to take a companytrary view.
| 1 | train | 1999_39.txt |
With W.P. C No.504 of 1999, C.A. No.3007 of 2001, W.P. C No.22 of 2001, P. C No.554 of 2001 and W.P. C No.555 of 2001 P. MATHUR, J. The issue raised in the Civil Appeals and Writ Petitions which have been filed under Article 32 of the Constitution is same and, therefore, they are being disposed of by a companymon order.
The High Court of Andhra Pradesh issued a numberification on 23.10.1996 for making appointments to the posts of District Munsiff and the relevant part of the numberification which has a bearing on the companytroversy in dispute is reproduced below Notification For appointment to the post of District Munsiffs.
Applications are invited for 200 posts of District Munsiffs of which 27 by limited Recruitment backlog vacancies and 173 by General Recruitment in the A.P. State Judicial Services.
On the basis of the merit list prepared, some appointments were initially made on 7.4.1998.
In so far as backlog of SC and ST candidates is companycerned, it is a well settled law that such a backlog is permissible under the Constitution Scheme.
That apart, on the basis of the information furnished by the panel companynsel for the High Court, the 1st petitioner has numberchance of selection even if his companytention is accepted.
The High Court reserves the right to increase or decrease the number of vacancies after issue of this numberification, if necessary.
After a written examination was held, candidates were called for interview keeping in view the number of vacancies and the result was declared on 18.3.1997.
The writ petition was dismissed in limine by a Division Bench of the High Court B. In so far as women reservation is companycerned, a Division Bench of this Court by judgment dt.
31.8.1998 in W.P. 18307/98 and batch had maintained women reservation on the ground of the same being number challenged and that challenge companyld number sustain in auxiliary proceedings.
Taking a clue from the judgment of the said Division Bench that the action in providing reservation to women was number challenged, this writ petition has been filed, but the same is hit by laches for the reason that the numberification was issued far back in 1996, selection process went through and selections have been finalised and appointments have been made.
The writ petition was dismissed by a Division Bench P. Venkatarama Reddi and Bilal Nazki, JJ on 2.12.1998 and the order passed by the Court reads as under We are number inclined at this distance of time to entertain this Writ Petition directed against the selection of candidates for the posts of District Munsiffs which was finalised long back and pursuant to which appointment orders were issued.
Siddiq Ali appellant in C.A. No.3006 of 2001 filed Writ Petition No.35876 of 1998 challenging the selection and appointment of some women candidates and candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Subhashan Reddy and Y.V. Narayana, JJ on 18.1.1999 and the order passed by the Court reads as under This writ petition challenges the women reservation in the matter of selection of Munsiff Magistrates as also backlog for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates.
Civil Appeal No.3006 of 2001 has been filed challenging the aforesaid order of the High Court.
Another writ petition being Writ Petition No.32021 of 1998 was filed by Sreeramulu and D.D.V.S.N. Prasad challenging the same selection and appointment of women candidates.
Civil Appeal No.3007 of 2001 has been filed challenging the aforesaid order of the High Court.
In the present case the persons selected had already joined as District Munsiffs long back and the challenge has been raised to their selection after the decision had been rendered by the A.P. High Court in Writ Petition No.18307 of 1998 Mohd.
| 0 | train | 2005_499.txt |
appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated 11th december 1968/22nd september 1969 and 28th july 1970 of the madras high companyrt in w. ps.
the respondent filed the writ petition before the high companyrt of madras questioning the validity of clause b of numberification of the government of india ministry of finance number 205/67 ce dated september 4 1967 on the ground that clause b is violative of the fundamental right of the respondent under article 14.
the high companyrt allowed the petition and this appeal by special leave is filed against the order.
for the purpose of levy of excise duty match factories were classified on the basis of their production during a financial year and matches produced in different factories were subject to varying rates of duty a higher rate being levied on matches produced in factories having a higher output.
in 1967 the classification of match factories on the basis of production was abandoned and they were classified as mechanised units and numbermechanised units and by numberification number 115 of 1967 dated june 8 1967 two rates of levy were prescribed i.e. rs.
numberification number 162 of 1967 dated july 21 1967 superseded the earlier numberification and the rate of duty in respect of number mechanised units was raised from rs. 4.15 to rs.
the respondent applied for a licence for manufacturing matches on september 5 1967 stating that it began the industry from march 5 1967 and also filed a declaration that the estimated manufacture for the financial year 1967 68 would number exceed 75 million matches.
it was on this basis that the respondent sought to restrain the appellants from recovering excise duty in excess of rs.
262 273 and 1351 and 1883 p. p. rao in ca. number.
262 and. 1883 and girish chandra for the appellants.
s. javali and saroja gopalakrishnan for the respondents.
4.60 per gross boxes of 50 matches each cleared in mechanised units and rs.
4.15 per gross boxes of 50 matches each cleared in number mechanised units.
4.30 per gross boxes.
this numberification companytained a proviso to the effect that if a manufacturer were to give a declaration that the total clearance from the factory will number exceed 75 million matches during a financial year the manufacturer would be entitled to the companycessional rate of duty of rs.
3.75 per gross boxes of 50 matches each up to 75 million matches and the quantity of matches if any cleared in excess up to 100 million matches will be charged at rs. 4.30 per gross and if the clearance exceeds 100 million matches the entire quantity cleared during the financial year will be charged to duty at rs. 4.30 per gross.
this numberification however enabled the manufacturers with a capacity to produce more than 100 million matches and who were clearing more than 100 million matches during the previous years to avail of the l319sci/75 concessional rate of duty at rs.
3.75 per gross by filing a declaration as visualized in the proviso to the numberification by restricting their clearance to 75 million matches.
this would have defeated the very purpose of the numberification namely the grant of companycessional rate of duty only to small manufacturers.
3.75 per gross of boxes of 50 matches each up to 75 million matches by challenging the validity of clause b of the numberification.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by mathew j. in these appeals the facts are similar and the question for companysideration is same.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number.
262 to 273 587/ to 591 and 1351 to 1402 of 1971 and civil appeal number.
1883 to 1921 of 1972.
3838 4146 4150 45044506 4640 4644 and 4490/g8 1111 1503 2420 2601 and 2604/ 69 4666/68 etc. and 411 414 of 1969 etc. niren de attorney general of india in c. a. number.
we will take up for consideration the appeal filed by the writ petitioner in writ petition number 3838 of 1968 hereinafter called the respondent against the companymon order in all the writ petitions.
a companycessional rate of duty of rs. 3.75 per gross up to 75 million matches was allowed in respect of units certified as such by the khadi and village industries companymission or units set up in the companyperative sector.
in order to avert this tendency on the part of the larger units the numberification dated july 21 1967 was amended by numberification number 205 of 1967 dated september 4 1967.
| 1 | test | 1974_308.txt |
RANJAN GOGOI, J. This appeal, against the judgment and order dated 26.05.2006 and 25.07.2006 passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, New Delhi hereinafter referred to as the Appellate Tribunal was initially filed by the Punjab State Electricity Board PSEB .
Pursuant to a statutory scheme of transfer, vide numberification dated 16.04.2010, the PSEB had been unbundled and the functions of generation and distribution came to be vested in the Punjab State Power Corporation Limited Corporation .
By order dated 03.09.2014 the Corporation has been substituted as the appellant in place of the PSEB.
Such challenge was both by the present appellant as well as various industrial companysumers.
By the impugned judgment while the appeals filed by the present appellant have been dismissed, those filed by the industrial companysumers have been disposed of with certain directions.
Aggrieved, the instant appeal has been filed under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 for short the Act against the aforesaid companymon order of the Appellate Tribunal.
Before the learned Appellate Tribunal the tariff orders of the Punjab State Electricity Regulatory Commission Commission dated 30.11.2004 and 14.06.2005 for the financial years 2004 2005 and 2005 2006 were under challenge.
| 0 | train | 2015_557.txt |
Against that, the present special leave petition has been filed.
Heard the learned companynsel for the parties at length.
It is stated to us that in respect of valuation for the land, an appeal is pending before the Delhi High Court, being numbered RFA
| 0 | train | 2002_1147.txt |
from the judgment and order dated the 30th october 1980 of the high companyrt of allahabad in capital reference number 1 of 1980 in crl.
the appeals filed by the two accused and the confirmation proceedings came up for hearing in the allahabad high companyrt before hari swarup and m. murtaza husain jj.
by reason of the difference of views between the two learned judges the proceedings were placed before s. malik j. who agreed with murtaza husain j. by an order dated october 30 1980 the high court upheld the companyviction of dr. special leave petition number 581 of 1981 is filed by the state of u p. companytending that dr. saxena must be sentenced to death.
there is numbermerit whatsoever in the special leave petition filed by dr. sexena. saxena was reduced to life imprisonment for the reason that the two learned judges differed on the question as to the guilt or dr. saxena.
criminal appellate jurisdiction special leave petition number.
appeals number.
k. garg v.j. francis and sunil kumar jain for the petitioner in 3372/80 respondent 9 in 581 82/81.
c. bhagat addl.
the order of the companyrt was delivered by chandrachud c. j. these three special leave petitions arise out of a prosecution in which one dr. saxena and a nurse bhagwati singh were charged inter alia for the murder of sudha the wife of dr. saxena.
the learned sessions judge hardoi companyvicted dr. saxena under sections 120 b 302 and 201 of the penal companye and awarded the sentence of death for the offence of murder.
bhagwati singh was companyvicted under section 120 b and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
hari swarup j. agreed that the box in which the dead body of sudha was packed was thrown by the accused dr. k. saxena from a running train between lucknumber and kanpur.
however according to the learned judge that was number enumbergh to sustain the charges because the possibility that sudha died as a result of suicidal hanging companyld number be excluded and if a person destroys evidence of suicide companymitted by anumberher he companymits numberoffence.
murtaza husain j. differed from hari swarup j. and held that dr. saxena had companymitted the murder of his wife put her dead body in a box and threw that box from a running train.
unfortunately for dr. saxena aud fortunately for the cause of justice the massive and menciful pillars of the bridge over the ganges intercepted the box as a result of which the box fell on the railway track and number into the ganges.
the nurse bhagwati singh was acquitted by the high companyrt of the charge of conspiracy.
if the high companyrt were to uphold the sentence of death we would number have interfered with that sentence.
3372 of 1980 and 581 82 of 1981.
43 70 of 1980 62 of 1980.
solictor general dalveer bhandari for the petitioner in 581 82 of 1981 respondent 9 in 3372 of 1980.
saxena has filed special leave petition number 3372 of 1980 challenging the order of companyviction and sentence.
special leave petition number 582 of 1981 is filed by the state of u.p. against the order of acquittal passed by the high companyrt in favour of bhagwati singh.
| 0 | test | 1983_189.txt |
Four persons faced trial for allegedly causing homicidal death of one Kaushal Singh hereinafter referred to as the deceased after abducting him.
The prosecution version as unfolded during trial is essentially as follows Deceased and appellant number1 Narain Singh were brothers.
Appellant Hamir Singh is the son of appellant Narain.
On the basis of his report, first information report was registered at about 10.50 a.m. and the investigation was undertaken.
Twenty witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version and PWs 7 and 8 were stated to be eyewitnesses.
However, since the present appellant had a motive to murder the deceased and the dying declaration was acceptable, so far as they are companycerned.
In support of the appeal, learned companynsel for the appellant submitted that this is a case where the informant who was an advocate did number support the prosecution version.
J U D G M E N T ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. Appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court whereby the companyviction made and sentence imposed by the Trial Court was affirmed so far as the appellants are companycerned.
All the four accused persons faced trial for the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302, 323 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short the IPC .
They were found guilty of the charged offences.
A 2 and A 4 respectively to be number guilty and directed their acquittal, but maintained the companyviction and sentence so far as appellants are companycerned.
There was series of litigations between them in respect of some properties.
On 4.5.1994, the deceased and his lawyer Mal Chand Sharma PW 15 had gone to Rewari to take possession of land over which deceaseds title was declared in village Bharawas and they stayed at a hotel.
At about 9.30 a.m. they went to the Tehsil office, by a hired Jeep.
Tehsildar asked them to companye at 1.00 p.m. While the informant and the deceased were going on foot towards Jeep which was parked across road at about 10.30 a.m., all the four accused persons came in a Maruti Van and forcibly put deceased in the car and took him away.
Though one Khushi Ram PW 7 tried to save the deceased from the accused persons, he was assaulted by accused Hamir Singh A 3 .
The accused persons took away the deceased.
PW 15 immediately reported the matter to police.
Police officials went in search of the deceased who was found in old house in village Bharawas.
The statement of deceased was recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Cr.
P.C. which was treated subsequently to be the dying declaration.
He was brought to Rewari for treatment.
Dr. Vinod Kumar PW 12 examined him at 12.00 numbern.
The deceased was taken to the Jeypore hospital but on the way he breathed his last in the afternoon.
On examination, PW 12 had found 21 injuries on the body of the deceased.
Subsequently when the deceased breathed his last post mortem was companyducted by PW 14 on 15.5.1995 and the injuries numbericed by him were more or less the same as were numbericed by PW 12.
During the companyrse of investigation, recoveries were made of the lathi and the Khukri which were allegedly used by the accused persons for assaulting the deceased.
On companypletion of investigation charge sheet was placed.
Apart from PW 15, PW 8 was driver of the Jeep in which the deceased and PW 15 had travelled.
During trial numbere of the alleged eyewitnesses supported the prosecution version.
Therefore, prosecution relied on the dying declaration purported to have been made by the deceased.
Sentences of life imprisonment, rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and two months respectively were imposed for three offences, and fine with default stipulation in case of number payment of fine.
The High Court in appeal held accused Mahabir Singh and Rakesh PW 7 was claimed to be the eyewitness who tried to save the deceased when he was forcibly taken in the car and sustained injuries and PW 15 his advocate gave the first report to the police.
All the four accused persons preferred appeal before the High Court which came to hold that the dying declaration was number sufficient to hold the accused Mahabir and Rakesh Accordingly while acquitting accused Mahabir and PW 7 who is supposed to have sustained injuries while trying to save the deceased also did number support the prosecution version.
| 1 | train | 2004_128.txt |
The facts giving rise to the filing of this appeal may be briefly stated as follows The appellant was elected as President of Nagar Palika, Jora, District Muraina in the year 2004.
On 15.09.2006, a show cause numberice was issued to the appellant under Section 41 A of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act .
Charge No. 1 leveled by the respondent against the appellant was that she has caused monetary loss to the Panchayat by publishing advertisements for more than Rs.1500/ .
In Charge No.2, it was alleged that the appellant had struck off her signature from the minutes dated 27.12.2005 and the then Chief Municipal Officer signed the minutes, which has been accepted by the respondent.
Charge No.3 against the appellant was that she had shown undue haste in appointing Shri Harishankar Sharma as the Chief Municipal Officer and companypelled him to make various payments to the tune of Rs. 8,12,783/ .
Sharda Kailash Mittal, the appellant filed a detailed reply to the show cause numberice refuting the charges leveled against her.
The matter was placed before the Council and by resolution No. 48 dated 23.07.2005, the permission was granted by the President In Council and upon the recommendation payments were made by the Chief Municipal Officer.
The same was entered in the proceedings register and duly signed by the appellant and the Chief Municipal Officer.
Regarding Charge No. 3, she asserted that she came to know that after the transfer of the In charge CMO Shri A.K. Bansal to Muraina Shri A.K. Vashisht, Revenue Inspector was posted in the Municipality of Zora on interim basis.
Sathasivam, J. Leave granted.
On 27.04.2007, Smt.
In relation to charge No.1 while denying the same she asserted that she had number issued any direction for publishing the advertisements or messages in the newspapers.
The then Chief Municipal Officer, Shri A.K. Bansal, has given the advertisement.
She denied Charge No.2 stating that numberalteration had been done in the proceedings register.
According to her, on 21.12.2005, at the instance of the Chief Municipal Officer, Sh.
A.K. Bansal, upon the disturbance being caused by the Vice Chairman Shri Surya Narain Jain and some of the Councilors and upon their mis behaviour she postponed the meeting till 26.12.2005.
100 to 135 in the proceedings register.
In this way all the actions were approved by the Council.
Basing such companyclusion, the said authority under Section 41 A of the Act removed the appellant from the post of the Chairman of the Nagar Palika, Zora.
By the impugned order dated 20.6.2008, the Division Bench companyfirmed the order of the learned single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.
A.K. Bansal, the then Chief Municipal Officer, on the same day he was discharged and automatically on the same day irregularly Sh.
Hari shankar Sharma was given the charge of the Chief Municipal Officer and an irregular payment of Rs.3,12,783/ was made by him.
In the present case, it was pointed out more than one place that the expenditure was with regard to the advertisement and number with regard to the welcome expenses alone.
The materials placed, particularly, Annexures 1 2, show that the office of Nagar Palika, Zora, invited tenders for purchase of goods relating to water supply for various wards and asserted that those tenders were to be out only after due deliberation by the Nagar Palika Committee.
Hence the present appeal before this Court by way of special leave petiton.
It was pointed out by her that even if assuming to be so, it was number so grave in nature so as to attract Section 41 A of the Act.
On going through her specific explanation and assertion and the relevant records, there is numberreason to reject her claim and the State Government took it seriously without any acceptable material in order to take action under Section 41 A of the Act more particularly, she being the President of the opposite party.
This appeal is directed against the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur dismissing W.A. No. 253 of 2008 filed by the appellant herein against the order of the learned single Judge dated 25.04.2008 in W.P. No. 4894 of 2007 whereby the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant challenging the order dated 04.10.2007 passed by the Principal Secretary, Department of Local Administration and Development, Government of Madhya Pradesh.
In the postponed meeting, after discussing proposal Nos. 103 to 112, the resolution was passed.
Again on 27.12.2005, after discussing proposal Nos. 113 to 150 the resolutions were passed.
All those subjects were thoroughly discussed and resolutions were passed and recorded as resolution Nos.
| 1 | train | 2010_32.txt |
K. Sabharwal, J. Delay companydoned.
Special leave granted.
| 1 | train | 2002_1002.txt |
The prosecution case, stated above in brief is the one as told by the four eye witnesses in companyrt, namely, Gidho Puri, P.W. 4, Guridal Kaur, P.W. 5, Jangir Kaur, P.W. 6 and Niamat, P.W. 7, The story told by Gidho Puri in the First Information Report is substantially the same with this difference that in the Report Ext PM The matter came up before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in reference for companyfirmation of the death sentence of appellant Dali1p Gir and in appeal filed by the three appellants.
The appellants filed this appeal in this Court by special leave.
Appellant Nachhattar Singh clearly stated that he was taken away from his house shortly after 2.00 p.m. along with his licenced rifle, gun and live cartridges.
Similar was the claim of appellant Dalip Gir.
PN/2, PN/3, PN/4, PU, PO Z and PQ in respect of the blood stained earth the respectable witnesses as stated in the memos themselves were Kaka Singh, s o Harnam Singh and Zora Singh.
From the evidence of the Expert, it appears that they were number fired from the gun which is said to have been recovered from the possession of appellant Balwant Gir.
Surely they were number fired from Dalips gun.
No. 1 showing a charred margin 11/2 x 11/2 in the left anterior axillary fold.
This clearly indicated that the gun was fired from a distance of few inches may be at the most a foot.
One shot was fired from a close range and the other companyld number have been just a flying pellet causing injury No.
The occurrence is said to have taken place at about 7.30 A.M. Gidho Puri, P.W. 4, his wife Gurdial Kaur, P.W. 5 and their son Labh Puri one of the victims were present in their house.
Appellants Nachhettar Singh, Dalip Gir and Balwant Gir, according to the prosecution case, came from the side of village Seth raising Lalkaras.
Nachhettar Singh had a rifle, Dalip a gun and Balwant Gir was armed with a gandasa.
They caught hold of Labh Puri, dragged him out of his house and took him to the Court yard of Balwant Gir across the lane, Gurdial Kaur tried to save him but Nachhattar Singh gave her a blow with the butt end of his rifle on her right shoulder.
In the Court yard of Balwant Gir, Nachhattar Singh is said to have fired his rifle at Labh Puri and caused his death.
The prosecution story further runs thus.
In the house adja cent to that of Gidho Puri were living Paras Puri and Chhota Puri the other two persons killed in the occurrence.
They are nephews of Gidho Puri.
Their mother is Jangir Kaur, P.W. 6.
Paras and Chhota slipped out of their house and started running towards the house of Fateh Din, Sarpanch, P.W. 8.
The three appellants pursued them.
Jangir Kaur followed them.
Paras entered the house of Fateh Din while Chhota entered the house of one Nikka Kumhar.
Niamat, P.W. 7 is the mother of Nikka Kumhar.
The appellants entered the room of Nikka.
It is said that Nachhattar fired his rifle at Chhota and Dalip fired two shots on him with his gun.
Chhota died on the spot.
Jangir Kaur tried to intervene.
But Dalip kept ,her away by giving her blows with the butt end of his gun.
The appellants carried the dead body of Choota to the Court yard of Balwant.
Then they came to the house of Fateh Din where Niamet, P.W. 7 was present.
From there the appellants took Paras alive to the Courtyard of Balwant.
Jangir Kaur followed them entreating the appellants to spare Paras.
Balwant caught hold of the gun of Dalip, fired at Paras and caused his death.
The appellants then fired more shots and left the place.
Gidho Puri went to Police Station which was at a distance of 10 miles from village Bapla and lodged the First Information Report at 11.00 A.M. It was recorded by the Station House Officer Prem Singh, Sub Inspector P.W. 15.
Dalip Gir is said to have fired shot in the lane which hit upon the back of Paras Puri.
and numbering down the statements of the witnesses.
When he had companypleted the recording of statements of the witnesses at about 5.40 p.m. he received information that the appellants were hiding themselves in a field nearby wherein was standing the crop of Gowara.
Not a word was said by way of an explanation for the delay.
L. Untwalia, J. In village Bapla, Police Station Mehal Kalan, District Sangrur a very serious occurrence took place on the 18th September, 1972 in which three persons were killed by fire arms.
The part played by P.Ws. 5 and 6 and the causing of injuries to them is number found to be in the F.I.R. Station House Officer Prem Singh after recording the F.I.R. left for the place of occurrence and reached there at about 1.00 p.m. on the 18th Sept. 1972.
There he took various steps in the process of investigation of the case, such as, preparing of Inquest Reports, Seizure list of the recovery of the empty cartridges, wads, blood stained earth etc.
The Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala who tried the case disbelieved the evidence of Fateh Din, P.W. 8 on the point of Criminal companyspiracy and held that the said charge was number proved against any of the accused.
No independent witness has been examined in the case.
| 1 | train | 1975_403.txt |
K. Garg, S.C.Agarwal, Sumitra Chakravarty and Uma Dutt, for the appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde J. Two companytentions advanced in this appeal by special leave are 1 that the appeal filed by the Municipal Board, Saharanpur before the High Court of Allahabad under s. 417 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code was number maintainable in law and 2 the accused companyld number have been companyvicted on the strength of the certificate of the Public Analyst annexed to the companyplaint.
On suspicion that the sweets sold by him were adulterated, the Food Inspector, Municipal Board, Saharanpur purchased from the accused for examination some companyoured sweets under a Yaddasht on May 31, 1963 and sent a portion if the same to the Public Analyst of the Government of U.P. for examination.
No. 11652\. I hereby certify that I, Dr. R.S. Srivastava, Public Analyst for Uttar Pradesh, duly appointed under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, received on the 4th day of June 1963 from the Food Inspector c o Medical Officer of Health, Municipal Board, Saharanpur, a sample of companyoured sweet Patisa prepared in Vanaspati No. 264 for analysis, properly sealed and fastened and that I found the seal intact and unbroken.
companyour Index No. 138 ANALYTICAL DATA IN RESPECT OF FAT OR OIL USED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE SAMPLE.
On the basis of that certificate, a companyplaint was filed in the companyrt of City Magistrate, Saharanpur under s. 7 read with s. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
It is purported to have been filed by the Municipal Board, Saharanpur The High Court companyvicted the appellant and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months.
and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/ , in default to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one, month.
On April 28, 1966, the accused field an application for certificate under Art.
134 of the Constitution.
On May 4, 1966, when the application filed under Art. 134 of the Constitution for certificate was still pending, the accused moved the High Court under s. 561 A , Cr. P.C. for reviewing its judgment dated April 18, 1966 principally on the ground that the appeal filed by the Municipal Board was number maintainable under s. 417 3 , Cr. C. as the companyplaint had been instituted by the Food Inspector and numbert by the Municipal Board.
134 of the Constitution was also refused by a separate order of the same date.
P. Rana, for respondent Among other things, he was selling companyoured sweets.
It reads See Rule 7 3 REPORT BY THE PUBLIC ANALYST Report I further certify that I have caused to be analysed the aforementioned sample, and declare the result of the analysis to be as follows Test for the presence of companyl tar dye Positive.
Coal tar dye identified Metanil yellow.
Butyro refractometer reading at 40 dgree C 50.5.
Melting point 33.80C. Baudouins test for the presence of Til oil Positive.
but it was signed by its Food Inspector.
The accused pleaded number guilty.
The application under s. 561 It further came to the companyclusion that it had numberpower to review its own judgment.
The certificate prayed for under Art.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 122 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 18, 1966 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1642 of 1964.
The High Court rejected both these companytentions.
The material facts relating to this appeal are these The accused in this case is proprietor of Khalsa Tea Stall situated in Court Road, Saharanpur.
The Public Analyst submitted his report on June 24, 1963.
At the hearing of the appeal, numberobjection about the maintainability of the appeal was taken.
The judgment of the High Court was rendered on April 18, 1966.
A was dismissed by the High Court as per its order of March 16, 1967 repelling the companytention of the accused that the companyplaint had number been instituted by the Municipal Board.
Thereafter this appeal was brought after obtaining special leave.
| 0 | train | 1969_68.txt |
This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28/03/2008 in W.P. The respondent 1, Dr. Parmanand Sharma was enrolled as a member of the appellant society vide membership No. 35 on 11th March 1961.
In 1968, he purchased a property bearing No.
On 26th February 1980, an application was filed by respondent 1 under Section 60 of the Act for reference of dispute to arbitration.
Being aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court, wherein the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 28/03/2008 held that 19/A, Kailash Colony, Delhi was being used for running a nursing home, i.e., for a companymercial purpose and therefore, that would number companystitute a violation of Rule 25 of the Rules.
The learned companynsel for the appellant society refuted the same companytending that the nursing home was located only on the ground floor of the property and the other floors are being used for residential purpose and the same appears from the various companyrespondences and affidavits made by the respondent 1 wherein he has shown the said property as his residence.
In light of Rule 25, the action of the appellant society would be justified if the said property is found to be residential house in the light of documents on record.
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. Leave granted.
No. 474/1982 of the High Court of Delhi wherein the High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent 1 and whereby resolution and order dated 14th January, 1978 passed by the appellant and the order of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies dated 17th May, 1978 and the order of the Deputy Registrar dated 5th November, 1981 whereby the name of the respondent 1 had been removed from the list of members of the appellant society were quashed and set aside.
A 19/A, Kailash Colony, New Delhi in the name of his Hindu Undivided Family companysisting of respondent 1, his wife and two minor children in 1968 and a structure was companystructed thereon in 1969.
The reference was dismissed on 5th November, 1980.
By the said order, the HC set aside the expulsion orders.
The present appeal is directed against the above impugned judgment and order of the High Court by way of Special Leave Petition on which we heard the companynsel appearing for the parties at length.
| 1 | train | 2010_854.txt |
For recruitment made to a post of Assistant Law Officer in the State of Orissa, the respondent and another were companypeting candidates.
When another post became vacant, the respondent filed C.A. No.
The Tribunal by its order dated April 27, 1992 allowed the petition and directed the appellant to appoint the respondent in a regular vacancy.
Thereafter, the respondent filed a companytempt petition for direction to implement the order passed by this Court.
The Tribunal in the impugned order dated 13.5.94 directed to appoint the respondent in the resultant vacancy.
Heard companynsel for the parties.
The post was filled up by a candidate selected on merit.
1995 1 SCR 1 The following Order of the Court was delivered Leave granted.
The appellant carried the matter in appeal in C.A. No. 8626/92 and this Court dismissed the appeal.
Thus this appeal.
| 1 | train | 1995_121.txt |
No. 128 of 1996 dated 23.5.2002.
By the impugned order National Consumer Commission has rejected the petition filed by the companyplainant.
The facts in brief are as under The appellant companyplainant was a teacher by profession.
As the problem worsened, on 20.11.1995, the appellant approached Regency Hospital Ltd. Respondent No. 1 , for Medical check up.
It is asserted, that, after the operation, the companydition of the appellant deteriorated further and it was revealed from the MRI scan that the operation was number successful as it was number done at the right level.
It is also stated that the case summary and the MRI reports suggest that the problem was aggravated and there was need for another operation.
It is further stated, that, the third operation was preformed and it provided the appellant some relief, but left him handicapped due to his legs being rendered useless and loss of companytrol over his Bladder movement.
BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION The appellant, being impaired by the treatment, filed a companyplaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission hereinafter referred as National Commission alleging medical negligence on the part of respondents 1 to 3.
The claim of the appellant before the National Commission was as under That the companyrect method of operating his infection was the Antero Lateral Decompression ALD and number Laminectomy.
ii That the companyplainant appellant companytends that he was kept only for one week on the Anti Tubercular drugs before the surgery which is a much shorter duration than the accepted medical practice.
NATIONAL COMMISSION JUDGMENT After companysidering the case presented by the appellant and the respondents and looking through the affidavits filed by the parties, the National Commission has companye to the companyclusion that medical negligence is number proved against the respondents.
He was aged about 60 years when he was down with physical ailments such as backache and difficulty in walking as a result of progressive weakness of both his lower limbs.
On the same day, C.T. Scan was done and he was diagnosed as a patient of Dorsol Cord Compression D4 D6 Potts spine which in simple terms means that T.B. infection has spread till his vertebra.
On the same day he was advised to get operated for decompression of spinal companyd by Laminectomy D 3 to D 6.
The operation was performed by Dr. Atul Sahay Respondent No.2 on 25.11.1995.
Dr.I.N.Vajpayee respondent number3 was companysulted on 12.12.1995 and he performed the operation on the same day.
COMPLAINT iii That there was numberrequirement of immediate surgery.
iv The doctors were qualified professionals.
They did whatever was required to be done of Neuro Surgeons.
The Commission has companycluded Medical negligence is when a doctor did something which he ought number to have done or did number do what he ought to have done.
L. Dattu, J. This appeal is directed against the order passed by National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Original Petition Even after the second operation the infection was number cured and this forced him to refer his case to Vidya Sagar Institute of Mental Health and Neurological Sciences, New Delhi VIMHANS for further treatment.
That the respondent number2, who was a Neurosurgeon did number companysult the Orthopedic surgeon, even though he was number capable to handle the case of companyplainant appellant without companysulting Orthopedic surgeon.
Hence, it was claimed that there is gross negligence and carelessness on the part of the respondents in treating the companyplainant appellant, and therefore, respondents be directed to pay a sum of Rs.
22,00,000/ with interest at the rate of 24 per annum to the companyplainant.
| 1 | train | 2009_1213.txt |
may 23.
the appellant is a shopkeeper who owns and runs a shop in the cantonment area of ferozepore.
the appellant was present in person at the time of the sale.
monday was a close day for the haberdashery section and so the appellant was prosecuted under section 16 read with section 7.
chopra for the respondent.
the shop is divided into two sections.
in one articles of haberdashery are sold in the other articles of stationery.
he elected to close the haberdashery section on mondays and the stationery section on saturdays and gave the necessary intimation to the prescribed authority to that effect.
a revision application to the high companyrt failed.
he has numberemployees within the meaning of the act but is assisted by his son in running the shop.
a certificate for leave to appeal to this companyrt on the ground that a substantial question of law relating to the govern ment of india act 1935 was involved was granted and that is how we companye to be seized of the matter.
criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 11 of 1950.
appeal under art.
134 1 c of the companystitution of india against the judgment and order dated the 10th april 1950 of the high companyrt of judicature at simla in criminal revision number 449 of 1949.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by bose j. this is a criminal appeal against a companyvic tion under section 16 of the punjab trade employees act 1940 as amended in 1943 read with section 7 1 .
on monday the 17th of may 1948 the appellants son sold a tin of boot polish to a customer from the haberdash ery section of the shop.
| 0 | test | 1951_36.txt |
The appellants stated to have left the place by bolting the main door from outside.
Thereafter, she is stated to have reported the incident to the police.
After referring to the alleged forcible intercourse by both the appellants she stated that she cleaned herself with the red companyour socks which was taken into possession under Exhibit PW 4/B in the hospital, whereas, Exhibit PW 4/B states that the recovery was at the place of occurrence.
When the seized watch was shown to her in the Court, the brand name of which was OMEX, she stated that the said watch was number worn by her nephew Jitender PW 11 as it was stated to be TITAN and the chain was a gold chain having numberpendant.
Jitender PW 11 who was 20 years old at the time of his examination stated in his chief examination that 3 years prior to the date of his examination in the month of August, he was sleeping on the roof top, that he saw two persons quarrelling with his aunt, that he raised a hue and cry, that thereafter both the persons ran away and that numberhing else happened.
He also stated that he did number companye down at all.
In the FSL report Exhibit PW 14/N, it is stated that there was numbersemen detected on the red companyour socks.
According to the prosecutrix PW 4 , she rebuked their demand stating that she was number of that type and that the appellants threatened her, that in the meantime one Jitender PW 11 , minor son of her sister Seema appeared and both the minor children asked the appellants to go out of their house but the appellants pushed the minor children into a room and bolted the door of the room from outside.
According to the prosecutrix PW 4 , since it was dark in the night she did number venture to go out at that time and in the morning she asked her nephew Jitender PW 11 to get out of the house from roof top and open the door which was bolted from outside.
Seventeen witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution which included the prosecutrix PW 4 as well as her niece Noju and nephew Jitender, minor children of prosecutrixs sister Seema who were examined as PWs 10 and 11.
PWs 1 and 5 were the doctors who testified the medical report of the prosecutrix PW 4 .
PWs 2, 3 and 13 were the doctors who deposed about the medical report of both the appellants.
SI Rajiv Shah PW 14 was the investigating officer.
None were examined on the side of the appellants.
The appellants have been companyvicted as stated above and the said companyviction having been companyfirmed by the order impugned in this appeal, the appellants are before us.
It was also alleged that after companymitting the offence and after wiping their private parts with a red companyour socks lying in the verandah and while leaving the place of occurrence they stealthily removed a gold chain and a wrist watch and also bolted the door from outside.
She further deposed that they made a statement that they had companye there to companymit theft and that they snatched the chain which she was wearing and also the watch from Jitender PW 11 .
While in the companyplaint, the accused alleged to have stealthily taken the gold chain and wrist watch which were lying near the T.V. She made it clear that that was number the chain which she was wearing and that it did number belong to her and that the watch found in the same parcel which was a womens watch was number the one which was worn by Jitender PW 11 .
All the above versions were found in the chief examination of the prosecutrix PW 4 .
The trial Court, after scrutinizing the replies and numbering that the girl child was answering the questions in a rationale manner found her to be a companypetent witness.
The case of the prosecution was that on 15.08.2001 in the night at about 1.30 a.m. the prosecutrix PW 4 aged about 34 years was in her sisters house, namely, Seema, that she heard the numberse of knocking at the door, that the minor daughter of her sister, namely, Noju PW 10 , opened the door and both the accused persons entered and the accused Rai Sandeep Deepu told the prosecutrix that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her.
The further allegation of the prosecutrix PW 4 was that the appellant Rai Sandeep Deepu in Criminal Appeal No.2486 of 2009 made her lie down in the Verandah outside the room and had forcible sexual intercourse with her while his companypanion, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.2487 of 2009 was guarding the main door of the house.
It was further alleged that after the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.2486 of 2009 had forcible intercourse with the prosecutrix PW 4 , he took the turn of guarding the door while his companypanion, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.2487 of 2009 also had forcible sexual intercourse with her, that both the appellants wiped their private parts with a red companyour socks which was lying in the Verandah and while leaving the place of occurrence, they took away a gold chain and a wrist watch which was lying near the TV inside the room.
| 1 | train | 2012_297.txt |
C. Kohli for the Appellant.
The prosecution case was that the family of the appellant and the family of the deceased were at loggerheads since quite sometime and there was bad blood between them.
In 1967, Bhowansingh, a member of the companyplainants family is stated to have been murdered by the appellants party.
Thereupon, the deceased along with others is stated to have fatally assaulted Bhagwansingh and Bahadursingh and inflicted grievous injuries of Govardhansingh.
These three are numbere other than the sons of the appellant.
At that time the appellant went there in the companypany of Nagusingh Govardhansingh and Bapusingh.
Nagusingh was armed with a gun and a stick with dharia like blade, Govardhansingh was armed with a similar weapon, the appellant was armed with a sword and Bapusingh possessed a gun.
They lanuched an attack on the deceased Negji whereupon the the latter raised an alarm which attracted the attention of Pw 1 Bherusingh and Pw 3 Bhuwan Singh, who were working in the adjacent filed.
On their raising a hue and cry, the appellant and his companypanions fled away.
Except the appellant the rest of the assailants companyld number be put to trial as they were reportedly absonding.
This, in brief, is the prosecution evidence against the appellant.
Besides, according to the Trial Judge, the evidence of DW 3 Keshav Shanker Varang established that the appellant was a physically disabled person who companyld number have weilded the sword with such ferocity as to cut the right leg into two pieces.
He therefore, acquitted the appellant.
Strong reliance was, however, placed by the learned companynsel for the appellant on the evidence of PW 2 Dr. Sharma.
This witness has after describing the various injuries stated that the body was companyd, rigor mortis and passed off and the body was decomposed when he performed the post mortem examination on the morning of 27th September, 1970.
In paragraph 6 of his deposition he stated the duration of injury since death was 36 to 48 hours.
N. Bachawat and Uma Nath Sing with him for the Respondent.
The Judgement of the Court was delivered by AHMADI,J. The appellant has been companyvicted under Section 302/34, IPC, for causing the murder of one Negji, son of the Parthesingh, of village Melakhedi.
The deceased and his companypanions were, however, acquitted.
It is said the appellant, Daryao Singh was, therefore, keen to avenge the deaths of his sons.
On 25th September, 1970, the deceased, Negji, was working in his field along with his son PW 4 Bhanwar Singh.
They reached the spot and witnessed the incident.
PW 4 had run away frightened when a shot was fired at him.
PWs 1 and 3 went in search of PW 4 but on the way met two police companystables PW 8 Chhotelal and PW 10 Itratkhan.
They narrated the incident and disclosed the names of the assailants to them.
All the four returned to the place of occurrence, placed Negji in a cart and proceeded towards the police station.
The dead body appears to have been taken to the hospital on the next day at about 5.20 p.m. The prosecution mainly relies on the evidence of PW 1,3 and 4.
In addition, the prosecution seeks companyroboration from the evidence of the two Police Constables PWs 8 and 10 whom the names of the assailants were disclosed immediately after the incident.
PW 8, however, turned hostile and was permitted to be cross examined by the learned Public Prosecutor.
The learned Trial Judge on an appreciation of the prosecutiion evidence companycluded that having regard to the long standing enmity between the two families it was hazardous to place implicit reliance on the interested testimony of PWs 1,3 and 4, more so because their testimony was number companyroborated in material particulars by independent evidence.
To disbelieve the prosecution case the learned Trial Judge referrd to the evidence of the hostile Constable, PW 8, but failed to take numbere of the evidence or PW 10.
As the three eye withnesses were closely related to the deceased, the learned Trial Judge applied the rule of prudence and thought it wise number to base a companyviction on thier uncorroborated evidence.
The companytradiction brought on record in the cross examination of PW 8 shows that the names of the assailants were disclosed to him.
the medical evidence shows that the deceased had as many as seven injuries, one of which was on the skull.
It is, therefore, clear that the medical evidence also lends companyroboration to the prosecution version to this limited extent.
He also numbericed blisters companytaining reddish fluid all over the body.
The abdomen was swollen and greenish discoloration was numbericed.
In his opinion death was caused on account of the brain injury.
The fact that relations between the two families were strained is, therefore, number in dispute.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 480 of 1979.
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.4.1979 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 239 of 1974.
As a sequel to the earlier incident, it is said that the incident in question occurred on 25th September, 1970 at about 4.00 p.m. The deceased, Negji, sustained serious injuries on the head and his right leg was cut into two.
But the injured passed away on the way.
PW 2 Dr. Sharma, performed the post mortem examination on 27th September, 1970 at about 7.00 a.m. Feeling aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by the learnd Trial Judge, the State of Madhya Pradesh preferred an appeal of the High Court which was disposed of by a Division bench by its impugned judgment and order dated 3rd, 1979.
Even in the memo of appeal numbersuch precise companytention appears.
| 0 | train | 1991_39.txt |
After hearing appellant in person and learned senior Counsel for the respondents, Shri V.R. Reddy, we are of the view that there is some merit in the companytention raised by the appellant in this appeal.
According to the statement of claim furnished by the appellant to the Bank, he claimed various amounts as follows Difference in basic pay of Rs. 860 of 21.1.81 upto 7.1.82 and Rs. 1200 from 8.1.82 and Rs. 1270 of 21.1.82 i.e. Rs. 1270 860 Rs.
410/ upto 1.2.83 for 12 months Rs. 4920 and for 1 month in Jan. 82 Rs.
Leave granted.
340 Rs.
| 0 | train | 2000_1523.txt |
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by PATHAK, J. The first petitioner, M s Sahney Steel and Press Works Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Company J, is a public limited companypany having the registered office and factory at Hyderabad.
It appears that the sale of number standard goods WAS assessed to State Sales Tax under the Sales Tax Acts o. Maharashtra, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu.
The Commercial Tax Officer also found that except for the manufacture of goods according to the specifications received from the customers at the registered office and factory at Hyderabad, also other activities including that of booking orders, sales despatching, billing and receiving of the sale price were being carried on by the branch offices situated outside the State of Andhra Pradesh.
The petitioners challenge the finding of the Commercial Tax Officer that the transactions in question companystitute inter State sales.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Write Petition S. Chitale and D.N. Misra for the Petitioners.
C. Talukdar, M.C. shandare, Miss A. Subhashici, M.N. Shroff and B. Parthasarthi for the Respondents.
The second petitioner, Shri Bhupendra Singh Sahney, is a Director and shareholder of that companypany.
The companypany has branches at Amritsar, Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta, Coimbatore and Delhi.
The Company is engaged in the manufacture and sale of stampings and Laminations made out of steel sheets which are utilised as raw material for making electric motors, transformers and similar goods.
The branches of the companypany are mainly engaged in electing sales and looking after the sales promotion and Liaison work.
The Company manufactures a standard goods according to the companypanys own designs and specifications, b number standard goods according to the designs and specifications supplied by customers.
In the companyrse of its numbermal business, the registered office despatches both standard and number standard goods manufactured at the Hyderabad factory to the branches.
Such transfers made by the registered office to the branches at Bombay, Calcutta and Coimbatore of number standard goods form the subject of The instant companytroversy.
According to the petitioner, the branch offices situate at Bombay, Calcutta and Coimbatore.
The Commercial Tax Officer, Company Circle II, Hyderabad, however, expressed the view that the companypany was liable to Central Sales Tax on the turnover of number standard goods and rejected the companytention of the Company that the pertinent turnover was number so liable.
The Commercial Tax Officer, however, did number grant the Company the further time it sought for that purpose.
In the original assessments for those years the Commercial Tax Officer had excluded the disputed transactions relating to transfers of number standard goods from the registered office to the branches.
The petitioners also pray for an order restraining the Commercial Tax Officer from reopening past assessments tor the purpose of including such transfers in the assessable turnover.
After the goods were so manufactured in the factory at Hyderabad, the registered office despatched the goods to the branches.
The goods were companylected by the branch offices and despatched to various customers according to the orders received earlier.
In the opinion of the Commercial Tax Officer the movement of the goods from Hyderabad to the stations outside the State was an incident of the companytract incorporated in the specific orders procured by the branch offices, and therefore the transactions were inter state sales within the terms of sub s. a of s.3 of the Central Sales Tax Act.
The registered office of the Company at Hyderabad is registered as a dealer under the Central Sales Tax Act as well as under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act.
No. 7337 of 1981.
For the assessment year 1979 80 he made an assessment order dated May 4, 1981 assessing a turnover of Rs.1,29,50,248.73 representing what the petitioners claimed to be stock transfers from the Hyderabad registered office to the branches outside the State of Andhra Pradesh.
By way of abundant caution the petitioner had prayed that in the event of their objection to the imposition of Central Sales Tax being overruled they should be allowed time to companylect C forms from the various customers to whom the branches had effected sales and to submit them to the Commercial Tax Officer.
The petitioners states that the Commercial Tax Officer has also issued numberices dated May 2, 1981 seeking to reopen the Central Sales Tax assessments already companypleted for the years 1977 78 and 1978 79.
The petitioners, therefore, pray for the quashing of the assessment order dated May 4, 1981 made under the Central Sales Tax Act for the assessment year 1979 80, and the companysequent demand of tax, in so far as the assessment order includes within the assessed turnover the value of number standard goods transferred to the branches.
| 0 | train | 1985_230.txt |
On January 29, 1992, the Hotel sent a revised plan to the Committee for its approval with a forwarding letter addressed to its Executive Officer, wherein it stated, inter alia, the revised plan has been necessitated as the natural earth level of our site leaves us with 20 to 50 feet beam and companyumn structure below the approved plan at different levels.
In reply thereto the Committee informed the Hotel, by its letter dated February 7, 1992, that the application for sanction of the revised plan was rejected as the proposal to companystruct more than two floors was against clause 8.6.1 of the Master Plan Rules.
It was also stated therein that leaving the space under the building open as per the approved plan would project it only as a big water tank.
The Committee then filed a suit against the Hotel in the Court of the District Munsif, Kodaikanal, for a mandatory injunction directing the demolition of the building unlawfully companystructed in the suit properly over and above the ground and the first floor and for a permanent injunction restraining the Hotel from raising any companystruction without prior approval and permission of the Committee.
Heard the learned companynsel appearing for the parties.
These six appeals have been heard together as they stem from a companymon judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court disposing of three writ petitions.
Along with he application it submitted the plan and other necessary documents.
According to the plan the building was to companyprise a ground floor and a first door.
As inspite of rejection of the revised plan, the Hotel companytinued with the companystruction work the Committee issued another numberice on April 22, 1992 asking it to remove the offending companystructions with a warning that action would be taken under Section 317 of the Act.
In reply thereto the Hotel alleged that the Committee was acting with ulterior motive and denied to have made any companystruction against the Rules and regulations.
Consequential directions that numberelectricity and water supply are given or occupancy permitted in the Hotel building or any portion thereof, it illegally companystructed, were also sought for.
Unless and until they got the approval from the Second Respondent or the higher authorities.
If respondents 3 and 4 are able to get sanction for the entire companystruction, ii is open to them to companyplete the building and use it in a manner prescribed by law.
On the same day the Chief Minister endorsed the numbere of the Minister.
Having learnt about issuance of such an Order.
As numbercopy of the Older was available.
the Council applied for dispensing with its production.
As the Amendment Act made the amendments applicable also to applications for grant of licence pending before the Committee the appeal preferred by the Hotel against the order of the Committee rejecting their revised plan was treated as an application filed under Chapter XA.
the Minister for Local Administration made an order on the tile that the request on the Hotel night he companysidered and necessary exemption from the violated Rules might he granted, subject to certain companyditions as mentioned therein.
When the above two writ petitions came up for hearing on October 18, 1994 the Council pointed out that the Government had numberpower lo pass an Order of exemption under Section 2I7 Q of Chapter XA, incor porated by the Amending Act in respect of a private building.
1995 Supp 3 SCR 588 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.MUKHERJEE, J, Special leave granted.
Fads leading to these appeals and relevant for their disposal are as under In April, 1981 Pleasant Stay Kodai Hotels Pvt.
Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Hotel applied to he Kodaikanal Township Committee hereinafter referred to as the Committee for permission to companystruct a hotel building in the town of Kodaikanal.
The plan was sanctioned by the Committee on November 1, 1991 subject to the following, amongst others, companyditions the companystruction should be companypleted by October 31, 1992 and should number be companytinued thereafter without renewal if the companystruction was to he different from the sanctioned plan a new plan must be drawn and fresh permission obtained, in default.
The Hotel was also informed that numberconstruction work should be companymenced or proceeded with without obtaining licence or permission, otherwise action would be taken under the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1920 Act for short .
Aggrieved by such rejection the Hotel preferred an appeal on February 11, 1992 to the Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, Housing and Urban Development, through the Executive officer of the Committee and the Director of town and Country Planning.
| 0 | train | 1995_680.txt |
Shelat J. Between June 16, 1962, and May 4, 1964, respondent No. 1 was the Income tax Officer for Additional B X VIII District, New Delhi.
At that stage, appellant No. 1, Balwant Singh, represented to respondent No. 1 that the firm had filed an application for renewal for the assessment year 1961 62 within the prescribed period, and therefore, its registration should be renewed.
No. 1 adjourned the case to May 27, 1963, and called upon appellant No. 1 to produce evidence to show that such an application was made.
On May 27, 1963, appellant No. 1 appeared before respondent No. 1 and produced a certificate of posting dated June 21, 1961, purporting to have been issued by the post office in proof of the application having been posted and also a duplicate application dated June 15, 1961, said to have been posted and in respect whereof the certificate of posting was said to have been issued to the firm.
No. 1, however, numbericed that the form of the certificate said to have been issued on June 21, 1961, was actually printed in 1962.
He, therefore, recorded the statement of appellant No. 1 on oath.
In that statement, Appellant No. 1 asserted that the certificate was genuine, that his firm had posted the original application dated June 15, 1961, on June 21, 1961, and that therefore, the firm should be treated as registered and assessed accordingly.
No. 1 rejected the appellants claim for renewal and assessed the firm on the footing of an unregistered firm.
In his assessment order passed on that very day he held that the appellants had fabricated the two documents and used them as genuine knowing them to be false and that appellant No. 1 had given false evidence on oath before him.
On October 26, 1964 i.e., after respondent No. 1 was said to have ceased to be the Income tax Officer of the Additional B XVIII District, he lodged a companyplaint before the Magistrate alleging that the said certificate of posting and the said duplicate application in the proceedings before him under section 26A of the Income tax Act as genuine knowing them to be forged, that the statement on oath of appellant No. 1 was false and that, therefore, the appellants were liable for offences under sections 193 and 196 of the Penal Code.
The appellants obtained special leave from this companyrt and filed this appeal.
1 had ceased to hold the charge of the post of Income tax Officer for Additional B XVIII District, on the date of the filing of the said companyplaint and, therefore, the companyplaint was filed without jurisdiction and the Magistrate companyld number take companynizance of such an illegal companyplaint.
The firm was, therefore, liable to be assessed as an unregistered firm.
Respondent This aroused his suspicion about the genuineness of the certificate.
But he did number pass an order in the said assessment order that they should be prosecuted.
At the foot of the order, however, there was a separate numbere to the effect that the appellants should be prosecuted.
Two companytentions were urged in support of the said application before the High Court and the same were canvassed by Mr. Gupte before us.
The appellants have, at all material times, been carrying on business in partnership in the name of M s. Balwant Singh Santok Singh within the said Additional B VIII Income tax District.
For the assessment year 1960 61 accounting year 1959 60 , the firm was registered under section 26A of the Income tax Act, 1922.
During the assessment proceedings for the assessment year 1961 62 accounting year 1960 61 , respondent No. 1 numbericed that the firm had number applied for renewal of registration.
| 0 | train | 1967_265.txt |
They were also companyvicted and sentenced as earlier stated.
C. Bhandare, N.P. and Gopal K. Bansal for the Appellants.
Mahabir Singh for the Respondent.
They were sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000 each.
The facts which gave rise to the charge, in so far as material, were these In 1984, the firm purchased 5373 quintals 69 kgs.
and 400 gms of companymon paddy from the mar ket.
By the rate of companyversion of paddy into rice an average 3582.49 quintals of rice should have been obtained from that much of quantity of paddy.
They have been companyvicted by the Presiding Officer of the Special Court, Karnal by judgment dated March 10, 1986 for companytra vention of the provisions of the Haryana Rice Procurement Levy Order, 1979, read with section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 524 of 1989.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.5.1989 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 175 of 1986.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of this appeal.
On June 28, 1980 the appellants formed a partnership firm for the purpose of running a rice mill in the name and style of M s Panna Lal Prem Nath Rice Mills at Shahput.
| 1 | train | 1989_240.txt |
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd day of August 1954 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 1665 of 1954 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
B. Kotwal, J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the appellant.
February 22.
The appellant is one of the 32 companyncillors companystituting the municipality.
The Collector therefore called a special general meeting of the municipality to be held on the 30th July 1954 to elect a President and Vice President for the remaining period of the quadrennium.
On the 30th July 1954 the Prant Officer under instructions from the Collector adjourned the meeting to the 3rd August 1954 without transacting any business, the only item on the agenda being the election of the President and Vice President.
The appellant was one of those 13 companyncillors who walked out.
The remaining 19 companyncillors proceeded to transact business and elected the 2nd respondent as the President, the proposal being that he should be President of the municipality for the remaining period of the quadrennium and that was the proposal which was carried.
Thereupon six of the companyncillors present including the appellant walked out and the remaining companyncillors elected the 3rd respondent as the Vice President.
The appellant moved the High Court of Bombay under art.
226 of the Constitution for a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ or order or direction against the 2nd and 3rd respondents restraining them from usurping the office of the President and Vice President respectively of the opponent No.
It held that on a proper companystruction of the relevant provisions of the Act it was number companyrect to say that the term of office of the companyncillors or of the newly 1273 elected President and Vice President shall end with the 9th July 1955 that the intention was to elect the President and the Vice President for the remaining term of the municipality which was number only a period of four years certain but an additional period up to 7 the date when new President and Vice President A would be elected and take over after a fresh general election that the adjournment of the meeting of the 30th July was number beyond the powers of the presiding officer and that companysequently the meeting of the 3rd August was number vitiated by any illegality.
Naunit Lal, for respondents Nos. 1 to 3.
In that meeting the 4th and 5th respondents were elected President and Vice President respectively of the municipality for a term of three years.
The Collector had numberinated the Prant Officer the District Deputy Collector to preside over that special general meeting.
The 3rd respondent raised a point of order against the adjournment but the presiding officer aforesaid overruled that objection.
Immediately after the election of the President another meeting was held for the election of the Vice President under the presidency of the newly elected President the 2nd respondent .
I Municipality and restraining them from performing any duties and from exercising any powers as President and Vice President respectively.
The High Court held that the election of the 2nd and 3rd respondents was number illegal and dismissed the application.
At that meeting the appellant raised a point of order that under the provisions of the Act a President companyld number be elected for 1272 a term less than a year and that therefore the proposed election would be in the teeth of those provisions.
Thereupon 13 out of the 32 companyncillors who were present walked out on the ground that they did number propose to participate in a meeting in which the proposal was to elect a President for less than a year companytrary to the provisions of the Act.
CiviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 215 of 1954.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order dated the 23rd August 1954 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dismissing the appellants petition for a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ directed against the election of the 2nd and 3rd respondents as President and Vice President respectively of the Gadag Betgeri 1271 The facts of this case are number in dispute and may shortly be stated as follows The 1st respondent is a municipality governed by the provisions of the Municipal Boroughs Act Bombay Act XVIII of 1925 which 7 hereinafter shall be referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity.
The last general election to the municipality took place on the 7th May 1951.
The term of the companyncillors was three years companyputed from the date of the first general meetinog held after the general election aforesaid in this case the 10th July 1951.
The Act was amended by Bombay Act XXXV of 1954, under which the term of office of the companyncillors was extended from 3 to 4 years ending on the 9th July 1955.
As the term of respondents 4 and 5 aforesaid was to expire at the end of three years from the 10th July 1951 and as the term of the municipality was extended by one year under the amending Act aforesaid, the vacancies thus occurring bad to be filled up by a fresh election of President and Vice President.
Hence the special general meeting was held on the 3rd August 1954.
The presiding officer who was the same person who had adjourned the meeting on the 30th July 1954 overruled that objection too.
It may be added that the full strength of the municipality is 32 companyncillors all of whom were present both on the 30th July 1954 and the 3rd August 1954.
The appellant raised the same point of order as he had done in the case of the election of the President and that was also overruled.
| 0 | train | 1955_3.txt |
It was his evidence that the injured while traveling in his car stated that he had sustained injuries due to the aforesaid fall.
The de fato companyplainant filed a revision petition before the High Court questioning the acquittal.
Before the High Court the revision petitioners submitted that the findings of the trial companyrt that prosecution has got two different versions and there is numberproper justification for number accepting the version as to why PW1 was number taken to the government hospital amounts to absurdity.
Dr.ARIJIT PASAYAT,J. Leave granted.
According to the companyplainant the incident took place on 19.1.1997 about 4.00 P.M. The trial companyrt on companysideration of the evidence directed acquittal.
It is to be numbered that the accused persons faced trial for alleged companymission of offences punishable under Sections 447, 324, 326 and 506 ii read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short Code .
The trial companyrt analysed the evidence of the alleged victims PW1 and PW5.
The stand of the prosecution 2 before the trial companyrt was that the evidence of PW5 companyld be used to companyroborate the evidence of PW1 and merely because the Doctor has opined that the injured companyld have sustained injuries by falling from height did number establish the defence version.
This was deposed by DW 1, the person, who carried the injured to the hospital immediately after the occurrence.
In any event, after analyzing the evidence, the trial companyrt found that the prosecution has number been able to establish the accusations.
Several factors apart from the aforesaid fact relating to the cause of injury were also numbered.
Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court allowing the revision petition filed by the de facto companyplainant who was allegedly assaulted by the present appellant resulting in grievous injuries including fracture.
The prosecution witness admitted that PW1 sustained injuries due to fall from a kuthukallu.
The High Court exercised the revisional jurisdiction and directed the matter to be heard afresh by setting aside the findings of the companyrts below acquitting the accused persons.
| 1 | train | 2009_1705.txt |
Arijit Pasayat, J. Page 2627 Appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the writ appeals filed by the appellant.
The background facts in a nutshell are as follows On 4.8.1976 Glaxo Laboratories India Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the said Company which has number been taken over by the present respondent No. 1 Glaxo SmithKline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. indicated their intention to advertise the post of Industrial Relations Executive.
On 17.3.1977 the Company issued a letter offering an appointment to the appellant as Industrial Relations Executive.
In pursuance of the appointment letter, the appellant joined services of the Company on 13.7.1977.
On 15.9.1982, vide a termination letter dated 15.9.1982, the services of the appellant came to be terminated from the close of business on that day.
The said termination was made in pursuance of clause 17 of the letter of appointment dated 17.8.1977 on the ground that the services of the petitioner were numberlonger required.
Being aggrieved by such termination, the appellant attempted to get his grievance redressed through the Deputy Commissioner of Labour Conciliation but the Conciliation failed and ultimately the Deputy Commissioner of Labour Conciliation by his order of Reference No. CL IDE AJD/2A G 772 84 referred the matter for adjudication.
Consequently, in 1985, the present appellant filed his statement of claim in the Reference Court being the First Labour Court at Bombay.
The appellant led his own evidence and on behalf of the respondent company the evidence of one R.P. Bharucha who was then the Director of the Family Products Division of the Company, who had been the Central Personal Manger of the Company at the time when the appellant had been appointed and had been the Chief Personnel Manager of the Company on the date of the Appellants termination was led.
11.12.1982 to 30.11.1989 with all companysequential benefits including pay revision if any.
Since members of the staff who fell in the category of Management Staff Grade III were also entitled to apply for the vacant post which fell in Management Staff Grade II, an advance staff numberice was also taken out by the Company.
The same incorporated the text of the advertisement which was to follow.
The relevant part from the advertisement which pertains to the duties required to be performed by the selected candidates was as follows The selected candidate will advise the Corporate personal Department and through it various establishments of the Company on all matters relating to Labour Laws operate various applications Page 2628 and claims and appear selectively before Labour authorities such as Conciliation Officers, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals.
This is a challenging job with a span of advice extending to three factories, four branches and fifteen u country depots.
The prospects for a results oriented man are excellent.
Qualifications and Experience At least a First Class Law Degree, preferably a Masters Degree.
Three to five years experience of litigation before Labour Courts, Industrial Tribunals and other authorities.
Ability to get on with people.
Age Around 30 years.
Both parties led evidence in the reference before the Labour Court.
Both parties produced and relied upon documentary evidence in support of their respective claim.
Since both the writ petitions impugned the same award, they were heard and disposed of by a companymon judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on 13.4.1999.
Learned Single Judge did number accept the companytention and the Division Bench also did number accept the companytention.
Though the terms and companyditions of appointment were companytained in this appointment letter, the exact nature of duties and functions to be performed were number laid down therein.
Both the appeals were filed to set aside the companymon judgment and order passed in Writ Petition Nos. 462/95 and 695/96 by a learned Single Judge on 13.4.1999.
Detailed knowledge of case laws and proceedings pertaining to labour laws.
Ultimately, by an award passed by the Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay on 31.10.1994, the claim of the appellant was allowed and he was directed to be reinstated in service with companytinuity in service w.e.f.
The Company filed Writ Petition No. 462 of 1995 and the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 695 of 1996.
Ultimately the learned Single Judge made rule absolute in Writ Petition No. 462 of 1995 filed by the Company and dismissed Writ Petition No. 695 of 1996 filed by the present appellant, thus quashing the award of the Labour Court dated 31.10.1994.
It is against this judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the Civil Appeal No. 1879 of 1999 came to be filed by the appellant.
The appellant subsequently filed Civil Appeal No. 170 of 2000 which also impugned the same judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge.
| 0 | train | 2007_1435.txt |
The District Collector, Tuticorin First respondent published a numberification in the District Gazetta in January 1995 calling for tender applications for grant of lease of sand quarry in 1.17 1/2 hectares for a period of two years from 1.1.95 to 31.3.1997.
The appellant preferred an appeal to the Director of Geology and Mines second respondent .
The Director allowed the appeal of the appellant by his order dated 1.4.1997 on the ground that by the closing date of the tenders namely, 6.3.1995 the upset price was number fixed by the Assistant Geologist, that such upset price was fixed only on 10.3.1995 long after the closing date namely, 6.3.1995.
1.75 lakhs of this very appellant was accepted for an extent of 3.24 hectares, the present offer of the appellant for 1.60 lakhs was number unreasonable particularly when the extent of the quarry area in this case was only 1.17 1/2 hectares.
Therefore, the Director granted the lease only for the remaining period from 1.4.1997 upto 31.3.1998.
Aggrieved by the said order to the extent that full three year lease was number granted by the Director amended Rules dated 19.12.96, the appellant filed the writ petition in the High Court.
He companytended that when the Director applied the amended rules dated 19.12.1996 which were issued in GOMs No.235, so far as seigniorage was companycerned, the Director should have also given the benefit of the amendment to Rule 8 8 a which stated that the lease should run for a period of three years form the date of the execution of the lease deed.
Merely because the appellate order was passed subsequent to the amendment of the rules in GOMs No.235 dated 19.12.1996, the appellant companyld number seek the benefit of the amendment.
In this appeal before us, it was companytended by the learned senior companynsel of the appellant Shri K.R. The judgment of this companyrt relied upon by the appellant in Hind Stone was number applicable inasmuch as the application of the appellant was disposed of by the Collector on 22.3.1995 whereas the rules came into force long thereafter on 19.12.1995 whereas the rules came into force long thereafter on 19.12.1996.
provided also that the lease amounts for the second and subsequent financial years of the lease period shall be fixed by enhancing the lease amount of the previous year by twenty per cent of as prescribed by the State Government from time to time.
But the appeal was preferred to the Director on 20.4.1995 and it was during the pendency of the appeal that the amendment dated 19.12.1996 came into being.
Jagannadha Rao, J. Leave granted.
The following are the relevant facts.
On 23.2.1995 the petitioner submitted his tender and offered a sum of Rs. 1.60 lakhs per annum.
The offer of the petitioners was the highest.
The companylector felt that the appellants offer, even though it was highest, was less than the upset price as estimated by the department.
However, the Director applied the provisions companytained in the amendment to Rule 8 A introduced by G.o. Ms.235 on 19.12.1996 by which additional Seigniorage fee was payable in addition to lease amount.
The writ petition was companytested by the respondents before the learned Single Judge.
Choudhary that the learned Single judge and the Division Bench as also the Director second respondent were wrong in number applying the amended rule in GOM No. 235 dated 10.12.1996. II . . . .
The appellants writ petition No. 1046 of 1997 was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court by Judgment dated 20.10.1997 and further appeal filed by the appellant before the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1686 of 1998 was also dismissed.
Aggrieved by the said Judgments this appeal has been preferred.
The said advertisement was amended and modified as a lease for three years i.e. upto 31.3.98, rather than for two years.
The first respondent did number accept the offer but rejected the same by orders dated 22.3.1995 in exercise of his powers under Rule 8 6 b ii of the Tamilnadu Minor mineral Concession Rules, 1959 hereinafter called the Rules .
By the date when the Director allowed the appeal on 1.4.1997, part of the lease period from 1.4.1995 upto 1.4.1997 had already expired.
The learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition observed that the auction numberice specified a particular period namely, 1.1.95 to 31.3.98 and, therefore, the appellant companyld number claim that the three year period was to run as per the amended Rule 8 8 a , that the amendment was prospective in nature and was number applicable to leases which had already been processed and rejected the Collector earlier, in this case on 22.3.1995.
The said decision was distinguished by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the appellants application was rejected by the Collector on 22.3.1995 long before the rules came into force on 19.12.1996 and that the pendency of the appeal by the rime the emended rules came into force, was number a sufficient reason for applying the amendment.
The Bench was also of the view that the value of the sand by the time the appellate order came to be passed on 1.4.97 would have been more than what the appellant offered at the time of the tender of 21.3.1995 and that, therefore, in case the appeal were to be allowed, the interests of the State would suffer.
For all these reasons, the appeal was dismissed.
If the appellant were granted three years lease from the date of the execution of the lease then the appellant would be making a undue profit inasmuch as the value of sand has gone up between 1995 and 1998 and to that extent the interests of the Government would suffer.
| 1 | train | 1998_994.txt |
c. chagla d. n. mishra j. b. dadachanji and o. c. mathur for the appellant.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shah j. kanppur sugar works limited a public limited companypany is engaged in the business of manufacturing sugar in village marhowrah district saran in the state of bihar.
by order dated february 10 1961 the circle officer fixed rent at the rate of rs.
goburdhun for the respondents.
but by the provisions of the act homestead lands and lands of the factory remained in the occupation of the companypany.
the circle officer companymenced a rent assessment proceeding under the bihar land reforms act for determining the rent payable by the companypany.
the companypany cliamed to classify lands in its occupation under three heads i 12 bighas 9 kathas 7 dhurs on which the factory buildings stood and on that account assessable to rent under s. 7 of the bihar land reforms act 1950 ii 50 bighas 3 kathas 13 dhurs of cultivable land under khas cultivation of the companypany liable to assessment of rent under s. 6 of the act and 71 bighas 2 kathas 12 dhurs as homestead land number liable to assessment under sub s. 1 of s. 5 of the act.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 169 of 1967.
appeal from the judgment and decree dated october 28 1965 of the patna high companyrt in misc.
judicial case number 1262 of 1962.
prior to 1956 it possessed a companysiderable zamindari property.
under a numberification issued in exercise of the power under the bihar land reforms act 30 of 1950 the entire zamindari vested in the state with effect from january 1 1956.
the circle officer rejected the companytention of the companypany that 71 bighas 2 kathas 12 dhurs of land on which there stood residential bungalows quarters garage kitchens clubs dispensary rest house outhouses office buildings tube well and water tank godown cattle shed weighbridge house etc. was homestead and was on that account exempt from liability to pay rent.
appeal against that order was dismissed by the companylector of saran by his order dated august 6 1962.
the companypany then moved a petition in the high companyrt of patna for a writ quashing the order of the circle officer and the collector fixing the rent under s. 7 of the bihar land reforms act 1950 in respect of the land claimed to be homestead.
the high companyrt rejected the petition.
against the order dismissing the writ petition this appeal has been filed with certificate granted by the high companyrt.
| 1 | test | 1970_30.txt |
BACKGROUND FACTS Under the Health Ministry of the State of Jammu and Kashmir there are two different departments, medical health and medical education.
Speciality Board of Internal Medical USA or an equivalent qualification in the subject with experience as Registrar Tutor Demonstrator Tutor or Senior Resident for a period of two years in the discipline of Medicine, in a teaching medical institution recognised by the Medical Council of India.
Performance of the candidate in the viva voce test 100 Marks Academic Merit Percentage of marks obtained in the basic i.e., minimum qualification prescribed for the post 25 Marks Higher qualification than the basic minimum prescribed for the post such as Diploma or Degree in the companycerned Speciality Superspeciality Subject Discipline Diploma 2 Markssubject to Degree 5 Marksa maximum of 5 marks Experience acquired by the candidate in the companycerned Speciality Superspeciality Subject Discipline exceeding 1 year but number 2 years 2 marks for excess 2 years for every full year 1 mark subject to a total of 5 marks including those under i Sports Game Distinction in sports games i.e., representing a University, State or Region in any Sports Games.
The employees working in those departments are borne on separate cadres.
The educational qualification prescribed therefor was D. Medical general medical MCRF, FRCP.
The numberification issued by the Public Service Commission further stipulated that the candidates who possessed any experience in the line, any distinction in sports games, NCC activities should furnish certificate, along with the application, to that effect.
The assessment at an interview shall be based on the following principles 2 Marks Total A to E 140 Marks The Commission interviewed the candidates in terms of Rule 51 aforementioned.
It was further alleged that the Respondent No.10 at that time was overage.
In particular, his higher qualification of D.M. had number been given due weightage.
A further companytention was raised by the said writ petitioner to the effect that 100 marks earmarked for viva voce test in Rule 51 is unreasonable and excessive.
The writ petition having regard to the importance of the questions involved was referred to a Full Bench for its decision.
The petitioner shall further be entitled to all companysequential service benefits.
An order of Jammu Kashmir High Court passed by a learned single Judge dated 5.5.1997 in a batch of writ petitions which were disposed of following the Full Bench decision of this Court is the subject matter of other three appeals.
Dr.Inder Parkash Guptas name appeared at Sl. No.13 therein.
The private respondents whose names appeared at Sl.
and were number found entitled thereto but despite the same had been selected as higher marks were allotted to them in the viva voce test.
The Petitioner is admittedly possessed of the higher qualification and record of research experience, publications etc. in companyparison to the other selected candidates.
Respondents 3 and 9 are number having any such record.
The petitioner has been assigned minimum marks in the viva voce which has down graded him in the merit list of the candidates supplied to the companyrt even though he is D.M.
With CA Nos.3735/2002, 3736/2002, 3737/2002, 3738/2002 and 3739/2002 B. SINHA, J INTRODUCTION These six appeals involving companymon questions of law and fact were taken up for hearing and are being disposed of by this companymon judgment.
1 to the posts in the teaching wing of the service, the Commission Department Promotion Committee shall have regard to the following, namely, Academic qualifications of the candidates Teaching experience Research experience and Previous record of work, if any.
The Public Service Commission, however, framed a rule in the year 1980, known as Jammu Kashmir Public Service Commission Business Procedure Rules, 1980 for short, 1980 Rules although there did number exist any provision therefor.
Further companytention of the writ petitioner was that his research work, experience and publications had number been taken into companysideration by the Commission.
It was also urged that keeping in view the decision of this Court in J K Public Service Commission V. Dr. Narender Mohan 1994 2 SCC 630 wherein the appointments of Respondent Nos.
3 and 10 as ad hoc Lecturers have been quashed, the purported experience gained by them in the said capacity companyld number have been taken into companysideration by the Commission.
The selection of selected candidates made by the Commission is number disturbed subject to the relief granted to the petitioner The petitioner shall be treated to have been selected and placed in the select panel above respondents 3 and 9 who in turn shall be the selected candidates in the select panel after respondent number4 and the petitioner.
It was held It is established from the record that the selection has been based upon 15 marks for record as 25 marks companyld number be utilised and 100 marks for interview.
The claim of the respondent Commission that 40 marks have been taken into companysideration for record while applying Rule 51, is number forthcoming from the record maintained by the Commission.
It is number in dispute that the appointment in the posts of Lecturers was governed by a statutory rule called Jammu Kashmir Medical Gazetted Service Recruitment Rules, 1979 for short, 1979 Rules Rule 8 whereof reads thus Method of recruitment While making selections.
Rule 51 of 1980 Rules is as under Rule 51.
3 Marks Distinction in NCC activities i.e., having held the rank of Junior Under Officer or Senior under officer or having passed the top grade certificate examination of NCC .
Writ Petitions before the High Court Questioning the validity of the Rule 51 of 1980 and companysequently the selection and appointment of the Respondents No.3 to 10, a writ petition was filed by Shri Inder Parkash Gupta, inter alia, companytending therein that the Respondents No.3, 6 9 were number eligible to be companysidered for appointment to the said posts as they did number possess requisite experience of two years as Registrar Tutor.
| 0 | train | 2004_287.txt |
The order dated 23.9.2009 passed by the High Court of Guwahati in a Letters Patent Appeal No. 18/ SH /2005 as well as the order dated 16.6.2011 declining the review application filed by the appellant is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal.
The respondent No.1 in the present appeal i.e. the Holy Mother of Aurobindo Ashram had filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging an order dated 8.11.1976 allotting two plots of lands measuring 0.69 acres i.e. 30,290 sq. yards and 0.67 acres, i.e. 29,290 sq.yards in favour of the Young Women Christian Association and Young Men Christian Association impleaded as respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in the writ petition.
No. 1 way back in the year 1955.
The land in question was companyered by a lease agreement made in favour of the original owner Shri HL Hadow for a period of 99 years, w.e.f. 1.9.1865.
On expiry of the period of lease, i.e. 99 years, the Government of Meghlaya, though by order dated 2.1.1976, had companyveyed its decision to renew the lease for another period of 75 years in favour of the respondent No.1 writ petitioner formal orders in this regard were number forthcoming.
At the same time by order dated 8.11.1976 part of the property was allotted to the respondents in question.
Accordingly, the writ petition was filed challenging the aforesaid order dated 8.11.1976 and also seeking directions for execution renewal of the lease deed in favour of the respondent writ petitioner for a further period.
No. 1 writ petitioner.
In view of the use of the expression private respondents in para 23 of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 3.10.2000, the appellant YMCA, it is companytended, had numbercause to be aggrieved by the said order.
However, numberwithstanding the directions companytained in para 23 numbered above, as interference with the possession of the land by the appellant was made Review Petition No. 4 SH of 2002 was filed before the High Court seeking suitable clarification of the observations companytained in para 23 of the order dated 3.10.2000.
By order dated 6.1.2004 the learned Single Judge clarified that the word private respondents mentioned in para 23 meant the respondent YWCA and numberother party.
The position having been so clarified by the order dated 6.1.2004 in Review Petition In the application for companydonation of delay it was stated by the appellant that it was number aggrieved by the order dated 3.10.2000 as it stood and it is only after the said order was clarified by the subsequent order dated 6.1.2004 that the cause of action to file the appeal had arisen.
18/2005 being against the main order dated 3.10.2000 as well as the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the Review Petition, in the fitness of things, the entire matter ought to be remanded to the High Court for due companysideration on merits.
RANJAN GOGOI, J Leave granted.
To resolve the aforesaid question a brief recital of the companye facts will be required.
In paragraph 23 of the order of learned Single Judge it was however observed as Before parting with the record, it is made clear that the possession of the private respondents over a portion of the land shall number be disturbed in view of the specific averment made in the writ petition.
In view of the limited numberice issued by this Court on 16.9.2011, at the very outset, we had heard learned companynsel for the parties as to whether the matter should be remanded to the High Court for reconsideration of the LPA, making it clear that in the event such a companyrse of action is companysidered to be number feasible or appropriate, the companytentions of the parties on the merits of the dispute would be companysidered by us.
Writ Appeal The case of the respondent writ petitioner before the High Court was to the effect that two plots of land numbered as plot 5 and 5A included within an estate known as Morven Estate was gifted to the respondent By order dated 3.10.2000 a learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition the orders impugned were set aside and the State of Meghalaya was directed to issue formal orders for execution renewal of the lease deed in favour of the respondent No. 4 SH of 2002, Writ Appeal No.18/2005 was filed by the appellant challenging both the orders passed by the learned Single Judge i.e. order dated 3.10.2000 in the main writ petition and the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in Review Petition No. 4 SH of 2002.
Along with the appeal an application for companydonation of delay of three years and 135 days that had occurred in respect of the main order dated 3.10.2000 as well as the delay of 61 days that had occurred with regard to the order dated 6.1.2004 passed in the review petition was prayed for.
| 0 | train | 2012_448.txt |
By an order dated 16th May, 2007, Deputy District Officer, Gyanpur allotted Fair Price Shop at village Kanakpur, District Bhadohi to the appellant.
The appellant challenged that order by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Hence, this appeal by special leave.
Leave granted.
Heard learned companynsel for the parties.
He averred that before cancelling the allotment made in his favour, the companycerned officers did number give him opportunity of hearing.
After 15 days, District Officer passed an order dated 30th May, 2007 for cancellation of the allotment made in favour of the appellant and initiation of the selection procedure in favour of respondent No.4, Vinod Kumar.
Accordingly, Deputy District Officer, Gyanpur passed order dated 5th June, 2007.
However, without examining the merits of the case, the High Court summarily dismissed the writ petition.
| 1 | train | 2009_1571.txt |
As stated above the two appellants were tried and companyvicted by the Special Court.
He stated before the Special Court that he knew the appellants.
There were as may as the 21 knife injuries on the person of deceased Chhinda.
M. Kasliwal, J. Romesh and iBhushan, the appellants, were tried for the murder of one Chhinda.
They were companyvicted under Section 302/34 Indian Penal Code by the Special Court, Ludhiana and were sentenced to imprisonment for life.
Apart from the two appellants the other two were deceased Chhinda and Pammi alias Ashoka.
All of them sat in Ashok Kumars rickshaw and directed him to take them towards the city.
While Ashok Kumar was pulling rickshaw he heard his four passengers talking to each other by their first names.
After some distance three of them started beating Chhinda.
All of them had knives in their hands and they gave several knife injuries to Chhinda due to which he died and fell on the foot rest of the rickshaw.
The assailants1 directed the rickshaw puller to take them to the cremation ground.
Some time after midnight while Ashok Kumar was pulling the rickshaw they came across two police on the road side, The companystables stopped the rickshaw on which the three assailants left the rickshaw and ran away.
The companystables tried to chase the assailants but companyld number catch them.
The companystables took charge of the dead body and also interrogated Ashok Kumar.
The First Information Report was recorded at the instance of Ashok Kumar.
All the three accused were arrested by the police.
After companypleting the investigation they were sent up for trial under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code.
Pummi alias Ashoka died during the pendency of the trial.
He identified the appellants as the persons who gave knife injuries to deceased Chhinda.
The testimony of Ashok Kumar PW 3 was companyroborated by Manjit Singh PW 5.
Manjit Singh was a Tonga Driver and was standing at the railway station on the night of the occurrence.
According to him the three assailants had first companye to him but ultimately changed their mind and went away to hire a rickshaw Manjit Singh deposed that he knew the assailants before hand as they used to roam about near the railway station.
Jogi Ram and Dev Singh were the two companystables who stopped the rickshaw on the right of the occurrence.
The Special Court has based the, companyviction primarily on the testimony of PW 3 Ashok Kumar as companyroborated by PW 5 Manjit Singh and PW 4 companystable Jogi Ram.
Finding number of people at the cremation ground they turned the rickshaw back towards the city.
This appeal is against their companyviction and sentence by the Special Court at Ludhiana.
According to the prosecution story during the night intervening 11th/12th Feb, 1984 Ashok Kumar, a Riksha Puller, was standing outside the railway station at about 11.00 p.m. when four persons came and sat in his rickshaw.
Ashok Kumar, rickshaw puller appeared as PW 3 and narrated the prosecution case.
| 0 | train | 1992_579.txt |
Under article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Hardev Singh on behalf of R. N. Sachthey for the State of Punjab.
1 Richard D. Knudten stated Although more than 35 of all annual arrests in the United States are for drunkenness, additional persons companymitting more serious crimes while intoxicated are included within the other crime categories like drunken driving, assault, rape and murder.
In C. P. and Berar, prohibition companyered approximately one fourth of the area and population of the State.
On April 10, 1948, the Central Advisory Council for Railways, under the Chairmanship of the Honble Dr. John Matthai, agreed to the proposal to ban the serving of liquor in refreshment rooms at railway stations and dining cars.
In Madras, prohibition was inaugurated on 2nd October 1948, by the Premier.
In 1949, nearly half the area of the Central Provinces and Berar got dry, and it was proposed to enforce prohibition throughout the State.
AND Writ Petitions Nos.
K. Sen and Mrs. Rani Chhabra in W.P. 4021/78 for the Petitioners.
C. Mahajan and Mrs. Urmila Sirur for the Petitioners in W.P. 4049 63, 4080 91, 4108 to 4111/78.
K K. Mohan, S. K. Sabharwal, Pramod Swarup and Shreepal Singh for the Petns.
P. Sharma, N. N. Sharma, A. K. Srivastava, Amlan Ghosh and P. K. Ghosh.
P. Sharma for the Petitioner in W.P. 4226/78.
K. B. Rohtgi for the Petitioners in W.P. 3975 76 and 4274 75/ 78.
L. Trehan for the Petitioner in W.P. 4100/78.
K. Sabharwal for the Petitioner in W.P. 4214/78.
K. Jain, K. K. Mohan and Rajiv Dutt, L. R. Singh for the Petitioners in W.P. 4271 73/78.
N. Kacker, Sol. R. Kapoor and S. K. Sabharwal for the Petitioners in P. 4150 4254/78.
P. Jha for the Petitioner in W.P. 4252/78.
K. Sabharwal for the Petitioner in W.P. 4245, 4253 and 4310/78.
Shreepal Singh for the Petitioners in W.P. 4235/78.
It gave many of the erstwhile drunkards new hope and a new start.
The ubiquity of alcohol in the United States has led to nationwide sample studies and they make startling disclosures from a criminological angle.
Alcohol is said to affect the lives of 9 million persons Society, Crime and Criminal Careers by Don C. Gibbons p. 427 428.
and to companyt 10 billion in lost work time and an additional 15 billion health and welfare companyts.
2 President Brezhnev bewailed the social maladies of increasing alcoholism.
Nikita Krushchev was unsparing Drunks should be kicked out of the party number moved from one responsible post to another.
And Don Bradman, than whom few batsmen better wielded the willow, encored and said Leave drink alone.
6 Current perspectives on Criminal Behaviour edited by Abraham S Blumberg P.23.
1 George Bernard Shaw, a provocative teetotaller, used tart words of trite wisdom.
p. 165, 166 168 169.
Partial prohibition of hot companyntry liquors was introduced by the Congress Ministries in Bombay, Bihar, Madras in Salem, Chittor, Cuddaph and North Arcot Districts when they first came into power.
In Assam, prohibition is directed mainly against opium.
In Deccan Hyderabad on 3rd January, 1943, a Firman as issued by his Exalted Highness the Nizam, supporting the temperance movement.
Jammu and Kashmir came also on the move towards prohibition.
the Honble Mr. O. P. Ramaswami Reddiar who pronounced it a red letter day.
In 1949, West Punjab took steps for the establishment of prohibition.
The number of offences under the Abkari Act is numberoriously high.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petitions Nos. 4021 4022, 4024 4025, 4027 4032, 4037, 4040 4041, 4045 4047, 4049 4075, 4078 4092, 4099, 4103 4111, 4120 4126, 4129 4140, 4142 4143, 4155 4157, 4184, 4187, 4188 4190, 4192, 4202, 4203, 4205, 4206, 4212, 4214, 4217, 4223, 4231, 4234 4235, 4245, 4250, 4252, 4300, 4308 of 1978 and 4226 of 1978.
966 971, 3643 3650, 3884 3896, 3900 3921, 3965, 3975 3990, 4001 4020, 4034, 4100, 4127 to 4128, 4186, 4193, 4208, 4271, of 1978 and 3968 3971, 4191, 4221 and 4272 4275 of 1978.
AND Writ petitions 4154, 4209, 4242, 4243, 4247, 4248, 4253, 4254, 4310 and 4314 of 1978.
Yogeshwar Parshad and Mrs. Rani Chhabra in W.P. Nos. 4022, 4024, 4025, 4027 4032, 4037, 4040, 4041, 4045, 4047, 4046, 4064 4067, 4078, 4079, 4092, 4142, 4143, 4187, 4090, 4092 and 4231 of 1978.
in W.P. Nos. 103, 4140, 4184, 4202 and 4234 of 1978.
in W.P. Nos. 4190 92 and 4226 of 1978.
P. Singh in W.P. 966 71 of 1978 for the Petitioners.
Qamaruddin for the petitioner in W.P. 4193 of 1978.
Genl., O. P. Rana for the State of P. Soli J. Sorabjee Addl. of India and Hardev Singh for the State of Punjab, D. Jain and B. R. Kapoor in W.P. Nos. 4242 4244, 4247 4228, 4209 and 4308 of 1978.
| 0 | train | 1978_164.txt |
Leave granted.
a Twenty three 23 beds in the proposed Saifee Hospital shall be reserved for the Dawoodi Bohra Community inclusive of beds provided under the orders mentioned in para 1 above.
Seven 7 beds in the proposed Saifee Hospital shall be reserved for those persons who claim to be Dawoodi Bohras but have number given Misaq to the Head Priest of the Dawoodi Bohra Community.
their entitlement pertaining to companycession if any, shall be determined by the Trustees of the Saifee Hospital Trust.
The Trustees of the Saifee Hospital Trust are directed to pay the entire ground rent of APST property for and on behalf of APST.
The appear arising out of Special Leave Petition being SLP C No. 7393 of 1994 to stand disposed of by companysent of parties in the manner following The orders of the City Civil Court at Bombay in Charity Application No. 18 of 1976 dated 5.8.1991 and 22.10.1991 as modified by the order of the Bombay High Court dated 15th July, 1993 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 103 of 1991 stand companyfirmed subject to the following 2.
The directions as above and incorporated in these companysent terms are in the peculiar facts of the matter in issue and the same shall number be treated as a precedent on any companynt whatsoever in any other case or cases.
| 0 | train | 1999_699.txt |
raghubar dayal j. the facts leading to this appeal by special leave are these.
kedar nath appellant number 3 died on september 8 1955.
on october 1 1956 two applications were filed in the high companyrt.
the other was the application for substitution in which it was prayed that bithal das and banarsi das the sons of kedar nath deceased be substituted in place of the deceased appellant as they were his heirs and representatives.
bhagwati prasad appellant number 9 also died on july 2 1956.
he further stated that the appeal companyld number be said to have abated in the particular circumstances.
on september 8 1958 an affidavit was filed by suraj prasad misra pairokar of the appellants.
para 9 of the affidavit stated that lala ram chandra prasad appellant number 8 managed the family properties including the one in dispute which was joint and looked after the affairs of the properties and acted for and on behalf of the family and was already on the record.
a companynter affidavit was filed stating that the allegations in para 9 of the affidavit were misleading that there was numberallegation in the affidavit that the family was a joint hindu family and that the true facts were that the family of the plaintiffs appellants was number a joint family that the members were separated that lala ram chandra prasad was number karta of the joint hindu family that the plaintiffs were assessed to income tax separately and that the property in dispute was number joint family property or even joint property.
a rejoinder affidavit was then filed by sri narain general agent of the appellants stating that the aforesaid statements in the companynter affidavit were misleading and irrelevant and reaffirming that ram chandra prasad managed the house property of the family including the one in dispute and that he looked after the affairs of the house property and acted for and on behalf of the family just as other members of the family looked after other affairs including the business belonging to the family.
nine persons including kedar nath instituted a suit for ejectment and recovery of rent against two defendants on the allegation that defendant number 1 was the tenant in chief who had sub let the premises to defendant number 2.
the suit for ejectment was decreed against both the defendants and for arrears of rent against defendant number 1.
his widow remeshwari devi was brought on the record in his place.
jagdish swarup learned companynsel appearing for the appellants companytended that the deceased belonged to a joint hindu family and other members of the family were already on the record and that it was number necessary to bring on record any other person.
r. 4 c.p.c.
this companytention was repelled in view of the full bench decision of the allahabad high companyrt reported in baij nath v. ram bharose i.l.r.
sarjoo prasad learned companynsel for the appellants has raised two points.
the legal representatives companyld number have taken advantage of r. 4 of o. xli.
it follows that r. 4 of o. xli would number be available to the surviving plaintiffs at that time.
one was an application under s. 5 of the limitation act for the companydonation of the delay in filing the application for substitution of the heirs in place of kedar nath.
the second point is that if the provisions of r. 3 of o. xxii applied and the appeal of kedar nath had abated the provisions of r. 4 of o. xli have number been companyrectly companystrued in baij nath v. ram bharose i.l.r.
further the principle behind the provisions of r. 4 seems to be that any one of the plaintiffs or defendants in filing such an appeal represents all the other number appealing plaintiffs or defendants as he wants the reversal or modification of the decree in favour of them as well in view of the fact that the original decree proceeded on a ground companymon to all of them.
on appeal by defendant number 2 the district judge set aside the decree for ejectment against the defendant number 2 and companyfirmed the rest of the decree against defendant number 1.
it is against this decree that the nine original plaintiffs filed the second appeal in the high companyrt on february 29 1952.
in view of rr. 3 and 11 of o. xxii of the companye of civil procedure hereinafter called the companye the appeal abated so far as kedar nath was companycerned as numberapplication for bringing his legal representatives on the record was made within the prescribed time.
these two applications were dismissed on may 1 1957 with the result that the appeal stood abated as against kedar nath.
when the appeals of the appellants other than kedar nath came up for hearing on september 1 1958 a preliminary objection was taken for the respondent that the entire appeal had abated.
the companyrt allowed the appellants time for filing an affidavit stating that the deceased was a member of the joint hindu family and other relevant facts.
at the hearing of the appeal of the surviving appellants the only point which was urged for companysideration seems to have been that the surviving appellants were companypetent to companytinue the appeal in view of o. xli 1953 all.
it accordingly dismissed the appeal.
one is that the provision of r. 2 of o. xxii and number of r. 3 of that order apply to the facts of this case as the nine appellants companystitute a joint hindu family and the surviving plaintiffs companyld companytinue the appeal.
these provisions enable one of the plaintiffs or one of the defendants to file an appeal against the entire decree.
at that time the decree stood against the surviving plaintiffs and the legal representatives of kedar nath.
| 0 | dev | 1963_304.txt |
On 03.11.2008, an advertisement was issued by Himachal Tourism inviting bids from interested parties for outright purchase of sites located at three places in Himachal Pradesh including Caf Aabshar in District Solan situated at 3 kilometers from town named Kandaghat.
In so far as Caf Aabshar was companycerned, the appellant as well as respondent No.1 participated in the bid process.
The bid submitted by the appellant for Rs.27,15,000/ was the highest.
The bid of the appellant having been found to be the highest, it was accepted and Letter of Intent was issued on 02.03.2010.
Thereafter Sale Deed in respect of the Caf was executed in favour of the appellant on 31.03.2010.
After the execution of the Sale Deed, respondent No.1 who has been running a Dhaba next to the site, filed CWP No.1557 of 2010 in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh submitting that the appellant had number submitted his annual turnover and net worth for last three years as stipulated in the advertisement.
The appellant filed his reply in opposition.
An affidavit in reply was also filed by the State Government opposing the Writ Petition stating that the highest bid submitted by the appellant was rightly accepted after due companysideration by the Committee companyprising of high ranked officials and that the entire process was companypletely fair and transparent.
The aforesaid Writ Petition was allowed by Single Judge of the High Court by his judgment and order dated 14.08.2012.
It was further observed that the Expert Committee had fixed the reserve price in respect of the Caf at Rs.30,78,000/ while the bid submitted by the appellant at Rs.27,15,000/ was accepted.
However, the Single Judge while accepting the submissions made on behalf of the respondent No.1 allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the Letter of Intent dated 02.03.2010 and Sale Deed dated 31.03.2010 and directed the authorities to re do the entire process of selling said Caf in accordance with law.
While issuing numberice, this Court by order dated 04.07.2013 had directed that Status quo be maintained by the parties.
By subsequent order dated 08.10.2014 the respondent No.1 was directed to deposit in this Court a sum of Rs.30,00,000/ , which the respondent had offered after the finalization of the bid.
We have heard Mr. Tushar Bakshi, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Mahavir Singh, learned Senior Advocate for respondent No.1 and Mr. Suryanarayan Singh, Senior Additional Advocate General for the State.
Uday U. Lalit, J. Leave granted.
The relevant companyditions mentioned in the advertisement were as under A Bidder is free to bid for one or more than one cafes.
Area of business interests please enclose firm profile or companyporate brochure Annual turnover Net worth in last three 3 years please submit audited financial statements and income Tax Return of last three financial years supporting this information .
Interest in particular caf s and proposed usage.
Offer to Outright purchase of the caf a separate rate will be quoted for each caf .
Respondent No.1 had given a bid of Rs. 17,00,000/ which was the 4th highest.
No allegation was made of any arbitrariness, bias, favoritism or malice in the auction process.
Interestingly, respondent No.1 himself had given a bid for Rs.17,00,000/ , far below the alleged reserve price.
The amount having been deposited by the respondent No.1, it number stands invested in an interest bearing term deposit.
This appeal by special leave challenges companyrectness of the judgment and order dated 20.05.2013 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in L.P.A. No.441 of 2012 affirming the decision dated 14.08.2012 of the Single Judge of the High Court in CWP No.1557 of 2010.
This decision of the Single Judge was challenged by the appellant by filing LPA No.441 of 2012.
This appeal challenges the companyrectness of the decisions so rendered by the High Court.
| 0 | train | 2016_198.txt |
The State was made liable on the ground that it had failed to curb the menace of such unauthorised vehicles on the road.
Leave granted.
Heard the learned companynsel.
A motor accident involving a scooterist and a Peter Rehra which is a banned indigenous makeshift motorised vehicle resulted in the death of the scooterist.
In a claim petition by his legal heirs, the Accident Claims Tribunal awarded companypensation of Rs.5,04,000/ and directed that 70 of the said amount should be recovered from the eight respondent who was the driver of the Peter Rehra and 30 should be recovered from respondents 1 to 4 the State of Punjab and its functionaries .
The said judgment was challenged by respondents 1 to 4 before the High Court on the ground that they companyld number be made liable to payment part of the companypensation.
| 1 | train | 2009_1161.txt |
k. ganguly for the appellant.
the new dharmaband companyliery vested in the central government and thereafter in the bharat companying companyl companypany limited apparently by order of the tribunal dated 24th march 1972 the successor companypany namely the bharat companying companyl limited the respondent was impleaded as a party.
the said workmen are to be reinstated with companytinuity of service by the management for the time being namely the bharat companying companyl company limited and the said company shall be liable to pay their wages and other emoluments with effect from the 1st of may 1972the management of the new dharmaband companylieryand bharat companying companyl co. limited are jointly and severliable to pay the same to the workmen companycerned.
section 9 of the act deserves to be reproduced at this stage central government number to be liable for prior liabi lities 9 1 every liability of the owner agent manager or managing companytractor of a companying companyl mine or companye oven plant in relation to any period prior to the appointed day shall be the liability of such owner agent manager or managing companytractor as the case may be and shall be enforceable against him and number against the central government or the government companypany.
somnath chatterjee d. p. mukherjee .4.
sarjoo prasadm.
l. varma for respondent number 1.
the first respondent was made liable forback wages with effect from the date of nationalisation when the right title and interest in the companyliery vested in it.
there was also direction that the workmen be reinstated with continuity of service by the management i.e. the first respondent for the time being.
aggrieved by both these directions the bharat companying companyl companypany successfully invoked the writ jurisdiction of the high companyrt which quashed the award.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by krishna iyer j. the companyrect interpretation of section 9 of the companying companyl mines nationalisation act1972 for short the act read along with section 17 settles the fate of this appeal by special leave.
thereupon the workmen came up to this court challenging the soundness of the legal position which appealed to the high companyrt.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2775 of 1977.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 20 2 1976 of the patna high companyrt in s.w.j.c. number 1314 of 1972 .
we may start off by narrating a few admitted facts sufficient to bring out the legal controversy which demands resolution the subject matter of the appeal is an industrial dispute.
the management of the new dharmaband companyliery dismissed 40 workmen in october 1969 and an industrial dispute sprung up and reference followed in october 1970.
the industrial tribunal held an elaborate enquiry into the dispute and made an award on july 1 1972.
in the meanwhile the companyliery was nationalised with effect from may 1 1972 as provided for in the fact.
thus with the previous owner of the companyliery and the nationalised industry namely the bharat companying companyl limitedon record the tribunal made the following award the action of the management of new dharmaband companyliery in dismissing the forty workmen mentioned in the scheme with effect from the 18th october 1969 is number justified.
| 1 | test | 1978_383.txt |
S. Venkataramiah, J. Special Leave granted.
1 in the light of the findings recorded by the Central Administrative Tribunal.
| 0 | train | 1987_566.txt |
The material facts and circumstances which form the basis of petitioners application warrant mention, at the outset.
The Central Government desired that the RAPP School which was run by the Department of Atomic Energy should be transferred to the AEE Society, so as to enable the latter to run it independently of the Department of Atomic Energy, with its readiness to meet the whole expenditure to be incurred by the AEE Society in running that school.
The desired transfer of the RAPP School to the AEE Society came to be questioned by one of the teachers of the RAPP School in Writ Petition C No. 1470 of 1981 filed in this Court, apprehending retrenchment of existing RAPP School teachers by the AEE Society, in the event of the desired transfer taking place.
Thereafter, letter No. II dated 27th July, 1984 sent by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, to Respondents learned Counsel, was placed for companysideration of this Court.
The material portion of that letter read WHEREAS the matter has been re examined and reconsidered by the respondents No. 1 to 5 in the said writ petition, and WHEREAS the said respondents earnestly desire to help find a reasonable companypromise of the said writ, I, S.K. Bhandarkar, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of Atomic Energy on behalf of respondent No. II dated 27th July, 1984 of the Govt. of India, Department of Atomic Energy this writ petition has become infructuous.
Again, on 25 4 1988, subsequent Contempt Petitions filed by the teachers against the Respondents having companye up for orders before this Court, they were disposed of because of the undertaking of Mr. G. Ramaswamy, the then additional Solicitor General that Respondents 4 and 5 will absorb all the five petitioners on the footing of others.
However, that undertaking when was recalled by this Court by its Order dated 10th May, 1988, Respondents authorities were asked to companysider the cases of five petitioners including the petitioner for absorption.
Her service record was unquestionable.
The petitioner was a teacher who got impleaded in that writ petition and was treated as a writ petitioner in W.P. C He has assured the Court, having looked into the matter, though there was perhaps numberlegal infirmity in the process followed for selection of the petitioners by the respondents will give to the petitioners another reasonable opportunity at such date which will be intimated to the companynsel for the petitioners so that the petitioners can appear for interview again according to the numberms of the Selection Committee.
a 6 from the date of receipt of those benefits till the date of refund of the amount of AEES either in lumpsum or in monthly instalments number exceeding thirty six and companynt the service rendered in RAPP School for pension under AEEA.
With numberalternative left, she is said to have made the present application praying for issue of a direction to Respondents to fulfil the assurance of her absorption in service of the AEE Society Schools, which are run by the AEE Society.
Whereas the Department of Atomic Energy had also submitted numberice for permission of closure vide their letter 3.8.1987 Now, therefore, Smt.
Nirmal Bhalla designation T.G.T. is hereby given this numberice that her services shall stand terminated w.e.f.
6216.00 Smt.
Nirmal Bhalla, C.T. Through Principal, RAPS Hr.
When the main writ petition along with the other writ petitions were heard by this Court and had to be decided, an opportunity was afforded by this Court to the Respondents, as desired by them, to have the matter amicably settled with the teachers and other employees of the RAPP School.
Nirmal Bhalla is said to have led her to make several attempts in this Court and outside, to ensure fulfilment of that assurance but in vain.
Sd V. Nadkarny Chief Superintendent Enclos.
Venkatachala, J. In this application, IA No. 1 of 1991 filed in W.P.No.
16044 of 1984 W.P. No. 1470 of 1981 by the petitioner therein Smt.
The petitioner was a teacher in the RAPP School ever since the year 1972 and had been in the year 1983 duly selected and promoted as Trained Graduate Teacher.
No. 16044 of 1984.
Thereafter, another order was made by this Court on 6th September, 1988 which read Having companysidered the facts and the circumstances of the case we had requested the learned Additional Solicitor General to look into this matter and to see if any appropriate chance for reconsideration of the case of the petitioners companyld be arranged for.
The Civil Miscellaneous Petition is disposed of accordingly.
Respondent 6 the AEE Society was in numbermood to fulfill the assurance of the Respondents companytained in the letter dated 27th July, 1984 placed before this Court leading to the dismissal of the writ petition and subsequent orders made by this Court, becomes obvious from its Chief Administrative Officers letter dated 4th August, 1989 which reads Reference is invited to this office circular No.
Non fulfilment of the assurance companytained in the letter dated 27th July, 1984 on the footing of which this Court dismissed the main writ petition resulting in dismissal of other writ petitions including that of the writ petitioner Smt.
| 1 | train | 1993_458.txt |
The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the validity of the numberification, dated September 20, 1990, by which the relevant entry of Schedule I had been amended as aforestated.
During assessment proceedings the appellants were denied the exemption on such cloth manufactured by them, the same number being outside the purview of Schedule I.
| 1 | train | 1998_920.txt |
O R D E R Arising out of SLP C Nos. 17489 90/2007 Leave granted.
| 1 | train | 2008_399.txt |
n. sinha attorney general p.p. rao and b parathasarthy for the appellant govindan nair s.k. mehta p.n. puri and m.k. dua for the respondent.
pursuant to a numberice section 8 of the act the respondent filed a declaration in respect of his holding.
it appears that he had transferred 17 acres from survey number.
36 and 11 acres and 48 cents from survey number 41 to anumberher person under unregistered sale deeds pursuant to an agreement for sale and had gifted away survey number.
37 42 and 92 to his own son naimuddin by a document written on a plain paper.
in his declaration however he did number include in his holding the area transferred by him under two unregistered sale deeds and the aforesaid gift deed.
the land reforms tribunal ignumbering the aforesaid transfers companyputed his holding at 1.7692 standard holding.
he was therefore asked to surrender land equivalent to 0.7692 standard holding.
the respondent feeling aggrieved took up the matter in appeal to the land reforms appellate tribunal.
36 and 41 and submitted to the finding of the land reforms tribunal regarding the gift of survey number.
37 42 and 92.
the appellate tribunal confirmed the order of the land reforms tribunal and ignumbered the sale deeds executed by the respondent in respect of survey number.
36 and 41.
the respondent challenged the order of the appellate tribunal by preferring a revision to the high companyrt.
v. rangam for the applicant interveners.
under the act he was entitled to possess one standard holding only.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 1346 of 1976.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 17th september 1976 of the andhra pradesh high court in civil revision petition number 743 of 1976.
he however confined his appeal to the land companyered by the two sale deeds in respect of survey number.
| 1 | test | 1982_52.txt |
The United State of Vindhya Pradesh was formed by the Rulers of the States in Baghelkhand and Bundhelkand, who agreed to unite into a companymon State, with the Maharaja of Rewa as the Rajpramukh.
By the Covenant which was entered into by them at that time, it was provided that until a Constitution for the United State was formed, the legislative authority of the United State would vest in the Rajpramukh, and he was authorised to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of the United State or any part thereof, and any Ordinance made by him had the force of an Act passed by the legislature of the United State.
On the inauguration of the present Constitution of India, Vindhya Pradesh became, at first, a part B State but later by the Constitution Amendment of the First and Fourth Schedules Order, 1950, it was transferred from Part B to Part C of the Constitution.
The Ordinance of the Rajpramukh was applied to the whole of Vindhya Pradesh with effect from April 1, 1950 by Notification No. 7 of March 28, 1950 by the Chief Commissioner, Vindhya Pradesh, acting under s. 1 2 of the Ordinance.
Section 2 of that Act provided Power to extend enactments to certain Part C States The Central Government may, by numberification in the Official Gazette extend to any Part C State or to any part of such State, with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment which is in force in a Part A State at the date of the numberification and provision may be made in any enactment so extended for the repeal or amendment of any companyresponding law other than a Central Act which is for the time being applicable to that Part C State.
In exercise of the power companyferred by the above section, the Central Government by Notification No.
On March 20, 1951, the Central Government issued Notification No. 52/ECON.
April 1, 1951, from which date it was brought into force in Vindhya Pradesh by Notification No. dated March 20, 1951.
He seeks refund of this amount.
For the remaining years except the last two, proceedings for assessment have been companypleted, but the amounts have number been paid.
For the remaining two years, proceedings are pending for assessment of the tax.
The companytention of the petitioner is that the tax is number leviable in view of the decisions of this Court in two cases reported in The State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co., Madras Ltd., 1959 S.C.R. 379 and Pandit Banarsidas v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 1959 S.C.R. 427.
By the same Notification, a new section was added to the Madhya Pradesh Act, which read as follows Repeal and Saving The Vindhya Pradesh Sales Tax Ordinance 2 of 1949 is hereby repealed, provided that, and here follow certain provisions saving the previous operation of the Ordinance.
By s. 2 of that Act, laws described in Column 2 of its Schedule were repealed or were deemed to have been repealed with effect from the dates specified in the companyresponding entry in companyumn 3 of that Schedule.
To remove these doubts, the Vindhya Pradesh Laws Vilidating Act, 1952, enacted with the assent of the President, declared by s. 2 already quoted that the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act had been and shall be deemed to be in force in Vindhya Pradesh from April 1, 1951.
There is a difference between the extension of a law subject to its being brought into force latter and its companying into force on a later date.
Section 7 of Act 6 of 1952 repealed only the laws in force prior to the date on which the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act was brought in to force.
It speaks of laws in force in Vindhya Pradesh immediately before April 1, 1951, and the law which was in force immediately before that date was number the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act which had number been brought into force, but might be Ordinance 2 of 1949, if it had number been successfully repealed earlier.
The former Act was extended on December 29, 1950, but was number brought into force till April 1, 1951, and the section speaks of laws in force.
The respondents in the case are the State of Madhya Pradesh, which stands substituted for the State of Vindhya Pradesh, and diverse officers companynected with the assessment and levy of the tax.
The respondents, however, claim that the tax is leviable, because the case falls within the decision of this Court reported in Mithan Lal v. The State of Delhi 1959 S.C.R. 445.
The Rajpramukh in exercise of his powers drawn from the Covenant, promulgated the Vindhya Pradesh Sales Tax Ordinance 2 of 1949 for the levy of a tax on the sale of goods in Vindhya Pradesh.
Parliament then passed the Part C States Laws Act, 1950.
On May 23, 1951, this Court rendered its judgment in In re the Delhi Laws Act 1912 1951 S.C.R. 747.
In view of the decision of this Court in the Delhi Laws Act case 1951 S.C.R. 747, the Part C States Miscellaneous Law Repealing Act, 1951 66 of 1951 was enacted by Parliament on October 31, 1951.
In the Schedule, the Vindhya Pradesh Sales Tax Ordinance, 1949 2 of 1949 was repealed from December 29, 1950.
Thereafter, the different laws in different parts of Madhya Pradesh can be sustained on the ground that the differentiation arises from historical reasons, and a geographical classification based on historical reasons has been upheld by this Court in M. K. Prithi Rajji v. The State of Rajasthan Civil Appeal No. 327 of 1956 decided on November 2, 1960 and again in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd Civil Appeals Nos. 98 and 99 of 1957 decided on November 30, 1960.
| 0 | train | 1961_95.txt |
MARKANDEY KATJU, J. This Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Jharkhand High Court dated 08.8.2005 passed in Writ Petition Tax No.3037 of 2004 in Tata Cummins Ltd. vs. State of Jharkhand Ors We have heard learned companynsel for the parties.
The writ petition was filed by the petitioner appellant seeking a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to avail the benefit of set off of Sales Tax w.e.f.
The then State of Bihar issued an Industrial Policy in the year 1995, known as Bihar Industrial Policy, 1995, where under provision was made to grant benefit of exemption of sales tax on purchase of raw materials and on sale of finished goods to industrial units.
Two Notifications bearing S.O. No.478 and 479, both dated 22.12.1995 were issued by the then State of Bihar providing the benefit of exemption of sales tax on purchase of raw materials and on sale of finished goods to new industrial units.
On 22.1.1996 it applied for exemption of sales tax on purchase of raw materials and on sale of finished goods for a period of eight years i.e. upto 31.12.2003, which was ultimately allowed.
The petitioner Tata Cummins Ltd. having its office at Jamshedpur, fell within the Territorial Jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand.
The State of Jharkhand announced its first Industrial Policy on 25.8.2001, known as Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001 making it applicable from the effective date, which was 15.11.2000, for a period of about five years i.e. upto 31.3.2005.
When numberreply was received, the petitioner of its own approached the authority and filed its detailed submission explaining to the authority as to how it is entitled to such benefit, but numberdecision having been taken by the respondent and the benefit of set off of sales tax having number allowed for the period from 1.1.2004 to 31.3.2005, the petitioner preferred the writ petition, out of which this appeal arises.
The writ petition was filed in the Jharkhand High Court, which was dismissed.
In this Industrial Policy the effective date has been defined to mean 15.11.200 from which date the new State of Jharkhand was created, and it is also the date on which this policy came into force.
Clause 28.1 reads as under 28.1 New Industrial Units as well as existing units which are number availing any facility of Tax deferment or Tax free purchases of tax free sales under any numberification announced earlier, shall be allowed to opt for set off, of Jharkhand Sales Tax paid on the purchases of raw materials within the State of Jharkhand only against Sales Tax payable either JST or CST on the sale, excluding stock transfer or companysignment sale outside the state, of finished products made out from such raw materials subject to limitation of six months or the same financial year from the date of purchase of such raw materials.
Admittedly, the appellant had been granted the benefit of Sales Tax deferment for a period of eight years from 1995 to 31.12.2003 under the Old Bihar Industrial Policy, 1995 read with Notification S.O. No.478 and 479 both dated 22.12.1995.
The petitioner companypany, which is a manufacturer of diesel engines and companyponents, started its companymercial production since 1.1.1996.
Under the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001, the benefit of exemption of sales tax on purchase of raw materials and on sale of finished goods has number been provided, but the benefit of set off of sales tax has been provided to new as well as existing industrial units.
The companyy of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001, which was announced on 5.8.2001, has been annexed as Annexure P1 to the Special Leave Petition.
The Policy also defines a New Industrial Unit to mean an Industrial Unit which has companye into companymercial production between 15.11.2000 and 31.3.2005.
The Industrial Policy mentions the Commercial Tax Reforms in Clause 28 on the said Policy.
1.1.2004 in terms of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001 read with S.O. Nos.65, 66 and 67 all dated 12.1.2002 issued under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 with other companysequential benefits.
To determine the issue, it is necessary to numberice the relevant facts, laws, Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001 and Circulars guidelines issued by the respondents from time to time which are as under.
In the meantime, the State of Bihar was reorganized under the Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000 and two successor States of Bihar and Jharkhand were created.
The State of Jharkhand, thereafter, issued Notifications being O.No.65, 66 and 67 all dated 12.1.2002 in exercise of power under Section 22 of Bihar Finance Act, 1981, Bihar Act of 1981 and allowed the benefits in terms of the provisions of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001.
After the first Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2001 was given effect to vide Notification being S.O. Nos.65, 66 and 67 all dated 12.1.2002, the petitioner applied for and requested to set off the sales tax w.e.f. 1.1.2004.
Hence this appeal.
| 0 | train | 2006_475.txt |
No. 1 is the son of plaintiff No. 2, whereas Plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of possession in respect of several properties mentioned in schedule of the plaint and in the present appeal we are companycerned with Schedule I property i.e. four acres of land pertaining to R.S. No. 44/3 situate at village Vijjeswaram, hereinafter referred to as the land in dispute.
According to the plaintiffs their predecessor in interest viz., one Venkata Ramana Rao, who happened to be the father of plaintiff No. 1 and husband of plaintiff No. 2, was the owner of land in dispute.
Venkata Ramana Rao was a Government employee and in his absence defendant No. 1 i.e. elder brother of second plaintiff used to look after his property.
Said Venkata Ramana Rao died in the year 1948 and thereafter the plaintiffs came back to the village and started looking after the agricultural land including the land in dispute.
No. 1 was asked to look after the land in dispute.
In the year 1974 when the defendant declined to deliver possession of the land in dispute, lawyers numberice dated 6th April, 1974 was issued calling upon the defendants to hand over the property.
No. 1 responded to the numberice by his letter dated 27th May, 1974 denying the title of the plaintiffs and claiming himself to be the owner of the property.
Plaintiffs thereafter filed the suit bearing O.S. No. 20 of 1974 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, West Godavari District, Kovvur for recovery of possession in respect of land in dispute and for mesne profit.
In the written statement filed by defendant No. 1 his plea was that he purchased the land in dispute under a stamped agreement from Venkata Ramana Rao for a value of Rs.1600/ .
No. 1 that balance amount of Rs.400/ was sent by Money Order.
After the death of Venkata Ramana Rao, the second plaintiff claimed more money towards the sale of the land in dispute and plaintiff No. 1 categorically stated that on 18th February, 1954 the Settlement Officer directed issuance of patta of the land in dispute along with other lands in their favour and he was all through waiting for the issuance of patta.
1, in August, 1959 he came to know that a rough patta was issued to second plaintiff companytrary to the decision of the Settlement Officer and thereafter he filed an application on 7th November, 1959 before the Rough Patta Correction Officer informing him about variance between grant and the order and prayed that the name of the second plaintiff be deleted from the patta and in her place his name and that of his brothers name be substituted.
On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial companyrt framed various issues including the following issues Whether the father of the 1st plaintiff late Venkata Ramana Rao died possessed of the plaint schedule properties? No. 1 had purchased the land in dispute and on these findings the trial companyrt dismissed the suit.
CHANDRAMAULI KR.
PRASAD, J. Plaintiff original defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were brother and sister of the second plaintiff.
Both the defendants died during the pendency of the suit.
The heirs and legal representatives of the first defendant were substituted in his place and they had companytested the suit.
Defendant Thereafter the first defendant did number present the petition for substituting his name in the patta by deleting the name of the second plaintiff.
Further plea of the first defendant was that he had perfected his title by adverse possession.
Whether any of the suit properties were entrusted to any of the defendants in or about the year 1952? The trial companyrt further held that defendant
Plaintiffs case further is that again in the year 1954 they shifted their residence to Kakinada for education of the first plaintiff and defendant According to him he paid Rs.1,000/ to Venkata Ramana Rao and a sum of Rs.225/ to one Bombothu Chitteyya who was the tenant and in possession of the land in dispute during 1943 and said tenant vide letter dated 16th June, 1943 relinquished his possession and delivered the land to defendant It is further case of defendant 1 he filed reminder on 6th November, 1960 but it was returned by the Assistant Settlement Officer on 22nd November, 1960 with certain objections.
Plaintiffs, aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt, preferred appeal before the High Court and the learned Single Judge by his judgment and decree dated 16.09.1987 dismissed the appeal.
Plaintiffs thereafter preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 438 of 1988 and the Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment and decree dated 19.12.2001 allowed the appeal set aside the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt as well as of the appellate companyrt and decreed the suit.
1, aggrieved by the same, have preferred this appeal with leave of the Court.
| 0 | train | 2010_1222.txt |
It arises out of a judgment and order dated 11.08.2008 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Writ Petition No.676 of 2008 whereby and whereunder the appellants application questioning the validity and or legality of an order issuing a warrant against the appellant by the Magistrate Court, Clayton County, Georgia in case No. 2006/CW/06369 and Case No. 2006/CW/06370 in USA in respect of a companyplaint filed by the respondent No. 6 herein, was dismissed.
The appellant in that application had also sought for a direction restraining the respondents or any other Central Government machinery from arresting the appellant or taking any action pursuant to or in furtherance of the Red Corner Notice issued by INTERPOL in respect of those arrest warrants.
BACKGROUND FACTS Appellant and the respondent No. 6 are citizens of India.
Appellant married the respondent No. 6 on 6.04.2002 at Mumbai.
Marital life of the Appellant and the Respondent No. 6 was however number happy.
According to the respondent No. 6, she was companytinuously being harassed.
She applied for grant of permanent asylum on 1.07.2003 allegedly under companyrcion from the appellant.
No. 6 allegedly moved to her sisters house at Sharon Massachusetts, USA.
PROCEEDINGS IN USA She filed a companyplaint with the Sharon Police Department on 26.04.2005.
On or about 09.05.2005 an application before the Probate and Family Court of Massachusetts for grant of divorce was filed by her.
The Probate and Family Court, Massachusetts passed an order of temporary custody of the child, restraint and abuse prevention ex parte in favour of the respondent No.6 and against the appellant on 10.05.2005.
Service of the said order is said to have been effected on the appellant on 20.05.2005.
She companytends that her Indian Passport was stolen by the appellant from the premises which was being occupied by her.
Admittedly, the appellant came to India with the child on 15.04.2006 in violation of the companyrt custody orders.
The companytention of the appellant is that despite the initial marital discord, the parties started living together.
It was decided that he should return to India with the child wherefor even a written companysent was given by the respondent No. 6 by affirming an affidavit before a Notary on or about 14.04.2006, stating I, Hetal G. Thakker authorize my child Eesha Lakhani to travel with my husband and her father, Bhavesh Lakhani to India.
No. 6, however, companytends that the appellant travelled out of the United States of America with the child by creating false and fabricated documents including the said affidavit as would also appear from the fact that the child already had a passport.
On the premise that the child was abducted by the appellant, warrants of arrest were issued against him on the basis of a companyplaint made by the respondent No. 6 before the police authorities.
No. 6 thereafter married one Ashwin Matta.
Indisputably, she filed an application for custody of the child before the Family Court at Mumbai on 11.05.2007.
By an order dated 15.05.2007, the Family Court directed the appellant to remain present in the Court with Eesha.
B. SINHA, J Leave granted.
Out of the said wedlock, a daughter Eesha was born on 26.04.2003.
Later on the respondent In the said proceeding, she also sought for orders of custody of her daughter.
Allegedly, he neither appeared before the Court companytesting the said interim custody order number sought for any modification thereof.
Respondent No.6 took up a job and companytinued to live with her child in Massachusetts.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FAMILY COURT Respondent The requesting Embassy would instruct the CBI to carry out its instructions for surveillance, arrest and detention.
The requesting Embassy can even companytact the Indian police directly.
Offences to be investigated by special police establishment.
The Ministry of External Affairs works for the administrative watching of the Act.
Indisputably, therefore, when a proceeding under the Act is initiated, the civil liberty of a person would be directly affected.
The DSPE Act was brought into existence the same year.
When by an order under sub section 1 the powers and jurisdiction of members of the said police establishment are extended to any such area, a member thereof may, subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf, discharge the functions of a police officer in that area and shall, while so discharging such functions be deemed to be a member of the police force of the area and be vested with the powers, functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of a police officer belonging to that police force.
INTRODUCTION Interpretation of the roles and responsibilities of the Central Bureau of Investigation CBI vis vis the provisions of the Extradition Act, 1962 hereinafter referred to as the Act is involved in this appeal.
He went to Michigan to pursue his studies in M.S. Computer Engineering between August, 1998 and May, 2000.
He also worked as a Software Engineer at California in a companypany named Broadbase Software upto 2001.
He was later on employed as a Technical Lead in a Government Contract Firm at California known as Ancore Corporation between 2001 and 2003.
They moved to California on 19.04.2002 and stayed there till 2005.
They will be leaving the United States of America on or about April 14, 2006 and returning on or about Undecided Respondent A decree for divorce as also the custody of the child was passed by the Norfolk Country Probate and Family Court, Canton, Massachusetts on 2.5.2006.
Appellant indisputably preferred an appeal before the High Court which was marked as Family Court Appeal Stamp No. 11724 of 2007.
was served on the appellant on 20th May, 2005 which was extended till 24th May, 2005.
Criminal offences, if any, are sought to be made out relate to the violation of the Order of the Court which speaks of companymission of an offence of forgery as well.
| 1 | train | 2009_1845.txt |
No. III/209 of Vengola Panchayat, the abovesaid accused persons assaulted Kochunni PW 4 and Kunjumuhammed PW 3.
Seeing the assault on Majeed it is stated Muhammed PW 2 rushed to the scene but he was intercepted and stabbed by A 1 on the right side of the lower part of his belly.
The said learned Sessions Judge as per his judgment dated 29.10.1994 came to the companyclusion that though the prosecution has established that the deceased Majeed died due to the injuries suffered by him, further came to the companyclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt that it is these accused persons who had caused injuries to Majeed leading to his death.
Ashraf A 6 and Subair A 7 on the other, on 3.11.1991 at about 8.15 a.m. on the North Eastern portion of Korathukudy House At that time the deceased Majeed came to the place of the incident and resisted the said accused from assaulting PWs.3 and 4 at which time Ummer A 3 beat Majeed with an iron rod MO 1 which blow was warded off by Majeed who caught hold of the iron rod and a scuffle ensued between Majeed and Ummer A 3.
At this point of time, Kunjumohammed A 1 came to the scene with a fishing sword MO 2 and stabbed on the back of Majeed with the same.
Majeed having received the said stab injury then allegedly turned towards A 1 and caught hold of the sword which was pulled back by A 1 who again stabbed Majeed on the left side of his chest.
PW 2 then caught hold of the sword but he was assaulted by Ummer A 3 on the head with the iron rod.
At that point of time the prosecution alleges accused 2 and 4 to 7 dragged Majeed to the residential companypouned of the 3rd accused and put Majeed in a supine position and A 4 exhorted others by shouting cut this pigs throat.
The prosecution then alleges that the second accused got MO 2 a swrod from the first accused and inflicted a forceful cut on the front of the neck of Majeed due to which injury Majeed died on the spot.
from the place of incident and lodged a companyplaint as per Ex.
The Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, PW 18 attached to the said Police Station recorded Ex.
P 6 which was attested by PW 10 Azeez.
The I.O. PW 19 also seized MO 4, a lungi found on the body of Majeed, a thorthu MO 3 found near the body of Majeed and also MO 5 slippers.
Thereafter he sent the body to Kottayam Medical College hospital for postmortem examination.
He then companyducted the Mahazar of the scene of the incident.
On search of the house of the 3rd accused he found and seized Mos.1 and 2 as per Ex.
P 8 which was attested by Mohammad PW 12.
The postmortem of the body of the deceased was companyducted at about 1.30 p.m. on 3.11.1991 by PW 13 the doctor who was then the Asstt.
Professor of Forensic Medicine, Kottayam Medical College and who issued Ex.
It also numbericed the fact that the prosecution had failed to explain the clay and mud found on the feet of the deceased which companyld number have been there on his feet if actually the incident had taken place as projected by the prosecution said companyrt opined that this fact also indicated that incident must have taken place in the Tapioca garden.
The case of the prosecution as presented to the trial companyrt is that in an altercation that took place between Kunjumuhammed PW 3, Kochunni PW 4, Khadarkunju PW 5 on one side and Moosakutty A 2, Ummer A 3, Ali A 4, Kochunni A 5, P 1 and registered Crime No.408/91, he then sent the file to the Circle Inspector of Police, PW 19, who initiated the investigation of the case and proceeded to the scene of incident at about 9 a.m. and prepared inquest Panchnama as per Ex.
The trial companyrt also numbericed the fact that even though the prosecution had projected PW 1 as an eye witness to the incident in question, he had number supported the prosecution case and had actually stated in his evidence before the companyrt that he was called to the Police Station on the midnight of 3rd and 4th November, 1991 and was asked to sign a prepared statement which indicated the fact that the investigating agency did number know who the accused persons were till that time.
| 1 | train | 2003_471.txt |
KURIAN, J. Leave granted.
In the companyrse of hearing of the appeals, the Division Bench framed the following questions Whether the writ petitioners appellants belong to any recognized political party or number If number, whether the aforesaid mischief of law will be applicable Whether the ratio decided by this Court in the aforesaid judgments is applicable to these cases or number.
The appellants are aggrieved by the Judgment dated 11.12.2014 in Writ Appeal Nos.1149 and 1150 of 2014 and judgment dated 12.12.2014 in P. No. 29984 of 2014.
Essentially the dispute pertains to the disqualification of the appellants in terms of Rule 6 8 i of the Andhra Pradesh Municipal Rules, 2005.
| 0 | train | 2016_555.txt |
No. 1 in favour of Caltex India Limited for a period of five years expiring on 31.7.1979.
The Appellant herein, thus, was at the liberty to renew the period of lease for a period of further five years with effect from 1.8.1979 on the same terms and companyditions as companytained in the deed of lease dated 24.12.1974.
The Appellant herein exercised its option of renewing the lease with effect from 24.4.1979.
On the expiry of the said period, an eviction proceeding was initiated by the First Respondent against the Appellant by filing a suit which was marked as O.S. No. 737 of 1985.
The Regional Manager of the Appellant herein thereafter sent a requisition to the Special Deputy Collector for acquisition of the land for the purpose of companytinuing the business wherefor a numberification was published on 15.10.1985.
The First Respondent filed a detailed objection on 20th July, 1989 companytending that there existed numberpublic purpose for acquisition of the said land and in any event, other suitable lands are available therefor.
Upon giving an opportunity of hearing to the Respondents, the Collector is said to have companyducted an enquiry and submitted his Report to the Government on or about 28.8.1989.
Questioning the said numberification, the First Respondent herein filed a writ petition in the High Court which was marked as W.P. No. 16012 of 1989.
Although, the Deputy Collector and the Appellant filed their companynter affidavits in the said proceedings, numbercounter affidavit was filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of such liberty, the First Respondent herein raised additional grounds by filing a Miscellaneous Application which was marked as WPMP No. 27633 of 2003 companytending inter alia therein that there had been a total number application of mind on the part of the State Government both before issuing the numberification under Section 4 1 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
A companynter affidavit was filed by Respondent Nos.
2 and 3 affirmed by one Shri B. Venkataiah, Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition General both for himself as also the State in the said Miscellaneous Application.
On or about 24.12.1974, another deed of lease was executed by the mother of the Respondent The Central Government, however, in exercise of its power companyferred upon it under Section 9 of the said Act directed that the said undertakings shall, instead of companytinuing to vest in the Central Government, vest in Caltex Oil Refining India Ltd., a Govt.
companypany with effect from 30.12.1976.
Caltex Oil Refining India Ltd. was later on amalgamated with the Appellant herein in terms of Sub section 3 of Section 7 of the said Act.
The said suit for eviction was decreed.
However, the said numberification lapsed.
On or about 3.6.1989, a fresh numberification was issued under Section 4 1 of the Land Acquisition Act for short the Act .
A declaration thereafter was issued under Section 6 of the Act on 25.9.1989.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the said writ petition.
The parties were, however, granted liberty to file additional pleadings.
An apology was also tendered for number production of records.
The Appellant being aggrieved thereby are before us.
W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO.
2253 OF 2005 B. SINHA, J Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited was a tenant in the premises in question wherefor an agreement of tenancy was entered into by and between the father of the First Respondent and Caltex India Limited for a period of ten years from 15.12.1965.
On or about 30.12.1976, the Caltex Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining India Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex India Limited Ordinance, 1976 which was replealed and replaced by the Caltex Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining India Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex India Limited Act, 1977 was promulgated whereby and whereunder right, title and interest of Caltex India Ltd. in relation to its undertakings in India stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government.
An appeal preferred thereagainst was dismissed.
An appeal thereagainst was filed before this Court marked as Civil Appeal No. 910 of 1998 and by an order dated 19.8.1998 the judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court on the ground that several other companytentious issues have been raised.
An affidavit affirmed by one Shri K.V. Rao was filed on 7th November, 2003 stating that the records were number readily traceable in view of shifting of Industries and Commerce Department within the premises of the Secretariat Buildings twice in four years.
By reason of the impugned judgment, the writ petition has been allowed.
The companynter affidavit filed on 30th October, 2003 was also affirmed by a Special Deputy Collector.
| 0 | train | 2005_746.txt |
In the year 1982, M s Rashtriya Chemicals Fertilizers Limited hereinafter referred to as RCF , a Government of India Undertaking, floated a global tender for supply of various types of capital goods required for its Thal project.
The tender was accepted by RCF and by a purchase order dated 13th October, 1982, they agreed to purchase cables worth Rs.
17,49,000/ from the appellant.
According to the appellant, as they were number clear about the form on which they had to make the application, on the companyering letter filed with the applications, with companyies to the Advance Licensing Committee as well as to the Special Imprest Licensing Committee at New Delhi, a request was made to forward the said applications to the companycerned cell so that an appropriate licence is issued for the aforesaid purpose.
On processing of the application, the office of JCCI, Bombay, vide their letter dated 30th November, 1982, called upon the appellant to furnish the essentiality certificate from RCF.
Accordingly, the appellant obtained the essentiality certificate from the project authority i.e. RCF, to the effect that they have agreed to purchase goods valued at Rs. 17,49,000/ , from the appellant for their Thal project under the global tendering procedure and that the Thal project is fully financed by the Government of India.
In the certificate issued by RCF, it was also stated that the appellant was eligible for availing companycessional rate of import duty on the raw materials imported by them for manufacture of cables in terms of para 14 of Import Policy 1981 82.
The appellant forwarded the said certificate to JCCI, Bombay.
K. JAIN, J. Leave granted.
Material facts leading to these proceedings are as follows Responding to the said tender numberice, the appellant, a partnership firm, through its managing partner, Mr. Manohar Kulkarni, an ex army man, submitted its quotation for supply of thermocouple companypensating cables and extension cables.
In order to avail of customs duty exemption on the import of certain raw materials required in the manufacture of capital goods to be supplied to RCF, on 22nd November, 1982, the appellant applied to the Joint Chief Controller of Imports Exports for short JCCI , Bombay, for issuance of an import licence with duty exemption entitlement certificate etc.
for import of raw materials free of duty or at a companycessional rate of duty in terms of Import Policy Book for AM 83.
Cash assistance, if any, will be as per the instructions issued by the Ministry of Commerce from time to time.
In the event of failure to fulfil the export obligation within the time stipulated, the bond will be enforced and the licence holder shall pay customs duty on the proportionate quantity of the material companyresponding to the products number exported.
The appellant imported raw materials from time to time, aggregating to C.I.F. value of Rs.3,01,439/ , and cleared the same without payment of duty in terms of the Bond.
RCF, for requisite endorsement on Duty Exemption Entitlement Certificate for short DEEC .
R. Johny, though the appellate order is purported to have been issued with the approval of JCCI.
The Writ Petition was, thus, disposed of on the same day.
But they had number been able to identify and choose a companyrect scheme of import licence to execute the order.
But, they did number object when the special imprest licence under reference was granted to them under the deemed export category with specific export obligation with reference to 100 duty free imports.
Since they accepted the companyditions of the licence and also executed a bond to abide by the companyditions of the licence which carried an export obligation, it was incumbent on them to companyplete formalities in support of their companytention of having discharged export obligation numberwithstanding that the imported goods were utilised for the execution of the project.
The project they executed or supplied they made towards the execution of the RCF, Thal Project was number a project falling under the category of deemed exports.
This project was number aided by IDA IBRD.
But they did number do so companysidering the fact that the appellants mis understood the provisions of the policy in force and that there was numbermalafides on their part, I am inclined to take a lenient view.
This appeal, by special leave, arises out of the judgment and order dated 7th April, 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1174 of 2003.
To ensure fulfilment of the export obligation under the said licence, the appellant shall execute a bond with 100 bank guarantee as per the proforma given in Appendix 38 of the Handbook of Import Export Procedure 1981 82 for a sum of Rs.12,14,623.
The requisite Bond in terms of the aforementioned companydition b was accordingly, executed on 17th June, 1983.
However, later on, RCF made the requisite endorsement on the DEEC book on 2nd February, 1988 to the effect that the appellant had supplied goods valued at Rs.17,59,382/ during the period from 27th July, 1983 to 10th May, 1984.
The appellant was required to appear before Mr. G.R. Nair, Deputy Chief Controller of Imports Exports on 20th September, 1985, at 315 p.m. for a personal hearing, which, in fact, was granted on 29th September, 1985.
The appeal preferred by the appellant against the forfeiture order dated 4th December, 1985 was rejected vide order dated 21st May, 1986 issued by Smt.
Incidentally, the forfeiture order as well as the appellate order was passed by the same officer, namely, Smt.
The proposed action was challenged by the appellant by preferring Writ Petition No.2038 of 1988.
| 1 | train | 2008_2290.txt |
We may briefly numberice the facts of each case.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II vide order dated 15.5.1985.
In 1993, he filed a claim petition before the Tribunal inter alia claiming that the period of his service rendered as Co operative Supervisor be reckoned for the purpose of gratuity, leave encashment, family pension and other retiral benefits.
The Tribunal by an order dated 17.8.1994 allowed the claim and directed that the period from 1.2.1959 to 31.7.1989 be reckoned towards the respondents total length of service for the purpose of determining family pension and gratuity.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court, which was dismissed by the impugned order of the High Court.
All the respondents claimed that the period they have worked as Co operative Supervisor which is a number governmental post be reckoned towards the period for companyputing the pensionary benefits as government servants.
7350, 7320, 7321, 7322, 7323, 7324, 7325, 7326, 7327, 7328, 7329, 7330, 7331, 7332, 7333, 7334, 7335, 7336, 7337, 7338 7339, 7342, 7343 7349, 7351, 7352 of 2003, C.A.No.
Leave granted in both the Special Leave Petitions.
We have heard Dr.R.G. Padia, learned senior companynsel, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, learned senior companynsel Mr.Naresh Kaushik, Mr.Shakil Ahmed Syed, Mr.Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Mr.Girdhar G. Upadhyay, Mr.Rameshwar Prasad Goyal and Mr.Sunil Kumar Singh, learned companynsel appearing for different appellants respondents.
He was companyfirmed in the post on 30.04.1972.
He retired from service on 31.07.1989 as Co operative Inspector Grade II.
The Tribunal further directed that the respondent would also be entitled to arrears of pension and gratuity.
Respondent in C.A.No.7320 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 8.10.1959.
He was promoted to Inspector Grade II on 1.3.1979 and retired on 31.8.1993.
Respondent in C.A.No.
He was promoted to Inspector Grade II on 5.8.1978 and retired on 31.7.1994.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 7.11.1978 and retired on 31.1.1989.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 7.10.1977.
He retired on 30.6.1986.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 15.1.1971.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 1.2.1964.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 29.4.1962.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 20.2.1977.
He retired on 30.6.1994.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 25.5.1985.
He retired on 31.1.1991.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 7.5.1963.
He retired on 31.7.1983.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 25.11.1988.
He retired on 31.1.1994.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 29.5.1976.
He retired on 31.7.1993.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 31.5.1994.
He retired on 31.7.1997.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 24.5.1985.
He retired on 31.12.1994.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 16.7.1979.
He retired on 31.7.1986.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 8.9.1965.
He retired on 31.7.1985.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 16.10.1971.
He retired on 30.11.1989.
He was promoted to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II on 9.5.1985.
He retired on 31.1.1995.
WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS.
5243 of 2006 arising out of SLP Civil No.21480 of 2002 and C.A.No.
5242 of 2006 arising out of SLP civil No.22787 of 2002 and W.P. Civil No.647 of 2002.
K.SEMA,J. Delay companydoned in S.L.P. Civil No. 22787 of 2002.
Respondent in C.A.No.7318 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor, which is a number government post on 1.02.1959.
Under Rule 5 of the Subordinate Co operative Service Rules, 1979 the promotion to the post of Co operative Inspector Grade II is either by direct recruitment or by promotion through the State Public Service Commission.
Hence the present appeal.
7326 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 22.6.1959.
Respondent in C.A.No.7334 of 2003 was holding the post of Co operative Supervisor.
Respondent in C.A.No.7350 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 5.4.1956.
Respondent in C.A.No.7321 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 1.12.1954.
He retired on 31 3 1989.
Respondent in C.A.No.7322 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 1.2.1956.
He retired on 30 6 1989.
Respondent in C.A.No.7323 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 15.12.1947.
He retired on 31 7 1983.
Respondent in C.A.No.7325 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 22.3.1958.
Respondent in C.A.No.7327 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 17.2.1958.
Respondent in C.A.No.7328 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 15.7.1952.
Respondent in C.A.No.7329 of 2003 was appointed as Co operative Supervisor on 24.6.1959.
| 0 | train | 2006_1064.txt |
By letter dated 13.3.2002, he sought voluntary retirement under rule 16 2 of All India Services Death cum Retirement Benefits Rules, 1958 hereinafter referred to as the 1958 Rules with immediate effect.
Appellant was registered as an elector at 535.
No. 62, Mujeggar Plot No.
A numberification was issued to fill up the two vacancies under which the last date of filing the numberination papers was 14.3.2002, the date of scrutiny was 15.3.2002, last date of withdrawal was 18.3.2002 and the date of polling was 27.3.2003.
The appellant sought voluntary retirement from service as he wanted to companytest the election to Rajya Sabha.
On 15.3.2003, the Returning Officer rejected the numberination papers of the appellant on the ground that rule 16 of the 1958 Rules warranted giving three months previous numberice to the appointing authority and since the said period had number elapsed on the date of scrutiny the appellant was holding the office of profit on that day and, therefore, stood disqualified under Article 102 1 c of the Constitution.
On 18.3.2002, election results were announced, since there was numbercontest after rejection of the numberination papers submitted by the appellant.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed election petition No. 27 of 2002 in the High Court on the ground that his numberination papers had been wrongly rejected by the Returning Officer.
In the election petition, he stated that on companypletion of 40 years of service and on attaining the age of 591/2 years, he was eligible to seek voluntary retirement under the 1958 Rules that he had applied for the same through proper channel on 13.3.2002 that he had also made a request to the appointing authority to waive numberice period of three months for seeking voluntary retirement that he had relinquished the charge on 13.3.2002 and companysequently, he was number holding office of profit with the Government on that day and, therefore, he was eligible to seek election to Rajya Sabha.
In the election petition, the appellant further pleaded that his request was duly received by the Government of India.
Ministry of Personnel appointing authority and also by Government of Haryana at Chandigarh.
He further averred that he sought voluntary retirement on account of illness of his wife and after resigning voluntarily from his post, he had filed numberination papers.
He further stated that since his numberination papers were rejected, there was numbercontest and results were declared on 18.3.2002 when respondents were declared as members of the Rajya Sabha from the State of Haryana.
In the light of the above allegations, the appellant challenged the elections of the respondents on the ground of improper rejection of his numberination papers.
The election petition was scrutinized by the Registry of the High Court, which was found to have been filed within the period of limitation, and accordingly it was numbered and numberices were issued to the respondents who appeared before the High Court on 31.7.2002 through their companynsel.
A joint written statement was filed by the respondents companytroverting the averments made by the appellant.
In the written statement, the respondent submitted that the petition was liable to be dismissed as the appellant had number disclosed a material facts as to on which date he had received companymunication regarding acceptance of his application for voluntary retirement.
On merits also, the respondents denied various averments made by the appellant.
that his application for voluntary retirement was accepted by the appointing authority before the date of scrutiny and that his request for waiver of the numberice period of three months was actually accepted.
The appellant was a member of Indian Administrative Service having 40 years service to his credit and who was 591/2 years old.
hereinafter referred to as the said Act is the question which arises for determination in this appeal referred under section 116 A of the said Act.
2004 3 SCR 683 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPADIA, J. Whether the election petition filed by the appellant was lacking in material facts as required under section 83 1 a of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 He further averred that on the date of the scrutiny, he was present when he brought to the numberice of the Returning Officer the factum of his voluntary retirement but the Returning Officer disregarded the provisions of the 1958 Rules as also the provisions of All India Services Conditions of Service Residuary Matters Rules, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the 1960 Rules as also Fundamental Rules, 1922.
In the election petition, the appellant had alleged that the action of the Returning Officer in rejecting his numberination papers was number justified as the appointing authority has the power under the 1960 Rules to relax the companydition and to waive the numberice period of three months in the case of an employee who seeks voluntary retirement.
A preliminary objection was raised to the effect that the averments companytained in the election petition were vague and lacked material facts and particulars, as such, the said petition was liable to be dismissed.
In the absence of disclosure of the above facts, the High Court dismissed the election petition.
Hence, the High Court was right in dismissing the election petition for want of material facts.
| 0 | train | 2004_890.txt |
It was pointed out that admittedly the registered offices of the respondent companypanies are number located in the State of Kamataka but are located either at Bombay or at Gujarat.
As against this, the. appellant who is a practising advocate companytended that he was a permanent resident of Bangalore and letters requesting the companypany to transfer the shares and to send memorandum, articles of association, balance sheets etc. were sent from Bangalore to the registered offices of the companypanies and, therefore, cause of action also arose at Bangalore.
The learned companynsel appearing on behalf of the appellant companyplamant strenuously companytended that the order passed by the High Court is, on the face of it, erroneous because admittedly the appellant is residing at Bangalore.
Leave granted.
The only question involved in these appeals is whether the companyplaint for the offence punishable under Section 113 2 of the Companies Act. 1956 companyld be filed only where the registered office of the companypany is situated or where the companyplainant is residing.
The appellant had lodged criminal cases before the Special Court for economic offences in Karnataka at Bangalore on the allegation that the respondent companypanies had companymitted offences punishable under Section 113 2 of the Companies Act.
As the documents were sent to the respondent by post, as requested by him, the cause of action would arise only where the head office is situated.
The Court, therefore, arrived at the companyclusion that having regard to Section 201 of the Cr.
P.C., the Magistrate is required to return the companyplaint for presentation before the proper companyrt with an endorsement to that effect.
Being purchaser of the shares, he was entitled to get the share certificates at Bangalore and, therefore, cause of action would arise at Bangalore also.
52 Company Cases 177 Patna .
For this purpose, he relied upon the decision rendered by Rajasthan High Court in Ranboxy Laboratories Ltd v. Smt.
Criminal Petition Nos.240, 1485, 1548, 1848 and 1849 of 1996 before the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore challenged the order passed by the trial companyrt rejecting applications for the discharge on the ground that the Magistrate had numberterritorial jurisdiction to try the alleged offences.
In some cases, companypanies straightway approached the High Court questioning the order passed by the learned Magistrate issuing summons to them after taking companynizance of the offence.
He referred to the decision rendered by the Patna High Court in Upendra Kuniar Joshi v. Manik Lal Chatterjee and others, 1982 Vol.
| 0 | train | 1999_887.txt |
n. phadke naunit lal and b.p. singh for the appellant.
the appellant firm companyducts a number of bidi factories at various places in vidharba including the one at kamptee.
aggrieved by the order he flied an application under s. 16 of the c.p. berar industrial disputes settlement act alleging that the said order was incompetent and illegal.
the appellant firm companytended that at the material time respondent 1 was employed as a clerk in the head office that the head office was a separate entity that the dismissal order had number been passed by the appellant firm as the owner of the said factory that the firm as such owner was wrongly impleaded and that the application was misconceived.
against the dismissal of his application respondent 1 filed a revision application before the industrial companyrt nagpur.
respondent 1 thereafter filed a writ petition in the high companyrt challenging the said orders.
d. verma and ganpat rai for respondent number 1.
its head office is also situate there.
the factory at kamptee and the head office have always been treated as separate entities though owned by the same firm.
respondent 1 was originally employed in the factory at kamptee.
the high companyrt held that it was possible in law for an employer to have various establishments where different kinds of work would be done in which case an employee in one establishment would be liable to be transferred to anumberher establishment.
the scindias therefore were numberlonger companycerned with them.
but the learned judges explained that these were special terms applicable to the appellants.
but in spite of them they still had become the employees of the asi and were such employees on the appointed day.
it seems that this companyclusion was reached on the footing that since asi was the subsidiary companypany of the scindias like several other subsidiary companypanies and it was.
companysequently the head office was registered under the central provinces berar shops and establishment act 1947 and the factory at kamptee was registered under the factories act.
he relied on the fact that the head office and the factory had separate rules that respondent 1 used to sign his attendance in the register of the head office that he was being paid his salary by the head office and lastly that his name was number on the muster roll of the factory.
he also found that whereas the staff of the head office was governed by the c.p. berar shops establishments act the factory was governed by the c.p. berar industrial disputes settlement act.
the industrial dismissed the application holding that the only question raised before it was whether respondent 1 was the employee of the head office and that that being purely a question of fact he could number interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the assistant companymissioner.
they were the employees of asi and were such employees on the appointed day and since they had number exercised the option under s. 20 1 they became the employees of the companyporation by operation of that provision.
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 793 of 1966.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated august 21 1964 of the bombay high companyrt nagpur bench in special civil application number 353 of 1963.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by shelat j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the high companyrt of bombay nagpur bench which set aside the orders of the assistant companymissioner of labour and the industrial companyrt nagpur and remanded the case to the assistant companymissioner.
the factory has also its own standing orders certified under the central provinces berar industrial disputes settlement act 1947.
two or three years thereafter he was directed to work at the head office and worked therein for about six years prior to the impugned order of dismissal passed against him by the munim of the head office.
the assistant companymissioner dismissed the application holding that respondent 1 at the material time was number the employee in the factory but was employed in the firms head office.
as the order passed by the assistant companymissioner was number clear on this question the high companyrt remanded the case for disposal according to law.
in 1943 the scindias purchased the asi and by 1946 asi became a full fledged subsidiary of the scindias.
on april 6 1953 the appellants wrote to the scindias to recall them to their original posts but the scindias refused to do so as they were number in a position to absorb them.
they pointed out that a bill called the air companyporation bill 1953 was pending before parliament that under cl.
the act was passed on may 28 1953.
| 0 | test | 1968_220.txt |
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 14, 1960, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Gwalior Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Revision No. 91/59.
January 25.
The three appellants then filed a petition for revision in the High Court.
The appellants, however, obtained special leave from this Court and have filed the present appeal.
L. Kohli and C. L. Sarin, for the appellants.
N. Shroff, for the respondent.
200 on each companynt or companynts for which they were originally companyvicated.
The Appellants asked for a certificate to appeal to this Court but it was refused by the High Court.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 47 of 1961.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court Gwalior Bench , by which a criminal revision filed by the three appellants was dismissed.
The three appellants with five others were tried for offences under s. 4 of The United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa Madhya Bharat , Gambling Act, Samvat 2006, Madhya Bharat Act No. 51 of 1949 Samvat 2036 .
The sentences in Krishna chandras case were ordered to run companycurrently.
| 0 | train | 1963_13.txt |
By Commissioners Order dated 30th October, 1986, redemption fine of Rs.85 lakhs and penalty of Rs.15 lakhs came to be imposed.
Against the said order, the assessee respondent herein filed an appeal before CEGAT.
We hereby direct the respondents to refund the redemption fine and penalty paid by the Appellants in terms of the above said order within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order.
In the event of the Respondents number refunding the amounts within the above said period of one month the same shall carry interests 12 per annum from the expiry of the above period.
On 29th October, 1990, CEGAT dismissed Reference Application filed by the Department.
By minutes of the Order dated 17th June, 1991, CEGAT was directed by the High Court to submit Statement of Case within three months.
No appeal was filed by the Department against the grant of refund of Rs.45,59,733/ .
The Department has filed a further affidavit today.
The assessee has deposited a sum of Rs.79,36,058.52 vide Demand Drafts favouring the Deputy Registrar Administration , Supreme Court of India, as indicated in its affidavit dated 11th October, 2008 see page 88 of the paper book .
The Tribunal is directed to forward the Statement of Case in the pending Reference marked as Matter No.1104/1991 within a period of twelve weeks.
Delay companydoned.
Leave granted.
The Revenue also moved cross appeal cross objection before the Tribunal.
Pursuant to the Commissioners order, the assessee deposited Rs.45,59,733/ in cash.
For the balance amount, bank guarantee was furnished.
By the said order, Revenue was directed to refund the redemption fine and penalty within thirty days and in default the Department was liable to pay interest at the rate of 12.
The assessee received the said amount of Rs.45,59,733/ .
Thereafter, the assessee moved an application before the Tribunal marked as MA 193/02 claiming interest on the principal amount refunded to it on 11th July, 2000.
The Writ Petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge which stood companyfirmed by the Division Bench vide impugned judgment.
Office is directed to list the matter immediately on Board on deposit of the said amount.
Matter to be listed on number miscellaneous day.
In this companynection, we direct the Department to submit its draft Statement of Case before the Tribunal within six weeks before the Tribunal.
On receipt of the draft Statement of Case within six weeks, the Tribunal will take steps to forward the Statement of Case to the High Court.
This Court will pass further direction only on such deposit.
On 30th April, 1990, the Tribunal passed Order No.154 Cal/1990 154 allowing the assessees appeal.
We quote hereinbelow the operative part of the order passed by the Tribunal, which reads as under In the result, the appeal of M s. B.Arun Kumar Co., Bombay, succeeds.
The impugned order passed by the learned Collector dated 31.10.86 is hereby set aside.
Thereafter, on the Revenues Application marked as Matter No.1104/1991 , the Calcutta High Court made the rule absolute on two questions which are as under Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in setting aside the order of Collector dated 31st October 1986 and directing the refund with interest? Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in transferring the cross objection to be decided by the Special Branch of the Tribunal? By Order dated 21st August, 1991, CEGAT stayed its order dated 30th April, 1990 for refund of redemption fine and penalty with interest till disposal of the Reference by the High Court.
The assessee herein requested for refund of the amounts deposited by it vide letter dated 23rd October, 1999, which was surprisingly granted by the Department on 11th July, 2000 even when the Reference was pending in the High Court.
This application was disposed of by the Tribunal vide order dated 19th December, 2002 by which the Commissioner was directed to decide on the application for interest as calculated and claimed by the assessee.
The Commissioner rejected the claim for interest vide order dated 12th May, 2003.
This order was challenged by the assessee by filing Writ Petition No.12027 W of 2003.
Hence, this Civil Appeal by the Department.
On 19th August, 2008, this Court passed the following order Pending further orders, we are directing the respondent herein, M s. B.Arun Kumar Co., to deposit in this Court Rs.45,00,000/ Rupees forty five lakhs together with interest at nine per cent per annum from 11th July, 2000 till the date of deposit, within eight weeks.
The above quoted order came to be passed because the status of the pending Reference Application was number known.
| 0 | train | 2008_1558.txt |
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.4.1988 of the Gujarat High Court in Spl.
Application No. 733 of 1987.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RATNAVEL PANDIAN, J. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellants, namely, Union of India and the Additional Secretary to the Government of India is against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Crimi nal Application No. 733 of 1987 dated 11.4.
Kapil Sibal, Additional Solicitor General, A. Subba Rao and P. Parmeshwaran for the Appellants.
Vineet Kumar and M.N. Shroff for the Respondents.
In the result, the order of detention was quashed and the detenu was directed to be set as liberty.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 750 of 1989.
This ground was only subse quently added by an amendment with the permission of the Court.
| 1 | train | 1990_588.txt |
k. garg and rajendra prasad singh for the appellant.
the appellant was present near the dead body which had been companyered by a dhoti and on interrogation the appellant informed the police party that his brother and family had retired for the night in their bed room at about 10.00 p.m. and he alongwith his wife had slept in the back verandah.
the wife of the appellant was wearing a gold chain on her neck eartops in her ears and golden bangles on her wrists besides glass bangles.
the appellant felt thirsty and asked his wife to give him water and after some time when he felt chilly he went inside the room.
at about 3.45 a.m. the appellant got up to urinate and when he went outside the room he found that his wife was lying on the company with her face upwards but her clothes were in a loose companydition and he was almost naked upto the thighs.
according to the appellant his wife had been murdered by somebody by strangulation while companymitting the theft of the golden chain and the bangles.
the statement of the appellant which revealed a case of lurking house trespass with a view to companymit offence of theft and murder was recorded as ex.
the statement of the appellant ex.
p5 was despatched by sho harmit singh to the police station with his endorsement for registration of a case under section 460 ipc.
n. goswamy and ashok bhan for the respondent.
police companytrol room was informed over the telephone by sulekh chand jain at 4.55 a.m. that an incident had taken place at p 5 green park extension and on receiving the telephone message s.i.
after reaching the spot the said asi maha singh informed the police station on telephone that a murder had taken place.
the information so provided was recorded by asi mangal sen in the daily diary whereupon sho harmit singh immediately left for the spot alongwith si dalip singh si moti singh companystable bhawani dutt and companystable randhir singh.
the police party arrived at the spot at about 5.35 a.m. and took charge of the investigation.
at about 1.30 a.m. he slept in the room while his wife kept sleeping outside.
on going closer to the company he found her tongue protruding and on touching her he found her dead.
he numbericed some scratches on her face and neck and also discovered that the golden chain which was on her neck and golden bangles were missing from her body.
he started screaming and his brother the brothers wife as well as some neighbours came there.
since his telephone was found to be out of order police was informed at his request by sulekh chand anumberher neighbour from his telephone.
the parents of the deceased living in sonepat were also companyveyed the tragic news on telephone through their neighbours.
p5 and a case under section 460 ipc was registered.
the crime team as also the dog squad were summoned.
before proceeding to the police station.
the sho had effected recoveries of various articles including some hair lying near the dead body on the company.
the lock was also taken into possession but it did number appear to have been broken or tampered with.
the inquest proceedings were companyducted by si moti singh and the body was thereafter sent for postmortem examination.
recovery memo ex.pf was prepared and the golden chain and the bangles after being duly weighed were sealed separately and the seal was handed over to kuldip kaul pw1.
the postmortem on the dead body of usha jain was companyducted on 27.7.1976 at 9.00 a.m. by dr. bharat singh pw 4 and according to the postmortem report ex.pl all the injuries found on the person of the deceased were ante mortem and the same were possible by throttling the deceased and that the death of usha jain was caused by asphyxia resulting from throttling.
the nail clippings of the deceased were also sent for analysis to cfsl.
the deceased was carrying 7th month pregnancy at the time of her death.
when the ritual of the recovery under section 27 of the evidence act was performed.
criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 123 of 1985.
from the judgment and order dated 12.11.84 of the delhi high court in state criminal appeal number 71 of 1978.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by dr. anand j. this appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the high companyrt of delhi dated 12th of numberember 1984 setting aside an order of the additional sessions judge new delhi acquitting the appellant of an offence under section 302/203 ipc.
the prosecution case is that on the fateful night of 25th/26th july 1976 the appellant and his wife usha jain went to sleep in the back verandah of their house situated at p 5 green park extension new delhi while his brother p. jain alongwith his wife sharda and children went to sleep separately in their bed room in the same house.
mauji ram made a record of it in the daily diary and passed on the information to the duty officer at police station hauz khas.
asi maha singh was deputed to proceed to the spot for investigation of the case.
after the disclosure statement was made by the appellant leading to the recovery of the ornaments and after numbericing injuries on his person the case which was originally registered under section 460 ipc was companyverted into one under section 302/203 ipc.
| 1 | test | 1993_785.txt |
Appeal filed against the aforesaid order before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal for short the Tribunal was dismissed.
The assessee being aggrieved filed an appeal before the CIT Appeals .
The revenue thereafter filed an appeal under Section 260 of the Act in the High Court.
The respondent assessee for short the assessee is a film producer.
Thereafter, the Assessing Officer implemented the directions issued by the Commissioner of Income Tax by passing a fresh order under Section 143 3 withdrawing the benefit of carry forward of amortization expenses granted to the assessee.
The assessee had claimed amortization expenses in respect of the two films, namely, Ex Kannikcodi and ii Santhwanam.
It appears that in the first film the assessee incurred heavy loss and to make up that loss the assessee ventured to produce the second film.
It was the finding of the appellate authority that the amortization expenses relating to the second year would have to be allowed separately while companyputing the income for the next year and number at the time of companyputation of the income for the current year.
REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7750 OF 2002 BHAN, J. With the leave of the Court the Revenue has filed the present appeal, against the judgment and order dated 27th November, 2001 of the High Court of Kerala in ITA No. 105/1999, rejecting the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 260 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for short the Act .
In his income tax return for the assessment year 1992 93, the assessee claimed the benefit of carry forward of Rs.39,43,830/ as amortization expenses.
The Assessing Officer allowed the claim of amortization.
CIT Appeals accepted the appeal.
Being aggrieved against the order passed by the CIT Appeals , Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal, which was dismissed with certain clarifications.
| 0 | train | 2008_2590.txt |
in writ petitions filed in the bombay high companyrt they were held entitled to the export house certificates.
this was challenged by m s raj prakash chemicals limited an indian companypany manufacturing acrylic ester monumberers in india by a writ petition in the bombay high companyrt seeking a clarification of the order dated april 18 1985 of this companyrt mentioned earlier.
the high court rejected the writ petition and an appeal by special leave filed by the indian companypany was disposed of by this court by its order dated march 5 1986.
the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by pathak j. the petitioners m s indo afghan chambers of commerce and its president sundar lal bhatia are aggrieved by the grant of additional licences to the respondents m s rajnikant brothers and m s everest gems for the import of dry fruits.
the petitioner m s indo afghan chambers of companymerce is an association of dealers engaged in the business of selling dry fruit in numberth india.
the dry fruit is purchased by them either locally or through imports from outside india.
the respondents m s rajnikant brothers and m s everest gems are diamond exporters who have been issued additional licences pursuant to an order of the companyrt in the following circumstances.
the respondents diamond exporters and other like diamond exporters were granted additional licences and started importing goods on those additional licences.
the diamond exporters companymenced the import of acrylic ester monumberers.
it is asserted that the respondents diamond exporters and other like diamond exporters began to import dry fruit under their additional licences.
original civil appellate jurisdiction writ petition number 199 of 1986 under article 32 of the companystitution of india.
with civil appeal number 664 of 1986 from the judgment and order dated 20th january 1986 of the bombay high companyrt in writ petition number 183 of 1986.
m. tarkunde and rajiv datta for the petitioner in p. number 199 of 1986.
datta additional solicitor general soli j. sorabji and k.k. venugopal a.g. ganguli a. subba rao miss kutty kumarmangalam c.v. subba rao harish salve k.r. nagaraja r. agarwala m.m. jayakar and miss v. menumber for the respondents in w.p. number 199 of 1986 s. nariman and a.b. diwan p.h. parekh and uday lalit for the appellants in c.a. number 664 of 1986 datta additional solicitor general k.k.
venlugopal a.g. ganguli a. subba rao miss kutty kumarmangalam c.v. subba rao b.r. agarwala m.m. jayakar and miss v. menumber for the respondents in c.a. number 664 of 1906.
the respondents diamond exporters had applied for the grant of export house certificates under the import policy 1978 79 and had been denied the certificates on the erroneous ground that they had number diversified their exports.
special leave petitions filed by the union of india against the order of the high companyrt were dismissed by this companyrt by its order dated april 18 1985 which while companyfirming the order of the high companyrt directed the appellants to issue the necessary export house certificates for the year 1978 79 and further that save and except items which are specificially banned under the prevalent import policy at the time of import the respondents shall be entitled to import all other items whether canalised or otherwise in accordance with the relevant rules.
it is the case of the petitioners that the goods sought to be imported on the additional licences included those which were prohibited by the prevalent import policy.
it is companytended that having regard to the terms of the order of this companyrt dated april 18 1985 as construed and clarified by its order dated march 5 1986 the diamond exporters are number entitled to import dry fruit.
by order dated march 5 1986 the companyrt companystrued its order dated april 18 1985 to mean that only such items could be imported by diamond exporters under the additional licences granted to them as companyld have been imported under the import policy 1978 79 the period during which the diamond exporters had applied for export house certificates and had been wrongfully refused and were also importable under the import policy prevailing at the time of import which in the present case is the import policy 1985 88.
| 1 | test | 1986_135.txt |
The appellant is the Chief Minister of Haryana.
The first respondent filed a Writ Petition C.W.P. No. 1898 of 1992 challenging the assessment order passed by the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner cum Assessing Authority, Hissar, Haryana companyfirming a demand for sales tax of Rs.
Similar writ petitions have been filed against separate assessment orders by the first respondent for a total amount of payment aggregating to a liability of Rs.
In these writ petitions allegations of personal mala fide have been levelled against the appellant.
On 22.10.92, G.R. Majithia, J. once again wrote to the Registrar Judicial seeking companypliance with his earlier order dated 20.10.92.
Accordingly a direction was issued that the writ petitions be placed for final hearing on 13.9.93.
A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the State about the maintainability of the writ petition since the alternate statutory remedies available to the first respondent had number been exhausted.
The appellant on his return after long tour of Rajasthan arid Delhi, on 4.10.93, came to know about these happenings.
Notice was issued and the hearing was fixed on 6.10.93.
However, time was granted till 12.10.93 to approach this Court and it was indicated that thereafter the matter would be taken up on day to day basis.
Appellant assails in this appeal the order refusing transfer.
During this civil appeal, an additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the appellant giving details of the companyrse which the writ petition took.
He would have it, on 3.8.93, when S.S. Sodhi, J. took over as Acting Chief Justice the writ petition was listed at Serial No. 342 before A.P. Choudhary and N.K.
Mohan, J Leave granted.
20 crores.
The writ petition came up for preliminary hearing on 7.2.92 before a Division Bench companysisting of S.S. Sodhi and K.C. Garg JJ.
The writ petition was admitted and ex parte ad interim stay was granted.
After numberice, when the matter came up for hearing before a Bench companysisting of S.S. Sodhi and R.S. Mongia, JJ.
it was directed to be listed for final hearing on 3.8.92.
The then Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois Proceeded on leave on 1.8.92.
Thereupon, S.S. Sodhi, J. became the Acting Chief Justice.
It appears this was the only case which was directed to be delisted from the Tax Bench and transferred to the Division Bench presided over by the then Acting Chief Justice.
On 21.8.92, Chief Justice Mr. Rama Jois returned from leave and resumed charge.
On 1.9.92, Chief Justice Rama Jois resigned.
Thereupon, again, S.S. Sodhi, J, became Acting Chief Justice.
He companytinued in that capacity till 13.11.92.
On 21.10.92, S.S. Sodhi, J. delisted the writ petition from his Bench and re transferred it to the Tax Bench companyprising of A.L. Bahri and Ashok Bhan, JJ.
This letter was forwarded by the Registrar Judicial to the Acting Chief Justice soliciting orders in respect thereof.
It was directed that the numbere be placed in the file.
On 14.11.92, justice S.D. Agarwala was appointed as chief Justice, As result, S.S. Sodhi, J. became the seniormost puisne Judge.
On the re opening of the High Court after summer vacation, the writ petition along with other companynected petitions were placed for hearing before the Tax Bench companyprising of S.S. Sodhi and Ashok Bhan, JJ.
A request was made for an early hearing of the writ petition on behalf of the first respondent.
The hearing went on 13.9.93.
The Division Bench did number companysider that objection but directed the arguments be addressed on merits.
The records bear out G.R. Majithia, J. addressed a letter to the learned Chief Justice on 13.9.93 referring to his earlier companymunication on the subject and requested to know the circumstances under which the writ petition had been transferred to a Division Bench presided over by S.S. Sodhi, J. Be that so.
On 4.10.93, the hearing recommended on the writ petition.
They were the cause of some companysternation and apprehension in his mind since allegations of malafides had been levelled against him by the first respondent who is said to be a political opponent.
Therefore, on 4.10.93 an application C.M. No. 9909 of 1993 was moved requesting the Division Bench to transfer the matter from their Bench.
Sodhi, JJ.
On 3.8.92, when the writ petition was listed before the Tax Bench companyprising of A.P. Choudhary and N.K. Sodhi, JJ, S.S. Sodhi, J. directed the writ petition to be delisted from the Tax Bench before which it was listed and transferred the case presided over by S.S. Sodhi, J. himself.
On 24.8.92 this Court in Special Leave Petition Civil No. 7700 of 1992 arising out of a companynected Writ Petition Civil No. 3864 of 1992 directed the case be remanded to the High Court ordering expeditious disposal along with C.W.P. No. 1898 of 1992.
When the writ petition was pending hearing, G.R. Majithia, J. sought an explanation from the Registrar Judicial as to why the case was transferred from the Tax Bench to the Bench presided over by the Acting Chief Justice.
The case did number reach for hearing before this Bench.
The petitions were adjourned for further order to 4.10.93.
After hearing the arguments, the application for transfer was dismissed.
The affidavit further proceeds to state that the deponent reliably learnt that the then Acting Chief Justice, in fact, went to the Chambers of N.K. Sodhi, J. and told him that by mistake it had been listed before a Bench presided over by A.P. Chaudhari, J. N.K. Sodhi, J. was somewhat agitated and told the Acting Chief Justice that the transfer of the case from that Bench was number in accordance with the numbermal practice of the High Court.
| 0 | train | 1994_1034.txt |
Jagannatha Shetty, J. This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 11 November 1988 in O.A. The event leading to the appeal are these On 20 February 1958, Bal Kishan, the appellant, was enrolled as a Constable in Delhi Police.
On 1 February 1964, he was promoted to officiate as Head Constable.
Complaining about the belated companyfirmation and seeking further promotion, he filed a writ petition in Delhi High Court.
The High Court by judgment dated 25 September 1984 allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents to companyfirm the appellant w.e.f.
The appellant was companyfirmed as directed w.e.f.
The appellant replied to the show cause numberice but companyld number carry companyviction.
The Additional Commissioner of Police Admn after companysidering the reply made an order dated 25 October 1988 in the following terms After going through the relevant record available on file, I find that the name of Inspector Min Bal Kishan,
No. D/338 was brought on list D, E and F Min erroneously resulting that he has become senior to his seniors viz.
Min Rameshwar Singh, No. 20.10.73 by alloting him range No. 117/D. His name will exist above the name of ASI Bhagat Ram, No. 802/D and below the name of ASI Rameshwar Singh, No. 800/D. The name of ASI M Bal Kishan No. 117/D is admitted to promotion list E Min w.e.f.
6.12.87 by alloting him range No.
A above the name of S.I. Min Khazan Singh, No. D/80 and below the name of S.I. Min Jagdish Singh, No. D/1347 in this Headquarters numberification No. 7837/CB III, dated 15.3.88.
11834/CB I, dated 20.4.88, are cancelled.
Delhi No. 42034 50/CB I, dated Delhi, the 25.10.1988.
Challenging the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Central Administrative Tribunal.
With this and other companyclusion, the Tribunal expressed the view that there was numberillegality in the reversion of the appellant Upon re examination of cases of the appellant and his seniors in the light of the judgment of the High Court and the relevant rules of promotion, companynsel has produced before us the list showing the particulars of all those Head Constables whose name were brought in list D Promotional list for promotion to the rank of ASI w.e.f.
His companyfirmation as Head Constable was delayed on account of certain adverse remarks against him.
This has delayed his promotion as Sub Inspector SI .
This is number disputed by the respondents.
1.2.1966 and also promoted as ASI Min w.e.f.
Again he was promoted as SI Min w.e.f.
Further he was admitted to promotion list F Min w.e.f.
They made representations companyplaining of injustice done to them.
Thus by giving seniority to you, you have become much senior even from those who were earlier senior to you.
Commissioner of Police Admn.
He is promoted to officiate as S.I. Min w.e.f.
He is companyfirmed as S.I. Min w.e.f.
His name will exist at SI.
23 Orders regarding admission of his name to promotion list F M w.e.f.
Sd Arun Bhagat Addl.
His promotion to the cadre of HCs, ASIs and SIs was unjustified.
and it was companyrective action justified under the circumstances.
The order of the Tribunal has been assailed in this appeal.
On this aspect of the matter we asked Mr. Dutta, learned Additional Solicitor General to have the matter re examined by the respondents.
No. 1677 of 1988.
That adverse remarks were later expunged and he was companyfirmed in 1969.
1 February 1966 with all companysequential benefits.
It is the case of the petitioner that he has been promoted as an Assistant Sub Inspector with effect from February 25, 1970.
24 July 1967 instead of 25 February 1970.
1 May 1980 and companyfirmed as such w.e.f. 5 July 1983.
18 February 1988 and further promoted as Officiating Inspector Min w.e.f. 19 April 1988.
The Tribunal has dismissed the appeal.
21 December 1966 and thereafter upto 18 February 1970.
He has also produced another list showing the particulars of ASIs Min whose names were brought on list E promotional list for promotion to the rank of SIs drawn on 21 July 1978 and thereafter upto 14 August 1985.
| 0 | train | 1989_349.txt |
While the appellants preferred an appeal to the High Court against their companyviction sentence, the State filed an appeal against the aforesaid judgment and order of the Sessions Judge acquitting the appellants of the offences under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
The High Court by its judgment and order dated September 16, 1971 found that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
Thereupon, the deceased prevented the appellants from doing so whereupon both the appellants launched an attack on him, Bakhtawar, appellant inflicting injuries on his arm and other parts of the body with a lathi and Satbir giving blows on his head from the wrong side of a gandasi.
PB of Richpal PW 4 on the basis whereof a case under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code was registered against the appellants.
Both the appellants and the State felt aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Sessions Judge and preferred cross appeals with the result as indicated above.
One abrasion 3 x 1/4 on the left hyolchonderic region on abdoman of 7 above the anterior iliac region.
One companytused wound 1 x 1/2 skin deep on the posterior aspect of the left side of the chest over the scapular region in the lower part.
One companystrued wound 2 x 3/4 bone deep on the left parietal region on the scalp 4 above the pinna of the left ear.
One companystrued wound l 1/2 x 1/2 bone deep on the right pariatal region of scalp 2 1/2 above the pinna of the right ear.
Jaswant Singh, J. The appellants, Bakhtawar and his son, Satbir, who were charged and tried under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as the Penal Code for causing the death of one Balbir Singh, their companyvillager, were companyvicted under Section 304, Part II of the Penal Code and were sentenced to ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.
Balbir deceased while ploughing his land numbericed the appellants cutting bushes from his Johari and taking it to the land which was in their possession as mortgagees from one Phule.
On seeing the occurrence Richpal and Maida, PWs.
4 5 who had gone to Sheoprasads well situate near their fields to quench them thirst rushed to the place of occurrence and extricated the deceased from the clutches of the appellants who then ran away towards their fields.
Leaving Maida to look after the deceased who had become unconscious as a result of the injuries inflicted on him by the appellants, Richpal, PW 4 went and reported the matter to the village Sarpanch named Risal Singh PW 8 .
After preparing the inquest report, the S I. sent the dead body for post mortem examination, Dr. T R Bhalla PW 1 who performed the autopsy found 12 injuries on the body of the deceased which he detailed in the Post Mortem Report Exh.
PA and opined that injuries Nos. 11 and 12 which were grievous were sufficient to cause the death of the deceased.
After sending the body for post mortem examination, the S. I. repaired to the place of the occurrence and recorded the statement of Maida PW 5 .
The S I. also posted a companystable to guard the place of the occurrence and on the next morning seized some blood from there vide Exh.
P.F. and arrested the appellants.
After the usual investigation, the appellants were proceeded against in the companyrt of the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Jhajjar, who companymitted them to the Court of Sessions to stand their trial under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
On a companysideration of the evidence, the Sessions Judge found that the appellants did number have the intention of causing the murder of Balbir but had only the knowledge that the injuries caused by them were likely to cause his death.
It was caused by blunt weapon.
One companytused wound 2 x 1/4 bone deep on the dorsel aspect of the left index finger in the proximal and middle phalyox the proximal phylyinx was fractured.
The injury was of grevious nature and was caused by blunt weapon.
Two companytused wound 3/4 x 1/4 and 3/4 x 1/4 bone deep on the posterior aspect of left elbow joint.
The wound was one inch apart from each other.
One companytused wound 3/4 x 1/2 skin deep on the posterior aspect of the right fore arm in the middle part.
It is against this judgment and order that the appellants have companye up in appeal to this Court.
500/ each by the Sessions Judge, Rohtak by his judgment and order dated 15 5 1971.
The case as put forth by the prosecution was On July 20, 1969 at about 3.00 P.M. On being informed about the matter, Risal Singh PW 8 , accompanied by Richpal PW 4 arrived at the scene of the occurrence and removed the deceased to the Civil Hospital, Beri were he succumbed to his injuries shortly after admission.
On the expiry of the deceased, Dr. Ram Lal Gulati PW 2 , Incharge Civil Hospital, Beri sent Ruqa Exh.
PC to the police station, Beri on receipt whereof, S I Ram Singh PW 10 went to the hospital and recorded the statement Exh.
| 0 | train | 1978_266.txt |
A. No. 827/73 dt.
Out of these four cases, three cases were companymitted to the Court of Sessions and the trial was pending against Natvarlal Govindlal Patel.
Natvarlal Govindlal Patel stated that on several occasions, he paid the appellants a sum of Rs.
12th December, 1974 reversing the order of acquittal of the trial Court and finding the appellant guilty of offences under Section 161 I.P.C. and Section 5 1 d read with Section 5 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentencing him to three months rigorous Imprisonment, The appellant is a Bench Clerk in the Court of the City Magistrate, 3rd Court, Ahmedabad.
The charge against him is that on 7 7 72 he accepted from one Natvarlal Govindlal Patel a sum of Rs. 497/72 and for accepting another sum of Rs.
In the fourth case Natvarlal Govindlal Patel was companyvicted of an offence under Section 420 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for 9 months and to a fine of Rs. 1,000/ .
It is alleged that on 7 7 72 Natvarlal paid a sum of Rs.
The trial Court observed there is absolutely numberreason for him to go to the Bench Clerk on that date i,e. 7 7 72 because he knew that next date was 11 7 72.
He was number required to go to Court on 7 7 72.
The High Court accepted finding of the trial Court that the evidence of the companyplainant that he paid Rs.
2/ to the accused on 7 7 72 cannot be accepted.
The only charge that is left against the accused that he accepted sum of Rs.
5/ on 18 7 72.
Though the accused demanded sum of Rs.
2/ on 7 7 72 itself, the companyplainant went to the police only on 17 7 72 after an interval of 10 days and companyplained about the demand of bribe by the accused.
The usual trap was Bet up and two marked numbered disped in anthracene powder were handed over to the companyplainant for being given to the accused on demand.
2/ he gave it to him.
The evidence is said to be companyroborated by Panch witness Kirti Kumar Ext.
After the preananged signal was given by the companyplainant the police officer end others came in.
Regarding the recovery of Rs.
2/ the evidence is that after the money was paid by the companyplainant to the accused, the police caught hold the bands of the accused.
Nothing was done for about 20 minutes Later the accused was taken to the adjoining room and when the Sheristedar had gone to the Chief City Magistrate to inform him about the incident the search end the recovery was affected.
The search was companycluded within 15 minutes.
The trial Court was of the view that the entire story about the companyplainants giving Rs.
2/ and its recovery is highly artificial and evidence of the Panch witness Kirti Kumar is unacceptable.
The trial Court pointed out that in the Court room there were several independent persons present when the offer of the bribe was made and accepted, Curiously even after the police came the money was number recovered immediately from the accused.
The accused was taken into a room and after a lapse of about 20 minutes, he was asked to remove his shirt and hand it over to the police.
When the pocket of the shirt was searched Rs.
2/ on 18 7 72 from Natvarlal Govindlal Patel for showing favour in granting a date for the next hearing The prosecution case in brief is that the companyplainant Natvarlal Govindlal Patel was accused in the Court in about four cases before the City Magistrate.
An appeal against companyviction and sentence by Natvarlal Govindlal Patel also failed.
2/ to the accused for getting the case adjourned to 18 7 72.
Apart from the fact that the evidence of Natvarlal is number companyroborated, the trial Court found that on bis own showing the case was adjourned to 18 7 72 on 4 7 72 and there was numberneed for any request by the companyplainant on 7 7 72 for posting it on 18 7 72.
The case of the companyplainant in that he went to the Court hail in the first floor where the accused was seated and asked for a date and when the accused demanded Rs.
| 1 | train | 1980_231.txt |
The tenant has been residing in the building of the landlord for nearly half a century by number, a few more years from number may mark the golden jubilee year of the tenancy .
He executed a gift deed in favour of his daughter the appellant on 2 8 1980, as per Ext.
B.10 Gift Deed executed by the erstwhile landlord, since a new lease arrangement has companye into effect between the appellant and the tenant as per Ext.
The order so passed by the Appellate Authority remained undisturbed in the revision filed by the landlord before the District Court which was then the revisional authority.
THOMAS, J. A landlord approached the Rent Control companyrt prematurely and lost the cause number only regarding the timing of her approach to the companyrt but on merits as well.
When the building was originally leased in 1956, it was in the ownership of appellants father.
But the appellant, bereft of patience to wait for the expiry of the moratorium period of one year, hastened to file the petition for eviction of the tenant on 1 7 1981 under Section 11 3 of the Kerala Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, 1965, for short the Act.
The sub section has four provisos of which the third alone is relevant for companysideration in this appeal and hence that is extracted below Provided further that numberlandlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument.
So the Rent Control Court granted the order for eviction.
The unsuccessful landlord has, therefore, reached this Court by special leave.
Section 11 3 of the Act reads thus A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him.
But the Appellate Authority under the Act reversed the findings both on the maintainability of the petition for eviction and also on the merits of the claim and companysequently dismissed the petition of the landlord.
Appellant made an endeavour to circumvent the quarantine prescribed under the sub section on the premise that the tenant had executed a fresh lease agreement in her favour on 18 8 1980 Ext.
| 0 | train | 1999_519.txt |