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cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

True.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

No; there I do not agree with you.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

No, indeed.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Or that one name is better than another?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Certainly not.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then all names are rightly imposed?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes, if they are names at all.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature which corresponds to it.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

What do you mean?

cratylus

SOCRATES

Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not?

cratylus

SOCRATES

Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Neither spoken nor said.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: “Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion”—these words, whether spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly false:—which is all that I want to know.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I should say that he would be putting himself in motion to no purpose; and that his words would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot.

cratylus

SOCRATES

But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the same with the thing named?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I should.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Certainly.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

I believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things of which they are the imitation.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

They are.

cratylus

SOCRATES

First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Certainly.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Very true.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Only the first.

cratylus

SOCRATES

That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

That is my view.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names—they must be always right.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, “This is your picture,” showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a woman; and when I say “show,” I mean bring before the sense of sight.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Certainly.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And may I not go to him again, and say, “This is your name”?—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him—“This is your name”? and may I not then bring to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, “This is a man”; or of a female of the human species, when I say, “This is a woman,” as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, Granted.

cratylus

SOCRATES

That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of them we may call truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I agree; and think that what you say is very true.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not give them all—some may be wanting; or there may be too many or too much of them—may there not?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Very true.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others ill made.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

That is true.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And this artist of names is called the legislator?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold good?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the letters alpha or beta, or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.

cratylus

SOCRATES

But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

How so?

cratylus

SOCRATES

I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes, I see.

cratylus

SOCRATES

But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the realities.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Quite true.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the letters.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes, I remember.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;—well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be inconsistent with yourself.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And the proper letters are those which are like the things?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word: you would admit that?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes, I do.

cratylus

SOCRATES

But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes, I do.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call small great and great small—that, they would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you prefer?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than representation by any chance sign.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Impossible.

cratylus

SOCRATES

No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the original elements are letters?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter rho is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

I should say that you were right.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And that lamda was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

There again you were right.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes, is by the Eretrians called skleroter.

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Very true.

cratylus

SOCRATES

But are the letters rho and sigma equivalents; and is there the same significance to them in the termination rho, which there is to us in sigma, or is there no significance to one of us?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.

cratylus

SOCRATES

In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

In as far as they are like.

cratylus

SOCRATES

Are they altogether alike?

cratylus

CRATYLUS

Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.

cratylus

SOCRATES

And what do you say of the insertion of the lamda? for that is expressive not of hardness but of softness.