Daily Papers

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has enabled the ability to effectively analyze and generate code nearly instantaneously, resulting in their widespread adoption in software development. Following this advancement, researchers and companies have begun integrating LLMs across the hardware design and verification process. However, these highly potent LLMs can also induce new attack scenarios upon security vulnerabilities across the hardware development process. One such attack vector that has not been explored is intellectual property (IP) piracy. Given that this attack can manifest as rewriting hardware designs to evade piracy detection, it is essential to thoroughly evaluate LLM capabilities in performing this task and assess the mitigation abilities of current IP piracy detection tools. Therefore, in this work, we propose LLMPirate, the first LLM-based technique able to generate pirated variations of circuit designs that successfully evade detection across multiple state-of-the-art piracy detection tools. We devise three solutions to overcome challenges related to integration of LLMs for hardware circuit designs, scalability to large circuits, and effectiveness, resulting in an end-to-end automated, efficient, and practical formulation. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation of LLMPirate using eight LLMs of varying sizes and capabilities and assess their performance in pirating various circuit designs against four state-of-the-art, widely-used piracy detection tools. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMPirate is able to consistently evade detection on 100% of tested circuits across every detection tool. Additionally, we showcase the ramifications of LLMPirate using case studies on IBEX and MOR1KX processors and a GPS module, that we successfully pirate. We envision that our work motivates and fosters the development of better IP piracy detection tools.

NVDLA is an open-source deep neural network (DNN) accelerator which has received a lot of attention by the community since its introduction by Nvidia. It is a full-featured hardware IP and can serve as a good reference for conducting research and development of SoCs with integrated accelerators. However, an expensive FPGA board is required to do experiments with this IP in a real SoC. Moreover, since NVDLA is clocked at a lower frequency on an FPGA, it would be hard to do accurate performance analysis with such a setup. To overcome these limitations, we integrate NVDLA into a real RISC-V SoC on the Amazon cloud FPGA using FireSim, a cycle-exact FPGA-accelerated simulator. We then evaluate the performance of NVDLA by running YOLOv3 object-detection algorithm. Our results show that NVDLA can sustain 7.5 fps when running YOLOv3. We further analyze the performance by showing that sharing the last-level cache with NVDLA can result in up to 1.56x speedup. We then identify that sharing the memory system with the accelerator can result in unpredictable execution time for the real-time tasks running on this platform. We believe this is an important issue that must be addressed in order for on-chip DNN accelerators to be incorporated in real-time embedded systems.

In this paper, we explore low-power custom quantised Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs) as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for automotive controller area network (CAN). We utilise the FINN framework from AMD/Xilinx to quantise, train and generate hardware IP of our MLP to detect denial of service (DoS) and fuzzying attacks on CAN network, using ZCU104 (XCZU7EV) FPGA as our target ECU architecture with integrated IDS capabilities. Our approach achieves significant improvements in latency (0.12 ms per-message processing latency) and inference energy consumption (0.25 mJ per inference) while achieving similar classification performance as state-of-the-art approaches in the literature.

Vector search has emerged as the foundation for large-scale information retrieval and machine learning systems, with search engines like Google and Bing processing tens of thousands of queries per second on petabyte-scale document datasets by evaluating vector similarities between encoded query texts and web documents. As performance demands for vector search systems surge, accelerated hardware offers a promising solution in the post-Moore's Law era. We introduce FANNS, an end-to-end and scalable vector search framework on FPGAs. Given a user-provided recall requirement on a dataset and a hardware resource budget, FANNS automatically co-designs hardware and algorithm, subsequently generating the corresponding accelerator. The framework also supports scale-out by incorporating a hardware TCP/IP stack in the accelerator. FANNS attains up to 23.0times and 37.2times speedup compared to FPGA and CPU baselines, respectively, and demonstrates superior scalability to GPUs, achieving 5.5times and 7.6times speedup in median and 95th percentile (P95) latency within an eight-accelerator configuration. The remarkable performance of FANNS lays a robust groundwork for future FPGA integration in data centers and AI supercomputers.

Machine learning has shown great promise in addressing several critical hardware security problems. In particular, researchers have developed novel graph neural network (GNN)-based techniques for detecting intellectual property (IP) piracy, detecting hardware Trojans (HTs), and reverse engineering circuits, to name a few. These techniques have demonstrated outstanding accuracy and have received much attention in the community. However, since these techniques are used for security applications, it is imperative to evaluate them thoroughly and ensure they are robust and do not compromise the security of integrated circuits. In this work, we propose AttackGNN, the first red-team attack on GNN-based techniques in hardware security. To this end, we devise a novel reinforcement learning (RL) agent that generates adversarial examples, i.e., circuits, against the GNN-based techniques. We overcome three challenges related to effectiveness, scalability, and generality to devise a potent RL agent. We target five GNN-based techniques for four crucial classes of problems in hardware security: IP piracy, detecting/localizing HTs, reverse engineering, and hardware obfuscation. Through our approach, we craft circuits that fool all GNNs considered in this work. For instance, to evade IP piracy detection, we generate adversarial pirated circuits that fool the GNN-based defense into classifying our crafted circuits as not pirated. For attacking HT localization GNN, our attack generates HT-infested circuits that fool the defense on all tested circuits. We obtain a similar 100% success rate against GNNs for all classes of problems.

Modern Machine Learning models are expensive IP and business competitiveness often depends on keeping this IP confidential. This in turn restricts how these models are deployed -- for example it is unclear how to deploy a model on-device without inevitably leaking the underlying model. At the same time, confidential computing technologies such as Multi-Party Computation or Homomorphic encryption remain impractical for wide adoption. In this paper we take a different approach and investigate feasibility of ML-specific mechanisms that deter unauthorized model use by restricting the model to only be usable on specific hardware, making adoption on unauthorized hardware inconvenient. That way, even if IP is compromised, it cannot be trivially used without specialised hardware or major model adjustment. In a sense, we seek to enable cheap locking of machine learning models into specific hardware. We demonstrate that locking mechanisms are feasible by either targeting efficiency of model representations, such making models incompatible with quantisation, or tie the model's operation on specific characteristics of hardware, such as number of cycles for arithmetic operations. We demonstrate that locking comes with negligible work and latency overheads, while significantly restricting usability of the resultant model on unauthorized hardware.

Designing accurate and efficient ConvNets for mobile devices is challenging because the design space is combinatorially large. Due to this, previous neural architecture search (NAS) methods are computationally expensive. ConvNet architecture optimality depends on factors such as input resolution and target devices. However, existing approaches are too expensive for case-by-case redesigns. Also, previous work focuses primarily on reducing FLOPs, but FLOP count does not always reflect actual latency. To address these, we propose a differentiable neural architecture search (DNAS) framework that uses gradient-based methods to optimize ConvNet architectures, avoiding enumerating and training individual architectures separately as in previous methods. FBNets, a family of models discovered by DNAS surpass state-of-the-art models both designed manually and generated automatically. FBNet-B achieves 74.1% top-1 accuracy on ImageNet with 295M FLOPs and 23.1 ms latency on a Samsung S8 phone, 2.4x smaller and 1.5x faster than MobileNetV2-1.3 with similar accuracy. Despite higher accuracy and lower latency than MnasNet, we estimate FBNet-B's search cost is 420x smaller than MnasNet's, at only 216 GPU-hours. Searched for different resolutions and channel sizes, FBNets achieve 1.5% to 6.4% higher accuracy than MobileNetV2. The smallest FBNet achieves 50.2% accuracy and 2.9 ms latency (345 frames per second) on a Samsung S8. Over a Samsung-optimized FBNet, the iPhone-X-optimized model achieves a 1.4x speedup on an iPhone X.

The rapid growth of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), has raised concerns regarding its global environmental impact that extends beyond greenhouse gas emissions to include consideration of hardware fabrication and end-of-life processes. The opacity from major providers hinders companies' abilities to evaluate their AI-related environmental impacts and achieve net-zero targets. In this paper, we propose a methodology to estimate the environmental impact of a company's AI portfolio, providing actionable insights without necessitating extensive AI and Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA) expertise. Results confirm that large generative AI models consume up to 4600x more energy than traditional models. Our modelling approach, which accounts for increased AI usage, hardware computing efficiency, and changes in electricity mix in line with IPCC scenarios, forecasts AI electricity use up to 2030. Under a high adoption scenario, driven by widespread Generative AI and agents adoption associated to increasingly complex models and frameworks, AI electricity use is projected to rise by a factor of 24.4. Mitigating the environmental impact of Generative AI by 2030 requires coordinated efforts across the AI value chain. Isolated measures in hardware efficiency, model efficiency, or grid improvements alone are insufficient. We advocate for standardized environmental assessment frameworks, greater transparency from the all actors of the value chain and the introduction of a "Return on Environment" metric to align AI development with net-zero goals.

The remarkable predictive performance of deep neural networks (DNNs) has led to their adoption in service domains of unprecedented scale and scope. However, the widespread adoption and growing commercialization of DNNs have underscored the importance of intellectual property (IP) protection. Devising techniques to ensure IP protection has become necessary due to the increasing trend of outsourcing the DNN computations on the untrusted accelerators in cloud-based services. The design methodologies and hyper-parameters of DNNs are crucial information, and leaking them may cause massive economic loss to the organization. Furthermore, the knowledge of DNN's architecture can increase the success probability of an adversarial attack where an adversary perturbs the inputs and alter the prediction. In this work, we devise a two-stage attack methodology "DeepPeep" which exploits the distinctive characteristics of design methodologies to reverse-engineer the architecture of building blocks in compact DNNs. We show the efficacy of "DeepPeep" on P100 and P4000 GPUs. Additionally, we propose intelligent design maneuvering strategies for thwarting IP theft through the DeepPeep attack and proposed "Secure MobileNet-V1". Interestingly, compared to vanilla MobileNet-V1, secure MobileNet-V1 provides a significant reduction in inference latency (approx60%) and improvement in predictive performance (approx2%) with very-low memory and computation overheads.

Integrating Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) with cloud computing instances is a rapidly emerging trend on commercial cloud computing platforms such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), Huawei cloud, and Alibaba cloud. Cloud FPGAs allow cloud users to build hardware accelerators to speed up the computation in the cloud. However, since the cloud FPGA technology is still in its infancy, the security implications of this integration of FPGAs in the cloud are not clear. In this paper, we survey the emerging field of cloud FPGA security, providing a comprehensive overview of the security issues related to cloud FPGAs, and highlighting future challenges in this research area.