Daily Papers

Sparse coding, which refers to modeling a signal as sparse linear combinations of the elements of a learned dictionary, has proven to be a successful (and interpretable) approach in applications such as signal processing, computer vision, and medical imaging. While this success has spurred much work on provable guarantees for dictionary recovery when the learned dictionary is the same size as the ground-truth dictionary, work on the setting where the learned dictionary is larger (or over-realized) with respect to the ground truth is comparatively nascent. Existing theoretical results in this setting have been constrained to the case of noise-less data. We show in this work that, in the presence of noise, minimizing the standard dictionary learning objective can fail to recover the elements of the ground-truth dictionary in the over-realized regime, regardless of the magnitude of the signal in the data-generating process. Furthermore, drawing from the growing body of work on self-supervised learning, we propose a novel masking objective for which recovering the ground-truth dictionary is in fact optimal as the signal increases for a large class of data-generating processes. We corroborate our theoretical results with experiments across several parameter regimes showing that our proposed objective also enjoys better empirical performance than the standard reconstruction objective.

We are in the midst of quantum hype with some excessive claims of quantum computing potential, many vendors' and even some research organizations' exaggerations, and a funding frenzy for very low technology readiness level startups. Governments are contributing to this hype with their large quantum initiatives and their technology sovereignty aspirations. Technology hypes are not bad per se since they create emulation, drive innovations and also contribute to attracting new talents. It works as scientists and vendors deliver progress and innovation on a continuous basis after a so-called peak of expectations. It fails with exaggerated overpromises and underdeliveries that last too long. It could cut short research and innovation funding, creating some sort of quantum winter. After looking at the shape and form of technology and science hypes and driving some lessons from past hypes, we investigate the current quantum hype and its specifics. We find that, although there is some significant uncertainty on the potential to create real scalable quantum computers, the scientific and vendor fields are relatively sane and solid compared to other technology hypes. The vendors hype has some profound and disruptive impact on the organization of fundamental research. Also, quantum technologies comprise other fields like quantum telecommunications and quantum sensing with a higher technology readiness level, which are less prone to hype. We then make some proposals to mitigate the potential negative effects of the current quantum hype including recommendations on scientific communication to strengthen the trust in quantum science, vendor behavior improvements, benchmarking methodologies, public education and putting in place a responsible research and innovation approach.

At face value, this essay is about understanding a fairly esoteric governance tool called compute thresholds. However, in order to grapple with whether these thresholds will achieve anything, we must first understand how they came to be. This requires engaging with a decades-old debate at the heart of computer science progress, namely, is bigger always better? Hence, this essay may be of interest not only to policymakers and the wider public but also to computer scientists interested in understanding the role of compute in unlocking breakthroughs. Does a certain inflection point of compute result in changes to the risk profile of a model? This discussion is increasingly urgent given the wide adoption of governance approaches that suggest greater compute equates with higher propensity for harm. Several leading frontier AI companies have released responsible scaling policies. Both the White House Executive Orders on AI Safety (EO) and the EU AI Act encode the use of FLOP or floating-point operations as a way to identify more powerful systems. What is striking about the choice of compute thresholds to-date is that no models currently deployed in the wild fulfill the current criteria set by the EO. This implies that the emphasis is often not on auditing the risks and harms incurred by currently deployed models - but rather is based upon the belief that future levels of compute will introduce unforeseen new risks. A key conclusion of this essay is that compute thresholds as currently implemented are shortsighted and likely to fail to mitigate risk. Governance that is overly reliant on compute fails to understand that the relationship between compute and risk is highly uncertain and rapidly changing. It also overestimates our ability to predict what abilities emerge at different scales. This essay ends with recommendations for a better way forward.

Temporal Difference (TD) algorithms are widely used in Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL). Their performance is heavily influenced by the size of the neural network. While in supervised learning, the regime of over-parameterization and its benefits are well understood, the situation in RL is much less clear. In this paper, we present a theoretical analysis of the influence of network size and l_2-regularization on performance. We identify the ratio between the number of parameters and the number of visited states as a crucial factor and define over-parameterization as the regime when it is larger than one. Furthermore, we observe a double descent phenomenon, i.e., a sudden drop in performance around the parameter/state ratio of one. Leveraging random features and the lazy training regime, we study the regularized Least-Square Temporal Difference (LSTD) algorithm in an asymptotic regime, as both the number of parameters and states go to infinity, maintaining a constant ratio. We derive deterministic limits of both the empirical and the true Mean-Squared Bellman Error (MSBE) that feature correction terms responsible for the double descent. Correction terms vanish when the l_2-regularization is increased or the number of unvisited states goes to zero. Numerical experiments with synthetic and small real-world environments closely match the theoretical predictions.

Understanding how overparameterized neural networks generalize despite perfect interpolation of noisy training data is a fundamental question. Mallinar et. al. 2022 noted that neural networks seem to often exhibit ``tempered overfitting'', wherein the population risk does not converge to the Bayes optimal error, but neither does it approach infinity, yielding non-trivial generalization. However, this has not been studied rigorously. We provide the first rigorous analysis of the overfitting behavior of regression with minimum norm (ell_2 of weights), focusing on univariate two-layer ReLU networks. We show overfitting is tempered (with high probability) when measured with respect to the L_1 loss, but also show that the situation is more complex than suggested by Mallinar et. al., and overfitting is catastrophic with respect to the L_2 loss, or when taking an expectation over the training set.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, and a thought-provoking paper by Bubeck and Sellke has analyzed this phenomenon through the lens of over-parameterization: interpolating smoothly the data requires significantly more parameters than simply memorizing it. However, this "universal" law provides only a necessary condition for robustness, and it is unable to discriminate between models. In this paper, we address these gaps by focusing on empirical risk minimization in two prototypical settings, namely, random features and the neural tangent kernel (NTK). We prove that, for random features, the model is not robust for any degree of over-parameterization, even when the necessary condition coming from the universal law of robustness is satisfied. In contrast, for even activations, the NTK model meets the universal lower bound, and it is robust as soon as the necessary condition on over-parameterization is fulfilled. This also addresses a conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li and Nagaraj. Our analysis decouples the effect of the kernel of the model from an "interaction matrix", which describes the interaction with the test data and captures the effect of the activation. Our theoretical results are corroborated by numerical evidence on both synthetic and standard datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10).

Legal practice has witnessed a sharp rise in products incorporating artificial intelligence (AI). Such tools are designed to assist with a wide range of core legal tasks, from search and summarization of caselaw to document drafting. But the large language models used in these tools are prone to "hallucinate," or make up false information, making their use risky in high-stakes domains. Recently, certain legal research providers have touted methods such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) as "eliminating" (Casetext, 2023) or "avoid[ing]" hallucinations (Thomson Reuters, 2023), or guaranteeing "hallucination-free" legal citations (LexisNexis, 2023). Because of the closed nature of these systems, systematically assessing these claims is challenging. In this article, we design and report on the first preregistered empirical evaluation of AI-driven legal research tools. We demonstrate that the providers' claims are overstated. While hallucinations are reduced relative to general-purpose chatbots (GPT-4), we find that the AI research tools made by LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI) each hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time. We also document substantial differences between systems in responsiveness and accuracy. Our article makes four key contributions. It is the first to assess and report the performance of RAG-based proprietary legal AI tools. Second, it introduces a comprehensive, preregistered dataset for identifying and understanding vulnerabilities in these systems. Third, it proposes a clear typology for differentiating between hallucinations and accurate legal responses. Last, it provides evidence to inform the responsibilities of legal professionals in supervising and verifying AI outputs, which remains a central open question for the responsible integration of AI into law.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

This paper studies the challenging problem of estimating causal effects from observational data, in the presence of unobserved confounders. The two-stage least square (TSLS) method and its variants with a standard instrumental variable (IV) are commonly used to eliminate confounding bias, including the bias caused by unobserved confounders, but they rely on the linearity assumption. Besides, the strict condition of unconfounded instruments posed on a standard IV is too strong to be practical. To address these challenging and practical problems of the standard IV method (linearity assumption and the strict condition), in this paper, we use a conditional IV (CIV) to relax the unconfounded instrument condition of standard IV and propose a non-linear CIV regression with Confounding Balancing Representation Learning, CBRL.CIV, for jointly eliminating the confounding bias from unobserved confounders and balancing the observed confounders, without the linearity assumption. We theoretically demonstrate the soundness of CBRL.CIV. Extensive experiments on synthetic and two real-world datasets show the competitive performance of CBRL.CIV against state-of-the-art IV-based estimators and superiority in dealing with the non-linear situation.

The realization that complex systems such as ecological communities can collapse or shift regimes suddenly and without rapid external forcing poses a serious challenge to our understanding and management of the natural world. The potential to identify early warning signals that would allow researchers and managers to predict such events before they happen has therefore been an invaluable discovery that offers a way forward in spite of such seemingly unpredictable behavior. Research into early warning signals has demonstrated that it is possible to define and detect such early warning signals in advance of a transition in certain contexts. Here we describe the pattern emerging as research continues to explore just how far we can generalize these results. A core of examples emerges that shares three properties: the phenomenon of rapid regime shifts, a pattern of 'critical slowing down' that can be used to detect the approaching shift, and a mechanism of bifurcation driving the sudden change. As research has expanded beyond these core examples, it is becoming clear that not all systems that show regime shifts exhibit critical slowing down, or vice versa. Even when systems exhibit critical slowing down, statistical detection is a challenge. We review the literature that explores these edge cases and highlight the need for (a) new early warning behaviors that can be used in cases where rapid shifts do not exhibit critical slowing down, (b) the development of methods to identify which behavior might be an appropriate signal when encountering a novel system; bearing in mind that a positive indication for some systems is a negative indication in others, and (c) statistical methods that can distinguish between signatures of early warning behaviors and noise.