Daily Papers

Recent decisions by leading AI labs to either open-source their models or to restrict access to their models has sparked debate about whether, and how, increasingly capable AI models should be shared. Open-sourcing in AI typically refers to making model architecture and weights freely and publicly accessible for anyone to modify, study, build on, and use. This offers advantages such as enabling external oversight, accelerating progress, and decentralizing control over AI development and use. However, it also presents a growing potential for misuse and unintended consequences. This paper offers an examination of the risks and benefits of open-sourcing highly capable foundation models. While open-sourcing has historically provided substantial net benefits for most software and AI development processes, we argue that for some highly capable foundation models likely to be developed in the near future, open-sourcing may pose sufficiently extreme risks to outweigh the benefits. In such a case, highly capable foundation models should not be open-sourced, at least not initially. Alternative strategies, including non-open-source model sharing options, are explored. The paper concludes with recommendations for developers, standard-setting bodies, and governments for establishing safe and responsible model sharing practices and preserving open-source benefits where safe.

Recent In-Context Learning based methods have achieved remarkable success in Text-to-SQL task. However, there is still a large gap between the performance of these models and human performance on datasets with complex database schema and difficult questions, such as BIRD. Besides, existing work has neglected to supervise intermediate steps when solving questions iteratively with question decomposition methods, and the schema linking methods used in these works are very rudimentary. To address these issues, we propose MAG-SQL, a multi-agent generative approach with soft schema linking and iterative Sub-SQL refinement. In our framework, an entity-based method with tables' summary is used to select the columns in database, and a novel targets-conditions decomposition method is introduced to decompose those complex questions. Additionally, we build a iterative generating module which includes a Sub-SQL Generator and Sub-SQL Refiner, introducing external oversight for each step of generation. Through a series of ablation studies, the effectiveness of each agent in our framework has been demonstrated. When evaluated on the BIRD benchmark with GPT-4, MAG-SQL achieves an execution accuracy of 61.08\%, compared to the baseline accuracy of 46.35\% for vanilla GPT-4 and the baseline accuracy of 57.56\% for MAC-SQL. Besides, our approach makes similar progress on Spider.

Despite their remarkable performance, the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) faces a critical challenge in scalable oversight: providing effective feedback for tasks where human evaluation is difficult or where LLMs outperform humans. While there is growing interest in using LLMs for critique, current approaches still rely on human annotations or more powerful models, leaving the issue of enhancing critique capabilities without external supervision unresolved. We introduce SCRIT (Self-evolving CRITic), a framework that enables genuine self-evolution of critique abilities. Technically, SCRIT self-improves by training on synthetic data, generated by a contrastive-based self-critic that uses reference solutions for step-by-step critique, and a self-validation mechanism that ensures critique quality through correction outcomes. Implemented with Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct, one of the most powerful LLMs, SCRIT achieves up to a 10.3\% improvement on critique-correction and error identification benchmarks. Our analysis reveals that SCRIT's performance scales positively with data and model size, outperforms alternative approaches, and benefits critically from its self-validation component.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.