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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Plank 5 solves warming.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "RECOMMENDATIONS\nThe analysis presented here highlights potential ways in which climate change could impact the U.S. nuclear triad. Given the high-stakes nature of the nuclear enterprise, the United States should undertake concerted efforts to better prepare for, mitigate, and adapt to these challenges. The following recommendations describe actions the DOD and other key stakeholders can take at the installation, system, and broader deterrent levels to do so.\nCONDUCT CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF ALL NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES\nThe analysis of the potential impacts of climate change on the U.S. nuclear deterrent presented here is not only limited by its primary focus on three installations but also by information available in the open source. Drawing on more extensive resources and information, the DOD and DOE should conduct in-depth assessments of how and when climate change could impact all U.S. nuclear bases and facilities. These dedicated, site-specific studies should account for the unique nuclear systems, operations, and activities at each site. Importantly, these assessments also need to consider the implications for U.S. nuclear deterrence if the missions at each site are compromised, undermined, or threatened by climate change in any way. Focusing on individual nuclear bases and facilities, as well as deterrence implications, would add important specificity to the DOD’s broader, high-level assessments of climate change impacts, which to date have not provided sufficient or sustained attention to the U.S. deterrent.123\nIt is reasonable that such studies be conducted at the classified level owing to sensitive information about the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Some people might argue that publicly identifying climate vulnerabilities could potentially undermine the credibility of the deterrent. However, it is important to also produce unclassified assessments that include as much information as possible. Being transparent about climate change challenges and threats can encourage greater collaboration with interagency and nongovernmental entities to identify and implement mitigation or adaptation measures—and will also encourage greater accountability to follow through on such measures. Implementing mitigation and adaptation plans, especially those that require infrastructure updates or changes, will be long-term endeavors given the nature of budget and resource decisionmaking and planning. Therefore, it is urgent that the DOD and DOE conduct installation vulnerability assessments as soon as possible to ensure those efforts are well underway before climate change effects worsen.\nINVEST IN DYNAMIC CLIMATE CHANGE MODELING AND PARTNERSHIPS\nModernization efforts for each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad are actively progressing. Given the expected—or, in the B-21 case, assumed—service lives of the modernized systems, key nuclear decisions are made decades in advance of their full implementation. Yet, climate models cannot necessarily project climate change effects over such extended timelines. The above analysis demonstrates that some climate hazards, especially extreme weather events, cannot be adequately modeled at all whether due to the complexity of interactions among various factors that drive these hazards, a lack of observational data of already variable events, or competing perspectives and theories on event attribution.124 Modernization decisions therefore cannot fully account for the potential impacts of climate change. To address this issue, the DOD should devote additional resources to monitoring and modeling climate change and regularly update their decisions and planning accordingly.\nThe DOD’s existing climate tools are an important starting point. The DCAT, for example, can give nuclear decisionmakers an initial steer in assessing the vulnerability of nuclear installations to climate hazards, although additional efforts are needed to address limitations of the tool, as considered below. To ensure decisions are informed by the most accurate climate change projections, these tools should be dynamic, incorporating regular updates to ensure projections account for current trends and the latest climate science. If governments undertake substantial mitigation and adaptation efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, for example, projected sea level rise trends may become less severe. The opposite, of course, is also possible if governments do not undertake such efforts. Meanwhile, at a more local level, preventive mitigation efforts taken at Kings Bay may also positively impact projections of how climate change could impact the base. Consequently, changes in projected trends could significantly impact climate change risks at nuclear facilities and must therefore be regularly monitored and factored into nuclear decisions and planning.\nBeyond these existing tools, the DOD, with support from Congress, should continue to make and expand its climate monitoring investments, including by building expertise to ensure personnel are adequately trained to incorporate climate modeling into future planning. Climate change–related investments cannot simply focus on installations or regions where disasters have already struck but must be proactive in anticipating possible future conditions and challenges, especially where the United States’ nuclear installations are involved. Moreover, as this paper demonstrates, different climate hazards stand to challenge different nuclear facilities and missions. The DOD, therefore, cannot standardize its efforts across installations and regions but rather must diversify its modeling and monitoring efforts.\nThe DOD should not undertake these efforts alone. The department would benefit from improved interagency and cross-government collaboration, as well as more partnerships with nongovernmental stakeholders. For instance, since the DOD appears to rely on FEMA flood data to conduct its EISs for its nuclear modernization programs, the department should work directly with FEMA to ensure it has the resources and access it needs to complete and regularly update flood mapping of all nuclear installations and their surrounding communities. Doing so would allow for more comprehensive assessments that more accurately consider and account for possible future flooding vulnerabilities or challenges. The DOD can also expand successful programs like the Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration Program and the Sentinel Landscapes Partnership—both of which bring together local, state, and federal stakeholders to implement conservation and resilience measures that help preserve military and local interests—to include all nuclear installations.125 Establishing and, importantly, contributing funding to these initiatives at all nuclear facilities, including landlocked bases that may not seem as vulnerable to the worst effects of climate change, would help the DOD develop robust local relationships and mitigation measures to ensure the department is best prepared to address worsening climate conditions.\nMANDATE “IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENT STATEMENTS”\nInformed by rigorous research and engagement with key stakeholders, EISs are important assessments designed to determine how major federal actions will affect the environment. This process does not, however, adequately consider how the environment may in turn impact the action being considered. Just nine pages of the nearly 1,000-page Sentinel EIS, for example, explicitly discuss climate change, providing fairly general depictions of climate change effects in the Great Plains and Southwest regions where Sentinel construction activities will take place.126 Given the potential impacts climate change could have on nuclear and other federal actions, unidirectional EISs are no longer sufficient.\nTo complement these statements, the DOD and other agencies should also be required to complete “Impact of Environment Statements.” These statements should be forward-looking, dedicated assessments of how climate change may impact the federal action at hand. Conducted with as much rigor and engagement as EISs, they should draw on advanced climate modeling—including worst-case scenario projections—to identify relevant climate change hazards over the lifetime of the action. They should evaluate the potential impacts of those hazards at the installation, system, and broader mission levels and identify how and when these impacts can best be mitigated. The statements should also identify how these hazards may affect the lifetime costs of the action, including by factoring in cost estimates of potential mitigation plans. Importantly, the statements should be updated at regular intervals to account for changes in climate modeling.\nCongress may have a particular interest in mandating these Impact of Environment Statements especially given the potentially substantial budgetary implications of climate change for planned actions. This carries particular relevance for nuclear modernization efforts, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates will cost $634 billion (in 2021 dollars) throughout the 2020s.127 Congress should be interested in determining, for example, whether the Sentinel program plans laid out in the Sentinel EIS have adequately accounted for climate change and, if not, how climate change impacts could affect the full costs of maintaining and operating the system later this century. A Sentinel Impact of Environment Statement would help to address this concern and increase the DOD’s accountability to effectively plan for and respond to climate change impacts. Congress could mandate these assessments through a dedicated law, similar to how the National Environmental Policy Act mandates EISs, or as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) process. To initiate this effort and complement the second B-21 EIS currently underway, Congress should require the DOD to complete an Impact of Environment Statement for the B-21 as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2024.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Given the high-stakes nature of the nuclear enterprise, the United States should undertake concerted efforts to better prepare for, mitigate, and adapt to these challenges. The following recommendations describe actions the DOD and other key stakeholders can take at the installation, system, and broader deterrent levels to do so.\nDrawing on more extensive resources and information, the DOD and DOE should conduct in-depth assessments of how and when climate change could impact all U.S. nuclear bases and facilities\nImplementing mitigation and adaptation plans, especially those that require infrastructure updates or changes, will be long-term endeavors given the nature of budget and resource decisionmaking and planning\nModernization efforts for each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad are actively progressing.\nTo address this issue, the DOD should devote additional resources to monitoring and modeling climate change and regularly update their decisions and planning accordingly.\nThe DOD’s existing climate tools are an important starting point\nthe DOD, with support from Congress, should continue to make and expand its climate monitoring investments,\nluding by building expertise to ensure personnel are adequately trained to incorporate climate modeling into future planning.\nThe DOD should not undertake these efforts alone\nThe department would benefit from improved interagency and cross-government collaboration\nEstablishing and, importantly, contributing funding to these initiatives at all nuclear facilities, including landlocked bases that may not seem as vulnerable to the worst effects of climate change\nwould help the DOD develop robust local relationships and mitigation measures to ensure the department is best prepared to address worsening climate conditions.\nhow climate change impacts could affect the full costs of maintaining and operating the system later this century\nCongress could mandate these assessments through a dedicated law", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Plank 5 solves warming.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Given the high-stakes nature of the nuclear enterprise, the United States should undertake concerted efforts to better prepare for, mitigate, and adapt to these challenges. The following recommendations describe actions the DOD and other key stakeholders can take at the installation, system, and broader deterrent levels to do so.\nDrawing on more extensive resources and information, the DOD and DOE should conduct in-depth assessments of how and when climate change could impact all U.S. nuclear bases and facilities\nImplementing mitigation and adaptation plans, especially those that require infrastructure updates or changes, will be long-term endeavors given the nature of budget and resource decisionmaking and planning\nModernization efforts for each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad are actively progressing.\nTo address this issue, the DOD should devote additional resources to monitoring and modeling climate change and regularly update their decisions and planning accordingly.\nThe DOD’s existing climate tools are an important starting point\nthe DOD, with support from Congress, should continue to make and expand its climate monitoring investments,\nluding by building expertise to ensure personnel are adequately trained to incorporate climate modeling into future planning.\nThe DOD should not undertake these efforts alone\nThe department would benefit from improved interagency and cross-government collaboration\nEstablishing and, importantly, contributing funding to these initiatives at all nuclear facilities, including landlocked bases that may not seem as vulnerable to the worst effects of climate change\nwould help the DOD develop robust local relationships and mitigation measures to ensure the department is best prepared to address worsening climate conditions.\nhow climate change impacts could affect the full costs of maintaining and operating the system later this century\nCongress could mandate these assessments through a dedicated law", "role": "user" }, { "content": "mitigate\nchallenges\ndepth assessments\nnuclear bases\nfacilities\nresource decisionmaking and planning\nModernization efforts\nadditional resources\nmonitoring\nmodeling climate change\nclimate monitoring investments\nbuilding expertise\nclimate modeling\nEstablishing\nDOD develop robust local relationships\ndepartment\nprepared\naddress worsening climate conditions.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Plank 5 solves warming.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "RECOMMENDATIONS\nThe analysis presented here highlights potential ways in which climate change could impact the U.S. nuclear triad. Given the high-stakes nature of the nuclear enterprise, the United States should undertake concerted efforts to better prepare for, mitigate, and adapt to these challenges. The following recommendations describe actions the DOD and other key stakeholders can take at the installation, system, and broader deterrent levels to do so.\nCONDUCT CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF ALL NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES\nThe analysis of the potential impacts of climate change on the U.S. nuclear deterrent presented here is not only limited by its primary focus on three installations but also by information available in the open source. Drawing on more extensive resources and information, the DOD and DOE should conduct in-depth assessments of how and when climate change could impact all U.S. nuclear bases and facilities. These dedicated, site-specific studies should account for the unique nuclear systems, operations, and activities at each site. Importantly, these assessments also need to consider the implications for U.S. nuclear deterrence if the missions at each site are compromised, undermined, or threatened by climate change in any way. Focusing on individual nuclear bases and facilities, as well as deterrence implications, would add important specificity to the DOD’s broader, high-level assessments of climate change impacts, which to date have not provided sufficient or sustained attention to the U.S. deterrent.123\nIt is reasonable that such studies be conducted at the classified level owing to sensitive information about the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Some people might argue that publicly identifying climate vulnerabilities could potentially undermine the credibility of the deterrent. However, it is important to also produce unclassified assessments that include as much information as possible. Being transparent about climate change challenges and threats can encourage greater collaboration with interagency and nongovernmental entities to identify and implement mitigation or adaptation measures—and will also encourage greater accountability to follow through on such measures. Implementing mitigation and adaptation plans, especially those that require infrastructure updates or changes, will be long-term endeavors given the nature of budget and resource decisionmaking and planning. Therefore, it is urgent that the DOD and DOE conduct installation vulnerability assessments as soon as possible to ensure those efforts are well underway before climate change effects worsen.\nINVEST IN DYNAMIC CLIMATE CHANGE MODELING AND PARTNERSHIPS\nModernization efforts for each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad are actively progressing. Given the expected—or, in the B-21 case, assumed—service lives of the modernized systems, key nuclear decisions are made decades in advance of their full implementation. Yet, climate models cannot necessarily project climate change effects over such extended timelines. The above analysis demonstrates that some climate hazards, especially extreme weather events, cannot be adequately modeled at all whether due to the complexity of interactions among various factors that drive these hazards, a lack of observational data of already variable events, or competing perspectives and theories on event attribution.124 Modernization decisions therefore cannot fully account for the potential impacts of climate change. To address this issue, the DOD should devote additional resources to monitoring and modeling climate change and regularly update their decisions and planning accordingly.\nThe DOD’s existing climate tools are an important starting point. The DCAT, for example, can give nuclear decisionmakers an initial steer in assessing the vulnerability of nuclear installations to climate hazards, although additional efforts are needed to address limitations of the tool, as considered below. To ensure decisions are informed by the most accurate climate change projections, these tools should be dynamic, incorporating regular updates to ensure projections account for current trends and the latest climate science. If governments undertake substantial mitigation and adaptation efforts to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, for example, projected sea level rise trends may become less severe. The opposite, of course, is also possible if governments do not undertake such efforts. Meanwhile, at a more local level, preventive mitigation efforts taken at Kings Bay may also positively impact projections of how climate change could impact the base. Consequently, changes in projected trends could significantly impact climate change risks at nuclear facilities and must therefore be regularly monitored and factored into nuclear decisions and planning.\nBeyond these existing tools, the DOD, with support from Congress, should continue to make and expand its climate monitoring investments, including by building expertise to ensure personnel are adequately trained to incorporate climate modeling into future planning. Climate change–related investments cannot simply focus on installations or regions where disasters have already struck but must be proactive in anticipating possible future conditions and challenges, especially where the United States’ nuclear installations are involved. Moreover, as this paper demonstrates, different climate hazards stand to challenge different nuclear facilities and missions. The DOD, therefore, cannot standardize its efforts across installations and regions but rather must diversify its modeling and monitoring efforts.\nThe DOD should not undertake these efforts alone. The department would benefit from improved interagency and cross-government collaboration, as well as more partnerships with nongovernmental stakeholders. For instance, since the DOD appears to rely on FEMA flood data to conduct its EISs for its nuclear modernization programs, the department should work directly with FEMA to ensure it has the resources and access it needs to complete and regularly update flood mapping of all nuclear installations and their surrounding communities. Doing so would allow for more comprehensive assessments that more accurately consider and account for possible future flooding vulnerabilities or challenges. The DOD can also expand successful programs like the Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration Program and the Sentinel Landscapes Partnership—both of which bring together local, state, and federal stakeholders to implement conservation and resilience measures that help preserve military and local interests—to include all nuclear installations.125 Establishing and, importantly, contributing funding to these initiatives at all nuclear facilities, including landlocked bases that may not seem as vulnerable to the worst effects of climate change, would help the DOD develop robust local relationships and mitigation measures to ensure the department is best prepared to address worsening climate conditions.\nMANDATE “IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENT STATEMENTS”\nInformed by rigorous research and engagement with key stakeholders, EISs are important assessments designed to determine how major federal actions will affect the environment. This process does not, however, adequately consider how the environment may in turn impact the action being considered. Just nine pages of the nearly 1,000-page Sentinel EIS, for example, explicitly discuss climate change, providing fairly general depictions of climate change effects in the Great Plains and Southwest regions where Sentinel construction activities will take place.126 Given the potential impacts climate change could have on nuclear and other federal actions, unidirectional EISs are no longer sufficient.\nTo complement these statements, the DOD and other agencies should also be required to complete “Impact of Environment Statements.” These statements should be forward-looking, dedicated assessments of how climate change may impact the federal action at hand. Conducted with as much rigor and engagement as EISs, they should draw on advanced climate modeling—including worst-case scenario projections—to identify relevant climate change hazards over the lifetime of the action. They should evaluate the potential impacts of those hazards at the installation, system, and broader mission levels and identify how and when these impacts can best be mitigated. The statements should also identify how these hazards may affect the lifetime costs of the action, including by factoring in cost estimates of potential mitigation plans. Importantly, the statements should be updated at regular intervals to account for changes in climate modeling.\nCongress may have a particular interest in mandating these Impact of Environment Statements especially given the potentially substantial budgetary implications of climate change for planned actions. This carries particular relevance for nuclear modernization efforts, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates will cost $634 billion (in 2021 dollars) throughout the 2020s.127 Congress should be interested in determining, for example, whether the Sentinel program plans laid out in the Sentinel EIS have adequately accounted for climate change and, if not, how climate change impacts could affect the full costs of maintaining and operating the system later this century. A Sentinel Impact of Environment Statement would help to address this concern and increase the DOD’s accountability to effectively plan for and respond to climate change impacts. Congress could mandate these assessments through a dedicated law, similar to how the National Environmental Policy Act mandates EISs, or as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) process. To initiate this effort and complement the second B-21 EIS currently underway, Congress should require the DOD to complete an Impact of Environment Statement for the B-21 as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2024.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the U\nS\nshould\nmitigate\nand adapt to these challenges\nDOD\nconduct in-depth assessments of how and when climate change could impact all U.S. nuclear bases and facilities\nDOD should devote\nresources to monitoring and modeling climate change\nDOD\nshould\nexpand\nclimate monitoring investments\nincorporate climate modeling\nEstablishing\nfunding to these initiatives at all nuclear facilities\nwould\ndevelop robust local relationships\nto ensure the department is\nprepared to address worsening climate conditions", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No net benefit.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Behind the smiles from Iranian and Chinese leaders in Beijing this week, there may well be frustration. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited the Chinese capital with the hope of shoring up his country’s international support and extracting economic advantages from his country’s relationship with China. Meanwhile, Chinese President Xi Jinping wanted to use the visit to push for a resolution to the ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. Unfortunately for both, neither are unlikely to get what they want. For Raisi, it was important to show that Iran is not the international pariah that many in the West presume. Iran is also struggling economically; in addition to coping with the sanctions that were reimposed on the country after then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran’s economy has been sluggish, despite the apparent end of the pandemic. Inflation is high, at 40 percent, while GDP growth has been slowing, from 4.7 percent in 2021 to 3 percent in 2022 and a projected 2 percent this year, according to the IMF. Raisi may have hoped that the visit to China would unlock more funds and investment. In 2021, the two countries signed a 25-year cooperation agreement. Although media reports suggested (with no reputable sourcing) that the investments involved would be substantial, worth up to $400 billion, there is little sign that is happening. In 2022, Chinese firms accounted for only $185 million, or 3 percent of total investments. Indeed, in recent years Russia has become a bigger investor in Iran than China. Instead, Raisi had to make do with Iran and China signing more agreements, around 20 in total, including on trade and tourism. A return to the JCPOA, whereby sanctions are removed in exchange for Iran freezing its nuclear program, could be a helpful first step toward unlocking more Chinese investment. That may be what Xi was thinking when he implicitly blamed U.S. behavior for the current deadlock in talks. Certainly, the Chinese feel it should be the Americans who make the first move. However, Xi’s words obscure potential difficulties that the Chinese may face. One is the imbalance in the relationship between the two countries. Economically, the current state of affairs benefits the Chinese more than Iran. This is especially notable when it comes to oil sales in the post-JCPOA period. Since the reimposition of sanctions, Iran’s ability to sell its primary export has become more limited. Increasingly, Iran has had to rely on Chinese purchases, which worked to China’s advantage by letting it purchase Iranian oil for cheaper than the global market price. The disparity between the two has not gone unnoticed in Tehran. Not only do some in the regime fear becoming too dependent on China, but wider public opinion is also skeptical.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Behind the smiles from Iranian and Chinese leaders in Beijing this week, there may well be frustration\nEbrahim Raisi visited the Chinese capital with the hope of shoring up his country’s international support and extracting economic advantages from his country’s relationship with China\nXi Jinping wanted to use the visit to push for a resolution to the ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program\nUnfortunately for both\nneither are unlikely to get what they want\nFor Raisi, it was important to show that Iran is not the international pariah that many in the West presume. Iran is also struggling economically\nInflation is high, at 40 percent, while GDP growth has been slowing\nfrom 4.7 percent in 2021 to 3 percent in 2022 and a projected 2 percent this year, according to the IMF\n Raisi may have hoped that the visit to China would unlock more funds and investment\nAlthough media reports suggested\nthat the investments involved would be substantial\nthere is little sign that is happening\nRussia has become a bigger investor in Iran than China\nA return to the JCPOA\ncould be a helpful first step toward unlocking more Chinese investment\nThat may be what Xi was thinking when he implicitly blamed U.S. behavior for the current deadlock in talks\nthe current state of affairs benefits the Chinese more than Iran\nIran has had to rely on Chinese purchases, which worked to China’s advantage by letting it purchase Iranian oil for cheaper than the global market price\nsome in the regime fear becoming too dependent on China, but wider public opinion is also skeptical", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No net benefit.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Behind the smiles from Iranian and Chinese leaders in Beijing this week, there may well be frustration\nEbrahim Raisi visited the Chinese capital with the hope of shoring up his country’s international support and extracting economic advantages from his country’s relationship with China\nXi Jinping wanted to use the visit to push for a resolution to the ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program\nUnfortunately for both\nneither are unlikely to get what they want\nFor Raisi, it was important to show that Iran is not the international pariah that many in the West presume. Iran is also struggling economically\nInflation is high, at 40 percent, while GDP growth has been slowing\nfrom 4.7 percent in 2021 to 3 percent in 2022 and a projected 2 percent this year, according to the IMF\n Raisi may have hoped that the visit to China would unlock more funds and investment\nAlthough media reports suggested\nthat the investments involved would be substantial\nthere is little sign that is happening\nRussia has become a bigger investor in Iran than China\nA return to the JCPOA\ncould be a helpful first step toward unlocking more Chinese investment\nThat may be what Xi was thinking when he implicitly blamed U.S. behavior for the current deadlock in talks\nthe current state of affairs benefits the Chinese more than Iran\nIran has had to rely on Chinese purchases, which worked to China’s advantage by letting it purchase Iranian oil for cheaper than the global market price\nsome in the regime fear becoming too dependent on China, but wider public opinion is also skeptical", "role": "user" }, { "content": "frustration\nneither are unlikely to get what they want\nfunds\ninvestment\nlittle sign\nbigger investor\nunlocking more Chinese investment\nU.S. behavior\nbenefits the Chinese more than Iran\nskeptical", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No net benefit.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Behind the smiles from Iranian and Chinese leaders in Beijing this week, there may well be frustration\nEbrahim Raisi visited the Chinese capital with the hope of shoring up his country’s international support and extracting economic advantages from his country’s relationship with China\nXi Jinping wanted to use the visit to push for a resolution to the ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program\nUnfortunately for both\nneither are unlikely to get what they want\nFor Raisi, it was important to show that Iran is not the international pariah that many in the West presume. Iran is also struggling economically\nInflation is high, at 40 percent, while GDP growth has been slowing\nfrom 4.7 percent in 2021 to 3 percent in 2022 and a projected 2 percent this year, according to the IMF\n Raisi may have hoped that the visit to China would unlock more funds and investment\nAlthough media reports suggested\nthat the investments involved would be substantial\nthere is little sign that is happening\nRussia has become a bigger investor in Iran than China\nA return to the JCPOA\ncould be a helpful first step toward unlocking more Chinese investment\nThat may be what Xi was thinking when he implicitly blamed U.S. behavior for the current deadlock in talks\nthe current state of affairs benefits the Chinese more than Iran\nIran has had to rely on Chinese purchases, which worked to China’s advantage by letting it purchase Iranian oil for cheaper than the global market price\nsome in the regime fear becoming too dependent on China, but wider public opinion is also skeptical", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Xi\nwanted to\npush for\nresolution\nover\nnuclear program\nneither\nunlikely to get what they want\nIran is\nstruggling economically\nInflation is high\nGDP growth\nslowing\nmay have hoped\nvisit to China would unlock\nfunds\nmedia\nsuggested\ninvestments\nwould be substantial\nthere is little sign\nRussia\nbigger investor in Iran\nreturn to the JCPOA\nfirst step toward unlocking\nChinese investment\ncurrent\naffairs benefit\nChinese more than Iran\nregime fear becoming too dependent\npublic opinion\nskeptical", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That causes extinction.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "What AI Could Do For Us Equipped with superintelligence and all the technology superintelligence would know how to build, Artificial superintelligence would be capable of solving every problem in humanity. Global warming? Artificial superintelligence could first stop CO2 emissions by creating a much better way to generate energy without using fossil fuels. Then it could build some innovative way to begin to remove extra CO2 from the atmosphere. Cancer and other major or minor diseases? No problem for ASI—the health and medicine industry would be revolutionized beyond imagination. There would be a huge advancement in the Nanotech industry that could transform a bunch of garbage into a huge vat of fresh meat and distribute all this food across the world using advanced transportation. Artificial superintelligence could even figure out the complicated macro issues and our debates over how economies should work and how world trade is best managed, even our haziest doubts in philosophy or ethics—would all be very easy to ASI. ASI could grant us to conquer our mortality Learning and reading about AI will make you reevaluate everything you thought you were sure, among other things – your notion of death. Evolution had no good sense to boost our lifespans any longer than they are now. The possibilities for new human experiences are boundless. Nanobots will be in charge of providing perfect nutrition to the cells of the body, intelligently advising anything unhealthy to go through the body without affecting anything. The expectation that AI will perform its task with determined and unstoppable efficiency has got some of the amazing contemporary thinkers like Stephan Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk very busy. AI is a machine and a superintelligent one. There is a buzz of developing AI through a humanist approach, depending on human values and human rights and projecting human values on a non-human entity. This is because most people think about only humans with intelligence and expect an intelligent machine to be human. This expectation may lead to the belief that AI could either be friendly & moral or evil & immoral. A few aspects, such as moral /immoral, apply only to human behaviour, and non-human, non-biological entities are amoral by default. While humans breathe and live by a moral code, AI’s code will drive it to do with relentless efficiency what it is programmed to do by its maker. Any prediction that once superintelligent, a system would be over it with their original objective and onto more alluring or meaningful things is anthropomorphizing. AI does not have to change from ‘friendly’ to ‘unfriendly.’ It just has to be doing its work while getting more expert and efficient at the task. A virtual assistant algorithm like Siri performs tasks like listening to your voice, learn your preferences, and make life easier for you to get a good experience out of a smartphone device.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Equipped with superintelligence and all the technology superintelligence would know how to build, Artificial superintelligence would be capable of solving every problem in humanity. Global warming? Artificial superintelligence could first stop CO2 emissions by creating a much better way to generate energy without using fossil fuels. Then it could build some innovative way to begin to remove extra CO2 from the atmosphere\ndiseases? No problem for ASI—the health and medicine industry would be revolutionized beyond imagination. There would be a huge advancement in the Nanotech industry that could transform a bunch of garbage into\nfresh meat and distribute\nthis food across the world using advanced transportation. Artificial superintelligence could even figure out the complicated macro issues and our debates over how economies should work and how world trade is best managed\nAI will make you reevaluate\nyour notion of death. Evolution had no good sense to boost our lifespans any longer than they are now. The possibilities for new human experiences are boundless\nNanobots will be in charge of providing perfect nutrition to the cells of the body, intelligently advising anything unhealthy to go through the body without affecting anything.\nAI will perform its task with determined and unstoppable efficiency\nThere is a buzz of developing AI through a humanist approach, depending on human values and human rights\nbecause most people think about only humans with intelligence and expect an intelligent machine to be human. This expectation may lead to the belief that AI could either be friendly & moral or evil & immoral.\naspects, such as moral /immoral, apply only to human behaviour, and non-human, non-biological entities are amoral by default\nAI’s code will drive it to do with relentless efficiency what it is programmed to do by its maker. Any prediction that once superintelligent, a system would be over it with their original objective and onto more alluring or meaningful things is anthropomorphizing. AI does not have to change from ‘friendly’ to ‘unfriendly.’ It just has to be doing its work while getting more expert and efficient at the task.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: That causes extinction.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Equipped with superintelligence and all the technology superintelligence would know how to build, Artificial superintelligence would be capable of solving every problem in humanity. Global warming? Artificial superintelligence could first stop CO2 emissions by creating a much better way to generate energy without using fossil fuels. Then it could build some innovative way to begin to remove extra CO2 from the atmosphere\ndiseases? No problem for ASI—the health and medicine industry would be revolutionized beyond imagination. There would be a huge advancement in the Nanotech industry that could transform a bunch of garbage into\nfresh meat and distribute\nthis food across the world using advanced transportation. Artificial superintelligence could even figure out the complicated macro issues and our debates over how economies should work and how world trade is best managed\nAI will make you reevaluate\nyour notion of death. Evolution had no good sense to boost our lifespans any longer than they are now. The possibilities for new human experiences are boundless\nNanobots will be in charge of providing perfect nutrition to the cells of the body, intelligently advising anything unhealthy to go through the body without affecting anything.\nAI will perform its task with determined and unstoppable efficiency\nThere is a buzz of developing AI through a humanist approach, depending on human values and human rights\nbecause most people think about only humans with intelligence and expect an intelligent machine to be human. This expectation may lead to the belief that AI could either be friendly & moral or evil & immoral.\naspects, such as moral /immoral, apply only to human behaviour, and non-human, non-biological entities are amoral by default\nAI’s code will drive it to do with relentless efficiency what it is programmed to do by its maker. Any prediction that once superintelligent, a system would be over it with their original objective and onto more alluring or meaningful things is anthropomorphizing. AI does not have to change from ‘friendly’ to ‘unfriendly.’ It just has to be doing its work while getting more expert and efficient at the task.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Artificial superintelligence\ncapable of solving every problem\nstop CO2 emissions by creating\nway to generate energy\nThen\nbuild\ninnovative way to\nremove extra CO2 from\natmosphere\ndiseases? No problem\nhealth and medicine\nrevolutionized\nadvancement in\nNanotech\ntransform\ngarbage into\nmeat and distribute\nacross the world using advanced transportation\nfigure out\ndebates over how economies should work\nreevaluate\ndeath\nNanobots\nproviding perfect nutrition to\ncells\nadvising anything unhealthy to go through the body\npeople\nexpect\nintelligent machine to be human\nlead to\nbelief that AI could\nbe\nevil\nmoral\napply only to human behaviour\nAI’s\nwill\ndo with relentless efficiency what it is programmed to do\nAny prediction that\nsuperintelligent\nsystem\nbe over\nwith their original objective\nis anthropomorphizing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3. China won’t escalate---strategic vulnerabilities and economic interests dissuade", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Talk of war has become louder in recent days, but the “drumbeat” has been heard for some time now as China’s military capabilities have grown. China does not want war, at least not yet. It’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving.\nScholars like Brendan Taylor have identified four flash points for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage.\n[Paragraphs Condensed]\nWhere tensions are currently high The armistice between North and South Korea has held for nearly 70 years. The pandemic has severely constrained North Korea’s economy and its testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles has ceased, for now. China has a stake in keeping Kim Jong-un’s regime in power in the North, but the prospects of reverting to a hot war have flowed and ebbed. Just south of Korea, in the East China Sea, China has intensified its military activities around the Japanese-claimed but uninhabited Senkaku Islands. China appears to be wearing down Japan’s resolve to resist its claims over what it calls the Diaoyu Islands. The United States has assured Japan the islands fall under their mutual defence security guarantee. But a confrontation with China could test US backing and possibly set the stage for escalated confrontation elsewhere. Similarly, China’s industrial-scale island building in the South China Sea has resulted in extensive military hardware and infrastructure. This will enable the Chinese to consolidate their position militarily and assert control over the so-called nine-dash line — its vast claim over most of the sea. The US Navy continues to conduct freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the sea to challenge China’s claims. With thousands of marked and unmarked Chinese vessels operating there, however, the risk of an accident triggering an escalation is real. In 2016, an international tribunal rejected China’s claims to the waters in a case brought by the Philippines. Despite being a signatory to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, China has ignored the tribunal’s ruling and continued to intrude on islands claimed by both the Philippines and Indonesia. Recently, 220 Chinese vessels were anchored for months at a reef inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China’s actions appear premised on the dictum that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Like China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012 that preceded its massive island construction further south, China could conceivably take the unwillingness of the US to challenge its latest moves as a cue for more assertive action over Taiwan. This is, after all, the main prize Beijing seeks to secure President Xi Jinping’s legacy.\n[Paragraphs Resumed]\nWhy Taiwan’s security matters\nTaiwan presents the US and its allies with a conundrum. It is a liberal open democracy and the world’s leading computer chip maker. It also sits in the middle of what military strategists refer to as the “first island chain” stretching from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. Its strategic significance is profound.\nHaving adopted a “One China” policy since 1979, the US security guarantee for Taiwan is conditional and tenuous. Reflecting growing unease over China’s actions, polls show strong US public support for defending Taiwan.\nSo far, ambiguity has served US interests well, providing some assurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading.\nThis guarantee has been important for Japan, as well. With its pacifist constitution, and occasional concern over US commitment to its defence, Japan would be closely watching how the US approaches its Taiwan policy.\nChina is so far avoiding open war\nMeanwhile, China has metamorphosed both economically and militarily. An exponential growth in China’s military capabilities has been matched by a steep rise in the lethality, accuracy, range and quantity of its weapons systems. On top of this, Beijing has ratcheted up its warlike rhetoric and tactics.\nLast month, Xi made a muscular speech to the Boao Forum Asia, calling for an acceptance of China not only as an emerging superpower but also as an equal in addressing global challenges.\nChina's navy has been significantly upgraded.\nSometimes actions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a “nail” to a US “hammer”. This is for good reason.\nIf war did break out, China would be vulnerable. For starters, it shares land borders with 14 countries, bringing the potential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts.\nThen there are the economic concerns. China has significant Japanese, US and European industrial investments, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through the Malacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the Indo-Pacific’s jugular vein.\nThis reliance on the Malacca Strait — referred to by one analyst as the “Malacca dilemma” — helps explain why China has invested so much capital in its Belt and Road Initiative and studiously avoided open conflict, at least until it is more self-reliant.\nTo avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a paramilitary force with white-painted ships and armed fishing vessels in the thousands to push its claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea and constrict Taiwan’s freedom of action.\nIt also recently passed a new law allowing its coast guard to act more like a military body and enforce maritime law — again in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Talk of war has become louder\nbut\ndrumbeat” has been heard for some time now\nChina does not want war\nIt’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving\nScholars\nhave identified four flash points for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage\nambiguity has served US interests well, providing\nassurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading\nChina is so far avoiding open war\nChina has metamorphosed both economically and militarily\nactions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a “nail” to a US “hammer”. This is for good reason\nIf war did break out, China would be vulnerable\nit shares land borders with 14 countries, bringing\npotential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts\nthere are the economic concerns. China has significant Japanese, US and European industrial investments, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through\nMalacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia\nMalacca dilemma\nexplain why China has invested so much capital in its Belt and Road Initiative and studiously avoided open conflict\nTo avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a paramilitary force", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3. China won’t escalate---strategic vulnerabilities and economic interests dissuade", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Talk of war has become louder\nbut\ndrumbeat” has been heard for some time now\nChina does not want war\nIt’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving\nScholars\nhave identified four flash points for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage\nambiguity has served US interests well, providing\nassurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading\nChina is so far avoiding open war\nChina has metamorphosed both economically and militarily\nactions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a “nail” to a US “hammer”. This is for good reason\nIf war did break out, China would be vulnerable\nit shares land borders with 14 countries, bringing\npotential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts\nthere are the economic concerns. China has significant Japanese, US and European industrial investments, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through\nMalacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia\nMalacca dilemma\nexplain why China has invested so much capital in its Belt and Road Initiative and studiously avoided open conflict\nTo avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a paramilitary force", "role": "user" }, { "content": "drumbeat\nsome time now\nnot want war\nlong game\nflash points\nKorea\nE\nC\nS\nS\nC\nS\nTaiwan\nwar\nnot likely\nassurance\ndiscouraging\nPRC from invading\nactions\navoided crossing the threshold\nopen war\nnail\nUS “hammer”\nvulnerable\nborders\n14 countries\neconomic concerns\nJapanese\nUS\nEu\nindustrial investments\noverwhelmingly dependent\nenergy and goods\nMalacca Strait\nMalacca dilemma\navoided open conflict\navoid\nwar\nparamilitary force", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 3. China won’t escalate---strategic vulnerabilities and economic interests dissuade\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Talk of war has become louder\nbut\ndrumbeat” has been heard for some time now\nChina does not want war\nIt’s playing the long game and its evident intentions have become more unnerving\nScholars\nhave identified four flash points for a possible conflict with China, including Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea and Taiwan, but conventional war is not likely at this stage\nambiguity has served US interests well, providing\nassurance to Taiwan while discouraging the PRC from invading\nChina is so far avoiding open war\nChina has metamorphosed both economically and militarily\nactions speak louder than words. And China’s actions so far have avoided crossing the threshold into open warfare, refusing to present a “nail” to a US “hammer”. This is for good reason\nIf war did break out, China would be vulnerable\nit shares land borders with 14 countries, bringing\npotential for heightened challenges, if not open attack on numerous fronts\nthere are the economic concerns. China has significant Japanese, US and European industrial investments, and is also overwhelmingly dependent on energy and goods passing through\nMalacca Strait between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia\nMalacca dilemma\nexplain why China has invested so much capital in its Belt and Road Initiative and studiously avoided open conflict\nTo avoid outright war, China evidently reckons it is better to operate a paramilitary force", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Scholars\nidentified\nflash points\nincluding Korea\nE\nC\nS\nS\nC\nS\nTaiwan, but\nwar is not likely\nambiguity\nserved US\nwell, providing\nassurance to Taiwan while discouraging\nPRC from invading\nChina is\navoiding open war\nactions speak louder\nChina’s actions\nhave avoided crossing\nthreshold into open war\nrefusing to present a “nail” to a US “hammer”\nIf war\nbreak out, China would be vulnerable\nit shares\nborders with 14 countries, bringing\npotential for\nattack on numerous fronts\nthere are\neconomic concerns. China has significant Japanese, US and Eu\ninvestments, and is\noverwhelmingly dependent on\ngoods passing through\nMalacca Strait\nTo avoid\nwar, China\noperate\nparamilitary force", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4---The perm orders: doesn’t solve the net benefit---guidance is key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nTherefore, getting guidance right is fundamental to the effective exercise of civilian oversight. It has also rarely been more important to master than it is now. Although officers will acknowledge the principle of military subordination to civilian control, many Americans both in and out of uniform nevertheless question the wisdom, sincerity, and competence of civilian leadership. This eroding faith in civilians threatens to overwhelm their formal authority with informal bureaucratic practices such as dominating the process of writing guidance itself. And, for those who question whether civilians can have the expertise and credibility necessary to have the final word in defense policymaking, proffering and implementing good guidance is critical to efficacy. In short, civilians cannot rely only on their prerogatives to exercise control over defense matters. There are — and always have been — skill sets involved. Such civilian skill sets just haven’t been captured as systematically as military ones have.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "getting guidance right is fundamental to the effective exercise of civilian oversight\nIt has\nrarely been more important to master than it is now\nthough officers will acknowledge the principle of military subordination to civil\ncontrol, many\nboth in and out of uniform nevertheless question\ncivil\nleadership. This eroding faith in civilians threatens to overwhelm their formal authority with informal bureaucratic practices\nfor those who question whether civilians can have the\ncred\nto have the final word in defense policymaking\nimplementing good guidance is critical\nIn short, civilians cannot rely only on their prerogatives to exercise control over defense matters\nThere are\nskill sets involved. Such civil\nskill sets just haven’t been captured as systematically as military ones have.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4---The perm orders: doesn’t solve the net benefit---guidance is key.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nTherefore, getting guidance right is fundamental to the effective exercise of civilian oversight. It has also rarely been more important to master than it is now. Although officers will acknowledge the principle of military subordination to civilian control, many Americans both in and out of uniform nevertheless question the wisdom, sincerity, and competence of civilian leadership. This eroding faith in civilians threatens to overwhelm their formal authority with informal bureaucratic practices such as dominating the process of writing guidance itself. And, for those who question whether civilians can have the expertise and credibility necessary to have the final word in defense policymaking, proffering and implementing good guidance is critical to efficacy. In short, civilians cannot rely only on their prerogatives to exercise control over defense matters. There are — and always have been — skill sets involved. Such civilian skill sets just haven’t been captured as systematically as military ones have.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "getting guidance right\nfundamental\nrarely been more important\nnow\nmany\nboth in and out of uniform\ncred\nis critical\nIn short, civilians cannot rely only on their prerogatives to exercise control over defense matters", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 4---The perm orders: doesn’t solve the net benefit---guidance is key.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "getting guidance right is fundamental to the effective exercise of civilian oversight\nIt has\nrarely been more important to master than it is now\nthough officers will acknowledge the principle of military subordination to civil\ncontrol, many\nboth in and out of uniform nevertheless question\ncivil\nleadership. This eroding faith in civilians threatens to overwhelm their formal authority with informal bureaucratic practices\nfor those who question whether civilians can have the\ncred\nto have the final word in defense policymaking\nimplementing good guidance is critical\nIn short, civilians cannot rely only on their prerogatives to exercise control over defense matters\nThere are\nskill sets involved. Such civil\nskill sets just haven’t been captured as systematically as military ones have.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "getting guidance right\nfundamental to\neffective\ncivil\noversight\nrarely been more important to master than\nnow\nthough officers\nacknowledge\n principle of military subordination\nmany\nboth in and out of uniform\nquestion\ncivil\nleadership\neroding faith\noverwhelm\nformal authority with informal bureaucratic practices\nfor those who question\ncivilians\ncred\nimplementing good guidance is critical\ncivilians can\nt rely only on their prerogatives to exercise control over defense matters", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The iterative, ongoing nature of debate ensures that we can make space for the queer Other in debate – only a discursive refusal of traditional norms of debate can challenge the commodified roles that constitute queer existence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "QUEERING ANARCHIST PEDAGOGIES\nPart of poststructuralist, queer, and gender theories' contributions to social theory are criticisms of binary thinking and understandings of our world(s). Queer and (some) gender theories critique the binaries of hetero/homo, man/woman, etc. (e.g., see Butler [11]; Halperin [38]; Sedgwick [74]; Queen and Schimel [68]; Warner [82]). We can likewise apply this project of unpacking and releasing borders of gender and sexuality to the project of dropping the walls around the roles of teacher and student\" (in the academic world and beyond). In fact, breaking down this false binary of teacher/student is a necessary aspect of anarchist education if we are committed to non-hierarchical relationships and practicing prefigurative politics. For a consistent and ethical practice, we need to assume egalitarian social relations in our classrooms in contrast to the hierarchical relationships promoted through various mechanisms by academic institutions. Educational and pedagogical philosophers have written and spoken at length about the benefits of this (e.g., see DeLeon [18], [19], [20], [21]; Armaline [ 3]; DeLeon and Love 2009; Shukaitis [77]; Kahn [50]; Suissa [78]).\nQueer theory offers us new theoretical bases from which we can deconstruct those kinds of binary understandings and create a social practice that tries to blur those distinctions in real time. Judith Butler has written at length on gender performativity—by which she means that gender is not only socially constructed, but that it is iterative of particular norms set in place by dominant and normative cultural status quos (Butler [ 8], [10]). Performativity does not mean that one merely performs their gender (or other identities) in the same way an actor takes on a role. This incorrect (yet often misunderstood as such) notion would assume that we have agency that allows us to choose any gender we desire to perform, and this, for obvious reasons, invisibilizes one of the more important angles of Butler's point: that we are iterating available social roles—we are pulling from already-constructed (and enforced) available gender identities (Butler [ 8], [10]). Her point here is more to illustrate that we don't freely choose roles to perform; rather, we are constituted by such roles, and in our iterations (our repetitions of such roles in our own localized contexts), we simultaneously buttress such cultural norms—or—we challenge such roles by our strategic and unfaithful iterations. This is where anarchist/queer vitality comes in. Instead of obediently reproducing our idea of what a particular role should be, we might play with what a role could be.\nIf we look at the roles of teacher and student as iterative performances in a similar light as Butler's notion of gender performativity, we can get an inkling as to where we can strategically challenge normative roles such as teacher and student and the relationship between the two. For instance, Butler theorizes that because gender is performative and iterative of cultural norms and status quos, that these roles simultaneously constitute us as social beings (in these particular roles) all the while caging us within their particular borders. The place, then, that we can look to subvert these status quos and norms is located within the act of iteration itself. We need to iterate roles (that are simultaneously reiterative) to become a social being—we will not be able to do away with (re)iterations because we cannot escape the world of discourse. But what we can do, as Butler ([ 8], [10]) notes, is subvert such status quos (teacher and student) by iterating in a fresh, lively way—by iterating differently. This is where Butler locates our agency(ies) within a discursive society (regime). We might uncover the genealogies that have created (and continue to create) socially viable ways of being and recognize how they encourage obedience to the status quo. As Claudia W. Ruitenberg ([72], 265) writes, \"Discursive constitution is not discursive determinism.\" This is great news because it means we can be unfaithful to our expected repetitions and be subversive when we perform roles such as teacher and/or student; (Butler [10]; Heckert [42]). Instead, we might be faithful to what is alive within us.\nIt's important to note that when we are dreaming of ways that we can do the roles of teacher and student differently, that as important as our own strategic and playful iterations of status quos (gently allowing for the subversion of hierarchical roles and creating newer, freer, and more fluid roles) are, those of us in the situation will bring our body-memories of roles. We might find ourselves acting out teacher or student, even though we didn't mean to. Or others might be caught up in their own expectations and not understand that it's possible to do things differently. From my past experiences:\nI was in a high school once, teaching sex education. As we went around the circle introducing ourselves, I came to realize that three of the young men were stoned. 'Oh, no!' I thought to myself. As I was explaining how this would be different from our school usually was, one of them asked me to slow down and repeat. He was confused, and I don't think it was just from cannabis. That might have simply made him more honest and less concerned about appearing confused. I knew that what I was doing was radically unschool-like because I had been iterating myself differently for some years. But for them, it was brand new and I couldn't simply tell them it would be different. Why should they believe me against the weight of their experience? I had to show them through my practice and give them time to adjust, to understand that another classroom was possible. I'm grateful to the young man for reminding me of this.\nNorms are not individually created or iterated—they are co-created over time. What we mean here is that there is a \"cumulative power of related speech, writing, and other discourse\" (Ruitenberg [72], 263). Identity categories are \"cumulatively produced\" by such things as \"advertising, school texts, sitcoms, legal discourse, and so on\" (Ruitenberg [72], 263). Although we still feel excited about subverting the status quo of such roles in small places such as within our own classrooms—we understand our lively and subversive iterations as one strategy among many others that might be taken up to truly change the relationships and constitutions of the roles of teacher and student.\nJohnston and Klandermans suggest \"a performative view of culture stresses that social movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape and reshape it\" ([47], 9). If we both live within discursive regimes that constitute our identities, and also have access to a vital agency that allows us to iterate roles and identities differently and subversively, what might (or does) this look like in the classroom? What kind of behavior can we see when teachers and students iterate their roles differently, fluidly, and prefiguring the participatory and egalitarian (and creative!) world(s) in which we want to (and could) live?\nRuitenberg ([72], 265–266) writes \"Educators must conceive of students, and students themselves, not as autonomous agents, nor as passive recipients of tradition, but rather as subjects whose actions and identities both depend on, and can make changes to, discourses that precede and exceed them.\" We argue that teachers, themselves, might well take this to heart in considering their own roles as subjects. From my experiences:\nAs a new graduate student, I am slowly discovering the little ways with which I can reorganize the physical architecture of the classroom I'm given. For instance, I prefer to have the classroom set up as a circle of chairs rather than a room that positions myself at the front with all the students facing me. However, I think it's most likely better practice to actually ask the students how they would prefer to have the room set up, although I like to explain the reasons why I prefer the classroom in this way.\nWe take heart from a long tradition in critical pedagogy questioning the relationship between teachers and students. As Paulo Freire ([32]) wrote, \"Education must begin with the solution of the teacher–student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simultaneously students and teachers\" (72). And as Luhmann ([56]) points out, undermining this false dichotomy in critical pedagogy is intertwined with the queer project of subverting the imaginary divisions of hetero/homo and man/woman. Because the role of student and teacher are embodied roles (Shapiro and Shapiro [76]), we need to be aware of our bodies and how they are being related to each other; to learn how we might release the postures of authority or submission. We can blur the distinction between the roles of teacher and student by committing ourselves to learning from each other in a dynamic and fluid way. How would we want classrooms to function in the worlds we desire to live in? We would like to see classrooms where participants are invited to honor their own experience (while questioning their stories about that experience) above and beyond ideas or practices offered by teachers. That is, we want to see practices of self-loving in the classroom. We also value the open-hearted honesty of teachers who are able to talk about what they/we learn from the experience of working with those labeled students. What mutuality exists without that acknowledgment, out of a desire to maintain clear identities, out of fear? As bell hooks ([45]) has argued, fear and love cannot occupy the same space. If the classroom can be a space of love, separations and hierarchies might unravel, creating space for something Other. \"The meanings we make alongside those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field\" (Carillo Rowe [12], 43). The key for the so-called teacher, then, is to learn to release fear, to be present with it without getting caught up in it. To let themselves be loving.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Queer and (some) gender theories critique the binaries of hetero/homo, man/woman\nWe can likewise apply this project of unpacking and releasing borders of gender and sexuality to the project of dropping the walls around the roles of teacher and student\" (in the academic world and beyond).\nbreaking down this false binary\nis a necessary aspect of anarchist education if we are committed to non-hierarchical relationships and practicing prefigurative politics. For a consistent and ethical practice, we need to assume egalitarian social relations in our classrooms in contrast to the hierarchical relationships promoted through various mechanisms by academic institutions. Educational and pedagogical philosophers have written and spoken at length about the benefits of this\nQueer theory offers us new theoretical bases from which we can deconstruct those kinds of binary understandings and create a social practice that tries to blur those distinctions in real time.\nButler has written at length on gender performativity—by which she means that gender is not only socially constructed, but that it is iterative of particular norms set in place by dominant and normative cultural status quos\nPerformativity does not mean that one merely performs their gender (or other identities) in the same way an actor takes on a role\nthis\ninvisibilizes one of the more important angles of Butler's point: that we are iterating available social roles—we are pulling from already-constructed (and enforced) available gender identities\nwe don't freely choose roles to perform; rather, we are constituted by such roles, and in our iterations (our repetitions of such roles in our own localized contexts), we simultaneously buttress such cultural norms—or—we challenge such roles by our strategic and unfaithful iterations. This is where anarchist/queer vitality comes in. Instead of obediently reproducing our idea of what a particular role should be, we might play with what a role could be.\nButler theorizes that because gender is performative and iterative of cultural norms and status quos, that these roles simultaneously constitute us as social beings (in these particular roles) all the while caging us within their particular borders. The place, then, that we can look to subvert these status quos and norms is located within the act of iteration itself. We need to iterate roles (that are simultaneously reiterative) to become a social being—we will not be able to do away with (re)iterations because we cannot escape the world of discourse.\nThis is where Butler locates our agency(ies) within a discursive society\nmight uncover the genealogies that have created (and continue to create) socially viable ways of being and recognize how they encourage obedience to the status quo\nDiscursive constitution is not discursive determinism.\" This is great news because it means we can be unfaithful to our expected repetitions and be subversive when we perform roles such as teacher and/or student; (Butler [10]; Heckert [42]). Instead, we might be faithful to what is alive within us.\nNorms are not individually created or iterated—they are co-created over time. What we mean here is that there is a \"cumulative power of related speech, writing, and other discourse\nIdentity categories are \"cumulatively produced\" by such things as \"advertising, school texts, sitcoms, legal discourse,\nsocial movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape and reshape it\nIf we both live within discursive regimes that constitute our identities, and also have access to a vital agency that allows us to iterate roles and identities differently and subversively, what might (or does) this look like in the classroom\nEducators must conceive of students, and students themselves, not as autonomous agents, nor as passive recipients of tradition, but rather as subjects whose actions and identities both depend on, and can make changes to, discourses that precede and exceed them\nundermining this false dichotomy in critical pedagogy is intertwined with the queer project of subverting the imaginary divisions of hetero/homo and man/woman. Because the role of student and teacher are embodied roles\nwe need to be aware of our bodies and how they are being related to each other; to learn how we might release the postures of authority or submission. We can blur the distinction between the roles of teacher and student by committing ourselves to learning from each other in a dynamic and fluid way.\nthe classroom can be a space of love, separations and hierarchies might unravel, creating space for something Other. \"The meanings we make alongside those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The iterative, ongoing nature of debate ensures that we can make space for the queer Other in debate – only a discursive refusal of traditional norms of debate can challenge the commodified roles that constitute queer existence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Queer and (some) gender theories critique the binaries of hetero/homo, man/woman\nWe can likewise apply this project of unpacking and releasing borders of gender and sexuality to the project of dropping the walls around the roles of teacher and student\" (in the academic world and beyond).\nbreaking down this false binary\nis a necessary aspect of anarchist education if we are committed to non-hierarchical relationships and practicing prefigurative politics. For a consistent and ethical practice, we need to assume egalitarian social relations in our classrooms in contrast to the hierarchical relationships promoted through various mechanisms by academic institutions. Educational and pedagogical philosophers have written and spoken at length about the benefits of this\nQueer theory offers us new theoretical bases from which we can deconstruct those kinds of binary understandings and create a social practice that tries to blur those distinctions in real time.\nButler has written at length on gender performativity—by which she means that gender is not only socially constructed, but that it is iterative of particular norms set in place by dominant and normative cultural status quos\nPerformativity does not mean that one merely performs their gender (or other identities) in the same way an actor takes on a role\nthis\ninvisibilizes one of the more important angles of Butler's point: that we are iterating available social roles—we are pulling from already-constructed (and enforced) available gender identities\nwe don't freely choose roles to perform; rather, we are constituted by such roles, and in our iterations (our repetitions of such roles in our own localized contexts), we simultaneously buttress such cultural norms—or—we challenge such roles by our strategic and unfaithful iterations. This is where anarchist/queer vitality comes in. Instead of obediently reproducing our idea of what a particular role should be, we might play with what a role could be.\nButler theorizes that because gender is performative and iterative of cultural norms and status quos, that these roles simultaneously constitute us as social beings (in these particular roles) all the while caging us within their particular borders. The place, then, that we can look to subvert these status quos and norms is located within the act of iteration itself. We need to iterate roles (that are simultaneously reiterative) to become a social being—we will not be able to do away with (re)iterations because we cannot escape the world of discourse.\nThis is where Butler locates our agency(ies) within a discursive society\nmight uncover the genealogies that have created (and continue to create) socially viable ways of being and recognize how they encourage obedience to the status quo\nDiscursive constitution is not discursive determinism.\" This is great news because it means we can be unfaithful to our expected repetitions and be subversive when we perform roles such as teacher and/or student; (Butler [10]; Heckert [42]). Instead, we might be faithful to what is alive within us.\nNorms are not individually created or iterated—they are co-created over time. What we mean here is that there is a \"cumulative power of related speech, writing, and other discourse\nIdentity categories are \"cumulatively produced\" by such things as \"advertising, school texts, sitcoms, legal discourse,\nsocial movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape and reshape it\nIf we both live within discursive regimes that constitute our identities, and also have access to a vital agency that allows us to iterate roles and identities differently and subversively, what might (or does) this look like in the classroom\nEducators must conceive of students, and students themselves, not as autonomous agents, nor as passive recipients of tradition, but rather as subjects whose actions and identities both depend on, and can make changes to, discourses that precede and exceed them\nundermining this false dichotomy in critical pedagogy is intertwined with the queer project of subverting the imaginary divisions of hetero/homo and man/woman. Because the role of student and teacher are embodied roles\nwe need to be aware of our bodies and how they are being related to each other; to learn how we might release the postures of authority or submission. We can blur the distinction between the roles of teacher and student by committing ourselves to learning from each other in a dynamic and fluid way.\nthe classroom can be a space of love, separations and hierarchies might unravel, creating space for something Other. \"The meanings we make alongside those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field", "role": "user" }, { "content": "necessary aspect of anarchist education if we are committed to non-hierarchical relationships\nPerformativity does not mean that one merely performs their gender (or other identities) in the same way an actor takes on a role\nwe are constituted by such roles, and in our iterations\nwe simultaneously buttress such cultural norms\nThis is where Butler locates our agency(ies) within a discursive society\nmight uncover the genealogies that have created (and continue to create) socially viable ways of being and recognize how they encourage obedience to the status quo\nwe might be faithful to what is alive within us.\nNorms are not individually created or iterated—they are co-created over time\ncumulative power of related speech, writing, and other discourse\nEducators must conceive of students, and students themselves, not as autonomous agents, nor as passive recipients of tradition, but rather as subjects whose actions and identities both depend on, and can make changes to, discourses that precede and exceed them\nlearning from each other in a dynamic and fluid way.\nthe classroom can be a space of love, separations and hierarchies might unravel, creating space for something Other. \"The meanings we make alongside those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The iterative, ongoing nature of debate ensures that we can make space for the queer Other in debate – only a discursive refusal of traditional norms of debate can challenge the commodified roles that constitute queer existence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Queer and (some) gender theories critique the binaries of hetero/homo, man/woman\nWe can likewise apply this project of unpacking and releasing borders of gender and sexuality to the project of dropping the walls around the roles of teacher and student\" (in the academic world and beyond).\nbreaking down this false binary\nis a necessary aspect of anarchist education if we are committed to non-hierarchical relationships and practicing prefigurative politics. For a consistent and ethical practice, we need to assume egalitarian social relations in our classrooms in contrast to the hierarchical relationships promoted through various mechanisms by academic institutions. Educational and pedagogical philosophers have written and spoken at length about the benefits of this\nQueer theory offers us new theoretical bases from which we can deconstruct those kinds of binary understandings and create a social practice that tries to blur those distinctions in real time.\nButler has written at length on gender performativity—by which she means that gender is not only socially constructed, but that it is iterative of particular norms set in place by dominant and normative cultural status quos\nPerformativity does not mean that one merely performs their gender (or other identities) in the same way an actor takes on a role\nthis\ninvisibilizes one of the more important angles of Butler's point: that we are iterating available social roles—we are pulling from already-constructed (and enforced) available gender identities\nwe don't freely choose roles to perform; rather, we are constituted by such roles, and in our iterations (our repetitions of such roles in our own localized contexts), we simultaneously buttress such cultural norms—or—we challenge such roles by our strategic and unfaithful iterations. This is where anarchist/queer vitality comes in. Instead of obediently reproducing our idea of what a particular role should be, we might play with what a role could be.\nButler theorizes that because gender is performative and iterative of cultural norms and status quos, that these roles simultaneously constitute us as social beings (in these particular roles) all the while caging us within their particular borders. The place, then, that we can look to subvert these status quos and norms is located within the act of iteration itself. We need to iterate roles (that are simultaneously reiterative) to become a social being—we will not be able to do away with (re)iterations because we cannot escape the world of discourse.\nThis is where Butler locates our agency(ies) within a discursive society\nmight uncover the genealogies that have created (and continue to create) socially viable ways of being and recognize how they encourage obedience to the status quo\nDiscursive constitution is not discursive determinism.\" This is great news because it means we can be unfaithful to our expected repetitions and be subversive when we perform roles such as teacher and/or student; (Butler [10]; Heckert [42]). Instead, we might be faithful to what is alive within us.\nNorms are not individually created or iterated—they are co-created over time. What we mean here is that there is a \"cumulative power of related speech, writing, and other discourse\nIdentity categories are \"cumulatively produced\" by such things as \"advertising, school texts, sitcoms, legal discourse,\nsocial movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape and reshape it\nIf we both live within discursive regimes that constitute our identities, and also have access to a vital agency that allows us to iterate roles and identities differently and subversively, what might (or does) this look like in the classroom\nEducators must conceive of students, and students themselves, not as autonomous agents, nor as passive recipients of tradition, but rather as subjects whose actions and identities both depend on, and can make changes to, discourses that precede and exceed them\nundermining this false dichotomy in critical pedagogy is intertwined with the queer project of subverting the imaginary divisions of hetero/homo and man/woman. Because the role of student and teacher are embodied roles\nwe need to be aware of our bodies and how they are being related to each other; to learn how we might release the postures of authority or submission. We can blur the distinction between the roles of teacher and student by committing ourselves to learning from each other in a dynamic and fluid way.\nthe classroom can be a space of love, separations and hierarchies might unravel, creating space for something Other. \"The meanings we make alongside those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Queer\ntheories critique\nbinaries\napply this\nto\ndropping\nwalls around the roles of teacher and student\nnecessary aspect of anarchist education if we are committed to non-hierarchical relationships\nwe need to assume egalitarian social relations\ngender\nis iterative of particular norms set in place by dominant and normative cultural status quos\nwe are iterating available social roles—we are pulling from already-constructed (and enforced) available gender identities\nwe don't\nchoose roles to perform; rather, we are constituted by such roles, and in our iterations\nwe\nbuttress\ncultural norms\nchallenge\nroles by\niterations\nroles\nconstitute us as social beings\nwe can l\nsubvert\nwithin\niteration\nuncover\ngenealogies that\ncreate\nsocially viable ways of being\nDiscursive constitution is not discursive determinism\nNorms are not individually created or iterated—they are co-created over time\na \"cumulative power of related speech, writing, and other discourse\nmovements are\nshaped by culture\nand reshape it\nEducators must conceive of students, and students themselves\nas\nsubjects whose actions and identities\ndepend on, and can make changes to, discourses that precede and exceed them\nundermining this false dichotomy in critical pedagogy is intertwined with the queer project of subverting the imaginary divisions\nWe can blur the distinction between the roles of teacher and student by committing ourselves to learning from each other in a dynamic and fluid way\nthe classroom can be a space of love, separations and hierarchies might unravel, creating space for something Other. \"The meanings we make alongside those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Biden is spending PC on shipping alliances now", "role": "system" }, { "content": "President Joe Biden’s call for shipping reform during his State of Union address is the latest indicator that the longstanding antitrust exemption for ocean carriers may be running aground. On January 7, 2022, this blog asked whether supply chain delays and skyrocketing container shipping prices could lead to the end of ocean carriers’ historical immunity from the antitrust laws under the Shipping Act of 1916. Given events in the ensuing weeks, the answer may well be “yes.” The White House released a Fact Sheet on February 28, entitled “Lowering Prices and Leveling the Playing Field in Ocean Shipping.” After citing estimates that in 2021 the pandemic enabled the container shipping industry to reap profits seven times higher than its 2020 profits, and five times its profit over the entire prior decade, the Biden administration announced several steps designed to “lower consumer prices and level the playing field in ocean shipping.” Id. Among those initiatives, the President called on Congress to pass “reforms that address the current antitrust immunity for ocean shipping alliances.” Id. President Biden echoed this message in his State of the Union address. After commenting that “capitalism without competition isn’t capitalism,” it is “exploitation,” President Biden observed: “During the pandemic, these foreign-owned companies raised prices by as much as 1,000% and made record profits.” Id. He then announced a “crackdown” on ocean carriers “overcharging American businesses and consumers.” Id. In fact, Congress did not wait for the State of the Union to put the shipping antitrust exemption on the chopping block. Representative Jim Costa issued a press release following the State of the Union address describing his bipartisan Ocean Shipping Antitrust Enforcement Act as the answer to President Biden’s call for shipping reform. The bill, which would eliminate the shipping antitrust exemption in its entirety, was introduced in the House on February 28 by Rep. Costa and co-sponsors- Rep. Dusty Johnson and Rep. John Garimendi (whose Ocean Shipping Reform Act passed the House in December 2021 by a 364-60 bipartisan vote). This legislation would thus go even further than the Free Market Antitrust Immunity Reform (“FAIR”) Act bill proposed in 1999-2001, which would have eliminated the exemption for ocean carriers while preserving the exemption for marine terminal operators. We can expect this drive to revive competition in the shipping industry to continue. Reps. Costa and Johnson are the Chair and Ranking Member, respectively, of the House Agriculture Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture. Agricultural export interests have been severely affected by ocean carrier practices during the pandemic, including the shipping of empty containers back to foreign ports.) Our January 7 post observed that Congress could consider more granular approaches. In addition to the FAIR Act approach, we noted that a pro-competitive bill could eliminate the exemptions that enable fuel profiteering while “permitting ocean carriers to continue entering into vessel-sharing agreements that at least in theory promote efficiency by combining containers from multiple carriers onto a single ship—similar to airline codesharing arrangements.” The adverse market effects of the Shipping Act antitrust exemptions continue to command the attention of the White House and Congress. The days of ocean carriers’ antitrust immunity, though more than a century old, may now indeed be numbered.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the President called on Congress to pass “reforms that address the current antitrust immunity for ocean shipping alliances.\nBiden echoed this message in his State of the Union address\nCosta issued a press release following the State of the Union address describing his bipartisan Ocean Shipping Antitrust Enforcement Act as the answer to President Biden’s call for shipping reform\nWe can expect this drive to revive competition in the shipping industry to continue\nShipping Act antitrust exemptions continue to command the attention of the White House", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Biden is spending PC on shipping alliances now\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the President called on Congress to pass “reforms that address the current antitrust immunity for ocean shipping alliances.\nBiden echoed this message in his State of the Union address\nCosta issued a press release following the State of the Union address describing his bipartisan Ocean Shipping Antitrust Enforcement Act as the answer to President Biden’s call for shipping reform\nWe can expect this drive to revive competition in the shipping industry to continue\nShipping Act antitrust exemptions continue to command the attention of the White House", "role": "user" }, { "content": "President called on Congress to pass\nreforms that address\nantitrust immunity for ocean shipping alliances\nechoed this\nin\nState of the Union\nCosta issued a press release\ndescribing\nbipartisan Ocean Shipping Antitrust Enforcement Act as the answer\nShipping Act\nexemptions\ncommand\nattention of the White House", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Plank 6 solves terminal to LIO.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers. As the history of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe demonstrated—its members were the United Kingdom, France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria—a steering group of leading countries can curb the geopolitical and ideological competition that usually accompanies multipolarity.\nConcerts have two characteristics that make them well suited to the emerging global landscape: political inclusivity and procedural informality. A concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there, regardless of their regime type. In so doing, it largely separates ideological differences over domestic governance from matters of international cooperation. A concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements, clearly distinguishing it from the UN Security Council. The UNSC serves too often as a public forum for grandstanding and is regularly paralyzed by disputes among its veto-wielding permanent members. In contrast, a concert offers a private venue that combines consensus building with cajoling and jockeying—a must since major powers will have both common and competing interests. By providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences.\nA global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body. It would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions. This steering group would help fashion new rules of the road and build support for collective initiatives but leave operational matters, such as deploying peacekeeping missions, delivering pandemic relief, and concluding new climate deals, to the UN and other existing bodies. The concert would thus tee up decisions that could then be taken and implemented elsewhere. It would sit atop and backstop, not supplant, the current international architecture by maintaining a dialogue that does not now exist. The UN is too big, too bureaucratic, and too formalistic. Fly-in, fly-out G-7 or G-20 summits can be useful but even at their best are woefully inadequate, in part because so much effort goes toward haggling over detailed, but often anodyne, communiqués. Phone calls between heads of state, foreign ministers, and national security advisers are too episodic and often narrow in scope.\nFashioning major-power consensus on the international norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises—the Concert of Europe relied on these important innovations to preserve peace in a multipolar world. By drawing on lessons from its nineteenth-century forebearer, a twenty-first-century global concert can do the same. Concerts do lack the certitude, predictability, and enforceability of alliances and other formalized pacts. But in designing mechanisms to preserve peace amid geopolitical flux, policymakers should strive for the workable and the attainable, not the desirable but impossible. \nA GLOBAL CONCERT FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY\nA global concert would have six members: China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Democracies and nondemocracies would have equal standing, and inclusion would be a function of power and influence, not values or regime type. The concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop.\nMembers would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters. Although they would not be formal members of the concert, four regional organizations—the African Union, Arab League, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Organization of American States (OAS)—would maintain permanent delegations at the concert’s headquarters. These organizations would provide their regions with representation and the ability to help shape the concert’s agenda. When discussing issues affecting these regions, concert members would invite delegates from these bodies as well as select member states to join meetings. For example, were concert members to address a dispute in the Middle East, they could request the participation of the Arab League, its relevant members, and other involved parties, such as Iran, Israel, and Turkey.\nA global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus. Like the Concert of Europe, it would privilege the territorial status quo and a view of sovereignty that precludes, except in the case of international consensus, using military force or other coercive tools to alter existing borders or topple regimes. This relatively conservative baseline would encourage buy-in from all members. At the same time, the concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty and the potential need to deny sovereign immunity to nations that engage in certain egregious activities. Those activities might include committing genocide, harboring or sponsoring terrorists, or severely exacerbating climate change by destroying rainforests.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers\nA concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there\nA concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements\nBy providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences\nA global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body\nIt would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions\nFashioning major-power consensus on\ninternational norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises\nto preserve peace in a multipolar world\nA global concert would have six members\nChina, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States\nThe concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop\nMembers would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters\nA global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus\nthe concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty\ninclude\nsponsoring terrorists", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Plank 6 solves terminal to LIO.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers\nA concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there\nA concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements\nBy providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences\nA global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body\nIt would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions\nFashioning major-power consensus on\ninternational norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises\nto preserve peace in a multipolar world\nA global concert would have six members\nChina, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States\nThe concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop\nMembers would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters\nA global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus\nthe concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty\ninclude\nsponsoring terrorists", "role": "user" }, { "content": "global concert of major powers\nFashioning major-power consensus on\ninternational norms\nadvancing shared approaches to crises\nto preserve peace in a multipolar world\nChina, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States\ndialogue to build consensus\nsponsoring terrorists", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Plank 6 solves terminal to LIO.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The best vehicle for promoting stability in the twenty-first century is a global concert of major powers\nA concert’s inclusivity means that it puts at the table the geopolitically influential and powerful states that need to be there\nA concert’s informality means that it eschews binding and enforceable procedures and agreements\nBy providing a vehicle for genuine and sustained strategic dialogue, a global concert can realistically mute and manage inescapable geopolitical and ideological differences\nA global concert would be a consultative, not a decision-making, body\nIt would address emerging crises yet ensure that urgent issues would not crowd out important ones, and it would deliberate on reforms to existing norms and institutions\nFashioning major-power consensus on\ninternational norms that guide statecraft, accepting both liberal and illiberal governments as legitimate and authoritative, advancing shared approaches to crises\nto preserve peace in a multipolar world\nA global concert would have six members\nChina, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States\nThe concert’s members would collectively represent roughly 70 percent of both global GDP and global military spending. Including these six heavyweights in the concert’s ranks would give it geopolitical clout while preventing it from becoming an unwieldy talk shop\nMembers would send permanent representatives of the highest diplomatic rank to the global concert’s standing headquarters\nA global concert would shun codified rules, instead relying on dialogue to build consensus\nthe concert would provide an ideal venue for discussing globalization’s impact on sovereignty\ninclude\nsponsoring terrorists", "role": "user" }, { "content": "global concert of major powers\nFashioning major-power consensus on\ninternational norms\nadvancing shared approaches to crises\nto preserve peace in a multipolar world\nChina, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States\nrelying on dialogue to build consensus", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No AI impact---too far off, technical complexities overwhelm", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Convinced that sufficient “intelligence” can overcome almost any obstacle, Bostrom acknowledges few limits on what artificial intelligences might accomplish. Engineering realities rarely enter into Bostrom’s analysis, and those that do contradict the thrust of his argument. He admits that the theoretically optimal intelligence, a “perfect Bayesian agent that makes probabilistically optimal use of available information,” will forever remain “unattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any physical computer.” Yet Bostrom’s postulated “superintelligences” seem uncomfortably close to this ideal. The author offers few hints of how machine superintelligences would circumvent the computational barriers that render the perfect Bayesian agent impossible, other than promises that the advantages of artificial components relative to human brains will somehow save the day. But over the course of 60 years of attempts to create thinking machines, AI researchers have come to the realization that there is far more to intelligence than simply deploying a faster mechanical alternative to neurons. In fact, the history of artificial intelligence suggests that Bostrom’s “superintelligence” is a practical impossibility.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "probabilistically optimal use of available information\nwill forever remain\nunattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any physical computer\nover the course of 60 years of attempts to create thinking machines\nAI researchers\nrealiz\nthere is far more to intelligence than\ndeploying a faster mechanical alternative to neurons\nhistory of a\ni\nsuggests\nsuperintelligence\nis a practical impossibility", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No AI impact---too far off, technical complexities overwhelm\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7", "role": "system" }, { "content": "probabilistically optimal use of available information\nwill forever remain\nunattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any physical computer\nover the course of 60 years of attempts to create thinking machines\nAI researchers\nrealiz\nthere is far more to intelligence than\ndeploying a faster mechanical alternative to neurons\nhistory of a\ni\nsuggests\nsuperintelligence\nis a practical impossibility", "role": "user" }, { "content": "optimal use\nwill forever remain\nunattainable because it is too computationally demanding to be implemented in any\ncomputer\nover\n60 years\nAI researchers\nrealiz\nthere is far more to intelligence than\ndeploying\nfaster\nalternative\nhistory\nsuggests\nsuperintelligence\nis a practical impossibility", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Impact is global war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nA large portion of the burden of creating and maintaining order at the regional or global level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable for several reasons, only one of which is that the United States is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come. The corollary to this point is that no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically; there is no invisible hand in the geopolitical marketplace. Again, a large part of the burden (or, more positively, opportunity) falls on the principal power of the day. There is more than a little self-interest at stake. The United States cannot remain aloof, much less unaffected by a world in disarray. Globalization is more reality than choice. At the regional level, the United States actually faces the opposite problem, namely, that certain actors do have the mind-set and means to shape an order. The problem is that their views of order are in part or in whole incompatible with U.S. interests. Examples would include Iran and ISIS in the Middle East, China in Asia, and Russia in Europe. \nIt will not be an easy time for the United States. The sheer number and range of challenges is daunting. There are a large number of actors and forces to contend with. Alliances, normally created in opposition to some country or countries, may not be as useful a vehicle in a world in which not all foes are always foes and not all friends are always friendly. Diplomacy will count for a great deal; there will be a premium on dexterity. Consultations that aim to affect the actions of other governments and their leaders are likely to matter more than negotiations that aim to solve problems. \nAnother reality is that the United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges. The United States could reduce its carbon footprint dramatically, but the effect on global climate would be modest if India and China failed to follow suit. Similarly, on its own the United States cannot maintain a world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease. Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy. Earlier I made the case that it represents realism for an era of globalization. It also is a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War. There are basic differences, however. Containment was about holding back more than bringing in and was designed for an era when rivals were almost always adversaries and in which the challenges were mostly related to classical geopolitical competition.1 Sovereign obligation, by contrast, is designed for a world in which sometime rivals are sometime partners and in which collective efforts are required to meet common challenges. \nUp to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter. \nWhen it comes to the domestic side, the argument is straightforward. In order to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order. I have written on what this entails in a book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home.2 This was sometimes interpreted as suggesting a turn away from foreign policy. It was nothing of the sort. Foreign policy begins at home, but it ends there only at the country’s peril.3 \nEarlier I mentioned that the United States has few unilateral options, that there are few if any things it can do better alone than with others. The counterpart to this claim is that the world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States. The United States is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is also true that the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities. An additional benefit is that respect for the United States and for the American political, social, and economic model (along with a desire to emulate it) will increase only if it is seen as successful. \nThe most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth. U.S. growth levels may appear all right when compared with what a good many other countries are experiencing, but they are below what is needed and fall short of what is possible. There is no reason why the United States is not growing in the range of 3 percent or even higher other than what it is doing and, more important, not doing.4\n\nFTC CP—\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the burden of\nmaintaining order at the\nglobal level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable\nthe United States is and will\n remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come.\nno other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order.\nThere is more than\nself-interest at stake\ncertain actors\nare\nincompatible with U.S. interests. Examples\ninclude Iran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\n.\nThe sheer number and range of challenges is daunting.\nare\nactors and forces to contend with.\nno country can contend with\nglobal climate\na world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease.\nthe Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia\nfocus on foreign policy is not enough.\nwhat the United States does at home\nis\n as much a part of national security as foreign policy.\nto lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order.\nForeign policy begins at home\n.\nthe world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States.\nthe United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it\nneeds to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities.\nrespect for the U\nS\nwill increase only if it is seen as successful\nThe most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Impact is global war.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the burden of\nmaintaining order at the\nglobal level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable\nthe United States is and will\n remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come.\nno other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order.\nThere is more than\nself-interest at stake\ncertain actors\nare\nincompatible with U.S. interests. Examples\ninclude Iran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\n.\nThe sheer number and range of challenges is daunting.\nare\nactors and forces to contend with.\nno country can contend with\nglobal climate\na world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease.\nthe Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia\nfocus on foreign policy is not enough.\nwhat the United States does at home\nis\n as much a part of national security as foreign policy.\nto lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order.\nForeign policy begins at home\n.\nthe world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States.\nthe United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it\nneeds to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities.\nrespect for the U\nS\nwill increase only if it is seen as successful\nThe most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "maintaining order\nglobal level\nU\nS\ninevitable\nU\nS\nthe most powerful country\ndecades to come\ngroup\ncapacity\nmind-set\ncertain actors\nincompatible\nU.S. interests\nIran\nISIS\nChina\nRussia\nnumber\nrange\nglobal climate\na world trading system\nterror\ndisease\nnot enough\nU\nS\nas much a part\nlead and compete and act effectively\nbegins\nworld\na working order\nU\nS\nU\nS\na strong domestic foundation\nhuman\nphysical\nfinancial\nU\nS\ndoing economically\navailable\nthe way of resources\na divisive and distracting domestic debate\nrespect\nonly if\nmost basic test\necon\ngrowth", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Impact is global war.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the burden of\nmaintaining order at the\nglobal level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable\nthe United States is and will\n remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come.\nno other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order.\nThere is more than\nself-interest at stake\ncertain actors\nare\nincompatible with U.S. interests. Examples\ninclude Iran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\n.\nThe sheer number and range of challenges is daunting.\nare\nactors and forces to contend with.\nno country can contend with\nglobal climate\na world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease.\nthe Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia\nfocus on foreign policy is not enough.\nwhat the United States does at home\nis\n as much a part of national security as foreign policy.\nto lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order.\nForeign policy begins at home\n.\nthe world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States.\nthe United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it\nneeds to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities.\nrespect for the U\nS\nwill increase only if it is seen as successful\nThe most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "maintaining order\nwill fall on the U\nS\n.\nthe U\nS\nwill\nremain the most powerful country\n.\nIran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\nare\nactors\nto contend with.\nclimate\nworld trading\nterror\nor disease.\nForeign policy begins at home\n.\nthe world cannot come up with\na working order absent the U\nS\n.\nNational security\nrequires\nfinancial resources\n. The better the U\nS\nis\neconomically, the more\nresources to devote\nabroad\n.\nThe most basic test\nwill be econ\ngrowth", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Capitalism solves the environment and makes growth sustainable—it’s too late for degrowth, but not too late for the free market. Try or die.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nWhen it comes to generating support for climate policy, a warranted sense of alarm is only half the battle. And the other half-a shared belief that the problem is solvable-is lagging far behind. The newfound sense of urgency is at risk of being swamped by collective despair. A scant six percent of Americans, according to the Yale study, believe that the world \"can and will\" effectively address climate change. With carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels having risen by an estimated 2.7 percent in 2018 and atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, which will determine the ultimate extent of warming, at their highest level in some three million years, such pessimism may seem justified-especially with a climate change denier in the White House. But it is not too late to solve the global climate crisis. A decade of extraordinary innovation has made the greening of the global economy not only feasible but also likely. The market now favors clean energy: in many U.S. states, it is cheaper to build new renewable energy plants than to run existing coal-fired power plants. By combining solar power with new, efficient batteries, Arizona and other sunny states will soon be able to provide electricity at a lower cost per megawatthour than new, efficient natural gas plants. Local, regional, and federal governments, as well as corporations, are making measurable progress on reducing carbon pollution. Since 2000, 21 countries have reduced their annual greenhouse gas emissions while growing their economies; China is expected to see emissions peak by 2025, five years earlier than it promised as part of the negotiations for the Paris climate agreement in 2015. At the UN climate talks held late last year in Poland, countries agreed on rules for how to report progress on meeting emission-reduction commitments, an important step in implementing the Paris accord. What's more, an entirely new arsenal is emerging in the fight against climate change: negative emission technologies, or nets. Nets are different from conventional approaches to climate mitigation in that they seek not to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere but to remove carbon dioxide that's already there. These technologies range from the old-fashioned practice of reforestation to high-tech machines that suck carbon out of the sky and store it underground. The window of opportunity to combat climate change has not closed-and with a push from policymakers, nets can keep it propped open for longer. THE HEAT IS ON How much time is left to avoid climate catastrophe? The truth is that it is impossible to answer the question with precision. Scientists know that human activity is warming the planet but still don't fully understand the sensitivity of the climate system to greenhouse gases. Nor do they fully comprehend the link between average global warming and local repercussions. So far, however, most effects of climate change have been faster and more severe than the climate models predicted. The downside risks are enormous; the most recent predictions, ever more dire. The Paris agreement aims to limit the increase in global average temperatures above preindustrial levels to well below two degrees Celsius, and ideally to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. Going above those levels of warming would mean more disastrous impacts. Global average temperatures have already risen by about one degree Celsius since 1880, with two-thirds of that increase occurring after 1975. An October 2018 special report by the un's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a body of leading scientists and policymakers from around the world, found that unless the world implements \"rapid and far-reaching\" changes to its energy and industrial systems, the earth is likely to reach temperatures of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels sometime between 2030 and 2052. Limiting warming to that level, the ipcc found, would require immediate and dramatic cuts in carbon dioxide: roughly a 45 percent reduction in the next dozen years. Even meeting the less ambitious target of two degrees would require deep cuts in emissions by 2030 and sustained aggressive action far beyond then. The ipcc report also warns that seemingly small global temperature increases can have enormous consequences. For example, the half-degree difference between 1.5 degrees Celsius and two degrees Celsius of total warming could consign twice as many people to water scarcity, put ten million more at risk from rising sea levels, and plunge several hundred million more people into poverty as lower yields of key crops drive hunger across much of the developing world. At two degrees of warming, nearly all of the planet's coral reefs are expected to be lost; at 1.5 degrees, ten to 30 percent could survive. The deeper message of the IPCC report is that there is no risk-free level of climate change. Targets such as 1.5 degrees Celsius or two degrees Celsius are important political markers, but they shouldn't fool anyone into thinking that nature works so precisely. Just as the risks are lower at 1.5 degrees Celsius than at two degrees Celsius, so are they lower at two degrees Celsius than at 2.5 degrees Celsius. Indeed, the latter difference would be far more destructive, since the damages mount exponentially as temperatures rise. To manage the enormous risks of climate change, global emissions of greenhouse gases need to be cut sharply, and as soon as possible. That will require transforming energy, land, transport, and industrial systems so they emit less carbon dioxide. It will also require reducing short-lived climate pollutants such as methane, which stay in the atmosphere for only a fraction of the time that carbon dioxide does but have a disproportionate effect on near-term warming. Yet even that will not be enough. To stabilize the total atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases [GHGs], the world will have to reach net negative emissions-that is, taking more greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere than are being pumped into it. Achieving that through emission reductions alone will be extremely difficult, since some emissions, such as of methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture, are nearly impossible to eliminate. Countering the emissions that are hardest to abate, and bring concentrations down to safer levels, requires technologies that actually remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. That's where nets come in-not as a substitute for aggressive efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but as a complement. By deploying technology that removes existing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, while accelerating cuts in emissions, the world can boost its chances of keeping warming below two degrees and reduce the risk of catastrophe. Scientists and activists have tended to regard these technologies as a fallback option, to be held in reserve in case other efforts fail. Many fear that jumping ahead to carbon dioxide removal will distract from the critical need to cut pollution. But the world no longer has the luxury of waiting for emission-reduction strategies to do the job alone. Far from being a Plan B, nets must be a critical part of Plan A. What's more, embracing nets sooner rather than later makes economic sense. Because the marginal costs of emission reductions rise as more emissions are cut, it will be cheaper to deploy nets at the same time as emission-reduction technologies rather than waiting to exhaust those options first. The wider the solution set, the lower the costs. And the lower the costs, the easier it is to raise ambitions and garner the necessary political support. THE FUTURE IS NOW Even though removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere may sound like the stuff of science fiction, there are already nets that could be deployed at scale today, according to a seminal report released by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in October 2018. One category involves taking advantage of carbon sinks-the earth's forests and agricultural soils, which have soaked up more carbon dioxide since the Industrial Revolution than has been released from burning petroleum. To date, the growth of carbon sinks has been inadvertent: in the United States, for example, as agriculture shifted from the rocky soils of the Northeast to the fertile Midwest, forests reclaimed abandoned farmland, breathing in carbon dioxide in the process. But this natural process can be improved through better forest management-letting trees grow longer before they are harvested and helping degraded forests grow back more quickly. The large-scale planting of trees in suitable locations around the world could increase carbon sinks further, a process that must go hand in hand with efforts to curb tropical deforestation and thereby continue to contain the vast amounts of carbon already stored in the earth's rainforests. Farmland provides additional potential for negative emissions. Around the world, conventional agricultural practices have reduced the amount of carbon in soils, decreasing their fertility in the process. Smarter approaches can reverse the process. Small and large landholders alike could add agricultural waste to soil, maximize the time that the soil is covered by living plants or mulch, and reduce tilling, which releases carbon dioxide. All these steps would decrease the amount of carbon that is lost from soil and increase the amount of carbon that is stored in it. The most technologically sophisticated net available in the near term is known as \"bioenergy with carbon capture and storage,\" or BECCS. It is also the riskiest. Broadly defined, beccs involves burning or fermenting biomass, such as trees or crops, to generate electricity or make liquid fuel; capturing the carbon dioxide produced in the process; and sequestering it underground. It is considered a negative emission technology, and not a zero emission technology, because growing the biomass used in the process removes carbon from the atmosphere. What makes BECCS so exciting is its potential to remove significantly more carbon from the atmosphere than other approaches do. But it also brings challenges. For one, it is expensive: electricity generated from beccs could cost twice as much as that generated with natural gas, because biomass is an inefficient fuel source and capturing and sequestering carbon dioxide is costly. The technology would also require careful monitoring to ensure that the carbon dioxide pumped underground stays there and clear rules for legal liability in the event of leaks. But the fact that private companies have been successfully injecting carbon dioxide into depleted oil and gas reservoirs for decades offers good evidence that permanent storage is possible on a large scale. More worrying are the additional climate risks that BECCS poses. If BECCS drives demand for biomass and more of the carbon that is stored in the forest ecosystem is released as a result, it could end up raising the level of carbon in the atmosphere rather than reducing it. Another concern is competition for land: converting farms or forests to grow energy crops, something that the large-scale use of BEccs might require, could drive up the cost of food, reduce agricultural production, and threaten scarce habitats. These problems could be mitigated by using only biomass waste, such as residues from logging and agriculture, but that would reduce the potential scale. Although BEccs deserves consideration as part of the arsenal, these risks mean that its contribution will likely end up being smaller than some proponents claim. Taking all these land-based nets together, and factoring in the considerable economic, practical, and behavioral hurdles to bringing them to scale, the National Academies report concludes that by midcentury, nets could remove as much as five billion tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere annually. Given the significant risks involved, that estimate is probably too bullish. Even if it were not, that's still only half of the ten billion tons of carbon dioxide that will likely need to be removed each year to zero out the remaining greenhouse gas emissions, even with aggressive cuts. CLOSING THE GAP Removing from the atmosphere the balance of the carbon dioxide necessary will require perfecting technologies currently in development. Two deserve particular mention; both are full of promise, although neither is ready for widespread use. The first is called \"direct air capture\"- essentially, sucking carbon from the sky. The technology is already being tested in Canada, Iceland, Italy, and Switzerland at pilot plants where massive arrays of fans direct a stream of air toward a special substance that binds with the passing carbon dioxide. The substance is then either heated or forced into a vacuum to release the carbon dioxide, which is compressed and either stored or used as feedstocks for chemicals, fuels, or cement. These technologies are real-albeit prohibitively expensive in their current form. As a recent study led by David Sandalow of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy concludes, taking them to scale means solving a variety of technological challenges to bring down the costs. Above all, these processes are highly energy intensive, so scaling them would require enormous amounts of low-carbon electricity. (A direct-air-capture facility powered by coal-fired electricity, for example, would generate more new carbon dioxide than it would capture.) These obstacles are serious, but the surprising progress of the past decade suggests that they can be overcome in the next one. The second technology, enhanced carbon mineralization, is even further from being realized, but it is full of even more possibility. Geologists have long known that when rock from the earth's mantle (the layer of the earth between its crust and its core) is exposed to the air, it binds with carbon dioxide to form carbon-containing minerals. The massive tectonic collisions that formed the Appalachian Mountains around 460 million years ago, for example, exposed subsurface rock to weathering that resulted in the absorption of substantial amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. That took tens of millions of years; enhanced carbon mineralization seeks to fast-forward the process. Scientists are exploring two ways to do this. In one approach, rocks would be brought to the surface to bind with carbon from the air. Such natural weathering already occurs in mine tailings, the waste left over from certain mining operations. But mimicking this process on a large scale-by grinding up large quantities of rock containing reactive minerals and bringing it to the earth's surface-would be highly energy intensive and thus costly, roughly on par with direct air capture. Another potential approach is pumping the carbon dioxide underground to meet the rock. As the National Academies report explains, carbon-dioxide-rich fluids injected into basalt or peridotite formations (two kinds of igneous rock that make up much of the earth's mantle) react with the rock, converting the dissolved carbon dioxide into solid carbon-containing minerals. Pilot projects in Iceland and the United States have demonstrated that this is possible. There is also evidence for how this could work in the natural world. Peridotite usually lies deep inside the earth, but some rock formations around the globe contain pockets of it on the surface. For example, scientists are studying how the surface-level peridotite in Oman's rock formations reacts with the air and absorbs large amounts of carbon. In theory, this approach offers nearly unlimited scale, because suitable rock formations are widespread and readily accessible. It would also be cheap, because it takes advantage of chemical potential energy in the rock instead of costly energy sources. And since the carbon dioxide is converted to solid rock, the effect is permanent, and it carries few of the side effects that other nets could bring. GETTING TO LESS These technologies do not come cheap. The National Academy of Sciences recommends as much as $1 billion annually in U.S. government funding for research on nets. And indeed, such funding should be an urgent priority. But to make these technologies economically viable and scale them rapidly, policymakers will also have to tap into a much more powerful force: the profit motive. Putting a price on carbon emissions creates an economic incentive for entrepreneurs to find cheaper, faster ways to cut pollution. Valuing negative emissions-for example, through an emission-trading system that awards credits for carbon removal or a carbon tax that provides rebates for them-would create an incentive for them to join the hunt for nets. Forty-five countries, along with ten U.S. states, have put in place some mechanism to price carbon. But only a handful of them offer rewards for converting land into forest, managing existing forests better, or increasing the amount of carbon stored in agricultural soils, and none offers incentives for other nets. What's needed is a carbon pricing system that not only charges those who emit carbon but also pays those who remove it. Such a system would provide new revenue streams for landowners who restored forest cover to their land and for farmers and ranchers who increased the amount of carbon stored in their soils. It would also reward the inventors and entrepreneurs who developed new, better technologies to capture carbon from the air and the investors and businesses that took them to scale. Without these incentives, those players will stay on the sidelines. By spurring innovation in lower-cost nets, incentives would also ease the way politically for an ambitious pollution limit-which, ultimately, is necessary for ensuring that the world meets it climate goals. Simply put, humanity's best hope is to promise that the next crop of billionaires will be those who figure out low-cost ways to remove carbon from the sky. The biggest hurdle for such incentives is the lack of a global market for carbon credits. Hope on that front, however, is emerging from an unlikely place: aviation. Currently responsible for roughly two percent of global greenhouse gases, aviation's emissions are expected to triple or quadruple by midcentury in the absence of effective policies to limit them. But in 2016, faced with the prospect that the eu would start capping the emissions of flights landing in and taking off from member states, the un body that governs worldwide air travel, the International Civil Aviation Organization, agreed to cap emissions from international flights at 2020 levels. The airline industry supported the agreement, hoping to avoid the messy regulatory patchwork that might result if the eu went ahead and states beyond the eu followed suit with their own approaches. The resulting program, called the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (corsia), requires all airlines to start reporting emissions this year, and it will begin enforcing a cap in 2021. Once in full swing, at least 100 countries are expected to participate, covering at least three-quarters of the forecast increase in international aviation emissions. Airlines flying between participating countries will have two ways to comply: they can lower their emissions (for example, by burning less fuel or switching to alternative fuels), or they can buy emission-reduction credits from companies. Because the technologies for reducing airline emissions at scale are still a long way off, the industry will mostly choose the second option, relying on carbon credits from reductions in other sectors. It is estimated that over the first 15 years of corsia, demand for these credits will reach between 2.5 billion and 3.0 billion tons-roughly equal to the annual greenhouse gas emissions from the U.S. power and manufacturing sectors. With this new option to sell emission-reduction credits to airlines, there is a good possibility that a pot of gold will await companies that cut or offset their carbon emissions. In short, corsia could catalyze a global carbon market that drives investment in low-carbon fuels and technologies-including nets. To realize its promise, corsia must be implemented properly, and there are powerful forces working to see that it is not. Some countries, including ones negotiating on behalf of their state-owned companies, are trying to rig the system by allowing credits from projects that do not produce legitimate carbon reductions, such as Brazil's effort to allow the sale of credits from huge hydroelectric dams in the Amazon that have already been built and paid for (and thus do not represent new reductions). Allowing such credits into the system could crowd out potential rewards for genuine reductions. But there are also powerful, sometimes unexpected allies who stand to gain from a global carbon market that works. For example, some airlines are motivated to act out of a fear that millennials, concerned about their carbon footprint, may eventually begin to shun air travel. The new regulations, by creating demand for emission reductions and spurring investment in nets to produce jet fuel, could be the industry's best hope of protecting its reputation-and a critical step toward a broader global carbon market that moves nets from promising pilot projects to a gamechanging reality. Skeptics say that nets are too speculative and a possibility only, perhaps, in the distant future. It is true that these innovations are not fully understood and that not all of them will pan out. But no group of scholars and practitioners, no matter how expert, can determine exactly which technologies should be deployed and when. It is impossible to predict what future innovations will look like, but that shouldn't stop the world from pursuing them, especially when the threat is so grave. The fact remains that many nets are ready to be deployed at scale today, and they might make the difference between limiting warming to two degrees and failing to do so. Ultimately, climate change will be stopped by creating economic incentives that unleash the innovation of the private sector-not by waiting for the perfect technology to arrive ready-made, maybe when it's already too late. No one is saying that achieving all of this will be easy, but the road to climate stability has never been that. Hard does not mean impossible, however, and the transformative power of human ingenuity offers an endless source of hope.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "carbon dioxide emissions\nrisen by an estimated 2.7 percent\nand atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide\npessimism may seem justified\nit is not too late to solve the\nclimate crisis\nextraordinary innovation\nmade the greening of the global economy not only feasible but\nlikely\nThe market\nfavors clean energy\nit is cheaper to build new renewable energy plants than\nrun existing coal\nplants\nregional, and federal governments, as well as corporations, are making\nprogress on reducing carbon pollution\n21 countries have reduced\ngreenhouse gas emissions while growing their economies\nnegative emission technologies\nare different from conventional approaches to climate mitigation\nthey seek\nto remove carbon dioxide that's already there\nHow much time is left\nThe truth is\nimpossible to answer\nwith precision\nScientists know\nhuman activity is warming\nbut still don't fully understand\nsensitivity of the climate\ndownside risks are enormous\nthere is no risk-free level of climate change\nTo manage\nenormous risks of climate change, global emissions\nneed to be cut sharply\nand as soon as possible\nThat will require transforming energy, land, transport, and industrial systems so they emit less carbon dioxide\nreducing short-lived climate pollutants such as methane, which stay in the atmosphere for only a fraction of the time that carbon dioxide does but have a disproportionate effect on near-term warming\neven that will not be enough\nTo stabilize the total atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases [GHGs], the world will have to reach net negative emissions-\nAchieving that through emission reductions\nsince some emissions\nare\nimpossible to eliminate\nCountering\nemissions\nrequires technologies that\ncarbon dioxide from the atmosphere\nBy deploying technology that removes existing carbon dioxide\nthe world can\nreduce the risk of catastrophe\nthe world no longer has the luxury of waiting for emission-reduction strategies\nalone\nembracing nets sooner rather than later makes economic sense\nBecause\nmarginal costs of emission reductions rise as more emissions are cut\nit will be cheaper to deploy nets at the same time as emission-reduction technologies rather than waiting\nthere are already nets that could be deployed\ntoday\nThe most technologically sophisticated net\nis\ncarbon capture and storage\nor BECCS\nIt is\na negative emission technology\nbecause growing\nbiomass\nremoves carbon from the atmosphere\nWhat makes BECCS\nexciting is its potential to remove\nmore carbon\nthan other approaches do\nthe fact that private companies have been successfully injecting carbon dioxide into depleted oil and gas reservoirs\noffers good evidence\npermanent storage is possible on a large scale\nby midcentury, nets could remove\nfive billion tons of carbon dioxide\nannually\nRemoving\ncarbon dioxide\nwill require perfecting technologies currently in development\ndirect air capture\nis\nbeing tested\ntechnologies are real-albeit\nexpensive\ntaking them to scale means solving\ntechnological challenges\nprogress\nsuggests\nthey can\novercome\ncarbon mineralization\nis full of\npossibility\nwhen rock from the earth's mantle\nis exposed to\nair, it binds with carbon dioxide\nAnother\nis pumping\ncarbon dioxide underground\ncarbon-dioxide\nfluids injected into basalt or peridotite\nreact with the rock, converting\ndissolved carbon dioxide into solid carbon-containing minerals\nPilot projects\ndemonstrated\nthis is possible\nsince\ncarbon dioxide is converted to solid rock, the effect is permanent\nto make\ntechnologies economically viable and scale them rapidly, policymakers will\nhave to tap into\nthe profit motive\nPutting a price on carbon emissions creates an economic incentive\nto find cheaper, faster ways to cut pollution\na system would provide new revenue streams for landowners who restored forest cover\nand for farmers and ranchers who increased\ncarbon stored in their soils\nIt would\nreward\ninventors and entrepreneurs who developed new, better technologies to capture carbon\nBy spurring innovation\nincentives would\nease the way politically for\nensuring\nthe world meets\nclimate goals\nnets are ready to be deployed\nand they\nmake the difference between\ntwo degrees and failing\nclimate change will be stopped by creating economic incentives that unleash\ninnovation of the private sector\nhuman ingenuity offers an endless source of hope", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Capitalism solves the environment and makes growth sustainable—it’s too late for degrowth, but not too late for the free market. Try or die.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "carbon dioxide emissions\nrisen by an estimated 2.7 percent\nand atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide\npessimism may seem justified\nit is not too late to solve the\nclimate crisis\nextraordinary innovation\nmade the greening of the global economy not only feasible but\nlikely\nThe market\nfavors clean energy\nit is cheaper to build new renewable energy plants than\nrun existing coal\nplants\nregional, and federal governments, as well as corporations, are making\nprogress on reducing carbon pollution\n21 countries have reduced\ngreenhouse gas emissions while growing their economies\nnegative emission technologies\nare different from conventional approaches to climate mitigation\nthey seek\nto remove carbon dioxide that's already there\nHow much time is left\nThe truth is\nimpossible to answer\nwith precision\nScientists know\nhuman activity is warming\nbut still don't fully understand\nsensitivity of the climate\ndownside risks are enormous\nthere is no risk-free level of climate change\nTo manage\nenormous risks of climate change, global emissions\nneed to be cut sharply\nand as soon as possible\nThat will require transforming energy, land, transport, and industrial systems so they emit less carbon dioxide\nreducing short-lived climate pollutants such as methane, which stay in the atmosphere for only a fraction of the time that carbon dioxide does but have a disproportionate effect on near-term warming\neven that will not be enough\nTo stabilize the total atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases [GHGs], the world will have to reach net negative emissions-\nAchieving that through emission reductions\nsince some emissions\nare\nimpossible to eliminate\nCountering\nemissions\nrequires technologies that\ncarbon dioxide from the atmosphere\nBy deploying technology that removes existing carbon dioxide\nthe world can\nreduce the risk of catastrophe\nthe world no longer has the luxury of waiting for emission-reduction strategies\nalone\nembracing nets sooner rather than later makes economic sense\nBecause\nmarginal costs of emission reductions rise as more emissions are cut\nit will be cheaper to deploy nets at the same time as emission-reduction technologies rather than waiting\nthere are already nets that could be deployed\ntoday\nThe most technologically sophisticated net\nis\ncarbon capture and storage\nor BECCS\nIt is\na negative emission technology\nbecause growing\nbiomass\nremoves carbon from the atmosphere\nWhat makes BECCS\nexciting is its potential to remove\nmore carbon\nthan other approaches do\nthe fact that private companies have been successfully injecting carbon dioxide into depleted oil and gas reservoirs\noffers good evidence\npermanent storage is possible on a large scale\nby midcentury, nets could remove\nfive billion tons of carbon dioxide\nannually\nRemoving\ncarbon dioxide\nwill require perfecting technologies currently in development\ndirect air capture\nis\nbeing tested\ntechnologies are real-albeit\nexpensive\ntaking them to scale means solving\ntechnological challenges\nprogress\nsuggests\nthey can\novercome\ncarbon mineralization\nis full of\npossibility\nwhen rock from the earth's mantle\nis exposed to\nair, it binds with carbon dioxide\nAnother\nis pumping\ncarbon dioxide underground\ncarbon-dioxide\nfluids injected into basalt or peridotite\nreact with the rock, converting\ndissolved carbon dioxide into solid carbon-containing minerals\nPilot projects\ndemonstrated\nthis is possible\nsince\ncarbon dioxide is converted to solid rock, the effect is permanent\nto make\ntechnologies economically viable and scale them rapidly, policymakers will\nhave to tap into\nthe profit motive\nPutting a price on carbon emissions creates an economic incentive\nto find cheaper, faster ways to cut pollution\na system would provide new revenue streams for landowners who restored forest cover\nand for farmers and ranchers who increased\ncarbon stored in their soils\nIt would\nreward\ninventors and entrepreneurs who developed new, better technologies to capture carbon\nBy spurring innovation\nincentives would\nease the way politically for\nensuring\nthe world meets\nclimate goals\nnets are ready to be deployed\nand they\nmake the difference between\ntwo degrees and failing\nclimate change will be stopped by creating economic incentives that unleash\ninnovation of the private sector\nhuman ingenuity offers an endless source of hope", "role": "user" }, { "content": "extraordinary innovation\nmade the green\nof the global economy not only feasible but\nlikely\nregional, and federal governments, as well as corporations, are making\nprogress on reducing carbon pollution\nnegative emission technologies\nare different from conventional approaches to climate mitigation\ndownside risks are enormous\nthere is no risk-free level of climate change\neven that will not be enough\nnet negative emissions-\nCountering\nemissions\nrequires technologies that\ncarbon dioxide from the atmosphere\nthe world no longer has the luxury of waiting for emission-reduction strategies\nalone\nthere are already nets that could be deployed\ntoday\nor BECCS\nWhat makes BECCS\nexciting is its potential to remove\nmore carbon\nthan other approaches do\nby midcentury, nets could remove\nfive billion tons of carbon dioxide\nannually\nperfecting technologies currently in development\ndirect air capture\nis\nbeing tested\nprogress\nsuggests\nthey can\novercome\npossibil\nAnother\nis pumping\ncarbon dioxide underground\nsince\ncarbon dioxide is converted to solid rock, the effect is permanent\nthe profit motive\na system would provide new revenue streams for landowners who restored forest cover\nand for farmers and ranchers who increased\ncarbon stored in their soils\nBy spurring innovation\nincentives would\nease the way politically for\nensuring\nthe world meets\nclimate goals\nnets are ready to be deployed\nand they\nmake the difference between\ntwo degrees and failing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Capitalism solves the environment and makes growth sustainable—it’s too late for degrowth, but not too late for the free market. Try or die.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nWhen it comes to generating support for climate policy, a warranted sense of alarm is only half the battle. And the other half-a shared belief that the problem is solvable-is lagging far behind. The newfound sense of urgency is at risk of being swamped by collective despair. A scant six percent of Americans, according to the Yale study, believe that the world \"can and will\" effectively address climate change. With carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels having risen by an estimated 2.7 percent in 2018 and atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, which will determine the ultimate extent of warming, at their highest level in some three million years, such pessimism may seem justified-especially with a climate change denier in the White House. But it is not too late to solve the global climate crisis. A decade of extraordinary innovation has made the greening of the global economy not only feasible but also likely. The market now favors clean energy: in many U.S. states, it is cheaper to build new renewable energy plants than to run existing coal-fired power plants. By combining solar power with new, efficient batteries, Arizona and other sunny states will soon be able to provide electricity at a lower cost per megawatthour than new, efficient natural gas plants. Local, regional, and federal governments, as well as corporations, are making measurable progress on reducing carbon pollution. Since 2000, 21 countries have reduced their annual greenhouse gas emissions while growing their economies; China is expected to see emissions peak by 2025, five years earlier than it promised as part of the negotiations for the Paris climate agreement in 2015. At the UN climate talks held late last year in Poland, countries agreed on rules for how to report progress on meeting emission-reduction commitments, an important step in implementing the Paris accord. What's more, an entirely new arsenal is emerging in the fight against climate change: negative emission technologies, or nets. Nets are different from conventional approaches to climate mitigation in that they seek not to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere but to remove carbon dioxide that's already there. These technologies range from the old-fashioned practice of reforestation to high-tech machines that suck carbon out of the sky and store it underground. The window of opportunity to combat climate change has not closed-and with a push from policymakers, nets can keep it propped open for longer. THE HEAT IS ON How much time is left to avoid climate catastrophe? The truth is that it is impossible to answer the question with precision. Scientists know that human activity is warming the planet but still don't fully understand the sensitivity of the climate system to greenhouse gases. Nor do they fully comprehend the link between average global warming and local repercussions. So far, however, most effects of climate change have been faster and more severe than the climate models predicted. The downside risks are enormous; the most recent predictions, ever more dire. The Paris agreement aims to limit the increase in global average temperatures above preindustrial levels to well below two degrees Celsius, and ideally to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius. Going above those levels of warming would mean more disastrous impacts. Global average temperatures have already risen by about one degree Celsius since 1880, with two-thirds of that increase occurring after 1975. An October 2018 special report by the un's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a body of leading scientists and policymakers from around the world, found that unless the world implements \"rapid and far-reaching\" changes to its energy and industrial systems, the earth is likely to reach temperatures of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels sometime between 2030 and 2052. Limiting warming to that level, the ipcc found, would require immediate and dramatic cuts in carbon dioxide: roughly a 45 percent reduction in the next dozen years. Even meeting the less ambitious target of two degrees would require deep cuts in emissions by 2030 and sustained aggressive action far beyond then. The ipcc report also warns that seemingly small global temperature increases can have enormous consequences. For example, the half-degree difference between 1.5 degrees Celsius and two degrees Celsius of total warming could consign twice as many people to water scarcity, put ten million more at risk from rising sea levels, and plunge several hundred million more people into poverty as lower yields of key crops drive hunger across much of the developing world. At two degrees of warming, nearly all of the planet's coral reefs are expected to be lost; at 1.5 degrees, ten to 30 percent could survive. The deeper message of the IPCC report is that there is no risk-free level of climate change. Targets such as 1.5 degrees Celsius or two degrees Celsius are important political markers, but they shouldn't fool anyone into thinking that nature works so precisely. Just as the risks are lower at 1.5 degrees Celsius than at two degrees Celsius, so are they lower at two degrees Celsius than at 2.5 degrees Celsius. Indeed, the latter difference would be far more destructive, since the damages mount exponentially as temperatures rise. To manage the enormous risks of climate change, global emissions of greenhouse gases need to be cut sharply, and as soon as possible. That will require transforming energy, land, transport, and industrial systems so they emit less carbon dioxide. It will also require reducing short-lived climate pollutants such as methane, which stay in the atmosphere for only a fraction of the time that carbon dioxide does but have a disproportionate effect on near-term warming. Yet even that will not be enough. To stabilize the total atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases [GHGs], the world will have to reach net negative emissions-that is, taking more greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere than are being pumped into it. Achieving that through emission reductions alone will be extremely difficult, since some emissions, such as of methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture, are nearly impossible to eliminate. Countering the emissions that are hardest to abate, and bring concentrations down to safer levels, requires technologies that actually remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. That's where nets come in-not as a substitute for aggressive efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but as a complement. By deploying technology that removes existing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, while accelerating cuts in emissions, the world can boost its chances of keeping warming below two degrees and reduce the risk of catastrophe. Scientists and activists have tended to regard these technologies as a fallback option, to be held in reserve in case other efforts fail. Many fear that jumping ahead to carbon dioxide removal will distract from the critical need to cut pollution. But the world no longer has the luxury of waiting for emission-reduction strategies to do the job alone. Far from being a Plan B, nets must be a critical part of Plan A. What's more, embracing nets sooner rather than later makes economic sense. Because the marginal costs of emission reductions rise as more emissions are cut, it will be cheaper to deploy nets at the same time as emission-reduction technologies rather than waiting to exhaust those options first. The wider the solution set, the lower the costs. And the lower the costs, the easier it is to raise ambitions and garner the necessary political support. THE FUTURE IS NOW Even though removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere may sound like the stuff of science fiction, there are already nets that could be deployed at scale today, according to a seminal report released by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in October 2018. One category involves taking advantage of carbon sinks-the earth's forests and agricultural soils, which have soaked up more carbon dioxide since the Industrial Revolution than has been released from burning petroleum. To date, the growth of carbon sinks has been inadvertent: in the United States, for example, as agriculture shifted from the rocky soils of the Northeast to the fertile Midwest, forests reclaimed abandoned farmland, breathing in carbon dioxide in the process. But this natural process can be improved through better forest management-letting trees grow longer before they are harvested and helping degraded forests grow back more quickly. The large-scale planting of trees in suitable locations around the world could increase carbon sinks further, a process that must go hand in hand with efforts to curb tropical deforestation and thereby continue to contain the vast amounts of carbon already stored in the earth's rainforests. Farmland provides additional potential for negative emissions. Around the world, conventional agricultural practices have reduced the amount of carbon in soils, decreasing their fertility in the process. Smarter approaches can reverse the process. Small and large landholders alike could add agricultural waste to soil, maximize the time that the soil is covered by living plants or mulch, and reduce tilling, which releases carbon dioxide. All these steps would decrease the amount of carbon that is lost from soil and increase the amount of carbon that is stored in it. The most technologically sophisticated net available in the near term is known as \"bioenergy with carbon capture and storage,\" or BECCS. It is also the riskiest. Broadly defined, beccs involves burning or fermenting biomass, such as trees or crops, to generate electricity or make liquid fuel; capturing the carbon dioxide produced in the process; and sequestering it underground. It is considered a negative emission technology, and not a zero emission technology, because growing the biomass used in the process removes carbon from the atmosphere. What makes BECCS so exciting is its potential to remove significantly more carbon from the atmosphere than other approaches do. But it also brings challenges. For one, it is expensive: electricity generated from beccs could cost twice as much as that generated with natural gas, because biomass is an inefficient fuel source and capturing and sequestering carbon dioxide is costly. The technology would also require careful monitoring to ensure that the carbon dioxide pumped underground stays there and clear rules for legal liability in the event of leaks. But the fact that private companies have been successfully injecting carbon dioxide into depleted oil and gas reservoirs for decades offers good evidence that permanent storage is possible on a large scale. More worrying are the additional climate risks that BECCS poses. If BECCS drives demand for biomass and more of the carbon that is stored in the forest ecosystem is released as a result, it could end up raising the level of carbon in the atmosphere rather than reducing it. Another concern is competition for land: converting farms or forests to grow energy crops, something that the large-scale use of BEccs might require, could drive up the cost of food, reduce agricultural production, and threaten scarce habitats. These problems could be mitigated by using only biomass waste, such as residues from logging and agriculture, but that would reduce the potential scale. Although BEccs deserves consideration as part of the arsenal, these risks mean that its contribution will likely end up being smaller than some proponents claim. Taking all these land-based nets together, and factoring in the considerable economic, practical, and behavioral hurdles to bringing them to scale, the National Academies report concludes that by midcentury, nets could remove as much as five billion tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere annually. Given the significant risks involved, that estimate is probably too bullish. Even if it were not, that's still only half of the ten billion tons of carbon dioxide that will likely need to be removed each year to zero out the remaining greenhouse gas emissions, even with aggressive cuts. CLOSING THE GAP Removing from the atmosphere the balance of the carbon dioxide necessary will require perfecting technologies currently in development. Two deserve particular mention; both are full of promise, although neither is ready for widespread use. The first is called \"direct air capture\"- essentially, sucking carbon from the sky. The technology is already being tested in Canada, Iceland, Italy, and Switzerland at pilot plants where massive arrays of fans direct a stream of air toward a special substance that binds with the passing carbon dioxide. The substance is then either heated or forced into a vacuum to release the carbon dioxide, which is compressed and either stored or used as feedstocks for chemicals, fuels, or cement. These technologies are real-albeit prohibitively expensive in their current form. As a recent study led by David Sandalow of Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy concludes, taking them to scale means solving a variety of technological challenges to bring down the costs. Above all, these processes are highly energy intensive, so scaling them would require enormous amounts of low-carbon electricity. (A direct-air-capture facility powered by coal-fired electricity, for example, would generate more new carbon dioxide than it would capture.) These obstacles are serious, but the surprising progress of the past decade suggests that they can be overcome in the next one. The second technology, enhanced carbon mineralization, is even further from being realized, but it is full of even more possibility. Geologists have long known that when rock from the earth's mantle (the layer of the earth between its crust and its core) is exposed to the air, it binds with carbon dioxide to form carbon-containing minerals. The massive tectonic collisions that formed the Appalachian Mountains around 460 million years ago, for example, exposed subsurface rock to weathering that resulted in the absorption of substantial amounts of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. That took tens of millions of years; enhanced carbon mineralization seeks to fast-forward the process. Scientists are exploring two ways to do this. In one approach, rocks would be brought to the surface to bind with carbon from the air. Such natural weathering already occurs in mine tailings, the waste left over from certain mining operations. But mimicking this process on a large scale-by grinding up large quantities of rock containing reactive minerals and bringing it to the earth's surface-would be highly energy intensive and thus costly, roughly on par with direct air capture. Another potential approach is pumping the carbon dioxide underground to meet the rock. As the National Academies report explains, carbon-dioxide-rich fluids injected into basalt or peridotite formations (two kinds of igneous rock that make up much of the earth's mantle) react with the rock, converting the dissolved carbon dioxide into solid carbon-containing minerals. Pilot projects in Iceland and the United States have demonstrated that this is possible. There is also evidence for how this could work in the natural world. Peridotite usually lies deep inside the earth, but some rock formations around the globe contain pockets of it on the surface. For example, scientists are studying how the surface-level peridotite in Oman's rock formations reacts with the air and absorbs large amounts of carbon. In theory, this approach offers nearly unlimited scale, because suitable rock formations are widespread and readily accessible. It would also be cheap, because it takes advantage of chemical potential energy in the rock instead of costly energy sources. And since the carbon dioxide is converted to solid rock, the effect is permanent, and it carries few of the side effects that other nets could bring. GETTING TO LESS These technologies do not come cheap. The National Academy of Sciences recommends as much as $1 billion annually in U.S. government funding for research on nets. And indeed, such funding should be an urgent priority. But to make these technologies economically viable and scale them rapidly, policymakers will also have to tap into a much more powerful force: the profit motive. Putting a price on carbon emissions creates an economic incentive for entrepreneurs to find cheaper, faster ways to cut pollution. Valuing negative emissions-for example, through an emission-trading system that awards credits for carbon removal or a carbon tax that provides rebates for them-would create an incentive for them to join the hunt for nets. Forty-five countries, along with ten U.S. states, have put in place some mechanism to price carbon. But only a handful of them offer rewards for converting land into forest, managing existing forests better, or increasing the amount of carbon stored in agricultural soils, and none offers incentives for other nets. What's needed is a carbon pricing system that not only charges those who emit carbon but also pays those who remove it. Such a system would provide new revenue streams for landowners who restored forest cover to their land and for farmers and ranchers who increased the amount of carbon stored in their soils. It would also reward the inventors and entrepreneurs who developed new, better technologies to capture carbon from the air and the investors and businesses that took them to scale. Without these incentives, those players will stay on the sidelines. By spurring innovation in lower-cost nets, incentives would also ease the way politically for an ambitious pollution limit-which, ultimately, is necessary for ensuring that the world meets it climate goals. Simply put, humanity's best hope is to promise that the next crop of billionaires will be those who figure out low-cost ways to remove carbon from the sky. The biggest hurdle for such incentives is the lack of a global market for carbon credits. Hope on that front, however, is emerging from an unlikely place: aviation. Currently responsible for roughly two percent of global greenhouse gases, aviation's emissions are expected to triple or quadruple by midcentury in the absence of effective policies to limit them. But in 2016, faced with the prospect that the eu would start capping the emissions of flights landing in and taking off from member states, the un body that governs worldwide air travel, the International Civil Aviation Organization, agreed to cap emissions from international flights at 2020 levels. The airline industry supported the agreement, hoping to avoid the messy regulatory patchwork that might result if the eu went ahead and states beyond the eu followed suit with their own approaches. The resulting program, called the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (corsia), requires all airlines to start reporting emissions this year, and it will begin enforcing a cap in 2021. Once in full swing, at least 100 countries are expected to participate, covering at least three-quarters of the forecast increase in international aviation emissions. Airlines flying between participating countries will have two ways to comply: they can lower their emissions (for example, by burning less fuel or switching to alternative fuels), or they can buy emission-reduction credits from companies. Because the technologies for reducing airline emissions at scale are still a long way off, the industry will mostly choose the second option, relying on carbon credits from reductions in other sectors. It is estimated that over the first 15 years of corsia, demand for these credits will reach between 2.5 billion and 3.0 billion tons-roughly equal to the annual greenhouse gas emissions from the U.S. power and manufacturing sectors. With this new option to sell emission-reduction credits to airlines, there is a good possibility that a pot of gold will await companies that cut or offset their carbon emissions. In short, corsia could catalyze a global carbon market that drives investment in low-carbon fuels and technologies-including nets. To realize its promise, corsia must be implemented properly, and there are powerful forces working to see that it is not. Some countries, including ones negotiating on behalf of their state-owned companies, are trying to rig the system by allowing credits from projects that do not produce legitimate carbon reductions, such as Brazil's effort to allow the sale of credits from huge hydroelectric dams in the Amazon that have already been built and paid for (and thus do not represent new reductions). Allowing such credits into the system could crowd out potential rewards for genuine reductions. But there are also powerful, sometimes unexpected allies who stand to gain from a global carbon market that works. For example, some airlines are motivated to act out of a fear that millennials, concerned about their carbon footprint, may eventually begin to shun air travel. The new regulations, by creating demand for emission reductions and spurring investment in nets to produce jet fuel, could be the industry's best hope of protecting its reputation-and a critical step toward a broader global carbon market that moves nets from promising pilot projects to a gamechanging reality. Skeptics say that nets are too speculative and a possibility only, perhaps, in the distant future. It is true that these innovations are not fully understood and that not all of them will pan out. But no group of scholars and practitioners, no matter how expert, can determine exactly which technologies should be deployed and when. It is impossible to predict what future innovations will look like, but that shouldn't stop the world from pursuing them, especially when the threat is so grave. The fact remains that many nets are ready to be deployed at scale today, and they might make the difference between limiting warming to two degrees and failing to do so. Ultimately, climate change will be stopped by creating economic incentives that unleash the innovation of the private sector-not by waiting for the perfect technology to arrive ready-made, maybe when it's already too late. No one is saying that achieving all of this will be easy, but the road to climate stability has never been that. Hard does not mean impossible, however, and the transformative power of human ingenuity offers an endless source of hope.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "it is not too late\ninnovation\nmade the green\neconomy\nfeasible\nit is cheaper to build\nrenewable energy\ngovernments\ncorporations\nare\nreducing carbon pollution\nnegative emission tech\nremove carbon\nalready there\nTo manage\nrisk\nemissions\nneed to be cut\neven that will not be enough\nTo stabilize\natmospheric concentration\nthe world will have to reach net negative emissions\nsome emissions\nare\nimpossible to eliminate\nembracing nets sooner\nmakes economic sense\nBecause\nmarginal cost\nof\nreductions rise as more\nare cut\nit will be cheaper\nthan waiting\nthere are\nnets that could be deployed\ntoday\nbiomass\nremoves carbon from the atmosphere\npermanent storage is possible\nby midcentury\nnets could remove\nfive billion tons\nannually\nRemoving\ncarbon\nwill require perfecting technologies currently in development\ndirect air capture\nis\nbeing tested\nmineralization\nis\npossibil\npumping\ncarbon\nunderground\nis possible\nto make\ntech\nscale\nrapidly, policymakers\ntap into\nthe profit motive\na price\ncreates an\nincentive\nreward\nbetter tech\nto capture carbon\nspurring innovation\nwould\nease the way politically\nclimate change will be stopped by\neconomic incentives", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Verification without categorical prohibition fails to assuage concerns", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Comments on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or Hosting U.S. GBIRMs\nDespite Japan being a close U.S. ally, there are reasons to believe Japan would oppose hosting U.S. GBIRMs. From the start, Japanese officials were vocal in their opposition to the U.S. INF Treaty withdrawal, with the foreign minister calling it “extremely regrettable” and the chief cabinet secretary and foreign press secretary calling it “undesirable.”126 Even then–Prime Minister Abe, while saying he understood U.S. thinking, noted that the treaty’s termination was “not a situation that is desirable.”127\nDespite these negative comments, Japan relies heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. deterrence capabilities. After the United States withdrew from the treaty, then–Defense Minister Kōno spoke about the idea of hosting U.S. GBIRMs, saying, “The US doesn’t have non-nuclear missiles that can be deployed yet. Maybe they’re in the phase of development.”128 This suggested that Japan might host U.S. GBIRMs should nonnuclear missiles be developed. Kōno admitted, however, that his government and that of the United States had not yet talked about the idea.129 Should his comment indicate reluctance to host U.S. GBIRMs, the reluctance likely would stem from two possibilities: political awareness that introducing new U.S. presence into Japan would be difficult or a misunderstanding that U.S. GBIRMs are only nuclear-armed. For the latter point, commentators have pointed out that Washington has not indicated whether specific facilities and systems overseas are to be explicitly nonnuclear.130 This could pose a problem for Japan given its history with nuclear weapons and its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.131 Even if the United States refrained from deploying nuclear capabilities, if the Japanese public believed that such capabilities were nuclear capable or left open the door to such capabilities, it would be politically difficult to obtain local consent to host these capabilities, particularly if China (or Russia) engaged in information operation campaigns to push this idea.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Despite Japan being a close U.S. ally, there are reasons to believe Japan would oppose hosting U.S. GBIRMs\nFrom the start, Japanese officials were vocal in their opposition to the U.S. INF Treaty withdrawal, with the foreign minister calling it “extremely regrettable” and the chief cabinet secretary and foreign press secretary calling it “undesirable.”\nDespite these negative comments, Japan relies heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. deterrence capabilities. After the United States withdrew from the treaty, then–Defense Minister Kōno spoke about the idea of hosting U.S. GBIRMs, saying, “The US doesn’t have non-nuclear missiles that can be deployed yet. Maybe they’re in the phase of development.”\nThis suggested that Japan might host U.S. GBIRMs should nonnuclear missiles be developed\nreluctance likely would stem from two possibilities: political awareness that introducing new U.S. presence into Japan would be difficult or a misunderstanding that U.S. GBIRMs are only nuclear-armed\ncommentators have pointed out that Washington has not indicated whether specific facilities and systems overseas are to be explicitly nonnuclear\na problem for Japan given its history with nuclear weapons and its Three Non-Nuclear Principles\nEven if the United States refrained from deploying nuclear capabilities, if the Japanese public believed that such capabilities were nuclear capable or left open the door to such capabilities, it would be politically difficult to obtain local consent to host these capabilities, particularly if China (or Russia) engaged in information operation campaigns to push this idea", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Verification without categorical prohibition fails to assuage concerns", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Comments on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or Hosting U.S. GBIRMs\nDespite Japan being a close U.S. ally, there are reasons to believe Japan would oppose hosting U.S. GBIRMs. From the start, Japanese officials were vocal in their opposition to the U.S. INF Treaty withdrawal, with the foreign minister calling it “extremely regrettable” and the chief cabinet secretary and foreign press secretary calling it “undesirable.”126 Even then–Prime Minister Abe, while saying he understood U.S. thinking, noted that the treaty’s termination was “not a situation that is desirable.”127\nDespite these negative comments, Japan relies heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. deterrence capabilities. After the United States withdrew from the treaty, then–Defense Minister Kōno spoke about the idea of hosting U.S. GBIRMs, saying, “The US doesn’t have non-nuclear missiles that can be deployed yet. Maybe they’re in the phase of development.”128 This suggested that Japan might host U.S. GBIRMs should nonnuclear missiles be developed. Kōno admitted, however, that his government and that of the United States had not yet talked about the idea.129 Should his comment indicate reluctance to host U.S. GBIRMs, the reluctance likely would stem from two possibilities: political awareness that introducing new U.S. presence into Japan would be difficult or a misunderstanding that U.S. GBIRMs are only nuclear-armed. For the latter point, commentators have pointed out that Washington has not indicated whether specific facilities and systems overseas are to be explicitly nonnuclear.130 This could pose a problem for Japan given its history with nuclear weapons and its Three Non-Nuclear Principles.131 Even if the United States refrained from deploying nuclear capabilities, if the Japanese public believed that such capabilities were nuclear capable or left open the door to such capabilities, it would be politically difficult to obtain local consent to host these capabilities, particularly if China (or Russia) engaged in information operation campaigns to push this idea.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Japan would oppose hosting\nvocal\nopposition\nINF Treaty withdrawal\nDespite\nnegative comments\nhost\nnonnuclear missiles\nreluctance\nstem from\npolitical awareness\nmisunderstanding\nGBIRMs\nnuclear-armed\nEven if\nU\nS\nrefrained from deploying nuclear capabilities\nif\npublic believed\nnuclear capable or left open the door\npolitically difficult\nconsent\nhost\nChina\nor Russia\ninformation operation campaigns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Verification without categorical prohibition fails to assuage concerns\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Despite Japan being a close U.S. ally, there are reasons to believe Japan would oppose hosting U.S. GBIRMs\nFrom the start, Japanese officials were vocal in their opposition to the U.S. INF Treaty withdrawal, with the foreign minister calling it “extremely regrettable” and the chief cabinet secretary and foreign press secretary calling it “undesirable.”\nDespite these negative comments, Japan relies heavily on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. deterrence capabilities. After the United States withdrew from the treaty, then–Defense Minister Kōno spoke about the idea of hosting U.S. GBIRMs, saying, “The US doesn’t have non-nuclear missiles that can be deployed yet. Maybe they’re in the phase of development.”\nThis suggested that Japan might host U.S. GBIRMs should nonnuclear missiles be developed\nreluctance likely would stem from two possibilities: political awareness that introducing new U.S. presence into Japan would be difficult or a misunderstanding that U.S. GBIRMs are only nuclear-armed\ncommentators have pointed out that Washington has not indicated whether specific facilities and systems overseas are to be explicitly nonnuclear\na problem for Japan given its history with nuclear weapons and its Three Non-Nuclear Principles\nEven if the United States refrained from deploying nuclear capabilities, if the Japanese public believed that such capabilities were nuclear capable or left open the door to such capabilities, it would be politically difficult to obtain local consent to host these capabilities, particularly if China (or Russia) engaged in information operation campaigns to push this idea", "role": "user" }, { "content": "reluctance\nstem from\na misunderstanding that\nGBIRMs are\nnuclear-armed\nEven if the U\nS\nrefrained from deploying nuclear\nif the\npublic believed\nwere nuclear capable or left open the door\nit would be politically difficult to obtain\nconsent to host\nparticularly if\ninfo\nop\ns\npush", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Reconciliation is key to pandemic preparedness", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nThe Build Back Better Act, originally introduced in Congress on September 27, 2021, is a broad funding and programmatic package supported by President Biden. The bill, as first introduced by the House, was estimated to total $3.5 trillion. A more recent version now under consideration in the House is estimated to total significantly less, at $1.75 trillion, due to pressures to reduce the bill’s cost. Among the provisions in the bill are several designed to strengthen the public health infrastructure, including the workforce, and to support pandemic preparedness. While the original version of the bill provided $51.8 billion for these purposes (with $36 billion directed toward improving the public health infrastructure and $15.8 billion toward pandemic preparedness), the new version of the bill provides 63% less, or $19.2 billion, including $16.2 billion for public health infrastructure and $3 billion for pandemic preparedness. Almost all public health and preparedness areas in the original bill saw reductions, and several were eliminated. The following table identifies the provisions of the bill related to public health infrastructure and pandemic preparedness, their specific funding amounts, and activities supported.1 Unless otherwise specified, all funding would be made available until expended, and, if ultimately enacted, would build on funding provided in previous emergency spending bills passed by Congress to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Area/Provision Amount Activities HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND WORKFORCE $16,160,000,000 SEC. 31001. FUNDING TO SUPPORT CORE PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE FOR STATE, TERRITORIAL, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS AT THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION $7,000,000,000 (provided between 2022-2026) Funding to support core public health infrastructure activities to strengthen the public health system and expand and improve activities of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Activities include: health equity activities; workforce capacity and competency; all hazards public health and preparedness; testing capacity, including test platforms, mobile testing units, and personnel; health information, health information systems, and health information analysis (including data analytics); epidemiology and disease surveillance; contact tracing; policy and communications; financing; community partnership development; and relevant components of organizational capacity. Funding Allocation: To support core public health infrastructure activities throughout the U.S. Population-Based Grants: $3,500,000,000 provided to each State or territorial health department, and to local health departments that serve counties with a population of at least 2,000,000 or cities with a population of at least 400,000 people. Formula must consider population size and the Social Vulnerability Index. Competitive Grants: $1,750,000,000 provided through competitive grants to State, territorial, local, or Tribal health departments. NOTE: Of the grant funding provided to State health departments through formula and competitive awards, at least 25% must be reallocated to local health departments. CDC: $1,750,000,000 to expand and improve core public health infrastructure and activities at the CDC. SEC. 31002. FUNDING FOR HEALTH CENTER CAPITAL GRANTS $2,000,000,000 Funding to be awarded through grants and cooperative agreements to support community health centers for capital improvement projects. SEC. 31003. FUNDING FOR TEACHING HEALTH CENTER GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION $3,370,000,000 Funding for direct payments and awards to support the establishment of new as well as the maintenance and expansion of existing graduate medical residency training programs. SEC. 31004. FUNDING FOR CHILDREN’S HOSPITALS THAT OPERATE GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS $200,000,000 Funding to support children’s hospitals that operate graduate medical education programs. SEC. 31005. FUNDING FOR NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS $2,000,000,000 Funding to support the National Health Service Corps. SEC. 31006. FUNDING FOR THE NURSE CORPS $500,000,000 Funding to support the Nurse Corps. SEC. 31007. FUNDING FOR SCHOOLS OF MEDICINE IN UNDERSERVED AREAS $500,000,000 Funding to be awarded to support the establishment, improvement, or expansion of an allopathic or osteopathic school of medicine, with priority given to minority-serving institutions, and taking into consideration equitable distribution of awards among the geographical regions of the United States (including rural populations) in order to reach disadvantaged, rural, underserved, underrepresented, and low-income individuals. Among other things, supported activities include: recruiting, enrolling, and retaining students; curricula development, implementation, expansion, and modernization; facilities construction, modernization, or expansion; accreditation; and the hiring of faculty and staff. SEC. 31008. FUNDING FOR SCHOOLS OF NURSING IN UNDERSERVED AREAS $500,000,000 Funding to be awarded to support schools of nursing to enhance and modernize nursing education programs and increase the number of faculty and students at such schools, taking into consideration equitable distribution of awards among the geographical regions of the United States, the capacity of a school of nursing to provide care in underserved areas, and with priority to reach disadvantaged, rural, underserved, underrepresented, and low-income individuals. Among other things, supported activities include: recruiting, enrolling, and retaining students; creating, modernizing, enhancing, or expanding curricula and programs; hiring and retention of faculty; modernizing school infrastructure; and establishing partnerships with healthcare providers as well as interdisciplinary programs to further educational opportunities. SEC. 31009. FUNDING FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AND HOSPICE EDUCATION AND TRAINING $25,000,000 Funding to be awarded through grants and contracts to support the training of health professionals in palliative and hospice care as well as foster patient and family engagement, integration of palliative and hospice care with primary care and other appropriate specialties, and collaboration with community partners to address gaps in health care for individuals in need of palliative or hospice care with priority given to rural, medically underserved populations and communities, Indian Tribes or Tribal Organizations, or Urban Indian organizations. SEC. 31010. FUNDING FOR PALLIATIVE MEDICINE PHYSICIAN TRAINING $20,000,000 Funding to be awarded through grants and contracts to accredited schools of medicine, schools of osteopathic medicine, teaching hospitals, and graduate medical education programs for the purpose of providing support for projects that fund the training of physicians or specialists who plan to teach or practice palliative medicine. SEC. 31011. FUNDING FOR PALLIATIVE CARE AND HOSPICE ACADEMIC CAREER AWARDS $20,000,000 Funding to be awarded to accredited schools of medicine, osteopathic medicine, nursing, social work, psychology, allied health, dentistry, or chaplaincy applying on behalf of board-certified or board-eligible individuals to promote the academic career development as hospice and palliative care specialists. SEC. 31012. FUNDING FOR HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE NURSING $20,000,000 Funding to be awarded as grants and contracts to accredited schools of nursing, health care facilities, programs leading to certification as a certified nurse assistant, or partnerships of such schools and facilities to develop and implement programs and initiatives to train and educate individuals in providing interprofessional, interdisciplinary, team-based palliative care in health-related educational, hospital, hospice, home, or long-term care settings. SEC. 31013. FUNDING FOR DISSEMINATION OF PALLIATIVE CARE INFORMATION $5,000,000 Funding to be provided through the award of grants or contracts to public and nonprofit private entities to disseminate information to inform patients, families, caregivers, direct care workers, and health professionals about the benefits of palliative care throughout the continuum of care for patients with serious or life-threatening illness. PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS $3,000,000,000 SEC. 31021. FUNDING FOR LABORATORY ACTIVITIES AT THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION $1,400,000,000 Acting through the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, funding shall be used to renovate, improve, expand, and modernize State and local public health laboratory infrastructure as well as CDC laboratories. Activities supported include improving and enhancing: testing and response capacity; the Laboratory Response Network for rapid outbreak detection; genomic sequencing capabilities to detect emerging diseases and variant strains; and biosafety and biosecurity capacity. Funding may also be used to enhance the ability of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to monitor and exercise oversight over biosafety and biosecurity of State and local public health laboratories. SEC. 31022. FUNDING FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREPAREDNESS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND COUNTERMEASURE CAPACITY $1,300,000,000 Acting through the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response Activities, funding shall be used to support: Surge capacity, including through construction, expansion, or modernization of facilities, to respond to a public health emergency, for procurement and domestic manufacture of drugs, active pharmaceutical ingredients, vaccines and other biological products, diagnostic technologies and products, personal protective equipment, medical devices, vials, syringes, needles, and other components or supplies for the Strategic National Stockpile Expanded global and domestic vaccine production capacity, including by developing or acquiring new technology and expanding manufacturing capacity through construction, expansion, or modernization of facilities Activities to mitigate supply chain risks and enhance supply chain elasticity and resilience for critical drugs, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and supplies (including essential medicines, medical countermeasures, and supplies in shortage or at risk of shortage), drug and vaccine raw materials, and other supplies through the construction, expansion, or modernization of facilities, adoption of advanced manufacturing processes, and other activities to support domestic manufacturing of such supplies Activities conducted by the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority for advanced research, standards development, and domestic manufacturing capacity for drugs, including essential medicines, diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and personal protective equipment Increased biosafety and biosecurity in research on infectious diseases, including by modernization or improvement of facilities. SEC. 31023. FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION AND INNOVATION AT THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION $300,000,000 Funding provided to improve and modernize infrastructure at the Food and Drug Administration and to enhance food and medical product safety as follows: $150,000,000 for improving technological infrastructure, including through developing integrated systems, and improving the interoperability of information technology systems. $150,000,000 for modernizing laboratory infrastructure of, or used by, the Food and Drug Administration, including modernization of facilities related to, and supporting, such laboratory infrastructure, including through planning for, and the construction, repair, improvement, extension, alteration, demolition, and purchase of, fixed equipment or facilities.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "B\nB\nB\nis\nbroad\nA more recent version\nis estimated\n1.75 trillion\nAmong the provisions in the bill are several designed to strengthen the public health infrastructure\nand\nsupport pandemic preparedness\nthe\nbill provides\n$19.2 billion\nfor public health infrastructure and\npandemic preparedness\nThe following\nidentifies the provisions of the bill related to\npandemic preparedness\nFunding to support core public health infrastructure activities\nActivities include\npreparedness\ntesting\ndisease surveillance\ncontact tracing\norganizational capacity\nimprove core public health infrastructure and activities at the CDC\nFunding for direct payments and awards to support\nmedical residency training programs\nFUNDING FOR NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS\nFUNDING FOR THE NURSE CORPS\nFUNDING FOR LABORATORY ACTIVITIES AT THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL\nto renovate, improve, expand, and modernize\nCDC laboratories\nfor rapid outbreak detection\ngenomic sequencing capabilities to detect emerging diseases\nand biosafety and biosecurity capacity\nSurge capacity\nto respond to a public health emergency\nExpanded global and domestic vaccine production capacity\nActivities to mitigate supply chain risks and enhance supply chain elasticity and resilience for critical drugs\nand vaccine raw materials\nResearch and Development\nfor advanced research\nincluding\nvaccines", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Reconciliation is key to pandemic preparedness", "role": "system" }, { "content": "B\nB\nB\nis\nbroad\nA more recent version\nis estimated\n1.75 trillion\nAmong the provisions in the bill are several designed to strengthen the public health infrastructure\nand\nsupport pandemic preparedness\nthe\nbill provides\n$19.2 billion\nfor public health infrastructure and\npandemic preparedness\nThe following\nidentifies the provisions of the bill related to\npandemic preparedness\nFunding to support core public health infrastructure activities\nActivities include\npreparedness\ntesting\ndisease surveillance\ncontact tracing\norganizational capacity\nimprove core public health infrastructure and activities at the CDC\nFunding for direct payments and awards to support\nmedical residency training programs\nFUNDING FOR NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS\nFUNDING FOR THE NURSE CORPS\nFUNDING FOR LABORATORY ACTIVITIES AT THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL\nto renovate, improve, expand, and modernize\nCDC laboratories\nfor rapid outbreak detection\ngenomic sequencing capabilities to detect emerging diseases\nand biosafety and biosecurity capacity\nSurge capacity\nto respond to a public health emergency\nExpanded global and domestic vaccine production capacity\nActivities to mitigate supply chain risks and enhance supply chain elasticity and resilience for critical drugs\nand vaccine raw materials\nResearch and Development\nfor advanced research\nincluding\nvaccines", "role": "user" }, { "content": "B\nB\nB\n1.75 trillion\n$19.2 billion\nfor public health infrastructure and\npandemic preparedness\npreparedness\ntesting\ndisease surveillance\ncontact tracing\nfor rapid outbreak detection\nResearch and Development\nfor advanced research\nvaccines", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Reconciliation is key to pandemic preparedness\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "B\nB\nB\nis\nbroad\nA more recent version\nis estimated\n1.75 trillion\nAmong the provisions in the bill are several designed to strengthen the public health infrastructure\nand\nsupport pandemic preparedness\nthe\nbill provides\n$19.2 billion\nfor public health infrastructure and\npandemic preparedness\nThe following\nidentifies the provisions of the bill related to\npandemic preparedness\nFunding to support core public health infrastructure activities\nActivities include\npreparedness\ntesting\ndisease surveillance\ncontact tracing\norganizational capacity\nimprove core public health infrastructure and activities at the CDC\nFunding for direct payments and awards to support\nmedical residency training programs\nFUNDING FOR NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE CORPS\nFUNDING FOR THE NURSE CORPS\nFUNDING FOR LABORATORY ACTIVITIES AT THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL\nto renovate, improve, expand, and modernize\nCDC laboratories\nfor rapid outbreak detection\ngenomic sequencing capabilities to detect emerging diseases\nand biosafety and biosecurity capacity\nSurge capacity\nto respond to a public health emergency\nExpanded global and domestic vaccine production capacity\nActivities to mitigate supply chain risks and enhance supply chain elasticity and resilience for critical drugs\nand vaccine raw materials\nResearch and Development\nfor advanced research\nincluding\nvaccines", "role": "user" }, { "content": "B\nB\nB\nis\n1.75 trillion\nAmong\nprovisions\nare several designed to strengthen\nhealth infrastructure\nand\npandemic preparedness\nthe\nbill provides\n19.2 billion\nfor public health\nand\npandemic prep\nThe following\nidentifies the provisions of the bill related to\npandemic preparedness\npreparedness\ntesting\ndisease surveillance\ncontact tracing\norganizational capacity\nimprove core\ninfrastructure\nat the CDC\nFunding for\nmedical residency\nFUNDING FOR\nCDC laboratories\nfor rapid outbreak detection\ngenomic sequencing capabilities to detect emerging diseases\nand biosafety and biosecurity capacity\nSurge capacity\nto respond to a public health emergency\nExpanded global and domestic vaccine production\nActivities to mitigate supply chain risks\nvaccine raw materials\nResearch and Development\nfor advanced research\nincluding\nvaccines", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Devolved state authority is uniform, not pre-empted, and solves case without federal enforcement.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nCongress is free to devolve its domestic powers to states with the exception of coinage and in 1789 enacted the first statute devolving powers to state, and in 1790 enacted the first two of 615 preemption statutes removing regulatory powers from the states. There are nine types of devolution statutes with savings clauses in preemption acts the most common type. Preemption statutes vary in length from less than one page to hundreds of pages, and some are included in another preemption statute or in an omnibus consolidated appropriation act. Courts play a key role in determining whether a statute is a preemptive if it lacks an explicit preemption statement. \nThe proliferation of these statutes has produced a democratic deficit by making it difficult for citizens to determine which plane of government is responsible for many regulatory functions. Congress could clarify to an extent the responsibilities of each plane by directing national regulatory departments and agencies to prepare a Code of Restrictions for each partial preemption statute and implementing regulations. Furthermore, Congress should enact additional innovative preemption statutes respecting state sovereignty while promoting more harmonious state regulation. \nCongress first devolved some of its constitutionally delegated powers to the states in 1789 and enacted its first two preemption statutes in 1790 removing completely two state regulatory powers. Subsequently, numerous statutes containing devolution and/or preemption provisions have been enacted and illustrate the Association’s 2009 annual meeting theme of “Politics in Motion.” These countervailing trends reveal Congress has been the principal architect of constitutionally authorized changes in regulatory power distribution in the United States federal system. \nThe first devolution statute granted power to states to regulate marine pilots in ports and the first two preemption statutes—Copyright Act and the Patent Act—completely removed state regulatory powers in these fields.1 The United States federal system today is the most complex federal system in the world and stands in sharp contrast to the relatively simple and easy to understand system during the early decades of the economic union and the political union when interactions between the national government and the states were limited. The theory of dual federalism had general validity during this time period. \nThe first part of this paper examines briefly powers devolved by Congress to the states. The second part focuses Congress’ use of its preemption powers to remove regulatory powers from the states, mandate that they initiated specified actions, and forbid states to initiate specified actions. The concluding part contains recommendations addressed to Congress to enact innovative statutes encouraging states to harmonize their regulations, preserve the discretionary authority of states, and improve national-state relations. \nDevolution of Powers \t\nTextbooks on the federal system explain the powers delegated by the United States Constitution to Congress and the President by Articles I and II, respectively, and note the Tenth Amendment reserves unspecified powers to the states. Generally omitted are powers devolved by the constitution to each state legislature to (1) determine the times, places, and manner of holding elections for United States Senators and Representatives subject to alteration by Congress, (2) enter into compacts with sister states with the consent of Congress, (3) appoint presidential and vice presidential electors, (4) require Congress to call a convention for the purpose of proposing constitutional amendments, and (5) regulate or prohibit drinking of intoxicating liquors.2\nUnless constitutionally prohibited, a national legislature may devolve its legislative, executive, and administrative powers to one or more territorial governmental units.3 The above constitutionally devolved powers are outweighed in importance by congressionally devolved powers, including consent to interstate compacts allowing states to initiate actions otherwise unconstitutional.4\nEach devolution statute is relatively short in length and may be classified as one of following eleven types. A statute may (1) turn over a specified regulatory responsibility to the states, (2) include one or more savings clauses preventing complete prevention of a field such as a declaration of intent not to preempt, (3) return to states regulatory enforcement authority in a new completely preempted field, (4) authorize a national department or agency to delegate regulatory primacy to states, (5) grant authority to states to establish regulatory standards more stringent than national standards without the approval of a federal agency, (6) permit a state veto of a national government officer’s decision subject to an override by Congress, (7) exempt from preemption a uniform state law enacted by a state legislature, (8) include an opt-in provision and/or an opt-out provision in a preemption statute, (9) empower governors to initiate actions not authorized by their respective state constitution and statutes, (10) grant authority to each state attorney general to file a law suit to enforce a preemption statute, and (11) authorize a state agency to administer a federal program.5\nPowers Devolved to State Legislatures \nA number of devolved powers are relatively insignificant as illustrated by the requirement all appraisals of properties involving federal government transactions must be made by state-licensed or state-certified appraisers, and authorization for a state to register pesticides to meet special local needs. Space limitations prevent a listing of all devolved powers and attention is focused on devolution statutes involving four regulatory fields.6\nMarine Ports and Water Safety\nCongress in 1789 granted states authority to regulate marine pilots and the current Shipping Statute provides “pilots in the bays, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall be regulated only in conformity with the laws of the States.”7\nThe Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 directs the United States Secretary of Transportation to require federally licensed pilots on all domestic and foreign self-propelled vessels “engaged in foreign trade when operating in the navigable waters of the United States in areas and under circumstances where a pilot is not otherwise required by state law.”8 This act also devolves power to states to prescribe higher “safety equipment requirements or safety standards” than federal ones for bridges and other structures on or in the navigable waters of the United States.9\nThe Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1984 directs the Secretary of Transportation to develop standards for determining whether an individual is intoxicated while operating a marine recreational vessel.10 In 1987, the Coast Guard encouraged state legislatures to enact such standards by promulgating a rule adopting a state blood-alcohol-content (BAC) standard if it exists, but also establishing a national BAC standard of 0.08 percent in the absence of a state standard.11 The Coast Guard similarly promulgated a regulation exempting from preemption a state which has a life jacket requirement for persons on boats.12\nInsurance Regulation \nStates historically regulated the business of insurance and the United States Supreme Court in 1868 opined the business does not involve commerce and hence is not subject to regulation by Congress.13 The court in 1944 reversed this decision by holding insurance involves interstate commerce.14 States successfully lobbied Congress to enact the McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945, the most important devolution statute unrelated to a preemption statute, exempting state regulation of the industry from the antitrust statutes and devolving to states the power to regulate the business of insurance.15\nInsurance companies with the passage of time became increasingly frustrated with nonharmonious state regulations that required up to eighteen months to secure the approval of all states for a new product, and lobbied Congress to enact the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 that partially preempts thirteen specified areas of insurance regulation by establishing maximum regulatory standards and threatened to impose a national licensing system for insurance agents if twenty-six states failed to adopt a uniform system by November 12, 2002.16 A federal licensing system was averted when thirty-five states on September 10, 2002, were certified as having a uniform system. \nThe act convinced the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) that state legislatures must initiate additional actions to harmonize insurance regulations, and drafted the Producer Licensing Model Act, providing for interstate reciprocity, that has been enacted by forty-seven state legislatures.17 NAIC also drafted the Interstate Insurance Product Regulation Compact creating a commission with authority to protect consumers by establishing uniform regulatory standards for annuity, disability income, life insurance, and long-term health care products.18 Thirty-four state legislatures and the Puerto Rico legislature by September 1, 2009, enacted the compact creating a commission as a central filing and decision-making body for regulatory approval of new insurance products. The commission acts expeditiously on applications for approval of new products and the time to render a decision on each application averages thirty-one days. \nA number of large insurance companies currently are lobbying Congress to authorize a national charter for insurance companies, and thereby establish a dual insurance charter system somewhat similar to the dual bank charter system. The failure of federal financial regulatory agencies to use successfully powers granted to them by eleven congressional statutes and the success of state attorneys general in prosecuting financial services companies for fraud constitute strong evidence that Congress should not establish a dual insurance charter system at this time.19\nMinimum Standards Preemption\nThis preemption type involves devolution of congressional powers and can be described as “contingent” complete preemption designed to encourage states to initiate action to meet minimum national regulatory standards under the threat of losing primacy in a regulatory field. Congress in 1965 decided water pollution could not be abated by state and local governmental regulation aided by federal conditional grants-in-aid, and a new problem-solving approach was necessary.20 To continue to exercise regulatory authority under a minimum preemption statute, a state must submit a plan containing standards at least as stringent as national ones to the appropriate federal agency for approval and provide evidence the state possesses qualified enforcement personnel and equipment essential for effective enforcement. The agency, after approving a plan, devolves “regulatory primacy” to the state and the role of the agency is limited to monitoring the state’s performance and providing technical advice. A state on occasion has returned “regulatory primacy” to the Environmental Protection Agency, but reaccepted primacy after negotiating an agreement with the agency. \nThis type of preemption encourages states to become responsible in large measure for implementing national regulatory policies and in effect multiplies federal government resources by incorporating resources of the states in national programs. Although this statement suggests Congress “commandeers” resources of reluctant states to achieve its policy goals, this suggestion is not entirely accurate. A state prior to minimum standards preemption may have wished to initiate more stringent regulatory programs, but was reluctant to do so for fear industrial firms would be discouraged from expanding their facilities within the state which also would acquire an anti-business image injuring its industrial recruitment program. \nCongress to date has enacted eight minimum standards regulatory acts: Water Quality Act of 1965 (now Clean Water Act), Air Quality Act of 1967 (now Clean Air Act), Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Hazardous Liquid Pipe Line Safety Act of 1979, Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, Fax Prevention Act of 2005, and Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008. 21\n\n\n\n\n\nRegulation Counterplan—\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Congress is free to devolve its domestic powers to states\nThere are nine types of devolution statutes with savings clauses in preemption acts the most common type.\na national legislature may devolve its legislative\nexecutive\nand administrative powers to one or more territorial governmental units.\nEach devolution statute\nmay be classified as one of following eleven types. A statute may\nturn over a specified regulatory responsibility to the states,\ninclude\ndeclaration of intent not to preempt\nreturn to states regulatory enforcement authority in a new completely preempted field\nexempt from preemption a uniform state law enacted by a state legislature\nempower governors to initiate actions not authorized by their respective state constitution and statutes,\nStates historically regulated the business of insurance\nThe court in 1944 reversed this decision by holding insurance involves interstate commerce.\nthe McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945\nexempt\nstate regulation of the industry from the antitrust statutes\ndevolving to states the power to regulate\nInsurance companies\nbecame\nfrustrated with nonharmonious state regulations\nand lobbied Congress to enact the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act\nestablishing maximum regulatory standards and threatened to impose a national licensing system\nif twenty-six states failed to adopt a uniform system\nstates\nwere certified as having a uniform system\nThe act convinced the National Association of Insurance Commissioners\nthat state legislatures must initiate additional actions to harmonize insurance regulations\nproviding for interstate reciprocity\nenacted by forty-seven state legislatures\nMinimum Standards Preemption\nThis preemption type involves devolution of congressional powers and can be described as “contingent” complete preemption designed to encourage states to initiate action to meet minimum national regulatory standards under the threat of losing primacy in a regulatory field. Congress\ndecided water pollution could not be abated by state and local governmental regulation aided by federal conditional grants-in-aid, and a new problem-solving approach was necessary.\nTo continue to exercise regulatory authority\na state must submit a plan containing standards at least as stringent as national ones to the appropriate federal agency for approval\nThe agency\ndevolves “regulatory primacy” to the state and the role of the agency is limited to monitoring the state’s performance\nThis type of preemption encourages states to become responsible\nfor implementing national regulatory policies and in effect multiplies federal government resources by incorporating resources of the states in national programs.\nCongress “commandeers” resources of reluctant states", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Devolved state authority is uniform, not pre-empted, and solves case without federal enforcement.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Congress is free to devolve its domestic powers to states\nThere are nine types of devolution statutes with savings clauses in preemption acts the most common type.\na national legislature may devolve its legislative\nexecutive\nand administrative powers to one or more territorial governmental units.\nEach devolution statute\nmay be classified as one of following eleven types. A statute may\nturn over a specified regulatory responsibility to the states,\ninclude\ndeclaration of intent not to preempt\nreturn to states regulatory enforcement authority in a new completely preempted field\nexempt from preemption a uniform state law enacted by a state legislature\nempower governors to initiate actions not authorized by their respective state constitution and statutes,\nStates historically regulated the business of insurance\nThe court in 1944 reversed this decision by holding insurance involves interstate commerce.\nthe McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945\nexempt\nstate regulation of the industry from the antitrust statutes\ndevolving to states the power to regulate\nInsurance companies\nbecame\nfrustrated with nonharmonious state regulations\nand lobbied Congress to enact the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act\nestablishing maximum regulatory standards and threatened to impose a national licensing system\nif twenty-six states failed to adopt a uniform system\nstates\nwere certified as having a uniform system\nThe act convinced the National Association of Insurance Commissioners\nthat state legislatures must initiate additional actions to harmonize insurance regulations\nproviding for interstate reciprocity\nenacted by forty-seven state legislatures\nMinimum Standards Preemption\nThis preemption type involves devolution of congressional powers and can be described as “contingent” complete preemption designed to encourage states to initiate action to meet minimum national regulatory standards under the threat of losing primacy in a regulatory field. Congress\ndecided water pollution could not be abated by state and local governmental regulation aided by federal conditional grants-in-aid, and a new problem-solving approach was necessary.\nTo continue to exercise regulatory authority\na state must submit a plan containing standards at least as stringent as national ones to the appropriate federal agency for approval\nThe agency\ndevolves “regulatory primacy” to the state and the role of the agency is limited to monitoring the state’s performance\nThis type of preemption encourages states to become responsible\nfor implementing national regulatory policies and in effect multiplies federal government resources by incorporating resources of the states in national programs.\nCongress “commandeers” resources of reluctant states", "role": "user" }, { "content": "devolve its domestic powers to states\nsavings clauses\nnational legislature\nlegislative\nexecutive\nadministrative powers\nturn over\nspecified regulatory responsibility\nintent not to preempt\nnew completely preempted field\nuniform state law\ninsurance\nreversed this decision\nMcCarran Ferguson Act\nfrom the antitrust statutes\npower to regulate\nnonharmonious state regulations\nmaximum regulatory standards\nnational licensing system\nuniform system\nuniform system\nadditional actions to harmonize insurance regulations\ninterstate reciprocity\nMinimum Standards Preemption\ncontingent\nminimum national regulatory standards\nlosing primacy\nwater pollution\nnew problem-solving approach was necessary\nexercise regulatory authority\nas stringent as national ones\napproval\nregulatory primacy\nmonitoring the state’s performance\nencourages states to become responsible\nnational regulatory policies\nmultiplies federal government resources\ncommandeers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Devolved state authority is uniform, not pre-empted, and solves case without federal enforcement.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Congress is free to devolve its domestic powers to states\nThere are nine types of devolution statutes with savings clauses in preemption acts the most common type.\na national legislature may devolve its legislative\nexecutive\nand administrative powers to one or more territorial governmental units.\nEach devolution statute\nmay be classified as one of following eleven types. A statute may\nturn over a specified regulatory responsibility to the states,\ninclude\ndeclaration of intent not to preempt\nreturn to states regulatory enforcement authority in a new completely preempted field\nexempt from preemption a uniform state law enacted by a state legislature\nempower governors to initiate actions not authorized by their respective state constitution and statutes,\nStates historically regulated the business of insurance\nThe court in 1944 reversed this decision by holding insurance involves interstate commerce.\nthe McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945\nexempt\nstate regulation of the industry from the antitrust statutes\ndevolving to states the power to regulate\nInsurance companies\nbecame\nfrustrated with nonharmonious state regulations\nand lobbied Congress to enact the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act\nestablishing maximum regulatory standards and threatened to impose a national licensing system\nif twenty-six states failed to adopt a uniform system\nstates\nwere certified as having a uniform system\nThe act convinced the National Association of Insurance Commissioners\nthat state legislatures must initiate additional actions to harmonize insurance regulations\nproviding for interstate reciprocity\nenacted by forty-seven state legislatures\nMinimum Standards Preemption\nThis preemption type involves devolution of congressional powers and can be described as “contingent” complete preemption designed to encourage states to initiate action to meet minimum national regulatory standards under the threat of losing primacy in a regulatory field. Congress\ndecided water pollution could not be abated by state and local governmental regulation aided by federal conditional grants-in-aid, and a new problem-solving approach was necessary.\nTo continue to exercise regulatory authority\na state must submit a plan containing standards at least as stringent as national ones to the appropriate federal agency for approval\nThe agency\ndevolves “regulatory primacy” to the state and the role of the agency is limited to monitoring the state’s performance\nThis type of preemption encourages states to become responsible\nfor implementing national regulatory policies and in effect multiplies federal government resources by incorporating resources of the states in national programs.\nCongress “commandeers” resources of reluctant states", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Congress is free to devolve its\npowers to states\n national legislature may\nturn over a specified\nresponsibility to the states,\nreturn\nauthority in a new\nfield\nexempt from preemption a uniform state law\n.\nthe McCarran Ferguson Act\nexempt\nstate regulation\nfrom the antitrust statutes\ndevolving\nthe power to regulate\nCongress\nthreatened to impose\nnational licensing\nThe act convinced\nstate legislatures\nto harmonize\nregulations\nproviding for interstate reciprocity\nThis preemption\ncan be\ndesigned to encourage\nminimum national\nstandards under\nthreat of losing primacy\n.\nThis type of preemption\nin effect multiplies federal\nresources", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: ‘Devaluation’ is a crucial first step.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "This collective purpose can be labelled ‘deep’ devaluing: qualitative changes in nuclear doctrine, posture and practice that restrict the compass of nuclear deterrence; a shift in practices of nuclear deterrence towards the ‘weaponless’ end of the deterrence spectrum; and a significant diminution of the value of nuclear weapons in national security planning and international politics in order to move nuclear-armed states towards disarmament. In this respect NNWS are quite clear that these steps are ‘pragmatic, interim and practical measures’ pending nuclear disarmament and not a permanent substitute for this end goal.28 Negative security assurances NNWS have long sought legally binding assurances from the NWS that they will not be subject to nuclear attack or blackmail. Such negative security assurances (NSAs) were considered during the negotiation of the NPT in the 1960s but did not survive the final draft.29 The 118-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has been pressing for negotiation of a universal, legally binding negative security assurance in treaty form, and reiterated its longstanding policy at the 2010 NPT Review Conference: ‘Pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty should be undertaken as a matter of priority.’30 The NWS issued separate and different non-use declarations for NNWS at the UN General Assembly’s First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. These were further refined in 1995 when new security assurances were issued to garner support for indefinite extension of the NPT.31 These were noted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995). A number of these statements included caveats, including a so-called ‘Warsaw Pact clause’ that exempted NNWS that attacked an NWS in association or alliance with another NWS. This caveat was removed from updated NSAs issued by the US and UK in 2010.32 China, in contrast, extends a blanket, unconditional NSA to all states.33 Beijing’s position and language mirror the NAM’s case for universal and legally binding NSAs.34 NSAs have been closely tied to the formation of nuclear weapon-free zones.35 The NWS have steadily codified their NSAs in legal form for an increasing number of states through protocols to some of these zones. The UK, for example, has legally codified its NSA for nearly 100 countries by ratifying the protocols annexed to the treaties establishing nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ)in South America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, and Africa.36 This total will increase by 15 more countries if the UK resolves outstanding differences to enable signature of the protocols to the treaties establishing similar zones in South-East Asia and Central Asia.37 NSAs are seen as conducive to diminishing the value of nuclear weapons by constraining nuclear practice through formal and legally binding undertakings.38 Under a universal and legally binding NSA regime, nuclear weapon politics would become an exclusive feature of relations between nuclear weapon states and, potentially, states outside the NPT or those in breach of NPT commitments. This would shrink the political realm in which nuclear weapons have salience in interstate relations, reducing it from a global space in which nuclear weapons can be framed as a legitimate response to general ‘strategic uncertainty’ to a much narrower one defined by existential emergencies involving a discrete number of nuclear-armed states pending disarmament. No first use Proposals to formalize no first use of nuclear weapons remain controversial. China has consistently declared, since its first nuclear test in 1964, that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.39 This is reflected in its operational posture whereby, according to Kulacki: ‘China keeps all of its warheads in storage. China’s nuclear warheads and nuclear-capable missiles are kept separate and the warheads are not mated to the missiles until they are prepared for launch.’40 India has also adopted a conditional policy of no first use. No other nuclear-armed states have formally ruled out the possibility of using nuclear weapons first in a crisis. NNWS have consistently advocated a formal no first use agreement since the early 1960s, again with a view to restricting the scope of nuclear deterrent threats and the practice of nuclear deterrence, following the examples of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These banned possession of chemical and biological weapons and were facilitated by established norms against their use in customary international law and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.41 A legally binding and unconditional42 no first use policy would mean NWS could not legally threaten pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against other states (nuclear-armed or otherwise) or retaliatory nuclear use in response to a massive conventional attack, or even engage in nuclear ‘signalling’ during a severe crisis by firing a ‘sub-strategic’ ‘warning shot indicating intent to escalate to a full nuclear exchange should aggression continue’.43 It would limit nuclear deterrence policy and planning to an exclusively defensive posture whereby NWS could consider nuclear use only for two categories of retaliation: (1) to a nuclear attack; (2) possibly to a massive conventional/chemical/biological weapon onslaught that threatened the very survival of the state, that is, in which the state faced destruction through hostile occupation or being bombed or poisoned past the point of recovery (in fact, some have argued for a non-WMD first use agreement that stigmatizes first use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons as an integrated category44). This would consign all other potential missions for nuclear weapons to the doctrinal dustbin with corresponding effects on alert procedures, operational war plans and perhaps procurement decisions.45 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, outlined in their 2005 draft ‘Doctrine for Nuclear Operations’ a range of scenarios for the first use of nuclear weapons that would have to be repealed under a formal no first use agreement, such as countering ‘potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces’.46 This would reinforce the ‘firebreak’ between use of conventional and nuclear weapons, ‘weaken the political force of explicit and implicit threats to initiate the use of nuclear weapons’ and diminish the legitimacy of tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities and plans.47 Acceptance and normalization of no first use would begin to change conceptions of nuclear deterrence in ways that diminish ‘requirements’ for large and diverse nuclear forces. It would restrict the residual deterrent value of nuclear weapons to a narrow and strictly defined set of existential military threats to the survival of the state as a part of the long transition to a world free of nuclear weapons. As K. Subrahmanyam argues: If the world ever is to become free of nuclear weapons the first essential step nuclear-armed nations must take is to adopt the no-first-use policy. No weapon considered legitimate is ever likely to be eliminated. The goal of a nuclear weapon-free world calls for delegitimization of nuclear weapons before they can be eliminated, a process that must start with diminishing their military role.48 The strategic environment for a no first use agreement has improved markedly since the end of the Cold War with the expansion of NWFZs, the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons in addressing complex global security challenges, progressive consolidation of NSAs that constitute no-use pledges to NNWS, and major power interdependence that increasingly and collectively renders the first use of nuclear weapons non-credible.49 Prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons in international law50 without conditions would go a considerable way to devaluing nuclear weapons and constitute a significant step towards the goal of prohibiting possession.51 For some, a no first use agreement would, in effect, prohibit their use at all, though there is a difference between a ‘no use’ agreement, with the implication that nuclear weapons have little value or legitimacy, and a ‘no first use’ agreement that could still legitimate nuclear retaliation against a state that transgresses that agreement.52 Others have taken no first use a step further and argued that the use of nuclear weapons be declared a crime against humanity.53 Embedding the first use of nuclear weapons as a crime under international law would shift the basis of debate from state-centric conceptions of strategic stability among NWS to an ethics of common humanity embodied in international humanitarian law — an issue explored further below.54 \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "collective purpose\ndeep\ndevaluing\nqualitative changes in nuclear doctrine\nposture\npractice that restrict\ncompass of nuclear deterrence\nsignificant diminution of\nvalue of nuclear weapons in national security\nto move nuclear-armed states towards disarmament\nsteps are\npragmatic\ninterim\npractical measures\npending nuclear disarmament\nnot a\nsubstitute for this end goal\nformal no first use agreement\nweaken\npolitical force of explicit and implicit threats to initiate\nuse of nuclear weapons\ndiminish\nlegitimacy of tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities and plans\nno first use\nchange conceptions of nuclear deterrence in ways that diminish\nrequirements\nfor large\nnuclear forces\nrestrict\nresidual deterrent value of nuclear weapons to\nnarrow\nstrictly defined set of existential military threats\nto\nworld free of nuclear weapons\nIf the world ever\nto become free of nuclear weapons the first essential step nuclear\nnations must take is to adopt\nno-first-use\nNo weapon considered legitimate\nlikely to be eliminated\ngoal of\nnuclear weapon-free world calls for delegitimization of nuclear weapons before\neliminated\nprocess\nmust start with diminishing\nmilitary role\nno first use\nEmbedding\nfirst use of nuclear weapons\nshift\nbasis of debate from state-centric conceptions of strategic stability\nto\nethics of common humanity", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: ‘Devaluation’ is a crucial first step.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "This collective purpose can be labelled ‘deep’ devaluing: qualitative changes in nuclear doctrine, posture and practice that restrict the compass of nuclear deterrence; a shift in practices of nuclear deterrence towards the ‘weaponless’ end of the deterrence spectrum; and a significant diminution of the value of nuclear weapons in national security planning and international politics in order to move nuclear-armed states towards disarmament. In this respect NNWS are quite clear that these steps are ‘pragmatic, interim and practical measures’ pending nuclear disarmament and not a permanent substitute for this end goal.28 Negative security assurances NNWS have long sought legally binding assurances from the NWS that they will not be subject to nuclear attack or blackmail. Such negative security assurances (NSAs) were considered during the negotiation of the NPT in the 1960s but did not survive the final draft.29 The 118-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has been pressing for negotiation of a universal, legally binding negative security assurance in treaty form, and reiterated its longstanding policy at the 2010 NPT Review Conference: ‘Pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the Treaty should be undertaken as a matter of priority.’30 The NWS issued separate and different non-use declarations for NNWS at the UN General Assembly’s First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. These were further refined in 1995 when new security assurances were issued to garner support for indefinite extension of the NPT.31 These were noted in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995). A number of these statements included caveats, including a so-called ‘Warsaw Pact clause’ that exempted NNWS that attacked an NWS in association or alliance with another NWS. This caveat was removed from updated NSAs issued by the US and UK in 2010.32 China, in contrast, extends a blanket, unconditional NSA to all states.33 Beijing’s position and language mirror the NAM’s case for universal and legally binding NSAs.34 NSAs have been closely tied to the formation of nuclear weapon-free zones.35 The NWS have steadily codified their NSAs in legal form for an increasing number of states through protocols to some of these zones. The UK, for example, has legally codified its NSA for nearly 100 countries by ratifying the protocols annexed to the treaties establishing nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ)in South America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, and Africa.36 This total will increase by 15 more countries if the UK resolves outstanding differences to enable signature of the protocols to the treaties establishing similar zones in South-East Asia and Central Asia.37 NSAs are seen as conducive to diminishing the value of nuclear weapons by constraining nuclear practice through formal and legally binding undertakings.38 Under a universal and legally binding NSA regime, nuclear weapon politics would become an exclusive feature of relations between nuclear weapon states and, potentially, states outside the NPT or those in breach of NPT commitments. This would shrink the political realm in which nuclear weapons have salience in interstate relations, reducing it from a global space in which nuclear weapons can be framed as a legitimate response to general ‘strategic uncertainty’ to a much narrower one defined by existential emergencies involving a discrete number of nuclear-armed states pending disarmament. No first use Proposals to formalize no first use of nuclear weapons remain controversial. China has consistently declared, since its first nuclear test in 1964, that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.39 This is reflected in its operational posture whereby, according to Kulacki: ‘China keeps all of its warheads in storage. China’s nuclear warheads and nuclear-capable missiles are kept separate and the warheads are not mated to the missiles until they are prepared for launch.’40 India has also adopted a conditional policy of no first use. No other nuclear-armed states have formally ruled out the possibility of using nuclear weapons first in a crisis. NNWS have consistently advocated a formal no first use agreement since the early 1960s, again with a view to restricting the scope of nuclear deterrent threats and the practice of nuclear deterrence, following the examples of the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These banned possession of chemical and biological weapons and were facilitated by established norms against their use in customary international law and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.41 A legally binding and unconditional42 no first use policy would mean NWS could not legally threaten pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons against other states (nuclear-armed or otherwise) or retaliatory nuclear use in response to a massive conventional attack, or even engage in nuclear ‘signalling’ during a severe crisis by firing a ‘sub-strategic’ ‘warning shot indicating intent to escalate to a full nuclear exchange should aggression continue’.43 It would limit nuclear deterrence policy and planning to an exclusively defensive posture whereby NWS could consider nuclear use only for two categories of retaliation: (1) to a nuclear attack; (2) possibly to a massive conventional/chemical/biological weapon onslaught that threatened the very survival of the state, that is, in which the state faced destruction through hostile occupation or being bombed or poisoned past the point of recovery (in fact, some have argued for a non-WMD first use agreement that stigmatizes first use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons as an integrated category44). This would consign all other potential missions for nuclear weapons to the doctrinal dustbin with corresponding effects on alert procedures, operational war plans and perhaps procurement decisions.45 The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, outlined in their 2005 draft ‘Doctrine for Nuclear Operations’ a range of scenarios for the first use of nuclear weapons that would have to be repealed under a formal no first use agreement, such as countering ‘potentially overwhelming adversary conventional forces’.46 This would reinforce the ‘firebreak’ between use of conventional and nuclear weapons, ‘weaken the political force of explicit and implicit threats to initiate the use of nuclear weapons’ and diminish the legitimacy of tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities and plans.47 Acceptance and normalization of no first use would begin to change conceptions of nuclear deterrence in ways that diminish ‘requirements’ for large and diverse nuclear forces. It would restrict the residual deterrent value of nuclear weapons to a narrow and strictly defined set of existential military threats to the survival of the state as a part of the long transition to a world free of nuclear weapons. As K. Subrahmanyam argues: If the world ever is to become free of nuclear weapons the first essential step nuclear-armed nations must take is to adopt the no-first-use policy. No weapon considered legitimate is ever likely to be eliminated. The goal of a nuclear weapon-free world calls for delegitimization of nuclear weapons before they can be eliminated, a process that must start with diminishing their military role.48 The strategic environment for a no first use agreement has improved markedly since the end of the Cold War with the expansion of NWFZs, the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons in addressing complex global security challenges, progressive consolidation of NSAs that constitute no-use pledges to NNWS, and major power interdependence that increasingly and collectively renders the first use of nuclear weapons non-credible.49 Prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons in international law50 without conditions would go a considerable way to devaluing nuclear weapons and constitute a significant step towards the goal of prohibiting possession.51 For some, a no first use agreement would, in effect, prohibit their use at all, though there is a difference between a ‘no use’ agreement, with the implication that nuclear weapons have little value or legitimacy, and a ‘no first use’ agreement that could still legitimate nuclear retaliation against a state that transgresses that agreement.52 Others have taken no first use a step further and argued that the use of nuclear weapons be declared a crime against humanity.53 Embedding the first use of nuclear weapons as a crime under international law would shift the basis of debate from state-centric conceptions of strategic stability among NWS to an ethics of common humanity embodied in international humanitarian law — an issue explored further below.54 \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "deep\ndevaluing\nsignificant diminution\ntowards disarmament\npractical measures\nnot a\nsubstitute\nn\nf\nu\nexplicit and implicit threats\nnuclear war-fighting\nn\nf\nu\nresidual deterrent value\nstrictly defined\nexistential military threats\nfirst essential step\nn\nf\nu\nconsidered legitimate\ndelegitimization\nmust start\nn\nf\nu\nstate-centric conceptions\nstrategic stability\ncommon humanity", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: ‘Devaluation’ is a crucial first step.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "collective purpose\ndeep\ndevaluing\nqualitative changes in nuclear doctrine\nposture\npractice that restrict\ncompass of nuclear deterrence\nsignificant diminution of\nvalue of nuclear weapons in national security\nto move nuclear-armed states towards disarmament\nsteps are\npragmatic\ninterim\npractical measures\npending nuclear disarmament\nnot a\nsubstitute for this end goal\nformal no first use agreement\nweaken\npolitical force of explicit and implicit threats to initiate\nuse of nuclear weapons\ndiminish\nlegitimacy of tactical nuclear war-fighting capabilities and plans\nno first use\nchange conceptions of nuclear deterrence in ways that diminish\nrequirements\nfor large\nnuclear forces\nrestrict\nresidual deterrent value of nuclear weapons to\nnarrow\nstrictly defined set of existential military threats\nto\nworld free of nuclear weapons\nIf the world ever\nto become free of nuclear weapons the first essential step nuclear\nnations must take is to adopt\nno-first-use\nNo weapon considered legitimate\nlikely to be eliminated\ngoal of\nnuclear weapon-free world calls for delegitimization of nuclear weapons before\neliminated\nprocess\nmust start with diminishing\nmilitary role\nno first use\nEmbedding\nfirst use of nuclear weapons\nshift\nbasis of debate from state-centric conceptions of strategic stability\nto\nethics of common humanity", "role": "user" }, { "content": "deep\ndevaluing\nqualitative changes in nuclear doctrine\nposture\npractice\nrestrict\nnuclear deterrence\nmove\ntowards disarmament\nsteps are\npragmatic\ninterim\nmeasures\nnot a\nsubstitute for\nend goal\nn\nf\nu\nweaken\npolitical force of\nnuclear weapons\ndiminish\nimacy of\nnuclear war-fighting\nchange conceptions of nuclear deterrence\nrestrict\ndeterrent\nto\nnarrow\nstrictly defined\nthreats\nIf\nworld ever\nbecome free of nuclear weapons the first essential step\nis\nn\nf\nu\nNo weapon considered legitimate\neliminated\ngoal\ncalls for delegitimization of nuclear weapons before\nprocess\nmust start with diminishing\nmilitary role\nshift\ndebate from state-centric\nstability\nto\nethics of\nhumanity", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2—Legislative and judicial action are key to restoring deterrence and clarity that were destroyed by First and Third Circuit decisions that gutted Actavis—that’s Soter AND …", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nAlthough legislative reform is no small task,181 this legislative reform most succinctly addresses patent and antitrust policy concerns. However, because legislative reform is such a sizeable goal, reform should be made through common law, where federal courts would work to create a uniform standard in approaching pay-for-delay settlement litigation arising out of the Hatch-Waxman Act.\nLawmakers should act now⎯tensions are too high between patent and antitrust law to continue in this COVID-19 pandemic absent a uniform standard for addressing reverse payments.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "legislative reform most succinctly addresses patent and antitrust policy concerns.\nreform should be made through common law, where federal courts would work to create a uniform standard in approaching pay-for-delay\nLawmakers should act now⎯tensions are too high between patent and antitrust law to continue in this COVID-19 pandemic absent a uniform standard", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2—Legislative and judicial action are key to restoring deterrence and clarity that were destroyed by First and Third Circuit decisions that gutted Actavis—that’s Soter AND …\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "legislative reform most succinctly addresses patent and antitrust policy concerns.\nreform should be made through common law, where federal courts would work to create a uniform standard in approaching pay-for-delay\nLawmakers should act now⎯tensions are too high between patent and antitrust law to continue in this COVID-19 pandemic absent a uniform standard", "role": "user" }, { "content": "legislative reform most succinctly addresses\nantitrust\nconcerns\ncourts would\ncreate a uniform standard\nLawmakers should act now", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The DOJ is already prepared to engage in more antitrust litigation over SEP’s---tradeoffs inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Justice Department has confirmed it is looking to develop new policies surrounding how standard-essential patents might be used as tools for anticompetitive practices. The change in policy will mean big business for law firms that can combine highly technical IP advice with their antitrust and litigation practices, with one lawyer likening the demanding skill set to “three-dimensional chess.” Standard-essential patents, or SEPs, are a fundamental piece of intellectual property for business and innovation because they are used under license so frequently by manufacturing companies other than the patent owners. The policy change was hinted at during an online event in late May, when Richard Powers, the acting attorney general of DOJ’s antitrust division, gave an indication that the government might be walking back the relaxed approach implemented by the DOJ under the Trump administration. A DOJ spokesperson confirmed in an email Tuesday to Law.com that it will change its policy on SEPs and antitrust behavior, with the agency still working out the details. The new administration, said the DOJ spokesperson, is rethinking what policies at the intersection of IP and anti- trust will best serve competition and consumers. “New Department leadership is working with career staff on developing a more balanced approach,” said the DOJ spokesperson. “The department wants to develop neutral and balanced policies in this area that recognize the importance of both antitrust enforcement and JUNE 15, 2021 As DOJ Confirms a Change in Antitrust Patent Policy, Lawyers Prepare for Shifting Demand BY BRUCE LOVE U.S. law has often shied away from enforcing essential patent obligations. That’s set to change. The result could be “a significant change in the volume and nature of business for IP trial lawyers and their clients,” one lawyer said. Office of the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. June 6, 2020. THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL JUNE 15, 2021 intellectual property protection to our economy and that do not favor one set of interests over others.” Such policy changes could result in a swell of business for law firms with deep, technical IP benches and strong experience representing the industry in enforcement actions, lawyers said. Trump’s DOJ had “taken its foot off the gas” when it came to SEPs as the focus of anti-competitive behavior, said one Washington-based lawyer, speaking on the condition of anonym- ity because he currently has active cases that involve both SEP enforcement and defense. “It didn’t mean we weren’t busy as litigators. There was a lot of work enforcing SEPs against infringers and defending against infringement allegations,” he said. “But we weren’t busy in the antitrust arena. A greater focus on SEPs—not just by the DOJ but also other agencies—might mean more litigation, but it will also mean a more transparent field of play. It doesn’t do companies any good for there to be unfettered SEP enforcement.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Justice Department has confirmed it is looking to develop new policies surrounding how standard-essential patents might be used as tools for anticompetitive practices\nThe policy change was hinted\nduring an online event in late May\nwhen Richard Powers\ngave an indication that the government might be walking back the relaxed approach implemented by the DOJ under the Trump administration\nA DOJ spokesperson confirmed\nit will change its policy on SEPs and antitrust behavior\nU.S. law has often shied away from enforcing essential patent obligations\nThat’s set to change\nTrump’s DOJ had “taken its foot off the gas” when it came to SEPs\nwe weren’t busy in the antitrust arena\nA greater focus on SEPs\nnot just by the DOJ but also other agencies\nmight mean more litigation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The DOJ is already prepared to engage in more antitrust litigation over SEP’s---tradeoffs inevitable.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Justice Department has confirmed it is looking to develop new policies surrounding how standard-essential patents might be used as tools for anticompetitive practices. The change in policy will mean big business for law firms that can combine highly technical IP advice with their antitrust and litigation practices, with one lawyer likening the demanding skill set to “three-dimensional chess.” Standard-essential patents, or SEPs, are a fundamental piece of intellectual property for business and innovation because they are used under license so frequently by manufacturing companies other than the patent owners. The policy change was hinted at during an online event in late May, when Richard Powers, the acting attorney general of DOJ’s antitrust division, gave an indication that the government might be walking back the relaxed approach implemented by the DOJ under the Trump administration. A DOJ spokesperson confirmed in an email Tuesday to Law.com that it will change its policy on SEPs and antitrust behavior, with the agency still working out the details. The new administration, said the DOJ spokesperson, is rethinking what policies at the intersection of IP and anti- trust will best serve competition and consumers. “New Department leadership is working with career staff on developing a more balanced approach,” said the DOJ spokesperson. “The department wants to develop neutral and balanced policies in this area that recognize the importance of both antitrust enforcement and JUNE 15, 2021 As DOJ Confirms a Change in Antitrust Patent Policy, Lawyers Prepare for Shifting Demand BY BRUCE LOVE U.S. law has often shied away from enforcing essential patent obligations. That’s set to change. The result could be “a significant change in the volume and nature of business for IP trial lawyers and their clients,” one lawyer said. Office of the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. June 6, 2020. THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL JUNE 15, 2021 intellectual property protection to our economy and that do not favor one set of interests over others.” Such policy changes could result in a swell of business for law firms with deep, technical IP benches and strong experience representing the industry in enforcement actions, lawyers said. Trump’s DOJ had “taken its foot off the gas” when it came to SEPs as the focus of anti-competitive behavior, said one Washington-based lawyer, speaking on the condition of anonym- ity because he currently has active cases that involve both SEP enforcement and defense. “It didn’t mean we weren’t busy as litigators. There was a lot of work enforcing SEPs against infringers and defending against infringement allegations,” he said. “But we weren’t busy in the antitrust arena. A greater focus on SEPs—not just by the DOJ but also other agencies—might mean more litigation, but it will also mean a more transparent field of play. It doesn’t do companies any good for there to be unfettered SEP enforcement.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "new policies\nstandard-essential patents\nanticompetitive practices\nwalking back\nrelaxed approach\nTrump administration\nchange its policy\nSEPs\nantitrust behavior\nshied away\nThat’s set to change\ntaken its foot off the gas\nweren’t busy\nantitrust\ngreater focus\nmore litigation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The DOJ is already prepared to engage in more antitrust litigation over SEP’s---tradeoffs inevitable.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Justice Department has confirmed it is looking to develop new policies surrounding how standard-essential patents might be used as tools for anticompetitive practices\nThe policy change was hinted\nduring an online event in late May\nwhen Richard Powers\ngave an indication that the government might be walking back the relaxed approach implemented by the DOJ under the Trump administration\nA DOJ spokesperson confirmed\nit will change its policy on SEPs and antitrust behavior\nU.S. law has often shied away from enforcing essential patent obligations\nThat’s set to change\nTrump’s DOJ had “taken its foot off the gas” when it came to SEPs\nwe weren’t busy in the antitrust arena\nA greater focus on SEPs\nnot just by the DOJ but also other agencies\nmight mean more litigation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Justice Department\nconfirmed it is looking to develop new policies surrounding\nstandard-essential patents\nthe government might be walking back the relaxed approach implemented\nunder\nTrump\nA\nspokesperson confirmed\nit will change its policy on SEPs and antitrust\nA greater focus on SEPs\nmight mean more litigation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Congress is in recess until after the midterms---normal means for the plan is post-election", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The House of Representatives will be out for six weeks starting October 1 and the Senate is expected to follow suit in order to allow members to campaign for November’s midterm elections.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The House\nwill be out for six weeks starting October 1\nthe Senate is expected to follow\nto allow members to campaign for\nmidterm", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Neuro-symbolic models enable human reasoning.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "4.4 Learning and reasoning\nState of the art algorithms for learning and reasoning in different domains, including speech recognition [9, 28] natural language processing [12, 16] and graph data analysis [21, 4, 2], are based on computing embeddings for input objects. Instead of computing these embeddings when solving an specific task, we can pre-train them using a general-purpose objective function. Then, for each task a simple method that instead of objects, takes their pre-trained embeddings as input, usually works fine [1]. Figure 1 shows an example of a neural network that consists of the input layer, the output layer and a number of hidden layers. Each layer takes the output of its previous layer as input and using some train- able parameters, generates an embedding. The hidden layers (or at least some of them) can be pre-trained, so that only the output layer is trained during an specific learning task. This may slightly decrease the quality of the results, but enormously improves the efficiency and run time of the learning process.\nA domain that particularly depicts the strength of pre-trained embeddings, is neuro-symbolic AI. Neuro-symbolic AI states that combining deep neural models\n<<FIGURE OMITTED>>\nFigure 1: In this simple neural network, each hidden layer produces an embed- ding of the input object. If we produce most of hidden layers during pre-training (using a general-purpose objective function), one or a few layers will be left for the learning and reasoning phase, which can be done very efficiently.\nwith classical rules-based symbolic AI can improve the learning and reasoning process. More precisely, it suggests to use deep learning for feature extraction and embedding learning, and rule-based symbolic AI to manipulate and reason with these embeddings [31]. Recent studies [25] show that for tasks such as visual reasoning [20], neuro-symbolic models outperform deep models, when a limited training dataset is available. We think one of key reasons for the success of neuro-symbolic AI is the high quality embeddings that are learned to capture and encode different aspects of objects, and make it easy to reason about them.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "algorithms for\nspeech\nnatural language processing\nand\nanalysis\nare based on computing embeddings for input objects\nwe can pre-train them using\ngeneral\nobjective function\nshows\nexample of a n\nn\nthat consists of the input layer\noutput layer and\nhidden layers. Each layer takes the output of its previous layer as input\ngenerates an embedding\nhidden layers\ncan be pre-trained\nenormously improves\nefficiency and\nlearning\ndomain that\ndepicts\nstrength\nis neuro-symbolic AI\nsymbolic AI can improve\nlearning and reasoning\nto use d\nl\nto manipulate and reason\nRecent studies\nshow that for\nreasoning\nneuro-symbolic models outperform deep models\none of key reasons for\nsuccess of neuro-symbolic AI is\nhigh quality embeddings that are learned to capture\nobjects, and make it easy to reason", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Neuro-symbolic models enable human reasoning.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "algorithms for\nspeech\nnatural language processing\nand\nanalysis\nare based on computing embeddings for input objects\nwe can pre-train them using\ngeneral\nobjective function\nshows\nexample of a n\nn\nthat consists of the input layer\noutput layer and\nhidden layers. Each layer takes the output of its previous layer as input\ngenerates an embedding\nhidden layers\ncan be pre-trained\nenormously improves\nefficiency and\nlearning\ndomain that\ndepicts\nstrength\nis neuro-symbolic AI\nsymbolic AI can improve\nlearning and reasoning\nto use d\nl\nto manipulate and reason\nRecent studies\nshow that for\nreasoning\nneuro-symbolic models outperform deep models\none of key reasons for\nsuccess of neuro-symbolic AI is\nhigh quality embeddings that are learned to capture\nobjects, and make it easy to reason", "role": "user" }, { "content": "speech\nlanguage\nanalysis\ninput\ns\npre-train\ngeneral\nn\nn\ninput\noutput\nhidden\noutput\nprevious\nembedding\npre-trained\nenormously\nefficiency\nlearning\nstrength\nneuro-symbolic\nsymbolic\nlearning\nreasoning\nd\nl\nmanipulate\nreason\nRecent studies\nreasoning\nneuro-symbolic\noutperform\nneuro-symbolic\nembeddings\ncapture\neasy\nreason", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Neuro-symbolic models enable human reasoning.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "algorithms for\nspeech\nnatural language processing\nand\nanalysis\nare based on computing embeddings for input objects\nwe can pre-train them using\ngeneral\nobjective function\nshows\nexample of a n\nn\nthat consists of the input layer\noutput layer and\nhidden layers. Each layer takes the output of its previous layer as input\ngenerates an embedding\nhidden layers\ncan be pre-trained\nenormously improves\nefficiency and\nlearning\ndomain that\ndepicts\nstrength\nis neuro-symbolic AI\nsymbolic AI can improve\nlearning and reasoning\nto use d\nl\nto manipulate and reason\nRecent studies\nshow that for\nreasoning\nneuro-symbolic models outperform deep models\none of key reasons for\nsuccess of neuro-symbolic AI is\nhigh quality embeddings that are learned to capture\nobjects, and make it easy to reason", "role": "user" }, { "content": "n\nn\nconsists of\ninput\noutput\nand\nhidden layers. Each layer takes\noutput of\nprevious layer as input\ngenerates\nembedding\nenormously improves\nlearning\ndepicts\nneuro-symbolic AI\nimprove\nreasoning\nstudies\nshow\nneuro-symbolic models outperform deep models\nreasons for\nsuccess\nis\nembeddings\nmake it easy to reason", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No reciprocation---asymmetry, pocketing, lack of pressure, AND economic incentives.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Likely Response to Unilateral U.S. Reductions \nIf the United States were to unilaterally eliminate its ICBMs, while asking Russia to reciprocate, the effects on Russia’s nuclear arsenal are unlikely to be benign. Russia could choose from a host of options. One option is that Vladimir Putin and the rest of the Russian leadership embrace the U.S. gesture and respond in kind by also eliminating all of their ICBMs. \nThis option seems least likely for a variety of reasons. Most prominently, while the raison d'être for Russian ICBMs would supposedly disappear (doubtfully assuming Russian leaders believe their ICBMs have only one mission), a much larger portion of its nuclear arsenal would actually be cut compared to the U.S. arsenal. U.S. ICBMs are currently loaded with a single warhead, so eliminating the 400 U.S. ICBMs would necessarily eliminate 400 warheads from the arsenal (assuming they are not redeployed). 13 Russia, however, reportedly places multiple warheads on its ICBMs: eliminating its approximately 318 ICBMs apparently would result in about 800 warheads being removed from the arsenal.14 With such an asymmetric outcome, it seems unlikely that Russia would engage in the reciprocal elimination of ICBMs. \nAnother more likely option Russia could take in response to the United States unilaterally eliminating its ICBMs would be pocketing the concession and then claiming to begin discussions with China to bilaterally eliminate their ICBMs – which would necessarily involve bringing in India to the discussion as well. One does not have to be a hardened cynic to think Russia would relish the opportunity to be viewed as promoting world peace and security by leading the negotiations (with the United States on the sideline – having already done its part). Of course, any such negotiations would likely go nowhere as both Russia and China would likely want to secure the advantage of retaining their ICBMs when the United States would have none.\nIf Russia were to fail to reciprocate, however, there could be public pressure on Russia from around the world to quickly reciprocate by eliminating its ICBMs in a verifiable manner. And yet, Vladimir Putin does not appear to be the type of leader who is easily swayed by foreign public pressure. If that were the case, one would think Russia would have refrained from invading Ukraine, cheating on the INF Treaty, and possibly ordering the assassination of political opponents with chemical and radiological weapons – all illegal acts to which world opinion has had arguably little effect. It is highly questionable how effective foreign public pressure could be with regard to the perfectly legal act of not reciprocating the U.S. elimination of ICBMs.\nThe economic incentive for Russian elimination of ICBMS in response to U.S. elimination may appear to be strong. Yet even this observation likely misreads how Vladimir Putin views the defense industry in Russia. As he wrote in Foreign Policy in 2012: \nIn other words, we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak. We will, under no circumstances, surrender our strategic deterrent capability. Indeed, we will strengthen it… The huge resources invested in modernizing our military industrial complex and re-equipping the army must serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditure funds new jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research.15\nEssentially, Putin appears to believe that increased defense spending, especially on nuclear forces, will drive economic prosperity – so cutting defense would be equal to cutting the prospects for growth. As the noted Russian military analyst Alexei Nikolsky recently concluded after reviewing the state of Russia’s military-industrial base: “That is why, despite all the financial and non-financial constraints, the capability of the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent remains a top priority for which Russia will spare no effort or resources. A reliable nuclear deterrent will minimize the detrimental impact of setbacks in the development and procurement of some conventional weapons systems, and continue to serve as the lynchpin of Russian military security.”16 Russian leaders would likely consider eliminating their ICBMs to be strategically and fiscally unwise.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "If the U\nS\nwere to unilaterally eliminate its ICBMs\nthe effects on Russia’s nuclear arsenal are unlikely to be benign\nPutin and\nRussian leadership embrace\ngesture\nseems least likely for a variety of reasons\nwhile the raison d'être for Russian ICBMs would supposedly disappear\ndoubtfully assuming Russian leaders believe their ICBMs have only one mission\na much larger portion of its nuclear arsenal would actually be cut compared to the U.S. arsenal\nso eliminating the 400\nICBMs would necessarily eliminate 400 warheads\nRussia\nplaces multiple warheads on its ICBMs: eliminating\n318 ICBMs\nresult in\n800 warheads\nWith such an asymmetric outcome, it seems unlikely that Russia would engage in the reciprocal elimination of ICBMs\nA\nmore likely option Russia\ntake in response to\nU\nS\neliminating its ICBMs would be pocketing the concession\nPutin does not appear to be the type of leader who is easily swayed by foreign public pressure. If that were the case\ninvading Ukraine, cheating\nINF\nand\nassassination of political opponents with chemical and radiological weapons\nhas had arguably little effect\nPutin views the defense industry\nas fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditure funds new jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research\nPutin appears to believe that increased defense spending, especially on nuclear forces, will drive economic prosperity\nso cutting defense would be equal to cutting the prospects for growth\nRussian leaders\nlikely consider eliminating their ICBMs to be strategically and fiscally unwise", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No reciprocation---asymmetry, pocketing, lack of pressure, AND economic incentives.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If the U\nS\nwere to unilaterally eliminate its ICBMs\nthe effects on Russia’s nuclear arsenal are unlikely to be benign\nPutin and\nRussian leadership embrace\ngesture\nseems least likely for a variety of reasons\nwhile the raison d'être for Russian ICBMs would supposedly disappear\ndoubtfully assuming Russian leaders believe their ICBMs have only one mission\na much larger portion of its nuclear arsenal would actually be cut compared to the U.S. arsenal\nso eliminating the 400\nICBMs would necessarily eliminate 400 warheads\nRussia\nplaces multiple warheads on its ICBMs: eliminating\n318 ICBMs\nresult in\n800 warheads\nWith such an asymmetric outcome, it seems unlikely that Russia would engage in the reciprocal elimination of ICBMs\nA\nmore likely option Russia\ntake in response to\nU\nS\neliminating its ICBMs would be pocketing the concession\nPutin does not appear to be the type of leader who is easily swayed by foreign public pressure. If that were the case\ninvading Ukraine, cheating\nINF\nand\nassassination of political opponents with chemical and radiological weapons\nhas had arguably little effect\nPutin views the defense industry\nas fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditure funds new jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research\nPutin appears to believe that increased defense spending, especially on nuclear forces, will drive economic prosperity\nso cutting defense would be equal to cutting the prospects for growth\nRussian leaders\nlikely consider eliminating their ICBMs to be strategically and fiscally unwise", "role": "user" }, { "content": "unlikely\nbenign\nleast likely\nraison d'être\nsupposedly disappear\ndoubtfully assuming\none mission\nmuch larger portion\nactually be cut\n400\n400\nmultiple\n318\n800\nasymmetric outcome\nunlikely\nreciprocal\nmore likely\npocketing the concession\ndoes not appear\ntype of leader\nforeign public pressure\nUkraine\nINF\nassassination\nchemical\nradiological\narguably little effect\ndefense industry\nfeed the engines\neconomy\ncreating real growth\nincreased defense spending\ndrive economic prosperity\nstrategically\nfiscally unwise", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No reciprocation---asymmetry, pocketing, lack of pressure, AND economic incentives.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If the U\nS\nwere to unilaterally eliminate its ICBMs\nthe effects on Russia’s nuclear arsenal are unlikely to be benign\nPutin and\nRussian leadership embrace\ngesture\nseems least likely for a variety of reasons\nwhile the raison d'être for Russian ICBMs would supposedly disappear\ndoubtfully assuming Russian leaders believe their ICBMs have only one mission\na much larger portion of its nuclear arsenal would actually be cut compared to the U.S. arsenal\nso eliminating the 400\nICBMs would necessarily eliminate 400 warheads\nRussia\nplaces multiple warheads on its ICBMs: eliminating\n318 ICBMs\nresult in\n800 warheads\nWith such an asymmetric outcome, it seems unlikely that Russia would engage in the reciprocal elimination of ICBMs\nA\nmore likely option Russia\ntake in response to\nU\nS\neliminating its ICBMs would be pocketing the concession\nPutin does not appear to be the type of leader who is easily swayed by foreign public pressure. If that were the case\ninvading Ukraine, cheating\nINF\nand\nassassination of political opponents with chemical and radiological weapons\nhas had arguably little effect\nPutin views the defense industry\nas fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditure funds new jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research\nPutin appears to believe that increased defense spending, especially on nuclear forces, will drive economic prosperity\nso cutting defense would be equal to cutting the prospects for growth\nRussian leaders\nlikely consider eliminating their ICBMs to be strategically and fiscally unwise", "role": "user" }, { "content": "If\nU\nS\neliminate\nICBMs\neffects on\narsenal are unlikely to be benign\nso eliminating\n400\nICBMs would\neliminate 400 warheads\nRussia\nplaces multiple\neliminating\n318\nresult in\n800\nasymmetric outcome\nseems unlikely\nRussia\nengage in\nreciprocal elimination\nmore likely\nwould be pocketing\nconcession\nPutin does not\nswayed by\npublic pressure\nUkraine\nINF\nassassination\nhas\nlittle effect\nPutin views\ndefense\nas fuel to feed\neconomy, creating real growth\nincreased defense spending\nwill drive economic prosperity\nleaders\nconsider eliminating\nstrategically and fiscally unwise", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2---Sector-specific antitrust has no effect on other parts of the economy", "role": "system" }, { "content": "One thing the Biden administration has been doing, however, is trying to toughen up antitrust policy, arguing that highly concentrated ownership in many industries — largely a result of decades of lax regulation — is helping keep prices high and possibly contributing to recent inflation.\nI’d describe this initiative as controversial, except that there’s hardly any controversy, at least in the media: Biden’s linkage of monopoly power to inflation is facing vehement, almost hysterical, criticism from all sides, including many progressive commentators. And I find that vehemence puzzling; I think it says more about the commentators than it does about the administration.\nLet’s stipulate that monopolies aren’t the reason inflation shot up in 2021 — because there was already plenty of monopoly power in America back in 2020. True, profit margins, as measured by the share of profits in gross domestic product, have increased quite a lot recently:\nMost of that rise, however, probably reflects big returns to companies, like shippers, that happen to own crucial assets at a time of supply-chain bottlenecks. It’s possible, as Senator Elizabeth Warren has suggested, that some companies are using general inflation as an excuse to jack up prices, abusing their monopoly power in ways that might have provoked a backlash in normal times; that’s certainly not a crazy argument, and making it doesn’t make Warren the second coming of Hugo Chavez. Still, such behavior can’t explain more than a small fraction of current inflation.\nBut as far as I can see, the Biden administration and its allies aren’t claiming otherwise. They’re simply emphasizing monopoly power because it’s one thing they might be able to do something about.\nAnd where is the policy harm? On one side, toughening up antitrust enforcement in sectors like meatpacking is something the U.S. government should be doing in any case. On the other side, there’s no hint that the administration’s antimonopoly rhetoric will lead to irresponsible policies elsewhere. \nAs I said, all indications are that Biden and company will leave the Fed alone as it raises interest rates in an effort to cool demand. And I haven’t seen any important Democratic figure, inside or outside the administration, calling for Nixon-style price controls. The most interventionist policy that seems remotely possible would be something like John F. Kennedy’s jawboning of the steel industry after an obviously coordinated jump in steel prices — and it’s hard to imagine Biden sounding nearly as hard-line and critical of big business as Kennedy did in that speech, as you can see in the video below.\nSo why the barrage of criticism, not just from the right — which was to be expected — but from the center and even the center-left?\nI don’t really know the answer, but I have a few suspicions.\nPart of the problem, I think, is an obsession with intellectual purity. Some policy wonks outside the administration apparently expect the policy wonks inside the administration — many of them friends and former colleagues — to keep sounding exactly the way they did when they weren’t political appointees. But look, that’s not the way the world works. Political appointees are supposed to serve the politicians who appointed them. Dishonesty or gross misrepresentation of reality isn’t OK, but emphasizing the good things one’s employers are trying to do is OK — and part of the job.\nBeyond that, it sure looks as if many people who consider themselves progressive are made deeply uncomfortable by anything that sounds populist — even when a bit of populist outrage is entirely justified by the facts. Imagine the reaction if Biden gave a speech sounding anything like Kennedy on the steel companies (again, video below). How many Democratic-leaning economists would have fainting spells?\nSo here’s my suggestion: Give Biden and his people a break on their antitrust crusade. It won’t do any harm. It won’t get in the way of the big stuff, which is mostly outside Biden’s control in any case. At worst, administration officials will be using inflation as an excuse to do things they should be doing in any case. And they might even have a marginal impact on inflation itself.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "One thing\nBiden\nhas been doing\nis trying to toughen up antitrust policy\nthere’s hardly any controversy\nBiden’s linkage of monopoly power to inflation is facing vehement\ncriticism\nincluding many progressive commentators\nwhere is the policy harm? On one side, toughening up antitrust enforcement in sectors like meatpacking is something the U.S. government should be doing in any case\nthere’s no hint that the administration’s antimonopoly rhetoric will lead to irresponsible policies elsewhere\nAnd I haven’t seen any important Democratic figure, inside or outside the administration, calling for Nixon-style price controls\nit’s hard to imagine Biden sounding\nhard-line and critical of big business\nSo why the barrage of criticism\nPart\nis an obsession with intellectual purity\nGive Biden and his people a break on their antitrust crusade. It won’t do any harm. It won’t get in the way of the big stuff", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2---Sector-specific antitrust has no effect on other parts of the economy", "role": "system" }, { "content": "One thing the Biden administration has been doing, however, is trying to toughen up antitrust policy, arguing that highly concentrated ownership in many industries — largely a result of decades of lax regulation — is helping keep prices high and possibly contributing to recent inflation.\nI’d describe this initiative as controversial, except that there’s hardly any controversy, at least in the media: Biden’s linkage of monopoly power to inflation is facing vehement, almost hysterical, criticism from all sides, including many progressive commentators. And I find that vehemence puzzling; I think it says more about the commentators than it does about the administration.\nLet’s stipulate that monopolies aren’t the reason inflation shot up in 2021 — because there was already plenty of monopoly power in America back in 2020. True, profit margins, as measured by the share of profits in gross domestic product, have increased quite a lot recently:\nMost of that rise, however, probably reflects big returns to companies, like shippers, that happen to own crucial assets at a time of supply-chain bottlenecks. It’s possible, as Senator Elizabeth Warren has suggested, that some companies are using general inflation as an excuse to jack up prices, abusing their monopoly power in ways that might have provoked a backlash in normal times; that’s certainly not a crazy argument, and making it doesn’t make Warren the second coming of Hugo Chavez. Still, such behavior can’t explain more than a small fraction of current inflation.\nBut as far as I can see, the Biden administration and its allies aren’t claiming otherwise. They’re simply emphasizing monopoly power because it’s one thing they might be able to do something about.\nAnd where is the policy harm? On one side, toughening up antitrust enforcement in sectors like meatpacking is something the U.S. government should be doing in any case. On the other side, there’s no hint that the administration’s antimonopoly rhetoric will lead to irresponsible policies elsewhere. \nAs I said, all indications are that Biden and company will leave the Fed alone as it raises interest rates in an effort to cool demand. And I haven’t seen any important Democratic figure, inside or outside the administration, calling for Nixon-style price controls. The most interventionist policy that seems remotely possible would be something like John F. Kennedy’s jawboning of the steel industry after an obviously coordinated jump in steel prices — and it’s hard to imagine Biden sounding nearly as hard-line and critical of big business as Kennedy did in that speech, as you can see in the video below.\nSo why the barrage of criticism, not just from the right — which was to be expected — but from the center and even the center-left?\nI don’t really know the answer, but I have a few suspicions.\nPart of the problem, I think, is an obsession with intellectual purity. Some policy wonks outside the administration apparently expect the policy wonks inside the administration — many of them friends and former colleagues — to keep sounding exactly the way they did when they weren’t political appointees. But look, that’s not the way the world works. Political appointees are supposed to serve the politicians who appointed them. Dishonesty or gross misrepresentation of reality isn’t OK, but emphasizing the good things one’s employers are trying to do is OK — and part of the job.\nBeyond that, it sure looks as if many people who consider themselves progressive are made deeply uncomfortable by anything that sounds populist — even when a bit of populist outrage is entirely justified by the facts. Imagine the reaction if Biden gave a speech sounding anything like Kennedy on the steel companies (again, video below). How many Democratic-leaning economists would have fainting spells?\nSo here’s my suggestion: Give Biden and his people a break on their antitrust crusade. It won’t do any harm. It won’t get in the way of the big stuff, which is mostly outside Biden’s control in any case. At worst, administration officials will be using inflation as an excuse to do things they should be doing in any case. And they might even have a marginal impact on inflation itself.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "antitrust\nhardly any\npolicy harm\nsectors\nmeatpacking\nno hint\nrhetoric\nelsewhere\nany\ncall\nprice controls\nhard-line\ncritical\nbarrage of criticism\nobsession\nintellectual purity\nIt won’t do any harm\nbig stuff", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2---Sector-specific antitrust has no effect on other parts of the economy\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "One thing\nBiden\nhas been doing\nis trying to toughen up antitrust policy\nthere’s hardly any controversy\nBiden’s linkage of monopoly power to inflation is facing vehement\ncriticism\nincluding many progressive commentators\nwhere is the policy harm? On one side, toughening up antitrust enforcement in sectors like meatpacking is something the U.S. government should be doing in any case\nthere’s no hint that the administration’s antimonopoly rhetoric will lead to irresponsible policies elsewhere\nAnd I haven’t seen any important Democratic figure, inside or outside the administration, calling for Nixon-style price controls\nit’s hard to imagine Biden sounding\nhard-line and critical of big business\nSo why the barrage of criticism\nPart\nis an obsession with intellectual purity\nGive Biden and his people a break on their antitrust crusade. It won’t do any harm. It won’t get in the way of the big stuff", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nis trying to toughen\nantitrust\nwhere is the\nharm?\ntoughening\nantitrust\nin sectors\nthere’s no hint\nwill lead to irresponsible policies elsewhere\nI haven’t seen any\nfigure\ncall\nfor\nprice controls\nit’s hard to imagine Biden\nhard-line\nof big business\nantitrust\nwon’t do\nharm", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Not binding.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Second, yes, it took a relatively short period to draft and finalize our new vertical merger guidelines. Draft vertical merger guidelines were announced and released on January 10, 2020.20 After workshops and a short extension of the comment period, the final guidelines were released only six months later in June 2020.21 So the process of creating guidelines, unlike formal rulemaking, can be completed quickly. But these guidelines also provide a cautionary tale of agency inaction. The old version was issued in 1984, and there had been broad consensus for many years that they required an update. 22 In fact, in an interview after his tenure as FTC Chairman ended, Bob Pitofsky said that his guiding principle in deciding whether to challenge a vertical merger was to ignore the vertical merger guidelines.23 While the FTC and courts can disregard outdated guidelines, bright-line rules are difficult to ignore", "role": "user" }, { "content": "it took a relatively short period to draft\nnew vertical merger guidelines\ncreating guidelines\ncan be completed quickly\nBut\nguidelines\nprovide a cautionary tale of agency inaction. The old version was issued in 1984, and there had been broad consensus for\nyears that they required an update\nPitofsky said\nhis guiding principle in deciding whether to challenge a vertical merger was to ignore\nguidelines\nthe FTC and courts can disregard outdated guidelines", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Not binding.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "it took a relatively short period to draft\nnew vertical merger guidelines\ncreating guidelines\ncan be completed quickly\nBut\nguidelines\nprovide a cautionary tale of agency inaction. The old version was issued in 1984, and there had been broad consensus for\nyears that they required an update\nPitofsky said\nhis guiding principle in deciding whether to challenge a vertical merger was to ignore\nguidelines\nthe FTC and courts can disregard outdated guidelines", "role": "user" }, { "content": "vertical merger guidelines\nquickly\nagency inaction\n1984\nbroad consensus\nupdate\nguiding principle\nchallenge\ndisregard\nguidelines", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Not binding.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "it took a relatively short period to draft\nnew vertical merger guidelines\ncreating guidelines\ncan be completed quickly\nBut\nguidelines\nprovide a cautionary tale of agency inaction. The old version was issued in 1984, and there had been broad consensus for\nyears that they required an update\nPitofsky said\nhis guiding principle in deciding whether to challenge a vertical merger was to ignore\nguidelines\nthe FTC and courts can disregard outdated guidelines", "role": "user" }, { "content": "vertical merger guidelines\nprovide a cautionary tale of agency inaction\nThe old version was issued in\n84\nand there had been\nconsensus\nthey required an update\nPitofsky said\nhis guiding principle\nwas to ignore\nguidelines\nthe FTC and courts\ndisregard\nguidelines", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4. But the plan solves, aggressive nuclear postures wrecks trust.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Conclusion This article has shown that changes to US nuclear policy following the NPR have complicated NATO dynamics and damaged NATO cohesion on nuclear issues. There is a real risk that the US ‘peace through strength’ approach will continue to deepen transatlantic divisions and the existing arms control crisis. While US nuclear policy clearly represents an attempt within the Trump administration’s ‘peace through strength’ foreign policy to bolster deterrence against Russia and provide increased assurance to allies, it may have unintended consequences. In Europe, changes in US policy are being interpreted as signalling a lowering threshold for nuclear use and a willingness to engage in a destabilizing arms race, and projecting a disregard for consensual decision-making. Such conclusions are felt even more keenly in view of the President’s adversarial and often erratic behaviour in his interactions with European leaders, and the administration’s increased willingness to openly criticize its allies. Although NATO continues to be resilient and has long experience in bridging US and varying European perspectives, for the reasons explored in this article Washington is finding it difficult to persuade Europeans to give vigorous support to a ‘peace through strength’ approach to nuclear issues. Europeans remain uneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats and to use limited nuclear strikes to control escalation. Trump administration plans that increase the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO planning revive unresolved discussions about European contributions to NATO’s nuclear deterrence capabilities that could in turn undermine the credibility of its deterrent value in the long term. Finally, the Trump administration’s strategy on arms control, which relies on increasing the nuclear threat, has deepened tensions with European allies. While nuclear cooperation has historically been a way of managing alliance relations and creating NATO cohesion, the Trump administration’s ‘peace through strength’ approach has damaged trust within the alliance. If such an approach fails to command broad European support, promotes neither NATO cohesion nor trust in the alliance, and does not reinforce security assurances, while creating risks in arms control and non-proliferation, its success must be considered questionable, to say the least. While European states’ responses have been relatively muted over the first two years of the Trump administration, as their transatlantic ally and security guarantor has diverged from the post-Cold War nuclear consensus and implemented a strategy designed to advocate US strength, dissenting opinions are increasingly being expressed—especially regarding arms control. At the same time, European governments are concerned about contesting US policy across a range of areas, given a President who is highly critical of his allies and their sympathy with the objective of facing up to Russia—even if they disagree with details of the methods espoused by Washington and are perhaps confused by the mixed messages that come from the Trump administration and in particular from President Trump himself. Yet the issues outlined in this article, if not tackled, will only grow, and will have impacts on NATO’s capability to deal with future challenges. NATO has historically provided an institutional framework for allies to raise nuclear concerns and seek consensus-based decisions with Washington, as well as to influence US policy. Europeans can use these mechanisms to address their concerns, strengthen the alliance and project a vision of a Europe based upon cooperative security and an appreciation of the positive value of restraint and arms control. If the West and Russia have already entered a new Cold War, one characterized by a heightened risk of miscalculation and misperception rather than an ideologically driven conflict, there are significant dangers for Europeans in policies that lower the nuclear threshold, expand the circumstances of nuclear use and endanger arms control. These bring into being nuclear insecurities not seen for over 30 years. When the Reagan administration adopted a ‘peace through strength’ strategy in the early 1980s, this too resulted initially in increased tensions in Europe, not only with nervous allies but also, provocatively, with its Soviet adversary, and greatly increased fear of nuclear war among publics. The Reagan administration, however, did move from the projection of strength to negotiating peace, and Reagan agreed with Mikhail Gorbachev that ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. The two leaders built a relationship of trust as they engaged in an ambitious arms control agenda to reduce tensions and move towards a more peaceful and cooperative relationship. Trump and Putin claimed this same objective in Helsinki but did little to convince observers they were serious, and developments around the INF have raised grave doubts about this shared objective. Yet nuclear restraint, risk reduction and arms control could rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia. This approach would provide a better route for the US to alleviate Great Power conflict and reassure European allies—the pressing issues that US nuclear policy seeks to solve. It is an approach that would also demonstrate real strength in US purpose and intent, and ultimately lead to more genuine opportunities for peace. In this context it is the responsibility of European allies to express their own vision and build a new European nuclear consensus, based on decreasing nuclear risks despite international political tensions. Early action by European governments to clarify an approach not based solely on the projection of perceived ‘strength’ could clearly benefit longer-term cohesion in NATO and provide for more credible and sustainable European security.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "changes to US nuclear policy following the NPR have complicated NATO dynamics and damaged NATO cohesion\ndeepen transatlantic divisions\nWhile US nuclear policy clearly represents an attempt\nto bolster deterrence\nit may have unintended consequences\nSuch conclusions are felt even more keenly in view of the President’s adversarial\nbehaviour\nAlthough NATO continues to be resilient and has long experience in bridging US and varying European perspectives\nWashington is finding it difficult to persuade Europeans to give vigorous support to a ‘peace through strength’ approach to nuclear issues. Europeans remain uneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats and to use limited nuclear strikes to control escalation. Trump administration plans that increase the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO planning revive unresolved discussions\nthat could in turn undermine the credibility of its deterrent value in the long term\nWhile nuclear cooperation has historically been a way of\ncreating NATO cohesion, the Trump administration’s ‘peace through strength’ approach has damaged trust within the alliance. If such an approach\npromotes neither\ncohesion nor trust\nand does not reinforce security assurances, while creating risks\nits success must be considered questionable, to say the least.\nnuclear restraint\ncould rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia\nprovide a better route for the US to alleviate Great Power conflict and reassure European allies—the pressing issues that US nuclear policy seeks to solve\ndemonstrate real strength in US purpose and intent, and ultimately lead to more genuine opportunities for peace\nEarly action\ncould\nbenefit longer-term cohesion in NATO and provide for more credible and sustainable European security", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4. But the plan solves, aggressive nuclear postures wrecks trust.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Conclusion This article has shown that changes to US nuclear policy following the NPR have complicated NATO dynamics and damaged NATO cohesion on nuclear issues. There is a real risk that the US ‘peace through strength’ approach will continue to deepen transatlantic divisions and the existing arms control crisis. While US nuclear policy clearly represents an attempt within the Trump administration’s ‘peace through strength’ foreign policy to bolster deterrence against Russia and provide increased assurance to allies, it may have unintended consequences. In Europe, changes in US policy are being interpreted as signalling a lowering threshold for nuclear use and a willingness to engage in a destabilizing arms race, and projecting a disregard for consensual decision-making. Such conclusions are felt even more keenly in view of the President’s adversarial and often erratic behaviour in his interactions with European leaders, and the administration’s increased willingness to openly criticize its allies. Although NATO continues to be resilient and has long experience in bridging US and varying European perspectives, for the reasons explored in this article Washington is finding it difficult to persuade Europeans to give vigorous support to a ‘peace through strength’ approach to nuclear issues. Europeans remain uneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats and to use limited nuclear strikes to control escalation. Trump administration plans that increase the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO planning revive unresolved discussions about European contributions to NATO’s nuclear deterrence capabilities that could in turn undermine the credibility of its deterrent value in the long term. Finally, the Trump administration’s strategy on arms control, which relies on increasing the nuclear threat, has deepened tensions with European allies. While nuclear cooperation has historically been a way of managing alliance relations and creating NATO cohesion, the Trump administration’s ‘peace through strength’ approach has damaged trust within the alliance. If such an approach fails to command broad European support, promotes neither NATO cohesion nor trust in the alliance, and does not reinforce security assurances, while creating risks in arms control and non-proliferation, its success must be considered questionable, to say the least. While European states’ responses have been relatively muted over the first two years of the Trump administration, as their transatlantic ally and security guarantor has diverged from the post-Cold War nuclear consensus and implemented a strategy designed to advocate US strength, dissenting opinions are increasingly being expressed—especially regarding arms control. At the same time, European governments are concerned about contesting US policy across a range of areas, given a President who is highly critical of his allies and their sympathy with the objective of facing up to Russia—even if they disagree with details of the methods espoused by Washington and are perhaps confused by the mixed messages that come from the Trump administration and in particular from President Trump himself. Yet the issues outlined in this article, if not tackled, will only grow, and will have impacts on NATO’s capability to deal with future challenges. NATO has historically provided an institutional framework for allies to raise nuclear concerns and seek consensus-based decisions with Washington, as well as to influence US policy. Europeans can use these mechanisms to address their concerns, strengthen the alliance and project a vision of a Europe based upon cooperative security and an appreciation of the positive value of restraint and arms control. If the West and Russia have already entered a new Cold War, one characterized by a heightened risk of miscalculation and misperception rather than an ideologically driven conflict, there are significant dangers for Europeans in policies that lower the nuclear threshold, expand the circumstances of nuclear use and endanger arms control. These bring into being nuclear insecurities not seen for over 30 years. When the Reagan administration adopted a ‘peace through strength’ strategy in the early 1980s, this too resulted initially in increased tensions in Europe, not only with nervous allies but also, provocatively, with its Soviet adversary, and greatly increased fear of nuclear war among publics. The Reagan administration, however, did move from the projection of strength to negotiating peace, and Reagan agreed with Mikhail Gorbachev that ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. The two leaders built a relationship of trust as they engaged in an ambitious arms control agenda to reduce tensions and move towards a more peaceful and cooperative relationship. Trump and Putin claimed this same objective in Helsinki but did little to convince observers they were serious, and developments around the INF have raised grave doubts about this shared objective. Yet nuclear restraint, risk reduction and arms control could rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia. This approach would provide a better route for the US to alleviate Great Power conflict and reassure European allies—the pressing issues that US nuclear policy seeks to solve. It is an approach that would also demonstrate real strength in US purpose and intent, and ultimately lead to more genuine opportunities for peace. In this context it is the responsibility of European allies to express their own vision and build a new European nuclear consensus, based on decreasing nuclear risks despite international political tensions. Early action by European governments to clarify an approach not based solely on the projection of perceived ‘strength’ could clearly benefit longer-term cohesion in NATO and provide for more credible and sustainable European security.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NPR\ndamaged NATO cohesion\ndivisions\nattempt\ndeterrence\nunintended consequences\nview\nadversarial\nbehaviour\ncontinues to be resilient\nlong experience in bridging US and varying European perspectives\nfinding\nEurope\nnuclear issues\nuneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats\ncontrol escalation\nsalience\nrevive unresolved discussions\nundermine the credibility of its deterrent value in the long term\nhistorically\ncreating\ndamaged trust within the alliance\nneither\ncohesion\ntrust\nassurances\nrisks\nquestionable, to say the least.\nnuclear restraint\nrebuild\nconfidence between the United States, NATO and Russia\nbetter\nalleviate Great Power conflict\nreassure European allies\nreal strength in US purpose and intent\ngenuine opportunities for peace\nEarly action\nbenefit longer-term cohesion in NATO and provide for more credible and sustainable European security", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 4. But the plan solves, aggressive nuclear postures wrecks trust.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "changes to US nuclear policy following the NPR have complicated NATO dynamics and damaged NATO cohesion\ndeepen transatlantic divisions\nWhile US nuclear policy clearly represents an attempt\nto bolster deterrence\nit may have unintended consequences\nSuch conclusions are felt even more keenly in view of the President’s adversarial\nbehaviour\nAlthough NATO continues to be resilient and has long experience in bridging US and varying European perspectives\nWashington is finding it difficult to persuade Europeans to give vigorous support to a ‘peace through strength’ approach to nuclear issues. Europeans remain uneasy about proposals to expand nuclear deterrence to cover non-nuclear threats and to use limited nuclear strikes to control escalation. Trump administration plans that increase the salience of non-strategic nuclear weapons in NATO planning revive unresolved discussions\nthat could in turn undermine the credibility of its deterrent value in the long term\nWhile nuclear cooperation has historically been a way of\ncreating NATO cohesion, the Trump administration’s ‘peace through strength’ approach has damaged trust within the alliance. If such an approach\npromotes neither\ncohesion nor trust\nand does not reinforce security assurances, while creating risks\nits success must be considered questionable, to say the least.\nnuclear restraint\ncould rebuild trust and confidence between the United States, NATO and Russia\nprovide a better route for the US to alleviate Great Power conflict and reassure European allies—the pressing issues that US nuclear policy seeks to solve\ndemonstrate real strength in US purpose and intent, and ultimately lead to more genuine opportunities for peace\nEarly action\ncould\nbenefit longer-term cohesion in NATO and provide for more credible and sustainable European security", "role": "user" }, { "content": "NPR\ndamaged NATO cohesion\nAlthough NATO\nresilient and has\nexperience in bridging\nvarying\nperspectives\nfinding it difficult to persuade Europe\nto\nsupport\n‘peace through strength’\nuneasy about\nnuclear deterrence to\nnon-nuclear threats\nrevive unresolved discussions\nthat could\nundermine the\ndeterrent\nrestraint\ncould rebuild\nconfidence between the U\nS\nNATO and Russia\nbetter\nto alleviate Great Power conflict and reassure\nallies", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Iran prolif----multiple checks", "role": "system" }, { "content": "No, Iran has not restarted its nuclear weapons programme. Commentators such as the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman blithely assume so, based on Iran’s decision on 5 January to retreat from the enrichment limits in the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Others wrongly conclude that Tehran has abandoned the deal. Yet Iran is still keeping a foot in the accord, abiding by the crucial inspection requirements, while insisting it will resume full compliance if the US resumes its JCPOA obligations to loosen sanctions. What Iran has done is advance the timeline toward a nuclear weapons capability in line with its nuclear hedging strategy. How much so is a matter of conjecture among experts. Some say that if Iran decided to make an all-out dash for a bomb, and experienced no hiccups along the way — what its adversaries call a worst-case scenario — Iran could produce a bomb’s worth of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in as little as 4-5 months. But such assessments of the so-called break-out period are based on uncertain data and questionable assumptions. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF), which presumably has a clearer window into Iran’s program, assesses that Iran will be able to produce enough HEU by the end of the year and to assemble a weapon in less than two years. Alarming as this might sound, it is not significantly different than when the JCPOA went into effect in 2016. And it is a much better situation than when negotiations began in 2013, at which point the break-out period was judged to be only a couple of months. The IDF also assesses that Iran is currently not interested in developing an atomic bomb as quickly as possible. A key goal of Iran’s negotiating partners was to extend the break-out period to at least a year. The deal succeeded in doing so by eliminating 98 per cent of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium, all of its stockpile of 20 per cent enriched uranium, which is just below the threshold of being weapons-usable, and two-thirds of the centrifuges that do the enriching. Before those cuts, Iran’s stockpile was enough for up to ten weapons, if further enriched. Afterwards, it had less than a quarter of the feed stock for one bomb Now that Iran has removed restrictions, the stockpile of low-enriched uranium is growing, centrifuges are being reinstalled and more efficient centrifuges are being developed at a faster pace. We will know by how much each of these steps has advanced when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases its next quarterly report in the latter half of February. The enriched uranium feedstock will still be less than a bomb’s worth, but the pace of acceleration will be concerning. One question is whether Iran will resume 20 per cent enrichment, a level it first reached ten years ago, in an escalating stand-off with western states which were imposing ever-more biting sanctions. Today, Iran can again use the 20 per cent step as a bargaining chip in efforts to forestall the re-imposition of UN sanctions. Do not be spooked by the alarmist assessments that will surely follow when the next IAEA report comes out. Remember that worst-case assumptions assume that Iran would be able to get everything right the first time it attempts the tricky task of producing weapons-grade uranium without it exploding prematurely, and that assembling a warhead small enough to fit in the nosecone of Iran’s missiles would go like clockwork. Remember, too, that Iran would be [foolish] suicidal to try to rush to produce HEU at sites that are intrusively monitored.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Iran has not restarted its nuclear weapons programme\nCommentators\nassume so, based on Iran’s decision\nJanuary to retreat from the enrichment limits in the 2015 nuclear deal\nOthers wrongly conclude\nTehran has abandoned the deal\nIran is still keeping a foot in the accord, abiding by\ncrucial inspection requirements\nWhat Iran has done is advance the timeline toward a nuclear weapons capability in line with its\nhedging strategy\nHow much so is a matter of conjecture\nassessments of the so-called break-out period are based on uncertain data and questionable assumptions\nIran will be able to produce enough HEU\nto assemble a weapon in less than two years\nit is not significantly different than when the JCPOA went into effect in 2016\nit is a much better situation than when negotiations began in 2013, at which point the break-out period was judged to be only a couple of months\nIran is currently not interested in developing an atomic bomb\nDo not be spooked by\nalarmist assessments that will\nfollow when the next IAEA report comes out\nRemember\nworst-case assumptions assume\nIran would be able to get everything right the first time it attempts the tricky task of producing weapons-grade uranium without it exploding prematurely, and\nassembling a warhead small enough to fit in the nosecone of Iran’s missiles would go like clockwork\nIran would be [foolish]\nto try to rush to produce HEU at sites that are intrusively monitored", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No Iran prolif----multiple checks", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Iran has not restarted its nuclear weapons programme\nCommentators\nassume so, based on Iran’s decision\nJanuary to retreat from the enrichment limits in the 2015 nuclear deal\nOthers wrongly conclude\nTehran has abandoned the deal\nIran is still keeping a foot in the accord, abiding by\ncrucial inspection requirements\nWhat Iran has done is advance the timeline toward a nuclear weapons capability in line with its\nhedging strategy\nHow much so is a matter of conjecture\nassessments of the so-called break-out period are based on uncertain data and questionable assumptions\nIran will be able to produce enough HEU\nto assemble a weapon in less than two years\nit is not significantly different than when the JCPOA went into effect in 2016\nit is a much better situation than when negotiations began in 2013, at which point the break-out period was judged to be only a couple of months\nIran is currently not interested in developing an atomic bomb\nDo not be spooked by\nalarmist assessments that will\nfollow when the next IAEA report comes out\nRemember\nworst-case assumptions assume\nIran would be able to get everything right the first time it attempts the tricky task of producing weapons-grade uranium without it exploding prematurely, and\nassembling a warhead small enough to fit in the nosecone of Iran’s missiles would go like clockwork\nIran would be [foolish]\nto try to rush to produce HEU at sites that are intrusively monitored", "role": "user" }, { "content": "restarted its nuclear weapons programme\nenrichment limits\nkeeping a foot in\nhedging strategy\nmatter of conjecture\nso-called break-out period\nless than two years\nsignificantly different\nnot interested in developing an atomic bomb\nalarmist assessments\nto get everything right the first time\ntricky task\nfit in the nosecone\ngo like clockwork\nfoolish", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No Iran prolif----multiple checks\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Iran has not restarted its nuclear weapons programme\nCommentators\nassume so, based on Iran’s decision\nJanuary to retreat from the enrichment limits in the 2015 nuclear deal\nOthers wrongly conclude\nTehran has abandoned the deal\nIran is still keeping a foot in the accord, abiding by\ncrucial inspection requirements\nWhat Iran has done is advance the timeline toward a nuclear weapons capability in line with its\nhedging strategy\nHow much so is a matter of conjecture\nassessments of the so-called break-out period are based on uncertain data and questionable assumptions\nIran will be able to produce enough HEU\nto assemble a weapon in less than two years\nit is not significantly different than when the JCPOA went into effect in 2016\nit is a much better situation than when negotiations began in 2013, at which point the break-out period was judged to be only a couple of months\nIran is currently not interested in developing an atomic bomb\nDo not be spooked by\nalarmist assessments that will\nfollow when the next IAEA report comes out\nRemember\nworst-case assumptions assume\nIran would be able to get everything right the first time it attempts the tricky task of producing weapons-grade uranium without it exploding prematurely, and\nassembling a warhead small enough to fit in the nosecone of Iran’s missiles would go like clockwork\nIran would be [foolish]\nto try to rush to produce HEU at sites that are intrusively monitored", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Iran has not restarted its nuc\nprogram\nCommentators\nassume\nbased on Iran’s\nretreat from\nenrichment limits\nIran is\nkeeping a foot in\nabiding by\ninspection requirements\nIran will\nproduce enough\nin\ntwo years\nnot\ndifferent than\nthe JCPOA\nbetter\nthan\n2013\nIran is\nnot interested in\nan atomic bomb\nalarmist assessments\nwill\nfollow\nworst-case\nassum\nIran\nget everything right the first time\nproducing\nuranium withou\nexploding\nand\na warhead\nto fit\nthe nosecone of Iran’s missiles\nIran would be [foolish\nto try\nsites\nare intrusively monitored", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Any neg argument that says using institutional channels is intrinsically colonial turns their k --- that places a violent and forced choice onto Indigenous people for failing to be perfectly decolonial.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The cases this project has analyzed demonstrate the necessity of embracing a multi-layered approach to decolonial rhetoric. The protesters in each of these cases employed consummatory, instrumental, and coalitional approaches, rather than just 1 or 2 of them. Western Shoshone advocates both called on the U.S. government to comply with the Treaty of Ruby Valley and enacted sovereignty with Nevada Desert Experience protesters at the Nevada Test Site, regardless of the government’s failure to comply. Bikinian repatriation advocates both demanded the acknowledgment and fulfillment of responsibility from a government that had repeatedly poisoned them, and took responsibility for deconstructing competing narratives of erasure circulated among their descendants and with tourists. Hawaiian witnesses at Ka Ho’okolokolonui Hawai’i both compelled the U.S. and Hawaiian state governments to honor trust lands and occupied those lands even when their possession was not acknowledged. However, the dialectical nature of consummatory and instrumental rhetoric is insufficient for understanding these movements. For a more complete understanding of these movements, it is also necessary to consider the dialectical nature of decolonial use of colonial structures. For Western Shoshone advocates, rejecting U.S. citizenship also necessitated a recognition of U.S. governmental authority through treaty agreements. Rather than rejecting the United States wholesale, the Nevada Test Site protesters acknowledged and accepted U.S. sovereignty outside of Newe Segobia. For Bikinians whose exile was predicated on wardship, that same legal concept became the foundation for arguments for compensation under eminent domain. For Hawaiians who reject U.S. citizenship and white presence in Hawai’i, the English language and Christian religion may still play an important role in their lives and offer inroads to holding the U.S. government responsible for violence. The decisions, then, between embracing colonial tools for decolonial aims or rejecting them are not simply questions of whether to appeal to colonial governments or to turn inward. Instead, these decisions are made simultaneously and they necessarily influence one another. Disagreements among members of the same movement over whether to use the English language or if repatriation is a valuable goal may serve as a challenge to unity within movements, but they may also strengthen those movements, as individuals recognize their own ability to weather the storms that can emerge based on those disagreements. This thesis contributes to the field of indigenous decolonial rhetoric by demanding that we consider the overlap between questions of consummatory, instrumental, and coalitional rhetoric and rhetorical tactics, maneuvers, strategies, and appropriation. My argument throughout this thesis has been that indigenous decolonial advocates must simultaneously make choices about how to employ or reject colonial tools and about who to address and what to demand as they use those chosen tools. At the same time, I have worked to recognize the constraining role of colonial contexts in these decisions. The choice to use a consummatory maneuver that rejects foreign presence in Hawai’i, for example, is complicated by the presence of people of East Asian descent whose historical connection to Hawai’i is also constructed by painful colonial realities. These choices, then, are always both influenced by and influencing the people with whom decolonial advocates share space. Recognizing and embracing these constraining factors is distinct from arguing that decolonial resistance can never successfully challenge colonial systems from within. Rather, recognizing the complex realities of decolonial work serves to destabilize naturalized notions of decolonial advocacy as always either perfectly escaping from colonial knowledge structures or as failing to challenge colonial systems. This dichotomous way of understanding decolonial advocacy serves to perpetuate colonial systems by rejecting the work of decolonial advocates for no other reason than that they cannot perfectly escape the colonial systems that have been imposed upon them. If the only approach to decolonization that can be successful or celebrated is that which is not influenced by the colonial context it challenges, there will never be a successful decolonial movement. This embrace of decolonial tactics is not, however, a rejection of decolonial maneuvers that work from perspectives outside of colonial understandings. These approaches are equally necessary to decolonial work. The choice to enact sovereignty and self-determination regardless of colonial refusal to recognize such sovereignty is valuable in and of itself.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Western Shoshone advocates both called on the U.S. government to comply with the Treaty of Ruby Valley and enacted sovereignty with Nevada Desert Experience protesters at the Nevada Test Site, regardless of the government’s failure to comply. Bikinian repatriation advocates both demanded the acknowledgment and fulfillment of responsibility from a government that had repeatedly poisoned them, and took responsibility for deconstructing competing narratives of erasure circulated among their descendants and with tourists. Hawaiian witnesses at Ka Ho’okolokolonui Hawai’i both compelled the U.S. and Hawaiian state governments to honor trust lands and occupied those lands even when their possession was not acknowledged\nRather than rejecting the United States wholesale, the Nevada Test Site protesters acknowledged and accepted U.S. sovereignty outside of Newe Segobia\nFor Hawaiians who reject U.S. citizenship and white presence in Hawai’i, the English language and Christian religion may still play an important role in their lives and offer inroads to holding the U.S. government responsible for violence\nThe decisions, then, between embracing colonial tools for decolonial aims or rejecting them are not simply questions of whether to appeal to colonial governments or to turn inward.\nthese decisions are made simultaneously and they necessarily influence one another. Disagreements among members of the same movement over whether to use the English language or if repatriation is a valuable goal may serve as a challenge to unity within movements, but they may also strengthen those movements, as individuals recognize their own ability to weather the storms that can emerge based on those disagreements.\nindigenous decolonial advocates must simultaneously make choices about how to employ or reject colonial tools and about who to address and what to demand as they use those chosen tools\nRecognizing and embracing these constraining factors is distinct from arguing that decolonial resistance can never successfully challenge colonial systems from within.\nrecognizing the complex realities of decolonial work serves to destabilize naturalized notions of decolonial advocacy as always either perfectly escaping from colonial knowledge structures or as failing to challenge colonial systems. This dichotomous way of understanding decolonial advocacy serves to perpetuate colonial systems by rejecting the work of decolonial advocates for no other reason than that they cannot perfectly escape the colonial systems that have been imposed upon them. If the only approach to decolonization that can be successful or celebrated is that which is not influenced by the colonial context it challenges, there will never be a successful decolonial movement", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Any neg argument that says using institutional channels is intrinsically colonial turns their k --- that places a violent and forced choice onto Indigenous people for failing to be perfectly decolonial.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Western Shoshone advocates both called on the U.S. government to comply with the Treaty of Ruby Valley and enacted sovereignty with Nevada Desert Experience protesters at the Nevada Test Site, regardless of the government’s failure to comply. Bikinian repatriation advocates both demanded the acknowledgment and fulfillment of responsibility from a government that had repeatedly poisoned them, and took responsibility for deconstructing competing narratives of erasure circulated among their descendants and with tourists. Hawaiian witnesses at Ka Ho’okolokolonui Hawai’i both compelled the U.S. and Hawaiian state governments to honor trust lands and occupied those lands even when their possession was not acknowledged\nRather than rejecting the United States wholesale, the Nevada Test Site protesters acknowledged and accepted U.S. sovereignty outside of Newe Segobia\nFor Hawaiians who reject U.S. citizenship and white presence in Hawai’i, the English language and Christian religion may still play an important role in their lives and offer inroads to holding the U.S. government responsible for violence\nThe decisions, then, between embracing colonial tools for decolonial aims or rejecting them are not simply questions of whether to appeal to colonial governments or to turn inward.\nthese decisions are made simultaneously and they necessarily influence one another. Disagreements among members of the same movement over whether to use the English language or if repatriation is a valuable goal may serve as a challenge to unity within movements, but they may also strengthen those movements, as individuals recognize their own ability to weather the storms that can emerge based on those disagreements.\nindigenous decolonial advocates must simultaneously make choices about how to employ or reject colonial tools and about who to address and what to demand as they use those chosen tools\nRecognizing and embracing these constraining factors is distinct from arguing that decolonial resistance can never successfully challenge colonial systems from within.\nrecognizing the complex realities of decolonial work serves to destabilize naturalized notions of decolonial advocacy as always either perfectly escaping from colonial knowledge structures or as failing to challenge colonial systems. This dichotomous way of understanding decolonial advocacy serves to perpetuate colonial systems by rejecting the work of decolonial advocates for no other reason than that they cannot perfectly escape the colonial systems that have been imposed upon them. If the only approach to decolonization that can be successful or celebrated is that which is not influenced by the colonial context it challenges, there will never be a successful decolonial movement", "role": "user" }, { "content": "indigenous decolonial advocates must\nmake choices about how to employ or reject colonial tools and about who to address and what to demand as they use those chosen tools\nrecognizing\ncomplex realities\nserves to destabilize\nnotions of decolonial advocacy as always either perfectly escaping from colonial knowledge structures or as failing to challenge colonial systems.\ndichotomous way of understanding decolonial advocacy serves to perpetuate colonial systems by rejecting the work of decolonial advocates for no other reason than that they cannot perfectly escape the colonial systems that have been imposed upon them.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Capitalism can in no way explain slavery. Slavery is dependent on symbolic value that structures the libidinal economy", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Also an indict of marx/cap K in general\nMarx goes on to tell us that whether the worker saves, hoards, or squanders his money on drink, he “acts as a free agent” and so “learns to control himself, in contrast to the slave, who needs a master.” It is sad, in a funny sort of way, to think of a worker standing in the same relationship to the sellers of goods as any other buyer, simply because his use-values can buy a loaf of bread just like the capitalist’s capital can. But it is frightening to take this “same relationship” in a direction that Marx does not take it: If workers can buy a loaf of bread, they can also buy a slave. It seems to me that the psychic dimension of a proletariat who “stands in precisely the same relationship” to other members of civil society due to their intramural exchange in mutual, possessive possibilities, the ability to own either a piece of Black flesh or a loaf of white bread or both, is where we must begin to understand the founding antagonism between the something Mailer has to save and the nothing Baldwin has to lose. David Eltis is emphatic in his assertion that European civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves along the banks of the Thames or other rivers in the lands of White people or in prisons or poor houses was a bad business decision that slowed the pace of economic development in both Europe and the “New World.” Eltis writes: “No Western European power after the Middle Ages crosses the basic divide separating European workers from full chattel slavery. And while serfdom fell and rose in different parts of early modern Europe and shared characteristics with slavery, serfs were not outsiders either before or after enserfment. The phrase ‘long distance serf trade’ is an oxymoron.” He goes on to show how population growth patterns in Europe during the 1300s, 1400s, and 1500s far outpaced population growth patterns in Africa. He makes this point not only to demonstrate how devastating chattel slavery was on African population growth patterns—in other words, to highlight its genocidal impact—but also to make an equally profound but commonly overlooked point: Europe was so heavily populated that had the Europeans been more invested in the economic value of chattel slavery than they were in the symbolic value of Black slavery and hence had instituted “a properly exploited system drawing on convicts, prisoners and vagrants. . . . [they] could easily have provided 50,000 [White slaves] a year [to the New World] without serious disruption to either international peace or the existing social institutions that generated and supervised these potential European victims.” I raise Eltis’s counterposing of the symbolic value of slavery to the economic value of slavery in order to debunk two gross misunderstandings: One is that work—or alienation and exploitation—is a constituent element of slavery. Slavery, writes Orlando Patterson, “is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” Patterson goes to great lengths to delink his three “constituent elements of slavery” from the labor that one is typically forced to perform when one is enslaved. Forced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not. In pursuit of his “constituent elements” of slavery, a line of inquiry that helps us separate experience (events) from ontology (the capacities of power—or lack thereof—lodged in distinct and irreconcilable subject positions, e.g., Humans and Slaves), Patterson helps us denaturalize the link between force and labor so that we can theorize the former as a phenomenon that positions a body, ontologically (paradigmatically), and the latter as a possible but not inevitable experience of someone who is socially dead. The other misunderstanding I am attempting to correct is the notion that the profit motive is the consideration in the slaveocracy that trumps all others. David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe have gone to considerable lengths to show that, in point of fact, slavery is and connotes an ontological status for Blackness; and that the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility (as Hartman puts it): the condition of being owned and traded. Patterson reminds us that though professional athletes and brides in traditional cultures can be said to be bought and sold (when the former is traded among teams and the latter is exchanged for a bride price), they are not slaves because (1) they are not “generally dishonored,” meaning they are not stigmatized in their being prior to any transgressive act or behavior; ( ) they are not “natally alienated,” meaning their claims to ascending and descending generations are not denied them; and ( ) they have some choice in the relationship, meaning they are not the objects of “naked violence.” The relational status of the athlete and the traditional bride is always already recognized and incorporated into relationality writ large. Unlike the Slave, the professional athlete and traditional bride are subjected to accumulation and fungibility as one experience among many experiences, and not as their ontological foundation. Eltis meticulously explains how the costs of enslavement would have been driven down exponentially had Europeans taken White slaves directly to America rather than sailing from Europe to Africa to take Black slaves to America. He notes that “shipping costs . . . comprised by far the greater part of the price of any form of imported bonded labor in the Americas. If we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast as well, then the case for sailing directly from Europe with a cargo of [Whites] appears stronger again.” Eltis sums up his data by concluding that if European merchants, planters, and statesmen imposed chattel slavery on some members of their own society— say, only 50,000 White slaves per year—then not only would European civil society have been able to absorb the social consequences of these losses (i.e., class warfare would have been unlikely even at this rate of enslavement), but civil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs, a faster development of the Americas, and higher exports and income levels on both sides of the Atlantic.” But what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the latter which structures the libidinal economy of civil society. White chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract had been completely stripped from the body of the convict, vagrant, beggar, indentured servant, or child. This is a subtle point but one vital to our understanding of the relationship between the world of Blacks and the world of Humans. Even under the most extreme forms of coercion in the late Middle Ages and in the early modern period—for example, the provisional and selective enslavement of English vagrants from the early to mid-1500s to the mid-1700s —“the power of the state over [convicts in the Old World] and the power of the master over [convicts in the New World] was more circumscribed than that of the slave owner over the slave.”\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Marx goes on to tell us that whether the worker saves, hoards, or squanders his money on drink, he “acts as a free agent” and so “learns to control himself, in contrast to the slave, who needs a master.”\nworker standing in the same relationship to the sellers of goods as any other buyer, simply because his use-values can buy a loaf of bread just like the capitalist’s capital can.\nIf workers can buy a loaf of bread, they can also buy a slave.\nproletariat who “stands in precisely the same relationship” to other members of civil society due to their intramural exchange in mutual, possessive possibilities, the ability to own either a piece of Black flesh or a loaf of white bread or both,\nEuropean civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves along the banks of the Thames or other rivers in the lands of White people or in prisons or poor houses was a bad business decision that slowed the pace of economic development in both Europe and the “New World.” Eltis writes: “No Western European power after the Middle Ages crosses the basic divide separating European workers from full chattel slavery. And while serfdom fell and rose in different parts of early modern Europe and shared characteristics with slavery, serfs were not outsiders either before or after enserfment. The phrase ‘long distance serf trade’ is an oxymoron.” He goes on to show how population growth patterns in Europe during the 1300s, 1400s, and 1500s far outpaced population growth patterns in Africa.\nthey] could easily have provided 50,000 [White slaves] a year [to the New World] without serious disruption to either international peace or the existing social institutions that generated and supervised these potential European victims.”\nSlavery\nis the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored person\nForced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not\nIf we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast as well, then the case for sailing directly from Europe with a cargo of [Whites] appears stronger again.”\n, only 50,000 White slaves per year—then not only would European civil society have been able to absorb the social consequences of these losses (i.e., class warfare would have been unlikely even at this rate of enslavement), but civil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs, a faster development of the Americas, and higher exports and income levels on both sides of the Atlantic.” But what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the latter which structures the libidinal economy of civil society. White chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract had been completely stripped from the body of the convict, vagrant, beggar, indentured servant, or child.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Capitalism can in no way explain slavery. Slavery is dependent on symbolic value that structures the libidinal economy", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Marx goes on to tell us that whether the worker saves, hoards, or squanders his money on drink, he “acts as a free agent” and so “learns to control himself, in contrast to the slave, who needs a master.”\nworker standing in the same relationship to the sellers of goods as any other buyer, simply because his use-values can buy a loaf of bread just like the capitalist’s capital can.\nIf workers can buy a loaf of bread, they can also buy a slave.\nproletariat who “stands in precisely the same relationship” to other members of civil society due to their intramural exchange in mutual, possessive possibilities, the ability to own either a piece of Black flesh or a loaf of white bread or both,\nEuropean civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves along the banks of the Thames or other rivers in the lands of White people or in prisons or poor houses was a bad business decision that slowed the pace of economic development in both Europe and the “New World.” Eltis writes: “No Western European power after the Middle Ages crosses the basic divide separating European workers from full chattel slavery. And while serfdom fell and rose in different parts of early modern Europe and shared characteristics with slavery, serfs were not outsiders either before or after enserfment. The phrase ‘long distance serf trade’ is an oxymoron.” He goes on to show how population growth patterns in Europe during the 1300s, 1400s, and 1500s far outpaced population growth patterns in Africa.\nthey] could easily have provided 50,000 [White slaves] a year [to the New World] without serious disruption to either international peace or the existing social institutions that generated and supervised these potential European victims.”\nSlavery\nis the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored person\nForced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not\nIf we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast as well, then the case for sailing directly from Europe with a cargo of [Whites] appears stronger again.”\n, only 50,000 White slaves per year—then not only would European civil society have been able to absorb the social consequences of these losses (i.e., class warfare would have been unlikely even at this rate of enslavement), but civil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs, a faster development of the Americas, and higher exports and income levels on both sides of the Atlantic.” But what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the latter which structures the libidinal economy of civil society. White chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract had been completely stripped from the body of the convict, vagrant, beggar, indentured servant, or child.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Marx goes on to tell us that whether the worker saves, hoards, or squanders his money on drink, he “acts as a free agent” and so “learns to control himself, in contrast to the slave, who needs a master.”\nworker standing in the same relationship to the sellers of goods as any other buyer, simply because his use-values can buy a loaf of bread just like the capitalist’s capital can.\nIf workers can buy a loaf of bread, they can also buy a slave.\nproletariat who “stands in precisely the same relationship” to other members of civil society due to their intramural exchange in mutual, possessive possibilities, the ability to own either a piece of Black flesh or a loaf of white bread or both,\nEuropean civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves along the banks of the Thames or other rivers in the lands of White people or in prisons or poor houses was a bad business decision that slowed the pace of economic development in both Europe and the “New World.” Eltis writes: “No Western European power after the Middle Ages crosses the basic divide separating European workers from full chattel slavery. And while serfdom fell and rose in different parts of early modern Europe and shared characteristics with slavery, serfs were not outsiders either before or after enserfment. The phrase ‘long distance serf trade’ is an oxymoron.” He goes on to show how population growth patterns in Europe during the 1300s, 1400s, and 1500s far outpaced population growth patterns in Africa.\nthey] could easily have provided 50,000 [White slaves] a year [to the New World] without serious disruption to either international peace or the existing social institutions that generated and supervised these potential European victims.”\nSlavery\nis the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored person\nForced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not\nIf we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast as well, then the case for sailing directly from Europe with a cargo of [Whites] appears stronger again.”\n, only 50,000 White slaves per year—then not only would European civil society have been able to absorb the social consequences of these losses (i.e., class warfare would have been unlikely even at this rate of enslavement), but civil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs, a faster development of the Americas, and higher exports and income levels on both sides of the Atlantic.” But what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the latter which structures the libidinal economy of civil society. White chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract had been completely stripped from the body of the convict, vagrant, beggar, indentured servant, or child.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Capitalism can in no way explain slavery. Slavery is dependent on symbolic value that structures the libidinal economy\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Also an indict of marx/cap K in general\nMarx goes on to tell us that whether the worker saves, hoards, or squanders his money on drink, he “acts as a free agent” and so “learns to control himself, in contrast to the slave, who needs a master.” It is sad, in a funny sort of way, to think of a worker standing in the same relationship to the sellers of goods as any other buyer, simply because his use-values can buy a loaf of bread just like the capitalist’s capital can. But it is frightening to take this “same relationship” in a direction that Marx does not take it: If workers can buy a loaf of bread, they can also buy a slave. It seems to me that the psychic dimension of a proletariat who “stands in precisely the same relationship” to other members of civil society due to their intramural exchange in mutual, possessive possibilities, the ability to own either a piece of Black flesh or a loaf of white bread or both, is where we must begin to understand the founding antagonism between the something Mailer has to save and the nothing Baldwin has to lose. David Eltis is emphatic in his assertion that European civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves along the banks of the Thames or other rivers in the lands of White people or in prisons or poor houses was a bad business decision that slowed the pace of economic development in both Europe and the “New World.” Eltis writes: “No Western European power after the Middle Ages crosses the basic divide separating European workers from full chattel slavery. And while serfdom fell and rose in different parts of early modern Europe and shared characteristics with slavery, serfs were not outsiders either before or after enserfment. The phrase ‘long distance serf trade’ is an oxymoron.” He goes on to show how population growth patterns in Europe during the 1300s, 1400s, and 1500s far outpaced population growth patterns in Africa. He makes this point not only to demonstrate how devastating chattel slavery was on African population growth patterns—in other words, to highlight its genocidal impact—but also to make an equally profound but commonly overlooked point: Europe was so heavily populated that had the Europeans been more invested in the economic value of chattel slavery than they were in the symbolic value of Black slavery and hence had instituted “a properly exploited system drawing on convicts, prisoners and vagrants. . . . [they] could easily have provided 50,000 [White slaves] a year [to the New World] without serious disruption to either international peace or the existing social institutions that generated and supervised these potential European victims.” I raise Eltis’s counterposing of the symbolic value of slavery to the economic value of slavery in order to debunk two gross misunderstandings: One is that work—or alienation and exploitation—is a constituent element of slavery. Slavery, writes Orlando Patterson, “is the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.” Patterson goes to great lengths to delink his three “constituent elements of slavery” from the labor that one is typically forced to perform when one is enslaved. Forced labor is not constitutive of enslavement because whereas it explains a common practice, it does not define the structure of the power relation between those who are slaves and those who are not. In pursuit of his “constituent elements” of slavery, a line of inquiry that helps us separate experience (events) from ontology (the capacities of power—or lack thereof—lodged in distinct and irreconcilable subject positions, e.g., Humans and Slaves), Patterson helps us denaturalize the link between force and labor so that we can theorize the former as a phenomenon that positions a body, ontologically (paradigmatically), and the latter as a possible but not inevitable experience of someone who is socially dead. The other misunderstanding I am attempting to correct is the notion that the profit motive is the consideration in the slaveocracy that trumps all others. David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Hortense Spillers, Orlando Patterson, and Achille Mbembe have gone to considerable lengths to show that, in point of fact, slavery is and connotes an ontological status for Blackness; and that the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility (as Hartman puts it): the condition of being owned and traded. Patterson reminds us that though professional athletes and brides in traditional cultures can be said to be bought and sold (when the former is traded among teams and the latter is exchanged for a bride price), they are not slaves because (1) they are not “generally dishonored,” meaning they are not stigmatized in their being prior to any transgressive act or behavior; ( ) they are not “natally alienated,” meaning their claims to ascending and descending generations are not denied them; and ( ) they have some choice in the relationship, meaning they are not the objects of “naked violence.” The relational status of the athlete and the traditional bride is always already recognized and incorporated into relationality writ large. Unlike the Slave, the professional athlete and traditional bride are subjected to accumulation and fungibility as one experience among many experiences, and not as their ontological foundation. Eltis meticulously explains how the costs of enslavement would have been driven down exponentially had Europeans taken White slaves directly to America rather than sailing from Europe to Africa to take Black slaves to America. He notes that “shipping costs . . . comprised by far the greater part of the price of any form of imported bonded labor in the Americas. If we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast as well, then the case for sailing directly from Europe with a cargo of [Whites] appears stronger again.” Eltis sums up his data by concluding that if European merchants, planters, and statesmen imposed chattel slavery on some members of their own society— say, only 50,000 White slaves per year—then not only would European civil society have been able to absorb the social consequences of these losses (i.e., class warfare would have been unlikely even at this rate of enslavement), but civil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs, a faster development of the Americas, and higher exports and income levels on both sides of the Atlantic.” But what Whites would have gained in economic value, they would have lost in symbolic value; and it is the latter which structures the libidinal economy of civil society. White chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract had been completely stripped from the body of the convict, vagrant, beggar, indentured servant, or child. This is a subtle point but one vital to our understanding of the relationship between the world of Blacks and the world of Humans. Even under the most extreme forms of coercion in the late Middle Ages and in the early modern period—for example, the provisional and selective enslavement of English vagrants from the early to mid-1500s to the mid-1700s —“the power of the state over [convicts in the Old World] and the power of the master over [convicts in the New World] was more circumscribed than that of the slave owner over the slave.”\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Marx\ntell us\nthe worker\nacts as a free agent\nin contrast to the slave,\nIf workers\ncan also buy a slave.\nproletariat\nstands in\nthe same relationship” to\ncivil society due to their\nability to own\nBlack flesh\nEuropean civil society’s decision not to hunt for slaves\nin the lands of White people or in prisons\nwas a bad business decision\nNo Western European power\ncrosses the\ndivide separating\nworkers from full chattel slavery\nserfs were not outsiders\nlong distance serf trade’ is an oxymoron.\npopulation growth patterns in Europe\noutpaced population growth patterns in Africa\nthey] could easily have provided 50,000\na year\nwithout serious disruption\nSlavery\nis the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored person\nForced labor is not constitutive of enslavement\nit does not define the structure of the power\nIf we take into account the time spent collecting a slave cargo on the African coast\n50,000 White slaves per yea\ncivil society “would [also] have enjoyed lower labor costs\nand higher exports and income levels\nwhat Whites would have\nlost\nsymbolic value\nwhich structures the libidinal economy of civil society\nWhite chattel slavery would have meant that the aura of the social contract\nbeen completely stripped", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Business Confidence low", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It’s the kind of record any president would envy. Economic growth in 2021 is forecast to have reached a 38-year high. Jobs are being added at a historic pace. The administration – and some others – are calling it the “Biden boom.”\nBut the American public is skeptical. After one year in office, President Joe Biden’s approval rating is slipping to lows that Donald Trump experienced for most of his presidency.\nA key reason? Inflation is also on a tear and is beginning to undercut the otherwise thriving economy that Mr. Biden inherited. The damage is minimal so far, but the trends are ominous for Democrats. The Federal Reserve is likely to begin throttling back growth just as voters begin to make up their minds about the direction of the economy. When they go to the polls this November to vote for members of Congress, will they perceive a Biden boom or a sticker-shock bust?\nRising prices are important for ​reasons that go well beyond politics. When untamed, inflation itself can threaten economic growth by eroding consumer and business confidence – and damaging household finances as prices surge faster than incomes. And if Americans expect ​it to be lasting, they will make purchasing decisions that exacerbate inflation and complicate the Fed’s efforts to control it.​\n“The Fed is behind the curve,” says Frederic Mishkin, an economist at Columbia Business School and former Fed governor. “They are going to have to tighten more than they otherwise would.”\nTo counteract inflation, central bankers typically “tighten” monetary conditions – by raising interest rates, for example. However, those actions can cool demand and slow the economy, often resulting in a recession. And if there’s one thing voters like even less than inflation, it’s slow or negative economic growth, research shows.\nThis is what scares Democrats. Heading into midterm elections where their prospects for holding onto the House and Senate already look shaky, they don’t want to get saddled with high inflation or a weak economy. At his first solo press conference in 10 months, Mr. Biden on Wednesday acknowledged that inflation was bad: “People see it at the gas pumps, the grocery stores, and elsewhere.” And he endorsed efforts to fight the surge in prices, pointing out that it was the Fed’s responsibility.\nInflation rises on the worry list\nThe surge in prices is undeniable. Inflation last month rose at an annual rate of 7%, the highest 12-month increase since 1982, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Even using “core inflation” measures, which strip away sectors where prices can swing widely, the price surge is ratcheting up. \nAnd its effects are beginning to be felt. Average hourly earnings rose by a strong 4.7% for 2021, but that turns out to be more than a 2% pay cut once adjusted for inflation. An index of consumer sentiment is lower now than during a spring 2020 dip as the pandemic began.\nThe Biden administration pins the blame on the pandemic and says supply chain issues will get worked out over time and inflation will then abate.\n“Given that it is a supply-demand mismatch that really is a result of the pandemic, the reason ... forecasters are expecting that inflation will ease is we do expect that this pandemic will moderate,” Cecilia Rouse, chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, said in an online symposium with the Council on Foreign Relations last week. \nThat argument becomes harder to make the longer high inflation persists. In a Conference Board survey of U.S. CEOs released last week, inflation was the No. 2 external challenge after labor shortages; a year ago, it barely registered on CEOs’ radar at No. 22. Even Federal Reserve policymakers, who spent most of last year agreeing with the administration that inflation was transitory, have dropped the term and are signaling a tougher stance. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the\npublic is skeptical\nInflation is\non a tear and is beginning to undercut the\nthriving economy\nBiden inherited\ninflation\nthreaten economic growth by eroding consumer and business confidence\nif Americans expect ​it to\nlast\nthey will make purchasing decisions that exacerbate inflation and complicate the Fed’s efforts to control it.​\nThe Fed is behind the curve\nTo counteract inflation, central bankers typically\ntighten\nmonetary conditions\nthose\nslow the economy\nresulting in a recession\nThe surge in prices is undeniable\nEven using “core inflation” measures\nthe price surge is ratcheting up\nsentiment is lower now than during a spring 2020 dip as the pandemic began\nIn a Conference Board survey of U.S. CEOs released last week, inflation was the No. 2 external challenge after labor shortages; a year ago, it barely registered on CEOs’ radar at No. 22.\nFed\npolicymakers\ndropped the term and\nsignal\na tough\nstance", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Business Confidence low", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the\npublic is skeptical\nInflation is\non a tear and is beginning to undercut the\nthriving economy\nBiden inherited\ninflation\nthreaten economic growth by eroding consumer and business confidence\nif Americans expect ​it to\nlast\nthey will make purchasing decisions that exacerbate inflation and complicate the Fed’s efforts to control it.​\nThe Fed is behind the curve\nTo counteract inflation, central bankers typically\ntighten\nmonetary conditions\nthose\nslow the economy\nresulting in a recession\nThe surge in prices is undeniable\nEven using “core inflation” measures\nthe price surge is ratcheting up\nsentiment is lower now than during a spring 2020 dip as the pandemic began\nIn a Conference Board survey of U.S. CEOs released last week, inflation was the No. 2 external challenge after labor shortages; a year ago, it barely registered on CEOs’ radar at No. 22.\nFed\npolicymakers\ndropped the term and\nsignal\na tough\nstance", "role": "user" }, { "content": "skeptical\ntear\nundercut\nthriving economy\neconomic growth\nconsumer\nbusiness confidence\npurchasing decisions\ninflation\nFed’s efforts\nit\nbehind\ncurve\ncounteract inflation\nslow\neconomy\nrecession\nsurge\nprices\nundeniable\ncore inflation\nmeasures\nprice surge\nratcheting up\nlower now\nspring 2020\npandemic began\nConference Board\nU.S. CEOs\ninflation\nNo. 2 external challenge\nlabor shortages\nyear ago\nCEOs’ radar\nNo. 22.\ndropped\nterm\ntough\nstance", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Business Confidence low\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It’s the kind of record any president would envy. Economic growth in 2021 is forecast to have reached a 38-year high. Jobs are being added at a historic pace. The administration – and some others – are calling it the “Biden boom.”\nBut the American public is skeptical. After one year in office, President Joe Biden’s approval rating is slipping to lows that Donald Trump experienced for most of his presidency.\nA key reason? Inflation is also on a tear and is beginning to undercut the otherwise thriving economy that Mr. Biden inherited. The damage is minimal so far, but the trends are ominous for Democrats. The Federal Reserve is likely to begin throttling back growth just as voters begin to make up their minds about the direction of the economy. When they go to the polls this November to vote for members of Congress, will they perceive a Biden boom or a sticker-shock bust?\nRising prices are important for ​reasons that go well beyond politics. When untamed, inflation itself can threaten economic growth by eroding consumer and business confidence – and damaging household finances as prices surge faster than incomes. And if Americans expect ​it to be lasting, they will make purchasing decisions that exacerbate inflation and complicate the Fed’s efforts to control it.​\n“The Fed is behind the curve,” says Frederic Mishkin, an economist at Columbia Business School and former Fed governor. “They are going to have to tighten more than they otherwise would.”\nTo counteract inflation, central bankers typically “tighten” monetary conditions – by raising interest rates, for example. However, those actions can cool demand and slow the economy, often resulting in a recession. And if there’s one thing voters like even less than inflation, it’s slow or negative economic growth, research shows.\nThis is what scares Democrats. Heading into midterm elections where their prospects for holding onto the House and Senate already look shaky, they don’t want to get saddled with high inflation or a weak economy. At his first solo press conference in 10 months, Mr. Biden on Wednesday acknowledged that inflation was bad: “People see it at the gas pumps, the grocery stores, and elsewhere.” And he endorsed efforts to fight the surge in prices, pointing out that it was the Fed’s responsibility.\nInflation rises on the worry list\nThe surge in prices is undeniable. Inflation last month rose at an annual rate of 7%, the highest 12-month increase since 1982, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Even using “core inflation” measures, which strip away sectors where prices can swing widely, the price surge is ratcheting up. \nAnd its effects are beginning to be felt. Average hourly earnings rose by a strong 4.7% for 2021, but that turns out to be more than a 2% pay cut once adjusted for inflation. An index of consumer sentiment is lower now than during a spring 2020 dip as the pandemic began.\nThe Biden administration pins the blame on the pandemic and says supply chain issues will get worked out over time and inflation will then abate.\n“Given that it is a supply-demand mismatch that really is a result of the pandemic, the reason ... forecasters are expecting that inflation will ease is we do expect that this pandemic will moderate,” Cecilia Rouse, chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, said in an online symposium with the Council on Foreign Relations last week. \nThat argument becomes harder to make the longer high inflation persists. In a Conference Board survey of U.S. CEOs released last week, inflation was the No. 2 external challenge after labor shortages; a year ago, it barely registered on CEOs’ radar at No. 22. Even Federal Reserve policymakers, who spent most of last year agreeing with the administration that inflation was transitory, have dropped the term and are signaling a tougher stance. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Inflation\nundercut the\neconomy\ninflation\nthreaten\ngrowth by eroding\nbusiness confidence\nAmericans\nmake\ndecisions that exacerbate inflation\ntight\nmonetary conditions\nresult\nin a recession\nThe surge\nis undeniable\nsentiment is lower now than during\nspring 2020\nIn a\nsurvey of\nCEOs\ninflation was the No. 2\nchallenge after\nshortages", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: States won’t model U.S. NFU and it won’t bolster the nonproliferation regime", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Some argue that adopting such a policy would set an example and cause nuclear adversaries to follow America’s lead. If promises were kept, this would allow the U.S. conventional juggernaut to win wars absent the threat of nuclear use. But this outcome is unlikely. Indeed, several nuclear adversaries have acquired, or are currently seeking, nuclear weapons precisely to offset superior U.S. conventional capabilities. Again, quoting Tierney:\n“If [a President] made a dramatic announcement of no-first-use, it would probably have less impact than people think because other countries wouldn’t follow suit, especially if they’re weak.”\nWould U.S. adoption of no-first-use cause other countries to be more inclined to cooperate with the United States to work toward a strengthened nonproliferation regime and less likely to acquire nuclear weapons of their own? No evidence exists to support such a contention and, as noted above, allied perceptions of weakened extended deterrence could actually spur proliferation.\nAnother purported benefit of adopting a no-first-use policy is that it might silence criticism from Non-Aligned Movement countries that periodically denounce the United States for, among other things, not having disarmed unilaterally. This is unlikely. Indeed, the enormous progress made in the decades leading up to the end of the Cold War and beyond in ending the nuclear arms race, reducing nuclear stockpiles, and eliminating other global nuclear threats has done little to moderate such rhetoric.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Some argue\nsuch a policy would set an example and cause nuclear adversaries to follow America’s lead.\nthis would allow the U.S. conventional juggernaut to win wars absent the threat of nuclear use. But this outcome is unlikely\nseveral nuclear adversaries have acquired\nnuclear weapons precisely to offset superior U.S. conventional capabilities\nIf [a President] made a dramatic announcement of n\nf\nu\nit would\nhave less impact than people think because other countries wouldn’t follow suit\nWould U.S.\nn\nf\nu\ncause other countries to be more inclined to cooperate\ntoward a strengthened nonproliferation regime and less likely to acquire nuclear weapons of their own? No evidence exists to support such a contention\nallied perceptions of weakened extended deterrence could actually spur proliferation\nAnother purported benefit\nis that it might silence criticism from N\nA\nM\ncountries that\ndenounce the U\nS\nfor\nnot having disarmed unilaterally. This is unlikely\nenormous progress\nin ending the nuclear arms race, reducing nuclear stockpiles, and eliminating other global nuclear threats has done little to moderate such rhetoric", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: States won’t model U.S. NFU and it won’t bolster the nonproliferation regime", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Some argue\nsuch a policy would set an example and cause nuclear adversaries to follow America’s lead.\nthis would allow the U.S. conventional juggernaut to win wars absent the threat of nuclear use. But this outcome is unlikely\nseveral nuclear adversaries have acquired\nnuclear weapons precisely to offset superior U.S. conventional capabilities\nIf [a President] made a dramatic announcement of n\nf\nu\nit would\nhave less impact than people think because other countries wouldn’t follow suit\nWould U.S.\nn\nf\nu\ncause other countries to be more inclined to cooperate\ntoward a strengthened nonproliferation regime and less likely to acquire nuclear weapons of their own? No evidence exists to support such a contention\nallied perceptions of weakened extended deterrence could actually spur proliferation\nAnother purported benefit\nis that it might silence criticism from N\nA\nM\ncountries that\ndenounce the U\nS\nfor\nnot having disarmed unilaterally. This is unlikely\nenormous progress\nin ending the nuclear arms race, reducing nuclear stockpiles, and eliminating other global nuclear threats has done little to moderate such rhetoric", "role": "user" }, { "content": "set an example\nunlikely\nnuc\ns precisely to offset superior U.S. conventional capabilities\nn\nf\nu\nother countries wouldn’t follow suit\nn\nf\nu\nmore inclined to cooperate\nnonprolif\nNo evidence exists\nactually spur prolif\nN\nA\nM\nU\nS\nThis is unlikely\nenormous progress\ndone little", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: States won’t model U.S. NFU and it won’t bolster the nonproliferation regime\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Some argue\nsuch a policy would set an example and cause nuclear adversaries to follow America’s lead.\nthis would allow the U.S. conventional juggernaut to win wars absent the threat of nuclear use. But this outcome is unlikely\nseveral nuclear adversaries have acquired\nnuclear weapons precisely to offset superior U.S. conventional capabilities\nIf [a President] made a dramatic announcement of n\nf\nu\nit would\nhave less impact than people think because other countries wouldn’t follow suit\nWould U.S.\nn\nf\nu\ncause other countries to be more inclined to cooperate\ntoward a strengthened nonproliferation regime and less likely to acquire nuclear weapons of their own? No evidence exists to support such a contention\nallied perceptions of weakened extended deterrence could actually spur proliferation\nAnother purported benefit\nis that it might silence criticism from N\nA\nM\ncountries that\ndenounce the U\nS\nfor\nnot having disarmed unilaterally. This is unlikely\nenormous progress\nin ending the nuclear arms race, reducing nuclear stockpiles, and eliminating other global nuclear threats has done little to moderate such rhetoric", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Some argue\nsuch\npolicy would set an example and cause\nadversaries to follow\nthis\nis unlikely\nadversaries\nacquired\nnuc\ns\nto offset\nU.S. conventional capabilities\nn\nf\nu\nwould\nhave less impact\nbecause other countries wouldn’t follow\nWould U.S\nn\nf\nu\ncause\ncountries to\ncooperate\ntoward a strengthened nonprolif\nregime\nNo evidence exists\nallied perceptions of weakened extended deterrence could\nspur prolif\npurported benefit\nis\nit might silence criticism from N\nA\nM\ncountries\nThis is unlikely\nenormous progress\nin ending the\narms race\nhas done little to moderate\nrhetoric", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2---Unsustainable growth---profit at all costs cannot be reconciled with finite resources", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Sustainable development is central to the current global development vision (Guruswamy 2010). It also acts both as a pivotal point of orientation of environmental law and policy, and as a Grundnorm that anchors and orientates global environmental governance (Kim and Bosselmann 2013). Sustainable development emerged in the 1970s with the noble idea that individuals would favour development that enhances human wellbeing and social justice while protecting the environment. It was originally conceived as a ‘discourse of resistance, fusing radical environmental consciousness with a critical rethinking of a failed development enterprise’ by highlighting the ‘scarcity and limits, affluence and poverty, global inequality, and the environmental viability of westernization’ (Carruthers 2001, p. 93).\nOver the years, however, sustainable development has metamorphosed into a perverse ideological paradigm that provides the overarching ‘basis for organising the beliefs, subjectivities and values of individuals, and thus producing and reproducing a certain social order in its multiple dimensions, from the individual to the institutional’ (Gudynas 2013, p. 28). Neoliberalism acts as the broader context for the continuing hegemony of mainstream models of development, of which sustainable development is the latest and dominant incarnation (Carruthers 2001). More recently, the confluence of the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change has yet again exposed the limitations of sustainable development and the inequalities occasioned by its neoliberal mindset (Barbier and Burgess 2020; Horn 2021). These predatory mainstream development models contribute to the socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene by exacerbating systemic inequalities and injustices, repeatedly generating economic crises and driving habitat destruction that intensify the vulnerability of the living order (Adelman 2021a). This is anything but sustainable development.\nThis article outlines our deep concern about the perverse consequences of the central role of sustainable development as the dominant worldview that steers the current course of ‘development’, especially insofar as it manifests as a core environmental law and governance principle in the context of the Anthropocene.Footnote1 We concur with the view that ‘sustainable development is an ecopolitical project which might be neither sustainable nor developmental … [I]t is a palatable approach to “green-wrap” the economic and political project of “sustainable degradation” already now fully in play’ (Luke 2008, p. 1813). We argue that sustainable development, an ‘improbable idea [that] is too rarely questioned’ (Nebbia 2012, p. 101), promises what it cannot deliver due to its central contradiction between economic growth and ecological sustainability. We will further show that sustainable development is based on the false promise that endless growth is actually possible on a finite planet where the human footprint is already far greater than Earth’s ability to sustain life.Footnote2 This false promise cultivates, what Gudynas (2013) describes as the delusion of infinite natural assets that the capitalist system has at its disposal to expand forever, while in fact, the ambition of sustainable development is detached from the reality of ever-deepening socio-ecological destruction of a finite planet. Another concern is that the concept is so conveniently malleable that it enables its proponents to mask the negative socio-ecological impacts of relentless growth-driven development promoted by states and corporations. We are particularly concerned that environmental law is complicit in facilitating all of the foregoing to the extent that sustainable development is a legally sanctioned ideological palliative at the centre of environmental law and governance that enables its proponents to rationalize continuing destruction of the fragile earth system, rather than safeguarding planetary integrity (Kotzé et al. 2022, forthcoming; Richardson 2011, p. 31). Our focus in this paper is on environmental law, but the legal and regulatory responses adopted by the international community in response to environmental degradation have implications for the broader substantive and systemic principles and processes of law.\nIn the following section, we offer a brief contextual overview and critique of growth-driven development and the associated ideology of developmentalism and neoliberal globalization that underpins sustainable development. We endeavour to reveal the many contradictions at the heart of sustainable development’s history and its different iterations by global institutions and associated legal and political apparatus. We then provide a deeper critique of the role of sustainable development in environmental law and governance to demonstrate how it perpetuates epistemologies of mastery over a vulnerable living order at a time when we urgently need epistemologies of humility and care as alternatives to mainstream models of development. The aim in this part of the discussion is to show how environmental law has played a crucial role in legitimising a wide range of socio-ecologically destructive practices around the world in the name of sustainable development. The article concludes more hopefully with an examination of an attempt to reimagine alternatives to the sustainable development paradigm in the form of the indigenous onto-epistemology of buen vivir that articulates an ethics of humility and care alien to sustainable development. While buen vivir has not yet managed to fully replace sustainable development in the countries where it operates (at least not in practice), the influence of this worldview is already evident in some laws and policies. This suggests that its acceptance in environmental law and governance as an alternative to sustainable development is more feasible than might be expected, and that there is hope for pursuing a radically different future legal trajectory of planetary care that focuses on the well-being of the entire living order.\nThe Problems with Development, Developmentalism and Growth\nDevelopment, the fulcrum on which the notion of sustainable development revolves, emerged after the Second World War as a way of incorporating the erstwhile Third World into the global economy on unequal terms (Escobar 2011). As Hettne writes, development is ‘one of the oldest and most powerful of all Western ideas’ (1995, p. 29). Development was promoted as the means whereby postcolonial states:\ncould achieve economic growth, reduce poverty and promote social justice. In principle, development is a process of social change designed to improve the wellbeing of people. In practice, it has regularly manifested itself as underdevelopment or maldevelopment so that its scope and rationale have been vigorously contested. (Adelman and Paliwala 2021, p. 1)\nThe idea of development was promoted by the West as the means to save benighted and feckless developing countries from themselves. The concept attracted criticism from the outset but its advocates defended it as a form of progress through modernisation, extractive industrialisation, and economic growth as the primary means of promoting human wellbeing and as the sole expression of material progress (Gudynas 2013). Supporters of development conveniently discount the inconvenient truth that all economic activity is intrinsically destructive when it involves the exploitation of the foundations of life on Earth (Luke 2008). Mainstream, hegemonic models of development have been particularly heedless of environmental destruction despite repeated warnings about the limits to growth, increasing evidence of earth system decay, fast approaching planetary boundaries, and a looming sixth mass extinction event (Barnosky et al. 2011). Profit has persistently trumped people and the planet, driven by the logic of capital accumulation as the only measure of progress and well-being. One effect is that the tenacity of such mainstream models of development has successfully crowded out and marginalized alternative visions of progress and well-being in their pursuit of ‘uninterrupted growth towards a civilisation in the image and likeness of the countries of the North’ (Alcoreza 2013, p. 147).\nToday it is almost tautological to argue that development requires growth. Despite attempts by Sen (1999) and others to construe development as freedom through the capabilities approach—which gave rise to measures of human-centred development such as the Human Development Index—the concept of development remains irredeemably anthropocentric, economistic, extractivist, and growth-driven (UNDP n.d.). By the 1960s, development had become an ideological end in itself in the form of developmentalism;\nan ideological orientation characterized by the fetishization of development, or the attribution to development of the power of a natural (or even, divine) force which humans can resist or question only at the risk of being condemned to stagnation and poverty. The ideology renders opaque the historical forces that have shaped the idea of development. It also disguises the social and political forces that have played, and continue to play, a crucial part in endowing it with the power to dominate human consciousness. (Dirlik 2014, pp. 30–31)\nThe intrinsic flaws of developmentalism, and by extension of neoliberal sustainable development, are only now belatedly acknowledged (at least in part) by institutions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a longstanding promoter of green capitalism and the green economy (Carvalho 2001). UNEP’s position aligns with the mainstream proposition that sees green capitalism and sustainable development as a combination of ‘environmental and sustainability discourses with industrial and economic policy ones, in search of “win–win” solutions and virtuous cycles of progress and prosperity’ (Bina 2013, p. 1024). It has taken several years for the world’s foremost intergovernmental environmental protection champion to finally accept that ‘the current mode of development degrades the Earth’s finite capacity to sustain human well-being’ (UNEP 2021, p. 13, our emphasis). But having linked itself so tightly to sustainable development, UNEP is trapped within the mindset of human focused developmentalism that consistently sidelines ecological sustainability. This is also evident in its acknowledgment that ‘environmental changes are undermining hard-won development gains … [and] are impeding progress towards ending poverty and hunger, reducing inequalities and promoting sustainable economic growth’ (UNEP 2021, p. 13, our emphasis). Global governance institutions responsible for environmental protection are clearly mired in a discursive straitjacket that makes it difficult or even illegitimate for them to question sustainable development orthodoxy. The nub of the problem is that all mainstream models of development are predicated upon economic growth which flows from the dogmatic insistence that the current mode of purportedly sustainable development can be tweaked in the right direction. This makes it impossible to reconcile ecological sustainability and sustainable economic growth. Given earth system limits, endless growth cannot be sustainable; after all, humanity currently uses 74 per cent more than the planet’s ecosystems are able to regenerate—or 1.7 Earths,Footnote3 while four of the nine planetary boundaries have already been crossed, and the others are fast approaching (Rockström et al. 2009). Yet, ‘growthism’ (Hickel 2020, p. 89) remains the main driver of neoliberal globalisation and its devastating effects on our shared world (Fraser 2021; Springer 2016), while proponents of green capitalism such as UNEP continue to maintain that it is possible to grow our way to sustainability, among others, through decoupling; the idea—or fantasy—that economies can grow without increasing environmental pressures (Fletcher and Rammelt 2017).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Sustainable development is central to the current global development vision (Guruswamy 2010). It also acts both as a pivotal point of orientation of environmental law and policy, and as a Grundnorm that anchors and orientates global environmental governance\nIt was originally conceived as a ‘discourse of resistance, fusing radical environmental consciousness with a critical rethinking of a failed development enterprise’ by highlighting the ‘scarcity and limits, affluence and poverty, global inequality, and the environmental viability of westernization’\nhowever, sustainable development has metamorphosed into a perverse ideological paradigm that provides the overarching ‘basis for organising the beliefs, subjectivities and values of individuals, and thus producing and reproducing a certain social order in its multiple dimensions, from the individual to the institutional’\nNeoliberalism\nthe confluence of the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change has yet again exposed the limitations of sustainable development and the inequalities occasioned by its neoliberal mindset (Barbier and Burgess 2020; Horn 2021). These predatory mainstream development models contribute to the socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene by exacerbating systemic inequalities and injustices, repeatedly generating economic crises and driving habitat destruction that intensify the vulnerability of the living order (Adelman 2021a). This is anything but sustainable development.\ndue to its central contradiction between economic growth and ecological sustainability\nWe will further show that sustainable development is based on the false promise that endless growth is actually possible on a finite planet where the human footprint is already far greater than Earth’s ability to sustain life.\nThis false promise cultivates, what Gudynas (2013) describes as the delusion of infinite natural assets that the capitalist system has at its disposal to expand forever, while in fact, the ambition of sustainable development is detached from the reality of ever-deepening socio-ecological destruction of a finite planet\nthe concept is so conveniently malleable that it enables its proponents to mask the negative socio-ecological impacts of relentless growth-driven development promoted by states and corporations\nthat sustainable development is a legally sanctioned ideological palliative at the centre of environmental law and governance that enables its proponents to rationalize continuing destruction of the fragile earth system, rather than safeguarding planetary integrity\nDevelopment, the fulcrum on which the notion of sustainable development revolves, emerged after the Second World War as a way of incorporating the erstwhile Third World into the global economy on unequal terms\nDevelopment was promoted as the means whereby postcolonial states:\ncould achieve economic growth, reduce poverty and promote social justice. In principle, development is a process of social change designed to improve the wellbeing of people. In practice, it has regularly manifested itself as underdevelopment or maldevelopment so that its scope and rationale have been vigorously contested. (Adelman and Paliwala 2021, p. 1)\nThe idea of development was promoted by the West as the means to save benighted and feckless developing countries from themselves. The concept attracted criticism from the outset but its advocates defended it as a form of progress through modernisation, extractive industrialisation, and economic growth as the primary means of promoting human wellbeing and as the sole expression of material progress\nall economic activity is intrinsically destructive when it involves the exploitation of the foundations of life on Earth\nMainstream, hegemonic models of development have been particularly heedless of environmental destruction despite repeated warnings about the limits to growth, increasing evidence of earth system decay, fast approaching planetary boundaries, and a looming sixth mass extinction event\nProfit has persistently trumped people and the planet, driven by the logic of capital accumulation as the only measure of progress and well-being\nintrinsic flaws of\nneoliberal sustainable development\nare\nnow belatedly acknowledged\nby institutions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),\nThis is also evident in its acknowledgment that ‘environmental changes are undermining hard-won development gains … [and] are impeding progress towards ending poverty and hunger, reducing inequalities and promoting sustainable economic growth’\nGlobal governance institutions responsible for environmental protection are clearly mired in a discursive straitjacket that makes it difficult or even illegitimate for them to question sustainable development orthodoxy\nThe nub of the problem is that all mainstream models of development are predicated upon economic growth which flows from the dogmatic insistence that the current mode of purportedly sustainable development can be tweaked in the right direction\nmakes it impossible to reconcile ecological sustainability and sustainable economic growth\nhumanity currently uses 74 per cent more than the planet’s ecosystems are able to regenerate—or 1.7 Earths", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2---Unsustainable growth---profit at all costs cannot be reconciled with finite resources", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Sustainable development is central to the current global development vision (Guruswamy 2010). It also acts both as a pivotal point of orientation of environmental law and policy, and as a Grundnorm that anchors and orientates global environmental governance (Kim and Bosselmann 2013). Sustainable development emerged in the 1970s with the noble idea that individuals would favour development that enhances human wellbeing and social justice while protecting the environment. It was originally conceived as a ‘discourse of resistance, fusing radical environmental consciousness with a critical rethinking of a failed development enterprise’ by highlighting the ‘scarcity and limits, affluence and poverty, global inequality, and the environmental viability of westernization’ (Carruthers 2001, p. 93).\nOver the years, however, sustainable development has metamorphosed into a perverse ideological paradigm that provides the overarching ‘basis for organising the beliefs, subjectivities and values of individuals, and thus producing and reproducing a certain social order in its multiple dimensions, from the individual to the institutional’ (Gudynas 2013, p. 28). Neoliberalism acts as the broader context for the continuing hegemony of mainstream models of development, of which sustainable development is the latest and dominant incarnation (Carruthers 2001). More recently, the confluence of the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change has yet again exposed the limitations of sustainable development and the inequalities occasioned by its neoliberal mindset (Barbier and Burgess 2020; Horn 2021). These predatory mainstream development models contribute to the socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene by exacerbating systemic inequalities and injustices, repeatedly generating economic crises and driving habitat destruction that intensify the vulnerability of the living order (Adelman 2021a). This is anything but sustainable development.\nThis article outlines our deep concern about the perverse consequences of the central role of sustainable development as the dominant worldview that steers the current course of ‘development’, especially insofar as it manifests as a core environmental law and governance principle in the context of the Anthropocene.Footnote1 We concur with the view that ‘sustainable development is an ecopolitical project which might be neither sustainable nor developmental … [I]t is a palatable approach to “green-wrap” the economic and political project of “sustainable degradation” already now fully in play’ (Luke 2008, p. 1813). We argue that sustainable development, an ‘improbable idea [that] is too rarely questioned’ (Nebbia 2012, p. 101), promises what it cannot deliver due to its central contradiction between economic growth and ecological sustainability. We will further show that sustainable development is based on the false promise that endless growth is actually possible on a finite planet where the human footprint is already far greater than Earth’s ability to sustain life.Footnote2 This false promise cultivates, what Gudynas (2013) describes as the delusion of infinite natural assets that the capitalist system has at its disposal to expand forever, while in fact, the ambition of sustainable development is detached from the reality of ever-deepening socio-ecological destruction of a finite planet. Another concern is that the concept is so conveniently malleable that it enables its proponents to mask the negative socio-ecological impacts of relentless growth-driven development promoted by states and corporations. We are particularly concerned that environmental law is complicit in facilitating all of the foregoing to the extent that sustainable development is a legally sanctioned ideological palliative at the centre of environmental law and governance that enables its proponents to rationalize continuing destruction of the fragile earth system, rather than safeguarding planetary integrity (Kotzé et al. 2022, forthcoming; Richardson 2011, p. 31). Our focus in this paper is on environmental law, but the legal and regulatory responses adopted by the international community in response to environmental degradation have implications for the broader substantive and systemic principles and processes of law.\nIn the following section, we offer a brief contextual overview and critique of growth-driven development and the associated ideology of developmentalism and neoliberal globalization that underpins sustainable development. We endeavour to reveal the many contradictions at the heart of sustainable development’s history and its different iterations by global institutions and associated legal and political apparatus. We then provide a deeper critique of the role of sustainable development in environmental law and governance to demonstrate how it perpetuates epistemologies of mastery over a vulnerable living order at a time when we urgently need epistemologies of humility and care as alternatives to mainstream models of development. The aim in this part of the discussion is to show how environmental law has played a crucial role in legitimising a wide range of socio-ecologically destructive practices around the world in the name of sustainable development. The article concludes more hopefully with an examination of an attempt to reimagine alternatives to the sustainable development paradigm in the form of the indigenous onto-epistemology of buen vivir that articulates an ethics of humility and care alien to sustainable development. While buen vivir has not yet managed to fully replace sustainable development in the countries where it operates (at least not in practice), the influence of this worldview is already evident in some laws and policies. This suggests that its acceptance in environmental law and governance as an alternative to sustainable development is more feasible than might be expected, and that there is hope for pursuing a radically different future legal trajectory of planetary care that focuses on the well-being of the entire living order.\nThe Problems with Development, Developmentalism and Growth\nDevelopment, the fulcrum on which the notion of sustainable development revolves, emerged after the Second World War as a way of incorporating the erstwhile Third World into the global economy on unequal terms (Escobar 2011). As Hettne writes, development is ‘one of the oldest and most powerful of all Western ideas’ (1995, p. 29). Development was promoted as the means whereby postcolonial states:\ncould achieve economic growth, reduce poverty and promote social justice. In principle, development is a process of social change designed to improve the wellbeing of people. In practice, it has regularly manifested itself as underdevelopment or maldevelopment so that its scope and rationale have been vigorously contested. (Adelman and Paliwala 2021, p. 1)\nThe idea of development was promoted by the West as the means to save benighted and feckless developing countries from themselves. The concept attracted criticism from the outset but its advocates defended it as a form of progress through modernisation, extractive industrialisation, and economic growth as the primary means of promoting human wellbeing and as the sole expression of material progress (Gudynas 2013). Supporters of development conveniently discount the inconvenient truth that all economic activity is intrinsically destructive when it involves the exploitation of the foundations of life on Earth (Luke 2008). Mainstream, hegemonic models of development have been particularly heedless of environmental destruction despite repeated warnings about the limits to growth, increasing evidence of earth system decay, fast approaching planetary boundaries, and a looming sixth mass extinction event (Barnosky et al. 2011). Profit has persistently trumped people and the planet, driven by the logic of capital accumulation as the only measure of progress and well-being. One effect is that the tenacity of such mainstream models of development has successfully crowded out and marginalized alternative visions of progress and well-being in their pursuit of ‘uninterrupted growth towards a civilisation in the image and likeness of the countries of the North’ (Alcoreza 2013, p. 147).\nToday it is almost tautological to argue that development requires growth. Despite attempts by Sen (1999) and others to construe development as freedom through the capabilities approach—which gave rise to measures of human-centred development such as the Human Development Index—the concept of development remains irredeemably anthropocentric, economistic, extractivist, and growth-driven (UNDP n.d.). By the 1960s, development had become an ideological end in itself in the form of developmentalism;\nan ideological orientation characterized by the fetishization of development, or the attribution to development of the power of a natural (or even, divine) force which humans can resist or question only at the risk of being condemned to stagnation and poverty. The ideology renders opaque the historical forces that have shaped the idea of development. It also disguises the social and political forces that have played, and continue to play, a crucial part in endowing it with the power to dominate human consciousness. (Dirlik 2014, pp. 30–31)\nThe intrinsic flaws of developmentalism, and by extension of neoliberal sustainable development, are only now belatedly acknowledged (at least in part) by institutions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a longstanding promoter of green capitalism and the green economy (Carvalho 2001). UNEP’s position aligns with the mainstream proposition that sees green capitalism and sustainable development as a combination of ‘environmental and sustainability discourses with industrial and economic policy ones, in search of “win–win” solutions and virtuous cycles of progress and prosperity’ (Bina 2013, p. 1024). It has taken several years for the world’s foremost intergovernmental environmental protection champion to finally accept that ‘the current mode of development degrades the Earth’s finite capacity to sustain human well-being’ (UNEP 2021, p. 13, our emphasis). But having linked itself so tightly to sustainable development, UNEP is trapped within the mindset of human focused developmentalism that consistently sidelines ecological sustainability. This is also evident in its acknowledgment that ‘environmental changes are undermining hard-won development gains … [and] are impeding progress towards ending poverty and hunger, reducing inequalities and promoting sustainable economic growth’ (UNEP 2021, p. 13, our emphasis). Global governance institutions responsible for environmental protection are clearly mired in a discursive straitjacket that makes it difficult or even illegitimate for them to question sustainable development orthodoxy. The nub of the problem is that all mainstream models of development are predicated upon economic growth which flows from the dogmatic insistence that the current mode of purportedly sustainable development can be tweaked in the right direction. This makes it impossible to reconcile ecological sustainability and sustainable economic growth. Given earth system limits, endless growth cannot be sustainable; after all, humanity currently uses 74 per cent more than the planet’s ecosystems are able to regenerate—or 1.7 Earths,Footnote3 while four of the nine planetary boundaries have already been crossed, and the others are fast approaching (Rockström et al. 2009). Yet, ‘growthism’ (Hickel 2020, p. 89) remains the main driver of neoliberal globalisation and its devastating effects on our shared world (Fraser 2021; Springer 2016), while proponents of green capitalism such as UNEP continue to maintain that it is possible to grow our way to sustainability, among others, through decoupling; the idea—or fantasy—that economies can grow without increasing environmental pressures (Fletcher and Rammelt 2017).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Sustainable development\ncurrent global development vision\nsustainable development\nperverse ideological paradigm\nNeoliberalism\nCovid\nclimate\nsustainable development\nsocio-ecological crisis\nsystemic inequalities\nrepeatedly generating economic crises\nhabitat destruction\ncentral contradiction\neconomic growth\necological sustainability\nfalse promise\nendless growth\nactually possible\nfinite planet\nalready far greater\nlegally sanctioned ideological palliative\ndestruction of the fragile earth system\ndevelopment\nextractive industrialisation\nexploitation of the foundations of life on Earth\nparticularly heedless\nenvironmental destruction\nincreasing evidence of earth system decay\nfast approaching planetary boundaries\na looming sixth mass extinction event\nintrinsic flaws\nneoliberal sustainable development\nbelatedly acknowledged\nUNEP\ndevelopment gains\nsustainable economic growth’\ndogmatic insistence\ntweaked in the right direction\necological sustainability\nsustainable economic growth\n1.7 Earths", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2---Unsustainable growth---profit at all costs cannot be reconciled with finite resources\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Sustainable development is central to the current global development vision (Guruswamy 2010). It also acts both as a pivotal point of orientation of environmental law and policy, and as a Grundnorm that anchors and orientates global environmental governance (Kim and Bosselmann 2013). Sustainable development emerged in the 1970s with the noble idea that individuals would favour development that enhances human wellbeing and social justice while protecting the environment. It was originally conceived as a ‘discourse of resistance, fusing radical environmental consciousness with a critical rethinking of a failed development enterprise’ by highlighting the ‘scarcity and limits, affluence and poverty, global inequality, and the environmental viability of westernization’ (Carruthers 2001, p. 93).\nOver the years, however, sustainable development has metamorphosed into a perverse ideological paradigm that provides the overarching ‘basis for organising the beliefs, subjectivities and values of individuals, and thus producing and reproducing a certain social order in its multiple dimensions, from the individual to the institutional’ (Gudynas 2013, p. 28). Neoliberalism acts as the broader context for the continuing hegemony of mainstream models of development, of which sustainable development is the latest and dominant incarnation (Carruthers 2001). More recently, the confluence of the Covid-19 pandemic and climate change has yet again exposed the limitations of sustainable development and the inequalities occasioned by its neoliberal mindset (Barbier and Burgess 2020; Horn 2021). These predatory mainstream development models contribute to the socio-ecological crisis of the Anthropocene by exacerbating systemic inequalities and injustices, repeatedly generating economic crises and driving habitat destruction that intensify the vulnerability of the living order (Adelman 2021a). This is anything but sustainable development.\nThis article outlines our deep concern about the perverse consequences of the central role of sustainable development as the dominant worldview that steers the current course of ‘development’, especially insofar as it manifests as a core environmental law and governance principle in the context of the Anthropocene.Footnote1 We concur with the view that ‘sustainable development is an ecopolitical project which might be neither sustainable nor developmental … [I]t is a palatable approach to “green-wrap” the economic and political project of “sustainable degradation” already now fully in play’ (Luke 2008, p. 1813). We argue that sustainable development, an ‘improbable idea [that] is too rarely questioned’ (Nebbia 2012, p. 101), promises what it cannot deliver due to its central contradiction between economic growth and ecological sustainability. We will further show that sustainable development is based on the false promise that endless growth is actually possible on a finite planet where the human footprint is already far greater than Earth’s ability to sustain life.Footnote2 This false promise cultivates, what Gudynas (2013) describes as the delusion of infinite natural assets that the capitalist system has at its disposal to expand forever, while in fact, the ambition of sustainable development is detached from the reality of ever-deepening socio-ecological destruction of a finite planet. Another concern is that the concept is so conveniently malleable that it enables its proponents to mask the negative socio-ecological impacts of relentless growth-driven development promoted by states and corporations. We are particularly concerned that environmental law is complicit in facilitating all of the foregoing to the extent that sustainable development is a legally sanctioned ideological palliative at the centre of environmental law and governance that enables its proponents to rationalize continuing destruction of the fragile earth system, rather than safeguarding planetary integrity (Kotzé et al. 2022, forthcoming; Richardson 2011, p. 31). Our focus in this paper is on environmental law, but the legal and regulatory responses adopted by the international community in response to environmental degradation have implications for the broader substantive and systemic principles and processes of law.\nIn the following section, we offer a brief contextual overview and critique of growth-driven development and the associated ideology of developmentalism and neoliberal globalization that underpins sustainable development. We endeavour to reveal the many contradictions at the heart of sustainable development’s history and its different iterations by global institutions and associated legal and political apparatus. We then provide a deeper critique of the role of sustainable development in environmental law and governance to demonstrate how it perpetuates epistemologies of mastery over a vulnerable living order at a time when we urgently need epistemologies of humility and care as alternatives to mainstream models of development. The aim in this part of the discussion is to show how environmental law has played a crucial role in legitimising a wide range of socio-ecologically destructive practices around the world in the name of sustainable development. The article concludes more hopefully with an examination of an attempt to reimagine alternatives to the sustainable development paradigm in the form of the indigenous onto-epistemology of buen vivir that articulates an ethics of humility and care alien to sustainable development. While buen vivir has not yet managed to fully replace sustainable development in the countries where it operates (at least not in practice), the influence of this worldview is already evident in some laws and policies. This suggests that its acceptance in environmental law and governance as an alternative to sustainable development is more feasible than might be expected, and that there is hope for pursuing a radically different future legal trajectory of planetary care that focuses on the well-being of the entire living order.\nThe Problems with Development, Developmentalism and Growth\nDevelopment, the fulcrum on which the notion of sustainable development revolves, emerged after the Second World War as a way of incorporating the erstwhile Third World into the global economy on unequal terms (Escobar 2011). As Hettne writes, development is ‘one of the oldest and most powerful of all Western ideas’ (1995, p. 29). Development was promoted as the means whereby postcolonial states:\ncould achieve economic growth, reduce poverty and promote social justice. In principle, development is a process of social change designed to improve the wellbeing of people. In practice, it has regularly manifested itself as underdevelopment or maldevelopment so that its scope and rationale have been vigorously contested. (Adelman and Paliwala 2021, p. 1)\nThe idea of development was promoted by the West as the means to save benighted and feckless developing countries from themselves. The concept attracted criticism from the outset but its advocates defended it as a form of progress through modernisation, extractive industrialisation, and economic growth as the primary means of promoting human wellbeing and as the sole expression of material progress (Gudynas 2013). Supporters of development conveniently discount the inconvenient truth that all economic activity is intrinsically destructive when it involves the exploitation of the foundations of life on Earth (Luke 2008). Mainstream, hegemonic models of development have been particularly heedless of environmental destruction despite repeated warnings about the limits to growth, increasing evidence of earth system decay, fast approaching planetary boundaries, and a looming sixth mass extinction event (Barnosky et al. 2011). Profit has persistently trumped people and the planet, driven by the logic of capital accumulation as the only measure of progress and well-being. One effect is that the tenacity of such mainstream models of development has successfully crowded out and marginalized alternative visions of progress and well-being in their pursuit of ‘uninterrupted growth towards a civilisation in the image and likeness of the countries of the North’ (Alcoreza 2013, p. 147).\nToday it is almost tautological to argue that development requires growth. Despite attempts by Sen (1999) and others to construe development as freedom through the capabilities approach—which gave rise to measures of human-centred development such as the Human Development Index—the concept of development remains irredeemably anthropocentric, economistic, extractivist, and growth-driven (UNDP n.d.). By the 1960s, development had become an ideological end in itself in the form of developmentalism;\nan ideological orientation characterized by the fetishization of development, or the attribution to development of the power of a natural (or even, divine) force which humans can resist or question only at the risk of being condemned to stagnation and poverty. The ideology renders opaque the historical forces that have shaped the idea of development. It also disguises the social and political forces that have played, and continue to play, a crucial part in endowing it with the power to dominate human consciousness. (Dirlik 2014, pp. 30–31)\nThe intrinsic flaws of developmentalism, and by extension of neoliberal sustainable development, are only now belatedly acknowledged (at least in part) by institutions such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a longstanding promoter of green capitalism and the green economy (Carvalho 2001). UNEP’s position aligns with the mainstream proposition that sees green capitalism and sustainable development as a combination of ‘environmental and sustainability discourses with industrial and economic policy ones, in search of “win–win” solutions and virtuous cycles of progress and prosperity’ (Bina 2013, p. 1024). It has taken several years for the world’s foremost intergovernmental environmental protection champion to finally accept that ‘the current mode of development degrades the Earth’s finite capacity to sustain human well-being’ (UNEP 2021, p. 13, our emphasis). But having linked itself so tightly to sustainable development, UNEP is trapped within the mindset of human focused developmentalism that consistently sidelines ecological sustainability. This is also evident in its acknowledgment that ‘environmental changes are undermining hard-won development gains … [and] are impeding progress towards ending poverty and hunger, reducing inequalities and promoting sustainable economic growth’ (UNEP 2021, p. 13, our emphasis). Global governance institutions responsible for environmental protection are clearly mired in a discursive straitjacket that makes it difficult or even illegitimate for them to question sustainable development orthodoxy. The nub of the problem is that all mainstream models of development are predicated upon economic growth which flows from the dogmatic insistence that the current mode of purportedly sustainable development can be tweaked in the right direction. This makes it impossible to reconcile ecological sustainability and sustainable economic growth. Given earth system limits, endless growth cannot be sustainable; after all, humanity currently uses 74 per cent more than the planet’s ecosystems are able to regenerate—or 1.7 Earths,Footnote3 while four of the nine planetary boundaries have already been crossed, and the others are fast approaching (Rockström et al. 2009). Yet, ‘growthism’ (Hickel 2020, p. 89) remains the main driver of neoliberal globalisation and its devastating effects on our shared world (Fraser 2021; Springer 2016), while proponents of green capitalism such as UNEP continue to maintain that it is possible to grow our way to sustainability, among others, through decoupling; the idea—or fantasy—that economies can grow without increasing environmental pressures (Fletcher and Rammelt 2017).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Covid\nand climate\nexposed\nlimitations of sustainable development\nits neoliberal mindset\ncontribute to\nsocio-ecological crisis\nexacerbating\ninequalities\nrepeatedly generating economic crises and\nhabitat destruction\nbased on the false promise that endless growth is\npossible on a finite planet where the human footprint is already far greater than Earth’s ability to sustain life\nproponents\nmask\nnegative\nimpacts\nsustainable development is a\nideological palliative\nthat\nrationalize\ndestruction\ndevelopment\npromoted by the West\nadvocates\nextractive industrialisation\nit involves\nexploitation of the foundations of life on Earth\nhegemonic models\nhave been particularly heedless\ndestruction despite\nincreasing evidence of earth system decay, fast approaching planetary boundaries, and a looming sixth mass extinction\nintrinsic flaws of\nneoliberal\ndevelopment\nare\nnow\nacknowledged\nby institutions such as\nUNEP\nenvironmental changes\nundermin\ndevelopment gains\nimpeding progress towards\nsustainable economic growth’\ndogmatic insistence\ndevelopment can be tweaked in the right direction\nmakes it impossible to reconcile ecological sustainability and sustainable economic growth\nhumanity currently uses\n1.7 Earths", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Companies want ethical use—the Pentagon is scaring them away now.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nThe Pentagon's first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan stressed that “in 15 to 20 years, we have no competing fighting chance against China.” It's already decided; “Whether it requires a war or not is kind of anecdotal right now.”\nHe also claimed that several government departments in the U.S. had \"kindergarten-level\" cyber defenses. Moreover, Chaillan also criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms, such as Google, to collaborate with the government on AI, and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation. While China was destined to rule the world's future, everything from media narratives to geopolitics is under their control.\nOne of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly than the U.S. is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics. But partly because Chinese businesses are compelled to collaborate with the government, whereas many American businesses are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google, for instance, halted working with the Pentagon on AI in 2018 after a dozen employees departed after the business assisted the Department of Defense in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy.\n\n\n\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Pentagon's first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan\nclaimed that several government departments in the U.S. had \"kindergarten-level\" cyber defenses.\nChaillan also criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms, such as Google, to collaborate with the government on AI, and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation.\nOne of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly than the U.S. is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics.\nChinese businesses are compelled to collaborate with the government, whereas many American businesses are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google, for instance, halted working with the Pentagon on AI in 2018 after a dozen employees departed after the business assisted the Department of Defense in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Companies want ethical use—the Pentagon is scaring them away now.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nThe Pentagon's first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan stressed that “in 15 to 20 years, we have no competing fighting chance against China.” It's already decided; “Whether it requires a war or not is kind of anecdotal right now.”\nHe also claimed that several government departments in the U.S. had \"kindergarten-level\" cyber defenses. Moreover, Chaillan also criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms, such as Google, to collaborate with the government on AI, and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation. While China was destined to rule the world's future, everything from media narratives to geopolitics is under their control.\nOne of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly than the U.S. is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics. But partly because Chinese businesses are compelled to collaborate with the government, whereas many American businesses are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google, for instance, halted working with the Pentagon on AI in 2018 after a dozen employees departed after the business assisted the Department of Defense in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy.\n\n\n\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "chief software officer\nseveral government departments\nkindergarten-level\nreluctance of U.S. firms\nGoogle\ncollaborate with the government\nAI\nextensive ethical disputes\ndelayed innovation\nmove more rapidly\nnot mired\nenormous arguments\nAI ethics\ncompelled to collaborate\nAmerican businesses\nwary\nhalted working\nAI\ndozen employees\nD\no\nD\nboost drone attack accuracy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Companies want ethical use—the Pentagon is scaring them away now.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nThe Pentagon's first chief software officer, Nicolas Chaillan stressed that “in 15 to 20 years, we have no competing fighting chance against China.” It's already decided; “Whether it requires a war or not is kind of anecdotal right now.”\nHe also claimed that several government departments in the U.S. had \"kindergarten-level\" cyber defenses. Moreover, Chaillan also criticized the reluctance of U.S. firms, such as Google, to collaborate with the government on AI, and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation. While China was destined to rule the world's future, everything from media narratives to geopolitics is under their control.\nOne of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly than the U.S. is that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics. But partly because Chinese businesses are compelled to collaborate with the government, whereas many American businesses are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google, for instance, halted working with the Pentagon on AI in 2018 after a dozen employees departed after the business assisted the Department of Defense in developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy.\n\n\n\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Pentagon's\nchief software officer\nChaillan\nclaimed\ncriticized the reluctance of U.S. firms\nto collaborate with the government on AI, and extensive ethical disputes over technology for the U.S.’ delayed innovation.\nOne of the reasons China has been able to move more rapidly\nis that it is not mired in enormous arguments about AI ethics.\nChinese businesses are compelled to collaborate\nwhereas many American\ns are wary of working with the Pentagon. Google\nhalted working with the Pentagon on AI\nafter\nemployees departed after the business assisted\nin developing software that could boost drone attack accuracy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Our list breaks down into a coherent set of themes that conveniently organize NEG prep.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law\nThe scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities-: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.\nThe U.S. Constitution limits antitrust in two ways. First, the Constitution sets the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the power on which federal antitrust laws are predicated. Under current constitutional law, as explained in Chapter II.A.l, the issue of whether the application of federal antitrust law in a particular instance will violate the Commerce Clause is not raised particularly often. While in principle an antitrust claim might be dismissed because the challenged conduct is local, and while there have been some recent indications that Commercej Clause limits could become somewhat more demanding in antitrust,37 the conduct ordinarily must be highly isolated and economically insignificant to fall outside of Congress’s commerce power.\nSecond, antitrust can be limited where it would violate defendants’! constitutional rights. Prominently, a pair of related rules—the “state action” doctrine, or Parker immunity, and the Noerr-Pennington immunity—preclude antitrust enforcement against political activities. I The state action rule protects state governments from liability when they act in their sovereign capacities, and largely frees them to restrain trade within their own borders, so long as they do not indiscriminately authorize private trade restraints without government oversight. The Noerr doctrine protects private persons when they participate in the political process, even if the government action that they request would be anticompetitive.\nAs explained in Chapter. V.B, there is some-controversy among commentators as to whether the political immunities are themselves rules of constitutional law—limits without which antitrust would violate the Constitution—or merely judicial constructions, of the antitrust, statutes. 1 Still, even if the political immunities are not themselves constitutionally required, ^\"substantive rulesl of constitutional law plainly ido limit antitrust directly. Notably, antitrust enforcement against “expressive” 1 conduct and the conduct of religious organizations can violate the First Amendment.38\nNext, the language of the federal antitrust laws imposes several j scope limits. Each of the major antitrust statutes applies only to “trade or commerce,”39 and that phrase has been held to exclude gratuitous or j charitable conduct and other conduct not involving the exchange of goods or services for consideration.40 The Sherman Act likewise applies only to “persons,” and while that term is construed broadly under the Sherman Act, it has some exceptions, notably for the federal government and its instrumentalities.41 Stricter limits appear in the Clayton, i Robinson-Patman, and Federal Trade Commission Acts (FTC Act), and these limits are quite complex. The Robinson-Patman Act and two of the Clayton Act’s substantive provisions, the limit on tying and exclusive dealing arrangements in section 3 and the limit on interlocking directorates in section 8, apply only to persons “engaged in commerce.”42 The Federal Trade Commission Act is subject to a few special peculiar scope limits of its own.43\nFinally, in several distinct ways the language of other federal statutes can limit the scope of the federal antitrust laws. First, approximately three dozen statutes explicitly limit antitrust as it would otherwise apply in particular contexts. Statutory exemptions tend to concern either (1) industries that are already regulated by some agency, like insurers excepted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, by virtue of their being regulated by state insurance commissioners,44 or ocean shipping firms regulated by the Federal Maritime Commission,45 or (2) specific kinds of conduct that Congress has chosen from time to time to favor with special freedom to collaborate, like technological research and development,46 the graduate medical resident program,47 or production joint ventures among competing newspapers.48\nSecond, the courts have sometimes held that other federal laws implicitly limit antitrust. This impulse is expressed in three different judge-made doctrines. Under the doctrine of “implied repeal,” the language of some federal statute may be so plainly inconsistent with the applicability of antitrust in a given case that courts will find that Congress implicitly stated an intent to repeal antitrust as to that case.49 (A closely related rule, called the “federal instrumentality” doctrine, holds that a defendant acting pursuant to a command or explicit approval of the federal government cannot violate antitrust law.) Traditionally, implied repeal was strongly disfavored, and though it has been applied somewhat more freely in recent decades, it still appears almost exclusively in two areas: federally regulated, exchange-listed securities, and labor union activities.50 Under the “filed rate” or Keogh doctrine, where Congress gives a regulatory agency authority to receive filed tariffs setting the rates that regulated firms may charge, courts hold that Congress intended to bar money damages for any harm caused by those rates.51 And under the rule of “primary jurisdiction,” antitrust courts will sometimes defer to the statutory authority of a federal agency to resolve matters entrusted to it by Congress, before proceeding to resolve antitrust issues.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The\nConstitution limits antitrust in two ways\nFirst\ninterstate commerce\nSecond\nconstitutional rights\nProminently\nstate action\nand\nNoerr-Pennington\nantitrust enforcement against “expressive”\nconduct and the conduct of religious organizations\nviolate the First Amendment\nNext\nthe language of the federal antitrust laws imposes\nscope limits\napplies only to “trade or commerce,”\nand that\nhas been held to exclude gratuitous or\ncharitable conduct\nSherman\nlikewise applies only to “persons,”\nStricter limits appear in the Clayton\nRobinson-Patman\nand\nFTC A\nand these limits are quite complex. The Robinson-Patman Act and two of the Clayton Act’s substantive provisions, the limit on tying and exclusive dealing arrangements in section 3 and the limit on interlocking directorates in section 8, apply only to persons “engaged in commerce.”\nThe F\nT\nC\nA\nis subject to\nspecial\nscope limits of its own\nFinally\nthe language of other federal statutes can limit the scope of the federal antitrust laws\napproximately three dozen statutes\nStatutory exemptions\nconcern\nindustries that are already regulated\nlike insurers\nor ocean shipping\nor\nspecific kinds of conduct that Congress has chosen\nto favor with special freedom to collaborate, like tech\nr\nand d\nthe graduate medical resident program\nor production joint ventures among competing newspapers\nSecond,\ncourts have\nheld\nother federal laws implicitly limit antitrust\nalmost exclusively in two areas: federally regulated, exchange-listed securities, and labor union activities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Our list breaks down into a coherent set of themes that conveniently organize NEG prep.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law\nThe scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities-: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.\nThe U.S. Constitution limits antitrust in two ways. First, the Constitution sets the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the power on which federal antitrust laws are predicated. Under current constitutional law, as explained in Chapter II.A.l, the issue of whether the application of federal antitrust law in a particular instance will violate the Commerce Clause is not raised particularly often. While in principle an antitrust claim might be dismissed because the challenged conduct is local, and while there have been some recent indications that Commercej Clause limits could become somewhat more demanding in antitrust,37 the conduct ordinarily must be highly isolated and economically insignificant to fall outside of Congress’s commerce power.\nSecond, antitrust can be limited where it would violate defendants’! constitutional rights. Prominently, a pair of related rules—the “state action” doctrine, or Parker immunity, and the Noerr-Pennington immunity—preclude antitrust enforcement against political activities. I The state action rule protects state governments from liability when they act in their sovereign capacities, and largely frees them to restrain trade within their own borders, so long as they do not indiscriminately authorize private trade restraints without government oversight. The Noerr doctrine protects private persons when they participate in the political process, even if the government action that they request would be anticompetitive.\nAs explained in Chapter. V.B, there is some-controversy among commentators as to whether the political immunities are themselves rules of constitutional law—limits without which antitrust would violate the Constitution—or merely judicial constructions, of the antitrust, statutes. 1 Still, even if the political immunities are not themselves constitutionally required, ^\"substantive rulesl of constitutional law plainly ido limit antitrust directly. Notably, antitrust enforcement against “expressive” 1 conduct and the conduct of religious organizations can violate the First Amendment.38\nNext, the language of the federal antitrust laws imposes several j scope limits. Each of the major antitrust statutes applies only to “trade or commerce,”39 and that phrase has been held to exclude gratuitous or j charitable conduct and other conduct not involving the exchange of goods or services for consideration.40 The Sherman Act likewise applies only to “persons,” and while that term is construed broadly under the Sherman Act, it has some exceptions, notably for the federal government and its instrumentalities.41 Stricter limits appear in the Clayton, i Robinson-Patman, and Federal Trade Commission Acts (FTC Act), and these limits are quite complex. The Robinson-Patman Act and two of the Clayton Act’s substantive provisions, the limit on tying and exclusive dealing arrangements in section 3 and the limit on interlocking directorates in section 8, apply only to persons “engaged in commerce.”42 The Federal Trade Commission Act is subject to a few special peculiar scope limits of its own.43\nFinally, in several distinct ways the language of other federal statutes can limit the scope of the federal antitrust laws. First, approximately three dozen statutes explicitly limit antitrust as it would otherwise apply in particular contexts. Statutory exemptions tend to concern either (1) industries that are already regulated by some agency, like insurers excepted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, by virtue of their being regulated by state insurance commissioners,44 or ocean shipping firms regulated by the Federal Maritime Commission,45 or (2) specific kinds of conduct that Congress has chosen from time to time to favor with special freedom to collaborate, like technological research and development,46 the graduate medical resident program,47 or production joint ventures among competing newspapers.48\nSecond, the courts have sometimes held that other federal laws implicitly limit antitrust. This impulse is expressed in three different judge-made doctrines. Under the doctrine of “implied repeal,” the language of some federal statute may be so plainly inconsistent with the applicability of antitrust in a given case that courts will find that Congress implicitly stated an intent to repeal antitrust as to that case.49 (A closely related rule, called the “federal instrumentality” doctrine, holds that a defendant acting pursuant to a command or explicit approval of the federal government cannot violate antitrust law.) Traditionally, implied repeal was strongly disfavored, and though it has been applied somewhat more freely in recent decades, it still appears almost exclusively in two areas: federally regulated, exchange-listed securities, and labor union activities.50 Under the “filed rate” or Keogh doctrine, where Congress gives a regulatory agency authority to receive filed tariffs setting the rates that regulated firms may charge, courts hold that Congress intended to bar money damages for any harm caused by those rates.51 And under the rule of “primary jurisdiction,” antitrust courts will sometimes defer to the statutory authority of a federal agency to resolve matters entrusted to it by Congress, before proceeding to resolve antitrust issues.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Constitution\ntwo ways\ninterstate commerce\nconstitutional rights\nstate action\nNoerr-Pennington\nNext\nlanguage of the federal antitrust laws\ntrade or commerce\nexclude gratuitous\ncharitable\nlikewise\nonly\npersons\nClayton\nRobinson-Patman\nFTC A\ncomplex\npersons “engaged in commerce.”\nF\nT\nC\nA\nspecial\nown\nFinally\nother federal statutes\nthree dozen statutes\nStatutory exemptions\nalready regulated\ninsurers\nocean shipping\nkinds of conduct\nCongress\nchose\nfavor\nfreedom to collaborate\ntech\nr\nand d\ngraduate medical resident program\nproduction joint ventures\ncompeting newspapers\ncourts\nother\nimplicitly\nexchange-listed securities\nlabor union activities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Our list breaks down into a coherent set of themes that conveniently organize NEG prep.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The\nConstitution limits antitrust in two ways\nFirst\ninterstate commerce\nSecond\nconstitutional rights\nProminently\nstate action\nand\nNoerr-Pennington\nantitrust enforcement against “expressive”\nconduct and the conduct of religious organizations\nviolate the First Amendment\nNext\nthe language of the federal antitrust laws imposes\nscope limits\napplies only to “trade or commerce,”\nand that\nhas been held to exclude gratuitous or\ncharitable conduct\nSherman\nlikewise applies only to “persons,”\nStricter limits appear in the Clayton\nRobinson-Patman\nand\nFTC A\nand these limits are quite complex. The Robinson-Patman Act and two of the Clayton Act’s substantive provisions, the limit on tying and exclusive dealing arrangements in section 3 and the limit on interlocking directorates in section 8, apply only to persons “engaged in commerce.”\nThe F\nT\nC\nA\nis subject to\nspecial\nscope limits of its own\nFinally\nthe language of other federal statutes can limit the scope of the federal antitrust laws\napproximately three dozen statutes\nStatutory exemptions\nconcern\nindustries that are already regulated\nlike insurers\nor ocean shipping\nor\nspecific kinds of conduct that Congress has chosen\nto favor with special freedom to collaborate, like tech\nr\nand d\nthe graduate medical resident program\nor production joint ventures among competing newspapers\nSecond,\ncourts have\nheld\nother federal laws implicitly limit antitrust\nalmost exclusively in two areas: federally regulated, exchange-listed securities, and labor union activities", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The\nConstitution limits antitrust\nFirst\ninterstate commerce\nSecond\nconstitutional rights\nNext\nthe\nantitrust laws\napplies\nto “trade or commerce\nand\nonly to “persons,”\nFinally\nother federal statutes\nlimit the scope\napproximately three dozen\nStatutory exemptions\nand\ncourts\nheld\nother\nlaws\nlimit antitrust", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Xi isn’t feeling the heat.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Chinese Communist Party and its leader, Xi Jinping, aren’t doing so well. Sky-high youth unemployment, a tumbling stock market, and continuing real-estate turmoil threaten to derail his “China dream” and possibly drag Xi down with it. And a spate of purges of senior officials over the past year—some of them former Xi proteges—has fueled speculation that his position in the party isn’t as secure as it appears.\nAt least this is the narrative presented in much of the western media discourse. The Communist Party sees things differently.\nThis was obvious from the recently concluded annual session of China’s rubber-stamp National People’s Congress (NPC). The week-long session is the most important yearly gathering in China’s political calendar, establishing an official narrative of the past year’s performance and setting priorities for the year to come. Everything presented at the congress is first approved by the ruling Communist Party after a lengthy period of drafting and deliberation, making it one of the clearest windows into the party’s thinking.\nJudging from the NPC session, the party doesn’t see itself as a regime in crisis. The Government Work Report, presented by Premier Li Qiang, portrayed a China facing “both strategic opportunities and challenges, with favorable conditions outweighing unfavorable ones.” This isn’t hollow propaganda—the work report is the most authoritative statement of high-level policy for the year ahead and is designed primarily for internal government audiences.\nThe report acknowledges the year won’t be easy, due to geopolitical pressure, weak external demand, and a host of domestic economic challenges and financial risks. Nevertheless, its tone is, if anything, triumphant, pointing out that these challenges didn’t prevent China from reporting solid 5.2% economic growth last year. The report neglects to mention the low baseline due to terrible economic performance in 2022 or the widespread questions around the accuracy of official figures—Rhodium Group places last year’s growth at closer to 1.5%. In any case, the party is confident enough that it set a target of “around 5%” growth for 2024 as well.\nAs for Xi’s leadership, the work report credits him with single-handedly leading China through the economic and political challenges of 2023. “We owe our achievements in 2023 to General Secretary Xi Jinping, who is at the helm charting the course,” it said. This is unprecedented language—previous work reports gave all credit to “the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core.” Rhetorical upgrades like this make a world of difference in an uber-formalistic system in which every word matters.\nAnd it’s more than just rhetoric. Xi’s “New Era” vision permeates nearly every section of the work report. Furthermore, the NPC on Monday passed new revisions to the Organic Law of the State Council, which further strengthened the Communist Party’s control over China’s cabinet and made the cabinet responsible for implementing Xi Jinping Thought. The entire PRC government was already answerable to Xi in practice, but now it’s more official.\nIndeed, by all appearances, the Communist Party is happy with Xi’s leadership. But how can this be, given the economy is a mess and investor sentiment is at a multi-decade low? The answer is simple: These aren’t the metrics the party uses to measure his performance. Western audiences seeking to gauge Xi’s political fortunes should take note.\nUnder Xi, the Communist Party is more firmly in control than it has ever been, thanks to both its more complete control over government decision-making and the surveillance state that enables it to quickly detect and neutralize dissent. Nothing matters more to the party than its political control. Investors can moan, but they aren’t Xi’s constituents. The Chinese people aren’t even his constituents. His sole constituent is the Communist Party, and it is far more interested in preserving and strengthening its grip on power than overseeing a thriving economy.\nThis doesn’t mean the economy isn’t important. To the contrary, it’s one of the party’s most powerful tools for pursuing its political aims. But the breakneck growth of the reform era was unsustainable and riddled with long-term risks. The party has long seen a need to restructure its economy by addressing these risks and transitioning to a more sustainable—albeit slower—growth model. This is exactly what Xi is doing, and his ruthlessness and unprecedented consolidation of power have helped him get past the vested interests that prevented his predecessors from making significant progress in this endeavor.\nOf course, the party can’t neglect economic growth. But it only needs enough growth to maintain stability as it pursues grander priorities such as a regulatory overhaul, technological self-reliance, and evening out the wealth gap through “common prosperity.”\nThe leadership are well aware that these efforts work in opposition to growth, but they see them as crucial to reducing the risk of crisis in the longer term. They could take their foot off the pedal if they feared the short-term damage to the economy was starting to risk precipitating the very crisis they seek to avert. Or they could unveil a major stimulus, as their predecessors did in previous periods of economic difficulty. So far, they’re doing neither, and the fact that they continue to press forward with their economic restructuring is one indication that they think they have things under control.\nAre they correct? Only time will tell. For all anyone knows, Xi’s leadership could rest on a giant house of cards that will eventually come crashing down. But America shouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening of the regime in Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times before, and the Communist Party appears genuinely confident that it will do so again.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Sky-high youth unemployment, a tumbling stock market, and\nreal-estate turmoil threaten to derail\nXi\nThe Communist Party sees things differently\nJudging from the NPC session, the party doesn’t see itself as a regime in crisis\nthe work report is the most authoritative statement of high-level policy\nand is designed\nfor internal government audiences\nThe report acknowledges the year won’t be easy\nNevertheless, its tone is\ntriumphant, pointing out\nchallenges didn’t prevent China from reporting solid 5.2% economic growth last year\nthe party is confident enough that it set a target of\naround 5%\ngrowth for 2024\nAs for Xi’s leadership, the work report credits him with single-handedly leading China through the economic and political challenges of 2023\nThis is unprecedented language\nRhetorical upgrades\nmake a world of difference in an uber-formalistic system\nXi’s\nNew Era\nvision permeates nearly every section\nby all appearances, the Communist Party is happy with Xi’s leadership\nWestern audiences seeking to gauge Xi’s political fortunes should take note\nUnder Xi, the Communist Party is more firmly in control than\never\nthanks to\ncomplete control over government decision-making and\nsurveillance\nNothing matters more to the party than its political control. Investors\naren’t Xi’s constituents\nHis sole constituent is the Communist Party\nit is far more interested in preserving and strengthening its grip on power than overseeing a thriving economy\nbreakneck growth\nwas unsustainable and riddled with\nrisks. The party has long seen a need to restructure its economy by addressing these\nand transitioning to a\nslower\nmodel. This is exactly what Xi is doing\nhis ruthlessness and unprecedented consolidation of power\nhelped him get past\nvested interests\nAmerica shouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening of the regime in Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times before\nthe Communist Party appears genuinely confident that it will do so again", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Xi isn’t feeling the heat.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Sky-high youth unemployment, a tumbling stock market, and\nreal-estate turmoil threaten to derail\nXi\nThe Communist Party sees things differently\nJudging from the NPC session, the party doesn’t see itself as a regime in crisis\nthe work report is the most authoritative statement of high-level policy\nand is designed\nfor internal government audiences\nThe report acknowledges the year won’t be easy\nNevertheless, its tone is\ntriumphant, pointing out\nchallenges didn’t prevent China from reporting solid 5.2% economic growth last year\nthe party is confident enough that it set a target of\naround 5%\ngrowth for 2024\nAs for Xi’s leadership, the work report credits him with single-handedly leading China through the economic and political challenges of 2023\nThis is unprecedented language\nRhetorical upgrades\nmake a world of difference in an uber-formalistic system\nXi’s\nNew Era\nvision permeates nearly every section\nby all appearances, the Communist Party is happy with Xi’s leadership\nWestern audiences seeking to gauge Xi’s political fortunes should take note\nUnder Xi, the Communist Party is more firmly in control than\never\nthanks to\ncomplete control over government decision-making and\nsurveillance\nNothing matters more to the party than its political control. Investors\naren’t Xi’s constituents\nHis sole constituent is the Communist Party\nit is far more interested in preserving and strengthening its grip on power than overseeing a thriving economy\nbreakneck growth\nwas unsustainable and riddled with\nrisks. The party has long seen a need to restructure its economy by addressing these\nand transitioning to a\nslower\nmodel. This is exactly what Xi is doing\nhis ruthlessness and unprecedented consolidation of power\nhelped him get past\nvested interests\nAmerica shouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening of the regime in Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times before\nthe Communist Party appears genuinely confident that it will do so again", "role": "user" }, { "content": "sees things differently\ntriumphant\ncredits him\nlead\nunprecedented language\nnearly every section\nhappy with Xi’s leadership\nmore firmly in control than\never\nNothing matters more to the party than its political control\nsole constituent is the\nParty\nexactly what Xi is doing\nshouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening\ngenuinely confident", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Xi isn’t feeling the heat.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Sky-high youth unemployment, a tumbling stock market, and\nreal-estate turmoil threaten to derail\nXi\nThe Communist Party sees things differently\nJudging from the NPC session, the party doesn’t see itself as a regime in crisis\nthe work report is the most authoritative statement of high-level policy\nand is designed\nfor internal government audiences\nThe report acknowledges the year won’t be easy\nNevertheless, its tone is\ntriumphant, pointing out\nchallenges didn’t prevent China from reporting solid 5.2% economic growth last year\nthe party is confident enough that it set a target of\naround 5%\ngrowth for 2024\nAs for Xi’s leadership, the work report credits him with single-handedly leading China through the economic and political challenges of 2023\nThis is unprecedented language\nRhetorical upgrades\nmake a world of difference in an uber-formalistic system\nXi’s\nNew Era\nvision permeates nearly every section\nby all appearances, the Communist Party is happy with Xi’s leadership\nWestern audiences seeking to gauge Xi’s political fortunes should take note\nUnder Xi, the Communist Party is more firmly in control than\never\nthanks to\ncomplete control over government decision-making and\nsurveillance\nNothing matters more to the party than its political control. Investors\naren’t Xi’s constituents\nHis sole constituent is the Communist Party\nit is far more interested in preserving and strengthening its grip on power than overseeing a thriving economy\nbreakneck growth\nwas unsustainable and riddled with\nrisks. The party has long seen a need to restructure its economy by addressing these\nand transitioning to a\nslower\nmodel. This is exactly what Xi is doing\nhis ruthlessness and unprecedented consolidation of power\nhelped him get past\nvested interests\nAmerica shouldn’t bet on a rapid collapse or sustained weakening of the regime in Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times before\nthe Communist Party appears genuinely confident that it will do so again", "role": "user" }, { "content": "tumbling\nmarket\nthreaten to derail\nXi\nParty sees things differently\ndoesn’t see\ncrisis\nwork report\ntone is\ntriumphant\nXi’s leadership\nlead\nChina through\neconomic\nchallenges\nunprecedented\nNew Era\nvision permeates\nevery section\nParty is happy with Xi’s leadership\nParty\nmore\nin control than\never\nNothing matters more\nbreakneck growth\nunsustainable\nparty has long seen a need to restructure\nexactly what Xi is doing\nAmerica shouldn’t bet on\nrapid collapse or sustained weakening\nin Beijing. China has proven naysayers wrong many times\nParty appears genuinely confident\nit will\nagain", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 6---Harbinger DA---formlessness becomes the “harbinger” of new forms of black sociality as “terrifying, beautiful monstrosity”---that is a) necessary to identify historically contingent violence [“index…the ‘spiritual ordeal’ of death that is settler modernity”] and b) generative of “alternative ways of being” in “representation’s colonializing ruin”---that was 1AC Carter here…", "role": "system" }, { "content": "But to stay with Bataille, in that same essay he keeps his eye trained on the left side of things where there is always heterogeneity or base energies exceeding the terms of order. He finds examples in this regard in the untouchables of India, on the one hand, and among the destitute in the economically and socially “less ritualistic” or “advanced civilizations” of the West, as he puts it, on the other. In the latter, “being destitute is all it takes . . . to create between the self and others—who consider themselves the expression of normal man—a nearly insurmountable gap” (144). Whether it be the hereditarily untouchables or the destitute in advanced countries, it is the “lowest strata of society,” Bataille contends, “[that] can . . . be described as heterogeneous . . . those who generally provoke repulsion and can in no case be assimilated to the whole of mankind” (144). In their untouchability or destitution, such groups are a heterogeneous element associated with useless expenditure, with “violence, excess, delirium, madness . . . [that] to varying degrees” has the capacity because occluded within but not fully subsumed by the juridical-economic order to unsettle the terms of order (142). Interpreted as mobs, they are outlaw or “[breakers] of the laws of social homogeneity.” As such, “these impoverished classes,” Bataille says, “are characterized by the prohibition of contact analogous to that applied to sacred things” (144), particularly those tabooed things, those things, as Richman explains again elaborating Bataille, placed under “restricted contact” and whose collective effervescence indicates a “transgression” or a “negation [that] surpasses itself” in exceeding every closed order “without returning to the original condition or state it had negated.”14 Here we find the sacred in its excessive, left-hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture, as harbinger of a sociality without limit or completion.\nThis brings us to an absolutely vital point around which much of what I want to say in this article and, indeed, much of my effort to mobilize a discourse of the sacred for black studies, turns: the ambiguity within the very notion of the sacred itself as both pure and the impure. Alexander Riley succinctly clarifies the issues here: “The sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed.”15 That is to say, “in addition to being opposed in a binary relationship to the profane [this is Bataille’s sphere of homogeneity], [the sacred] is itself comprised of two opposing binary poles: the forces that maintain physical and moral purity and order, life, and health [the holy that upholds the holy], and those that contribute to impurity, evil, sacrilege, disease, and death [the accursed].”16 The former sphere of pure divinity depends on an accursed share, an excremental element, to constitute and secure itself, within the terms of a restricted economy of sacrificial exchange, as pure. As Giorgio Agamben understood and as Riley reiterates, this doubled, contradictory or ambiguous sense of the sacred is connected to the Latin word from which it derives: sacer. Riley goes on to explain how the idea of the sacred can trip us up: hewing close to the Latin sense of sacer, “the French sacré . . . can mean both, and is frequently used in both senses (la musique sacrée, holy or sacred music, and un sacré menteur, a damned or accursed liar), whereas the English ‘sacred’ has in practice lost the second meaning.”17\nIf Bataille associates this second sense of the sacred, whose relationship to the first is not dialectical but excessive or abyssal, with the untouchables and the destitute, then here I stretch the generally Durkheimian formulation of the right-and left-hand sacred, bending along with it even Bataille’s more renegade formulation of sacred excess to that blackened or black sacral (non)position that aroused the Charlottesville white nationalist rally in the first place as a violent secondary, “right-hand” reaction. This opens up a consideration of the sacred’s proximity to blackness wherein, following Hortense J. Spillers, we might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity, that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called.18 The monstrosity to be claimed here, this “unbounded sociality,” concerns “blackness as matter [that] signals [infinity], another world . . . that which exists without time and out of space, in the plenum”19—the sacred otherwise. Here the sacred is obscure and formless, even “oceanic,” to stay with Spillers’s Freudian-inflected formulation. More akin to that “raw prime matter” of which Denise Ferreira da Silva has recently spoken as part and parcel of the virtuality of a “black feminist poethics,” the sacred here is of the wild, of the wilderness. To continue to think under the force of Spillers’s thought, the sacred, in its adjacency to black ness or as itself symptomatically black, points to those hermetic energies or those forces of enchantment, to metamorphosis bound to devotional practices of un/knowing. Black sacrality indexes a certain liveliness and aliveness occasioned by, moving in relationship to, and yet irreducible to the “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity.20 For this reason, black radical sacrality, which we might just as well think of as the sorcery of (black social) life itself, unsettles, is ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality. That is to say, the sacred, as I am given to thinking about it here as figuring a poetics of malpracticed black (religious) study, is neither transcendental, pure, nor beneficent but, rather, is base, stank, impure, low to the ground, underground, of and with the earth. All this is to say, I approach the sacred as a kind of pathological and ek-static threshold before which other, differential and unrepresentable presences, genres or forms of life, unplottable gatherings in representation’s colonializing ruins, alternative ways of being with the earth, come into view.21\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the left side of things where there is always heterogeneity or base energies exceeding the terms of order.\nInterpreted as mobs, they are outlaw or “[breakers] of the laws of social homogeneity.” As such, “these impoverished classes,” Bataille says, “are characterized by the prohibition of contact analogous to that applied to sacred things”\ncollective effervescence indicates a “transgression” or a “negation [that] surpasses itself” in exceeding every closed order “without returning to the original condition or state it had negated.”\nHere we find the sacred in its excessive, left-hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture\nas harbinger of a sociality without limit or completion.\nto mobilize a discourse of the sacred for black studies,\nthe ambiguity within the very notion of the sacred itself as both pure and the impure.\nThe sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed\nin addition to being opposed in a binary relationship to the profane\nthe sacred\nis itself comprised of two opposing binary poles\nthe forces that maintain physical and moral purity and order, life, and health\nand those that contribute to impurity, evil, sacrilege, disease, and death [the accursed].”\nIf Bataille associates this second sense of the sacred, whose relationship to the first is not dialectical but excessive or abyssal\nwith\ndestitute\nthen\nBataille’s more renegade formulation of sacred excess to that blackened or black sacral (non)position that aroused the Charlottesville white nationalist rally in the first place as a violent secondary, “right-hand” reaction\nThis opens up a consideration of the sacred’s proximity to blackness\nfollowing\nSpillers\nwe might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity, that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called\nThe monstrosity to be claimed here, this “unbounded sociality,” concerns “blackness as matter [that] signals [infinity]\nthe sacred otherwise. Here the sacred is obscure and formless\nthe sacred, in its adjacency to black ness or as itself symptomatically black, points to those hermetic energies or those forces of enchantment, to metamorphosis bound to devotional practices of un/knowing. Black sacrality indexes a certain liveliness and aliveness occasioned by, moving in relationship to, and yet irreducible to the “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity.\nblack radical sacrality\nwhich we might just as well think of as the sorcery of (black social) life itself, unsettles, is ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality.\nthe sacred, as I am given to thinking about it here as figuring a poetics of malpracticed black (religious) study, is neither transcendental, pure, nor beneficent but, rather, is base, stank, impure, low to the ground, underground, of and with the earth.\nI approach the sacred as a kind of pathological and ek-static threshold before which other, differential and unrepresentable presences, genres or forms of life, unplottable gatherings in representation’s colonializing ruins, alternative ways of being with the earth, come into view.21", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 6---Harbinger DA---formlessness becomes the “harbinger” of new forms of black sociality as “terrifying, beautiful monstrosity”---that is a) necessary to identify historically contingent violence [“index…the ‘spiritual ordeal’ of death that is settler modernity”] and b) generative of “alternative ways of being” in “representation’s colonializing ruin”---that was 1AC Carter here…", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the left side of things where there is always heterogeneity or base energies exceeding the terms of order.\nInterpreted as mobs, they are outlaw or “[breakers] of the laws of social homogeneity.” As such, “these impoverished classes,” Bataille says, “are characterized by the prohibition of contact analogous to that applied to sacred things”\ncollective effervescence indicates a “transgression” or a “negation [that] surpasses itself” in exceeding every closed order “without returning to the original condition or state it had negated.”\nHere we find the sacred in its excessive, left-hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture\nas harbinger of a sociality without limit or completion.\nto mobilize a discourse of the sacred for black studies,\nthe ambiguity within the very notion of the sacred itself as both pure and the impure.\nThe sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed\nin addition to being opposed in a binary relationship to the profane\nthe sacred\nis itself comprised of two opposing binary poles\nthe forces that maintain physical and moral purity and order, life, and health\nand those that contribute to impurity, evil, sacrilege, disease, and death [the accursed].”\nIf Bataille associates this second sense of the sacred, whose relationship to the first is not dialectical but excessive or abyssal\nwith\ndestitute\nthen\nBataille’s more renegade formulation of sacred excess to that blackened or black sacral (non)position that aroused the Charlottesville white nationalist rally in the first place as a violent secondary, “right-hand” reaction\nThis opens up a consideration of the sacred’s proximity to blackness\nfollowing\nSpillers\nwe might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity, that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called\nThe monstrosity to be claimed here, this “unbounded sociality,” concerns “blackness as matter [that] signals [infinity]\nthe sacred otherwise. Here the sacred is obscure and formless\nthe sacred, in its adjacency to black ness or as itself symptomatically black, points to those hermetic energies or those forces of enchantment, to metamorphosis bound to devotional practices of un/knowing. Black sacrality indexes a certain liveliness and aliveness occasioned by, moving in relationship to, and yet irreducible to the “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity.\nblack radical sacrality\nwhich we might just as well think of as the sorcery of (black social) life itself, unsettles, is ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality.\nthe sacred, as I am given to thinking about it here as figuring a poetics of malpracticed black (religious) study, is neither transcendental, pure, nor beneficent but, rather, is base, stank, impure, low to the ground, underground, of and with the earth.\nI approach the sacred as a kind of pathological and ek-static threshold before which other, differential and unrepresentable presences, genres or forms of life, unplottable gatherings in representation’s colonializing ruins, alternative ways of being with the earth, come into view.21", "role": "user" }, { "content": "without returning to the original condition\nHere we find the sacred in its excessive, left-hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture\nas harbinger of\nsociality without limit\nThe sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed\nwe might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity, that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called\n. Here the sacred is obscure and formless\nbound to devotional practices of un/knowing.\nblack radical sacrality\nis ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality.\nrepresentation’s colonializing ruins\nalternative ways of being", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 6---Harbinger DA---formlessness becomes the “harbinger” of new forms of black sociality as “terrifying, beautiful monstrosity”---that is a) necessary to identify historically contingent violence [“index…the ‘spiritual ordeal’ of death that is settler modernity”] and b) generative of “alternative ways of being” in “representation’s colonializing ruin”---that was 1AC Carter here…\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the left side of things where there is always heterogeneity or base energies exceeding the terms of order.\nInterpreted as mobs, they are outlaw or “[breakers] of the laws of social homogeneity.” As such, “these impoverished classes,” Bataille says, “are characterized by the prohibition of contact analogous to that applied to sacred things”\ncollective effervescence indicates a “transgression” or a “negation [that] surpasses itself” in exceeding every closed order “without returning to the original condition or state it had negated.”\nHere we find the sacred in its excessive, left-hand mode of ceaseless rupture and rapture\nas harbinger of a sociality without limit or completion.\nto mobilize a discourse of the sacred for black studies,\nthe ambiguity within the very notion of the sacred itself as both pure and the impure.\nThe sacred is not only the holy or consecrated but can also be the accursed\nin addition to being opposed in a binary relationship to the profane\nthe sacred\nis itself comprised of two opposing binary poles\nthe forces that maintain physical and moral purity and order, life, and health\nand those that contribute to impurity, evil, sacrilege, disease, and death [the accursed].”\nIf Bataille associates this second sense of the sacred, whose relationship to the first is not dialectical but excessive or abyssal\nwith\ndestitute\nthen\nBataille’s more renegade formulation of sacred excess to that blackened or black sacral (non)position that aroused the Charlottesville white nationalist rally in the first place as a violent secondary, “right-hand” reaction\nThis opens up a consideration of the sacred’s proximity to blackness\nfollowing\nSpillers\nwe might think of blackness as “symptom of the sacred,” as terrifying monstrance of that beautiful monstrosity, that inner scar voluntarily claimed in having been called\nThe monstrosity to be claimed here, this “unbounded sociality,” concerns “blackness as matter [that] signals [infinity]\nthe sacred otherwise. Here the sacred is obscure and formless\nthe sacred, in its adjacency to black ness or as itself symptomatically black, points to those hermetic energies or those forces of enchantment, to metamorphosis bound to devotional practices of un/knowing. Black sacrality indexes a certain liveliness and aliveness occasioned by, moving in relationship to, and yet irreducible to the “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity.\nblack radical sacrality\nwhich we might just as well think of as the sorcery of (black social) life itself, unsettles, is ever poised to incite volatility within regimes of politicality.\nthe sacred, as I am given to thinking about it here as figuring a poetics of malpracticed black (religious) study, is neither transcendental, pure, nor beneficent but, rather, is base, stank, impure, low to the ground, underground, of and with the earth.\nI approach the sacred as a kind of pathological and ek-static threshold before which other, differential and unrepresentable presences, genres or forms of life, unplottable gatherings in representation’s colonializing ruins, alternative ways of being with the earth, come into view.21", "role": "user" }, { "content": "collective effervescence in\n“transgression”\nexceed\nwithout returning to the original condition\nthe sacred in its excessive,\n-\nmode\nas harbinger of\nsociality without limit\nthis\nis\nformulation of\nblack sacral (non)position that aroused\nCharlottesville\nblackness as “symptom of the sacred\nas terrifying\nbeautiful monstrosity\nthe sacred otherwise\nobscure and formless\nBlack sacrality indexes\nthe “spiritual ordeal” of death that is settler modernity\nblack radical sacrality\nis\npoised to incite volatility within\npoliticality\nas\na\nmalpracticed black (religious) study\nthe sacred as a\npathological\nthreshold before which\ngenres\nof life\nunplottable\nin representation’s colonializing ruins\nalternative ways of being\ncome into view.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It’s an advocate for the green new deal---proves the perm shields their K of nuclearism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The world-ending atomic bomb was created in secret atop a sacred Tewa Pueblo mesa at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. It was tested on Native lands, and the United States became the first and only nation to drop the bomb. The horrors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were a warning to the rest of world: fall in line, or else. Scientists who maintain the Doomsday Clock set its hands at one minute and forty seconds to midnight in 2020, the closest humanity has been to global catastrophe since the clock’s creation in 1947. The two main factors contributing to this threat, experts warn, are global warming and nuclear risk. The atomic age and climate change were made possible by settler colonialism and Indigenous genocide.\nThe spirit of these times frequently gets forgotten: freedom for some is unfreedom for others. The legacy of the New Deal—which required the plundering of Indigenous lands to keep a settler economy afloat—cannot be the plan for the rest of the planet. Nations of the Global South cannot follow the same path of development as the North in their pursuit of climate equity because the atmosphere has become colonized, disallowing the path for industrialization and development the Global North has followed. The unequal distribution of power—and suffering—is literally in the molecules we breathe and drink. The burden of transition lies at the feet of those most responsible for carbon emission-driven climate change, not those most imperiled by it. The energy consumption of the Global North—especially in the United States and Europe—has to be radically curtailed, not subsidized by more “green” energy. The amounts of resource extraction to facilitate this transition, such as the acquisition of lithium for rechargeable batteries, will come at the expense of other nations who have been historically denied the technology to develop their own resources for the benefit of their own people. The United States, more than any other country, owes a huge share of the climate debt that should be paid—which should be taken from the massive surplus of resources used to militarize the planet and stockpile nuclear weapons—to help nations of the Global South develop sustainably and according to their own values and processes.\nDecolonization\nIn this era of catastrophic climate change, why is it easier for some to imagine the end of fossil fuels than settler colonialism? To imagine green economies, carbon-free wind and solar energy, and electric, bullet-train utopias but not the return of Indigenous lands? Why is it easier to imagine the end of the world—a zombie apocalypse—than the end of capitalism? It’s not an either/or scenario. Ending settler colonialism and capitalism and returning Indigenous lands are all possible—and necessary.\nThe question of restoring Indigenous land to Indigenous people is thoroughly political, which means the theft of it was—and is—not inevitable or beyond our current capacities to resolve. The same goes for Black reparations, ending the hardening of the US border, defunding US imperialism, and stopping the continued exploitation of resources and labor in the Global South by countries up north. “The issue is that accumulation-based societies don’t like the answers we come up with because they are not quick technological fixes, they are not easy,” Michi Saagiig Nichnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson has said.4\nFifty years ago, decolonization—nations freeing themselves from colonial rule—and land reform inspired global visions for a socialist future, advancing the class struggle further than it has ever gone before by raising the living standards of billions in the Global South. Some Western socialists seem to have abandoned that future in favor of technological pipe dreams like mining asteroids, gene editing, and synthetic meat, without addressing the real problem of overconsumption in the Global North, which is directly enabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the Global South. We need a revolution of values that recenters relationships to one another and the Earth over profits.\nAnti-Imperialism\nThe geopolitical relationship countries like the United States have with the rest of the world is deeply intertwined with settler colonialism. Imperial projects build upon settler colonial ones. For the last twenty years, we’ve seen the United States destroy countries and communities in a quest for oil. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was for oil. Cultural treasures from one of the oldest civilizations on the planet were destroyed in the first days of the invasion, but the US military and its mercenary contractors chose to guard oil infrastructure. US oil companies secured contracts with the provisional government the US installed after it deposed Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. Those who recognized the US’ geopolitical motivation for the war soon called for “energy independence” in the United States instead of anti-imperialism. Consequently, Republicans and Democrats spent much of the 2000s promoting oil and gas expansion in the United States and Canada, and this has translated into new oil and gas production on stolen Indigenous lands.\nFormer US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama supported fossil fuels as the best path towards energy independence, which was also heralded as a means to achieve economic stability and improve homeland security. Both presidents cracked down on nations that strayed from the dictates of US hegemony. In 2002, Bush sponsored a coup d’état against Venezuela’s democratically elected president Hugo Chávez, who came to power on a promise to nationalize the corrupt oil sector to fund national infrastructure and poverty relief programs for the poor. When Obama assumed office in January 2009, he continued Bush’s sanctions against Venezuela and other nations deemed hostile to US interests. Obama considered natural gas fracking an alternative to coal and oil and he challenged China’s subsidies to its national solar industry that would lower the cost of solar production across the world. Like the dams that pulled the nation out of the Great Depression of the 1930s, fracking rigs pulled the nation out of the great recession of 2008. Obama was an imperialist first, a supporter of green energy second.\nIncreasingly, there is a direct link to the ongoing Venezuelan crisis and oil production in North America. When global oil prices began to fall due to the North American oil boom, a crisis ensued in Venezuela, and the money used to fund the social progress of the country’s poorest was all but halted. Around the time that Obamaera, pro-oil-and-gas energy policies began to take hold in 2008, during the Great Recession, global oil prices rapidly fell. This was partially due to the United States and Canada building new carbon infrastructure to drill and transport oil from production to market. This oil boom has wreaked havoc on Indigenous nations, with the creation of oil pipelines, the tar sands “dead zones,” fracking rigs, and refineries, locking in settler economies to drill at the expense of Indigenous lands and lives. Meanwhile, the boom weaned the US economy from oil imported from countries like Venezuela, whose major buyer was the United States. But the alternative source of oil is much worse.\nBoth the United States and Canada drilled their economies out of the gutter by producing the dirtiest oil in the world from tar sands and fracking rigs either on Indigenous treaty lands or next door to Indigenous communities. Each subsequent proposal for new carbon infrastructure, like oil pipelines, not only deepens the climate crisis and locks in carbon consumption, it aims to crush Venezuela. Why target Venezuela? It partially has to do with its oil reserves. But it also has to do with the threat it poses as an economic and social alternative to neoliberal capitalism. Venezuelans brought the Bolivarian Revolution into power, which, in turn, increased the participation in social, economic, and political life of Indigenous peoples, women, LGBTQ2+ people, Black communities, and poor people. The nation’s oil wealth was redistributed to the lowest sectors of society. And while, for a moment, the US-backed coup to oust the democratically elected president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, seemed imminent, people took to the streets and to the countryside to defend these hard-fought gains. The Bolivarian Revolution represents a possible alternative to neoliberal capitalism. That’s why from its inception it has drawn the ire of Washington, DC. And the most recent standoffs against the construction of oil pipelines at Standing Rock, Bayou Bridge, Line 3, and Unist’ot’en Camp show that the United States and Canada still need to plunder Indigenous lands to make a profit and to keep their economies afloat. Indigenous resistance in North America is at the forefront of combatting imperialist plunder, and our struggles are interconnected with our relatives of the Global South.\nVenezuela’s solidarity has extended beyond its borders to Indigenous nations of Turtle Island, or North America. In 2007, Tim Giago, a preeminent Oglala Lakota journalist, applauded Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution for providing heating assistance to hard-hit Indian reservations, the poorest places in North America on the Northern Plains, during the harsh winter months.5 Citgo Petroleum, a Venezuelan state-owned oil company, had for years donated millions of dollars of heating oil not only to reservations’ communities in the United States, but also to low-income Black and Chicanx neighborhoods and homeless shelters.\nProminent Ojibwe activist from White Earth, Winona LaDuke, has also made the connection between the war on Indigenous nations in Turtle Island and the economic war waged against Venezuela. In 2016, during the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protests, she told Democracy Now! that the construction of DAPL “has to do with crushing Venezuela, because Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world.”6 It also has to do with crushing one of Cuba’s major trading partners—Venezuela.\nCutting off Venezuelan oil to Cuba is part of a US-led blockade against the island nation that has lasted for more than six decades and which the UN General Assembly annually votes to end. The Mas family, an infamous billionaire Cuban-American clan, is responsible for many of the subversive and legislative attacks on Cuba, and much of its accumulated wealth comes from fossil fuels. The family patriarch, Jorge Mas Canosa, founded the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and MasTec, one of the largest self-described Latino businesses in the United States that specializes in energy, utilities, and communications infrastructure. In 2017, MasTec’s profits rose sharply by 90 percent, due to a high demand for oil pipelines and its role in building a major section of the DAPL, which trespassed through Oceti Sakowin treaty lands. The goal is not only to profit from the destruction of Indigenous lands but also to crush the political alternatives to neoliberal capitalism that Cuba and Venezuela represent.7\nWhen looking to the left governments of the Global South, we have to understand that the extractivism of the North is fundamentally based on the imperialist domination of markets, people, and territory. US-backed economic sanctions impact nearly one-third of humanity in some thirty countries, causing untold death and devastation by denying people access to global markets. This restricts a country’s ability to generate wealth, stabilize currency, and provide basic human essentials for its people. Countries like Iran, Venezuela, and Bolivia have chosen the path of resource nationalism—that is, nationalizing and developing their own resources for the benefit of their own people and as a mechanism of protection and strength against the predation of the United States and Canada, whose notorious multination fossil fuel and mining companies salivate with each new coup attempt. The price these nations pay for choosing self-determination—delinking from the imperialist supply chain—is heavy sanctioning from the US that targets their civilian populations with hunger and deprivation.\nSanctions, which are war by other means, had already deprived nations of medical supplies, thus undermining their efforts to save lives from a global pandemic. In March 2020, the UN Secretary-General called for a “global ceasefire” because “the fury of the [Corona]virus illustrates the folly of war.”8 How can there be a ceasefire when sanctions continue to tear through one-third of humanity faster than the pandemic? Coronavirus has shown us that US imperialism holds the world back from responding to pandemics. And as we have seen with the targeting of nations who chart an alternative path, it also holds back the rest of the world from developing alternative forms of energy and sustainability. In other words, because of US intervention, economies of the Global South are not allowed to develop to a point where they can transition away from fossil fuels. Therefore, any climate policy must also be anti-imperialist, demanding an immediate end to genocidal sanctions and the payment of northern climate debt to the rest of the world.\nThe Red Deal\nSome advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes. Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals, but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone.\nIn 2018, Winona LaDuke pushed for an Indigenous-led GND. The former Green Party vice-presidential candidate inspired us to think about how divesting from fossil fuel infrastructure—such as billion-dollar oil pipelines—could be reinvested into building wind and solar farms and sustainable agriculture on reservations. Indeed, the most radical appraisals of the GND come from Indigenous people. According to the Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN), the GND, as is, “will leave incentives by industries and governments to continue causing harms to Indigenous communities.”10 Before endorsing the GND, IEN called for a clear commitment to keep fossil fuels in the ground; reject carbon pricing schemes; strengthen language on Indigenous peoples and uphold Indigenous rights; and stop, not prolong, our current exploitative and abusive economic and political systems.\nA complete moratorium on all new fossil fuel extraction—a long-standing demand by Indigenous environmental organizations to “keep it in the ground”—would cause a ruling-class rebellion.11 Warming temperatures demonstrate how deeply entrenched CO2 emissions are within class society. Framing this as a panhuman problem or a problem of the species—such as the term “the Anthropocene,” the geological age of the fossil fuel economy—misses the point. A select few are hoarding the life rafts while also shooting holes in a sinking ship. Class hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the gilded lives of the few. The upper one-tenth of humanity is responsible for half of the carbon emissions from consumption. Half of humanity only accounts for one-tenth of emissions. The richest 1 percent similarly emit 175 times more CO2 than the poorest Hondurans, Mozambicans, or Rwandans. Twenty-six billionaires hoard half the world’s social wealth, and the world’s 2,153 billionaires possess more social wealth than the 4.6 billion people who make up 60 percent of planet’s population—numbers that appear to get more extreme as CO2 concentrations rise. We have to draw lines of separation between us and them, because they have already done so. The 100 companies responsible for 70 percent of global emissions—those relentlessly searching for new hydrocarbon frontiers, market-driven fixes that won’t cost as much, or green energy booms—aren’t going to put themselves out of business. Nor will the ruling elite put their own system up for debate.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The world-ending atomic bomb was created in secret atop a sacred Tewa Pueblo mesa at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. It was tested on Native lands, and the United States became the first and only nation to drop the bomb. The horrors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were a warning to the rest of world: fall in line, or else.\nThe atomic age and climate change were made possible by settler colonialism and Indigenous genocide.\nThe energy consumption of the Global North—especially in the United States and Europe—has to be radically curtailed, not subsidized by more “green” energy. The amounts of resource extraction to facilitate this transition, such as the acquisition of lithium for rechargeable batteries, will come at the expense of other nations who have been historically denied the technology to develop their own resources for the benefit of their own people.\nIn this era of catastrophic climate change, why is it easier for some to imagine the end of fossil fuels than settler colonialism?\nSome Western socialists seem to have abandoned that future in favor of technological pipe dreams like mining asteroids, gene editing, and synthetic meat, without addressing the real problem of overconsumption in the Global North, which is directly enabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the Global South.\nWhen looking to the left governments of the Global South, we have to understand that the extractivism of the North is fundamentally based on the imperialist domination of markets, people, and territory.\nany climate policy must also be anti-imperialist\nThe Red Deal\nSome advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes. Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals, but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone.\nIEN called for a clear commitment to keep fossil fuels in the ground\nand stop\nabusive economic and political systems.\nFraming this as a panhuman problem or a problem of the species—such as the term “the Anthropocene,” the geological age of the fossil fuel economy—misses the point.\nClass hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the gilded lives of the few.\nWe have to draw lines of separation between us and them, because they have already done so.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It’s an advocate for the green new deal---proves the perm shields their K of nuclearism.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The world-ending atomic bomb was created in secret atop a sacred Tewa Pueblo mesa at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. It was tested on Native lands, and the United States became the first and only nation to drop the bomb. The horrors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were a warning to the rest of world: fall in line, or else.\nThe atomic age and climate change were made possible by settler colonialism and Indigenous genocide.\nThe energy consumption of the Global North—especially in the United States and Europe—has to be radically curtailed, not subsidized by more “green” energy. The amounts of resource extraction to facilitate this transition, such as the acquisition of lithium for rechargeable batteries, will come at the expense of other nations who have been historically denied the technology to develop their own resources for the benefit of their own people.\nIn this era of catastrophic climate change, why is it easier for some to imagine the end of fossil fuels than settler colonialism?\nSome Western socialists seem to have abandoned that future in favor of technological pipe dreams like mining asteroids, gene editing, and synthetic meat, without addressing the real problem of overconsumption in the Global North, which is directly enabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the Global South.\nWhen looking to the left governments of the Global South, we have to understand that the extractivism of the North is fundamentally based on the imperialist domination of markets, people, and territory.\nany climate policy must also be anti-imperialist\nThe Red Deal\nSome advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes. Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals, but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone.\nIEN called for a clear commitment to keep fossil fuels in the ground\nand stop\nabusive economic and political systems.\nFraming this as a panhuman problem or a problem of the species—such as the term “the Anthropocene,” the geological age of the fossil fuel economy—misses the point.\nClass hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the gilded lives of the few.\nWe have to draw lines of separation between us and them, because they have already done so.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The Red Deal\nSome advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes. Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals, but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone.\nIEN", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It’s an advocate for the green new deal---proves the perm shields their K of nuclearism.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The world-ending atomic bomb was created in secret atop a sacred Tewa Pueblo mesa at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. It was tested on Native lands, and the United States became the first and only nation to drop the bomb. The horrors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima were a warning to the rest of world: fall in line, or else. Scientists who maintain the Doomsday Clock set its hands at one minute and forty seconds to midnight in 2020, the closest humanity has been to global catastrophe since the clock’s creation in 1947. The two main factors contributing to this threat, experts warn, are global warming and nuclear risk. The atomic age and climate change were made possible by settler colonialism and Indigenous genocide.\nThe spirit of these times frequently gets forgotten: freedom for some is unfreedom for others. The legacy of the New Deal—which required the plundering of Indigenous lands to keep a settler economy afloat—cannot be the plan for the rest of the planet. Nations of the Global South cannot follow the same path of development as the North in their pursuit of climate equity because the atmosphere has become colonized, disallowing the path for industrialization and development the Global North has followed. The unequal distribution of power—and suffering—is literally in the molecules we breathe and drink. The burden of transition lies at the feet of those most responsible for carbon emission-driven climate change, not those most imperiled by it. The energy consumption of the Global North—especially in the United States and Europe—has to be radically curtailed, not subsidized by more “green” energy. The amounts of resource extraction to facilitate this transition, such as the acquisition of lithium for rechargeable batteries, will come at the expense of other nations who have been historically denied the technology to develop their own resources for the benefit of their own people. The United States, more than any other country, owes a huge share of the climate debt that should be paid—which should be taken from the massive surplus of resources used to militarize the planet and stockpile nuclear weapons—to help nations of the Global South develop sustainably and according to their own values and processes.\nDecolonization\nIn this era of catastrophic climate change, why is it easier for some to imagine the end of fossil fuels than settler colonialism? To imagine green economies, carbon-free wind and solar energy, and electric, bullet-train utopias but not the return of Indigenous lands? Why is it easier to imagine the end of the world—a zombie apocalypse—than the end of capitalism? It’s not an either/or scenario. Ending settler colonialism and capitalism and returning Indigenous lands are all possible—and necessary.\nThe question of restoring Indigenous land to Indigenous people is thoroughly political, which means the theft of it was—and is—not inevitable or beyond our current capacities to resolve. The same goes for Black reparations, ending the hardening of the US border, defunding US imperialism, and stopping the continued exploitation of resources and labor in the Global South by countries up north. “The issue is that accumulation-based societies don’t like the answers we come up with because they are not quick technological fixes, they are not easy,” Michi Saagiig Nichnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson has said.4\nFifty years ago, decolonization—nations freeing themselves from colonial rule—and land reform inspired global visions for a socialist future, advancing the class struggle further than it has ever gone before by raising the living standards of billions in the Global South. Some Western socialists seem to have abandoned that future in favor of technological pipe dreams like mining asteroids, gene editing, and synthetic meat, without addressing the real problem of overconsumption in the Global North, which is directly enabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the Global South. We need a revolution of values that recenters relationships to one another and the Earth over profits.\nAnti-Imperialism\nThe geopolitical relationship countries like the United States have with the rest of the world is deeply intertwined with settler colonialism. Imperial projects build upon settler colonial ones. For the last twenty years, we’ve seen the United States destroy countries and communities in a quest for oil. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was for oil. Cultural treasures from one of the oldest civilizations on the planet were destroyed in the first days of the invasion, but the US military and its mercenary contractors chose to guard oil infrastructure. US oil companies secured contracts with the provisional government the US installed after it deposed Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party. Those who recognized the US’ geopolitical motivation for the war soon called for “energy independence” in the United States instead of anti-imperialism. Consequently, Republicans and Democrats spent much of the 2000s promoting oil and gas expansion in the United States and Canada, and this has translated into new oil and gas production on stolen Indigenous lands.\nFormer US Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama supported fossil fuels as the best path towards energy independence, which was also heralded as a means to achieve economic stability and improve homeland security. Both presidents cracked down on nations that strayed from the dictates of US hegemony. In 2002, Bush sponsored a coup d’état against Venezuela’s democratically elected president Hugo Chávez, who came to power on a promise to nationalize the corrupt oil sector to fund national infrastructure and poverty relief programs for the poor. When Obama assumed office in January 2009, he continued Bush’s sanctions against Venezuela and other nations deemed hostile to US interests. Obama considered natural gas fracking an alternative to coal and oil and he challenged China’s subsidies to its national solar industry that would lower the cost of solar production across the world. Like the dams that pulled the nation out of the Great Depression of the 1930s, fracking rigs pulled the nation out of the great recession of 2008. Obama was an imperialist first, a supporter of green energy second.\nIncreasingly, there is a direct link to the ongoing Venezuelan crisis and oil production in North America. When global oil prices began to fall due to the North American oil boom, a crisis ensued in Venezuela, and the money used to fund the social progress of the country’s poorest was all but halted. Around the time that Obamaera, pro-oil-and-gas energy policies began to take hold in 2008, during the Great Recession, global oil prices rapidly fell. This was partially due to the United States and Canada building new carbon infrastructure to drill and transport oil from production to market. This oil boom has wreaked havoc on Indigenous nations, with the creation of oil pipelines, the tar sands “dead zones,” fracking rigs, and refineries, locking in settler economies to drill at the expense of Indigenous lands and lives. Meanwhile, the boom weaned the US economy from oil imported from countries like Venezuela, whose major buyer was the United States. But the alternative source of oil is much worse.\nBoth the United States and Canada drilled their economies out of the gutter by producing the dirtiest oil in the world from tar sands and fracking rigs either on Indigenous treaty lands or next door to Indigenous communities. Each subsequent proposal for new carbon infrastructure, like oil pipelines, not only deepens the climate crisis and locks in carbon consumption, it aims to crush Venezuela. Why target Venezuela? It partially has to do with its oil reserves. But it also has to do with the threat it poses as an economic and social alternative to neoliberal capitalism. Venezuelans brought the Bolivarian Revolution into power, which, in turn, increased the participation in social, economic, and political life of Indigenous peoples, women, LGBTQ2+ people, Black communities, and poor people. The nation’s oil wealth was redistributed to the lowest sectors of society. And while, for a moment, the US-backed coup to oust the democratically elected president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, seemed imminent, people took to the streets and to the countryside to defend these hard-fought gains. The Bolivarian Revolution represents a possible alternative to neoliberal capitalism. That’s why from its inception it has drawn the ire of Washington, DC. And the most recent standoffs against the construction of oil pipelines at Standing Rock, Bayou Bridge, Line 3, and Unist’ot’en Camp show that the United States and Canada still need to plunder Indigenous lands to make a profit and to keep their economies afloat. Indigenous resistance in North America is at the forefront of combatting imperialist plunder, and our struggles are interconnected with our relatives of the Global South.\nVenezuela’s solidarity has extended beyond its borders to Indigenous nations of Turtle Island, or North America. In 2007, Tim Giago, a preeminent Oglala Lakota journalist, applauded Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution for providing heating assistance to hard-hit Indian reservations, the poorest places in North America on the Northern Plains, during the harsh winter months.5 Citgo Petroleum, a Venezuelan state-owned oil company, had for years donated millions of dollars of heating oil not only to reservations’ communities in the United States, but also to low-income Black and Chicanx neighborhoods and homeless shelters.\nProminent Ojibwe activist from White Earth, Winona LaDuke, has also made the connection between the war on Indigenous nations in Turtle Island and the economic war waged against Venezuela. In 2016, during the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) protests, she told Democracy Now! that the construction of DAPL “has to do with crushing Venezuela, because Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world.”6 It also has to do with crushing one of Cuba’s major trading partners—Venezuela.\nCutting off Venezuelan oil to Cuba is part of a US-led blockade against the island nation that has lasted for more than six decades and which the UN General Assembly annually votes to end. The Mas family, an infamous billionaire Cuban-American clan, is responsible for many of the subversive and legislative attacks on Cuba, and much of its accumulated wealth comes from fossil fuels. The family patriarch, Jorge Mas Canosa, founded the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and MasTec, one of the largest self-described Latino businesses in the United States that specializes in energy, utilities, and communications infrastructure. In 2017, MasTec’s profits rose sharply by 90 percent, due to a high demand for oil pipelines and its role in building a major section of the DAPL, which trespassed through Oceti Sakowin treaty lands. The goal is not only to profit from the destruction of Indigenous lands but also to crush the political alternatives to neoliberal capitalism that Cuba and Venezuela represent.7\nWhen looking to the left governments of the Global South, we have to understand that the extractivism of the North is fundamentally based on the imperialist domination of markets, people, and territory. US-backed economic sanctions impact nearly one-third of humanity in some thirty countries, causing untold death and devastation by denying people access to global markets. This restricts a country’s ability to generate wealth, stabilize currency, and provide basic human essentials for its people. Countries like Iran, Venezuela, and Bolivia have chosen the path of resource nationalism—that is, nationalizing and developing their own resources for the benefit of their own people and as a mechanism of protection and strength against the predation of the United States and Canada, whose notorious multination fossil fuel and mining companies salivate with each new coup attempt. The price these nations pay for choosing self-determination—delinking from the imperialist supply chain—is heavy sanctioning from the US that targets their civilian populations with hunger and deprivation.\nSanctions, which are war by other means, had already deprived nations of medical supplies, thus undermining their efforts to save lives from a global pandemic. In March 2020, the UN Secretary-General called for a “global ceasefire” because “the fury of the [Corona]virus illustrates the folly of war.”8 How can there be a ceasefire when sanctions continue to tear through one-third of humanity faster than the pandemic? Coronavirus has shown us that US imperialism holds the world back from responding to pandemics. And as we have seen with the targeting of nations who chart an alternative path, it also holds back the rest of the world from developing alternative forms of energy and sustainability. In other words, because of US intervention, economies of the Global South are not allowed to develop to a point where they can transition away from fossil fuels. Therefore, any climate policy must also be anti-imperialist, demanding an immediate end to genocidal sanctions and the payment of northern climate debt to the rest of the world.\nThe Red Deal\nSome advocates of the GND propose implementing a 70 percent tax hike on the wealthiest Americans to pay for necessary changes. Others argue that seizing the assets of fossil fuel companies, and reallocating money and resources away from state institutions directly contributing to climate change and social inequality must also be part of the agenda.9 We agree with these proposals, but we understand more must be done. Inspired by the appeals to divest from the financial institutions funding oil pipelines during the Standing Rock uprising and the Movement for Black Lives’ divest-invest strategy, the Red Deal also targets the institutions of the military, police, and prisons for divestment. Imagine divesting from these institutions and opening up $1 trillion to accomplish the task of saving this Earth for everyone.\nIn 2018, Winona LaDuke pushed for an Indigenous-led GND. The former Green Party vice-presidential candidate inspired us to think about how divesting from fossil fuel infrastructure—such as billion-dollar oil pipelines—could be reinvested into building wind and solar farms and sustainable agriculture on reservations. Indeed, the most radical appraisals of the GND come from Indigenous people. According to the Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN), the GND, as is, “will leave incentives by industries and governments to continue causing harms to Indigenous communities.”10 Before endorsing the GND, IEN called for a clear commitment to keep fossil fuels in the ground; reject carbon pricing schemes; strengthen language on Indigenous peoples and uphold Indigenous rights; and stop, not prolong, our current exploitative and abusive economic and political systems.\nA complete moratorium on all new fossil fuel extraction—a long-standing demand by Indigenous environmental organizations to “keep it in the ground”—would cause a ruling-class rebellion.11 Warming temperatures demonstrate how deeply entrenched CO2 emissions are within class society. Framing this as a panhuman problem or a problem of the species—such as the term “the Anthropocene,” the geological age of the fossil fuel economy—misses the point. A select few are hoarding the life rafts while also shooting holes in a sinking ship. Class hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the gilded lives of the few. The upper one-tenth of humanity is responsible for half of the carbon emissions from consumption. Half of humanity only accounts for one-tenth of emissions. The richest 1 percent similarly emit 175 times more CO2 than the poorest Hondurans, Mozambicans, or Rwandans. Twenty-six billionaires hoard half the world’s social wealth, and the world’s 2,153 billionaires possess more social wealth than the 4.6 billion people who make up 60 percent of planet’s population—numbers that appear to get more extreme as CO2 concentrations rise. We have to draw lines of separation between us and them, because they have already done so. The 100 companies responsible for 70 percent of global emissions—those relentlessly searching for new hydrocarbon frontiers, market-driven fixes that won’t cost as much, or green energy booms—aren’t going to put themselves out of business. Nor will the ruling elite put their own system up for debate.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The\natomic bomb was\ntested on Native lands\nwarning\nthe\nworld: fall in line, or else.\nThe atomic age and climate change were made possible by\nIndigenous genocide.\nconsumption of the Global North\nhas to be\ncurtailed\nresource extraction\nwill come at the expense of other nations\noverconsumption in the\nNorth\nis\nenabled by the dispossession of Indigenous and Black life and imperial wars in the\nSouth\nThe Red Deal\nadvocates\npropose\na 70 percent tax hike\nto pay for\nchanges\nWe agree with these proposals\nFraming this as a panhuman problem\nmisses the point\nClass hatred is warranted. The immiseration of billions sustains the\nlives of the few\nWe have to draw lines\nbetween us and them", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No LoW accidents", "role": "system" }, { "content": "As numerous former heads of U.S. Strategic Command have explained, the United States would not launch any ballistic missiles until it—at a very minimum—has dual confirmations that the country is under attack. There is not and has not been a policy of “launch on warning.” \nIn reality, multiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command-and-control leadership.  \nIn peacetime, no U.S. strategic weapons are aligned to potential adversary targets. ICBM missiles are targeted on broad ocean areas. Ballistic missiles aboard America’s at-sea ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) are aligned to broad ocean-area targets similar to ICBMs. Since bombers have not been on peacetime alert since 1991, they do not have any nuclear targets assigned. Additionally, the policy of the United States is not to rely upon “launch on warning.”  Thus, describing America’s missiles as on a “hair trigger” is a gross mischaracterization; the United States’ so-called trigger is built so it can always wait. \nIn addition, to even consider launching a missile, U.S. satellites must confirm that an adversary attacking missile launch has been detected. Second, radars must confirm that a missile track has been established. Only then will various commanders and civilian leaders convene what is known as a launch and/or threat conference to determine what launch has been undertaken and what the threat is. No such conferences have ever been called in all of the seventy-five years of the nuclear era. And more importantly, no president has ever been formally consulted regarding the launch of a nuclear weapon.\nBut what about von Hippel’s claims of a false warning possibly triggering a mistaken retaliatory launch? It is true that in 1980, a Senate Armed Services Committee report examined two such false missile attack warning occurrences that did take place. The report, however, also concluded that there was no danger of the United States inadvertently or accidentally or mistakenly launching a missile. This was determined after officials examined the details of the two warnings of a Soviet sea-launched ballistic missile and land-based ballistic missile launches in 1979 and 1980.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U\nS\nwould not launch any ballistic missiles until it—at a very minimum—has dual confirmations that the country is under attack. There is not and has not been a policy of “launch on warning\nmultiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command-and-control leadership\nno U.S. strategic weapons are aligned to potential adversary targets. ICBM missiles are targeted on broad ocean areas\nto even consider launching a missile, U.S. satellites must confirm that an adversary attacking missile launch has been detected\nradars must confirm that a missile track has been established. Only then will various commanders and civilian leaders convene what is known as a launch and/or threat conference\nNo such conferences have ever been called in\nseventy-five years\nmore importantly, no president has ever been\nconsulted\nSenate Armed Services Committee report examined two\nfalse missile attack warning occurrences\ndid take place\nreport\nalso concluded that there was no danger of the U\nS\ninadvertently or accidentally or mistakenly launching a missile.\ndetermined after officials examined the details of the two warnings", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No LoW accidents", "role": "system" }, { "content": "U\nS\nwould not launch any ballistic missiles until it—at a very minimum—has dual confirmations that the country is under attack. There is not and has not been a policy of “launch on warning\nmultiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command-and-control leadership\nno U.S. strategic weapons are aligned to potential adversary targets. ICBM missiles are targeted on broad ocean areas\nto even consider launching a missile, U.S. satellites must confirm that an adversary attacking missile launch has been detected\nradars must confirm that a missile track has been established. Only then will various commanders and civilian leaders convene what is known as a launch and/or threat conference\nNo such conferences have ever been called in\nseventy-five years\nmore importantly, no president has ever been\nconsulted\nSenate Armed Services Committee report examined two\nfalse missile attack warning occurrences\ndid take place\nreport\nalso concluded that there was no danger of the U\nS\ninadvertently or accidentally or mistakenly launching a missile.\ndetermined after officials examined the details of the two warnings", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U\nS\nminimum\ndual confirmations\nnot\nhas not been\nlaunch on warning\nmultiple stringent procedural\ntechnical\naccidental\nunauthorized\nsafety\nsecurity\nreliability\ncommand-and-control leadership\nconsider\nsatellites must confirm\nradars must confirm\nthen\nlaunch and/or threat conference\nconferences\nseventy-five years\ntwo\nU\nS\ninadvertently\naccidentally\nmistakenly", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No LoW accidents\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "U\nS\nwould not launch any ballistic missiles until it—at a very minimum—has dual confirmations that the country is under attack. There is not and has not been a policy of “launch on warning\nmultiple stringent procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command-and-control leadership\nno U.S. strategic weapons are aligned to potential adversary targets. ICBM missiles are targeted on broad ocean areas\nto even consider launching a missile, U.S. satellites must confirm that an adversary attacking missile launch has been detected\nradars must confirm that a missile track has been established. Only then will various commanders and civilian leaders convene what is known as a launch and/or threat conference\nNo such conferences have ever been called in\nseventy-five years\nmore importantly, no president has ever been\nconsulted\nSenate Armed Services Committee report examined two\nfalse missile attack warning occurrences\ndid take place\nreport\nalso concluded that there was no danger of the U\nS\ninadvertently or accidentally or mistakenly launching a missile.\ndetermined after officials examined the details of the two warnings", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U\nS\nwould not launch\nuntil it—at a\nminimum—has dual confirmations that\ncountry is under attack. There is not and has not been\npolicy of “launch on warning\nstringent procedural and technical safeguards\nguard against accidental or unauthorized launches and\nensure\nsafety, security\nand command-and-control leadership\nno U.S.\nweapons are aligned to\nadversary targets\nto\nconsider launching a missile\nsatellites must confirm\nmissile\nradars must confirm\nmissile track\nOnly then will\ncommanders and\nleaders convene\ntwo\nfalse missile attack\noccurrences\ndid take place\nno danger of\nU\nS\nmistakenly launching", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: We should use the framework of challenge-driven political economy instead of a competitiveness framework. Using the power of the state to make and shape markets is key to direct policy to solve inequality and climate change.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nTwenty-first-century policymaking is increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environmental, and economic challenges. Sometimes referred to as ‘grand challenges’, these include threats like climate change, demographic, health, and well-being concerns, as well as the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclusive growth. Against this background, policymakers are increasingly embracing the idea of using industrial and innovation policy to tackle these ‘grand challenges’. Examples of challenge-led policy frameworks include the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; Borras, 2019), the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and development programme (Mazzucato, 2018a), and the UK’s 2017 Industrial Strategy White Paper (HM Government, 2018).\nChallenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to well-established modernization and competitiveness frameworks. While 1 2 modernization, and in particular competitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should first and foremost fix market failures,3 a challenge-driven agenda does not have such clearly defined theoretical origins and analytical lenses. As Richard Nelson argued in 1977 in his seminal book The Moon and the Ghetto, getting man to the moon and back is not the same as solving the problem of ghettos in American cities. Put differently, the nature of our knowledge about socio-economic challenges differs from our perception of strictly technical challenges. We can discover answers to technical puzzles; socio-economic issues do not have a single correct discoverable solution. Such issues require continuous discussion, experimentation, and learning.\nWe believe challenge-led growth requires a new conceptual and analytical framework that has at its core the idea of confronting the direction of growth with growth that is, for example, more inclusive and sustainable. Such a framework should focus on market shaping and market co-creating (Mazzucato, 2016). This is a question of both theory and policy practice. In theory, challenge-driven innovation policy questions both established neoclassical and evolutionary concepts (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). In policy practice, directed policies require rethinking what is meant by ‘vertical policies’.\nIndustrial policies have always been composed of both a horizontal and a vertical element. Horizontal policies have historically been focused on skills, infrastructure, and education, while vertical policies have focused on sectors like transport, health, energy, or technologies. These two traditional approaches roughly embody differing schools of economics: neoclassical economics-inspired horizontal policies focusing on supply-side factors and inputs; and evolutionary economics-inspired policies putting emphasis on demand-side factors and systemic interactions (Nelson and Winter, 1974; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006 for a synthesis). Although certain sectors might be more suited to sectorspecific vertical strategies, the ‘grand challenges’ expressed in SDGs are cross-sectoral by nature and hence we cannot simply apply a vertical approach to them. Both neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to industrial policy have relied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development, without specifying its nature. In policy this has led to managing economies according to GDP growth rates, competitiveness indices and rankings, or other macro indicators (e.g. exports, patents) (Drechsler, 2019). Yet, many SDGs are only indirectly related to the economy and hence many of the key issues around SDGs have not been theorized in the context of innovation and industrial policy (see, e.g., Zehavi and Brenzitz, 2017).\nIn this chapter we argue that through well-defined goals, or more specifically ‘missions’, that are focused on solving important societal challenges, policymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction of growth by making strategic investments, coordinating actions across many different sectors, and nurturing new industrial landscapes that the private sector can develop further (Mazzucato, 2017; Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). The result would be an increase in cross-sectoral learning and macroeconomic stability. This ‘mission-oriented’ approach to industrial policy is not about top-down planning by an overbearing state; it is about providing a direction for growth, increasing business expectations about future growth areas, and catalysing activity—self-discovery by firms (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003)—that otherwise would not happen (Mazzucato and Perez, 2015). It is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field, nor about supporting more competitive sectors over less (Aghion et al., 2015), since the market does not always know best, but about tilting the playing field in the direction of the desired societal goals, such as the SDGs. However, we argue, to achieve this requires a new analytical framework based on the idea of public value and a policymaking framework aimed at shaping markets in addition to fixing various existing failures. Indeed, we argue that if we want to take grand challenges such as the SDGs seriously as policy goals, market shaping should become the overarching approach followed in various policy fields.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Twenty-first-century policymaking is increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environmental, and economic challenges\ngrand challenges’\ninclude\nclimate change, demographic, health, and well-being concerns\nas well as the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclusive growth. Ag\nChallenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to\n competitiveness frameworks\ncompetitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should first and foremost fix market failures\nthe nature of our knowledge about socio-economic challenges differs from our perception of strictly technical challenges.\nchallenge-led growth requires a new conceptual and analytical framework that has at its core the idea of confronting the direction of growth with growth that is\nsustainable\nSuch a framework should focus on market shaping and market co-creating\nchallenge-driven innovation policy questions both established neoclassical and evolutionary concepts\nBoth neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to industrial policy have relied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development, without specifying its nature\nthis has led to managing economies according to GDP growth rates, competitiveness indices and rankings, or other macro indicators\nwell-defined goals\nthat are focused on solving important societal challenges, policymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction of growth by making strategic investments, coordinating actions across many different sectors, and nurturing new industrial landscapes that the private sector can develop further\nThe result would be an increase in cross-sectoral learning and macroeconomic stability\nIt is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field\nnor about supporting more competitive sectors over less (\nsince the market does not always know best, but about tilting the playing field in the direction of the desired societal goals,\nto achieve this requires a new analytical framework based on the idea of public value and a policymaking framework aimed at shaping markets in addition to fixing various existing failures.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: We should use the framework of challenge-driven political economy instead of a competitiveness framework. Using the power of the state to make and shape markets is key to direct policy to solve inequality and climate change.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Twenty-first-century policymaking is increasingly defined by the need to respond to major social, environmental, and economic challenges\ngrand challenges’\ninclude\nclimate change, demographic, health, and well-being concerns\nas well as the difficulties of generating sustainable and inclusive growth. Ag\nChallenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to\n competitiveness frameworks\ncompetitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should first and foremost fix market failures\nthe nature of our knowledge about socio-economic challenges differs from our perception of strictly technical challenges.\nchallenge-led growth requires a new conceptual and analytical framework that has at its core the idea of confronting the direction of growth with growth that is\nsustainable\nSuch a framework should focus on market shaping and market co-creating\nchallenge-driven innovation policy questions both established neoclassical and evolutionary concepts\nBoth neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to industrial policy have relied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development, without specifying its nature\nthis has led to managing economies according to GDP growth rates, competitiveness indices and rankings, or other macro indicators\nwell-defined goals\nthat are focused on solving important societal challenges, policymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction of growth by making strategic investments, coordinating actions across many different sectors, and nurturing new industrial landscapes that the private sector can develop further\nThe result would be an increase in cross-sectoral learning and macroeconomic stability\nIt is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field\nnor about supporting more competitive sectors over less (\nsince the market does not always know best, but about tilting the playing field in the direction of the desired societal goals,\nto achieve this requires a new analytical framework based on the idea of public value and a policymaking framework aimed at shaping markets in addition to fixing various existing failures.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "policymaking is\ndefined by\ngrand challenges’\nChallenge-driven policy frameworks are emerging in parallel to\ncompetitiveness frameworks\ncompetitiveness frameworks, rely on the idea that government should\nfix market failures\nchallenge-led growth requires a new\nframework that has at its core the idea of\ngrowth that is\nsustainable\nBoth\nrelied on the idea that the best policy outcome is economy-wide development\nthis\nled to managing economies according to GDP growth\npolicymakers have the opportunity to determine the direction\nby making strategic investments,\nand nurturing new industrial landscapes\nIt is not about de-risking and levelling the playing field\nnor about supporting\ncompetitive sectors", "role": "assistant" } ]