Daily Papers

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

We define a probabilistic programming language for Gaussian random variables with a first-class exact conditioning construct. We give operational, denotational and equational semantics for this language, establishing convenient properties like exchangeability of conditions. Conditioning on equality of continuous random variables is nontrivial, as the exact observation may have probability zero; this is Borel's paradox. Using categorical formulations of conditional probability, we show that the good properties of our language are not particular to Gaussians, but can be derived from universal properties, thus generalizing to wider settings. We define the Cond construction, which internalizes conditioning as a morphism, providing general compositional semantics for probabilistic programming with exact conditioning.

The aim of this paper is to present an elementary computable theory of probability, random variables and stochastic processes. The probability theory is baed on existing approaches using valuations and lower integrals. Various approaches to random variables are discussed, including the approach based on completions in a Polish space. We apply the theory to the study of stochastic dynamical systems in discrete-time, and give a brief exposition of the Wiener process as a foundation for stochastic differential equations. The theory is based within the framework of type-two effectivity, so has an explicit direct link with Turing computation, and is expressed in a system of computable types and operations, so has a clean mathematical description.

Probability estimation models play an important role in various fields, such as weather forecasting, recommendation systems, and sports analysis. Among several models estimating probabilities, it is difficult to evaluate which model gives reliable probabilities since the ground-truth probabilities are not available. The win probability estimation model for esports, which calculates the win probability under a certain game state, is also one of the fields being actively studied in probability estimation. However, most of the previous works evaluated their models using accuracy, a metric that only can measure the performance of discrimination. In this work, we firstly investigate the Brier score and the Expected Calibration Error (ECE) as a replacement of accuracy used as a performance evaluation metric for win probability estimation models in esports field. Based on the analysis, we propose a novel metric called Balance score which is a simple yet effective metric in terms of six good properties that probability estimation metric should have. Under the general condition, we also found that the Balance score can be an effective approximation of the true expected calibration error which has been imperfectly approximated by ECE using the binning technique. Extensive evaluations using simulation studies and real game snapshot data demonstrate the promising potential to adopt the proposed metric not only for the win probability estimation model for esports but also for evaluating general probability estimation models.

Physics is based on probabilities as fundamental entities of a mathematical description. Expectation values of observables are computed according to the classical statistical rule. The overall probability distribution for one world covers all times. The quantum formalism arises once one focuses on the evolution of the time-local probabilistic information. Wave functions or the density matrix allow the formulation of a general linear evolution law for classical statistics. The quantum formalism for classical statistics is a powerful tool which allows us to implement for generalized Ising models the momentum observable with the associated Fourier representation. The association of operators to observables permits the computation of expectation values in terms of the density matrix by the usual quantum rule. We show that probabilistic cellular automata are quantum systems in a formulation with discrete time steps and real wave functions. With a complex structure the evolution operator for automata can be expressed in terms of a Hamiltonian involving fermionic creation and annihilation operators. The time-local probabilistic information amounts to a subsystem of the overall probabilistic system which is correlated with its environment consisting of the past and future. Such subsystems typically involve probabilistic observables for which only a probability distribution for their possible measurement values is available. Incomplete statistics does not permit to compute classical correlation functions for arbitrary subsystem-observables. Bell's inequalities are not generally applicable.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

We present a modular semantic account of Bayesian inference algorithms for probabilistic programming languages, as used in data science and machine learning. Sophisticated inference algorithms are often explained in terms of composition of smaller parts. However, neither their theoretical justification nor their implementation reflects this modularity. We show how to conceptualise and analyse such inference algorithms as manipulating intermediate representations of probabilistic programs using higher-order functions and inductive types, and their denotational semantics. Semantic accounts of continuous distributions use measurable spaces. However, our use of higher-order functions presents a substantial technical difficulty: it is impossible to define a measurable space structure over the collection of measurable functions between arbitrary measurable spaces that is compatible with standard operations on those functions, such as function application. We overcome this difficulty using quasi-Borel spaces, a recently proposed mathematical structure that supports both function spaces and continuous distributions. We define a class of semantic structures for representing probabilistic programs, and semantic validity criteria for transformations of these representations in terms of distribution preservation. We develop a collection of building blocks for composing representations. We use these building blocks to validate common inference algorithms such as Sequential Monte Carlo and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. To emphasize the connection between the semantic manipulation and its traditional measure theoretic origins, we use Kock's synthetic measure theory. We demonstrate its usefulness by proving a quasi-Borel counterpart to the Metropolis-Hastings-Green theorem.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

Higher-order probabilistic programming languages allow programmers to write sophisticated models in machine learning and statistics in a succinct and structured way, but step outside the standard measure-theoretic formalization of probability theory. Programs may use both higher-order functions and continuous distributions, or even define a probability distribution on functions. But standard probability theory does not handle higher-order functions well: the category of measurable spaces is not cartesian closed. Here we introduce quasi-Borel spaces. We show that these spaces: form a new formalization of probability theory replacing measurable spaces; form a cartesian closed category and so support higher-order functions; form a well-pointed category and so support good proof principles for equational reasoning; and support continuous probability distributions. We demonstrate the use of quasi-Borel spaces for higher-order functions and probability by: showing that a well-known construction of probability theory involving random functions gains a cleaner expression; and generalizing de Finetti's theorem, that is a crucial theorem in probability theory, to quasi-Borel spaces.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

Many people have flipped coins but few have stopped to ponder the statistical and physical intricacies of the process. In a preregistered study we collected 350{,}757 coin flips to test the counterintuitive prediction from a physics model of human coin tossing developed by Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery (DHM; 2007). The model asserts that when people flip an ordinary coin, it tends to land on the same side it started -- DHM estimated the probability of a same-side outcome to be about 51%. Our data lend strong support to this precise prediction: the coins landed on the same side more often than not, Pr(same side) = 0.508, 95% credible interval (CI) [0.506, 0.509], BF_{same-side bias} = 2359. Furthermore, the data revealed considerable between-people variation in the degree of this same-side bias. Our data also confirmed the generic prediction that when people flip an ordinary coin -- with the initial side-up randomly determined -- it is equally likely to land heads or tails: Pr(heads) = 0.500, 95% CI [0.498, 0.502], BF_{heads-tails bias} = 0.182. Furthermore, this lack of heads-tails bias does not appear to vary across coins. Additional exploratory analyses revealed that the within-people same-side bias decreased as more coins were flipped, an effect that is consistent with the possibility that practice makes people flip coins in a less wobbly fashion. Our data therefore provide strong evidence that when some (but not all) people flip a fair coin, it tends to land on the same side it started. Our data provide compelling statistical support for the DHM physics model of coin tossing.

It is typically understood that the training of modern neural networks is a process of fitting the probability distribution of desired output. However, recent paradoxical observations in a number of language generation tasks let one wonder if this canonical probability-based explanation can really account for the empirical success of deep learning. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative utility-based explanation to the standard supervised learning procedure in deep learning. The basic idea is to interpret the learned neural network not as a probability model but as an ordinal utility function that encodes the preference revealed in training data. In this perspective, training of the neural network corresponds to a utility learning process. Specifically, we show that for all neural networks with softmax outputs, the SGD learning dynamic of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be seen as an iteration process that optimizes the neural network toward an optimal utility function. This utility-based interpretation can explain several otherwise-paradoxical observations about the neural networks thus trained. Moreover, our utility-based theory also entails an equation that can transform the learned utility values back to a new kind of probability estimation with which probability-compatible decision rules enjoy dramatic (double-digits) performance improvements. These evidences collectively reveal a phenomenon of utility-probability duality in terms of what modern neural networks are (truly) modeling: We thought they are one thing (probabilities), until the unexplainable showed up; changing mindset and treating them as another thing (utility values) largely reconcile the theory, despite remaining subtleties regarding its original (probabilistic) identity.

Many poker systems, whether created with heuristics or machine learning, rely on the probability of winning as a key input. However calculating the precise probability using combinatorics is an intractable problem, so instead we approximate it. Monte Carlo simulation is an effective technique that can be used to approximate the probability that a player will win and/or tie a hand. However, without the use of a memory-intensive lookup table or a supercomputer, it becomes infeasible to run millions of times when training an agent with self-play. To combat the space-time tradeoff, we use deep learning to approximate the probabilities obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation with high accuracy. The learned model proves to be a lightweight alternative to Monte Carlo simulation, which ultimately allows us to use the probabilities as inputs during self-play efficiently. The source code and optimized neural network can be found at https://github.com/brandinho/Poker-Probability-Approximation

Applying a machine learning model for decision-making in the real world requires to distinguish what the model knows from what it does not. A critical factor in assessing the knowledge of a model is to quantify its predictive uncertainty. Predictive uncertainty is commonly measured by the entropy of the Bayesian model average (BMA) predictive distribution. Yet, the properness of this current measure of predictive uncertainty was recently questioned. We provide new insights regarding those limitations. Our analyses show that the current measure erroneously assumes that the BMA predictive distribution is equivalent to the predictive distribution of the true model that generated the dataset. Consequently, we introduce a theoretically grounded measure to overcome these limitations. We experimentally verify the benefits of our introduced measure of predictive uncertainty. We find that our introduced measure behaves more reasonably in controlled synthetic tasks. Moreover, our evaluations on ImageNet demonstrate that our introduced measure is advantageous in real-world applications utilizing predictive uncertainty.

Probabilistic circuits (PCs) are models that allow exact and tractable probabilistic inference. In contrast to neural networks, they are often assumed to be well-calibrated and robust to out-of-distribution (OOD) data. In this paper, we show that PCs are in fact not robust to OOD data, i.e., they don't know what they don't know. We then show how this challenge can be overcome by model uncertainty quantification. To this end, we propose tractable dropout inference (TDI), an inference procedure to estimate uncertainty by deriving an analytical solution to Monte Carlo dropout (MCD) through variance propagation. Unlike MCD in neural networks, which comes at the cost of multiple network evaluations, TDI provides tractable sampling-free uncertainty estimates in a single forward pass. TDI improves the robustness of PCs to distribution shift and OOD data, demonstrated through a series of experiments evaluating the classification confidence and uncertainty estimates on real-world data.

We develop Markov categories as a framework for synthetic probability and statistics, following work of Golubtsov as well as Cho and Jacobs. This means that we treat the following concepts in purely abstract categorical terms: conditioning and disintegration; various versions of conditional independence and its standard properties; conditional products; almost surely; sufficient statistics; versions of theorems on sufficient statistics due to Fisher--Neyman, Basu, and Bahadur. Besides the conceptual clarity offered by our categorical setup, its main advantage is that it provides a uniform treatment of various types of probability theory, including discrete probability theory, measure-theoretic probability with general measurable spaces, Gaussian probability, stochastic processes of either of these kinds, and many others.

Generating functions, which are widely used in combinatorics and probability theory, encode function values into the coefficients of a polynomial. In this paper, we explore their use as a tractable probabilistic model, and propose probabilistic generating circuits (PGCs) for their efficient representation. PGCs are strictly more expressive efficient than many existing tractable probabilistic models, including determinantal point processes (DPPs), probabilistic circuits (PCs) such as sum-product networks, and tractable graphical models. We contend that PGCs are not just a theoretical framework that unifies vastly different existing models, but also show great potential in modeling realistic data. We exhibit a simple class of PGCs that are not trivially subsumed by simple combinations of PCs and DPPs, and obtain competitive performance on a suite of density estimation benchmarks. We also highlight PGCs' connection to the theory of strongly Rayleigh distributions.

Minimum Bayes risk (MBR) decoding is a decision rule of text generation tasks that outperforms conventional maximum a posterior (MAP) decoding using beam search by selecting high-quality outputs based on a utility function rather than those with high-probability. Typically, it finds the most suitable hypothesis from the set of hypotheses under the sampled pseudo-references. mbrs is a library of MBR decoding, which can flexibly combine various metrics, alternative expectation estimations, and algorithmic variants. It is designed with a focus on speed measurement and calling count of code blocks, transparency, reproducibility, and extensibility, which are essential for researchers and developers. We published our mbrs as an MIT-licensed open-source project, and the code is available on GitHub. GitHub: https://github.com/naist-nlp/mbrs

A desired closure property in Bayesian probability is that an updated posterior distribution be in the same class of distributions --- say Gaussians --- as the prior distribution. When the updating takes place via a statistical model, one calls the class of prior distributions the `conjugate priors' of the model. This paper gives (1) an abstract formulation of this notion of conjugate prior, using channels, in a graphical language, (2) a simple abstract proof that such conjugate priors yield Bayesian inversions, and (3) a logical description of conjugate priors that highlights the required closure of the priors under updating. The theory is illustrated with several standard examples, also covering multiple updating.

This paper presents a brief, semi-technical comparison of the essential features of the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference, with several illustrative examples implemented in Python. The differences between frequentism and Bayesianism fundamentally stem from differing definitions of probability, a philosophical divide which leads to distinct approaches to the solution of statistical problems as well as contrasting ways of asking and answering questions about unknown parameters. After an example-driven discussion of these differences, we briefly compare several leading Python statistical packages which implement frequentist inference using classical methods and Bayesian inference using Markov Chain Monte Carlo.

The field of Explainable AI (XAI) is seeking to shed light on the inner workings of complex AI models and uncover the rationale behind their decisions. One of the models gaining attention are probabilistic circuits (PCs), which are a general and unified framework for tractable probabilistic models that support efficient computation of various probabilistic queries. Probabilistic circuits guarantee inference that is polynomial in the size of the circuit. In this paper, we improve the explainability of probabilistic circuits by computing a comprehensible, readable logical theory that covers the high-density regions generated by a PC. To achieve this, pruning approaches based on generative significance are used in a new method called PUTPUT (Probabilistic circuit Understanding Through Pruning Underlying logical Theories). The method is applied to a real world use case where music playlists are automatically generated and expressed as readable (database) queries. Evaluation shows that this approach can effectively produce a comprehensible logical theory that describes the high-density regions of a PC and outperforms state of the art methods when exploring the performance-comprehensibility trade-off.

Counterfactual explanations are attracting significant attention due to the flourishing applications of machine learning models in consequential domains. A counterfactual plan consists of multiple possibilities to modify a given instance so that the model's prediction will be altered. As the predictive model can be updated subject to the future arrival of new data, a counterfactual plan may become ineffective or infeasible with respect to the future values of the model parameters. In this work, we study the counterfactual plans under model uncertainty, in which the distribution of the model parameters is partially prescribed using only the first- and second-moment information. First, we propose an uncertainty quantification tool to compute the lower and upper bounds of the probability of validity for any given counterfactual plan. We then provide corrective methods to adjust the counterfactual plan to improve the validity measure. The numerical experiments validate our bounds and demonstrate that our correction increases the robustness of the counterfactual plans in different real-world datasets.

We introduce Probabilistic Dependent Type Systems (PDTS) via a functional language based on a subsystem of intuitionistic type theory including dependent sums and products, which is expanded to include stochastic functions. We provide a sampling-based semantics for the language based on non-deterministic beta reduction. Further, we derive a probabilistic logic from the PDTS introduced as a direct result of the Curry-Howard isomorphism. The probabilistic logic derived is shown to provide a universal representation for finite discrete distributions.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

A Neural Process (NP) estimates a stochastic process implicitly defined with neural networks given a stream of data, rather than pre-specifying priors already known, such as Gaussian processes. An ideal NP would learn everything from data without any inductive biases, but in practice, we often restrict the class of stochastic processes for the ease of estimation. One such restriction is the use of a finite-dimensional latent variable accounting for the uncertainty in the functions drawn from NPs. Some recent works show that this can be improved with more "data-driven" source of uncertainty such as bootstrapping. In this work, we take a different approach based on the martingale posterior, a recently developed alternative to Bayesian inference. For the martingale posterior, instead of specifying prior-likelihood pairs, a predictive distribution for future data is specified. Under specific conditions on the predictive distribution, it can be shown that the uncertainty in the generated future data actually corresponds to the uncertainty of the implicitly defined Bayesian posteriors. Based on this result, instead of assuming any form of the latent variables, we equip a NP with a predictive distribution implicitly defined with neural networks and use the corresponding martingale posteriors as the source of uncertainty. The resulting model, which we name as Martingale Posterior Neural Process (MPNP), is demonstrated to outperform baselines on various tasks.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.