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Equall 47

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that his brief contains 3743 words (excluding the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, statemen of the case, record references, issues presented, signature block, proof of service, and certificate of compliance). This is a computer-generated document created in Microsoft Word using 14-point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying ono the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document. The entire document, according to Word, contains 5808 words.

Party Submissions

Serbia argues that Obnova’s buildings are allegedly temporary because, amongst other t hings, Obnova (at that time existing under the name “Otpad”) only prepared main designs for some of the buildings, while permanent objects would require also preliminary designs.74 To support this argument, Serbia relies on exhibits R-037 to R-039, which seem to be decisions approving certain main designs submitted by Obnova. However, these decisions ( i ) do not identify the location of the buildings for which the designs were approved, making it impossible to verify whether these buildings correspond to the existing buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23; and ( ii ) do not state whether the main designs were the only designs submitted by Obnova or whether they were preceded by preliminary designs. The requested documents are therefore relevant and material to clarify whether the decisions submitted by Serbia relate to buildings within Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and 23 and what was Obnova and Serbia’s contemporaneous understanding of the status of these buildings— mainly whether Obnova and Serbia considered them to be temporary or not.

Legal Decisions

HN2 [ ] When both parties move for summary judgment on the same issues and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, a reviewing court examines the summary [*475] judgment evidence presented by both sides, determines all questions presented, and if reversing, renders such judgment as the trial court should have rendered. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661, 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 671 (Tex. 2005) ; see Johnston v. Crook, 93 S.W.3d 263, 267 (Tex. App.-- Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in his favor. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d at 661 .

Party Submissions

Arbitration Rule 6 13.1. Written communications shall be transmitted by email or other electronic means to the Parties, the Tribunal Secretary, the Tribunal Members, and the Assistant.

Legal Decisions

PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the requested documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (which prepared exhibit C-330) in accordance with the applicable regulations101. In other words, the requested documents are "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".102 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.103 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it would not be justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves, especially in view of the broad scope of their request. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. R, M: Claimants do not explain why the requested documents are relevant to the facts in issue or material to their case. The Urban Planning Institute's assessment of the potential costs of compensating for destroyed buildings and land expropriation do not constitute proof of ownership rights or other rights over the land and buildings encompassed by the 2013 DRP. As such, the requested documents would not have a material effect on the Tribunal's determination of issues in dispute.

Legal Decisions

Claimants hereby incorporate their replies from Requests Nos. 15 and 22. DECISION Letter from the Secretariat for Urban Planning and Construction No. 350.1-35/2007 dated 23 September 2013.

Legal Decisions

To direct the Office for Victims of Crime of the Department of Justice to implement anti-trafficking recommendations of the Government Ac-countability Office.

Legislation

The percentage of the Performance Share Target earned for results between performance levels shall be determined by straight line interpolation with the number of Performance Share Units earned rounded down to the nearest whole number. Any Performance Share Units that are not earned in accordance with this Section 4 shall be forfeited.

Contract

In 1999, Sonic filed its contract claims against TMI in a Harris County court and also filed claims against Randy Croix and the Eddie [**4] Croix Insurance Agency, Inc. (the "Croix defendants"), the parties that sold TMI's policy to Sonic. 2 [**5] In that same year, Cochran filed suit against Sonic in Alabama, under that state's workers' compensation laws. Cochran recovered judgment against Sonic on July 13, 2001. Several days later, on July 17, 2001, Sonic filed a claim with the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission ("TWCC") seeking reimbursement under section 409.009 of the Labor Code, for $ 78,023.89, the voluntary benefits it paid to Cochran prior to his receipt of the Alabama judgment. 3 Following a hearing on Sonic's reimbursement claim, the hearing officer concluded that Cochran was Sonic's employee at the time of the accident and was entitled to benefits under the TWCA, but because he recovered benefits under Alabama's laws, he was barred by section 406.075 of the Texas Labor Code 4 from recovering benefits and, as Cochran's subclaimant, Sonic's reimbursement claim was likewise barred.

Party Submissions

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.), does not support Petitioners’ argument, yet Respondents fail to recognize that Burton directly supports the holding in 402 Lone Star. Petitioners cited this case as a string cite to support the above analysis of 402 Lone Star. Further, Respondents admit that the issue on appeal in Burton was whether the defendant filed fraudulent liens with intent to injure the plaintiff. Respondents’ Br. at 14. Here, Petitioners make the same argument as it is an element of the Chapter 12 cause of action.

Party Submissions

Yellowfin also suggests that Santos’s interpretation of Section 51.003 conflicts with Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, which held that “[i]f a note or deed of trust secured by real property contains an optional acceleration clause, ” “ the action accrues only when the holder actually exercises its option to accelerate. ” 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001). But as our opening brief explained (at 30-31), Santos’s interpretation of Section 51.003(a) does not conflict with Holy Cross because the rule espoused there applies only to notes “secured by real property, ” 44 S.W.3d at 566. After foreclosure on Santos’s home, the junior lien on the property was extinguished and the note was no longer secured by real property. Wesley v.

Party Submissions

With regard to snow crab, it appears that this species is “unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil” and it thus falls within the definition of “sedentary species” of Article 77(4) of UNCLOS. The fact that snow crab falls within that definition formed the subject matter of an earlier dispute between Canada and the United States about the prosecution of snow-crab fisheries conducted by United States fishing vessels on the Canadian continental shelf at a location where Canada’s continental shelf extended beyond 200 nautical miles in the Northwest Atlantic. At that time, the European Union (then the European Community) considered snow crab to fall within the definition of “sedentary species” and, therefore, did not lodge any protest against Canada.

Legal Decisions

Convention Article 43(a); Arbitration Rules 5 and 36-40 16.1. The Tribunal shall be guided but not bound by the IBA Rules.

Legal Decisions

Notwithstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, this Agreement is intended to be exempt from or, in the alternative, comply with Section 409A and the interpretive guidance in effect thereunder, including the exceptions for short-term deferrals, separation pay arrangements, reimbursements, and in-kind distributions. The Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with such intent.

Contract

Finally, just because Wilson Plaintiffs might have made a long shot attempt at obtaining offensive collateral estoppel if the Harpst plaintiffs had won, that doesn’t mean the Harpst plaintiffs were the formal legal representatives of Wilson Plaintiffs, and nothing in Taylor would suggest otherwise.

Party Submissions

This is a project where a fishing vessel under the EU flag will land live snow crabs at approved Norwegian reception stations (factories). Please describe or present the process regarding the documents to be sent to the Directorate of Fisheries in this case .741 525. The reply, sent on 25 July 2014, read: Basically this corresponds to matters concerning the regulations of the Fisheries Administration. Regulations issued by other agencies, such as the Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Råfiklaget etc. must be clarified to these agencies.

Legal Decisions

Carter may have played a part in accounting errors that were later corrected, but that does not establish a fraudulent or criminal intent, which was the gist of the Newspaper’s reporting. Thus, we agree with the court of appeals that the Newspaper was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed to conclusively prove the substantial truth of the Newspaper’s alleged defamatory statements.

Party Submissions

See Henry, 70 S.W.3d at 809 (citing Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex.2001) and holding trial court could not adjudicate employee's claim for bad faith denial of workers' compensation benefits without determining whether she was entitled to benefits, a matter within the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction); Saenz v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 612 (Tex.1996) (stating Act vests power to award workers' compensation benefits solely in Commission, subject to judicial review). The Commission's exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensability necessarily encompasses exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury or death occurred in the course and scope of employment. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 401.011(10) (Vernon Supp.2003) (defining compensable injury as “an injury that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which compensation is payable” under the Act).

Party Submissions

The trial courts amended order specifically denies the plaintiff's motion to strike the affidavit of David Carlin and Pamela McShann. Both denials were in error.

Party Submissions

By its third issue, Bay contends that section 408.001(d) of the labor code does not preclude Bay from asserting the exclusive-remedy defense, as the Manns argued in the trial court. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(d). Section 408.001(d) primarily deals with situations in which an injured employee has willfully removed himself from the justifiable reach of workers' compensation—for instance, where the employee simply fails to file a claim for compensation, or where the injury is due to the employee's horseplay or willful self-harm. See id. (citing statutory sections related to failure to file notice of injury, *328 failure to file compensation claim, and “exceptions” including horseplay, intoxication, etc.). The Act provides that in such situations, the employee may not collect benefits, but the employer retains access to the exclusive-remedy defense. See id. Reasoning by inversion, the Manns assert that if the insurance carrier denies coverage for any reason other than those referred to in section 408.001(d), then the employer loses access to the exclusive-remedy defense.

Party Submissions

Administrative and Financial Regulation 28 7.1. The Tribunal Secretary is Ms. Jara Mínguez Almeida, Team Leader/Legal Counsel, ICSID, or such other person as ICSID may notify the Tribunal and the Parties from time to time.

Legal Decisions

Certificate of Service I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was forwarded to all counsel of record on November 16, 2023, by e-file and/or electronic mail in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Party Submissions

Respondents’ concerted actions began as soon as Respondents bought the premises from the previous landlord, continued unabated even after Westwood withdrew its appeal of the eviction ruling, and ended only after Westwood consented to the form of the agreed judgment and left the premises for good. This campaign distracted Westwood’s employees, caused its sales to drop, and forced it to incur enormous attorney’s fees. (8RR103-04) The reasons for Westwood’s departure were manifestly not “voluntary.” But even taken on its own terms, Respondents’ tale makes no sense. Westwood did not “go out of business” or “shut[] down” as part of “a broader strategic decision.” (Resp. 12, 31, 38) It simply changed its name from “Westwood Motorcars, LLC” to “Westwood Motors LLC” and continued selling cars under the new name. (8RR154-55, 159-60) So it had the same need for “warehouse” space after the name-change as before.

Party Submissions

The First Court wrote: “The elements of mutual mistake are: (1) a mistake of fact; (2) held mutually by the parties; (3) which materially affects the agreed-on exchange. City of The Colony v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 272 S.W.3d 699, 735 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd). A mutual mistake of fact occurs when the parties to an agreement have a common intention, but the written agreement does not accurately reflect that intention due to a mutual mistake. See Smith– Gilbard v. Perry, 332 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.); City of The Colony, 272 S.W.3d at 735. When mutual mistake is alleged, the party seeking relief must show what the parties' true agreement was and that the instrument incorrectly reflects that agreement because of a mutual mistake. Atlantic Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004 pet. denied). Under the doctrine of mutual mistake, when parties to an agreement have contracted under a misconception or ignorance of a material fact, the agreement will be voided. Walden v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 303, 326 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). To prove a mutual mistake, the evidence must show that both parties were acting under the same misunderstanding of the same material fact. Id. A unilateral mistake by one party, combined with knowledge of that mistake by the other party, is equivalent to mutual mistake. But, ‘[a] mistake by only one party to an agreement, not known or induced by acts of the other party[,] will not constitute grounds for relief.’. Smith–Gilbard, 332 S.W.3d at 713–14 (Tex. App. –Dallas, 2011-no pet.) “A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which that party had the burden of proof at trial must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence conclusively established, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.” RM Crowe Prop. Servs. Co., L.P. v. Strategic Energy, L.L.C., 348 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). We consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (Petitioners here), according every reasonable inference in that party's favor and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005); Tricon Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Thumann, 226 S.W.3d 494, 500–01 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). “If there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding, i.e., more than a mere scintilla, we will overrule the issue.” City of Houston v. Hildebrandt, 265 S.W.3d 22, 27 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (citing Haggar Clothing Co. v. Hernandez, 164 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Tex.2005)). If no evidence supports the adverse finding, we examine the entire record to determine if the contrary position is established as a matter of law. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex.2001). The issue will be sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Id.

Party Submissions

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should recognize the 1994 genocide in Rwanda as ‘‘the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda’’.

Legislation

Alternatively, a take-nothing judgment is appropriate because there is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict on liability or damages. At a minimum, the finding of gross negligence should be reversed and rendered, and the remainder of the case remanded for trial, either for the reasons the court of appeals found or because of the failure to submit proportionate liability under Chapter 33.

Party Submissions

The court of appeals improperly wrote nonexistent words into a statute, depriving the Petitioners of its critical protection, and resurrected a long rejected false-light theory. In urging denial of review, Barina invites this Court to condone the appellate court’s judicial activism. Left undisturbed, the court of appeals’ opinion will sow confusion in the jurisprudence and severely imperil advocacy related journalism, documentaries, and political speech that lie at our Constitution’s core. Petitioners respectfully request that the Court grant their petition for review, reverse the appellate court’s judgment, and render judgment for Petitioners.

Party Submissions

Instead of claiming the surplus proceeds to which it was entitled after the foreclosure sale, the junior lienholder intentionally chose eventually to sell its rights under the Note, 1CR53-55, and there are now no records of what happened to the excess proceeds, RR24:9-14. Because the junior lienholder “elected not to enforce any rights arising under” the Note at a time when funds were available, it waived its right to enforce those rights at a later time when records of those proceeds were no long available because of its “intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming that right.” See Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co ., 925 S.W.2d 640, 643-44 (Tex. 1996) (holding that defendants had established waiver where plaintiff “had elected not to enforce any rights arising under” the agreement between the parties).

Party Submissions

Yellowfin cites a number of decisions from other jurisdictions, but not a single one discusses the statute of limitations to enforce a note after a foreclosure. Collins Asset Grp., L.L.C. v. Alialy, 139 N.E.3d 712 (Ind. 2020), did not involve foreclosure at all. Yellowfin cites City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 237 (Utah 1991), for the unremarkable proposition that a junior creditor can still proceed against a debtor even if its debt becomes unsecured as a result of foreclosure by the senior creditor. Resp. Br. 12. Of course. The junior creditor could have proceeded against Santos, but it had to do so on a timely basis after the triggering event — foreclosure. And Section 51.003 provides the limitations period, which Yellowfin missed by more than ten years.

Party Submissions

Synopsis Background: After employee was sexually assaulted while working on employer's premises, and employer submitted a workers' compensation claim, employee brought action against employer for premises liability and gross negligence. The 293rd Judicial District Court, Dimmit County, Ron Carr, J., granted employer's motion to dismiss. Employee appealed.

Party Submissions

When DFPS filed its original Petition against Appellant, DFPS only pled the following grounds for termination: D, E, K O, and P of subsection 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. See CR 23-24. Appellate counsel is unaware of any amended pleading by DFPS that alleged the additional grounds of termination that were contained within the jury’s charge. Furthermore, the language of Intervenor’s stated that Intervenors incorporated all allegations and documents filed by the Department.” CR 553. Intervenors did amend their pleadings to include grounds for termination again A.S.; however, because the original suit was filed by DFPS, and the order terminating A.S.’s rights to R.W., this Court should strike termination grounds (F) and (N) that were neither originally pled nor later amended by Petitioner and should not have been considered by the jury.

Party Submissions

In contrast, Osprin filed suit against TX 1111 and alleged that TX 1111 had breached its representations, covenants, and warranties under the assignment of rights to capital contributions. Further, although Osprin filed a UDJA claim against TX 1111, it only asked that the trial court declare that Osprin was entitled to a perfected security interest in the Contributions and that TX 1111’s statement regarding the value of the Contributions did not impair its right to recover the full value of its perfected security interest in the Contributions. As to these claims, Osprin later asserted that it was undisputed that it held a perfected security interest in the Contributions, and the trial court never made a finding regarding the second requested declaration. Regarding the other claims asserted against TX 1111, the trial court found that TX 1111 did not breach any of its representations, covenants, and warranties under the bridge loan documents and the amended bridge loan documents.

Party Submissions

In a scant one page of discussion in his two-page report, Dr. Null concludes that, because H.W. was “significantly depressed at birth,” he must have had an “antenatal asphyxia event,” but “more likely than not” would not have had it had he been delivered an hour to an hour and a half earlier. (CR.709). He never says it was Dr. Castillo’s claimed departures from the standards of care that proximately caused H.W.’s injuries.

Party Submissions

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to impose a tax on the purchase of single-family homes by certain large investors, and for other purposes.

Legislation

Id. at 829–30. The Court had before it the settlement agreement and the letter from Walker instructing her attorneys to pay her family members from the settlement, but the Court remanded to allow the trial court to consider other evidence of the actual payments received. Id. In this case, the forbearance agreement expressly allocated the settlement payments to the $175,000.00 constitutional lien against Mendietta’s homestead—an injury not involving the Diocese. (2CR915–29). In addition, counsel for Bay, Ltd. submitted an affidavit detailing the allocation of the payments that had been made toward the $175,000.00 constitutional lien on Mendietta’s homestead, explaining that Mendietta was paying less than the yearly post-judgment interest generated only by that amount of the judgment. (3CR968–79). This is precisely the type of evidence the Court approved in Sky View and Utts.

Party Submissions

The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 2.a and no decision is therefore made.

Legal Decisions

In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Walkers ’ experts drew a direct line from the providers’ negligence to H.W.’s brain injury: In short, Drs. Null and Tappan informed the trial court of an impending birth, defaults in monitoring the child, purported misapplication of medications influencing (directly or indirectly) the fetal heart rate, a medical practitioner leaving the hospital for a short period of time, little progress in a birth unassisted by surgery, delay in ultimately removing the child through surgery, purportedly questionable means by which the baby was removed, and the child ultimately suffering brain trauma. That trauma may have been avoided, according to the experts, if the monitoring was better, the doctor acted sooner, and the doctor removed H by pulling on his feet.

Party Submissions

Here, what is done truly cannot be undone. The just result is to render. If the Court rules instead that the assignment is void but allows HSMiller to subject the Lawyers to yet another trial, that would be a Pyrrhic victory indeed. Nor would it discourage future assignments of the same nature. If the only result is a retrial without the position shifting, there is no reason for future litigants not to take their chances with a potentially void assignment, get a multi-million-dollar verdict, and see if the law firm and its insurers settle rather than going through the long fight in the appellate courts.

Party Submissions

Antonio 2010, no pet.) (citing Entergy, 282 S.W.3d at 436). We liberally construe the terms of the Act in favor of coverage in order to effectuate the Act's purposes: lowering costs for employers while assisting injured employees. SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 642.

Party Submissions

C) The Tribunal’s analysis 298. The Tribunal notes that it has already expressed its opinion, by majority, in the Partial Award regarding the directly related issue of whether the Treaty provided protection to indirect investors.317 None of the allegations made by Respondent in its subsequent submissions—which the Tribunal has carefully analyzed—have been sufficient to change the findings already made by the Tribunal.

Legal Decisions

As such, both Walker and Devine submitted petitions accompanying their applications. Walker’s petition contained 134 signatures from the 8th Court of Appeals District (El Paso). Exhibit B. Devine’s petition facially contained 73 signatures from the 8 th Court of Appeals District. Exhibit C. However, 28 signatures on Devine’s petition were invalid because they were duplicates, were signed by persons who signed his petition subsequent to signing Walker’s petition, or both. Compare Exhibit B to Exhibit C. An additional 11 persons signed both Walker’s and 6 Devine’s petitions on the same day,1 however because they were signed on the same day it is impossible to determine which petition was signed first, and are not at issue in this Petition today, since Relator is entitled to relief even without considering these signatures. Id.

Party Submissions

Weatherford also recognizes the determination of which cases present questions “important to the jurisprudence of state” is relative to the Court’s capacity.

Party Submissions

Convention Article 48(5), Arbitration Rules 62-66, FTC Note of Interpretation of 31 July 2001, Section A: Access to Documents 25.1. The Parties agree that the transparency regime governing these proceedings is dealt with in Procedural Order No. 2.

Legal Decisions

Relator has established all the prerequisites for mandamus relief. It brought Relator no pleasure to file this proceeding, concerning an incumbent on this Court, no less. But the law is the law, and it must be enforced, no matter the parties involved. Failure to do so risks further gamesmanship, and loss of integrity in our electoral system. Any other action will result in future judicial candidates not being required to get the minimum number of signatures specifically required by law; thwarting the will of the people, as expressed through their Legislature, only 7 years ago.

Party Submissions

In November, while the Martinez Family's challenge to DWC's jurisdiction was still pending before that agency, the Martinez Family moved the court presiding over the tort suit to lift the abatement, arguing that Bruno's beneficiaries had never filed a claim for benefits, that the statute of limitations to file such a claim had passed, and that "there is no pending or disputed claim for worker's compensation benefits for [DWC] to resolve so its exclusive jurisdiction is no longer triggered." The Harper & Associates, L.P., as a defendant. court took the matter under advisement and ultimately granted the motion to lift the abatement. This original proceeding followed, with Hellas arguing that the district court abused its discretion by lifting the abatement when the administrative order was still subject to judicial review and therefore not final. As relief, [*6] Hellas asks this Court to issue a mandamus writ ordering the district court to reinstate the abatement.

Party Submissions

If the defendant is a workers compensation insurance company and the worker is attempting to circumvent the administrative process to determine any aspect of a benefit claims dispute at the trial court level prior to exhausting his or her administrative remedies first, then Fodge applies to bar the injured claimant's suit and the trial court should dismiss the matter; if the defendant is the employer in a negligence action and the injured person has not made an election of remedies, then course and scope is an affirmative defense at trial and nothing more. If one reviews the plaintiff's live pleadings 1, it is clear Mann is not seeking benefits nor damages related to the wrongful denial of benefits, so Fodge does not bar his case at the trial court.

Party Submissions

The principal amount of the Loan shall be due and payable on the Maturity Date. The Borrower further promises to pay to the order of the Lender interest on the unpaid principal amount hereof from time to time outstanding at the rate or rates per annum determined pursuant to the terms of the Loan Agreement, payable on the dates set forth therein.

Contract

JAMES R. EVANS, JR. State Bar No. 06721500 [email protected] State Bar No. 24062428 ERIC RUIZ State Bar No. 24125845 [email protected] E. BARRY GAINES State Bar No. 24042358 [email protected] LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC 4425 SOUTH MOPAC, BUILDING 3, SUITE 400, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78735 ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER MILLS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT FILED 23-0145 1/11/2024 8:28 PM tex-83349910 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK This Court has long held that finality of a section 1.111(e) agreement is a jurisdictional issue, and the cases cited by Oncor do not support their contention that finality is a merits issue. Oncor ’ s interpretation of section 1.111(e) ’ s finality as “ eligible for review” contravenes the same cases it cites in support, in addition to the plain language of the statute. The agreement related to the value of Oncor ’ s transmission lines in Mills County, which must necessarily include the individual characteristics affecting such value. The value is settled, the agreement is final, and despite Oncor ’ s attempts to circumvent the tax code ’ s pervasive scheme, the court lacks jurisdiction.

Party Submissions

Although Subcontract paragraph 11.1 states for “disputes involving [MVP] described in Paragraph 11.2 herein, venue shall be in the place set forth in the [MCC],” it makes no mention of any waiver-- let alone a clear and specific waiver of Section 272.001 or of any right to object to this venue provision. R.0507. To the extent paragraph 11.2 could be read as incorporating the MCC’s waiver provisions, then it is precisely the type of provision the Texas Legislature gave contractors, like RLB, the right to void through Section 272.001 because it would subject RLB to another state’s laws or litigation in another state’s courts. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE § 272.001(b). This language is not effective for RLB to knowingly and intentionally waive any rights.

Party Submissions

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Husband the February 14, 2020 discretionary bonus as his separate property. We overrule Wife’s second issue.

Party Submissions

Held : A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Pp. 1918 – 1923.

Party Submissions

Finally, as also explained in the Lawyers’ brief, the only evidence that the jury would have put more than 50% of the responsibility on Flaven came from conclusory expert testimony and biased “fact witness” testimony.5 See Pet’rs’ Br. at 56-60.

Party Submissions

RR 9, 11-12, 23; see 9 RR 97, 236-37, 241. The jury was entitled to re- ject that excuse.

Party Submissions

This Court held that the evidence was not legally sufficient to establish that the homeowners would be “ actually” charged excessive arbitration fees due to the capped costs of the AAA's commercial arbitration rules. And therefore, there was no legally sufficient evidence that such fees would have prevented the homeowners from effectively pursuing their claim in the arbitral forum Id. at 897. V. Rafiei Presented Sufficient Evidence That the Arbitration In this case, the arbitration agreement, when taken together with the AAA Construction Industry Arbitration Rules, significantly differs from the precedents cited above based on several key points.

Party Submissions

Respondents first try to steer the lower court’s opinion clear of the prohibitions in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.004(a) and TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.008 by contending that the “sole issue addressed by these statutes” is “ [r]es judicata,” and insisting that “[t]his case was not decided based on res judicata.” (Resp. 18-19, 21) But the first part of that sentence is wrong and the second part does not really matter.

Party Submissions

As explained above, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s contemporaneous understanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23; and ( ii ) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises. Serbia’s argument that the requested documents “ do not answer the question who built the Objects, i.e., whether Obnova built the Objects, or who is the owner of the Objects ” is contradicted by Serbia’s own exhibits. Specifically, exhibit submitted as R-043 contains excerpts of two sketches that describe Obnova as the “ user” and the “ owner ” of buildings at Dunavska 17 -19.64 This fact shows that Cadaster documents can contain notes about Obnova’s rights to its premises at Dunavska 17 -19 and Dunavska 23. Serbia’s argument that the only relevant question related to the time when the buildings were constructed is whether they were constructed before 1948 or not is equally incorrect. Knowledge of the exact time when the buildings were built is relevant to assess what rights Obnova acquired to these buildings and the land on which they were built. As Claimants explained in their Memorial,65 Serbian regulation of rights to buildings and land has extensively evolved from 1948 to today. Knowledge of when exactly the buildings were built is therefore directly relevant and material for assessment of Obnova’s rights to these buildings, as well as to the land on which they were built.

Legal Decisions

VerDate Sep 11 2014 18:20 Feb 02, 2024 Jkt 049200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H7118.IH H7118 ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with BILLS • HR 7118 IH SEC. 2. PROHIBITION.

Legislation

In light of the many background facts which favor a finding of course and scope, and the further evidence suggesting that Mann's activities were consistent with course and scope, we conclude that summary judgment could not have been granted in the Manns' favor on the basis of this element. See Helix Energy, 522 S.W.3d at 431. Bay's fourth issue is sustained.

Party Submissions

That the junior lienholder has a right to surplus proceeds after foreclosure means that the loan has been accelerated. Even if a borrower were up to date on installment payments for the junior loan, the junior lender would still receive surplus proceeds up to the entire amount of its debt after foreclosure. That confirms that the entire balance has come due and foreclosure has accelerated the junior loan.

Party Submissions

I hereby certify that on December 1, 2023, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served on Appellee’s counsel, below, through the Texas electronic court filing system.

Party Submissions

Respondents continue to argue that this Court’s jurisdictional ruling in Matagorda County, supra, is “undiscernable.” See Respondents’ Brief at 24. But the case clearly says the Court disagrees that the scope and preclusive effect of a tax settlement “is a jurisdictional question.” See Matagorda Cnty., 165 S.W.3d at 331. Respondents argue the Court made this observation about the issue of “whether there were two protests, not whether the settlement agreement under § 1.111(e) was subject to revision.” See Respondents’ Brief at 24. But in the next sentence, Respondents acknowledge there were two protests filed in Matagorda County. Id. There was no dispute about that—the only dispute was whether the settlement of the first protest precluded litigation of the second. The Court recognized it was necessary to construe the settlement to answer that question. See Matagorda Cnty., 165 S.W.3d at 331-32. Respondents’ reading of Matagorda County is nonsensical.

Party Submissions

Respondents quote instances where Petitioners brief in the court of appeals stated that the liens at issue are not fraudulent. These quotes are used out of context. A complete review of Petitioners’ court of appeals briefing demonstrates that this is simply a linguistic disagreement and nothing more. Petitioners have always maintained that, even if the liens were “facially valid” under Chapter 55, they can still be used fraudulently, which is actionable under Chapter 12. In holding otherwise, the court of appeals erred and established an untenable precedent.

Party Submissions

This document complies with the typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point font for text and 12-point font for footnotes. It complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) because it contains 2,060 words.

Party Submissions

However, according to the Manns, the record reflects a fourth version of events that takes Mann outside the course and scope of his employment. According to a report drafted by Mann's supervisor on the date of the accident, Mann reported that he was going to his truck to get out of the rain at the time of the accident.

Party Submissions

Section 2. Eligibility for Participation. Each person who is customarily employed by the Company as a Vice President, Senior Vice President or Executive Vice President (an “Eligible Associate”) who experiences a “Qualifying Termination” (as defined below) shall be a participant in the Plan, other than any person who is covered by an employment, severance or similar agreement with the Company that provides for payment of severance pay under specified circumstances; provided, however, that for purposes of this Section 2, any agreement, plan or award or similar instrument providing for benefits upon a change in control of the Company shall not be deemed to be such an agreement; provided, further, that there shall be no duplication of comparable benefits under the Plan and any such agreement, plan or award or similar instrument. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any person classified by the Company as an independent consultant, contractor, or temporary worker to the Company will not be eligible for this severance program, even if it is later determined by a court or governmental agency that such person was or is an employee of the Company.

Contract

The requested Documents are relevant and material to the outcome of the dispute in that they will address whether and if so how Coropi acquired a beneficial interest in Kalemegdan and/or an indirect beneficial interest in Obnova through the payment of consideration. These matters are at the heart of Respondent's objections to the Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione materiae under the Cyprus-Serbia BIT which, if successful, would dispense with the Cypriot Claimants' claims and thus with a substantial part of Claimants' case against Respondent. This is because it is Respondent's case that Coropi never made a contribution or otherwise "caused" an investment to be made in Serbia in exchange for a beneficial interest in the Kalemegdan or Obnova shares.

Legal Decisions

The requested documents were prepared by Serbia in connection with Obnova’s requests for legalization of its buildings at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23. As such, the requested documents are relevant and material to assess the reasons for which Serbia failed to legalize Obnova’s buildings.

Legal Decisions

For column 24: Indicate the design prevalence based on a pre-survey estimate of the likely actual prevalence of the pest in the field. The design prevalence is set as a goal of the survey and corresponds to the compromise the risk managers are making between the risk of having the pest and the resources available for the survey. Typically, for a detection survey a value of 1 % is set.

Legislation

Rafiei has not met his burden of showing that the arbitration provision which is the focus of this case is unconscionable. Lennar’s petition for review should be granted and the majority opinion should be reversed.

Party Submissions

And as this diagram illustrates, those two spheres of authority do not overlap. Indeed, to reinforce the boundary between those two spheres, Section 31.004(a) and Section 24.008 prohibit the issues related to the award of immediate possession adjudicated in the inferior justice of the peace court from having any effect whatsoever on the different issues reserved to the district court.

Party Submissions

As shown at the Hearing, Mexico conducted multiple inspections and audits of La Rosita between 1993 and 2016 and has thus been aware for decades of CALICA’s activities in that lot and what it now claims is “damage” resulting from operations there.400 Mexico also knew of the purported environmental damage it alleges for El Corchalito by no later than its shutdown of that lot in January 2018.401 Mexico’s counterclaim would have therefore arisen more than three years before Mexico pursued it, in contravention of NAFTA’s three-year limitations period. 402 Mexico provided no answer to this at the Hearing.

Party Submissions

While a life jacket is certainly a safety device, we do not agree that a life jacket is a “component” of a pool. See Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 585. Regardless, the integral safety component doctrine is limited to negligent “use of tangible personal property. ” Id.; see, e.g., Robinson, 780 S.W.2d at 169 (providing swimming attire without a life preserver); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 300 (Tex. 1976) (providing a football uniform without a knee brace); Overton Mem’l Hosp. v. McGuire, 518 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam) (providing a hospital bed without bed rails). As the Delapenas acknowledge, Buttercup Pool is real property, not tangible personal property; therefore, its “use” cannot serve as the basis for an integral safety component claim. See Clark, 923 S.W.2d at 585. Stated differently, the Delapenas cannot tie the non-use of the life jacket to the “use” of the premises; to do so would run contrary to the supreme court’s admonition that a claim cannot “be both a premises defect claim and a claim relating to a condition or use of tangible property.” Sampson, 500 S.W.3d at 385 (citing Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 233).

Party Submissions

This Eleventh Amendment to the Second Amended and Restated Revolving Loan Agreement (the “Amendment”), effective as of October 1, 2023, is entered into by and between Union Carbide Corporation, a New York corporation (the “Lender”) and The Dow Chemical Company, a Delaware corporation (the “Borrower”).

Contract

The surrounding facts and circumstances support our conclusion that the parties intended that all of Backes’ s obligations under the guaranty would come to an end once the historic tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building was completed. The evidence showed that First NBC and Backes were sophisticated parties with extensive experience in the funding of historic tax credit rehabilitation projects, including tax credit bridge loans. Both parties were represented by counsel in an arms-length transaction. The bridge loan documents, including the guaranty, were prepared by Firs t NBC’s attorney after negotiations between the parties and their attorneys. Consequently, the surrounding circumstances show that the termination clause in the guaranty was a bargained-for exchange between the parties and clearly expressed their intent. See Barrow-Shaver, 590 S.W.3d at 484.

Party Submissions

TADA’s Letter (Apr. 19, 2023). And it will ultimately affect Texas’s economy and citizens, which the Legislature expressly aimed to protect by regulating in this area. Even Respondents did not deny the importance of the issue.

Party Submissions

Here, Relator is not challenging the eligibility of Devine; indeed, Devine is an incumbent Justice on the Supreme Court. Rather, Relator is challenging Devine’s application as being noncompliant with the applicable statutory requirements. Section 172.021, Election Code makes clear that candidates for justice, supreme court must have a minimum of 50 valid signatures from each court of appeals district. T EX. E LEC. CODE § 172.021(g). Devine’s application does not contain the requisite number of unique, non-duplicate signatures in the 8 th Court of Appeals District from individuals only signing his petition as required by law. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 141.062(a)(2); 141.066(c). While a facial review might have been sufficient initially, once challenged, Respondent was required to review Relator’s challenge, Devine’s petition, and determine that his application be rejected. See TEX. ELEC. C ODE §§ 172.0222(e), (f), and (g); 172.0223(d). Moreover, Respondent is required to withdraw his certification of Devine’s name to the 2024 Republican Primary Ballot by notifying the secretary of state once his “application is determined not to comply with the applicable requirements.” See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.029(d). Again, this is a form, content and procedure challenge, not a challenge to Devine’s 10 eligibility to the office.

Party Submissions

Limit on Accounts. Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything contained herein to the contrary, unless otherwise determined by the Committee, in no event shall any Participant be permitted to have more than five (5) Separation from Service Accounts and/or Specified Date Accounts in total (in addition to the Retirement Account) with an Account Balance greater than zero, and any new Deferrals made once such limits are reached may only be made to an existing Account.

Contract

S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. 1943). Of course, contractual provisions may be used to accomplish such waivers. See Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 60-61 (Tex.

Party Submissions

While the issue here is vitally important, it is also sufficiently narrow— and the error is so clear from the statute’s plain language—that the Court should consider a per curiam reversal to correct the errors below.

Party Submissions

The trial court's abatement orders state as follows: [A]ll further proceedings relating to the Plaintiff's causes of action for negligence, gross negligence, violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade [**26] Practices Act ["DTPA"], breach of contract, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in this cause are hereby ABATED AND STAYED under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction until such time as the Court may lift this abatement by written order rendered after the filing of a motion to revive these causes of action and after the Court has conducted a hearing on said motion.

Party Submissions

The experts in this case were qualified to opine on standard of care, breach, and causation. Issue No. 4: Chapter 74 unambiguously requires an objection to the sufficiency of an expert report to be made “no later of the 21 st day after the date the report is served or the 21st day after the date the defendant’s answer is filed, failing which all objections are waived.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.351(a). The court of appeals erred when it failed to limit its review to the providers’ specific objections, failed to distinguish between the providers ’ objections, and raised and sustained objections that the providers themselves had never asserted at any stage of the proceeding.

Party Submissions

But even setting aside Walker’s refusal to pursue judicial relief through the ordinary course, Walker nonetheless lacks a compelling reason to have sought mandamus in this Court initially. As Walker acknowledges (at 3-4), the Election Code confers concurrent jurisdiction on this Court and the courts of appeals to issue mandamus relief to enforce legal duties imposed by the Code. Tex. Elec. Code § 273.061(a). Walker therefore must offer a “compelling reason” for failing to first seek mandamus relief from the appropriate court of appeals. Tex. R. App. P. 52.3(e). Walker’s sole reason is the apparent time pressure surrounding his claim: as he candidly admits (at 2), the electoral process is well underway, and counties throughout Texas 1 Indeed, Walker’s refusal to pursue relief in a trial court highlights another problem with his application for mandamus relief: no court has ever found facts regarding Walker’s immensely fact-specific disqualification claim against Devine. Despite Walker’s bare assertion (at 13-14) that this Court need resolve no factual disputes to grant him relief, the paucity of a factual record resolving any underlying factual issues demonstrates further that mandamus is inappropriate here.

Party Submissions

The agreement's stipulation, making each party individually responsible for all inherent costs, starkly tilts the scales in favor of large, well-funded entities like Lennar, rendering individual claimants like Rafiei vulnerable to disproportionate financial duress. Rafiei's option to alleviate this via the Flexible Fee Schedule is marred by the looming peril of case closure by the AAA, emphasizing the fiscal stranglehold this agreement potentially places on him.

Party Submissions

Claimants agree to conduct a reasonable search for and produce documents responsive to this request that are in the Claimants’ possession and/or control.

Legal Decisions

DAVID M. MEDINA Texas State Bar No. 00000088 [email protected] STEVEN J. KNIGHT Texas State Bar No. 24012975 [email protected] AMBER ALI Texas State Bar No. 24109573 [email protected] 1200 Smith Street, Suite 1400 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 658-1818 The petition for review preserved Issue No. 3 for argument pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(i). The rule states that the petition need not argue every issue included in the appeal. Id. Any issue not argued can be briefed at a later time if requested by the Court. Id. Petitioners’ motion for rehearing asks the Court to reconsider the petition. Importantly, the rules do not limit the scope of a motion for rehearing to only issues briefed in the petition. Respondents fail to cite any authority supporting their contention that Petitioners’ motion is improper.

Party Submissions

Petitioner also argues that the foreclosure transformed the Note into a non-real estate note, but there is no law supporting such a “conversion” theory in which the Note should be re-christened based on the borrower’s default. Petitioner would have a real estate note magically lose its contractual provisions for optional acceleration depending on the borrower’s circumstances and behavior, despite it occurring well into the lifespan of the loan. Yet even if the Note were transformed, Respondent still had plenty of time to choose when to accelerate and sue: either four years after maturity or acceleration, or four years after each payment was due (including the final maturity payment where any unpaid amount is then due), because a breach occurs each time an installment payment is missed. Gabriel v. Alhabbal, 618 S.W.2d at 897 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

Party Submissions

Respondent did not breach the RER Contract by rejecting Second Claimant’s Third Extension Request. Neither the RER Contract nor Peruvian law provide an entitlement to an extension of the Actual COS or the Termination Date of the Contract or an obligation on Respondent to grant one. To the contrary, such an extension would have been inconsistent with the terms of the RER Contract and binding provisions of the RER Regulations. 1214. It follows from the Tribunal’s findings on the denial of the Third Extension Request in relation to the RER Contract that this same denial is not a breach of the FET standard. The denial of the Third Extension Request was consistent with, and required by, the applicable legal regime at that time.

Legal Decisions

Q: Okay, and using that value did they [Pritchard & Abbott] determine what was the total value of the transmission lines in Texas? A: Of just the lines it was $496,193,596. Q: Okay. And did you guys agree to that as well? A: Yes sir. There is no document in the record reflecting an “agreement” to the “total value of the lines in Texas.” The agreement in question is to the value of Oncor’s property in Wilbarger County, that value that Oncor is by this action trying to renege. I C.R. 18. Furthermore, the testimony is vague as best. When answering affirmatively to the question “did you guys agree to that as well,” did the witness mean that Oncor or Duff & Phelps (Oncor’s agent) concur with the rationale or did one of those parties reach some unrecorded understanding with Pritchard & Abbott? Or was the “agree[d] to” matter something else entirely? Furthermore, the “total value of the transmission lines in Texas” is not the subject of this petition. The agreed upon value on the 2019 Wilbarger CAD roll is the issue. The objected to testimony should be stricken and ignored. TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4.

Party Submissions

Taking Weatherford’s “mixture” argument the full distance, Weatherford asks the Court to adopt an arbitrary classification system to classify part of Midland’s sewage system as a “solid waste facility” under the jurisdiction of the SWDA, and the remainder of the system as a domestic sewage system, exempted by the SWDA, placing an arbitrary and nonexistent burden upon Midland to show the difference. Simply put, Weatherford would ask the court to create a tangled regulatory scheme treating sewer pipe that hypothetically transports certain wastes as a “solid waste facility” subject to the SWDA, and then sewer pipe conveying mixed contaminants and household sewage as a sewer regulated by Chapter 26 of the TWC. Such a pipe-by-pipe analysis is neither required by R.R. Street, nor would it make any regulatory sense to invent such a burdensome and arbitrary classification system. Midland met its threshold jurisdictional burden by affirmatively showing that a sewage system is not a solid waste facility. Weatherford did not provide any evidence in response, and it cannot cite authority for its novel-proposed rule that sections “ A-C ” of a sewer collection system are, in actuality a “solid waste facility,” but sections “D-Z” of the sewer collection system are actually sewer pipe exempt from the SWDA. Such a distinction is not found in the SWDA statute, it is not found in prior case law, and that is because Weatherford’s desired rule is a product of its own construction as it attempts to ram-rod a landfill statute onto a municipal sewer system for cost-recovery purposes.

Party Submissions

In her summary-judgment response and on appeal, Douglas does not specifically use the term "unconscionable." However, Douglas suggests she was precluded from filing a workers' compensation claim based on Moody's initial position that she was not injured in the course and scope of her employment; therefore, she will receive no form of recovery if Moody is allowed to now reverse its position. This reasoning is insufficient to raise a material fact issue on whether it would be unconscionable for Moody to rely on the exclusivity provision of the act as a bar to this suit, despite its earlier inconsistent position.

Party Submissions

In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., Inc., 107 S.W.3d 832 (2003) LAB.CODE ANN. § 410.303. Therefore, the trial court would controvert that provision by trying the negligence claims while judicial review is pending.

Party Submissions

Griggs stands for a modest proposition: Two courts should avoid exercising control over the same order or judgment simultaneously. The problem Griggs identifies is the “danger a district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyzing the same judgment.” Id., at 59, 103 S.Ct. 400. The cure Griggs prescribes is that “[t]he filing of a notice of appeal ... divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Id., at 58, 103 S.Ct. 400.

Party Submissions

Relief sought : This Court should deny Relator’s petition and should deny Relator’s motion for temporary relief because (1) Relator seeks to disrupt an ongoing or imminent election; (2) under the equitable principles that control mandamus, Relator’s delay precludes relief; (3) the appropriate remedy for any technical defects is a chance to cure, and (4) removing Justice Devine from the ballot would violate the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.

Party Submissions

Account. Account means a bookkeeping account maintained by the Committee to record the payment obligation of a Participating Employer to a Participant as determined under the terms of the Plan (and for clarity, shall include each Retirement Account, each Separation from Service Account and each Specified Date Account). The Committee may maintain an Account to record the total obligation to a Participant and component Accounts to reflect amounts payable at different times and in different forms. Reference to an Account means any such Account established by the Committee, as the context requires.

Contract

There is no SWDA requirement for the cost-recovery defendant to prove a mixture of household sewage with industrial waste to qualify for the domestic sewage exclusion. Weatherford’s self-serving interpretation of the SWDA statute is not supported in this Court’s R.R. Street precedent, but instead is Weatherford’s attempt to introduce an evidentiary burden where none exists. In essence, Weatherford contends that: (1) any discharge (even an illicit discharge prohibited by law) is governed by the SWDA; unless (2) the recipient can prove a mixture of industrial discharges with household wastes; and (3) barring such a defendant’s proof-of-mixture showing, the domestic sewage exclusion cannot apply. Weatherford does not offer authority for such a burden-shifting obligation under the SWDA when jurisdiction has not been established, and that is because none exists.

Party Submissions

Accordingly, the trial court's Order Granting Temporary Injunction is hereby reversed and declared void, and the temporary injunction is dissolved. Interfirst, 715 S.W.2d 640.

Party Submissions

The Delapenas filed a response to the plea and submitted their own jurisdictional evidence, including a copy of a “Texas Health and Human Services Commission Child -Care Licensing Investigation Report. ” Citing multiple acts and omissions, the report concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the camp’s director breached the duty of care owed to Catiana and that his “ negligence result[ed] in the death of [a] child in his care.” In particular, the report found that the director placed camp counselors in positions where they could not monitor the shallow end of the pool. According to the report, the director then “released” some children, including Catiana, into the shallow end without life jackets, even though these children had not taken swim tests and the Delapenas had informed the camp that Catiana could not swim.

Party Submissions

FTC Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation dated 7 October 2003; Arbitration Rule 67 29.1. If a request for the submission of an amicus curiae brief is filed by the date indicated in Annex B, the Tribunal will give the appropriate directions in the exercise of its powers under Arbitration Rule 67 and take into consideration the recommendation of the North American Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party participation of 7 October 2003.

Legal Decisions

HN5 [ ] "Under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, the Legislature grants an administrative agency the sole authority to make the initial determination in a dispute." Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002). If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute until the party has exhausted all of the administrative remedies within the agency. See In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321-22 (Tex. 2004) ; Subaru of Am., Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 221. Absent subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must dismiss any claim within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction. See In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 322 .

Party Submissions

We conclude that French v. French, and subsequent cases erred in characterizing nonvested pension rights as expectancies and in denying the trial courts the authority to divide such rights as community property. This mischaracterization of pension rights has, and unless overturned, will continue to result in inequitable division of community assets.. . .

Party Submissions