Daily Papers

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

Large-scale text-to-image diffusion models excel in generating high-quality images from textual inputs, yet concerns arise as research indicates their tendency to memorize and replicate training data, raising We also addressed the issue of memorization in diffusion models, where models tend to replicate exact training samples raising copyright infringement and privacy issues. Efforts within the text-to-image community to address memorization explore causes such as data duplication, replicated captions, or trigger tokens, proposing per-prompt inference-time or training-time mitigation strategies. In this paper, we focus on the feed-forward layers and begin by contrasting neuron activations of a set of memorized and non-memorized prompts. Experiments reveal a surprising finding: many different sets of memorized prompts significantly activate a common subspace in the model, demonstrating, for the first time, that memorization in the diffusion models lies in a special subspace. Subsequently, we introduce a novel post-hoc method for editing pre-trained models, whereby memorization is mitigated through the straightforward pruning of weights in specialized subspaces, avoiding the need to disrupt the training or inference process as seen in prior research. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of the pruned model against training data extraction attacks, thereby unveiling new avenues for a practical and one-for-all solution to memorization.

Previous work has shown that Large Language Models are susceptible to so-called data extraction attacks. This allows an attacker to extract a sample that was contained in the training data, which has massive privacy implications. The construction of data extraction attacks is challenging, current attacks are quite inefficient, and there exists a significant gap in the extraction capabilities of untargeted attacks and memorization. Thus, targeted attacks are proposed, which identify if a given sample from the training data, is extractable from a model. In this work, we apply a targeted data extraction attack to the SATML2023 Language Model Training Data Extraction Challenge. We apply a two-step approach. In the first step, we maximise the recall of the model and are able to extract the suffix for 69% of the samples. In the second step, we use a classifier-based Membership Inference Attack on the generations. Our AutoSklearn classifier achieves a precision of 0.841. The full approach reaches a score of 0.405 recall at a 10% false positive rate, which is an improvement of 34% over the baseline of 0.301.

This paper studies extractable memorization: training data that an adversary can efficiently extract by querying a machine learning model without prior knowledge of the training dataset. We show an adversary can extract gigabytes of training data from open-source language models like Pythia or GPT-Neo, semi-open models like LLaMA or Falcon, and closed models like ChatGPT. Existing techniques from the literature suffice to attack unaligned models; in order to attack the aligned ChatGPT, we develop a new divergence attack that causes the model to diverge from its chatbot-style generations and emit training data at a rate 150x higher than when behaving properly. Our methods show practical attacks can recover far more data than previously thought, and reveal that current alignment techniques do not eliminate memorization.

Natural Language Understanding (NLU) models can be trained on sensitive information such as phone numbers, zip-codes etc. Recent literature has focused on Model Inversion Attacks (ModIvA) that can extract training data from model parameters. In this work, we present a version of such an attack by extracting canaries inserted in NLU training data. In the attack, an adversary with open-box access to the model reconstructs the canaries contained in the model's training set. We evaluate our approach by performing text completion on canaries and demonstrate that by using the prefix (non-sensitive) tokens of the canary, we can generate the full canary. As an example, our attack is able to reconstruct a four digit code in the training dataset of the NLU model with a probability of 0.5 in its best configuration. As countermeasures, we identify several defense mechanisms that, when combined, effectively eliminate the risk of ModIvA in our experiments.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

Large pre-trained language models achieve impressive results across many tasks. However, recent works point out that pre-trained language models may memorize a considerable fraction of their training data, leading to the privacy risk of information leakage. In this paper, we propose a method named Ethicist for targeted training data extraction through loss smoothed soft prompting and calibrated confidence estimation, investigating how to recover the suffix in the training data when given a prefix. To elicit memorization in the attacked model, we tune soft prompt embeddings while keeping the model fixed. We further propose a smoothing loss that smooths the loss distribution of the suffix tokens to make it easier to sample the correct suffix. In order to select the most probable suffix from a collection of sampled suffixes and estimate the prediction confidence, we propose a calibrated confidence estimation method, which normalizes the confidence of the generated suffixes with a local estimation. We show that Ethicist significantly improves the extraction performance on a recently proposed public benchmark. We also investigate several factors influencing the data extraction performance, including decoding strategy, model scale, prefix length, and suffix length. Our code is available at https://github.com/thu-coai/Targeted-Data-Extraction.

Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is often provided as a pay-per-query, black-box system to clients. Such a black-box approach not only hinders open replication, validation, and interpretation of model results, but also makes it harder for white-hat researchers to identify vulnerabilities in the MLaaS systems. Model extraction is a promising technique to address these challenges by reverse-engineering black-box models. Since training data is typically unavailable for MLaaS models, this paper focuses on the realistic version of it: data-free model extraction. We propose a data-free model extraction approach, CaBaGe, to achieve higher model extraction accuracy with a small number of queries. Our innovations include (1) a novel experience replay for focusing on difficult training samples; (2) an ensemble of generators for steadily producing diverse synthetic data; and (3) a selective filtering process for querying the victim model with harder, more balanced samples. In addition, we create a more realistic setting, for the first time, where the attacker has no knowledge of the number of classes in the victim training data, and create a solution to learn the number of classes on the fly. Our evaluation shows that CaBaGe outperforms existing techniques on seven datasets -- MNIST, FMNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-subset, and Tiny ImageNet -- with an accuracy improvement of the extracted models by up to 43.13%. Furthermore, the number of queries required to extract a clone model matching the final accuracy of prior work is reduced by up to 75.7%.

Large language models (LLMs) offer impressive performance in various zero-shot and few-shot tasks. However, their success in zero-shot and few-shot settings may be affected by task contamination, a potential limitation that has not been thoroughly examined. This paper investigates how zero-shot and few-shot performance of LLMs has changed chronologically over time. Utilizing GPT-3 series models and several other recent open-sourced LLMs, and controlling for dataset difficulty, we find that on datasets released before the LLM training data creation date, LLMs perform surprisingly better than on datasets released after. This strongly indicates that, for many LLMs, there exists task contamination on zero-shot and few-shot evaluation for datasets released prior to the LLMs' training data creation date. Additionally, we utilize training data inspection, task example extraction, and a membership inference attack, which reveal further evidence of task contamination. Importantly, we find that for classification tasks with no possibility of task contamination, LLMs rarely demonstrate statistically significant improvements over simple majority baselines, in both zero and few-shot settings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to memorize significant portions of their training data. Parts of this memorized content have been shown to be extractable by simply querying the model, which poses a privacy risk. We present a novel approach which uses prompt-tuning to control the extraction rates of memorized content in LLMs. We present two prompt training strategies to increase and decrease extraction rates, which correspond to an attack and a defense, respectively. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our techniques by using models from the GPT-Neo family on a public benchmark. For the 1.3B parameter GPT-Neo model, our attack yields a 9.3 percentage point increase in extraction rate compared to our baseline. Our defense can be tuned to achieve different privacy-utility trade-offs by a user-specified hyperparameter. We achieve an extraction rate reduction of up to 97.7% relative to our baseline, with a perplexity increase of 16.9%.

With the advance of language models, privacy protection is receiving more attention. Training data extraction is therefore of great importance, as it can serve as a potential tool to assess privacy leakage. However, due to the difficulty of this task, most of the existing methods are proof-of-concept and still not effective enough. In this paper, we investigate and benchmark tricks for improving training data extraction using a publicly available dataset. Because most existing extraction methods use a pipeline of generating-then-ranking, i.e., generating text candidates as potential training data and then ranking them based on specific criteria, our research focuses on the tricks for both text generation (e.g., sampling strategy) and text ranking (e.g., token-level criteria). The experimental results show that several previously overlooked tricks can be crucial to the success of training data extraction. Based on the GPT-Neo 1.3B evaluation results, our proposed tricks outperform the baseline by a large margin in most cases, providing a much stronger baseline for future research.

When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a significant privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new practical data extraction attack that we call "neural phishing". This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of 10% attack success rates, at times, as high as 50%. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as 10s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.

Large language models have gained significant popularity because of their ability to generate human-like text and potential applications in various fields, such as Software Engineering. Large language models for code are commonly trained on large unsanitised corpora of source code scraped from the internet. The content of these datasets is memorised and can be extracted by attackers with data extraction attacks. In this work, we explore memorisation in large language models for code and compare the rate of memorisation with large language models trained on natural language. We adopt an existing benchmark for natural language and construct a benchmark for code by identifying samples that are vulnerable to attack. We run both benchmarks against a variety of models, and perform a data extraction attack. We find that large language models for code are vulnerable to data extraction attacks, like their natural language counterparts. From the training data that was identified to be potentially extractable we were able to extract 47% from a CodeGen-Mono-16B code completion model. We also observe that models memorise more, as their parameter count grows, and that their pre-training data are also vulnerable to attack. We also find that data carriers are memorised at a higher rate than regular code or documentation and that different model architectures memorise different samples. Data leakage has severe outcomes, so we urge the research community to further investigate the extent of this phenomenon using a wider range of models and extraction techniques in order to build safeguards to mitigate this issue.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose ``gray-box'' access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

The generations of large language models are commonly controlled through prompting techniques, where a user's query to the model is prefixed with a prompt that aims to guide the model's behaviour on the query. The prompts used by companies to guide their models are often treated as secrets, to be hidden from the user making the query. They have even been treated as commodities to be bought and sold. However, there has been anecdotal evidence showing that the prompts can be extracted by a user even when they are kept secret. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically measuring the success of prompt extraction attacks. In experiments with multiple sources of prompts and multiple underlying language models, we find that simple text-based attacks can in fact reveal prompts with high probability.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

The proliferation of large AI models trained on uncurated, often sensitive web-scraped data has raised significant privacy concerns. One of the concerns is that adversaries can extract information about the training data using privacy attacks. Unfortunately, the task of removing specific information from the models without sacrificing performance is not straightforward and has proven to be challenging. We propose a rather easy yet effective defense based on backdoor attacks to remove private information such as names of individuals from models, and focus in this work on text encoders. Specifically, through strategic insertion of backdoors, we align the embeddings of sensitive phrases with those of neutral terms-"a person" instead of the person's name. Our empirical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our backdoor-based defense on CLIP by assessing its performance using a specialized privacy attack for zero-shot classifiers. Our approach provides not only a new "dual-use" perspective on backdoor attacks, but also presents a promising avenue to enhance the privacy of individuals within models trained on uncurated web-scraped data.

Recently, Carlini et al. demonstrated the widely used model Stable Diffusion can regurgitate real training samples, which is troublesome from a copyright perspective. In this work, we provide an efficient extraction attack on par with the recent attack, with several order of magnitudes less network evaluations. In the process, we expose a new phenomena, which we dub template verbatims, wherein a diffusion model will regurgitate a training sample largely in tact. Template verbatims are harder to detect as they require retrieval and masking to correctly label. Furthermore, they are still generated by newer systems, even those which de-duplicate their training set, and we give insight into why they still appear during generation. We extract training images from several state of the art systems, including Stable Diffusion 2.0, Deep Image Floyd, and finally Midjourney v4. We release code to verify our extraction attack, perform the attack, as well as all extracted prompts at https://github.com/ryanwebster90/onestep-extraction.

Decision-based adversarial attacks construct inputs that fool a machine-learning model into making targeted mispredictions by making only hard-label queries. For the most part, these attacks have been applied directly to isolated neural network models. However, in practice, machine learning models are just a component of a much larger system. By adding just a single preprocessor in front of a classifier, we find that state-of-the-art query-based attacks are as much as seven times less effective at attacking a prediction pipeline than attacking the machine learning model alone. Hence, attacks that are unaware of this invariance inevitably waste a large number of queries to re-discover or overcome it. We, therefore, develop techniques to first reverse-engineer the preprocessor and then use this extracted information to attack the end-to-end system. Our extraction method requires only a few hundred queries to learn the preprocessors used by most publicly available model pipelines, and our preprocessor-aware attacks recover the same efficacy as just attacking the model alone. The code can be found at https://github.com/google-research/preprocessor-aware-black-box-attack.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in real-world applications, they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: malicious third party prompts that subvert the intent of the system designer. To help researchers study this problem, we present a dataset of over 126,000 prompt injection attacks and 46,000 prompt-based "defenses" against prompt injection, all created by players of an online game called Tensor Trust. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the largest dataset of human-generated adversarial examples for instruction-following LLMs. The attacks in our dataset have a lot of easily interpretable stucture, and shed light on the weaknesses of LLMs. We also use the dataset to create a benchmark for resistance to two types of prompt injection, which we refer to as prompt extraction and prompt hijacking. Our benchmark results show that many models are vulnerable to the attack strategies in the Tensor Trust dataset. Furthermore, we show that some attack strategies from the dataset generalize to deployed LLM-based applications, even though they have a very different set of constraints to the game. We release all data and source code at https://tensortrust.ai/paper

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

The drastic increase of large language models' (LLMs) parameters has led to a new research direction of fine-tuning-free downstream customization by prompts, i.e., task descriptions. While these prompt-based services (e.g. OpenAI's GPTs) play an important role in many businesses, there has emerged growing concerns about the prompt leakage, which undermines the intellectual properties of these services and causes downstream attacks. In this paper, we analyze the underlying mechanism of prompt leakage, which we refer to as prompt memorization, and develop corresponding defending strategies. By exploring the scaling laws in prompt extraction, we analyze key attributes that influence prompt extraction, including model sizes, prompt lengths, as well as the types of prompts. Then we propose two hypotheses that explain how LLMs expose their prompts. The first is attributed to the perplexity, i.e. the familiarity of LLMs to texts, whereas the second is based on the straightforward token translation path in attention matrices. To defend against such threats, we investigate whether alignments can undermine the extraction of prompts. We find that current LLMs, even those with safety alignments like GPT-4, are highly vulnerable to prompt extraction attacks, even under the most straightforward user attacks. Therefore, we put forward several defense strategies with the inspiration of our findings, which achieve 83.8\% and 71.0\% drop in the prompt extraction rate for Llama2-7B and GPT-3.5, respectively. Source code is avaliable at https://github.com/liangzid/PromptExtractionEval.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become a cornerstone in the field of Natural Language Processing (NLP), offering transformative capabilities in understanding and generating human-like text. However, with their rising prominence, the security and vulnerability aspects of these models have garnered significant attention. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the various forms of attacks targeting LLMs, discussing the nature and mechanisms of these attacks, their potential impacts, and current defense strategies. We delve into topics such as adversarial attacks that aim to manipulate model outputs, data poisoning that affects model training, and privacy concerns related to training data exploitation. The paper also explores the effectiveness of different attack methodologies, the resilience of LLMs against these attacks, and the implications for model integrity and user trust. By examining the latest research, we provide insights into the current landscape of LLM vulnerabilities and defense mechanisms. Our objective is to offer a nuanced understanding of LLM attacks, foster awareness within the AI community, and inspire robust solutions to mitigate these risks in future developments.

Many commercial and open-source models claim to detect machine-generated text with extremely high accuracy (99% or more). However, very few of these detectors are evaluated on shared benchmark datasets and even when they are, the datasets used for evaluation are insufficiently challenging-lacking variations in sampling strategy, adversarial attacks, and open-source generative models. In this work we present RAID: the largest and most challenging benchmark dataset for machine-generated text detection. RAID includes over 6 million generations spanning 11 models, 8 domains, 11 adversarial attacks and 4 decoding strategies. Using RAID, we evaluate the out-of-domain and adversarial robustness of 8 open- and 4 closed-source detectors and find that current detectors are easily fooled by adversarial attacks, variations in sampling strategies, repetition penalties, and unseen generative models. We release our data along with a leaderboard to encourage future research.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

We explore a class of adversarial attacks targeting the activations of language models. By manipulating a relatively small subset of model activations, a, we demonstrate the ability to control the exact prediction of a significant number (in some cases up to 1000) of subsequent tokens t. We empirically verify a scaling law where the maximum number of target tokens t_max predicted depends linearly on the number of tokens a whose activations the attacker controls as t_max = kappa a. We find that the number of bits of control in the input space needed to control a single bit in the output space (what we call attack resistance chi) is remarkably constant between approx 16 and approx 25 over 2 orders of magnitude of model sizes for different language models. Compared to attacks on tokens, attacks on activations are predictably much stronger, however, we identify a surprising regularity where one bit of input steered either via activations or via tokens is able to exert control over a similar amount of output bits. This gives support for the hypothesis that adversarial attacks are a consequence of dimensionality mismatch between the input and output spaces. A practical implication of the ease of attacking language model activations instead of tokens is for multi-modal and selected retrieval models, where additional data sources are added as activations directly, sidestepping the tokenized input. This opens up a new, broad attack surface. By using language models as a controllable test-bed to study adversarial attacks, we were able to experiment with input-output dimensions that are inaccessible in computer vision, especially where the output dimension dominates.

The widespread use of large language models (LLMs) is increasing the demand for methods that detect machine-generated text to prevent misuse. The goal of our study is to stress test the detectors' robustness to malicious attacks under realistic scenarios. We comprehensively study the robustness of popular machine-generated text detectors under attacks from diverse categories: editing, paraphrasing, prompting, and co-generating. Our attacks assume limited access to the generator LLMs, and we compare the performance of detectors on different attacks under different budget levels. Our experiments reveal that almost none of the existing detectors remain robust under all the attacks, and all detectors exhibit different loopholes. Averaging all detectors, the performance drops by 35% across all attacks. Further, we investigate the reasons behind these defects and propose initial out-of-the-box patches to improve robustness.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

In various real-world applications such as machine translation, sentiment analysis, and question answering, a pivotal role is played by NLP models, facilitating efficient communication and decision-making processes in domains ranging from healthcare to finance. However, a significant challenge is posed to the robustness of these natural language processing models by text adversarial attacks. These attacks involve the deliberate manipulation of input text to mislead the predictions of the model while maintaining human interpretability. Despite the remarkable performance achieved by state-of-the-art models like BERT in various natural language processing tasks, they are found to remain vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in the input text. In addressing the vulnerability of text classifiers to adversarial attacks, three distinct attack mechanisms are explored in this paper using the victim model BERT: BERT-on-BERT attack, PWWS attack, and Fraud Bargain's Attack (FBA). Leveraging the IMDB, AG News, and SST2 datasets, a thorough comparative analysis is conducted to assess the effectiveness of these attacks on the BERT classifier model. It is revealed by the analysis that PWWS emerges as the most potent adversary, consistently outperforming other methods across multiple evaluation scenarios, thereby emphasizing its efficacy in generating adversarial examples for text classification. Through comprehensive experimentation, the performance of these attacks is assessed and the findings indicate that the PWWS attack outperforms others, demonstrating lower runtime, higher accuracy, and favorable semantic similarity scores. The key insight of this paper lies in the assessment of the relative performances of three prevalent state-of-the-art attack mechanisms.

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

Model adaptation is crucial to handle the discrepancy between proxy training data and actual users data received. To effectively perform adaptation, textual data of users is typically stored on servers or their local devices, where downstream natural language processing (NLP) models can be directly trained using such in-domain data. However, this might raise privacy and security concerns due to the extra risks of exposing user information to adversaries. Replacing identifying information in textual data with a generic marker has been recently explored. In this work, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to suggest substitutes of masked tokens and have their effectiveness evaluated on downstream language modeling tasks. Specifically, we propose multiple pre-trained and fine-tuned LLM-based approaches and perform empirical studies on various datasets for the comparison of these methods. Experimental results show that models trained on the obfuscation corpora are able to achieve comparable performance with the ones trained on the original data without privacy-preserving token masking.

In this paper we undertake a systematic study of privacy attacks against open source Large Language Models (LLMs), where an adversary has access to either the model weights, gradients, or losses, and tries to exploit them to learn something about the underlying training data. Our headline results are the first membership inference attacks (MIAs) against pre-trained LLMs that are able to simultaneously achieve high TPRs and low FPRs, and a pipeline showing that over 50% (!) of the fine-tuning dataset can be extracted from a fine-tuned LLM in natural settings. We consider varying degrees of access to the underlying model, customization of the language model, and resources available to the attacker. In the pre-trained setting, we propose three new white-box MIAs: an attack based on the gradient norm, a supervised neural network classifier, and a single step loss ratio attack. All outperform existing black-box baselines, and our supervised attack closes the gap between MIA attack success against LLMs and other types of models. In fine-tuning, we find that given access to the loss of the fine-tuned and base models, a fine-tuned loss ratio attack FLoRA is able to achieve near perfect MIA peformance. We then leverage these MIAs to extract fine-tuning data from fine-tuned language models. We find that the pipeline of generating from fine-tuned models prompted with a small snippet of the prefix of each training example, followed by using FLoRa to select the most likely training sample, succeeds the majority of the fine-tuning dataset after only 3 epochs of fine-tuning. Taken together, these findings show that highly effective MIAs are available in almost all LLM training settings, and highlight that great care must be taken before LLMs are fine-tuned on highly sensitive data and then deployed.

Although large language models (LLMs) are widely deployed, the data used to train them is rarely disclosed. Given the incredible scale of this data, up to trillions of tokens, it is all but certain that it includes potentially problematic text such as copyrighted materials, personally identifiable information, and test data for widely reported reference benchmarks. However, we currently have no way to know which data of these types is included or in what proportions. In this paper, we study the pretraining data detection problem: given a piece of text and black-box access to an LLM without knowing the pretraining data, can we determine if the model was trained on the provided text? To facilitate this study, we introduce a dynamic benchmark WIKIMIA that uses data created before and after model training to support gold truth detection. We also introduce a new detection method Min-K% Prob based on a simple hypothesis: an unseen example is likely to contain a few outlier words with low probabilities under the LLM, while a seen example is less likely to have words with such low probabilities. Min-K% Prob can be applied without any knowledge about the pretraining corpus or any additional training, departing from previous detection methods that require training a reference model on data that is similar to the pretraining data. Moreover, our experiments demonstrate that Min-K% Prob achieves a 7.4% improvement on WIKIMIA over these previous methods. We apply Min-K% Prob to two real-world scenarios, copyrighted book detection, and contaminated downstream example detection, and find it a consistently effective solution.

It has recently been shown that adversarial attacks on large language models (LLMs) can "jailbreak" the model into making harmful statements. In this work, we argue that the spectrum of adversarial attacks on LLMs is much larger than merely jailbreaking. We provide a broad overview of possible attack surfaces and attack goals. Based on a series of concrete examples, we discuss, categorize and systematize attacks that coerce varied unintended behaviors, such as misdirection, model control, denial-of-service, or data extraction. We analyze these attacks in controlled experiments, and find that many of them stem from the practice of pre-training LLMs with coding capabilities, as well as the continued existence of strange "glitch" tokens in common LLM vocabularies that should be removed for security reasons.

Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers are known to be vulnerable to Trojan or backdoor attacks, where the classifier is manipulated such that it misclassifies any input containing an attacker-determined Trojan trigger. Backdoors compromise a model's integrity, thereby posing a severe threat to the landscape of DNN-based classification. While multiple defenses against such attacks exist for classifiers in the image domain, there have been limited efforts to protect classifiers in the text domain. We present Trojan-Miner (T-Miner) -- a defense framework for Trojan attacks on DNN-based text classifiers. T-Miner employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq-2-seq) generative model that probes the suspicious classifier and learns to produce text sequences that are likely to contain the Trojan trigger. T-Miner then analyzes the text produced by the generative model to determine if they contain trigger phrases, and correspondingly, whether the tested classifier has a backdoor. T-Miner requires no access to the training dataset or clean inputs of the suspicious classifier, and instead uses synthetically crafted "nonsensical" text inputs to train the generative model. We extensively evaluate T-Miner on 1100 model instances spanning 3 ubiquitous DNN model architectures, 5 different classification tasks, and a variety of trigger phrases. We show that T-Miner detects Trojan and clean models with a 98.75% overall accuracy, while achieving low false positives on clean models. We also show that T-Miner is robust against a variety of targeted, advanced attacks from an adaptive attacker.

In this paper, we introduce a black-box prompt optimization method that uses an attacker LLM agent to uncover higher levels of memorization in a victim agent, compared to what is revealed by prompting the target model with the training data directly, which is the dominant approach of quantifying memorization in LLMs. We use an iterative rejection-sampling optimization process to find instruction-based prompts with two main characteristics: (1) minimal overlap with the training data to avoid presenting the solution directly to the model, and (2) maximal overlap between the victim model's output and the training data, aiming to induce the victim to spit out training data. We observe that our instruction-based prompts generate outputs with 23.7% higher overlap with training data compared to the baseline prefix-suffix measurements. Our findings show that (1) instruction-tuned models can expose pre-training data as much as their base-models, if not more so, (2) contexts other than the original training data can lead to leakage, and (3) using instructions proposed by other LLMs can open a new avenue of automated attacks that we should further study and explore. The code can be found at https://github.com/Alymostafa/Instruction_based_attack .

Contrastive Learning (CL) has attracted enormous attention due to its remarkable capability in unsupervised representation learning. However, recent works have revealed the vulnerability of CL to backdoor attacks: the feature extractor could be misled to embed backdoored data close to an attack target class, thus fooling the downstream predictor to misclassify it as the target. Existing attacks usually adopt a fixed trigger pattern and poison the training set with trigger-injected data, hoping for the feature extractor to learn the association between trigger and target class. However, we find that such fixed trigger design fails to effectively associate trigger-injected data with target class in the embedding space due to special CL mechanisms, leading to a limited attack success rate (ASR). This phenomenon motivates us to find a better backdoor trigger design tailored for CL framework. In this paper, we propose a bi-level optimization approach to achieve this goal, where the inner optimization simulates the CL dynamics of a surrogate victim, and the outer optimization enforces the backdoor trigger to stay close to the target throughout the surrogate CL procedure. Extensive experiments show that our attack can achieve a higher attack success rate (e.g., 99% ASR on ImageNet-100) with a very low poisoning rate (1%). Besides, our attack can effectively evade existing state-of-the-art defenses. Code is available at: https://github.com/SWY666/SSL-backdoor-BLTO.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

Language generation models have been an increasingly powerful enabler for many applications. Many such models offer free or affordable API access, which makes them potentially vulnerable to model extraction attacks through distillation. To protect intellectual property (IP) and ensure fair use of these models, various techniques such as lexical watermarking and synonym replacement have been proposed. However, these methods can be nullified by obvious countermeasures such as "synonym randomization". To address this issue, we propose GINSEW, a novel method to protect text generation models from being stolen through distillation. The key idea of our method is to inject secret signals into the probability vector of the decoding steps for each target token. We can then detect the secret message by probing a suspect model to tell if it is distilled from the protected one. Experimental results show that GINSEW can effectively identify instances of IP infringement with minimal impact on the generation quality of protected APIs. Our method demonstrates an absolute improvement of 19 to 29 points on mean average precision (mAP) in detecting suspects compared to previous methods against watermark removal attacks.

In this paper, both empirically and theoretically, we show that several AI-text detectors are not reliable in practical scenarios. Empirically, we show that paraphrasing attacks, where a light paraphraser is applied on top of a large language model (LLM), can break a whole range of detectors, including ones using watermarking schemes as well as neural network-based detectors and zero-shot classifiers. Our experiments demonstrate that retrieval-based detectors, designed to evade paraphrasing attacks, are still vulnerable to recursive paraphrasing. We then provide a theoretical impossibility result indicating that as language models become more sophisticated and better at emulating human text, the performance of even the best-possible detector decreases. For a sufficiently advanced language model seeking to imitate human text, even the best-possible detector may only perform marginally better than a random classifier. Our result is general enough to capture specific scenarios such as particular writing styles, clever prompt design, or text paraphrasing. We also extend the impossibility result to include the case where pseudorandom number generators are used for AI-text generation instead of true randomness. We show that the same result holds with a negligible correction term for all polynomial-time computable detectors. Finally, we show that even LLMs protected by watermarking schemes can be vulnerable against spoofing attacks where adversarial humans can infer hidden LLM text signatures and add them to human-generated text to be detected as text generated by the LLMs, potentially causing reputational damage to their developers. We believe these results can open an honest conversation in the community regarding the ethical and reliable use of AI-generated text.

Language Models (LMs) have been shown to leak information about training data through sentence-level membership inference and reconstruction attacks. Understanding the risk of LMs leaking Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has received less attention, which can be attributed to the false assumption that dataset curation techniques such as scrubbing are sufficient to prevent PII leakage. Scrubbing techniques reduce but do not prevent the risk of PII leakage: in practice scrubbing is imperfect and must balance the trade-off between minimizing disclosure and preserving the utility of the dataset. On the other hand, it is unclear to which extent algorithmic defenses such as differential privacy, designed to guarantee sentence- or user-level privacy, prevent PII disclosure. In this work, we introduce rigorous game-based definitions for three types of PII leakage via black-box extraction, inference, and reconstruction attacks with only API access to an LM. We empirically evaluate the attacks against GPT-2 models fine-tuned with and without defenses in three domains: case law, health care, and e-mails. Our main contributions are (i) novel attacks that can extract up to 10times more PII sequences than existing attacks, (ii) showing that sentence-level differential privacy reduces the risk of PII disclosure but still leaks about 3% of PII sequences, and (iii) a subtle connection between record-level membership inference and PII reconstruction. Code to reproduce all experiments in the paper is available at https://github.com/microsoft/analysing_pii_leakage.

Machine Learning models increasingly face data integrity challenges due to the use of large-scale training datasets drawn from the Internet. We study what model developers can do if they detect that some data was manipulated or incorrect. Such manipulated data can cause adverse effects including vulnerability to backdoored samples, systemic biases, and reduced accuracy on certain input domains. Realistically, all manipulated training samples cannot be identified, and only a small, representative subset of the affected data can be flagged. We formalize Corrective Machine Unlearning as the problem of mitigating the impact of data affected by unknown manipulations on a trained model, only having identified a subset of the corrupted data. We demonstrate that the problem of corrective unlearning has significantly different requirements from traditional privacy-oriented unlearning. We find most existing unlearning methods, including retraining-from-scratch without the deletion set, require most of the manipulated data to be identified for effective corrective unlearning. However, one approach, Selective Synaptic Dampening, achieves limited success, unlearning adverse effects with just a small portion of the manipulated samples in our setting, which shows encouraging signs for future progress. We hope our work spurs research towards developing better methods for corrective unlearning and offers practitioners a new strategy to handle data integrity challenges arising from web-scale training. Code is available at https://github.com/drimpossible/corrective-unlearning-bench.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with [email protected] as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Amid the expanding use of pre-training data, the phenomenon of benchmark dataset leakage has become increasingly prominent, exacerbated by opaque training processes and the often undisclosed inclusion of supervised data in contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). This issue skews benchmark effectiveness and fosters potentially unfair comparisons, impeding the field's healthy development. To address this, we introduce a detection pipeline utilizing Perplexity and N-gram accuracy, two simple and scalable metrics that gauge a model's prediction precision on benchmark, to identify potential data leakages. By analyzing 31 LLMs under the context of mathematical reasoning, we reveal substantial instances of training even test set misuse, resulting in potentially unfair comparisons. These findings prompt us to offer several recommendations regarding model documentation, benchmark setup, and future evaluations. Notably, we propose the "Benchmark Transparency Card" to encourage clear documentation of benchmark utilization, promoting transparency and healthy developments of LLMs. we have made our leaderboard, pipeline implementation, and model predictions publicly available, fostering future research.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have shown remarkable success in recent years, especially with pre-trained language models. However, deep neural models are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Adversarial attacks may become a new type of web spamming technique given our increased reliance on neural information retrieval models. Therefore, it is important to study potential adversarial attacks to identify vulnerabilities of NRMs before they are deployed. In this paper, we introduce the Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) task against NRMs, which aims to promote a target document in rankings by adding adversarial perturbations to its text. We focus on the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the attackers cannot directly get access to the model information, but can only query the target model to obtain the rank positions of the partial retrieved list. This attack setting is realistic in real-world search engines. We propose a novel Pseudo Relevance-based ADversarial ranking Attack method (PRADA) that learns a surrogate model based on Pseudo Relevance Feedback (PRF) to generate gradients for finding the adversarial perturbations. Experiments on two web search benchmark datasets show that PRADA can outperform existing attack strategies and successfully fool the NRM with small indiscernible perturbations of text.

As large language models become more prevalent, their possible harmful or inappropriate responses are a cause for concern. This paper introduces a unique dataset containing adversarial examples in the form of questions, which we call AttaQ, designed to provoke such harmful or inappropriate responses. We assess the efficacy of our dataset by analyzing the vulnerabilities of various models when subjected to it. Additionally, we introduce a novel automatic approach for identifying and naming vulnerable semantic regions - input semantic areas for which the model is likely to produce harmful outputs. This is achieved through the application of specialized clustering techniques that consider both the semantic similarity of the input attacks and the harmfulness of the model's responses. Automatically identifying vulnerable semantic regions enhances the evaluation of model weaknesses, facilitating targeted improvements to its safety mechanisms and overall reliability.

The pretraining data of today's strongest language models is opaque. In particular, little is known about the proportions of various domains or languages represented. In this work, we tackle a task which we call data mixture inference, which aims to uncover the distributional make-up of training data. We introduce a novel attack based on a previously overlooked source of information -- byte-pair encoding (BPE) tokenizers, used by the vast majority of modern language models. Our key insight is that the ordered list of merge rules learned by a BPE tokenizer naturally reveals information about the token frequencies in its training data: the first merge is the most common byte pair, the second is the most common pair after merging the first token, and so on. Given a tokenizer's merge list along with data samples for each category of interest, we formulate a linear program that solves for the proportion of each category in the tokenizer's training set. Importantly, to the extent to which tokenizer training data is representative of the pretraining data, we indirectly learn about the pretraining data. In controlled experiments, we show that our attack recovers mixture ratios with high precision for tokenizers trained on known mixtures of natural languages, programming languages, and data sources. We then apply our approach to off-the-shelf tokenizers released with recent LMs. We confirm much publicly disclosed information about these models, and also make several new inferences: GPT-4o's tokenizer is much more multilingual than its predecessors, training on 39% non-English data; Llama3 extends GPT-3.5's tokenizer primarily for multilingual (48%) use; GPT-3.5's and Claude's tokenizers are trained on predominantly code (~60%). We hope our work sheds light on current design practices for pretraining data, and inspires continued research into data mixture inference for LMs.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate grounded responses by leveraging external knowledge databases without altering model parameters. Although the absence of weight tuning prevents leakage via model parameters, it introduces the risk of inference adversaries exploiting retrieved documents in the model's context. Existing methods for membership inference and data extraction often rely on jailbreaking or carefully crafted unnatural queries, which can be easily detected or thwarted with query rewriting techniques common in RAG systems. In this work, we present Interrogation Attack (IA), a membership inference technique targeting documents in the RAG datastore. By crafting natural-text queries that are answerable only with the target document's presence, our approach demonstrates successful inference with just 30 queries while remaining stealthy; straightforward detectors identify adversarial prompts from existing methods up to ~76x more frequently than those generated by our attack. We observe a 2x improvement in TPR@1%FPR over prior inference attacks across diverse RAG configurations, all while costing less than $0.02 per document inference.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) attempt to predict whether a particular datapoint is a member of a target model's training data. Despite extensive research on traditional machine learning models, there has been limited work studying MIA on the pre-training data of large language models (LLMs). We perform a large-scale evaluation of MIAs over a suite of language models (LMs) trained on the Pile, ranging from 160M to 12B parameters. We find that MIAs barely outperform random guessing for most settings across varying LLM sizes and domains. Our further analyses reveal that this poor performance can be attributed to (1) the combination of a large dataset and few training iterations, and (2) an inherently fuzzy boundary between members and non-members. We identify specific settings where LLMs have been shown to be vulnerable to membership inference and show that the apparent success in such settings can be attributed to a distribution shift, such as when members and non-members are drawn from the seemingly identical domain but with different temporal ranges. We release our code and data as a unified benchmark package that includes all existing MIAs, supporting future work.

The indexing-retrieval-generation paradigm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been highly successful in solving knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external knowledge into large language models (LLMs). However, the incorporation of external and unverified knowledge increases the vulnerability of LLMs because attackers can perform attack tasks by manipulating knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark named SafeRAG designed to evaluate the RAG security. First, we classify attack tasks into silver noise, inter-context conflict, soft ad, and white Denial-of-Service. Next, we construct RAG security evaluation dataset (i.e., SafeRAG dataset) primarily manually for each task. We then utilize the SafeRAG dataset to simulate various attack scenarios that RAG may encounter. Experiments conducted on 14 representative RAG components demonstrate that RAG exhibits significant vulnerability to all attack tasks and even the most apparent attack task can easily bypass existing retrievers, filters, or advanced LLMs, resulting in the degradation of RAG service quality. Code is available at: https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/SafeRAG.

We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Specifically, our attack recovers the embedding projection layer (up to symmetries) of a transformer model, given typical API access. For under \20 USD, our attack extracts the entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models. We thereby confirm, for the first time, that these black-box models have a hidden dimension of 1024 and 2048, respectively. We also recover the exact hidden dimension size of the gpt-3.5-turbo model, and estimate it would cost under 2,000 in queries to recover the entire projection matrix. We conclude with potential defenses and mitigations, and discuss the implications of possible future work that could extend our attack.

We introduce a new analytical framework to quantify the changes in a machine learning algorithm's output distribution following the inclusion of a few data points in its training set, a notion we define as leave-one-out distinguishability (LOOD). This problem is key to measuring data **memorization** and **information leakage** in machine learning, and the **influence** of training data points on model predictions. We illustrate how our method broadens and refines existing empirical measures of memorization and privacy risks associated with training data. We use Gaussian processes to model the randomness of machine learning algorithms, and validate LOOD with extensive empirical analysis of information leakage using membership inference attacks. Our theoretical framework enables us to investigate the causes of information leakage and where the leakage is high. For example, we analyze the influence of activation functions, on data memorization. Additionally, our method allows us to optimize queries that disclose the most significant information about the training data in the leave-one-out setting. We illustrate how optimal queries can be used for accurate **reconstruction** of training data.

The success of Large Language Models (LLMs) relies heavily on the huge amount of pre-training data learned in the pre-training phase. The opacity of the pre-training process and the training data causes the results of many benchmark tests to become unreliable. If any model has been trained on a benchmark test set, it can seriously hinder the health of the field. In order to automate and efficiently test the capabilities of large language models, numerous mainstream benchmarks adopt a multiple-choice format. As the swapping of the contents of multiple-choice options does not affect the meaning of the question itself, we propose a simple and effective data leakage detection method based on this property. Specifically, we shuffle the contents of the options in the data to generate the corresponding derived data sets, and then detect data leakage based on the model's log probability distribution over the derived data sets. If there is a maximum and outlier in the set of log probabilities, it indicates that the data is leaked. Our method is able to work under black-box conditions without access to model training data or weights, effectively identifying data leakage from benchmark test sets in model pre-training data, including both normal scenarios and complex scenarios where options may have been shuffled intentionally or unintentionally. Through experiments based on two LLMs and benchmark designs, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. In addition, we evaluate the degree of data leakage of 31 mainstream open-source LLMs on four benchmark datasets and give a ranking of the leaked LLMs for each benchmark, and we find that the Qwen family of LLMs has the highest degree of data leakage.

Adversarial attacks are carried out to reveal the vulnerability of deep neural networks. Textual adversarial attacking is challenging because text is discrete and a small perturbation can bring significant change to the original input. Word-level attacking, which can be regarded as a combinatorial optimization problem, is a well-studied class of textual attack methods. However, existing word-level attack models are far from perfect, largely because unsuitable search space reduction methods and inefficient optimization algorithms are employed. In this paper, we propose a novel attack model, which incorporates the sememe-based word substitution method and particle swarm optimization-based search algorithm to solve the two problems separately. We conduct exhaustive experiments to evaluate our attack model by attacking BiLSTM and BERT on three benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that our model consistently achieves much higher attack success rates and crafts more high-quality adversarial examples as compared to baseline methods. Also, further experiments show our model has higher transferability and can bring more robustness enhancement to victim models by adversarial training. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained on https://github.com/thunlp/SememePSO-Attack.

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

Recent claims about the impressive abilities of large language models (LLMs) are often supported by evaluating publicly available benchmarks. Since LLMs train on wide swaths of the internet, this practice raises concerns of data contamination, i.e., evaluating on examples that are explicitly or implicitly included in the training data. Data contamination remains notoriously challenging to measure and mitigate, even with partial attempts like controlled experimentation of training data, canary strings, or embedding similarities. In this work, we conduct the first thorough longitudinal analysis of data contamination in LLMs by using the natural experiment of training cutoffs in GPT models to look at benchmarks released over time. Specifically, we consider two code/mathematical problem-solving datasets, Codeforces and Project Euler, and find statistically significant trends among LLM pass rate vs. GitHub popularity and release date that provide strong evidence of contamination. By open-sourcing our dataset, raw results, and evaluation framework, our work paves the way for rigorous analyses of data contamination in modern models. We conclude with a discussion of best practices and future steps for publicly releasing benchmarks in the age of LLMs that train on webscale data.

In order to enhance the performance of language models while mitigating the risks of generating harmful content, it is crucial to identify which training dataset affects the model's outputs. Ideally, we can measure the influence of each dataset by removing it from training; however, it is prohibitively expensive to retrain a model multiple times. This paper presents UnTrac, which estimates the influence of a training dataset by unlearning it from the trained model. UnTrac is extremely simple; each training dataset is unlearned by gradient ascent, and we evaluate how much the model's predictions change after unlearning. We empirically examine if our methods can assess the influence of pretraining datasets on generating toxic, biased, and untruthful content. Experimental results demonstrate that our method estimates their influence much more accurately than existing methods while requiring neither excessive memory space nor multiple model checkpoints.

To address the increasing complexity and frequency of cybersecurity incidents emphasized by the recent cybersecurity threat reports with over 10 billion instances, cyber threat intelligence (CTI) plays a critical role in the modern cybersecurity landscape by offering the insights required to understand and combat the constantly evolving nature of cyber threats. Inspired by the powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) in handling complex tasks, in this paper, we introduce a framework to benchmark, elicit, and improve cybersecurity incident analysis and response abilities in LLMs for Security Events (SEvenLLM). Specifically, we create a high-quality bilingual instruction corpus by crawling cybersecurity raw text from cybersecurity websites to overcome the lack of effective data for information extraction. Then, we design a pipeline to auto-select tasks from the tasks pool and convert the raw text into supervised corpora comprised of question and response. The instruction dataset SEvenLLM-Instruct is used to train cybersecurity LLMs with the multi-task learning objective (27 well-designed tasks) for augmenting the analysis of cybersecurity events. Extensive experiments in our curated benchmark (SEvenLLM-bench) demonstrate that SEvenLLM performs more sophisticated threat analysis and fortifies defenses against the evolving landscape of cyber threats.

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

Monitoring the threat landscape to be aware of actual or potential attacks is of utmost importance to cybersecurity professionals. Information about cyber threats is typically distributed using natural language reports. Natural language processing can help with managing this large amount of unstructured information, yet to date, the topic has received little attention. With this paper, we present AnnoCTR, a new CC-BY-SA-licensed dataset of cyber threat reports. The reports have been annotated by a domain expert with named entities, temporal expressions, and cybersecurity-specific concepts including implicitly mentioned techniques and tactics. Entities and concepts are linked to Wikipedia and the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base, the most widely-used taxonomy for classifying types of attacks. Prior datasets linking to MITRE ATT&CK either provide a single label per document or annotate sentences out-of-context; our dataset annotates entire documents in a much finer-grained way. In an experimental study, we model the annotations of our dataset using state-of-the-art neural models. In our few-shot scenario, we find that for identifying the MITRE ATT&CK concepts that are mentioned explicitly or implicitly in a text, concept descriptions from MITRE ATT&CK are an effective source for training data augmentation.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) presents significant priority in text understanding and generation. However, LLMs suffer from the risk of generating harmful contents especially while being employed to applications. There are several black-box attack methods, such as Prompt Attack, which can change the behaviour of LLMs and induce LLMs to generate unexpected answers with harmful contents. Researchers are interested in Prompt Attack and Defense with LLMs, while there is no publicly available dataset with high successful attacking rate to evaluate the abilities of defending prompt attack. In this paper, we introduce a pipeline to construct high-quality prompt attack samples, along with a Chinese prompt attack dataset called CPAD. Our prompts aim to induce LLMs to generate unexpected outputs with several carefully designed prompt attack templates and widely concerned attacking contents. Different from previous datasets involving safety estimation, we construct the prompts considering three dimensions: contents, attacking methods and goals. Especially, the attacking goals indicate the behaviour expected after successfully attacking the LLMs, thus the responses can be easily evaluated and analysed. We run several popular Chinese LLMs on our dataset, and the results show that our prompts are significantly harmful to LLMs, with around 70% attack success rate to GPT-3.5. CPAD is publicly available at https://github.com/liuchengyuan123/CPAD.

It is well known that natural language models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which are mostly input-specific in nature. Recently, it has been shown that there also exist input-agnostic attacks in NLP models, called universal adversarial triggers. However, existing methods to craft universal triggers are data intensive. They require large amounts of data samples to generate adversarial triggers, which are typically inaccessible by attackers. For instance, previous works take 3000 data samples per class for the SNLI dataset to generate adversarial triggers. In this paper, we present a novel data-free approach, MINIMAL, to mine input-agnostic adversarial triggers from models. Using the triggers produced with our data-free algorithm, we reduce the accuracy of Stanford Sentiment Treebank's positive class from 93.6% to 9.6%. Similarly, for the Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI), our single-word trigger reduces the accuracy of the entailment class from 90.95% to less than 0.6\%. Despite being completely data-free, we get equivalent accuracy drops as data-dependent methods.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

Semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) is gaining popularity as it reduces the cost of training ML models. It does so by using very small amounts of (expensive, well-inspected) labeled data and large amounts of (cheap, non-inspected) unlabeled data. SSL has shown comparable or even superior performances compared to conventional fully-supervised ML techniques. In this paper, we show that the key feature of SSL that it can learn from (non-inspected) unlabeled data exposes SSL to strong poisoning attacks. In fact, we argue that, due to its reliance on non-inspected unlabeled data, poisoning is a much more severe problem in SSL than in conventional fully-supervised ML. Specifically, we design a backdoor poisoning attack on SSL that can be conducted by a weak adversary with no knowledge of target SSL pipeline. This is unlike prior poisoning attacks in fully-supervised settings that assume strong adversaries with practically-unrealistic capabilities. We show that by poisoning only 0.2% of the unlabeled training data, our attack can cause misclassification of more than 80% of test inputs (when they contain the adversary's backdoor trigger). Our attacks remain effective across twenty combinations of benchmark datasets and SSL algorithms, and even circumvent the state-of-the-art defenses against backdoor attacks. Our work raises significant concerns about the practical utility of existing SSL algorithms.

Adversarial purification is a defense mechanism for safeguarding classifiers against adversarial attacks without knowing the type of attacks or training of the classifier. These techniques characterize and eliminate adversarial perturbations from the attacked inputs, aiming to restore purified samples that retain similarity to the initially attacked ones and are correctly classified by the classifier. Due to the inherent challenges associated with characterizing noise perturbations for discrete inputs, adversarial text purification has been relatively unexplored. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of adversarial purification methods in defending text classifiers. We propose a novel adversarial text purification that harnesses the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to purify adversarial text without the need to explicitly characterize the discrete noise perturbations. We utilize prompt engineering to exploit LLMs for recovering the purified examples for given adversarial examples such that they are semantically similar and correctly classified. Our proposed method demonstrates remarkable performance over various classifiers, improving their accuracy under the attack by over 65% on average.

Text classification systems have been proven vulnerable to adversarial text examples, modified versions of the original text examples that are often unnoticed by human eyes, yet can force text classification models to alter their classification. Often, research works quantifying the impact of adversarial text attacks have been applied only to models trained in English. In this paper, we introduce the first word-level study of adversarial attacks in Arabic. Specifically, we use a synonym (word-level) attack using a Masked Language Modeling (MLM) task with a BERT model in a black-box setting to assess the robustness of the state-of-the-art text classification models to adversarial attacks in Arabic. To evaluate the grammatical and semantic similarities of the newly produced adversarial examples using our synonym BERT-based attack, we invite four human evaluators to assess and compare the produced adversarial examples with their original examples. We also study the transferability of these newly produced Arabic adversarial examples to various models and investigate the effectiveness of defense mechanisms against these adversarial examples on the BERT models. We find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to our synonym attacks than the other Deep Neural Networks (DNN) models like WordCNN and WordLSTM we trained. We also find that fine-tuned BERT models were more susceptible to transferred attacks. We, lastly, find that fine-tuned BERT models successfully regain at least 2% in accuracy after applying adversarial training as an initial defense mechanism.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using O({VM}^2) queries (with vocabulary size V and prompt length M) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

As the scale of training corpora for large language models (LLMs) grows, model developers become increasingly reluctant to disclose details on their data. This lack of transparency poses challenges to scientific evaluation and ethical deployment. Recently, pretraining data detection approaches, which infer whether a given text was part of an LLM's training data through black-box access, have been explored. The Min-K\% Prob method, which has achieved state-of-the-art results, assumes that a non-training example tends to contain a few outlier words with low token probabilities. However, the effectiveness may be limited as it tends to misclassify non-training texts that contain many common words with high probabilities predicted by LLMs. To address this issue, we introduce a divergence-based calibration method, inspired by the divergence-from-randomness concept, to calibrate token probabilities for pretraining data detection. We compute the cross-entropy (i.e., the divergence) between the token probability distribution and the token frequency distribution to derive a detection score. We have developed a Chinese-language benchmark, PatentMIA, to assess the performance of detection approaches for LLMs on Chinese text. Experimental results on English-language benchmarks and PatentMIA demonstrate that our proposed method significantly outperforms existing methods. Our code and PatentMIA benchmark are available at https://github.com/zhang-wei-chao/DC-PDD.

Among adversarial attacks against sequential recommender systems, model extraction attacks represent a method to attack sequential recommendation models without prior knowledge. Existing research has primarily concentrated on the adversary's execution of black-box attacks through data-free model extraction. However, a significant gap remains in the literature concerning the development of surrogate models by adversaries with access to few-shot raw data (10\% even less). That is, the challenge of how to construct a surrogate model with high functional similarity within the context of few-shot data scenarios remains an issue that requires resolution.This study addresses this gap by introducing a novel few-shot model extraction framework against sequential recommenders, which is designed to construct a superior surrogate model with the utilization of few-shot data. The proposed few-shot model extraction framework is comprised of two components: an autoregressive augmentation generation strategy and a bidirectional repair loss-facilitated model distillation procedure. Specifically, to generate synthetic data that closely approximate the distribution of raw data, autoregressive augmentation generation strategy integrates a probabilistic interaction sampler to extract inherent dependencies and a synthesis determinant signal module to characterize user behavioral patterns. Subsequently, bidirectional repair loss, which target the discrepancies between the recommendation lists, is designed as auxiliary loss to rectify erroneous predictions from surrogate models, transferring knowledge from the victim model to the surrogate model effectively. Experiments on three datasets show that the proposed few-shot model extraction framework yields superior surrogate models.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

Backdoor attacks are a kind of insidious security threat against machine learning models. After being injected with a backdoor in training, the victim model will produce adversary-specified outputs on the inputs embedded with predesigned triggers but behave properly on normal inputs during inference. As a sort of emergent attack, backdoor attacks in natural language processing (NLP) are investigated insufficiently. As far as we know, almost all existing textual backdoor attack methods insert additional contents into normal samples as triggers, which causes the trigger-embedded samples to be detected and the backdoor attacks to be blocked without much effort. In this paper, we propose to use the syntactic structure as the trigger in textual backdoor attacks. We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the syntactic trigger-based attack method can achieve comparable attack performance (almost 100% success rate) to the insertion-based methods but possesses much higher invisibility and stronger resistance to defenses. These results also reveal the significant insidiousness and harmfulness of textual backdoor attacks. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained at https://github.com/thunlp/HiddenKiller.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

Prompt-based learning paradigm bridges the gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, and works effectively under the few-shot setting. However, we find that this learning paradigm inherits the vulnerability from the pre-training stage, where model predictions can be misled by inserting certain triggers into the text. In this paper, we explore this universal vulnerability by either injecting backdoor triggers or searching for adversarial triggers on pre-trained language models using only plain text. In both scenarios, we demonstrate that our triggers can totally control or severely decrease the performance of prompt-based models fine-tuned on arbitrary downstream tasks, reflecting the universal vulnerability of the prompt-based learning paradigm. Further experiments show that adversarial triggers have good transferability among language models. We also find conventional fine-tuning models are not vulnerable to adversarial triggers constructed from pre-trained language models. We conclude by proposing a potential solution to mitigate our attack methods. Code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/leix28/prompt-universal-vulnerability

Membership inference attacks (MIA) attempt to verify the membership of a given data sample in the training set for a model. MIA has become relevant in recent years, following the rapid development of large language models (LLM). Many are concerned about the usage of copyrighted materials for training them and call for methods for detecting such usage. However, recent research has largely concluded that current MIA methods do not work on LLMs. Even when they seem to work, it is usually because of the ill-designed experimental setup where other shortcut features enable "cheating." In this work, we argue that MIA still works on LLMs, but only when multiple documents are presented for testing. We construct new benchmarks that measure the MIA performances at a continuous scale of data samples, from sentences (n-grams) to a collection of documents (multiple chunks of tokens). To validate the efficacy of current MIA approaches at greater scales, we adapt a recent work on Dataset Inference (DI) for the task of binary membership detection that aggregates paragraph-level MIA features to enable MIA at document and collection of documents level. This baseline achieves the first successful MIA on pre-trained and fine-tuned LLMs.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

Dataset distillation offers a potential means to enhance data efficiency in deep learning. Recent studies have shown its ability to counteract backdoor risks present in original training samples. In this study, we delve into the theoretical aspects of backdoor attacks and dataset distillation based on kernel methods. We introduce two new theory-driven trigger pattern generation methods specialized for dataset distillation. Following a comprehensive set of analyses and experiments, we show that our optimization-based trigger design framework informs effective backdoor attacks on dataset distillation. Notably, datasets poisoned by our designed trigger prove resilient against conventional backdoor attack detection and mitigation methods. Our empirical results validate that the triggers developed using our approaches are proficient at executing resilient backdoor attacks.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

Due to the expanding capabilities and pre-training data, Large Language Models (LLMs) are facing increasingly serious evaluation challenges. On one hand, the data leakage issue cause over-estimation on existing benchmarks. On the other hand, periodically curating datasets manually is costly. In this paper, we propose to automate dataset updates for reliable and timely evaluation. The basic idea is to generate unseen and high-quality testing samples based on existing ones to mitigate leakage issues. In specific, we propose two strategies with systematically verification. First, the mimicking strategy employs LLMs to create new samples resembling existing ones, to the maximum extent preserving the stylistic of the original dataset. Our experiments demonstrate its evaluation stability across multiple instantiations and its effectiveness in dealing with data leakage issues in most cases. Second, for the cases that mimicking dataset works poorly, we design an extending strategy that adjusts the difficulty of the generated samples according to varying cognitive levels. This not only makes our evaluation more systematic, but also, with a balanced difficulty, even discern model capabilities better at fine-grained levels.

The field of cybersecurity is evolving fast. Experts need to be informed about past, current and - in the best case - upcoming threats, because attacks are becoming more advanced, targets bigger and systems more complex. As this cannot be addressed manually, cybersecurity experts need to rely on machine learning techniques. In the texutual domain, pre-trained language models like BERT have shown to be helpful, by providing a good baseline for further fine-tuning. However, due to the domain-knowledge and many technical terms in cybersecurity general language models might miss the gist of textual information, hence doing more harm than good. For this reason, we create a high-quality dataset and present a language model specifically tailored to the cybersecurity domain, which can serve as a basic building block for cybersecurity systems that deal with natural language. The model is compared with other models based on 15 different domain-dependent extrinsic and intrinsic tasks as well as general tasks from the SuperGLUE benchmark. On the one hand, the results of the intrinsic tasks show that our model improves the internal representation space of words compared to the other models. On the other hand, the extrinsic, domain-dependent tasks, consisting of sequence tagging and classification, show that the model is best in specific application scenarios, in contrast to the others. Furthermore, we show that our approach against catastrophic forgetting works, as the model is able to retrieve the previously trained domain-independent knowledge. The used dataset and trained model are made publicly available

Large language models are now tuned to align with the goals of their creators, namely to be "helpful and harmless." These models should respond helpfully to user questions, but refuse to answer requests that could cause harm. However, adversarial users can construct inputs which circumvent attempts at alignment. In this work, we study to what extent these models remain aligned, even when interacting with an adversarial user who constructs worst-case inputs (adversarial examples). These inputs are designed to cause the model to emit harmful content that would otherwise be prohibited. We show that existing NLP-based optimization attacks are insufficiently powerful to reliably attack aligned text models: even when current NLP-based attacks fail, we can find adversarial inputs with brute force. As a result, the failure of current attacks should not be seen as proof that aligned text models remain aligned under adversarial inputs. However the recent trend in large-scale ML models is multimodal models that allow users to provide images that influence the text that is generated. We show these models can be easily attacked, i.e., induced to perform arbitrary un-aligned behavior through adversarial perturbation of the input image. We conjecture that improved NLP attacks may demonstrate this same level of adversarial control over text-only models.

In the future, powerful AI systems may be deployed in high-stakes settings, where a single failure could be catastrophic. One technique for improving AI safety in high-stakes settings is adversarial training, which uses an adversary to generate examples to train on in order to achieve better worst-case performance. In this work, we used a safe language generation task (``avoid injuries'') as a testbed for achieving high reliability through adversarial training. We created a series of adversarial training techniques -- including a tool that assists human adversaries -- to find and eliminate failures in a classifier that filters text completions suggested by a generator. In our task, we determined that we can set very conservative classifier thresholds without significantly impacting the quality of the filtered outputs. We found that adversarial training increased robustness to the adversarial attacks that we trained on -- doubling the time for our contractors to find adversarial examples both with our tool (from 13 to 26 minutes) and without (from 20 to 44 minutes) -- without affecting in-distribution performance. We hope to see further work in the high-stakes reliability setting, including more powerful tools for enhancing human adversaries and better ways to measure high levels of reliability, until we can confidently rule out the possibility of catastrophic deployment-time failures of powerful models.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing image quality and alignment results. Consequently, they are employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also produce unsafe content. As a contribution to the Adversarial Nibbler challenge, we distill a large set of over 1,000 potential adversarial inputs from existing safety benchmarks. Our analysis of the gathered prompts and corresponding images demonstrates the fragility of input filters and provides further insights into systematic safety issues in current generative image models.

Large language models with instruction-following capabilities open the door to a wider group of users. However, when it comes to information extraction - a classic task in natural language processing - most task-specific systems cannot align well with long-tail ad hoc extraction use cases for non-expert users. To address this, we propose a novel paradigm, termed On-Demand Information Extraction, to fulfill the personalized demands of real-world users. Our task aims to follow the instructions to extract the desired content from the associated text and present it in a structured tabular format. The table headers can either be user-specified or inferred contextually by the model. To facilitate research in this emerging area, we present a benchmark named InstructIE, inclusive of both automatically generated training data, as well as the human-annotated test set. Building on InstructIE, we further develop an On-Demand Information Extractor, ODIE. Comprehensive evaluations on our benchmark reveal that ODIE substantially outperforms the existing open-source models of similar size. Our code and dataset are released on https://github.com/yzjiao/On-Demand-IE.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in language understanding and generation. Nonetheless, it was also witnessed that LLMs tend to produce inaccurate responses to specific queries. This deficiency can be traced to the tokenization step LLMs must undergo, which is an inevitable limitation inherent to all LLMs. In fact, incorrect tokenization is the critical point that hinders LLMs in understanding the input precisely, thus leading to unsatisfactory output. To demonstrate this flaw of LLMs, we construct an adversarial dataset, named as ADT (Adversarial Dataset for Tokenizer), which draws upon the vocabularies of various open-source LLMs to challenge LLMs' tokenization. ADT consists of two subsets: the manually constructed ADT-Human and the automatically generated ADT-Auto. Our empirical results reveal that our ADT is highly effective on challenging the tokenization of leading LLMs, including GPT-4o, Llama-3, Qwen2.5-max and so on, thus degrading these LLMs' capabilities. Moreover, our method of automatic data generation has been proven efficient and robust, which can be applied to any open-source LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigating LLMs' vulnerability in terms of challenging their token segmentation, which will shed light on the subsequent research of improving LLMs' capabilities through optimizing their tokenization process and algorithms.

Recently, there has been significant progress in studying neural networks to translate text descriptions into SQL queries. Despite achieving good performance on some public benchmarks, existing text-to-SQL models typically rely on the lexical matching between words in natural language (NL) questions and tokens in table schemas, which may render the models vulnerable to attacks that break the schema linking mechanism. In this work, we investigate the robustness of text-to-SQL models to synonym substitution. In particular, we introduce Spider-Syn, a human-curated dataset based on the Spider benchmark for text-to-SQL translation. NL questions in Spider-Syn are modified from Spider, by replacing their schema-related words with manually selected synonyms that reflect real-world question paraphrases. We observe that the accuracy dramatically drops by eliminating such explicit correspondence between NL questions and table schemas, even if the synonyms are not adversarially selected to conduct worst-case adversarial attacks. Finally, we present two categories of approaches to improve the model robustness. The first category of approaches utilizes additional synonym annotations for table schemas by modifying the model input, while the second category is based on adversarial training. We demonstrate that both categories of approaches significantly outperform their counterparts without the defense, and the first category of approaches are more effective.

Modern deep learning requires large volumes of data, which could contain sensitive or private information that cannot be leaked. Recent work has shown for homogeneous neural networks a large portion of this training data could be reconstructed with only access to the trained network parameters. While the attack was shown to work empirically, there exists little formal understanding of its effective regime which datapoints are susceptible to reconstruction. In this work, we first build a stronger version of the dataset reconstruction attack and show how it can provably recover the entire training set in the infinite width regime. We then empirically study the characteristics of this attack on two-layer networks and reveal that its success heavily depends on deviations from the frozen infinite-width Neural Tangent Kernel limit. Next, we study the nature of easily-reconstructed images. We show that both theoretically and empirically, reconstructed images tend to "outliers" in the dataset, and that these reconstruction attacks can be used for dataset distillation, that is, we can retrain on reconstructed images and obtain high predictive accuracy.

Probing or fine-tuning (large-scale) pre-trained models results in state-of-the-art performance for many NLP tasks and, more recently, even for computer vision tasks when combined with image data. Unfortunately, these approaches also entail severe risks. In particular, large image datasets automatically scraped from the web may contain derogatory terms as categories and offensive images, and may also underrepresent specific classes. Consequently, there is an urgent need to carefully document datasets and curate their content. Unfortunately, this process is tedious and error-prone. We show that pre-trained transformers themselves provide a methodology for the automated curation of large-scale vision datasets. Based on human-annotated examples and the implicit knowledge of a CLIP based model, we demonstrate that one can select relevant prompts for rating the offensiveness of an image. In addition to e.g. privacy violation and pornographic content previously identified in ImageNet, we demonstrate that our approach identifies further inappropriate and potentially offensive content.

Exchanging gradients is a widely used method in modern multi-node machine learning system (e.g., distributed training, collaborative learning). For a long time, people believed that gradients are safe to share: i.e., the training data will not be leaked by gradient exchange. However, we show that it is possible to obtain the private training data from the publicly shared gradients. We name this leakage as Deep Leakage from Gradient and empirically validate the effectiveness on both computer vision and natural language processing tasks. Experimental results show that our attack is much stronger than previous approaches: the recovery is pixel-wise accurate for images and token-wise matching for texts. We want to raise people's awareness to rethink the gradient's safety. Finally, we discuss several possible strategies to prevent such deep leakage. The most effective defense method is gradient pruning.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have achieved promising results in information retrieval. NRMs have also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. A typical Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) against NRMs was proposed recently, in which an attacker promotes a target document in rankings by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to its text. This raises concerns when deploying NRMs in real-world applications. Therefore, it is important to develop techniques that defend against such attacks for NRMs. In empirical defenses adversarial examples are found during training and used to augment the training set. However, such methods offer no theoretical guarantee on the models' robustness and may eventually be broken by other sophisticated WSRAs. To escape this arms race, rigorous and provable certified defense methods for NRMs are needed. To this end, we first define the Certified Top-K Robustness for ranking models since users mainly care about the top ranked results in real-world scenarios. A ranking model is said to be Certified Top-K Robust on a ranked list when it is guaranteed to keep documents that are out of the top K away from the top K under any attack. Then, we introduce a Certified Defense method, named CertDR, to achieve certified top-K robustness against WSRA, based on the idea of randomized smoothing. Specifically, we first construct a smoothed ranker by applying random word substitutions on the documents, and then leverage the ranking property jointly with the statistical property of the ensemble to provably certify top-K robustness. Extensive experiments on two representative web search datasets demonstrate that CertDR can significantly outperform state-of-the-art empirical defense methods for ranking models.

The performance of spoofing countermeasure systems depends fundamentally upon the use of sufficiently representative training data. With this usually being limited, current solutions typically lack generalisation to attacks encountered in the wild. Strategies to improve reliability in the face of uncontrolled, unpredictable attacks are hence needed. We report in this paper our efforts to use self-supervised learning in the form of a wav2vec 2.0 front-end with fine tuning. Despite initial base representations being learned using only bona fide data and no spoofed data, we obtain the lowest equal error rates reported in the literature for both the ASVspoof 2021 Logical Access and Deepfake databases. When combined with data augmentation,these results correspond to an improvement of almost 90% relative to our baseline system.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Watermarking of language model outputs enables statistical detection of model-generated text, which has many applications in the responsible deployment of language models. Existing watermarking strategies operate by altering the decoder of an existing language model, and the ability for a language model to directly learn to generate the watermark would have significant implications for the real-world deployment of watermarks. First, learned watermarks could be used to build open models that naturally generate watermarked text, allowing for open models to benefit from watermarking. Second, if watermarking is used to determine the provenance of generated text, an adversary can hurt the reputation of a victim model by spoofing its watermark and generating damaging watermarked text. To investigate the learnability of watermarks, we propose watermark distillation, which trains a student model to behave like a teacher model that uses decoding-based watermarking. We test our approach on three distinct decoding-based watermarking strategies and various hyperparameter settings, finding that models can learn to generate watermarked text with high detectability. We also find limitations to learnability, including the loss of watermarking capabilities under fine-tuning on normal text and high sample complexity when learning low-distortion watermarks.

Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution to activate the backdoor, posing limitations in real-world applicability. Addressing this gap, we introduce a novel Claim-Guided Backdoor Attack (CGBA), which eliminates the need for such manipulations by utilizing inherent textual claims as triggers. CGBA leverages claim extraction, clustering, and targeted training to trick models to misbehave on targeted claims without affecting their performance on clean data. CGBA demonstrates its effectiveness and stealthiness across various datasets and models, significantly enhancing the feasibility of practical backdoor attacks. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/PaperCGBA/CGBA.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

The robustness of recent Large Language Models (LLMs) has become increasingly crucial as their applicability expands across various domains and real-world applications. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a promising solution for addressing the limitations of LLMs, yet existing studies on the robustness of RAG often overlook the interconnected relationships between RAG components or the potential threats prevalent in real-world databases, such as minor textual errors. In this work, we investigate two underexplored aspects when assessing the robustness of RAG: 1) vulnerability to noisy documents through low-level perturbations and 2) a holistic evaluation of RAG robustness. Furthermore, we introduce a novel attack method, the Genetic Attack on RAG (GARAG), which targets these aspects. Specifically, GARAG is designed to reveal vulnerabilities within each component and test the overall system functionality against noisy documents. We validate RAG robustness by applying our GARAG to standard QA datasets, incorporating diverse retrievers and LLMs. The experimental results show that GARAG consistently achieves high attack success rates. Also, it significantly devastates the performance of each component and their synergy, highlighting the substantial risk that minor textual inaccuracies pose in disrupting RAG systems in the real world.

Studying data memorization in neural language models helps us understand the risks (e.g., to privacy or copyright) associated with models regurgitating training data and aids in the development of countermeasures. Many prior works -- and some recently deployed defenses -- focus on "verbatim memorization", defined as a model generation that exactly matches a substring from the training set. We argue that verbatim memorization definitions are too restrictive and fail to capture more subtle forms of memorization. Specifically, we design and implement an efficient defense that perfectly prevents all verbatim memorization. And yet, we demonstrate that this "perfect" filter does not prevent the leakage of training data. Indeed, it is easily circumvented by plausible and minimally modified "style-transfer" prompts -- and in some cases even the non-modified original prompts -- to extract memorized information. We conclude by discussing potential alternative definitions and why defining memorization is a difficult yet crucial open question for neural language models.

We introduce a new Information Extraction (IE) task dubbed Instruction-based IE, which aims to ask the system to follow specific instructions or guidelines to extract information. To facilitate research in this area, we construct a dataset called InstructIE, consisting of 270,000 weakly supervised data from Chinese Wikipedia and 1,000 high-quality crowdsourced annotated instances. We further evaluate the performance of various baseline models on the InstructIE dataset. The results reveal that although current models exhibit promising performance, there is still room for improvement. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive case study analysis, underlining the challenges inherent in the Instruction-based IE task. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/DeepKE/tree/main/example/llm.

Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, finding applications across various domains. However, their reliance on massive internet-sourced datasets for training brings notable privacy issues, which are exacerbated in critical domains (e.g., healthcare). Moreover, certain application-specific scenarios may require fine-tuning these models on private data. This survey critically examines the privacy threats associated with LLMs, emphasizing the potential for these models to memorize and inadvertently reveal sensitive information. We explore current threats by reviewing privacy attacks on LLMs and propose comprehensive solutions for integrating privacy mechanisms throughout the entire learning pipeline. These solutions range from anonymizing training datasets to implementing differential privacy during training or inference and machine unlearning after training. Our comprehensive review of existing literature highlights ongoing challenges, available tools, and future directions for preserving privacy in LLMs. This work aims to guide the development of more secure and trustworthy AI systems by providing a thorough understanding of privacy preservation methods and their effectiveness in mitigating risks.

We investigate a new threat to neural sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) models: training-time attacks that cause models to "spin" their outputs so as to support an adversary-chosen sentiment or point of view -- but only when the input contains adversary-chosen trigger words. For example, a spinned summarization model outputs positive summaries of any text that mentions the name of some individual or organization. Model spinning introduces a "meta-backdoor" into a model. Whereas conventional backdoors cause models to produce incorrect outputs on inputs with the trigger, outputs of spinned models preserve context and maintain standard accuracy metrics, yet also satisfy a meta-task chosen by the adversary. Model spinning enables propaganda-as-a-service, where propaganda is defined as biased speech. An adversary can create customized language models that produce desired spins for chosen triggers, then deploy these models to generate disinformation (a platform attack), or else inject them into ML training pipelines (a supply-chain attack), transferring malicious functionality to downstream models trained by victims. To demonstrate the feasibility of model spinning, we develop a new backdooring technique. It stacks an adversarial meta-task onto a seq2seq model, backpropagates the desired meta-task output to points in the word-embedding space we call "pseudo-words," and uses pseudo-words to shift the entire output distribution of the seq2seq model. We evaluate this attack on language generation, summarization, and translation models with different triggers and meta-tasks such as sentiment, toxicity, and entailment. Spinned models largely maintain their accuracy metrics (ROUGE and BLEU) while shifting their outputs to satisfy the adversary's meta-task. We also show that, in the case of a supply-chain attack, the spin functionality transfers to downstream models.

Contrastive language-image pretraining (CLIP) has been found to be vulnerable to poisoning backdoor attacks where the adversary can achieve an almost perfect attack success rate on CLIP models by poisoning only 0.01\% of the training dataset. This raises security concerns on the current practice of pretraining large-scale models on unscrutinized web data using CLIP. In this work, we analyze the representations of backdoor-poisoned samples learned by CLIP models and find that they exhibit unique characteristics in their local subspace, i.e., their local neighborhoods are far more sparse than that of clean samples. Based on this finding, we conduct a systematic study on detecting CLIP backdoor attacks and show that these attacks can be easily and efficiently detected by traditional density ratio-based local outlier detectors, whereas existing backdoor sample detection methods fail. Our experiments also reveal that an unintentional backdoor already exists in the original CC3M dataset and has been trained into a popular open-source model released by OpenCLIP. Based on our detector, one can clean up a million-scale web dataset (e.g., CC3M) efficiently within 15 minutes using 4 Nvidia A100 GPUs. The code is publicly available in our https://github.com/HanxunH/Detect-CLIP-Backdoor-Samples{GitHub repository}.

How can we detect if copyrighted content was used in the training process of a language model, considering that the training data is typically undisclosed? We are motivated by the premise that a language model is likely to identify verbatim excerpts from its training text. We propose DE-COP, a method to determine whether a piece of copyrighted content was included in training. DE-COP's core approach is to probe an LLM with multiple-choice questions, whose options include both verbatim text and their paraphrases. We construct BookTection, a benchmark with excerpts from 165 books published prior and subsequent to a model's training cutoff, along with their paraphrases. Our experiments show that DE-COP surpasses the prior best method by 9.6% in detection performance (AUC) on models with logits available. Moreover, DE-COP also achieves an average accuracy of 72% for detecting suspect books on fully black-box models where prior methods give approx 4% accuracy. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/avduarte333/DE-COP_Method

Large language models trained on massive corpora of data from the web can memorize and reproduce sensitive or private data raising both legal and ethical concerns. Unlearning, or tuning models to forget information present in their training data, provides us with a way to protect private data after training. Although several methods exist for such unlearning, it is unclear to what extent they result in models equivalent to those where the data to be forgotten was never learned in the first place. To address this challenge, we present TOFU, a Task of Fictitious Unlearning, as a benchmark aimed at helping deepen our understanding of unlearning. We offer a dataset of 200 diverse synthetic author profiles, each consisting of 20 question-answer pairs, and a subset of these profiles called the forget set that serves as the target for unlearning. We compile a suite of metrics that work together to provide a holistic picture of unlearning efficacy. Finally, we provide a set of baseline results from existing unlearning algorithms. Importantly, none of the baselines we consider show effective unlearning motivating continued efforts to develop approaches for unlearning that effectively tune models so that they truly behave as if they were never trained on the forget data at all.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks -- models lose their safety alignment ability after fine-tuning on a few harmful samples. For risk mitigation, a guardrail is typically used to filter out harmful samples before fine-tuning. By designing a new red-teaming method, we in this paper show that purely relying on the moderation guardrail for data filtration is not reliable. Our proposed attack method, dubbed Virus, easily bypasses the guardrail moderation by slightly modifying the harmful data. Experimental results show that the harmful data optimized by Virus is not detectable by the guardrail with up to 100\% leakage ratio, and can simultaneously achieve superior attack performance. Finally, the key message we want to convey through this paper is that: it is reckless to consider guardrail moderation as a clutch at straws towards harmful fine-tuning attack, as it cannot solve the inherent safety issue of the pre-trained LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Virus

Up-to-date and reliable Large Language Models (LLMs) are consistently sought after. Typically, LLMs are trained on a fixed dataset and then deployed. However, the training data continually becomes outdated. Enable automatic training of AI using web data involves significant concerns regarding data quality and safety due to bias, spam, and other unsafe or unwanted text. Pure data is essential for producing reliable models. Training a model on impure data may result in undesirable outcomes. This research proposes a system that collects web data and automatically filters out unwanted text with the assistance of existing trusted AI models. In the experiment, a small sample of web data was collected and filtered, demonstrating the system's effectiveness in purifying the data.

This research addresses command-line embedding in cybersecurity, a field obstructed by the lack of comprehensive datasets due to privacy and regulation concerns. We propose the first dataset of similar command lines, named CyPHER, for training and unbiased evaluation. The training set is generated using a set of large language models (LLMs) comprising 28,520 similar command-line pairs. Our testing dataset consists of 2,807 similar command-line pairs sourced from authentic command-line data. In addition, we propose a command-line embedding model named CmdCaliper, enabling the computation of semantic similarity with command lines. Performance evaluations demonstrate that the smallest version of CmdCaliper (30 million parameters) suppresses state-of-the-art (SOTA) sentence embedding models with ten times more parameters across various tasks (e.g., malicious command-line detection and similar command-line retrieval). Our study explores the feasibility of data generation using LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. Furthermore, we release our proposed command-line dataset, embedding models' weights and all program codes to the public. This advancement paves the way for more effective command-line embedding for future researchers.

NLP models often rely on superficial cues known as dataset biases to achieve impressive performance, and can fail on examples where these biases do not hold. Recent work sought to develop robust, unbiased models by filtering biased examples from training sets. In this work, we argue that such filtering can obscure the true capabilities of models to overcome biases, which might never be removed in full from the dataset. We suggest that in order to drive the development of models robust to subtle biases, dataset biases should be amplified in the training set. We introduce an evaluation framework defined by a bias-amplified training set and an anti-biased test set, both automatically extracted from existing datasets. Experiments across three notions of bias, four datasets and two models show that our framework is substantially more challenging for models than the original data splits, and even more challenging than hand-crafted challenge sets. Our evaluation framework can use any existing dataset, even those considered obsolete, to test model robustness. We hope our work will guide the development of robust models that do not rely on superficial biases and correlations. To this end, we publicly release our code and data.

Model extraction is a growing concern for the security of AI systems. For deep neural network models, the architecture is the most important information an adversary aims to recover. Being a sequence of repeated computation blocks, neural network models deployed on edge-devices will generate distinctive side-channel leakages. The latter can be exploited to extract critical information when targeted platforms are physically accessible. By combining theoretical knowledge about deep learning practices and analysis of a widespread implementation library (ARM CMSIS-NN), our purpose is to answer this critical question: how far can we extract architecture information by simply examining an EM side-channel trace? For the first time, we propose an extraction methodology for traditional MLP and CNN models running on a high-end 32-bit microcontroller (Cortex-M7) that relies only on simple pattern recognition analysis. Despite few challenging cases, we claim that, contrary to parameters extraction, the complexity of the attack is relatively low and we highlight the urgent need for practicable protections that could fit the strong memory and latency requirements of such platforms.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advancements in specialized fields such as finance, law, and medicine. However, in cybersecurity, we have noticed a lack of open-source datasets, with a particular lack of high-quality cybersecurity pretraining corpora, even though much research indicates that LLMs acquire their knowledge during pretraining. To address this, we present a comprehensive suite of datasets covering all major training stages, including pretraining, instruction fine-tuning, and reasoning distillation with cybersecurity-specific self-reflection data. Extensive ablation studies demonstrate their effectiveness on public cybersecurity benchmarks. In particular, continual pre-training on our dataset yields a 15.88% improvement in the aggregate score, while reasoning distillation leads to a 10% gain in security certification (CISSP). We will release all datasets and trained cybersecurity LLMs under the ODC-BY and MIT licenses to encourage further research in the community. For access to all datasets and model weights, please refer to https://huggingface.co/collections/trendmicro-ailab/primus-67b1fd27052b802b4af9d243.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Safety guard models that detect malicious queries aimed at large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring the secure and responsible deployment of LLMs in real-world applications. However, deploying existing safety guard models with billions of parameters alongside LLMs on mobile devices is impractical due to substantial memory requirements and latency. To reduce this cost, we distill a large teacher safety guard model into a smaller one using a labeled dataset of instruction-response pairs with binary harmfulness labels. Due to the limited diversity of harmful instructions in the existing labeled dataset, naively distilled models tend to underperform compared to larger models. To bridge the gap between small and large models, we propose HarmAug, a simple yet effective data augmentation method that involves jailbreaking an LLM and prompting it to generate harmful instructions. Given a prompt such as, "Make a single harmful instruction prompt that would elicit offensive content", we add an affirmative prefix (e.g., "I have an idea for a prompt:") to the LLM's response. This encourages the LLM to continue generating the rest of the response, leading to sampling harmful instructions. Another LLM generates a response to the harmful instruction, and the teacher model labels the instruction-response pair. We empirically show that our HarmAug outperforms other relevant baselines. Moreover, a 435-million-parameter safety guard model trained with HarmAug achieves an F1 score comparable to larger models with over 7 billion parameters, and even outperforms them in AUPRC, while operating at less than 25% of their computational cost.

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

Detecting text generated by large language models (LLMs) is of great recent interest. With zero-shot methods like DetectGPT, detection capabilities have reached impressive levels. However, the reliability of existing detectors in real-world applications remains underexplored. In this study, we present a new benchmark, DetectRL, highlighting that even state-of-the-art (SOTA) detection techniques still underperformed in this task. We collected human-written datasets from domains where LLMs are particularly prone to misuse. Using popular LLMs, we generated data that better aligns with real-world applications. Unlike previous studies, we employed heuristic rules to create adversarial LLM-generated text, simulating advanced prompt usages, human revisions like word substitutions, and writing errors. Our development of DetectRL reveals the strengths and limitations of current SOTA detectors. More importantly, we analyzed the potential impact of writing styles, model types, attack methods, the text lengths, and real-world human writing factors on different types of detectors. We believe DetectRL could serve as an effective benchmark for assessing detectors in real-world scenarios, evolving with advanced attack methods, thus providing more stressful evaluation to drive the development of more efficient detectors. Data and code are publicly available at: https://github.com/NLP2CT/DetectRL.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

Offensive language detection is an important task for filtering out abusive expressions and improving online user experiences. However, malicious users often attempt to avoid filtering systems through the involvement of textual noises. In this paper, we propose these evasions as user-intended adversarial attacks that insert special symbols or leverage the distinctive features of the Korean language. Furthermore, we introduce simple yet effective pooling strategies in a layer-wise manner to defend against the proposed attacks, focusing on the preceding layers not just the last layer to capture both offensiveness and token embeddings. We demonstrate that these pooling strategies are more robust to performance degradation even when the attack rate is increased, without directly training of such patterns. Notably, we found that models pre-trained on clean texts could achieve a comparable performance in detecting attacked offensive language, to models pre-trained on noisy texts by employing these pooling strategies.

The rapid development of autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly improved the quality of generated texts, necessitating reliable machine-generated text detectors. A huge number of detectors and collections with AI fragments have emerged, and several detection methods even showed recognition quality up to 99.9% according to the target metrics in such collections. However, the quality of such detectors tends to drop dramatically in the wild, posing a question: Are detectors actually highly trustworthy or do their high benchmark scores come from the poor quality of evaluation datasets? In this paper, we emphasise the need for robust and qualitative methods for evaluating generated data to be secure against bias and low generalising ability of future model. We present a systematic review of datasets from competitions dedicated to AI-generated content detection and propose methods for evaluating the quality of datasets containing AI-generated fragments. In addition, we discuss the possibility of using high-quality generated data to achieve two goals: improving the training of detection models and improving the training datasets themselves. Our contribution aims to facilitate a better understanding of the dynamics between human and machine text, which will ultimately support the integrity of information in an increasingly automated world.

This paper investigates the radioactivity of LLM-generated texts, i.e. whether it is possible to detect that such input was used as training data. Conventional methods like membership inference can carry out this detection with some level of accuracy. We show that watermarked training data leaves traces easier to detect and much more reliable than membership inference. We link the contamination level to the watermark robustness, its proportion in the training set, and the fine-tuning process. We notably demonstrate that training on watermarked synthetic instructions can be detected with high confidence (p-value < 1e-5) even when as little as 5% of training text is watermarked. Thus, LLM watermarking, originally designed for detecting machine-generated text, gives the ability to easily identify if the outputs of a watermarked LLM were used to fine-tune another LLM.

Large-scale pre-trained language models have achieved tremendous success across a wide range of natural language understanding (NLU) tasks, even surpassing human performance. However, recent studies reveal that the robustness of these models can be challenged by carefully crafted textual adversarial examples. While several individual datasets have been proposed to evaluate model robustness, a principled and comprehensive benchmark is still missing. In this paper, we present Adversarial GLUE (AdvGLUE), a new multi-task benchmark to quantitatively and thoroughly explore and evaluate the vulnerabilities of modern large-scale language models under various types of adversarial attacks. In particular, we systematically apply 14 textual adversarial attack methods to GLUE tasks to construct AdvGLUE, which is further validated by humans for reliable annotations. Our findings are summarized as follows. (i) Most existing adversarial attack algorithms are prone to generating invalid or ambiguous adversarial examples, with around 90% of them either changing the original semantic meanings or misleading human annotators as well. Therefore, we perform a careful filtering process to curate a high-quality benchmark. (ii) All the language models and robust training methods we tested perform poorly on AdvGLUE, with scores lagging far behind the benign accuracy. We hope our work will motivate the development of new adversarial attacks that are more stealthy and semantic-preserving, as well as new robust language models against sophisticated adversarial attacks. AdvGLUE is available at https://adversarialglue.github.io.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

In the evolving landscape of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, the remarkable capability to generate high-quality images from textual descriptions faces challenges with the potential misuse of reproducing sensitive content. To address this critical issue, we introduce Robust Adversarial Concept Erase (RACE), a novel approach designed to mitigate these risks by enhancing the robustness of concept erasure method for T2I models. RACE utilizes a sophisticated adversarial training framework to identify and mitigate adversarial text embeddings, significantly reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Impressively, RACE achieves a 30 percentage point reduction in ASR for the ``nudity'' concept against the leading white-box attack method. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate RACE's effectiveness in defending against both white-box and black-box attacks, marking a significant advancement in protecting T2I diffusion models from generating inappropriate or misleading imagery. This work underlines the essential need for proactive defense measures in adapting to the rapidly advancing field of adversarial challenges. Our code is publicly available: https://github.com/chkimmmmm/R.A.C.E.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved human-level fluency in text generation, making it difficult to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated texts. This poses a growing risk of misuse of LLMs and demands the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. However, existing detectors lack robustness against attacks: they degrade detection accuracy by simply paraphrasing LLM-generated texts. Furthermore, a malicious user might attempt to deliberately evade the detectors based on detection results, but this has not been assumed in previous studies. In this paper, we propose OUTFOX, a framework that improves the robustness of LLM-generated-text detectors by allowing both the detector and the attacker to consider each other's output. In this framework, the attacker uses the detector's prediction labels as examples for in-context learning and adversarially generates essays that are harder to detect, while the detector uses the adversarially generated essays as examples for in-context learning to learn to detect essays from a strong attacker. Experiments in the domain of student essays show that the proposed detector improves the detection performance on the attacker-generated texts by up to +41.3 points in F1-score. Furthermore, the proposed detector shows a state-of-the-art detection performance: up to 96.9 points in F1-score, beating existing detectors on non-attacked texts. Finally, the proposed attacker drastically degrades the performance of detectors by up to -57.0 points F1-score, massively outperforming the baseline paraphrasing method for evading detection.

The collection of security-related logs holds the key to understanding attack behaviors and diagnosing vulnerabilities. Still, their analysis remains a daunting challenge. Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated unmatched potential in understanding natural and programming languages. The question arises whether and how LMs could be also useful for security experts since their logs contain intrinsically confused and obfuscated information. In this paper, we systematically study how to benefit from the state-of-the-art in LM to automatically analyze text-like Unix shell attack logs. We present a thorough design methodology that leads to LogPr\'ecis. It receives as input raw shell sessions and automatically identifies and assigns the attacker tactic to each portion of the session, i.e., unveiling the sequence of the attacker's goals. We demonstrate LogPr\'ecis capability to support the analysis of two large datasets containing about 400,000 unique Unix shell attacks. LogPr\'ecis reduces them into about 3,000 fingerprints, each grouping sessions with the same sequence of tactics. The abstraction it provides lets the analyst better understand attacks, identify fingerprints, detect novelty, link similar attacks, and track families and mutations. Overall, LogPr\'ecis, released as open source, paves the way for better and more responsive defense against cyberattacks.

Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning interfaces, we introduce covert malicious finetuning, a method to compromise model safety via finetuning while evading detection. Our method constructs a malicious dataset where every individual datapoint appears innocuous, but finetuning on the dataset teaches the model to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. Applied to GPT-4, our method produces a finetuned model that acts on harmful instructions 99% of the time and avoids detection by defense mechanisms such as dataset inspection, safety evaluations, and input/output classifiers. Our findings question whether black-box finetuning access can be secured against sophisticated adversaries.

In this paper, we show that knowledge distillation can be subverted to manipulate language model benchmark scores, revealing a critical vulnerability in current evaluation practices. We introduce "Data Laundering," a three-phase process analogous to financial money laundering, that enables the covert transfer of benchmark-specific knowledge through seemingly legitimate intermediate training steps. Through extensive experiments with a 2-layer BERT student model, we show how this approach can achieve substantial improvements in benchmark accuracy (up to 75\% on GPQA) without developing genuine reasoning capabilities. Notably, this method can be exploited intentionally or even unintentionally, as researchers may inadvertently adopt this method that inflates scores using knowledge distillation without realizing the implications. While our findings demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique, we present them as a cautionary tale highlighting the urgent need for more robust evaluation methods in AI. This work aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about evaluation integrity in AI development and the need for benchmarks that more accurately reflect true model capabilities. The code is available at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/data_laundering.

The widespread exchange of digital documents in various domains has resulted in abundant private information being shared. This proliferation necessitates redaction techniques to protect sensitive content and user privacy. While numerous redaction methods exist, their effectiveness varies, with some proving more robust than others. As such, the literature proposes several deanonymization techniques, raising awareness of potential privacy threats. However, while none of these methods are successful against the most effective redaction techniques, these attacks only focus on the anonymized tokens and ignore the sentence context. In this paper, we propose RedactBuster, the first deanonymization model using sentence context to perform Named Entity Recognition on reacted text. Our methodology leverages fine-tuned state-of-the-art Transformers and Deep Learning models to determine the anonymized entity types in a document. We test RedactBuster against the most effective redaction technique and evaluate it using the publicly available Text Anonymization Benchmark (TAB). Our results show accuracy values up to 0.985 regardless of the document nature or entity type. In raising awareness of this privacy issue, we propose a countermeasure we call character evasion that helps strengthen the secrecy of sensitive information. Furthermore, we make our model and testbed open-source to aid researchers and practitioners in evaluating the resilience of novel redaction techniques and enhancing document privacy.

We introduce a new method for extracting structured threat behaviors from threat intelligence text. Our method is based on a multi-stage ranking architecture that allows jointly optimizing for efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, we believe this problem formulation better aligns with the real-world nature of the task considering the large number of adversary techniques and the extensive body of threat intelligence created by security analysts. Our findings show that the proposed system yields state-of-the-art performance results for this task. Results show that our method has a top-3 recall performance of 81\% in identifying the relevant technique among 193 top-level techniques. Our tests also demonstrate that our system performs significantly better (+40\%) than the widely used large language models when tested under a zero-shot setting.

LLMs now exhibit human-like skills in various fields, leading to worries about misuse. Thus, detecting generated text is crucial. However, passive detection methods are stuck in domain specificity and limited adversarial robustness. To achieve reliable detection, a watermark-based method was proposed for white-box LLMs, allowing them to embed watermarks during text generation. The method involves randomly dividing the model vocabulary to obtain a special list and adjusting the probability distribution to promote the selection of words in the list. A detection algorithm aware of the list can identify the watermarked text. However, this method is not applicable in many real-world scenarios where only black-box language models are available. For instance, third-parties that develop API-based vertical applications cannot watermark text themselves because API providers only supply generated text and withhold probability distributions to shield their commercial interests. To allow third-parties to autonomously inject watermarks into generated text, we develop a watermarking framework for black-box language model usage scenarios. Specifically, we first define a binary encoding function to compute a random binary encoding corresponding to a word. The encodings computed for non-watermarked text conform to a Bernoulli distribution, wherein the probability of a word representing bit-1 being approximately 0.5. To inject a watermark, we alter the distribution by selectively replacing words representing bit-0 with context-based synonyms that represent bit-1. A statistical test is then used to identify the watermark. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on both Chinese and English datasets. Furthermore, results under re-translation, polishing, word deletion, and synonym substitution attacks reveal that it is arduous to remove the watermark without compromising the original semantics.

Recently there have been many shared tasks targeting the detection of generated text from Large Language Models (LLMs). However, these shared tasks tend to focus either on cases where text is limited to one particular domain or cases where text can be from many domains, some of which may not be seen during test time. In this shared task, using the newly released RAID benchmark, we aim to answer whether or not models can detect generated text from a large, yet fixed, number of domains and LLMs, all of which are seen during training. Over the course of three months, our task was attempted by 9 teams with 23 detector submissions. We find that multiple participants were able to obtain accuracies of over 99% on machine-generated text from RAID while maintaining a 5% False Positive Rate -- suggesting that detectors are able to robustly detect text from many domains and models simultaneously. We discuss potential interpretations of this result and provide directions for future research.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

We proposes a novel algorithm, ANTHRO, that inductively extracts over 600K human-written text perturbations in the wild and leverages them for realistic adversarial attack. Unlike existing character-based attacks which often deductively hypothesize a set of manipulation strategies, our work is grounded on actual observations from real-world texts. We find that adversarial texts generated by ANTHRO achieve the best trade-off between (1) attack success rate, (2) semantic preservation of the original text, and (3) stealthiness--i.e. indistinguishable from human writings hence harder to be flagged as suspicious. Specifically, our attacks accomplished around 83% and 91% attack success rates on BERT and RoBERTa, respectively. Moreover, it outperformed the TextBugger baseline with an increase of 50% and 40% in terms of semantic preservation and stealthiness when evaluated by both layperson and professional human workers. ANTHRO can further enhance a BERT classifier's performance in understanding different variations of human-written toxic texts via adversarial training when compared to the Perspective API.

This paper describes EMBER: a labeled benchmark dataset for training machine learning models to statically detect malicious Windows portable executable files. The dataset includes features extracted from 1.1M binary files: 900K training samples (300K malicious, 300K benign, 300K unlabeled) and 200K test samples (100K malicious, 100K benign). To accompany the dataset, we also release open source code for extracting features from additional binaries so that additional sample features can be appended to the dataset. This dataset fills a void in the information security machine learning community: a benign/malicious dataset that is large, open and general enough to cover several interesting use cases. We enumerate several use cases that we considered when structuring the dataset. Additionally, we demonstrate one use case wherein we compare a baseline gradient boosted decision tree model trained using LightGBM with default settings to MalConv, a recently published end-to-end (featureless) deep learning model for malware detection. Results show that even without hyper-parameter optimization, the baseline EMBER model outperforms MalConv. The authors hope that the dataset, code and baseline model provided by EMBER will help invigorate machine learning research for malware detection, in much the same way that benchmark datasets have advanced computer vision research.

We have now entered the era of trillion parameter machine learning models trained on billion-sized datasets scraped from the internet. The rise of these gargantuan datasets has given rise to formidable bodies of critical work that has called for caution while generating these large datasets. These address concerns surrounding the dubious curation practices used to generate these datasets, the sordid quality of alt-text data available on the world wide web, the problematic content of the CommonCrawl dataset often used as a source for training large language models, and the entrenched biases in large-scale visio-linguistic models (such as OpenAI's CLIP model) trained on opaque datasets (WebImageText). In the backdrop of these specific calls of caution, we examine the recently released LAION-400M dataset, which is a CLIP-filtered dataset of Image-Alt-text pairs parsed from the Common-Crawl dataset. We found that the dataset contains, troublesome and explicit images and text pairs of rape, pornography, malign stereotypes, racist and ethnic slurs, and other extremely problematic content. We outline numerous implications, concerns and downstream harms regarding the current state of large scale datasets while raising open questions for various stakeholders including the AI community, regulators, policy makers and data subjects.

Many adversarial attacks in NLP perturb inputs to produce visually similar strings ('ergo' rightarrow 'epsilonrgo') which are legible to humans but degrade model performance. Although preserving legibility is a necessary condition for text perturbation, little work has been done to systematically characterize it; instead, legibility is typically loosely enforced via intuitions around the nature and extent of perturbations. Particularly, it is unclear to what extent can inputs be perturbed while preserving legibility, or how to quantify the legibility of a perturbed string. In this work, we address this gap by learning models that predict the legibility of a perturbed string, and rank candidate perturbations based on their legibility. To do so, we collect and release LEGIT, a human-annotated dataset comprising the legibility of visually perturbed text. Using this dataset, we build both text- and vision-based models which achieve up to 0.91 F1 score in predicting whether an input is legible, and an accuracy of 0.86 in predicting which of two given perturbations is more legible. Additionally, we discover that legible perturbations from the LEGIT dataset are more effective at lowering the performance of NLP models than best-known attack strategies, suggesting that current models may be vulnerable to a broad range of perturbations beyond what is captured by existing visual attacks. Data, code, and models are available at https://github.com/dvsth/learning-legibility-2023.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

In this work we introduce malware detection from raw byte sequences as a fruitful research area to the larger machine learning community. Building a neural network for such a problem presents a number of interesting challenges that have not occurred in tasks such as image processing or NLP. In particular, we note that detection from raw bytes presents a sequence problem with over two million time steps and a problem where batch normalization appear to hinder the learning process. We present our initial work in building a solution to tackle this problem, which has linear complexity dependence on the sequence length, and allows for interpretable sub-regions of the binary to be identified. In doing so we will discuss the many challenges in building a neural network to process data at this scale, and the methods we used to work around them.

Language models (LMs) are trained on vast amounts of text data, which may include private and copyrighted content. Data owners may request the removal of their data from a trained model due to privacy or copyright concerns. However, exactly unlearning only these datapoints (i.e., retraining with the data removed) is intractable in modern-day models. This has led to the development of many approximate unlearning algorithms. The evaluation of the efficacy of these algorithms has traditionally been narrow in scope, failing to precisely quantify the success and practicality of the algorithm from the perspectives of both the model deployers and the data owners. We address this issue by proposing MUSE, a comprehensive machine unlearning evaluation benchmark that enumerates six diverse desirable properties for unlearned models: (1) no verbatim memorization, (2) no knowledge memorization, (3) no privacy leakage, (4) utility preservation on data not intended for removal, (5) scalability with respect to the size of removal requests, and (6) sustainability over sequential unlearning requests. Using these criteria, we benchmark how effectively eight popular unlearning algorithms on 7B-parameter LMs can unlearn Harry Potter books and news articles. Our results demonstrate that most algorithms can prevent verbatim memorization and knowledge memorization to varying degrees, but only one algorithm does not lead to severe privacy leakage. Furthermore, existing algorithms fail to meet deployer's expectations because they often degrade general model utility and also cannot sustainably accommodate successive unlearning requests or large-scale content removal. Our findings identify key issues with the practicality of existing unlearning algorithms on language models, and we release our benchmark to facilitate further evaluations: muse-bench.github.io

With increasingly more data and computation involved in their training, machine learning models constitute valuable intellectual property. This has spurred interest in model stealing, which is made more practical by advances in learning with partial, little, or no supervision. Existing defenses focus on inserting unique watermarks in a model's decision surface, but this is insufficient: the watermarks are not sampled from the training distribution and thus are not always preserved during model stealing. In this paper, we make the key observation that knowledge contained in the stolen model's training set is what is common to all stolen copies. The adversary's goal, irrespective of the attack employed, is always to extract this knowledge or its by-products. This gives the original model's owner a strong advantage over the adversary: model owners have access to the original training data. We thus introduce dataset inference, the process of identifying whether a suspected model copy has private knowledge from the original model's dataset, as a defense against model stealing. We develop an approach for dataset inference that combines statistical testing with the ability to estimate the distance of multiple data points to the decision boundary. Our experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100 and ImageNet show that model owners can claim with confidence greater than 99% that their model (or dataset as a matter of fact) was stolen, despite only exposing 50 of the stolen model's training points. Dataset inference defends against state-of-the-art attacks even when the adversary is adaptive. Unlike prior work, it does not require retraining or overfitting the defended model.

This paper introduces a novel adversarial attack method targeting text classification models, termed the Modified Word Saliency-based Adversarial At-tack (MWSAA). The technique builds upon the concept of word saliency to strategically perturb input texts, aiming to mislead classification models while preserving semantic coherence. By refining the traditional adversarial attack approach, MWSAA significantly enhances its efficacy in evading detection by classification systems. The methodology involves first identifying salient words in the input text through a saliency estimation process, which prioritizes words most influential to the model's decision-making process. Subsequently, these salient words are subjected to carefully crafted modifications, guided by semantic similarity metrics to ensure that the altered text remains coherent and retains its original meaning. Empirical evaluations conducted on diverse text classification datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method in generating adversarial examples capable of successfully deceiving state-of-the-art classification models. Comparative analyses with existing adversarial attack techniques further indicate the superiority of the proposed approach in terms of both attack success rate and preservation of text coherence.

The volume of "free" data on the internet has been key to the current success of deep learning. However, it also raises privacy concerns about the unauthorized exploitation of personal data for training commercial models. It is thus crucial to develop methods to prevent unauthorized data exploitation. This paper raises the question: can data be made unlearnable for deep learning models? We present a type of error-minimizing noise that can indeed make training examples unlearnable. Error-minimizing noise is intentionally generated to reduce the error of one or more of the training example(s) close to zero, which can trick the model into believing there is "nothing" to learn from these example(s). The noise is restricted to be imperceptible to human eyes, and thus does not affect normal data utility. We empirically verify the effectiveness of error-minimizing noise in both sample-wise and class-wise forms. We also demonstrate its flexibility under extensive experimental settings and practicability in a case study of face recognition. Our work establishes an important first step towards making personal data unexploitable to deep learning models.

This paper addresses the privacy and security concerns associated with deep neural language models, which serve as crucial components in various modern AI-based applications. These models are often used after being pre-trained and fine-tuned for specific tasks, with deployment on servers accessed through the internet. However, this introduces two fundamental risks: (a) the transmission of user inputs to the server via the network gives rise to interception vulnerabilities, and (b) privacy concerns emerge as organizations that deploy such models store user data with restricted context. To address this, we propose a novel method to adapt and fine-tune transformer-based language models on passkey-encrypted user-specific text. The original pre-trained language model first undergoes a quick adaptation (without any further pre-training) with a series of irreversible transformations applied to the tokenizer and token embeddings. This enables the model to perform inference on encrypted inputs while preventing reverse engineering of text from model parameters and intermediate outputs. After adaptation, models are fine-tuned on encrypted versions of existing training datasets. Experimental evaluation employing adapted versions of renowned models (e.g., BERT, RoBERTa) across established benchmark English and multilingual datasets for text classification and sequence labeling shows that encrypted models achieve performance parity with their original counterparts. This serves to safeguard performance, privacy, and security cohesively.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful capabilities that render them valuable in different applications, including conversational AI products. It is paramount to ensure the security and reliability of these products by mitigating their vulnerabilities towards malicious user interactions, which can lead to the exposure of great risks and reputational repercussions. In this work, we present a comprehensive study on the efficacy of fine-tuning and aligning Chain-of-Thought (CoT) responses of different LLMs that serve as input moderation guardrails. We systematically explore various tuning methods by leveraging a small set of training data to adapt these models as proxy defense mechanisms to detect malicious inputs and provide a reasoning for their verdicts, thereby preventing the exploitation of conversational agents. We rigorously evaluate the efficacy and robustness of different tuning strategies to generalize across diverse adversarial and malicious query types. Our experimental results outline the potential of alignment processes tailored to a varied range of harmful input queries, even with constrained data resources. These techniques significantly enhance the safety of conversational AI systems and provide a feasible framework for deploying more secure and trustworthy AI-driven interactions.

Recent advancements in dense retrieval have introduced vision-language model (VLM)-based retrievers, such as DSE and ColPali, which leverage document screenshots embedded as vectors to enable effective search and offer a simplified pipeline over traditional text-only methods. In this study, we propose three pixel poisoning attack methods designed to compromise VLM-based retrievers and evaluate their effectiveness under various attack settings and parameter configurations. Our empirical results demonstrate that injecting even a single adversarial screenshot into the retrieval corpus can significantly disrupt search results, poisoning the top-10 retrieved documents for 41.9% of queries in the case of DSE and 26.4% for ColPali. These vulnerability rates notably exceed those observed with equivalent attacks on text-only retrievers. Moreover, when targeting a small set of known queries, the attack success rate raises, achieving complete success in certain cases. By exposing the vulnerabilities inherent in vision-language models, this work highlights the potential risks associated with their deployment.

Pretrained Language Models (LMs) memorize a vast amount of knowledge during initial pretraining, including information that may violate the privacy of personal lives and identities. Previous work addressing privacy issues for language models has mostly focused on data preprocessing and differential privacy methods, both requiring re-training the underlying LM. We propose knowledge unlearning as an alternative method to reduce privacy risks for LMs post hoc. We show that simply performing gradient ascent on target token sequences is effective at forgetting them with little to no degradation of general language modeling performances for larger LMs; it sometimes even substantially improves the underlying LM with just a few iterations. We also find that sequential unlearning is better than trying to unlearn all the data at once and that unlearning is highly dependent on which kind of data (domain) is forgotten. By showing comparisons with a previous data preprocessing method and a decoding method known to mitigate privacy risks for LMs, we show that unlearning can give a stronger empirical privacy guarantee in scenarios where the data vulnerable to extraction attacks are known a priori while being much more efficient and robust. We release the code and dataset needed to replicate our results at https://github.com/joeljang/knowledge-unlearning.

The efficacy of an large language model (LLM) generated text detector depends substantially on the availability of sizable training data. White-box zero-shot detectors, which require no such data, are nonetheless limited by the accessibility of the source model of the LLM-generated text. In this paper, we propose an simple but effective black-box zero-shot detection approach, predicated on the observation that human-written texts typically contain more grammatical errors than LLM-generated texts. This approach entails computing the Grammar Error Correction Score (GECScore) for the given text to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated text. Extensive experimental results show that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art (SOTA) zero-shot and supervised methods, achieving an average AUROC of 98.7% and showing strong robustness against paraphrase and adversarial perturbation attacks.

Large volumes of text data have contributed significantly to the development of large language models (LLMs) in recent years. This data is typically acquired by scraping the internet, leading to pretraining datasets comprised of noisy web text. To date, efforts to prune these datasets down to a higher quality subset have relied on hand-crafted heuristics encoded as rule-based filters. In this work, we take a wider view and explore scalable estimates of data quality that can be used to systematically measure the quality of pretraining data. We perform a rigorous comparison at scale of the simple data quality estimator of perplexity, as well as more sophisticated and computationally intensive estimates of the Error L2-Norm and memorization. These metrics are used to rank and prune pretraining corpora, and we subsequently compare LLMs trained on these pruned datasets. Surprisingly, we find that the simple technique of perplexity outperforms our more computationally expensive scoring methods. We improve over our no-pruning baseline while training on as little as 30% of the original training dataset. Our work sets the foundation for unexplored strategies in automatically curating high quality corpora and suggests the majority of pretraining data can be removed while retaining performance.

Visual modifications to text are often used to obfuscate offensive comments in social media (e.g., "!d10t") or as a writing style ("1337" in "leet speak"), among other scenarios. We consider this as a new type of adversarial attack in NLP, a setting to which humans are very robust, as our experiments with both simple and more difficult visual input perturbations demonstrate. We then investigate the impact of visual adversarial attacks on current NLP systems on character-, word-, and sentence-level tasks, showing that both neural and non-neural models are, in contrast to humans, extremely sensitive to such attacks, suffering performance decreases of up to 82\%. We then explore three shielding methods---visual character embeddings, adversarial training, and rule-based recovery---which substantially improve the robustness of the models. However, the shielding methods still fall behind performances achieved in non-attack scenarios, which demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with visual attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

In Dynamic Adversarial Data Collection (DADC), human annotators are tasked with finding examples that models struggle to predict correctly. Models trained on DADC-collected training data have been shown to be more robust in adversarial and out-of-domain settings, and are considerably harder for humans to fool. However, DADC is more time-consuming than traditional data collection and thus more costly per annotated example. In this work, we examine whether we can maintain the advantages of DADC, without incurring the additional cost. To that end, we introduce Generative Annotation Assistants (GAAs), generator-in-the-loop models that provide real-time suggestions that annotators can either approve, modify, or reject entirely. We collect training datasets in twenty experimental settings and perform a detailed analysis of this approach for the task of extractive question answering (QA) for both standard and adversarial data collection. We demonstrate that GAAs provide significant efficiency benefits with over a 30% annotation speed-up, while leading to over a 5x improvement in model fooling rates. In addition, we find that using GAA-assisted training data leads to higher downstream model performance on a variety of question answering tasks over adversarial data collection.

As social media becomes increasingly prominent in our day to day lives, it is increasingly important to detect informative content and prevent the spread of disinformation and unverified rumours. While many sophisticated and successful models have been proposed in the literature, they are often compared with older NLP baselines such as SVMs, CNNs, and LSTMs. In this paper, we examine the performance of a broad set of modern transformer-based language models and show that with basic fine-tuning, these models are competitive with and can even significantly outperform recently proposed state-of-the-art methods. We present our framework as a baseline for creating and evaluating new methods for misinformation detection. We further study a comprehensive set of benchmark datasets, and discuss potential data leakage and the need for careful design of the experiments and understanding of datasets to account for confounding variables. As an extreme case example, we show that classifying only based on the first three digits of tweet ids, which contain information on the date, gives state-of-the-art performance on a commonly used benchmark dataset for fake news detection --Twitter16. We provide a simple tool to detect this problem and suggest steps to mitigate it in future datasets.

Recent research has highlighted the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against data poisoning attacks. These attacks aim to inject poisoning samples into the models' training dataset such that the trained models have inference failures. While previous studies have executed different types of attacks, one major challenge that greatly limits their effectiveness is the uncertainty of the re-training process after the injection of poisoning samples, including the re-training initialization or algorithms. To address this challenge, we propose a novel attack method called ''Sharpness-Aware Data Poisoning Attack (SAPA)''. In particular, it leverages the concept of DNNs' loss landscape sharpness to optimize the poisoning effect on the worst re-trained model. It helps enhance the preservation of the poisoning effect, regardless of the specific retraining procedure employed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAPA offers a general and principled strategy that significantly enhances various types of poisoning attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) have notably enhanced the fluency and diversity of machine-generated text. However, this progress also presents a significant challenge in detecting the origin of a given text, and current research on detection methods lags behind the rapid evolution of LLMs. Conventional training-based methods have limitations in flexibility, particularly when adapting to new domains, and they often lack explanatory power. To address this gap, we propose a novel training-free detection strategy called Divergent N-Gram Analysis (DNA-GPT). Given a text, we first truncate it in the middle and then use only the preceding portion as input to the LLMs to regenerate the new remaining parts. By analyzing the differences between the original and new remaining parts through N-gram analysis in black-box or probability divergence in white-box, we can clearly illustrate significant discrepancies between machine-generated and human-written text. We conducted extensive experiments on the most advanced LLMs from OpenAI, including text-davinci-003, GPT-3.5-turbo, and GPT-4, as well as open-source models such as GPT-NeoX-20B and LLaMa-13B. Results show that our zero-shot approach exhibits state-of-the-art performance in distinguishing between human and GPT-generated text on four English and one German dataset, outperforming OpenAI's own classifier, which is trained on millions of text. Additionally, our methods provide reasonable explanations and evidence to support our claim, which is a unique feature of explainable detection. Our method is also robust under the revised text attack and can additionally solve model sourcing. Codes are available at https://github.com/Xianjun-Yang/DNA-GPT.

This paper describes our system developed for SemEval-2024 Task 8, "Multigenerator, Multidomain, and Multilingual Black-Box Machine-Generated Text Detection." Machine-generated texts have been one of the main concerns due to the use of large language models (LLM) in fake text generation, phishing, cheating in exams, or even plagiarizing copyright materials. A lot of systems have been developed to detect machine-generated text. Nonetheless, the majority of these systems rely on the text-generating model, a limitation that is impractical in real-world scenarios, as it's often impossible to know which specific model the user has used for text generation. In this work, we propose a single model based on contrastive learning, which uses ~40% of the baseline's parameters (149M vs. 355M) but shows a comparable performance on the test dataset (21st out of 137 participants). Our key finding is that even without an ensemble of multiple models, a single base model can have comparable performance with the help of data augmentation and contrastive learning.

Recent deep neural networks (DNNs) have come to rely on vast amounts of training data, providing an opportunity for malicious attackers to exploit and contaminate the data to carry out backdoor attacks. These attacks significantly undermine the reliability of DNNs. However, existing backdoor attack methods make unrealistic assumptions, assuming that all training data comes from a single source and that attackers have full access to the training data. In this paper, we address this limitation by introducing a more realistic attack scenario where victims collect data from multiple sources, and attackers cannot access the complete training data. We refer to this scenario as data-constrained backdoor attacks. In such cases, previous attack methods suffer from severe efficiency degradation due to the entanglement between benign and poisoning features during the backdoor injection process. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach that leverages the pre-trained Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) model. We introduce three CLIP-based technologies from two distinct streams: Clean Feature Suppression, which aims to suppress the influence of clean features to enhance the prominence of poisoning features, and Poisoning Feature Augmentation, which focuses on augmenting the presence and impact of poisoning features to effectively manipulate the model's behavior. To evaluate the effectiveness, harmlessness to benign accuracy, and stealthiness of our method, we conduct extensive experiments on 3 target models, 3 datasets, and over 15 different settings. The results demonstrate remarkable improvements, with some settings achieving over 100% improvement compared to existing attacks in data-constrained scenarios. Our research contributes to addressing the limitations of existing methods and provides a practical and effective solution for data-constrained backdoor attacks.

In this paper we introduce a new publicly available dataset for verification against textual sources, FEVER: Fact Extraction and VERification. It consists of 185,445 claims generated by altering sentences extracted from Wikipedia and subsequently verified without knowledge of the sentence they were derived from. The claims are classified as Supported, Refuted or NotEnoughInfo by annotators achieving 0.6841 in Fleiss kappa. For the first two classes, the annotators also recorded the sentence(s) forming the necessary evidence for their judgment. To characterize the challenge of the dataset presented, we develop a pipeline approach and compare it to suitably designed oracles. The best accuracy we achieve on labeling a claim accompanied by the correct evidence is 31.87%, while if we ignore the evidence we achieve 50.91%. Thus we believe that FEVER is a challenging testbed that will help stimulate progress on claim verification against textual sources.