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Equall 47

Archives originated from USTR or the State Department) that contain information regarding the U.S. position in the NAFTA renegotiation/USMCA negotiation and do not contain “any reference to positions of other parties or agreed text.” • Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada or Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect to paragraph 6(1) of Annex 14-by November 27, 2023. Alternatively, Claimants request that the Tribunal order Respondent to immediately seek, in good faith, to obtain Canada’s and Mexico’s consent to produce responsive documents regarding (i) the positions of Canada and Mexico and (ii) “agreed text” with respect paragraph 6(1) of Annex 14-C of USMCA.

Legal Decisions

Claimants note Serbia’s representation that Serbia “ has already conducted a reasonable search and has not located any other lease agreements concluded between Serbia or Luka Beograd on one side and Obnova on other side ”. No decision is required. DECISION Request no. Is pov-3/21 of 26 June 2023 based on which Serbia obtained document submitted as Serbia’s exhibit R-043.

Legal Decisions

HSMiller and its vice president, Defterios, were insureds of Diamond State. The company owed them a duty to provide an effective defense if they were sued.

Party Submissions

City of Ames Under Texas Water Code Section 13.041 for an Emergency Order to Compel the City of Liberty to Provide Sewer Service, Docket No. 2022-0763-UCR-E (Jun. 29, 2022) (final order) (the “TCEQ Emergency Order”). The reservation of Liberty’s rights and remedies in the Contract does not absolve Liberty of any and all obligation to provide wastewater service to volumes above the TAV, and Ames remains liable for its failure to pay for such service.

Party Submissions

Claimant is, therefore, entitled to 9(2)(a)). The analysis of a discrimination claim does not require determining whether or not the Respondent State "personally likes" certain individuals, and Claimant did not allege this point in its Memorial either. The personal liking or lack of such liking that may exist towards these individuals is totally irrelevant. Therefore, the documents are neither relevant nor material to the outcome of the case.

Legal Decisions

Instead, OSPrin was left with approximately $5 million (plus the interest and attorney’s fees that continue to accrue) that could not be recovered.

Party Submissions

Here, Liberty pled that Ames is a “Type A General Law Municipality.” CR 437, ¶ 2. Such a municipality does not have any power or authority other than what the Legislature has provided. A contract with a Type A general law municipality is “properly executed” when “the contract’s execution comports with the authority the legislature granted the [municipality]. .. including the statutory and regulatory requirements placed on [municipalities] entering (or seeking to enter) contractual relationships.” El Paso Education Initiative, Inc., 602 S.W.3d at 532. The statute giving Type A general law municipalities the power to enter into interlocal agreements is Chapter 791 of the Texas Government Code. In order for an interlocal agreement between governmental entities to be “properly” executed, the contract “must: (1) be authorized by the governing body of each party to the contract.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 791.011(d). Liberty was required to plead that the Contract was authorized by the governing body, not merely signed by the mayor. Liberty failed to state in any of its petitions that the Ames city council authorized the Contract, or that the city council delegated authority or approved for the mayor to execute the agreement. Merely pleading that the Contract was “executed” does not establish jurisdiction and does not meet Liberty’s pleading burden.

Party Submissions

If a Participant or Beneficiary prevails in a legal proceeding brought under the Plan to enforce the rights of such Participant or any other similarly situated Participant or Beneficiary, in whole or in part, the Participating Employer shall reimburse such Participant or Beneficiary for all legal costs, expenses, attorneys’ fees and such other liabilities incurred as a result of such proceedings. If the legal proceeding is brought in connection with a Change in Control, or a “change in control” as defined in a rabbi trust described in Section 11.2, the Participant or Beneficiary may file a claim directly with the trustee for reimbursement of such costs, expenses and fees. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the amount of the claim shall be treated as if it were an addition to the Participant’s or Beneficiary’s Account Balance and will be included in determining the Participating Employer’s trust funding obligation under Section 11.2.

Contract

And, although Dr. Tappan writes that H.W. “would have been born without neurological injury” had he been delivered an hour or so earlier (CR.671), Dr. Null says something different—H.W. “would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has” if he had been delivered earlier. (CR.709). In other words, the baby would have suffered some injury without negligence. If it is Dr. Null’s opinion that controls, what degree of brain injury would H.W. have suffered, and how and why is anything beyond that causally tied to Dr. Castillo’s claimed negligence? The report is silent on these issues. ( See id. ).

Party Submissions

Beyond this, the jury instruction, commenting on the weight of the evidence and essentially siding with HSMiller on the fact issues related to the RTP issue, undermined the Lawyers’ case and their expert’s testimony. As HSMiller’s counsel argued in closing, the RTP issue “was a game changer.” (11RR258:17-18) The jury instruction defined “negligence” in such a way — using Terry’s name and the facts of the case — that it commented on the weight of the evidence and required the jury to answer “yes.” 7 For the reasons set forth in the Lawyers’ Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, the Court should reverse and render judgment. Alternatively, the Court should uphold the remand for new trial based on the prejudicial jury instructions and other reasons not reached by the court of appeals.

Party Submissions

You are instructed that ordinary care means that degree of care that would be used by a lawyer or law firm of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

Party Submissions

Despite these background facts, the parties dispute the exact nature of Mann's activities while he was crossing the road, and whether the nature of those activities removes Mann from course and scope. Our review of the record reveals four possible versions of events. The first three versions are consistent with the course and scope of Mann's employment: (1) that he was gathering water for his workers, as Mann reportedly told his doctors in the hospital on the day of the collision; (2) that he was going to look at an excavation to determine what paperwork he would need to obtain for that day's work, as Mann allegedly told an insurance adjuster sometime after the accident; and (3) that he was preparing for *326 a morning safety meeting, as Mann allegedly told his supervisor just after the accident. In each of these versions, Mann's activities certainly originate in and advance Bay's purpose of performing projects at the refinery. See SeaBright, 465 S.W.3d at 642.

Party Submissions

To amend the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 to include as a high-priority research and extension area research on microplastics in land-applied biosolids on farmland, and for other purposes.

Legislation

In Mallios, involving a partial assignment of claims, the assignor was allowed to pursue its claim against its former lawyer. Mallios, 11 S.W.3d at 158-59. But Mallios was in a completely different posture procedurally when the Court considered the assignment. There, a summary judgment had been granted against the assignor and its assignee on the malpractice claims. Id. at 158. No trial had occurred yet — malpractice or otherwise — because, unlike here, Mallios involved a failure to sue the proper party. A remand for the original plaintiff to pursue its malpractice claims would lead to the first trial in the case. Unlike here, the Court was not confronted with a former plaintiffs’ counsel who took legal positions in the malpractice trial diametrically opposed to those he took in the underlying trial. Nor did the Court have to consider the impact of expert testimony that 27 was based on the former plaintiffs’ counsel’s improper position-shifting.

Party Submissions

Weatherford’s contentions effectively turn the domestic sewage exclusion upside-down. Instead of a categorical carve-out of sewer systems from the SWDA (which the Legislature provided by applying the statute to only “solid waste facilities”), Weatherford would impose a duty on a defendant to prove wrong the bare and unsupported allegations of a plaintiff. Such municipalities would then be burdened with identifying and labeling every molecule of waste entering its sewer system to demonstrate a “mixture” for the ultimate conclusion that a sewer system is, in fact, not a landfill (as landfills are the focus of the “solid waste facility” definition).

Party Submissions

Predictably, after the episode aired, Tonya received death threats from all over the world accusing her of exploiting her great-uncle Charlie.

Party Submissions

We appreciate that “engaging in the very conduct disclaimed as a basis for waiver is insufficient as a matter of law to nullify the nonwaiver provision. ” Shields, 526 S.W.3d at 484-85. But in the provision here, Santos waived only “notice of ... demand for payment (subject to any right you may have to cure your default), waiver, delay and all other notices or demands in connection with this Note,” and acknowledged that the lender “may waive or delay the enforcement of our rights under this Note without waiving or otherwise affecting such rights. ” 1CR9 ¶ 13. Yellowfin and its predecessors did not simply delay enforcement of their rights or fail to provide notice of waiver or delay; instead, as a string of different creditors acquired the Note, no creditor even attempted to discover Santos’s addres s or inform her where her payments should be made.

Party Submissions

For column 8: Indicate the chosen target population providing accordingly the list of host species/genera and area covered. The target population is defined as the ensemble of inspection units. Its size is defined typically for agricultural areas as hectares, but could be lots, fields, greenhouses etc. Please justify the choice made in the underlying assumptions. Indicate the inspection units surveyed. ‘Inspection unit’ means plants, plant parts, commodities, materials, pest vectors that had been scrutinised for identifying and detecting the pests.

Legislation

More still, Dr. Null — who explicitly stated that he reviewed Dr. Tappan’s report and agreed with its conclusions— went even further by conducting a differential diagnosis to explain why nothing in the medical records suggested any other potential cause of H.W.’s brain injury: This neonate’s course postdelivery is consistent with an antenatal asphyxia event. His normal fetal heart tracing initially followed by his requirement for resuscitation, need for assisted ventilation, need to be cooled, coagulopathy, seizures, severe acidosis, and no evidence of infection are all consistent with an asphyxia event that occurred late in the course of labor. There was no evidence on MRI of a brain malformation or old injury to explain his condition at birth. More likely than not had [H.W.] been delivered one to one and a half hours sooner he would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has.

Party Submissions

Respondents’ effort to draw support for the decision below from Kemp v. Brenham, No. 05-18-01377-CV, 2020 WL 205313 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) is also unavailing. Respondents claim that Kemp first established their position that “compliance” with the eviction order in the forcible entry and detainer action constitutes “voluntary abandonment of the premises” under all circumstances—meaning that even a tenant who offers “testimony” that it abandoned its challenge to the eviction and surrendered the premises only because of “mistreatment” from its landlord interfering with its right of possession cannot maintain a claim for constructive eviction in district court. (Resp. 16, 30) Of course, such a result would be indefensible. It would be in direct conflict with section 31.004(a), section 24.008, and the many decisions establishing that even the tenant who loses the right to immediate possession in a forcible entry and detainer action can still contest ultimate possession and recover damages in district court. The result Respondents urge also makes no sense: A party’s right to pursue a constructive-eviction claim requires an eviction as an element of the claim. It cannot be defeated by an eviction —or by a party’s compliance with a wrongful eviction order. Otherwise, no constructive-eviction claim could ever lie. It is thus no surprise that Kemp in fact adopted no such rule.

Party Submissions

The purpose of an expert report under the TMLA is to deter frivolous claims and not to dispose of claims regardless of merit.

Party Submissions

Supporting the values of the Equity or Else quality-of-life platform and acknowledging the need for the House of Representatives to use the platform as a holistic framework for drafting and implementing policy that promotes racial and economic equity for all across various social issues.

Legislation

Executive and the Company agree to cooperate to amend this Agreement from time to time as appropriate to avoid the imposition of any Section 409A Penalty.

Contract

To amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify the organization of the Office of Survivors Assistance of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Legislation

The nationals of all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories specified in Article 1; subject to the observance of local laws and regulations, they may carry on there without impediment all maritime, industrial, mining and commercial operations on a footing of absolute equality. They shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practise of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters, and no monopoly shall be established on any account for any enterprise whatever.

Legal Decisions

Respondents argue that this Court should not intervene because there is no split in authority or conflict on the meaning or application of Chapters 12 and 55. Respondents’ Br. at 8. However, a split in authority is just one of the many factors this Court considers in deciding whether to grant review. TEX. R. APP. P. 56.1(a).

Party Submissions

Valuation. Deferrals shall be credited to appropriate Accounts on the date such Compensation would have been paid to the Participant absent the Compensation Deferral Agreement. Company Contributions shall be credited to a Participant’s Retirement Account at the time(s) determined by the Committee. Valuation of Accounts shall be performed under procedures approved by the Committee.

Contract

Husband’s right to the bonus vested when he received it. At that time, he was ano longer married, and Wife was not entitled to any division of the property. See the community owns at the time of. divorce”). In reaching this conclusion, we are unpersuaded by Wife’s reliance on Sprague v. Sprague, 363 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) and Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661', 665—66 (Tex. 1976).

Party Submissions

On February 26, 2020, Yellowfin mailed a Notice of Intent to Accelerate and Right to Cure letter to Santos, advising: (1) Yellowfin purchased the account on August 29, 2019; (2) the amount due as of that date was $21,640.59; (3) Yellowfin waived and forgave the monthly installment payments due through June 1, 2019, and the new post waiver principal balance, as of July 1, 2019, was $21,023.13; (4) the monthly payment amount was $236.97; (5) payments were due beginning July 1, 2019; and (6) Santos had thirty (30) days in which to cure the default or Yellowfin would accelerate the balance of the Note. CR2:82-83. On March 25, 2020, Yellowfin mailed a Notice of Acceleration, advising Santos that the principal balance had been accelerated and was due immediately. CR2:84-85.

Party Submissions

Participant under this Award and such unvested Performance Share Units represented by this Award shall immediately terminate. For purposes of this Award, the termination date shall be the last day of employment or provision of services and shall not be extended by any actual or deemed period of notice of termination, whether under statute, common law, contract or otherwise. For purposes of this Award, the Participant’s employment or provision of services shall be deemed to have terminated if the entity for which the Participant is employed or providing services ceases to be a Subsidiary. In addition, the Participant’s employment or service will be deemed to have terminated for Cause, if after the Participant’s employment or service has terminated, facts and circumstances are discovered that would have justified a termination for Cause (and any Shares that may have been issued upon settlement of vested Performance Share Units after the occurrence of the conduct that would have justified a termination for Cause shall be subject to recoupment by the Company, and if such Shares are no longer held by the Participant, then the Participant shall pay to the Company a sum equal to the Fair Market Value of the Shares at the time such Shares were issued). Any determination of Cause shall be made by the Committee, in its sole discretion. For purposes of this Award Agreement (other than for purposes of determinations made under Article 11 of the Plan), “Cause” shall mean (i) the willful and continued failure by the Participant to substantially perform his or her duties with the Company and its Subsidiaries (other than any such failure resulting from his or her incapacity due to physical or mental illness), (ii) the engaging by the Participant in conduct which is demonstrably and materially injurious to the Company or its Subsidiaries, monetarily or otherwise, (iii) the engaging by the Participant in fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, dishonesty, misappropriation or other actions that cause damage to the property or business of the Company or its Subsidiaries, or (iv) the Participant’s conviction of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, a felony. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Participant’s employment is terminated by the Company without Cause or the Participant voluntarily terminates his or her employment, (i) if the Participant is eligible for Retirement at the time of such termination, this Award shall partially vest, any forfeiture restrictions on such partially vested Award shall lapse on the date of such termination, the Participant shall be entitled to receive a number of Performance Share Units equal to the product of (a) and (b), where (a) is equal to a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of full years (i.e., 365-day periods) of employment from the Date of Grant until the date of such termination, and the denominator of which is three (3), and (b) is the number of Performance Share Units that otherwise would have been earned by the Participant if the Participant’s employment had not terminated prior to the Vesting Date determined in accordance with Section 4, and settlement shall be made as provided in Section 6 or (ii) if the Participant has reached age sixty-five (65) with five (5) years of service at the time of such termination, this Award shall fully vest, any forfeiture restrictions on this Award shall lapse on the date of such termination, the Participant shall be entitled to receive the full number of Performance Share Units that otherwise would have been earned by the Participant if the Participant’s employment or provision of services had not terminated prior to the Vesting Date determined in accordance with Section 4, and settlement shall be made as provided in Section 6.

Contract

In Heldenfels Brothers, Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, this Court held that a party may recover for unjust enrichment when they provide another person a benefit, as a result of that person’s “fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage.” See 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). There are no allegations of fraud or duress against the Diocese. The only issue in this case is undue advantage, which this Court has never defined.

Party Submissions

Several justices at oral argument inquired as to the settlement amount and whether Mendietta was required to make payments beyond the $175,000.00 constitutional lien on his homestead. Here, while there is a judgment for $1.9 million, there simply is no promise to pay $1.9 million. The total settlement amount is $175,000.00 plus interest allocated to the constitutional lien. While the judgment references the injury to the Diocese, the forbearance agreement does not.

Party Submissions

Accounts are intended to constitute unfunded obligations within the meaning of Sections 201(2), 301(a)(3) and 401(a)(1) of ERISA.

Contract

This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session; the 1st C.S.; the 2nd C.S.; the 3rd C.S. and the 4th C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the November 7, 2023 election results.

Party Submissions

Tribunal The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.

Legal Decisions

Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4, I hereby certify that this Petition for Review contains 1681 words. This is a computer-generated document created in Microsoft Word, using 14-point typeface for all text, except for footnotes which are in 12-point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document.

Party Submissions

Respondent’s alleged breach of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 5 of the Qatar-France BIT and to assess the appropriate remedies that the Claimant is seeking: the restitution and/or indemnification of the assets seized, which are the subject matter of this claim”.

Legal Decisions

Backes is the founder and CEO of Provident Realty Advisors (PRA), a company in the business of large-scale real estate projects. PRA forms various partnerships and entities dedicated solely to each real estate project. In 2013, PRA decided to purchase and rehabilitate the Texaco building and formed Rusk at San Jacinto Building Investors, LP, whose general partner is TX 1111, to purchase the building. PRA also formed other entities to take advantage of the benefits offered under the federal program. TX 1111 filed Part 2 of the application in the federal program in November 2012 and described the proposed work that included both work involving QREs and work that would not qualify for QREs. Actual work on the project began in 2014. As the work progressed, several amendments were made to Part 2 of TX 1111’s federal program application.

Party Submissions

S.L.U. acquired a 99.92% interest in Duke Energy Generating S.A. and thus acquired an indirect 90.80% interest in Cerros Colorados in December 2003.469 The Tribunal also finds that the evidence on the record shows that the Claimant has held the investment at all times since its acquisition. The only change in corporate ownership concerns the decrease of the Claimant’s indirect participation in Cerros Colorados from 90.87% to 86.33%, which could have a consequence on the calculation of the claimed damages.470 The Claimant also changed its corporate name but such change does not have any effect on the Claimant’s continued ownership of the investment. 451. The fact that the Claimant’s ultimate parent company acquired the Claimant in 2016 likewise has no bearing on the Claimant’s claim. 452. The Claimant has thus proven that it owned its investment since December 2003.

Legal Decisions

Justice John Devine currently holds Place 4 on this Court. Devine first successfully sought the Republican Party nomination to Place 4 in 2012; he ran in the 2012 and 2018 general elections with the Republican Party’s endorsement, garnering millions of votes statewide in each election. See 2018 General Election, TEXAS SECRE-TARY OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2018), https://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist331 _state.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2024); 2012 General Election, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2012), https://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist164_state.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Tens of thousands of these votes were cast in the counties within the jurisdiction of the Eighth Court of Appeals. See, e.g., November 2018 Gen-eral Election, EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS ELECTIONS DEPARTMENT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://results.enr.clarityelections.com/TX/El_Paso/92416/Web02.222611/#/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). Before that, Devine successfully sought judicial office with the Republican Party’s endorsement in both 1994 and 1998, winning election to the 190th district court in Harris County both times. See, e.g., “Justice John Phillip Devine,” TEXAS JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/supreme/about-the-court/justices/justice-john-phillip-devine/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024).

Party Submissions

To amend the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 with respect to the definition of biofuels and sustainable aviation fuel, and for other purposes.

Legislation

Agreement for providing and using port and warehousing services number 1819 dated 16 March 2006. Serbia may have other agreements allegedly relating to Obnova’s premises that it did not to e xhibit to its Counter-Memorial. The requested documents are relevant and material to fully understand contractual relations between Obnova, Serbia and Luka Beograd with respect to Obnova’s premises in the period preceding Claimants’ investment in Obnova.

Legal Decisions

Appellant's brief fails to establish these two mandatory threshold matters with any clarity or evidence whatsoever. The appellate rules require an appellant's brief to contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Capstone Healthcare Equipment Servs., Inc. v. Quality Home Health Care, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 696, 698-99 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied); Burke v. Ins. Auto Auctions Corp., 169 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied). The trial court and this court, have no duty to brief the issues for the Appellant. See Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). In Briggs, the Fourth Circuit refused to piece together a written agreement for Toyota out of the summary judgment record on appeal. This court should do likewise as the clear language of the statute requires a written agreement between the parties relying upon Tex. Lab Code § 406.123. The record evidence does not contain any of the requirements of Tex. Lab. Code § 406.123 and Bay may not now supplement and rely upon any *20 evidence not previously part of the appellate record. K-Six Television, Inc. v. Santiago, 75 S.W.3d 91, 97 (Tex.App. -San Antonio, 2002, no pet.).

Party Submissions

The instruction on responsible third parties was wrong in several respects: First, it assumed HSMiller’s side of the case that the judge in the underlying case denied the designation solely because of timeliness. Second, it also assumed that the judge in the underlying trial would have eventually submitted Flaven over the objection of the same lawyer who testified in the malpractice trial that Terry had erred in not naming Flaven. Third, the instruction called out the Terry defendants by name, which makes this a direct 18 comment on the weight of the evidence. Fourth, it was erroneous. Flaven could not be a responsible third party because he was not a party to the real estate transaction and there was never any evidence that he caused his company not to close, which was the alleged injury. These erroneous comments were harmful in themselves, and the harm is made more manifest by the emphasis put on the instructions in the closing arguments made by opposing counsel.

Party Submissions

Prior to 2011, this Court had allowed candidates to cure defects in form, content and procedure. E.g., In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 543 (Tex. 2006). “The Legislature has since made clear that candidates may not amend their applications once the filing deadline passes.” In re Anthony, 642 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Tex. 2022), citing TEX. ELEC. CODE § 141.032(g). Similarly, courts have previously held that once the list of candidates is certified, changes were neither required nor permitted to the accepted list. Escobar, 917 S.W.2d at 410. Here too, the Legislature specifically responded by imposing a statutory obligation on the chair to update the list of candidates by omitting those whose applications do not comply with the applicable requirements. See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.029(d) (West 2015) ("The secretary of state shall be notified if a. .. candidate's application is determined not to comply with the applicable requirements."); see also TEX. ELEC. CODE § 172.0222(f) (“A determination under this section that an application complies with the applicable requirements does not preclude a subsequent determination that the application does not comply”). It is also important to note that it was only in 2017, during the 85th Legislature, that S.B. 44 was passed requiring judicial candidates to obtain petition signatures after a two-year hiatus in which ballot petition signatures were not required.

Party Submissions

To amend title 23, United States Code, to require transportation planners to consider projects and strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and for other purposes.

Legislation

In support of their claims, the Walkers served preliminary expert reports from Dr. James G. Tappan, a board-certified obstetrician, Dr.

Party Submissions

In Thompson, the parent-claimants’ expert relied on a series of assumptions to conclude that medical-provider negligence caused their daughter to die by suicide. 649 S.W.3d at 162. Not only did the parents’ expert offer no factual support for his assumptions, but he also failed to exclude the defense expert’s alternative possibility: that the girl’s suicide was a spontaneous, impulsive, and unpreventable act. Id. As the parents’ expert had failed to rule out other plausible causes raised by the evidence, his testimony could not prove cause-in-fact. Id. (“[I]f the record contains no evidence supporting an expert’s material factual assumptions, or if such assumptions are contrary to conclusively proven facts, opinion testimony founded on those assumptions is not competent evidence.”).

Party Submissions

McCarthy Subcontract -12-01-12-2017 Rev. 8.2 Storage areas, if available, will be allocated by McCarthy for Subcontractor's materials and equipment during the course of the Work. Locations for parking, office trailer(s), marshalling yard(s), etc. shall be submitted to and approved by McCarthy. Subcontractor shall relocate, without additional cost to McCarthy, said storage areas, trailers, marshalling yard(s), etc., as directed by McCarthy.

Party Submissions

It should be remembered that acceleration of a real estate note is a harsh remedy which gets close scrutiny from courts. McGowan v. Pasol, 605 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). Courts have looked with disfavor upon the exercise of optional acceleration, requiring a clear, positive and unequivocal declaration of acceleration, followed by affirmative action towards enforcement. Crow v. Heath, 516 S.W.2d 225 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Attempts to apply silence as a manifestation of intentional waiver in the context of a loan generally requires other circumstances which are evidence of such intention. Self v. Kinder, 474 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Miller v. Sandvick, 921 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied). Given this high bar, it would be inequitable to hold that a lender’s hesitancy to tread upon this path bars recovery under the Note.

Party Submissions

Oncor also relies on Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Jacob S. McDonald and 1615 Tabor, LLC, upholding a section 1.111(e) agreement and rendering judgment 36 for the appraisal district. The holding in the case is irrelevant to these proceedings.

Party Submissions

Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied), likewise doesn’t help the Walkers. There, the expert reports contained much more extensive factual explanations as to how and why hypoxia began during labor, how the failure to continuously monitor the baby throughout the night contributed to the injuries, and how and why the defendant’s failure to deliver earlier caused the baby to suffer injuries from hypoxia. Id. at 116-19, 124-26. Further, one expert explained in “great detail” how the effects of hypoxia and asphyxia were cumulative and progressive, the role of fetal heart monitoring, and the medical relationship between the late decelerations on the strip and the baby’s injuries. Id. at 125. The reports here do not contain the factual explanations of causation found in the Cornejo reports.

Party Submissions

Nowhere in its causation discussion does the opinion explain how the trial court’s conclusion was unreasonable or made without reference to guiding principles. Compare Walker, 2022 WL 17324338, at *3-*5 with Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53 (reversing court of appeals because trial court “could have reasonably determined” report was deficient); see also Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. 2011) (discussing the abuse of discretion standard).

Party Submissions

Tribunal The Arbitral Tribunal considers that the documents sought under this request are included in Request 3.a and no decision is therefore made.

Legal Decisions

Stay Pursuant To Rule 13 of the Rules of Judicial Administration has been served upon all counsel of record via facsimile, email or by electronic filing, on this 27th day of December, 2023.

Party Submissions

Id (emphasis added). Thus, far from supporting Petitioner, the Wells Fargo opinion supports the maturity date of the Note as the accrual date for limitations, and separates acceleration from foreclosure.

Party Submissions

Start with the text. Samson’s substitution of “late charges” for “interest” in art. XVII.D wrongly alters the text to push the due date for Late Charges to an indefinite future date. See Respondents’ Oral Argument Exhibit 2. But even if those terms were interchangeable, such substitution would render meaningless the last sentence of the prior provision that makes Late Charges “due and payable” each month.

Party Submissions

Serbia argues in the Counter-Memorial that Claimants did not prove that Obnova built the buildings presently existing at its premises and argue that all Obnova’s buildings at Dunavska 17 -19 had been built before the creation of Obnova’s predecessor Otpad. 58 The requested documents are relevant and material to assess Serbia’s contemporaneous und erstanding of the: ( i ) existence of buildings at Obnova’s premises at Dunavska 17-19 and Dunavska 23; and (ii) ownership and other rights to these buildings and the land plots at these premises.

Legal Decisions

A correct reading of the Court of Appeals’ opinion shows that the SWDA does not apply to a sewer collection system and such a system is not a solid waste facility. Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. City of Midland, 652 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. filed) (“the SWDA’s cost recovery provision does not apply to the allegations and subject matter—i.e., a domestic wastewater collection system. . .”). The opinion found that Weatherford failed to establish a waiver of the City’s immunity under the SWDA, and that such an immunity waiver does not apply to Midland’s facilities regardless of the City’s possible status as a person responsible for solid waste. Id. (“the governmental immunity waiver provisions contained in the SWDA do not apply to the City in this case—regardless of whether the City is characterized as either (1) an ‘owner’ or ‘operator’ of a ‘solid waste facility’ or (2) an ‘arranger’ of ‘solid waste.’”).

Party Submissions

Article 5 This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .

Legislation

Article 2 This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .

Legislation

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES A. The court of appeals found that this case alleged a departure from accepted standards of medical care, health care or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care.

Party Submissions

Oncor ’ s argument that the agreement did not purport to resolve the possibility of a clerical error lacks sense. The agreement resolved the property’s value. If Oncor ’ s sole concern was for the accuracy of Mills CAD’s records rather than its move to change values, this matter would have never reached this Court. What Oncor is patently seeking to change, however, is the value of it property on the Mills CAD 2019 appraisal roll, that same value it previously agreed to resolve.

Party Submissions

Encouraging all schools in the United States to teach students digital literacy and history related to the Holocaust, World War II, and antisemitism.

Legislation

Such documents are relevant to demonstrate the nature of the treatment and protection accorded by the Respondent to the Claimant and are therefore, notably, material to an assessment of the Respondent’s alleged breach27 of the Claimant’s rights under Art. 328 of the France-Qatar BIT.

Legal Decisions

Citing to its earlier opinion in Wingfoot, the Texas Supreme Court, in Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2005), again observed that an employee can have more than one employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act and its exclusive remedy provision. Garza at 477-478. In Garza, an employee hired by a temporary employment agency was injured while performing tasks for the agency's client company. Garza at 473. The Supreme Court ruled that, because the client company failed to come forward with a policy that it obtained for itself, the client company was not entitled to the exclusive remedy provision in Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a).

Party Submissions

The majority opinion erroneously holds that CKC’s allegations of self-dealing were insufficient because they did not address Alpesh’s subjective thoughts: “Significantly, Condon does not allege that any personal benefit Alpesh has received from the alleged misconduct is of such subjective material significance to him—taking into account his overall economic circumstances—that it is reasonable to question whether he could have objectively considered a litigation demand by Condon.” Condon v. Kadakia, 661 S.W.3d 443, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, pet. filed) (emphasis added).

Party Submissions

Unallocated Deferrals and Accounts. If the Participant fails to make an investment allocation with respect to an Account, such Account shall be invested in an investment option, the primary objective of which is the preservation of capital, as determined by the Committee.

Contract

IT IS ORDERED that after the child reaches age seven (7), then the electronic communication shall be for a period of up to thirty (30) minutes.

Party Submissions

That rule far surpasses the statement in Griggs —the sole statement on which the majority relies—that a district court loses “control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” 459 U.S. at 58, 103 S.Ct. 400; ante, at 1919. Only the arbitrability order is on appeal, not the merits. And those matters are distinct. As this Court recognized (before Congress enacted § 16), “arbitrability” is “easily severable from the merits of the underlying disputes.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 21, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983).

Party Submissions

Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, in the event of a Change in Control during the Performance Period described in Section 2.3 above, then subject to Executive remaining continuously employed with the Company through the date of such Change in Control (except as specified in the following sentence): (a) if the applicable per share consideration for Company stock in such Change in Control is less than $30.00, the First PSU Tranche shall immediately vest in full, and the Second PSU Tranche shall be forfeited and Executive shall not have any further rights with respect thereto; (b) if the applicable per share consideration for Company stock in such Change in Control is between $30.00 and $40.00, the First PSU Tranche shall immediately vest in full, and Executive shall be entitled to a portion of the Second PSU Tranche based on the application of linear interpolation between $30.00 and $40.00 (with the portion of the Second PSU Tranche that does not vest pursuant to such linear interpolation being forfeited); and (c) if the applicable per share consideration for Company stock in such Change in Control is $40.00 or greater, both the First PSU Tranche and the Second PSU Tranche shall immediately vest in full. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event that a Change in Control occurs during the Tail Period described in Section 2.3 above, the One-Time PSU Special Grant shall be eligible to vest pursuant to the preceding sentence, subject to the pro rata reduction described in Section 2.3.

Contract

The term “investment” shall mean every kind of asset invested in the territory of one Contracting Party in accordance with its laws and regulations by an investor of the other Contracting Party [...]. [emphasis added] 238. The Tribunal considers that the passage emphasised means that for an asset to qualify as an investment within the meaning of the BIT it must be made in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host State. Otherwise it is not an “investment” for the purposes of the BIT and a tribunal constituted under Article IX will not have jurisdiction over a dispute which arises out of it. In the view of the Tribunal, this requirement is satisfied if, at the time that the asset is first invested, it is invested in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host State. If those laws and regulations subsequently change, that change will not deprive the asset of its quality as an investment within the meaning of the BIT. To hold otherwise would enable a host State to circumvent the protection of the BIT.

Legal Decisions

An appellate court reviews a summary judgment de novo. The appellate court takes all evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true and indulges every reasonable inference and resolves any doubts in her favor.

Party Submissions

If you are a director, officer or principal shareholder, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) further restricts your ability to sell or otherwise dispose of Shares acquired upon settlement of the Units.

Contract

WHEREAS, the Seller desires to transfer and sell to the Buyer 49.5% of the units of membership interest in the Company (the “Transferred Equity Interest”), and the Buyer desires to purchase from the Seller the Transferred Equity Interest such that, after the transfer, the Buyer shall own 99.5% of the units of membership interest in the Company and the Seller shall own 0.5% of the units of membership interest in the Company.

Contract

To satisfy the causation requirement an expert must explain the basis of his statements and link his conclusions to the facts. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). But this Court has stressed that a valid expert report need not marshal all of plaintiff ’s proof. Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 223. It need not present evidence as if the plaintiff were actually litigating the merits. Abshire, 563 S.W.3d at 223; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879. The report need not use “magic words” or meet the same standards as evidence offered at summary judgment or at trial. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879.

Party Submissions

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for the distribution of additional residency positions to help combat the substance use disorder crisis.

Legislation

This is the eighth of nine requests for documents which the Claimant contends was seized during the criminal proceedings in Qatar.

Legal Decisions

Dr. Tappan then offered that the large subacute infarction seen on MRI and MRA “suggests the possibility” that H.W. “sustained a perinatal arterial ischemic stroke likely due to intrapartum factors including prolonged second-stage labor, fetal heart rate abnormalities, and trauma at the time of delivery.” (CR.670). But, as the Court of Appeals recognized, the mere “possibility” of a link between conduct and eventual harm fails to satisfy the reasonable medical probability standard imposed by the statute. Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *4 (citing, among other cases, Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53).

Party Submissions

Continuing, Dr. Tappan claimed “[H.W.] sustained an in-utero asphyxial injury during the final one to one and a half hours of labor. Had Dr. Castillo decided for cesarean delivery at or about 15:15 and had she atraumatically delivered [H.W.] by 15:45...[he] would have been born without neurological injury.” (CR.671). Again, this was not enough because Dr. Tappan never explained, factually, how or why it is purportedly true. ( Id. ). Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539-40; see also Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460-61.

Party Submissions

In concluding the reports were insufficient as to causation, the Amarillo Court properly relied on this Court’s decision in Zamarripa, which involved a similar set of alleged nursing failures. Baptist St. Anthony’s Hosp., 2022 WL 17324338, at *4-5. In Zamarripa, a pregnant patient presented at one hospital but a physician ordered her transferred to another for a higher standard of care. Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 456-57. En route, the placenta detached, and the woman and baby ultimately died. The expert opined that bleeding caused by the detached placenta caused a heart attack due to lack of oxygen carried to the heart for sufficient pumping. This collapse caused her death. Id. at 458. Had she been in a hospital setting, where emergent c-section and hysterectomy surgery were available, the harm would have been prevented.

Party Submissions

State accord the investment “ equitable and reasonable [...] protection”. The Tribunal agrees that this is an additional requirement not found in all other BITs. The Claimants rely upon it in support of their argument that Norway should have protected their investment from the effects of the introduction by the Russian Federation of a ban on harvesting snow crab in the Russian sector of the Loop Hole. For the reasons given in paragraphs 492 to 494, above, the Tribunal considers that claim unsustainable.

Legal Decisions

Dr. Tappan did discuss causation when writing about Dr. Castillo’s duty to deliver atraumatically—saying her alleged failure to do so “proximately caused traumatic extraction, physical craniocerebral deformation, and traumatic injury to the brain.” (CR.669). But he never explains, factually, how or why that is purportedly true, as a result of Dr. Castillo’s alleged breach. Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539-40. In fact, his statement that an alleged “fail[ure] to deliver baby [H.W.] in an atraumatic fashion...proximately caused traumatic extraction,” etc. (CR.669) is circular reasoning at its finest.

Party Submissions

This Court should reverse the Fourth Court’s judgment. It should remand to the court of appeals for consideration of the remaining issues, or alternatively address them here in the first instance, and either render judgment for Bay on damages and attorney fees or remand for a new trial on attorney fees.

Party Submissions

Multiple hurdles had to be cleared before Flaven would be submitted on the jury charge. HSMiller argues primarily that a timely filed motion for leave to designate Flaven as an RTP would have been 29 granted. Resp’t’s Br. at 40-42. But this analysis overlooks one of the two reasons the BNC Sellers objected to the RTP designation: Flaven’s “misrepresentations” did not violate any legal duty owed to the BNC Sellers. See 17RR740–45 (PX80).

Party Submissions

Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 515; ESIS, 908 S.W.2d at 559. However, the party appealing bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. LAB.CODE ANN.

Party Submissions

Oncor argues in its Petitioner’s Brief for the first time that this Court should remand the case to the trial court to allow Oncor to plead an ultra vires claim against the individual officials of Wilbarger CAD. One must assume that Oncor would claim that the chief appraiser or her agent had no authority to enter the agreement in issue. Aside from the argument being badly tardy, it is impossible to conceive such an argument being raised in good faith. Section 1.111(e) begins, “An agreement between a property owner or the owner’s agent and the chief appraiser is final. . .” Oncor cannot so much as imply with the least shred of credibility that the chief appraiser or her representative had no authority to enter the agreement in dispute. Or perhaps Oncor can conjure some duty on the chief appraiser’s part to divine the mindset and internal mistakes of the property owner prior to entering such an agreement. On the other hand, perhaps the argument makes as much sense as Oncor’s allegation of the implicit repeal of § 1.111(e)’s finality. VI. The Appraisal Review Board should not be a party under the Tax Code.

Party Submissions

Once again, if every single Wilson case must be individually tried to a jury, then this necessarily precludes any form of collateral estoppel, both offensive and defensive, and since the trial court ruled in favor of Fleming Defendants (VIII CR 4227), they once again achieved mutual assent with the court that collateral estoppel could not apply under circumstance. Using Fleming Defendants’ logic, this constitutes their second Absolute Anti-Collateral Estoppel Agreement.

Party Submissions

On the basis of the evidence in the record, please summarize the legal options available for CALICA before domestic administrative and/or judicial proceedings against: ... (ii) the execution of such order by officials of SEMARNAT and PROFEPA through a temporary shutdown resulting from an allegedly irregular process.

Party Submissions

That claim is substantial. While no doubt the Election Code advances a state interest in ensuring that statewide candidates enjoy a certain minimum breadth of support across the State, it does so by imposing an extensive and detailed set of requirements on the Republican Party regarding who it may allow to compete in its primary election. See, e.g., Tex. Elec. Code §§ 141.031, 172.021. Assuming arguendo that such an interest were compelling for First Amendment purposes, it is difficult to see how a 50-signature minimum in a particular judicial district would effectively advance that interest as applied to Justice Devine. After all, Justice Devine has not only earned the Republican nomination to state judicial office no fewer than four times, he has won statewide office in two general elections, most recently garnering tens of thousands of votes from the counties making up the judicial districts that are the subject of Walker’s challenge. See 2018 General Election, TEXAS SECRETARY OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2018), https://elections.sos.state.tx.us/elchist331 _state.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2024); November 2018 General Election, EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS ELECTIONS DEPARTMENT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://results.enr.clarityelec-tions.com/TX/El_Paso/92416/Web02.222611/#/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2024). It is difficult to see what interest in a statewide base of support would be advanced by demanding technical compliance with a signature minimum on pain of precluding both Justice Devine from seeking, and the Republican Party from conferring, the Re-publican Party nomination for Place 4 on Justice Devine for a third time. And given that long history between the Party and Justice Devine, the associational burdens would be no doubt great: it would effectively end their association and confer the nomination by default on Walker.

Party Submissions

It was not shown that Mrs. Benson participated in, or exercised any control over, the trial in the Porter suit, or that she had any right to do so. She was not shown to have any beneficial interest in the recovery of damages for personal injuries on behalf of the Porters. In our view, the requirements of due process compel the conclusion that a privity relationship which will support application of the rules of res judicata does not exist under these circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that the fact findings and judgment in the Porter suit do not bar Mrs. Benson, and that she is entitled to her day in court in prosecuting this action in her own right.

Party Submissions

Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Kai Hui Qi, 402 S.W.3d 374, 389–90 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (“[A] state entity’s failure to act does not invoke the [TTCA’s] limited waiver of immunity.”); see, e.g., Dallas Cnty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998) (“The real substance of plaintiffs ’ complaint is that Roger ’ s death was caused, not by the condition or use of property, but by the failure of Hillside ’ s staff to restrain him once they learned he was still suicidal. The [TTCA] does not waive Dallas County MHMR ’ s immunity from such a complaint .”) .

Party Submissions

There is no possible basis on which it could be said that the documents sought are all relevant and material to the claims set out at Request for Arbitration at paras 77 – 92.

Legal Decisions

A survey of the caselaw nationwide confirms this point. See Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., 917 F.Supp.2d 503, 526 (E.D. N.C. 2012) (“Interest on ‘all amounts’ and on ‘the unpaid balance’ is considered compound interest.”) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Crosby–Miss. Res., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1474, 1488–89 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), and Texon Energy Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 733 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

Party Submissions

Effective Date. A modification election submitted in accordance with this Article VII is irrevocable upon receipt by the Committee and becomes effective twelve (12) months after such date.

Contract

Dr. Tappan’s opinions as to the “chain of command” are likewise insufficient because they are not explained. There is no explanation of what a chain of command is much less an explanation of how to invoke it. This confused the trial court. (RR.32) The report does not adequately set out a standard of care on this point.

Party Submissions

Dr. Tappan explained that a non-reassuring fetal tracing needs assessment and prompt treatment to avoid fetal hypoxia (decreased oxygen in the tissue) and acidosis (an increase in lactic acid in the blood because of inadequate oxygen delivered to tissues). App. 7, CR 669 ( “ Non-reassuring fetal tracing.. .. requires assessment and prompt treatment to avoid fetal hypoxia and acidosis ” ); see also App. 5, CR 217 (defining metabolic acidosis and hypoxia).

Party Submissions

However, nothing in the termination clause supports Osprin ’s interpre tation. Rather, the plain language of the clause leads us to the opposite conclusion. The clause provides that “ any and all obligations of the Guarantor under this Guaranty shall terminate upon the construction and completion of the historic tax credit rehabilitation ” of the Texaco building. “Terminate” means “ to bring to an end. ” Terminate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006); Terminate, BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “Obligation” means “ something (as a formal contract, a promise), that obligates one to a course of action,” “a commitment. .. . to pay a particular sum of money; also: an amount owed under such an obliga tion,” Obligation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ’ S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2006), or “ a duty arising by contract, ” Obligation, BLACK ’ S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Under the plain language of the termination clause, upon the completion of the tax credit rehabilitation of the Texaco building, any and all of the actions Backes bound himself to perform under the guaranty, including his commitment to pay a particular sum of money and the amount owed under such commitment, were brought to an end.

Party Submissions

Rafiei asserts that he “provided the trial court with evidence that the unreasonably expensive filing expenses and unlimited fee-splitting required by the delegation clause” would “operate to bar him from being able to litigate his claims.” Brief at 23. But the only evidence he points to is his own affidavit: “Rafiei has provided his own affidavit in support of his contention that the delegation provision is unconscionable.” Id. at 30.

Party Submissions

HSMiller’s purported defenses — waiver and preemption —fail for the reasons explained in the Lawyers’ Petitioners’ Brief and herein. For one, HSMiller cannot seriously argue that the Bankruptcy Judge approved an unstated intent to engage in collusion and position switching in the ensuing litigation. That was not a decision presented to the court.

Party Submissions